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A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College In Partial Fulfillment of the of the Requirements for The Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN APPLIED INTELLIGENCE
DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES MERCYHURST COLLEGE ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA OCTOBER 2009
DEPARTMENT OF INTELLIGENCE STUDIES MERCYHURST COLLEGE ERIE, PENNSYLVANIA
A STUDY INTO THE SIZE OF THE WORLD’S INTELLIGENCE INDUSTRY
A Thesis Submitted to the Faculty of Mercyhurst College In Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for The Degree of MASTER OF SCIENCE IN APPLIED INTELLIGENCE
Certificate of Approval: ___________________________ Kristan J. Wheaton Associate Professor Department of Intelligence Studies
___________________________ James G. Breckenridge Chair/Assistant Professor Department of Intelligence Studies ___________________________ Phillip J. Belfiore Vice President Office of Academic Affairs October 2009
Copyright © 2009 by Christian Hippner All rights reserved.
I would like to thank my primary reader, Kristan Wheaton, for his creativity, found throughout this product. I would also like to thank Carl Hippner for his assistance in interpretation. Finally, I would like to acknowledge Cole Davis for his technical assistance and motivation, despite having a two o’clock meeting.
ABSTRACT OF THE THESIS A Study into the Size of the World’s Intelligence Industry By Christian Hippner Master of Science in Applied Intelligence Mercyhurst College, 2009 Professor Kristan J. Wheaton, Chair
[This thesis determines the approximate size of the world’s intelligence industry in quantitative terms. It reviews existing literature which describes, in qualitative terms, various themes found about intelligence agencies around the world. The thesis provides a quantitative method to estimate unknown intelligence spending and personnel. The study concludes that the world’s intelligence industry spends approximately 106 billion United States Dollars, and employs about one million people. Furthermore, the hypothesized direct correlation between Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and intelligence spending may exist, but the research does not strongly support the assertion. It is apparent that GDP is a factor when it comes to intelligence spending, but it does not seem to be the primary component.]
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page COPYRIGHT PAGE ........................................................................................................ iii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS .............................................................................................. iv ABSTRACT ........................................................................................................................v TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................. vi LIST OF TABLES .......................................................................................................... viii LIST OF FIGURES .......................................................................................................... ix CHAPTER 1 INTRODUCTION ............................................................................................ 1 2 LITERATURE REVIEW ................................................................................. 4 Information Gap ........................................................................................ 4 Comparative Studies in Intelligence ......................................................... 7 Self-Reporting Countries ......................................................................... 14 Systematic Studies of Intelligence .......................................................... 16 3 METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................... 21 Data Collection ........................................................................................ Collection from Internet Sources ................................................. Collection from Other Sources ................................................... Other Relevant Information Collection ...................................... Establishing Webpage Credibility .......................................................... Process for Estimating Unknown Spending ........................................... Process for Estimating Unknown Personnel ........................................... Standardizing Spending Units ................................................................. Standardizing Personnel Definitions ....................................................... 22 23 27 28 28 29 30 31 32
4 RESULTS ........................................................................................................ 33 The Totals: Spending ............................................................................... The Totals: Personnel ............................................................................. Other Extracted Results .......................................................................... Summary of Results ................................................................................ 33 40 46 50
5 CONCLUSION ............................................................................................... 53 vi
BIBLIOGRAPHY ........................................................................................................... 63 APPENDICES ................................................................................................................ 75 Appendix A: Websites You Can Trust ............................................................... 76 Appendix B: Intelligence Spending Sorted Highest to Lowest ........................... 77 Appendix C: Data for Individual Countries......................................................... 80
LIST OF TABLES
Page Table 4.1 Table 5.1 Affect of US on Estimating List of Journals, Newsletters, and Other Relevant Database Productions Outcome of Assuming Intelligence Spending and GDP is Linear or Exponential 39 56
LIST OF FIGURES
Page Figure 4.1 Figure 4.2 Figure 4.3 Figure 4.4 Figure 4.5 Figure 4.6 Figure 4.7 Figure 4.8 Total World Intelligence Spending Top Ten Percent Intelligence Spending Intelligence Spending Sorted Largest to Smallest Total Intelligence Employment Geographic Position of Top Intelligence Employers Top 21 Intelligence Employers Comparing Intelligence Spending Per Person Bottom 90 Percent Employment vs. Top Ten Percent Employment Countries with Top Spending and Employment Histogram of Intelligence Employment Histogram of Source Credibility Affect of a Linear Relationship Assumption on Intelligence Spending (US Not Included) Countries with Known Intelligence Spending with Trend Lines (US Not Included) 33 34 37 40 42 42 43 44
Figure 4.9 Figure 4.10 Figure 4.11 Figure 5.1
45 45 50 61
This thesis is about intelligence in national security.
Since the Treaty of
Westphalia every nation-state has had concerns about its national security, however defined. The role of intelligence is one that supports policymakers, military
commanders, and nation as a whole. Describing the actual process of intelligence is the subject of many books, reports, and theoreticians. Although the traditional view of intelligence encapsulates its activities as a cylindrical process, new conceptual models tend to structure it around a collaborative targeted process. Regardless of how one wants views what is intelligence, this thesis is about those engaged in it as a whole. Intelligence as field of employment dates back to biblical days, when Moses sent 12 men to the land of Canaan in order to, See what the land is like: whether the people who dell in it are strong or weak, few or many; whether the land they dwell in is good or bad; whether the cities they inhabit are like camps or strongholds; whether the land is rich or poor; and whether there are forests there or not.1 Moses is a decision maker who wants to know everything that may be relevant, as his tasking implies. He asks for reports on the economic, military, and social situation of Canaan. While this passage is infamous in some intelligence communities, Sun-Tzu’s writings may resonate in others. With the relatively few exceptions, the subject of how to finance the collection of intelligence is generally missing. Collection systems, or in Moses’ case human operators, require adequate funding to be successful. It is
Numbers 13:18-20 (New King James Version).
2 unimaginable that Moses sent 12 men “who were heads of the children of Israel” without food or other provisions.2 Yet discussion regarding this subject is absent. If intelligence requires funding, like the rest of the national security establishment, then every nation must allocate a budget. Various studies aiming to estimate national defense spending already exist. Some countries issue so-called white papers, while research institutions, such as the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) and the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), have elaborate methodologies to determine the spending of countries that do not self-report. While each entity has a particular estimate regarding the world’s spending on defense, none have ventured into a more nuanced subset of national security – intelligence. This thesis is a study to determine the approximate size of the world’s national intelligence industry. It uses two separate indicators to determine size. The first
indicator is intelligence spending by individual nations. The second indicator of size is intelligence personnel under employment by individual nations. For the purposes of this study, the components of the intelligence industry are, broadly speaking, services or agencies that are direct divisions of a recognized government. Understanding the size of the world's intelligence industry is significant for three reasons. First, there is no existing study with the purpose of discovering the approximate size of the global intelligence industry. Second, understanding its size can be useful for allocating resources by US intelligence agencies. Third, knowing the size of the world's intelligence industry would be helpful to educational institutions for their own planning. As the intelligence studies field grows, knowing the relative level of demand for professionals in this market will likely support these institutions in recruiting practices.
Numbers 13:3 (New King James Version).
3 To that end, a comprehensive and quantitative study is necessary. Although there are numerous smaller studies that focus on certain regions or nations, they all fit into the realm of qualitative discussions. While they add to the body of literature for this field, they fall short of exploring the “human resources” aspect. The study could also assist in training institutions’ recruitment by indicating the job market that exists for intelligence professionals. Determining the size of the world’s intelligence industry is also relevant for practitioners. A study of this nature would give a national intelligence community
another method to benchmark their performance, as well as assist in future planning. Knowing the relative size of other nations’ capabilities can result in more efficient resource allocation or support new hiring practices. There are certain limitations to this study. First, it does not intend to study the organizational structure of an intelligence community of a given country. It simply wants to determine an amount spent by that community. Second, governments are not always willing to publish such data and if they do, it may be intentionally inaccurate. This study can and will make the most accurate and conservative estimates as possible. A person can delve deep into government publications and other primary data for years in an attempt to determine a single precise answer. This is unnecessary due to the scale of the study – the individual numbers are more likely in the hundreds of millions of dollars, meaning that the impact of relatively few dollars is negligible. Third, for many countries there is no existing information at all. This study estimates these figures using a process described in Chapter 3, and then presents its findings in Chapter 4.
4 LITERATURE REVIEW
There are a limited number of comprehensive studies into the world’s different intelligence systems and agencies. Most studies on the topic of national intelligence communities are qualitative in nature. They explore a variety of intelligence related topics, such as structure and oversight, but few actually engage in describing their subject in quantitative terms. The following literature review has four sections. The first section briefly discusses why there are few systematic studies describing intelligence in quantitative terms. The second section discusses the different comparative studies of intelligence systems. The third section examines countries with self-reported data, their relevance, and their drawbacks. The fourth and final section looks at the existing
attempts to systematically document different intelligence communities.
Information Gap There are no comprehensive studies analyzing the total spending of the world’s different intelligence organizations, or are there studies indicating their accumulated size. One argument against the systematic study of intelligence is that the systems in different countries are not comparable. In the words of author Michael Warner, “both inside and outside scholars have sought to compare and contrast intelligence disciplines and organizations across multiple national experiences and time periods. Unfortunately, this is not yet possible to do in a systematic manner”.3 This mindset is perhaps the primary reason for the lack of research into these matters. However, arguing that a transnational quantitative comparison is not possible hinges on faulty assumptions.
Michael Warner, “Sources and Methods for the Study of Intelligence,” in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, ed. Lock K. Johnson (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 25.
5 The argument assumes that the functions, roles, and missions of intelligence organizations are inconsistent in international situations and cannot be categorized. Notable intelligence scholar Loch K. Johnson argues against this point, saying that there are basic common features found in all national intelligence apparatuses. According to Johnson, there are three basic activities of these governmental entities – collection and analysis, covert action, and counterintelligence.4 He argues that these three activities are universally found in all national intelligence systems, regardless of the security environment surrounding the country. This point seems to echo in the writings of Marina Caprini, a theoretician on security-sector reform, who says that “within government, intelligence has come to be thought of as comprising four main activities: collection, analysis and estimates, counterintelligence and covert action”.5 At the heart of the three activities, Johnson argues, is national wealth – Gross Domestic Product (GDP).6 Johnson would likely argue that the security situation around a nation impacts intelligence spending less than its national wealth. Of wealthy nations, he says, Because of the breadth of their concerns, not even expenditures in the range of $35 billion a year (the widely reported figure for U.S. intelligence in 2002-2003) can offer transparency for the entire globe – especially when adversaries choose to conceal their schemes and weapons systems in deep underground caverns, with camouflage, or by other methods of stealth to avoid the prying lens of satellite cameras orbiting above them. In contrast, the intelligence objectives of smaller nations are much more limited, say, to a single region or even a solitary enemy. Some may view this paradox as self-evident, but comparisons of the intelligence systems of different countries are often made without taking into account the differences in their funding abilities and targeting needs.7
Loch Johnson, “Bricks and Mortar for a Theory of Intelligence,” Comparative Strategy. 22, no. 1 (2003): 1. 5 Marina Caparini, “Controlling and Overseeing Intelligence Services in Democratic States,” in Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephant, ed. Hans Born and Marina Caparini (England: Ashgate, 2007), 5. 6 Loch Johnson, “Bricks and mortar for a Theory of Intelligence,” Comparative Strategy 22, no. 1 (2003): 22-23. 7 Ibid, 3.
Outside of national wealth, Johnson argues that other attributes are necessary for successfully implementing these activities, such as focused targeting, all-source synergism, and strong communication.8 These activities are important, but they are a result of three basic features, collection and analysis, covert action, and
counterintelligence. The ultimate goal of these activities is to reduce the level uncertainty for the decision-maker. The end goal for national intelligence agencies is also inherently For instance, law They collect and
different from other governmental entities with similar features. enforcement bodies often engage in Johnson’s three basic actives.
analyze crime statistics in order to identify problems and determine the best preventative measures.9 They engage in undercover operations, as well as establish security measures to prevent the dissemination of sensitive information. In short, many law enforcement agencies engage in intelligence. However, the purpose of having a law enforcement agency is to enforce laws, while its end goal is to facilitate crime and problem reduction.10 Nevertheless, the primary attribute for the successful implementation of Johnson’s activities is national wealth, suggesting that only wealthy nations have large, integrated, intelligence systems. Yet Johnson is quick to admit that there are some exceptions to his
Ibid. Veronica Coleman and others, "Using Knowledge and Teamwork to Reduce Crime," National Institute of Justice Journal 241, (1999): 18-20, http://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/jr000241d.pdf. 10 Jerry H. Ratcliffe, "Intelligence-led policing: Anticipating Risk and Influencing Action," in press 2009, 3, http://jratcliffe.net/papers/Ratcliffe%20(draft)%20ILPAnticipating%20risk%20and%20influencing%20action.pdf.
7 theory.11 He points to Russia as an example, saying while it may maintain a large intelligence service, it is not an affluent nation.12 Johnson’s conceptual framework seems to suggest an observable correlation exists between a nation’s wealth and the size of its intelligence community. If this is true, further research is necessary to test Johnson’s assertion that national wealth, GDP, determines the limits of intelligence activity. While most authors tend to focus
intelligence issues such as oversight, democratic control, and the significance of 9/11, Johnson’s assertion is measurable in quantitative terms. His assertion is not only
quantitative but free from cultural biases. The next section reviews existing comparative studies of intelligence, which are predominately qualitative in nature.
Comparative Studies in Intelligence There are several ways existing comparative studies describe different intelligence systems. The first section here describes intelligence in the context of the Cold War, the second section describes intelligence through the lens of the Civil-Military Relations (CMR) model, and the third section describes intelligence from the nonwestern perspective. Common themes exist throughout all three sections, for instance, all of the authors use a case-study format to compare intelligence systems. Each case-study uses narratives and qualitative information to describe intelligence communities – another theme in all three sections – and also tend to focus on research at the national level. There are several reasons to conduct comparative studies of intelligence communities. According to Peter Gill, conducting comparative studies allows one to “find out about
Loch Johnson, “Bricks and mortar for a Theory of Intelligence,” Comparative Strategy 22, no. 1 (2003): 15. 12 Ibid.
8 one’s own country through the study of others”.13 He adds that comparative studies also allow for the generalized classification of data.14 Beginning to classify data is the
intuitive starting point towards quantification. While comparative studies of intelligence are steadily increasing, they are not a new phenomenon. One example, written 1985, is Walter Laqueur’s A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence. Laqueur compares the intelligence systems in “open
societies” and the Soviet Union during the Cold War.15 He compares these entities in order to identify differences between the western world and Soviet bloc. Laqueur’s writings on open societies tend focus on the relationship between intelligence producers and consumers in the United States, United Kingdom, Germany, and Israel.16 He
arranges each chapter consistently, initially providing a brief overview of the national intelligence community, and then he gives examples of their interactions with civilian authorities. He also compares the performance of the intelligence communities by
addressing issues such as the inefficient bureaucracies within some large agencies, and analyzing the public’s perception of the intelligence community’s activities.17 Wellwritten, well-thought out, Laqueur gives a critical analysis of intelligence in open societies, but his method of comparative studies does not venture beyond qualitative research. Laqueur approaches Soviet intelligence from a slightly different angle. He looks at Soviet intelligence from a historical perspective, first describing its revolutionary roots,
Peter Gill, “Knowing the Self, Knowing the Other: The Comparative Analysis of Security Intelligence,” in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, ed. Lock K. Johnson (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 83. 14 Ibid. 15 Walter Laqueur, A World of Secrets: The Uses and Limits of Intelligence (New York: Basic Books, 1985), 201-251. 16 Ibid, 201. 17 Ibid, 228, 231.
9 then moving to its most recent structure.18 He describes the relationship between the Soviet Union and the other communist nations as unequal, where the smaller nations tend to aid the Soviets.19 Laqueur’s historical approach is different than his methods used to compare the various open societies. The dichotomy in approaches makes it difficult to have a transnational comparison. One example is his description of the Soviet Union’s intelligence structure – he focuses more on the weaknesses in their operations, rather than comparing different agencies to one another.20 While he explains in some length about the relationship between intelligence producers and consumers in open societies, he glazes over the subject when writing about the Soviet system. Instead, his focus remains more on its historical development and current defects.21 Other comparative studies use the Civil-Military Relations (CMR) model to compare intelligence communities. Scholar Robert Jervis says the role of intelligence is the “missing dimension” in international relations and advocates using the CMR model.22 There are some interesting parallels between CMR studies and other studies analyzing relations between civilian authorities and intelligence services. According to Jervis, the general view of intelligence services and militaries is that they “should be strong, efficient, and professionalized, but on the other hand they should not set their own goals and they must respond to civilian authority…We want the military and intelligence to be
Ibid, 233-248. Ibid, 249-250. 20 Ibid, 248-252. 21 There are a number of writings on the defects of the Soviet intelligence apparatus and Laqueur’s discussion is not entirely out of context. A more recent writing on this subject comes from Michael Herman in Intelligence Services in the Information Age. Herman discusses the role of the intelligence services in under Stalin and how their assessments were intentionally subjective. This continued after Stalin and exemplifies one difference between western intelligence and non-western intelligence. See Michael Herman, Intelligence Services in the Information Age (Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass Publishers, 2001), 16-19. 22 Robert Jervis, “Intelligence, Civil-Intelligence Relations, and Democracy,” in Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2007), xix.
10 under civilian control but also to resist illegitimate orders”.23 Studies using the CMR analogy generally fall into two broad categories, intelligence in modern democracies and intelligence in emerging democracies. The overall focus in each category is how to increase democratic civilian control over the intelligence organization of a given country.24 Democratic civilian control is possible by giving legal oversight authority to the executive, legislative, or judicial branches of government. According to authors Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau, a favorite oversight mechanisms used by governmental bodies is budgetary review.25 They argue that in modern democracies, executive bodies exercise budgetary control through advisory departments, such as the Office of Management and Budget (OMB).26 However, they are clear that budgetary review is not the only oversight tool at the disposal of the executive bodies. Boraz and Bruneau both agree that legislative bodies are able to control intelligence activities through budgetary control and fund allocation.27 Legislative bodies accomplish budgetary oversight by establishing oversight and appropriations committees.28 The CMR model analyzes
intelligence spending as a way to keep these organizations under the control of elected officials, and ultimately to learn about the effective practices of well-performing nations. However, these comparative case studies tend to introduce a certain level of Western-bias into their methods. This creates two problems. The first is whether or not a nation is measurably democratic. For countries conceptualized as undemocratic, the
Ibid, xiii. Steven Boraz and Thomas Bruneau, “Best Practices: Balancing Democracy and Effectiveness,” in Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz (Austin, Texas: University of Texas Press, 2007), 331. 25 Ibid, 14. 26 Ibid, 30 27 Ibid, 15. 28 Ibid, 45.
11 national intelligence system is automatically exempt from study. If the goal is to observe how various democratic nations maintain or create civilian control over their intelligence services, countries such as China or Burma, which are generally seen as undemocratic, cannot be studied for comparison. The likely underpinning argument for this point-ofview is that civilian control is desirable. The second problem addresses the subjectivity of what is desirable. Civilian control is desirable for whom? Iran has a standardized election process, yet would the West prefer to deal with the Supreme Council or the former Shah? If the ultimate purpose of using the CMR model to study national intelligence systems is to learn how to increase civilian control, then it is preferable to study Iran under the Supreme Council. Using CMR as model creates the assumption that more civilian control is a good thing (the researcher is inclined to agree). However, the Western bias that enters into these studies results in inappropriate comparisons. These comparisons may include budgetary reviews to satisfy the old adage “follow the money” but not to study transnational spending patterns. A third body of comparative literature might counter cultural bias, as it attempts to gather knowledge about non-western intelligence systems. This literature comes from native contributors and it provides descriptions of the strategic intelligence environment of a non-Western country.29 According to one author, the primary purpose for this accumulated research is to, Provide some counterweight to the liberal democratic domination of the literature, especially Anglo-American. Specifically…it is important to describe and analyze a wider range and variety of national intelligence systems in order to counter any simplistic assumptions that Anglo29
Peter Gill, introduction to the PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches, vol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson et al (London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 1.
12 American models provide a reliable guide to present or, necessarily, future arrangements elsewhere.30 As the quote suggests, studying other intelligence systems can allow for greater selfinspection, may result in empirical material suitable for comparison, and can counter the biases built into the CMR model.31 However, these studies are generally inconsistent in the intelligence attributes they analyze. Some of these studies describe the internal structure of an intelligence system, while others discuss issues relating to civilian oversight. In short, Laqueur’s problems manifest themselves once again, only now it is in a multi-polar world. Some of these studies are subsections of defense sector reviews – likely a result of their publishing venues. For instance, Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan write about the military forces of nation-states in the Persian Gulf.32 Their study reviews nine countries, each of which includes a section titled “Paramilitary, Security, Police, and Intelligence Forces”.33 These sections include a brief biographical background along with limited quantitative data. Yet, many of these defense sector reviews tend to
emphasize the military aspect over the intelligence component. An example of a robust defense review is The Middle East Military Balance: 2000-2001, edited by Shai Feldman and Yiftah Shapir. The review gives a weapons inventory for twenty-one Middle East countries.34 The authors provide general information about individual economic and
Ibid. This point is articulated by Peter Gill, although he does indicate what “material” can produce empirical data. See Peter Gill, “Knowing the Self, Knowing the Other: The Comparative Analysis of Security Intelligence,” in Handbook of Intelligence Studies, ed. Lock K. Johnson (London and New York: Routledge, 2007), 83. 32 See Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars (Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2007). 33 Ibid. 34 Shai Feldman and Yiftah Shapir, eds., The Middle East Military Balance: 2000-2001 (Massachusetts: MIT Press, 2001).
13 arms procurement programs for each country – only after which do they give an order-ofbattle for each military branch. Exploring countries in such a comprehensive manner allows the authors to create international benchmarks and compare levels of military prowess. Studies this detailed are not present in the current body of comparative studies of intelligence. Another example of a defense sector review with a subsection on intelligence is Jane’s Information Group. Its Sentinel Country Risk Assessment Library attempts to provide a comprehensive list of entities related to every nation’s security apparatus. It is a very valuable resource for those looking to obtain quick and general information about the security situation in a country. For many nations, the library is also successful in identifying their various intelligence agencies. While the information most pertinent to this study comes from Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment Library, the majority of the company’s intelligence related information is in Jane’s Intelligence Review and Intelligence Weekly – albeit in qualitative form. While some comparative studies discuss the interaction within the described national intelligence system, others provide a detailed account of the weapon systems in possession of each country. Each provides a response in a narrative format. As with all comparative studies, there is a certain measure of variance between each observed country. According to Peter Gill, the variance in national approaches reflects the
conditions of the individual nation itself.35 In western democracies, writers tend to describe intelligence as something in need of reform, whereas in non-western nations,
Peter Gill, introduction to the PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches, vol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson et al. (London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 15.
14 they are entities to support the ruling party.36 Nevertheless, these contributors add to the comparative body of intelligence studies, although, they are a reflection of the qualitative approach.
Self-Reporting Countries One body of literature relative to this thesis consists of countries opting to publish information about their individual intelligence organizations and programs. Although uncommon in most of the world, self-reporting can provide a wealth of information. Self-reporting countries can provide unique views of those within the intelligence establishment, as well as insight on the organization’s operations or how they interact with top decision-makers. It gives other qualitative information about their internal arrangements, decision-making process, and other data that is also useful for comparative research. Specifically, self-reporting countries are important to this thesis because they contain budgetary and workforce data. Quantitative data is necessary to create a Thus, this
benchmark and begin creating estimates in any study with unknowns.
quantitative data allows the study to estimate unknown intelligence spending and personnel – the explanation of this process is in Chapter 3. There are various reasons why a country would publish its intelligence community’s budgetary and personnel data. Some countries report their intelligence budgets because of their own rules and regulations, generally in an attempt to provide oversight. The US is an example of a country which requires its intelligence community to regularly report its budget. Yet there are some drawbacks to how it reports. For
15 instance, reporting the intelligence budget does not occur on an annual or semi-annual basis, only periodically with no set schedule. Infrequent and irregular reporting is a problem for researchers attempting to create a trend analysis for a case study. Fortunately, this study is not trying to analyze spending at the individual country level, and therefore the most recent published data ought to suffice. The US also demonstrates another problem with self-reported budgetary data. In previous reported amounts, the US exempted the budget for the Military Intelligence Program (MIP). Created in 2005, the MIP represents all intelligence spending under the Department of Defense.37 Similar defense programs – such as the Tactical Intelligence and Related Activities (TIARA) – formerly encompassed the department’s spending, and were not disclosed.38 Excluding part of the total intelligence budget is a common
problem. When nations do report their intelligence spending, it tends to only represent certain programs or agencies. Nevertheless, the solution to this problem usually requires more research. The obvious problem with reporting individual programs – or agencies – is that it becomes a bit more complex in counting, or more specifically, ensuring that none are absent from the total. Canada is one example. Although it is not legally required, each agency includes a budget within its own annual report. These reports usually discuss operations, ability to meet customer demands, and budgetary data. While much of the qualitative information here assists this thesis by ensuring the agency meets Johnson’s conceptual framework, it does not identify other agencies or programs. To be sure that
Congressional Research Service, “Intelligence Issues for Congress," US Library of Congress, Order Code IB10012, May 9, 2006, 6, http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/66506.pdf. 38 Ibid.
16 one identified the correct number of intelligence entities, secondary sources must be consulted. These problems are not unique to financial matters. Indeed, similar problems exist with sources that report on personnel. One example is Japan, which publishes a lot of information on their intelligence establishment. However, the Land of the Rising Sun has five distinct intelligence agencies – which apparently do not report to a single oversight entity. The end result is that, while information exists about the employment practices of the Japanese intelligence agencies, it becomes somewhat difficult to correctly identify each one and find its total personnel. Nevertheless, the nations that do self-report intelligence data are valuable to this study. While the reports are sometimes dense and qualitative, the quantitative data – budgets and personnel figure – are like golden nuggets of information. In many cases, reporting these figures is a matter of legality, while others report simply due to agency practice. This body of literature, nations which opt to publish quantitative data, is far from being universal – most are generally considered part of Western society. Regardless, the geographical spread of self-reporting nations is worldwide.
Systematic Studies of Intelligence Despite the lack of comprehensive quantitative research, there are two prominent studies attempting to catalog the world’s intelligence agencies. Each study has
substantial benefits and provides a solid starting point for quantitative research. However, each study approaches cataloging their information by using different methods. Uniformity between these studies is certainly lacking. Before discussing them further, it
17 is important to briefly review the suitability of using a comparative case study design for large-scale projects. According to Michael Collier, Director of Research at Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center, the purpose for conducting comparative studies is to identify variance among the measured attributes.39 Measuring variance allows the observer to identify diversity and determine how different attributes may result in the same outcome. He says, Often qualitative and quantitative analysis tools are used incorrectly in comparative studies…the goal or strategy of comparative research is to discover diversity among cases. Quantitative methods assume that all causal factors (independent variables) work the same against the outcome factor (dependent variable) being explained. In comparative analysis, it is assumed that there is more than one causal path to the same outcome.40 Collier points out that comparative research identifies diversity and only can apply to a moderate number of case studies, say 50 or so.41 For studies with more than 50 cases, the researcher must move away from the comparative case study format and use statistical methods.42 One project that uses the comparative case study design to systematically catalog national intelligence communities is Brassey’s International Intelligence Yearbook by Robert Henderson. Henderson attempts to create a comprehensive list of intelligence agencies in 50 countries.43 Brassey’s Yearbook “is intended to provide such a
background reference guide”.44 For the purposes of comparison, this “reference guide”
Michael Collier, “A Pragmatic Approach to Developing Intelligence Analysts,” Defense Intelligence Journal, 14, no. 2 (2005), 22. 40 Ibid, 26. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 Robert Henderson, Brassey’s International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC: Brassey’s Inc, 2003). 44 Ibid, x
18 structures its information into two broad categories, country briefings and countries studies. For each country Henderson compares the following attributes:45 System of Government National Intelligence Community National Security Legislation Intelligence Oversight International Intelligence Relationships Recent activities
Both categories, country studies and country briefings, contain a section of each listed attribute. However, each country lacks completeness and uniformity in its data. For example, Henderson’s Costa Rican country study says of intelligence oversight, “Reportedly, there is a Legislative Assembly Committee with responsibility for legislative review of the security and police forces”.46 This brief description includes only the name of the legislative body and their technical area of oversight. Henderson does not explain the historical context of the country’s intelligence oversight, officials charged with overseeing intelligence agencies, or the source for this information. This is a marked difference from the next country study, Estonia. For intelligence oversight, Henderson includes the name of the oversight authorities, the historical run-up to the current system, notable oversight figures, and the source of the information.47 While Henderson lacks uniformity in completeness of each predetermined attribute, he effectively creates a reference guide for future studies. His goal is not to create a methodologically correct book of case studies. Henderson wants to provide future researchers with a starting point. As a result, many of his country studies contain relevant information pertinent to this thesis.
Ibid, xi Robert Henderson, Brassey’s International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC: Brassey’s Inc, 2003), 248. 47 Ibid, 258-259.
19 Another study attempting to catalog the world’s intelligence agencies is a subset of the Intelligence Resource Program (IRP), an ongoing project by the Federation of American Scientists (FAS). This section of the IRP is dedicated toward finding and classifying any available information on any intelligence agency.48 Each country has information discussing their national intelligence agencies. The individual listings
generally have two sections. The first section contains documents specifically about the intelligence agencies. For example, the IRP lists India’s three different ministries with intelligence agencies.49 The second section contains information about sources and
background areas for future research. Looking again at the entry for India, the sourcing section has two entries; the first is a study by Ronald Kostoff of the US Department of the Navy, which reviews Indian defense research literature.50 The second source links to Bharat-Rakshak, a news-like consortium with different Indian military websites available.51 Each source provides a valuable starting place for future research. The IRP’s website on the world’s different intelligence agencies is a repository of information with limited analysis. It is best called a research library, not a study. Barring countries with well-known intelligence agencies, each country entry links to either a document on FAS’s website or to another external source. Like Henderson, the FAS’s IRP provides resources, much like a specialized library or database. These sources amount to correlated data and not congregate findings or assessments. Previous qualitative methods used to describe the world’s intelligence
To see the IRP’s list of countries with complied information on their intelligence agencies, see John Pike, World Intelligence and Security Agencies, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/index.html. 49 John Pike, India Intelligence and Security Agencies, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/index.html. 50 Ibid. To read Kostoff’s study, see Ronald N. Kostoff, et al., Assessment of India's Research Literature, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/research.pdf. 51 Ibid. To view Bharat-Rakshak, see Bharat-Rakshak, http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/.
20 systems are relevant when looking at individual countries, and understanding other methods to achieve civilian control over intelligence services is important. However, the lack of quantitative studies describing intelligence communities provides an excellent opportunity for advancement, particularly in testing Loch Johnson’s correlation between intelligence activity and national wealth. This study’s specific goal is to quantitatively determine the approximate size of the world’s intelligence industry, although it expects to identify Lock’s relationship. To that end, the researcher expects the aggregated amount spent on intelligence to near 100 billion United States Dollars (USD), and the total number of people working within the worldwide community to be about 500,000.
This study uses a quantitative descriptive research design because it allows for the classification of a sample population’s characteristics in a systematic way.52 For each country, the study measures the following interval data – intelligence spending, personnel, and Gross Domestic Product (GDP). This study uses the definition of GDP given by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA). The researcher collected intelligence spending and personnel information on individual countries using open sources, primarily from the internet. The data also comes from traditional academic sources, such as books, journals, and conference papers. However, not all budgetary and personnel information is readily available for every country. The study does estimate some of the intelligence spending and personnel data. The following chapter explains the process used to identify and estimate the different spending and personnel numbers of the world’s intelligence industry. This chapter also explains how the researcher collated the intelligence spending of individual nations into standardized units, such as dollars valued at a certain year. Quantifying the set of data allowed for cross-country comparisons. However, problems arose when unifying the datasets and this affected the standardizing process. The last section describes the methods used to resolve these classification problems, specifically
This concept and other methodological approaches are discussed in Ronald Hunter and Mark Dantzker, Research Methods for Criminology and Criminal Justice: A Primer, 2nd ed. (Boston: Jones & Bartlett, 2005), 98-100, http://books.google.com/books?id=Z0sDhvGkomgC&pg=PA98&lpg=PA98&dq=descriptive+historical+de sign&source=bl&ots=CSla94hG0K&sig=8ayiRuBBsQ7dp0OICv7dMOGjD8&hl=en&ei=M0whSsrLG4aHtgeK_7jCBg&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct =result&resnum=2#PPP1,M1.
22 how this study dealt with the definitional inconsistencies of different personnel types, such as full-time, part-time, and contacted employees.
Data Collection According to the Congressional Research Service, open source information comes from newspapers, journals, radio, television, and the internet.53 Collecting information on intelligence spending and employment came primarily from sources on the internet. The data also came from other sources, such as scholarly journals, trade publications, and congressional research documents. This thesis limits the scope of collection to the 195 sovereign nation-states recognized by the United States State Department – with the exception of the Holy See (Vatican City). These states form the basis of the data. The Vatican is not included because there are no GDP estimates to indicate its national wealth. Attempting to
measure this indicator would likely present a problem, as most of the Vatican’s income comes from outside its territorial boundaries. The Vatican’s external assets and
economic activity cannot be included in a GDP estimate under the BEA’s definition of GDP, which it says is “the value of final goods and services produced in [a country] in a given period of time”.54 With the exception of minor goods, such as tourist mementos and museum fees, the primary sources of income for Vatican City come from external sources. Therefore, its GDP estimate is tricky at best to determine.
Congressional Research Service, “Open Source Intelligence (OSINT): Issues for Congress,” US Library of Congress, Order Code RL34270, December 5, 2007, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/RL34270.pdf. 54 Bureau of Economic Analysis, “Measuring the Economy: A Primer on GDP and the National Income and Product Accounts,” US Department of Commerce, September 2007, 2, http://www.bea.gov/national/pdf/nipa_primer.pdf.
23 The list of 195 countries does not include dependencies or other areas that are not independent nations. Excluding these areas is consistent with the US State Department’s definitions.55 The United Nations also does not consider these territories as independent nations, and they are not recognized as Member States.56 The agencies listed within each country are intelligence agencies. To the best of his ability, the researcher excluded government agencies with characteristics unique to law enforcement. In some cases, the distinction between intelligence and law
enforcement is blurred. One example is the treatment of financial intelligence units (FIU) as members of an intelligence community. While some FIUs act as members of a nation’s intelligence community, others do not. The researcher addressed this issue by generally excluding agencies with mandates requiring them to enforce financial regulations, compliance matters, and tax evasion – when it relates to money laundering. In other cases, there is no distinction between intelligence and law enforcement agencies. The researcher used the best available information to establish if such an agency was consistent with the conceptual framework as explained in Chapter 2.
Collection from Internet Sources The researcher used three different methods to collect relevant information from the internet. The first method consisted of keyword and phrase searches using terms most likely to generate results of an individual country’s intelligence spending and personnel. Some keywords and phrases resulted in the desired information, but not all.
See United States State Department, Independent States in the World, http://www.state.gov/s/inr/rls/4250.htm#note4. 56 To see the list of Member-States of the United Nations, see United Nations, Member States of the United Nations, http://www.un.org/en/members/ [accessed June 1, 2009].
24 Most of the search results gave supplementary information, such as oversight committees or annual reports about the intelligence community of a country. The most useful results were noted for future use. After using this initial search criterion, the researcher adjusted the terms to specify the intelligence agencies. Adjusting the search criterion increased the precision of the results. The process of searching initial keywords and phrases, then refining, is a matter of trial and error. After finding the relevant information, the researcher recorded the relevant data and year of publication. This method was applied to every country. In the second search method, the researcher utilized online journals and websites with dedicated sections on intelligence. Journals like the International Journal of
Intelligence and Counterintelligence, the Defense Intelligence Journal, and the Intelligence and National Security Journal, provided some keywords and phrases for future use. While some of the journals are available print, many more are available on the internet. Additionally, their online versions tended to be more suitable, as they are easier to conduct keyword searches. The researcher searched these journals in a very systematic manner, where the most recent editions’ articles were examined for relevant information. The only articles searched had descriptions about intelligence agencies or communities – however, the journal article titles provided most of the information necessary to determine if they contained any relevant information. After recording the relevant data and citation from the journal publication, the researcher continued on to the previous journal edition, searching through it for relevant information. process. Each scholarly journal received this
25 Other online publishers that consistently report, or have dedicated sections, on intelligence agencies received the same systematic search approach. Some of these organizations include the Federation of American Scientists (FAS), Jane's Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library, the Geneva Center for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), and GlobalSecurity.org. The researcher also applied the
systematic search approach to these sources, although the process slightly differed. From a researcher’s standpoint, the primary difference between these sources and scholarly journals is how they categorize their information. The scholarly journals generally
organize their content around date, whereas these online publishers organize their content around national lines. This required a slight change in systematically searching for data. Instead of searching these online sources based on publication date, the researcher searched for data along national lines, systematically going through each publisher’s list of countries, one at a time. Government websites proved to be another useful source for information. As previously discussed, some countries’ intelligence agencies publish a regular report of spending, while in other countries the governments require the agencies to publish general budgetary reports every so often. An example of a country that requires annual reporting is New Zealand. Section 34 and 70I of the 1989 New Zealand Public Finance Act requires the New Zealand Security Intelligence Service to undergo an annual audit by the internal Auditor-General.57 Comparatively, the United States Constitution requires “a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditure of all public Money shall
New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, “Financial Reporting,” House of Representatives, Home > Annual Reports > 2006 > Financial Reporting, http://www.nzsis.govt.nz/reports/ar06/financial.aspx.
26 be published from time to time”.58 In practice however, the publication of this
information does not occur on a set schedule, but rather infrequently.59 Nevertheless, when self-reporting does exist it is generally attainable through government websites. The researcher used a systematic search approach similar to the method used for online publishers, in order to gather this information. In the third method, the researcher used “Google Alerts,” a free “push” service from Google.com. The researcher created a generic Boolean search criterion and set it at the comprehensive collection level. This setting covers news, blogs, and videos.
However, using Google Alerts requires the user to first identify terms likely to produce results. The researcher first identified the names of a particular country’s intelligence agencies, generally both in English and the native language. After identifying these agencies, the researcher entered their various names into the Google Alert search field using Boolean format. The reporting of these results generally occurred on a daily basis. In order to assist the translating of non-English results found by these three search methods, the researcher used the website FreeTranslation.com. The owner of this
website is a service company that provides language translation software to global corporations.60 FreeTranslation.com has two useful features: first, it has a single word translator. The user inputs the text from the original language and selects the language of the translation. Second, it has an entire webpage translator, where, the user inputs the Uniform Resource Locator (URL) and then FreeTranslation.com coverts it from the originating language to the desired language.
“The Constitution of the United States,” Article I, Section 9, Clause 7. Congressional Research Service, “Intelligence Spending: Public Disclosure Issues,” US Library of Congress, Order Code 94-261, Updated February 15, 2007, 2, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/intel/94-261.pdf. 60 SLD, Company Profile, http://www.sdl.com/en/company/company/.
27 Despite the benefits provided from using FreeTranslation.com, the website does not have a comprehensive list of languages. The text translator can only translate into English from the following languages: Spanish, French, German, Italian, Dutch, Portuguese, Russian, and Japanese. translator. A similar restriction applies to their webpage
The webpage translator can only translate to English: Spanish, French,
German, Italian, Dutch, and Portuguese. FreeTranslation.com also does not translate Portable Document Format (PDFs) – a rather large drawback. Despite these limitations, the service did assist in researching general information about foreign intelligence agencies.
Collection from Other Sources Data collected also came from other sources not previously mentioned. These sources include journals not online, trade publications, and congressional documents. The most common way in which the researcher identified these resources was cited footnotes in other sources. Throughout the data collection process, the researcher
continually checked the sourcing of relevant data, which not only provided more resources, but also allowed the researcher to better gauge the information’s reliability and credibility. For example, one document from the Congressional Research Service The report’s authors cite Checking the
document gave Spain’s intelligence spending for 2006.61
discussions with Spanish officials as the source of this information.
sourcing also led the researcher to further research that sometimes yielded more relevant
Congressional Research Service, "European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism," US Library of Congress, Order Code RL33573, July 24, 2006, 34, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33573.pdf.
28 data. A footnote may contain a book, report, or other primary source publications, which can led to other relevant studies.
Other Relevant Information Collection In addition to collecting information on intelligence spending and personnel, the researcher also identified the corresponding year of the published data, and GDPs of the individual countries. The purpose of citing the year of publication and the GDPs of individual countries is to assist in comparing and estimating unknown datasets. The GDP figures come from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which was chosen for its consistent reporting periods. Also included are the names of the national intelligence agencies, indicated intelligence community, or intelligence spending program. The
names of the intelligence agencies are not necessarily relevant to this study, but they are available for reference purposes only. The researcher used Microsoft Excel to collate this information in one single spreadsheet. Under each country listing is the name of an intelligence agency and its corresponding budgetary and personnel data. However, if the only information found represented the national intelligence community or spending program, then it is indicated, and not necessarily each agency.
Establishing Webpage Credibility This thesis uses Dax Norman’s Trust Evaluation Worksheet to estimate the credibility of online sources. This Worksheet comes from Norman’s study, How to Identify Credible Sources on the Web, in which he seeks to determine a “valid criteria for
29 evaluating the credibility of open source Web sites”.62 It is the first quantitative study which aims to create a methodologically sound criterion for establishing a website’s credibility, while targeting its use for open-source analysts. Previous studies either addressed the issue as tangent to a larger study or were methodologically flawed. According to Norman, there are several factors to consider when determining the credibility of a website; corroboration is the most influential criterion.63 The worksheet applies only to websites and not to online editions of journals or other primarily hardcover sources. Each online source has a credibility rating recorded with its citation. The purpose of tracking credibility is incidental to this study – it merely provides a critique to non-peer reviewed sources.
Process for Estimating Unknown Spending This thesis uses a three step process for estimating the unknown intelligence spending of an individual country. In short, the researcher created a ratio using the known intelligence spending and GDP from countries with the available information. Once identifying each individual ratio for countries with known intelligence spending, the researcher created an average of all the ratios. By using this averaged ratio, the study identified the unknown intelligence spending for the remaining countries. GDP acts as the independent variable, while intelligence spending represents the dependent variable. GDP is independent because it represents national wealth – the variable that influences the country’s intelligence spending. The following three steps explain how the study
Dax Norman, "How to Identify Credible Sources on The Web,," (Master's Thesis, Joint Military Intelligence College, December 2001), viii, http://daxrnorman.googlepages.com/5-CompleteThesisMay08.pdf. 63 Dax Norman, “Websites You Can Trust,” American Libraries 37, no. 7 (2006), 36, http://daxrnorman.googlepages.com/WebSitesYouCanTrust-Oct08.pdf.
30 created the averaged ratio and how it was used to identify the intelligence spending for countries without this information. The steps are: Step 1: Average the known intelligence spending of an individual country against its GDP. Record this ratio of known intelligence spending and GDP for future use. Each country with reported intelligence spending receives a ratio based on their reported information. Each country’s ratio reflects its intelligence spending compared to its GDP. Step 2: Create an average from all of the ratios in order determine a single general ratio for intelligence spending. Although statistical outliers generally diminish the overall accuracy of a distribution curve, they are included in this ratio. This is because it allows the ratio more flexibility when estimating the spending. Step 3: Apply this single averaged ratio to each country with unknown intelligence spending. The estimation of a nation’s unknown intelligence spending was identified through cross-multiplication, using the GDP of the country and the averaged ratio.
Process for Estimating Unknown Personnel For countries with reported intelligence spending but not personnel, the researcher used a four step process. This process treats intelligence spending as an independent variable in order to estimate a country’s intelligence personnel. To estimate the number of intelligence professionals in countries with unknown personnel, the researcher identified two countries with similar levels of intelligence spending and with reported employees. The researcher then took the average of these two countries’ employees and applied it to the country with unknown personnel. The depended variable here is
31 unknown personnel, as the estimated figure relies on intelligence spending. individual steps in the process are: Step 1: Identify the two most similar countries on the basis of reported intelligence spending. These two countries must have both reported spending and personnel. One country must have a lower level of reported intelligence spending than the country with unknown personnel. The other country must have higher reported intelligence spending than the country with unknown personnel. Step 2: The country with the lower reported intelligence spending and personnel is set as the low range, while the other country with reported intelligence spending and personnel is set as the high range. The country with unreported personnel must fall somewhere in between the high and low ranges. Step 3: Average the personnel for both the high and low ranges. This results in a ratio of the two ranges. Step 4: Apply this ratio to the country with unknown personnel. There are also countries with neither reported intelligence spending nor personnel. For these countries, the researcher used the previously described process to estimate intelligence spending. This included each of the three steps, where estimates use a general ratio based on GDP. After estimating the country’s intelligence spending, finding its personnel is a matter of following the pre-described four step process. The
Standardizing Spending Units The information for each country’s intelligence spending often came from different periods in time and in different currencies. In order to standardize the monetary
32 units, the researcher converted the amounts from the originating currency to US Dollars (USD). After converting the units, the amount still remained in the reported year. In order to unify the estimated amounts into a single year, the study uses 2008 used as a baseline year. To convert the original currency to USD, the researcher used the website Oanda.com. This website provides free “Internet-based forex trading and currency information services”.64 The advantage of using Oanda.com is that it allows the user to convert currencies using previous rates. The user can determine the desired amount currency to convert, set the rate used, and then pick the expressed currency.65
Standardizing Personnel Definitions While the currency data may differ, personnel information suffers from conflicting definitions. Some sources include only full-time employees, while others include contract-based personnel. For example, the Canadian Security Intelligence
Service reports its total as the number of full-time equivalent employees.66 However, the US includes approximately 56,000 contractors with its total intelligence personnel.67 In order to come to terms with the differences in classification, the researcher only included full-time equivalent employees directly employed by the government agency. In most situations, the reported figure did not further divide personnel into separate categories. The researcher accepted these figures as full-time equivalents.
OANDA, About OANDA, http://www.oanda.com/site/oanda/com_index.shtml. OANDA, “FXConverter - Currency Converter for 164 Currencies,” http://www.oanda.com/convert/classic. 66 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, “Public Report 2006-2007,” Canadian Security Intelligence Service (Gatineau: Public Works and Government Services, 2007), 15, http://www.csisscrs.gc.ca/pblctns/nnlrprt/2006/rprt2006-eng.pdf. 67 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009 National Intelligence Strategy, September 15, 2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2009/09/dni091509-m.pdf.
Research into the approximate size of the world’s intelligence industry produced a number of interesting results. This chapter will give the overall findings produced by the methods described in Chapter 3. This chapter’s first section will discuss the patterns of intelligence spending, while the second section will describe the workforce of the intelligence industry. The third section will give a brief narrative description of the identified intelligence agencies. The fourth and final section will provide a summary of the results.
The Totals: Spending Using the described methods, this study identifies that the world’s intelligence industry spends an United estimated States Figure 4.1: Total World Intelligence Spending
World Intelligence Spending: $31.96 Billion 35% US Intelligence Spending: $75 Billion 65%
Dollars (USD) on an annual basis. The relationship between intelligence
spending and Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is positive, where for every 947 units of GDP there are two units of
Total Spending: $106,961,604,308.01
intelligence spending. The United States spends the most on intelligence. As shown in Figure 4.1, the US spends about $75 billion dollars, approximately 65 percent of the total amount. According to statistics from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the US’s GDP represents only 23.5 percent of the
34 world’s entire GDP.68 When comparing the US’s portion of intelligence spending to its proportion of the world’s GDP, is it clear that the US spends far more proportionally on intelligence than the rest of the world. Its share of the intelligence pie is roughly double that of its share of GDP. Including the US, 20 nations represent the top ten percent of intelligence spenders Figure 4.2: Top Ten Percent Intelligence Spending
Top Ten Percent Spending: $99.5 Billion 93%
- those that spend $263,307,103.72 or more. Their accumulated
Remaining World Spending: $7.6 Billion 7%
spending – indicated in Figure 4.2 – accounts for about 93 percent of the total amount, or
$99,507,696,851.13. Compare this to the same countries’ accumulated GDP, about $42,127,856,999,999, or 69.42 percent of the world’s total 2008 GDP.69 However, not all of these 20 countries top the list of nations with the largest GDP.70 The average point-to-point variation in intelligence spending among the top ten percent of spenders is $3,933,496,948.26.
This figure uses the International Monetary Fund’s world GDP estimate to derive the number 23.5 percent. The amount is $60,689,812,000,000. See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, Report for Selected Country Groups and Subjects, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2008&ey=2008&scsm=1&ssd =1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=001%2C998&s=NGDPD&grp=1&a=1&pr.x=27&pr.y=8. 69 This figure uses the IMF’s GDP estimate for the years of the intelligence spending - the years which the study identified intelligence spending. See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009: Nominal GDP list of countries Data for the year 2008, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx. 70 For the complete list of GDP estimate for 2008, see International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009: Nominal GDP list of countries Data for the year 2008, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx. Or, to view a quick total, see “List of countries by GDP (nominal),” Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_GDP_(nominal)#cite_note-0 [accessed June 2, 2009].
35 However, excluding the US when measuring variation produces an average of $248,494,801.33. The other 175 nations, or the bottom 90 percent, spend the remaining seven percent of the total intelligence figure, or $7,453,907,456.88. These countries have a total GDP of $12,819,519,999,996, comprising about 31.12 percent of the world’s 2008 GDP.71 When comparing this population’s proportion of intelligence spending to its proportion of GDP, it again demonstrates unevenness. The bottom 90 percent of
intelligence spenders is similar to the bottom 90 percent of countries with the lowest GDP. The average intelligence spending for these countries is $42,593,756.90. A bar graph is perhaps the best method for displaying the spread of intelligence spending by each country. The graph in Figure 4.3 shows countries sorted by intelligence spending. The countries most close to the y-axis have the highest intelligence spending, while the countries farthest away, along the x-axis, have the lowest intelligence spending. For the purpose of increasing clarity, numbers are in place of country names. Appendix B: Intelligence Spending Sorted Highest to Lowest has a list of each number’s corresponding country, along with their individual intelligence spending. Additionally, the y-axis in Figure 4.3 is set as logarithmic – its scale increasing by the power 10 – in order to improve the visual display of the data. There are two trend lines that seem to be the best fit for the data, power and exponential. The first line is solid black and represents the exponential trend line. The second line is a dotted black, representing the power trend line. The solid black trend line
See International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, World Economic Outlook Database, April 2009, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/weorept.aspx?sy=2008&ey=2008&scsm=1&ssd =1&sort=country&ds=.&br=1&c=001%2C998&s=NGDPD&grp=1&a=1&pr.x=27&pr.y=8.
36 increases steadily upward from right to left. Given the logarithmic scaling, this The
movement is consistent with what one expects from data which is exponential.
dotted black trend line increases right to left in a similar way, however, there is a steady curve that eventually hooks sharply upwards as it nears the y-axis. The researcher computed the R-Squared (R2) values – which measures how well a trend line will match with the data – in order to assist in analyzing the trend lines. The R2 value for the exponential trend line is 0.940 and the R2 value for the power trend line is 0.835. It is likely that the dataset, the individual intelligence spending, follows slightly more of an exponential curve rather than a curve that obeys a power law. Nevertheless, the
proximity of the two R2 values to one another is notable, as it indicates that the dataset may still follow a power law. Further research into identifying the minimum x (Xmin) and the maximum likelihood estimator (MLE) is necessary. This step is necessary to
determine the approximated scaling exponent of the curve, if indeed it does follow a power law curve. After finding the scaling exponent, it ought to be relatively simple to accurately say this data does or does not follow a power law curve. One interesting finding of this study is the difference the US has on deriving statistical information from the data. For instance, including the US in estimating the mean amount spent on intelligence results in an average of $548,521,047.73. However, without the US the average drops dramatically, to $164,750,537.67. The standard
deviation with the US is $5,389,872,754.45, without the US it is $576,959,565.88. The differences in the two means and standard deviations are noteworthy. On one hand, this information suggests that the US is an outlier and it should not be included when calculating this statistical information. On the other hand, the US appears to play a very
38 minor role in shaping the ratio used to estimate unknown intelligence spending. The overall difference in the amount estimated – when using the measuring ratio that includes the US, verses using the ratio that excludes the US – is about five percent. When including the US, the average ratio of intelligence spending to GDP is 2/947, also expressed as 0.000961961. To determine this ratio, the researcher limited the dataset to countries with known intelligence spending and GDP. The ratio here found a total of $19,279,129,862.15 in estimated spending. The standard deviation of the ratio group – the sample used to estimate – is 1/798, or 0.001368871. When excluding the US from calculating the average of these ratios, the result is 1/442, or 0.0008665 – only slightly different from the original 2/947. Using 1/442 to find unknown intelligence spending results in a total of $17,365,946,777.38 in estimated spending. The difference between using the ratio 2/947 and 1/442 is $1,378,694,524.39, an overall difference of 5.22 percent. The US clearly spends far more on intelligence than any other nation, from any standpoint. However, when looking at its ratio of intelligence spending to GDP, the US does not necessarily spend in disproportionate amount. Its affect on the total spending figure is notable, but its affect on the estimating process is not. Table 4.1 reflects this information by showing the US’s slight affect on the estimating ratio.
Table 4.1: Affect of US on Estimating Population (US Included) Average Spending Standard Deviation Ratios for Estimating Percent Difference of Estimates $548,521,047.73 $5,389,872,754.45 2/947 5.22% Population (US Excluded) $164,750,537.67 $576,959,565.88 1/442
As for the countries that comprise the top ten percent of intelligence spenders, obvious nations – such as the US, UK, and Russia – are on the list. However, it is surprising to see the nations not on the top ten percent list. If GDP is the primary indicator of intelligence spending, then Spain would most certainly make the list with its 1.2 trillion dollar economy.72 Yet sources indicate that it spends about $200,000,000, an amount far lower than Venezuela, which is part of the top ten percent. A direct
correlation between GDP and intelligence spending may exist, but it is not strongly indicated here. It is apparent that GDP is a factor when it comes to intelligence spending but it does not seem to be the primary factor. Further research is necessary to quantify GDP’s affect on intelligence spending.
See Spain’s 2005 GDP at International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database, World Economic Outlook Database, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/weodata/index.aspx.
40 The Totals: Personnel This study identifies the total number of people working in the intelligence industry as 1,130,104 persons. The two largest employers are the US and Russia who, as shown in Figure 4.4, jointly employ approximately 28 percent of the total. All other things being equal, it is logical to assume that because the US spends the most on intelligence, that it should also employ the most people. However, it employs about 28,000 less than Russia. The US does employ intelligence approximately contractors, 56,000 however.73
Figure 4.4: Total Intelligence Employment
US 144,000 13% Russia 172,000 15% World 814,104 72%
Including them into the calculations would increase the US’s share, but the definitions given previously in this study prohibit non-government workers from being counted. Regardless, the
US employs about 144,000 people, resulting in roughly $520,833 in
Total Employment: 1,130,104
intelligence spending per person. Its GDP per person is about $99,059,722. For Russia, its total number of workers is about 172,000, making it the world’s largest employer of intelligence professionals.74 Although Russia may employ the most people, it does not come nearly as close as spending the most money. Russia has about
Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009 National Intelligence Strategy, September 15, 2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2009/09/dni091509-m.pdf. Although the total number given by the ODNI is 200,000, previous interviews indicate that in 2008 the US's intelligence community employed 28 percent of its workforce as contractors. After removing contractors, 56,000, the remaining number of employees is about 144,000. See Joseph Fitsanakis, "US Spy Services Hiding True Employee Numbers Says Senate Panel," IntelNews.org, July 27, 2009, http://intelligencenews.wordpress.com/2009/07/27/01-195/. 74 Ivan Safranchuk, “Funding for the Russian Secret Services," Agentura.ru, http://www.agentura.ru/english/experts/safranchuk/.
41 $18,902.70 in intelligence spending per person – a figure substantially lower than its American counterpart. This difference is also present when using GDP to calculate a per person figure, which is $5,752,488. Obviously there are other factors working into the equation. Given the small scope of this study, the finding here is that there are some differences in employment practices. Using the best information available, this thesis finds 21 countries that employ 10,000 or more people. They employ about 61 percent of the world’s total intelligence workforce, or 689,428 people. As shown in Figure 4.5, the 21 countries come from various regions around the world – however, some countries listed, such as Camroon and Algeria, have estimated personnel. The researcher based these estimates on the best available information and the methods outlined in Chapter 3. The total intelligence employment of these countries varies, as seen in Figure 4.6. While the US has the highest intelligence spending per person, $520,833.33, the United Kingdom has the highest GDP per person, at $229,787,213.11. Panama has the lowest intelligence
spending per person, $1,465.79, and Syria has the lowest GDP per person, $1,567,200. One interesting country on the list of top intelligence employers is China. China is third largest intelligence employer in the world with an estimated workforce of 88,050 people, a figure representing about 7.79 percent of the world’s total intelligence industry. Yet China’s intelligence spending per person is $46,755.19 – 40.42 percent higher than Russia. Figure 4.7 compares the amounts spent per person by China, Russia, and the world’s average. Taken at face value, China’s spending per employee is clearly more consistent with the world average when compared with Russia. China employs less people but spends more per person than its Russian counterpart.
Figure 4.5: Geographic Position of Top Intelligence Employers
= Top Intelligence Employers Source: Trevor Coultart, World Geography Ignorance, http://trevorcoultart.wordpress.com/2008/05/26/world-geography-ignorance/. The grey shading and color alterations are the work of this researcher.
Figure 4.6: Top 21 Intelligence Employers
200,000 180,000 160,000 140,000 120,000 100,000 80,000 60,000 40,000 20,000 0 Singapore Portugal Egypt Cuba India Syria Romania Iraq Pakistan Iran United Kingdom United States Luxembourg Panama Slovenia China Bangladesh Cameroon Switzerland Algeria Russia
43 Figure 4.7 also says something about Russia. One of three scenarios is likely: Russia’s identified intelligence spending is grossly inaccurate, the country values intelligence less than the rest of the world, or the country has drastically different hiring practices than its peers. Figure 4.7: Comparing Intelligence Spending Per Person
$60,000.00 $50,000.00 $40,000.00 $30,000.00 $20,000.00 $10,000.00 $0.00 Russia China
Intelligence Spending Per Person
The remaining 90 percent of employers comprise 174 countries, representing 39 percent of the world’s total intelligence workforce, or 440,676 people – shown in Figure 4.8. The average number of persons employed by any given country is 2,533, with a standard deviation of 2,709. Australia spends the most on its intelligence professionals, about $1,273,174.83 per person. However, this figure may result from problems with collection. The country with the second highest intelligence spending per person is Japan, which spends approximately $1,123,208.36 per employee. Japan’s spending per person estimate is likely more accurate due to the completeness in data collected on its workforce. In arguing the correctness of its estimate, this thesis is also arguing that Japan
44 has the highest intelligence spending per person in the world. Information on Japan’s total comes from the Ministry of Defense’s National Institute for Defense Studies, but its l spending is an estimate. One interesting finding is the diversity in intelligence spending per person. While ty approximately 60 percent of the world’s intelligence workforce is in countries that employ 10,000 or more persons, these nations are not necessarily the same as the top intelligence spenders. Only six countries with the highest intelligence spending are also ers. countries on the list of top intelligence employers – as shown in Figure 4.9. The data should reflect . the assumption that a relationship exists between intelligence spending and employment, yet it does not. Most countries employ between 0 and 2,000 persons in their intelligence ountries system, as shown in Figure 4.10. There are also notable decreases in the number of . countries that employ more than 6,000 persons and then again at 14,000. Countries seem to cluster around employment le levels between 0-6,000, and then 8,000-14,000. 14,000.
Figure 4.8: Bottom 90 Percent Employment vs. Top Ten Percent Employment
1,200,000 1,000,000 800,000 600,000 400,000 200,000 0 Top Ten Percent Employment Bottom 90 Percent Employment Total Employment 689,428 440,676
Figure 4.9: Countries with Top Spending and Employment
= Top Intelligence Spender and Employer Source: Trevor Coultart, World Geography Ignorance, http://trevorcoultart.wordpress.com/2008/05/26/world-geography-ignorance/. The grey shading and color alterations are the work of this researcher.
Figure 4.10: Histogram of Intelligence Employment
110 100 90 Number of Countries 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0 5 36 24 13 5 6 1 2 1 1 1 1 4 # of Countries 96
46 Other Extracted Results Research of the 195 sovereign nations identified 246 different national intelligence agencies.75 Based on the best available information, this list does not include agencies involved in law enforcement. The average number of intelligence agencies per country is 1.28. Most of these agencies seem to focus on military or political-strategic target sets rather than operating and maintaining technological systems. The average credibility rating for internet sources is 38.56, or somewhere between the medium and high ranges of Dax Norman’s Trust Evaluation Worksheet. Before elaborating further on credibility, the following paragraphs will discuss the exclusion of certain financial “intelligence agencies”. The 246 different agencies identified by this study generally do not include ones that specialize in, what they list as, “financial intelligence”. The by and large exclusion of these agencies is due to inconsistent descriptions of their duties, as briefly discussed in the methodology. For instance, the Canadian Financial Transaction and Reports Analysis Centre (FINTRAC) says a primary function is to counter terrorist financing,76 while its mandate requires the agency to “provide law enforcement financial intelligence that would be relevant to the investigation or prosecution of money laundering offences and terrorist activity financing offences as well as to provide CSIS [the Canadian Security
The figure does not include intelligence agencies of the United States. This is because the intelligence spending of the US is expressed in its budgetary account form, that is, the National Intelligence Program (NIP) or the Military Intelligence Program. The same is true for the United Kingdom which expresses its intelligence spending via the Single Intelligence Account (SIA). There is some question as whether or not the Defense Intelligence Staff includes its budget within the SIA – the figure within this study appears to include it. For referencing on the SIA, see Intelligence and Security Committee, "Annual Report 20072008," Parliament of the United Kingdom, ISC 2008/09/064, 8, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/isc200708.pdf. 76 To view a FINTRAC’s 2008 Annual Report on its duties, functions, and activities, see Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, FINTRAC Annual Report 2008 (Ottawa: 2008), 22, http://www.fintrac-canafe.gc.ca/publications/ar/2008/ar-eng.pdf.
47 and Intelligence Service is the country’s foreign intelligence agency] with financial intelligence that would be relevant threats to the security of Canada”.77 FINTRAC is an intelligence agency that participates in collection and analysis, and interacts with the Canadian intelligence system. Another example is the Saudi Arabian Financial
Investigation Unit, whose first priority is to “handle suspicious financial transactions, analyze them and prepare reports thereon to submit them to the competent authorities…and exchanges information with the relevant agencies in Saudi Arabia and abroad”.78 Despite using the term “investigation” in its title, the entity is Saudi Arabia’s official financial intelligence unit.79 These agencies differ from that of the Bahamas’ Financial Intelligence Unit, which says it is “The Bahamas’ regulator for anti-money laundering and prevention of the financing of terrorism”.80 While the unit’s realm of specialty includes preventing terrorism financing, the definition given here, along with the Financial Intelligence Unit Act of 2000, clearly describes itself as a regulatory entity and not an intelligence agency.81 The Bahamas’ description of its Financial Intelligence
Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, Who We Are, http://www.fintraccanafe.gc.ca/fintrac-canafe/1-eng.asp [accessed May 30, 2009]. 78 Kingdom of Saudi Arabia Financial Investigation Unit, Background, http://www.moi.gov.sa/wps/portal/safiu/!ut/p/c1/04_SB8K8xLLM9MSSzPy8xBz9CP0os3hT5wBnTwtfY0 N3ZxNnA08TwzCDYGdTY6MAE6B8JJK8gamTs4FRmJzaVBIgIGboykB3cGpefrhIDtxq7I0RpPHYgdI3gAHcDTQ9_PIz03VL8iNqPDMMlEEACELTPE!/dl2/d1/ L0lDU0lKSWdra0EhIS9JTlJBQUlpQ2dBek15cUEhL1lCSkoxTkExTkk1MC13ISEvN181Q1BDSThNMz E4NkU0MEk0NUpNNktFMkMyMQ!!/?WCM_PORTLET=PC_7_5CPCI8M3186E40I45JM6KE2C21_W CM&WCM_GLOBAL_CONTEXT=/wps/wcm/connect/main/Financial+Investigation/Main/Background/ [accessed November 17, 2009] 79 The Egmont Group, List of Members, http://www.egmontgroup.org/about/list-of-members/by-region/asia [accessed November 17, 2009]. 80 Commonwealth of The Bahamas, Welcome to FIU Bahamas, http://www.bahamas.gov.bs/bahamasweb2/home.nsf/vContentW/A4AE9BF530DECF23852572C600580B D7. 81 See An Act to Provide for the Establishment of a Body to be Known As the Financial Intelligence Unit, the Functions and Powers of That Body, and for Connected Purposes, No. 29 of 2000, Parliament of The Bahamas, December 29, 2000, http://www.bahamas.gov.bs/bahamasweb2/home.nsf/vContentW/CC-Other--Compliance+Commission+PDFS/$file/FinIntellUnitAct2000(ConsolidatedVersion).pdf.
48 Unit is consistent with members of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force (CFATF). CFATF is, An organisation of thirty states of the Caribbean Basin, which have agreed to implement common countermeasures to address the problem of criminal money laundering...In Aruba representatives of Western Hemisphere countries, in particular from the Caribbean and from Central America , convened to develop a common approach to the phenomenon of the laundering of the proceeds of crime...The main objective of the Caribbean Financial Action Task Force is to achieve effective implementation of and compliance with its recommendations to prevent and control money laundering and to combat the financing of terrorism. The Secretariat has been established as a mechanism to monitor and encourage progress to ensure full implementation of the Kingston Ministerial Declaration.82 CFATF’s mandate does not extend to sharing such financial information with intelligence agencies either within participating countries, or abroad. Simply put, these financial intelligence units are generally not part of a national intelligence system.83 The 246 intelligence agencies do not generally include intelligence oversight entities or coordinating agencies. The descriptions given by many these organizations are not systematically consistent with the definitions of this study, indicating that a correlation between them and what entities were counted is not possible. However, the study uses the best possible information available to establish if these oversight entities were comparable. Examples of these types of organizations are the Argentinean
Secretariat of National Intelligence and the Brazilian Consulting Council of the Intelligence System. These two entities exemplify oversight and coordinating bodies and are not comparable to agencies that participate in the coordination and analysis of information, such as the US’s Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI). In
Caribbean Financial Action Task Force [CFATF], CFATF OVERVIEW, http://www.cfatf.org/. For more information regarding financial Units, The Egmont Group provides a comprehensive starting point. The Egmont Group states in its purpose statement that it is an organization created with the intent to combat money laundering, regardless of the money’s end use. It is an organization that provides a mechanism for sharing financial information related to money laundering. See Egmont Group, Statement of Purpose of the Egmont Group of Financial Intelligence Units, June 23, 2004, http://www.egmontgroup.org/files/library_egmont_docs/statement_of_purpose.pdf.
49 short, the purposes and functions of the Secretariat of National Intelligence and the Consulting Council are not comparable or similar to the ODNI.84 Including these types of entities creates difficulties in maintaining a consistent conceptual model. Therefore, the list of 246 different intelligence agencies does not include them. The study finds its internet-based sources as having an averaged medium to high rating of credibility. Based on Dax Norman’s Trust Evaluation Worksheet (shown in Appendix A), the average of all internet sources used is 38.55, or medium to high credibility. This rating is applicable for about 36 percent of the sources used. Norman’s Trust Evaluation Worksheet does not apply to the remaining sources. Figure 4.11 is a histogram displaying the different credibility ranges and the frequency of their occurrences. The chart indicates that the sources follow a bimodal distribution, with most falling into either the low or high ranges. The distribution of the data supports the overall credibility of the internet sources, as, this study would not otherwise have a quantitative tool to measure them. Furthermore, Norman’s study finds that intelligence analysts generally require a source to be 75 percent credible to use in an intelligence product.85 According to Norman’s findings, a 75 percent rating is 35.06 on his Trust Evaluation Worksheet.86 Therefore, the researcher believes the credibility of this study’s internet-based sources to be sufficient.
For a discussion into the particular differences between organizations which coordinate and oversee verses organizations which primarily coordinate information, see Lucia Dammert, ed., Report of the Security Sector in Latin America and the Caribbean (Santiago, Chile: Facultad Latinoamericana de Ciencias Sociales, 2007), 99-121; available at http://issuu.com/flacso.chile/docs/ssr_lac. 85 Dax Norman, “How to Identify Credible Sources on the Web,” (Master’s Thesis, Joint Military College, December 2001), 63, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&source=web&ct=res&cd=3&ved=0CBAQFjAC&url=http%3A%2F%2F daxrnorman.googlepages.com%2F5-CompleteThesisMay08.pdf&ei=_xwDS56YF9OUnQftxt14&usg=AFQjCNFNfRehUePDuWuIgUUiq0xvcqcDnA. 86 Ibid.
40 35 30
Figure: 4.11: Histogram of Source Credibility
25 20 15 10 5 0 5 1 0 16
Summary of Results The data collected using the methods described in Chapter 3 indicates that the world’s intelligence industry spends $106,961,604,308.01, employs 1,130,104 persons, and has at least 246 agencies. Specific country information is in Appendix C: Data for Individuals Countries. There appears to be an identifiable correlation between GDP and intelligence spending, albeit not direct, while the personnel estimates seem to have some interesting per person patterns. One problem regarding the results is whether or not using GDP can create viable estimates of intelligence spending. Author Loch Johnson argues that national wealth is connected to intelligence spending. This study is indirectly exploring his assertion. Although the correlation is not likely linear, the results presented here show that a
51 connection does exist. However, the correlation predicates on the assumption that the dataset with identified known spending is self-reported in an objective and accurate manner. In short, the total spending assumes that deception does not play a role. This may distort the identified correlation between GDP and intelligence spending. The
correlation also assumes that the set of individual country data is complete. There are two problems with this assumption; first, the datasets are not complete, and second, ever knowing if they are complete poses a difficult challenge – one will likely never know. In addition, the total workforce findings hold similar problems. To estimate personnel, this study uses intelligence spending as the sole metric to define similarity among countries, thus creating the assumption that a linear correlation exists between the two. Countries were rank-ordered on the basis of intelligence spending, whether
estimated or not. Yet some countries with similar levels of intelligence spending did not have similar levels of employment. An example is Romania and South Africa. For both countries, the researcher identified the total intelligence spending of the two countries – the difference in spending is about $27,370,657.72, or 6.10 percent. Both Romania and South Africa have known employment levels, Romania has about 41,800 workers and South Africa has 3,500 – a difference of 38,300 persons or 84.54 percent! How can two countries with similar levels of intelligence spending have such drastically different levels of employment? Obviously other factors are at play. It may be a reflection of cultural traditions, the use of expensive technology, or due to inaccurate reported data. It may also indicate that the study’s assumption about the linear relationship between intelligence spending and personnel is incorrect. The reasons for the discrepancies are
52 plentiful, however, it can be said that this estimating process is acceptable, as it follows a structured methodology.
The purpose of this thesis was to identify the approximate size of the world’s intelligence industry. The primary indicator to measure its size was intelligence
spending, while the second indicator was the number of people working in such activities. Using the collection and estimation methods outlined in Chapter 3, this thesis found a total of $106 billion United States Dollars (USD) in intelligence spending and identified about one million people working in the field. In all likelihood, these numbers are probably a low estimate due to two factors: first, the methodology assumed a linear correlation between intelligence spending and Gross Domestic Product (GDP), not exponential. Based on the identified information, the estimating process used the ratio 2/947 to find unknown intelligence spending. Second, the list with the total number of intelligence agencies is probably not wholly comprehensive and complete. It is difficult to say with virtual certitude that this thesis “got them all,” because of the nature of these agencies and the conservative criteria used. Despite these two factors, this thesis makes the best approximation possible with the given information. It used two methods to identify the quantitative metrics and it is important to note what worked, and what did not work. The first method is direct observation of the national intelligence services, using the three methods explained in Chapter 3. Regarding the methods, the automate pushsource search method provided little valuable information. Although Google-Alerts do give a reasonable starting point for further research, creating them initially requires some reasonable knowledge of the target country. Therefore, the results of each alert tended to
54 err on the unhelpful or useless side. They do provide an excellent way to collect
information on a specific topic over time, allowing one to study its trends. Unfortunately this study did not have much use for one specific topic as it changes over time. It required the answer to many similar questions and nothing much more. Using keywords and phrase searches to identify the necessary information provided helpful information. Much of the intelligence spending and personnel data came from this method. One benefit of using this search method over automated pushsources is its adaptability. A researcher has the ability to quickly alter the search terms in order to increase the likelihood of identifying the necessary information. Having the ability to search by keywords and phrases allowed the researcher to quickly cover various online sources – books, scholarly works, and other forms of documents on the internet. Unfortunately, the primary drawback is that the process consumes a lot of time. This method requires a researcher to objectively understand that the amount of time spent looking for one country’s metrics is increasingly outweighing the benefits provided by the answers. The solution is to maintain objectivity and understand that time can
outweigh an answer. Perhaps the most beneficial method employed came from systematic searching journals and websites with dedicated sections on intelligence. This process is very effective, although it is also very time consuming. The process is likely the most
effective for obvious reasons – they are the industry’s trade journals, associations, and forums of discussion. Perhaps the most up-to-date and commonly used source is Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessment Library, although corroborating the information and identifying primary sources tended to be difficult. Nevertheless Jane’s library of country
55 studies provides valuable information on the defense and intelligence field. Although there are a few websites and online databases with sections dedicated to intelligence, none came close to matching Jane’s level of organization and extensive collection. The complete listing of journals and other scholarly sources searched for this thesis are on Table 5.1. Table 5.1 has two columns; the first indicates sources completely searched. The second column contains sources and publications not completely searched, due to their lack of availability or other restrictions. In addition to systematically searching through these various publications, the search method extended to the websites of governmental intelligence oversight committees and ministries. As many of these countries require their intelligence systems to publish reports on an annual or frequent basis, these websites were helpful. Although the practice of publishing annual reports is more common in Western nations, they are increasingly becoming common in Eastern European countries – these reports are not consistently published elsewhere, however. The second method used to identify the quantitative metrics was estimating unknown intelligence spending and employment. Determining the approximate total for each category required the researcher to proceed according to the methods presented in Chapter 3. It required using an averaged ratio, generated by countries with known intelligence spending and GDP. As mentioned, this study assumes that intelligence spending has a linear correlation with GDP. However, the results in Chapter 4 indicate that the relationship is most likely exponential, or even power-law, in nature. The study estimated unknown intelligence personnel using a slightly different approach. It
established the likeness of countries on the basis of intelligence spending. After which, it
56 estimated countries with unknown intelligence personnel by using known the workforces of similar nations.
Table 5.1: List of Journals, Newsletters, and Other Relevant Database Productions Completely Searched African Security Review American Intelligence Comparative Strategy Journal Cryptologia Cryptome Defense Intelligence Journal Europe-Asia studies Eye Spy Magazine Federation of American Scientists Intelligence Resource Program Foreign Affairs Intelligence Online Intelligence and National Security International Affairs International Journal of Intelligence & CounterIntelligence International Journal of Middle East Studies International Security International Studies Review Jane’s Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library Jane’s Intelligence Review Jane’s Intelligence Weekly Journal of Democracy Middle East Middle East Intelligence Bulletin Middle East journal Middle East Review of International Affairs Journal National Security Archive: George Washington University Orbis (Philadelphia) RUSI Journal Strategic Analysis Strategic Forecasting Strategic Forum Strategic Studies Quarterly Studies in Conflict and Terrorism Studies in Intelligence Partially Searched Arab-reform.net Armed Forces Journal International Athena Intelligence Special Report Brown Journal of World Affairs Institutions and Organizations Intelligence Heritage Centre Journal International Defense Review Joint Forces Quarterly Nativ – Israeli RFE/RL Newsline Terrorism Monitor The Spooks Newsletter World Intelligence Review
Another approach might use a ratio composed of known intelligence spending and known personnel, to estimate unknown personnel. Using this average is slightly akin to comparing countries on the basis of intelligence spending, as the underlying assumption is that a relationship exists between spending and employment. In terms of being a more accurate, further research is necessary to determine if this is a better approach. In terms of increasing confidence, using an intelligence spending per person average to estimate unknown employment would likely increase the overall confidence level. One can
statistically check the validity of a per person average, whereas the method used in this study lacks that ability. The standard deviation and variance of the known spending per person dataset is observable. The result, that is, the statistical information, would likely more clearly explain the relationship between intelligence spending and personnel. Both methods, the one used in this thesis and the hypothesized per person method, contain the assumption that a linear correlation exists between spending and employment. In retrospect, this assumption is built into the methodology, as explained in Chapter 3, and is present when estimating intelligence spending. The method used to approximate individual spending does not address this assumption. It was applied consistently when estimating spending and its affect is seen in Figure 5.1. The figure is a scatter-plot chart of the intelligence spending of individual countries. GDP is set as the X-axis and intelligence spending is set as the Y-axis. The trending line, in black, follows neatly along the line of data points, in blue. Although it is difficult to display, most countries lie just above the trending line until they reach approximately $40 billion in GDP.
58 The linear trend line in Figure 5.1 appears rather strong and initially seems to fit the data quite well. However the data points represent both known intelligence spending and estimated spending. Therefore, the data points should be consistent with the trending line, as some are estimated under the assumption that a linear relationship exists. The fit of the trending line is not so clear when looking at the same scatter-plot chart without the estimated data. In Figure 5.2, the blue data points represent the countries with identified intelligence spending. As with Figure 5.1, the GDP is set as the X-axis and intelligence spending is set as the Y-axis. There are two trend lines on Figure 5.2, the solid black line is the linear trend line, and the black dotted line is the exponential trend line. They are both included for purposes of comparison and to determine which has the best fit. It is difficult to determine which trend line most accurately describes the data, and it is likely that any future answer will be subjective. The R-Squared (R2) value of the linear trend line is 0.349, while the exponential R2 value is 0.401. Both numbers are similar in how they describe the fitness of the data. Therefore, using a methodology that assumes a linear relationship exists may not be correct, but it would not be anymore incorrect than using a methodology which assumes the relationship is exponential. The researcher would say that if the relationship is assumed to be exponential, then the intelligence spending total would likely be higher. However, this assumption would likely have little effect on estimating personnel, as there are few countries that fall beyond what appears to be key points – nations with GDPs over $1.8 trillion and $2.1 trillion. For a comparison of different outcomes, see Table 5.2. Nevertheless this study meets its stated purpose, that is, to identify the approximate size of the world’s intelligence industry. It identified both the primary and
59 secondary metrics – total intelligence spending and personnel. It also gave an
approximate number of externally-focused intelligence agencies and systems. In this regard, the study appears to have met its stated purpose.
Table 5.2: Outcome of Assuming Intelligence Spending and GDP is Linear or Exponential Assuming the Relationship is Assuming the Relationship is Linear Exponential
Estimating Intelligence Spending Outcome
Estimating Intelligence Personnel Outcome
Same results; this study Total intelligence spending assumes that the relationship is estimate would likely be linear. higher. This would be especially true for countries with GDP’s over approximately $1.8 trillion and then again at $2.1 trillion. Same results; this study Total intelligence personnel assumes that the relationship is estimate would likely be linear. slightly higher. There are relatively few countries beyond the two relative points that would be affected.
However there are many more topics for further research. As discussed, the methodology assumes a linear relationship exists between spending and employment. More research is necessary to explore this topic. Understanding this relationship will ultimately allow future studies to determine whether or not demand for intelligence professionals is growing. As intelligence studies programs increase in number and
function, it is beneficial to correctly gauge the industry’s demand. Hopefully this study plays a part in identifying that demand. In addition, now that a benchmark exists, national intelligence communities are able to quantitatively compare their performance against the industry average.
60 However, the breadth of this study is like an inverse function of its depth, that is, it does not delve deeply into both spending and personnel. Future studies may look at how these agencies spend their budgets, whether on personnel, technology, or on bureaucratic redundancies. Another topic is how they utilize their workforces, for
instance, what percentage are analysts, linguists, or support staff? These questions seem to be the next step in the field’s quantitative research.
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Appendix A: Websites You Can Trust
46.75 = Very High Credibility, 40.00 = High Credibility, 35.06 = Medium Credibility, 21.00 = Low Credibility, 7.46 = Not Credible Criteria Tips Value Y/N Check some of site’s Facts. 5.17 1. Content can be
corroborated? 2. Recommended by subject matter expert? 3. Author is reputable? 4. You perceive site as accurate? 5. Information was reviewed by an editor or peers 6. Author is associated with a reputable org? 7. Publisher is reputable?
Doctor, Biologist Google for opinions, ask others. Check with other sources. Science journals, newspapers. Google for opinions, ask others. Google for opinions, ask others. Trustworthy sources want to be known. Last update? Sites only link to other site they trust Librarian, Researcher A travel journal may suggest sites Trademark owners protect their marks. Bias is ok if not hidden It should look like someone cares.
4.94 4.64 4.56 4.52 4.02
8. Authors and
9. You perceive site as current? 10. Several other Web sites link to this one? 11. Recommended by a generalist? 12. Recommended by an independent subject-guide? 13. Domain includes a trademark name? 14. Site’s bias in clear? 15. Site has professional look?
3.78 3.68 3.65 3.56 3.45 3.06 2.86
Source: Norman, Dax. “Websites You Can Trust.” American Libraries 37, no. 7 (2006), 36, http://daxrnorman.googlepages.com/WebSitesYouCanTrust-Oct08.pdf.
Appendix B: Intelligence Spending Sorted Highest to Lowest
Number 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35
Countries United States Japan China Russia United Kingdom Italy Mexico South Korea France Germany Saudi Arabia Indonesia Switzerland Canada Iran Turkey Taiwan Greece Venezuela Finland Ireland Thailand Sweden United Arab Emirates Nigeria South Africa Portugal Malaysia Romania Netherlands Spain Israel Australia India Singapore
Total Expenditures $75,000,000,000 $4,736,464,406.93 $4,234,179,531.47 $3,251,264,510.00 $2,854,668,400.00 $2,225,874,049.52 $1,046,736,334.72 $1,000,000,000.00 $636,492,097.00 $515,661,895.00 $500,000,000.00 $492,297,799.83 $473,857,013.88 $469,481,900.00 $400,000,000.00 $378,301,672.00 $377,619,583.05 $343,948,073.89 $307,291,600.78 $263,557,983.06 $262,930,784.70 $262,853,827.85 $252,755,397.00 $250,245,409.41 $249,191,821.00 $237,920,657.72 $235,191,686.96 $213,765,937.06 $210,550,000.00 $200,271,805.00 $200,000,000.00 $194,086,145.77 $184,610,349.79 $178,120,639.00 $175,018,161.47
Number 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70
Countries Egypt Algeria Kuwait Hungary Kazakhstan Peru Argentina Norway Qatar Denmark Libya Ukraine Iraq Vietnam Morocco Angola Bangladesh Croatia Brazil Belarus Sudan Luxembourg Syria Slovenia Belgium Oman Ecuador Cuba Bulgaria Czech Republic Serbia Lithuania Azerbaijan Philippines Dominican Republic
Total Expenditures $155,995,389.31 $153,595,297.45 $152,075,399.60 $150,339,060.60 $127,199,096.80 $122,744,256.96 $114,126,558.00 $108,957,708.00 $98,410,499.97 $98,022,410.00 $96,264,365.73 $90,380,219.00 $87,448,958.19 $86,411,964.60 $83,107,629.71 $80,212,128.11 $78,821,132.99 $66,694,656.84 $63,600,000.00 $57,994,684.58 $55,708,104.08 $52,881,863.65 $52,718,330.34 $52,560,568.79 $51,860,690.13 $50,583,739.62 $50,572,196.09 $50,308,618.87 $50,011,373.02 $49,584,953.00 $48,156,712.86 $45,504,587.31 $44,613,811.73 $44,200,000.00 $43,862,520.45
Number 71 72 73 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104 105 106 107 108 109 Countries Austria Pakistan New Zealand Slovakia Tunisia Zambia Sri Lanka Guatemala Poland Latvia Uruguay Lebanon Uzbekistan Burma Yemen Botswana Ethiopia Cyprus Trinidad and Tobago Côte d'Ivoire Cameroon Panama El Salvador Kenya Bahrain Tanzania Jordan Equatorial Guinea Bosnia and Herzegovina Iceland Bolivia Ghana Paraguay North Korea Brunei Gabon Jamaica Honduras Senegal Total Expenditures $42,403,426.00 $41,600,000.00 $40,057,767.00 $39,370,697.13 $38,813,188.92 $38,508,618.00 $38,097,490.19 $37,474,139.67 $36,900,000.00 $32,758,608.49 $31,034,774.98 $27,838,179.69 $26,856,017.85 $26,148,014.80 $26,118,194.02 $25,677,600.00 $24,681,986.75 $23,994,184.87 $23,862,396.26 $22,613,771.32 $22,358,851.74 $22,209,747.84 $21,273,760.11 $21,229,784.00 $20,428,196.69 $19,932,786.94 $19,268,072.12 $17,820,321.32 $17,766,451.53 $16,881,447.71 $16,750,621.06 $15,510,653.77 $15,397,142.41 $14,191,805.69 $13,999,413.56 $13,966,706.90 $13,849,347.70 $13,588,656.36 $12,842,174.88 128 129 130 131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141 142 143 144 145 146 120 121 122 123 124 125 126 127 117 118 119 Number 110 111 112 113 114 115 116 Countries Albania Georgia Nepal Afghanistan Armenia Colombia D.R. Congo (Kinshasa) Estonia Cambodia Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) Mozambique Macedonia Madagascar Mali Mauritius Chad Malta Burkina Faso Papua New Guinea Bahamas Turkmenistan Namibia Burundi Haiti Benin Nicaragua Moldova Rwanda Palestinian Authority Niger Laos Mongolia Tajikistan Montenegro Guinea Liechtenstein Chile Total Expenditures $12,470,858.06 $12,380,433.76 $12,214,976.53 $11,602,207.58 $11,474,266.81 $11,428,800.00 $11,148,162.15 $10,867,484.00 $10,756,644.16 $10,364,164.21 $9,286,768.26 $9,205,001.61 $8,901,984.00 $8,448,900.52 $8,405,612.29 $8,070,849.98 $8,020,828.03 $7,794,767.27 $7,784,185.70 $7,179,112.44 $6,977,100.70 $6,906,166.00 $6,900,000.00 $6,687,550.54 $6,676,007.02 $6,108,450.22 $5,891,047.11 $5,758,689.00 $5,250,381.31 $5,174,386.42 $5,059,913.10 $5,057,989.18 $4,939,668.02 $4,638,574.33 $4,369,225.34 $4,001,756.37 $4,000,000.00
Number 147 148 149 150 151 152 153 154 155 156 157 158 159 160 161 162 163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 183 Countries Kosovo Barbados Fiji Kyrgyzstan Andorra Mauritania Zimbabwe Suriname Togo Swaziland Somalia Costa Rica Central African Republic Cape Verde San Marino Lesotho Eritrea Belize Malawi Bhutan Monaco Maldives Antigua and Barbuda Guyana Saint Lucia Djibouti Liberia Seychelles Gambia Grenada Uganda Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Vanuatu Saint Kitts and Nevis Samoa Comoros Timor-Leste Total Expenditures $3,659,298.37 $3,541,939.17 $3,453,438.79 $3,432,795.00 $3,121,562.36 $3,040,757.66 $2,996,216.00 $2,870,490.63 $2,780,066.32 $2,734,854.17 $2,436,646.36 $2,164,904.00 $1,921,035.45 $1,657,458.23 $1,638,219.01 $1,558,376.28 $1,419,853.94 $1,328,467.68 $1,323,120.00 $1,315,962.19 $1,261,130.43 $1,211,108.48 $1,208,222.60 $1,087,015.55 $986,009.68 $944,645.37 $804,199.12 $802,275.19 $777,264.22 $614,692.87 $606,953.15 $578,138.36 $551,203.46 $533,888.17 $516,572.88 $511,763.07 $480,018.37 191 192 193 194 195 185 186 187 188 189 190 Number 184 Countries Solomon Islands GuineaBissau Dominica Sierra Leone Tonga Micronesia, Sao Tome and Principe Palau Marshall Islands Kiribati Tuvalu Nauru Total Expenditures $455,007.39 $443,463.87 $350,153.68 $317,745.00 $248,185.85 $243,376.05 $169,305.08 $163,533.31 $143,332.14 $131,788.61 $28,858.82 $22,125.10
Appendix C: Data for Individual Countries
This appendix cites its information using the Chicago Style Manual, with one minor exception. Indicated before each cited source are the credibility results from Dax Norman’s Trust Evaluation Worksheet. The results include both a verbal assessment, anywhere from “Not Credible” to “Very High Credibility,” and also the quantitative finding. A record of the researcher’s scoring is available for each individual source but will only be provided by request. The researcher used a general score for information from Jane’s Information Group, which is “High Credibility, 44.3.” Government websites and uploaded documents were not scored. There are four columns of information in this appendix: first, the name of the country, second, the name of the identified intelligence agencies, third, intelligence spending, and fourth, intelligence personnel. There are essentially two rows of information, the first row has a country’s name, total spending, and total personnel (this row is in faded grey). An Italicized number indicates that the total was estimated using the methodology outlined in Chapter 3. Under each country, a second row contains an individual intelligence agency, with its identified spending and personnel. The information in this row has citations according to the location of the source. If the information was not identified then the cell is left empty. If a country has more than one intelligence agency, or program, it is likewise listed under the country’s name.
National Directorate of Security (NDS)
Albania State Intelligence Service (ShISh) Military Intelligence Agency
Algeria Department of Information and Security (DRS)
Angola Directorate of Intelligence and Security
Antigua and Barbuda
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > The Balkans > Albania > Security and Foreign Forces, “Total Strength 5,000 (estimated)” [accessed September 21, 2008].
State Intelligence Office (SIDE) National Military Strategic Intelligence (DNIEM) 8 Armenia National Security Ministry (NSM) Intelligence Department (MI) 9 Australia Australian Secret Intelligence Service (ASIS) Defence Signals Directorate (DSD) Office of National Assessments (ONA) Defence Intelligence Organisation (DIO)
Low Credibility, 26.85, Natasha Niebieskikwiat, "El Gobierno pasa a controlar las tareas de inteligencia militar," Clarin, April 23, 2006, http://www.clarin.com/diario/2006/04/23/elpais/p-00315.htm [accessed April 30, 2009]. 89 Ibid. 90 Ibid. 91 Ibid. 92 Australian Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade, Australian Secret Intelligence: Portfolio Budget Statements 2007-2008 (Canberra: Australian Government, 2008), 198, http://www.dfat.gov.au/dept/budget/2007_2008_pbs/2007-2008_FA+T_PBS_06_ASIS.pdf. 93 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Oceania > Australia > Security and Foreign Forces, "The ONA budget for 2005-06 was USD21 million (AUD28 million), representing a 290 per cent increase over four years from the 2001-02 level." 94 Office of National Assessments, About Us, http://www.ona.gov.au/aboutus.htm [accessed April 24, 2009].
Defence Imagery & Geospatial Organisation (DIGO) 10 Austria Army Intelligence Service (HNA) Abwehramt (AbwA)
Azerbaijan Ministry for National Security (MNS)
Bahamas Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU)
Bahrain Bahrain National Security Agency (BNSA)
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Oceania > Australia > Security and Foreign Forces, "DIGO has grown rapidly over the last few years, witnessing an increase in its staff numbers by over one third and a near tripling of its budget since inception to AUD90.5 million” [accessed November 11, 2008]. 96 Siegfried Beer, "Bound" to Cooperate: Austria’s Little-known Intelligence Community Since 1945," Journal of Intelligence History 4, no. 1 (2003), http://www.acipss.org/intelligence/beitraege/bound_to_cooperate/current_organizations.htm. 97 Ibid. 98 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Russia and the CIS > Azerbaijan > Security and Foreign Forces, “Total Strength 5,000 (estimated).” 99 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Central America & the Caribbean > Bahamas > Security and Foreign Forces , "There is a 97-strong Drug Enforcement Unit (DEU), with a 19-member strike force that participates in OPBAT missions; a 10-member marine unit which crews and services three fast interceptor boats; a 22-member general investigation unit; drug canine units; and a 14-member technical and surveillance unit with a nine-member unit in Freeport and three commanders” [November 12, 2008].
Anti-Money Laundering and Terrorist Financing Unit (AMLTFU) 14 Bangladesh Directorate-General of National Security Intelligence (NSI) Directorate General of Forces Intelligence (DGFI) 15 Barbados Regional Security System Liaison Unit 16 Belarus State Security Committee (KGB) Main Intelligence Directorate - MI (GRU) 17 Belgium $51,860,690.13 1,600103 $57,994,684.58 $3,541,939.17 10,000101 $78,821,132.99 10,000
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Gulf States > Bahrain > Security and Foreign Forces, "In 1998, Bahrain set up a new force, the National Guard (NG), to help protect the country from external military threats and also threats to internal security. It was proposed that the NG would be an elite, lightly armed force. It is organised on the basis of three battalions and has an estimated strength of about 2,000” [accessed November 13, 2008]. 101 Low Credibility, 24.52, Maloy Krishna Dhar, "The Fulcrum of Eastern Evil: DGFI Directs Terrorism and Jihad Against India," Frontier India Strategic and Defence, November 1, 2008, http://frontierindia.net/the-fulcrum-of-eastern-evil-dgfi-directs-terrorism-and-jihad-against-india. 102 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Central America & the Caribbean > Barbados > Security and Foreign Forces, "There is also a special Financial Investigations Unit, which targets money laundering, financial fraud, and similar offences. There is a 90-strong task force for special operations, which is trained by and liaises directly with the Regional Security System” [accessed October 4, 2008]. 103 Herman Matthijs, "Intelligence Services in Belgium", Intelligence and National Security 23, no. 4 (2008): 552-576.
Veiligheid Van de Staat (VS) Algemene Inlichtingen- en Veiligheidsdienst (AIVD) 18 Belize
Bolivia Bosnia and Herzegovina Intelligence and Security Agency (OSA)
Botswana Directorate of Intelligence and Security (DIS)
Ibid. High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > The Balkans > Bosnia-Herzegovina > Security and Foreign Forces, "A total of 200 agents of the former Intelligence and Security Service of Republika Srpska, which employs some 400 people, and 307 members of the former Federation Security and Intelligence Agency, were sacked on 31 December 2004. In line with the new systematisation, the new OSA will employ 703 people” [accessed September 29, 2008]. 106 Low Credibility, 24.01, Isaiah Morewagae, “Botswana: Police Chief Unaware of DIS Torture Report," AllAfrica Global Media, February 9, 2009, http://allafrica.com/stories/200902080020.html. 107 Marco Cepik, "Democratic Control of Intelligence in Brazil,” in Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas C. Bruneau and Steven C. Boraz (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 165, http://books.google.com/books?id=zvGTOjWOID4C&pg=PA149&dq=%E2%80%98%E2%80%98Structu
Brazilian Intelligence Agency (ABIN) Ministry of Defense
Brunei Department of Security and Intelligence Directorate of Intelligence (MI)
Bulgaria National Intelligence Service (NIS) Military Information Service (MIS)
Burma Office of the Chief of Military Affairs Security (OCMAS)
ral+Change+and+Democratic+Control+of+Intelligence+in+Brazil%22&ei=R6qySc_sEpGOMsennPkL&cl ient=firefox-a#PPA169,M1. 108 Ibid, 169. 109 Marco Cepik and Antunes, Priscila, "Brazil's New Intelligence System: An Institutional Assessment," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 16, no. 3 (2003): 370. 110 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Southeast Asia > Brunei > Security and Foreign Forces. , “Department of Security and Intelligence – 250” [accessed December 12, 2008].
National Intelligence Service (SNR) 30 Cambodia Cambodian Intelligence and Research Department (MI) 31 Cameroon National Security Service (Sureté Nationale) 32 Canada Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) Communications Security Establishment (CSE) Transaction and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada (FINTRAC) 33 Cape Verde Central African Republic
United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, La gouvernance, http://www.bi.undp.org/fr/service_renseigne.htm. 112 Canadian Security Intelligence Service, Public Report 2006-2007 (Gatineau: Public Works and Government Services, 2007), 18, http://www.csis-scrs.gc.ca/pblctns/nnlrprt/2006/rprt2006-eng.pdf. 113 Ibid, 15. 114 Roy Rempel, "Canada's Parliamentary Oversight of Security and Intelligence," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 17, no. 4 (2004): 639. 115 Communications Security Establishment Canada, CSEC: An Overview, http://www.cse-cst.gc.ca/homeaccueil/about-apropos/overview-survol-eng.html [accessed November 29, 2008]. 116 Financial Transactions and Reports Analysis Centre of Canada, FINTRAC Annual Report 2008 (Ottawa: 2008), 22, http://www.fintrac-canafe.gc.ca/publications/ar/2008/ar-eng.pdf. 117 Ibid, 21.
Chad National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)
Chile National Intelligence Agency (ANI) Directorate of National Defense Intelligence (DIDN)
China Ministry of State Security (MSS) General Staff Department Second Division (Second Division) General Political Department - Liaison Department (Liaison Department) United Front Works Department
Colombia Administrative Department of Security (DAS)
High Credibility, 44.3, José Higuera, "Chile set to create a National Intelligence Agency," Jane's Defense Weekly, March 19, 2003, www.janes.com [accessed March 15, 2009]. 119 Medium Credibility, 36.88, "Chile," Federation of American Scientists, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/chile/dina.htm [accessed January 3, 2009]. 120 The original figure, $100 million, represents the total annual budget for DAS, which provides "strategic intelligence and counterintelligence; investigates crimes that threaten state security such as terrorism, kidnapping, and drug and human trafficking; and all issues concerning immigration." It has a total of 7,000 employees, with 800 working specifically on intelligence. DAS spends approximately $14,286 per employee (Using $100 million as the total budget and 7,000 as total employees). However, the source also indicates that only 800 work specifically on intelligence. If DAS spent the same per employee ($14,286),
Military Intelligence (DIPOL) 39 Comoros Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) D.R. Congo (Kinshasa) National Intelligence Agency (ANR) Military Directorate on Anti-state Activities (DMIAP) 42 Costa Rica Security Intelligence Directorate (DIS) 43 Côte d'Ivoire $2,164,904.00 195 $511,763.07 250
National Security Council
the total spent for intelligence would be $11428800. See Steven Boraz, "Colombia," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches, vol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 137. 121 Steven Boraz, "Colombia," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches, vol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 137. Also see Steven Boraz, “Establishing Democratic Control of Intelligence in Colombia," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 19, no. 1 (2005): 90. 122 Paul Chaves, "Los Espías no Bastan: Definiendo las Politicas Públicas en Materia de Servicios de Inteligenciaen Costa Rica," in Research and Education in Defense and Security Studies (Washington DC: Center for Hemispheric Defense Studies, 2001), http://www.fas.org/irp/world/costa_rica/chaves.html. 123 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > The Balkans > Croatia > Security and Foreign Forces [accessed October 13, 2008].
Security and Intelligence Agency (SOA) Military Security and Intelligence Agency (VSOA) Croatian Intelligence Service (HIS) 45 Cuba Directorate General of Intelligence (DGI) America Department (DA) $50,308,618.87 15,000
Office for Foreign Relations and Information (ÚZSI/BIS)
Military Intelligence (VZ)
Edward González and Kevin McCarthy, “Cuba After Castro: Legacies, Challenges, and Impediments,” RAND (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2004), 44, http://www.rand.org/pubs/technical_reports/2005/RAND_TR131.pdf. 125 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > Central Europe and the Baltic States > Czech Republic > Security and Foreign Forces, "The UZSI is the smallest of the four Czech intelligence services numbering approximately 500 personnel” [accessed October 18, 2008]. 126 Security Information Service [BIS], Annual Report of the Security Information Service (BIS) for 2005, http://www.bis.cz/_english/vz2005/vz2005-9.html [accessed May 5, 2009]. 127 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > Central Europe and the Baltic States > Czech Republic > Security and Foreign Forces, "The UZSI is the smallest of the four Czech intelligence services numbering approximately 500 personnel” [accessed October 18, 2008]. 128 Kieran Williams and Denis Deletant, Security Intelligence Services in new Democracies: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania (New York: Houndmills, 2001), 94.
Denmark Defence Intelligence Service (FE)
Danish Security Intelligence Service (PET)
Djibouti Service de la Documentation et de la Sécurité (SDS)
Egypt Egyptian General Intelligence Service (EGIS) Military Intelligence (MI)
Forsvarets Efterretningstjeneste [ Danish Defence Intelligence Service], FE's Budget, http://feddis.dk/Om%20FE/Budget/Pages/default.aspx [accessed April 30, 2009]. 130 Danish Security and Intelligence Service, Organisation and Personnel, http://www.pet.dk/English/Organisation.aspx [accessed April 30, 2009]. 131 Autor Localizado, Africa South of the Sahara 2003, 32nd ed. (Routledge, 2002), 348, http://books.google.com/books?id=1KBP7QbalX0C&pg=PP1&dq=Africa+South+of+the+Sahara+2003&c lient=firefox-a.
National Directorate of Intelligence (DNI) Ministry of Defense and Public Security (MI) 55 Equatorial Guinea $17,820,321.32 1,352
Eritrea National Security Office (NSO)
Estonia Estonian Intelligence Bureau (EIB)
Ethiopia National Intelligence and Security Service (NISS)
Fiji Fiji Intelligence Service (FIS)
Finland General Staff Intelligence Division
This comes from the Estonian Ministry of Defence Budget for 2007 where it is listed under "Information Board". See: Estonian Ministry of Defence, "Estonian Ministry of Defence Budget 2007," Ministry of Defence, http://www.mod.gov.ee/?op=body&id=439 [accessed March 2, 2009]. 133 Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC: Brassey's Inc, 2007), 257.
France General Division of External Security (DGSE) Directorate of Military Intelligence (DRM) Directorate of Territorial Surveillance (DST) Direction de la Protection et de la Securite de la Defense (DPSD)
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > Western Europe > France > Security and Foreign Forces, "As of 2007, the DGSE employed 4,406 personnel, of which two-thirds were civilian and a third military. Military personnel are predominantly attached to the 44th Infantry Regiment. The DGSE has a budget of EUR445 million (excluding the wages of military personnel), translating to 0.9 per cent of the Ministry of Defence's budget. The DGSE operates out of two primary stations, Mortier and Tourelles, located in Paris. Although attached to the Ministry of Defence, the DGSE is highly dependent on the prime minister's office at Matignon” [accessed December 19, 2008]. 135 Ibid. 136 European Parliament, Report on the Existence of a Global System for the Interception of Private and Commercial Communications, Report A5-0264/2001PAR1, July 11, 2001, 173, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-20010264+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN [accessed April 30, 2009]. 137 Ibid. 138 Hans Born and Marina Caparini, ed., Democratic Control of Intelligence Services: Containing Rogue Elephants (Ashgate Publishing, 2007), 131, http://books.google.com/books?id=FUtNtTJVe6EC&printsec=frontcover&dq=Democratic+Control+of+Int elligence+Services:+Containing+Rogue&ei=NmgJSszUHaG2zQTqzeiQDw&client=firefox-a#PPA131,M1 [accessed May 5, 2009]. 139 European Parliament, Report on the Existence of a Global System for the Interception of Private and Commercial Communications, Report A5-0264/2001PAR1, July 11, 2001, 173, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//NONSGML+REPORT+A5-20010264+0+DOC+PDF+V0//EN [accessed April 30, 2009]. 140 Low Credibility, 32.25, "Exclusive: How DPSD Operates," Intelligence Newsletter, July 12, 2000, www.nexis.com. 141 Ibid.
National Intelligence Agency (NIA) 64 Georgia Foreign Intelligence and Security Service (FISS) 65 Germany Federal Intelligence Service (BND) Military Security Service (MAD) Intelligence Service (G-2) $515,661,895.00 $12,380,433.76 200
Ghana Defence Intelligence Agency
Greece National Intelligence Service (EYP)
"Gela Bezuashvili; Tblissi," Intelligence Online, February 14, 2008, www.nexis.com. Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, The 2006 Budget: Chancellor and Federal Chancellery, http://www.bundesregierung.de/nn_6562/Content/EN/Artikel/2006/03/2006-03-29-the-2006budget-chancellor-and-federal-chancellery.html. 144 Bundesnachrichtendienst, Herzlich Willkommen beim Arbeitgeber, http://www.bnd.de/cln_090/nn_1365968/DE/JobsUndKarriere/JobsUndKarriere__node.html?__nnn=true [accessed May 2,2009]. 145 Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc, 2003), 71. 146 John M. Nomikos, "Greek Intelligence Service (NIS-EYP): Past, Present and Future," National Security and the Future 9, no. 1-2 (2008): 84, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/greece/nomikos2.pdf.
Independent Intelligence Branch (MI) 68 Grenada Grenada Drug Information Network 69 Guatemala Military Intelligence Directorate (MI) Secretariat of Strategic Analysis (SAE) 70 Guinea $4,369,225.34 5,500 $37,474,139.67 5,500 $614,692.87 250
Hungary Military Intelligence Service (KFH) Military CounterIntelligence Service (KBH)
Foreign Intelligence Service (IH) 76 Iceland $16,881,447.71 477
India Research and Analysis Wing (RAW) Intelligence Bureau (IB) National Technical Facilities Organisation (NTFO) Defence Intelligence Agency (DIA)
Indonesia National Intelligence Agency (BIN) Strategic Intelligence Agency (BAIS)
Iran Ministry of Intelligence and Security (MOIS)
Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC: Brassey's Inc., 2003), 78. 148 Ibid. 149 Low Credibility, 30.9, Maloy Krishna Dhar, interview by Susheela Menon, "Keep Up the Pressure, Says Former IB operator," India Together, January 12, 2009, http://www.indiatogether.org/2009/jan/ivwdhar.htm [accessed March 25, 2009]. 150 Low Credibility, 33.37, Sanjay Singh, "New Intelligence Agency Set Up," The Pioneer (New Delhi), April 7, 2003, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/india/ntfo.html.
Intelligence Directorate (MI) 80 Iraq General Security Directorate Military Intelligence Service 81 Ireland $87,448,958.19
$262,930,784.70 Military Intelligence (G-2)
Israel Institute for Espionage and Special Tasks (Mossad)
Estate of Yael Botvin et al. v. The Islamic Republic of Iran, United States District Court for the District of Columbia, Civil Action No.: 05-220 (RMU), January 28, 2005, 8, http://nefafoundation.org/miscellaneous/FeaturedDocs/Botvin_v_Iran_Complaint.pdf. 152 Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies), 404, http://books.google.com/books?id=QaosFaOqzrEC&pg=PA235&lpg=PA235&dq=General+Intelligence+P residency+(GIP)&source=bl&ots=7mcsArTL0&sig=1hZp3Ol0xjxqnqTwQDd_RwxPfYU&hl=en&ei=NvXsScyAKp7ItgeuojOBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10#PPA233,M1 [accessed April 20, 2009]. Also see High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Gulf States > Iran > Security and Foreign Forces, “The agency is believed to have approximately 15,000 officers and support staff. MOIS differs from SAVAK in that its personnel are all civilians” [accessed April 20, 2009]. 153 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Gulf States > Iran > Security and Foreign Forces, The Intelligence Directorate of the IRGC is relatively small, boasting no more than 2,000 officers. Its officers are heavily vetted for ideological conformity, and unlike the VEVAK, their loyalty to the Islamic regime is beyond doubt." [accessed November 15, 1008]. See also Mahan Abedin, "The Iranian Intelligence Services and the War On Terror," Terrorism Monitor 2, no. 10 (2005), http://www.jamestown.org/programs/gta/single/?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=393&tx_ttnews[backPid]=179&no_ca che=1 [accessed on April 10, 2009]. 154 Ibrahim Al-Marashi, "Iraq's Security and Intelligence Network: A Guide and Analysis," Middle East Review of International Affairs 6, no. 3 (2002), http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2002/issue3/jv6n3a1.html. 155 Anthony H. Cordesman and Arleigh A. Burke, "Iraqi Intelligence and Security Forces and Capabilities for Popular Warfare," Center for Strategic and International Studies, January 16, 2003, 7, http://www.csis.org/media/csis/pubs/iraqi_popwarfare%5B1%5D.pdf.
Military Intelligence Branch (Aman) Research and Political Planning Center 83 Italy Intelligence and Democratic Security Service (SISDE) Service for Information and Military Security (SISDE) Security and Intelligence Division (RIS) 84 Jamaica Defence Force Intelligence Unit (HQ JDF Int Unit) 85 Japan Cabinet Intelligence and Research Office (CIRO) Cabinet Satellite Intelligence Center (CSICE) $4,736,464,406.93 $13,849,347.70 $2,225,874,049.52
Paul Todd and Jonathan Bloch, Global Intelligence: The World's Secret Services Today (London: Zed Books, 2003), 152-153. 157 Ibid. 158 Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC: Brassey's Inc, 2003), 103. 159 Ibid, 103-104. 160 Ken Kotani, "Current State of Intelligence and Intelligence Issues in Japan," The National Institute for Defense Studies News 100 (2006): 2, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/briefing/2006/pdf/100.pdf. 161 Hajime Kitaoka, "Japan," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches, vol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 266.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Intelligence and Analysis Service (IAS) Defense Intelligence Headquarters Public Security Intelligence Agency (PSIA) 86 Jordan General Intelligence Department (GID) 87 Kazakhstan National Security Committee - Syrbar (KNB) Defence Intelligence of the Ministry of Defence (GRU) 88 Kenya National Security Intelligence Service (NSIS) Military Intelligence (MI) $21,229,784.00 $127,199,096.80 $19,268,072.12
Ken Kotani, "Current State of Intelligence and Intelligence Issues in Japan," The National Institute for Defense Studies News, no. 100 (2006), 2, http://www.nids.go.jp/english/dissemination/briefing/2006/pdf/100.pdf. 163 Ibid, 271. 164 Ibid, 268. 165 Ibid, 270. 166 Low Credibility, 24.11, Fred Mukinda, "Battle Lines Drawn Over Election Violence Report," Daily Nation, October 22, 2008, http://www.nation.co.ke/News/-/1056/483076/-/view/printVersion/-/thp3kkz//index.html. 167 Ibid.
North Korea State Security Department, Communications Interception Bureau Reconnaissance Bureau (MPAF)
South Korea National Intelligence Service (NIS) Defense Intelligence Command (DIC)
Kuwait Kuwait State Security (KSS)
Jon Moran, "South Korea," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches vol. 1, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 287. 169 Ibid. 170 The Kuwait State Security is also referenced by other sources as the National Guard. The source here describes the duties of the guard as, “providing assistance to the military and security forces, in addition to the execution of any assignment entrusted to it by the Higher Defense Council, such as safeguarding establishments and utilities of a sensitive nature and importance.” This description indicates, at the qualitative level, to the researcher that it is an intelligence agency. See Anthony Cordesman and Khalid alRodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars, vol. 1 (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2007), 103.
Kyrgyz National Security Service (SNB) 95 Laos Ministry of National Defence 96 Latvia Military Intelligence's Security Service (J-2) 97 Lebanon State Security Organisation (SSO) General Security Directorate (MI) 98 Lesotho National Security Service (NSS) 99 Liberia
Stéphane Lefebvre and Roger McDermott, "Russia and the Intelligence Services of Central Asia," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 21, no. 2 (2008): 272. 172 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Southern Africa > Lesotho > Security and Foreign Forces, "TOTAL STRENGTH 300...It is responsible directly to the prime minister, in his capacity as minister of defence. Its role is set out in the National Security Service Act of 1998, and includes to: protect the state against threats of espionage, terrorism or sabotage which may infringe on national security; protect the state from activities of agents of foreign powers and from actions of persons intended to overthrow or undermine democracy by political, industrial or violent means; protect the economic well-being of the state against threats posed by the actions or intentions of persons inside or outside Lesotho; and protect the state against any activity that may tend to operate to undermine national security” [accessed December 27, 2008].
National Security Agency (NSA) Minister of National Security (MNS) National Security Council (NSC) 100 Libya Jamahiriya Security Organisation 101 Liechtenstein $4,001,756.37 $96,264,365.73 200
Lithuania State Security Department (VSD)
Luxembourg Second Bureau of the Army - Deuxième Bureau de l'Armée (MI)
Intelligence Agency (AR
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > North Africa > Libya > Security and Foreign Forces, "Hayat Ann al Jamahiriya is Libya's intelligence/security service. It is divided into two main wings, one dealing with domestic security (al-Amn al-Dakhili) and the other with foreign intelligence gathering and operations (al-Amn al-Khariji). The latter is run by Musa Kusa and is sometimes known as the Secretariat of External Security (SES) and has been involved in operations outside the country aimed at liquidating opponents of the regime. Approximately 200 agents are thought to be active” [accessed November 20, 2008].
Security and Counterintelligence Directorate (UBK) 105 Madagascar General Directorate of Information and Documentation (DGID) 106 Malawi National Intelligence Bureau 107 Malaysia $1,323,120.00 $8,901,984.00 300
High Credibility, 44.3 Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Southern Africa > Madagascar > Security and Foreign Forces, "300 - DGID…The General Directorate of Information and Documentation (Direction Générale de l'Information et de la Documentation: DGID)...was tasked as the main Madagascan internal and external intelligence agency with a heavy political bias towards the then ruling party” [accessed December 27, 2008]. 175 Malawi Economic Justice Network, "Comments on the proposed Malawi Budget 2001-2002: Report for Members of Parliament," Southern African Regional Poverty Network, 10, http://www.sarpn.org.za/CountryPovertyPapers/Malawi/ProposedBudget/MalawiBudget2001.pdf. 176 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Southeast Asia > Malaysia > Security and Foreign Forces, "Other intelligence units are Malaysia's external intelligence organisation, controlled by the Department of the Prime Minister, and the Ministry of Defence's jointservice 2,000-strong Military Intelligence” [accessed January 3, 2009]. 177 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > West Africa > Mali > Security and Foreign Forces, "Since 1996, specialist camel patrol units have been used within the National Guard to re-extend state control into the desert regions. Functions include border patrol, rural policing and dispute resolution, as well as countertrafficking and the gathering of intelligence on Saharan insurgent organisations...Known as Unités Méharistes, they have been funded and equipped by France on the model
Mauritania Direction Générale de la Securité Extérieure et de la Documentation (DGSED)
Mexico Center for Intelligence and National Security (CISEN)
Moldova Information and Security Service (SIS)
of colonial forces...Each 'brigade' is composed of 100 to 140 armed men...They are based in the following locations: Abeibara (Adrar des Iforhas mountains; Algerian border), Gossi (Burkina Faso border), Inabog (near Tessalit; Algerian border), Inakounder (near Araouane; northern desert), Léré (Mauritanian border), Ménaka (Niger border)” [accessed December 27, 2008]. 178 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Russia and the CIS > Moldova > Security and Foreign Forces, "Estimated Strength: 400+ The SIS was created in 2000 on the basis of the National Security Ministry. The agency's operations are governed by the Law on the SIS. The SIS director is appointed by the parliament and has a ministerial status, reporting to the prime minister. The current SIS director is Artur Resetnicov, a former legal advisor to President Vladimir Voronin” November 13, 2008].
General Intelligence Agency (GIA) Information Research Agency (IRA) 119 Montenegro $4,638,574.33 5,500
Morocco General Directorate of Studies and Documentation (DGED)
Mozambique State Security and Intelligence Service (SISE)
Namibia Namibia Central Intelligence Service (NCIS)
Nepal National Investigation Department (Guptachar Bibhag/NID)
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > North Africa > Morocco > Security and Foreign Forces, "The DGED is a counter-intelligence service, set up after an attempted coup against King Hassan II in 1972...It has been reported that the DGED has a strength of about 4,000” [accessed November 20, 2008]. 180 Institute for Public Policy Research, "National Budget 2008/09: Great Dollops of Jam," IPPR Briefing Paper No. 42, March 2008, 5, http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/cpsi/unpan031201.pdf [accessed January 4, 2009].
Military Intelligence Directorate (RNA) 125 Netherlands Defence Intelligence and Security Service (MIVD) General Intelligence and Security Service (AIVD) 126 New Zealand New Zealand Security Intelligence Service (NZSIS) Government Communications Security Bureau (GCSB) External Assessment Bureau (EAB)
Defence Intelligence and Security Service, Annual Report of the Defence Intelligence and Security Service of the Netherlands (The Hague: 2002), 29, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/netherlands/mivd2002.doc. 182 Ibid, 28. 183 Beatrice de Graaf, "The Netherlands," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches vol. 2, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 352. 184 According to Janes, the AIVD had 750 personnel in 2002. However, according to annual report, the service added 250 employees in 2004 and 2005. See High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > Western Europe > Netherlands > Security and Foreign Forces > "In 2001 the Netherlands National Communications Security Agency (NBV) was also incorporated into the service to increase its range and quality of information sources. The AIVD is undergoing an expansion in personnel. In 2002, it had 750 operatives with a target of recruiting an additional 150 each year until the AIVD reaches its desired strength in 2008. " and Beatrice de Graaf, "The Netherlands," in Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro, PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches Volume 2 (London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), p. 352. 185 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, “Annual Report 2006,” House of Representatives, http://www.nzsis.govt.nz/reports/ar06/review.aspx. 186 New Zealand Security Intelligence Service, Overview, http://www.nzsis.govt.nz/about/ [accessed March 20, 2009]. 187 Government Communications Security Bureau, Organisation, http://www.gcsb.govt.nz/aboutus/organisation.html [accessed March 20, 2009]. 188 Ibid. 189 Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc, 2003), 138. 190 Ibid.
Directorate of Defence Intelligence and Security (DDIS) 127 Nicaragua Directorate of Intelligence Affairs (DAI) 128 Niger $5,174,386.42 5,500 $6,108,450.22 2,700
Nigeria Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) National Intelligence Agency (NIA)
Norway Norwegian Intelligence Service (NIS)
Oman Internal Security Service (ISS)
Pakistan Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI)
Budget Office, "2009 Budget: Intelligence Community," Ministry of Finance, http://www.budgetoffice.gov.ng/2009_budget/2009BudgetICom.pdf [accessed April 1, 2009]. 192 Not Credible, 7.46, Norwegian Intelligence Service, http://dic.academic.ru/dic.nsf/enwiki/4133162 [accessed March 1, 2009]. 193 Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC: Brassey's Inc, 2003), 143-144.
General Intelligence Service
Panama National Service of Intelligence and Security
Papua New Guinea
Peru National Intelligence Centre (CNI) Army Intelligence Service (SIE)
Sean Winchell, "Pakistan's ISI: The Invisible Government," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 16, no. 3 (2003): 384. 195 Roland Friedrich and Mohammed Najib, "Palestine," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches, vol. 2, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 604. 196 Ibid, 606. 197 High Credibility, 44.3, "Philippines Intelligence Budget," Jane's Defense Weekly, December 22, 1999, www.janes.com.
National Security Council (NSC) National Intelligence Coordinating Agency (NICA) 140 Poland
The Intelligence Agency (AW) Military Intelligence Service (SWW) Military Counterintelligence Service (SKW) 141 Portugal Department of Defense Strategic Information Service (SIED) 142 Qatar $98,410,499.97 $235,191,686.96
Qatari State Security (QSS)
House of Representatives, "Intel Agencies Invoke Broader National Security Concerns to Justify Budget," Congress of the Philippines 13, no. 81 (2005), http://www.congress.gov.ph/committees/commnews/commnews_det.php?newsid=478 [accessed April 29, 2009]. 199 Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington DC: Brassey's Inc, 2003), 151-155. 200 Ibid. 201 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Central Europe and the Baltic States > Poland > Security and Foreign Forces, “The WSI was disbanded on 30 September 2006. Minister of Defence, Radek Sikorski, has been engaged with releasing WSI personnel trained under the former Soviet regime from duty. He has also discussed the resignation of WSI leadership. The WSI will be replaced by a new military intelligence (SWW) and counter-intelligence (SKW) service…According to Wassermann both the SWW and SKW would require between 1,200 and 1,300 personnel to be effective including civilian personnel” [accessed October 18, 2008] 202 Ibid.
National Security Shield (NSS) Intelligence Centre Against Drug Trafficking 143 Romania Foreign Intelligence Service (SIE) Defense General Directorate for Intelligence (DGIA) Special Telecommunication Service (STS) 144 Russia Federal Security Service (FSB) Foreign Intelligence Service (SVR)
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Gulf States > Qatar > Security and Foreign Forces > "Qatar launched a major security project, National Security Shield (NSS), in July 2007. The NSS, which is expected to deploy more than 800 personnel when fully operational, has the task of operating a network of electronic surveillance stations on Qatar's land and sea borders, and also of covering the emirate's airspace. The mission of the NSS is to supply security information to all official agencies in Qatar, including the armed forces and the Ministry of the Interior” [accessed November 13, 2008]. 204 Valentin Filip, "The Intelligence Phenomenon in a New Democratic Milieu: Romania - A Case Study" (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate School, March 2006), 44, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/romania/filip.pdf. 205 The source used here indicates a total of 46,800 individuals work in the "Security and Intelligence Service," however, this figure also includes the Romanian Intelligence Service (SRI). The SRI is the internal intelligence agency and the same source indicates that it has approximately 5,000 employees. This number was subtracted from the total to reach 41,800. This number includes the DGIA, SIE, and STS. High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > The Balkans > Romania > Security and Foreign Forces [accessed October 14, 2008]. 206 Low Credibility, 23.27, Ivan Safranchuk, “Funding for the Russian Secret Services," Agentura.ru, http://www.agentura.ru/english/experts/safranchuk/. 207 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Russia and the CIS > Russia Federation > Security and Foreign Forces > Security and Foreign Forces [accessed November 13, 2008].
Federal Agency of Government Information and Communication (FAPSI)
Main Intelligence Directorate (GRU) 145 Rwanda Directorate of Military Intelligence (DMI) National Security Service (NSS) 146 Saint Kitts and Nevis $5,758,689210 $5,758,689.00 2,700
Saint Lucia Saint Vincent and the Grenadines Samoa Transnational Crime Unit (TCU)
Paul Todd, Jonathan Bloch, Global Intelligence: The World's Secret Services Today (London: Zed Books, 2003), 143. 209 Ibid, 146. 210 Ministry of Finance and Planning, "Annex II-3: State expenditure by Budget Agency – 2008-2010," Government of Rwanda, 1, http://www.minecofin.gov.rw/en/inno-download_file.php?fileId=100.
Sao Tome and Principe Saudi Arabia General Intelligence Presidency (GIP) Military Intelligence (MI) Financial Investigation Unit (SA-FIU)
Senegal Senegalese Intelligence Agency
Serbia Security-Intelligence Agency (BIA) Military-Security Agency (VBA)
Anthony Cordesman and Khalid Al-Rodhan, Gulf Military Forces in an Era of Asymmetric Wars (Washington DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies), 233-234, http://books.google.com/books?id=QaosFaOqzrEC&pg=PA235&lpg=PA235&dq=General+Intelligence+P residency+(GIP)&source=bl&ots=7mcsArTL0&sig=1hZp3Ol0xjxqnqTwQDd_RwxPfYU&hl=en&ei=NvXsScyAKp7ItgeuojOBQ&sa=X&oi=book_result&ct=result&resnum=10#PPA233,M1 [accessed April 20, 2009]. ; Anthony Cordesman and Nawaf Obaid, "The Saudi Security Apparatus: Military and Security Services Challenges and Developments," Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces (DCAF), 42, http://www.dcaf.ch/news/past_2004/ev_geneva_04071113_Cordesman.pdf. 212 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > The Balkans > Serbia > Security and Foreign Forces [October 25, 2008].
Sierra Leone Central Intelligence and Security Unit (CISU) JIC Joint Assessment Team (JAT) Office of National Security (ONS)
Singapore Security and Intelligence Division (SID)
Slovakia Slovenska informacni sluzba (SIS)
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Library > Central Africa > Seychelles > Security and Foreign Forces, "TOTAL STRENGTH = 500 (estimated)...The National Guard is the main internal security force, but there is also the small Police Special Support Unit, which is armed for riot control and response. Police Special Branch is the main organ for non-criminal intelligence gathering and analysis” [accessed October 19, 2008]. 214 It should be noted that this figure does not include two important spending figures. First, it does not include funds from international aid programs, which are generally one time allotments for specific projects. For instance, the ONS received grant money from the United Nations Peacebuilding Fund. The ONS received USD $1.5 million to start construction on a new facility. This money is not included in the total number given in the Ministry of Finance's budgetary statement. For more information on this specific project, see United Nations Peacebuilding Fund, Sierra Leone Peacebuilding Fund Project Summary, http://www.unpbf.org/sierraleone/sierraleone-projects.shtml [accessed April 16, 2009]. The second spending figure excluded from the total figure given is salaried employees. See Ministry of Finance, Government Budget and Statement of Economic and Financial Policies for the Financial Year 2007 (Freetown: Bank of Sierra Leone, 2006), 6, http://bankofsierraleone-centralbank.net/pdf/Gov_Budget.pdf [accessed April 16, 2009]. 215 The amount cited was for 1998 and was 944,912,000 SKK, however, no rates were available for conversion to 1998 USD. The researcher used the 2008 exchange rate, 48.22 SKK per 1 USD) Kieran Williams and Denis Deletant, Security Intelligence Services in new Democracies: the Czech Republic, Slovakia, and Romania (New York: Houndmills, 2001), 141.
Military Intelligence Service (VSS) 159 Slovenia Intelligence and Security Agency (SOVA) Intelligence and Security Service (OVS) 160 Solomon Islands $455,007.39 250 $52,560,568.79 13,300
Somalia Somali National Security Agency
South Africa South African Secret Service (SASS) Intelligence Division (SANDF-ID)
High Credibility, 35.31, Steve Swart, MP, "Intelligence Budget Vote," African Christian Democratic Party, http://acdp.intoweb.co.za/index.php?page=speeches167. 217 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Southern Africa > South Africa > Security and Foreign Forces, “At provincial level, Provincial Intelligence Co-coordinating Committees (PICOC) were subsequently created. Information on personnel strengths is confidential, but a report published at the end of 1999 indicated that NIA employed some 2,500 agents and the Secret Service 1,500 agents. Control mechanisms such as a mechanism for parliamentary oversight; an independent inspector-general; and an absence of law enforcement powers are also provided for." 218 Source cites The Library of Congress Country Studies; CIA World Fact book, http://www.photius.com/countries/south_africa/national_security/ south_africa_national_security_defense_budget.html. 219 Kevin A. O'Brien, "South Africa's Evolving Intelligence and Security Structures," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 9, no. 2 (1996): 197.
National Intelligence Center (CNI) Armed Forces Intelligence Center (CIFAS) 164 Sri Lanka National Intelligence Bureau (SIS) Military Intelligence Corps (MIC) 165 Sudan
al-Amn al-Khariji Military Intelligence Branch (MI) 166 Suriname $2,870,490.63 195
Security Service (SS)
Congressional Research Service, "European Approaches to Homeland Security and Counterterrorism," Federation of American Scientists, 34, http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/RL33573.pdf. 221 Dennis Töllborg, "Sweden," in PSI Handbook of Global Security and Intelligence: National Approaches vol. 2, ed. Stuart Farson, Peter Gill, Mark Phythian, and Shlomo Shpiro (London and Connecticut: Praeger Security International, 2008), 379. 222 Ibid. See also, Swedish Security Service, Swedish Security Service 2006: Annual Report (Växjö: Davidsons Tryckeri AB, 2007), 10, http://www.securityservice.se/download/18.79f4d0a71125247256d800035/swedishsecurityservice2006.pdf .
Military Intelligence and Security Directorate (MUST) Independent Special Unit (FRA) Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) 169 Switzerland $137,755,397223 1,000224
Syria General Intelligence Directorate (GID) Political Security Directorate (PSD) Syrian Military Intelligence (SMI) Air Force Intelligence (AFI)
Taiwan National Security Bureau (NSB) Military Intelligence Bureau (MIB)
Swedish Defence Research Agency, What is FOI?, http://www.foi.se/FOI/templates/Page____6630.aspx [accessed March 25, 2009]. 224 Ibid. 225 Robert Henderson, Brassey's International Intelligence Yearbook: 2003 Edition (Washington, DC: Brassey's Inc, 2003), 317. 226 Steven Phillips, "Taiwan's Intelligence Reform in an Age of Democratization," in Reforming Intelligence: Obstacles to Democratic Control and Effectiveness, ed. Thomas Bruneau and Steven Boraz (Austin: University of Texas Press, 2007), 177.
Ministry of Security (MoS)
Tanzania Tanzania Intelligence and Security Service (TISS)
Thailand National Intelligence Agency (NIA)
Togo National Intelligence Agency
Trinidad and Tobago Special Intelligence Agency (SIA)
Tunisia Tunisian Intelligence Agency
Turkey National Intelligence Organisation (MIT) Special Warfare Unit (SWU)
Turkmenistan National Security Committee (KNB) Aliens' Registration Service (GSRIG)
Uganda External Security Organisation (ESO)
The translation from Turkish to English was provided by Babylon.com, Low Credibility, 28.47, "MİT'İN 2009 BÜTÇESİ NE?" Cafe Siyaset, November 4, 2008, http://www.cafesiyaset.com/haber/20081104/MITin-2009-butcesi-ne.php [accessed April 28, 2009]. The figure indicated here represents the allocated amount in the 2009 budget in 2008 USD. However, using the 2009 USD conversion rate, the amount would be USD $273,475,903, quite a difference! 228 The translation from Turkish to English was provided by Babylon.com, Low Credibility, 32.25, Hazırlayan Ferhat Ünlü, "MİT'te iç çekişme entrikaya yol açtı," Sabah, July 19, 2007, http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2007/07/19/haber,4D36E8C34C434B5880E8E8BE1D3FF328.html [accessed April 27, 2009]. 229 Stéphane Lefebvre and Roger McDermott, "Russia and the Intelligence Services of Central Asia," International Journal of Intelligence and CounterIntelligence 21, no. 2 (2008): 280. 230 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Russia and the CIS > Turkmenistan > Security and Foreign Forces, "The GSRIG, a spin-off from the NKB...Its de-facto core responsibility is counter-espionage and total control over the expatriate community. The agency employs over 1,000 intelligence officers..." 231 Joseph Enyimu, A Review of the Uganda Police Force Budget and its Effect on Crime Management, ed. G.P. Joshi, Michelle Kagari & Sophy Thomas, Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative (London: Commonwealth Human Rights Initiative, 2006), 24, http://www.humanrightsinitiative.org/publications/police/uganda_report.pdf.
Chieftaincy of Military Intelligence (CMI) Joint Anti-Terrorism Task Force (JATT) 184 Ukraine Foreign Intelligence Service of Ukraine (FISU) Main Directorate for Intelligence (MDI) 185 United Arab Emirates $602,724232
United Kingdom Single Intelligence Account (SIA) Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) Security Service
Low Credibility, 30.75, Human Rights Watch, "Open Secret: Illegal Detention and Torture by the Joint Anti-terrorism Task Force in Uganda," Human Rights Watch, April 8, 2009, http://www.hrw.org/en/node/82072/section/8. 233 Oleksii Petrov, "Political and Budgetary Oversight of the Ukraine Intelligence Community: Processes, Problems, and Prospects for Reform," (Master's Thesis, Naval Postgraduate College, September 2007), 71, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/ukraine/petrov.pdf. 234 Ibid. 235 Ibid, 74. 236 Intelligence and Security Committee, "Annual Report 2007-2008," Federation of American Scientists, 8, http://www.fas.org/irp/world/uk/isc2007-08.pdf. 237 High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Western Europe > United Kingdom > Security and Foreign Forces, "Defence Intelligence Staff Total Strength 4,500 (est)."
Secret Intelligence Services Government Communications Headquarters 187 United States National Intelligence Program (NIP) Military Intelligence Program (MIP) 188 Uruguay $31,034,774.98 9,800
Uzbekistan National Security Service (SNB) Defence Intelligence Service (GRU)
High Credibility, 44.3, Janes.com > Sentinel Country Risk Assessments Library > Western Europe > United Kingdom > Security and Foreign Forces > "The number of staff is around 2,200 in total after a recruitment drive during 2004, and there are plans to increase staff numbers to around 3,200 by 2008…” [accessed December 12, 2008]. 239 Medium Credibility, 36.03, “GCHQ Moves Into Limelight," Intelligence Newsletter, December 7, 2000, www.nexis.com. 240 Ibid. 241 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009 National Intelligence Strategy, September 15, 2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2009/09/dni091509-m.pdf. 242 Office of the Director of National Intelligence, 2009 National Intelligence Strategy, September 15, 2009, http://www.fas.org/irp/news/2009/09/dni091509-m.pdf. Although the total number given by the ODNI is 200,000, previous interviews indicate that in 2008 the US's intelligence community employed 28 percent of its workforce as contractors. After removing contractors, 56,000, the remaining number of employees is about 144,000. See High Credibility 43.28, Joseph Fitsanakis, "US Spy Services Hiding True Employee Numbers Says Senate Panel," IntelNews.org, July 27, 2009, http://intelligencenews.wordpress.com/2009/07/27/01-195/.
Venezuela Directorate of Security and Police Intelligence (DISIP)
Vietnam General Department II (GD II, Tong Cuc 2)
Zambia Zambia Security Intelligence Service
Zimbabwe Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO)
Low Credibility, 31.39, Charles Musonda, "State, Mines Act to Save Jobs," Zambia Daily Mail, March 26, 2009, http://www.daily-mail.co.zm/media/news/viewnews.cgi?category=9&id=1238053304. 244 Medium Credibility, 36.03, Tendai Biti, "Zimbabwe's 2008 Budget: Economic Fiction," Association of Zimbabwe Journalists in the UK, November 30, 2007, http://www.zimbabwejournalists.com/story.php?art_id=3245&cat=4.
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