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Prof.

Coordonator:
Asist.Univ.Dracea Nicoleta
Studenta:
Savca Victoria
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Economic Crisis in Europe:
Causes, Consequences
and Responses

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
1. A CRISIS OF HISTORIC PROPORTIONS
The financial crisis that hit the global economy
since the summer of 2007 is without precedent in
post-war economic history. Although its size and
extent are exceptional, the crisis has many features
in common with similar financial-stress drien
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EUROPEAN COMMISSION
recession episodes in the past. The crisis was
preceded by long period of rapid credit growth,
low ris! premiums, abundant aailability of
li"uidity, strong leeraging, soaring asset prices
and the deelopment of bubbles in the real estate
sector. #er-stretched leeraging positions
rendered financial institutions extremely
ulnerable to corrections in asset mar!ets. As a
result a turn-around in a relatiely small corner of
the financial system $the %& subprime mar!et' was
sufficient to topple the whole structure. &uch
episodes hae happened before $e.g. (apan and the
)ordic countries in the early *++0s, the Asian
crisis in the late-*++0s'. ,oweer, this time is
different, with the crisis being global a!in to the
eents that triggered the -reat .epression of the
*+/0s.
0hile it may be appropriate to consider the -reat
.epression as the best benchmar! in terms of its
financial triggers, it has also sered as a great
lesson. At present, goernments and central ban!s
are well aware of the need to aoid the policy
mista!es that were common at the time, both in the
1% and elsewhere. 2arge-scale ban! runs hae
been aoided, monetary policy has been eased
aggressiely, and goernments hae released
substantial fiscal stimulus. %nli!e the experience
during the -reat .epression, countries in 1urope
or elsewhere hae not resorted to protectionism at
the scale of the *+/0s. 3t demonstrates the
importance of 1% coordination, een if this crisis
proides an opportunity for further progress in this
regard.
3n its early stages, the crisis manifested itself
as an acute li"uidity shortage among financial
institutions as they experienced eer stiffer mar!et
conditions for rolling oer their $typically shortterm'
debt. 3n this phase, concerns oer the
solency of financial institutions were increasing,
but a systemic collapse was deemed unli!ely. This
perception dramatically changed when a ma4or %&
inestment ban! $2ehman 5rothers' defaulted in
&eptember 2006. 7onfidence collapsed, inestors
massiely li"uidated their positions and stoc!
mar!ets went into a tailspin. 8rom then onward the
1% economy entered the steepest downturn on
record since the *+/0s. The transmission of
financial distress to the real economy eoled at
record speed, with credit restraint and sagging
confidence hitting business inestment and
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household demand, notably for consumer durables
and housing. The cross-border transmission was
also extremely rapid, due to the tight connections
within the financial system itself and also the
strongly integrated supply chains in global product
mar!ets. 1% real -.9 is pro4ected to shrin! by
some :; in 200+, the sharpest contraction in its
history. And although signs of an incipient
recoery abound, this is expected to be rather
sluggish as demand will remain depressed due to
deleeraging across the economy as well as painful
ad4ustments in the industrial structure. %nless
policies change considerably, potential output
growth will suffer, as parts of the capital stoc! are
obsolete and increased ris! aersion will weigh on
capital formation and <=..
The ongoing recession is thus li!ely to leae deep
and long-lasting traces on economic performance
and entail social hardship of many !inds.
(ob losses can be contained for some time by
flexible unemployment benefit arrangements,
but eentually the impact of rapidly rising
unemployment will be felt, with downturns
in housing mar!ets occurring simultaneously
affecting $notably highly-indebted' households.
The fiscal positions of goernments will continue
to deteriorate, not only for cyclical reasons, but
also in a structural manner as tax bases shrin! on a
permanent basis and contingent liabilities of
goernments stemming from ban! rescues may
materialise. An open "uestion is whether the crisis
will wea!en the incenties for structural reform
and thereby adersely affect potential growth
further, or whether it will proide an opportunity
to underta!e far-reaching policy actions.
2. VAST POLICY CHALLENGES
The current crisis has demonstrated the importance
of a coordinated framewor! for crisis management.
3t should contain the following building bloc!s>
  7risis preention to preent a repeat in the
future. This should be mapped onto a collectie
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European Comm!!on
E"onom" Cr!! n Europe# Cau!e!$ Con!e%uen"e! an& Re!pon!e!
4udgment as to what the principal causes
of the crisis were and how changes in
macroeconomic, regulatory and superisory
policy framewor!s could help preent their
recurrence. 9olicies to boost potential
economic growth and competitieness could
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also bolster the resilience to future crises.
  7risis control and mitigation to minimise the
damage by preenting systemic defaults or by
containing the output loss and easing the social
hardship stemming from recession. 3ts main
ob4ectie is thus to stabilise the financial
system and the real economy in the short run. 3t
must be coordinated across the 1% in order to
stri!e the right balance between national
preoccupations and spilloer effects affecting
other ?ember &tates.
  7risis resolution to bring crises to a lasting
close, and at the lowest possible cost for the
taxpayer while containing systemic ris! and
securing consumer protection. This re"uires
reersing temporary support measures as well
action to restore economies to sustainable
growth and fiscal paths. 3nter alia, this includes
policies to restore ban!s@ balance sheets, the
restructuring of the sector and an orderly policy
@exit@. An orderly exit strategy from
expansionary macroeconomic policies is also
an essential part of crisis resolution.
The beginnings of such a framewor! are emerging,
building on existing institutions and legislation,
and complemented by new initiaties. 5ut of
course policy ma!ers in 1urope hae had no
choice but to employ the existing mechanisms and
procedures. A framewor! for financial crisis
preention appeared, with hindsight, to be
underdeeloped A otherwise the crisis would most
li!ely not hae happened. The same held true to
some extent for the 1% framewor! for crisis
control and mitigation, at least at the initial stages
of the crisis.
Buite naturally, most 1% policy efforts to date
hae been in the pursuit of crisis control and
mitigation. 5ut first steps hae also been ta!en to
redesign financial regulation and superision A
both in 1urope and elsewhere A with a iew to
crisis preention. 5y contrast, the adoption of
crisis resolution policies has not begun in earnest
yet. This is now becoming urgent A not least
because it should underpin the effectieness of
control policies ia its impact on confidence.
2.1. Cr!! "on'ro( an& m')a'on
Aware of the ris! of financial and economic meltdown
central ban!s and goernments in the
1uropean %nion embar!ed on massie and
coordinated policy action. 8inancial rescue policies
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hae focused on restoring li"uidity and capital of
ban!s and the proision of guarantees so as to get
the financial system functioning again. .eposit
guarantees were raised. 7entral ban!s cut policy
interest rates to unprecedented lows and gae
financial institutions access to lender-of-last-resort
facilities. -oernments proided li"uidity facilities
to financial institutions in distress as well, along
with state guarantees on their liabilities, soon
followed by capital in4ections and impaired asset
relief. 5ased on the coordinated 1uropean
1conomy recoery 9lan $11<9', a discretionary
fiscal stimulus of some 2; of -.9 was released A
of which two-thirds to be implemented in 200+ and
the remainder in 20*0 A so as to hold up demand
and ease social hardship. These measures largely
respected agreed principles of being timely and
targeted, although there are concerns that in some
cases measures were not of a temporary nature and
therefore not easily reersed. 3n addition, the
&tability and -rowth 9act was applied in a flexible
and supportie manner, so that in most ?ember
&tates the automatic fiscal stabilisers were allowed
to operate unfettered. The dispersion of fiscal
stimulus across ?ember &tates has been
substantial, but this is generally A and
appropriately A in line with differences in terms of
their needs and their fiscal room for manoeure. 3n
addition, to aoid unnecessary and irreersible
destruction of $human and entrepreneurial' capital,
support has been proided to hard-hit but iable
industries while part-time unemployment claims
were allowed on a temporary basis, with the 1%
ta!ing the lead in deeloping guidelines on the
design of labour mar!et policies during the crisis.
The 1% has played an important role to proide
guidance as to how state aid policies A including to
the financial sector A could be shaped so as to pay
respect to competition rules. ?oreoer, the 1% has
proided balance-of payments assistance 4ointly
with the 3?8 and 0orld 5an! to ?ember &tates in
7entral and 1astern 1urope, as these hae been
exposed to reersals of international capital flows.
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E*e"u'+e Summar,
8inally, direct 1% support to economic actiity
was proided through substantially increased loan
support from the 1uropean 3nestment 5an! and
the accelerated disbursal of structural funds.
These crisis control policies are largely achieing
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their ob4ecties. Although ban!s@ balance sheets
are still ulnerable to higher mortgage and credit
default ris!, there hae been no defaults of ma4or
financial institutions in 1urope and stoc! mar!ets
hae been recoering. 0ith short-term interest
rates near the zero mar! and @non-conentional@
monetary policies boosting li"uidity, stress in
interban! credit mar!ets has receded. 8iscal
stimulus proes relatiely effectie owing to the
li"uidity and credit constraints facing households
and businesses in the current enironment.
1conomic contraction has been stemmed and the
number of 4ob losses contained relatie to the size
of the economic contraction.
2.2. Cr!! re!o(u'on
0hile there is still ma4or uncertainty surrounding
the pace of economic recoery, it is now essential
that exit strategies of crisis control policies be
designed, and committed to. This is necessary both
to ensure that current actions hae the desired
effects and to secure macroeconomic stability.
,aing an exit strategy does not inole
announcing a fixed calendar for the next moes,
but rather defines those moes, including their
direction and the conditions that must be satisfied
for ma!ing them. 1xit strategies need to be in
place for financial, macroeconomic and structural
policies ali!e>
  8inancial policies. An immediate priority is to
restore the iability of the ban!ing sector.
#therwise a icious circle of wea! growth,
more financial sector distress and eer stiffer
credit constraints would inhibit economic
recoery. 7lear commitments to restructure and
consolidate the ban!ing sector should be put in
place now if a (apan-li!e lost decade is to be
aoided in 1urope. -oernments may hope that
the financial system will grow out of its
problems and that the exit from ban!ing
support would be relatiely smooth. 5ut as
long as there remains a lac! of transparency as
to the alue of ban!s@ assets and their
ulnerability to economic and financial
deelopments, uncertainty remains. 3n this
context, the reluctance of many ban!s to reeal
the true state of their balance sheets or to
exploit the extremely faourable earning
conditions induced by the policy support to
repair their balance sheets is of concern. 3t is
important as well that financial repair be done
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at the lowest possible long-term cost for the tax
payer, not only to win political support, but
also to secure the sustainability of public
finances and aoid a long-lasting increase in
the tax burden. 8inancial repair is thus essential
to secure a satisfactory rate of potential growth
A not least also because innoation depends on
the aailability of ris! financing.
  ?acroeconomic policies. ?acroeconomic
stimulus A both monetary and fiscal A has been
employed extensiely. The challenge for
central ban!s and goernments now is to
continue to proide support to the economy and
the financial sector without compromising their
stability-oriented ob4ecties in the medium
term. 0hile withdrawal of monetary stimulus
still loo!s some way off, central ban!s in the
1% are determined to unwind the supportie
stance of monetary policies once inflation
pressure begins to emerge. At that point a
credible exit strategy for fiscal policy must be
firmly in place in order to pre-empt pressure on
goernments to postpone or call off the
consolidation of public finances. The fiscal exit
strategy should spell out the conditions for
stimulus withdrawal and must be credible, i.e.
based on pre-committed reforms of
entitlements programmes and anchored in
national fiscal framewor!s. The withdrawal of
fiscal stimulus under the 11<9 will be "uasi
automatic in 20*0-**, but needs to be followed
up by ery substantial A though differentiated
across ?ember &tates A fiscal consolidation to
reerse the aderse trends in public debt. An
appropriate mix of expenditure restraint and tax
increases must be pursued, een if this is
challenging in an enironment where
distributional conflicts are li!ely to arise. The
"uality of public finances, including its impact
on wor! incenties and economic efficiency at
large, is an oerarching concern.
  &tructural policies. 1en prior to the financial
crisis, potential output growth was expected to
roughly hale to as little as around *; by the
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European Comm!!on
E"onom" Cr!! n Europe# Cau!e!$ Con!e%uen"e! an& Re!pon!e!
2020s due to the ageing population. 5ut such
low potential growth rates are li!ely to be
recorded already in the years ahead in the wa!e
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of the crisis. As noted, it is important to
decisiely repair the longer-term iability of
the ban!ing sector so as to boost productiity
and potential growth. 5ut this will not suffice
and efforts are also needed in the area of
structural policy proper. A sound strategy
should include the exit from temporary
measures supporting particular sectors and the
preseration of 4obs, and resist the adoption or
expansion of schemes to withdraw labour
supply. 5eyond these defensie ob4ecties,
structural policies should include a reiew of
social protection systems with the emphasis on
the preention of persistent unemployment and
the promotion of a longer wor! life. 8urther
labour mar!et reform in line with a flexicuritybased
approach may also help aoid the
experiences of past crises when hysteresis
effects led to sustained period of ery high
unemployment and the permanent exclusion of
some from the labour force. 9roduct mar!et
reforms in line with the priorities of the 2isbon
strategy $implementation of the single mar!et
programme especially in the area of serices,
measures to reduce administratie burden and
to promote <=. and innoation' will also be
!ey to raising productiity and creating new
employment opportunities. The transition to a
low-carbon economy should be pursued
through the integration of enironmental
ob4ecties and instruments in structural policy
choices, notably taxation. 3n all these areas,
policies that carry a low budgetary cost should
be prioritised.
2.-. Cr!! pre+en'on
A broad consensus is emerging that the ultimate
causes of the crisis reside in the functioning of
financial mar!ets as well as macroeconomic
deelopments. 5efore the crisis bro!e there was a
strong belief that macroeconomic instability had
been eradicated. 2ow and stable inflation with
sustained economic growth $the -reat ?oderation'
were deemed to be lasting features of the
deeloped economies. 3t was not sufficiently
appreciated that this owed much to the global
disinflation associated with the faourable supply
conditions stemming from the integration of
surplus labour of the emerging economies, in
particular in 7hina, into the world economy. This
prompted accommodatie monetary and fiscal
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policies. 5uoyant financial conditions also had
microeconomic roots and these tended to interact
with the faourable macroeconomic enironment.
The list of contributing factors is long, including
the deelopment of complex A but poorly
superised A financial products and excessie
short-term ris!-ta!ing.
7risis preention policies should tac!le these
deficiencies in order to aoid repetition in the
future. There are again agendas for financial,
macroeconomic and structural policies>
  8inancial policies. The agenda for regulation
and superision of financial mar!ets in the 1%
is ast. A number of initiaties hae been ta!en
already, while in some areas ma4or efforts are
still needed. Action plans hae been put
forward by the 1% to strengthen the regulatory
framewor! in line with the -20 regulatory
agenda. 0ith the ma4ority of financial assets
held by cross-border ban!s, an ambitious
reform of the 1uropean system of superision,
based on the recommendations made by the
,igh-2eel -roup chaired by ?r (ac"ues de
2arosiCre, is under discussion. 3nitiaties to
achiee better remuneration policies, regulatory
coerage of hedge funds and priate e"uity
funds are being considered but hae yet to be
legislated. 3n many other areas progress is
lagging. <egulation to ensure that enough
proisions and capital be put aside to cope with
difficult times needs to be deeloped, with
accounting framewor!s to eole in the same
direction. A certain degree of commonality and
consistency across the rule boo!s in ?ember
&tates is important and a single regulatory rule
boo!, as soon as feasible, desirable. 3t is
essential that a robust and effectie ban!
stabilisation and resolution framewor! is
deeloped to goern what happens when
superision fails, including effectie deposit
protection. 7onsistency and coherence across
the 1% in dealing with problems in such
institutions is a !ey re"uisite of a much
improed operational and regulatory
framewor! within the 1%.
  ?acroeconomic policies. -oernments in
many 1% ?ember &tates ran a relatiely
.
E*e"u'+e Summar,
accommodatie fiscal policy in the @good times@
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that preceded the crisis. Although this cannot
be seen as the main culprit of the crisis, such
behaiour limits the fiscal room for manoeure
to respond to the crisis and can be a factor in
producing a future one A by undermining the
longer-term sustainability of public finances in
the face of aging populations. 9olicy agendas
to preent such behaiour should thus be
prominent, and call for a stronger coordinating
role for the 1% alongside the adoption of
credible national medium-term framewor!s.
3ntra-area ad4ustment in the 1conomic and
?onetary %nion $which constitutes two-thirds
of the 1%' will need to become smoother in
order to preent imbalances and the associated
ulnerabilities from building up. This
reinforces earlier calls, such as in the
7ommission@s 1?%D*0 report $1uropean
7ommission, 2006a', to broaden and deepen
the 1% sureillance to include intra-area
competitieness positions.
  &tructural policies. &tructural reform is among
the most powerful crisis preention policies in
the longer run. 5y boosting potential growth
and productiity it eases the fiscal burden,
facilitates deleeraging and balance sheet
restructuring, improes the political economy
conditions for correcting cross-country
imbalances, ma!es income redistribution issues
less onerous and eases the terms of the
inflation-output trade-off. 8urther financial
deelopment and integration can help to
improe the effectieness of and the political
incenties for structural reform.
-. A STRONG CALL ON EU COOR/INATION
The rationale for 1% coordination of policy in the
face of the financial crisis is strong at all three
stages A control and mitigation, resolution and
preention>
  At the crisis control and mitigation stage, 1%
policy ma!ers became acutely aware that
financial assistance by home countries of their
financial institutions and unilateral extensions
of deposit guarantees entail large and
potentially disrupting spilloer effects. This led
to emergency summits of the 1uropean 7ouncil
at the ,eads of &tate 2eel in the autumn of
2006 A for the first time in history also of the
1urogroup A to coordinate these moes. The
7ommission@s role at that stage was to proide
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guidance so as to ensure that financial rescues
attain their ob4ecties with minimal
competition distortions and negatie spilloers.
8iscal stimulus also has cross-border spilloer
effects, through trade and financial mar!ets.
&pilloer effects are een stronger in the euro
area ia the transmission of monetary policy
responses. The 11<9 adopted in )oember
2006, which has defined an effectie
framewor! for coordination of fiscal stimulus
and crisis control policies at large, was
motiated by the recognition of these
spilloers.
  At the crisis resolution stage a coordinated
approach is necessary to ensure an orderly exit
of crisis control policies across ?ember &tates.
3t would not be enisaged that all ?ember
&tate goernments exit at the same time
$as this would be dictated by the national
specific circumstances'. 5ut it would be
important that state aid for financial institutions
$or other seerely affected industries' not
persist for longer than is necessary in iew of
its implications for competition and the
functioning of the 1% &ingle ?ar!et. )ational
strategies for a return to fiscal sustainability
should be coordinated as well, for which a
framewor! exists in the form of the &tability
and -rowth 9act which was designed to tac!le
spilloer ris!s from the outset. The rationales
for the coordination of structural policies hae
been spelled out in the 2isbon &trategy and
apply also to the exits from temporary
interention in product and labour mar!ets in
the face of the crisis.
  At the crisis preention stage the rationale for
1% coordination is rather straightforward in
iew of the high degree of financial and
economic integration. 8or example, regulatory
reform geared to crisis preention, if not
coordinated, can lead to regulatory arbitrage
that will affect location choices of institutions
and may change the direction of international
capital flows. ?oreoer, with many financial
institutions operating cross border there is a
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European Comm!!on
E"onom" Cr!! n Europe# Cau!e!$ Con!e%uen"e! an& Re!pon!e!
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clear case for exchange of information and
burden sharing in case of defaults.
The financial crisis has clearly strengthened the
case for economic policy coordination in the 1%.
5y coordinating their crisis policies ?ember &tates
heighten the credibility of the measures ta!en, and
thus help restore confidence and support the
recoery in the short term. 7oordination can also
be crucial to fend off protectionism and thus seres
as a safeguard of the &ingle ?ar!et. ?oreoer,
coordination is necessary to ensure a smooth
functioning of the euro area where spilloers of
national policies are particularly strong. And
coordination proides incenties at the national
leel to implement growth friendly economic
policies and to orchestrate a return to fiscal
sustainability. 2ast but not least, coordination of
external policies can contribute to a more rapid
global solution of the financial crisis and global
recoery.
1% framewor!s for coordination already exist in
many areas and could be deeloped further in
some. 3n seeral areas the 1% has a direct
responsibility and thus is the highest authority in
its 4urisdiction. This is the case for notably
monetary policy in the euro area, competition
policy and trade negotiations in the framewor! of
the .#,A <ound. This is now proing more
useful than eer. 3n other areas, @bottom-up@ 1%
coordination framewor!s hae been deeloped and
should be exploited to the full.
The pursuit of the regulatory and superisory
agenda implies the set-up of a new 1%
coordination framewor! which was long oerdue
in iew of the integration of financial systems. An
important framewor! for coordination of fiscal
policies exists under the aegis of the &tability and
-rowth 9act. The reamped 2isbon strategy
should sere as the main framewor! for
coordination of structural policies in the 1%. The
balance of payment assistance proided by the 1%
is another area where a coordination framewor!
has been established recently, and which could be
exploited also for the coordination of policies in
the pursuit of economic conergence.
At the global leel, finally, the 1% can offer a
framewor! for the coordination of positions in e.g.
the -20 or the 3?8. 0ith the %& adopting its own
exit strategy, pressure to raise demand elsewhere
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will be mounting. The ad4ustment re"uires that
emerging countries such as 7hina reduce their
national saing surplus and changed their
exchange rate policy. The 1% will be more
effectie if it also considers how policies can
contribute to more balanced growth worldwide, by
considering bolstering progress with structural
reforms so as to raise potential output. 3n addition,
the 1% would facilitate the pursuit of this agenda
by leeraging the euro and participating on the
O CRIZA DE PROPORTII ISTORICE
Criza financiara care a lovit economia globala inca din vara anului 2007 este
fara precedent in istoria economiei dupa razboi !esi dimensiunea si amploarea ei
sunt e"ceptionale criza are multe trasaturi in comun cu probleme financiare similare
care au determinat episoade de criza in trecut Criza a fost precedata de o lunga
perioada de crestere rapida a creditelor# risc redus al primelor# o ampla abundenta
de lic$iditate# puternic efect de parg$ie# escaladarea preturilor activelor si
dezvoltarea problemelor in sectorul imobiliar %ntinderea pozitiei de influenta a facut
institutiile financiare e"term de vulnerabile pentru a corecta piata activelor Ca
rezultat# o sc$imbare# intr&un colt relativ mic al sistemului financiar 'piata ()* a fost
suficienta sa clatine intreaga structura +semenea episoade au avut loc inainte 'e"
,aponia si tarile nordice la inceputul anilor 1990# si criza asiana#la sfarsitul anilor
1990* -ricum# de data aceasta este diferit# criza fiind globala asemanatoare cu
evenimente care au declansat .area !epresiune a anilor 1930 %n timp ce poate fi
potrivit sa consideram .area !epresiune ca cea mai buna referinta in ceea ce
priveste factorii financiali declansatori# ea a servit de asemenea ca o lectie %n
prezent# guvernele si bancile centrale sunt constiente de nevoia de a evita politica de
greseli care au fost comune la momentul acela# si in (/ si oriunde 0ancile au fost
evitate# politica monetara a fost facilitata in mod agresiv si guvernele au eliberat
stimuli fiscali substantiali )pre deosebire de e"perientele din timpul .arii !epresiuni#
tarile din /uropa si de oriunde nu au recurs la protectie in timpul anilor 1930 +ceasta
demonstreaza importanta coordonarii (/# c$iar daca criza furnizeaza o oportunitate
pentru un progres indepartat in aceasta privinta
%n primele ei stadii# criza s&a manifestat ca o lipsa acuta de lic$iditate printre
institutiile financiare cum ele au e"perimentat conditii tot mai acerbe de rasturnare a
datoriilor lor 'tipic pe termen scurt* %n aceasta faza ingri1orarile fata de solvabilitatea
financiara au crescut# dar un esec sistemic a fost putin probabil +ceasta perceptie s&
a sc$imbat in mod dramatic cand o investitie bancara ma1ora a () 'fratii 2e$mnan*
nu s&a ac$itat in septembrie 2008 %ncrederea s&a prabusit# investitorii au lic$idat
puternic pozitiile lor si pietele bursiere au a1uns in soc !e aici inainte economia (/ a
intrat in recesiune mai abrupta inregistrata inca din 1930 3ransmisia problemei
financiare la economia reala desfasurata la viteza record# cu limite de credit si
scaderea increderii lovind investitiile de afaceri si cererile de uz casnic# remarcabile
pentru bunurile de consum durabile3ransmisia transfrontaliera de asemenea e"trem
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de rapida# datorata legaturilor incordate in sistemul financiar si lantul de
aprovizionare pe pietele globale de produse (/# cu adevarat 4!5 este proiectata sa
micsoreze cu 4 6 in 2009# cea mai accentuata contractie din istoria sa )i# desi
semne ale unei refaceri incipiente abunda# aceasta se asteapta sa fie mai degraba
lenta# ca cererea va stagna datorita recuperarii datoriilor in intreaga economie
precum si a1ustari dureroase in structura industriala !aca politica nu se sc$imba
considerabil cresterea potentiala a productiei va suferi cat si parti ale capitalului stoc
sunt iesite din uz si cresterea aversiunii fata de risc va ridica formarea de capital si
78!
7ecesiunea activa in curs de desfasurare este asa de probabil sa lase urme
adanci si permanente pe performanta economiei si implica dificultatea sociala in mai
multe feluri 5ierderile de locuri de munca poate fi retinut de ceva timp de soma1
fle"ibil beneficiat de regimuri dar eventual impactul cresterii rapide a soma1ului va fi
simtit cu declinuri pe piata locuintelor 'constructiilor*care au loc in mod simultan
afectand 'in special e"trem de indatorate* gospodariile
5ozitia fiscala a guvernelor va continua sa deterioreze# nu numai din motive
ciclice# dar de asemenea intr&o maniera structurala ca ta"e de impozitare micsorate
pe o baza permanenta si eventuale datorii ale guvernelor care rezulta din a1utoarele
bancii se pot concretiza - intrebare desc$isa este daca criza va micsora stimulentii
pentru reforma structurala si astfel afecteaza negativ potentiala crestere mai departe
sau daca va aduce o oportunitate sa se intreprinda o politica de actiuni de anvergura
2. MARI PREOCUPARI POLITICE
Criza actuala a demonstrat importanta unui cadru coordonat pentru
conducerea crizei /a ar trebui sa contina urmatoarele 9blocuri de cladire:;
!e prevenirea a crizei pentru a impiedica o repetitie in viitor +ceasta ar trebui
fi planuita de un colectiv de $otarare comun ca sa se identifice care au fost
principalele cauze ale crizei si cum sc$imbarile in macroeconomie# cadruri politice de
recomandare si supravegere pot a1uta la prevenirea si reaparitia ei 5olitica pentru a
stimula posibila crestere economica si concurenta pot de asemenea sa sustina
capacitatea de adaptare a crizelor viitoare
!e control al crizei si atenuare pentru a minimaliza pagubele prevenind lipsuri
sistemice sau retinand pierderile productiei si facilitand dificultati sociale
dedeterminate recesiune -biectivul ei principal este deocamdata sa stabileasca
sistemul finaciar si economia reala in cel mai scurt timp 3rebuie sa fie coordonat prin
intermediul (/ pentru a stabili balanta corecta dintre preocuparile nationale si
e"cedentul de efecte care afecteaza celelalta state membre
!e rezolvarea a crizei sa aduca criza la un sfarsit aprope# la cel mai scazut
cost posibil pentru contribuabili pe timp ce limiteaza riscul sistemic si asigurand
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protectia consumatorului +ceasta cere intoarcerea .asuri temporare de spri1in cat
si actiuni da stabilire a economiilor pentru a sustine cresterea si ipoteci fiscale %ntre
alianta asta include politici sa stabileasca bilantele # retructurarea sectorului si o
iesire politica ordonata - strategie de iesire oronata din e"pansiunea
macroeconomica este de asemenea o parte esentiala a rezolvarii crizei
%nceputurile unui astfel de cadru iese la iveala construind pe institutii e"istente
si legislatie si complementate de noi initiative !ar bineinteles factorii de decizie
politica in /uropa nu au alta optiune decat sa ac$izitioneze mecanismele si
procedurile e"istente (n cadru pentru prevenirea crizei e"istente a aparut & cu
retrospectie& sa fie nedezvoltat& in caz contrar criza ar fi putut mai bine sa nu aiba
loc +celasi lucru a avut loc intr&o oarecare masura pentru cadrurile /( pentru
controlul si atenuarea crizei# in cele din urma la stadiile initiale ale crizei
!estul de natural# mai multe eforturi politice de a data au fost in urmarirea
controlului si reducerii crizei dar primii pasi au fost de asemenea luati pentru a
redefini reglarea si supraveg$erea financiara < in /uropa si oriunde < cu privire la
prevenirea crizei )pre deosebire +doptarea politicile de rezolvare a crizei nu au
inceput cu seriozitate inca +ceasta incepe acum urgent < nu in ultimul rand pentru
ca ar trebui sa stea la baza efectivitatii controlului politic prin impactul ei asupra
increderii
2.1. COTROLUL SI ATEUAREA CRIZEI
Constiente de riscul finaciar si economic sus&1os# bancile centrale si guvernele
in (/ s&au imbarcat intr&o masiva si coordonata actiune politica +1utorul financiar s&a
centrat pe reintegrarea lic$iditatii si a capitalului bancilor si prevederea garantiilor in
asa fel incat sa functioneze din nou 4arantiile depozitelor au crescut 0ancile
centrale au scos ratele intereselor politice pentru a preveni micsorarile si au dat
institutiilor financiare acces sa imprumute credite de ultima instanta 4uvernele au
asigurat facilitatile lic$idarii institutiilor financiare in pericol precum si impreuna cu
garantiile statului pe datoriile lor# curand urmate de implementari de capital si
afectarea reliefului
 0azate pe refacerea 5lanului /conomiei /( '//75* a fost eliberat un
stimul fiscal de 26 4!5 < din care 2 treimi sa fie implementate in 2009
si restul in 2010 in asa fel inact sa mentina cererea si sa diminueze
dificultatea sociala +ceste masuri in mare parte respectate au
concordat cu principii de a fi oportune si orientate benefic# desi sunt
preocupari ca in unele cazuri masurile nu au fost de un caracter
temporar si deci nu usor de anulat %n plus# 5actul de )tabilitate si
Crestere a fost aplicat intr&o maniera fle"ibila si sustinatoare# asa ca in
mai multe )tate .embre stabilizatorii fiscali au fost permisi sa
actioneze liber !ispersia stimulului fiscal in )tatele .embre a fost
substantiala# dar acesta este general < si potrivit < in acord cu
diferentele in ceea ce priveste nevoile lor si camera de manevra fiscala
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%n plus pentru a evita distrugerea care nu e necesara si ireversibila a
capitalului 'uman si antreprenorial* sustinerea a fost prevazuta sa
loveasca tare dar industriile viabile cat si drepturile au fost permise pe o
perioad temporara # (/ luand conducerea in dezvoltarea fractiunii de
norma de soma1 pe modelul pietelor politice de munca in timpul crizei
(/ a 1ucat un rol important in asigurarea conducerii in felul cum statul
a1uta politica < incluzand sectorul financiar < poate fi format in asa fel
incat sa asigure respect regulilor competitiei 5e deasupra (/ a
asigurat balantei de plati de asistenta asociata cu %.= si 0anca
.ondiala pentru )tatele .embre in /uropa Centrala si de /st ca si
acestea au fost e"puse la anularea flu"ului de capital international
 %n final suportul direct (/ pentru activitatea economica asigurat prin
cresterea substantiala a imprumutului suportat de 0anca /( de
%nvestitii si a accelerat platile resurselor structurale
 +cestea controale ale crizei si&au atins in mare parte obiectivele !esi
balantele bancare sunt inca vulnerabile cu maai mari ipoteci si riscul de
neplata al creditelor nu au fost lipsuri ale institutiilor financiare ma1ore in
/uropa si stocurile pietelor au fost refacute Cu dobanzile ratelor pe
termen scurt aproape de zero si politici monetare 9non&conventional:
marind lic$iditate problema pe piata creditelor interbancare a scazut
)timulul fiscal dovedeste efectivitatea relativa din pricina lic$idarii si
creditele constrang acoperirea si afacerilor in mediul curent
Contragerea economica a fost infranta si numarul 1ob&urilor continute in
raport cu dimensiunea de contractie economica
2.2 REZOL!AREA CRIZEI
%n timp ce este inca o incertitudine ma1ora care incon1oara ritmul refacerii
economice acum este essential ca strategiilede iesire ale controlului politic al
crizei sa fie formate si facute deasemenea +cesta este necesar atat pentru a
asigura ca actiunile curente sa aiba efectele dorite cat si pentru a asigura
stabilitatea macroeconomica +vand o strategie de iesire nu include anuntarea
unui calendar fi"at pentru urmatoarele miscari# dar mai de graba sa defineasca
aceste miscari# incluzand directia lor si conditiile care trebuie indeplinite pentru
realizarea lor )trategiile de iesire au nevoie sa fie in spatiu pentru politici
financiare# macroeconomice si structurale asemenea;
 5olitici financiare - prima prioritate este sa reintegreze'redea
viabilitatea sectorului de finante* %n caz contrar un cerc vicios al
cresterii slabe# mai multe probleme in sectorul financiar si c$iar
constrangeri puternice de credit ar opri refacerea economica-bligatii
clare sa restructureze si sa consolideze sectorul de finante poate fi pus
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la loc acum daca# o decada precum in ,aponia este pe cale sa fie
permisa in /uropa 4uvernele pot spera ca sistemul financiar va depasi
problemele si ca iesirea din suportul de finante ar fi relativ egal !ar atat
timp cat ramane o lipsa de transparenta ca si valoarea bunurilor
financiare si vulnerabilitatea lor cu privire la dezvoltarea economica si
financiara# nesiguranta ramane %n acest conte"t# opozitia in mai multe
banci de a dezvalui adevarata stare a bilanturilor lor sau sa e"ploateze
conditiile de castig foarte favorabile induse de suportul politic pentru a
repara bilanturile lor este o problema /ste important atat ca repararea
financiara sa fie facuta la cel mai scazut cost posibil pentru ta"ele
platnicilor pe termen lung# nu doar sa castige spri1in politic# dar de
asemenea sa asigure sustinerea finantelor publice si sa evite o crestere
permanta in povara ta"ei> 7efacerea financiara este atat de esentiala
sa asigure o rata satisfactorie a cresterii potentiale < nu doar pentru ca
inovatia depinde de disponibilitatea riscului financiar
 5olitici macroeconomice )timulul macroeconomic < monetar si fiscal <
a fost folosit intensiv 5reocuparea pentru bancile centrale si guverne
este acum sa continue sa asigure spri1in economiei si sectorului
financiar fara sa compromita stabilitatea obiectivelor in termen mediu
%n timp ce retragerea stimulului monetar ramane inca some ?a@ off
0ancile centrale in /( sunt determinate sa desfaca atitudinea
supportive a politicilor monetare odata ce presiunea inflatiei incepe sa
creasca 5ana la acel punct o strategie de iesire credibila pentru
politica fiscala terbuie sa fie ferma pe loc pentru a pre&elibera presiunea
in guverne # sa amane sau sa call off consolidarea finantelor publice
)trategia de iesire fiscala ar putea preciza conditiile pentrtu retragerea
stimulului si trebuie sa fie credibila# ie bazata pe reforme pre&comise a
programelor si ancorate in cadruri fiscale nationale 7etragerea stimului
fiscal sub //75 va fi cvasi automata in 2010&2011# dar trebuie sa fie
continuata de o foarte substantiala& totusi diferentiata intre )tatele
.embre < conditii fiscale care sa anuleze tendintele negative in datoria
publica (n amestec de c$eltuieli limiteaza si cresterile ta"ei trebuie sa
fie urmate# c$iar daca acesta este solicitat intr&un mediu unde confictele
de repartizare sunt pe cale sa apara Calitatea finantelor publice#
incluzand impactul ei asupra stimulilor de munca si eficienta
economica# in mare este o problema ma1ora
 5olitici structurale C$iar mai important pentru criza financiara#
cresterea potentiala a productiei a fost asteptata sa in1umatateasca la
apro"imativ mai putin de 16 aproape d 2020 due to t$e populatie
batrana !ar asemenea crestere a ratelor potential scazuta este
probabil sa fie inregistarta de1a in anii urmatori in timpul crizei !e notat
ca este important sa se refaca decisiv cel mai lung termen de viabilitate
a sectorului de finante astfel incat sa a1ute productivitatea si potentiala
crestere !ar asta nu va multumi si eforturile sunt deasemenea
necesare in aria structural politica propriu&zisa - strategie serioasa ar
trebui sa includa iesirea din masuri temporare spri1inind sectoarele
particulare si pastrarea 1ob&urilor si rezistenta adoptiei sau e"pansiunea
planurilor proiectelor pentru a retrage oferta de munca !incolo de
aceste obiective defensive# politicile structurale ar trebui sa include o
revizuire a sistemelor de protectie sociala cu accentual pe prevenirea
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soma1ului persistent promovarea unei vieti de munca mai lunga %n plus
reforma pietei muncii in acord cu fle"icuritatea < abordare bazata de
asemenea sa a1ute evitarea e"perientelor crizelor trecute cand efectele
isteriei au condus la sustinerea perioadei foarte ridicate de soma1 si
e"cluderea permanenta unor forte de munca 7eformele productiei
pietei in acord cu prioritatea strategiei 2isabonieni 'implementarea unui
singur program de piata in special in aria serviciilor# masuri pentru a
reduce sarcini administrative si sa promoveze 76! si inovatia*vor fi de
asemenea c$eia pentru a creste productivitatea si crearea de noi
posibilitati de anga1are 3ranzitia la economia carbunelui inferior ar
putea fi urmata prin integrarea obiectivelor de mediu si instrumente in
alegerile structural politice# impozite notabile %n toate aceste arii#
politicile care suporta un cost bugetar scazut ar putea fi prioritare
2." PRE!EIREA CRIZEI
(n consens mai larg se pare ca sunt ultimele cauze ale crizei rezidate din
functionarea pietelor publice# cat si din dezvoltarile macroeconomice %nainte ca criza
sa apara a fost o puternica credinta ca instabilitatea macroeconomica fusese
eradicata %nflatia scazuta si stabila cu cresterea economica sustinuta '.area
.oderare* au considerat a fi trasaturi permanente ale economiilor dezvolatate
+ceasta nu a fost suficient de apreciata incat a datorat mult dezimflatiei globale
asociate cu conditiile ofertelor favorabile provocate de integrarea surplusului de
munca al economiilor aparute# in specific in C$ina# in lumea economiei +ceasta a
sugerat un monetar rezervant si politici fiscale Conditiile financiare care rezista au
avut de asemeanea originile macroeconomice si acestea au tins sa interactioneze cu
mediul macroeconomic favorabil 2ista factorilor contributive este lunga incluzand
dezvoltarea comple"elor < dar supraveg$eate prost& productiile financiare si
asumarea riscurilor e"cesivelor pe termen scurt
5revenirea crizei politice ar putea aborda aceste deficienta pentru a evita repetarea
in viitor /"ista din nou agende pentru politici financiale# macroeonomice si structural
1 5olitici financiare +genda pentru reglarea si supraveg$erea crizei pietelor
financiare in (/ este vasta (n numar de initiative au fost luate de1a# in timp
ce in unele arii eforturi ma1ore sunt inca necesare 5lanuri de actiune au fost
puse inainte de (/ pentru a intari cadrul reglatoriu in acord cu agenda
reglatorie 420 Cu ma1oritatea bunurilor financiare pastrate de bancile
transfrontaliere# o reforma ambitioasa a sistemului /uropean de
supraveg$ere# bazata pe o recomandare facuta de 4rupul de %nalt Aivel
prezidat de .r ,acBues de 2arosiere# este in discutie %nitiative pentru a obtine
renumeratii politice mai bune# coverage reglatorie a surselor $edge si resurse
private egale sunt considerate dar mai au inca pana sa fie legislate %n multe
arii progresul este in urma 7eglarea pentru a asigura atat de multe provizii si
capitalul sa fie pus de&o parte pentru a face fata la dificultatea timpului
necesita sa fie dezvoltata cu cadrele 1ustificate sa se desfasoare in aceeasi
directie (n anumit grad de comunalitate si consistenta printre regula cartii in
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)tatele .embre este importanta o singura regula a cartii# pe cat mai curand
posibil de dorit /ste esential ca o stabilitate bancara viguroasa si efectiva si
fermitatea cadrului este dezvoltata sa guverneze ceea ce se intampla cu
conducerea esueaza# incluzand depozitele effective de productie Consistenta
si claritatea printre tarile (/ in legatura cu problemele in astfel de institutii este
o c$eie necessara a unui cadru operational si reglatoriu mai mult improvizat in
cadrul tarilor (/
2 5olitici macroeconomice 4uvernele in multe )tate .embre (/ risca o
politica fiscala rezervanta in Ctimpurile bune: care au precedat criza !esi
aceasta nu poate fi vazuta ca principalul vinovat al crizei si poate fi factorul in
producerea in viitor a uneia < subminand sustinerea pe termen mai lung a
finantelor publice in fata imbatranirii populatiei +gendele politice pentru a
preveni asemenea comportament ar trebui se fie atat de proeminente
3- c$emare puternica catre coordonarea /(
,ustificare pentru coordonarea /( a politicii in fata crizei financiare este
puternica la toate trei stadiile < control si atenuare# rezolvare si prevenire;
 2a etapa de control si atenuare a crizei# factorii de decizie politica /( a
devenit e"treme de constienta ca asistenta financiara de tarile de origine a
institutiilor lor financiare si e"tensiilor unilaterale a depozitului de garantii
determina mari si posibile efecte ale e"cedentelor de perturbari +ceasta
conduce la summit&ul de urgenta a Consiliului /uropean la Deads of )tate
2evel in toamna anului 2008 < pentru prima data in istorie de asemenea
pentru /urogroup < sa coordoneze aceste miscari 7olul Comisiei la
aceasta etapa a fost sa asigure indrumare in asa fel incat sa asigure ca
a1utoarele financiare ating obiectivele lor cu denaturari minime ale
competitiei si abundente negative )timulul fiscal de asemenea a depasit
efectele spillover printre pietele comerciale si financiare /fectele de
revarsare sunt inca puternice in aria /uro prin transmisia raspunsurilor
politicii monetare //75 adoptat in noiembrie 2008# care a fost definit un
cadru efectiv pentru coordonarea stimulului fiscal si controlul crizei politice
pe larg# a fost motivate de recunoasterea acestor spilovers
 2a etapa de rezolvarea a crizei o abordare coordonata este necesara sa
asigure o iesire ordonata a controlului crizei politice peste )tatele .embre
)&ar putea sa nu se fi avut in vedere ca toate guvernele )tatelor .embre
ies in acelasi timp ' ca si cum asta ar fi putut fi dictat de circumstante
nationale specifice* !ar aceasta poate fi important ca a1utorul statelor
pentru institutiile financiare 'sau alte industrii afectate sever * sa nu
persiste pentru mult timp decat este necesar in ceea ce priveste implicatiile
sale pentru competitie si functionarea unei )ingure 5iete /( )trategiile
nationale pentru pentru o revenire la durabilitatea fiscala poate fi
coordonata la fel de bine # pentru fiecare cadru care e"ista in forma
)tabilitatii 5actul Cresterii care a fost creat sa abordeze riscurile spilover
de la inceput ,ustificarile pentru coordonarea politicilor structurale au fost
precizate in )trategia 2isaboniana si aplicat de asemenea la iesirile din
interventie temporara in piata productiei si a muncii in fata crizei
 2a etapa de prevenire a crizei pentru coordonare /( este mai de graba
drep inainte in ceea ce priveste gradul ridicat al integrarii financiale si
economice !e e"emplu# o reforma reglatorie orientata pentru prevenirea
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crizei# poate conduce la un arbitra1 reglatoriu care va afecta alegerea
locatiilor institutiilor si poate sc$imba directia flu"ului de capital
international 3otusi# cu multe institutii financiale operand transfrontalier
e"ista un proces clar de sc$imb de informatie si impartirea sarcinilor in caz
de lipsuri
Criza financiara a consolidat procesul pentru coordonarea economic politica in
/( Coordonand crizele lor politice )tatele .embre au ridicat credibilitatea
masurilor luate# si asta a1uta sa redea incredrea si suportul refacerii in termen
scurt Coordonarea poate de asemenea sa fie cruciala pentru a se ingri1i de
protectionism si acesta serveste ca o garantie a 5ietii (nice 3otusi#
coordonarea este necesara sa asigure o functionare buna in aria /uro unde
revarsarea politicilor nationale sunt foarte puternice )i coordonarea asigura
stimuli la nivel national pentru a implementa cresterea prietenoasa a politicilor
economice si sa coordoneze o intoarcere la sustinerea fiscala (ltimul dar nu
cel din urma# coordonarea politicilor e"terne poate contribui la o mai rapida
solutie a crizei financiare si refacerea globala
)tructurile /( pentru coordonare de1a e"ista in multe arii si pot fi dezvoltate in
continuare in unele %n anumite arii /( are o responsabilitate directa si
aceasta este cea mai mare autoritate in 1urisdictia ei +ceste este procesul
pentru politica monetara remarcabila in aria euro# competitie si politica si
negocieri comerciale in cadrul !-D+ 7ound +ceasta se dovedeste acum mai
folositoare ca oricand %n alte arii coordonarea cadrurilor /( cu susul in 1os a
fost dezvoltata si poate fi e"ploatata la ma"im (rmarile unei agende reglatorii
si supervizorii implica set&up unui nou cadru de coordonare /( care a fost
intarziat in vederea integrarii sistemelor financiale (n cadru important pentru
coordonarea politicilor fiscale e"ista sub aegis )tabilitatii si 5actului de
crestere )trategia 2isaboniana reinnoita ar putea servi ca cel mai important
cadru pentru coordonarea politicilor structurale in /( 0alanta de plati a
asistentei asigurata de /( in alta arie unde un cadru coordonat a fost stabilit
recent# si care poate fi e"ploatat de asemenea pentru coordonarea politicilor in
scopul convergence economice
2a nivel global# in final# /u poate oferi un cadru pentru coordonarea pozitiilor
in 420 sau %.= Cu () adoptand propria sa strategie de iesire# presiunea sa
creasca cererea oriunde va fi mounting %nfluentele cer ca tarile emergente
precum C$ina sa reduca politica ratei de sc$imb /( va fi mult mai efectiva
daca de asemenea considera cum politicile pot contribui la o crestere mult mai
ec$ilibrata in lumea intreaga# considerand procesul de spri1inire cu reforme
structurale# in asa fel incat sa ridice productivitatea potentiala 5rin urmare# /(
va ar putea facilita scopurile agendei sale influentand euro si participand la
baza unei singure pozitii
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