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Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

REVISION SHEET


Rev. Reason Page(s)
This FMEA document supersedes the FMEA report GM-670-170-R01_Rev2
1 Update of old FMEA Whole report



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TABLE OF CONTENTS
1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................................ 6
1.1 General ........................................................................................................................... 6
1.2 Scope of Work ................................................................................................................ 6
1.3 Reference Standards ....................................................................................................... 6
1.4 Objective ........................................................................................................................ 7
1.5 Definition of DP Class 3 ................................................................................................ 8
1.6 Vessel Particular ............................................................................................................. 9
2 SUMMARY ..................................................................................................................... 11
2.1 General ......................................................................................................................... 11
3 ABBREVATION ............................................................................................................ 13
4 GENERAL LAYOUT .................................................................................................... 15
4.1 General ......................................................................................................................... 15
4.2 Cable Routing ............................................................................................................... 15
4.3 Effect of Fire & Flooding Protection ........................................................................... 18
4.4 Communications ........................................................................................................... 19
5 POWER GENERATION .............................................................................................. 20
5.1 General ......................................................................................................................... 20
5.2 Generators G1, G2 and G3 ........................................................................................... 20
5.3 Generators G4 and G5 .................................................................................................. 21
5.4 Thruster Engine and Generator .................................................................................... 22
6 POWER DISTRIBUTION ............................................................................................ 24
6.1 General ......................................................................................................................... 24
6.2 460V Distribution ......................................................................................................... 26
6.3 230V Distribution ......................................................................................................... 28
6.4 Uninterrupted Power Supply unit, UPS ....................................................................... 30
7 POWER, AUTOMATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS ............................................... 31
7.1 General ......................................................................................................................... 31
7.2 Diesel Generators Control System ............................................................................... 31
7.3 Integrated Automation System ..................................................................................... 32
7.4 Thruster Engines Control System ................................................................................ 37
7.5 Generator Protection .................................................................................................... 37
7.6 Thruster Control System, HELICON ........................................................................... 38
7.7 Clutch Control .............................................................................................................. 40
7.8 Tunnel Thrusters Control System ................................................................................ 41
7.9 Emergency Stop System ............................................................................................... 42
7.10 Fire Switch ................................................................................................................... 42
8 FUEL OIL SYSTEMS ................................................................................................... 43
8.1 General ......................................................................................................................... 43
8.2 Fuel Oil System Diesel Generators .............................................................................. 44
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8.3 Fuel Oil System Thruster Engines ............................................................................... 45
8.4 Quick Closing Valves ................................................................................................... 45
9 COOLING WATER SYSTEMS ................................................................................... 46
9.1 General ......................................................................................................................... 46
9.2 Cooling System Generators .......................................................................................... 46
9.3 Cooling System Thruster Engines ................................................................................ 47
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10 LUBRICATION SYSTEMS .......................................................................................... 49
10.1 General ......................................................................................................................... 49
10.2 Lubrication system Diesel Generators ......................................................................... 49
10.3 Lubrication System Thruster Engines .......................................................................... 49
10.4 Lubrication System Gear/ Clutch ................................................................................. 50
11 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM .................................................................................... 51
11.1 General ......................................................................................................................... 51
11.2 Starting Air System to Generators ............................................................................... 51
11.3 Starting Air System to Thruster Engines ...................................................................... 52
11.4 Service air system ......................................................................................................... 53
12 VENTILATION ............................................................................................................. 54
12.1 General description ...................................................................................................... 54
12.2 Ventilation & AC Units ................................................................................................ 54
13 THRUSTERS .................................................................................................................. 56
13.1 General ......................................................................................................................... 56
13.2 Azimuth Thrusters ........................................................................................................ 56
13.3 Tunnel Thrusters .......................................................................................................... 58
14 DP CONTROL SYSTEMS ............................................................................................ 59
14.1 General ......................................................................................................................... 59
14.2 Operator Stations .......................................................................................................... 61
14.3 DP Computers and Network ........................................................................................ 62
14.4 DP Control Modes and Functions ................................................................................ 63
14.5 DP Sensors ................................................................................................................... 65
14.6 Position Reference Systems ......................................................................................... 68
14.7 DP Control System Power Supply ............................................................................... 74
15 FAILURE ANALYSIS – “SEVEN POLARIS” ........................................................... 75
15.1 Configuration and assumptions .................................................................................... 75
15.2 Failure Analysis – Fire & Flooding .............................................................................. 77
15.3 Failure Analysis - Power Generation ........................................................................... 79
15.4 Failure Analysis - Power Distribution .......................................................................... 81
15.5 Failure Analysis – Power Automation and Propulsion Control ................................... 86
15.6 Failure Analysis - Fuel Oil System .............................................................................. 95
15.7 Failure Analysis - Cooling Water Systems .................................................................. 99
15.8 Failure Analysis - Lube Oil Systems .......................................................................... 103
15.9 Failure Analysis - Compressed Air System ............................................................... 107
15.10 Failure Analysis - Ventilation ................................................................................ 110
15.11 Failure Analysis – Propulsion System ................................................................... 111
15.12 Failure Analysis - DP Control System ................................................................... 115
16 REFERENCES ............................................................................................................. 122

APPENDIX A Text
APPENDIX B Text
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1 INTRODUCTION
1.1 General
1.1.1 Global Maritime A/S received instructions from Mr. Julien Manach of Subsea
7 to carry out the scope of work listed below for the vessel Seven Polaris.
1.2 Scope of Work
1.2.1 The scope of work consists of:
 Update the FMEA, with new power management system.
 Prepare the Annual DP Trials.
 Witness the trials and report any findings.
 Produce a final report for the Annual Trials including the DP control
system and all related vessel equipment including the trial findings.
1.3 Reference Standards
1.3.1 Global Maritime AS is verifying the systems and design towards the regulation
“IMO 1994 Guidelines for Vessels with Dynamic Positioning Systems (IMO
1994 MSC/Circ. 645)”for vessel to comply with guidelines for IMO DP class
III (3).
1.3.2 IMCA Guidelines for the Design and Operation of DP Vessels, rev1,
December 2007.
1.3.3 The FMEA is carried out in accordance with industry, IMO and IMCA
guidelines relating to DP Class 3 vessels.
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1.4 Objective
1.4.1 The objective of the FMEA is to provide a complete, systematic and
documented investigation of the dynamic positioning systems of the vessel.
This means to identify the failures and their effects on the vessels position
keeping performance. Based on the analysis, possible recommendations will be
made to improve the performance or the safety of the vessel.
1.4.2 The FMEA is an independent document containing a system description of the
DP system including propulsion systems, steering systems, thruster systems,
machinery systems, electrical systems, alarm and control systems.
1.4.3 The Vessel is classed by BV with the following notation:
I 3/3 (E)
Offshore Service Unit/ Pipe Laying Barge/ AP
Deep Sea
PDY MA TA RS
AUT CC
1.4.4 The notation PDY MA TA RS is corresponding to IMO MSC/ Circ. 645
Guideline as the vessel is a class 3 vessel. The essential feature of the DP class
3 philosophies is to identify the worst single failure that can occur within the
total system of the dynamic positioning of the vessel, without losing station
keeping capabilities, fire and flooding in compartments included. I.e. a loss of
position is not to occur in the event of a single fault in any “active or static“
component or system, fire and flooding in compartment included. By the term
“active” component, it is defined generators, thrusters, switchboards, remote
controlled valves, coolers etc. and “static” component are like cables, pipes
manual valves etc.
1.4.5 The FMEA is limited to specific failure conditions of individual components
and the subsequent effect on the overall position keeping of the vessel. If not
evident, procedures are assumed to ensure that inherent redundancy is
available and used correctly.
1.4.6 It is assumed that the electrical switchboard and distribution system is designed
in accordance with Regulation relating to Maritime Electrical Installations.
1.4.7 System drawings/ illustrations included in this report is not accurate and is
included to simplify the understanding of the various systems, and should
therefore be seen as such.
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1.5 Definition of DP Class 3
1.5.1 Quote from IMO MSC Circ. 645 for DP classes


























1.5.2 As per IMO MSC Circ. 645 DP class 3 the vessel must be designed and
commissioned to comply with the following basic rules:
 Automatic and manual position and heading control under specified
maximum environmental conditions, during and following any single fault
including loss of a compartment due to fire or flood.
 Three independent computer systems with a separate back-up system must
be installed and separated by A60 class division. The cabling must be
arranged in such a way that loss of one compartment (fire or flood) will
still allow control of the thrusters.
 At least three different position references and three sets of sensors (MRU,
wind sensor, gyrocompass) must be provided. Of these, the third reference
system and the third set of sensors must be provided for the back-up
system.
 The generators and the distribution systems must be arranged in different
compartments separated by A60 class division.
2.2 The equipment classes are defined by their worst case failure modes as
follows:

.2 For equipment class 2, a loss of position is not to occur in the event of
a single fault in any active component or system. Normally static
components will not be considered to fail where adequate protection
from damage is demonstrated, and reliability is to the satisfaction of
the Administration., Single failure criteria include:

.1 Any active component or system (generators, thrusters,
switchboards, remote controlled valves. etc.).

.2 Any normally static component (cables, pipes, manual valves,
etc.) which is not properly documented with respect to
protection and reliability.

.3 For equipment class 3, a single failure includes:

.1 Items listed above for class 2, and any normally static
component is assumed to fail

.2 All components in any one watertight compartment, from fire
or flooding.

.3 All components in any one fire sub-division, from fire or
flooding (for cables see also 3.5.1).

2.3 For equipment classes 2 and 3, a single inadvertent act should be
considered as a single fault if such an act is reasonably probable.
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 The physical separation of generators, thrusters and DP control systems
plays an essential part to classify a vessel as class 3. Cable routes and the
location of cable terminations have to be considered with respect to fire
and water damage in each compartment.
1.6 Vessel Particular
1.6.1 The vessel Seven Polaris is an Offshore Service Unit / Lay Barge operated by
Subsea 7 and the owner is Class 3 Shipping Ltd.
1.6.2 The vessel was built in 1979 at Mitsui Ocean Development as Yard S133.
Previous names are DLB Polaris (87), Seaway Polaris (2000), Acergy Polaris
(2006) and Seven Polaris (2012)
1.6.3 The bridge and accommodation is located forward and accommodation is also
provided within the hull on Quarters deck. The barge is fitted with an S-lay
pipe laying system and a 1500T Clyde fully revolving crane on aft centre.
Main power generation and other machinery systems are located in Hold Deck.
In addition there are two generators and a switchboard located in the crane
pedestal, which are also included in the main power generation.
1.6.4 Vessel Particulars:
Length (Loa): 137,6 m
Length (Lpp): 137,16 m
Breadth(mld): 39 m
Operating Draft on DP 5,5 to 6 m
Design Draught 9,5 m
Crew 266 Persons
Deck Cargo 5000 Tons
Displacement 28700 Tons
Call Sign HO2654
IMO No.: 8756772
Nationality/ Flag PAN
Port of Registry: Panama
1.6.5 The vessel is equipped with a power generation system consisting in total of
five main diesel generators named G1 to G5. These engines are divided among
the two generator rooms. The one on Hold deck includes three generators and
two are placed in the Crane pedestal. The emergency generator with an
emergency switchboard and auto start facilities is installed in the emergency
generator room.
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1.6.6 The main propulsion drive is by four azimuth thrusters, each are driven directly
with by an engine via a gearbox. The thrusters with engine and all related
auxiliary systems are located in respective thruster rooms. The thrusters are
self-sustained with power; this is achieved by a PTO generator.
1.6.7 In addition there are two tunnel thrusters fitted in separate water tight
compartments, one fore and aft centre of the vessel. These thrusters are
powered from the main switchboard (MS4). A single failure causing loss of
either or both can be “ignored” as there are four totally independent main
azimuth thruster fitted. The thrusters have a slight influence on the heading
ability and the weather window will increase with the tunnel thrusters
connected.
1.6.8 The thruster numbering and assignment to switchboard are illustrated in Figure
1-1 below:
T6
T4
T3
Switchboard MS4
T2
T1
T5

Figure 1-1: Thruster numbering and assignment to switchboard

1.6.9 The DP control system comprises of a Kongsberg Maritime SDP-21 and a
SDP-11 system. Three individual UPS’s powers the various related DP
systems. The DP system was updated during dry docking in 2008, among
others are new controllers (SBC500), software change from NT to XP and new
DP reference systems and sensors were fitted.
Fwd
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2 SUMMARY
2.1 General
2.1.1 Global Maritime AS has performed an upgrade of the existing Failure Mode
and Effects Analysis (FMEA) of the vessel “Seven Polaris” to reflect the new
changes that are to be made while the vessel is undergoing a ten year dry-dock
survey.
2.1.2 This FMEA document supersedes the FMEA report GM-670-170-R01_Rev2,
made by Global Maritime.
2.1.3 The complete FMEA proving trials program can be found in report GM-712-
059-R002_1, last DP trials.
2.1.4 The FMEA report is based upon that during DP operations all thrusters will be
running, that the vessel will be able to keep position after loss of either one of
the main thrusters or of both T5 and T6, and that there are no external
operational loads applied to the vessel.
2.1.5 Both tunnel thrusters can be lost as a single failure can cause simultaneously
loss of them both. Failure of one or both tunnel thrusters will not give a great
impact on the station keeping performance as the vessel does have four main
azimuth thrusters, placed in separate thruster rooms.
2.1.6 All four azimuth thrusters are individual and independent of each other. Only
common is the FO from the settling tank to the individual day tanks and the IO
cards. Each day tank has a capacity of 5m
3
and continues filling off all tanks
are done. A failure causing stop in filling the day tanks will still give sufficient
time to secure and abandon the on-going operation.
2.1.7 The main power plant is for tunnel thrusters and all vessel service systems.
Each Azimuth thruster has its own power generator with a possible backup
from the main power plant. Therefore a single failure causing a blackout of
main power plant will not cause loss of azimuth thrusters; however DP related
consumers will change over to backup supply (UPS).
2.1.8 There are several single failures that can cause loss of an azimuth thruster;
however such a failure will be for that particular thruster only.
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2.1.9 The worst case fire scenario is fire in control room A and loss of DPC21
cabinet and or main thruster control panel. Procedures are in place that in event
of fire the DPO shall take control from control room B.
2.1.10 Worst single system failure defined should be loss of two azimuth thrusters
and one tunnel thruster. This failure scenario will not cause loss of station
keeping ability. Complete list of I/O configuration can be found in Appendix
A.
2.1.11 Failure analysis in review of a fire or flooding based on the provided
information and observation made should not exceed worst case failure if
procedures implemented are followed. Each azimuth thruster is in its own
compartment, cabling is to be split and will cause loss of one network only.
Fire in control room A will be the most critical if the DPO does not take
control from control room B in time.
2.1.12 Based on the FMEA proving trials results the following can be stated as worst
case scenarios:
a) Worst single mechanical or electrical failure that can occur will result in
loss of an azimuth thruster only or loss of both tunnel thrusters.
b) A failure of the main power plant or emergency switchboard will affect the
DP system by causing loss of main power to the UPS’s they are powered
through. DP UPS’s have the possibility to be powered from either main or
emergency switchboard.
c) A single failure in the DP control system can cause simultaneously loss of
two azimuth thrusters and a tunnel thruster. This is being a result of failure
of I/O card where the thruster signals are handled. The powering to the
Galvanic isolation units are also configured in pairs, though only one fuse
is for two azimuth thrusters, being fuse F1 at X15A. Loss of power to
galvanic isolator results in loss of thruster in DP too. In both cases two
azimuth thrusters on same side will be lost.
2.1.13 On the basis of compliance with IMO 1994 MSC/Circ. 645 ‘Guidelines for
vessels with dynamic positioning system’ and the correction of any unexpected
results listed as ‘A’ recommendations, the vessel is considered fit for the
purpose of carrying out DP operations within it’s known operational
limitations. The FMEA proving trials and any recommendations are to be
found in report GM-712-059-R002_1, last DP trials. The vessel should be
operated in accordance with the provisions of the Marine DP Operations
Manual.
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3 ABBREVATION
AC Air Condition
Accom Accommodation
AHU Air Handling Unit
AUTOPOS Auto Positioning (DP terminology)
Aux. Auxiliary
AVR Automatic Voltage Regulator
BU Back Up
BV Bureau Veritas
Cab. Cabinet
CMID Common Marine Inspection Document
CP Controllable Pitch
CPU Controllable Processor Unit
Ctlr. Controller
Deg Degrees
DG# Diesel Generator
DGPS Differential Global Positioning System
DP Dynamic Positioning
DPO Dynamic Positioning Operator
DPC Dynamic Positioning Computer or Cabinet
ECR Engine Control Room
ER Engine Room
FMEA Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
FO Fuel Oil
FP Fixed Pitch
FW Fresh Water
Fwd Forward
G# Diesel Generator
GM Global Maritime
GPS Global Positioning System
GS Emergency Generator
HiPAP High Precision Acoustic Positioning
HPU Hydraulic Power Unit
HT High Temperature
HTFW High Temperature Fresh Water
IALA International Association of Lighthouse Authorities
IAS Integrated Alarm System
IMCA International Marine Contractors Association
I/O In/ Out (signal terminology)
IMO International Maritime Organization
KM Kongsberg Maritime
SDP Kongsberg Dynamic Positioning system
kW kilo Watt
kVA kilo Volt Ampere
LAN Local Area Network
LAL Level Alarm Low
LALL Level Alarm Low-low
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LBL Long Base Line
LO Lube Oil
LT Low Temperature
LTFW Low Temperature Fresh Water
LWT Light Weight Tautwire
MDO Marine Diesel Oil
MRU Motion Reference Unit
MS# Main Switchboard
NDU Network Distribution Unit
OS Operator Station
PCU Process Control Unit
PMS Power Management
PS Port Side
PSU Power Supply Unit
PTO Power Take Out
QCV Quick Closing Valve
RPM Revolutions per Minute
SB Starboard Side
SW Sea Water
SWBD Switchboard
T# Thruster number
TCC Thruster Control Cabinet
TCV Temperature Control Valve
TBA To Be Announced
Thr. Thruster
USBL Ultra Short Base Line
UPS Uninterrupted Power Supply
VMS Vessel Monitoring System
VRS Vertical Reference System

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4 GENERAL LAYOUT
4.1 General
4.1.1 The vessel consists of four Decks being:
 Plan View
 Main Deck
 Quarter Deck
 Hold Plan
4.2 Cable Routing
4.2.1 In general all cables (power, DP, K-Chief etc.) that have to be routed from one
compartment to another have to be segregated between the redundant systems.
4.2.2 All bushings where cables are going through shall be packed in accordance to
regulations, to maintain A-60 segregation. Where the cabling is crossing into
the other DP zone, the cables are put in A-60 insulated cable ducts.
4.2.3 Cabling for the SDP21 is called the main control cabling. This cabling from
control room A to all six thrusters, the HiPAP 1 and the HIPAP 2 is all routed
through a common cable way in the centre of the vessel.
4.2.4 Cabling from the SDP11 is called emergency control cabling. This cabling is
routed from Control Room B to the thrusters in two groups. The first group
emergency cabling runs to thrusters 2 and 4, the HIPAP and the HPR via the
port side of the vessel. The second connects to thrusters 1, 3, 5 and 6 via the
starboard side of the vessel.
4.2.5 The purpose of the split in main and emergency cabling is to ensure that if a
fire or fault occurs anywhere on the main cabling, emergency control over all
thrusters can always be restored. This purpose has been met. A consequence of
this split must also be that a fire or fault in emergency cabling should not cause
loss of DP capability either. The current design is such that control will remain
from room A, and this is satisfactory. Note that operators should be aware of
the cable routing so that they will not attempt to switch over to control room B
when the emergency cables are on fire.
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4.2.6 A principle layout of the DP system is shown below:
DPC-21 DPC-11
2 x Wind 2x Wind
3x MRU 2x MRU
2x Gyro 2x Gyro
DGPS 1
DGPS 3 Fanbeam
HiPAP 1
HiPAP 2
DGPS 2
Tautwire
DP Net A Routing DP Net B Routing
Main DP Backup DP
Isolator
Spiltter
Spiltter

Figure 4-1: Layout of DP system
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4.2.7 A principle layout of the DP network is shown below:

T
6
T
4
T
3

S
w
i
t
c
h
b
o
a
r
d

M
S
4
T
2
T
1
T
5
Main DP net A
Backup DP net B
H
i
P
A
P

1
H
i
P
A
P

2
Control room A
Main DP
Control room B
Backup DP

Figure 4-2: Layout of DP network

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4.3 Effect of Fire & Flooding Protection
4.3.1 The thruster rooms are segregated and there are bulkheads and open spaces/
tanks between these compartments equal to A60 segregation. The doors to the
different compartments are all combined Fire (A-60) and Flooding doors.
4.3.2 A fire in control room A or in the safety control room could damage remote
safety stop cabling to all thruster room fire dampers. As a result from this all
four main thrusters could be lost.
4.3.3 The cable way in the centre of the vessel contains no equipment aside the
cables themselves. A fire here could cause loss of control over T5 and T6, the
both HIPAP(s), and normal (SDP21) control over thrusters T1 to 4. Running
thrusters may stop or declutch automatically as a result of shorts in the normal
cabling caused by the fire. This process can be stopped by changing over to
Control Room B and activate the BU DP fire switch. Procedures are in place
that in event of fire the DPO shall take control from control room B.
4.3.4 A fire in the port cable tunnel could cause loss of emergency control over T2
and T4. T2 and T4 will be forced to (or to stay in) normal control, from room
A. None of the thrusters should stop or declutch automatically as a result of the
fire.
4.3.5 A fire in the starboard cable tunnel could cause loss of emergency control over
T1, T3 and T5. T1, T3 and T5 will be forced to (or to stay in) normal control,
from room A. None of the thrusters should stop or declutch automatically as a
result of the fire.
4.3.6 A fire in an individual thruster room will cause loss of that thruster. It is
possible to isolate fuel and start air supply to that thruster room as well as
shutting the fire damper/ ventilation for that room.
4.3.7 A fire in the generator room can cause loss of G1 to G3, and hence loss of
power to MS1 and MS2. MS3 can still be powered from MS4 in Crane
pedestal by opening bustie breaker between MS3 and MS1.
4.3.8 A fire in the Crane pedestal can cause loss of G4 & G5 and hence loss of MS4.
This will lead to loss of both tunnel thrusters, as these are powered from MS4.
By opening the bustie breaker between MS 3 and MS4 the switchboards MS1
to MS3 can still be intact.
4.3.9 A fire in the engine control room can cause loss of generators G1 to G3 as the
MS1 and their breaker controls are placed here.
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4.3.10 A fire in control room A would disable normal SDP21 control. It should be
possible to resume control from Control Room B. Thrusters could stop as a
result of shorts in cabling until control has been transferred to that room.
Thrusters 1-4 could stop from lack of air if safety stops are activated.
4.3.11 A fire in control room B would disable emergency (SDP11) control and
respective systems. Individual thruster control PLC’s should select normal
control automatically whenever a signal failure is detected, so that normal
control continues without interruption All thrusters should keep on running.
4.4 Communications
4.4.1 The Control rooms are equipped with a telephone systems and a sound
powered telephone system that connects the DP control rooms with the thruster
rooms, the ECR and the safety rooms. However communication is mainly by
VHF. The vessel is also equipped with a DP alert system.
4.4.2 There is no sort of telephone or talk back systems in close vicinity of the DP
desk only VHF.
4.4.3 The DP alert system is of “traffic light” type and the activation box is placed
far back inside the new built cabinet for DP alarm printer and Fanbeam. Lights
are located at strategic places.
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5 POWER GENERATION
5.1 General
5.1.1 The vessel is equipped with three generators being G1 to G3 in the generator
room and in the crane pedestal generator G4 and G5 are placed. Further each
thruster is engine driven, which also drives a PTO generator via the gear box.
This solely powers the electrical consumers needed for that particular thruster.
5.1.2 The two main generator pairs are segregated with regard to fire and the same
applies for the switchboard they serve. As each main thruster has its own
engine and power generation the vessel has a robust redundancy concept
regarding position keeping ability.
5.1.3 All diesel engines are kept ready for start by pre-heating and pre-lubrication of
the engine.
5.2 Generators G1, G2 and G3
5.2.1 These three generators were installed in 2006. The engines are of type Wärtsilä
SL20 and each drives an ABB alternator with a capacity of 1987kVA, 460V
60Hz at 900 rpm.
5.2.2 The generators can be started remotely by the engineer from the ECR or
locally at the engine. Emergency stop can be done locally and remotely from
ECR.
5.2.3 Starting of the generator is performed by using starting air taken from the
generators starting air system; separate from the thruster engine’s starting air
system. The shutdown solenoids require control air to operate the fuel rack and
the solenoids have to be energised to shut down the engine.
5.2.4 Each engine is equipped with an engine driven LO pump, SW pump, a LT &
HT pump and a FO pump. A pneumatic emergency FO booster pump is also
fitted that will deliver to all three DG’s. Each generator has electrical driven
priming pump and a standby LO pump.
5.2.5 Each generator has an electric hydraulic actuator of make Woodward that is
controlled by an electric governor of type Woodward 723+ speed controller.
This controller together with Basler excitation is placed inside each generator
governor speed cabinet. Load sharing and synchronisation is by the Woodward
DSLC and synch modules placed inside the PMS cabinet in ECR.
5.2.6 Each generator has its own monitor control system named Wärtsilä Engine
Control System (WECS) that is connected up to the K-Chief.
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5.2.7 The alternator is air cooled by a force driven fan. The AVR is placed on the
non-drive end and is of make Precilec, Magnet AVR.
5.3 Generators G4 and G5
5.3.1 Generator G4 and G5 are of make Caterpillar, each has a capacity of 1800kVA
460V, 60Hz. These were also installed in 2006 and both power the
switchboard MS4.
5.3.2 The generators can be started remotely by the engineer from the ECR or
locally at the engine. Emergency stop can be done locally and remotely from
ECR. These two generators are also connected to the PMS system.
5.3.3 These generators are started by use of starting air, which is taken from the
“Clyde system” (air compressor in the crane pedestal).
5.3.4 Each engine is equipped with an engine driven LO pump, a FW cooling pump
and a FO pump. There is an electrical driven LO priming pump per engine.
5.3.5 Each generator has an electric hydraulic actuator of make Woodward load
sharing is by Woodward droop mode.
5.3.6 Each generator has its own monitor control system that is connected up to the
K-Chief.
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5.4 Thruster Engine and Generator
5.4.1 The thruster engines are of type Ulstein Bergen 8 cylinder BRM type engines
with an MCR of 3530 kW at 750 rpm. The engines are connected to the
gearbox and clutch via a flexible coupling, and have an extra PTO for driving
the local generator.
5.4.2 The thruster engines can be started locally at the engine and semi auto start
from the VMS. Engine control panels are placed in both control rooms. The
panel in control room B offers only an emergency stop button and RPM
indication, whilst the panel in control room A also offers a normal stop button,
a reset shutdown button and a turbine-RPM indicator. Emergency stop can be
done locally and remotely from both control rooms.
5.4.3 Starting of the generator is performed by using starting air taken from the
generators starting air system; separate from the thruster engine’s starting air
system. The shutdown solenoids require control air to operate the fuel rack and
the solenoids have to be energised to shut down the engine.
5.4.4 After starting the engine will run at idle speed 450 rpm, until the clutch is
engaged. After that the engine speed will ramp towards the speed order of the
thruster control PLC which is set at 750 rpm.
5.4.5 Each engine is equipped with an engine driven LO pump, a LTFW & HTFW
pump and a FO pump. In addition, each engine has an electrical driven LO,
FO, LTFW and HTFW standby pump and a LO priming pump. All powered
from respective thruster switchboard.
5.4.6 Each generator has an electric hydraulic actuator of make Woodward that is
controlled by an electric governor of type Woodward 723+ digital governor.
Speed input is by two pickups, one mounted on the engine and one after the
flexible coupling so that torsional stress vibrations across this coupling can be
measured and filtered out before the speed signal is used in the control loop.
Each generator has its own monitor control system named WECS that is
connected up to the K-Chief.
5.4.7 Each thruster engine drives a PTO generator (GT#) via a belt arrangement.
This generator supplies the thruster switchboard with sufficient power making
the thruster independent of the main power distribution system. The generator
has a capacity of 250kVA 460V, 60Hz.
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5.4.8 When the engine is running at nominal speed the thruster switchboard is
isolated from switchboard MS3, and the PTO generator (GT#) takes over
power supply. The starter solenoids for all pumps fans etc. in the thruster room
are all supplied with 24V from the local UPS (1 to 4). This, to ensure that
pumps, fans etc. do not trip during the changeover of power supply between
switchboard MS3 and PTO generator.
5.4.9 The thruster switchboard is powered from switchboard MS3 when engine is
not running to maintain running of pre-lube and pre-heating pumps and
powering the critical systems to make sure that the thruster is ready for start. A
generator failure does not necessary mean that the changeover relay will allow
thruster to continue running by having its auxiliary systems powered from the
MS3. Observed during FMEA trial was that there will be a short period of
power loss, this can trip the thruster. Anyhow this will only affect one azimuth
thruster.
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6 POWER DISTRIBUTION
6.1 General
6.1.1 A general layout of the power distribution is shown in figure 6-1 below.
4ES
2ES
2CRBSB 1CRBSB
UPS 7
220V
220V
460V
Control roomB
2CRASB 1CRASB
UPS 6
220V
Control roomA
GS G4 G5
4CSB6
4CSB7
460V
460V
460V
460V
ES MS4 MS3
460V
T6 T5
4FSB
Sea Chest
Remote
ctrl
2SKB
2FC
4FC
Safety room
460V
220V
460V 2FSB
220V
1FSB
Common Aux.
SWB
T1 to T4
From MS3 BU supply
G1 G3 G2
MS1
460V
MS2
460V
J-box
P449
aft
future
J-box
P450
bow
winch
4CSB1
GT1
2CSB1
UPS 1
1CSB1
TR1
Generator room
ECR Crane
Tube
Emergency generator room
4CSB2
GT2
2CSB2
UPS 2
1CSB2
TR2
4CSB3
GT3
2CSB3
UPS 3
1CSB3
TR3
4CSB4
GT4
2CSB4
UPS 4
1CSB4
TR4
460V
460V
460V 460V
220V 220V 220V 220V
24V
24V
24V 24V 24V 24V
UPS 5
Figure 6-1: Switchboard Layout
6.1.2 The main power distribution consists of 4-four switchboards (MS1 to 4). There
are bustie breakers installed between the switchboards, however only MS1 and
MS 4 are connected to generators. The main power rating is 460V and sub-
distribution boards have ratings from 460V, 230V via transformer and 24V via
an UPS.
6.1.3 Generators G1 to G3 are connected to switchboard MS1 located in ECR
together with switchboard MS3. Switchboard MS2 is placed in the generator
room and switchboard MS4 is placed inside the crane pedestal and is powered
by generator G4 and G5.
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6.1.4 The emergency switchboard ES is normally powered from MS1. In an event of
power loss the emergency generator GS will start up and connect to the board
when the voltage is right. This is handled by the PLC logic within the ES. This
generator is fitted with electrical start motor and has a dedicated power pack
for such and its control system.
6.1.5 The main thrusters are engine driven and a PTO generator is installed
providing all necessary power needed for the thruster related systems. I.e. each
thruster is self-sustained; in addition there is a backup feed to each thruster
from the switchboard MS3. A Merlin Gerin automatic change over unit
controls the two circuit breakers. In automatic mode the unit selects PTO
supply whenever this is available. When a thruster is not running, power from
the common aux. switchboard is used to keep fans running, to pre-lubricate the
engine etc. It is possible to start an engine without power from the common
aux. board, by directly actuating the local start air valve. This overrides the
priming pump interlock.
6.1.6 The design philosophy is that each thruster is independent of each other and
the main power distribution system. A failure of the latter (i.e. blackout) will
therefore only cause loss of the two tunnel thrusters, with no influence on the
main azimuth thrusters.
6.1.7 During normal DP operations the main power plant is common, i.e. closed
bustie breakers and that thruster 1 to 4 are all powered by their own auxiliary
board via the PTO generator, and that both 230V control room switchboards
are powered by the 230V emergency switchboard, 2ES.
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6.2 460V Distribution
6.2.1 The 460V distribution consists of the main switchboards MS1 to MS4 and sub-
distribution boards. The table below shows the distributor and respective
consumers.
460V distribution # Consumers
MS1 Welding equipment, general barge consumers
MS2 Anchor Winches
Generator aux panel P419:
 G3 preheater
 G2 oil prime pump
 G3 oil prime pump
 Fan Generator room starter panel
 FO transfer pump
 LO separator 1
 LO separator 2
 LO heater 1 + 2
 LO filter PALL
 Start air compressor 2
 SW Dosing treatment unit
MS3 Ventilation T5
Backup supply to T5 drive
Common aux. switchboard 4FSB
Safety room 4FSC
Backup power to T1 to T4
ROV
MS4 Supply to transformer TE6 to T6
Supply to transformer TE5 to T5
Distribution 4CSB6 crane pedestal –
fans / SW pump T5/T6 & G4/G5
ROV panel
ROV SB (mid) / ROV PS (aft)
Aux. to G4 & G5
4FSB
(Common aux.
switchboard,
safety control
room)
MDO Separator #2 (DOS 501B)
Thruster room supply and exhaust fans for T5 and T6
HiPAP deployment motor unit
Tautwire hydraulic unit
SW cooling pumps generator G5/T5/T6 2 off
Transformer #5 (for 2FSB)
Thruster 5 and 6 cooling fans converters
HPU pump 1 to T5
HPU pump 1 to T6
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4FSC
(safety control
room)
Thruster 6 cooling fans
Thruster 5 cooling fan
HPU pump 2 to T6
HPU pump 2 to T5
4CSB1
(Thruster room 1)
2 supply and 1 exhaust fan to thruster room 1
Sea water cooling pumps (2 off)
Waste oil pump
Start air compressor #1 (K101)
Preheating control box Ulstein
Standby HT and LT cooling water pumps
Lube oil priming pump Ulstein
Lube oil stand by pump
Oil separator
Turning gear starter
Thruster pitch pump starters (2 off)
Gear/ Clutch standby pump starter
Transformer to 2CSB1
MDO cabinet (4CSB1 only)
4CSB2
(Thruster room 2)
Same consumers as for 4CSB1 except
No starting air and no oil compressor
Small control air compressor is included
4CSB3
(Thruster room 3)
Same consumers as for 4CSB2
4CSB4
(Thruster room 4)
Same consumers as for 4CSB1
4ES
(Emergency
switchboard room)
MDO separator 1
SW pump to G1-G3
Prelube & Preheating G5
Diving equipment PS side
HiPAP deployment motor
Start air compressor 2
230V CO cabinet
460V/ 230V transformer to 2ES
G1 oil prime pump
Tautwire
GS battery charger
Tensioners
Fire pumps
AC Units 1 & 2
++
Table 6-1: 460 distribution.
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6.3 230V Distribution
6.3.1 There are two main 230V distribution switchboards, which are the 2ES and the
2FSB. These two are powered from the 460V system via a transformer. The
2ES is powered from the 4ES and the 2FSB from the MS1. Downstream these
to switchboards there are other 230V distribution boards.
6.3.2 In addition there is one 230V switchboard in each thruster room, totally
independent of each other and power solely thruster consumers.
6.3.3 The table below shows the 230V distribution board and respective consumers.
230V distribution # Consumers
2FSB
(from MS1 via
transformer, located
in common aux.
room)
Alternate supplies for 2CRASB and 2CRBSB
Thrusters 5 and 6 variator switchboards (heating
resistors)
ECR lighting and G5 room lighting
UPS 5
G5 alternator heater
CO2 room lighting
2FC
(from 2FSB,
located in safety
control room)
Socket 230V
Alarm panel
FO tk. alarm panel
Waste Oil tk. alarm panel
2ES
(from 4ES via
transformer, located
in emergency
generator room)
Supplies for 2CRASB and 2CRBSB
Emergency lighting for all 6 thruster rooms and for the
control rooms
CO2 control cabinet (relays and valves)
UPS 8 (for generator 5 control functions)
Sea chest actuators (from 2SRSB, safety room)
2CRASB
(normal power is
from 2ES, operator
can change to
alternate supply
from 2FSB by
operating a selector
switch)
Kongsberg UPS/PDU 1
Kongsberg UPS/PDU 2
UPS 6 (to 24V 1CRASB)
Control room A lighting
Radars (X and S band)
GMDSS
Echo sounder and Log
Lights for life raft launching area port 7 starboard
Fire alarm system
Compass lighting
AIS/SSAS
2CRBSB
(from 2ES, located
in control room B)
Kongsberg UPS/PDU 3
A/C unit
Lighting for Control Room B
UPS 7
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2CSB1
(Thruster room 1)
Thruster room lighting
Pitch pump heater starters 1 & 2
Clutch standby pump heater starter
Alternator heating
Ulstein UN 41 Electronic unit 230 V supply
SW filter box
Closing flap and butterfly actuators.
UPS 1
Control box for waste oil pump
2CSB2
(Thruster room 2)

Same as 2CSB1
2CSB3
(Thruster room 3)
Same as 2CSB1

2CSB4
(Thruster room 4)
Same as 2CSB1
Table 6-2: 230V distribution.
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6.4 Uninterrupted Power Supply unit, UPS
6.4.1 There are 15 UPS’s feeding the essential 24 V and 230 V consumers. UPS 1 to
4 are identical and each feeds the 24 VDC consumers for one thruster, as listed
below. UPS 5 feeds the CO2 cabinet and UPS 6 and 7 feed the 24 VDC
consumers for DP. UPS 8 feeds the controls for generators G4 & G5. The
UPS/PDU 1, 2 & 3 are Kongsberg 230 VAC supplies for the DP system. Also
the new K-Chief 700 system have four UPS’s
6.4.2 The table below shows the UPS distribution board and respective consumers.
UPS # V Consumers
UPS 1-4/ 1CSB
1-4
(from 2CSB1-4,
located in thruster
room 1-4)
24V
Ulstein in/out control box UN50
All pump starter control supplies
PLC control cabinet Ulstein BW100A&B
Ulstein UN41 supply
SW filter box
UPS 5 / 1FSB
(from 2ES, located
near common aux.
room)
24V
Generators G4 & G5 + thruster T5& T6 SW
cooling pumps starter
CO2 control cabinet
UPS 6 / 1CRASB
(from control
room A)
24V
Thruster 5: electrical shaft
SDP21 OS 1 & 2 Kongsberg
Gyro 1
HiPAP OS Kongsberg
UPS 7 / 1CRBSB
(control room B)
24V
Gyro 4
Thruster 6 electrical shaft
SDP 11 Kongsberg
UPS 8 /
(in MS4
24V
MS4
Rear Artemis
DP UPS’s 230V Reference is made to section 14.7
K-Chief 700
UPS’s
230V Reference is made to section 7.3.18
Table 6-3: UPS distribution board.
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7 POWER, AUTOMATION & CONTROL SYSTEMS
7.1 General
7.1.1 This section describes the different control, alarm and monitoring systems
which are related to DP operations.
7.1.2 The following systems are described further within this chapter:
 Diesel Generator Control System
 The Integrated Automation System
 Power Management System
 Thruster Engine Control System
 Generator Protection
 Thruster Control System, Helicon
 Clutch Control
 Tunnel Thruster Control system
 Emergency Stop System
 Fire Switch
7.1.3 The DP control system is described in section 14 of this report.
7.2 Diesel Generators Control System
7.2.1 The speed governor for the Wärtsilä and Caterpillars are Woodward 723+ and
the DSLC is the synchronizing controller. The main functions provided in the
PMS for diesel engine control are as follows:
 Engine start & stop, on request or automatically from PMS
 Engine pre- and post lubrication
 Alarm and monitoring of the engines
 Safety systems for the engines are local PLC, WECS for Wärtsilä and
AutoMaskin for the Caterpillars
7.2.2 Automatic shutdown of a diesel generator is activated by any of the following
conditions:
 Over speed (governor/mechanical)
 Low-low LO pressure
 High-high Jacket water temperature
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7.2.3 The generator breaker should trip in the event of following:
 Over and under voltage protection
 Over and under frequency
 Overload
 Unbalanced current
 Over excitation
 Reverse power
7.3 Integrated Automation System
7.3.1 The Kongsberg K-Chief system consists of the following main components:
 Field stations (FS)
 Process Stations (PS)
 Operator Stations (OS)
 Remote IO cards (RIO)
 Network switches
 Printers
Figure 7-1: Layout of K-Chief configuration Courtesy Kongsberg Maritime
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7.3.2 The K-Chief System is a distributed monitoring and control system. All
operator stations and field stations with processors are self-contained units and
independent of the other units, i.e. a failure in one station will not cause any
other station to break down. All process logic including equipment safety and
control functions are contained in the respective process stations. Each
operator station contains a hard disc with all system configuration and acts as
backup for each other during system start-up. System configuration/update can
be done on-line without need of any additional equipment.
7.3.3 The main functions of the K-Chief system as installed are as follows:
 Alarm/event recording
 Engine room alarm and monitoring
 Primary Trend functionality
 Thruster alarm and monitoring
 Auxiliary alarm and monitoring
 Ballast alarm and monitoring
 Diesel Generator control, alarm and monitoring
 Power Management System control, alarm and monitoring
 Fire Central interface
 DP system interface
 Tensioner interface
 Engineer Call system
 Stinger interface
 Crane interface
7.3.4 For system navigation the operator panel comprises 28 navigation buttons for
quick access to the most commonly used mimics. The mimic will normally
have hotspots for further navigation to related views or sub-views. Each
navigation button has an alarm indicator lamp. The lamp will start to blink if
an alarm occurs at the mimic linked to the navigation button or to one of the
related views. An acknowledged, but still active alarm will cause a steady
light.
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7.3.5 The Remote Operator Stations (OS) positioned throughout the vessel provide
user access to configuration and control. The OS’s are, in general, connected
to all three networks, LAN A, B and LAN C, and are located in the various key
zones around the vessel. LAN A and B provide the main functions of the
system; LAN C is only for admin network.
OS Groups Location OS
BRG Bridge OS032
ECR Engine Control Room OS035, OS036
Monitor
Thr2. Room
Electrical Work shop
DP Backup Room
Ballast
OS033
OS034
OS031
OS038
Table 7-1 OS stations
7.3.6 The OS’s comprise of a Main Computer Unit (MCU), with one or two LCD
display, touch control pad (TCP) and tracker ball panel (CRP or INP/ALC),
and are personal computers with an input device of Human Machine Interface
(HMI) and output monitor. The HMI is a console comprising of a number of
function and operation buttons used to navigate the mimics and control the
field devices. The computers will be running on a Windows XP platform. The
key areas for control of vessel equipment are the Bridge and Engine Control
Room. In ECR there are two OSs provided for redundancy and also for ease of
use/monitoring by more than one operator.
7.3.7 There are 15 RCU that belong to the K-Chief system. The Field Station is the
interface between the K-Chief system and various machinery and equipment.
There are different types of terminals. Analogue input, digital input, analogue
output, digital output, process input for analogue values, process input for
digital values, process output for analogue values and process output for digital
values.
7.3.8 Each process station has an RCU (remote control unit) and process station 41
and 42 have a redundant set of RCU’s. The RCU processes receive inputs and
send outputs through the I/O modules. Each RCU has a double net interface.
The RCU and the Field Stations (FS) are powered from the K-Chief UPS’s and
PS 41 & PS 42 has a redundant set of supplies.
7.3.9 For the redundant sets of RCU, one controller acts as master and the other as
slave, both controllers receive the same inputs but only one of them act as
active and can send output signals. If the master controller fails, the slave
controller will automatically take over as active controller without interruption
to the external machinery.
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7.3.10 The following table shows the PCU Stations number, location and its power
supplies
PCU# Location Control Power supply
31 Thruster room 1 Thr Room 1
230V
UPS 1
32 Thruster room 2 Thr Room 2
230V
UPS 2
33 Thruster room 3 Thr Room 3
230V
UPS 3
34 Thruster room 4 Thr Room 4
230V
UPS 4
35 Thruster room 5 Thr Room 5
230V
UPS 1
36 Thruster room 6 Thr Room 6
230V
UPS 3
37 Captain office
Fire,System, tensioner/Stinger,
DP interface etc
230V
UPS 1
38 SWBD Room Alarms etc
230V
UPS 1
39 Sewage Room Tank gauging, etc.
230V
UPS 4
41
MS1( Master
Redundant with
141)
PMS, SwBd1/3, Engine 1/2/3, + etc.

230V
UPS 3
42
MS4(Master
Redundant with
142)
PMS, SwBd 4, Engine 4/5,BusTie
230V
UPS 4
141 MS1(Slave) PMS, SwBd1/3, Engine 1/2/3, + etc.
142 MS4(Slave) PMS, SwBd1/3, Engine 1/2/3, + etc.

Table 7-2: RCU & RIO units, courtesy Kongsberg Maritime
7.3.11 Where field stations have two controllers (RCU) both controllers read the same
data. The inputs are evaluated separately and for the output signal a Hot
Standby Voting will ensure that the output signal comes from the one in
command. The self-diagnostic feature will in the event of a failure generate an
alarm further the watchdog function will activate if the watchdog timer is not
updated. For the latter the watchdog output will be activated and the controller
and respective systems will stop.
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7.3.12 The redundant Network is based on the Ethernet principle and there are three
networks A, B and C. Network Distribution Units (NDU) and each unit
contains one or more switches as illustrated in the table below. The location of
the NDU’s and their power sources are shown below:
NDU# Location Power supply
NDU A1/C1 Room A 230V & UPS 1
NDU A2/C2 Crane Tub, Emergency Generator 230V & UPS 4
NDU B1 Thruster 5 Compartment 230V & UPS 2
NDU B2 Electric Control Room 230V & UPS 3
Table 7-3: NDU locations and supply.
7.3.13 The connections between NDUs are by optical fiber cables. Both networks are
in service at the same time and both carry the same information. Duplicated
data is then rejected at the destination (field stations). The NDUs also provide
data filtering to guard against interference and corrupted data.
7.3.14 The Network C1 is Administration Network for communication links between
printers and remote diagnostic with onshore over Internet.
7.3.15 The illustration below shows a typical configuration of the Network, Field
Stations and Operator Stations.

Figure 7-2: General K-Chief Network redundancy configuration,
courtesy Kongsberg Maritime
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7.3.16 The K-Chief 700 system is powered by four Kongsberg 230VAC UPS’s.
7.3.17 The computer, HMI panel and LCD monitor uses all 230V supply.
7.3.18 The K-Chief UPS’s are configured as follow:
 UPS 1 supply 230V EP-200 Q3
 UPS 2 supply 230V EP-200 Q4
 UPS 3 supply 230V EDC01 Q6
 UPS 4 supply 230V EDC01 Q7
UPS1 UPS2 UPS3 UPS4
FS 31 FS 32 FS 33 FS 34
FS 35 FS 37 FS 36 FS 39-01
K-CHIEF OS 31 K-CHIEF OS 32 FS 41 FS 42
K-CHIEF OS 33 K-CHIEF OS 33 K-CHIEF OS 35 K-CHIEF OS 36
NDU B1 NDU A1/C1 K-CHIEF OS 37 K-CHIEF OS 38
NDU B2 NDU A2/C2
PRINTER 1 PRINTER 2
FS 38
Table 7-4: K-Chief UPS’s
7.4 Thruster Engines Control System
7.4.1 There are five auto stop functions for the engines being:
 Overspeed (mech. & el.)
 Low-low LO pressure
 High-high Jacket water temperature
 Activation of oil mist
 Low-low Gear oil pressure
7.4.2 These auto stops are activated 30 seconds after the initial command is given.
All auto stop sensors are hardwired and have wire break detection, giving an
alarm to the K-Chief. Loss of 24 V supply to the shutdown solenoid circuit will
give an alarm, though no stop of engine.
7.5 Generator Protection
7.5.1 Each generator is fitted with Merlin Gerin Sepam series 80 protection relay.
This is a standard current, voltage and frequency protection relay, with a large
flexibility and upgrading capability if changes are needed in the future. The
electrician can access the data from the front panel or by use a computer
connected to the Sepam. Programming and settings are done on the computer
and then transferred to each and every unit afterwards. The Sepam is powered
from respective generator cubicle.
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7.5.2 Among the settings for generator protections are:
 Reverse power (reactive overpower): 596kVAR in 3s
 Reverse power (active overpower): 75kW in 3s
 Phase overcurrent: 6.4kA in 100ms
 Earth fault: 210A in 100ms
 Negative sequence current/ unbalanced: 30% in 1s
 Overcurrent: 2.86kA in 1s
 Under voltage: 80% in 100ms
 Over voltage: 120% in 100ms
 Over frequency (62,5Hz): 100ms
 Under frequency (55m5Hz): 100ms
7.6 Thruster Control System, HELICON
7.6.1 All four thruster engines and thrusters are controlled by Ulstein/ Rolls Royce
control system HELICON. This remote control system, which consists of an
electronic unit and control station located in control room A (UN63) and a
slave unit in control room B (UN66), controls each thruster engine. The UN66
is serial connected to the UN63. A complete loss of UN63 will also cause loss
of UN66, backup control.
7.6.2 The electronic unit (UN41) contains the microprocessor card, the supervisor
card and the power supply of the unit. Each unit is dual supplied from
respective 230V and 24V DC system placed in each thruster room. Within this
cabinet there are two disconnect units, one is for the main system and the other
is for the backup system which includes the backup DP system (SDP11)
only and the fire switch to break the normal configuration. When the fire
switch is activated there is not possible to activate/ deactivate thruster control
from thruster panels (main & BU) or from main DP OS in control room A. A
fire backup switch is also placed inside the thruster cabinets. This switch
overrides the main fire switch in control room B.
7.6.3 When in normal configuration thrusters can be controlled from the thruster
panel or by DP (SDP21), a changeover switch allows the DPO to select which
of the two systems the thrusters are to be operated from.
7.6.4 Order and feedback signals are fed to the electronic unit, which calculates and
gives output signals to the interfaces and the actuator units. Switches are read
and signal lamps and indicators are controlled from the two circuit cards in the
electronic unit. The actuator unit translate the electrical signal to hydraulic
mechanic movements. The main servo requires a hydraulic/ mechanic input
command in order to position the propeller blades.
7.6.5 A micro terminal is fitted and from this the engineer can change or adjust
settings if required.
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7.6.6 There are four different types of control: pitch control, direction control, load
control and engine rpm control. These different modes are controlled by the
HELICON system.
7.6.7 Load Control
The load control system is designed to protect the engines from overload. It
monitors continuously the engine load and reduces the thruster pitch
automatically if the load should exceed a pre-set load limit. The load control
calculates the main engine load based on the measurements of the fuel rack
position, engine speed and generator load. The load control has a “built in”
programmed limit curve which shows the relationship between the rpm and the
fuel consumption (fuel rack). The rpm signal is compared to the load curve.
The load controller calculates the result and decides the maximum load
allowed on the engine by the actual rpm. If the load is higher than the high
limit, the load controller gives a pitch reduction of the thruster. The pitch
reduction speed is proportional with the amount of overload. When the load is
below the low limit the load controller will give a pitch increase signal. The
signal from the load controller (increase/decrease) is fed into the pitch
controller.

The load controller will no longer work as intend upon loss of either rpm or
load signal. If the load controller fails acceleration limits (speed of pitch
adjustments) are automatically activated. This means that when a new pitch
order is given, to prevent an overload situation the pitch is decreased or
increased very slowly when reaching -100% or +100% pitch. When the load
controller is operational the load control signal is included in the pitch control.
This means that in case of an overload of the engine the pitch is automatically
reduced (Ulstein pitch reduction).
7.6.8 Engine rpm control
The rpm control is regulating the speed signals to the main engine governor.
When starting and stopping the engine variable rpm is used. As soon as the
thruster is clutched in the revolution of the engine can be increased and fixed
rpm is selected. When fixed speed mode is selected for the engine, a ready
contact (generator enable) is given to the switchboard allowing the PTO
generator to be synchronised on the board. When synchronised a closing
contact (lock constant rpm) from the switchboard to the electronic unit locks
the rpm signal to the fixed rpm for the main engine. The breaker for supply
from MS3 will open and the thruster is self-supplied with power.
7.6.9 Pitch control
The function of the pitch controller is to position the propeller blades. The
actual position is done by the main servo system reference is made to section
13.2. The pitch controller calculates the difference between two signals: the
pitch command and the pitch feedback. It then gives an output order to the
actuator unit to move the pitch to the correct position. The program scales the
command and feedback signals into a percentage and checks them against pre-
set limits. By discrepancy an alarm is given.
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7.6.10 Direction control
Function of the direction controller is to calculate the wanted direction of
thruster force. As for the pitch control, the new direction is based upon
calculation between order and feedback and the new order signal is sent to the
direction control valve that will divert the direction of oil flow to a hydraulic
motor until the thruster is in wanted position.
7.7 Clutch Control
7.7.1 The clutch is remotely controlled by the Helicon, electronic unit (UN41). It is
activated electrically using two solenoids that control a hydraulic valve.
Normal procedure is that clutch in/out commands are given at the clutch
control panel mounted in the thruster room, J/B cabinet UN33. The order
signals are then sent to the Clutch connection box mounted next to the Kumera
Clutch unit, which will control the clutch control valve to engage or disengage.
This connection box is for alarm and control monitoring of the clutch system.
7.7.2 Clutching in is only possible under the following conditions:
 Engine at idle RPM
 Thruster at zero pitch
 Clutch lube and system oil pressures OK
 Pitch oil pressures OK
 Change over switch in off position
 Thruster Locked out
7.7.3 The clutch automatically disengages if the clutch system oil pressure is too
low, the pitch oil pressure is too low, or if the signal ‘thruster locked out’
disappears.
7.7.4 Clutch out is available in DP control rooms A and B. The thruster control panel
in control room A also allows clutching out. This option uses a normally open
contact which makes the system vulnerable to shorts due to fire or otherwise.
A fire in main cabling or in Control Room A affecting the Ulstein propeller
control panel could cause random unwanted declutching of all four thrusters.
However, this can be prevented altogether by changing over to Control Room
B in good time. Note that each thruster is isolated electrically from its
neighbour and each electrical feed is from the thrusters own 24V supply loop.
In an emergency situation the clutch can also be controlled by manually
operating the hydraulic valve.

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7.8 Tunnel Thrusters Control System
7.8.1 The heart of the control system around thrusters 5 and 6 is the ‘Electric Shaft
Control Box,’ made by ABB and located beneath Control Room A. This
‘Electric Shaft Control Box’ takes care of the actual change over between
control rooms, and selection between DP or joystick control. The joystick
panel in room A is the ‘Master’ joystick panel, versus the ‘Slave’ panel in
room B. Similarly the SDP 21 is the ‘Master DP’, while the SDP11 is the
slave. The following functions are provided by the box:
 Selection room A or B according to the fire switch position
 Selection DP or joystick panel according to the switch in room A
 Connect emergency stop from selected room to converter.
7.8.2 When in DP:
 Connect speed reference from selected DP to converter
 Connect direction of rotation from selected DP to converter
7.8.3 When in joystick control:
 Connect speed reference from selected joystick to converter
 Connect direction of rotation from selected joystick to converter
 Make inactive joystick follow the active one.
7.8.4 The Electric shaft control box is common for both thrusters and generates
alarm outputs for converter failure, shaft system failure and power failure. A
failure causing damage to the shaft control box will cause simultaneously loss
of both thrusters.
7.8.5 Thrusters 5 and 6 can be set to either individual joystick control or DP control
using two switches mounted on the master panel for these thrusters.
7.8.6 There are emergency stop buttons on both the A-room and the B-room panel.
Whereas the Ulstein propeller control panel is inactive in Control Room B on
transfer to that control room, the ABB panel remains active. The non-active
panel in Control Room A is disconnected from the frequency converter so that
no fire or other damage to a panel that is not in use can stop the drive.
7.8.7 The master panel has a start drive and a stop drive button for each thruster.
These buttons control the logic of the frequency converter rather than switch
power supplies. Whilst the thruster is in DP control, the stop buttons are
active. There is however a switch on the electric shaft, which allows Control
Room B to be isolated.
7.8.8 Under normal operating conditions the switch on the electric shaft means that
both Control Room A and Control Room B have active panels. The thruster
cannot be set to DP control before the converter has been started.
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7.8.9 The frequency converters provide the actual speed control and protection of the
motor. The new speed based on feedback from the thrusters speed and the new
order given. The deviation calculated will give the new speed order signal to
motor. If the difference between the calculated speed and the actual speed is
too big, the drive will trip since a prolonged speed control difference occurs.
7.9 Emergency Stop System
7.9.1 The emergency stop system is based on an open/closed contact circuit. The
same philosophy is used for the clutch control to the azimuth thrusters.
7.9.2 The emergency stop system is individual per thruster and the clutch system is
the same. The biggest concern with a system like this for a DP 3 vessel is a
fire, and will in worst case cause activation of emergency stop. Even using an
NO and NC pole could lead to the e-stop activating as it cannot be determined
how the switch will melt.
7.9.3 Procedures are in place that in event of fire inside thruster console in control
room A. Operator shall immediately take control in control room B and operate
the fire switch there. All thrusters and control will be transferred to the backup
DP station. The Helicon control unit UN41 will now receive control data from
the backup DP. The disconnect unit inside the UN41 shall now be inactive and
any signals shall be disregarded by the unit.
7.10 Fire Switch
7.10.1 The fire switch in Control Room B determines what room is in control using
two contacts that should always be each other’s inverse. All wires for the fire
switch are routed through emergency cabling. If a fire switch signal fault
occurs, control will stay at control room A.
7.10.2 Within the Helicon control cabinet to each thruster there is a separate fire
switch, this switch overrides the main fire switch in control room B.
7.10.3 The fire switch is built up on two contacts open/closed. These two have to
change status to activate the fire switch. Contact 1 from closed to open and
contact 2 from open to closed position.

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8 FUEL OIL SYSTEMS
8.1 General
8.1.1 The vessel runs on MDO, which is stored in four FO storage tanks, one of
347m
3
, one of 454 m
3
, and two of 829 m
3
each. The overflow tank is 47m
3
.
There are two pumps that can be used to transfer fuel from these storage tanks,
being the service pump (46 m
3
/hr) and the transfer pump (136 m
3
/hr). Both of
these pumps are operated manually.
8.1.2 There is one common settling tank 57m
3
placed in the sewage treatment room
that supplies all day tanks with FO by use of a FO separator. Two FO
separators are installed one at same location as the settling tank; the other FO
separator is placed in the AC room.
8.1.3 From the separator there is a distribution line to all day tanks for thruster
engines and generators. The day tanks have an overflow line fitted to the
overflow tank. The filling of the day tanks is a manual process. All tanks are
fitted with level alarms. An illustration of the common FO distribution is
shown below.
Settling tk.
FO Separator
FO Separator
Day tank generators G4 & G5
Day tanks generators G1 to G3
Day tank Thruster Engine
Day tank Thruster Engine
Day tank Thruster Engine
Day tank Thruster Engine
Figure 8-1: Fuel oil transfer system
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8.1.4 Related to biological contamination is water contamination. This could occur
from bad supplies, tank leakage and possible other causes. Normally the
separators will remove any water from the FO before it is distributed to the day
tanks. Regular oil samples and draining of the tank will reduce the risk of
water contamination. Not only is water often a prelude to biological
contamination but also the separator may not be capable of removing extreme
quantities of water.
8.2 Fuel Oil System Diesel Generators
8.2.1 The FO supply to the generators G1 to G3 is taken from one of the service
tanks, the other is used as an additional settling tank where a separate FO
separator circulates the FO from one day tank to the other. This separator is
dedicated to these generators only.
8.2.2 The FO to generators is through a common line from the day tank through a
filter unit and then to each engine driven FO booster pump, which discharges
the FO through an engine mounted filter and to the injectors.
8.2.3 A pneumatic driven FO backup booster pump is installed that when started will
deliver to all engines. A simplified schematic illustration of the system is
illustrated below.
Day tank Day tank
Em.
booster
pump
Filter
unit

Figure 8-2: Fuel oil system diesel generators
8.2.4 FO supply to the generators G4 and G5 is from a single day tank, through a
common line with T-off to each generator. The engine driven pump discharges
the FO through an engine mounted filter and to the injectors. These generators
are not fitted with a standby booster pump.
8.2.5 For all generators excessive FO is lead back to the day tank.
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8.3 Fuel Oil System Thruster Engines
8.3.1 The FO system for each thruster engine is independent; the only common is
filling of day tank from the settling tank by use of the FO separator.
8.3.2 In the respective thruster room there is a day tank, FO to the engine is gravity
fed from the day tank through a flow meter and directly to the engine driven
FO pump, which discharges the FO through an engine mounted filter and to
the injectors. A simplified schematic illustration is shown below.
FO cooler
Flowmeter
Day tank
M
Standby pump
FO Truster room

Figure 8-3: Fuel oil system Thruster Engines
8.4 Quick Closing Valves
8.4.1 The outlet valves on the FO tanks are of hydraulic operated type quick closing
valves. Remote closing for the generators is placed inside a cabinet next to the
stairway up from mezzanine in pump room port side. There is one common
lever and one for each individual generator.
8.4.2 For the thruster engines there is a remote lever placed outside respective
thruster room that will shut the outlet valve from the day tank.
8.4.3 All levers are protected against mal-operation and needs hydraulic pressure to
close. It is not possible to inadvertently shut off the FO supply to all engines.
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9 COOLING WATER SYSTEMS
9.1 General
9.1.1 Each thruster unit has its own SW cooling system totally independent of each
other. As for the generators G1, G2, G3 these have suction from a common
SW manifold and generators G4 and G5 share the same common SW system
with suction from thruster room 6.
9.1.2 The FW cooling system for each engine / generator is totally independent. A
failure will only affect that engine/ generator pair.
9.1.3 A FW pre-heater pump is fitted, one for each engine. This pump circulates the
medium through the heater and engine to keep it warm while the engine is
stand-still to maintain engine ready for start.
9.1.4 There are no standby LTFW and HTFW pumps fitted. Temperature Control
Valves (TCV) are either electro- pneumatic operated or of element type.
Manual operation of TCV’s is possible.
9.1.5 Service air is available to clear the sea chests if necessary.
9.2 Cooling System Generators
9.2.1 The cooling system for generators G1, G2 and G3 are illustrated below.
SW Manifold
Low
Suction
High
Suction
Overboard
G3
FO Cooler
SW/FW central cooler
SW-
LTFW-
HTFW-
Pumps
G1
G2

Figure 9-1: Cooling system Generators
9.2.2 The SW system (solid line) comprises of a low and high suction sea chest with
remote operated inlet valve. A strainer (filter) and the common SW manifold.
Each engine driven SW pump has suction from this manifold, discharges the
SW through the SW/FW cooler and FO cooler. There is a common overboard
line for all three generators.
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9.2.3 Each generator has a LT/HT cooling circuit the LT circuit is illustrated as the
dotted line. The header/ expansion tanks (one each) are placed outside fwd of
the crane on starboard side and are equipped with a low level alarm. Each
generator has a direct driven LTFW and HTFW pump. The LTFW pump
draws the coolant from the outlet line of the cooler.
9.2.4 A TCV ensures that the coolant holds the set temperature. The LT pumps the
coolant to the various coolers such as LO and LT charge air cooler. On the
return line there are two T-off’s, for suction and discharge from the HTFW
system.
9.2.5 Downstream the HTFW pump there is the HT charge air cooler and cylinder
cooling. A TCV on the engine outlet will divert the flow into round circulation
and when the coolant reaches pre-set temperature. It will divert the coolant into
the LTFW common return line.
9.2.6 Generators G4 and G5 have a common SW cooling line together with systems
of thruster 5 and 6, whereby two SW pumps (duty/standby) with suction from
thruster room 6 discharges the SW for thruster cooling and for generators
through respective FO-, SW/FW cooler and overboard. These two pumps are
powered from 460V distribution 4SFB.
9.2.7 The engine driven FW cooling pump with suction from the engine mounted
expansion tank circulates the coolant through the SW/FW cooler and the
engine.
9.3 Cooling System Thruster Engines
9.3.1 The SW cooling system for a thruster engine is illustrated below.
SW Manifold Low
Suction
High
Suction
SW pumps
2 x 100%
2 x Central
Coolers
Clutch
Cooler
Thr. oil
Cooler
Overboard

Figure 9-2: Cooling system thruster engines
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9.3.2 Each system has two sea chests -one high, one low- feeding two 100% pumps
(duty/standby). The pumps supply water to the two FW coolers, the clutch and
the hydraulic power pack to thruster.
9.3.3 Each engine has a direct driven LTFW and HTFW pump. From the coolers a
TCV is fitted on the suction line regulating the coolant temperature by mixing
the flow from the coolers with the flow directly from the return line that
bypasses the coolers. Downstream the LTFW pump the coolant passes through
the FO cooler, PTO generator, charge air cooler and the LO cooler. On the
return line there are two T-off’s, for suction and discharge from the HTFW
system.
9.3.4 The HTFW cooling system consists of a direct driven HTFW pump that
circulates the coolant through the engine cooling system. Downstream the
HTFW pump there is the HT charge air cooler and cylinder cooling. A TCV on
the engine outlet will divert the flow into round circulation and when the
coolant reaches pre-set temperature. It will divert the coolant into the LTFW
common return line.
9.3.5 The thruster engines cooling system is fitted with an electric standby LT and a
HT pump. Both pumps are powered from thruster switchboard.
9.3.6 Failure of a SW or FW system will be confined to that thruster only. Failure of
the SW cooling to the thruster hydraulics will give rapid rise in the hydraulic
temperature; there is no shut down function related to this only to engine jacket
water system. Regular maintenance routines for cleaning of cooler will reduce
this risk.

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10 LUBRICATION SYSTEMS
10.1 General
10.1.1 The lubrication system for each thruster and generator engine is independent,
further thruster engines and generator engines G4 & G5 are not connected to
any LO separator. Only the generators G1, G2 and G3 are connected to the two
LO separators that are arranged in parallel.
10.1.2 Purifying of the LO is a manual operation and inlet/ outlet valves have to be
opened. There is no interlock of these valves to the separator, this gives a
potential of mal-operation by emptying one and filling another engine.
Procedure implemented ensures that this risk is highly unlikely to happen.
10.1.3 LO for the thruster engines and generator G4 & G5 are changed out based on
running hours according to planned maintenance system.
10.2 Lubrication system Diesel Generators
10.2.1 The engine drive LO pump has suction from the sump and circulates the LO
through the cooler, LO filter and to the oil distributor and by gravity back to
the sump. The electrical driven priming pump is used prior to start of engine to
build up the LO pressure keeping it ready for start, and when shutting down the
engine, especially for lubrication of the turbo charger. The priming pump is
connected to a T-off on the main LO pumps suction line and discharges into
the LO line before of the LO cooler. This pump is also used for maintenance to
empty the LO sump.
10.3 Lubrication System Thruster Engines
10.3.1 The LO system for thruster engine is independent. The only thing common is
that they all share the same LO storage tank and transfer pump. Valves have to
be open before start of filling an engine. There are two LO separators: one
placed in thruster room 1 for thruster engines 1 & 2 and the other is placed in
thruster room 4 for thruster engines 3 & 4. There are 3-way valves that are
interlocked, not possible to take oil from one engine and discharge to the other.
10.3.2 The main engine LO system comprises of a LO sump, an engine driven LO
pump and an electrical driven standby and a priming pump. The main pump
has suction from the sump and discharges LO through LO cooler and a TCV,
that regulates the LO temperature by regulating the flow through the cooler.
From the TCV the LO is diverted through a dual filter prior to the oil manifold
distributor and lubrication points of the engine and by gravity back to the
sump.
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10.3.3 Lubrication points are among others:
 Turbo charger
 Rocker arms
 Injector pump
10.3.4 Each engine control cabinet controls the solenoid valve for letting oil to the
injector pump.
10.3.5 The priming pump is used prior to start of engine to build up the LO pressure
and is also used for maintenance to empty the LO sump. The standby pump
will kick in if the LO pressure drops below a set limit and when shutting down
the engine, especially for lubrication of the turbo charger. Both pumps have
suction from the sump and discharges into the LO line before of the LO cooler.
10.3.6 These pumps and related control systems are powered from respective thruster
switchboard.
10.4 Lubrication System Gear/ Clutch
10.4.1 The clutch is hydraulic operated from the gear’s oil system and is controlled by
solenoids valves (24V). The valve control is pulse operated i.e. needs an active
pulse to operate solenoid valve and the valve will therefore stay in position
upon loss of control power.
10.4.2 The gear’s LO system is independent of each other and comprises of a gear
driven pump, filter unit, cooler and an electrical standby pump. The pump
draws LO from the sump and diverts it through the cooler and into the various
lubrication points for the gear and for clutch operation.
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11 COMPRESSED AIR SYSTEM
11.1 General
11.1.1 There are three compressed air systems that are used by the engines for starting
and control air. All three systems are independent of each other and these
systems are:
 Starting air system to generators G1, G2 and G3
 Starting air system to thruster engines
 Compressed air system to Clyde (Crane) used as starting air to generators
G4 and G5.
11.1.2 The starting air for the thruster engines is built as a ring line with isolation
valves and reservoir tanks for the control air. The reservoir tanks have a
capacity of 200 litres and upon a leakage causing loss of air this will give
ample time for the engineer to close the isolation valves.
11.2 Starting Air System to Generators
11.2.1 The compressed air system to the three generators is illustrated in Figure 11-1
below:
Start air
compressor 1
Start air receiver 1 & 2
Start air
compressor 2
Air filter
Working air
line
Generators G1, G2 & G3
NC
NO

Figure 11-1: Starting Air System Generators G1 to G3
11.2.2 The air compressors discharge via an oil/water separator into two air receivers.
On this line there is also a crossover to the working air system, this valve is
normally closed (NC). Both the air compressor and the receivers have relief
valves fitted and those from the receivers are piped clear to deck in order to
avoid feeding any fire with air. The compressors will start/stop upon low/high
air pressure.
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11.2.3 Form the air receivers there is a common line to the three generators. Prior to
the generators there is an air filter.
11.2.4 The air supply to generators G4 and G5 is from the service air system.
11.3 Starting Air System to Thruster Engines
11.3.1 The compressed starting air system to the thruster engines is illustrated in
Figure 11-12 below:
Start air
compressor 1
Control air reciever
Control air
30 - 8 bars
Starting air
reciever
Control air
30 - 8 bars
Start air
compressor 2
Control air reciever
Control air
30 - 8 bars
Starting air
reciever
Control air reciever
Control air
30 - 8 bars
Control air reciever
NC
NC

Figure 11-2: Starting Air System Thruster Engines
11.3.2 There are two start air compressors, one in thruster room 1 and one in room 4.
Each compressors feed into their own 1000 litres

start air receivers placed in
respective thrusters room. From there both vessels are connected to a piping
network that connects all thruster rooms, ring line. Valves are installed so that
crossovers between thruster rooms can be closed. During normal operation the
air receiver in thruster room 1 will feed into thruster room 3, whilst air receiver
in thruster room 4 feeds thruster room 2. I.e. the system is segregated into a
port and a starboard system.
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11.3.3 Each of the main thrusters T1 to T4 has its own 200 litres control air receiver
which is filled from the start air loop via a reducer unit and a non-return valve.
This control air supplies all thruster related consumers such as diesel engine
over speed protection, TCV and the local fire dampers. There is an alternative
supply from the service air that bypasses the control air receiver (not
illustrated).
11.3.4 Within thruster room 2 and 3 there is a separate service air compressor for that
thruster (not illustrated). This is a 7 bar compressor that is connected into the
line after the pressure reducer and before the receiver as illustrated.
11.4 Service air system
11.4.1 There is one common service air system on board. The service air system is
based on the same principle as for the other compressed air systems. This
system supplies the following systems/components with air:
 Starting air generator G4 & G5
 FO separators
 LO Separators
 SW inlet valves
 Service outlets
 Tautwire
 Alternate control air supply to thruster rooms (backup only)
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12 VENTILATION
12.1 General description
12.1.1 The vessel is equipped with several ventilation systems located over the
various areas. The vessel is divided into different hazardous areas, giving with
it the various rules and regulations applicable with regards to the ventilation
systems in those areas.
12.1.2 For IMO equipment class 2/3, systems not directly being a part of the DP-
system, but which in case of failure, could cause failure of the DP-system
(such as a ventilation system) should also comply with relevant requirements
of the IMO guidelines).
12.2 Ventilation & AC Units
12.2.1 Each generator and thruster room has two supply fans and an exhaust fan,
where one supply fan is reversible. These fans are powered from respective
thruster- or switchboard MS1/ MS4.
12.2.2 There are standalone AC units and supply fans for technical rooms, there is no
temperature monitoring but usually most of these rooms are manned.
12.2.3 There are two remote stopping panels for the ventilation systems. One panel is
placed in the control room A and the other is in the safety control room. The
latter is the master panel and do also stop the MDO separators. These panels
stop the following fans:
 T5 Fan starters
 T6 Fan starters
 Crane Tube fans starters
 Thruster room 1 fans
 Thruster room 2 fans
 Thruster room 3 fans
 Thruster room 4 fans
 (MDO Separator 1 + 2)
12.2.4 The CO2 cabinet is also configured to shut down fans in thruster room(s) when
activation of CO2 release.
12.2.5 Failure of a supply fan has no effect on the running machinery within the
spaces served by the affected fan. The thruster allocated within the affected
area will not be cooled by the air only, but also by the FW cooling system as
described earlier in this report.
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12.2.6 It should be noted that loss of cooling to a technical room such as instrument -,
thruster room can if no action is taken result in overheating of electrical
components, with worst case result of systems shutting down. Important rooms
that are not normally manned should have temperature sensor fitted to alert the
engineer of the change of status and to initiate corrective actions, if required.

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13 THRUSTERS
13.1 General
13.1.1 The main propulsion is by four engine driven azimuth thrusters in addition
there are two electrically driven tunnel thrusters. The main thrusters are
numerically numbered from 1 to 4 and the two electrical are thruster 5 and 6.
13.1.2 Each of the main thrusters is located in its own thruster room, which contains
all necessary equipment for running that thruster, such as a fuel tank, cooling
system, control air receiver, etc. This independence of thrusters T1 to 4 is one
of the attractive aspects of the overall redundancy of the installation. T1 is
located starboard fwd, T2 port fwd, T3 starboard aft and T4 port aft, as
illustrated below:
T6
T4
T3
Switchboard MS4
T2
T1
T5
Fwd

Figure 13-1: Thruster configuration
13.2 Azimuth Thrusters
13.2.1 All four azimuth thrusters are of the same type Ulstein TCNS 120/85 – 280
swing-up CPP thrusters driven by diesel engines.
13.2.2 This type of thruster swings up into an housing in the hull when not in use, by
two hydraulic cylinders powered from the Hydraulic Power Unit. In the
retracted position the thruster is disengaged from the engine by the clutch.
13.2.3 Each thruster consists of the following main components:
 Thruster unit with nozzle
 Steering gear with top bevel gear
 Hydraulic system, HPU
 Starter cabinet for the HPU
 Gravity tank, oil reservoir
 Remote control system, Helicon
 Diesel engine as drive motor with clutch
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13.2.4 The propeller diameter is 2800mm. As the thruster is of variable pitch type the
engine speed is set steady at 750 rpm and via a clutch and gears giving 218.5
rpm on the propeller. The thruster force is changed by operating the blade
angle (pitch).
13.2.5 The hydraulic systems for the thrusters are independent and identical; therefore
only one thruster is described.
13.2.6 There is one HPU per thruster that consists of a reservoir tank, two 100% pitch
pumps and steering pumps. Starter cabinet for control of pumps normally one
pump is running and the other act as standby. In retract/ deploy mode both
steering pumps are running.
13.2.7 The steering and lift/ lowering system is supplied with oil diverted from the
running hydraulic pump, discharging oil via a filter to the steering control
valve and lift/ lower control valve block. The steering control valve diverts oil
to either side of the hydraulic steering motor depending on the order given
from the electronic unit, Helicon. The lift/ lower control valve diverts the oil
to the load control valves mounted on the lifting cylinders. The locking
cylinders are directly supplied from the discharge line of this pump via a
pressure reducing valve, operating the locking cylinders for the upper and
lowered positions.
13.2.8 Downstream the pitch pump there is a non-return valve and the oil is
discharged via a filter set, to the pitch control valve. The solenoid valve diverts
the oil to the pitch unit, which operates the blades.
13.2.9 For both systems the filters do have a bypass line with a spring loaded bypass
valve. Relief valves are installed to protect the systems. Return oil is diverted
via an oil cooler, equipped with a thermostatic valve. This oil cooler is cooled
by the thrusters SW cooling system, reference is made to section 9.3.
13.2.10 The thruster is alarmed for start interlock pitch not zero, low pitch and steering
oil pressure. The system is equipped with a header tank and reservoirs are
fitted with a low-level alarm.
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13.3 Tunnel Thrusters
13.3.1 Thrusters 5 (fore) and 6 (aft) are Ulstein TM800 electrically driven fixed pitch
tunnel thrusters. The driving motors are 1700 kW squirrel cage rotor machines
suitable for direct air/sea water cooling. The motors are controlled by a 12
pulse frequency converter which allows the motor to run at any speed between
900 rpm CW and CCW. The frequency converters are air cooled.
13.3.2 Both thrusters are powered from same switchboard. A failure causing loss of
one or both tunnels will not give great impact on the DP capability as the
vessel will have the four main thrusters available for station keeping
performance. Though, a switchboard fault will have more impact on other DP
control systems in general rather than for thrusters.
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14 DP CONTROL SYSTEMS
14.1 General
14.1.1 The Vessel is fitted with a Kongsberg Maritime SDP-21 dual redundant and
SDP-11 single Dynamic Positioning Control system in order to comply with
BV’s PDY MA TA RS (IMO DP Class 3). The SDP-21 is placed in control
room A and SDP-11 in control room B. These two DP systems are segregated
by A60 fire wall and that’s also the case for auxiliary systems connected to
respective DP system.
14.1.2 The DP system has been upgraded with, new control computers from SBC 500
to MP8200 August 2012, new operator PC’s (COS).
14.1.3 The DP operator stations and computers, communicates with each other on a
dual redundant Network. The DP controllers which are the “brain” of the DP
system are communicating with each individual Thruster Control Cabinet
(TCC, thruster vendors control system (Helicon/ SITCON)). The DP
computers also receive commands from the position and environmental sensors
in order to give the thruster controls accurate commands by building a
mathematical model of the vessel and its environment. The DP uses a feed
forward loop to predict the forces required to hold position.
14.1.4 The DPO can manually switch the thruster controls between the main DP and
backup DP system; this is achieved by operating the fire switch at the backup
DP console. Prior to this the backup DP has to be set in “HOT” stand-by
allowing it to continuously update inputs from sensors, position reference
systems, thruster feedbacks etc. This to have a smooth transfer of control, if the
backup DP is not set in standby the transfer can cause loss of position. The
vessel operator needs to make sure that procedures are followed and crew is
familiarized with them. Switching over from main to backup DP should not
affect the position keeping ability or change of the vessel’s heading. SDP11
also has its own independent reference systems.
14.1.5 In Class 2/3 operations at least three position references must be available,
whereby the system can exclude any unsteady reference data and still keep a
good position with some quality degradation. The three reference systems must
be at least two different measurement principles to meet IMCA guidelines. The
median test function within the KM does solely look at three DP reference
systems and not on their type. Neither does the consequence analysis warning
function given by KM take this into account as it reacts purely on low power
availability or insufficient thrust (thrusters and generators).
14.1.6 Vessel owner to ensure procedures are in place and systems operated according
to DP operation manual.
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14.1.7 The DP consequence analysis software function will be activated automatically
when mode DP class 2/3 is selected. The consequence analysis function within
the DP software only runs when the vessel is in present position and on present
heading. I.e. if the vessel is in auto track mode, or on the move towards a set
point in AUTOPOS mode, the analysis will not run. There is no information
about this within the DP system help functions. The operator has to be aware
of this.
14.1.8 The DPO should be aware of that a failure causing loss of the SDP-21
controllers caused by a fire or internal cabinet damage, resulting in loss of the
SDP-21 system. This will also cause loss of all thrusters as their ready signal is
lost, this will also include for the SDP-11. In that case the DPO has to enable
all thrusters in DP after changing over the fire switch.
14.1.9 The layout of the DP control systems are as follows:
Main DP SDP-21 BU DP SDP-11
Equip. Location Equip. Location
SDP-21 OS’s Control room A SDP-11 OS Control room B
DPC-21 Control room A DPC-11 Control room B
Gyro 1
Gyro 2
Control room A

Gyro 3
Gyro 4
Control room B
VRS 1
VRS 2
VRS Seapath
Fire station 7

VRS3
VRS4
Control room B
Wind 1
Wind 2
Mast mounted
next to aft of
Helideck SB side
Wind 3
Wind 4
Mast mounted
above Control
room B PS side
DGPS 1
DGPS 2
Seapath
Control room A
Rack
DGPS 3 Control room B
HiPAP 1
APC11
Control room A
Rack
HiPAP 2
APC11
Control room B
HiPAP 1
Transducer
Fwd HiPAP
Trunk
HiPAP 2
Transducer
Aft HiPAP Trunk
HiPAP OS Control room A
LWTW Mk12
Operator panel
Control room A

LWTW interface Control room A
Fanbeam
Operator panel
Control room A




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14.2 Operator Stations
14.2.1 The DP desk in control room A consists of three operator stations (OS’s),
being the two DP OS1 & OS2 and the HiPAP OS. In control room B there is
one DP OS (OS3) and one HiPAP OS. Each OS consists of the following
components:
 Operator panel with joystick and pushbuttons
 Monitor
 OS computer
14.2.2 The OS has minimum hardware; the computer (COS) interfaces the operator
with the operating panel and the display. The sensors, references and thrusters
are selected and deselected using a Windows XP configuration. Alternatively
buttons are also provided on the console for quick operations and operational
mode selection. A joystick is provided on the OS desk for manual control of
the thrusters and for semi-automatic yaw, surge and sway control. Operator can
select joystick control of either or of two movements and the DP controls the
other.
14.2.3 The screen of the console is divided into one large area on the right and two
smaller areas on the left, the size of these areas cannot be changed but a zoom
function is available. Each of the areas can display a separate page of
information, which can be selected by the operator.
14.2.4 Alarms are displayed when the “Alarm view” button on the keypad is pushed.
All the alarms are presented on an overlapping window on the screen of the
console where the button is pushed. When an operator has to input information
this is also done using overlapping windows, which always show up at the
same location on the screen. The cursor is positioned directly on the input
window. The pointer can be moved using a trackball and selections are made
using three buttons in front of the trackball.
14.2.5 Colours can be selected from different palettes, (e.g. Daylight, Dusk and
Night). The 'Night' palette has different colours and easy to split information
and commands. The push buttons on the keypad are either light blue or dark
blue. The light blue buttons are “double push” buttons, while the blue buttons
are “single push” buttons. Several buttons have an indicator light which will be
lit when ‘selected’.
14.2.6 The vessel is also fitted with a DP operator terminal that can be connected up
to the DP system, this allows the operator to bring control of vessel from the
DP desk to another part of the bridge/ control room A.
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14.3 DP Computers and Network

Figure 14-1: SDP-21 Courtesy Kongsberg Maritime
14.3.1 There are two independent but linked microprocessors (Single Board
Computer – MP8200 based on Intel 960 RISC processor) which monitor input
data received from a range of sensors using a master/slave relationship and
generate the signals to the thrusters required for position and heading control
(SDP-21). The Backup DP SDP-11 has its own controller. The controller units
and the operator station communicate via a dual network. The hub is located
inside the operator station console.
14.3.2 The operating system for the console computers is Windows

XP. This is a
shell used for display purposes only. The actual control is done by the
computers (MP8200) in the Kongsberg computer cabinet.
14.3.3 Computers and all interface boards in the DPC-21/ DPC11 are located in the
upper cabinet whereas power supplies are placed in the lower cabinet. There
are analogue boards for reference system signals, and there are isolation
amplifiers on the signals for thrusters. Although the CPU’s and the power
supplies are separated, the interface boards are serial linked but common and
both computers are connected to each board. The layout in the SDP-11 is the
same, except that there are only a single computer and power supply.
14.3.4 The function of the Power Supply Units (PSU) within the DP cabinet is,
amongst others, to generate a stable reference voltage for the potentiometers
used for the feedback signals.
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14.3.5 The two computers in the SDP-21 operate in parallel each receiving inputs
from sensors, reference systems, thrusters and operator and each performing
the necessary calculations. However, only the on-line computer (master)
controls the thrusters. Switchover between the computers (master/slave) may
be either automatic or manual. It is automatic if failure is detected in the on-
line computer. Continuous comparison tests are performed to check that the
two computers read the same inputs and give the same outputs.
14.3.6 If a difference occurs, warnings and alarms are reported from each computer.
The weak point in a dual redundant system is in determining which computer
is wrong. The operator therefore could choose the wrong one.
14.3.7 When operating in accordance to DP class 3, the system will also alert if the
BU DP controller is not in “hot standby” configuration and an alarm is issued.
This will also apply if there is a deviation between all three controllers. The
backup DP is updated by inputs from sensors, position reference systems,
thruster feedbacks and etc. to be able to take control when necessary.
Switching over from main to backup DP should not affect the position keeping
or the vessel heading.
14.4 DP Control Modes and Functions

Figure 14-2: Forces and motions, courtesy: Kongsberg Maritime
14.4.1 The standard DP control modes are implemented which are standby, manual
(joystick) and auto position. Mixed modes between manual and auto are
automatic control of yaw, surge-axis and sway-axis either separately or
combined. When all three are selected an automatic switch to AUTOPOS
mode is made. Furthermore different control modes such as ROV (follow sub),
Auto-track, are implemented.
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14.4.2 The wind, gyro or VRS sensors used by the DP Control System cannot be
directly selected from the keypad. Instead, a dialogue box on the screen is used
where the preferred sensor has to be selected. Note! If a gyro falls out it has to
be manually enabled/reselected in the dialogue box. This is not the case for the
other sensors. Operators should be aware of this.
14.4.3 A standard median test is implemented which will detect a seemingly perfect
position measurement, e.g. dragging transponder or frozen DGPS signal. A
parameter is that at least three position reference systems have to be selected
and accepted by the DP computer. Also a high variance test is used to deselect
those position reference systems which show a high variance pattern over a
prolonged time period. It is required that sufficient position reference systems
are selected and accepted by the DP Control System.
14.4.4 The DP mathematical model is using various historical input data to predict
values/position and compare with actual readings. The computer calculates the
required force and thrusters to be used in order to keep required set-points. To
achieve a good mathematical model the vessel has to be in position for some
time in order to build up the model.
14.4.5 The thruster allocations can be set in various modes being:
 Variable, thrusters are operating individually and freely.
 Force Bias, Azimuth thrusters are operating against each other’s, setting
can be made from a separate pop-up menu and also thrust tonnage can be
set. Configuration is that T2 & T4 works against each other, same for T1 &
T3.
 Fixed, in this mode the azimuth thrusters can be set to a pre-defined
direction.
 Environmental Fixed, DP set the thrusters to a calculated defined direction
based on environmental forces.
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14.5 DP Sensors
14.5.1 The vessel is fitted with following DP Sensors:
 4 x Wind sensors
 4 x Gyro’s
 4 x VRS
 Lay Tension sensors
14.5.2 Extra sensors have been installed beyond the class requirements this to
increase the operational redundancy of the vessel.
14.5.3 Wind sensor
The vessel is furnished with a total of four wind sensors; all are of make Gill
Instruments and all were installed in last quarter of 2008. The wind sensors are
located in two different Masts. Both Masts are placed very close to the
Helideck and the DPO should be aware to have the wind sensors deselected
prior to arrival/ departure of a Helicopter.

The wind data from the Wind sensors are sent to the following systems:
 Wind 1: DPC-21
 Wind 2: DPC-21
 Wind 3: DPC-11
 Wind 4: DPC-11
14.5.4 Gyro Compass
Four new gyros were installed in last quarter of 2008 during dry-docking and
all are of make SG Brown Meridian. The vessels heading signal from the gyros
are sent to the systems as follows:
Gyro 1: DPC-21, via serial splitter to HiPAP 1 + Seapath 200
Gyro 2: DPC-21
Gyro 3: DPC-11, via serial splitter to HiPAP 2
Gyro 4: DPC-11,

Gyro 1 & 2 are both placed under desk PS forward in Control room A. While
Gyro 3 is placed in rack under HiPAP APC-11 next to the BU DP OS in
Control room B and the Gyro 4 is paced in the next room.

The Latitude correction to a gyro is from manual input only.
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14.5.5 Vertical Reference System (VRS)
The VRS systems are of make MRU delivered by Kongsberg Maritime. The
MRU system uses solid state device to measure the roll, pitch and heave rate
(MRU 5 only). The MRU’s have power supply from respective DPC cabinet.

The MRU’s signals are sent to the following systems:
 DP VRS 1 - MRU-5: DPC-21 and HiPAP 1 + Survey box via serial splitter
 DP VRS 2 - MRU-2: DPC-21
 DP VRS 3 - MRU-H(1355): DPC-11 & DPC 21 and via serial splitter to,
HiPAP 2
 DP VRS 4 - MRU-2(0734): DPC-11
 VRS5 MRU5 (3752): Seapath only

Having DP VRS 3 to be configured to DPC-21 allows the DP system to have
voting on the VRS’s.

The VRS’s are located at two locations, main VRS’s are located in a cabinet
next to fire station #7 and DP VRS 3 and DP VRS 4 are located in Control
Room B.
14.5.6 Lay Tensioner
The DP receives pipe lay tension information directly from the new lay control
system.
The two pipe lay tensioners, each have two load cells. The load cells interface
to a single PLC, which is located in control room A. If either a load cell or its
cabling were damaged, the automatic sensing of pipe tension would be lost.
The DPO would then have to either select a fixed tension value i.e. a manual
input, or let the DP resolve the external forces through the current resolution.
The latter option would take too long and an excursion would take place so it is
not recommended.
If the PLC fails then the DP will remember the last sensed figure and use that
as if it was continuing to receive that information. There is a possible danger
where the sensing cells break down and send false signals, in that circumstance
an excursion could take place and relies on the swift intervention of the DPO.
In an emergency, where the former options (use of DP) are not available, resort
may be made to the joystick, but it is certain that manual compensation would
be highly insensitive.
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Each load cell has two strain-gauge bridges so that failure of a single bridge
can be detected and alarmed. It would then be up to the operator to decide
which one has failed. The switching off of the faulty load cell must be done at
the pipe machine and the operation could continue with the one remaining cell.
The information from the load cells is used to calculate the actual pipe tension,
which is sent to the DP in serial format. There is a ‘signal valid’ section in this
data string. If the DP loses the pipe tension signal completely or if the
measurements exceed a pre-set maximum limit set by the DPO, the value will
revert to the last valid measurement used by the DP that was within the clip
limit, or the DPO does one of the following:
 Uses the last measurement
 Enters a manual value
 Deselects pipe tension altogether and then the external forces would be
resolved as current.
It would be the best option to use a manual setting similar to the last automatic
reading.
The DPO may also enter a minimum limit also, below which the pipe tension
input will not be allowed to fall. During a recovery from a tension input
failure the function ‘Filter Constant’ may be used, in general terms this assists
the transition between the absence of a tension value or a value of less than the
real value to the operational tension value.
Any jump in the compensation value will result in a disturbance of the position
so the values, be they manual or automatic have to be as close as possible to
the real tension.
In the DP system the pipe tension is low pass filtered before being used for
compensation which means that the peaks in tension are ironed out to make the
signal more usable The DPO has to set up this filter to adapt it to the stiffness
of the pipe, and may enter a correction factor called bias, which is a figure that
will be added to the automatic reading, thereby in fact setting the amount of
compensation. It should be noted that these values are crucial to the system’s
behaviour. Of all settings allowed by the DP system none should result in
instability. Careful testing is required to prove this
The DPO at all times has the option to change from automatic compensation
using the measured values, to a fixed value which is entered manually. The
DPO should take care when making changes to this value since a transient
disturbance of the position keeping will follow each change, the extent of
which is related to the size of the change in the compensation.
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A further problem with the use of fixed values for compensation is that the real
tension varies with the vessel’s position. The effect of this could be oscillating
motions with possibly increasing amplitude. A procedure should be developed
to prevent this problem.
Since there are several single failures that would fail tension measurement, the
automatic pipe tension compensation system is not consistent with the
philosophy of class 2 or 3 requirements. Thus, for class 2 or 3 operations the
vessel must always have the manual backup ready for use.
14.6 Position Reference Systems
14.6.1 The vessel is fitted with following positioning reference systems:
Main DP (SDP-21):
 2 x DGPS (Veripos LHD2-GG)
 1 x Seapath 200 (only for heading and VRS to HiPAP’s no DP interface)
 1 x HiPAP 500
 1 x Fanbeam
 1 x LWTW (also interface to Backup DP)

Backup DP (SDP-11):
 1 x DGPS (Veripos LHD2-GG)
 1 x HiPAP 500
14.6.2 DGPS
There are three DGPS systems fitted all of make Veripos, two DGPS’s for the
SDP-21 located in control room A and one for the SDP-11 in control room B.
Each DGPS system is set up with Inmarsat corrections.
The GPS antennas are mounted on the fwd edge of the Helideck with a proved
distance between the two (DGPS 1 & DGPS 2 is 2 meters).
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14.6.3 Seapath 200

Figure 14-3: Example of DGPS configuration Courtesy Kongsberg Maritime

The Seapath is not used as a DGPS system to DP, but is used by the HiPAP’s
as vessel sensor and gyro and therefore included in this report. As seen from
the illustration this system comprises of two GPS antennas mounted on a
bracket with a known distance between the two. One of the advantages with
the Seapath compare to traditional DGPS’s is that it can also be used as a
heading reference and motion reference.

The Seapath 200 system has its own MRU-5 sensor placed together with the
main DP MRU’s. The MRU signal can be used in main DP as a backup for the
other two. The gyro (gyro1) signal to the Seapath is needed for calibration
only.

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14.6.4 HiPAP

Figure 14-4: HiPAP Courtesy: Kongsberg Maritime

The vessel is equipped with two HiPAP 500 hydro acoustic systems. Both
HiPAP’s are setup for USBL and LBL. The HiPAP Hull units are located in
respective HiPAP trunk fore and aft amidships centre walkway Quarter deck
and down.
The system is named from “High Precision Acoustic Positioning” system and
is designed for all water depths from very shallow looking horizontally at a
transponder to deep water (2000m) looking straight down with a standard unit.
The transducer extends below the hull and uses a semi spherical transducer
with over 230 elements and electronic controls that enables narrow beam
transmission and focused reception in the direction of the transponder, thus
reducing the noise that would otherwise be received from other areas of the
sphere.
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The system calculates a three dimensional subsea position of a transponder
relative to the vessel mounted transducer unit. The directional stability of the
unit is obtained firstly fixing the transponder location by a wide beam and
subsequently by aiming a narrow reception beam towards the transponder. The
system uses a digital beam form, which takes its input from all the transducer
elements.
The system controls the beam dynamically so it is always pointing towards the
target, roll, pitch and yaw is input to the tracking algorithm to direct the beam
in the correct direction thus enabling the correction for these motions to be
effectively applied continuously.
The system calculates a variance for its measurements; determine the known
system accuracy and standard deviation. The HiPAP has a built-in Kalman
filter, which improves the stability and accuracy of the initial narrow beam
guidance but does not interfere with raw fixed data being sent to the DP
control computers.
The HiPAP needs a heading signal and a VRS signal to operate, the following
shows the different combinations that can be configured for each HiPAP.
HiPAP 1 HiPAP 2 (backup DP)
Seapath Seapath (HiPAP# Gyro 1 & VRS1)
Gyro 1 Gyro 3 (HiPAP# Gyro 2)
DP VRS1 DP VRS3 (HiPAP# VRS 2)
The HiPAP signals are sent via fibre optic link to the APC 11 computer and
from there to the DP system via the dual network.
The configuration of the Seapath, gyro and VRS into the HiPAP is to be in
according to DP operational manual. When calibrating the HiPAP’s the
Seapath will be used, and for operating according to DP class 3 HiPAP 2 can
only use Gyro 2 and VRS3.
The HiPAP operator station can operate in a master/slave setup. Further
configurations reference is made to vessels DP operational manual.
Note! The configuration of the HiPAP’s is that the Survey have their own
HiPAP OS (3) that is connected by the network and by that can communicate
with both HiPAP units. Survey can only control mobile units. The HiPAP 1
will solely be used for the main DP for positioning on the Fixed Transponder
at seabed. Survey will only be allowed to operate mobile transponders by use
of HiPAP 2. When operating in accordance to DP class 3, the Survey team
cannot operate the HiPAP 2. Reference is made to the DP Operations Manual
for configurations and procedures.
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14.6.5 Fanbeam

Figure 14-5: Fanbeam Courtesy: MDL

The Fanbeam system, of make MDL is an auto tracking laser radar system.
It’s measuring range and bearing to a target by using a reflected laser beam.
This is a short range reference system targeting either a reflector or a prism.
The Fanbeam system comprises a laser unit, a monitor and a control unit, in
addition to the reflector or prism. The Fanbeam position signals are fed into the
DP computers.
The maximum range with a single prism is 1 km. With a stack of prisms this
can be increased to over 2 km under ideal circumstances. The system can also
be used with a simple reflector. The maximum range is then limited to 200-250
metres.
The main limitation on use for DP is the resolution of the bearing measurement
which will limit the useable range for DP to about 100m.
The most serious failure of Fanbeam is it could track an erroneous target,
although the system does have features to reject false targets. The use of the
Fanbeam system can be limited by weather conditions, especially fog, which
limits the maximum range of the system because it uses an infrared laser beam
(905 nm) and infrared light is easily absorbed by moist air.
The position of the unit is corrected for roll and pitch in the DP system by VRS
input.
The vessel should be supplied with reflectors or prisms.

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14.6.6 Tautwire

A LWTW of type Bandak Mk 8-15 are installed as a DP reference system. The
LWTW is located in the bow of the vessel and is controlled locally at the unit
or remotely from control room A. The LWTW is supplied from the 460V 4FSB
distribution. The power supply is to the systems HPU, which is used to deploy
the weights and to maintain constant tension when the clump weight is at the
seabed. The 230V power supply is for the LWTW cabinet and the separate
Tautwire remote unit placed in control room A.
The LWTW uses instrument air to compensate higher frequency motions (roll,
pitch and heave). Small motions are corrected by air held in the twin
accumulator bottles fitted on the boom of the LWTW unit while the winch
corrects excess motions.
The LWTW has a gimbal head, measuring the athwart-ships angles and along-
ship angles. The pitch and roll signals from VRS is considered in reading the
angles in the gimbal head.
The illustration below shows the operational area and angle of the wire,
typically limits for warning is set in DP to 19
o
and alarm rejection from DP is
22
o
.

Figure 14-6: LWTW working area Courtesy: Kongsberg Maritime

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14.7 DP Control System Power Supply
14.7.1 The vessel is equipped with three independent UPS’s for the DP system and its
reference systems. The power supply to the UPS’s are configured as follows:
 DP UPS 1 CB Q7 in panel 4P208 (Radio Room)
 DP UPS 2 CB Q2 in panel 2CRASB (control room A)
 DP UPS BU: CB Q1 in panel 2CRBSB (control room B)
14.7.2 Each UPS provides 230V AC to the DPC, references and peripherals. The UPS
-distribution is as shown in below:

DP UPS 1 DP UPS 2 DP UPS 3 (BU)
- F1: Spare - F1: Spare DGPS 2 - F1: Spare
- F2: DPC 21A - F2: DPC 21B - F2: SDP 11
- F3: SDP OS1 - F3: SDP OS2 - F3: Backup OS
- F4: Spare - F4: DP printer - F4: Repeater Gyro 1
- F5: WIND n° 3
Wind 2
- F5: Wind n° 2 wind 1 - F5: Wind n° 1 3
- F6: GPS n° 2 & 3
unknown
- F6: Spare gyro 2 - F6: GPS 1 unknown
- F7: NDU 1
network distribution
unit
- F7: Fanbeam - F7: NDU 2
- F8: Spare Fan
beam fwd
- F8: HIPAP OS fed
from pdu3
- F8: Spare wind 4
- F9: Spare DGPS 1 - F9: HIPAP
transceiver Fwd
- F9: HIPAP
transceiver Aft
- F10: Repeater Gyro
3
- F10: LTW (Taut wire) - F10: Spare wind 4
- F11: Spare Seapath - F11: DPAL Alarm
light
- F11: Spare DP printer
- F12: Spare pilot
radar
- F12: Artemis Mat DP
survey
- F12: HIPAP OS
printer

14.7.3 In addition, some DP important consumers have power supplies as follows:
 VRS 1: DPC-21
 VRS 2: DPC-21
 VRS 3: DPC-11
 VRS 4: DPC-11
 Gyro 1 UPS 6
 Gyro 4 UPS 7
 HiPAP 1 Hoist Control: 4FSB
 HiPAP 2 Hoist Control: 4 ES

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15 FAILURE ANALYSIS – “SEVEN POLARIS”
15.1 Configuration and assumptions
15.1.1 All four main engines are running and driving respective azimuth thruster. These systems are independent of each other, and the
power supply for auxiliary systems is generated from the PTO generators.
15.1.2 This failure analyses show effects while operating according to DP Class 2/3 criteria with closed 460V bustie breaker if no other is
listed and the following switchboard configuration:
 Generators G1 to G3 ready for start if not running
 Generators G4 and G5 ready for start if not running
 At least one generator connected to MS4 and MS1
 460V 4ES is powered from MS1
 GS is ready for start
 All monitoring, automation and K-Chief working as designed
15.1.3 For power distribution configuration, reference is made to section 6 in this report.
15.1.4 The failure analysis shows effects with the auxiliary system set-up as follows:
 FO system all systems available
 SW system no alarms, all pumps available
 FW system no alarms, all circulation pumps available (duty/ standby)
 LO system all systems available
 Compressed air system all systems available
 HVAC/ Chilled Water systems, all systems available and no alarms
15.1.5 All position reference systems and all vessel sensors are to be available and in operations and DP system are set for DP class 3
with consequence analysis and median test functions running.
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15.1.6 In this failure analysis, the comment “Loss of redundancy” reflects that the vessel does not fulfil requirements in accordance with
IMO DP Class 2/3, after a single failure has occurred. This does not mean that there has to be an effect on the station keeping
performance, a failure can occur without affecting the performance.
15.1.7 The failure analysis is based on the available documentation listed in section 16 “References “in this report.
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15.2 Failure Analysis – Fire & Flooding

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Vessel
Layout
Control
room A
Fire in
control room
A
Electric failure
Technical failure
Personnel
Alarm
DPO to immediately take control
on BU DP and switch over the
Fire Switch. Abandon control
room A and take control from
control room B
No effect on station
keeping but loss of
redundancy
A fire in control room A or in
the safety control room could
damage remote safety stop
cabling to all thruster room fire
dampers. As a result from this
all four main thrusters could be
lost.
Control
room B
Fire in
control room
B
Electric failure
Technical failure
Personnel
Alarm
Fire here will damage equipment
and system in that room, else no
effect as all systems are run from
control room A
No effect on station
keeping but loss of DP
class 3 or redundancy

Quarter
Deck
Fire in a
compartment
Electric failure
Technical failure
Personnel
Alarm
Fire doors will shut to prevent
spreading of fire.
Depending on where the fire has
broken out and spread to it can
result in loss of a HiPAP, loss of a
network (Main Net is in corridor
centre)
Cables for respective DP zone is
A-60 insulated + there are shall be
distance between the cable
routing





No effect on station
keeping but loss of
redundancy
Both HiPAP’s are located in
centre walkway, distance and
fire doors/ bulkheads between
them
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Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Hold
Deck

Fire /
flooding in a
compartment
Electric failure
Technical failure
Pipe burst
Hull damage
Personnel
Alarm
Loss / damage of systems in that
compartment.
This deck houses among others
the generator room/ thruster
rooms etc.
At this level all doors are to be
water tight
No effect on station
keeping but loss of
redundancy. Reduced
thruster/ power capacity
Each thruster room is self-
contained.
Generator room includes G1 to
G3 + MS2.
Generators G4 G5 + MS are
located in crane pedestal
Fire/
Flooding of
a thruster
room
Electric failure
Technical failure
Pipe/ hull damage
Personnel
Alarm
Loss of that particular thruster
Each thruster room is segregated.
No effect on station
keeping but loss of
redundancy. Loss of one
thruster only

Generator
room
Electric failure
Technical failure
Pipe/ hull damage
Personnel
Alarm
Loss of generators G1 to G3 +
MS2
None Both generators G4 and G5 can
run supply MS4, feeding MS3
and MS1. As MS1 and MS3 are
placed in a different
compartment as MS2.
Fire in
Sewage
room
Electric failure
Technical failure

Personnel
Alarm
Have to close outlet valve from
settling tank, and stop transferring
of FO to all day tanks.
None Enough FO in day tanks to
abandon operation. Each
thruster engine day tank has a
capacity of 5m
3
estimated 5
hours running time.
Fire in pump
room
Electric failure
Technical failure
Pipe/ hull damage

Personnel
Alarm
Generators run out of day tank.



None
Crane
Pedestal
Fire in Crane
pedestal
Electric failure
Technical failure
Pipe/ hull damage
Personnel
Alarm
Loss of generators G4 & G5 +
MS4
No effect on station
keeping but loss of both
tunnel thrusters (MS4)
One tunnel has a secondary
supply from MS3 that can be
used.
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15.3 Failure Analysis - Power Generation

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Thruster
Engines
Thruster
Engine

Shut down of
engine
Mechanical
failure: piston,
valve,
camshaft,
bearings,
turbocharger
Aux. systems
Alarm Stop of affected engine, de-clutch
from main gear. Loss of that
thruster.
No effect on station
keeping

Reduced thruster capacity


Pre-warning of
engine
Aux. systems
i.e. LO pressure
FW cooling

Alarm Request stop of engine,


Governor
failure
Input failure
Output failure
Power failure
Alarm Trip of affected engine
Gear Gear failure Mech. failure

Alarm Loss of drive to thruster and PTO
generator

PTO
generator
PTO generator
failure
Internal short
circuit.
Excitation
failure, AVR
failure.
Overload
Belt drive
failure


Alarm. Trip of generator breaker, hence
loss of supply to thruster
switchboard.

Automatic changeover to power
supply from MS3.
None if quick enough,
otherwise loss of thruster

Reduced thruster capacity


Thruster switchboards have a
supply from MS3 when in
standstill. A relay contactor will
change over the supply.
If thruster stops it can be started
to be run with power from MS3.
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Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Diesel
Generators (G1-G5)
Diesel
Generator

Shut down of a
DG
Mechanical
failure: piston,
valve,
camshaft,
bearings,
turbocharger
Aux. systems
Alarm Stop of affected DG, the other DG
in parallel will pick up the load
DP system will perform load
reduction of tunnel thrusters if
required.
No effect on station
keeping
Reduced power capacity
If G1 to G3 is set in Auto then
PMS will automatically start the
one in 1
st
standby. Otherwise
engineer has to manually start
generator “Semi-automatic”
Pre-warning of
ME
Aux. systems
i.e. LO pressure
FW cooling
Alarm No automatic function for start of
next standby generator
None Engineer has to start next
generator manually and take the
faulty one off the board.
Governor
failure
Input failure
Output failure
Power failure
Alarm Trip of affected generator No effect on station
keeping
Reduced power capacity

Alternator Alternator
failure
Internal short
circuit.
Excitation
failure, AVR
failure.
Overload
Alarm. Trip of generator breaker, hence
reduced power capacity

An AVR failure/ overspeed can
result in also tripping of the other
DG on reverse power, hence
blackout
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
and power capacity, or
blackout

A full blackout will not directly
affect the vessel as it has four
independent running main
thrusters. The vessel will run on
UPS supply. FO to their day
tank will eventually be the
limiting factor. Day tanks are
each on 5 m
3
which will give
ample time to take corrective
actions.
Emergency.
Generator
(GS)
Engine failure
Alternator
failure
Mech. or
electrical
Alarm Stop of engine None Normally GS is not running.
The GS will start up when loss
of power to 4ES.
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15.4 Failure Analysis - Power Distribution

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection of
failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments

Ships 460V SWBDs
Main
switchboards
Powerless MS1 Internal short
circuit.

Alarm. Loss of MS1 and generators G1 to
G3 as these can only connect to
MS1.
None

Trip of bus tie to segregate fault.
Powerless MS2 Internal short
circuit.

Alarm. Loss of MS2 and related
consumers such as FO transfer
pump, LO sep 1&2 and starting
air compressor 2.
None

Trip of bus tie to segregate fault.
Powerless MS3 Internal short
circuit.

Alarm. Loss of MS3 and related
consumers such as ventilation T5,
distribution 4FSB and 4FSC, and
backup power to T1 to T4.
4FSB loss of Tautwire, HiPAP +
SW pumps to G4& G5
Loss of both tunnel thrusters as
loss of their HPU
4FSC loss of thruster cooling fan
+ 2
nd
pumps to tunnel thruster
HPU’s
None or
Reduced thruster capacity
The efficiency of the two tunnel
thrusters is normally very low.
Used to assist with heading
control.
Powerless MS4 Internal short
circuit.

Alarm. Loss of MS4 and related
consumers such both tunnel
thrusters, T5 can be connected to
MS3. Loss of generators G4 &
G5 as these are connected to
MS4.



None


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Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection of
failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Bustie
Breakers

Fails to open Internal failure Alarm A fault on these breakers such
that it does not open in case of a
major failure (i.e. a hidden
failure) can cause a blackout. If it
opens too late the transients on
the distribution can trip many
auxiliaries on under voltage due
to transients.

Worst case full blackout
Important systems on backup
supplies and azimuth thrusters
still running
None

There are two bustie breakers
for each SWBD; simultaneously
failure of them both is seen as
highly unlikely.
Thruster
room
switchboard
Loss of power
to thruster
switchboard
4CSB1-4














Internal short
circuit.

Alarm. Loss of power to that
switchboard, hence that thruster
will stop.
Reduced thruster capacity
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Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection of
failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Distribution
boards
4 FSB Loss of power Breaker trip
Short circuit

Alarm. Loss of consumers from that
board HiPAP deployment motor
LWTW, HPU pumps 1 to tunnel
thrusters auto changeover to 2
nd

pumps
No effect on station
keeping performance
Loss of LWTW

4FSC Loss of power Breaker trip
Short circuit

Alarm. Loss of consumers from that
board
Loss of pump no. 2 to tunnel
thrusters + cooling fans

No effect on station
keeping performance


4ES Loss of power Breaker trip
Short circuit

Alarm. Loss of consumers from that
board
Loss of power to 2 ES and to
control room A & B
No effect on station
keeping performance

If not restored power to control
room distribution eventually DP
UPS’s fails
Loss of redundancy

30 min battery endurance on
UPS












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Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection of
failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments

230V Distribution
Transformer
(460V/
230V
Transformer
failure
Mech. failure
El. Failure
Breaker fault
Alarm Loss of power to affected 230V
distribution. Important consumers
runs on redundant supply

No effect on station
keeping performance

If not restored power to control
room distribution eventually DP
UPS’s fails
Loss of redundancy

If the transformer to 2ES fails
then the alternate supply from
2FSB to control rooms should
be connected
230V
Distribution
board
Loss of power
to 2 ES
Breaker trip
Transformer
failure
Short circuit
Alarm. Loss of related consumer,
alternate supply to control room
to be instated.
No effect on station
keeping performance

If not restored power to control
room distribution eventually DP
UPS’s fails
Loss of redundancy
Loss of power
to 2 FSB
Breaker trip
Transformer
failure
Short circuit



Alarm. Loss of related consumer, such as
UPS 5
VMS ST2U
2FC
None



Loss of power
to 2 FC
Breaker trip
Short circuit

Alarm. Loss of related consumer, such as
VMS LC22
VMS LC23
Alarm panels
None


Loss of power
to 2 CRASB or
2CRBSB
Breaker trip
Short circuit

Alarm. Loss of related consumer such as
DP UPS(s)
NAV equipment
None
Eventually DP UPS(s) will
run out
Loss of redundancy
DP UPS 1&2 are powered from
same distribution 2CRASB.
Failure of this both systems on
30 min battery endurance

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Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection of
failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments

24V Distribution
24V
Distribution
Battery failure Internal failure
due to lack of
maintenance
None None None Battery failure should be found
on maintenance routines.
Battery change interval 3- 5
years, check with Vendor
UPS
Failure
Internal failure Alarm Loss of charging, system
continues to run on battery
None,
eventually loss of system
powered from that UPS

Loss of
UPS 1-4
Internal failure

Alarm Loss of corresponding thruster to
affected UPS
Reduced thruster capacity,
loss of redundancy

Loss of UPS 5 Internal failure

Alarm Loss of control power to pumps
start cabinet G4 & G5 etc.
None
Loss of UPS 6 Internal failure

Alarm Loss of thruster T5 alarming
power to SDP 21 OS 1 & OS2
None
Loss of UPS 7 Internal failure

Alarm Loss of Thruster T6, alarming
power to SDP 11 OS
None
Loss of UPS 8 Internal failure

Alarm Loss of control voltage to MS4 None
Loss of UPS
17
Internal failure

Alarm Loss of control voltage to G4 and
G5
None
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15.5 Failure Analysis – Power Automation and Propulsion Control

Function/
component

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
K-Chief 500

OS and
computers
Power failure Short circuit,
fuse failure,
loose wire.
Alarm Loss of affected ROS, other ROS
available
None
Tank sounding Not
functioning
Power failure
Internal failure
Alarm No data of level status No effect on station
keeping performance

Valve control Not
functioning
Power failure
Internal failure
Alarm No operation of valves or status
monitoring
No effect on station
keeping performance

Watch Call
System

Not
functioning
Any failure
mode


Alarm No alarming on duty station No effect on station
keeping performance

Thruster Engines
Control System
Engine
Control
Cabinet/ panel
Loss of a 24V
power
Fuse failure
Wire break
Alarm None, engine runs on redundant
supply
None
Loss of 230V
power supply
Fuse failure
Wire break
230V/24V
inverter failure
Alarm None, engine runs on redundant
supply
None
Loss of both
supplies
Short circuit,
Distr. failure
Alarm Trip of engine, hence loss of
thruster

Reduced thruster capacity
Loss of power
to safety PLC
Fuse failure
Wire break
PLC failure
Alarm Loss of electronic safety, engine
safety still intact
None
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 87 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Function/
component

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Governor Instability of
regulator
Hydraulic leak Alarm A hydraulic leak of oil from the
governor/ regulator can result in
engine hunting and oscillating
Engine to be stopped, hence loss
of a thruster
Reduced thruster capacity
Shutdown
initiated
Engine
shutdown
Overspeed
LO pressure ME
Cooling water
temp.
LO pres. MG

Alarm Affected engine shuts down,
hence loss of a thruster
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity

Diesel Generator
Control System
DG Control
Cabinet/ panel
Loss of a 24V
power
Fuse failure
Wire break
Alarm None, engine runs on redundant
supply
None
Loss of 230V
power supply
Fuse failure
Wire break
230V/24V
inverter failure
Alarm None, engine runs on redundant
supply
None
Loss of both
supplies
Short circuit,
Distr. failure
Alarm Trip of engine
Engineer to start standby
generator
None
Loss of power
to safety PLC
Fuse failure
Wire break
PLC failure
Alarm Loss of electronic safety, engine
safety still intact
None Load sharing com lines are
between DSLCs and from
DSLC to 723
Woodward
723+
load & Speed
control unit
Not working Power failure Alarm Trip of affected DG

None
Load sharing
line
Wire break Alarm Not Applicable None Load sharing is by governor
DROOP No load sharing lines
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 88 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Function/
component

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Governor Instability of
regulator
Hydraulic leak Alarm A hydraulic leak of oil from the
governor/ regulator can result in
engine hunting and oscillating of
the frequency.

None Engine to be stopped
AVR Over / under
excitation
Internal failure Alarm Trip of Generator breaker

None





Shut down
function of a
Generator
Engine shut
down
Overspeed
LO pressure ME
Cooling water
temp.
LO pres. MG

Alarm Stop of affected G#
If the Overspeed is not quick
enough this can result in
unsymmetrical load and the other
generator(s) can trip on reverse
power before the affected
generator trips.














None
Reduced power capacity

In case of blackout all
important systems on
backup supply
This can cause a blackout if
“faulty” DG takes all load and
then trip.

Note this will cause loss of
LWTW if used
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 89 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Function/
component

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
IAS / PMS system

Field Station Power failure UPS failure
Fuse failure
Alarm Loss of Field station with
belonging components
None Field stations (PS41 &PS42)
with important equipment
connected have redundant
power supply from both UPS’s.
Internal failure Alarm Loss of components/ controller
powered from that RCU
None PS 41 & 42 have redundant
controllers and power supply
Controller
failure
Power failure
Internal failure
Alarm Automatic changeover to backup
controller if master fails, else no
affect

None Loss of Field station with
equipment if no redundancy
Network HUB
Power failure
Internal failure
Alarm None, works on redundant
network
None
Software error Wrong
programming,
None Cause wrong configuration wrong
commands.
None This is eliminated trough use
and testing
Data Virus Data virus in all
computer
system on net
None A virus can result in “crash” of
computer systems
None To prevent this Vessel operator
should make sure to have
procedures available to restrict
the use of computers connected
to the network
Network

RBus
Serial line
NMEA
Comm. failure
Wire break
Alarm Loss of communication from
affected equipment
None
Ethernet
Comm. failure
Wire break
Alarm None
None

Runs on redundant network
ModBus
Comm. failure
Wire break
Alarm Loss of communication from
affected Equipment
None
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 90 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Function/
component

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
IAS OS

Stopped, not
working
PCU stop
Power failure
Internal failure
Alarm Loss of control/ monitoring from
that operator station
None

Operator to use other operator
station
Thruster Drive Not
communicatin
g to IAS/PMS
Power failure
Unit failure
Alarm Loss of remote ctrl and
monitoring of propulsion drives
No effect on propulsion drives.
None
Generator
Breaker
measurement
Loss of circuit
breaker signal
from SWBD
Wire break
Sensor failure
Alarm Affected DG runs in droop mode Could lead to reduced
thrust capacity

SWBD Hz
measurement
Loss of Hz
signal from
SWBD
Wire break
Sensor failure
Alarm No effect only alarm given None
SWBD Voltage
measurement
Loss of V
signal from
SWBD
Wire break
Sensor failure
Alarm No effect only alarm given None
DG kW
measurement
Over / under
range or lost
Wire break

Alarm No effect only alarm given None
Valve control Not
functioning
Power failure
Internal failure
Alarm No operation of valves or status
monitoring
None
Tank sounding Not
functioning
Power failure
Internal failure

Alarm No data of level status None
Watch Call
System
Not
functioning
Any failure
mode


Alarm No alarming on duty station None


Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 91 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Function/
component

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
PMS

Network Loss of comm.
line
Wire break Alarm Dual ring line network all systems
comm. on remaining line.
None G1 to G5 can be fully controlled
by PMS.

PLC Loss of comm.
/ control
server





PLC failure
Power failure
Alarm Systems controlled by secondary
server
None
Generator
Protection Unit

Sepam Loss of Sepam Power failure
Internal failure
Alarm Loss of Sepam will trip the
generator breaker
None
Reduced power capacity
The Sepam is powered from
respective generator cubicle.
Thruster &
Propulsion Control Systems

There is no loop monitoring for signal failure for any of the azimuth, pitch or RPM signals: Only a
prediction error warning is given when sufficient difference has occurred between demand and
feedback. Failure of the feedback signals from the thrusters should raise an alarm and de-selection
of the thruster –either automatically or by the operator.

Tunnel
Thrusters
Control
cabinet
Loss of power
supply to
control cabinet
Fuse failure
Short circuit
Alarm
Loss of one tunnel thruster
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity



Loss of
control unit
Short circuit
Internal failure.
Alarm
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 92 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Function/
component

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Comm.
between DP
and E-shaft
Rpm
command
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # prediction
Rpm to idle
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity

Rpm
feedback
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # input error, works as
normal
None DP uses calculated feedback
Comm.
between
E-shaft &
Converter
rpm
command
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # prediction error
Rpm to idle
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity


rpm
feedback
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # not ready, rpm to idle

No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity

Converter Converter
signal failure
Wire break
Pulse Encoder
Interface
Module
Alarm Thruster # not ready, rpm to idle

No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity

Azimuth
Thrusters
Control
cabinet
Loss of either
power supply
to control
cabinet
Fuse failure
Short circuit
Alarm Automatic changeover to other
supply


None Power supply connected by
diode bridge

Loss of
control unit
Short circuit
Internal failure.
Alarm Loss of one azimuth thruster in
DP and from Bridge control
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity






Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 93 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Function/
component

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Comm.
between DP
and TCC
Azimuth
command
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # Not ready deselected
from DP
Pitch and Azi to zero,
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity

Azimuth
feedback
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # Prediction / input error
Depending on wire broken, the
Azi will either freeze, rotate to
zero position

Pitch
command
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # Not ready deselected
from DP
Pitch and Azi to zero,
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity








Pitch feedback
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # prediction/ input error
Thruster works as normal
None DP uses calculated feedback
Comm.
between TCC
and thruster
Azimuth
command
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # prediction error
Pitch works
Azi freezes or rotates depending
on wire taken
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity

Azimuth
feedback
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # error azimuth, freezes,
pitch works

Local alarm on thruster panel
for emergency ctrl is sounded
way before any affect noted in
DP. This will alert DPO too.
Pitch
command
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster # prediction error
Pitch freezes, then slow down to 0
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity

Pitch feedback
signal failure
Wire break Alarm Thruster #not ready
Thruster deselects out of DP

Emergency ctrl from thruster
panel possible
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 94 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Function/
component

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Cause of
failure
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
Thruster Engine
Control Helicon
Control
cabinet

Speed signal
Rpm feedback
Lost comm. Wire break Alarm Loss of engine rpm to UN
Thruster # not ready
Engine runs at fixed speed
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity

Speed order will give alarm in
IAS Woodward minor alarm
None
Load signal Lost comm. Wire break Alarm Alarm in IAS None
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 95 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
15.6 Failure Analysis - Fuel Oil System



Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments

FO System General
Remote
operated
QCV’s
Closing of
valve
Manual act Alarm Stop of engine(s) due to FO
starvation.
QCV layout one lever for all and
one lever per engine / tanks
None This is highly unlikely the QCV
cabinets are protected against
inadvertent operation and valves
need oil pressure close.
Some are also by pulling a wire,
Loss of oil/
wire break
Leakage
Wire snaps /
stuck
No affect, The QCV’s needs oil
pressure to close
Same with wire type needs to pull
wire to close valve
None
FO day tank High level
alarm failure.
Sensor failure,
broken wire
None Can result in overfilling from
separator. Normally overflow to
FO overflow tank
None Valves are adjusted manually to
allow continues filling of all day
tanks.
Low level
alarm failure
Sensor failure,
broken wire
None No affect, Normally continuous
purification from settling to
service tank
None Periodic maintenance should
prevent this.

During trials testing for level
alarms were done by open
circuit, this is not testing of the
sensor itself. This is not testing
of sensor, rather the alarm
system only.

FO day tanks to the thruster
engines has a capacity of 5m3



Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 96 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001



Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
FO settling
tank
High level
alarm failure.
Sensor failure,
broken wire
None Can result in overfilling
Manual operation by use of FO
transfer pump
None Periodic maintenance should
prevent this.

Low level
alarm failure
Sensor failure,
broken wire
None No affect, None Operator to manually fill
settling tank
Periodic maintenance should
prevent this.
FO transfer
pump
Mech. Failure,
electrical
failure
Fatigue,
bearing,
coupling,
damage of
motor, short
circuit
Alarm Loss of affected pump.
FO separator can also have
suction from cargo manifold
None
FO
Separator
feed pump
Mech. Failure,
electric power
supply
Fatigue,
bearing,
coupling,
damage of
motor, short
circuit
Alarm FO feeding to the separator does
not work hence loss of
purification.
None Tank capacity is sufficient to
give enough time for operator to
repair/ fix separator feed pump
or use the other separator
FO separator Internal failure Mech.
Electrical
or dirt/ water
Alarm Worst case can cause engine
damage. Separator failure can in
worst case result in dirt/ water
into the affected FO tanks.
None; however in worst
case loss of engines caused
by water/ dirt.
As the separator delivers to all
tanks simultaneously this can
affect all engines/ generators.

This can cause engine damage,
correct maintenance and
regularly samples reduces the
risk of this.




Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 97 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001



Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
FO system FO
Contamination
Microbiological
growth,
water
Fuel oil
samples

Clogged filters, stop of engines. None; however in worst
case loss of engines caused
by water or other
contamination.
Procedures for periodic samples
to give a pre warning and
regular draining of any water
from tanks. FO storage tanks are
common

FO System
Thruster Engines
Generators
FO Filter
(Coarse type
Racor)
(Generator
only)
Reduced flow
through filter
Clogged filter Alarm Operator can change over to
bypass.

None Assume enough time from
alarm given allowing the
operator to change over filter.
Periodic maintenance should
prevent this.
Flow meter

Reduced flow
over flow
meter
Internal failure Alarm If for some reason an internal
failure will cause flow restriction
there is a bypass line that can be
used
None Assume enough time from
alarm given allowing the
operator to open for bypass.
One flow meter per engine
FO Booster
pump
(engine
driven)
Mech. Failure

Fatigue,
bearing,
coupling,
Internal pump
failure
Alarm Reduced FO pressure, start of
standby booster pump
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Once this pump fails it is highly
doubtful that the operation of
engine will continue. Engineer
will stop the engine to reduce
escalation of failure








Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 98 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001



Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detection
of failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position
keeping
Comments
FO standby
booster
pump
(electrical
driven)

Mech. Failure

Fatigue,
bearing,
coupling,
Internal pump
failure
Alarm

FO standby booster pump is not
working.
Loss of affected thruster engine
As this pump is only used if
engine driven id not working.
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity
One electrical standby booster
pump per thruster engine.

Generators 1 -3 has a pneumatic
backup pump.

Electrical
failure
Breaker failure
Internal failure
Motor failure

FO Filter
(fine, engine
mounted)
Clogged filter Clogged filter Alarm Clogged filter causing reduced
FO flow to injectors.
Assume enough time to take
corrective actions. This will affect
one engine only.
No effect on station
keeping performance
Reduced thruster capacity

Injectors Not
functioning
Mechanical
failure
Alarm Damage on affected engine and it
will be stopped


FO System GS
FO System
GS
Failure of GS
FO system
Any failure Alarm FO failure will only affect this
engine.
Normally not in use, but is fitted
as class of SOLAS.
None Service tank has LAL that
allows ample time (15 hours
continuous run from alarm is
activated)
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 99 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
15.7 Failure Analysis - Cooling Water Systems



Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection
of failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments

SW Cooling System
Generators
Sea chest Clogged
Not filled with
SW
Debris (weeds etc.)
Clogged vent pipe

Alarm Reduced cooling of FW
system
None Can affect a generator pair
SW Strainer
(filter)
Filter failure Clogged, dirt Alarm Can use other sea chest
and filter on the other
side.
None
SW manifold Aeration
Not filled with
water
Air taken in from sea
chest(s)
Clogged vent pipe
Ice/ weed blowing
Alarm Loss of suction and
cooling to generators, if
not restored in time,
engines will stop on
HTFW
None Generator G4 & G5 have a
separate system as of G1-G3
SW
overboard
valve
Flow restrictions Closed,
remote ctrl valve

If closed this will cause
no circulation of SW
through generators
None Generator G4 & G5 have a
separate system as of G1-G3
SW Pump
Engine
driven
(G1-G3)
Mechanical
failure of pump
Fatigue, bearing,
coupling, damage of
motor, overload
Alarm Loss of cooling to that
particular generator
None Loss of a generator, Engineer
starts another generator and
take it online
SW Pump
Electric
(G4& G5)
Mechanical
failure of pump
Fatigue, bearing,
coupling, damage of
motor, overload
Alarm Loss of running pump,
start of standby pump.
None SWBD failure hence loss of
both pumps and eventually
loss of G4 & G5 due to lack of
cooling
Electrical failure
of pump
Fuse failure
Short circuit
SWBD failure
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 100 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001



Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection
of failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
SW/ FW
Central
cooler
Reduced
capacity/Failure
of cooler
Leakage
Clogging
Damage/ rupture
Corrosion
Alarm Loss of cooling for
effected generator(s),
slow increase of FW
temperature for affected
system.
None

Loss of a generator, Engineer
starts another generator and
take it online

SW Cooling System
Thruster Engines
Sea chest Clogged
Not filled with
SW
Debris (weeds etc.)
Clogged vent pipe

Alarm Reduced cooling of FW
system

SW Strainer
(filter)
Filter failure Clogged, dirt Alarm Reduced cooling of FW
system

SW manifold Aeration
Not filled with
water
Air taken in from sea
chest(s)
Clogged vent pipe
Ice/ weed blowing
Alarm Loss of suction and
cooling to engine, if not
restored in time, engine
will stop on HTFW
No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
SW cooling system to thruster
engines are independent of
each other this will affect only
one thruster engine/ thruster
SW
overboard
valve
Flow restrictions Closed,
remote ctrl valve

If closed this will cause
no circulation of SW
through generators

SW cooling
Pump
Mechanical
failure of pump
Fatigue, bearing,
coupling, damage of
motor, overload
Alarm Running pump stops,
start of standby pump
None
Electrical failure
of pump
Breaker failure
Short circuit

Central
cooler
Mech. failure Damage
Corrosion
Clogged
Alarm No circulation through
cooler, reduced cooling
No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
SW cooling system to thruster
engines are independent of
each other this will affect only
one thruster engine/ thruster
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 101 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001



Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection
of failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Clutch cooler Mech. failure Damage
Corrosion
Clogged
Alarm No circulation through
cooler, increased clutch
oil temperature
No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
SW cooling system to thruster
engines are independent of
each other this will affect only
one thruster engine/ thruster
Thruster Oil
cooler
Mech. failure Damage
Corrosion
Clogged
Alarm No circulation through
cooler, increased thruster
oil temperature.
Thruster to be stopped

FW Cooling System
Generators
LTFW pump

Mechanical
failure of pump
Fatigue, bearing,
coupling,
Alarm Stop of affected
generator due to lack of
cooling.
None Loss of a generator, Engineer
starts another generator and
take it online
HTFW pump Mechanical
failure of pump
Fatigue, bearing,
coupling,
Alarm
TCV TCV valves not
working properly
Mech. Failure
Electrical failure
Pneumatic failure
Out of calibration
Alarm TCV fails as set or to full
open
None

Manual operation of TCV
If TCV fails to full open it can
cause under cooling of engine
FW header
tank
Drain of water Leakage in system Alarm Loss of a generator None Regular maintenance should
reduce this risk.
Each generator has its own
FW cooling system.
Heat
Exchanger
Mech. failure Damage
Corrosion
Clogged

Alarm No circulation through
that heat exchanger
Temperature increase on
that system, hence
generator has to be shut
down



FW Pre-
heater
Not working Pump failure
Heater failure
Alarm Affected engine not
ready for start
None
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 102 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001



Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/
comp.
Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection
of failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
FW Cooling System
Thruster Engines
FW cooling
system

Any See generators above Alarm Stop of affected engine,
hence loss of that
thruster
No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Any failure of an engine will
only affect one thruster.

Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 103 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
15.8 Failure Analysis - Lube Oil Systems

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/comp. Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
LO system
Generators
The LO system for each
engine is independent
LO direct
driven pump
Failure of
pump
Fatigue, pinion/gear
failure
Alarm Stop of affected
generator and auto start
of priming pump.
None

Engineer starts another
generator
Priming pump Mech. failure
El. failure
Fatigue, bearing,
coupling, damage of
motor, short circuit,
power supply
Alarm None if engine is
running
No start of G# if
standby, G# will be start
blocked
None Good practice is to have the
pump available at all time


LO cooler Leakage Rupture Alarm Due to higher pressure
in LO system, LO will
get in the FW system.
Loss of pressure
depending on size of
leak. Stop of affected
generator
None

Engineer starts another
generator
TCV TCV valves
not working
properly
Mech. failure, out of
calibration
Alarm TCV fails as set None Manual operation possible
LO filters Failure of filter Clogging, dirt Alarm Should not affect
running of generator
If not corrected stop of
affected engine.
None

Regular maintenance should
avoid this
LO sump Leakage Rupture or leak in
system.
Alarm Low level alarm before
low-low pressure and
stop of affected engine

None Regular maintenance should
avoid this
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 104 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/comp. Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
LO system Micro bacterial
growth
Stop of an engine LO sample This can cause engine
damage and clogging of
filters
None

This should be detected by
regular oil analysis.
LO separator Failure Power supply, internal
error
Alarm No effect on a running
engine. Worst case can
cause engine damage.
Separator failure can
result in dirt/ water into
the LO system.

None

This can cause engine
damage, correct maintenance
and regularly samples will
reduce the risk

Only generators G1, G2 and
G3 can have its LO purified
All other engines have oil
change.



















Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 105 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/comp. Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
LO system
Thruster Engine
The LO system for each
engine is independent
Engine LO
system
Any See generators Alarm A LO system failure
will only cause stop of
one engine, hence loss
of an azimuth thruster.

No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
These engines do also have a
standby LO pump in addition
to priming pump. That will
automatically start up upon
low LO pressure.

It is highly unlikely that the
engine will be running for a
long time if the standby pump
starts up. Engineer will mostly
stop the engine to reduce risk
of escalating the failure.
LO system
Gear/ Clutch
LO direct
driven pump
Failure of
pump
Fatigue, pinion/gear
failure
Alarm, noise Loss of that pump
Start of standby pump
None
Standby LO
pump MG
Mech.
failure/power
failure
Fatigue, bearing,
coupling, damage of
motor, short circuit,
power supply loss
Alarm Not in use when engine
is running.

No effect on running
machinery.
None Good practice is to have the
pump available for service at
all time.
LO filters MG Failure of filter Clogging, dirt Alarm Filters are fitted with
pressure differential
alarm to warn the
operator.
None, if proper actions
taken.

Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 106 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/comp. Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
LO cooler MG Reduced
capacity /
Failure of
cooler
Leakage, clogging,
dirt
Alarm Due to higher LO
pressure the LO will
leak into the coolant
system and result in low
pressure, hence declutch
of ME’s.
No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity

MG clutch Loss of oil
pressure to
clutch
Leakage Alarm A low pressure of gear
oil will initiate shut
down of engine
No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity

Loss of control
power (24V)
Fuse failure Alarm Clutch stays as set None
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 107 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
15.9 Failure Analysis - Compressed Air System

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/ comp. Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Starting Air System
Generators
Start air to generators G1 to
G3 is from one system, and to
G4 & G5 is from another
system.
Starting air
compressor
Mech. or
electrical
failure
Valve failure, fatigue,
bearing failure, loss
of power supply,
protection trip
Alarm Loss of one compressor
Air remains in two
receivers
None All engines running
Starting air
receivers/ valves
Leakage Rupture or leaking
valves
Alarm Isolate that receiver and
use the other one
None Each engine room has two
receivers
Starting air to
generator
No air
pressure or to
low
Start disk failure
Distributor failure
Alarm No start of generator None Assumed engines are running.
If not, no start and reduced
power capacity
Control air to
generators
No air
pressure or to
low
Pressure reduced
clogged, not working
Alarm No air to engine shut
down safety functions






None
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 108 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/ comp. Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Staring Air System
Thruster Engines
Starting air to the thruster
engines is from a common
system “ring line” this is
normally split as thruster room
1 and 3 shares the compressor
in thruster room 1. The second
compressor in thruster room 4
is shared amongst thruster
room 2 and 4. Each engine
room has a control air receiver
fitted with none return valve.
Starting air
compressor
Mech. or
electrical
failure
Valve failure, fatigue,
bearing failure, loss
of power supply,
protection trip
Alarm Loss of one compressor
Air remains in receivers
None All engines running

Starting air
receivers/ valves
Leakage Rupture or leaking
valves
Alarm Isolate that receiver, still
have control air in its
receiver.
None When totally drained this will
affect control air to two
engines rooms only. Engineer
shall have ample time to
isolate faulty receiver and
open isolation valves for air
supply from the PS/SB
system.
Starting air to
Engines
No air
pressure or to
low
Start disk failure
Distributor failure
No start of engine None Assumed engines are running.
If not, no start
Pressure
reducing panel
Not working Mech. Failure
Clogged
Alarm Loss of instr. Control air
feed. Eventually low
pressure alarm
None
If no action taken loss of an
engine
Reduced thruster capacity
Assume ample time for
engineer to open for air from
service air system.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 109 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/ comp. Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Control air No air
pressure or too
low to engines
Loss of air
Reduction panel
failure
Alarm Loss of control air
TCV to full open
Loss of air to engine shut
down safety
Fire dampers will
eventually close as they
are pneumatic controlled
None

Assume ample time for
engineer to open for air from
service air system, this will
prevent fire dampers to close

Worst case will be closing of
fire dampers and then loss of
an engine, hence a thruster

No immediate effect, reduced
head pressure in thruster
gravity tanks, can risk SW
ingress into thruster housing,
reduced oil sealing pressure
Control air
compressor
(Thruster room
2/3 only)
Mech. or
electrical
failure
Valve failure, fatigue,
bearing failure, loss
of power supply,
protection trip
Alarm Loss of one compressor
Air remains in receivers
+ air can be taken from
starting air line too.

None
Service
Air system
Service air
system
Loss of air Leakage
Loss of air on the line
Compressor failure
Alarm Loss of air to:
Separators
SW inlet valves control
Tautwire
Start air to G4 & G5
None Engineer to take necessary
actions to correct failure.

Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 110 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
15.10 Failure Analysis - Ventilation

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Function/ comp. Failure mode Failure
mech./cause
Detecti
on of
failure
On component in subsystem Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments

Ventilation

Engine room fan Fan not
working
Mech. failure
Electrical failure
Alarm Loss of one of the two supply
fans

Reduction in combustion air and
ventilation to engine room.
None As the ECR is manned the
loss of ventilation will be
noticed and appropriate
action to be taken.
Thruster room
fans
Fan not
working
Mech. failure
Electrical failure
Alarm Loss of supply fan
Thruster rooms do also have AC
system
Thrusters and its aux. systems
are water cooled too
None Important rooms have stand-
alone AC systems fitted in
addition to traditional fan
supply
SWBD room fan Fan not
working
Mech. failure
Electrical failure
Alarm Loss of supply fan
SWBD rooms do also have AC
system
None
AC Units AC unit not
working
Mech. failure
Electrical failure
Each room location has its own
independent standalone unit

None There is no alarm fitted.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 111 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
15.11 Failure Analysis – Propulsion System
15.11.1 Note that the failure analysis for the control and monitoring system for the propulsion system is found in section 15.5 in this
report.


Function/
comp.

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Tunnel
Thrusters
Thruster Mech. failure Bearings, blades,
couplings
Vibration,
noise
Stop of thruster
depending of extent of
failure


El. Motor Not running Motor failure
Power failure
Alarm Loss of affected thruster No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity

Frequency
converter
Mech. failure
El. failure
Hardware
Breaker failure
Short circuit
Protection trip
Alarm Loss of affected thruster


Pre-charger
Transformer
No power Breaker fault Alarm None None No affect as long as thruster is
running, else not possible to
start
Cooling circuit Lack of
cooling
Loss of cooling fan Alarm Two fans one will run

No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
There are two cooling fans per
thruster, all are powered from
4FSB.
Power failure Alarm Loss of cooling fan(s)
Failure of 4FSB loss of
cooling fans to both
tunnel thrusters.
This failure will cause loss of
both tunnel thrusters
LO/ servo
system
Loss of oil
pressure/
circulation
Pump failure
Leakage
Alarm Trip of thrusters No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Thruster is interlocked, loss of
LO pressure thruster stops
also start interlocked for same.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 112 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Function/
comp.

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments

Seal system incl.
Tank
Loss of head
pressure or oil
Leakage Alarm Risk of seawater ingress
into the thruster housing
None, however SW in
system will increase risk of
wear and tear

Azimuth
Thrusters
Thruster engine Not running Mech. failure
Electrical failure
Shutdown
Alarm Stop of thruster
depending of extent of
failure


No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity

Thruster or gear Mech. failure Bearings, blades,
couplings
Vibration,
noise
Loss of affected thruster
Cooling circuit
to HPU
Lack of
cooling
No circulation of
coolant in cooling
circuit
Alarm Temperature increases
no auto trip of thruster.
Thruster will run Hot
before a high temp and
shutdown of engine.

Engineer should stop thruster
engine to protect the thruster
itself from running to hot.
LO system Loss of oil
pressure/
circulation
Pump failure
Leakage
Alarm Trip of thrusters No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity

LO/ servo pump Mech. or
electrical
failure
Fatigue, bearing,
coupling, motor
failure, loss of power,
short circuit,
protection trip
Alarm Stop of pump.

Thruster trips, internal
safety.

The thruster is interlocked
meaning if pump fails,
automatically stop of thruster
and no start of thruster is
possible.
Oil filters Failure of
filter
Clogged, dirt Alarm No affect as long as
action taken.
Monitored for pressure
difference
None Watch keeper to take
necessary actions to correct
failure.
Filter set for each system,
pitch, steering and lift
lowering.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 113 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Function/
comp.

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Oil cooler Failure of
cooler
Leakage, rupture. Oil
in FW system.
Alarm Temp. increase
Can cause trip of thruster

Pitch Control
valves
Failure of
pitch valve
Leakage, seizure, dirt Alarm Can cause variance in
pitch or freeze.
No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Operator should be aware of
this and disable thruster if this
occurs. The outcome of this
type of failure can varies from
pitch to zero or to full 100%
depending on failure.
Steering control
valve
Valve failure Leakage, seizure, dirt Alarm Can cause uncontrolled
steering of thruster

Operator should be aware of
this and disable thruster if this
occurs.
Steering motor Mech. failure Piston, fatigue Alarm Thruster will not rotate
or rotates slower

Gravity /
Header tank
Loss of head
pressure
Lack of compressed
air to tank
Alarm Reduced head pressure No effect on station keeping
performance
Reduced thruster capacity
Regular maintenance should
avoid this
Reduced
amount of oil
Leakage Alarm No affect as long as
action taken.
Can cause stop of
affected thruster.
Watch keeper to take
necessary actions to correct
failure.
Increased amount of oil in
tank will also give an alarm,
notifying that something is
wrong.
Seal tank Loss of head
pressure
Lack of compressed
air to tank
Alarm Reduced head pressure,
risk of SW ingress to
thruster housing through
the seals
None No immediate effect Increase
of SW in LO system,
Regular maintenance/ oil
samples should give a warning
to avoid this
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 114 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Function/
comp.

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Feedback
transmitter
Slewing ring
gear failure
Mech. Failure This can cause the
thruster to rotate un-
controllably.
There will be a steady
signal to DP and thruster
cabinet, of which will
send out order signal for
the thruster to rotate to
the direction given.
Reduced thruster capacity

This can cause unstable
station keeping.
This type of failure will not
necessary give alarm for the
faulty thruster
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 115 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
15.12 Failure Analysis - DP Control System

Function/
component

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
DP
System
DPC-11
Computer

Any failure
causing loss of
this station
Electrical failure
Computer failure
Controller failure
Etc.
Alarm Loss of backup DP
station
No effect on station keeping
performance
Loss of DP Class 3
All systems running on main
DPC-21.
Vessel still within DP class 2
DPC-21
Computers
Power failure Short circuit in
cabinet, fuse failure,
PSU failure
Alarm Blackout of affected
computer.
Auto switchover to other
computer.
No effect on station keeping
performance
Loss of DP Class 2/3
In DP class 2 the BU DP
system does not count.

Note! That both DP UPS 1
and UPS 2 are both powered
through the same distribution
2CRASB.
Software error Wrong programming,
model


None Cause wrong
configuration wrong
commands.
DP system does not act
correct on commands/
functions selected.

Loss of position may occur.
Self-check routines between
computers.

Data Virus Data virus in all
computer system on
net
None A virus can result in
“crash” of computer
systems
Loss of Station keeping To prevent this Vessel
operator should make sure to
have procedures available to
restrict the use of computers
connected to the network


Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 116 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Function/
component

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Loss of I/O
card
Fuse failure, card
failure, short circuit
Alarm Loss of communication
to components on that
I/O card
Loss of redundancy Loss of class depends on I/O
lost.
The trials revealed that
there are I/O cards that
controls up to three
thrusters, failure of this,
three thrusters are lost. U31
thruster 2, 4 and 5. U32
thruster 1, 3 and 6 are lost.
Abnormal
behaviour
thruster
control
Internal failure in I/O
card
Alarm This scenario can be
critical for those I/O
cards that control
variable pitch thrusters.
Loss of redundancy

If a thruster goes to full pitch
this can affect station
keeping capability
Thruster to be deselected from
DP. Thruster can be used in
emergency mode to assist DP
if needed.

DP Network Net failure Net overload, cable
breakage, fuse/
breaker failure
HUB/ node failure
Alarm Loss of affected
communication network.
Signal transfer on
redundant network.
None and
loss of redundancy

Galvanic
Isolation unit
Not working Loss of power
Internal failure
Alarm Loss of control to
affected thruster(s)
No effect on station keeping
performance
Loss of redundancy
Reduced thruster capacity
Galvanic units are powered
in pairs. A fuse/power
failure will cause loss of two
units. Hence two thrusters
are lost.

Internal failure will cause loss
of one thruster.





Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 117 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Function/
component

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Operator
Console
Operator
Console
Loss of OS Power failure
Fuse failure
Short circuit
Computer failure
Alarm Loss of affected OS.

Other OS still available.

None and
loss redundancy

DP change over
switch
Any failure Power failure, short
circuit, cable
breakage
Alarm Power failure, breakage
of one input cable will
not have any affect due
to each thruster unit got
separate cables.
None One switch per thruster
DP
Sensors
VRS Power or
mech. failure
Fuse failure
Short circuit
Damage
Alarm Loss of affected VRS.

Vessel to be set up with
3 VRS’s to main DP
(include voting) and 2 to
the BU DP station
None

Sufficient number of VRS’s
available after failure of one.

Note! Loss of VRS to Seapath
or HiPAP will cause loss of
those systems.
Gyro Not working Short circuit
Fuse failure
Mech. failure
Alarm Loss of affected gyro.

DP auto select other
gyro(s).
None and
loss of redundancy

Gyro signal to Seapath are for
calibration only
Number of gyros to main DP
is 3; loss of one will cause loss
redundancy.

There are 2 gyros (3&4) to
backup DP loss of gyro 4, still
within class 2/3.


Difference Wrong calibration,
damage
Alarm Affected gyro will be de-
selected by DP system
due to gyro difference
check.

Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 118 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Function/
component

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Wind Power failure Fuse failure
Supply failure
Short circuit
Alarm Loss of affected wind
sensor

None and
loss of redundancy

Vessel has 4 sensors, 2 for
main and 2 for BU DP
Mech./internal
failure
Damage, shielding
effect
Excess wind speed
due to Helicopter
operations
Warning Can cause wrong signals
to DP system.
DP system compensates
for wrong input.
Can result in excursion

DPO to be aware of this.


Position
Reference
Systems
Vessel is fitted with 3
DGPS’s, 1 Fanbeam, 1
LWTW and 2 HiPAP’s
DGPS

Power failure Fuse failure
Supply failure
Short circuit
Alarm Loss of affected DGPS
as DP ref. system.
None
GPS Antenna Wire break
Shielding
GPS antenna damage
Alarm Shielding can affect more than
one DGPS
DGPS signal Loss of
differential
correction signal
Spotbeam
Shielding,
Out of range, power
failure
Warning
indication on
DGPS
monitor
Loss of diff. signal to
DGPS

None
Affected DGPS rejected
from DP as ref. system
There is one demodulator per
GPS, all diff. corr. of type
Spotbeam. However one of
AFSAT and the other two are
AOREH




Loss of pre-set
numbers of
satellite signals
Too few satellite
signals
Alarm Can cause loss of all
DGPS’s and Seapath
None
Or loss of redundancy


Vessel remains with only on
Fanbeam, LWTW and one
HiPAP if configured right.

Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 119 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Function/
component

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Degraded
performance
Shielding, noise/
disturbance in
hardware signal
network, poor
satellite constellation,
invalid satellites,
poor atmospheric
conditions

Alarm,
Warning
Can cause invalid
position on DGPS.


DP will vote away poor
DGPS.

Loss of redundancy.



Seapath Power Failure Fuse failure
UPS failure
Alarm The DP system does not use
the Seapath, but it’s used as
heading and motion reference
for HiPAP(s).

GPS antenna Shielding of a GPS
antenna
Communication
Alarm Loss of Seapath, hence
loss of HiPAP as a DP
reference source
No effect on station keeping
performance
Loss of a HiPAP as DP ref.
system
Loss of VRS
signals
Power failure
Mech. failure
Signal failure
Alarm
Loss of Gyro
signals
Power failure
Mech. failure
Signal failure




Alarm No affect None Gyro signal is used for visual
check / calibration only
HiPAP Computer
APC-11
Power failure
Internal failure
Alarm Motion + gyro signals from
Seapath or from a gyro &
MRU. Setup configuration
according to DP Ops
Manual
Transceiver MRU signal
Gyro signal
Power failure
Alarm Loss of affected HiPAP No effect on station keeping
performance

Transducer Mech. damage
Sensor failure
Alarm
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 120 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Function/
component

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Transponder Not working
Battery failure
Noise in water
(propeller wash/
water layers)
Alarm
Hoist control Power failure Alarm None as long as
transducer is deployed
None Not possible to lift / lower
transducer
Fanbeam Power Failure Fuse failure
Supply failure
Short circuit
Alarm Loss of Fanbeam No effect on station keeping
performance


Track failure Select new target,
Weather conditions
(e.g. fog), rotation of
vessel







Alarm Unstable reference.
LWTW HPU failure Electrical
Mech. failure
Alarm LWTW rejected from
DP, lost.

No effect on station keeping
performance

Failing HPU failure can lead
to not paying out wire or
pulling in = loss of mooring
Cable failure Cable break Alarm
Clump weight Stuck at seabed None Not possible to retrieve No affect as the system will be
in mooring
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 121 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001

Function/
component

Description of failure

Effect of failure

Failure mode Failure mech./cause Detection of
failure
On component in
subsystem
Effect on DP
operation/position keeping
Comments
Dragging clump
weight along Seabed
Alarm LWTW should be
rejected as the angle and
wire length will be
frozen
Internal DP verification
should reject the LWTW
based on same data sent
several times, though small
changes will not be detected
and the DPO has to determent
if LWTW data are OK or not.
DP UPS

DP UPS’s Power failure
230V/ rectifier
failure
Short circuit
Fuse/ breaker failure
Alarm Loss of 230V main
supply cause UPS to
auto-change to battery
power.
No effect on station keeping
performance
Eventually loss of main DP
if failure of 2CRASB.
Loss of redundancy

Battery endurance should be
min. 30 minutes.

Note both DP UPS 1 & UPS 2
from same distribution
Battery failure Battery failure Alarm None, remains on main
supply.
None Regular maintenance should
reveal this
Loss of UPS Internal UPS failure,
short circuit
Alarm Loss of consumers on
affected UPS.
Loss of redundancy Reference is made to section
14.7 for list of UPS consumers
that will be lost.
Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: 122 of 122
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
16 REFERENCES

/1/ FMEA report GM-694-170-R01-rev2
/2/ 1203351A_1 OSes.
/3/ 1203352A_1 FS 31-36
/4/ 1203353A_1 FS 37-38-41
/5/ 1203355A_1 FS 39
/6/ 1203356A_1 FS 42
/7/ 1203357A_1 UPS
/8 1208197B_1 KFDD Common system
/9/ 1208200B_1 KFDD IAS
/10/ 1208201B_1 KFDD PMS
/11/ 1208202A_1 KFDD Serial Lines
/12/ K-Chief Topology - 1203364A_1

Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: A1
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
APPENDIX A
Kongsberg Maritime DP I/O specifications

Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: A2
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
I/O Specification SDP 21

Equipment U11 U12 U13 U14 U31 U32 U33 U41
Tension NMEA X
Gyro 1 X
DGPS 1 X
Wind 1 X
Gyro 2 X
DGPS 2 X
Wind 2 X
Gyro 3 X
Artemis interface (not used) X
DGPS 3 X
Waypoint X
Fanbeam X
Thr. 5 ready X
Thr. 2 ready X
Thr. 4 ready X
VRS 1 OK X
VRS 2 OK X
UPS 1 alarm X
Thr. 1 ready X
Thr. 3 ready X
Thr. 6 ready X
LWTW warn., select, alarm X
VRS 3 OK X
UPS 2 alarm X
VRS 1 roll X
VRS 1 pitch X
VRS 1 heave X
LWTW length , beam, along X
VRS 2 roll X
VRS 2 pitch X
Thr. 2 pitch feedback X
Thr. 2 azimuth feedback sin X
Thr. 2 azimuth feedback cos X
Thr. 4 pitch feedback X
Thr. 4 azimuth feedback sin X
Thr. 4 azimuth feedback cos X
Thr. 2 pitch command X
Thr. 2 azimuth command X
Thr. 4 pitch command X
Thr. 4 azimuth command X







Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: A3
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
Equipment U51 U61
Thr. 1 pitch feedback X
Thr. 1 azimuth feedback sin X
Thr. 1 azimuth feedback cos X
Thr. 6 rpm feedback X
Thr. 1 pitch command X
Thr. 1 azimuth command X
Thr. 6 rpm command X
Thr. 6 direction command X

Thr. 3 pitch feedback X
Thr. 3 azimuth feedback sin X
Thr. 3 azimuth feedback cos X
Thr. 5 rpm feedback X
Thr. 3 pitch command X
Thr. 3 azimuth command X
Thr. 5 rpm command X
Thr. 5 direction command X


Note!
A single card failure can result in loss of three thrusters, ref. U31 & U32.
Two thrusters will be lost if following cards fails U41, U51 and U61.

Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: A4
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
I/O Specification SDP 11

Equipment U11 U12 U13 U31 U32 U33 U41 U51
Tension NMEA X
Gyro 4 X
Wind 3 X
VRS 4 X
DGPS 3 X
Wind 4 X
Gyro 3 X

Thr. 5 ready X
Thr. 4 ready X
VRS 3 OK X
UPS 3 X

Thr. 1 ready X
Thr. 6 ready X
Tautwire X
VRS 4 X

Backup selected X
VRS 3 (pitch/roll/heave) X
Tautwire X

Thr. 5 order/feedback X
Thr. 2 order/feedback X
Thr. 4 order/feedback X

Thr. 1 order/feedback X
Thr. 3 order/feedback X
Thr. 6 order/feedback X




Client: Subsea 7 Date: 07.09.2012 Page: B1
Title: Seven Polaris FMEA upgrade Rev.: 1 Made: KJ

Global Maritime AS GM Doc. No.: GM-712-059-R001
APPENDIX B
Annual DP Trials with recommendations
See last Annual DP Trials report