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125
ARGUMENTS & ARGUERS
Teaching Philosophy, June 1995, 18:2
[Pagination is same a journal.]

Michael A. Gilbert
York University

One of the courses considered a bread and butter service course for most philosophy
departments is the course entitled Critical Reasoning (or some similar rubric.) Students, even
those not planning on law school, flock to these courses because they promise that one can
become a better, more sophisticated, sharper, and well-armed argumentative adversary. And, to
a reasonable degree the courses so titled deliver on their promise. Certainly, in my personal
experience, I have greater student satisfaction with my critical reasoning courses than any other.
It is this course that students who meet me five or ten years later describe as the most important
course they took in university. This has never happened with Introduction to Symbolic Logic.
Perhaps it is a mistake to complain and want to alter something that seems to be working
so well, but that is nonetheless the task of this essay. I believe the usual approach taken to
critical reasoning is flawed and wants changing. There are three basic problems which will be
dealt with in turn. The first is the use of fallacies as a fundamental mode of analysis; the second
is the essentially negative outlook as expressed in the very title Critical Reasoning; and the
third is the lack of focus on the people who are arguing or who have made the argument under
examination. I see all three of these problems as instances of a larger issue which is captured in
the title of this paper, viz., the almost total emphasis critical reasoning puts on the argument as
an artifact, as opposed to the process of arguing as it occurs between two or more people who are
in disagreement. Critical reasoning, it will be argued, does not need to be replaced, but
expanded and modified to embrace arguers, and not just arguments.
The Problem With Fallacies
That there are problems with fallacies is not news to researchers in the area of
Argumentation Theory. (Vide, for example, Trudy Goviers excellent Problems in Argument
Analysis and Evaluation, 1987, for a good survey, discussion and defense of what might be
called a conservative position.) Recently any number of authors have argued that the tradi-
M.A.GILBERT ARGUMENTS & ARGUERS .126
tional presentation of fallacies just wont work (Walton, 1989; Willard, 1990 are two).
The categories are too rigid and when applied often defy whatever rules and criteria have been
specified. Any instructor knows that a quiz on fallacies invariably results in many appeals and
arguments about just whether or not question three is a hasty conclusion, or why question four
could not be read as a non sequitor. Indeed, one common way to avoid these post-exam
headaches is to make the examples used in the test correspond fairly rigidly to the description
propounded in lecture. This means, of course, that the answers are defining the question, a very
unphilosophical and pedagogically weak approach to testing.
Constructing the questions carefully might, nonetheless, be worth it except that it does not
even work. My assistants and I always review the questions, and their job is specifically to look
at the examples from different points of view than mine so we can discuss all the possible
answers in advance. But there are always answers we never dreamt of, sometimes accompanied
by perfectly reasonable explanations. Part credit is often garnered for imagination, if not for
accuracy, and the negotiation for more points can become both heated and ingenious. One longs
for the charmingly precise definition of formal validity and the straightforward true-false
questions it so nicely entertains.
So one basic problem with fallacies is that they are infinitely flexible and, so, infinitely
arguable. This is so not because they are not taught properly, but because mistakes in argument
can be understood in many different ways. Arguments have different threads running through
them, and picking up on one thread may lead to lessened emphasis on another. As a result, a
mistake will often be seen in the context of a particular outlook on the argument as a whole, and
this perspective may or may not have something to do with the proponents intent and reasoning.
As a result, the fallacy, which directs one to examine the argument in a certain way, may lessen
the possibility of understanding the position being put forward. But this is not the only problem.
If one attended university before 1970 then the way you learned fallacies was pre-Kahane
(1971). This meant that the classifications were viewed as rigid and primarily applicable to
statements in static environments. It also meant the examples were likely stilted and, not
infrequently, several thousand years old. Kahane, of course, made fallacies relevant in a time
when relevance was all the rage. He curried newspapers and magazines for contemporary
examples of classical fallacies and presented them in ways students found interesting and useful.
This long overdue change was welcomed by a large number of critical reasoning instructors, and,
in fact, every critical reasoning textbook written since Kahane has followed the same path.
Unfortunately, adding relevance to the traditional approach is insufficient because it still
avoids the essential difficulty: there is not enough respect for the situated nature of all
argumentation. Hamblin saw this in
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Fallacies (1970). He insisted that fallacies and errors in argumentation really only made sense in
the context of the dynamics of dialectic. He says, of equivocation, for example, that ...we
almost never suppose any word to be equivocal until we get into trouble with it(p. 294). The
classical example using the word bank simply does not arise. One who says, I put my money
in the bank, is never misunderstood, and when equivocation does lead to misunderstanding it is
rarely if ever intentionally misleading.
1
There are, in other words, no inherently equivocal
expressions outside of textbooks. This is contrary to the assumptions made by what Hamblin
calls the Standard Treatment which supposes that fallacies are identifiable occurrences lurking
in arguments. Most scholars now avowedly reject the Standard Treatment, but their approach
belies the disavowal. We are still presented with paradigm examples situated in a single
context-less paragraph, rules and criteria for identifying a particular fallacy, and lengthy lists of
explanations and examples. (Vide, for examples, Johnson & Blair, 1983; Engel, 1985; Govier,
1988)
Argumentation, first and last, is a subspecies of communication, and communication is a
complex act that integrates cultural and sub-cultural symbolism, social actors and local context.
This means that any given argument or part thereof may be acceptable or appropriate or useful
or sensible when used by one set of persons in one place and time, and not acceptable, etc., when
any or all of those variables are altered. The kinds of things traditionally called fallacies are not
descriptions of kinds of statements, but kinds of things a person can do with statements. An ad
misericordiam is supposed to be a mistake in argumentation. It is not. It is a decision by one
person involved in the argument to make an emotional appeal to her or his opposer. It is an
appeal to be given something such as money or credence or support on grounds that you do not
have it but want it or need it. If what is said is sincere, then there is no fallacy. A genuine
request for food because one is hungry is not fallacious, and neither is an appeal for tenure on the
grounds that ones lover has AIDS. If what is said is false, then there is also no fallacythere is
lying, infamy and weak moral character. These are characteristics of people, not arguments.
The difficulty with fallacies is that they create categories of mistakes, blanks that are to be
filled in, rather than stressing the dynamics of a particular argument. Worse, they encourage us
to look at the argument in terms of these categories rather than at a living social process
occurring between arguers who are trying to achieve certain ends. Not surprisingly, we find
what we were looking for, and can cease paying attention to that bit anymore, and, so, on with
the hunt.
A particular classical fallacy will or will not be fallacious depending on the circumstances.
Walton (op cit.) defends several classical fallacies as having perfectly legitimate non-fallacious
instances. He lists ad vericundiam, appeal to emotion, many questions, circular reasoning and
M.A.GILBERT ARGUMENTS & ARGUERS .128

ad hominem. In each instance he describes convincing situations that meet the conditions of the
fallacy but could not reasonably be called fallacious, i.e., they were reasonable arguments.
Consider, as what might be considered a true test case, ad baculum, appeal to force. This is
hardly a fallacy one wants to countenance as having good instancesthis is one we know we
want to keep. If we cannot abjure force and threats in argumentation then what is the point of
teaching critical reasoning at all? Still, when an employee threatens to inform her employer
about sexual harassment from a supervisor unless he desists in his advances, an ad baculum is
committed. It might be tempting to say that other, non-threatening, arguments ought have been
used beforehand, but there is no prima facie case that any such requirement exists. Sometimes
threats, and even violence, viz., ad baculum arguments, are very appropriate and not in the least
fallacious.
Examples abound, and it can be good fun to find non-fallacious fallacies. What this shows
is that the creation of categories of mistakes is wrongheaded. Arguments need to be examined
on their own merits, and not judged by an archaic set of pigeonholes. Certainly we need, for
example, to be careful of authorities, but we use them constantly and they provide us no more
trouble than anything else we do. It is not appeals to pity and authority that create problems in
argument, its dishonesty, insincerity, egoism, tribalism and lack of compassion. One can even
add chicanery to the list which is what some think sophists indulge in. As soon as we create
categories for good and bad arguments instead of examining an argument for its goodness or
badness, everything collapses because we will always find counter-examples. If we dont find
them now, well find them later.
3. Whats Wrong With Negativity
The second difficulty with critical reasoning lies in its essential negativity. The way it
stands now the student entering the area is informed, in no uncertain terms, that he is a critic; his
job is to look at the argument and criticize it. His purpose is to identify weakness, spot errors,
and, generally, to find fault with what has been put before him. We emphasize that criticism is
more important than agreement or disagreement. The argument must be taken apart and
examined, its nuts and bolts inspected for rust, its belts and cogs tested for worn spots and weak
teeth. There will be things wrong with the argument and they must be found.
2

We do, one might respond, have the Principle of Charity, itself in no small part promoted
by the strategic importance of meeting your opposer on her best, not weakest footing. But the
strategic aspect aside, the very title of the principle shows its real nature. What it instructs one to
give is not support or clarification or defense or insight, but charity.
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Charity is given to those who are needy, who cannot compose a defensible argument on their
own behalf, and who, save for our generous largesse, would appear stupid, shallow or inept and
most certainly be defeated and humiliated. All the Principle of Charity is really intended to do is
keep us honest, which means we are actually talking about the Principle of Honesty, and that
rule we should follow (and, of course, teach,) as a matter of course.
A given dialectic interchange can have, adapting Perelmans terms, varying degrees of
heuristic and eristic intention. Heuristic intention involves the commitment and effort to look for
commonality, agreement, and the truth, (even if only the situational truth.) Eristic intention is
the desire to achieve ones strategic ends at all, or at least some, moral costs. Both extremes are
constructs, and will actually be found in varying degrees in different dialogues (Perelman &
Olbrechts-Tyteca, 1969, p. 37ff). Expanding on this distinction the eristic component might be
exemplified by insistent urgings or carefully crafted but specious arguments. (Yes, there are
specious argumentsthey just dont have nicknames.) The heuristic attitude attempts to
understand an opposers position before criticizing it. The heuristic attitude is not critical, it is
comprehensive. At worst it deals with agreement and disagreement, not right and wrong. To do
critical reasoning properly one must find fault, find not what is right, but what is wrong. The
aim is to eliminate the presented argument so that ones own argument can take its place along
with the accompanying view. This approach is not heuristic because it is primarily focused on
the negative, on the goal of showing an opposer that he or she is wrong. It does not put
understanding, let alone inclusiveness, at the forefront, but eliminates it in favour of a critical
eristically oriented approach.
Why such a negative attitude? Why is the emphasis so heavily slanted toward finding fault
with the presented argument? Think of the possibilities if we just changed the terminology.
Why not call what we teach, constructive reasoning? Then we might be able to tell students
that we want to make sense of our opposers arguments in order to be better equipped to discuss
the issues with them. The student could be told to understand the argument, to try and determine
what her dispute partner means, to find what aspects of the argument she agrees with, what
aspects she disagrees with, and how, if at all, the opposing views may be reconciled. To do this
we do not have to throw the baby out with the bath. As will be stated later on, there is every
reason for a careful arguer to be aware of premisses and conclusions, grounds for accepting and
rejecting propositions, and, I firmly believe, elementary formal logic in its Natural Deduction
guise. It is just that there is more in argumentation than logic, formal or informal, and much of
it is systematically discarded which results in a lack of both comprehension and compassion.
M.A.GILBERT ARGUMENTS & ARGUERS .130

Arguments & Arguers
Inculcating a skill means importing techniques, attitudes, and perspectives. It is always
difficult, and doing so in a classroom or lecture hall in only two or three hours a week is next to
impossible. It is, therefore, not surprising that the main approach to critical reasoning has been
to formulate rules and procedures that standardize what to look for and how to look for it. We
create categories of mistakes called fallacies and instruct our students to hunt for them. We
present rules for connecting statements and teach them to create diagrams that are at best
artificial and at worst incomprehensible. (One gets almost as many post-quiz appeals about
diagramming arguments as about fallacies.) The problem is that there seems to be little choice.
If there is no focus on the quantifiable, the diagrammable, the structured and regular then it
becomes difficult to know what students will be instructed about. Without being able to appeal
to rules and procedures critical reasoning becomes too particularized; practices and techniques
used in one situation may not be applicable to another. As it is impossible to instruct about what
to do in each given situation, one must generalize away the details until one is left with a
structure that is sufficiently identifiable across the board, thus allowing common procedures for
any of this category of situation.
In symbolic logic this is exactly what is done. The details of context, language, nuance,
purpose, intention, ideology, person, emotion, location, intuition, and truth are stripped away so
that a universal structure can be exposed, examined, and placed into a uniform system. When we
do this we explain to our students that this is but one aspect of argument (or language or thought)
and that in order to examine it we must, perforce, lose many of the subtleties and nuances that
make arguments interesting and worthwhile. In fact, we lose absolutely everything save for the
formal logical structure. But that loss is reasonable since there is generally no pretense made
about confusing it with reality, and the aridity is necessary to create the model we seek. Even
here, when all we are left with is purely abstract structure, there is a great deal of controversy
over how a particular argument ought be formalized. We openly grant that translation from
formal to natural language is not an exact science but, often, a question of interpretation and
emphasis. Exactitude escapes us even when we are perfectly willing to pay almost any price.
When it comes to informal logic the task of identifying the arguments, sub-arguments,
premisses and conclusions is even more daunting. Now we do not want to lose many of those
aspects of communication we were previously willing to sacrifice on the alter of rigour, but at
the same time we must come up with a formulation of the particular argument that allows us to
inspect it with some degree of uniformity and generality. I.e., given an argument set on a quiz a
class of students should
M.A.GILBERT ARGUMENTS & ARGUERS .131

produce an analysis that has recognizably common elements. Once again, this entails ignoring a
mass of information that may be highly pertinent to truly understanding the argument. And here
we come to a crucial notion: what does it mean to understand an argument?
According to the critical reasoning approach understanding an argument means that one
needs to pare it down to the argumentative essentials. To sift through the rhetoric as Johnson
and Blair put it (p. 80), or, according to Govier (1987, p. 141), to determine which sentences are
premisses and which sentences conclusions, presumably in both instances discarding the rest.
Van Eemeren and Grootendorst list as one of the operations necessary for a normative
reconstruction of an argument from their Pragma-Dialectic perspective the dialectical
transformation of deletion. This involves selecting elements relevant to resolving the dispute
and then deleting elements not relevant. [E]lements that are irrelevant for this purpose
[include] elaborations, clarifications, anecdotes, and side-lines... Any repetitions that occur in the
text, even if slightly differently worded, are also omitted(1989, p. 375). But surely it is possible
that the heart of the argument or at least the key to understanding it might lie in just these
discarded components. Repetitions, for example, always have a slightly different emphasis and
thrust, and by examining them we might achieve an insight that otherwise would be lost. The
same is true of anecdotes which may in some instances be far clearer than the avowedly explicit
argument.
To do this sort of shaving away of irrelevant bit and pieces is to fail to look at the
argument as a communication, and, therefore, to potentially ignore important if not crucial
aspects of the message. The term message is used advisedly: an argument can serve many
purposes only one of which may be to persuade the opposer by purely logico-rational means to
the designated conclusion. It may instead, (or as well,) be intended to alert ones partner to
certain difficulties, concerns, wonderments, anxieties and so on. Certainly an argument may be
intended to persuade, but it also may be intended to irritate, provoke, test, explore, undermine,
upstage, hurt, and so on. In each case, understanding the argument means understanding it qua
message, as a communication transmitted from one human being to another. To suggest that
there is something in there that is the argument is as misleading as supposing that there is
always one clear way to perform a formal translation. And, the more interesting the argument,
the more complex, subtle and germane, the more true this is.
In Informal Logic an argument has one goal: to persuade the listener of the truth of the
conclusion. That this is the sole or primary goal of argumentation is not, however, a universally
acknowledged truth. In contemporary Discourse Analysis, for example, it is axiomatic that
every argumentation has several goals. Without going into too much detail, the
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goals can be identified as personal or relationship goals called face goals (as per Goffman,
1959, and Brown & Levinson, 1987,) and strategic or target goals. Naturally, sometimes these
goals can coincide or, at least, overlap. In the standard, critical reasoning approach an argument
can be understood or, if we prefer, analyzed independently of the investigation of the goals
of the arguers. (Indeed, if caught looking into the goals of the arguers, one can be charged with
some version or other of the genetic fallacy.) But how can an action, linguistic or otherwise,
really be understood without investigating its intent, its function, and its effects?
The notion of goals and both personal and interpersonal considerations is not idle in under-
standing arguments. One common observation made of intimate relationships, for example, is
that the argument is not really about what it seems to be about. In Informal Logic this makes no
sense. Arguments are always about whatever proposition is identified as the conclusion; if it
veers from that, then correction and/or critique is required. But this is just wrong. Why should
argumentation, unlike any other area of human endeavour, be devoid of the significance of
subtext, motivation and intent? The answer is that it cannot. To understand an argument is to
comprehend its function in a given situation every bit as much as it is to identify its premisses
and conclusions, indeed, in some contexts even more so. We are right when we acknowledge
that the patently silly argument the Smiths had last night about when the salad should be served
was not really about proper service at all.
Consider the notion of understanding from a different point of view. Willard, in A Theory
of Argumentation (1989), points out that people speaking with people they know frequently use
codes and references that refer to their private history. Some people will be aware of these
references and take them for granted, others will be mystified, or worse yet, take them at face
value. For example, Jack says, Lets go to The Starlight diner. Jill responds with, Mmm,
good soup. Jack responds with, O.K., then you pick a place. There is dissonance here
because Jills response sounds like agreement, but Jack reacts as if it is not. He knows, while we
cannot, that Jill is referring to an illness resulting from some bad soup eaten at that restaurant.
To any third party observer the interaction makes little sense, especially in a transcript where
tone of voice could not be a clue to irony and so on. And yet it is the case that our conversation
is rife with coded communications as specific as this one or more general and looser. And the
connection, the linguistic intimacy, ranges from individuals up through groups and all the
various levels of tribes.
If we are going to deal with arguments in a more than critical way we need to shift the
focus from the argument to the arguer, from the artifacts that happen to be chosen for
communicative purposes to the situation in which those artifacts function as a component. The
emphasis now is too
M.A.GILBERT ARGUMENTS & ARGUERS .133

strongly in favour of language, and language is not nearly as precise as we would like to think it
is. We focus on it because it is the only part of the entire argumentative process that is
physically identifiable, and even then many juicy bits are left to our enthymeme-decoding
imaginations.
3
The analysis of each argument must begin by grounding it in its context, in
appreciating its source, the goals of its producer, and the aims of the interaction taken as a whole.
Even an editorial, let alone discursive dialectic, requires its context and situation. An editorial
about NAFTA (the North American Free Trade Agreement) in a pro-union labour oriented
newspaper should be read differently from one in a pro-business financially oriented one. Each
newspaper has, as it were, a different personality or profile and therefore the background
assumptions, implicit claims, ideology and goals will be different in each case. This is also true
of people. What is the relationship between the disputers? The very same words spoken
between an employee and employer might have totally different meanings and import than those
same words spoken by a wife to her husband. Informal Logicians need to talk about the very
same argument spoken between different sets of people, but that is a mistake. Just because the
same utterances are sounded, the same noises made, does not mean they have the same meaning.
Someone leaving a movie theatre and responding to the question, Whatd you think of the
movie? may say, Great, and mean either that it was very good or very lousy.
5. Future Directions
While it is beyond the scope of this essay to present a full positive programme for critical
reasoning it is possible to sketch out a general approach that incorporates several traditional
techniques, but which also relies upon work being done in areas other than philosophy. In
general, the field that has come to be called Argumentation Theory draws upon the resources not
only of Informal Logic, but upon the fields of Communication Theory, Discourse Analysis, and
other branches of the social sciences. These areas do not view the intrusion of persons and their
goals, needs and desires as a problem, but rather as an essential component of the area of study.
This is not to say that changes are not necessary or called for within the philosophical
tradition itself. To begin with, fallacy names must not be understood as identifying mistakes or
deceptions, i.e., as fallacies, but as kinds of arguments. There is nothing wrong in identifying an
argument as an appeal to pity, or authority, force, or what have you. The error is in supposing
that one commits an error by using such an argument. We must teach that there are acceptable
and unacceptable arguments based on their merits and not on their typologies. Secondly,
arguments must be
M.A.GILBERT ARGUMENTS & ARGUERS .134

viewed as embedded in their situation. The idea that an argument can be examined
independently of who is presenting it, who is receiving it, why they are arguing, what is their
history, what are the goals of the argument, and so on must be abandoned. Instead we need
guidelines for establishing these parameters and applying them in such a way that the argument
is opened up.
Techniques such as diagramming and elementary symbolic logic are important for
understanding the nature and structure of an argument viewed in one particular way. The
internal dynamics of the argument may be exposed, its various components laid out, and its
chains of support and evidence made clear. This is, of course, all to the good. But the further
supposition that this is the argument must be eschewed. There has to be room for the wealth of
personal and cultural information that we really use and bring to an argument when we want to
understand it. Suggesting that such material is irrelevant and beside the point is to attempt to
purify and isolate argument as something non-human and mechanical, an error that is highly
misleading. This is even true of such attempts to move away from formal logic. Toulmins well-
known Data-Warrant-Claim [DWC] model, for example, is a useful way of laying out an
argument that permits us to see components that would formally not be differentiated.
Nonetheless, the DWC model is itself an attempt to extrapolate field invariant components from
diverse arenas. Similarly, dialogue theory (Hamblin, Walton), while introducing the crucial
element of interactivity, also removes us from the place of the argument to the abstract rendition
of it. This is not to suggest that the tools that have been used by Informal Logic must be
abandoned, but, rather, they should be put into perspective as one way of examining one aspect
of an argument.
The next obvious question is, what are those other aspects and how can they be
incorporated into our critical thinking pedagogy? The other aspects of argumentation are
various. First, we must make room for avenues of thought and modes of argument that are not
strictly logico-rational. These modes, widely used by all people almost all of the time, must be
allowed as at least understandable and at best perfectly acceptable. It has been argued elsewhere
(Gilbert, 1994) that arguments may rely upon non-logical modes of reasoning that are still
rational. Further, arguments based on these alternative modes should be judged as acceptable or
unacceptable by standards appropriate to those arenas. The analysis identifies four distinct
modes that can be used in argumentation. These include the classical logical mode, but also the
emotional mode, the visceral mode which covers the physical realm, and what I have called the
kisceral mode which includes the intuitive, religious, supernatural, new age, and/or mystical.
4

On this model arguments are seen as being based in one or another mode depending on the
source of, for example, data, warrant or claim. Invariably, arguments are grounded in more than
M.A.GILBERT ARGUMENTS & ARGUERS .135

one mode and may well include aspects from all four. The perspective an analyst takes on a
particular argument may emphasize one mode over another, or make the identification of a mode
crucial.
The value of this multi-modal analysis is that it emphasizes the diversity of resources upon
which arguers draw, while de-emphasizing the linguistic, linear aspect that is but one component
of actual argumentation. When paying attention to the modes the analyst can take into account
such aspects of the argument as crying, personal commitment, and the relationship existing
between the dispute partners. In certain situations we might identify fallacies that are especially
congenial to one mode. Special pleading, for example, might occur more in the kisceral mode
than in others insofar as special insight or active experience is often considered important to
certain mystical understandings. At the other extreme, we can judge the reasonableness of an
argument that refers to a feeling. For example, when Jeff explains that he decided not to buy
the house he looked at because it was creepy, or gave him the willies, we are dealing with a
kisceral argument. From a logical point of view, it is ridiculous. All that matters are price,
location and condition. However, most of us would recognize that when buying a house to live
in the inexplicables such as how the place feels do, in fact, play an important role. Emotion
also becomes part of an argument as opposed to something that must be put aside in order to
examine an argument. The rejection of a house because it reminds one of a place full of bad
memories similarly becomes reasonable, or at least, is recognized as a legitimate argument.
What this means is that the range of arguments opens up to include more of the types of
arguments actually used by situated arguers. Instead of declaring, by fiat, that the arguments
presented are illegitimate because illogical, we invite the study and examination of them on their
own terms. In this way we move toward establishing a set of criteria that can then be used
normatively in a more sensitive way.
Another aspect that can be incorporated into our understanding of the dynamics of
argumentation comes from that part of Communication Theory that focuses on goals. In that
discipline it is taken as axiomatic that arguers always have at least two goals. One is the object
of the individual argument, and may be called the primary or strategic goal. The other goal
always present in an argument is the maintenance of the relationship existing between the
arguers (be it positive or negative) and they may be called the secondary or face goals (Dillard,
Goffman.) In short, achieving ones strategic goal in an argument is always tempered by the
need to maintain certain social realities, observe social rules, and achieve goals that are
sometimes more important than the primary or strategic goal that first motivated the interaction.
These considerations effect the arguments actually chosen, the way in which they are presented,
and how
M.A.GILBERT ARGUMENTS & ARGUERS .136

far one goes or pushes in an argument. This approach also moves us away from viewing the
linguistic characterization of the argument as all that is really going on, and moves us to include
the realities of arguers as well as their arguments.
The general approach I am urging not only implies that the logical linearity inherent in
critical reasoning is too narrow, but also responds to various feminist concerns (Warren, 1988,
Nye, 1990, Gilbert, 1995). While it is highly controversial among feminist scholars, there is a
school of thought that claims that when women argue there are different values and attitudes at
work. If one moves the foundation of argument from, to use Gilligans (1982) terminology, the
justice model to the care model dramatic differences ensue. Even if we detach the assumption of
differential foundations from sex or gender to a looser way of organizing arguers, the effect is
pronounced. Now the very idea of what it is to win an argument, to succeed in argumentation,
changes. One need not even move the foundation so much as make room for non-critical
approaches in order for incorporation to replace capitulation. By broadening the range of
arguments that are acceptable and legitimate the power is shifted from logicality as the icon of
reason to a more encompassing attitude connected to what all arguers actually do.
The above consideration have led me to conclude that there ought be a greater emphasis on
understanding arguments as a means to finding agreement. This is as opposed to the current
approach to analyzing arguments as a means to finding fault. Finding agreement means
separating those parts of the argument with which one agrees from those parts that spark
disagreement. This, in turn, presupposes that a good deal of effort has gone into unpacking the
argument in order to understand it, uncover the goals of the arguers, and arrive at a
comprehension of the real motivations and needs of the arguers. One can then structure the
arguments and sub-arguments using means such as diagrams and premiss-conclusion analysis to
further pinpoint the disputational difficulties. I call such argumentation coalescent
argumentation (Gilbert, fc), and it has as its prime focus the uncovering of a position rather than
the defeat of a claim. Once positions are uncovered the opportunities for negotiation, movement,
and the exploration of alternative avenues opens up in a much more profound way.
On the coalescent view, claims are icons that represent a much more complex social-
psychological nexus that is the actual position. That is, the particular linguistic rendition of the
claim is not what the argument is really about, it is rather a handle on which the argument is
hung until the real dynamics can be uncovered. The role of coalescent argumentation is to reveal
and open up these positions for discussion. Our words, then, are merely a means to reach the
true motivations of a dispute partner, and we examine them not so much for error, as for
indications of what beliefs and attitudes may be attached to them.
M.A.GILBERT ARGUMENTS & ARGUERS .137

Coalescent argumentation is as much a question of the emphasis as it is the tools used to
achieve the end. When the avowed purpose is understanding as opposed to defeating the tools
used become tools for that purpose. The core idea is to promote inclusion and understanding as
the aim of careful reasoning. By decreasing the reliance on arguments as artifacts and increasing
the importance of arguers as persons with needs, goals and desires we create a much stronger
connection between the partners to a dispute. Indeed, when we shift the focus from the argument
to the arguer everything becomes much more complex. Categories are not nearly so precise, and
even identifying conclusions and premisses can be tricky. This is not to say that we cannot
proceed with the traditional analyses of critical reasoning, only that we cannot judge the worth or
significance of an argument on its basis alone. When such analyses become one tool in the kit of
the analyst as opposed to the only (or major) one, then we can begin to expand our understanding
of the dynamics of argumentation and allow for a multi-dimensional approach more suited to
human actors.


1
One possible exception to this is advertising where equivocation is an art form.
2
One might argue that the critical aspect is most essential when dealing with ones own
arguments, i.e., self-criticism. Indeed, when analyzing ones own arguments one ought be
extremely critical. But even here one ought to make the effort to understand the positions
motivation, consequences, goals and roots as opposed to merely criticizing the structure of the
relationship between premisses and conclusions. In other words, one certainly can be as critical
as one wants with oneself, but still ought to provide oneself with the civil, concerned and caring
attitudes one brings to interactions with others.

3
Any scholar who has ever had his or her position portrayed by a critic knows very well
that distortion and emphasis can occur even (giving the benefit of the doubt) with the most
honourable intentions.
4
Note that including the kisceral (from the Japanese word ki meaning energy,) does
mean endorsing it, believing in it, or accepting its status. Rather, it merely acknowledges the
existence, use, and naive arguers reliance upon such arenas.


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