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SEIC writers discuss the economics of the FIFA World Cup 2014, areas of reform that Indonesia should focus on, and the sectarian conflict plaguing Iraq today.
SEIC writers discuss the economics of the FIFA World Cup 2014, areas of reform that Indonesia should focus on, and the sectarian conflict plaguing Iraq today.

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Issue 52 07 July 2014

SMU Political-Economic Exchange
AN SMU ECONOMICS INTELLIGENCE CLUB PUBLICATION
Keep a lookout for the new SEIC/SPEX website, coming your way soon!
This Issue in Brief:
The Price of Sporting Prestige: The 2014 FIFA World Cup
With the 2014 FIFA World Cup hosted by Brazil in full swing at this
present moment, a team of writers from SEIC analyse the economic
pros and cons of hosting a World Cup, and how Brazil could stand to
gain and lose from being host to this highly anticipated event.
Reforms for Indonesia’s Future
The 2014 Indonesian Presidential Elections are just around the
corner, and SEIC’s Victor Barlian discusses the need for Indonesia’s
future leaders to reform the energy and infrastructural development
sectors, so as to pave the way for future economic prosperity.
CrISIS Iraq: Origins and Beyond
Rao Pranav explores the origins of the sectarian violence that is
plaguing Iraq today, and discusses how the bloodshed and conflict
could be resolved in the best way possible.

In collaboration with
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Issue 52 07 July 2014

The Price of Sporting Prestige: The 2014 FIFA World Cup
by Lee Yin Wei, Tay Qi Hang
Introduction
A global phenomenon, the FIFA World Cup is one of the largest and most anticipated events on the
sporting calendar alongside the Olympic Games. This year’s host is Brazil, the 5th largest nation in the
world by population and Latin America’s fastest growing economy. Being the chosen host, the 32-day
event is estimated to generate some 380,000 jobs and attract more than 600,000 foreign tourists, in
addition to $11.5 billion allocated budget. Despite the hype around the world, most of the locals harbour
massive discontent for the event, largely due to the controversial proportion of public spending for
hosting. In June 2013, a million Brazilians marched during a World Cup warm-up tournament to decry
issues such as poor public transportation and woefully underequipped schools and hospitals, which they
felt should take priority over the construction of stadiums. In fact, 61% of respondents in a Gallup survey
felt that hosting the World Cup would bring about more drawbacks than benefits for their country.
Beneath the glitzy spectacle and shiny brand-new stadiums, the World Cup also brings about many local
issues which need to be addressed.
Economy Booster


Table1: Consolidated impacts of the 2014 World Cup


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Issue 52 07 July 2014
The primary reason Brazil wants to play host to the World Cup is due to the potentially significant
economic gains such a popular global sports event could deliver in the short term. Ernst & Young (E&Y),
one of the largest multinational audit firms in the world, makes a forecast that Brazil will reap a gain 5
times that of which it has invested in the World Cup. This means that Brazil will generate up to $64 billion
from this event, and its government can look forward to collecting $8.12 billion in taxes. Exposure to global
media, construction and improvement of infrastructure will contribute to boosting inflow of tourists,
investors and business opportunities. As such, E&Y predicts that across the country, GDP, income and
employment will all rise (Table 1).










Some of the sectors that will benefit most are: construction, food and beverage, utilities and other
businesses. Table 2 summarizes the direct and indirect economic effects on the various sectors in Brazil,
and most notably, construction and business services in Brazil would enjoy the greatest benefits directly,
along with thousands of small, medium and big-sized enterprises in the country.
Bane for Local Businesses
Yet, a poll conducted by Pew Research Center discovered that 61% of respondents have a negative outlook
with regards to Brazil’s gains from being the host, and some of the primary reasons include the restrictions
imposed by FIFA and the substantial sum spent on this flagship event, instead of on its tattered education
and healthcare systems.
In order to peddle near the playing stadiums during this year’s playoffs, street vendors now have to acquire
licenses from the local government, and successful applicants are allowed to sell only FIFA-approved items
from its official partners. With a high poverty headcount ratio of 15.9%, and a ranking of 17th out of 140
countries in terms of highest levels of income disparity, the restriction on street hawking near stadiums
holding the games has essentially deprived its citizens a chance to benefit directly from an event largely
funded by their own taxpayers’ money.



Table2: Direct and indirect on Brazilian sector GDPs


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Issue 52 07 July 2014
Opportunity Cost to Education, healthcare
Education has long been regarded as the gateway for those on the lower economic strata to improve
on their social standings. According to the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development
(OECD), the current generation is more unlikely to graduate from college than the previous
generation, with a rate down from 36% to 23%. The World Economic Forum has ranked the Brazilian
education system as amongst the 35 worst education systems in the world. With its education system
in tatters, it is no wonder the Brazilians are angered that the government expends such a tremendous
budget on a sporting event which could have been otherwise channelled towards improving its
depressing education standards. A healthy nation also translates into better gross domestic product
(GDP). The economic performance of a nation is interlinked with the health of its citizens; the healthier
the latter, the more sustainable economic growth would be. Lack of properly-trained medical
professionals and equipment has added to the growing discontent in Brazil, especially amongst the
middle and lower income groups. To get an X-ray appointment, a waiting period of months is common;
there are approximately 2 beds for every 1,000 individuals. A poll revealed that 48% of Brazilians view
healthcare as the biggest issue in the country, ranking above corruption and the prevalence of
violence. Displeasure has propelled numerous street riots in the months leading up to World Cup,
where masses have protested against using public money on a flagship event instead of improving
their shabby healthcare system.
Investment Outlook
Goldman Sachs analysts have discovered a trend that World Cup hosts experience temporary
improvements in their stock market performance. Indeed, the Brazil Bovespa Index is up 10.71% in the
last 12 months. A World Cup victory is expected to propel Brazilian stocks towards even greater
heights. Additionally, Brazil’s high interest rates present to investors high real returns on government
bonds of 6% to 7%, thereby attracting more investments in its income-linked products (e.g. asset-
backed securities).
However, growing local resentment with FIFA and the Brazilian government has been attracting global
media attention for the past few months. Such unrest has culminated in a growing number of
criticisms from media, businesses and politicians all over the world, which could possibly shake
investor confidence and tourism appeal. How the Brazilian government is going to manage such
sentiment will have a substantial influence on the country’s potential economic performance in the
future.
Boon or Bane?
The economic impacts of the World Cup cannot be underestimated. While the World Cup is predicted
to add 0.2% to GDP growth in 2014 – making a 1.8% full-year total – it is also contributing to a 0.5
percentage point to inflation, bringing the latter up to 6.3%. A total of $3.6 billion in taxpayer monies
has been poured into the construction of new stadiums for the World Cup. There is a fear that these
stadiums could possibly be massively underutilised, and eventually attain an unfortunate moniker of
white elephants once the World Cup has concluded. One of these stadiums, the Amazonia Arena, cost
$270 million to construct and is situated in the middle of a jungle with no local team in the region.


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Issue 52 07 July 2014
More ominously, South Africa – a previous World Cup host – shares an uncannily similar predicament with
Brazil too; both are developing third world nations and have spent/are spending a substantial sum of public
money to host this flagship event in the hope of boosting their economies. Yet, South Africa has ended up
with a massive amount of debt as a result, and the expected economic boost was not as spectacular as it
was hoped. It is thus possible for Brazil to end up with unmanageable levels of debt, and see little economic
benefits from being a World Cup host.
To many of the locals, such expenditure is exorbitant and unnecessary. Hence, it is important that the
Brazilian government takes steps to ensure that the new stadiums will continue to serve an important role
in the development of football in the local region, even long after the 2014 World Cup has ended.
Reference
1. Ernst&Young,. (2014). Sustainable Brazil. Retrieved from:
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Sustainable_Brazil_-_World_Cup/$FILE/copa_2014.pdf
2. Antunes, A. (2013). Can Brazil Really Handle The 2014 FIFA World Cup?. Forbes. Retrieved from
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andersonantunes/2013/06/12/can-brazil-really-handle-the-2014-fifa-world-cup/
3. Ernst&Young,. (2014). Sustainable Brazil. Retrieved from
http://www.ey.com/Publication/vwLUAssets/Sustainable_Brazil_-_World_Cup/$FILE/copa_2014.pdf
4. Antunes, A. (2013). Can Brazil Really Handle The 2014 FIFA World Cup?. Forbes. Retrieved from
http://www.forbes.com/sites/andersonantunes/2013/06/12/can-brazil-really-handle-the-2014-fifa-world-cup/
5. Colitt, R. (2013). Brazil World Cup Kick-Starts Billionaire Boon as Farmers Lose. Bloomberg. Retrieved from
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2013-05-29/brazil-world-cup-kick-starts-billionaire-boon-as-farmers-lose.html
6. Leahy, J. (2014). World Cup will have little impact on Brazil, says Moody’s. Retrieved from
http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/770b70c8-b6b7-11e3-8695-00144feabdc0.html#axzz34b5Z2yMT
7. Moody's: 2014 FIFA World Cup to provide temporary lift for Brazil. (2014). Retrieved from
https://www.moodys.com/research/Moodys-2014-FIFA-World-Cup-to-provide-temporary-lift-for--PR_296043
8. Wright, C. (2014). Will Brazil's World Cup Pay Off For Investors?. Forbes. Retrieved from
http://www.forbes.com/sites/chriswright/2014/06/12/will-investors-in-brazil-see-a-world-cup-dividend/
9. Badkar, M. (2014). Here's A Reason Why Some Brazilian Politicians Could Want Their Team To Lose At The World
Cup - Business Insider. Business Insider. Retrieved from http://www.businessinsider.sg/impact-of-brazil-world-cup-
on-elections-2014-6/#.U5z60PmSy_g
10. Data.worldbank.org,. (2014). Brazil | Data. Retrieved from http://data.worldbank.org/country/brazil
11. Index Mundi,. (2014). Brazil Population below poverty line - Economy. Retrieved from
http://www.indexmundi.com/brazil/population_below_poverty_line.html
12. Chao, J. (2014). Hope fades in Brazil for a World Cup economic boost. Wall Street Journal. Retrieved from
http://online.wsj.com/articles/hope-fades-in-brazil-for-a-world-cup-economic-boost-1401242039
13. Caldwell, K. (2014). World Cup fever sends Brazil's shares soaring - Telegraph. Telegraph. Retrieved from
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/finance/personalfinance/investing/shares/10894900/World-Cup-fever-sends-Brazils-
shares-soaring.html
14. Global Research,. (2014). Brazil: A World Soccer Cup for Corporations. Retrieved from
http://www.globalresearch.ca/a-world-cup-for-corporations/5386974
15. Khazan, O. (2014). What the U.S. Can Learn From Brazil's Healthcare System. The Atlantic. Retrieved from
http://www.theatlantic.com/features/archive/2014/05/what-the-us-can-learn-from-brazils-healthcare-mess/361854/
16. Progressive.org,. (2014). Brazil's Poor Pay World Cup Penalty. The Progressive. Retrieved from
http://progressive.org/brazil-poor-pay-world-cup-penalty
17. Chin, C., & Leal, F. (2014). Why Brazil's youth turned against the World Cup. The Week. Retrieved from
http://theweek.com/article/index/262495/why-brazils-youth-turned-against-the-world-cup#axzz34xoSIFtK



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Issue 52 07 July 2014
Reforms for Indonesia’s Future
by Victor Julistiono Barlian

Introduction
Indonesia, being South East Asia’s largest economy with a GDP of close to US$1 trillion in 2013, has
enormous economic potential. After the1998 financial crisis, the archipelago nation has come back
stronger than before. It has undergone political reforms and has made significant progress in its
macroeconomic management.
Currently Indonesia enjoys a relatively stable political climate and robust economy. Democracy is
blossoming, with the last three general elections conducted peacefully. Inflation has dropped from double
to single digits and both its public and private debt has fallen significantly. The political stability and
improved macroeconomic management has caused Indonesia’s economy to remain resilient even during
the 2008 global financial crisis, making it “The World’s Most Stable Economy in the Last Five Years”
according to The Economist.
Indonesia is also the world’s 4th largest country in terms of population size, with around 240 million
individuals. With a young demographic, Indonesia offers great potential in terms of productivity and
creativity. In 2011, Indonesia’s total median age is 28.2 years, which implies that 50% of the population is
below 28.2 years Against this backdrop, it did not come as a surprise that McKinsey predicted that
Indonesia would rise from the world’s 16th largest economy to the world’s 7th largest come 2030.
The growth story of Indonesia is promising. Nevertheless, it is not without any challenges. In this article, I
would like to highlight two major challenges that need to be resolved immediately in order for Indonesia
to continue progressing economically. The upcoming presidential election in July would pose a pivotal
moment for Indonesia, where the nation will elect its leader for the next five years. Therefore, it is
important that the next government should take a clear stance on these pressing issues.
Infrastructural Reforms
The first reform that Indonesia should engage in is with regards to the infrastructure sector. If one were to
visit Indonesia’s capital – Jakarta, you would immediately notice that infrastructure is indeed a big
problem. Traffic jams are widespread, and it could take hours for one to reach a destination not too far
away. Indonesia is indeed behind its peers by a wide margin in terms of infrastructure adequacy. Data
from the World Bank shows that the country’s logistics costs were 27% of gross domestic product (GDP),
higher than those in Japan (10.6%), South Korea (16.3%) and the US (9.9%). Furthermore, the country’s
competitiveness in terms of infrastructure and logistics was ranked 118th out of 148 countries in the 2013-
2014 Global Competitiveness Index, released by World Economic Forum (WEF). To put things into
perspective, let us take a look at Indonesia’s infrastructure in terms of seaports, railways and road
networks and compare it to its peers. Looking at Indonesia’s standing in terms of dwell time at seaports in
Figure 1 below, we can see that Indonesia lags behind its peers. The dwelling time at Jakarta’s Tanjung
Priok port is higher compared to its regional peers and key seaports around the world.


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Issue 52 07 July 2014
Furthermore, Indonesian domestic shipping rates are also much higher than international rates. For
example, the cost of shipping a 40-foot container from Padang to Jakarta is US$600 while the cost of
shipping the same container from Jakarta to Singapore is only US$185, despite Singapore being further
away.







In terms of railway and road density, Indonesia also lags behind significantly when compared to Japan,
India, and China as shown in the figures below.








The National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas) estimates that Indonesia needs to invest at least
7% of its GDP in infrastructure so as to achieve the ideal 7%-8 % levels of economic growth. However, in
2013, its total infrastructure expenditure (inclusive of investments by the private sector) was only US$34
billion, or 4% of total GDP. If this figure remains constant, this will inevitably cause the logistics cost-to-
GDP to remain high at over 27 %, hampering productivity and in turn, economic growth.

The Need to Redirect Fuel Subsidies towards Infrastructure Expenditure
Despite the lack of expenditure on infrastructure, Indonesia spent around US$30 billion on energy
subsidies, while capital expenditure was only approximately US$15 billion (Figure 4). This already low


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Figure2: Rail lines (Source from Worldbank) Figure3: Road density (Source from Worldbank)


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Issue 52 07 July 2014
figure is aggravated by the government’s move to revise its 2014 state budget by reducing capital
expenditure further, and adding another US$10 billion towards energy subsidies (Figure 5).








Although the logical way to improve infrastructure in Indonesia is to remove the subsidies and allocate it
towards developing infrastructure, this is indeed a politically challenging move. Every time there is a plan
to increase fuel prices, the public has always responded negatively. For example, last year’s 44% hike in
fuel prices sparked anger and protests from the public. This issue would be inherited by the next
government, by means of the huge financial burden on the energy subsidy to the 2015 state budget.
Oil and Gas Sector Reforms
Besides infrastructural reforms, there is a need for a reform in Indonesia’s energy sector as well. Despite
having abundant energy resources, Indonesia is currently on the brink of becoming a net energy importer.
Indonesia’s net energy exports were 3.5% of its GDP in 2010, but this figure declined rapidly to 0.42% of
GDP in 2014. This is a problem that needs to be resolved immediately, as a continual decline in energy
would put further pressure on Indonesia’s overall trade balance and eventually harm Indonesia’s economic
well-being.

The precarious state that Indonesia’s energy sector is currently in is due to the decline in oil output levels
and an expected increase in domestic energy consumption levels in the coming years. Indonesia was once
a net exporter of oil. In 1977, Indonesia’s oil production was 1.7 million barrels per day (bpd), while its
consumption was only 285,000 bpd. This suggests that the surplus was 1.4 million bpd, which is similar to
Indonesia’s current levels of oil consumption. However, things began to change in 1991 as Indonesian oil
production levels started to decline. In 2003, Indonesia’s oil consumption finally surpassed its consumption
levels for the first time. Since then, oil production has always been below consumption levels. From its
peak 1.7 million bpd in 1991, Indonesia has seen a 47% decline in oil production to 882,000 bpd in 2013. It is
a pity to see Indonesia’s current condition bearing in mind that it was once one of the major oil exporting
nations and a member of OPEC.

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Figure4: Revised government expenditure 2014
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Issue 52 07 July 2014








The decline in oil output was due to the lack of upstream developments. Almost 80% of Indonesian oil
production comes from old oilfields that were exploited before 1975. Major oilfields in Indonesia are drying
up, and there is lack of exploratory work. Weak government management, bureaucracy and an unclear
regulatory framework are the main culprits of this lack of exploration. According to Indonesia’s upstream
regulator, SKK Migas, it would take 5 to 8 years from the time of initial drilling to prove reserves, develop
feasibility plans and finally open a new field. 5 to 8 years is a not short period, thereby making the case that
decisive actions to reform this sector are urgently needed.
On the consumption side, we see a robust intake of energy in the past few years. Figure 6 shows that as
Indonesia’s economy grows, its primary energy consumption has increased as well. Being a young and
growing nation, it is expected that Indonesia’s energy consumption will continue to increase in the next
few years.







As Indonesia’s energy consumption is highly geared towards oil (44%), we can therefore expect its oil
consumption to rise in the coming years. If Indonesia maintains this energy mix and no further
development in the sector is apparent, Indonesia could risk having an energy crisis in the next few years.
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(Source from BP statistical review of world energy 2014)


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Issue 52 07 July 2014
The impending energy crisis in Indonesia would pose numerous problems if it is not resolved immediately.
Hence, reforms in the oil and gas sector should be the top priority of the incoming government.
Conclusion
While Indonesia does indeed face issues in other sectors as well, the two problems that were highlighted in
this article are in my opinion, of the greatest threat to Indonesia’s economic progress, and I therefore feel
these issues require urgent attention from the Indonesian government.
The two presidential and vice presidential candidates have shown their concerns and have outlined their
strategies to address the issues in both the infrastructure and energy sectors, despite having different
approaches. Overlooking the grandiose plans that were outlined by the candidates, what is crucial, in my
opinion, is the ability of the next government to execute their vision and mission well, as the execution and
implementation of policies has always been one of the Indonesian government’s weakest points. For now,
let us await the arrival of 9 July 2014 - the day when Indonesians would vote in its top leaders, and see if
this very day would be the country’s turning point for the better.
References
1. Indirasardjana, P. (2014). 2020 Indonesia Dalam Bencana Krisis Minyak Nasional
2. CLSA (2014). Block by block – Technocrats get things rolling
3. CLSA (2014). Energizers – How sector reform is essential for growth
4. McKinsey Global Institute (2012). The archipelago economy: Unleashing Indonesia’s potential
5. Indonesia Investments (2013). Population of Indonesia http://www.indonesia-investments.com/culture/population/item67
6. The Global Competitiveness Report 2013-2014. http://www3.weforum.org/docs/WEF_GlobalCompetitivenessReport_2013-14.pdf
7. Jakarta Post (2014) budget cut will put RI’s already low logistic competitiveness at risk
http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2014/06/02/budget-cut-will-put-ri-s-already-low-logistic-competitiveness-risk.html
8. Indonesia Investments (2013). Logistics Costs Reduce Economic Potential of Indonesia http://www.indonesia-
investments.com/news/news-columns/world-bank-report-logistic-costs-reduce-economic-potential-of-indonesia/item1079
9. Bisnis Indonesia (2014) BAPPENAS: Indonesia Butuh Investasi Infrastruktur 7% Terhadap PDB
http://finansial.bisnis.com/read/20140413/9/219093/bappenas-indonesia-butuh-investasi-infrastruktur-7-terhadap-pdb
10. Indonesia oil and gas upstream challenges -
http://www.gbgindonesia.com/en/energy/article/2014/indonesia_s_oil_and_gas_sector_upstream_challenges.php
11. US Energy Information Administration - Indonesia http://www.eia.gov/countries/country-data.cfm?fips=id#pet

44%
21%
32%
2%
1%
Oil Natural gas Coal Hydro-electricity Renewables
Figure8: Indonesia energy consumption 2013(Source
from BP statistical review of world energy 2014)


11
Issue 52 07 July 2014
CrISIS Iraq: Origins and Beyond
by Rao Pranav
As the world commemorated the centennial anniversary of WWI this past month, a secret agreement
between Great Britain and France for the fragmentation of the Ottoman Empire, reached towards the end
of the war, lies at the heart of the conflagration in Iraq today.
The Sykes – Picot Agreement, named for the English negotiator and the French consul who were the
signatories to the document, carved out under English and French “mandates” an area that spans all of
modern day Israel, Lebanon, Syria, Jordan and Iraq. Though one would assume that a lot of thought would
have gone into breaking up such a large piece of land with so many religious and ethnic intricacies, a
cursory glance at the map attached shows the simplicity assumed by both sides when it came to
apportionment. And this attitude of the parties is apparent from a statement made by Sir Mark Sykes to
the prime minister at Downing Street: "I should like to draw a line from the "e" in Acre to the last "k" in
Kirkuk." Further, the agreement went against a promise the British had made to Hussein bin Ali, the Sharif
of Mecca, granting future independence to the Arab people if they rose up against the Ottomans.










Under the convention, the region marked A would fall under the French mandate and the region in blue
would fall under direct French control; the area marked B fell into the English mandate and the pink area
was under direct English control. The region in yellow to the west of the map covered the city of
Jerusalem, a city holy to three religions, and hence, to be administered by an international committee.
Now, though the British and the French might not have intended for this to happen, the borders drawn by
the convention went on to become a key consideration in the future formation of states and nations in the
region. And the arbitrariness of the borders, along with the breaking of the promise made to the Sharif of
Mecca for independence brought about by the Sykes – Picot Agreement, are what the ISIS (Islamic State in
Iraq and Syria) is now using to leverage their claim for an Islamic caliphate in the region.




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Issue 52 07 July 2014
ISIS was formed in the wake of the United States’ operations in Iraq post-9/11, and is a successor to the
group called Al-Qaeda in Iraq. And, though the group has been around for some time, they began their
offensive against the Iraqi government only earlier this year in January, by taking control of the western
Anbar province. Further, unlike general conceptions of militant groups, ISIS is highly organized and
strategic in its outlook for the Islamic State it envisages. In a recent audio address, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi,
the so called emir of the Islamic State, called on Muslim engineers, doctors and military personnel from
around the world to help in the nation building process. This ‘professionalism’ is also apparent in the latest
issue of the Islamic State Report, a fancy weekly propagandist webzine released by the ISIS, titled
“Smashing the Borders of the Tawaghit” (Tawaghit meaning non-Muslim creations in Arabic). It talks at
length about the steps taken thus far by the ISIS to destroy what was started in 1916 and has pictures
showing ISIS fighters freely crossing what used to be the border between Iraq and Syria, along with some
of several Shi’ite soldiers being rounded up for execution.
The vast progress that ISIS has made in its quest to set up a Sunni caliphate, along with re-emphasizing the
religious and ethnic frailties of the region, also brings to the fore a fear that the map of the Middle East will
not survive this onslaught. Further, there is a feeling that at least some of the plethora of stakeholders
involved in this mess have already accepted this. For example, the Kurdistan Regional Government, the
near-autonomous ruling body of the predominantly Kurdish north of Iraq, has taken control of regions left
behind by Iraqi forces in the wake of ISIS attacks, including the oil-rich city of Kirkuk. And the Israeli Prime
Minister, Benjamin Netanyahu, recently stoked long burning fires by stating that he would support a call
for independence by Kurdistan. This is indicative of the wide-ranging changes that eventually will need to
be effected in order to bring an end to the perpetual violence in the region.



13
Issue 52 07 July 2014
From all the facts available at this point, it can be inferred that the best short term solution is for the Iraqi
government to get rid of the incumbent prime minister, Nouri al-Maliki, who has thus far concerned himself
with tackling ISIS more because of their religious affiliation rather than for the reason of them being
religious extremists tearing apart the country he governs. Replacing him with someone who is seen as being
religiously neutral could go a long way in reducing the support ISIS has from Iraqi tribal leaders who have
had enough of Nouri al-Maliki.
However, the fact remains that the manner in which border lines are currently drawn in the Middle East
makes it highly susceptible to violent outbursts, and the only way many see to eradicate this is to revise the
map, possibly on the basis of religion and ethnicity. There is no doubt that any such process would be long
drawn out and would have innumerable barriers to success, but it is time to at least get the process
underway.
References
1. Sarajevo marks 100 years since Archduke Franz Ferdinand shooting. (2014, June 28). . Retrieved June 30, 2014, from
http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-28062876
2. Sykes-Picot Agreement. (2014). In Encyclopaedia Britannica. Retrieved
from http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/577523/Sykes-Picot-Agreement
3. Osman, T. (2013, December 14). Why border lines drawn with a ruler in WW1 still rock the Middle East. . Retrieved June 30,
2014, from http://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-25299553
4. Mezzofiore, G. (2014, June 30). Iraq Isis Crisis: Is This the End of Sykes-Picot?. . Retrieved July 1, 2014, from http://www.ibtimes.co.uk/iraq-
isis-crisis-this-end-sykes-picot-1454751
5. Howeidy, A. (2014, June 26). Iraq timeline: From invasion to ISIS. Al-Ahram.
6. Sennott, C. (2014, June 17). How ISIS Is Tearing Up The Century-old Map Of The Middle East. . Retrieved June 30, 2014, from
http://www.mintpressnews.com/how-isis-is-tearing-up-the-century-old-map-of-the-middle-east/192553/
7. Hall, J. (2014, June 25). ISIS militants produce slick weekly magazine packed with English language Islamist propaganda designed to
recruit and radicalise would-be extremists in the West. Daily Mail.
8. Middle East, Ethnic Groups. (n.d.). . Retrieved June 30, 2014, from http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml
9. Middle East, Religions. (n.d.). . Retrieved June 30, 2014, from http://gulf2000.columbia.edu/maps.shtml



Issue 52 07 July 2014
SEIC Correspondents for Issue 52:
Wong Shi Jun Aaron (Vice President, SPEX)
Undergraduate
Lee Kong Chian School of Business
Singapore Management University
aaron.wong.2012@business.smu.edu.sg

Zhou Li (Creative Director)
Undergraduate
School of Economics
Singapore Management University
li.zhou.2012@economics.smu.edu.sg
Lee Yin Wei (Writer)
Undergraduate
School of Economics
Singapore Management University
yinwei.lee.2012@economics.smu.edu.sg

Tay Qi Hang (Writer)
Undergraduate
School of Economics
Singapore Management University
qihang.tay.2013@economics.smu.edu.sg
Victor Julistiono Barlian (Writer)
Undergraduate
Lee Kong Chian School of Business
Singapore Management University
vjbarlian.2012@business.smu.edu.sg

Rao Pranav (Writer)
Undergraduate
Lee Kong Chian School of Business
Singapore Management University
pranav.rao.2012@business.smu.edu.sg


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