JESPER PACKERT PEDERSEN 2014 Te German Marshall Fund of the United States. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means without permission in writing from the German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF). Please direct inquiries to: Te German Marshall Fund of the United States 1744 R Street, NW Washington, DC 20009 T 1 202 683 2650 F 1 202 265 1662 E info@gmfus.org Tis publication can be downloaded for free at http://www.gmfus.org/publications/index.cfm. Limited print copies are also available. To request a copy, send an e-mail to info@gmfus.org. GMF Paper Series Te GMF Paper Series presents research on a variety of transatlantic topics by staf, fellows, and partners of the German Marshall Fund of the United States. Te views expressed here are those of the author and do not necessarily represent the views of GMF. Comments from readers are welcome; reply to the mailing address above or by e-mail to info@gmfus.org. About the Asmus Policy Entrepreneurs Fellowship Tis paper is the fnal product of the authors Asmus Policy Entrepreneurs Fellowship. Te German Marshall Fund of the United States launched this program in 2011 to honor Ronald D. Asmus, GMF Brussels ofce executive director and direc- tor of strategic planning. Asmus, a renowned policy entrepreneur who dedicated his life to the principle of freedom, passed away on April 30, 2011. Asmus Fellows must be U.S. or European citizens under the age of 40. Te fellowship enables them to pursue a project that they believe will address an important foreign or economic policy issue and will advance transatlantic cooperation. Over the course of the year, Asmus Fellows will utilize existing GMF activities and networks to advance their policy questions and to frame policy alternatives before summarizing their results by the years end. More information can be found at http://www. gmfus.org/programs/tli/asmus-policy-entrepreneurs-fellowship/ About GMF Te German Marshall Fund of the United States (GMF) strengthens transatlantic cooperation on regional, national, and global challenges and opportunities in the spirit of the Marshall Plan. GMF does this by supporting individuals and institu- tions working in the transatlantic sphere, by convening leaders and members of the policy and business communities, by contributing research and analysis on transatlantic topics, and by providing exchange opportunities to foster renewed commitment to the transatlantic relationship. In addition, GMF supports a number of initiatives to strengthen democra- cies. Founded in 1972 as a non-partisan, non-proft organization through a gif from Germany as a permanent memorial to Marshall Plan assistance, GMF maintains a strong presence on both sides of the Atlantic. In addition to its headquarters in Washington, DC, GMF has ofces in Berlin, Paris, Brussels, Belgrade, Ankara, Bucharest, Warsaw, and Tunis. GMF also has smaller representations in Bratislava, Turin, and Stockholm. On the cover: Gas pipeline. ssuaphoto/IStockPhoto Bolstering European Energy Security Foreign Policy Papers June 2014 By Jesper Packert Pedersen 1 1 The author wishes to thank the German Marshall Fund for its generosity, and for supporting the enduring policy entrepreneur legacy of Ronald D. Asmus. Thanks also to the many experts and policymakers, 77 in total, who were willing to discuss this project, all of which were off the record. The author can be reached at jesperpackert@gmail.com with any comments or questions. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 European Energy Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Changing Dynamics in European Energy Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Baltic Sea Regional Energy Policy Case Study . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 What to Do about Russian Gas? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 European Union Approaches to Energy Security. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17 The Geopolitics of Energy Efficiency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 Bolstering Energy Security in Europe: A Case for Optimism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Bolstering European Energy Security 1 Introduction 1 S ometimes it is the quiet, unassuming success stories that provide the most instructive examples for solving intractable problems. As Europe grapples to climb out of the most significant economic crisis in generations, it has been difficult to identify areas where Europe will maintain a competitive edge over other regions in the decades to come. Energy security is frequently listed amongst the problems Europe faces today, and projections suggest that these problems will be exacerbated in the future. Europes inclination for the past half century has been to address common problems from a central, integrated perspective as a European Union, but when it comes to cooperation on energy policy, national leaders and industries have resisted centralization and even collaboration, instead opting to fend for themselves and prioritize national over regional solutions. The result is a less competitive European continent vulnerable to energy disruptions and struggling to meet its own climate policy goals. That said, an often-overlooked, well-functioning model for cooperation, diversification, and security of supply stands out amidst the challenging scenarios. Nordic 1 countries have connected, integrated, and opened their energy markets to each other, achieving a significant level of energy security and diversification in the process, while allowing for substantial amounts of renewable energy to be leveraged in a highly efficient way. The Nordic model represents a best practice solution for other regions, and is worth exporting and duplicating. 1 Countries such as the Netherlands, U.K. and in some cases Germany are also relevant to this cooperation, so it could be considered a Northwestern Model in some ways. The most extensive cooperation, however, is between the Nordic countries, and hence this offers the best model for consideration. The German Marshall Fund of the United States 2 European Energy Challenges 2 E urope faces a number of energy security challenges, but they are significantly different across the continent. European nations have very divergent circumstances when it comes to energy security, with some nations entirely dependent on imports to cover their needs while others are net exporters. A workable, European model for energy security has existed for decades, and while the issue of energy security has received a great deal of attention in recent years, little attention has been awarded to proven successes and existing best practices. From an energy perspective, Europe is exceptional in an unfortunate way. According to BPs Global Energy Outlook 2035, all regions of the world will increase their energy production between today and 2035, except for Europe. This places additional demands on other policies, including energy efficiency and conservation, achieving and maintaining low energy intensity, 2 and the ability to secure imports. The latter may become challenging as the global competition for resources heats up in the coming decades. Scenarios from corporate analysts and international energy agencies unanimously predict a dramatic rise in energy consumption, particularly outside the OECD, with an increase of around 40 percent between today and 2035. This will mainly be led by China and India. European countries have a history of conducting energy policy at the national level, a preference for national infrastructure investment, and the associated instinct to protect national energy markets from external competition. These national policies generally impede pan-European solutions to energy security problems. Many observers of European policymaking would fail to see anything surprising in this finding, but in 2 Energy intensity in this context is measured by the quantity of energy required per unit output, activity, or value. a number of ways, it is puzzling. Not only is it clear that energy security is a challenge that no country can fully manage on its own, but on a number of occasions, national leaders have specifically tasked the European Commission to advance energy security at the EU level, only to thwart subsequent actions by the Commission to carry out this mandate. As a result, a pan-European energy policy does not currently exist, and some nations, entire regions even, do not have access to diversified energy supply at competitive prices. A number of steps can be taken both by national governments and the European Union to achieve higher levels of energy security throughout the region. These include breaking down internal trade barriers, utilizing the full range of domestic resources, linking together energy markets, investing in key energy infrastructure, coordinating and cooperating around energy policies, subjecting long-term energy decisions to peer review, developing the capacity to conduct energy diplomacy, and coaxing along existing dynamics in the Russian energy sector to facilitate better relations based on commercial decisions. Each of these proposals will be described in detail below. Forward looking EU policy decisions in recent years provide reason for optimism, but these have to be accompanied by equally determined implementation to achieve results. From an energy perspective, Europe is exceptional in an unfortunate way. Bolstering European Energy Security 3 Twenty-first century policymakers will continue to grapple with the complex triangulation between energy, climate, and competitiveness policies, and Europe has yet to find a satisfactory balance. I n recent years, European energy security discussions have centered around the ability to obtain sufficient supplies, particularly focused on natural gas through the Southern Corridor from the Caspian Sea and transiting Turkey in order to deliver natural gas to European consumers. Until the summer of 2013, it was unclear exactly which route would be chosen, and thereby which consumers would benefit. In a major upset for Central and Eastern European governments, the Shah Deniz Consortium in charge of developing Caspian resources chose to favor the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) over Nabucco-West, which would have supplied Bulgaria, Romania, Hungary, and Austria. These countries have great dependency on a single supplier: Russia. TAP will instead traverse Greece and Albania before reaching the sizeable Italian gas market, and could potentially be expanded to branch into the Balkans in the future. The Southern Corridor will initially, upon completion, add about 2 percent to European natural gas capacity, which does not sound like a dramatic game changer by any means. However, the ability to diversify suppliers even a little improves the bargaining position of Central and Eastern Europe when it comes to negotiating long-term contracts with Russia. In years past, Russia had the upper hand since few alternatives existed, but this situation has now slowly started to change. For instance, short-to-medium term oil and gas contracts have been renegotiated at more competitive prices than expiring contracts, as Russian gas has faced competition from both renewables, coal and LNG 3 and also had to adjust for increased use of spot pricing and waning demand in Europe. 4 Furthermore, the Southern 3 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2014-05-08/lithuania- offered-lng-cheaper-than-gazprom-natural-gas.html. 4 http://www.economist.com/news/business/21592639-euro- pean-efforts-reduce-russian-state-owned-companys-sway-over- gas-prices-have-been. Corridor is designed to be able to scale up if additional resources are developed in the Caspian, or if diplomatic breakthroughs occur in Iraq, Cyprus, or even Iran in the future. All of these are long shots at this time, but could potentially bring significant amounts of natural gas to Europe. Perhaps the prospect of a new $28 billion, 3,500 kilometer pipeline project 5 connecting two continents, a classic instrument of Great Game politics and geopolitical intrigue, has obfuscated some of the other options that exist for European policymakers? Decidedly less sexy topics such as energy efficiency standards, interconnectors, and market integration could yield far greater advantages for Europes security of supply and competitiveness than even the best case scenario for the Southern Corridor. In fact, the decision to move forward with the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline seems to have offered a broader lens for energy security in Europe. Some options will be spelled out in greater detail below, but the overall point is that European leaders would be well advised to consider this range of policy options carefully. Twenty-first century policymakers will continue to grapple with the complex triangulation between energy, climate, and competitiveness policies, and Europe has yet to find a satisfactory balance. It is difficult to advance all three objectives simultaneously, but it is reasonable to argue that European policymakers have not yet deployed all options available, and that one side of the triangle climate policy has been prioritized disproportionately to energy and competitiveness policies in recent years. But all that may be about to change. 5 http://www.bp.com/en/global/corporate/press/press-releases/ shah-deniz-final-investment-decision-paves-way.html. Changing Dynamics in European Energy Policy 3 The German Marshall Fund of the United States 4 Energy issues are amongst the least integrated policy areas in Europe. A pan- European energy policy does not exist, and neither does a single market for energy. As Europe continues to chart a way out of the euro crisis and global recession, ambitious but costly climate policies are currently being reconsidered, particularly as the EU is putting together a climate and energy package with targets for 2030. When the Barroso II EU Commission was seated in 2010, a new climate action commissioner was established specifically to advance the EUs already bold climate policy agenda, both inside and outside the EU. The position was naturally at odds with the energy commissioner, whose responsibilities are primarily guided by internal market and energy package implementation. The two policy areas climate and energy were not exactly in parity in 2010. Climate action was a new EU portfolio that few countries had addressed as a separate, cabinet level issue. 6 This is significant because the European Commission was able to expeditiously consolidate political initiative on climate policy at the EU level, in part as a result of not having to engage in the usual turf battles with vested interests in member states, since the climate portfolio was new. In addition, it made sense to approach climate policy from a pan-European, supranational perspective, since national-level policies are insufficient and ineffective in terms of addressing the problem of global warming. In comparison, the European Union itself was established partially as a result of energy concerns and evolved from a coal and steel union, and long-standing energy issues are deeply vested in European countries political architecture. Energy issues are amongst the least integrated policy areas in Europe. A pan-European energy policy does not exist, and neither does a single market for energy. Member states have the ultimate say on energy 6 Prior to her job as the first EU climate action commissioner, Connie Hedegaard was the first Danish minister for climate from 2007-09. policy, and they often have competing or non- cooperative policies. When Energy Commissioner Gunter Oettinger visited Washington, DC in summer 2013, he described the evolution of the two commission posts at a public event: When I started [as Energy Commissioner], European energy policy was just an instrument for climate change policies. Climate change was secretary and energy was undersecretary, just a service provider. 7 Competitiveness concerns have rebalanced this relationship over the last year or so, and arguably elevated the energy portfolio as the main driver of the EU climate-energy relationship. Several developments support this assertion: In April 2013, the European Parliament voted against a reform to bolster the EUs flagship climate policy, the Emissions Trading System (ETS). The vote itself was an acknowledgement that the system was not working properly. A back loading proposal to address the fact that too many allowances and exceptions had been granted, thereby reducing the price of carbon emissions to a point where it made economic sense for European countries to import U.S. coal for power generation use rather than use less-polluting gas. In May 2013, the European Council convened to discuss the interconnections between energy prices, competitiveness, jobs, and growth. One of the main conclusions was: The impact of high energy prices and costs must be addressed, bearing in mind the primary role of a well-functioning and effective market and of tariffs in financing investment. 8 The Council tasked the Commission with an in-depth 7 http://csis.org/event/transatlantic-energy-revolution, 43:30. 8 European Council conclusions, Brussels, May 22, 2013, http:// europa.eu/rapid/press-release_DOC-13-4_en.htm. Bolstering European Energy Security 5 analysis of energy prices and costs in Europe, subsequently published in 2014, highlighting amongst other issues the following points: 9
The relative share of the energy element in the retail price of electricity has generally diminished over time, while the tax/levy component has increased. In other words, taxes contributed more to retail price increases than energy price hikes. In the gas market, in addition to concentration and price regulation, there is often a supply constraint (with low numbers and competition) and gas prices are still often indexed to oil prices, though with significant regional differences. Successful European energy efficiency measures have offset but not fully compensated for the costs of rising electricity prices. However, despite Europes global leadership position on industrial energy efficiency, there is still potential for further efficiency measures. The intended convergence of energy prices across Europe as a result of the internal market for energy has not materialized. Consumers in the highest priced member states are paying 2.5 to 4 times as much as those in the lowest priced member states, with the gap widening over time. The European Commission notes that persistent differences in national energy prices indicate an inefficient internal market for energy. 9 EU Commission Communication COM(2014) 21/2, January 29, 2014 and Staff Working Document SWD(2014) 20, March 17, 2014, Energy Prices and Costs in Europe, COM(2014) 21/2. http://ec.europa.eu/energy/doc/2030/20140122_communica- tion_energy_prices.pdf. The energy price differential for gas and electricity with external competitors is increasing, particularly compared with the United States, where lower energy costs contribute to greater economic growth and job creation. In January 2014, the EU Commission released its policy framework for climate and energy in the period from 2020 to 2030. This framework took a significant departure from the 20/20/20 framework toward 2020, 10 and the explanation for this departure was directly related to energy security and competitiveness concerns. For instance, the report cites rising energy prices as a major political concern, and describes Europes constant struggle for adequate and affordable energy, all in the context of a widening energy price gap between the EU and major economic partners that Europe has little influence over. 11 In February 2014, independent reports commissioned by the German parliament and Danish government, respectively, argued for significant scaling back or complete elimination of all subsidies for renewable energy, and placing greater emphasis on international competitors comparative advantages. The Danish report concludes: Denmark has chosen to pursue an energy policy that in some areas is more ambitious 10 Established in 2008, the targets to be attained by 2020 included 20 percent reduction in greenhouse gas emissions from 1990 levels, a 20 percent share of renewable energy, and 20 percent improvement in energy efficiency. Emissions cuts and renewables levels were mandatory for member states, while energy efficiency goals were not binding. The 2030 framework, by contrast, includes a 40 percent mandatory emissions reduc- tion target, an EU-wide target of 27 percent renewables, though not connected to national targets (several EU countries have already passed this target by the way), while further reviewing energy efficiency goals. 11 European Commission Communication COM(2014) 21 Energy Prices and Costs in Europe. The German Marshall Fund of the United States 6 The changing dynamics in Europe are indicative of a much broader rethinking of energy and climate policies in the context of a challenging period for European competitiveness. than required by international obligations, 12
and that further subsidies do not lead to further CO 2 emission reduction at the European level, but shift emissions to other firms or sectors, and have direct opportunity costs on overall employment and economic growth. The German report concludes: The current route is neither competitive nor low- carbon. For this reason, the German economy is increasingly at a disadvantage compared to its key global competitors, owing to German industrys growing energy price burden compared to its international competitors. And in the great paradox CO 2 emissions in Germany have risen despite the rising costs associated with renewable deployment under the Energiewende. 13 Both reports indicate a shift away from a renewables-led strategy to a broader approach toward reducing greenhouse gas emissions while seriously considering the economic implications. The changing dynamics in Europe are not just about personal rivalries or turf wars, but indicative of a much broader rethinking of energy and climate policies in the context of a challenging period for European competitiveness. 12 2014 report from the Chairmen of the Danish Council of Environmental Economics, http://www.dors.dk/graphics/ Synkron-Library/Publikationer/Rapporter/Miljo_2014/Disk/ English_Summary.pdf. 13 IHS Global, A More Competitive Energiewende: Securing Germanys Global Competitiveness in a New Energy World, March 2014, page 73. Recommendation Europeans can pride themselves on extremely ambitious climate and environmental policies, but the lessons of recent years call for a rethinking that has already been initiated. While the United States has managed to increase energy production dramatically with gains in employment, reduction in energy prices, reduction in greenhouse gas emissions, and a reduction in energy import dependency trends have gone in the opposite direction for many European countries. European energy policy discussions should look at ways to emulate the U.S. energy revolution or find ways to benefit more directly from it. For instance, by exploring shale gas options that could meet high European environmental standards instead of issuing national bans, by allowing for scaled up renewable energy projects to gain most economic advantage, and by standing firm on creating a market-based, competitive internal market for energy. Bolstering European Energy Security 7 Baltic Sea Regional Energy Policy Case Study 4 The Nordic model of energy cooperation, collaboration, and market integration should be a model for best practice and considered elsewhere in Europe. A s a case study, this paper will focus on the Baltic Sea region: the Nordic countries (Norway, Sweden, Denmark, and Finland), the Baltic countries (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania), Poland, and Germany. While a great deal of attention has been devoted to energy policy developments in Southern Europe, Central and Eastern Europe, and the Baltics in recent years, particularly in connection with decisions over the Southern Corridor for gas from the Caspian to Europe, much less attention has been devoted to energy policy in Northern Europe. This is regrettable for two reasons. First, some of the Northern European countries have well- functioning policies in place that can be used as a model for other parts of Europe (or broader for that matter). Second, focusing on the Baltic Sea region allows for an interesting evaluation of EU energy security policies, as examples of both best and worst practices on energy security. Areas in need of significant attention and improvement can be drawn from this region. The Nordic Model The Nordic model of energy cooperation, collaboration, and market integration should be a model for best practice and considered elsewhere in Europe. The Baltics, Germany, and Central and Eastern Europe in particular could successfully adopt aspects of the Nordic model to leverage their respective energy mixes and infrastructure toward greater utility, and other regions in Europe would benefit similarly from a cooperative approach. In December 2013, the World Economic Forum conducted a Global Energy Architecture Performance Index (EAPI), where a series of indicators are used to monitor and benchmark a range of 124 countries performance against the competing goals of economic growth and development, environmental sustainability, and energy access and security. 14 In the global context, the top-performing region in the EAPI study is the EU28, and within the EU, the Nordic countries stand out even further, with their combination of advanced economic development, carbon abatement and efficiency measures, renewable energy deployment, and regional energy security. Interconnected electricity markets to transfer excess hydro, wind, and nuclear power across borders would improve the energy mix of various countries and regions, and better utilize their respective renewables strengths and excess production, and alleviate concerns from intermittent power generation while eliminating risk from overpowered national grids. The motivation for expansion of renewable energy in the Nordic countries is usually articulated in relation to greenhouse gas reduction and combating climate change. However, the historical context is actually closely related to achieving regional energy security in the wake of the OPEC embargos in the 1970s. Ambitious deployment of renewable energy 15 has enhanced Nordic energy security in several ways: reducing fossil fuel imports from volatile suppliers and thereby strengthening the regions balance of payments for energy supply; bringing price stability to electricity markets by decoupling pricing from fluctuations in fossil fuel markets; stimulating domestic and regional economies, frequently the high tech sectors, with 14 World Economic Forum Global Energy Architecture Perfor- mance Index 2014, page 3. 15 The percentage of renewable energy (including hydroelec- tricity) in the primary energy consumption in the Nordic coun- tries is Denmark, 20 percent; Finland, 24.2 percent; Norway, 67.9 percent; and Sweden, 41.6 percent according to the BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2013. The German Marshall Fund of the United States 8 Energy policymakers should give greater priority to energy market architecture to put it on par with energy infrastructure projects. opportunities to export renewable energy technology and services globally; and long-term economic predictability whereas fossil fuel reserves may fluctuate as a consequence of new discoveries or technologies, renewables offer a certain base that reduces volatility of supply and thereby price fluctuations. In addition, renewables offer ample opportunities to integrate regional economies, as displayed in the Nordic case with a patchwork of wind, hydro, biomass, and nuclear power generation traded across national borders, which further enhances economic stability, interdependence, and security. What the Nordic model ultimately provides is a blueprint for energy security, based on market principles, regional cooperation and collaboration. As stated in the World Economic Forum, Global Energy Performance Index 2014, [] energy security is also about relations among nations. Security of supply from trade partners, the risks of energy autarchy, and uncertainty over prices all creating volatility are critical concerns that must be managed. The Nordic model is not without downsides: Nordic consumers and industry pay high energy prices across the board, whether it is for electricity, natural gas, gasoline or other products. However, significant percentages of the retail price are environmental fees and taxes, somewhat masking the fact that the base price of energy is often competitive. Recommendations The Nordic countries could provide a model for future energy production if efforts to produce non- (or limited) subsidized renewable energy at scale are successful. As some of the major initial subsidy schemes are about to sunset amongst the Nordic countries, policymakers believe that this will evolve into the largest global demonstration project for non-subsidized renewable energy generation, and proof that renewables will eventually be competitive with fossil fuels. Wind turbine prices have dropped 30 percent in the past four years, and production and installation costs for photovoltaic solar power have dropped even further during the same period. The consulting firm McKinsey predicted in 2012 that solar technology would be cost competitive with coal, gas and nuclear by 2020, even if reductions in renewable subsidies are factored in. 16 The financial services firm Morgan Stanley has calculated that in certain windy regions of the United States, large-scale wind farms are frequently generating power at prices competitive with gas, coal, and nuclear power plants. 17 It is reasonable to point out that context matters and that some regions are better disposed for utilizing renewable energy at scale than others, but the point is that Europes full potential for utilizing renewable energy is far from met at this time. Following one of the main strengths of the Nordic model, energy policymakers should give greater priority to energy market architecture to put it on par with energy infrastructure projects. Energy market developments are so dynamic (as are energy technologies, which are often subject to disruptive technological evolutions) that accurate prediction, and in turn long-term energy policymaking, is a complex undertaking. Take for instance the U.S. LNG facilities that are currently 16 McKinsey & Company, Solar Power: Darkest Before Dawn, April 2012. 17 http://www.greentechmedia.com/articles/read/midwest- wind-cost-competitive-with-gas-and-coal. Bolstering European Energy Security 9 More than two decades after gaining political independence, the Baltic nations are struggling to gain their energy independence from Russia. being retrofitted for export use, just a few years after they were built to facilitate imports, or the mothballed gas plants in Germany and the Netherlands built only a few years ago. As these examples show, any policy- or decision-maker will face difficulties in evaluating the long- term viability of any major project, be it a pipeline, power plant, or LNG terminal projects that often come with billion dollar price tags. However, policymakers can hedge their bets by focusing more on the overall architecture of regional energy markets, including market integration, reverse-flow interconnectors, mixed-fuel power generation, and integration of various forms of renewables, in order to be better positioned toward future shifts or transformations in energy markets. Baltic Regional Challenges The Baltic nations would appear to be a natural fit for extensive energy cooperation, but for a number of reasons, this goal has remained elusive. The combination of small energy markets (the total population of the three Baltic nations is just over 6 million), modest domestic production, high dependency, and insufficient cooperation results in low energy security and outright vulnerability. More than two decades after gaining political independence, the Baltic nations are struggling to gain their energy independence from Russia. The Baltic region has paid a high price for this state of affairs, enduring threats of energy cutoffs or politically motivated price hikes by their dominant supplier and paying exorbitantly high energy prices since the regions independence in 1991. Compliance with EU environmental policies has in some cases been at odds with the ambition to achieve Baltic energy independence. Lithuania agreed to close its Soviet era nuclear plants as part of its EU accession process. When the last functioning reactor closed in 2009, Lithuanias import dependency jumped from near-EU- average 50 percent to over 80 percent. One of the few domestic energy resources in the Baltics, Estonian oil shale, faces an uncertain future, as it is amongst the most polluting fossil fuels, and the industry faces an existential threat from any future EU environmental, climate, or fuel quality directives. As 70 percent of Estonias total primary energy supply in 2012 came from oil shale, the vast majority of which was used for electricity production and heat generation, this is an issue of great concern for Estonia and the entire Baltic region. It is well known that the Baltic nations have a difficult energy relationship with Russia, but it is also relevant to point out that they have complex mutual energy relationships with each other. Several planned regional projects have failed to materialize, some of them after being voted down through national referendums or plebiscites, to the consternation of neighboring countries as well as EU and U.S. policymakers. Infrastructure projects have moved slowly forward, then rapidly backwards, at times risking EU funding opportunities and ultimately contributing to a situation of continued dependency on Russia despite a high degree of political attention toward energy independence. In spite of a high level of regional commonalities, the Baltic nations have significantly different energy circumstances that are relevant to forward-looking policy proposals. For one, energy import dependence numbers vary greatly, with Estonia at 17.2 percent, Latvia 56.4 percent, and Lithuania 80.3 percent. 18 This situation will likely improve over the course of the next decade. A series of infrastructure projects will link the Baltic region with Nordic and Polish 18 http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/tgm/table.do?tab=table&init =1&plugin=1&language=en&pcode=tsdcc310. The German Marshall Fund of the United States 10 The largest single supplier of Polish coal imports is Russia, accounting for over two- thirds of imports since 2009. gas and electricity grids, and the Baltic nations are cooperating in regional projects such as the Baltic Sea Region Energy Cooperation (BASREC), the Baltic Energy Market Integration Plan (BEMIP), and the Nord Pool Spot power market. Infrastructure projects are also moving forward. Lithuania is scheduled to receive a floating LNG barge (aptly named Independence), and underwater electricity cables will link Lithuania to Sweden and Poland, and Estonia to Finland. Lithuania is home to the NATO Center of Excellence for Energy Security, and the region is a leading participant in European policymaking to ensure increased diversification and domestic production, and lately also in the transatlantic energy agenda with a strong emphasis on facilitating U.S. exports of liquefied natural gas. Recommendations Ultimately, a number of energy security agendas in the Baltic nations appear to serve as distraction and divergence instead of much needed convergence. The Baltic region has opportunities to enhance its energy security, but these require close cooperation rather than operating individually. Analysts doubt whether there is a market basis for more than one regional LNG gasification plant and one nuclear power plant, so a priority for the Baltic nations is to settle on a mutually agreed upon plan for future energy infrastructure investment and deployment and to start implementing it. The Baltics would benefit from a broader perspective on value-for-money evaluations. For instance, interconnectors may be more important than new LNG facilities or nuclear power plants, even if the former are not considered prestige projects amongst policymakers. Focusing on regional, near-term projects would be beneficial for the Baltic nations. Cooperation should be stimulated at the regional or EU levels in order to secure open and connected markets and the best options for infrastructure development. Utilizing Domestic Resources in Poland Poland has staked its energy future on affordable domestic coal, and while this will ensure a level of economic competitiveness above the EU average in the short-to-medium term, long-term options are complicated by the fact that older coal power plants will eventually have to be retired. New plants that comply with EU environmental standards are prohibitively expensive and potentially very difficult to finance, plus they face both domestic and international opposition, so Polish policymakers will soon have to think beyond coal in order to maintain a competitive economy. Economically recoverable coal reserves accessible from existing mines are declining fast, and despite sizeable domestic production, Poland has become an importer of coal in recent years. Perhaps surprisingly, given a fraught relationship over gas trade and Polands stated interest in diversifying its energy mix in order to hedge against its dependency on Russian gas imports, the largest single supplier of Polish coal imports is Russia, accounting for over two-thirds of imports since 2009. Poland has undertaken a number of infrastructure and policy developments to address its energy security situation. An LNG gasification plant is under construction in the Baltic port Swinoujscie, Poland, with expected completion by the end of 2014. Licensing to explore shale gas has attracted major players such as Chevron, even though other majors abandoned projects in 2013. If Poland is successful in developing unconventional resources, it could set a new standard and guide policy options for other European countries. This could Bolstering European Energy Security 11 also significantly reduce carbon emissions if the predominantly coal-based power generation is substituted with lower-carbon content gas power generation. Polands difficult history with neighbors has had a direct impact on its energy security circumstances and vice versa, as energy security issues have complicated Polands relationships with Russia and Germany significantly in recent years. Russia continues to be a major concern as Poland is vulnerable to any future cutoff or price hike resulting from political turmoil between Russia and Europe. In some cases, principle has trumped pragmatics. Poland could technically have chosen to establish interconnectors to Germany in order to avail itself of the Nord Stream pipeline project delivering Russian gas to northern Germany and thereby hedged against future cutoffs through Ukraine or the Yamal pipeline connecting Poland and Russia directly. Considering, however, that then-Polish Defense Minister Radoslaw Sikorski in 2006 compared Nord Stream to the 1939 Molotov- Ribbentrop Pact, and that Nord Stream was deliberately conceived by both Russia and Germany to bypass Poland in the first place, 19 this was never a realistic option. Justified geopolitical concerns aside, if Polish policymakers are truly focused on utilizing domestic resources, a minimum of investments in renewable resources should be considered to ensure a better energy mix. Renewable energy producers have complained that an uncertain policy and legal environment (mainly favoring the coal industry) is not encouraging expansion of renewables, and in 2013, the two major international investors in Polish onshore wind, Iberdrola and DONG Energy, divested their Polish wind farms and withdrew from the Polish renewables market. 19 International analyses differ on whether a land route traversing Poland would have been cheaper than the sea route passing Poland by. Recommendation Renewable energy production does not currently appear to be connected to the important discussion over energy security policies in Poland, but it should be. If Poland invests in energy infrastructure links to neighboring countries, it could not only trade domestically produced energy or imported LNG, but also receive competitive virtually free in some instances renewable energy from Germany or elsewhere. Instead, Poland has created deliberate bottlenecks and energy trade barriers by erecting phase-shifters at the German border in order to avoid cheap renewable German energy from entering the Polish grid and competing with coal. 20 The German Energiewende In the wake of the March 2011 Fukushima nuclear power plant catastrophe in Japan, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, backed by strong public sentiment and a large parliamentary majority, moved swiftly to phase out nuclear energy in Germany. Until the time of Fukushima, Germany had 17 nuclear power plants; as of March 2014, eight of them are shut down and the rest are scheduled to shut down in 2022. This has left a gaping hole in Germanys energy calculus at a time when Europe is still struggling to recover from an economic recession. Germany has ambitiously sought to transform its entire energy system in a renewables-led Energiewende. As noted under the Nordic model, some European countries have already managed to generate one- third of their electricity demand from renewable energy, but no country has sought to achieve this percentage as rapidly as the Germans, particularly 20 As indicated in the next section, both Poland and Germany share blame for this situation. Justified geopolitical concerns aside, if Polish policymakers are truly focused on utilizing domestic resources, a minimum of investments in renewable resources should be considered to ensure a better energy mix. The German Marshall Fund of the United States 12 not while being at the center of a continents industrial and manufacturing base. If successful, Germany would represent a counterbalance to the U.S. unconventional energy revolution a model not just for European energy security, but also for the non-OECD countries that will double global energy demand between now and 2035. However, the short-term results are mixed at best. Something had to give on the energy-climate- competitiveness triangle, and climate lost out, in part because of a simultaneous collapse of the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS), which has led to a surge in coal being used for power generation. For a period, Germany was importing cheap U.S. coal, which had been priced out of the U.S. market by shale gas, but this has since subsided. Coal will remain an important part of Germanys energy mix for many years to come, and some analysts have pointed to the paradox of Germany using coal power as the bridge fuel to a future low-carbon or carbon-free economy as opposed to the U.S. utilization of lower-emission gas. The varying market mechanisms have worked exactly opposite in these two countries. In the United States, a surge of domestic gas led to plummeting prices and pushed coal off the market, while in Germany, a collapse of the ETS led to plummeting coal prices that pushed gas off the market. Furthermore, the competitiveness angle has also come under serious reconsideration following the latest German election. Shortly after assuming the position of economy and energy minister in the new coalition government, Sigmar Gabriel stated that: We have reached the limits of what we can ask of our economy 21 in terms of energy 21 Sigmar Gabriel speech at the 21 st Handelsblatt Jahrestagung: http://www.sigmar-gabriel.de/reden/rede-bei-der-handelsblatt- jahrestagung-energiewirtschaft-2014-am-21-januar-2014. prices, and that Germany will face a dramatic deindustrialization if it remains on the current course. As a consequence, subsidies for renewable energy are expected to be scaled significantly back in the coming years, but it is unclear whether this will be accompanied by a greater emphasis on shale gas exploration and production, 22 and what the future impact will be on German energy policy. German decisiveness on implementation of the Energiewende led to a feeling of resentment and political friction from neighboring countries who felt that the German government did not sufficiently coordinate this transformation. Furthermore, it led to an under-utilization of the renewable resources in which Germany has invested very heavily. In some instances, spikes in renewable energy generation overpowered the German grid (which has not been expanded as rapidly as renewable generation, hence the problem). Because the German and neighboring grids are connected, excess electricity spilled over into Polish, Czech, and Dutch grids, in some instances sending utility rates into negative territory and wreaking havoc on the economics of national energy infrastructures. Poland and the Czech Republic have disconnected their grids from Germanys on several occasions, and have since installed special transformers to prevent grid disruption in the future. However, going forward, these countries expect to export increased amounts of nuclear and coal-generated electricity to the German market, which is no small irony. The example raises an additional concern for the Energiewende: with the combined forces of German ingenuity, political willpower, and social acceptance of stomaching the costs, it may be 22 The coalition government agreement from November 2013 between SPD and CDU called for a continued moratorium on shale gas development, but a subsequent government-solicited report and a spirited campaign by German industry continues to challenge this position. If successful, Germany would represent a counterbalance to the U.S. unconventional energy revolution. Bolstering European Energy Security 13 possible to scale up rapidly to, say, 20-30 percent renewables in the overall electricity mix, but what happens from there? Experts point to the inherent difficulties of scaling up to 40-50 percent and beyond, especially if both nuclear and coal are ultimately phased out leaving few options to balance the intermittency of renewables, not to mention an even greater likelihood of over- powering both the national and neighboring grids. And that is not all. In order for a renewable-led power generation to actually work in a country the size of Germany, it will be necessary to erect a substantial transmission grid from offshore projects in the north to energy intensive manufacturing hubs in the south, and popular discontent is already mounting against such projects. If the Energiewende is essentially based on a popular demand for renewables and against nuclear power, how will a future German government manage demands that essentially undermine the logistical basis for renewables? Compounding German energy challenges, utilities were slow to catch on to the rapid expansion of renewables, so solar power generation in particular was adopted quickly by individual, private consumers, decreasing market shares for utilities that are not likely to ever come back. In 2010, of the 53GW renewable energy generated, about 50 percent was owned by private individuals and farmers (39.7 percent private individuals, 10.8 percent farmers) 23 and less than 10 percent from the four largest utilities, which in turn generated 80 percent of conventional power production (fossils and nuclear). Both the Energiewende and the deliberate bypassing of Poland and the Baltic nations via the Nord Stream gas pipeline are seen by some analysts as a German propensity to fend for itself 23 The Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, The Energiewende Germanys Gamble, http://www.oxfordenergy.org/wpcms/ wp-content/uploads/2012/06/SP-261.pdf, page 11. when it comes to energy infrastructure decisions. Some might appreciate this, as Germany after all remains the crucially important economic and industrial engine of Europe, but others allege that consequences such as higher energy prices in a region of key importance to German exports actually erodes the purchasing power, competitiveness, and ultimately the energy security of an entire region. As the 2014 Crimea crisis played out, fingers were once again pointed toward German energy policies. In March 2014, the day before Chancellor Angela Merkel visited Poland to discuss Crimea, Ukraine, and Russia, Polish Prime Minister Donald Tusk stated publicly what many European policymakers have been saying off-the-record for years: In the future, we will not be able to successfully resist against aggressive or expansionist steps by Russia if so many European countries will be dependent on [Russian] gas and will go even further down the road of dependence [] German dependence on Russian gas could effectively limit European sovereignty. 24 Prime Minister Tusk points to a fascinating aspect of the European energy relationship with Russia: while this relationship is usually described as a liability and a vulnerability, seen from the German perspective, Russia is actually a stable, reliable, dependable, and affordable energy supplier. In this sense, Germany showcases the need for energy imports, demonstrating that dependence on foreign suppliers is not in itself a security liability. However, energy diversification and a strong negotiating position (economic as well as political) can be leveraged to gain a high degree of reliability as well as competitive prices. Germany plays an outsized role in European energy policy, far beyond the Energiewende, and in this 24 EUObserver, Poland urges Germany to buy less Russian gas, March 10, 2014, http://euobserver.com/foreign/123410. Seen from the German perspective, Russia is actually a stable, reliable, dependable, and affordable energy supplier. The German Marshall Fund of the United States 14 sense, a tendency to go-it-alone and resist pan- European or regional cooperation is an energy security challenge and a liability for Europe and therefore for Germany itself. Solutions outlined in greater detail below include enhanced regional cooperation, open energy markets, and domestic energy production, in particular unconventional resources. Recommendations If all European countries could have the same energy relationship with Russia that Germany has, Europe would not have significant energy security problems to deal with. Instead of seeking to terminate Europes energy relationship with Russia, which is an unlikely scenario in the first place, Europe could expand the flow of Russian gas to Europe, but ensure that Germany, the unions strongest interlocutor vis-a-vis Russia, act as the steward and guarantor of this relationship. This would allow Germany to live up to the promises made when Nord Stream was created, and Russia would always think twice before cutting off supplies or spiking prices on gas to Germany. If supply could meet demand without the political and economic uncertainty brought about by cutoffs and geopolitical events, a Northern Corridor could deliver stable, competitively priced, lower-carbon content gas to Central and Eastern Europe. And if planned reverse-flow interconnectors materialize in coming years, the Baltics and Ukraine could also benefit from such a project, as it would undermine the serial threats of cutoffs and price hikes. This scenario would have to be accompanied by strong antitrust and competition rules enforced at the EU level, as well as interconnectors and diversified supply options coordinated amongst EU member states. A Northern Corridor would also benefit Russia and help reduce EU use of coal. Germany should establish opportunities to engage in regional energy security cooperation forums with her neighbors, where issues of mutual discontent can be addressed at a constructive working level. A tendency to go-it-alone and resist pan-European or regional cooperation is an energy security challenge and a liability for Europe. Bolstering European Energy Security 15 A ny extensive solution to European energy security challenges must address the issue of European dependency on Russian energy. At least three overall concerns exist: 1) potential gas cutoffs as a result of political problems, 2) non- competitive pricing, and 3) associated rampant corruption. Of the three, corruption issues may be the least discussed and most difficult to address in the long run. In many ways, Russia can be seen as the main driver of EU energy policy a policy area where member states have traditionally been reluctant to coordinate at the EU level. As one EU official noted, Vladimir Putin should receive the Charlemagne Prize for European integration 25
when it comes to development of an actual EU energy policy. Regardless of who is actually to blame for the gas cutoffs to Europe in 2006 and 2009, it is fair to say that these events jolted efforts to approach energy security from a European- wide perspective, as opposed to purely national or regional. Following the Russian invasion of Crimea in March 2014, energy security once again jumped to the top of the European agenda. At an EU Council meeting on March 20-21, national leaders requested that the EU Commission conduct an in-depth study of EU energy security and a comprehensive plan for the reduction of EU energy dependence, 26 . Subsequent news headlines addressed ideas to wean Europe off Russian gas, some describing a total gas war, when all pipelines are turned off. 27 This is no small task, as Russia is usually the top exporter of gas to European markets, only occasionally topped by 25 The International Charlemagne Prize of Aachen is awarded annually for distinguished service on behalf of European unifica- tion. 26 http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/ pressdata/en/ec/141749.pdf. 27 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/24/business/international/ weaning-europe-from-russian-gas.html. Norway. The notion of Europe ridding itself, and somehow replacing, 130 billion cubic meters of gas, one-third of the European market, is daunting, and begs the question of whether this should ultimately be a policy goal for Europe. Rather than blocking out Russian gas altogether, a more realistic approach for policymakers, at least for the next decades while Russia remains a significant supplier for Europe, would be to maximize the amount of Russian gas entering the European market under competitive contracts and prices. The European Commission is working toward this outcome, but national policies continue to dominate the energy landscape, so European leaders should seek to strengthen central decision- making and enforcement on energy matters. In the best case scenario, with a fully implemented Third Energy Package and a settled Gazprom antitrust case, European energy would be traded as a purely economic commodity on spot markets, without take or pay clauses or oil price indexing, and resources would be fungible as soon as they enter the integrated European energy market, allowing for distribution anywhere in the EU through built- out, reverse-flow infrastructure. Such a scenario would address many of Europes current headaches toward dependency on Russian energy supplies. Even if Gazprom remains a state- owned enterprise with the ability to use energy as a strategic, political tool, it would be forced to adopt (or at least play by) market principles in Europe. It is worth considering that increased Russian gas could help reduce EU use of coal and replace it with a lower-carbon, economically competitive fuel in order to improve climate policy goals. Neither European nor Russian energy policymakers should lose sight of the fact that longer-term developments could play out to Europes advantage. With waning European demand as a result of energy efficiency and renewables investments, What to Do about Russian Gas? 5 Regardless of who is actually to blame for the gas cutoffs to Europe in 2006 and 2009, it is fair to say that these events jolted efforts to approach energy security from a European-wide perspective. The German Marshall Fund of the United States 16 combined with little or moderate economic growth, the outlook for Russian energy in Europe is flat lining at best, even with declining European domestic production. Add to this the future options for diversification through the Southern Corridor and increased LNG trade. If these dynamics continue over time, Russia could face security of demand issues with associated downward pressure on pricing. In the current scenario, Russia benefits from European energy markets being walled off and poorly connected and from the lack of cooperation between European energy decision-makers. Gazproms ability to negotiate politically motivated energy deals is one reason why prices for Russian gas follow an inverted economic logic, which makes it cheaper in Armenia and Serbia than for instance in Ukraine, even though Russian gas transits Ukraine to reach both destinations and Ukraine consumes significantly greater quantities. In order to reduce Russias ability to use energy resources as a political commodity, and to ensure that European competition and antitrust regulations are being honored, DG Energy 28 could place negotiators in EU government teams to bolster adherence, add competence, and to signal European unity on energy issues. The biggest loser from the conflict in Crimea and Ukraine may well be Gazprom, as Europeans will escalate energy diversification and interconnection routes and insist on renegotiated contracts without take or pay and destination clauses. As a greater percentage of the European gas market will be sold through spot pricing contacts in years to come, Gazprom will be forced into this market as well. An antitrust case against Gazprom is under development at the European Court of Justice, and the South Stream project has been put on hold by the European Commission. If Gazprom, and 28 The European Commissions energy experts. thereby the Russian national budget, has not started to feel the pinch from these measures yet, they will soon. In the long run, Russia needs security of demand from European markets, but its actions as an unreliable supplier will undermine this goal at least for the foreseeable future. Recommendations Europe must complete the internal market for energy and ensure that any energy resources that enter the union are fungible, and able to be sold or transferred elsewhere along market principles, without destination clauses. Strong antitrust and competition measures such as unbundling of upstream, downstream, and transit assets must be put in place to ensure a diversity of energy providers with access to transit infrastructure into the European market. Interconnected infrastructure has to be put in place, either through market incentives or central EU funding where market mechanisms do not currently support it. The Connecting Europe Facility and Projects of Common Interest should receive increased funding for the specific purposes of strengthening energy infrastructure in order to complete the internal energy market and enhance energy security for all of Europe in the event of cutoffs or political standoffs. In the current scenario, Russia benefits from European energy markets being walled off and poorly connected and from the lack of cooperation between European energy decision-makers. Bolstering European Energy Security 17 I n recent years, events such as the Fukushima disaster, North American hurricanes, the Libya conflict, and even a short lived strike by offshore workers in the North Sea have led to energy market gyrations with the potential to disrupt fragile economic recovery in the transatlantic space. In the longer term, failure to meet energy supply needs in the United States or amongst U.S. allies raises questions of core strategic importance to future national security, international stability, and economic growth. If it is true that European integration is driven by crisis response and external pressure, gas cutoffs in 2006 and 2009 to Central and Eastern Europe and the Baltics exposed the need for integration of European energy markets, not just to protect against occasional threats from cutoffs, but also to hedge against uncompetitive pricing and poor negotiating positions when acquiring energy resources on international markets. Establishing a European internal market for energy has been an official EU objective since 2005, although conceivably it could be argued that because the European Union evolved out of the Coal and Steel Community, this has been a latent objective for European cooperation since the outset. While there are tangible results to show, including three significant reform packages at the European level, many EU member states remain completely dependent on imports to meet their energy needs, while others are forced to pay non-competitive prices because they lack alternative options. National leaders routinely request policy responses from the EU Commission to address diversification and pricing issues but subsequently undermine the Commissions options for action by maintaining national authority over energy decisions. Energy issues, which are inherently transnational, end up as a patchwork of national policies, often in tension or outright competition with each other. No common Europe-wide energy policy will emerge if this setup is maintained. European consumers, workers, and industry will pay a price over the long term, and European competitiveness will suffer. In the wake of Europes economic crisis from 2008 onwards, competitiveness challenges have come into much greater focus, including European energy prices, which in some cases are two or three times higher than prices paid by U.S. industry and consumers. High energy prices and the lack of energy diversity are currently the two main policy drivers for European energy market integration and should convince European leaders to place greater powers at the EU level. These dynamics have already led to a shift in the relative influence between the EU climate and energy commissioners and their respective policy portfolios. In recent years, discussion and analysis of European energy security has focused narrowly on the need for diversification of external resources, specifically a Southern Corridor from the Caspian to European markets. While this is indeed an important goal for a number of reasons, the initial capacity of the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline will be approximately 10 billion cubic meters per year, which amounts to around 2 percent of Europes annual gas demand. It is reasonable to consider this an important element in an overall solution to Europes energy security, but it is hardly the deciding factor. Stringent application and enforcement of EU competition rules toward the internal energy market is one of the strongest policy options for European energy security, but would have to be applied to both existing and potential future infrastructure in order to be truly effective. Recommendations The EU Commission must receive a stronger mandate from national leaders in European Union Approaches to Energy Security 6 In the longer term, failure to meet energy supply needs in the United States or amongst U.S. allies raises questions of core strategic importance to future national security, international stability, and economic growth. The German Marshall Fund of the United States 18 order to strengthen central coordination of European energy policy toward market- based, competitive solutions. This would raise revenue opportunities for energy infrastructure, lower costs for consumers, and guarantee a far more efficient use of the full range of energy mixes. Following the 2008 economic crisis, European leaders subjected their budgets and economic policies to peer review and scrutiny. The same should happen with long-term energy decisions in the form of a European Semester for energy policy, as these affect the economic well-being and security of the union as a whole. The EU Commission should develop an annual report on energy cooperation, analyzing the level of bilateral collaboration on energy issues throughout Europe, including market integration, bottlenecks, and energy-related trade restrictions. The technical skills and expertise of DG Energy and DG Competition should be utilized in any future energy negotiations conducted by EU member states, particularly smaller ones with weaker negotiating positions, for instance by placing EU Commission staff in negotiating teams throughout Europe (this has already happened in some cases). European leaders can rightfully pride themselves on global leadership on climate issues, but precisely because of this leadership, further steps should be proportional and competitive. Further lowering of European CO 2 emissions will not have any impact on global climate change unless other regions follow along, so Europe has to prove that emission reductions can happen through economically competitive policies. The U.S. example of achieving emission reductions through energy policy is instructive because lower carbon content gas has replaced coal through economic mechanisms. Europe should therefore explore all options to increase domestic production of natural gas, including shale gas, toward this end, while continuing to expand renewable energy production. It is not likely that European gas prices will reach U.S. price levels, but increased European production will lower prices as well as import dependency, both of which are needed. Europes leadership on energy efficiency can also be leveraged as an example of how to achieve economic results through conservation and innovation. EU climate policy is ambitious and impressive by any measure, but a rebalancing of climate and energy policies with significant attention paid to competitiveness concerns is long overdue. This could be achieved by increasing the amount of joint hearings between the relevant committees of jurisdiction on key legislation and reports. As a thought experiment, EU policymakers should be forced to answer the question of what the most optimal arrangement for energy infrastructure would look like if the EU were one large country. It is difficult to answer the question precisely, but most analysts, when asked, would agree that the current arrangement is far from optimal. If an internal market for energy is to materialize, someone has to be able to answer this question. Europe should explore all options to increase domestic production of natural gas, including shale gas. Bolstering European Energy Security 19 I n December 2013, the World Economic Forum estimated that the average GDP per unit of energy use extracted in BRICS economies is $5.40 dollars, compared with an average of $10.00 in EU28. In other words, EU countries get more bang for their buck when it comes to generating value out of energy sources. This is very significant, but rarely considered. Most discussions about energy security are likely to focus on security of supply, first and foremost. However, energy security should reasonably be construed as a broader phenomenon, involving, at minimum, supply, cost, reliability, commercial sustainability, source diversification, and environmental impact. An alternate global ranking for energy security would flip many conventional findings on their head. For instance, three of the lowest achieving regions for energy efficiency and energy intensity are the Middle East, Russia, and Central Asia, all regions with significant energy resources and therefore little incentive to focus on conservation on efficiency. Yet this is rapidly changing. These regions are challenged by skyrocketing domestic energy consumption, poor resource management, excessive industrial and residential subsidies that are very difficult to reform, poor fuel economies, and poor energy mixes. European industry and consumers may reasonably complain about excessive prices of energy, but these prices do force efficient behavior and innovative approaches to creating more value with less energy. If international projections are correct, global demand for energy will rise by about 40 percent from 2012 levels over the next two decades, almost exclusively driven by non-OECD countries such as China and India. According to the BP Energy Outlook 2035, 29 however, energy demand in the 29 http://www.bp.com/content/dam/bp/pdf/Energy-economics/ Energy-Outlook/Energy_Outlook_2035_booklet.pdf. EU has peaked and is expected to fall by 6 percent by 2035. The regions energy intensity is expected to decline by 36 percent during the same period. Energy demand per capita in the EU will decline by 8 percent and will be overtaken by China in 2032. Its share of global energy consumption will fall from 13 percent in 2012 to 9 percent in 2035. If the major impacts of resource scarcity or rising prices on energy resources are felt primarily in non- OECD countries, this may eventually balance out Europes non-competitive energy prices. If Europe manages to increase domestic production and lower prices in decades ahead, this would greatly strengthen Europes energy security circumstances. Recommendations Europe should build on its strengths and capitalize on leadership in energy efficiency, energy intensity, and energy diversity. Europe is a global leader in these fields and will be able to benefit from a flat-lining or even decreasing demand in coming decades as other regions of the globe increase their demand and struggle to invest in similar efficiency gains. Europes leadership position on these measures will eventually translate into a competitive edge. EU should see itself as the global leader in the geopolitics of energy efficiency. European policymakers should focus more on system architecture than on individual infrastructure projects. This would enable better use of diverse national resources and also hedge against future disruptive evolutions in energy markets (for example U.S. LNG terminals). The best way to hedge is to integrate markets (Nordic example), build reverse-flow interconnectors, and lower trade barriers. The Geopolitics of Energy Efficiency 7 An alternate global ranking for energy security would flip many conventional findings on their head. The German Marshall Fund of the United States 20 U.S. Leadership on International Energy Diplomacy The U.S. energy revolution has certainly caught the attention of European policymakers, and led to lively public debate about the possibilities for developing unconventional resources in the U.K. and Poland; Baltic, Croatian, and Polish interests in purchasing U.S. LNG; and EU trade negotiators seeking to address U.S. energy export restrictions. Another significant U.S. development has been less noticed in Europe. In December 2007, President George W. Bush signed an omnibus energy bill into law, 30 which contained forward-looking provisions designed to enhance the U.S. governments ability to engage on energy issues across the globe. A key provision was championed by U.S. Senator Richard Lugar (R-IN), capping multi-year efforts to integrate energy security interests into foreign policy decision-making and provide a government framework to address the foreign policy implications of energy. Specifically, Senator Lugar sought to ensure a more robust coordination of the U.S. Department of States energy diplomacy efforts by creating a position of coordinator for international energy affairs to manage and lead these efforts. 31
From 2009-10, the State Department conducted a Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review (QDDR), a study to establish a long-term blueprint for leveraging U.S. civilian power through the U.S. State Department and U.S. Agency for International Development. The QDDR report suggested a number of initiatives to ensure that the State Department was properly structured to deal with global issues transcending the regional bureaus 30 HR6/Public Law 110-140, Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 110 th Session of Congress. 31 For further details, see S. 193, Energy Security and Diplomacy Act of 2007 and Senate Foreign Relations Committee report 110-54. where policy coordination and development is usually anchored. The QDDR specifically recommended the establishment of a new Bureau for Energy Resources, under the under secretary for economic growth, energy, and the environment, 32
tasked with wide ranging goals such as fostering international cooperation toward a global clean energy future and bringing together diplomatic and programmatic efforts on energy commodities, electricity, renewable energy, transparent energy governance, strategic resources, and energy poverty. The Bureau for Energy Resources (ENR) 33 is currently led by Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs Carlos Pasqual, an accomplished career diplomat 34 who oversees a network of diplomats with energy expertise stationed at U.S. embassies across the globe to monitor, analyze, and report on current and long- term developments on energy policy and markets. This investment in international energy diplomacy dwarfs anything the European Union or individual EU member states have to offer. The establishment of the Bureau of Energy Resources and energy attachs deployed abroad will enable the United States to analyze, react to, and ultimately shape long-term energy developments across the globe. U.S. capacity to conduct energy diplomacy is a model for success and should be emulated by Europe, both at the member state and EU levels. Europeans would have a lot to gain from developing the capacity to integrate energy security interests into foreign policy decision-making, including into EU climate and development policies. When the European External Action Service (EEAS) was 32 2010 Quadrennial Diplomacy and Development Review, page 40. 33 http://www.state.gov/e/enr/. 34 http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/biog/164148.htm. U.S. capacity to conduct energy diplomacy is a model for success and should be emulated by Europe. Bolstering European Energy Security 21 launched in 2010, it was done along a traditional architecture, with five managing directors to cover geographic regions and an additional two to cover crisis response and global and multilateral issues. The EEAS has not devoted any significant resources to focus on cross-cutting issues such as energy security, in part because such issues traditionally fall under the auspices of the commissioner and director-general for energy. In an internal review conducted by the European External Action Service in 2013, 35 the EEAS concludes: Close co-operation between the EEAS and the Commission is also vital on the various global issues where the external aspects of internal EU policies have a growing foreign policy dimension. This includes areas such as energy security, environmental protection, and climate change [] Yet, following the allocation of responsibilities and resources at the creation of the EEAS, virtually all the expertise and capacity to manage the external aspects of these polices remained in the Commission services. 36 In other words, EEAS has limited expertise when it comes to working on international energy issues, so the commissioner and director-general for energy does not have direct access to a sprawling network of delegations (embassies) and staffers deployed abroad to engage directly in energy policy development and analysis, and report back to the relevant policymakers. National foreign services throughout the EU have similar limitations, where energy issues are most frequently handled by regional or national experts and viewed exclusively through this lens. This creates a natural tendency for tunnel vision or 35 http://eeas.europa.eu/library/publications/2013/3/2013_eeas_ review_en.pdf. 36 ibid, page 8. an overly narrow view of issues that are inherently regional if not truly international by nature. The EU may not be on the cusp of solving this challenge. As one EU bureaucrat noted, If your long term policy is to phase out fossil fuels and rely exclusively on domestically or regionally produced renewable energy three or four decades from now, why would you care about the international implications of fossil energy? To this point, one could argue that even if countries (all of the Nordic countries have explicit long-term policies to de-carbonize their economies, for example) are successful in achieving this goal a big if there is little evidence that the rest of the globe will follow suit any time soon. Herein lies an additional motivation for engaging ambitiously in international energy diplomacy. Breaking the demand curve of China and India, the largest projected consumers of energy resources from around 2035, would be a crucially important factor toward the EU achieving their global climate change ambitions. This is a multifaceted goal to be sure, but would certainly require hands-on policy work with China, India, Russia, Central Asia, and beyond, specifically around international energy issues. Notably, the ENR Bureau is engaged in this endeavor. 37 Recommendation European governments should follow the U.S. example of developing competent, long-term energy analysis as a core function of government. Investing in this ability allows for serious energy diplomacy and economic statecraft, not just during 37 For example, in a September 25, 2013, speech at Columbia Universitys Center on Global Energy Policy, Special Envoy and Coordinator for International Energy Affairs Carlos Pasqual addressed how non-OECD energy demand growth will likely determine international energy pricing, in turn generating a national security and economic interest for the United States: http://www.state.gov/e/enr/rls/rem/2013/218820.htm. Breaking the demand curve of China and India...would be a crucially important factor toward the EU achieving their global climate change ambitions. The German Marshall Fund of the United States 22 crisis situations such as Egypt, Libya, or Ukraine in recent years, but also to guide long-term policies toward future demand hubs such as Asia and Africa. A Transatlantic Energy Alliance The transatlantic dialogue on energy security is oddly incongruent. Decision-makers in the United States often appear to have greater concern about European energy security than Europeans themselves. Consecutive U.S. administrations have advocated forcefully for energy supply diversification in Europe, greater domestic production, lowering energy prices, and conducting hands on pipeline politics and energy diplomacy, for instance in relation to a Southern Corridor to transport Caspian oil and gas to Central, Eastern, and Southern Europe to hedge against over- reliance on Russian energy resources. Washington policymakers have also expressed greater concern about the potential repercussions of both Nord Stream and South Stream projects than many of their European counterparts. Significant improvements in the U.S. energy outlook following advances in unconventional resources may lead to a change in Washingtons approach to the geopolitics of energy, but the United States can ill afford to disengage from Europes energy calculus, because collective security and resilience could ultimately be undermined by threats to allied energy needs. Europeans, on their end, seem more focused on achieving a fossil-free economy in order to address the impacts of climate change. While far outpacing the United States and other parts of the world on climate policy, this strategy has exacerbated European dependence on gas imports from Russia in the short term and created the potential for tangible strategic security threats. European policymakers are frequently frustrated with the lack of U.S. buy-in on the climate change agenda and struggle to find an attentive audience for these concerns in Washington, DC. Despite public acknowledgements about the importance of energy security from many European governments, the European Union, and NATO, Europeans have ultimately failed to bring about the conditions needed to establish energy security, and some nations remain as dependent as ever on a single, unreliable supplier. Divergent transatlantic approaches lead to a lack of coherence and prohibit forward movement on resolving energy security issues. As a consequence, an additional Russian pipeline to Europe could soon become a reality, further entrenching regional dependency. Because U.S. and European economies and security interests are so highly integrated and interdependent, energy security remains a common transatlantic interest, and leaving key strategic issues unresolved is not a tenable option. Together, the United States and European allies could meet these challenges, but progress will remain elusive if additional convergence amongst executive, legislative, and private sector stakeholders does not occur soon. Substantive engagement could reasonably be expected from transatlantic lawmakers and governments on issues ranging from connecting Central Asian and Caspian energy resources to European consumers, to bringing northern Iraqi resources to market, active diplomacy following Eastern Mediterranean energy discoveries in contested waters, permanently securing the Shah Deniz consortium from Iran related sanctions, and ending Russian dominance as European energy supplier. If transatlantic decision-makers award insufficient attention to energy security issues, it would draw into question a series of assumptions about the priority of achieving energy security as a core security concern at both national and international levels. Despite public acknowledgements about the importance of energy security... some nations remain as dependent as ever on a single, unreliable supplier. Bolstering European Energy Security 23 The on-going negotiations over the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP) offers a rare opportunity for the transatlantic alliance to address European energy security issues by establishing a transatlantic energy alliance based on open and liquid energy markets. 38 The European Commission has published a forward-looking negotiating position on raw materials and energy, which includes preferences to address export barriers, support open trade, non-discriminatory access, and market principles regarding access, distribution, trade, and sale of raw material and energy at the multilateral trade level. In an effort to wrench open the discussion of U.S. energy export restrictions, the EU Commission is seeking a broad agreement encompassing crude oil, natural gas, electrical energy, and renewable energy. According to the EU position, Disciplines agreed in the transatlantic context could serve as a model for subsequent negotiations involving third countries. It also sends a powerful signal to other countries that trade in raw materials and energy can be and will be subject to global governance, including the fundamental principles of transparency, market access, and nondiscrimination. 39 A transatlantic energy alliance could affect global energy trade and contribute to economic growth, but hinges on whether the United States is willing to implement a long tradition of opposition to resource nationalism at home. Energy security represents a potential area of collaboration between the European Union and NATO, two influential policy organizations that seem to have a permanent interest in cooperating but have very few tangible results to showcase. 38 I have previously expanded on this idea together with David Koranyi from the Atlantic Council and I am deeply grateful for his insights. Towards a Transatlantic Energy Alliance? February 5, 2014, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/david- koranyi/toward-a-transatlantic-energy-alliance_b_4730227.html 39 http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2013/july/ tradoc_151624.pdf. Essentially, the EU has the soft power tools to alleviate NATOs hard security concerns, but various bilateral squabbles stand in the way of actual cooperation and represent a lost opportunity for both. Recommendation Europe should develop a more strategic approach toward energy security issues, for instance by incorporating energy trade in major trade agreements, and addressing the non-commercial aspects of energy trade through classic diplomatic tools. Energy security represents a potential area of collaboration between the European Union and NATO. The German Marshall Fund of the United States 24 A chieving energy security in Europe requires significant international coordination across a broad range of policies. However, the ability of transatlantic governments to secure mutual strategic and economic interests in relation to energy security is reduced if policymakers are not prioritizing the issue. European energy security will not be advanced by wishful thinking, and setbacks from entrenched national protectionism remains are always likely. Forward movement will require specific, dedicated policies to address shortcomings and barriers, even if solutions upset well-established constituencies or national champions in some instances. The Ukraine and Crimea crises have exposed a deep-rooted European vulnerability and significant policy disagreements. Europe must decide whether to utilize all available options to improve circumstances, or to simply continue coping with the current arrangement of high energy prices, high energy import levels, and regional dependency on an unreliable supplier. That said, there is a case to be made for optimism going forward. The European Union has made great strides in advancing pan-European energy policies, and significant developments will come to fruition in the next five to ten years, including implementation of the Third Energy Package, the Connecting Europe Facility and Projects of Common Interest, advancement of the Energy Community, and settlement of the Gazprom antitrust case. All of these will act as drivers of positive policy evolution and market developments and strengthen the security of supply, competitiveness, and efficient use of energy resources. Europe has an opportunity to identify and correct its apparent weaknesses through targeted initiatives, which include improved energy cooperation and market integration, enhanced competition, removal of internal energy trade barriers and bottlenecks, and increased European production and storage investments. This report has identified a range of recommendations to bolster European energy security. The Nordic practice of integrating energy markets and trading renewable energy could be a model for other regions, particularly as renewable energy technologies continue to become cost effective and less dependent on government subsidies. Policymakers in Europe should place greater emphasis on energy market architecture than specific, often politicized projects and position their nations better if disruptive evolutions were to occur in international energy markets in the future. In some instances, energy policy in Europe has become a partisan or national distraction, as opposed to an opportunity for mutual gains through collaboration. It is not an easy task to predict what Europes future needs or circumstances will look like, but Europe as a whole should address the common interest in funding costly interconnectors, storage facilities, and other critical infrastructure that will be necessary across a range of scenarios, even if these projects are less prestigious for national policymakers to embrace. An open and connected European energy market is a prerequisite for progress. Some Europeans will have to move out of their comfort zone and acknowledge the need for development of unconventional resources, while others will have to embrace renewable energy or phase out fossil fuels at a slower pace than currently envisioned. If a real energy emergency were to occur, it is currently unclear which reserves Europeans would be able to lean on, apart from U.S. coal or Qatari gas perhaps. Germany plays a unique role in European energy security, and while its Energiewende is still at an early stage, successful implementation will be a If a real energy emergency were to occur, it is currently unclear which reserves Europeans would be able to lean on. Bolstering Energy Security in Europe: A Case for Optimism 8 Bolstering European Energy Security 25 game changer not just for Europe but far beyond. Germany has another special role in its energy and economic relationship with Russia, simultaneously a matter of controversy and opportunity. Germany could play a key role in securing competitively priced Russian gas to a large part of Europe if it agrees to manage relations with Russia on behalf of other European gas importers. A successful relationship would achieve security of supply for Europe and security of demand for Russia, but only if European antitrust and anti-monopoly rules are rigorously applied and enforced. Positive steps are being taken in this direction, as the European Union continues to implement an internal market for energy, where energy resources entering the EU are fungible, and external suppliers must observe EU competition regulations. Sadly, national interests have stymied progress, but the Ukraine crisis may turn out to be a turning point that focuses sufficient political attention to make progress. The EU has also made significant investments in infrastructure through the Connecting Europe Facility and Projects of Common Interest, which will progress until at least 2020. Greater emphasis should be applied to cooperation across Europe. The EU could utilize a European Semester model of forced peer-review amongst national leaders of major energy policy and infrastructure decisions, and the European Commission could aid this process by analyzing and publicizing an annual report on energy cooperation between nations and regions, in order to stimulate collaboration and market integration and eradicate deliberate bottlenecks and restrictions. The Commission could also aid individual nations by lending technical expertise to negotiating teams and utilities as they negotiate future contracts with external suppliers. European climate and energy security ambitions are at loggerheads in certain instances, but this situation is evolving as European leaders seek to address competitiveness concerns relating to high energy prices. European policymakers should analyze the U.S. example of achieving emission reductions through energy policies that favor lower carbon-content fuels such as gas, and examine whether this strategy could be replicated in Europe. The U.S. governments ability to conduct energy diplomacy and developing long-term energy analysis at the global scale should be another area of inspiration for Europeans, as this has allowed the United States, particularly the State Department, to respond in a targeted way to the current crisis in Ukraine, and likely to future energy-related conflicts as well. As Europes import dependency will increase in the future, it is critical to develop these capabilities at the EU level in order to respond and react accordingly. Finally, Europe should seek to capitalize on its competitive advantage as the global leader in the geopolitics of energy efficiency. As global demand for energy resources will rise during the next decades, Europe will benefit from decreased energy demand since prices are likely to rise and resource- related conflicts likely to ensue. This leadership position could provide opportunities for European competitiveness and a potential rejuvenation of its production and manufacturing industries. It is reasonable to conclude from the current conflict in Ukraine that the 2006 and 2009 cutoffs did not spur sufficient European action. European energy security could very well be improved five to ten years from now, but real political action has to take place today to achieve results in this timeline. European energy security could very well be improved five to ten years from now, but real political action has to take place today to achieve results in this timeline. OF F I CE S Washington Berlin Paris Brussels Belgrade Ankara Bucharest Warsaw Tunis www.gmfus.org