Ambassador Lumumba Stanislaus Di-Aping

Summary of Comments 1

Specific Comments , ' 2

Preamble 2

The Copenhagen Agreement " 2

1. Shared Vision 2

II. Adaptation 3

III. Mitigation 4

Developed Countries' NAMCs 4

Developing Countries' NAMAs 5

REDD - 5

Bunkers , 5

Carbon Markets 6

IV. Technology 6

V. Financing 7

VI. MRV and Improved National Communications 8

MRV for Developed Countries 8

MRV for Developing Countries 8

The Registry " 8

Improved National Communications 8

VI. The Copenhagen Process 9

Summary of Comments

This is an extremely dangerous document for developing countries. It IS fundamentally a reworking of the UNFCCC's balance of obligations.

It does the following, among others:

• de facto merge the AWG- LeA and AWG- KP tracks;

• pushes for the negotiation of treaty instrument that may havejhe effec~mendini the UNFCCC's balance of obligations, or may have the effect of eventually killing off the Kyoto Protocol;

• creates new obligations for~~ing· coun.!ries with respect to mitigation, adaptation, protection of IPRs, and financing;

• it is very weak in terms of actually setting up financing and technology mechanisms that will ensure flows of" finance ana teclinofogy-ffom N ortb to South;

• creates a new sub-category of developing countries ('~poor and most

vulnerable"l;~. --~~

\.• it allocates a disproportionate share of the remaining carbon space up to 2050 for Annex I countries;

• it overturns the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities in the UNFCCC, and tries to treat developed and developing countries in the same way; and

• does not seem to reflect at all any of the key concepts and positions that the G77 and China have put forward since Bali.

Specific Comments

Paragraph Comments
2nd preamble This clause shows right away the intent to link the work and the
outcomes of the AWG-LCA and the AWG-KP - something that the
G77 and China has consistently opposed
3rd preamble There is no reference to the principle of equity which, in Art. 3.1
UNFCCC, goes hand in hand with the principle of CBDR
5th preamble There is no reference to developed countries having to take the lead as
referred to in Art. 3.1
6th preamble - This shows clear intent for negotiations to continue and eventually
continuing result in a ratifiable treaty outcome - i.e. a new UNFCCC protocol or a
negotiations "with a series of amendments to the UNFCCC that could essentially
view to agreeing on a reformulate the existing balance of obligations. This would be
comprehensive legal problematic because it could result in new treaty commitments or
framework under the obligations on developing countries. And if the "Copenhagen
Convention" Agreement" is to be any guide as to what the provisions of such a
"comprehensive legal framework" would be, this seems to be precisely
what the objective is.
The Copenhagen Agreement
Title - "The The title itself is problematic because it creates an expectation and an
Copenhagen impression that this document will eventually from the basis of and be
Agreement" reflected in a new treaty instrument
I. Shared Vision
2 - chapeau The chapeau of para. 2 is a mishmash of text from the UNFCCC's
operational and preambular provisions, as well as new language
coming mostly from developed countries.
2, first tiret - This is essentially a rewording of UNFCCC Art. 4.1(b), done in such a
"Commit to take way as would essentially commit developing countries to undertake
action to mitigate mitigation actions outside of the context of the balance of obligations
climate change based contained in Art. 4.3 and 4.7 vis-a-vis Art. 4.1(b).
on their common but
responsibilities and
2, second tiret - This rewords UNFCCC Art. 4.1(e), changing the common obligation
"Commit to take from one of cooperation to one of committing to undertake adaptation
action on adaptation action-s~Furtl1ermore, it creates an obligatIon-for neveloping countries
including . to provide adaptation financing lO"llie poorest ana most vulnerable
international ~m:eS", essenflally reformufiillng Art. 1:;l:.., which commits only
support assisting the Annex II developed countries to provide hnancing to "meet the costs':
poorest and most of developing countries (note: no prioritization among developing
vulnerable countries) in adapting to climate change. Finally, the phrase "Eoo~
countries" and most vulnerable countries" creates new sub-categories among
developing cm::iilfDesthat do not exist under the UNFCCC (wnetlier in
the preamEiIe or'Ill Ai9:-:-:r8 or 4:9)~~~--·--~·=--="~-~-~-~ 2

Paragraph Comments
2, third tiret- By avoiding a clear reference to the UNFCCC's financial._m!~.chanism,
"Commit to this text lays,the basis for the contID...ll~..d~_e.Yen_mQre.d.QillinanUQle
strengthen the of the World Bank, regional ~elop.!p...m.t banks,. and.~de.2cl.Qped
international coun~' bilateral-:channels;-as the prim~ conduits for climate
architecture for the financing from North to_ South -; This would weaken the UNFCCC F
provision of finaricial mechanism and would continue fcJma:intai~
substantially institufiOnal arrangerlle!its'-ort· climate financi~' tharth~7.:an:d
increased finance for China have so often and so consistently criticized.
climate efforts in
3 The reference to the "2 degrees C" temperature benchmark is no
- "not to exceed 2 longer scientifically accurate
degrees C"
. global emissions Only a to-year peaking period is provided for developing countries
peak "no later than (2010-2020), this is the implication in the phrase "acknowledging
[2020], that developed countries collectively have peaked"-i.e. since
acknowledging developed countries have peaked, any peaking that needs to be done
that developed by 2020 would have to be done by developing countries.
collectively have Finally, his paragraph must be read together with paragraph 17, in
peaked" which the text suggests developed countries to have a goal of reducing
- global emissions their aggregate emissions by "80% or more by 2050 versus 1990 (X3
reduction goal in percent versus 2005)." These two paragraphs essentially is the EU's
2050 "by at least and other developed countries' proposal for a long-term global goal of
50 percent versus 50% below 1990 levels by 2050, with Annex I countries to reduce their
1990 annual aggregate emissions by 80% below 1990 by 2050. What this proposal
emissions, essentially means is for global annual emj~"sio!!LtQ_g9. fro!D,.g,9 v, 7J)_
equivalent to at billiontons-m 199oleXcludrng"LULUCF and bunkers) to 1~85 billion
least 58% versus tons 1n2050,- wftI1Annex1-cotilltries to:J.~dy'~~jhf'iL .ig~~e
2005 annual e~!§?j2~~onf18-Ji@2~J9Q§l (19.9..o.119~3J:l_b.iUi.9Jl .J:PJJ·.§jgQS_Q) _~nd
emissions" therefo1:~ le<!Yil]Ji.~~~lopin~!!
- "long term approximately 11.7 billion tons in 1990 to 11.25 billiQ!Lt9.!lUn 205.fL.,
convergence of per But oy 2050TWl1ile-ffie average aggregate 2op'ulation in Annex.. I
capita emissions" countries IS expecteato remain stable at around 1.32 billion, the
popu'G.tio'll'01 developmg countries is projecteatCi grow-from 5.6
billioi'f'teJr'8D'iIlion. Tliis means tlierelore tliat in terms or~9l?ita~:
en1i's'st(j'f[s~A:ft:nerr countries -wfllactUaIIysfilf enjoy b-Y"2050. per ..
capita emissions of 2.67 tons (from 14.14 tons per capita in 2005, an
81.12% reduction from 2005 to 2050J. w1iIreaeve~ntries
wotirdSuDslst on 1-44 tons.pE c~pJ!a::Ctrom 3-49 t~~"~E.~~it~)n
2005, a 58.74% reduction from 2005 to 2050).
The phrase "long term convergence of per capita emissions", since it is
not linked to the achievement of developing countries' development
policies and objectives, prioritizes the undertaking of mitigation
actions by developing countries more than their achievement of
II. Adaptation
4 This paragraph essentially seems to be a blah-blah non-operational
paragraph designed to create the impression that developing
countries' adaptation needs are being taken seriously.
5 This paragraph bears out the assessment with respect to paragraph 4.
- "Support should be Also, this paragraph has problematic phraseology from the
provided with perspective of developing countries:
priority for the
poorest and most - the referen~J9_:IlQ.Qr.e&t and most vulnerable countries"
vulnerable seems aesigned to ~R!i~gorize developing
.. 3



- "institutional arrangements will be established over time to support Parties' actions and provide technical assistance"

- "A share offaststart financing comprising [$X] for 2010-12 will be provided through existing channels, including the Adaptation Fund"


countries in ways that are different from and not con§istent wnli-Uie'"way iii- which- VUinerability -aT develcipfni~~~ntries are ·""descrioea' un:aer ""UNFCt;-C' s-19th~ana"-'20th~ 'preamb-tii'ar paragrapl1san(r.Ait.'"'4.1rto~4,1o,· This reference to "poorest and most vulnerable" countries essentially creates a new subcategory of developing countries

- the reference to adaptation financing institutional arrangements that "will be established over time" essentially means that no such institutions will be established (i.e, the LDC and AOSIS pr~osals...iID!~ essen.§].XJe~tedY and that Art, 4-4 will not be effectively implemented

- the reference to the AdaRtation Fund (presumably the Kyoto Protocol's Adaptation Fund set up by the COP-MOP) shows two things: (i) a confusion as to what the KP Adaptation Fund is and what its sources of financing are (i.e, it being a SouthSouth solidarity fund for adaptation in developing countries, and that its sources of financing are from the 2% share of proceeds of CDM projects in developing countries); and (ii) it reflects as well the intent to mix up KP issues (e.g. the KP Adaptation Fund) with LCA issues on adaptation financing

III. Mitigation

6 - "nationally appropriate mitigation contributions to be carried out by the Parties"

This paragraph mixes up and treats developed countries' mitigation commitments under paragraph 1(b)(i) BAP with developing countries' mitigation actions under paragraph 1 (b)(ii) BAP - something that the G77 and China have consistently opposed as being inconsistent with the UNFCCC's distinction between developed countries' specific mitigation commitments under Art, 4.2 and the common commitment relating to mitigation actions under Art, 4,1(b) that is conditioned on the provision of agreed full incremental costs by developed countries under Art. 4.3

Developed Countries' NAMes

7 This paragraph shows the intent to create a Kyoto Protocol-we

- "Developed modalii)T'for establishlilg--mitigationcommitmeDts-for developed

country Parties cou'ilirieS':T.e:·settfng indivlau:a.ltarget;-~hic~~~Q~i(r1iiTefliQ1~d i~La

commit to table or schedlile:1'fifs-ls a illstoriion of paragraph l(b)(i) BAP, which

individual national is premiseaonAnnex I KP Parties making their mitigation

economy wide commitments under the KP's 2nd commitment period and therefore

targets for 2020, leaving paragraph l(b)(i) BAP as applying only for the US as the only

The targets in Annex I non-KP Party,

Attachment A would expect to yield aggregate emissions reductions by Xi percent by 2020 versus 1990"

- "The purchase of international offset credits will playa supplementary

role to domestic


- "reduce their greenhouse gas emissions in aggregate by 80% or more"

The reference to "offset credits" in this paragraph also is another example of mixing up KP issues with the LCA. This is a clear inclusion of developed countries' proposals in the LCA to have recourse to KPtype flex mex (such as mechanisms similar to the KP's CDM, JI, and emissions trading) under which they would not have to reduce domestically but instead purchase emissions credits through emissions trading or acquire emissions credits by getting/paying developing countries to do such reductions,


Attachment A is essentially an expanded version of Annex B of the KP,




in which are inscribed developed countries' individual economy-wide mitigation targets with some more information added as to how such targets would be achieved.

Taken together, both paragraphs 7 and 8 essentially create a KP-type framework for developed countries' mitigation commitments that could eventually allow Annex I Parties to the KP to "jump ship" and instead have their mitigation commitments be under the paragraph l(b)(i) BAP framework.


Developing Countries' NAMAs

The entire paragraph is problematic and dangerous for developing countries because:

- it rewords paragraph l(b)(ii) BAP by delinking the concept of NAMAs from its support (finance, technology, capacity building) components

- by such delinking, it creates a new mitigation obligation for developing countries

- it se.eks. to divide developing countries by exemIllinK.E.QID~ developJQg countrIes from such a new mlligation obl!gatioll

- the-reference to "[Y percent] deviation in [2020] from business as usual" clearly comes from the EU's proposal to have developing countries commit to a deviation of 15-30% from BAD in their emissions growth. This could mean, depending on the BAD used, not just a reduction in the rate of emissions growth but actual reductions in terms of overall aggregate emissions as compared to 2005 by at least 12% (using 30% and the lowest BAD) by 2020 (or essentially reducing developing countries' average per capita emissions from 3049 tons in 2005 to 2.54 tons in 202, a drop Of27.22%)

- the reference to "collective emissions peak before [20XX] must be read with paragraph 3, first tiret's reference to a global peak by "[2020]" - i.e. developing countries' emissions peak will be pegged to 2020


Attachment B essentially is the schedules approach suggested by Australia and supported by the US and the EU. It essentially establishes a mitigation commitment mechanism similar to what developed countries would have in terms of having specified quantitative mitigation targets.


The registry concept in paragraph 11 is not consistent with paragraph l(b)(ii) BAP in terms of the relationship between the NAMA and NAMA support and how these two components are to be MRVd:

- the G77 and China has consistently said in the paragraph l(b)(ii) negotiations that only NAMAs which are enabled and supported can be MRVd

- many developing countries have also said that only mitigation actions that developing countries voluntarily put forward for external funding and support under paragraph l(b)(ii) should be registered and, once support is provided, be subject to MRV; and that any unilateral mitigation actions would not be subject to MRV



By saying that "deve~oping countries should contribute to enhanced mitigation> actions through" RED rtandJn..s,p~.,! shQ..Uld be ...MRVable, thi~_~gra~lLey.en1llally-illy. the

fouIl,£ation .l2L a new REDD-ba~~gation obligation---.f.2!

developing countries as part of the outcomes of the post-COPls

negotIationprOcess:--"'- ." -- ....


The formulation of this paragraph is problematic for developing





countries because it establishes$.lobal .emissjQIl . rednction.targets-fos shipping and avianori--r e.g. reducing emissions from maritime transpoi.C.ifficnntemalionalaviation}.somethingthat_~._1L.!.ve medium-term and long-term economic imp!!! cmintneswnose economiesare Oej:Jeiia.ent or may become dependent on international trade. The priority in terms of reducing emissions from maritime transport and international aviation should be with respect to those taking place among developed countries (since most international trade was and currently still is between such developed countries) so as not to adversely affect South-South trade and economic relations, increase the transportation costs associated with developing countries' exports, and lessen the long-term competitiveness of developing countries

Carbon. Markets


This is another example of a KP issue making its way into the LCA. Carbon markets are speculative and is another way by which deveIope"'d-COi:i'ilf"rleswilID-e-aEle-ro'avoldmaklng-dOiTieSncreouctions at tne eXpense ofaeVelOp"inFCOiliitfles. .~.- .. "~.-

W. Technology


- "removal of barriers"

- "increased incentives to promote the development and dissemination of environmentally sustainable technologies"


. "respecting IPR regimes including protecting the legitimate interests of public and private innovators"

These phrases in this paragraph in relation to technology transfer can be very dangerous for developing countries in the context of their trade policies in relation to environmentally sustainable technologies. Developed countries always argue in the WTO th!lt the be~~.I~.!!y"!o u~¥rf3ketecl'in6Iozy'fransrerisfoFa.·evelOping cou~e~~,e:_o! eliminate tarIff and non-tariff barriers to environmentaf goods (most of wnfch are -g6oOslI1at devefOped countriesi-enterpnses export and hold the patents for and which developing countries generally do not). Additionally, the reference to "increased incentives" would refer to subSldleSthat may De -provi~vate sector"actors in·oraer to develOp and russeminate sUcI1TeCliilorogi~ agaii:l'SOiiietliing-fnat' developeaCciUri.trfeSJiaVe1he financial resources to aoand sonietliing that 'most developing countries do not. -~~-~~-.~- .. ~

This paragtapn, especlal1y tRe phrase highlighted, carries forward the strong IPR enforcement agenda that developed countries have consistently promoted in various other fora such as the WTO, the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO), the World Customs Organization (WCO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the Universal Postal Union CUPU), and the International Telecommunications Union (ITU). This IPR enforcement agenda has been just as consistently opposed and criticized by most developing countries in these various institutions.

Furthermore, the highlighted phrase itself establishes a much stronger normative standard with respect to IPR enforcement than even the WTO's Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). Whereas the TRIPS Agreement recognizes that IPR protection and enforcement must be subject to public policy objectives such as developmental objectives, social and economic welfare, and that the rights and obligations of IPR holders and users must have a balance and be to the mutual advantage of both (see e.g. TRIPS, 5th and 6th preambular clauses, Art. 7, Art. 8), the language in paragraph 18 of the "Copenhagen Agreement" stresses protecting the interests of IPR holders (i.e. the public and private innovators).

Finally, the paragraph does not provide for any concrete and operational modalities for effecting technology transfer, since it remains focused on viewing technology transfer as supporting research and development and demonstration projects, rather than as


actually embarking on transfers of technology that would lead to effective adoption, adaptation and subsequent innovation in the recipient country.


v. Financing


The references to "international financial architecture, "multiple sources" for financing, and "multiple bilateral and multilateral channels" for financing, all indicate that the UNFCCC's financiaL mechanism will not be the central player in climate financing; that the Worldl3aiil< and otlier instlIDtions preferred by developed countnes would remain to'l:lel1i:e pnmaryfiillii'iCing conauits; ana that climate financmg will continue tolJeOri-thTIasls of a dOllor-donee afd-=l5ased' relafiofiSlilP ·Cwl'llc1i woulO"1lierefore allow the DEeD-DACls andUie-VVorIaBaiik's standards on aid delivery to De ayulied to climate

financffiiU~ . -.-----.---


This paragraph completely turns UNFCCC Art. 4.7 around because . .iL ,.\ premises increased international public financial flows to developing .~.' ~ Q ) coutitnes-on"rlrebasrsOQRp.rop'riate-riicreaSes-~n"'riimga"fion- and'- ",rF l adapt8Iion effgrtsoy ~uountriE}s." Art. 4.7, on the otner

hand, premises developing countries' mitigation and adaptation

actions "on the effective implementation by developed country Parnes

of their commitments under the Convention related to financial

resources and transfer of technology."


The reference in this paragraph to "Parties confirm climate financing committed under this agreement as new amr-adruti'Oilaf resources" is an attempt to forestall any future arguments among the Parties as to whether such financing is, in fact, "new and additional" as required under Art. 4.3. In effect, it establishes an ex ante, a priori, conclusive determination by the Parties with respect to the "new and additional" financing concept even before such !!D . .lm!!.ing .. b1!~_ been provided.

' .......... '-'''. . _. -.----


The <J2:antum of public financing (amount to US_$.~erJ:hr.e.~. y~ar - 2010-2012 - or US$1O billion per year)~ falls far short of the range_ of estimates made by the UNFCCC Secretariat UNDP, UBDESA, the Stern Review,.1he G.zL1mQ. China, and other academlc and, the scale . .QLftnancing regy.iI.e...di1rllli;h. .. tend to run in the multiple tens to hundreds of billions of dollars per year).

Finally, the review to a regular review from 2013 with respect to the appropriateness of contributions and the circle of contributors shows the intent to expand the coverage of the climate financing obligation under Art. 4.3, 4-4 and 4.5 of the UNFCCC beyond Annex II developed country Parties. This regular review provision should be read in coniuction with paragraph 22.


This paragraph, when viewed in the context of the other paragraphs in relation to financing, seems designed to placate the G77 and China by showing that a new climate fund is being set up as an operating entjty of Q1~_JINFCC~fiE.,!!!~iaLrpffh1iI1~~~ .. !UJsl~r.~:A:rf. ··ii·.1Iowe~er, . the .. intent to limit therole and scope of the Fund is clear in the reference in "this paragraph lnanne ··Fiiucrm aycnan-rieF its ·flilimdng"ihrou-gh mulfifiiterarffiSfitutl6lis or-directly to -iiiitioii'aI ·eii.flfi~nru;eji~on

agreed criteria." ~ ~,,-~-~,~--..

The reference in this paragraph to "Parties commit to allocate an initial amount of [$X] to the Fund as p~·o{1~il}t~rn<;j1'[nalj)jj.plic fitla~!J"'seems-f(r1ie~'inteiiuo-nally crafted in an ambiguous way so that it can refer to both, <:!.e~el~p~d.'Pd developing country Parties. Take note that paragraph 21, second tiret, already introduced


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the concept and possibility of having non-Annex II Parties be also subject to provide climate financing.


The International Climate Financing Board concept in this paragraph seems to be a spin -off from the EU's proposal for a High- Level Forum on International Climate Finance.


VI. MRVandImprouedNational Communications

The reference to a facilitative matching mechanism is a reference to the EU's proposal for such a mechanism

26 This paragraph is dangerous because it implies that MRV modalities would be common, at least in terms of nature or "robustness", with respect both developed and developing countries. It erases the distinction in terms of MRV that exists with respect to MRV of developed countries' mitigation commitments under paragraph 1(b)(0 BAP and the MRV of both developing countries' NAMAs and their corre~onding s~ort under Qara~raphl(b)(ii) BAP

MRV for Developed Countries

27 The last sentence of this paragraph stating that "provision of international public climate financing should be verified in conjunction with the MRV of supported action and according to international guidelines" is problematic because:

- it pegs overall climate financing (and verification of such financing) to the NAMAs under paragraph l(b)(ii) EAP and their corresponding financing support that would be subjected to MRV. That is, paragraph l(b)(ii) BAP NAMAs of developing countries become the basis for determining and verifying the overall amount of climate financing provided rather than having the paragraph l(b)(ii) NAMAs be only a component part of all the other UNFCCC-related actions that should be funded by developed countries pursuant to UNFCCC Art. 4,3, 4A, 4·5 and 4· 7·

MRV for Developing Countries

28 This paragraph is couched in mandatory language - i.e. establishing a new obligation for developing countries.

The last sentence is problematic because iLcr:~m:es l!..neYi-o.hligation for develcipiIlg"CountrTest6--ais§.)irR~_-~e~UtiL~tiOjlJJ..l level; and subjectttrinterrratiortally agreed guidelines, their unilatera] mitigation actions and then have such unilateral mitigation a~i911S be subjected to a "consul'tat"ive: ~eYi:~w under the UNFCCC." This creates a ~r:~'{Y obli@.lli>_n'because under the UNFCCC, while developing countries are required to submit national communications, such communications are not reviewed on a national basis by the SBI but rather, under Art. 1O.2(a), only with respect to their aggregate effects (i.e, all developing countries' national communications to be taken together with those of developed countries to determine what their overall aggregate effect in terms of meeting; the UNFCCC objective is).

The Registry

29 This is problematic because it separates the mechanism that is supposed to MRV the provision of climate finance from the UNFCCC financial mechanism. It would weaken the UNFCCC financial mechanism by delinking it from ''lll!'uf:rp-6ftan'tcOfiipofienfOfcliffiii'i:e fimiiicing - flTIit onimmcirlg~fofNAIVfAs lin'defparagrapni·tDKliTBAP

Improved National Communications

30, first and second The formulation of these two tirets are problematic because they

tirets essentially cancel out the differentiation between national communications of Annex I and non-Annex I Parties under Art. 12.1 and 12.2 of the UNFCCC. Furthermore, there is no reference to UNFCCC Art. 4.3 anyway in this paragraph, which omission is crucial




because Art. 4,3 conditions the submission by developing countries of their national communications under Art. 12.1 to the provision by developed countries of agreed full cost financing to developing countries for the latter's preparation of their national communications.

30, third tiret

This puts in a new reporting obligation on all Parties that do not currently exist under UNFCCC Art. 121.1, 12.2 and 12.3. For developing countries, this is particularly problematic because this tiret is essentially seeking the submission of economy-wide mitigation and energy policy plans or frameworks as a condition for developing countries being able to obtain support for their NAMAs under paragraph 1(b )(U) - this is the implication of the phrase "these plans will help facilitate access to support for mitigation actions anchored in the plans."

30, fourth tiret

This tiret is not linked to the UNFCCC financial mechanism, when ideally, in fact, having statistics relating to climate finance should be part and parcel of what the mechanism's operating entity should be doing,

30, fifth tiret

This paragraph would be problematic because it would do away with the current differentiation in treatment between Annex I national communications and non-Annex I national communications. By having just a single expert body to consider both Annex I and nonAnnex I communications, this paragraph would de facto force a common methodology for assessing Annex I and non-Annex I national communications despite the fact that the UNFCCC clearly specifies that these are to be treated and assessed differently using different methodologies, parameters and ~ocesses.

31, first tiret

The phrase "with a view to agreeing on a comprehensive legal framework under the Convention" as the objective of post-COPIS negotiations can only mean one thing - that the outcome of the postCOPIS process is already prejudged as having to result in an instrument that would be a treaty in nature and legal effect subject to Parties' ratification or accession processes,

31, second tiret

VI. The Copenhagen Process


This creates a "built-in agenda" beginning in 2014 for a review and, if needed, amendment or overhaul ofthe UNFCCC'sjlTovisions.

The reference to parties committing to "work together in international organizations, including international financial institutions" is

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