Mark Chappel 1

Is The War On Terror

A New Kind Of War?

An Extended Independent Learning Essay

By Mark Chappel

Summer 2009
Mark Chappel 2

Is The War On Terror A New Kind of War?

In order to gain enough perspective to answer this question fully, one must consider the
whole spectrum of international politics relating to the War on Terror (WoT) since
11 September 2001 (“9/11”). On this date, a series of terrorist attacks occurred in the
United States, including the demolition of the two towers of the World Trade Center in
New York, causing the deaths of 2752 people. Any conclusions reached must be
considered in the context both of international events since then and in the context of any
previous precedents which may exist for such a WoT.

On 20 September 2001, the then US President, George W. Bush, declared, "Our war on
terror begins with Al Qaeda, but it does not end there. It will not end until every terrorist
group of global reach has been found, stopped and defeated".i It is therefore safe to state
that this specific WoT began with Al Qaeda following the events of 9/11, and continued,
subsequently, as a result of the series of bombings which took place in London, UK, on
7th July 2005 (“7/7”) for which Al Qaeda also claimed responsibility. This is, however, an
official, some might argue, artificial, starting point since, as will be discussed later,
dealing with terrorism is not a new experience for international governments.

This current WoT may also be said to cover the “sideline” terroristii activities or conflicts
which have also occurred since September 2001. These include the Mumbai attacks in
India in November 2008, the Hamas/Israel crisis of January 2009 and the bomb blasts in
Spain of this summer. Consideration should also be given to the roles of the so-called
“rogue” state actors in the funding and supplying of terrorism (“Axis of Evil”, iii Libya,
Syria, North Korea, Iran, etc). At this time we also need to look at the role of the US as
the only remaining economic and military superpower and the consequent view, both
internally and abroad, of the US as the “World Police”. The threats and abilities of
predominantly international terrorists and the responses to those dangers, namely the
impatience of the US, the indifference of the UN or the overreaction of certain states
must also be factored into any discussion on this WoT.

To judge accurately whether this War is new or not we need to draw comparisons with
how terrorism has been dealt with in the past i.e. pre-9/11. Terrorism is not a recent
phenomenon. It has a strong history not only closer to home with the “Troubles” in
Ireland but as a tool used by various far left extremist groups in Europe, as the
background to the constant bomb threats in Israel and Palestine and as a part of more
formal conflicts against groups or states that use terrorist methods. Events in Vietnam,
Malaysia and Cyprus (where such methods were used) were all aptly labelled
“emergencies” in much the same way as the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan have not
officially been labelled “wars”. The WoT means that there is evidently a new scope on
war itself and therefore a new response to such a war, which defines the enemies and
allies whilst redefining the boundaries of warfare.
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The Phrase “The War On Terror”

The phrase “the War on Terror” is virtually unprecedented (it was once used by the press
in 1881iv) but it is probable that the intentions behind it have their own precedents. Many
cynics see the phrase as a ‘get out clause’ for US interventionism and, likewise, for the
concomitant infringement of civil liberties by both the US and UK governments. But
then the phrase “War on Terror” is arguably in itself wrong since “terror” is an abstract
noun and “Terror is a means used by the enemy, not the enemy itself”. v There is such a
lengthy description from the Dictionary of Political Thought on the term “War” that it
would be foolish to cite the entire definition. However there is one point that ought to be
noted, “War is to be distinguished from domestic upheavals and rebellions, however
violent, in that it occurs between states or powers seeking to constitute themselves as
states”.v This quote makes it clear that the UK Government believes that conventional
warfare is between states and powers, and while “terror” is neither of these, it is clear that
the WoT is not considered to be a conventional war. It is a different kind of war but
against whom? “The ‘War on Terror’ implied that the correct response was primarily
military.... [and gave the] impression of a unified transnational enemy”.vi The phrase
predominantly divides the world into the two factions, i.e. as George W. Bush pointed out
“If you’re not with us, you’re against us”.vii But does the phrase solve the problem of
“good terrorists” and (more often) “bad terrorists”? I.e. separating the terrorists from the
so-called freedom fighters blessed with popular US support. If not, why are some
terrorists (particularly state actors) treated very differently from others?

The idea of “Them and Us” (or in this discussion more appropriately perhaps “Them and
the US”) is nothing new as it helps to achieve multiple goals for the respective
governments: “[The] Phrase is useful for polarising those (states, organisations,
individuals) who are “with” the United States (its citizens, interests home and abroad,
etc.) and those who are, by logical elimination, “against” it”.viii The same concept is seen
in the book “1984”ix where a constant state of warfare helps unite the nation in a much
greater way than mere harmonious peace. The phrase achieves its goals of explaining and
justifying US foreign policy, unity and the need for troops to the public. Moreover, it acts
as words of warning to those “rogue” state actors who are sponsors of, or at least
sympathisers with terrorism (the Axis of Evil). It is not just a warning to adversaries, but
also a justification for action and the war is that action. Finally, it puts pressure on
reluctant state players (for example, France and Germany) to “pick a side”. We can say
that this single phrase otherwise defines the course the US chose to take and explains
how it would go about putting it into action (“primarily military”). However, the explicit
use of the phrase does not in itself prove that War on Terror is an unprecedented
situation.

Dealing With Terrorism

It is true that the size of the operation, the concept and the myriad number of inter-
governmental policies and agreements is definitely unprecedented, at least in peacetime.
The US government has confronted other nations in conventional warfare before (War of
1812, War for Independence with Britain, Germany WW1/WW2, North Korea, North
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Vietnam, and Iraq in 1991). These wars have (by definition) been conventional, and have
had fixed boundaries and conclusions, but the War on Terror has no boundaries since it is
outside the legal parameters of international law, and no fixed conclusions because there
will always be those who choose to use violence to advance their ideals. Since the
declaration of the War on Terror two nations have been attacked, Afghanistan
(October 2001) and Iraq (March 2003) but the US and its allies justify this by claiming
they are seeking out and destroying terrorist cells wherever they may be (continuing the
World Police attitude). What many fail to recognise fully is that the War on Terror
consists of a war within Iraq and Afghanistan and not with them. The US and its allies
are searching fervently for potential terrorists within their own borders, most notably in
Britain as a result of the 7/7 bombings and the failed 21/7/2005 and Glasgow Airport
bombings (many of whose protagonists proved to be British nationals).

It has now produced a myriad of domestic security measures (better known in the UK as
the Anti-Terrorism legislationx) which, some have suggested, cast such a draconian
shadow over civil liberties that it is reminiscent of McCarthyism in the US. Thankfully
however, there are calls for moderation. Ken McDonald (Ex- Director of Public
Prosecutions in the UK) said, in response to the 7/7 bombings, that “a culture of
legislative restraint was needed in passing anti-terrorism laws...the fight against
terrorism on the streets of Britain is not a war. It is the prevention of crime, the
enforcement of our laws, and the winning of justice for those damaged by their
infringement”.xi The level of paranoia and the need to handle this terrorism differently is
clearly unprecedented in peacetime, as are the levels of anti terror laws which stray so far
from the liberal Millian ideal. Despite this, the mere fact that new laws have been
introduced means that this is a new response from the UK government and as such
proves that at least the UK is treating this as a new kind of war.

Apart from the failed Al Qaeda car bomb on the World Trade Center in 1993 and the
Oklahoma City bombing in 1995, the US government has not previously been a target of
terrorist attacks unlike European and Middle Eastern cities which have been; the
Israel/Gaza conflict of 2000, the Piazza Fontana bombing in Madrid of 1969, the Red
Army Faction siege of the West German Embassy in Stockholm. Previous US experience
is therefore limited and, as we shall see later, this is a distinctive factor in their reaction to
9/11 and actions in the War on Terror. We can now see a sequence of specific
proceedings emerging: dealing with terror and anti-terror is not new in Europe and the
Middle East, yet is relatively novel in the US and therefore requires a whole new
response from the US.

We must look at the counter arguments to the idea that this is an unprecedented form of
terrorism. As already discussed above, tackling terrorism in other countries is not a new
phenomenon. Numerous examples exist of terrorist activities in different European
countries: the IRA have been active for over 35 years in the UK, the Basque separatists
have waged “war” in Spain, and the far left extremist groups of the 1970s and 80s -
Baader-Meinhoff and the Red Brigade – were a thorn in the side of the German and
Italian governments, respectively. It is also the case that terrorist attacks for spectacular
effect are nothing new either; for example, the Pan Am 747 bombing over Lockerbie and
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the Canadian Airlines flight destroyed over the mid-Atlantic in 1985. More recently, the
Mumbai attacks in India of November 2008 were a wake up call to the Pakistani
government that while they did not specifically advocate terrorism, their nonetheless
almost sympathetic attitude to it would come to have ramifications on themselves and
would spark multiple calls for them to take action. To take an example, the UK
government said that Pakistan “Need[s] to take urgent and effective action to break up
terror networks on its soil”.xii And while this is the case, if they do nothing, to what extent
is Pakistan protected from US interventionism as already seen in the War on Terror? The
answer is that they are not; the War on Terror justifies the US intervening and taking
matters into their own hands. This raises another important point, is this interventionism
post-9/11 in the context of the War on Terror new?

US Interventionism
The conflicts in Afghanistan and Iraq were driven primarily by demand from the US
electorate which was carried out by the government. This is in contrast to the situation in
Vietnam and Somalia where the US government intervened and then explained/justified
its actions (often with very dubious evidence). Many people blame President George
W. Bush for his apparent “trigger-happy” attitude in going to war, but might it not be the
case that, if anything, it was more that he was satisfying the US public’s need for
revenge? The tyranny of the majority (Mills) is a dangerous thing and could have many
factors, such as an evident reaction to the events of 9/11, the unsatisfactory outcomes of
the conflicts caused by the previous Bush administration (George Bush Senior) or simply
the need for decisive action to be seen to be taken. George W. Bush had already let it be
known that he considered it electoral suicide to allow another 9/11 event to take place, so
maybe the electorate’s outrage and need for revenge following the 9/11 attacks allowed
the President to gain the public’s gratitude and satisfy their desire for vengeance.

In Iraq (following US President Obama’s “Surge”, i.e. the swift increase of troops sent to
Afghanistan, by more than 17,000 in Autumn 2009) the armed forces appear to be
making some democratic progress as they withdraw and hand over police control to the
Iraqi army. In Afghanistan, the reverse appears to be the case. In both cases (as in
Vietnam) the US government’s version of democratisation is likely to be too ambitious
since neither state has a political/cultural tradition of “democracy” as understood by
Western standards. US action has been taken in Iraq and Afghanistan (predominantly)
outside of the UN/NATO and thus without the need to justify action to a wide range of
allies. The wars have been seen by multiple EU and Arab States’ governments and
societies as the very worst side of US unilateralism. In particular (and obviously), they
have condemned the defiance of international law, that is to say the alleged illegal attack
on Iraq (a sovereign state), the extraordinary rendition of young men from the war zone
to Guantanamo and their almost certain torture thereafter.

US interventionism in this form (i.e. almost wholly independently with few confident
allies) is new but historically the US has repeatedly sent its forces to defend its interests
at home and abroad. US concerns in Central America have often been protected by the
engagement of troops (Dominican Republic in 1965, Grenada 1983 and Panama 1989)
Mark Chappel 6

and between the Cold War and 9/11 there exists a whole range of evidence to show that
the US has intervened; e.g., in the Gulf in 1991, in Somalia in 1992-93 (both through the
UN), and three times in the Balkans (Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999, and Macedonia in
2000), all through NATO. During the Cold War the US was only involved in Vietnam
from 1964-1973 and in Korea (the 1st UN War). What all of these conflicts have in
common is the support, or at least the consent, of an official intergovernmental
organisation. This sets them apart from the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan. However
it is true that the US has repeatedly fought to protect what were perceived to be vital
strategic points. Most (Vietnam and Somalia excepted, where non-state actors were
highly involved) were against conventional state actors using conventional military
campaigns (Vietnam and Somalia excepted again).

Are The Consequences New?

The massive cost of these conflicts is clearly unprecedented. It costs, and will continue to
cost US $3 Billion every month to cover the “Surge” proposed by President Obama in
Afghanistanxiii and it will have cost the US taxpayer US $500 Billionxiv thus far.
Unfortunately, in the current political and economic climate both conflicts can only
become ever more expensive and with the economic downturn failing banks having such
a direct impact on the lives of taxpayers, the public is deeply reluctant to commit more
resources to the war effort, especially when politicians promise enormous nationalisation,
fiscal stimulus plans and bailouts for failing banksxv. The huge amount of money fuelling
this war would have a minimal stimulus impact on the economic crisis (specific to the
UK) in the long term since there are a limited number of British based armament
manufacturers left. Most have branched out into much more profitable areas of business
and into other countries. Thus the unemployment problem would hardly be helped
(worldwide) except in the explicit area of Private Contractorsxix which will probably only
consist of retired service personnel and marginal administrators.

Many people objected to the war from the beginning because of the dubious evidence on
which the invasion was based. Whatever the truth of the matter, a large proportion of the
US and UK public feel that they were tricked into going to war in Iraq. “Nigel Inkster ex-
deputy [chief] of MI6 said “[Britain was] dragged into a war in Iraq which was always
against our better judgement”....MI6 was blamed for the failure of intelligence...that
claimed Iraq could deploy Weapons of Mass Destruction within 45 minutes... The
dossier, said to have been “sexed up” by Downing Street, also mentioned controversial
intelligence that Saddam Hussein was seeking uranium from Niger”.xvi It is very
uncommon for such a large scale operation to be undertaken on such scarce and
apparently fundamentally unsound evidence. The UK domestic political and legal
ramifications of the War on Terror are mostly new in peacetime, though not without
precedent in wartime. In World War II the federal US government and the coalition
government of the UK gave themselves sweeping powers to govern their countries,
organise the economic war effort and intern suspected aliens (Japanese, German etc.) but
this all took shape within a wartime context.
Mark Chappel 7

In the aftermath of recent world events, there are those asking if this has not now become
a War of Terror? At the end of Spring 2005, Amnesty International claimed that more
than 100,000 Iraqi civilians had already died because of the war. These statistics were
dismissed by the US Bush administration and ignored by UK Prime Minister Blair’s
government. In October 2006, Human Rights Watch claimed that there had been 650,000
Iraqi deaths, although the bulk of these had been the result of the insurgencies. Increasing
numbers of people in Britain are asking why there is still a shroud of secrecy over the
documents identifying the reasons why the country went to war, and why there has been
no clear decision made about whether a public or private inquiry will be held.

In addition, there are those different attitudes to particular terrorists on the part of the US
government. It seems that the Bush administration had no quarrel with the terrorist
policies of President Mugabe in Zimbabwe; some commentators even suggest that the
best the UK could manage was moral indignation. Nor had the US government expressed
any problem with any of the other “state terrorists” who abuse people’s human rights
either by persecuting voters or by putting down civil demonstrations with brute force
such as in China (where governments were very quiet about their human rights record
during the Olympic games and thereafter) or in Iran after the supposedly unfair elections
re-electing far-right fundamentalist Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. It is all a case of “why
‘friendly’ state terrorists are not challenged more on their human rights records?” but it is
an unfortunate fact that, whether we like it or not, this is not unprecedented and has
frequently been the case.

Conclusions
So what conclusions can be drawn from this evidence? We must look at the reasons for
the American reaction to 9/11 and the conception of the War on Terror.
o It was certainly unprecedented in sheer scale and impact in American history in
peacetime.
o The worst casualties on a single day were recorded since the Civil War. This
traumatised a society which was desperate for reassurance that it could not happen
again.
o The World Trade Center, a great symbol of American economic prestige, was
destroyed.
o This then created a climate of fear with the stock markets in virtual freefallxvii until
2003 and a subsequent attack on civil liberties by the US and UK Government in
the name of security.
While the way the US intervened in response to 9/11 (wars in faraway foreign countries,
unconventional enemies and fighting, difficult questions being asked back home and no
evident exit plan) does have precedents, there are more major differences.

In the US, the world’s only military and economic superpower, “a state for military
intervention remains atypical but nonetheless fairly frequent”.xviii Since the end of the
Cold War, but prior to the events of 9/11, the US was involved in six major interventions:
Panama in 1989, Gulf I in 1990/91, Somalia in 1992/93, Bosnia in 1995, Kosovo in 1999
and Macedonia in 2000. What is highly unusual and unprecedented about the conflicts in
Mark Chappel 8

Afghanistan and Iraq is the lack of either a wide range of allies or else of the legitimising
authority of an Intergovernmental Organisation such as the UN or NATO. So while
dealing with terrorism clearly has a precedent in European and Middle Eastern States it is
(more or less) unprecedented in the US which is another reason 9/11 caused such an
effect on the US people.

The reaction demanded by the US electorate was immediate revenge or “justice” on the
perpetrators (leading to a “you should have looked before you leaped” scenario). It can be
said that there are elements of this US intervention which bear a likeness to previous
years. However, the consequences of the said intervention in Iraq and Afghanistan are
mostly dissimilar. Even taking the most conservative of government statistics relating to
Iraqi civilian casualties caused by coalition troops, that number is still three times higher
than the number of Americans killed in the attacks on 9/11. Rightly or wrongly, this is
described by many people as an overreaction and comparisons could be drawn to the
Israeli military campaign in Gaza in January 2009, which drew widespread
condemnation. The billions of pounds and dollars of public money thrown at this “war”
have given the impression of desperate governments frantically searching for a
favourable result. Furthermore there are the so-called “private contractorsxix”, many of
whom are accused of war profiteering.

There are therefore five conclusions to be drawn from the initial question ‘Is the War on
Terror a New Kind of War?’:
o One, a new phrase is a new term and therefore a new scope of war as a concept
with the possibility of it not merely being against states and within the confines of
national boundaries i.e. borders.
o Two, the use of terror as a means is not new but the response most definitely is.
o Three, while intervention is not new and while Iraq and Afghanistan could be
seen as an intervention, in reality this is not the case, since the War on Terror
consists of a war within these countries and not against them.
o Four, a new scope means a new response which requires new rules or rather, no
rules, since the War on Terror liberates the US from the limitations of
international laws that are meant to constrict sovereign nations in conventional
warfare.
o Five, terror helps to draw a clear distinction (particularly in the minds of the
general public) between the bad guys and the good guys, depending of course on
the perspective of the government, which often leads to the perspective of the
media, and then lastly the view of the entire country.
These repercussions are unprecedented in peacetime with few (if any) precedents in
wartime and it is for that reason that I believe that while the use of terror as a “means
used by the enemy” is not unprecedented, the War on Terror is indeed a new kind of war.
Mark Chappel 9

Endnotes
i
Source: CNN, September 21st 2001, Transcript of President George W. Bush’s address
ii
Also see the last paragraph of the next section - “Them and Us” and how it is up to the discretion of the US government to
determine the Freedom Fighter from the Revolutionary Terrorist (in the confines of the War on Terror)
iii
Source: CNN, January 29th 2002, George W. Bush, State of the Union Address
iv
Source: The New York Times, April 2, 1881. (New York Times website archive)
v
Source: “Dictionary of Political Thought” 3rd Edition, Scruton
vi
Source: David Miliband, Guardian, 15th January 2009
vii
Source: Foreign Affairs, “Bush and the World”, September-October 2002
viii
Source: P. Riddick, „War on Terror Study Skills“ sheet, update 10th June 2009
ix
The book “1984” by George Orwell
x
Terrorism Act 2000, Anti-Terrorism Crime and Security Act 2001, Prevention of Terrorism Act 2005, Terrorism Act 2006
and the Counter Terrorism Bill of 2008
xi
Source: The Times, “There is no war on terror in the UK says DPP”, 24th January 2007
xii
Source: David Miliband, Guardian, 15th January 2009
xiii
Source: 27 March 2009, BBC News 24
xiv
Source: December 2008, Economist
xv
For more information see “The Crisis of 2008 and the Return of Depression Economics” Paul Krugman
xvi
Source: „Britain was dragged into Iraq“ Daily Telegraph, 4 May 2009, Duncan Gardham Security Correspondent
xvii
When the next trading sessions finally opened after the September 11th attacks (17th Sept.) the Dow Jones Industrial
Average fell by a record 684.71 points. See source (CNNMoney.com September 11th 2006) for a greater in depth analysis of
the five year difference
xviii
Source: P. Riddick, „War on Terror Study Skills“ sheet, update 10th June 2009
xix
„Private security companies, funded by billions of dollars in U.S. military and State Department Contracts” Source:
Washington Post, “Iraq Contractors Face Growing Parallel War”, June 16th 2007.
N.B After the killings of 17 innocent civilians by the Blackwater private security guard, U.S. security contractors
worldwide were made accountable under U.S. law.