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have deprived of life nothing that &anted to live.ch &ill ein Stein-( !. %ut impersonal. immediately. &ant to go home( is !. . instead of going %eyond it. that it &ould %e evil if done to me. . not simply %eings &ho are sentient and conscious. present active indicative: &ill:. and a lot more naturally.uivocation is the undoing of reverence for life as Sch&eit'er descri%es it in The Philosophy of *ivili'ation.Our ethics come first Their argument is ethically naïve—ethics should be grounded in direct experience—pain and consciousness should be our moral guidelines.ue of !going %eyond(<that it %ecomes a denial of the original principle and. let6s revisit a statement of Sch&eit'er6s that .nternationale:.. the noun =ille ac.The empathy of an ethic %ased on love and compassion is a valid empathy.uoted a%ove in the standard nglish translation.n this regard.#y trying to go %eyond love and compassion. &hat is there to empathi'e &ith? *onsciousness can empathi'e &ith consciousness.n the course of identifying his o&n &ill7to7 live &ith all other &ills7to7live.n short.9th century philosophy 9and Sch&eit'er is nothing if not a . dass le%en &ill. therefore. !The "uest for a #oundless thic: A $eassessment of Al%ert Sch&eit'er( )ournal for *ritical Animal Studies. not direct e1perience. and Sch&eit'er ma0es it clear in the passage a%out not pic0ing a leaf or pluc0ing a flo&er that he is including in Le%en. have caused no pain. 0no& that this is evil %ecause . falls short of an ethic %ased on love and compassion %y trying to reach %eyond it - .An ethic %ased on love and compassion is grounded directly in e1perience . %e translated. %ut to say that consciousness can empathi'e &ith an unconscious force is to commit a pathetic fallacy .9th century >erman philosophy. !. can empathi'e &ith your pain and 0no& apodictically that it is also evil.9th century philosopher: as the urge to !go %eyond( esta%lished and accepted principles that have stood the test of timeAnd 8ier0egaard6s criti. tear a leaf from a tree or pluc0 a flo&er.ch %in Le%en.ts empathy is an illusion of a%stract thin0ing.n the 2argon of . +. 0no& from immediate.An ethic %ased on &ill7to7live understood 9at least sometimes: as distinct from and prior to consciousness is grounded in an intellectual a%straction. &ants to e1perience pleasure and avoid pain. everyday ver% meaning !to &ant-( =hen a >erman spea0er &ants a stein of %eer.. this constitutes an ethical na4vet5 that &ould surprise us in a thin0er of Sch&eit'er6s depth and originality if &e had not encountered the same na4vet5 in his one7man crusade to re7ma0e uropean civili'ation and reverse the flo& of history. have caused. consciousness. natural translation %ecause !&ants( implies conscious desire.uoted a%ove. /ere. &hich he initially identifies &ith the !&ill7to7live-( #ut he then uses the dual meaning of !&ill( to e1tend his ethic to unconscious %eings.ual it.n the Preface to 3ear and Trem%ling. in fact. ho&ever. might as &ell have %ro0en a roc0 &ith a hammer.Sch&eit'er6s errors are often the errors of no%le overreaching.. as Sch&eit'er originally conceived it.This e. &hich can 2ust as easily. nothing. . Phelps 2009 Norm. unargua%ly. am life &hich &ills to live. dass le%en &ill( 9Association . apparently failing to reali'e that he has cut it loose from its original moorings. &hich can %e translated into nglish as either !to &ill( or !to &ant. have destroyed a &ill7to7live that is conscious of itself and &ants to continue living. . Schopenhaurian meaning of =ille &ith the commonsense. &ill discuss in a moment..Li0e&ise.n terms of the suffering . Sch&eit'er ma0es no distinction %et&een the &ay &e should treat sentient and insentient %eings .To use Sch&eit'er6s e1amples that . am life that &ants to live surrounded %y life that &ants to live-( #ut the translator could not use the more straightfor&ard.. she says !.#ut neither the leaf nor the tree.. and only sentient %eings are valid o%2ects of love and compassion. a confusion that is facilitated %y the happenstance that &ollen can mean %oth !&ant( and !&ill-( =e can empathi'e &ith other &ills to live . !. animal rights activist and author of The Longest Struggle: Animal Advocacy from Pythagoras to P TA. everyday meaning. he tells us. if . is conscious.=ith this in mind.t is life defined as the a%ility to gro& and reproduce that grants ethical standing. and it is in that regard that reverence for life .( is the common..3or reasons that . Sch&eit'er6s ethic<as defined in The Philosophy of *ivili'ation< fails even to e. falls short of it <applies to !reverence for life( as &ell. the flo&er nor the plant on &hich it gro&s. such as a caterpillar for &hom the leaf &as food or shelter or a honey%ee &ho needs the nectar from the flo&er. in the midst of life &hich &ills to live. Sch&eit'er systematically confuses the technical. do nothing &rong unless .uired the meaning of a vital. %ecause &e can e1perience our o&n#ut if another &ill7to7live cannot e1perience itself 9or anything else:.All sentient %eings are valid o%2ects of love and compassion.*omparing the crushing of an insect to pulling a leaf from a tree or pic0ing a flo&er triviali'es the crushing of the insect %y negating the insect6s consciousness.. crush an insect .ch &ill nach /aus gehen-( .n Sch&eit'er6s original >erman. especially the %astardi'ed #uddhism of Arthur Schopenhauer.( is !. inmitten von Le%en.. !life.And so &hen . not the a%ility to e1perience suffering and 2oy. the related ver% &ollen 9first and third person singular. and therefore. 0no& directly. That is the "uestion Li0e its nglish cognate.. Sch&eit'er anchors his ethical thin0ing to consciousness. undenia%le e1perience that my pain is evil.-.. indirectly harm a sentient %eing.( everything that gro&s and reproduces. Soren 8ier0egaard identified the cardinal sin of . ..To =ill or to =ant. force that is the ultimate reality underlying the &orld of appearances that &e e1perience day7to7day. the >erman noun =ille<at least in everyday usage<implies intention and desire.Therefore. Sch&eit'er6s !&ill7to7live( differs little from @escartes6 !thought(. that e1perienced life in any &ay.

f for the organism its o&n continuation is good.0 Aichael A. D:2 As &e have said. it is not human %eings &ho introduce into the &orld the values that call for and 2ustify that treatment. already signal that. !Psychosomatic medicine and the philosophy of life( Philosophy. thics. the meta%olic activity of the organism is geared to&ard sustaining the e1istence of the organism.+alue is thus %uilt into the reality of organic life: it is organic life itself that places value there.uirement and develop the medical techni.The %eing that the activity is geared to&ard preserving is the organismFs future %eing The meta%olic functioning is for the sa0e of %ridging the temporal gap that separates the organism in the present from its o&n e1istence in the future./ence the moral need to com%at death issues from the organismFs o&n internal striving. Bniversity of Louisville./ence it is temporal duration that poses the main threat to the organismFs contingent e1istence: the . that the values that motivate medical practice are grounded in organic life itself.n slightly different terms.JI- .3elt suffering and pain are posited %y the organism feeling them as %ad.2I. then its death &ould %e %ad.. at least for the %eing involved.. the organism posits its o&n e1istence as having a positive value.0./ence the moral need to relieve and even eradicate pain through medical treatment arises at the most %asic levels of life.Organics Good No lin and turn—Organic life is teleological and posits the alleviation of suffering and continuation of life as good—it!s biology.f &e can spea0 of the meta%olic activity of the organism as occurring Efor the sa0e ofE the organismFs future %eing.n other &ords..Living %eings themselves.Life is thus teleological: the present activity of the living %eing aims at its o&n future %eing GH.=hile only human %eings can develop and practice medical treatment.07. even if only human %eings can recogni'e this value as a moral re. at least for those organismFs that can feel.. @epartment of Philosophy. then. @epartment of Psychiatry. Bniversity of /a&aii and C%s%orne P.ues to respond to it G.Living %eings themselves posit the goodness of an activity that prevents death and alleviates suffering. this means that at some fundamental level the organism posits its o&n continuation in reality as a Egood -E ..And the threat can %e defeated only if the activity of meta%olism is sustained.t is not human %eings and certainly not human agency that introduces value into an other&ise value7free universe. meta%olic activity serves the temporal enduring of the organism..The same &ould %e true for suffering and pain. %y striving to preserve themselves.This %eing geared to&ard the sustaining of its o&n %eing sho&s that the meta%olism of the organism is Efor the sa0e ofE its o&n continuation in %eing .uestion of &hether the organism &ill endure from moment to moment al&ays remains an unans&ered .9I..uestion until the future %ecomes the present and the organism still lives.=e can see.And therefore the need to treat and hopefully cure the ill organism so that it does not die 7 at least not %efore its naturally allotted time 7 is %ased on a value that the organism itself posits. Sch&art' and =iggins 20. its o&n life is a good G. and /umanities in Aedicine 20.

&hat happens here and no& is of little conse.Aoral . Beneath the Surface. %illions of years and nanoseconds are irrelevant for structuring our preferences and choices.Similarly.n our sort of lives.#ut &e do not inha%it cosmic or su%atomic levels of organi'ation.SylvanFs account of values no&here ac0no&ledges the e1istence of such limits./uman scale<or rather.The domain of action <that is. they are not necessary. Such perspectives are. matter.That is.uestions.3rom a remote temporal perspective or a remote spatial perspective. =illiam >rey F00 Associate Professor in the @epartment of Philosophy at the Bniversity of "ueensland. %ecause &ithout the capacity to choose and to act. the domain in &hich &e have the causal po&er to effect changes<imposes limits on the 0ind and the scale of states of affairs a%out &hich &e can coherently entertain preferences. the scale appropriate for choicema0ing preference7havers &ho herea%outs happen to %e human<does. &hile our species characteristics are sufficient for having the capacity to choose.The realm of practical reason is the 'one of middle dimensions. it imposes limits on the domain of pra1is .uestions are not the only interesting . and the structure and organi'ation at those levels are not relevant to pra1isL they lie %eyond the %oundaries of community.Alt lin s Their alternative still re"uires a concept of human agency./o&ever. in general.Aeaningful deli%eration must conform to the range of po&ers and opportunities that creatures such as ourselves possess- .+alues are tied to the notion of agency.These limits can %e illustrated %y considering alternative spatial and temporal perspectives. from a su%atomic level much of the practically relevant structure of the &orld disappears .That is not to say it is &ithout interest.KH: +alues depend on the e1istence of choice7ma0ing preference7havers.. Australia 9EA *riti. there can %e no coherent preference7ordering.ue of @eep >reen TheoryE. ho&ever.uence-2. p. not relevant to choice. #e are limited to our own spatial$temporal perspective.

f nonhuman life forms. nature &ould have value if valuing %eings encountered it and had the appropriate sorts of e1periences and thoughtsL ho&ever. interests. possess intrinsic value..t might appear that anthropocentrism in environmental ethics.ualities they possess. p.: is o%vious. in &hole and in part. %ut some&here in %et&een and in the interaction connecting them.uires an act of imagination on the part of valuers &ho no& e1ist and can contemplate possi%le futures. there is an o%2ective side to the value relation &hich deserves our respect and cultivation since it is insepara%le from the valued e1periences that ma0e life &orth&hile.this assertion re.uence.Second. interactions &ith things of the &orld presents occasions for value 2udgments and values can %e thought of as !e1isting( %ut only in the episodic state of reciprocity %et&een o%2ects and valuing %eings. %ut rather %ecause once the only class of %eing to &hich anything can matter. is that if &e as0. the e1tinction or massive slaughter of /omo sapiens is not the gravest tragedy that the arth could suffer. they are 3inally.MH anthropocentric locus of valuation and ethical thin0ing to a %iocentric or ecocentric one.uestion 9. and Paul Taylor.( nvironmental thics.. in any event. Arne Naess. is or may %e uni. nothing else matters. pollution.uestion is not so easy to ans&er from the standpoint of the &ea0 anthropocentrist &ho does not posit the intrinsic value of natural o%2ects and processes.ue depending on &hether it is thought o have potentially omnicidal conse..E for &hat else can it mean for a value to %e a relational entity other than that it is something that connects Q and P-. plants.According to the relational theory. and is therefore a purely fanciful thought e1periment that is of no real conse.The dangers and uncertainties of nuclear &ar do cast us in the uncomforta%le role of hypothetical last people on arth.The second . as species or as individuals. deep ecologists assert that other things have a right to continue e1isting even if &e insist on o%literating ourselves in &hole or in part. or inherent value.The greenhouse effect. E=here do values reside?E the ans&er must %e.uences? The ans&er to ./ere it is tempting to say that once human %eing are annihilated. value is neither su%2ective and ineffa%le nor o%2ective and independent of consciousnesses that are capa%le of forming value 2udgments in response to certain features of e1perience. intrinsic. have outlined. or &hich alone can %e said plausi%ly to have an a1iological !point of vie& on the &orld( is removed from the scene no value 2udgments can ta0e place and all tal0 of them is rendered pointless.Such a standpoint allo&s for the fact that certain features of the &orld tend to elicit fairly uniform a1iological responses from us.9. 3o1 .%xtinction bad %xtinction is ethically ban rupt—values are relational and cannot exist without the human valuer.Neither in the &orld nor in the mind. rather.#ut this approach is mista0en . that if %eings capa%le of value 2udgments ever visited our planet after a nuclear holocaust.uestion.+alue .This can %e understood in purely instrumental terms. yet one that is neither narro&ly e1ploitative nor dependent on the du%ious attri%ution of .Cne can al&ays assert the counterfactual claim that in the post7nuclear &ar period..: =ould nuclear devastation that falls short of %iocide matter to those humans 9if any: &ho survived nuclear &ar? 92: Should the prospect of &idespread environmental destruction 9%iocidal or other&ise: matter to us no& if omnicide also occurred and left %ehind no humans to e1perience the conse. deep ecologists.uestions.uestion &hether the last people on arth should care a%out its fate after they are gone. if %uilt upon a relational theory of value of the 0ind . *anada !nuclear &eapons and the ultimate environmental crisis. such as those 2ust s0etched. su%tracted themselves form the picture. argue for a radical shift from homocentric or firmly committed to the position that nonhuman life forms have independent. ENo&here. that they possess value in and of themselves and &ithout reference to human e1periences. is una%le to sustain any concern for nature and the impact of human action upon the %iosphere other than that &hich affects human interests.*ertainly there is a predisposition on the part of a to argue that unless &e ascri%e intrinsic value to nature and to various nonhuman %eings. &e cannot e1plain F &hy it &ould %e &rong to despoil the environment through nuclear &ar or other means. and that humans must cultivate attitudes similar to those of native peoples in order to live in harmony &ith nature and to ena%le themselves to carry out their o%ligation to preserve and nurture other life forms for their o&n sa0e.t is thought %y some that a nonanthropocentric position.Nuclear &ar. or needs. is needed in order to give purchase to concern over the &anton destruction of the arth. or course.There are really t&o .Anthropocentric conclusions .=ea0 anthropocentrism can serve as a foundation for moral concern over the fate of the %iosphere in t&o &ays.uences. sym%olic and cultural values: all foster a concern for the %iosphere that is anthropocentric.t is claimed further %y them that a revolution in value theory 9a1iology: is necessary to recogni'e this fact.. this position is often couched in termss of hypothetical Elast people arguments.+.arguments that pose the . as Norton indicates. they &ould find it valueless &himpering &asteland. is a relational concept that has %oth su%2ective and o%2ective elements.=hat are the implications of all this value tal0 for the second .Cne could 2ust as &ell speculate.Nuclear &ar is.Pet it does not re. yet is neither Q nor P? None of this entails that animals. and ecosystems do not matter or have no value.This is not %ecause nothing else in nature can present occasion for value 2udgment to ta0e place.Some &ould maintain that &e put a theory of environmental ethics to the supreme test and find it promising only if &e can posit the vie& that in the a%sence of humans the %iosphere &ould continue to possess value.uire that &e attri%ute the values &e posit entirely to the things themselves or to any of the .#y assigning intrinsic value to other species. ho&ever.n short. only one &ay in &hich the %iosphere may %e permanently damaged or destroyed %y humansO impact upon it. and so &e may &ell &ant to raise this .As Norton points out. li0e #ill @evall and >eorge Sessions.n my vie&. %ut it does entail that they have no value apart from interaction &ith valuing %eings &ho have e1 hypothesi.E i-e.The parado1 at the heart of this account. it follo&s that annihilating or decimating them is morally a%horrent.9HM Aichael Phil Prof N "ueens B.That is.. and glo%al deforestation are others one might mention .uestion a%ove? . since the surviving humans &ould e1perience a variety of negative effects on their lives even from limited environmental damage and long7term nuclear pollution of the %iosphere.MD7. of course.3irst. the recognition of our evolutionary continuity &ith other generate values 9e-g-.

and from an anthropocentric perspective. or some com%ination of these. in addition to its conse.uences for the nonhuman environment - . inspirational. the decimation of human andRor nonhuman species and environment. then there should %e no lingering difficulty over the ans&er to the second .uestion.. and re2uvenating.t follo&s that nuclear &ar can %e condemned in the strongest terms. as sensitive and dependent organisms that supports and sustains our concern for the fate of the arth . the intimacy &e have &ith nature. &hether it results in omnicide.t is.uences in human terms nuclear &ar must %e regarded as morally &orse in terms of its conse. %iocide..3urthermore.f the environment can %e seen in these &ays as generative. simply put.intrinsic value of the nonhuman &orld- .

the political claims of &omen in the past or of se1ual minorities today:.. %ut they are also the main vehicle through &hich cross7cultural agreements a%out values are reached. as if !there can %e no competing versions of universality( 92000.. ..Such translation is a political practice of ma0ing cross7cultural 2udgments and claims in an idiom that others can come to recogni'e as shared.Local ideas may %e the source of arguments for cultural relativism. for the claim to &or0.. is not the ongoing search for universal values 9Nuss%aum 2000: or !normative principles to guide our 2udgments and deli%erations in comple1 human situations( 9#enha%i% 2002. JM: %ut the presumption that this search &ill discover something that is al&ays already there 9shared %y =estern and non7=estern cultures ali0e:. in other &ords.There are num%ers of claims that have never attained such status 9e-g-. for it . e1cludes local ideas 9the particular: as critically relevant and ma0es it seem. to spea0 &ith )udith #utler.nstead of thin0ing a%out our political practice in terms of either cultural e1portation 9as the old universalism understood it: or cultural attri%ution 9as the ne& universalism suggests:. &e might thin0 a%out it &ith #utler in terms of cultural translation../olding that the %est ideas 9the universal: are al&ays already shared across cultural %orders. %ecause in each cultural conte1t !there is an esta%lished rhetoric for the assertion of universality and a set of norms that are invo0ed in the recognition of such claims.Thus. To&ard a 3eminist Theory of )udgment: )ust %ecause a particular claim 9local idea: does not achieve articulation as universal 9%est idea : and in this &ay come to stand for the aspirations of political &omen across national %orders does not ma0e it either meaningless 9&ith no relation to universality: or dangerous 9an instance of particularism and relativism: in the &ay that Nuss%aum assumes. Bniversity of *hicago. Linda Serilli 2009 9prof of political science.And it is to treat the local or particular as a potential source of ever ne& iterations of universality. yet their particularity may &ell har%or another &ay of thin0ing a%out &hat counts as universal .These conte1ts are irreduci%ly local.to enact the very universality it enunciates..Translation is necessary. after all.No &mpact There is no impact to the riti ' we can ma e particular (udgments without universal validity and still have a basis for norms.=hat &ould it mean to ta0e the conte1ts of local particularity as a starting point for a critical political encounter in &hich the universal criteria for cross7 cultural 2udgments could %e articulated rather than assumed? The pro%lem.TK:. JD:. &here the very idea of the universal &ill not %e decided once and for all %ut &ill al&ays remain open to further political interrogation- . &rites #utler. it must undergo a set of translations into the various rhetorical and cultural conte1ts in &hich the meaning and force of universal claims are made( 92000.To understand the search for universal values as an act of cultural translation rather than e1portation 9the old universalism: or attri%ution 9the ne& universalism: is to refuse to assume from the start an agreement that needs to %e &or0ed out politically. Signs 2009.

further. %ecause our epistemologically and philosophically inflected language of politics repeats it to us ine1ora%ly. matters of individual or cultural preference. is !a practical matter of actions and historical conte1t and not a%stract issues of epistemic privilege( 9>unnell .Not only do such terms continually land feminists.t simply cannot %e settled at the level of philosophyRepistemology.She . %y turning to the thought of /annah Arendt.uestion &ould assume that political pro%lems are fundamentally philosophicalRepistemological ones and.. To&ard a 3eminist Theory of )udgment: there is much to recommend in /ara&ayOs notion of !limited location and situated 0no&ledge ( 9. !this &ar is un2ust(:. they not only felt that they had to defeat cultural relativism as a 0ind of epistemological claim %ut also missed &hat is really at sta0e in ma0ing cross7cultural 2udgments. to see0 transconte1tual criteria and grounds for political 2udgment.0 ArendtOs point is not to contest the idea that &e often do su%sume particulars under rules 9e-g-. an a%ility to form an opinion a%out the particular . the !this( that refers to this &ar and to no other. !this is a &ar(:. Signs 2009.M:L the 2udgment of %eauty posits or.An affirmative ans&er to this . for it mo%ili'es particulars to confirm the generality of conceptsLost is the particularity of the particular itself. as if once &e have the rules for deciding the As an alternative epistemology that ma0es visi%le the irreduci%le relations of po&er in claims to 0no&ledge. Arendt 9.. anticipates the agreement of others.ua particular precisely in the a%sence of 0no&n rules. appreciate the contri%utions of standpoint theory .uestion. . then. namely.mmanuel 8antOs third *riti.uestion of validity &e &ill %e a%le to ad2udicate the significant 0inds of practical challenges that are associated &ith ma0ing 2udgments in the glo%al conte1t of &idespread value pluralism. one that cannot %e .9H2: holds that .9HM:. do not mean it is un2ust for me %ut that others too ought to find it un2ust. &e shall continually %e tempted. %ac0 in<if not the crisis<then the pro%lem of relativism and thus rationalism . Arendt 9. namely.. if political 2udgments are not o%2ective in the aforementioned sense.t is a picture that holds us captive.uestion.n her vie&. not&ithstanding their cogent re%uttals 9/arding . sec. .)udging is less an act of su%suming.99J. DMT:. is something &e do &ell to .3or Arendt. Arendt sees the chance to practice 2udgment critically ane&.9HTa:. can %e properly addressed if &e hold to the idea that such 2udgment is fundamentally a pro%lem of having a 9more: critical epistemology. Arendt argues. she argues. argues Arendt. 2udgment emerges as a pro%lem in the &a0e of the collapse of inherited criteria for 2udgment.The threat that relativism supposedly poses to our a%ility to ma0e 2udgments in the firstorder discourses that concern us. .Cn the contrary. accepted as valid or not.#ut &hat &ould it mean to thin0 a%out the pro%lem of 2udgment in terms other than the threat of relativism? #eyond relativism Let us try to %ypass the crisis of relativism.90:. neither are they merely su%2ective. ho&ever. Bniversity of *hicago. they are also terms that 0eep us from seeing 2udgment as a practical pro%lem of a first7order discourse.And it is only &ith the %rea0do&n of such criteria.)erm solves )ermutation solves' only politics can settle the "uestion of value (udgments..Li0e&ise.This is the mista0e made %y #enha%i% and Nuss%aum.n this &ay. &here others see relativism and a crisis of 2udgment. namely.9HM. is not fully reflective and critical. cross7cultural 2udgment as a practical pro%lem of feminist politics.. and more an act of discerning and differentiating 9&hich is ho& 8ant defined the reflective 2udgment that he associated &ith aesthetic 2udgments:-.9TH.=hether others find it so is another matter.To paraphrase 8ant.n the realm of politics. and the entire epistemological pro%lematic in &hich it arises. !this &ar is un2ust.D:.. led partly to the %rea0do&n of the capacity to 2udge critically in the first place.9H2: turns to . is &hether the pro%lem of 2udgment that concerns us here. &hich has no philosophicalRepistemological secondorder solution -9 This is not %ecause no claims to 0no&ledge and truth are at sta0e in politics<surely they are<%ut rather %ecause &hether a claim is critical or dogmatic. namely.The act of mere su%sumption that is at sta0e in a determinative 2udgment.. the 2udgment !this painting is %eautiful( is different from the claim !.99.n her effort to foreground 2udgment as a critical capacity of democratic citi'enship precisely once the rules for 2udgment have collapsed. &ant to resist framing the political pro%lem of 2udgment in epistemological terms.3ollo&ing 8antOs account of 2udgments of taste. politics. utterly una%le to 2udge . it is the very idea that criteria must %e given as universal rules governing from a%ove the application of concepts to the particulars of political life that has.. Their alternative is nihilist and refuses the need to still act in the face of value uncertainty.t is not a pro%lem of relativism in the sense of a loss of criteria of 2udgment that can %e solved through the reesta%lishment of such criteria.D: that mar0ed the definitive political event of the t&entieth century. lest &e %e critically impaired. this painting !is %eautiful for me( 98ant . as there is in other iterations of standpoint theoryThe . that the %asis of feminism as a critical enterprise is epistemology..f &e understand our predicament in terms of relativism.( . Linda Serilli 2009 9prof of political science. . the collapse of the shared criteria of 2udgment represents a practical.. more precisely. first7order pro%lem that has no philosophical. second7order solution.ue 9.uestions the idea that 2udgment is the faculty of su%suming particulars under 0no&n rules 9&hich is ho& 8ant defined the determinative 2udgment that he associated &ith cognitive 2udgments:. not&ithstanding a&areness of the dangers of rationalism. totalitarianism. sec. ho&ever. though far from easy. %ut rather to foreground the features of 2udgment that characteri'e it as critical value 2udgment 9e-g-.As much as . say. to paraphrase Lud&ig =ittgenstein 9. &ho too0 for granted that feminist 2udgments in the register of politics need philosophyRepistemology to under&rite them. if . or &hat she calls the final !%rea0 in tradition ( 9.99Ja. &e have al&ays to do &ith opinion and thus &ith value 2udgments that cannot %e ad2udicated %y an appeal to the o%2ective truth criteria and the a%ility to give proofs that are at sta0e in the validity of cognitive 9determinative: 2udgments 9see Serilli 200T:.. li0e canary &ineL( it &ould %e ridiculous to say. that the po&er of critical 2udgment can come into its o&nThus. in her vie&.

as the philosophers and epistemologists &ould have us %elieve. that practical 2udgment &ill %e paraly'ed in the a%sence of transconte1tual criteria of application is to accept the top7do&n conception of 2udgment as a practice of su%sumption that Arendt &ould have us .The real threat of nihilism is not the loss of standards as such %ut the refusal to accept the conse.The pro%lem &ith this top7do&n understanding of 2udgment is that it leaves &hatever rules &e employ more or less une1aminedL their normativity %ecomes the ta0enforgranted %asis for every claim to validity.=hat matters from the perspective of our critical capacities is not the content of the rules as such %ut the very dependence on rules 9Arendt .Political 2udgments solicit the agreement of all.=e then ris0 not only ethnocentricism %ut also losing the critical purchase that the act of 2udging might give us on our o&n rules and standards- .To argue. as the rationalist tradition has. %ut they cannot compel it.uestion.settled %y claims to epistemic authority or privilege 90no&ing &hich criteria to apply and ho& to apply them: %ut that must %e &or0ed out in the difficult first7order practice of politics itself. KJT:.The idea that %y holding fast to universal criteria &e shall avoid a crisis of critical 2udging neglects the very real possi%ility that such rules can function as a mental crutch that inhi%its our capacity to 2udge critically.uences of that loss. in the manner of giving proofs. that is. %y means of persuasion and the e1change of opinions..9M.$ules are li0e a %anister to &hich &e hold fast for fear of losing our footing and not %eing a%le to 2udge at all.

and feminist te1ts<there inevita%ly follo&s the charge of relativism. practical pro%lems of 2udgment loo0 nothing li0e the picture given to us in philosophical discussions of relativism.uestion.. postcolonial. -oo ing for (ustifications will always fail' you should prioriti.n these discussions. Linda Serilli 2009 9prof of political science. for 9as Arendt and 8ant argue: . as Arendt argues a%out life after totalitarianism.pretending that something similar is already 0no&n to us( 9.As Arendt once remar0ed. epistemic privilege: that my 2udgment is valid or that it &ill %e accepted %y others or that it ought to %e- . these ne& universalists do not escape the pro%lems &ith the old universalism that they other&ise critici'e.uestion<as it &as in many multicultural. &ho rightly calls for ma0ing 2udgments %ut does not properly consider ho& =estern feminists might do so &hile remaining critical in relation to their o&n cultural norms. !denying that &e sa& anything ne& at all. J2D n. .To say fare&ell to relativism as the threat that names the &hole political pro%lem of 2udgment in the conte1t of modernityOs value pluralism.That said. To&ard a 3eminist Theory of )udgment: *onclusion . such as those that guide #enha%i% and Nuss%aum. .e our engagement with politics.99K.M:. armed &ith rules and their correct application. criteria of 2udgment may &ell give &ay under the &eight of history. the ina%ility to 2udge cultures and practices not our o&n. is to refuse to frame political pro%lems in epistemologicalR philosophical terms. DTM:. of course.3inding solace in our o&n norms cannot possi%ly count as critical 2udging<and yet the threat of relativism leaves us &ith little other choice. . &hich typically feature a complete paralysis of our critical faculties.=hen . as it did Nuss%aum and #enha%i%. %egan this essay &ith C0in. right: of philosophy to ad2udicate matters of practical concern is put into . %ut the failure to ta0e genuine account of the strangeness of &hat &e are 2udging. Bniversity of *hicago. %ut it cannot compel it &ith proofs 9as o%2ectivism &ould hold:..n the interest of reviving the pro%lem of 2udgment as it arises for us in everyday conte1ts. have argued that relativism is a false pro%lem that leads us to misunderstand &hat &e do &hen &e 2udge politically. &e have seen that their ne& universalism attri%utes to non7=estern cultures the very=estern values that are in .Preoccupied &ith the threat of relativism. Signs 2009. rather.99J. .The real pro%lem of 2udgment in the conte1t of &idespread value pluralism is not relativism. the charge of relativism almost inevita%ly lands feminists..Bnderstood in a very loose sense. say more than ho& it appears to me 9as su%2ectivism &ould have it:.There simply is no e1trapolitical guarantee 9e-g-. should say. the threat of relativism may resonate &ith feminists as a real pro%lem insofar as &hen &e are engaged in politics.. %ac0 in the very rationalism they &ould dispute. &e tend to ta0e refuge in our o&n criteria. suggest &e do.. &hat is at sta0e is not really practical 2udgment in first7order discourses such as politicsL at sta0e.3urthermore. &e may &ell<and indeed often do &ell to<e1perience a sense of uncertainty a%out the legitimacy of our criteria and thus our 2udgments. but must be based on experiences with others.%xperience *A Their riti is anti$political' +alue (udgments do not have any ultimate philosophical truth.Ay 2udgment anticipates your agreement. as .=henever such an a%ility 9or.. have suggested that &e rethin0 political 2udgments as fundamentally anticipatory rather than antecedent 92ustificatory: in structure. is !the a%ility of philosophy to posit a metatheoretical %asis of 2udgment &ith respect to such practices( 9>unnell .Although #enha%i% and Nuss%aum are sensitive to this challenge. have ta0en the standpoints of others into account.f accepted. 2udge political things.

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