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Instructor's manual for Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory (Second Ed) by Joel Watson

Instructor's manual for Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory (Second Ed) by Joel Watson

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Second Edition

Instructors Manual

Joel Watson with Jesse Bull

April 2008

1

Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory, Second Edition, Instructors Manual,

version 4/2008.

c Copyright 2008, 2002 by Joel Watson. This document is available, with the per-

mission of W. W. Norton & Company, for use by textbook adopters in conjunction

with the textbook. The authors thank Pierpaolo Battigalli, Takako Fujiwara-Greve,

Michael Herron, David Miller, David Reinstein, Christopher Snyder, and Charles

Wilson for pointing out some typographical errors in earlier versions of this manual.

2

This Instructors Manual has four parts. Part I contains some notes on outlining and

preparing a game theory course that is based on the textbook. Part II contains more

detailed (but not overblown) materials that are organized by textbook chapter. Part

III comprises solutions to all of the exercises in the textbook. Part IV contains some

sample examination questions.

Please report any typographical errors to Joel Watson (jwatson@ucsd.edu). Also feel

free to suggest new material to include in the instructors manual or web site.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

Contents

I General Materials 7

II Chapter-Specic Materials 12

1 Introduction 13

2 The Extensive Form 15

3 Strategies and the Normal Form 19

4 Beliefs, Mixed Strategies,

and Expected Payos 22

5 General Assumptions and Methodology 24

6 Dominance and Best Response 25

7 Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance 28

8 Location and Partnership 30

9 Nash Equilibrium 32

10 Oligopoly, Taris, Crime, and Voting 34

11 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 35

12 Strictly Competitive Games

and Security Strategies 37

13 Contract, Law, and Enforcement

in Static Settings 38

14 Details of the Extensive Form 41

15 Backward Induction

and Subgame Perfection 43

16 Topics in Industrial Organization 45

17 Parlor Games 46

3

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

CONTENTS 4

18 Bargaining Problems 48

19 Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games 50

20 Games with Joint Decisions;

Negotiation Equilibrium 52

21 Unveriable Investment, Hold Up,

Options, and Ownership 54

22 Repeated Games and Reputation 56

23 Collusion, Trade Agreements,

and Goodwill 58

24 Random Events and

Incomplete Information 60

25 Risk and Incentives in Contracting 63

26 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

and Rationalizability 65

27 Lemons, Auctions,

and Information Aggregation 66

28 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 68

29 Job-Market Signaling and Reputation 70

30 Appendices 71

III Solutions to the Exercises 72

2 The Extensive Form 73

3 Strategies and the Normal Form 77

4 Beliefs, Mixed Strategies,

and Expected Payos 82

6 Dominance and Best Response 84

7 Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance 86

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

CONTENTS 5

8 Location and Partnership 88

9 Nash Equilibrium 92

10 Oligopoly, Taris, Crime,and Voting 96

11 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium 100

12 Strictly Competitive Games

and Security Strategies 105

13 Contract, Law, and Enforcement

in Static Settings 106

14 Details of the Extensive Form 111

15 Backward Induction

and Subgame Perfection 112

16 Topics in Industrial Organization 116

17 Parlor Games 120

18 Bargaining Problems 124

19 Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games 127

20 Games with Joint Decisions;

Negotiation Equilibrium 130

21 Unveriable Investment, Hold Up,

Options, and Ownership 133

22 Repeated Games and Reputation 136

23 Collusion, Trade Agreements,

and Goodwill 139

24 Random Events and

Incomplete Information 143

25 Risk and Incentives in Contracting 145

26 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

and Rationalizability 147

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

CONTENTS 6

27 Lemons, Auctions,

and Information Aggregation 152

28 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium 155

29 Job-Market Signaling and Reputation 157

30 Appendix B 162

IV Sample Examination Questions 163

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

7

Part I

General Materials

This part contains some notes on outlining and preparing a game theory course for

those adopting Strategy: An Introduction to Game Theory.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

8

Sample Syllabi

Most of the book can be covered in a semester-length (13-15 week) course. Here

is a sample thirteen-week course outline:

Weeks Topics Chapters

A. Representing Games

1 Introduction, extensive form, strategies, 1-3

and normal form

1-2 Beliefs and mixed strategies 4-5

B. Analysis of Static Settings

2-3 Best response, rationalizability, applications 6-8

3-4 Equilibrium, applications 9-10

5 Other equilibrium topics 11-12

5 Contract, law, and enforcement 13

C. Analysis of Dynamic Settings

6 Extensive form, backward induction, 14-15

and subgame perfection

7 Examples and applications 16-17

8 Bargaining 18-19

9 Negotiation equilibrium and problems of 20-21

contracting and investment

10 Repeated games, applications 22-23

D. Information

11 Random events and incomplete information 24

11 Risk and contracting 25

12 Bayesian equilibrium, applications 26-27

13 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and applications 28-29

In a ten-week (quarter system) course, most, but not all, of the book can be

covered. For this length of course, you can easily leave out (or simply not cover in

class) some of the chapters. For example, any of the chapters devoted to applications

(Chapters 8, 10, 16, 21, 23, 25, 27, and 29) can be covered selectively or skipped

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

9

without disrupting the ow of ideas and concepts. Chapters 12 and 17 contain ma-

terial that may be regarded as more esoteric than essential; one can easily have the

students learn the material in these chapters on their own. Instructors who prefer

not to cover contract can skip Chapters 13, 20, 21, and 25.

Below is a sample ten-week course outline that is formed by trimming some of

the applications from the thirteen-week outline. This is the outline that I use for my

quarter-length game theory course. I usually cover only one application from each

of Chapters 8, 10, 16, 23, 27, and 29. I avoid some end-of-chapter advanced topics,

such as the innite-horizon alternating-oer bargaining game, I skip Chapter 25, and,

depending on the pace of the course, I selectively cover Chapters 18, 20, 27, 28, and 29.

Weeks Topics Chapters

A. Representing Games

1 Introduction, extensive form, strategies, 1-3

and normal form

1-2 Beliefs and mixed strategies 4-5

B. Analysis of Static Settings

2-3 Best response, rationalizability, applications 6-8

3-4 Equilibrium, applications 9-10

5 Other equilibrium topics 11-12

5 Contract, law, and enforcement 13

C. Analysis of Dynamic Settings

6 Backward induction, subgame perfection, 14-17

and an application

7 Bargaining 18-19

7-8 Negotiation equilibrium and problems of 20-21

contracting and investment

8-9 Repeated games, applications 22-23

D. Information

9 Random events and incomplete information 24

10 Bayesian equilibrium, application 26-27

10 Perfect Bayesian equilibrium and an application 28-29

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

10

Experiments and a Course Competition

In addition to assigning regular problem sets, it can be fun and instructive to

run a course-long competition between the students. The competition is mainly for

sharpening the students skills and intuition, and thus the students performance in

the course competition should not count toward the course grades. The competi-

tion consists of a series of challenges, classroom experiments, and bonus questions.

Students receive points for participating and performing near the top of the class.

Bonus questions can be sent by e-mail; some experiments can be done by e-mail as

well. Prizes can be awarded to the winning students at the end of the term. Some

suggestions for classroom games and bonus questions appear in various places in this

manual.

Level of Mathematics and Use of Calculus

Game theory is a technical subject, so the students should come into the course

with the proper mathematics background. For example, students should be very

comfortable with set notation, algebraic manipulation, and basic probability theory.

Appendix A in the textbook provides a review of mathematics at the level used in

the book.

Some sections of the textbook benet from the use of calculus. In particular, a

few examples and applications can be analyzed most easily by calculating derivatives.

In each case, the expressions requiring dierentiation are simple polynomials (usually

quadratics). Thus, only the most basic knowledge of dierentiation suces to follow

the textbook derivations. You have two choices regarding the use of calculus.

First, you can make sure all of the students can dierentiate simple polynomials;

this can be accomplished by either (a) specifying calculus as a prerequisite or (b)

asking the students to read Appendix A at the beginning of the course and then

perhaps reinforcing this by holding an extra session in the early part of the term to

review how to dierentiate a simple polynomial.

Second, you can avoid calculus altogether by either providing the students with

non-calculus methods to calculate maxima or by skipping the textbook examples that

use calculus. Here is a list of the examples that are analyzed with calculus in the

textbook:

the partnership example in Chapters 8 and 9,

the Cournot application in Chapter 10 (the tari and crime applications in this

chapter are also most easily analyzed using calculus, but the analysis is not

done in the book),

the advertising and limit capacity applications in Chapter 16 (they are based

on the Cournot model),

the dynamic oligopoly model in Chapter 23 (Cournot-based),

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

11

the discussion of risk-aversion in Chapter 25 (in terms of the shape of a utility

function),

the Cournot example in Chapter 26, and

the analysis of auctions in Chapter 27.

Each of these examples can be easily avoided, if you so choose. There are also some

related exercises that you might avoid if you prefer that your students not deal with

examples having continuous strategy spaces.

My feeling is that using a little bit of calculus is a good idea, even if calculus is

not a prerequisite for the game theory course. It takes only an hour or so to explain

slope and the derivative and to give students the simple rule of thumb for calculating

partial derivatives of simple polynomials. Then one can easily cover some of the most

interesting and historically important game theory applications, such as the Cournot

model and auctions.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

12

Part II

Chapter-Specic Materials

This part contains instructional materials that are organized according to the chapters

in the textbook. For each textbook chapter, the following is provided:

A brief overview of the material covered in the chapter;

Lecture notes (including an outline); and

Suggestions for classroom examples and/or experiments.

The lecture notes are merely suggestions for how to organize lectures of the textbook

material. The notes do not represent any claim about the right way to lecture.

Some instructors may nd the guidelines herein to be in tune with their own teach-

ing methods; these instructors may decide to use the lecture outlines without much

modication. Others may have a very dierent style or intent for their courses; these

instructors will probably nd the lecture outlines of limited use, if at all. I hope this

material will be of some use to you.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

1 Introduction

This chapter introduces the concept of a game and encourages the reader to begin

thinking about the formal analysis of strategic situations. The chapter contains a

short history of game theory, followed by a description of non-cooperative theory

(which the book emphasizes), a discussion of the notion of contract and the related use

of cooperative theory, and comments on the science and art of applied theoretical

work. The chapter explains that the word game should be associated with any

well-dened strategic situation, not just adversarial contests. Finally, the format and

style of the book are described.

Lecture Notes

The non-administrative segment of a rst lecture in game theory may run as

follows.

Denition of a strategic situation.

Examples (have students suggest some): chess, poker, and other parlor games;

tennis, football, and other sports; rm competition, international trade, inter-

national relations, rm/employee relations, and other standard economic exam-

ples; biological competition; elections; and so on.

Competition and cooperation are both strategic topics. Game theory is a general

methodology for studying strategic settings (which may have elements of both

competition and cooperation).

The elements of a formal game representation.

A few simple examples of the extensive form representation (point out the basic

components).

Examples and Experiments

1. Clap game. Ask the students to stand and then, if they comply, ask them to

clap. (This is a silly game.) Show them how to diagram the strategic situation

as an extensive form tree. The game starts with your decision about whether to

ask them to stand. If you ask them to stand, then they (modeled as one player)

have to choose between standing and staying in their seats. If they stand, then

you decide between saying nothing and asking them to clap. If you ask them to

clap, then they have to decided whether to clap. Write the outcomes at terminal

nodes in descriptive terms such as professor happy, students confused. Then

show how these outcomes can be converted into payo numbers.

13

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

1 INTRODUCTION 14

2. Auction the textbook. Many students will probably not have purchased the

textbook by the rst class meeting. These students may be interested in pur-

chasing the book from you, especially if they can get a good deal. However,

quite a few students will not know the price of the book. Without announcing

the bookstores price, hold a sealed-bid, rst-price auction (using real money).

This is a common-value auction with incomplete information. The winning bid

may exceed the bookstores price, giving you an opportunity to talk about the

winners curse and to establish a fund to pay students in future classroom

experiments.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

2 The Extensive Form

This chapter introduces the basic components of the extensive form in a non-technical

way. Students who learn about the extensive form at the beginning of a course are

much better able to grasp the concept of a strategy than are students who are taught

the normal form rst. Since strategy is perhaps the most important concept in game

theory, a good understanding of this concept makes a dramatic dierence in each

students ability to progress. The chapter avoids the technical details of the extensive

form representation in favor of emphasizing the basic components of games. The

technical details are covered in Chapter 14.

Lecture Notes

The following may serve as an outline for a lecture.

Basic components of the extensive form: nodes, branches. Nodes are where

things happen. Branches are individual actions taken by the players.

Example of a game tree.

Types of nodes: initial, terminal, decision.

Build trees by expanding, never converging back on themselves. At any place

in a tree, you should always know exactly how you got there. Thus, the tree

summarizes the strategic possibilities.

Player and action labels. Try not to use the same label for dierent places where

decisions are made.

Information sets. Start by describing the tree as a diagram that an external

observer creates to map out the possible sequences of decisions. Assume the

external observer sees all of the players actions. Then describe what it means

for a player to not know what another player did. This is captured by dashed

lines indicating that a player cannot distinguish between two or more nodes.

We assume that the players know the game tree, but that a given player may

not know where he is in the game when he must make any particular decision.

An information set is a place where a decision is made.

How to describe simultaneous moves.

Outcomes and how payo numbers represent preferences.

15

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

2 THE EXTENSIVE FORM 16

Examples and Experiments

Several examples should be used to explain the components of an extensive form.

In addition to some standard economic examples (such as rm entry into an industry

and entrant/incumbent competition), here are a few I routinely use:

1. Three-card poker. In this game, there is a dealer (player 1) and two potential

betters (players 2 and 3). There are three cards in the deck: a high card, a

middle card, and a low card. At the beginning of the game, the dealer looks at

the cards and gives one to each of the other players. Note that the dealer can

decide which of the cards goes to player 2 and which of the cards goes to player 3.

(There is no move by Nature in this game. The book does not deal with moves

of Nature until Part IV. You can discuss moves of Nature at this point, but it

is not necessary.) Player 2 does not observe the card dealt to player 3, nor does

player 3 observe the card dealt to player 2. After the dealers move, player 2

observes his card and then decides whether to bet or to fold. After player 2s

decision, player 3 observes his own card and also whether player 2 folded or

bet. Then player 3 must decide whether to fold or bet. After player 3s move,

the game ends. Payos indicate that each player prefers winning to folding and

folding to losing. Assume the dealer is indierent between all of the outcomes

(or specify some other preference ordering).

2. Lets Make a Deal game. This is the three-door guessing game that was made

famous by Monty Hall and the television game show Lets Make a Deal. The

game is played by Monty (player 1) and a contestant (player 2), and it runs as

follows.

First, Monty secretly places a prize (say, $1000) behind one of three

doors. Call the doors a, b, and c. (You might write Montys actions

as a

, b

, and c

Then, without observing Montys choice, the contestant selects one

of the doors (by saying a, b, or c).

After this, Monty must open one of the doors, but he is not allowed

to open the door that is in front of the prize, nor is he allowed to open

the door that the contestant selected. Note that Monty does not have

a choice if the contestant chooses a dierent door than Monty chose

for the prize. The contestant observes which door Monty opens. Note

that she will see no prize behind this door.

The contestant then has the option of switching to the other unopened

door (S for switch) or staying with the door she originally selected

(D for dont switch).

Finally, the remaining doors are opened and the contestant wins the

prize if it is behind the door she chose. The contestant obtains a

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

2 THE EXTENSIVE FORM 17

payo 1 if she wins, zero otherwise. Monty is indierent between all

of the outcomes.

For a bonus question, you can challenge the students to draw the extensive form

representation of the Lets Make a Deal game or the Three-Card Poker game.

Students who submit a correct extensive form can be given points for the class

competition. The Lets Make a Deal extensive form is pictured on the next

page.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

2 THE EXTENSIVE FORM 18

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

3 Strategies and the Normal Form

As noted already, introducing the extensive form representation at the beginning of

a course helps the students appreciate the notion of a strategy. A student that does

not understand the concept of a complete contingent plan will fail to grasp the

sophisticated logic of dynamic rationality that is so critical to much of game theory.

Chapter 3 starts with the formal denition of strategy, illustrated with some examples.

The critical point is that strategies are more than just plans. A strategy prescribes

an action at every information set, even those that would not be reached because of

actions taken at other information sets.

Chapter 3 proceeds to the construction of the normal-form representation, starting

with the observation that each strategy prole leads to a single terminal node (an

outcome) via a path through the tree. This leads to the denition of a payo function.

The chapter then denes the normal form representation as comprising a set of players,

strategy spaces for the players, and payo functions. The matrix form, for two-player,

nite games, is illustrated. The chapter then briey describes seven classic normal

form games. The chapter concludes with a few comments on the comparison between

the normal and extensive forms.

Lecture Notes

The following may serve as an outline for a lecture.

Formal denition of strategy.

Examples of strategies.

Notation: strategy space S

i

, individual strategy s

i

S

i

. Example: S

i

= {H, L}

and s

i

= H.

Refer to Appendix A for more on sets.

Strategy prole: s S, where S = S

1

S

2

S

n

(product set).

Notation: i and i, s = (s

i

, s

i

).

Discuss how nite and innite strategy spaces can be described.

Why we need to keep track of a complete contingent plan: (1) It allows the

analysis of games from any information set, (2) it facilitates exploring how a

player responds to his belief about what the other players will do, and (3) it

prescribes a contingency plan if a player makes a mistake.

Describe how a strategy implies a path through the tree, leading to a terminal

node and payo vector.

Examples of strategies and implied payos.

19

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

3 STRATEGIES AND THE NORMAL FORM 20

Denition of payo function, u

i

: S R, u

i

(s). Refer to Appendix A for more

on functions.

Example: a matrix representation of players, strategies, and payos. (Use any

abstract game, such as the centipede game.)

Formal denition of the normal form.

Note: The matrix representation is possible only for two-player, nite games.

Otherwise, the game must be described by sets and equations.

The classic normal form games and some stories. Note the dierent strategic

issues represented: conict, competition, coordination, cooperation.

Comparing the normal and extensive forms (translating one to the other).

Examples and Experiments

1. Ultimatum-oer bargaining game. Have students give instructions to others as

to how to play the game. Those who play the role of responder will have to

specify under what conditions to accept and under what conditions to reject the

other players oer. This helps solidify that a strategy is a complete contingent

plan.

2. The centipede game (like the one in Figure 3.1(b) if the textbook). As with the

bargaining game, have some students write their strategies on paper and give

the strategies to other students, who will then play the game as their agents.

Discuss mistakes as a reason for specifying a complete contingent plan. Then

discuss how strategy specications helps us develop a theory about why players

make particular decisions (looking ahead to what they would do at various

information sets).

3. Any of the classic normal forms.

4. The Princess Bride poison scene. Show the poison scene (and the few minutes

leading to it) from the Rob Reiner movie The Princess Bride. In this scene,

protagonist Wesley matches wits with the evil Vizzini. There are two goblets

lled with wine. Away from Vizzinis view, Wesley puts poison into one of

the goblets. Then Wesley sets the goblets on a table, one goblet near himself

and the other near Vizzini. Vizzini must choose from which goblet to drink.

Wesley must drink from the other goblet. Several variations of this game can be

diagrammed for the students, rst in the extensive form and then in the normal

form.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

3 STRATEGIES AND THE NORMAL FORM 21

5. A 3 3 dominance-solvable game, such as the following.

The payos are in dollars. It is very useful to have the students play a game

such as this before you lecture on dominance and best response. This will help

them to begin thinking about rationality, and their behavior will serve as a

reference point for formal analysis. Have the students write their strategies

and their names on slips of paper. Collect the slips and randomly select a

player 1 and a player 2. Pay these two students according to their strategy

prole. Calculate the class distribution over the strategies, which you can later

use when introducing dominance and iterated dominance.

6. Repeated Prisoners Dilemma. Describe the k-period, repeated prisoners dilemma.

For a bonus question, ask the students to compute the number of strategies for

player 1 when k = 3. Challenge the students to nd a mathematical expression

for the number of strategies as a function of k.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

4 Beliefs, Mixed Strategies,

and Expected Payos

This chapter describes how a belief that a player has about another players behavior

is represented as a probability distribution. It then covers the idea of a mixed strat-

egy, which is a similar probability distribution. The appropriate notation is dened.

The chapter denes expected payo and gives some examples of how to compute it.

At the end of the chapter, there are a few comments about cardinal versus ordinal

utility (although it is not put in this language) and about how payo numbers reect

preferences over uncertain outcomes. Risk preferences are discussed in Chapter 25.

Lecture Notes

The following may serve as an outline for a lecture.

Example of belief in words: Player 1 might say I think player 2 is very likely

to play strategy L.

Translate into probability numbers.

Other examples of probabilities.

Notation:

j

S

j

,

j

(s

j

) [0, 1],

s

j

S

j

j

(s

j

) = 1.

Examples and alternative ways of denoting a probability distribution: for S

j

=

{L, R} and

j

{L, R} dened by

j

(L) = 1/3 and

j

(R) = 2/3, we can

write

j

= (1/3, 2/3).

Mixed strategy. Notation:

i

S

i

.

Refer to Appendix A for more on probability distributions.

Denition of expected value. Denition of expected payo.

Examples: computing expected payos.

Briey discuss how payo numbers represent preferences over random outcomes,

risk. Defer elaboration until later.

22

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

BELIEFS AND EXPECTED PAYOFFS 23

Examples and Experiments

1. Lets Make a Deal game again. For the class competition, you can ask the

following two bonus questions: (a) Suppose that, at each of his information

sets, Monty randomizes by choosing his actions with equal probability. Is it

optimal for the contestant to select switch or dont switch when she has

this choice? Why? (b) Are there conditions (a strategy for Monty) under which

it is optimal for the contestant to make the other choice?

2. Randomization in sports. Many sports provide good examples of randomized

strategies. Baseball pitchers may desire to randomize over their pitches, and

batters may have probabilistic beliefs about which pitch will be thrown to them.

Tennis serve and return play is another good example.

1

1

See Walker, M., and Wooders J. Minimax Play at Wimbledon, American Economic Review

91 (2001): 1521-1538.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

5 General Assumptions and Methodology

This chapter contains notes on (a) the trade-o between simplicity and realism in

formulating a game-theoretic model, (b) the basic idea and assumption of rationality,

(c) the notion of common knowledge and the assumption that the game is commonly

known by the players, and (d) a short overview of solution concepts that are discussed

in the book. It is helpful to briey discuss these items with the students during part

of a lecture.

24

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

6 Dominance and Best Response

This chapter develops and compares the concepts of dominance and best response.

The chapter begins with examples in which a strategy is dominated by another pure

strategy, followed by an example of mixed strategy dominance. After the formal

denition of dominance, the chapter describes how to check for dominated strategies

in any given game. The rst strategic tension (the clash between individual and joint

interests) is illustrated with reference to the prisoners dilemma, and then the notion

of eciency is dened. Next comes the denition of best response and examples.

The last section of the chapter contains analysis of the relation between the set of

undominated strategies and the set of strategies that are best responses to some

beliefs. An algorithm for calculating these sets is presented.

Lecture Notes

The following may serve as an outline for a lecture.

Optional introduction: analysis of a game played in class. If a 33 dominance-

solvable game (such as the one suggested in the notes for Chapter 4) was played

in class earlier, the game can be quickly analyzed to show the students what is

to come.

A simple example of a strategy dominated by another pure strategy. (Use a

2 2 game.)

An example of a pure strategy dominated by a mixed strategy. (Use a 3 2

game.)

Formal denition of strategy s

i

being dominated. Set of undominated strategies

for player i, UD

i

.

Discuss how to search for dominated strategies.

The rst strategic tension and the prisoners dilemma.

Denition of eciency and an example.

Best response examples. (Use simple games such as the prisoners dilemma, the

battle of the sexes, Cournot duopoly.)

Formal denition of s

i

being a best response to belief

i

. Set of best responses

for player i, BR

i

(

i

). Set of player is strategies that can be justied as best

responses to some beliefs, B

i

.

Note that forming beliefs is the most important exercise in rational decision

making.

25

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6 DOMINANCE AND BEST RESPONSE 26

Example to show that B

i

= UD

i

. State formal results.

Algorithm for calculating B

i

= UD

i

in two-player games: (1) Strategies that

are best responses to simple (point mass) beliefs are in B

i

. (2) Strategies that

are dominated by other pure strategies are not in B

i

. (3) Other strategies can

be tested for mixed strategy dominance to see whether they are in B

i

. Step 3

amounts to checking whether a system of inequalities can hold.

Note: Remember that payo numbers represent preferences over random out-

comes.

Note that Appendix B contains more technical material on the relation between

dominance and best response.

The book does not discuss weak dominance until the analysis of the second-price

auction in Chapter 27. This helps avoid confusion (students sometimes interchange

the weak and strong versions) and, besides, there is little need for the weak dominance

concept.

Examples and Experiments

1. Example of dominance and best response. To demonstrate the relation between

dominance and best response, the following game can be used.

First show that M is the best response to L, whereas B is the best response to R.

Next show that T is dominated by player 1s strategy (0, 1/2, 1/2), which puts

equal probability on M and B but zero probability on T. Then prove that there

is no belief for which T is a best response. A simple graph will demonstrate

this. On the graph, the x-axis is the probability p that player 1 believes player 2

will select L. The y-axis is player 1s expected payo of the various strategies.

The line corresponding to the expected payo playing T is below at least one

of the lines giving the payos of M and B, for every p.

2. The 70 percent game. This game can be played by everyone in the class, either

by e-mail or during a class session. Each of the n students selects an integer

between 1 and 100 and writes this number, along with his or her name, on a slip

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

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For instructors only; do not distribute.

6 DOMINANCE AND BEST RESPONSE 27

of paper. The students make their selections simultaneously and independently.

The average of the students numbers is then computed and the student whose

number is closest to 70 percent of this average wins 20 dollars. If two or more

students tie, then they share the prize in equal proportions. Ideally, this game

should be played between the lecture on Best Response and the lecture on

Rationalizability/Iterated Dominance. The few students whose numbers fall

within a preset interval of 70 percent of the average can be given bonus points.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

7 Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance

This chapter follows naturally from Chapter 6. It discusses the implications of com-

bining the assumption that players best respond to beliefs with the assumption that

this rationality is common knowledge between the players. At the beginning of the

chapter, the logic of rationalizability and iterated dominance is demonstrated with an

example. Then iterated dominance and rationalizability are dened more formally.

The second strategic tensionstrategic uncertaintyis explained.

Lecture Notes

The following may serve as an outline for a lecture.

Example of iterated dominance, highlighting hierarchies of beliefs (player 1

knows that player 2 knows that player 1 will not select. . . ).

Common knowledge: information that each player knows, each player knows the

others know, each player knows the others know that they all know. . . . It is as

though the information is publicly announced while the players are together.

Combining rationality (best response behavior, never playing dominated strate-

gies) with common knowledge implies, and only implies, that players will play

strategies that survive iterated dominance. We call these the rationalizable

strategies.

Formally, let R

k

be the set of strategy proles that survives k rounds of iterated

dominance. Then the rationalizable set R is the limit of R

k

as k gets large. For

nite games, after some value of k, no more strategies will be deleted.

Notes on how to compute R: algorithm, order of deletion does not matter.

The second strategic tension: strategic uncertainty (lack of coordination be-

tween beliefs and behavior).

28

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7 RATIONALIZABILITY AND ITERATED DOMINANCE 29

Examples and Experiments

1. The 70 percent game again. Analyze the game and show that the only rational-

izable strategy is to select 1. In my experience, this always stimulates a lively

discussion of rationality and common knowledge. The students will readily

agree that selecting 100 is a bad idea. However, showing that 100 is dominated

can be quite dicult. It is perhaps easier to demonstrate that 100 is never a

best response.

Note that one players beliefs about the strategies chosen by the other players is,

in general, a very complicated probability distribution, but it can be summarized

by the highest number that the player believes the others will play with positive

probability. Call this number x. If x > 1, then you can show that the players

best response must be strictly less than x (considering that the player believes

at least one other player will select x with positive probability). It is a good

example of a game that has a rationalizable solution, yet the rationalizable set

is quite dicult to compute. Discuss why it may be rational to select a dierent

number if common knowledge of rationality does not hold.

2. Generalized stag hunt. This game can be played in class by groups of dierent

sizes, or it can be played over the Internet for bonus points. In the game, n

players simultaneously and independently write A or B on slips of paper.

If any of the players selected B, then those who chose A get nothing and those

who chose B get a small prize (say, $2.00 or 10 points). If all of the players

selected A, then they each obtain a larger prize ($5.00 or 25 points). The game

can be used to demonstrate strategic uncertainty, because there is a sense in

which strategic uncertainty is likely to increase (and players are more likely to

choose B) with n.

A good way to demonstrate strategic uncertainty is to play two versions of

the game in class. In the rst version, n = 2. In this case, tell the students

that, after the students select their strategies, you will randomly choose two

of them, whose payos are determined by only each others strategies. In the

second version of the game, n equals the number of students. In this case, tell

the students that you will pay only a few of them (randomly chosen) but that

their payos are determined by the strategies of everyone in the class. That is,

a randomly drawn student who selected A gets the larger prize if and only if

everyone else in the class also picked A. You will most likely see a much higher

percentage of students selecting A in the rst version than in the second.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

8 Location and Partnership

This chapter presents two important applied models. The applications illustrate the

power of proper game theoretic reasoning, they demonstrate the art of construct-

ing game theory models, and they guide the reader on how to calculate the set of

rationalizable strategies. The location game is a nite (nine location) version of

Hotellings well-known model. This game has a unique rationalizable strategy prole.

The partnership game has innite strategy spaces, but it too has a unique rational-

izable strategy prole. Analysis of the partnership game coaches the reader on how

to compute best responses for games with dierentiable payo functions and contin-

uous strategy spaces. The rationalizable set is determined as the limit of an innite

sequence. The notion of strategic complementarity is briey discussed in the context

of the partnership game.

Lecture Notes

Students should see the complete analysis of a few games that can be solved

by iterated dominance. The location and partnership examples in this chapter are

excellent choices for presentation. Both of these require nontrivial analysis and lead

to denitive conclusions. It may be useful to substitute for the partnership game in

a lecture (one can, for example, present the analysis of the Cournot duopoly game in

class and let the students read the parallel analysis of the partnership game from the

book). This gives the students exposure to two games that have continuous action

spaces.

The following may serve as an outline for a lecture.

Describe the location game and draw a picture of the nine regions. S

i

=

{1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}.

Show that the end regions are dominated by the adjacent ones. Write the

dominance condition u

i

(1, s

j

) < u

i

(2, s

j

). Thus, R

1

i

= {2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8}.

Repeat. R

2

i

= {3, 4, 5, 6, 7}, R

3

i

= {4, 5, 6}, R

4

i

= {5} = R.

Applications of the location model.

Describe the partnership game (or Cournot game, or other). It is useful to draw

the extensive form.

Player is belief about player js strategy can be complicated, but, for expected

payo calculations, only the average (mean) matters. Thus, write BR

1

(y) or,

for the Cournot duopoly game, BR

i

(q

j

), etc.

Dierentiate (or argue by way of dierences) to get the best response functions.

Sets of possible best responses (B

i

).

30

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8 LOCATION AND PARTNERSHIP 31

Restrictions: implications of common knowledge of rationality. Construct R

1

i

,

R

2

i

, R

3

i

. Indicate the limit R.

Concept of strategic complementarity.

Examples and Experiments

1. Location games. You can play dierent versions of the location game in class

(see, for instance, the variations in the Exercises section of the chapter).

2. Repeated play and convergence. It may be useful, although it takes time and

prizes, to engage your class in repeated play of a simple matrix game. The

point is not to discuss reputation, but rather to see whether experimental play

stabilizes on one particular strategy prole or subset of the strategy space.

This gets the students thinking about an institution (historical precedent, in

this case) that helps align beliefs and behavior, which is a nice transition to the

material in Chapter 9.

Probably the easiest way of running the experiment is to have just two students

play a game like the following:

A game like the one from Exercise 6 of Chapter 9 may also be worth trying.

To avoid repeated-game issues, you can have dierent pairs of students play in

dierent rounds. The history of play can be recorded on the chalkboard. You

can motivate the game with a story.

3. Contract or mediation. An interesting variant on the convergence experiment

can be used to demonstrate that pre-play communication and/or mediation

can align beliefs and behavior. Rather than have the students play repeatedly,

simply invite two students to play a one-shot game. In one version, they can be

allowed to communicate (agree to a self-enforced contract) before playing. In a

second version, you or a student can recommend a strategy prole to the players

(but in this version, keep the players from communicating between themselves

and separate them when they are to choose strategies).

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

9 Nash Equilibrium

This chapter provides a solid conceptual foundation for Nash equilibrium, based on

(1) rationalizability and (2) strategic certainty, where players beliefs and behavior

are coordinated so there is some resolution of the second strategic tension. Strate-

gic certainty is discussed as the product of various social institutions. The chapter

begins with the concept of congruity, the mathematical representation of some co-

ordination between players beliefs and behavior. Nash equilibrium is dened as a

weakly congruous strategy prole, which captures the absence of strategic uncertainty

(as a single strategy prole). Various examples are furnished. Then the chapter ad-

dresses the issue of coordination and welfare, leading to a description of the third

strategic tensionthe specter of inecient coordination. Finally, there is an aside on

behavioral game theory (experimental work).

Lecture Notes

The following may serve as an outline for a lecture.

Discuss strategic uncertainty (the second strategic tension). Illustrate with a

game (such as the battle of the sexes) where the players beliefs and behavior

are not coordinated, so they get the worst payo prole.

Institutions that alleviate strategic uncertainty: norms, rules, communication,

etc.

Stories: (a) repeated social play with a norm, (b) pre-play communication (con-

tracting), and (c) an outside mediator suggests strategies.

Represent as congruity. Dene weakly congruous, best response complete, and

congruous strategy sets.

Example of an abstract game with various sets that satisfy these denitions.

Nash equilibrium (where there is no strategic uncertainty). A weakly congruous

strategy prole. Strict Nash equilibrium (a congruous strategy prole).

Examples of Nash equilibrium: classic normal forms, partnership, location, etc.

An algorithm for nding Nash equilibria in matrix games.

Pareto coordination game shows the possibility of inecient coordination. Dis-

cuss real examples of inecient coordination in the world. This is the third

strategic tension.

Note that a institution may thus alleviate the second tension, but we should

better understand how. Also, the rst and third strategic tensions still remain.

32

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9 NASH EQUILIBRIUM 33

Examples and Experiments

1. Coordination experiment. To illustrate the third strategic tension, you can

have students play a coordination game in the manner suggested in the previ-

ous chapter (see the repeated play, contract, and mediation experiments). For

example, have two students play a Pareto coordination game with the recom-

mendation that they select the inferior equilibrium. Or invite two students to

play a complicated coordination game (with, say, ten strategies) in which the

strategy names make an inferior equilibrium a focal point.

2. The rst strategic tension and externality. Students may benet from a discus-

sion of how the rst strategic tension (the clash between individual and joint

interests) relates the classic economic notion of externality. This can be illus-

trated in equilibrium, by using any game whose equilibria are inecient. An

n-player prisoners dilemma or commons game can be played in class. You can

discuss (and perhaps sketch a model of) common economic settings where a neg-

ative externality causes people to be more active than would be jointly optimal

(pollution, shing in common waters, housing development, arms races).

3. War of attrition. A simple war of attrition game (for example, one in discrete

time) can be played in class for bonus points or money. A two-player game would

be the easiest to run as an experiment. For example, you could try a game like

that in Exercise 9 of Chapter 22 with x = 0. Students will hopefully think

about mixed strategies (or at least, nondegenerate beliefs). You can present

the static analysis of this game. To compute the mixed strategy equilibrium,

explain that there is a stationary continuation value, which, in the game

with x = 0, equals zero. If you predict that the analysis will confused the

students, this example might be better placed later in the course (once students

are thinking about sequential rationality).

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

10 Oligopoly, Taris, Crime, and Voting

This chapter presents six standard applied models: Cournot duopoly, Bertrand duopoly,

tari competition, a model of crime and police, candidate location (the median voter

theorem), and strategic voting. Each model is motivated by an interesting, real strate-

gic setting. Very simple versions of the models are described and the equilibria of

four of the examples are calculated. Calculations for the other two models are left as

exercises.

Lecture Notes

Any or all of the models can be discussed in class, depending on time constraints

and the students background and interest. Other equilibrium models can also be

presented, either in addition to or substituting for the ones in the textbook. In each

case, it may be helpful to organize the lecture as follows.

Motivating story and real-world setting.

Explanation of how some key strategic elements can be distilled in a game

theory model.

Description of the game.

Overview of rational behavior (computation of best response functions, if ap-

plicable).

Equilibrium calculation.

Discussion of intuition.

Examples and Experiments

Students would benet from a discussion of real strategic situations, especially

with an eye toward understanding the extent of the rst strategic tension (equilibrium

ineciency). Also, any of the applications can be used for classroom experiments.

Here is a game that can be played by e-mail, which may be useful in introducing

mixed strategy Nash equilibrium in the next lecture. (The game is easy to describe,

but dicult to analyze.) Students are asked to each submit a number from the

set {1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9}. The students make their selections simultaneously and

independently. At a prespecied date, you determine how many students picked each

of the numbers and you calculate the mode (the number that was most selected). For

example, if ten students picked 3, eight students picked 6, eleven students picked 7,

and six students picked 8, then the mode is 7. If there are two or more modes, the

highest is chosen. Let x denote the mode. If x = 9, then everyone who selected the

number 1 gets one bonus point (and the others get zero). If x is not equal to 9, then

everyone who selected x + 1 gets x + 1 bonus points (and the others get zero).

34

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11 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium

This chapter begins with the observation that, intuitively, a randomized strategy

seems appropriate for the matching pennies game. The denition of a mixed-strategy

Nash equilibrium is given, followed by instructions on how to compute mixed-strategy

equilibria in nite games. The Nash equilibrium existence result is presented.

Lecture Notes

Few applications and concepts rely on the analysis of mixed strategies, so the

book does not dwell on the concept. However, it is still an important topic and one

can present several interesting examples. Here is a lecture outline.

Matching penniesnote that there is no Nash equilibrium (in pure strategies).

Ask for suggestions on how to play. Ask Is there any meaningful notion of

equilibrium in mixed strategies?

Note the (1/2, 1/2), (1/2, 1/2) mixed strategy prole. Conrm understanding

of mixing.

The denition of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibriumthe straightforward exten-

sion of the basic denition.

Two important aspects of the denition: (a) what it means for strategies that

are in the support (they must all yield the same expected payo) and (b) what

it means for pure strategies that are not in the support of the mixed strategy.

An algorithm for calculating mixed-strategy Nash equilibria: Find rationalizable

strategies, look for a mixed strategy of one player that will make the other player

indierent, and then repeat for the other player.

Note the mixed-strategy equilibria of the classic normal form games.

Mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium existence result.

Examples and Experiments

1. Attack and defend. Discuss how some tactical choices in war can be analyzed

using matching pennies-type games. Use a recent example or a historical exam-

ple, such as the choice between Normandy and the Pas de Calais for the D-Day

invasion of June 6, 1944. In the D-Day example, the Allies had to decide at

which location to invade, while the Germans had to choose where to bolster

their defenses. Discuss how the model can be modied to incorporate more

realistic features.

35

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11 MIXED-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM 36

2. A socially repeated strictly competitive game. This classroom experiment demon-

strates how mixed strategies may be interpreted as frequencies in a population

of players. The experiment can be done over the Internet or in class. The

classroom version may be unwieldy if there are many students. The game can

be played for money or for points in the class competition.

For the classroom version, draw on the board a symmetric 22 strictly compet-

itive game, with the strategies Y and N for each of the two players. Use a game

that has a unique, mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium. Tell the students that

some of them will be randomly selected to play this game against one another.

Ask all of the students to select strategies (by writing them on slips of paper

or using cards as described below). Randomly select several pairs of students

and pay them according to their strategy prole. Compute the distribution of

strategies for the entire class and report this to all of the students. If the class

frequencies match the Nash equilibrium, then discuss this. Otherwise, repeat

the gaming procedure several times and discuss whether play converges to the

Nash equilibrium.

Here is an idea for how to play the game quickly. With everyones eyes closed,

each student selects a strategy by either putting his hands on his head (the Y

strategy) or folding his arms (the N strategy). At your signal, the students open

their eyes. You can quickly calculate the strategy distribution and randomly

select students (from a class list) to pay.

3. Another version of the socially repeated game. Instead of having the entire class

play the game in each round, have only two randomly selected students play.

Everyone will see the sequence of strategy proles and you can discuss how the

play in any round is inuenced by the outcome in preceding rounds.

4. Randomization in sports. Discuss randomization in sport (soccer penalty shots,

tennis service location, baseball pitch selection, American football run/pass

mix).

In addition to demonstrating how random play can be interpreted and form a

Nash equilibrium, the social repetition experiments also make the students familiar

with strictly competitive games, which provides a good transition to the material in

Chapter 12.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

12 Strictly Competitive Games

and Security Strategies

This chapter oers a brief treatment of two concepts that played a major role in

the early development of game theory: two-player, strictly competitive games and

security strategies. The chapter presents a result that is used in Chapter 17 for the

analysis of parlor games.

Lecture Notes

One can present this material very quickly in class, or leave it for students to read.

An outline for a lecture may run as follows.

Denition of a two-player, strictly competitive game.

The special case called zero-sum.

Examples of strictly competitive and zero-sum games.

Denition of security strategy and security payo level.

Determination of security strategies in some examples.

Discuss the dierence between security strategy and best response, and why

best response is our behavioral foundation.

The Nash equilibrium and security strategy result.

Examples and Experiments

Any abstract examples will do for a lecture. It is instructive to demonstrate

security strategies in the context of some games that are not strictly competitive, so

the students understand that the denition applies generally.

37

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13 Contract, Law, and Enforcement

in Static Settings

This chapter presents the notion of contract. Much emphasis is placed on how con-

tracts help to align beliefs and behavior in static settings. It carefully explains how

players can use a contract to induce a game whose outcome diers from that of the

game given by the technology of the relationship. Further, the relationship between

those things considered veriable and the outcomes that can be implemented is care-

fully explained. The exposition begins with a setting of full veriability and complete

contracting. The discussion then shifts to settings of limited liability and default

damage remedies.

Lecture Notes

You may nd the following outline useful in planning a lecture.

Denition of contract. Self-enforced and externally enforced components.

Discuss why players might want to contract (and why society might want laws).

Explain why contracts are fundamental to economic relationships.

Practical discussion of the technology of the relationship, implementation, and

how the court enforces a contract.

Denition of the induced game.

Veriability. Note the implications of limited veriability.

Complete contracting. Default damage rules: expectation, reliance, restitution.

Liquidated damage clauses and contracts specifying transfers.

Ecient breach.

Comments on the design of legal institutions.

Examples and Experiments

1. Contract game. A contract game of the type analyzed in this chapter can

be played as a classroom experiment. Two students can be selected to rst

negotiate a contract and then play the underlying game. You play the role of

the external enforcer. It may be useful to do this once with full veriability

and once with limited veriability. This may also be used immediately before

presenting the material in Chapter 13 and/or as a lead-in to Chapter 18.

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CONTRACT, LAW, AND ENFORCEMENT 39

2. Case study: Chicago Coliseum Club v. Dempsey (Source: 265 Ill. App. 542;

1932 Ill. App.). This or a dierent case can be used to illustrate the various

kinds of default damage remedies and to show how the material of the chapter

applies to practical matters.

2

First, give the background of the case and then

present a stylized example that is based on the case.

Facts of the Case:

Chicago Coliseum Club, a corporation, as plainti, brought its action against

defendant William Harrison Dempsey, known as Jack Dempsey, to recover

damages for breach of a written contract executed March 13, 1926, but bearing

date of March 6 of that year.

Plainti was incorporated as an Illinois corporation for the promotion of general

pleasure and athletic purposes and to conduct boxing, sparring and wrestling

matches and exhibitions for prizes or purses. Dempsey was well known in the

pugilistism world and, at the time of the making and execution of the contract

in question, held the title of worlds Champion Heavy Weight Boxer.

Dempsey was to engage in a boxing match with Harry Wills, another well-

known boxer. At the signing of the contract, he was paid $10. Dempsey was to

be paid $800,000 plus 50 percent of the net prots over and above the sum of

$2,000,000 in the event the gate receipts should exceed that amount. Further,

he was to receive 50 percent of the net revenue derived from moving picture

concessions or royalties received by the plainti. Dempsey was not to engage

in any boxing match after the date of the agreement and before the date of the

contest. He was also to have his life and health insured in favor of the plainti

in a manner and at a place to be designated by the plainti. The Chicago

Coliseum Club was to promote the event. The contract between the Chicago

Coliseum Club and Wills was entered into on March 6, 1926. It stated that

Wills was to be payed $50,000. However, he was never paid.

The Chicago Coliseum Club hired a promoter. When it contacted Dempsey con-

cerning the life insurance, Dempsey repudiated the contract with the following

telegram message.

BM Colorado Springs Colo July 10th 1926

B. E. Clements

President Chicago Coliseum Club Chgo Entirely too busy training for

my coming Tunney match to waste time on insurance representatives

stop as you have no contract suggest you stop kidding yourself and

me also Jack Dempsey.

2

For a more detailed discussion of this case, see Barnett, R., Contracts: Cases and Doctrine, 2d

Ed. (Aspen 1999), p.125.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

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For instructors only; do not distribute.

CONTRACT, LAW, AND ENFORCEMENT 40

The court identied the following issues as being relevant in establishing dam-

ages:

First: Loss of prots which would have been derived by the plainti

in the event of the holding of the contest in question;

Second: Expenses incurred by the plainti prior to the signing of the

agreement between the plainti and Dempsey;

Third: Expenses incurred in attempting to restrain the defendant

from engaging in other contests and to force him into a compliance

with the terms of his agreement with the plainti; and

Fourth: Expenses incurred after the signing of the agreement and

before the breach of July 10, 1926.

The Chicago Coliseum Club claimed that it would have had gross receipts of

$3,000,000 and expenses of $1,400,000, which would have left a net prot of

$1,600,000. However, the court was not convinced of this as there were too many

undetermined factors. (Unless shown otherwise, the court will generally assume

that the venture would have at least broken even. This could be compared

to the case where substantial evidence did exist as to the expected prots of

Chicago Coliseum.) The expenses incurred before the contract was signed with

Dempsey could not be recovered as damages. Further, expenses incurred in

relation to 3 above could only be recovered as damages if they occured before

the repudiation. The expense of 4 above could be recovered.

Stylized Example

The following technology of the relationship shows a possible interpretation

when proof of the expected revenues is available.

This assumes that promotion by Chicago Coliseum Club benets Dempseys

reputation and allows him to gain by taking the other boxing match. The strate-

gies for Chicago Coliseum are promote and dont promote. The strategies

for Dempsey are take this match and take other match. This example can

be used to illustrate a contract that would induce Dempsey to keep his agree-

ment with Chicago Coliseum. Further, when it is assumed that the expected

prot is zero, expectations and reliance damages result in the same transfer.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

14 Details of the Extensive Form

This chapter elaborates on Chapter 2s presentation of the extensive form represen-

tation. The chapter denes some technical terms and states ve rules that must

be obeyed when designing game trees. The concepts of perfect recall and perfect

information are registered.

Lecture Notes

This material can be covered very quickly in class, as a transition from normal

form analysis to extensive form analysis. The key, simply, is to bring the extensive

form back to the front of the students minds, and in a more technically complete

manner than was needed for Part I of the book. Here is an outline for a lecture.

Review of the components of the extensive form: nodes, branches, labels, infor-

mation sets, and payos; initial, decision, and terminal nodes.

Terms describing the relation between nodes: successor, predecessor, immediate

successor, and immediate predecessor.

Tree rules, with examples of violations.

Perfect versus imperfect recall.

Perfect versus imperfect information.

How to describe an innite action space.

Examples and Experiments

1. Abstract examples can be developed on the y to illustrate the terms and con-

cepts.

2. Forgetful driver. This one-player game demonstrates imperfect recall. The

player is driving on country roads to a friends house at night. The player

reaches an intersection, where he must turn left or right. If he turns right, he

will nd a police checkpoint, where he will be delayed for the entire evening.

If he turns left, he will eventually reach another intersection requiring another

right/left decision. At this one, a right turn will bring him to his friends house,

while a left turn will take him to the police checkpoint. When he has to make

a decision, the player does not recall how many intersections he passed through

or what decisions he made previously. The extensive form representation is

pictured on the next page.

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14 DETAILS OF THE EXTENSIVE FORM 42

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15 Backward Induction

and Subgame Perfection

This chapter begins with an example to show that not all Nash equilibria of a game

may be consistent with rationality in real time. The notion of sequential rationality

is presented, followed by backward induction (a version of conditional dominance)

and then a demonstration of backward induction in an example. Next comes the

result that nite games of perfect information have pure strategy Nash equilibria

(this result is used in Chapter 17 for the analysis of parlor games). The chapter

then denes subgame perfect Nash equilibrium as a concept for applying sequential

rationality in general games. An algorithm for computing subgame perfect equilibria

in nite games is demonstrated with an example.

Lecture Notes

An outline for a lecture follows.

Example of a game featuring a Nash equilibrium with an incredible threat.

The denition of Sequential rationality.

Backward induction: informal denition and abstract example. Note that the

strategy prole identied is a Nash equilibrium.

Result: every nite game with perfect information has a (pure strategy) Nash

equilibrium.

Note that backward induction is dicult to extend to games with imperfect

information.

Subgame denition and illustrative example. Note that the entire game is itself

a subgame. Denition of proper subgame.

Denition of subgame perfect Nash equilibrium.

Example and algorithm for computing subgame perfect equilibria: (a) draw the

normal form of the entire game, (b) draw the normal forms of all other (proper)

subgames, (c) nd the Nash equilibria of the entire game and the Nash equilibria

of the proper subgames, and (d) locate the Nash equilibria of the entire game

that specify Nash outcomes in all subgames.

Examples and Experiments

1. Incredible threats example. It might be useful to discuss, for example, the cred-

ibility of the Chicago Bulls of the 1990s threatening to re Michael Jordan.

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BACKWARD INDUCTION AND SUBGAME PERFECTION 44

2. Grab game. This is a good game to run as a classroom experiment immediately

after lecturing on the topic of subgame perfection. There is a very good chance

that the two students who play the game will not behave according to backward

induction theory. You can discuss why they behave dierently. In this game,

two students take turns on the move. When on the move, a student can either

grab all of the money in your hand or pass. At the beginning of the game, you

place one dollar in your hand and oer it to player 1. If player 1 grabs the

dollar, then the game ends (player 1 gets the dollar and player 2 gets nothing).

If player 1 passes, then you add another dollar to your hand and oer the two

dollars to player 2. If she grabs the money, then the game ends (she gets $2

and player 1 gets nothing). If player 2 passes, then you add another dollar and

return to player 1. This process continues until either one of the players grabs

the money or player 2 passes when the pot is $21 (in which case the game ends

with both players obtaining nothing).

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

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16 Topics in Industrial Organization

This chapter presents several models to explore various strategic elements of market

interaction. The chapter begins with a model of advertising and rm competition,

followed by a model of limit capacity. In both of these models, rms make a techno-

logical choice before competing with each other in a Cournot-style (quantity selection)

arena. The chapter then develops a simple two-period model of dynamic monopoly,

where a rm discriminates between customers by its choice of price over time. The

chapter ends with a variation of the dynamic monopoly model in which the rm can

eectively commit to a pricing scheme by oering a price guarantee. The models in

this chapter demonstrate a useful method of calculating subgame perfect equilibria

in games with innite strategy spaces. When it is known that each of a class of sub-

games has a unique Nash equilibrium, one can identify the equilibrium and, treating

it as the outcome induced by the subgame, work backward to analyze the game tree.

Lecture Notes

Any or all of the models in this chapter can be discussed in class, depending

on time constraints and the students background and interest. Other equilibrium

models, such as the von Stackelberg model, can also be presented or substituted for

any in the chapter. With regard to the advertising and limit capacity models (as well

as with others, such as the von Stackelberg game), the lecture can proceed as follows.

Description of the real setting.

Explanation of how some key strategic elements can be distilled in a game

theory model.

Description of the game.

Observe that there are an innite number of proper subgames.

Note that the proper subgames at the end of the game tree have unique Nash

equilibria. Calculate the equilibrium of a subgame and write its payo as a func-

tion of the variables selected by the players earlier in the game (the advertising

level, the entry and production facility decisions).

Analyze information sets toward the beginning of the tree, conditional on the

payo specications just calculated.

The dynamic monopoly game can be analyzed similarly, except it pays to stress

intuition, rather than mathematical expressions, with this game.

Examples and Experiments

Students would benet from a discussion of real strategic situations, especially

with an eye toward understanding how the strategic tensions are manifested. Also,

any of the applications can be used for classroom experiments.

45

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17 Parlor Games

In this chapter, two results stated earlier in the book (from Chapters 12 and 15) are

applied to analyze nite, strictly competitive games of perfect information. Many

parlor games, including chess, checkers, and tic-tac-toe, t in this category. A result

is stated for games that end with a winner and a loser or a tie. A few examples are

briey discussed.

Lecture Notes

An outline for a lecture follows.

Describe the class of two-player, nite games of perfect information that are

strictly competitive.

Examples: tic-tac-toe, checkers, chess, etc.

Note that the result in Chapters 12 and 15 apply. Thus, these games have (pure

strategy) Nash equilibria and the equilibrium strategies are security strategies.

Result: If the game must end with a winner, then one of the players has a

strategy that guarantees victory, regardless of what the other player does. If

the game ends with either a winner or a tie, then either one of the players has

a strategy that guarantees victory or both players can guarantee at least a tie.

Discuss examples, such as chess, that have no known solution.

Discuss simpler examples.

Examples and Experiments

1. Chomp tournament. Chomp is a fun game to play in a tournament format, with

the students separated into teams. For the rules of Chomp, see Exercise 5 in

Chapter 17. Have the students meet with their team members outside of class

to discuss how to play the game. The teams can then play against each other at

the end of a few class sessions. Give them several matrix congurations to play

(symmetric and asymmetric) so that, for fairness, the teams can each play the

role of player 1 and player 2 in the various congurations. After some thought

(after perhaps several days), the students will ascertain a winning strategy for

the symmetric version of Chomp. An optimal strategy for the asymmetric

version will elude them, as it has eluded the experts. You can award bonus

points based on the teams performance in the tournament. At some point, you

can also explain why we know that the rst player has a winning strategy, while

we do not know the actual winning strategy.

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17 PARLOR GAMES 47

2. Another tournament or challenge. The students might enjoy, and learn from,

playing other parlor games between themselves or with you. An after-class

challenge provides a good context for meeting with students in a relaxed envi-

ronment.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

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For instructors only; do not distribute.

18 Bargaining Problems

This chapter introduces the important topic of negotiation, a component of many eco-

nomic relationships and theoretical models. The chapter commences by noting how

bargaining can be put in terms of value creation and division. Several elements of

negotiationterms of trade, divisible goodsare noted. Then the chapter describes

an abstract representation of bargaining problems in terms of the payos of feasi-

ble agreements and the disagreement point. This representation is common in the

cooperative game literature, where solution concepts are often expressed as axioms

governing joint behavior. Transferable utility is assumed. Joint value and surplus

relative to the disagreement point are dened and illustrated in an example. The

standard bargaining solution is dened as the outcome in which the players maximize

their joint value and divide the surplus according to xed bargaining weights.

Lecture Notes

An outline for a lecture follows.

Examples of bargaining situations.

Translating a given bargaining problem into feasible payo vectors (V ) and the

default payo vector d, also called the disagreement point.

Transferable utility. Value creation means a higher joint value than with the

disagreement point. Recall eciency denition.

Divisible goods, such as money, that can be used to divide value.

An example in terms of agreement items x and a transfer t, so payos are

v

1

(x) +t and v

2

(x) t.

The standard bargaining solution: summarizing the outcome of negotiation in

terms of bargaining weights

1

,

2

. Assume the players reach an ecient agree-

ment and divide the surplus according to their bargaining weights. Descriptive

and predictive interpretations.

Player is negotiated payo is u

i

= d

i

+

i

(v

d

1

d

2

). This implies that x = x

) and t

= d

1

+

1

(v

d

1

d

2

) u

1

(x

).

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18 BARGAINING PROBLEMS 49

Examples and Experiments

1. Negotiation experiments. It can be instructiveespecially before lecturing on

negotiation problemsto present a real negotiation problem to two or more

students. Give them a set of alternatives (such as transferring money, getting

money or other objects from you, and so on). It is most useful if the alternatives

are multidimensional, with each dimension aecting the two players dierently

(so that the students face an interesting enlarge and divide the pie problem).

For example, one alternative might be that you will take student 1 to lunch

at the faculty club, whereas another might be that you will give one of them

(their choice) a new jazz compact disc. The outcome only takes eect (enforced

by you) if the students sign a contract. You can have the students negotiate

outside of class in a completely unstructured way (although it may be useful

to ask the students to keep track of how they reached a decision). Have the

students report in class on their negotiation and nal agreement.

2. Anonymous ultimatum bargaining experiment. Let half of the students be the

oerers and the other half responders. Each should write a strategy on a slip

of paper. For the oerers, this is an amount to oer the other player. For a

responder, this may be an amount below which she wishes to reject the oer

(or it could be a range of oers to be accepted). Once all of the slips have

been collected, you can randomly match an oerer and responder. It may be

interesting to do this twice, with the roles reversed for the second run, and to

try the non-anonymous version with two students selected in advance (in which

case, their payos will probably dier from those of the standard ultimatum

formulation). Discuss why (or why not) the students behavior departs from

the subgame perfect equilibrium. This provides a good introduction to the

theory covered in Chapter 19.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

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19 Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games

This chapter presents the analysis of alternating-oer bargaining games and shows

how the bargaining weights discussed in Chapter 18 are related to the order of moves

and discounting. The ultimatum game is reviewed rst, followed by a two-period game

and then the innite-period alternating-oer game. The analysis features subgame

perfect equilibriumand includes the motivation for, and denition of, discount factors.

At the end of the chapter is an example of multilateral bargaining in the legislative

context.

Lecture Notes

A lecture can proceed as follows.

Description of the ultimatum-oer bargaining game, between players i and j

(to facilitate analysis of larger games later). Player i oers a share between 0

and 1; player j accepts or rejects.

Determination of the two sequentially rational strategies for player j (the re-

sponder), which give equilibrium play in the proper subgames: (*) accept all

oers, and (**) accept if and only if the oer is strictly greater than 0.

Strategy (**) cannot be part of an equilibrium in the ultimatum game. Note

that this observation will be used in larger games later.

The unique subgame perfect equilibrium species strategy (*) for player j and

the oer of 0 by player i. Bargaining weight interpretation of the outcome.

Discounting over periods of time. Examples. Representing time preferences by

a discount factor

i

.

Description of the two-period, alternating-oer game with discounting. De-

termining the subgame perfect equilibrium using backward induction and the

equilibrium of the ultimatum game. Bargaining weight interpretation of the

outcome.

Description of the innite-period, alternating-oer game with discounting. Sketch

of the analysis: the subgame perfect equilibrium is stationary; m

i

is player is

equilibrium payo in subgames where he makes the rst oer.

Bargaining weight interpretation of the equilibrium outcome of the innite-

period game. Convergence as discount factors approach one.

Brief description of issues in multilateral negotiation.

50

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19 ANALYSIS OF SIMPLE BARGAINING GAMES 51

Examples and Experiments

For a transition from the analysis of simple bargaining games to modeling joint

decisions, you might run a classroom experiment in which the players negotiate a

contract that governs how they will play an underlying game in class. This combines

the negotiation experiment described in the material for Chapter 18 with the contract

experiment in the material for Chapter 13.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

20 Games with Joint Decisions;

Negotiation Equilibrium

This chapter introduces, and shows how to analyze, games with joint decision nodes.

A joint decision node is a distilled model of negotiation between the players; it takes

the place of a noncooperative model of bargaining. Games with joint decision nodes

can be used to study complicated strategic settings that have a negotiation compo-

nent, where a full noncooperative model would be unwieldy. Contractual relationships

often have this avor; there are times when the parties negotiate to form a contract

and there are times in which the parties work on their own (either complying with

their contract or failing to do so). Behavior at joint decision nodes is characterized by

the standard bargaining solution. Thus, a game with joint decision nodes is a hybrid

representation, with cooperative and noncooperative components.

The chapter explains the benets of composing games with joint decisions and, in

technical terms, demarcates the proper use of this representation. The term regime

generalizes the concept of strategy to games with joint decisions. The concept of a

negotiation equilibrium combines sequential rationality at individual decision nodes

with the standard bargaining solution at joint decision nodes. The chapter illustrates

the ideas with an example of an incentive contract.

Lecture Notes

Here is an outline for a lecture.

Noncooperative models of negotiation, such as those just analyzed, can be com-

plicated. In many strategic settings, negotiation is just one of the key compo-

nents.

It would be nice to build models in which the negotiation component were

characterized by the standard bargaining solution. Then we could examine

how bargaining power and disagreement points inuence the outcome, while

concentrating on other strategic elements.

Denition of a game with joint decisionsdistill a negotiation component into

a joint decision (a little model of bargaining).

Example: the extensive form version of a bargaining problem, utilizing a joint

decision node. Recall the pictures and notation from Chapter 18.

Always include a default decision to describe what happens if the players do

not reach an agreement.

Labeling the tree. Tree Rule 6.

Denition of regime: a specication of behavior at both individual and joint

decision nodes.

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JOINT DECISIONS AND NEGOTIATION EQUILIBRIUM 53

Negotiation equilibrium: sequential rationality at individual decision nodes;

standard bargaining solution at joint decision nodes.

Example of a contracting problem, modeling by a game with a joint decision.

Calculating the negotiation equilibriumby backward induction. First determine

the eort incentive, given a contract. Then, using the standard bargaining

solution, determine the optimal contract and how the surplus will be divided.

Examples and Experiments

1. Agency incentive contracting. You can run a classroom experiment where three

students interact as follows. Students 1 and 2 have to play a matrix game.

Specify a game that has a single rationalizable (dominance-solvable) strategy s

but has another outcome t that is strictly preferred by player 1 [u

1

(t) > u

1

(s)]

and has the property that t

2

is the unique best response to t

1

. Student 1 is

allowed to contract with student 3 so that student 3 can play the matrix game

in student 1s place (as student 1s agent). The contract between students 1

and 3 (which you enforce) can specify transfers between them as a function of

the matrix game outcome.

You can arrange the experiment so that the identities of students 1 and 3

are not known to student 2 (by, say, allowing many pairs of students to write

contracts and then selecting a pair randomly and anonymously, and by paying

them privately). After the experiment, discuss why you might expect t, rather

than s, to be played in the matrix game. To make the tensions pronounced,

make s an ecient outcome.

2. Ocean liner shipping-contract example. A producer who wishes to ship a moder-

ate shipment of output (say three or four full containers) overseas has a choice of

three ways of shipping the product. He can contract directly with the shipper,

he can contract with an independent shipping contractor (who has a contract

with a shipper), or he can use a trade association that has a contract with a

shipper. The producer himself must negotiate if he chooses either of the rst

two alternatives, but in the third the trade association has a non-negotiable fee

of 45. Shipping the product is worth 100 to the producer. Suppose that the

producer only has time to negotiate with one of the parties because his product

is perishable, but in the event of no agreement he can use the trade association.

The shippers cost of the shipment is 20. The shipping contractors cost is 30.

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21 Unveriable Investment, Hold Up,

Options, and Ownership

This chapter applies the concept of joint decisions and negotiation equilibrium to

illustrate the hold up problem. An example is developed in which one of the players

must choose whether to invest prior to production taking place. Three variations are

studied, starting with the case in which a party must choose his/her investment level

before contracting with the other party (so here hold up creates a serious problem).

In the second version, parties can contract up front; here, option contracts are shown

to provide optimal incentives. The chapter also comments on how asset ownership

can help alleviate the hold up problem.

Lecture Notes

An outline for a lecture follows.

Description of tensions between individual and joint interests because of the

timing of unveriable investments and contracting. Related to externality.

Hold up example: unveriable investment followed by negotiation over the re-

turns, where agreement is required to realize the returns.

Calculate the negotiation equilibrium by backward induction. Find the outcome

and payos from the joint decision node, using the standard bargaining solution.

Then determine the rational investment choice.

Note the incentive to underinvest, relative to the ecient amount.

Consider up-front contracting and option contracts. Describe how option con-

tracts work and are enforced.

Show that a particular option contract leads to the ecient outcome. Calculate

and describe the negotiation equilibrium.

Extension of the model in which the value of the investment is tied to an asset,

which has a value in the relationship and another value outside of the relation-

ship.

Ownership of the asset aects the disagreement point (through the outside

value) and thus aects the outcome of negotiation.

Find the negotiation equilibrium for the various ownership specications.

Investor ownership is preferred if the value of the asset in its outside use rises

with the investment. This may not be true in general. If the outside asset value

rises too quickly with the investment, then the investor may have the incentive

to overinvest.

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INVESTMENT AND HOLD UP 55

Examples and Experiments

You can discuss real examples of hold up, such as those having to do with specic

human capital investment, physical plant location, and unveriable investments in

long-term procurement contracting. You can also present the analysis of, or run an

experiment based on, a game like that of the Guided Exercise in this chapter.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

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Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

22 Repeated Games and Reputation

This chapter opens with comments about the importance of reputation in ongoing

relationships. The concept of a repeated game is dened and a two-period repeated

game is analyzed in detail. The two-period game demonstrates that any sequence of

stage Nash proles can be supported as a subgame perfect equilibrium outcome (a

result that is stated for general repeated games). The example also shows how a non-

stage Nash prole can be played in equilibrium if subsequent play is conditioned so

that players would be punished for deviating. The chapter then turns to the analysis

of innitely repeated games, beginning with a review of discounting. The presenta-

tion includes derivation of the standard conditions under which cooperation can be

sustained in the innitely repeated prisoners dilemma. In the following section, a

more complicated, asymmetric equilibrium is constructed to demonstrate that dier-

ent forms of cooperation, favoring one or the other player, can also be supported. A

Nash-punishment folk theorem is stated at the end of the chapter.

Lecture Notes

A lecture may be organized according to the following outline.

Intuition: reputation and ongoing relationships. Examples: partnerships, col-

lusion, etc.

Key idea: behavior is conditioned on the history of the relationship, so that

misdeeds are punished.

Denition of a repeated game. Stage game {A, u} (call A

i

actions), played T

times with observed actions.

Example of a two-period (non-discounted) repeated game.

Diagram of the feasible repeated game payos and feasible stage game payos.

Note how many subgames there are. Note what each players strategy species.

The proper subgames have the same strategic features, since the payo matrices

for these are equal, up to a constant. Thus, the equilibria of the subgames are

the same as those of the stage game.

Characterization of subgame perfect equilibria featuring only stage Nash proles

(action proles that are equilibria of the stage game).

A reputation equilibrium where a non-stage Nash action prole is played in the

rst period. Note the payo vector.

Review of discounting.

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22 REPEATED GAMES AND REPUTATION 57

The innitely repeated prisoners dilemma game.

Trigger strategies. Grim trigger.

Conditions under which the grim trigger is a subgame perfect equilibrium.

Example of another cooperative equilibrium. The folk theorem.

Examples and Experiments

1. Two-period example. It is probably best to start a lecture with the simplest

possible example, such as the one with a 3 2 stage game that is presented at

the beginning of this chapter. You can also run a classroom experiment based

on such a game. Have the students communicate in advance (either in pairs

or as a group) to agree on how they will play the game. That is, have the

students make a self-enforced contract. This will hopefully get them thinking

about history-dependent strategies. Plus, it will reinforce the interpretation of

equilibrium as a self-enforced contract, which you may want to discuss near the

end of a lecture on reputation and repeated games.

2. The Princess Bride reputation example. At the beginning of your lecture on

reputation, you can play the scene from The Princess Bride in which Wesley is

reunited with the princess. Just before he reveals his identity to her, he makes

interesting comments about how a pirate maintains his reputation.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

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23 Collusion, Trade Agreements,

and Goodwill

This chapter presents three applications of repeated game theory: collusion between

rms over time, the enforcement of international trade agreements, and goodwill.

The rst application involves a straightforward calculation of whether collusion can

be sustained using grim trigger strategies in a repeated Cournot model. This example

reinforces the basic analytical exercise from Chapter 22. The section on international

trade is a short verbal discussion of how reputation functions as the mechanism for

self-enforcement of a long-term contract. On goodwill, a two-period game with a

sequence of players 2 (one in the rst period and another in the second period) is

analyzed. The rst player 2 can, by cooperating in the rst period, establish a valuable

reputation that he can then sell to the second player 2.

Lecture Notes

Any or all of the applications can be discussed in class, depending on time con-

straints and the students background and interest. Other applications can also be

presented, in addition to these or substituting for these. For each application, it may

be helpful to organize the lecture as follows.

Description of the real-world setting.

Explanation of how some key strategic elements can be distilled in a game

theory model.

(If applicable) Description of the game to be analyzed.

Determination of conditions under which an interesting (cooperative) equilib-

rium exists.

Discussion of intuition.

Notes on how the model could be extended.

Examples and Experiments

1. The Princess Bride second reputation example. Before lecturing on goodwill,

you can play the scene from The Princess Bride where Wesley and Buttercup

are in the re swamp. While in the swamp, Wesley explains how a reputation

can be associated with a name, even if the name changes hands over time.

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COLLUSION, TRADE AGREEMENTS, AND GOODWILL 59

2. Goodwill in an innitely repeated game. If you want to be ambitious, you can

present a model of an innitely repeated game with a sequence of players 2

who buy and sell the player 2 reputation between periods. This can follow

the Princess Bride scene and be based on Exercise 4 of this chapter (which,

depending on your students backgrounds, may be too dicult for them to do

on their own).

3. Repeated Cournot oligopoly experiment. Let three students interact in a re-

peated Cournot oligopoly. This may be set as an oil (or some other commodity)

production game. It may be useful to have the game end probabilistically. This

may easy to do if it is done by e-mail, but may require a set time frame if done

in class. The interaction can be done in two scenarios. In the rst, players may

not communicate, and only the total output is announced at the end of each

round. In the second scenario, players are allowed to communicate and each

players output is announced at the end of each round.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

24 Random Events and

Incomplete Information

This chapter explains how to incorporate exogenous random events in the specication

of a game. Moves of Nature (also called the nonstrategic player 0) are made at

chance nodes according to a xed probability distribution. As an illustration, the gift

game is depicted in the extensive form and then converted into the Bayesian normal

form (where payos are the expected values over Natures moves). Another abstract

example follows.

Lecture Notes

A lecture may be organized according to the following outline.

Discussion of settings in which players have private information about strategic

aspects beyond their physical actions. Private information about preferences:

auctions, negotiation, etc.

Modeling such a setting using moves of Nature that players privately observe.

(For example, the buyer knows his own valuation of the good, which the seller

does not observe.)

Extensive form representation of the example. Nature moves at chance nodes,

which are represented as open circles. Natures probability distribution is noted

in the tree.

The notion of a type, referring to the information that a player privately ob-

serves. If a player privately observes some aspect of Natures choices, then the

game is said to be of incomplete information.

Many real settings might be described in terms of players already knowing their

own types. However, because of incomplete information, one type of player will

have to consider how he would have behaved were he a dierent type (because

the other players consider this).

Bayesian normal form representation of the example. Note that payo vectors

are averaged with respect to Natures xed probability distribution.

Other examples.

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RANDOM EVENTS AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 61

Examples and Experiments

1. The Lets Make a Deal game revisited. You can illustrate incomplete information

by describing a variation of the Lets Make a Deal game that is described in

the material for Chapter 2. In the incomplete-information version, Nature picks

with equal probabilities the door behind which the prize is concealed and Monty

randomizes equally between alternatives when he has to open one of the doors.

2. Three-card poker. This game also makes a good example (see Exercise 4 in

Chapter 24 of the textbook).

3. Ultimatum-oer bargaining with incomplete information. You might present,

or run as a classroom experiment, an ultimatum bargaining game in which the

responders value of the good being traded is private information (say, $5 with

probability 1/2 and $8 with probability 1/2). For an experiment, describe the

good as a soon-expiring check made out to player 2. You show player 2 the

amount of the check, but you seal the check in an envelop before giving it to

player 1 (who bargains over the terms of trading it to player 2).

4. Signaling games. It may be worthwhile to describe a signaling game that you

plan to analyze later in class.

5. The Price is Right. The bidding game from this popular television game show

forms the basis for a good bonus question. (See also Exercise 5 in Chapter 25

for a simpler, but still challenging, version.) In the game, four contestants must

guess the price of an item. Suppose none of them knows the price of the item

initially, but they all know that the price is an integer between 1 and 1, 000. In

fact, when they have to make their guesses, the contestants all believe that the

price is equally likely to be any number between 1 and 1, 000. That is, the price

will be 1 with probability 1/1000, the price will be 2 with probability 1/1000,

and so on.

The players make their guesses sequentially. First, player 1 declares his/her

guess of the price, by picking a number between 1 and 1, 000. The other players

observe player 1s choice and then player 2 makes her guess. Player 3 next

chooses a number, followed by player 4. When a player selects a number,

he/she is not allowed to pick a number that one of the other players already

had selected.

After the players make their guesses, the actual price is revealed. Then the

player whose guess is closest to the actual price without going over wins $100.

The other players get 0. For example, if player 1 chose 150, player 2 chose 300,

player 3 selected 410, and player 4 chose 490, and if the actual price were 480,

then player 3 wins $100 and the others get nothing.

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RANDOM EVENTS AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 62

This game is not exactly the one played on The Price is Right, but it is close.

The bonus question is: Assuming that a subgame perfect equilibrium is played,

what is player 1s guess? How would the answer change if, instead of the winner

getting $100, the winner gets the value of the item (that is, the actual price)?

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25 Risk and Incentives in Contracting

This chapter presents the analysis of the classic principal-agent problem under moral

hazard, where the agent is risk-averse. There is a move of Nature (a random produc-

tive outcome). Because Nature moves last, the game has complete information. Thus,

it can be analyzed using subgame perfect equilibrium. This is why the principal-agent

model is the rst, and most straightforward, application covered in Part IV of the

book.

At the beginning of the chapter, the reader will nd a thorough presentation

of how payo numbers represent preferences over risk. An example helps explain

the notions of risk aversion and risk premia. The Arrow-Pratt measure of relative

risk aversion is dened. Then a streamlined principal-agent model is developed and

fully analyzed. The relation between the agents risk attitude and the optimal bonus

contract is determined.

Lecture Notes

Analysis of the principal-agent problem is fairly complicated. Instructors will not

likely want to develop in class a more general and complicated model than the one

in the textbook. A lecture based on the textbooks model can proceed as follows.

Example of a lottery experiment/questionnaire that is designed to determine

the risk preferences of an individual.

Representing the example as a simple game with Nature.

Note that people usually are risk averse in the sense that they prefer the ex-

pected value of a lottery over the lottery itself.

Observe the dierence between an expected monetary award and expected util-

ity (payo).

Risk preferences and the shape of the utility function on money. Concavity,

linearity, etc.

Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion.

Intuition: contracting for eort incentives under risk.

The principal-agent model. Risk neutral principal.

Incentive compatibility and participation constraints. They both will bind at

the principals optimal contract oer.

Calculation of the equilibrium. Note how the contract and the agents behavior

depend on the agents risk preferences.

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25 RISK AND INCENTIVES IN CONTRACTING 64

Discussion of real implications.

Examples and Experiments

You can illustrate risk-aversion by oering choices over real lotteries to the stu-

dents in class. Discuss risk aversion and risk premia.

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26 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

and Rationalizability

This chapter shows how to analyze Bayesian normal form games using rationalizability

and equilibrium theory. Two methods are presented. The rst method is simply to

apply the standard denitions of rationalizability and Nash equilibrium to Bayesian

normal forms. The second method is to apply the concepts by treating dierent types

of a player as separate players. The two methods are equivalent whenever all types

are realized with positive probability (an innocuous assumption for static settings).

Computations for some nite games exemplify the rst method. The second method

is shown to be useful when there are continuous strategy spaces, as illustrated using

the Cournot duopoly with incomplete information.

Lecture Notes

A lecture may be organized according to the following outline.

Examples of performing standard rationalizability and equilibrium analysis to

Bayesian normal form games.

Another method that is useful for more complicated games (such as those with

continuous strategy spaces): treat dierent types as dierent players. One can

use this method without having to calculate expected payos over Natures

moves for all players.

Example of the second method: Cournot duopoly with incomplete information

or a dierent game.

Examples and Experiments

You can run a common- or private-value auction experiment or a lemons experi-

ment in class as a transition to the material in Chapter 27. You might also consider

simple examples to illustrate the method of calculating best responses for individual

player-types.

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27 Lemons, Auctions,

and Information Aggregation

This chapter focuses on three important settings of incomplete information: price-

taking market interaction, auctions, and information aggregation through voting.

These settings are studied using static models, in the Bayesian normal form, and the

games are analyzed using the techniques discussed in the preceding chapter. The

markets and lemons game demonstrates Akerlofs major contribution to informa-

tion economics. Regarding auctions, the chapter presents the analysis of both rst-

price and second-price formats. In the process, weak dominance is dened and the

revenue equivalence result is mentioned. The example of voting and information

aggregation gives a hint of standard mechanism-design/social-choice analysis and il-

lustrates Bayes rule.

Lecture Notes

Any or all of these applications can be discussed in class, depending on time

constraints and the students background and interest. The lemons model is quite

simple; a lemons model that is more general than the one in the textbook can easily

be covered in class. The auction analysis, on the other hand, is more complicated.

However, the simplied auction models are not beyond the reach of most advanced

undergraduates. The major sticking points are (a) explaining the method of assuming

a parameterized form of the equilibriumstrategies and then calculating best responses

to verify the form and determine the parameter, (b) the calculus required to calculate

best responses, and (c) double integration to establish revenue equivalence. One can

skip (c) with no problem. The information aggregation example requires students to

work through Bayes rule calculations.

For each application, it may be helpful to organize the lecture as follows.

Description of the real-world setting.

Explanation of how some key strategic elements can be distilled in a game

theory model.

Description of the game to be analyzed.

Calculations of best responses and equilibrium. Note whether the equilibrium

is unique.

Discussion of intuition.

Notes on how the model could be extended.

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LEMONS, AUCTIONS, AND INFORMATION AGGREGATION 67

Examples and Experiments

1. Lemons experiment. Let one student be the seller of a car and another be the

potential buyer. Prepare some cards with values written on them. Show the

cards to both of the students and then, after shuing the cards, draw one at

random and give it to student 1 (so that student 1 sees the value but student 2

does not). Let the students engage in unstructured negotiation over the terms of

trading the card from student 1 to student 2, or allow them to declare whether

they will trade at a prespecied price. Tell them that whomever has the card

in the end will get paid. If student 1 has the card, then she gets the amount

written on it. If student 2 has the card, then he gets the amount plus a constant

($2 perhaps).

2. Stock trade and auction experiments. You can run an experiment in which

randomly-selected students play a trading game like that of Exercise 8 in this

chapter. Have the students specify on paper the set of prices at which they are

willing to trade. You can also organize the interaction as a common-value auc-

tion, or run any other type of auction in class. You can discuss the importance

of expected payos contingent on winning or trading.

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28 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

This chapter develops the concept of perfect Bayesian equilibrium for analyzing be-

havior in dynamic games of incomplete information. The gift game is utilized through-

out the chapter to illustrate the key ideas. First, the example is used to demonstrate

that subgame perfection does not adequately represent sequential rationality. Then

comes the notion of conditional belief, which is presented as the belief of a player at

an information set where he has observed the action, but not the type, of another

player. Sequential rationality is dened as action choices that are optimal in response

to the conditional beliefs (for each information set). The chapter then covers the

notion of consistent beliefs and Bayes rule. Finally, perfect Bayesian equilibrium is

dened and put to work on the gift game.

Lecture Notes

A lecture may be organized according to the following outline.

Example to show that subgame perfection does not adequately capture sequen-

tial rationality. (A simple signaling game will do.)

Sequential rationality requires evaluating behavior at every information set.

Conditional belief at an information set (regardless of whether players origi-

nally thought the information set would be reached). Initial belief about types;

updated (posterior) belief.

Sequential rationality: optimal actions given beliefs (like best response, but with

actions at a particular information set rather than full strategies).

Consistency: updating should be consistent with strategies and the basic de-

nition of conditional probability. Bayes rule. Note that conditional beliefs are

unconstrained at zero-probability information sets.

Perfect Bayesian equilibrium: strategies, beliefs at all information sets, such

that (1) each players strategy prescribes optimal actions at all of his information

sets, given his beliefs and the strategies of the other players, and (2) the beliefs

are consistent with Bayes rule wherever possible.

Denition of pooling and separating equilibria.

Algorithm for nding perfect Bayesian equilibria in a signaling game: (a) posit

a strategy for player 1 (either pooling or separating), (b) calculate restrictions

on conditional beliefs, (c) calculate optimal actions for player 2 given his beliefs,

and (d) check whether player 1s strategy is a best response to player 2s strategy.

Calculations for the example.

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28 PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM 69

Examples and Experiments

1. Conditional probability demonstration. Students can be given cards with dier-

ent colors written on them, say red and blue. The colors should be given in

dierent proportions to males and females (for example, males could be given

proportionately more cards saying red and females could be given proportion-

ately more cards saying blue). A student could be asked to guess the color of

another students card. This could be done several times, and the color revealed

following the guess. Then a male and female student could be selected, and a

student could be asked to guess who has, for example, the red card.

2. Signaling game experiment. It may be instructive to play in class a signaling

game in which one of the player-types has a dominated strategy. The variant

of the gift game discussed at the beginning of Chapter 28 is such a game.

3. The Princess Bride signaling example. A scene near the end of The Princess

Bride movie is a good example of a signaling game. The scene begins with

Wesley lying in a bed. The prince enters the room. The prince does not know

whether Wesley is strong or weak. Wesley can choose whether or not to stand.

Finally, the prince decides whether to ght or surrender. This game can be

diagrammed and discussed in class. After specifying payos, you can calculate

the perfect Baysian equilibria and discuss whether it accurately describes events

in the movie. Exercise 6 in this chapter sketches one model of this strategic

setting.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

29 Job-Market Signaling and Reputation

This chapter presents two applications of perfect Bayesian equilibrium: job-market

signaling and reputation with incomplete information. The signaling model demon-

strates Michael Spences major contribution to information economics. The repu-

tation model illustrates how incomplete information causes a player of one type to

pretend to be another type, which has interesting implications. This oers a glimpse

of the reputation literature initiated by David Kreps, Paul Milgrom, John Roberts,

and Robert Wilson.

Lecture Notes

Either or both of these applications can be discussed in class, depending on time

constraints and the students background and interest. The extensive form tree of the

job-market signaling model is in the standard signaling-game format, so this model

can be easily presented in class. The reputation model may be slightly more dicult

to present, however, because its extensive form representation is a bit dierent and

the analysis does not follow the algorithm outlined in Chapter 28.

For each application, it may be helpful to organize the lecture as follows.

Description of the real-world setting.

Explanation of how some key strategic elements can be distilled in a game

theory model.

Description of the game to be analyzed.

Calculating the perfect Bayesian equilibria (using the circular algorithm from

Chapter 28, if appropriate).

Discussion of intuition.

Notes on how the model could be extended.

Examples and Experiments

In addition to, or in place of, the applications presented in this chapter, you might

lecture on the problem of contracting with adverse selection. Exercise 9 of Chapter 29

would be suitable as the basis for such a lecture. This is a principal-agent game, where

the principal oers a menu of contracts to screen between two types of the agent. You

can briey discuss the program of mechanism design theory as well.

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30 Appendices

Appendix A oers an informal review of the following relevant mathematical topics:

sets, functions, basic dierentiation, and probability theory. Your students can con-

sult this appendix to brush up on the mathematics skills that are required for game

theoretic analysis. As noted at the beginning of this manual, calculus is used spar-

ingly in the textbook and it can be avoided. In addition, where calculus is utilized,

it usually amounts to a simple exercise in dierentiating a second-degree polynomial.

If you wish to cover the applications/examples to which the textbook applies dier-

entiation, and if calculus is not a prerequisite for your course, you can simply teach

(or have them read on their own) the short section entitled Functions and Calculus

in Appendix A.

Appendix B gives some of the details of the rationalizability construction. If

you want the students to see some of the technical details behind the dierence

between correlated and uncorrelated conjectures, the relation between dominance

and best response, or the rationalizability construction, you can advise them to read

Appendix B just after reading Chapters 6 and 7. Three challenging mathematical

exercises appear at the end of Appendix B.

71

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72

Part III

Solutions to the Exercises

This part contains solutions to all of the exercises in the textbook. Although we

worked diligently on these solutions, there are bound to be a few typos here and

there. Please report any instances where you think you have found a substantial

error.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

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2 The Extensive Form

1.

2.

(a)

(b) Incomplete information. The worker does not know who has hired

him/her.

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2 THE EXTENSIVE FORM 74

3.

Note that we have not specied payos as these are left to the students.

4.

The order does not matter as it is a simultaneous move game.

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2 THE EXTENSIVE FORM 75

5.

The payos below are in the order A, B, C.

6.

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2 THE EXTENSIVE FORM 76

7.

8.

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3 Strategies and the Normal Form

1.

Exercise 1: S

L

= {A,B}. S

M

= {Rr, Rg, Gr, Gg}. S

J

= {Aa, Ab, Ba,

Bb }. Exercise 4: S

i

= {R,P,S}, i = 1, 2.

2.

No, not hire does not describe a strategy for the manager. A strat-

egy for the manager must specify an action to be taken in every contin-

gency. However, not hire does not specify any action contingent upon

the worker being hired and exerting a specic level of eort.

3.

(a)

(b)

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3 STRATEGIES AND THE NORMAL FORM 78

(c)

(d)

(e)

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3 STRATEGIES AND THE NORMAL FORM 79

(f)

4. Player 2 has 4 strategies: {(c, f), (c, g), (d, f), (d, g)}.

5.

The normal form species player, strategy spaces, and payo functions.

Here N = {1, 2}. S

i

= [0, ). The payo to player i is give by u

i

(q

i

, q

j

) =

(2 q

i

q

j

)q

i

.

6.

N = {1, 2}. S

1

= [0, ). Player 2s strategy must specify a choice of

quantity for each possible quantity player 1 can choose. Thus, player 2s

strategy space S

2

is the set of functions from [0, ) to [0, ).

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3 STRATEGIES AND THE NORMAL FORM 80

7.

Some possible extensive forms are shown below and on the next page.

(a)

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3 STRATEGIES AND THE NORMAL FORM 81

(b)

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4 Beliefs, Mixed Strategies,

and Expected Payos

1.

(a) u

1

(U,C) = 0.

(b) u

2

(M,R) = 4.

(c) u

2

(D,C) = 6.

(d) For

1

= (1/3, 2/3, 0) u

1

(

1

,C) = 1/3(0) + 2/3(10) + 0 = 6 2/3.

(e) u

1

(

1

,R) = 5 1/4.

(f) u

1

(

1

, L) = 2.

(g) u

2

(

1

, R) = 3 2/3.

(h) u

2

(

1

,

2

) = 4 1/2.

2.

(a)

(b) Player 1s expected payo of playing H is z. His expected payo of

playing L is 5. For z = 5, player 1 is indierent between playing H or L.

(c) Player 1s expected payo of playing L is 20/3.

3.

(a) u

1

(

1

,I) = 1/4(2) + 1/4(2) + 1/4(4) + 1/4(3) = 11/4.

(b) u

2

(

1

,O) = 21/8.

(c) u

1

(

1

,

2

) = 2(1/4) + 2(1/4) + 4(1/4)(1/3) + 1/4(2/3) + 3/4(1/3) +

14(2/3) = 23/12.

(d) u

1

(

,

2

) = 7/3.

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BELIEFS AND EXPECTED PAYOFFS 83

4.

Note that all of these, except Pigs, are symmetric games.

Matching Pennies: u

1

(

1

,

2

) = u

2

(

1

,

2

) = 0.

Prisoners Dilemma: u

1

(

1

,

2

) = u

2

(

1

,

2

) = 1 1/2.

Battle of the Sexes: u

1

(

1

,

2

) = u

2

(

1

,

2

) = 3/4.

Hawk-Dove/Chicken: u

1

(

1

,

2

) = u

2

(

1

,

2

) = 1 1/2.

Coordination: u

1

(

1

,

2

) = u

2

(

1

,

2

) = 1/2.

Pareto Coordination: u

1

(

1

,

2

) = u

2

(

1

,

2

) = 3/4.

Pigs: u

1

(

1

,

2

) = 3, u

2

(

1

,

2

) = 1.

5.

The expected prot of player 1 is (100 28 20)14 20(14) = 448.

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6 Dominance and Best Response

1.

(a) B dominates A and L dominates R.

(b) L dominates R.

(c) 2/3 U 1/3 D dominates M. X dominates Z.

(d) none.

2.

(a) To determine the BR set we must determine which strategy of player 1

yields the highest payo given her belief about player 2s strategy selec-

tion. Thus, we compare the payo to each of her possible strategies.

u

1

(U,

2

) = 1/3(10) + 0 + 1/3(3) = 13/3.

u

1

(M,

2

) = 1/3(2) + 1/2(10) + 1/3(6) = 6.

u

1

(D,

2

) = 1/3(3) + 1/3(4) + 1/3(6) = 13/3.

BR

1

(

2

) = {M}.

(b) BR

2

(

1

) = {L,R}.

(c) BR

1

(

2

) = {U,M}.

(d) BR

2

(

1

) = {C}.

3.

Player 1 solves max

q

1

(100 2q

1

2q

2

)q

1

20q

1

. The rst order condition

is 100 4q

1

2q

2

20 = 0. Solving for q

1

yields BR

1

(q

2

) = 20 q

2

/2.

It is easy to see that BR

1

(0) = 20. Since q

2

0, it cannot be that 25 is

ever a best response. Given the beliefs, player 1s best response is 15.

4.

(a) First we nd the expected payo to each strategy: u

1

(U,

2

) = 2/6+0+

4(1/2) = 7/3; u

1

(M,

2

) = 3(1/6)+1/2 = 1; and u

1

(D,

2

) = 1/6+1+1 =

13/6. As the strategy U yields a higher expected payo to player 1, given

2

, BR

1

(

2

) = {U}.

(b) BR

2

(

1

) = {R}.

(c) BR

1

(

2

) = {U}.

(d) BR

1

(

2

) = {U, D}.

(e) BR

2

(

1

) = {L, R}.

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6 DOMINANCE AND BEST RESPONSE 85

5.

(a) BR

1

(

2

) = {P}.

(b) BR

1

(

2

) = {R, S}.

(c) BR

1

(

2

) = {P}.

(d) BR

1

(

2

) = S

1

.

6.

No. This is because 1/2 A 1/2 B dominates C.

7.

M is dominated by (1/3, 2/3, 0).

8.

From exercise 3, BR

1

(q

2

) = 20 q

2

/2. So UD

1

= [0, 20].

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7 Rationalizability and Iterated Dominance

1.

(a) R = {U, M, D} {L, R}.

(b) Here there is a dominant strategy. So we can iteratively delete dom-

inated strategies. U dominates D. When D is ruled out, R dominates C.

Thus, R = {U, M} {L, R}.

(c) R = {(U, L)}.

(d) R = {A, B} {X, Y}.

(e) R = {A, B} {X, Y}.

(f) R = {A, B} {X, Y}.

(g) R = {(D, Y)}.

2.

For give in to be rationalizable, it must be that x 0. The man-

ager must believe that the probability that the employee plays settle is

(weakly) greater than 1/2.

3.

R = {(x, c)}. The order does not matter because if a strategy is domi-

nated (not a best response) relative to some set of strategies of the other

player, then this strategy will also be dominated relative to a smaller set

of strategies for the other player.

4.

R = {(7:00, 6:00, 6:00)}.

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7 RATIONALIZABILITY AND ITERATED DOMINANCE 87

5.

Yes. If s

1

is rationalizable, then s

2

is a best response to a strategy of

player 1 that may rationally be played. Thus, player 2 can rationalize

strategy s

2

.

6.

No. It may be that s

1

is rationalizable because it is a best response to some

other rationalizable strategy of player 2, say s

2

, and just also happens to

be a best response to s

2

.

7.

R = {(0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)}. Note that player u

10

= (a 10 1)s

10

and that a 11 < 0 since a is at most 10. So player 10 has a single

undominated strategy, 0. Given this, we know a will be at most 9 (if

everyone except player 10 selects 9). Thus, a 10 < 0 and so player 9

must select 0. by induction, every player selects 0.

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8 Location and Partnership

1.

We label the regions as shown below.

We rst nd the best response sets. Noticing the symmetry makes this

easier. BR

i

(1) = {2, 4, 5}; BR

i

(2) = {5}; BR

i

(3) = {2, 5, 6}; BR

i

(4) =

{5}; BR

i

(5) = {5}; BR

i

(6) = {5}; BR

i

(7) = {4, 5, 8}; BR

i

(8) = {5};

and BR

i

(9) = {5, 6, 8}. It is easy to see that {1, 3, 7, 9} are never best

responses. Thus, R

1

i

= {2, 4, 5, 6, 8}. Since player i knows that player j

is rational, he/she knows that j will never play {1, 3, 7, 9}. This implies

R

2

i

= R

i

= {5}.

2.

For x < 80 locating in region 2 dominates locating in region 1.

3.

(a) Yes, preferences are as modeled in the basic location game. When the

each players objective is to maximize his/her probability of winning, the

best response set is not unique. Suppose, for example, that player 2 plays

1 then BR

1

= {2, 3, 4, . . . , 8}.

(b) Here, we should focus on R

2

i

= {3, 4, 5, 6, 7}. It is easy to see that

if the regions are divided in half between 5 and 6 that 250 is distributed

to each half. So unlike in the basic location model there is not a single

region that is in the middle. Thus, R = {5,6} {5,6}. In any of these

outcomes, each candidate receives the same number of votes.

(c) When x > 75, player is best response to 5 is 6, and his/her best

response to 6 is 6. Thus, R = {(6, 6)}.

When x < 75, player is best response to 6 is 5, and his/her best response

to 5 is 5. Thus, R = {(5, 5)}.

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8 LOCATION AND PARTNERSHIP 89

4.

Recall from the text that BR

1

(y) = 1+cy, and BR

2

(x) = 1+cx. Assume

1 < c < 0. This yields the following graph of best response functions.

As neither player will ever optimally exert eort that is greater than 1,

R

1

i

= [0, 1]. Realizing that player js rational behavior implies this, R

2

i

=

[1 + c, 1]. Continuing yields R

3

i

= [1 + c, 1 + c + c

2

]. Repeating yields

R

i

= {

1+c

1c

2

} =

1

1c

.

Repeat of analysis for c > 1/4: Recall from the text that BR

1

(y) = 1+cy,

and BR

2

(x) = 1 + cx. Assume 1/4 < c 3/4. This yields the following

graph of best response functions.

Because player i will never optimally exert eort that is either less than

1 or greater than 1 + 4c, we have R

1

i

= [1, 1 + 4c]. Because the players

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8 LOCATION AND PARTNERSHIP 90

know this about each other, we have R

2

i

= [1+c, 1+c(1+4c)]. Repeating

yields R

i

= {

1+c

1c

2

} =

1

1c

.

Next suppose that c > 3/4. In this case, the functions x = 1+cy and y =

1+cx suggest that players would want to select strategies that exceed 4 in

response to some beliefs. However, remember that the players strategies

are constrained to be less than or equal to 4. Thus, the best response

functions are actually

BR

1

(y) =

_

1 +cy if 1 +cy 4

4 if 1 +cy > 4

and

BR

2

(x) =

_

1 +cx if 1 +cx 4

4 if 1 +cx > 4

.

In this case, the best response functions cross at (4, 4), and this is the

only rationalizable strategy prole.

5.

(a) u

1

(p

1

, p

2

) = [10 p

1

+ p

2

]p

1

. u

2

(p

1

, p

2

) = [10 p

2

+ p

1

]p

2

.

(b) u

i

(p

1

, p

2

) = 10p

i

p

2

i

+ p

j

p

i

. As above, we want to solve for p

i

that

maximizes is payo given p

j

. Solving for the rst order condition yields

p

i

(p

j

) = 5 + 1/2p

j

.

(c) Here there is no bound to the price a player can select. Thus, we

do not obtain a unique rationalizable strategy prole. The best response

functions are represented below.

Similar to the above, we have R

1

i

= [5, ) and R

2

i

= [15/2, ). Repeating

the analysis yields R

i

= [10, ) for i = 1, 2.

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8 LOCATION AND PARTNERSHIP 91

6.

(a) No.

(b)

i

= (0, p, 0, 0, 1 p, 0) dominates locating in region 1, for all p

(1/2, 1).

7.

Player 1 chooses x to maximize u

1

(x, y) = 2xy x

2

. The rst order

condition implies x = y. Thus, BR

1

(y) = y. Similarly, player 2 chooses y

to maximize u

2

(x, y) = 4xy y

2

. The rst order condition implies y = 2x,

but y [2, 8]. So

BR

2

(x) =

_

2x if x 4

8 if x > 4

.

So R = {(8, 8)}.

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9 Nash Equilibrium

1.

(a) The Nash equilibria (w,b) and (y,c).

(b) (y,c) is ecient.

(c) X is not congruent.

2.

(a) The set of Nash equilibria is {(B, L)} = R.

(b) The set of Nash equilibria is {(U, L),(M, C)}. R = {U, M, D}

{L, C}.

(c) The set of Nash equilibria is {(U, X)} = R.

(d) The set of Nash equilibria is {(U, L), (D, R)}. R = {U, D} {L, R}.

3.

Figure 7.1: The Nash equilibrium is (B,Z).

Figure 7.3: The Nash equilibrium is (M,R).

Figure 7.4: The Nash equilibria are (stag,stag) and (hare,hare).

Exercise 1: (a) No Nash equilibrium. (b) The Nash equilibria are (U,R)

and (M,L). (c) The Nash equilibrium is (U,L). (d) The Nash equilibria are

(A,X) and (B,Y). (e) The Nash equilibria are (A,X) and (B,Y). (f) The

Nash equilibria are (A,X) and (B,Y). (g) The Nash equilibrium is (D,Y).

Chapter 4, Exercise 2: The Nash equilibria are (Ea,aa

) and (Ea,an

).

Chapter 5, Exercise 1: The Nash equilibrium is (D,R).

Exercise 3: No Nash equilibrium.

4.

Only at (1/2, 1/2) would no player wish to unilaterally deviate. Thus,

the Nash equilibrium is (1/2, 1/2).

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9 NASH EQUILIBRIUM 93

5.

Player 1 solves max

s

1

3s

1

2s

1

s

2

2s

2

1

. Taking s

2

as given and dierentiat-

ing with respect to s

1

yields the rst order condition 32s

2

4s

1

= 0. Re-

arranging, we obtain player 1s best response function: s

1

(s

2

) = 3/4s

2

/2.

player 2 solves max

s

2

s

2

+2s

1

s

2

2s

2

2

. This yields the best response function

s

2

(s

1

) = 1/4+s

1

/2. The Nash equilibrium is found by nding the strategy

prole that satises both of these equations. Substituting player 2s best

response function into player 1s, we have s

1

= 3/41/2[1/4+s

1

/2]. This

implies that the Nash equilibrium is (1/2, 1/2).

6.

(a) The congruous sets are S, {(z, m)}, and {w, y} {k, l}.

(b) They will agree to {w, y} {k, l}.

(c) No, there are four possible strategy proles.

7.

(B,X) is a Nash equilibrium has no implications for x. (A,Z) is ecient

requires that x 4. For Y to be a best response to

1

= (

1

2

,

1

2

), we need

u

2

(

1

, Y ) = 3 u

2

(

1

, Z) = x/2 + 1. So we need x 4. Thus, for all

three statements to be true requires x = 4.

8.

(a) In the rst round strategies 1, 2, 8, and 9 are dominated by 3 and

7. Note that 3, 4, 5, 6, and 7 are all best responses to beliefs that put

probability .5 on 3 and probability .5 on 7, giving an expected payo of

3.5.

(b) The Nash equilibria are (3,7) and (7,3).

9.

(a) The Nash equilibria are (2, 1), (5/2, 2), and (3, 3).

(b) R = [2, 3] [1, 3].

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9 NASH EQUILIBRIUM 94

10.

Consider the following game, in which (H, X) is an ecient strategy prole

that is also a non-strict Nash equilibrium.

11.

(a) Play will converge to (D, D), because D is dominant for each player.

(b) Suppose that the rst play is (opera, movie). Recall that BR

i

(movie)

= {movie}, and BR

i

(opera) = {opera}. Thus, in round two, play will be

(movie, opera). Then in round three, play will be (opera, movie). This

cycle will continue with no equilibrium being reached.

(c) In the case of strict Nash equilibrium, it will be played all of the time.

The non-strict Nash equilibrium will not be played all of the time. It must

be that one or both players will play a strategy other than his part of such

a Nash equilibrium with positive probability.

(d) Strategies that are never best responses will eventually be eliminated

by this rule of thumb. Thus, in the long run s

i

will not be played.

12.

It must be the case that {s

1

, t

1

} {s

2

, t

2

} is weakly congruous. For

{s

1

, t

1

} {s

2

, t

2

} to be weakly congruous, we need s

1

BR

1

(

2

), t

1

BR

1

(

2

), s

2

BR

2

(

1

), and t

2

BR

2

(

1

), where

2

,

2

{s

2

, t

2

} and

1

,

1

{s

1

, t

1

}. This is true for

2

putting probability 1 on s

2

,

2

putting probability 1 on t

2

, etc., because s

and t

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9 NASH EQUILIBRIUM 95

13.

(a)

(b) This game has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium.

(c) Yes, it has a Nash equilibrium. To nd equilibrium, look for a case

in which the players are getting the same payos and none wished to

unilaterally deviate. This requires = 2 = 3. Thus, we need = 6,

= 3, and = 2. It is an equilibrium if 6 players select Z, 3 select X,

and 2 select Y. The number of equilibria is 4620.

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10 Oligopoly, Taris, Crime,and Voting

1.

(a) S

i

= [0, ). u

i

(q

i

, Q

i

) = [abQ

i

bq

i

]q

i

cq

i

, where Q

i

j=i

q

j

.

(b) Firm i solves max

q

i

[a bQ

i

bq

i

]q

i

cq

i

. This yields the rst order

condition abQ

i

c = 2bq

i

. Player is best response function is q

i

(Q

i

) =

(a c)/2b Q

i

/2. This is represented in the graph below.

(c) By symmetry, total equilibrium output is Q

= nq

, where q

is the

equilibrium output of an individual rm. Thus, Q

i

= (n 1)q

. So

q

= [a c b(n 1)q

]/2b. Thus, q

= [a c]/b(n + 1) and Q

=

n[a c]/b(n + 1). We also have

p

= [an + a an + nc]/(n + 1) = [a + cn]/(n + 1].

and

u

= p

cq

= (a c)2/b(n + 1)2

.

(d) In the duopoly case q

i

(q

j

) = (a c)/2b q

j

/2. The Nash equilibrium

is found by solving the system of two equations given by the best response

functions of the two players (alternatively, one can just set n = 2 in the

above result). Thus, q

function, we can identify the sequence R

k

i

and inspection reveals that

R

i

= {(a c)/3b} for i = 1, 2.

2.

(a) S

i

= [0, ], u

i

(p

i

, p

i

) =

_

1

m

(a p

i

)[p

i

c] if p

i

= p

0 if p

i

> p,

where m

denotes the number of players k {1, 2, . . . , n} such that p

k

= p.

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OLIGOPOLY, TARIFFS, CRIME, AND VOTING 97

(b) The Nash equilibrium is: p

i

= c for all i. For n > 2, there are other

Nash equilibria in which one or more players selects a price greater than

c (but at least two players select c).

(c) The notion of best response is not well dened. Let p

i

denote the

minimum p

j

selected by any player j = i. If c < p

i

, player is best

response is to select p

i

< p

i

, but as close to p

i

as possible. However

there is no such number.

3.

(a) BR

i

(x

j

) = 30 +x

j

/2.

(b) The Nash equilibrium is (60, 60).

(c) u

i

(60, 60) = 200. u

i

(0, 0) = 2000.

(d) The best response functions are represented below.

It is easy to see that player i will never set x

i

< 30 or x

i

> 80. Thus,

R

1

i

= [30, 80], R

2

i

= [45, 70], and so on. Thus, R

i

= {60} for i = 1, 2.

4.

(a) G solves max

x

y

2

x

1

xc

4

. This yields the rst order condition

y

2

x

2

c

4

= 0. Rearranging, we nd Gs best response function to be x(y) =

y/c

2

. C solves max

y

y

1/2

(1 + xy)

1

. This yields the rst order condition

1

2y

1/2

(1+xy)

y

1/2

x

(1+xy)

2

= 0. Rearranging, we nd Cs best response function

to be y(x) = 1/x. These are represented at the top of the next page.

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OLIGOPOLY, TARIFFS, CRIME, AND VOTING 98

(b) We nd x and y such that x = y/c

2

and y = 1/x. The Nash equilib-

rium is x = 1/c and y = c.

(c) As the cost of enforcement c increases, enforcement x decreases and

criminal activity y increases.

5.

In equilibrium b

1

= b

2

= 15, 000. Clearly, neither player wishes to bid

higher than 15,000 as she will receive a negative payo. Further, neither

does better by unilaterally deviating to a bid that is less than 15,000

because this leads to a payo of zero.

6.

(a) The normal form is given by N = {P, D}, e

i

[0, ), u

P

(e

P

, e

D

) =

8e

P

/(e

P

+ e

D

) e

P

, and u

D

(e

P

, e

D

) = 8 + 8e

D

/(e

P

+ e

D

) e

D

.

(b) The prosecutor solves max

e

P

8e

P

/(e

P

+ e

D

) e

P

. The rst order

condition is 8/(e

P

+e

D

) 8e

P

/(e

P

+e

D

)

2

= 1. This implies 8(e

P

+e

D

)

8e

P

= (e

P

+ e

D

)

2

, or 8e

D

= (e

P

+ e

D

)

2

. Taking the square root of both

sides yields 2

2e

D

= e

P

+e

D

. Rearranging, we nd e

P

(e

D

) = 2

2e

D

e

D

.

Similarly, e

D

(e

P

) = 2

2e

P

e

P

.

(c) By symmetry, it must be that e

P

= 2

_

2e

p

e

P

. Thus, e

P

= e

D

= 2.

The probability that the defendant wins in equilibrium is 1/2.

(d) This is not ecient.

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OLIGOPOLY, TARIFFS, CRIME, AND VOTING 99

7.

BR

1

(q

2

) = 5

1

2

q

2

, and BR

2

(q

1

) = 4

1

2

q

1

. The Nash equilibrium is

q

1

= 4 and q

2

= 2.

8.

(a) For

1

3

.

(b) For

1

4

.

9.

For L, voting for McClintock is dominated by voting for Bustamante.

Knowing that L will not vote for McClintock, M does strictly better voting

for Schwarzenegger than by voting for McClintock, for any strategy pro-

les of the others (aside from L voting for McClintock). So neither L nor M

will vote for McClintock. We can then show that L does strictly better by

voting for Bustamante than voting for Schwarzenegger for any strategies

of the others (assuming M does not vote for McClintock). Knowing this,

M will vote for Schwarzenegger. Thus, C will vote for Schwarzenegger.

10.

(a) All of the strategies are rationalizable. If player x selects G she gets

1. If she selects F, she gets 2m. If player x believes that no one else will

play F, then her best response is G. If she believes that everyone else will

play F, then her best response is F.

There is a symmetric Nash equilibrium in which everyone plays F. There

is another symmetric Nash equilibrium in which everyone plays G.

(b) Playing G yields 1; playing F yields 2m 2x. Note that m 1. If

after some round of iterated dominance it is rational for at most m of

the players to choose F, then any x with 2m 2x < 1 will nd that G

dominates F. Rearranging yields x > m

1

2

. This means that in the next

round, m has decreased by

1

2

. After two rounds, we get that G is the only

rationalizable strategy for everyone.

(c) Every player x >

1

2

selects G, and every player x <

1

2

selects F, and

x =

1

2

selects either F or G.

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11 Mixed-Strategy Nash Equilibrium

1.

(a) R = {X, Y } {Q, Z}.

(b) The Nash equilibrium is ((

1

2

,

1

2

), (

3

4

, 0,

1

4

)).

2.

There is enough information. It must be that u

1

(A,

2

) = 4, so we need

6

2

(X) + 0

2

(Y ) + 0

s

(Z) = 4. So

2

(X) =

2

3

.

3.

(a) (N, L) and (L, N).

(b) Firm Y chooses q so that Firm X is indierent between L and N. This

yields 5q + (x 15)(1 q) = 10 10q. Rearranging yields q =

25x

20x

.

Firm X chooses p so that rm Y is indierent between L and N. This

yields 5p + 15 15p = 10 10p. Rearranging yields p = 1/2.

(c) The probability of (L, N) = p(1 q) = (1/2)[

20x25+x

20x

] = (1/2)[

5

x20

].

(d) As x increases, the probability of (L, N) decreases. However, as x

becomes larger, (L, N) is a better outcome.

4.

(a)

1

= (1/5, 4/5)

2

= (3/4, 1/4).

(b) It is easy to see that M dominates L, and that (2/3, 1/3, 0) dominates

D. Thus, player 1 will never play D, and player 2 will never play L. We

need to nd probabilities over U and C such that player 2 is indierent

between M and R. This requires 5p + 5 5p = 3p + 8 8p or p =

3/5. Thus,

1

= (3/5, 2/5, 0). We must also nd probabilities over M

and R such that player 1 is indierent between U and C. This requires

3q + 6 6q = 5q + 4 4q or q = 1/2. Thus,

2

= (0, 1/2, 1/2).

5.

When x < 1, the Nash equilibria are (U, L) and ((0, 1/2, 1/2), (0, 1/2, 1/2)).

When x > 1, Nash equilibrium is (U, L). Further, for 0 < x < 1, there is

an equilibrium of ((1 x, x/2, x/2), (1 x, x/2, x/2)).

100

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11 MIXED-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM 101

6.

(a)

i

= (1/2, 1/2).

(b) (D, D)

(c) There are no pure strategy Nash equilibria.

1

= (1/2, 1/2) and

2

=

(1/2, 1/2).

(d) (A, A), (B, B), and

1

= (1/5, 4/5),

2

= (1/2, 1/2).

(e) (A, A), (B, B), and

1

= (2/3, 1/3),

2

= (3/5, 2/5).

(f) Note that M dominates L. So player 2 chooses probabilities over M

and R such that player 1 is indierent between at least two strategies.

Let q denote the probability with which M is played. Notice that the q

which makes player 1 indierent between any two strategies makes him

indierent between all three strategies. To see this note that q = 1/2

solves 4 4q = 4q = 3q + 1 q. Thus,

2

= (0, 1/2, 1/2). It remains to

nd probabilities such that player 2 is indierent between playing M and

R. Here p denotes the probability with which U is played and r denotes

the probability with which C is played. Indierence between M and R

requires 2p +4r +3(1 p r) = 3p +4(1 p r). This implies r = 1/5.

Thus,

1

= (x, 1/5, y), where x, y 0 and x + y = 4/5.

7.

First game: The normal form is represented below.

Player 2 mixes over X and Y so that player 1 is indierent between those

strategies on which player 1 puts positive probability. Let q be the prob-

ability that player 2 selects X. The comparison of 8q to 2q + 6 6q to

5 shows that we cannot nd a mixed strategy in which player 1 places

positive probability on all of his strategies. So we can consider each of the

cases where player 1 is indierent between two of his strategies. Clearly,

at q = 5/8 player 1 is indierent between A and C. Indierence between A

and B requires 8q = 6 4q or q = 1/2. However, note that BR

1

(1/2, 1/2)

= {C} and, thus, there is no equilibrium in which player 1 mixes between

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11 MIXED-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM 102

A and B. Finally, indierence between B and C requires 6 4q = 5 or

q = 1/4. Further, note that BR

1

(1/4, 3/4) = {B, C}.

Turning to player 2s incentives, there is clearly no equilibrium in which

player 1 mixes between A and C; this is because player 2 would strictly

prefer X, and then player 1 would not be indierent between A and C.

Likewise, there is no equilibrium in which player 1 mixes between B and

C; in this case, player 2 would strictly prefer Y, and then player 1 would

not be indierent between B and C. There are, however, mixed strategy

equilibria in which player 1 selects C with probability 1 (that is, plays a

pure strategy) and player 2 mixes between X and Y. This is an equilibrium

for every q [1/4, 5/8].

Second game: The normal form of this game is represented below.

Clearly, there is no equilibrium in which player 1 selects ID with positive

probability. There is also no equilibrium in which player 1 selects IU with

positive probability, for, if this were the case, then player 2 strictly prefers

O and, in response, player 1 should not pick IU. Note that player 1 prefers

OU or OD if player 2 selects O with a probability of at least 3/5. Further,

when player 1 mixes between OU and OD, player 2 is indierent between

his two strategies. Thus, the set of mixed strategy equilibria is described

by

1

= (0, 0, p, 1 p) and

2

= (q, 1 q), where p [0, 1] and q 2/5.

8.

(a) The symmetric mixed strategy Nash equilibrium requires that each

player call with the same probability, and that each player be indierent

between calling and not calling. This implies that (1 p

n1

)v = v c or

p = (c/v)

1

n1

.

(b) The probability that at least one player calls in equilibrium is 1p

n

=

1(c/v)

n

n1

. Note that this decreases as the number of bystanders n goes

up.

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11 MIXED-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM 103

9.

(a) If the game has a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, we are done.

(b) Assume the game has no pure-strategy Nash equilibrium, and proceed

as follows. That (U,L) is not a Nash equilibrium implies e > a and/or

d > b. That (U,R) is not a Nash equilibrium implies g > c and/or b > d.

That (D,R) is not a Nash equilibrium implies c > g and/or f > h. That

(D,L) is not a Nash equilibrium implies a > e and/or h > f. It is easy

to see that if there is no pure strategy Nash equilibrium, then only one

of each of these pairs of conditions can hold. This implies that each pure

strategy of each player is a best response to some other pure strategy of

the other. Further, it must be that there is a mixture for each player i

such that the other player j is indierent between his two strategies.

Consider player 1. It must be that either e > a and g > c or a > e

and c > g. It is easy to show that there exists a q [0, 1] such that

aq +c(1q) = eq +g(1q). Rearranging yields (ae) = (g c)(1q)/q.

It is the case that (a e) and (g c) have the same sign. The analogous

argument can be made with respect to player 2.

10.

No, it does not have any pure strategy equilibria. The mixed equilibrium

is ((1/3, 1/3, 1/3), (1/3, 1/3, 1/3)).

11.

(a) When

2

> 2/3, 001 should choose route a. When

2

< 2/3, 001

should choose route d. When

2

= 2/3, 001 should choose either route a,

route c, or route d.

(b) It is advised that 001 never take route b. Route b is dominated by a

mixture of routes a and c. One such mixture is 2/3 probability on a and

1/3 probability on c. It is easy to see that 12(2/3)+10(1/3) = 34/11 > 11,

and 4(1/3) > 1.

(c) As 002s payo is the same, regardless of his strategy, when 001 chooses

c, we should expect that the equilibrium with one player mixing and the

other playing a pure strategy will involve 001 choosing c. Clearly 002 is

indierent between x and y when 001 is playing c. Further, 002 can mix

so that c is a best response for 001. A mixture of 2/3 and 1/3 implies that

001 receives a payo of 8 from all of his undominated strategies. This

equilibrium is s

1

=c and

2

= (2/3, 1/3).

Since b is dominated, we now consider a mixture by 001 over a and d. In

nding the equilibrium above, we noticed that 002s mixing with proba-

bility (2/3, 1/3) makes 001 indierent between a, c, and d. Thus, we need

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11 MIXED-STRATEGY NASH EQUILIBRIUM 104

only to nd a mixture over a and d that makes 002 indierent between

x and y. Let p denote the probability with which 001 plays a, and 1 p

denote the probability with which he plays d. Indierence on the part of

002 is reected by 3 3p = 6p. This implies p = 1/3, which means that

002 receives a payo of 2 whether he chooses x or y. This equilibrium is

= ((1/3, 0, 0, 2/3), (2/3, 1/3).

In considering whether there are any more equilibria, it is useful to notice

that in both of the above equilibria that 002s payo from choosing x is

the same as that from y. Thus we should expect that, so long as the ratio

of a to d is kept the same, 001 could also play c with positive probability.

Let p denote the probability with which 001 plays a, and let q denote the

probability with which he plays c. Since he never plays b, the probability

with which d is played is 1pq. Making 002 indierent between playing

x and y requires that 2q + 3(1 p q) = 6p + 2q. This implies that any

p and q such that 1 = 3p + q will work. One such case is (1/9, 6/9, 2/9),

implying an equilibrium of ((1/9, 6/9, 2/9), (2/3, 1/3))

12.

(a)

(b) The pure strategy Nash equilibria are (X,Y,Y), (Y,X,Y), and (Y,Y,X).

(c) In equilibrium p =

102

2

.

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12 Strictly Competitive Games

and Security Strategies

1.

(a) No. Note that u

1

(A, Z) = u

1

(C, Z), but u

2

(A, Z) > u

2

(C, Z).

(b) Yes.

(c) Yes.

(d) No. Note that u

1

(D, X) > u

1

(D, Y), but u

2

(D, X) > u

2

(D, Y).

2.

(a) 1: C, 2: Z

(b) 1: C, 2: Z

(c) 1: A, 2: X

(d) 1: D, 2: Y

3.

Examples include chess, checkers, tic-tac-toe, and Othello.

4.

Let i be one of the players and let j be the other player. Because s

is a Nash equilibrium, we have u

i

(s) u

i

(t

i

, s

j

). Because t is a Nash

equilibrium, we have u

j

(t) u

j

(t

i

, s

j

); strict competition further implies

that u

i

(t) u

i

(t

i

, s

j

). Putting these two facts together, we obtain u

i

(s)

u

i

(t

i

, s

j

) u

i

(t). Switching the roles of s and t, the same argument

yields u

i

(t) u

i

(s

i

, t

j

) u

i

(s). Thus, we know that u

i

(s) = u

i

(s

i

, t

j

) =

u

i

(t

i

, s

j

) = u

i

(t) for i = 1, 2, so the equilibria are equivalent. To see

that the equilibria are also interchangeable, note that, because s

i

is a best

response to s

j

and u

i

(s) = u

i

(t

i

, s

j

), we know that t

i

is also a best response

to s

j

. For the same reason, s

i

is a best response to t

j

.

105

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13 Contract, Law, and Enforcement

in Static Settings

1.

(a)

(I,I) can be enforced by setting between 4 and 2.

(b)

No.

2.

(a) A contract specifying (I, I) can be enforced under expectations dam-

ages because neither player has the incentive to deviate from (I, I).

106

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CONTRACT, LAW, AND ENFORCEMENT 107

(b) Yes.

(c) No, player 2 still has the incentive to deviate.

(d)

(e) c > 1.

(f) Consider (I,N). Player 1 sues if c > 4 or c < 4. Consider (N,I).

Player 2 sues if c > 4 or c < 4. Thus, suit occurs if c < 4.

(g) c > 1/2.

3.

(a) 10

(b) 0

4.

(a) Now the payo to i when no one calls is negative. Let d denote the ne

for not calling. Consider the case where the ne is incurred regardless of

whether anyone else calls. This yields the new indierence relationship of

(1p

n1

)vd = vc. This implies that, if c > d, then p = [(cd)/v]

1

n1

.

If c < d then p = 0 in equilibrium.

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CONTRACT, LAW, AND ENFORCEMENT 108

Now consider the case where the ne is incurred only when no one calls.

The indierence relationship here implies (1 p

n1

)v dp

n1

= v c.

This implies p = [c/(d + v)]

1

n1

.

(b) (1) Given that if i doesnt call then he pays the ne with certainty,

the ne can be relatively low. (2) Here, if i doesnt call then he pays the

ne with a low probability. Thus, the ne should be relatively large.

(c) Either type of ne can be used to induce any particular p value, except

for p = 0 which results only if the type (1) ne is imposed. The required

type (2) ne may be much higher than the required type (1) would be.

The type (2) ne may be easier to enforce, because in this case one only

needs to verify whether the pedestrian was treated promptly and who the

bystanders were. The ecient outcome is for exactly one person to call.

There are pure strategy equilibria that achieve this outcome, but it never

happens in the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium.

5.

Veriability is more important. It must be possible to convey information

to the court in order to have a transfer imposed.

6.

Expectations damages gives the non-breaching player the payo that he

expected to receive under the contract. Restitution damages takes from

the breacher the amount of his gain from breaching. Expectations dam-

ages is more likely to achieve eciency. This is because it gives a player

the incentive to breach when it is ecient to do so.

7.

(a) For technology A, the self-enforced component is to play (I, I). The

externally-enforced component is a transfer of at least 1 from player 2

to player 1 when (I, N) occurs, a transfer of at least 2 from player 1 to

player 2 when (N, I) occurs, and none otherwise. For technology B, the

self-enforced component is to play (I, I). The externally-enforced compo-

nent is a transfer of at least 4 from player 1 to player 2 when (N, I) occurs,

and none otherwise.

(b) Now for technology A, the self-enforced component is to play (N,

N). There is no externally-enforced component. For B the self-enforced

component is to transfer 4 from player 1 to player 2 when someone plays

N, and no transfer when both play I.

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CONTRACT, LAW, AND ENFORCEMENT 109

(c) Expectations damages gives the non-breaching player the amount that

he expected to receive under the contract. The payos under this remedy

are depicted for each case as shown here:

Reliance damages seek to put the non-breaching party back to where he

would have been had he not relied on the contract. The payos under

reliance damages are depicted below.

Restitution damages take the gain that the breaching party receives due

to breaching. The payos under restitution damages are depicted below.

8.

(a)

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CONTRACT, LAW, AND ENFORCEMENT 110

(b) (H,H) and (L,L) are self-enforcing outcomes.

(c) The court cannot distinguish between (H,L) and (L,H).

(d) The best outcome the parties can achieve is (L,H). Their contract is

such that when (H,H) is played player 1 pays to player 2, and when

either (H,L) or (L,H) is played, player 1 pays to player 2. We need

and to be such that > 2 and > + 1.

(c) The best outcome the parties can achieve is (H,H). Their contract is

such that when (H,H) is played player 1 pays to player 2, when either

(H,L) is played player 1 pays to player 2, and when (L,H) is played player

1 pays to player 2. We need , , and to be such that +2 < < +1.

9.

(a) S

1

= [0, ), S

2

= [0, ). If y > x, then the payos are (0, 0). If

x y, the payos are (y Y, X y).

(b) There are multiple equilibria in which the players report x = y = ,

where [Y, X]. There is another set of multiple equilibria in which the

players report x (player 2) and y (player 1) such that x Y < X y.

(c) There are multiple equilibria; all satisfy x < y, y X, and x Y .

(d) It is ecient if an equilibrium in the rst set of multiple equilibria of

part (b) is selected. This is because the plant is shut down if and only if

it is ecient to do so.

10.

Examples include the employment contracts of salespeople, attorneys, and

professors.

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14 Details of the Extensive Form

1.

No general rule. Consider, for example, the prisoners dilemma. Clearly,

the extensive form of this game will contain dashed lines. Consider Exer-

cise 3 (a) of Chapter 4. The normal form of this does not exhibit imperfect

information.

2.

Suppose not. Then it must be that some pure strategy prole induces

at least two paths through the tree. Since a strategy prole species an

action to be taken in every contingency (at every node), having two paths

induced by the same pure strategy prole would require that Tree Rule 3

not hold.

3.

4.

5.

111

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15 Backward Induction

and Subgame Perfection

1.

(a) (AF, C)

(b) (BHJKN, CE)

(c) (I, C, X)

2.

(a) The subgame perfect equilibria are (WY, AC) and (ZX, BC). The

Nash equilibria are (WY, AC), (ZX, BC), (WY, AD), (ZY, BC), and

(WX, BD).

(b) The subgame perfect equilibria are (UE, BD) and (DE, BC). The Nash

equilibria are (UE, BD), (DE, BC), (UF, BD), and (DE, AC).

3.

(a) (AHILN,CE)

(b) 6

4.

For any given x, y

1

(x) = y

2

(x) = x; and x

= 2.

5.

(a)

(b) Working backward, it is easy to see that in round 5 player 1 will choose

S. Thus, in round 4 player 2 will choose S. Continuing in this fashion, we

nd that, in equilibrium, each player will choose S any time he is on the

move.

(c) For any nite k, the backward induction outcome is that player 1

chooses S in the rst round and each player receives one dollar.

112

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BACKWARD INDUCTION AND SUBGAME PERFECTION 113

6.

Payos in the extensive form representation are in the order RBC, CBC,

and MBC.

In the subgame perfect equilibrium, MBC chooses 7, RBC chooses 76

,

and CBC chooses 76

move case because of the sequential play.

7.

(a)

(b) If x > 3, the equilibria are (OA,A), (OB,A), (OA,B), (OB,B). If

X = 3, add (IA, A) to this list. If 1 < x < 3, the equilibria are (IA,A),

(OA,B), (OB,B). If x = 1, add (IB, B) to this list. If x < 1, the equilibria

are (IA,A), (IB,B).

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BACKWARD INDUCTION AND SUBGAME PERFECTION 114

(c) If x > 3 any mixture with positive probabilities over OA and OB for

player 1, and over A and B for player 2.

If 1 < x < 3, then IB is dominated. Any mixture (with positive proba-

bilities) over OA and OB will make player 2 indierent. Player 2 plays A

with a probability that does not exceed x/3.

Next consider the case in which 3/4 x 1. Let p denote the probability

that player 1 plays IA, let q denotes the probability with which she plays

IB, and let 1 p q denote the probability that player 1 plays OA or

OB. There is a mixed strategy equilibrium in which p = q = 0. Here,

player 2 mixes so that player 1 does not want to play IA or IB, implying

that player 2 can put no more than probability x/3 on A and no more

than x on B. There is not an equilibrium with p and/or q positive. To

see this, note that for player 2 to be indierent, we need p = 3q. We also

need player 2 to mix so that player 1 is indierent between IA and IB,

but (for x > 3/4) this mixture makes player 1 strictly prefer to select OA

or OB.

For x < 3/4, OA and OB are dominated. In equilibrium, player 1 chooses

IA with probability 3/4 and IB with probability 1/4. In equilibrium,

player 2 chooses A with probability 1/4, and B with probability 3/4.

(d)

The pure strategy equilibria are (A, A) and (B, B). There is also a mixed

equilibrium (3/4, 1/4; 1/4, 3/4).

(e) The Nash equilibria that are not subgame perfect include (OB, A),

(OA, B), and the above mixed equilibria in which, once the proper sub-

game is reached, player 1 does not play A with probability 3/4 and/or

player 2 does not play A with probability 1/4.

(f) The subgame perfect mixed equilibria are those in which, once the

proper subgame is reached, player 1 does plays A with probability 3/4

and player 2 does plays A with probability 1/4.

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BACKWARD INDUCTION AND SUBGAME PERFECTION 115

8.

(a) S

i

= {A, B} (0, ) (0, ). Each player selects A or B, picks a

positive number when (A, B) is chosen, and picks a positive number when

(B, A) is chosen.

(b) It is easy to see that 0 < (x

1

+ x

2

)/(1 + x

1

+ x

2

) < 1, and that

(x

1

+ x

2

)/(1 + x

1

+ x

2

) approaches 1 as (x

1

+ x

2

) . Thus, each has

a higher payo when both choose A. Further, B will never be selected in

equilibrium. The Nash equilibria of this game are given by (Ax

1

, Ax

2

),

where x

1

and x

2

are any positive numbers.

(c) There is no subgame perfect equilibrium because the subgames follow-

ing (A, B) and (B, A) have no Nash equilibria.

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16 Topics in Industrial Organization

1.

From the text, z

1

(a) = a

2

/92a

3

/81. If the rms were to write a contract

that specied a, they would choose a to maximize their joint prot (with

m set to divide the prot between them). This advertising level solves

max

a

2a

2

/9 2a

3

/81, which is a

= 6.

2.

The subgame perfect equilibrium is a = 0 and p

1

= p

2

= 0.

3.

Because this is a simultaneous move game, we are just looking for the

Nash equilibrium of the following normal form.

The equilibrium is (L, L). Thus, in the subgame perfect equilibrium both

players invest 50,000 in the low production plant.

4.

(a) u

2

(q

1

, q

2

(q

1

)) = (1000 3q

1

3q

2

)q

2

100q

2

F. Maximizing by

choosing q

2

yields the rst order condition 1000 3q1 6q2 100 = 0.

Thus, q

2

(q

1

) = 150 (1/2)q

1

.

(b) u

1

(q

1

, q

2

(q

1

)) = (10003q

1

3[1501/2q

1

])q

1

100q

1

F. Maximizing

by choosing q

1

yields the rst order condition 550 3q

1

100 = 0. Thus,

q

1

= 150. q

2

= 150(1/2)(150) = 75. Solving for equilibrium price yields

p

1

= 325(150) 100(150) = 33, 750 F.

u

2

= 325(75) 100(75) F = 16875 F.

(c) Find q

1

such that u

2

(q

1

, q

2

(q

1

)) = 0. We have

(1000 3q

1

3[150 (1/2)q

1

])[150 (1/2)q

1

] 100[150 (1/2)q

1

] F

= (900 3q

1

)[150 (1/2)q

1

] 3[150 (1/2)q

]

1

2 F

= 6[150 (1/2)q

1

]

2

3[150 (1/2)q

1

]

2

F

= 3[150 (1/2)q

1

]

2

F.

116

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16 TOPICS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 117

Setting prot equal to zero implies F = 3[150 (1/2)q

1

]

2

or (F/3)

1/2

=

150 (1/2)q

1

. Thus, q

1

= 300 2(F/3)

1/2

. Note that

u

1

= (1000 3[300 2(F/3)

1/2

])[300 (F/3)

1/2

]

100[300 2(F/3)

1/2

] F

= 900[300 2(F/3)

1/2

] 3[300 2(F/3)

1/2

]2 F.

d) (i) F = 18, 723 implies q

1

= 142 < q

1

. So rm 1 will produce q

1

and

u

1

= 48, 777. (ii) F = 8112: In this case, q

1

= 300 2(8112/3)

1/2

= 196

and pi

1

= 900(196) 3(196)2 8, 112 = 53, 040. u

1

= 33, 750 8, 112 =

25, 630. Thus rm 1 will produce q

1

= 196, resulting in u

1

= 53, 040. (iii)

F = 1728: Here, q

1

= 300 2(1, 728/3)

1/2

= 252 and u

1

= 900(252)

3(252)2 1, 728 = 34, 560. u

1

= 33, 750 1, 728 = 32, 022. Thus, rm 1

will produce q

1

= 252, resulting in u

1

= 34, 560. (iv) F = 108: In this case,

q

1

= 3002(108/3)

1/2

= 288 and u

1

= 900(288)3(288)2108 = 10, 260.

u

1

= 33, 750108 = 33, 642. Thus, rm 1 will produce q

1

= 150, resulting

in u

1

= 33, 642.

5.

(a) If Hal does not purchase the monitor in period 1, then p

2

= 200 is not

optimal because p

2

= 500 yields a prot of 500, while p

2

= 200 yields a

prot of 400. The optimal pricing scheme is as follows. Set p

1

= 1, 700

(or just below to make Hal strictly want to buy). If one unit is sold in the

rst period (that is, Hal purchased) then set p

2

= 200 to sell to Laurie.

On the other hand, if there are no rst-period sales (Hal deviated) then

set p

2

= 500 to sell to Hal in the second period. With Hal buying in the

rst period and Laurie in the second, total revenue is 1, 900. Tony would

not benet from being able to commit not to sell monitors in period 2.

(b) The optimal prices are p

1

= 1, 400 and p

2

= 200. Hal buys in period 1

and Laurie buys is period 2. Here, Tony would not benet from being able

to commit not to sell monitors in period 2, because the gain in extracting

surplus from Hal is more than oset by the loss of not selling to Laurie.

6.

(a) If enters against Firm 2, q

1

= q

2

= 3. If enters against Firm 3,

q

1

= q

3

= 4. Firm 1 enters Firm 3s industry.

(b) Yes. If Firm 3s strategy is to choose q

3

= 14 if Firm 1 enters, then

Firm 1s best response is to enter against Firm 2.

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16 TOPICS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 118

7.

The subgame perfect equilibrium is for player 1 to locate in region 5, and

for player 2 to use the strategy 234555678 (where, for example, 2 denotes

that player 2 locates in region 2 when player 1 has located in region 1).

8.

(a) Without payos, the extensive form is as follows.

In the subgame perfect equilibrium, player 1 selects E, player 2 chooses

DE

1

= q

2

= q

3

= 3, q

1

= q

3

= 4,

q

2

= q

3

= 4, and q

3

= 6.

(b) Player 1 enters.

9.

(a) The government solves max

p

30 + p

W p/2 30 or max

p

p/2

W.

This implies that they want to set p as high as possible, regardless of the

level of

W. So p

= 10.

Knowing how the government will behave, the ASE solves max

W

(

W

10)

2

. The rst order condition implies

W

= p

= 10. So in equilibrium

y = 30.

(b) If the government could commit ahead of time, it would solve max

W

W/2.

This implies that it would commit to p = 0 and the ASE would set

W = 0.

In (a) u = 0 and v = 5. Now, when commitment is possible, u = 0 and

v = 0.

(c) One way is to have a separate central bank that does not have a

politically elected head that states its goals.

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16 TOPICS IN INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 119

10.

For scheme A to be optimal, it must be that twice Lauries (the low type)

value in period 1 is at least as great as Hals (high type) period 1 value

plus his period 2 value. An example of this is below.

For scheme B to be optimal, it must be that Lauries (low type) value in

period 2 is at least as large as both Hals (high type) period 1 value and

Lauries period 1 value. An example of this is below.

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17 Parlor Games

1.

(a) Use backward induction to solve this. To win the game, a player must

not be forced to enter the top-left cell Z; thus, a player would lose if he

must move with the rock in either cell 1 or cell 2 as shown in the following

diagram.

A player who is able to move the rock into cell 1 or cell 2 thus wins the

game. This implies that a player can guarantee victory if he is on the

move when the rock is in one of cells 3, 4, 5, 6, or 7, as shown in the

diagram below.

We next see that a player who must move from cell 8, cell 9 or cell 10

(shown below) will lose.

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17 PARLOR GAMES 121

Continuing the procedure reveals that, starting from a cell marked with

an X in the following picture, the next player to move will win.

Since the dimensions of the matrix are 5 7, player 2 has a strategy that

guarantees victory.

(b) In general, player 2 has a winning strategy when m, n > 1 and both are

odd, or when m or n equals 1 and the other is even. Otherwise, player 1

has a winning strategy.

2.

If a player puts in the fteenth pennyand no more, that player is assured

of winning because her opponent must add at least one penny. Similarly,

if a player puts in exactly the tenth penny, that player is assured of being

able to put in exactly the fteenth penny. Continuing with this, the player

who puts in exactly the fth penny is assured of winning. So player 2 has

a winning strategy, and that strategy involves always putting in enough

pennies to exactly put in the fth one, the tenth one, and the fteenth

one.

3.

This can be solved by backward induction. Let (x, y) denote the state

where the red basket contains x balls and the blue basket contains y balls.

To win this game, a player must leave her opponent with either (0,1) or

(1,0). Thus, in order to win, a player must not leave her opponent with

either any of the following (0, z), (1, z), (z, 1), or (z, 0), z > 1. So, to win,

a player should leave her opponent with (2, 2). Thus, a player must not

leave her opponent with either (w, 2) or (2, w), where w > 2. Continuing

with this logic and assuming m, n > 0, we see that player 2 has a winning

strategy when m = n and player 1 has a winning strategy when m = n.

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17 PARLOR GAMES 122

4.

(a) In order to win, in the matrix below, a player must avoid entering a

cell marked with an X. As player 1 begins in cell Y, he must enter a cell

marked with an X. Thus, player 2 has a strategy that ensures a win.

(b) There are many subgame perfect equilibria in this game, because play-

ers are indierent between moves at numerous cells. There is a subgame

perfect equilibrium in which player 1 wins, another in which player 2 wins,

and still another in which player 3 wins.

5.

Player 1 has a strategy that guarantees victory. This is easily proved using

a contradiction argument. Suppose player 1 does not have a strategy

guaranteeing victory. Then player 2 must have such a strategy. This

means that, for every opening move by player 1, player 2 can guarantee

victory from this point. Let X be the set of matrix congurations that

player 1 can create in his rst move, which player 2 would then face. A

conguration refers to the set of cells that are lled in.

We have that, starting from each of the congurations in X, the next

player to move can guarantee victory for himself. Note, however, that

if player 1 selects cell (m, n) in his rst move, then, whatever player 2s

following choice is, the conguration of the matrix induced by player 2s

selection will be in X (it is a conguration that player 1 could have created

in his rst move). Thus, whatever player 2 selects in response to his

choice of cell (m, n), player 1 can guarantee a victory following player 2s

move. This means that player 1 has a strategy that guarantees him a

win, which contradicts what we assumed at the beginning. Thus, player 1

actually does have a strategy that guarantees him victory, regardless of

what player 2 does.

This game is interesting because player 1s winning strategy in arbitrary

mn Chomp games is not known. A winning strategy is known for the

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17 PARLOR GAMES 123

special case in which m = n. This strategy selects cell (2, 2) in the rst

round.

6.

(a) Yes.

(b) No.

(c) Player 1 can guarantee a payo of 1 by choosing cell (2,1). Player 2

will then rationally choose cell (1,2) and force player 3 to move into cell

(1,1).

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18 Bargaining Problems

1.

(a) v

= 50, 000; u

J

= u

R

= 25, 000; t = 15, 000.

(b) Solving max

x

60, 000 x

2

+ 800x yields x

=

220, 000, u

J

= u

R

= 110, 000, v

J

= 100, 000, and v

R

= 320, 000. Thus,

t = 210, 000.

(c) From above, x

= 400 and v

= 220, 000. u

J

= 40, 000 + (220, 000

40, 00020, 000)/4 = 80, 000 and u

R

= 20, 000+(3/4)(220, 00060, 000) =

140, 000. This implies t = 180, 000.

2.

John should undertake the activity that has the most impact on t, and

hence his overall payo, per time/cost. A one-unit increase in x will raise

t by

J

. A one unit increase in w raises t by 1

J

. Assuming that x and

w can be increased at the same cost, John should increase x if

j

> 1/2;

otherwise, he should increase w.

3.

(a) x = 15, t = 0, and u

1

= u

2

= 15.

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18 BARGAINING PROBLEMS 125

(b) x = 15, t = 1, u

1

= 14, and u

2

= 16.

(c) x = 15, t = 7, u

1

= 8, and u

2

= 22.

(d) x = 10, t = 175, u

1

= 25, and u

2

= 75.

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18 BARGAINING PROBLEMS 126

(e) x = 12, t = 144

1

336, u

1

= 144

1

, and u

2

= 144

2

.

4.

The other partys disagreement point inuences how much of v

you get

because it inuences the size of the surplus.

5.

You should raise the maximum joint value if your bargaining weight ex-

ceeds 1/2; otherwise, you should raise your disagreement payo. In the

latter case, your decision is not ecient.

6.

Possible examples would include salary negotiations, merger negotiations,

and negotiating the purchase of an automobile.

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19 Analysis of Simple Bargaining Games

1.

(a) The superintendent oers x = 0, and the president accepts any x.

(b) The president accepts x if x min{z, |y|}.

(c) The superintendent oers x = min{z, |y|}, and the president accepts.

(d) The president should promise z = |y|.

2.

(a) Here you should make the rst oer, because the current owner is

very impatient and will be quite willing to accept a low oer in the rst

period. More precisely, since < 1/2, the responder in the rst period

prefers accepting less than one-half of the surplus to rejecting and getting

all of the surplus in the second period. Thus, the oerer in the rst period

will get more than half of the surplus.

(b) In this case, you should make the second oer, because you are patient

and would be willing to wait until the last period rather than accepting a

small amount at the beginning of the game. More precisely, in the least,

you can wait until the last period, at which point you can get the entire

surplus (the owner will accept anything then). Discounting to the rst

period, this will give you more than one-half of the surplus available in

the rst period.

3.

In the case of T = 1, player 1 oers m = 1 and player 2 accepts. If T = 2,

player 1 oers 1 in the rst period and player 2 accepts, yielding the

payo vector (1, ). For T = 3, the payo vector is (1(1), (1)).

The payo is (1

2

(1),

2

(1)) in the case of T = 4. For T = 5,

the payo is (1

2

(1 +

2

),

2

(1 +

2

)). As T approaches

innity, the payo vector converges to ([1 ]/[1

2

], [

2

]/[1

2

],

which is the subgame perfect equilibrium payo vector of the innite-

period game.

4.

Note that BR

i

(m

j

) = 1 m

j

. The set of Nash equilibria is given by

{m

1

, m

2

[0, 1] | m

1

+ m

2

= 1}. One can interpret the equilibrium

demands (the m

i

s) as the bargaining weights.

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19 ANALYSIS OF SIMPLE BARGAINING GAMES 128

5.

6.

For simplicity, assume that the oer is always given in terms of the amount

player 1 is to receive. Suppose that the oer in period 1 is x, the oer

in period 2 it is y, and the oer in period 3 is z. If period 3 is reached,

player 2 will oer z = 0 and player 1 will accept. Thus, in period 2,

player 2 will accept any oer that gives her at least . Knowing this,

in period 2 (if it is reached) player 1 will oer y such that player 2 is

indierent between accepting and rejecting to receive 1 in the next period.

This implies y = 1 . Thus, in period 1, player 2 will accept any oer

that gives her at least (1 ). In the rst period, player 1 will oer x

so that player 2 is indierent between accepting and rejecting to receive

1 in the second period. Thus, player 1 oers x = 1 +

2

and it is

accepted.

7.

Player 3 accepts any oer such that his share is at least zero. Player 2

substitutes an oer of x = 0, y = 1 for any oer made by player 1. Player 1

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19 ANALYSIS OF SIMPLE BARGAINING GAMES 129

makes any oer of X and Y . Also, it may be that player 2 accepts

X = 0, Y = 1.

8.

(a)

(b) Player 2 accepts any m such that m + a(2m 1) 0. This implies

accepting any m a/(1 + 2a). Thus, player 1 oers a/(1 + 2a).

(c) As a becomes large the equilibrium split is 50:50. This is because,

when a is large, player 2 cares very much about how close his share is to

player 1s share and will reject any oer in which a is not close to 1 a.

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20 Games with Joint Decisions;

Negotiation Equilibrium

1.

(a)

(b) When b x

2

.

(c) v

8

= 16, surplus = 16, u

M

= 8, u

W

= 8, x

= 4, b

= 16, and t

= 8.

(d) This assumes veriability of worker eort.

2.

(a)

Carina expends no eort (e

(b) Carina solves max

e

800xe e

2

. This yields the rst order condition

of 800x = 2e. This implies e

x

800[400x]

800x[400x]. This yields x

= 1/2.

(c) Given x and t, Carina solves max

e

800xe + t e

2

. This implies

e

max

x

800[400x] [400x]

2

. This yields x

320, 000 160, 000 = 160, 000. Because of the players equal bargaining

weights, the transfer is t

= 80, 000.

130

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JOINT DECISIONS AND NEGOTIATION EQUILIBRIUM 131

3.

(a) x

= 10p and y

= 5(1 p).

(b) p

= .8, t

= 19.5, x

= 8, and y

= 1.

4.

(a) The players need enforcement when (H, L) is played. In this case,

player 2 would not select enforce. For player 1 to have the incentive to

choose enforce, it must be that t c. Player 2 prefers not to deviate

from (H, H) only if t 4. We also need t c 2, or otherwise player 1

would prefer to deviate from (H, H) and then select enforce. Combining

these inequalities, we have c [t 2, t] and t 4. A value of t that

satises these inequalities exists if and only if c 2. Combining this with

the legal constraint that t 10, we nd that (H, H) can be enforced (using

an appropriately chosen t) if and only if c [2, 10].

(b) We need t large to deter player 2, and t c small to deter player 1. It

is not possible to do both if c is close to 0. In other words, the legal fee

deters frivolous suits from player 1, while not getting in the way of justice

in the event that player 2 deviates.

(c) In this case, the players would always avoid court fees by negotiating

a settlement. This prevents the support of (H, H).

5.

The game is represented as below. Note that m [0, (100 q

1

q

2

)(q

1

+

q

2

)].

6.

(a) Since the cost is sunk, the surplus is [100 q

1

q

2

](q

1

+ q

2

). Thus,

u

i

= 10q

i

+

i

[100 q

1

q

2

](q

1

+ q

2

).

(b) u

1

= (1/2)[100 q

1

q

2

](q

1

+ q

2

) 10q

1

and u

2

= (1/2)[100 q

1

q

2

](q

1

+ q

2

) 10q

2

.

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JOINT DECISIONS AND NEGOTIATION EQUILIBRIUM 132

(c) Firm 1 solves max

q

1

(1/2)[100 q

1

q

2

](q

1

+ q

2

) 10q

1

. The rst

order condition implies q

1

(q

2

) = 40 q

2

. By symmetry q

2

(q

1

) = 40 q

1

.

In equilibrium, q

1

+ q

2

= 40. Since there are many combinations of q

1

and q

2

that satisfy this equation, there are multiple equilibria. Each rm

wants to maximize its share of the surplus less cost. The gain from having

the maximum surplus outweighs the additional cost. Note that the total

quantity (40) is less than both the standard Cournot output and the

monopoly output. Since it is less than the monopoly output, it is not

ecient from the rms point of view.

(d) Now each rm solves max

q

i

i

[100 q

i

q

j

](q

i

+ q

j

) 10q

i

. This

implies best response functions given by q

i

(q

j

) = 505/

i

q

j

that cannot

be simultaneously satised with positive quantities. This is because the

player with the smaller

i

would wish to produce a negative amount. In

the equilibrium, the player with the larger bargaining weight produces

50 5/ units and the other rm produces zero.

(e) The player with the smaller bargaining weight does not receive enough

gain in his share of the surplus to justify production.

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21 Unveriable Investment, Hold Up,

Options, and Ownership

1.

(a) The ecient outcome is high investment and acceptance.

(b) If p

0

p

1

5 then the buyer always accepts. The seller will not choose

H.

(c) In the case that L occurs, the buyer will not accept if p

1

5 + p

0

.

In the case that H occurs, the buyer will accept if p

1

20 + p

0

. Thus,

it must be that 20 + p

0

p

1

10 + p

0

. Because the seller invests high

if p

1

10 + p

0

, there are values of p

0

and p

1

that induce the ecient

outcome.

(d) The surplus is 10. Each gets 5. Thus, p

1

= 15 and p

0

[5, 5]. The

seller chooses H. The buyer chooses A if H, and R if L.

2.

(a) Let x = 1 denote restoration and x = 0 denote no restoration. Let

t

E

denote the transfer from Joel to Estelle, and let t

J

denote the transfer

from Joel to Jerry. The order of the payos is Estelle, Jerry, Joel. Here

is the extensive form with joint decisions:

The surplus is 900500 = 400. The standard bargaining solution requires

that each player i receive d

i

+

i

[v

d

i

d

l

d

k

], where l and k denote

the other players. Thus, Joel buys the desk, Joel pays Estelle 400/3, Joel

pays Jerry 1900/3, and Jerry restores the desk. This is ecient.

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INVESTMENT AND HOLD UP 134

(b) Let t denote the transfer from Estelle to Jerry. Let m denote the

transfer from Joel to Estelle when the desk has been restored. Let b denote

the transfer from Joel to Estelle when the desk has not been restored.

In equilibrium, the desk is not restored and Joel buys the desk for 50.

This is not ecient.

(c) Let t

E

denote the transfer from Joel to Estelle, and let t

J

denote the

transfer from Joel to Jerry.

In equilibrium, Joel buys the desk for 125, and pays Jerry 650 to restore

it. This is ecient. However, Jerrys payo is greater here than in part

(a) because Jerry can hold up Joel during their negotiation, which occurs

after Joel has acquired the desk from Estelle.

(d) Estelle (and Jerry) do not value the restored desk. Thus, Estelle can

be held up if she has the desk restored and then tries to sell it to Joel.

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INVESTMENT AND HOLD UP 135

3.

If the workers bargaining weight is less than 1, then he gets more of an

increase in his payo from increasing his outside option by a unit than

from increasing his productivity with the single employer. Thus, he does

better to increase his general human capital.

4.

(a) The ecient investment level is the solution to max

x

x x

2

m which

is x

= 1/2.

(b) Player 1 selects x = 1/2. Following this investment, the players de-

mand m

2

(1/2) = 0 and m

1

(1/2) = x. In the event that player 1 deviates

by choosing some x = 1/2, then the players are prescribed to make the

demands m

2

(x) = x and m

1

(x) = 0.

(c) One way to interpret this equilibrium is that player 1s bargaining

weight is 1 if he invests 1/2, but it drops to zero if he makes any other

investment. Thus, player 1 obtains the full value of his investment when

he selects 1/2, but he obtains none of the benet of another investment

level.

5.

(a) The union makes a take-it-or-leave-it oer of w = (R M)/n, which

is accepted. This implies that the railroad will not be built, since the

entrepreneur can foresee that it will lose F.

(b) The surplus is R M. The entrepreneur gets

E

[R M] and the

union gets nw +

U

[RM]. The railroad is built if

E

[RM] > F.

(c) The entrepreneurs investment is sunk when negotiation occurs, so he

does not generally get all of the returns from his investment. When he has

all of the bargaining power, he does extract the full return. To avoid the

hold-up problem, the entrepreneur may try to negotiate a contract with

the union before making his investment.

6.

Stock options in a start-up company, stock options for employees, and

options to buy in procurement settings are examples.

7.

If it is not possible to verify whether you have abused the computer or

not, then it is better for you to own it. This gives you the incentive to

treat it with care, because you will be responsible for necessary repairs.

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22 Repeated Games and Reputation

1.

(U, L) can be supported as follows. If player 2 defects ((U,M) is played)

in the rst period, then the players coordinate on (C, R) in the second

period. If player 1 defects ((C, L) is played) in the rst period, then the

players play (D, M) in the second period. Otherwise, the players play (D,

R) in the second period.

2.

(a) To support cooperation, must be such that 2/(1) 4+/(1).

Solving for , we see that cooperation requires 2/3.

(b) To support cooperation by player 1, it must be that 1/2. To

support cooperation by player 2, it must be that 3/5. Thus, we need

3/5.

(c) Cooperation by player 1 requires 4/5. Player 2 has no incentive

to deviate in the short run. Thus, it must be that 4/5.

3.

(a) The Nash equilibria are (B,X) and (B,Y).

(b) Yes. Player 1 plays A in period 1 and B in period 2. Player 2 plays X

in period 1. In period 2, player 2 plays X if player 1 played A in period

1, and plays Y if player 1 played B in period 1.

4.

In period 2, subgame perfection requires play of the only Nash equilibrium

of the stage game. As there is only one Nash equilibriumof the stage game,

selection of the Nash equilibrium to be played in period 2 cannot inuence

incentives in period 1. Thus, the only subgame perfect equilibrium is play

of the Nash equilibrium of the stage game in both periods. For any nite

T, the logic from the two period case applies, and the answer does not

change.

136

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22 REPEATED GAMES AND REPUTATION 137

5.

Alternating between (C, C) and (C, D) requires that neither player has

the incentive to deviate. Clearly, however, player 1 can guarantee himself

at least 2 per period, yet he would get less than this starting in period 2

if the players alternated as described. Thus, alternating between (C,C)

and (C,D) cannot be supported.

On the other hand, alternating between (C,C) and (C,D) can be sup-

ported. Note rst that, using the stage Nash punishment, player 2 has

no incentive to deviate in odd or even periods. Player 1 has no incen-

tive to deviate in even periods, when (D, D) is supposed to be played.

Furthermore, player 1 prefers not to deviate in an even period if

7 +

2

1

3 + 2 + 3

2

+ 2

3

+ 3

4

+ . . . ,

which simplies to

7 +

2

1

3 + 2)

1

2

.

Solving for yields

_

4

5

.

6.

A long horizon ahead.

7.

(a) The (pure strategy) Nash equilibria are (U, L, B) and (D, R, B).

(b) Any combination of the Nash equilibria of the stage game are subgame

perfect equilibria. These yield the payos (8, 8, 2), (8, 4, 10), and (8, 6, 6).

There are two other subgame perfect equilibria. In the rst, the players

select (U, R, A) in the rst round, and then if no one deviated, they play

(D, R, B) in the second period; otherwise, they play (U, L, B) in the

second period. This yields payo (9, 7, 10). In the other equilibrium, the

players select (U, R, B) in the rst round and, if player 2 does not cheat,

(U, L, B) in the second period; if player 2 cheats, they play (D, R, B) in

the second period. This yields the payo (8, 6, 9).

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22 REPEATED GAMES AND REPUTATION 138

8.

(a) Player 2

t

plays a best response to player 1s action in the stage game.

(b) Consider the following example. There is a subgame perfect equilib-

rium, using stage Nash punishment, in which, in equilibrium, player 1

plays T and player 2

t

plays D.

(c) Consider, for example, the prisoners dilemma. If only one player

is a long-run player, then the only subgame perfect equilibrium repeated

game will involves each player defecting in each period. However, from the

text we know that cooperation can be supported when both are long-run

players.

9.

(a) As x < 10, there is no gain from continuing. Thus, neither player

wishes to deviate.

(b) If a player selects S, then the game stops and this player obtains 0.

Since the players randomize in each period, their continuation values from

the start of a given period are both 0. If the player chooses C in a period,

he thus gets an expected payo of 10 (1 ). Setting this equal to 0

(which must be the case in order for the players to be indierent between

S and C) yields = 1/11.

(c) In this case, the continuation value from the beginning of each period

is x. When a player selects S, he expects to get z; when he chooses C,

he expects 10 + (1 )(1 +x). The equality that denes is thus

z = 10 + (1 )(1 +x).

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23 Collusion, Trade Agreements,

and Goodwill

1.

(a) Consider all players selecting p

i

= p = 60, until and unless someone

defects. If someone defects, then everyone chooses p

i

= p = 10 thereafter.

(b) The quantity of each rm when they collude is q

c

= (110 60)/n =

50/n. The prot of each rm under collusion is (50/n)60 10(50/n) =

2500/n. The prot under the Nash equilibrium of the stage game is 0. If

player i defects, she does so by setting p

i

= 60 , where is arbitrarily

small. Thus, the stage game payo of defecting can be made arbitrarily

close to 2, 500.

To support collusion, it must be that [2500/n][1/(1)] 2500+0, which

simplies to 1 1/n.

(c) Collusion is easier with fewer rms.

2.

(a) The best response function of player i is given by BR

i

(x

j

) = 30+x

j

/2.

Solving for equilibrium, we nd that x

i

= 30+

1

2

[30+

x

i

2

] which implies that

x

1

= x

2

= 60. The payo to each player is equal to 2, 000 30(60) = 200.

(b) Under zero taris, the payo to each country is 2,000. A deviation

by player i yields a payo of 2, 000 + 60(30) 30(30) = 2, 900. Thus,

player is gain from deviating is 900. Sustaining zero taris requires that

2000

1

2900 +

200

1

.

Solving for , we get 1/3.

(c) The payo to each player of cooperating by setting taris equal to k

is 2000 +60k + k

2

k

2

90k = 2000 30k. The payo to a player from

unilaterally deviating is equal to

2, 000 + 60

_

30 +

k

2

_

+

_

30 +

k

2

_

k

_

30 +

k

2

_

2

90k

= 2, 000 +

_

30 +

k

2

_

2

90k.

Thus, the gain to player i of unilaterally deviating is

_

30 +

k

2

_

2

60k.

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COLLUSION, TRADE AGREEMENTS, AND GOODWILL 140

In order to support tari setting of k, it must be that

_

30 +

k

2

_

2

60k +

200

1

[2000 30k]

1

.

Solving yields the condition

[30 +

k

2

]

2

60k

1800 90k + [30 +

k

2

]

2

.

3.

The Nash equilibria are (A, Z) and (B, Y). Obviously, there is an equilib-

rium in which (A, Z) is played in both periods and player 2

1

sells the right

to player 2

2

for 8. There is also a goodwill equilibrium that is like the

one constructed in the text, although here it may seem undesirable from

player 2

1

s point of view. Players coordinate on (A, X) in the rst period

and (A, Z) in the second period, unless player 2

1

deviated from X in the

rst period, in which case (B,Y) is played in the second period. Player 2

1

sells the right to player 2

2

for 8 if he did not deviate in the rst period,

whereas he sells the right for 4 if he deviated. This is an equilibrium

(player 2

1

prefers not to deviate) if > 3/4.

4.

(a) Each player 2

t

cares only about his own payo in period t, so he will

play D. This implies that player 1 will play D in each period.

(b) Suppose players select (C, C) unless someone defects, in which case

(D, D) is played thereafter. For this to be rational for player 1, we need

2/(1 ) 3 + /(1 ) or 1/2. For player 2

t

, this requires that

2 +p

G

3 +p

B

, where p

G

is the price he gets with a good reputation

and p

B

is the price he gets with a bad reputation. (Trade occurs at the

beginning of the next period, so the price is discounted). Cooperation can

be supported if (p

G

p

B

) 1.

Let be the bargaining weight of each player2

t

in his negotiation to sell

the right to player 2

t+1

. We can see that the surplus in the negotiation

between players 2

t

and 2

t+1

is 2 + p

G

, because this is what player 2

t+1

expects to obtain from the start of period t +1 if he follows the prescribed

strategy of cooperating when the reputation is good. This surplus is di-

vided according to the xed bargaining weights, implying that player 2

t

obtains p

G

= [2 + p

G

]. Solving for p

G

yields p

G

= 2/(1 ). Sim-

ilar calculations show that p

B

= /(1 ). Substituting this into the

condition (p

G

p

B

) 1 and simplifying yields 1/2. In words,

the discount factor and the owners bargaining weight must be suciently

large in order for cooperation to be sustained over time.

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COLLUSION, TRADE AGREEMENTS, AND GOODWILL 141

5.

(a) The Nash equilibria are (x, x), (x, z), (z, x), and (y, y).

(b) They would agree to play (y,y).

(c) In the rst round, they play (z, z). If no one defected in the rst period,

then they are supposed to play (y, y) in the second period. If player 1

defected in the rst period, then they coordinate on (z, x) in the second

period. If player 2 defected in the rst period, then they coordinate on (x,

z) in the second period. It is easy to verify that this strategy is a subgame

perfect equilibrium.

(d) The answer depends on whether one believes that the players bar-

gaining powers would be aected by the history of play. If deviation by a

player causes his bargaining weight to suddenly drop to, say, 0, then the

equilibrium described in part (c) seems consistent with the opportunity

to renegotiate before the second period stage game. Another way of in-

terpreting the equilibrium is that the prescribed play for period 2 is the

disagreement point for renegotiation, in which case there is no surplus of

renegotiation. However, perhaps a more reasonable theory of renegotia-

tion would posit that each players bargaining weight is independent of

the history (it is related to institutional features) and that each player

could insist on some neutral stage Nash equilibrium, such as (x, x) or (y,

y). In this case, as long as bargaining weights are positive, it would not be

possible to sustain (x, z) or (z, x) in period 2. As a result, the equilibrium

of part (c) would not withstand renegotiation.

6.

(a) If a young player does not expect to get anything when he is old, then

he optimizes myopically when young and therefore gives nothing to the

older generation.

(b) If player t 1 has given x

t1

= 1 to player t 2, then player t gives

x

t

= 1 to player t 1. Otherwise, player t gives nothing to player t 1

(x

t

= 0). Clearly, each young player thus has the incentive to give 1 to

the old generation.

(c) Each player obtains 1 in the equilibrium from part (a), 2 in the equilib-

rium from part (b). Thus, a reputation-based intergenerational-transfer

equilibrium is best.

7.

(a) Any .

(b)

3

7

.

(c) m =

4

3(1)

.

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COLLUSION, TRADE AGREEMENTS, AND GOODWILL 142

8.

(a) Cooperation can be sustained for

2

3

.

(b) Cooperation can be sustained for

k

k+1

.

(c) Cooperation can be sustained for

4(k2)!

4(k2)!+k!

.

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24 Random Events and

Incomplete Information

1.

2.

(a)

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RANDOM EVENTS AND INCOMPLETE INFORMATION 144

(b)

3.

4.

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25 Risk and Incentives in Contracting

1.

Examples include stock brokers, commodities traders, and salespeople.

2.

The probability of a successful project is p. This implies an incentive

compatibility constraint of

p(w + b 1)

+ (1 p)(w 1)

p(w + b 1)

+ (1 p)(w 1)

1.

Thus, we need

p(w + b 1)

+ (1 p)(w 1)

= 1 = w

.

This implies that b = p

1/

.

3.

(a) The wage oer must be at least 100 y, so the rms payo is 180

(100 y) = 80 +y.

(b) In this case, the worker accepts the job if and only if w+100q 100,

which means the wage must be at least 100(1 q). The rm obtains

200 100(1 q) = 100(1 +q).

(c) When q = 1/2, it is optimal to oer the risky job at a wage of 50 if

y 70, whereas the safe job at a wage of 100 y is optimal otherwise.

4.

(a) Below is a representation of the extensive form for T = 1.

145

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25 RISK AND INCENTIVES IN CONTRACTING 146

(b) Regardless of T, whenever player 1 gets to make the oer, he oers

q

2

to player 2 (and demands 1 q

2

for himself). When player 1 oers

q

2

or more, then player 2 accepts. When player 2 gets to oer, she oers

q

1

to player 1. When player 2 oers q

1

or more, player 1 accepts.

(c) The expected equilibriumpayo for player i is q

i

. Thus, the probability

with which player i gets to make an oer can be viewed as his bargaining

weight.

(d) The more risk averse a player is, the lower is the oer that he is willing

to accept. Thus, an increase in a players risk aversion should lower the

players equilibrium payo.

5.

(a) n

2

= 6.

(b) n

2

= 1 or 6.

(c) n

1

= 2, 4, 6, or 7.

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26 Bayesian Nash Equilibrium

and Rationalizability

1.

(a) The Bayesian normal form is:

(Z, V) is the only rationalizable strategy prole.

(b) The Bayesian normal form is:

X

A

Y

B

is a dominant strategy for player 1. Thus, the rationalizable set is

(X

A

Y

B

,W).

(c) False.

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BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM AND RATIONALIZABILITY 148

2.

Player 1s payo is given by

u

1

= (x

1

+ x

2L

+ x

1

x

2L

) + (x

1

+ x

2H

+ x

1

x

2H

) x

2

1

.

The low type of player 2 gets the payo

u

2L

= 2(x

1

+ x

2L

+ x

1

x

2L

) 2x

2

2L

,

whereas the high type of player 2 obtains

u

2H

= 2(x

1

+ x

2H

+ x

1

x

2H

) 3x

2

2H

.

Player 1 solves

max

x

1

(x

1

+ x

2L

+ x

1

x

2L

) + (x

1

+ x

2H

+ x

1

x

2H

) x

2

1

.

The rst-order condition is 1 +x

2L

x

1

+1 +x

2H

x

1

= 0. This implies

that x

1

(x

2L

, x

2H

) = 1 +(x

2L

+x

2H

)/2. Similarly, the rst-order condition

of the low type of player 2 yields x

2L

(x

1

) = (1 + x

1

)/2. The rst order

condition of the high type of player 2 implies x

2H

(x

1

) = (1+x

1

)/3. Solving

this system of equations, we nd that the equilibrium is given by x

1

=

17

7

,

x

2L

=

12

7

, and x

2H

=

8

7

.

3.

(a) The extensive form and normal form representations are:

The set of Bayesian Nash equilibria is equal to the set of rationalizable

strategies, which is {(Du, R)}.

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BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM AND RATIONALIZABILITY 149

(b) The extensive form and normal form representations in this case are:

The equilibrium is (D, u, R). The set of rationalizable strategies is S.

(c) Regarding rationalizability, the dierence between the settings of parts

(a) and (b) is that in part (b) the beliefs of players 1A and 1B do not

have to coincide. In equilibrium, the beliefs of player 1A and 1B must be

the same.

4.

Recall that player 1s best response function is given by BR

1

(q

L

2

, q

H

2

) =

1/2q

L

2

/4q

H

2

/4. The low type of player 2 has a best response function of

BR

L

2

(q

1

) = 1/2q

1

/2. The high type of player 2 has a best response func-

tion of BR

H

2

(q

1

) = 3/8q

1

/2. If q

1

= 0, then player 2s optimal quantities

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BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM AND RATIONALIZABILITY 150

are q

L

2

= 1/2 and q

H

2

= 3/8. Note that player 2 would never produce more

than these amounts. To the quantities q

L

2

= 1/2 and q

H

2

= 3/8, player 1s

best response is q

1

= 5/16. Thus, player 1 will never produce more than

q

1

= 5/16. We conclude that each type of player 2 will never produce

more than her best response to 5/16. Thus, q

L

2

will never exceed 11/32,

and q

H

2

will never exceed 7/32. Repeating this logic, we nd that the ra-

tionalizable set is the single strategy prole that simultaneously satises

the best response functions, which is the Bayesian Nash equilibrium.

5.

(a) u

1

(p

1

, p

2

) = 42p

1

+ p

1

p

2

2p

2

1

220 10p

2

and u

2

(p

1

, p

2

) = 922 +

2c)p

2

+ p

1

p

2

2p

2

2

22c cp

1

.

(b) BR

1

(p

2

) =

42+p

2

4

and BR

2

(p

1

) =

22+2cp

1

4

.

(c) p

1

= 14 and p

2

= 14.

(d) p

1

= 14, p

2,c=14

= 16, and p

2,c=6

= 12.

6.

(LL

, U).

7.

(a)

(b) (BA

, Y)

8.

It is easy to see that, whatever is the strategy of player j, player is best

response has a cuto form in which player i bids if and only if his draw is

above some number

i

. This is because the probability of winning when

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BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM AND RATIONALIZABILITY 151

i bids is increasing in is type. Let

j

be player js cuto. Then, by

bidding, player i of type x

i

obtains an expected payo of

b(x

i

,

j

) =

_

1

j

+ (1

j

)(2) if x

i

j

1

j

+ (x

i

j

)(2) + (1 x

i

)(2) if x

i

>

j

Note that, as a function of x

i

, b(,

j

) is the constant 3

j

2 up to

j

and then rises with a slope of 4. Player is best response is to fold if

b(x

i

,

j

) < 1 and bid if b(x

i

,

j

) > 1. Note that if

j

> 1/3 then

player i optimally bids regardless of his type (meaning that

i

= 0),

if

j

< 1/3 then player is optimal cuto is

i

= (1 +

j

)/4, and if

j

= 1/3 then player is optimal cuto is any number in the interval

[0, 1/3]. Examining this description of is best-response, we see that there

is a single Nash equilibrium and it has

1

=

2

= 1/3.

9.

The unique Nash equilibrium is (Bf,B). That is player 1 bids when he has

the Ace and folds when he has the King, and player 2 always bids.

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27 Lemons, Auctions,

and Information Aggregation

1.

There is always an equilibrium in this game. Note that, regardless of

p, there is an equilibrium in which neither the lemon nor the peach is

traded (Jerry does not trade and Freddie trades neither car). When either

1000 < p 2000 or p > 1000 + 2000q, the only equilibrium involves no

trade whatsoever.

2.

Your optimal bidding strategy is b = v/3, you should bid b(3/5) = 1/5.

3.

To show that bidding v

i

is weakly preferred to bidding any x < v

i

, consider

three cases, with respect to x, v

i

, and the other players bid b

j

. In the rst

case, x < b

j

< v

i

. Here, bidding x causes player i to lose, but bidding

v

i

allows player i to win and receive a payo of v

i

b

j

. Next consider

the case in which x < v

i

< b

j

. In this case, it does not matter whether

player i bids x or v

i

; he loses either way, and receives a payo of 0. Finally,

consider the case where b

j

< x < v

i

. Here, bidding either x or v

i

ensures

that player i wins and receives the payo v

i

b

j

.

4.

(a) Colin wins and pays 82.

(b) Colin wins and pays 82 (or 82 plus a very small number).

(c) The seller should set the reserve price at 92. Colin wins and pays 92.

5.

As discussed in the text, without a reserve price, the expected revenue of

the auction is 1000/3. With a reserve price r, player i will bid at least r if

v

i

> r. The probability that v

i

< r is r/1000. Thus, the probability that

both players have a valuation that is less than r is (r/1000)

2

. Consider,

for example, setting a reserve price of 500. The probability that at least

one of the players valuations is above 500 is 1 (1/2)

2

= 3/4. Thus,

the expected revenue of setting r = 500 is at least 500(3/4) = 385, which

exceeds 1000/3.

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LEMONS, AUCTIONS, AND INFORMATION AGGREGATION 153

6.

The equilibrium bidding strategy for player i is b

i

(v

i

) = v

2

i

/2.

7.

Let v

i

= 20. Suppose player i believes that the other players bids are

10 and 25. If player i bids 20 then she loses and obtains a payo of

0. However, if player i bids 25 then she wins and obtains a payo of

20 10 = 10. Thus, bidding 25 is a best response, but bidding 20 is not.

8.

(a) Clearly, if p < 200 then John would never trade, so neither player will

trade in equilibrium. Consider two cases for p between 200 and 1000.

First, suppose 600 p 1, 000. In this case, Jessica will not trade if her

signal is x

2

= 200, because she then knows that 600 is the most the stock

could be worth. John therefore knows that Jessica would only be willing

to trade if her signal is 1, 000. However, if Johns signal is 1, 000 and he

oers to trade, then the trade could occur only when v = 1000, in which

case he would have been better o not trading. Realizing this, Jessica

deduces that John would only be willing to trade if x

1

= 200, but then

she never has an interest in trading. Thus, the only equilibrium has both

players choosing not, regardless of their types.

Similar reasoning establishes that trade never occurs in the case of p <

600 either. Thus, trade never occurs in equilibrium. Interestingly, we

reached this conclusion by tracing the implications of common knowledge

of rationality (rationalizability), so the result does not rely on equilibrium.

(b) It is not possible for trade to occur in equilibrium with positive prob-

ability. This may seem strange compared to what we observe about real

stock markets, where trade is usually vigorous. In the real world, players

may lack common knowledge of the fundamentals or each others rational-

ity, trade may occur due to liquidity needs, and there may be dierences

in owners abilities to run rms.

(c) Intuitively, the equilibrium strategies can be represented by numbers

x

1

and x

2

, where John trades if and only if x

1

x

1

and Jessica trades if

and only if x

2

x

2

. For John, trade yields an expected payo of

_

x

2

100

(1/2)(x

1

+ x

2

)F

2

(x

2

)dx

2

+

_

1000

x

2

pF

2

(x

2

)dx

2

1.

Not trade yields

_

1000

100

(1/2)(x

1

+ x

2

)F

2

(x

2

)dx

2

.

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LEMONS, AUCTIONS, AND INFORMATION AGGREGATION 154

Simplifying, we see that Johns trade payo is greater than is his no-trade

payo when

_

1000

x

2

[p (1/2)(x

1

+ x

2

)]F

2

(x

2

)dx

2

1. ()

For Jessica, trade implies an expected payo of

_

x

1

100

[(1/2)(x

1

+ x

2

) p]F

1

(x

1

)dx

1

1.

No trade gives her a payo of zero. Simplifying, she prefers trade when

_

x

1

100

[(1/2)(x

1

+ x

2

) p]F

1

(x

1

)dx

1

1. ()

By the denitions of x

1

and x

2

, (*) holds for all x

1

x

1

and (**) holds

for all x

2

x

2

. Integrating (*) over x

1

< x

1

yields

_

x

1

100

_

1000

x

2

[p (1/2)(x

1

+ x

2

)]F

2

(x

2

)F

1

(x

1

)dx

2

dx

1

_

x

1

100

F

1

(x

1

)dx

1

.

Integrating (**) over x

2

> x

2

yields

_

x

1

100

_

1000

x

2

[(1/2)(x

1

+ x

2

) p]F

2

(x

2

)F

1

(x

1

)dx

2

dx

1

_

1000

x

2

F

2

(x

2

)dx

2

.

These inequalities cannot be satised simultaneously, unless trade never

occurs in equilibriumso that x

1

is less than 100 and x

2

exceeds 1, 000,

implying that all of the integrals in these expressions equal zero.

9.

(a) Player 1s best-response bidding strategy is

b

i

(v

i

) =

_

y

1

for y

1

3

0 for y

1

< 0

.

(b) Player i will bid up to y

i

.

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28 Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium

1.

Let w = Prob(H | p) and let r = Prob(H | p).

(a) The separating equilibrium is (pp

, NE

(b) For q 1/2, there is a pooling equilibrium with strategy prole (pp

,

NN

) and beliefs w = q and any r 1/2. There are also similar pooling

equilibria in which the entrant chooses E and has any belief r 1/2. For

q > 1/2, there is a pooling equilibrium in which the strategy prole is

(pp

, EE

) and the beliefs are w = q and any r 1/2. There are also

pooling equilibria in which the incumbent plays pp

.

2.

(a) No.

(b) Yes. (AA

, Y) with belief q

3

5

(c)

3.

(a) Yes, it is (RL

, U) with q = 1.

(b) Yes, it is (LL

4.

Yes. Player 1s actions may signal something of interest to the other

players. This sort of signaling can arise in equilibrium as long as, given

the rational response of the other players, player 1 is indierent or prefers

to signal.

155

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28 PERFECT BAYESIAN EQUILIBRIUM 156

5.

(a) The perfect Bayesian equilibrium is given by E

0

N

1

, y = 1, y = 0,

q = 1, and y = 1.

(b) The innocent type provides evidence, whereas the guilty type does

not.

(c) In the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, each type x {0, 1, . . . , K 1}

provides evidence and the judge believes that he faces type K when no

evidence is provided.

6.

(a) c 2. The separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium is given by OB

,

FS

, r = 0, and q = 1.

(b) c 2. The following is such a pooling equilibrium: OO

, SF

, r = 0,

and q = 1/2.

7.

(a) If the worker is type L, then the rm oers z = 0 and w = 35. If the

worker is type H, then the rm oers z = 1 and w = 40.

(b) Note that the H type would obtain 75+35 = 110 by accepting the safe

job. Thus, if the rm wants to give the H type the incentive to accept

the risky job, then the rm must set w

1

so that 100(3/5) + w

1

110,

which means w

1

50. The rms optimal choice is w

1

= 50, which yields

a higher payo than would be the case if the rm gave to the H type the

incentive to select the safe job.

(c) The answer depends on the probabilities of the H and L types. If the

rm follows the strategy of part (b), then it expects 150p + 145(1 p) =

145 +5p. If the rm only oers a contract with the safe job and wants to

employ both types, then it is best to set the wage at 35, which yields a

payo of 145. Clearly, this is worse than the strategy of part (b). Finally,

the rm might consider oering only a contract for the risky job, with the

intention of only attracting the H type. In this case, the optimal wage is

40 and the rm gets an expected payo of 160p. This H-only strategy

is best if p 145/155; otherwise, the part (b) strategy is better.

8.

In the perfect Bayesian equilibrium, player 1 bids with both the Ace and

the King, player 2 bids with the Ace and folds with the Queen. When

player 1 is dealt the Queen, he bids with probability 1/3. When player 2

is dealt the King and player 1 bids, player 2 folds with probability 1/3.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

29 Job-Market Signaling and Reputation

1.

Education would not be a useful signal in this setting. If high types and

low types have the same cost of education, then they would have the same

incentive to become educated.

2.

Consider separating equilibria. It is easy to see that NE

cannot be an

equilibrium, by the same logic conveyed in the text. Consider the workers

strategy of EN

MC

. Neither the high nor low type has the incentive to deviate.

Next consider pooling equilibria. It is easy to see that EE

cannot be a

pooling equilibrium, because the low type is not behaving rationally in

this case. There is a pooling equilibrium in which NN

is played, p = 1/2,

the rm selects M

C is whatever is optimal with respect to q.

3.

(a) There is no separating equilibrium. The low type always wants to

mimic the high type.

(b) Yes, there is such an equilibrium provided that p is such that the

worker accepts. This requires 2p(1p) 0, which simplies to p 1/3.

The equilibrium is given by (O

H

O

L

, A) with belief q = p.

(c) Yes, there is such an equilibrium regardless of p. The equilibrium is

given by (N

H

N

L

, R) with belief q 1/3.

4.

Clearly, the PBE strategy prole is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In fact,

there is no other Bayesian Nash equilibrium, because the presence of the

C type in this game (and rationality of this type) implies that player 2s

information set is reached with positive probability. This relation does

not hold in general, of course, because of the prospect of unreached infor-

mation sets.

157

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An Introduction to Game Theory

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29 JOB-MARKET SIGNALING AND REPUTATION 158

5.

As before, player 1 always plays S, I

, and B

that player 1 is indierent between I and N, which implies that s = 1/4.

Player 1 randomizes so that player 2 is indierent between I and N. This

requires 2q 2(1 q) = 0, which simplies to q = 1/2. However, q =

p/(p+r pr). Substituting and solving for r, we get r = p/(1p). Thus,

in equilibrium, player 1 selects action I with probability r = p/(1 p),

and player 2 has belief q = 1/2 and plays I with probability 1/4.

If p > 1/2, then player 2 always plays I when her information set is

reached. This is because 2p 2(1 p) = 4p 2 > 0. Thus, equilibrium

requires that player 1s strategy is II

SB

and that player 2 selects I.

6.

In period 2 player 2 will accept p

2

if and only if v p

2

. So player 1s oer

will solve max

p

2

p

2

prob(p

2

< v). This yields p

2

=

c(p

1

)

2

.

Player 2 accepts p

1

if and only if v = c(p

1

). Using that player 2 with

v = c(p

1

) is indierent between accepting and rejecting p

1

, we nd that

c(p

1

) =

p

1

1

2

. In period 1 player 1 maximizes

p

1

prob(p

1

c(p

1

)) +p

2

prob(p

2

< v)prob(p

1

< c(p

1

).

Substituting for player 2s oer in period 2, we nd that p

1

=

2[1/2]

2

4

.

7.

(a) The extensive form is:

In the Bayesian Nash equilibrium, player 1 forms a rm (F) if 10p4(1

p) 0, which simplies to p 2/7. Player 1 does not form a rm (O) if

p < 2/7.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

29 JOB-MARKET SIGNALING AND REPUTATION 159

(b) The extensive form is:

(c) Clearly, player 1 wants to choose F with the H type and O with the

L type. Thus, there is a separating equilibrium if and only if the types of

player 2 have the incentive to separate. This is the case if 10 g 0 and

0 5 g, which simplies to g [5, 10].

(d) If p 2/7 then there is a pooling equilibrium in which NN

and F

conditional on a gift is arbitrary, and player 1s choice between F and O

is optimal given this belief. If, in addition to p 2/7, it is the case that

g [5, 10], then there is also a pooling equilibrium featuring GG

and

FO

and

OO

are played (and player 1 puts a probability on H that is less than 2/7

conditional on receiving a gift).

8.

(a) A player is indierent between O and F when he believes that the

other player will choose O for sure. Thus, (O, O; O, O) is a Bayesian

Nash equilibrium.

(b) If both types of the other player select Y, the H type prefers Y if

10p4(1p) 0, which simplies to p 2/7. The L type weakly prefers

Y, regardless of p. Thus, such an equilibrium exists if p 2/7.

(c) If the other player behaves as specied, then the H type expects g +

p(w + 10) + (1 p)0 from giving a gift. He expects pw from not giving

a gift. Thus, he has the incentive to give a gift if 10p g. The L type

expects g +p9w+5) +(1 p)0 if he gives a gift, whereas he expects pw

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

29 JOB-MARKET SIGNALING AND REPUTATION 160

if he does not give a gift. The L type prefers not to give if g 5p. The

equilibrium, therefore, exists if g [5p, 10p].

9.

(a) The managers optimal contract solves max

e, x

e x subject to x e

2

will pick x and e so that the constraint binds. Using the constraint to

substitute for x yields the unconstrained problem max

e

e e

2

. Solving

the rst-order condition, we get e = 1/(2) and x = 1/(4).

(b) Using the solution of part (a), we obtain e = 4, x = 2, e = 4/3, and

x = 2/3.

(c) The worker will choose the contract that maximizes x e

2

. The

high type of worker would get a payo of 4 if he chooses contract (e, x),

whereas he would obtain 0 by choosing contract (e, x). Thus, he would

choose the contract that is meant for him. On the other hand, the low

type prefers to select contract (e, x), which gives him a payo of 4/9,

rather than getting 0 under the contract designed for him.

(d) The incentive compatibility conditions for the low and high types,

respectively, are

x

L

1

8

e

2

L

x

H

1

8

e

2

H

and

x

H

3

8

e

2

H

x

L

3

8

e

2

L

.

The participation constraints are

x

L

1

8

e

2

L

0

and

x

H

3

8

e

2

H

0.

(e) Following the hint, we can substitute for x

L

and x

H

using the equations

x

L

= x

H

1

8

e

2

H

+

1

8

e

2

L

and

x

H

=

3

8

e

2

H

.

Note that combining these gives x

L

=

1

4

e

2

H

+

1

8

e

2

L

. Substituting for x

L

and

x

H

yields the following unconstrained maximization problem:

max

e

L

,e

H

1

2

_

e

H

3

8

e

2

H

_

+

1

2

_

e

L

1

4

e

2

H

1

8

eL

2

_

.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

29 JOB-MARKET SIGNALING AND REPUTATION 161

Calculating the rst-order conditions, we obtain e

L

= 4, x

L

= 54/25,

e

H

= 4/5, and x

H

= 6/25.

(f) The high type exerts less eort than is ecient, because this helps the

manager extract more surplus from the low type.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

30 Appendix B

1.

(a) Suppose not. Then it must be that B(R

k1

) = , which implies that

B

i

(R

k1

) = for some i. However, we know that the best response set

is nonempty (assuming the game is nite), which contradicts what we

assumed at the start.

(b) The operators B and UD are monotone, meaning that X Y implies

B(X) B(Y ) and UD(X) UD(Y ). This follows from the denitions

of B

i

and UD

i

. Note, for instance, that any belief for player i that puts

positive probability only on strategies in X

i

can also be considered in

the context of the larger Y

i

. Furthermore, if a strategy of player i is

dominated with respect to strategies Y

i

, then it also must be dominated

with respect to the smaller set X

i

. Using the monotone property, we see

that UD(S) = R

1

S = R

0

implies R

2

= UD(R

1

) UD(R

0

) = R

1

. By

induction, R

k

R

k1

implies R

k+1

= UD(R

k

) R

k

= UD(R

k1

).

(c) Suppose not. Then there are an innite number of rounds in which at

least one strategy is removed for at least one player. However, from (b),

we know strategies that are removed are never put back, which means

an innite number of strategies are eventually deleted. This contradicts

that S is nite.

2.

This is discussed in the lecture material for Chapter 7 (see Part II of this

manual).

3.

(a) For any p such that 0 p 1, it cannot be that 6p > 5 and 6(1p) >

5.

(b) Let p denote the probability that player 1 plays U and let q denote the

probability that player 2 plays M. Suppose that C BR. Then it must

be that the following inequalities hold: 5pq 6pq, 100(1 p)q 0,

100p(1 q) 0, and 5(1 p)(1 q) 6(1 p)(1 q). This requires

that (1p)q = p(1q), which contradicts the assumption of uncorrelated

beliefs.

(c) Consider the belief

1

that (U, M) is played with probability 1/2 and

that (D, N) is played with probability 1/2. We have that u

1

(C,

1

) = 5

and u

1

(B,

1

) = u

1

(A,

1

) = 3.

162

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An Introduction to Game Theory

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163

Part IV

Sample Examination Questions

On the following pages are some sample examination questions, in the form of two

examinations used by Joel Watson for undergraduates at UCSD in 2007 (wild res in

San Diego shortened the term in Fall 2007, so the examinations covered a relatively

narrow set of topics) and a group of questions from Jesse Bull. Instructors are welcome

to send their own sample questions to Watson (jwatson@ucsd.edu), who will add them

to those shown here. Please also report errors to Watson.

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

Economics 109 Midterm Exam I

Prof. Watson, Fall 2007

You have 50 minutes to complete this examination. You may

not use your notes, calculators, or any books during the exami-

nation. Write your answers, including all necessary derivations,

in the spaces provided on the answer sheet that has been dis-

tributed separately. You may use the scratch paper that has

been distributed but submit only your answer sheet. You do

not need to show any work in your answers to questions 1-5;

these questions will be graded only on the basis of whether your

nal answers are correct.

1. Write your name in the designated space on the answer sheet.

In the space marked version, write the following number: 4.

2. In the extensive-form game pictured on the right, how many

(pure) strategies does player 1 have? Do not name the strategies;

simply report how many there are.

3. In the normal-form game pictured on your answer sheet,

suppose that player 1 believes that player 2 is equally likely to

play any of her strategies. What is player 1s best response?

4. In the normal-form game pictured on your answer sheet,

is player 1s strategy M dominated? If so, describe a strategy

that dominates it. If not, describe a belief to which M is a best

response.

5. Consider the normal-form game pictured on your answer

sheet.

(a) List all of the ecient strategy proles in this

game.

(b) Calculate the rationalizable set of strategy pro-

les in this game.

1

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

6. Consider a game in which, simultaneously, player 1 selects

a number x [0, 20] and player 2 selects a number y [0, 20].

The payos are given by:

u

1

(x, y) = 2xy x

2

u

2

(x, y) = 10y + xy y

2

.

(a) Calculate and graph each players best-response

function, as a function of the opposing players pure

strategy (equivalently, expected strategy).

(b) Determine the rationalizable strategy proles for

this game. Show your logic.

7. Consider a strategic setting in which ten rms simultaneously

and independently decide whether to locate in the city (X) or

in the suburbs (Y). That is, there are ten players (n = 10) and

two strategies for each player. Each rms payo of locating in

the suburbs is 20, and this is independent of how many other

rms locate there. However, if rm i locates in the city, then its

payo is v

i

(m), where m is the total number of rms (including

rm i) that locate in the city. Suppose that

v

1

(m) = v

2

(m) = v

3

(m) = v

4

(m) = 31 m,

v

5

(m) = v

6

(m) = v

7

(m) = v

8

(m) = 31 3m,

and

v

9

(m) = v

10

(m) = 31 2m.

You are to determine the set of rationalizable strategies in this

game. To show that you have done this accurately, answer the

following questions:

(a) How many strategy proles are contained in the

set of rationalizable strategy proles?

(b) Describe one of the rationalizable strategy pro-

les.

(c) Describe the various values of m that can arise

in a rationalizable outcome.

2

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

Economics 109 Midterm Examination I

Answer Sheet, Fall 2007, Prof. Watson

C

1. Your name:_____________________________ Your student ID:_________________________________

2. Number of strategies that player 1 has (circle one): 1 2 3 4 5 6

7 8 10 16 64 256

3.

Player 1's best response:

4.

Is M dominated? Circle one: YES NO

If so, name a strategy that dominates it:

If not, name a belief to which M is a best response:

5.

(a) The efficient strategy profiles are:

(b) The rationalizable set is: R =

Version:

4, 5 2, 2

1, 3 8, 5

t

m

l c

2

1

r

5, 2

1, 2

b 2, 1 3, 2 5, 2

8, 2 0, 0

3, 0 5, 1

K

L

X Y

2

1

M 4, 2 3, 2

8, 2 2, 4

6, 2 4, 3

w

x

a b

2

1

c

6, 8

4, 4

y 1, 1 3, 3 9, 2

2 3 4 5 6 7 Total

4 6 6 8 8 8 40

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

6. (a) Best-response functions

Graph:

BR

1

(y) =

BR

2

(x) =

(b) Rationalizable set: R =

7.

(a) Number of rationalizable strategy profiles (circle one): 0 1 2 4 8 16 256 1024

(b) One of the rationalizable strategy profiles is:

(c) Values of m that can arise in a rationalizable outcome:

20

0

0 20

x

y

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

Economics 109 Midterm Exam II

Prof. Watson, Fall 2007

You have 50 minutes to complete this examination. You may

not use your notes, calculators, or any books during the exami-

nation. Write your answers, including all necessary derivations,

in the spaces provided on the answer sheet that has been dis-

tributed separately. You may use the scratch paper that has

been distributed but submit only your answer sheet. You do

not need to show any work in your answers to question 2; this

questions will be graded only on the basis of whether your nal

answers are correct.

1. Write your name in the designated space on the answer sheet.

In the space marked version, write the following number: 2.

2. For the normal-form game pictured on your answer sheet,

nd the pure strategy Nash equilibria and describe which, if

any, are ecient.

3. For the normal-form game pictured on your answer sheet,

calculate the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium.

4. Consider the following two-player game. First, player 1

selects a number x, which must be greater than or equal to

zero. Player 2 observes x. Then, simultaneously and inde-

pendently, player 1 selects a number y

1

and player 2 selects

a number y

2

, at which point the game ends. Player 1s pay-

o is u

1

= 2y

1

y

2

+ xy

2

y

2

1

and player 2s payo is u

2

=

4y

2

4xy

2

2y

1

y

2

y

2

2

. Calculate the subgame perfect equilib-

rium of this game and report the equilibrium strategies.

5. Consider a two-player game in which the strategy spaces are

S

1

= [0, ) and S

1

= [0, ). That is, each player selects a

number that is greater than or equal to zero. Let s

1

denote the

strategy of player 1 and let s

2

denote the strategy of player 2.

Suppose that the payo functions are given by

u

1

(s

1

, s

2

) = 2s

1

+ 2as

1

s

2

s

2

1

and

u

2

(s

1

, s

2

) = 2s

2

+ 2as

1

s

2

s

2

2

,

where a is a constant parameter.

(a) Is there any value of a such that this game has

no Nash equilibrium? If so, provide such a value.

In either case, explain your answer.

(b) Is there any value of a such that this game has

an ecient Nash equilibrium? If so, provide such

a value. In either case, explain your answer.

1

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

Economics 109 Midterm Examination II

Answer Sheet, Fall 2007, Prof. Watson

1. Your name:_____________________________ Your student ID:_________________________________

2. Circle the cells that are pure-strategy Nash equilibria and put an asterisk (*) in the cell of each efficient Nash

equilibrium.

3.

Mixed strategy equilibrium:

C

Version:

2 3 4 5 Total

8 10 12 10 40

3, 9 1, 8

0, 1 6, 3 w

x

a b

2

1

c

0, 3

5, 4

y

6, 8 5, 7 2, 4

d e

v

z

5, 6 2, 3

4, 3 7, 2

1, 1 0, 4

1, 5 6, 1 3, 2 7, 6 2, 6

7, 4 8, 3 4, 1 4, 0 3, 3

5, 6 2, 3

8, 2 1, 5

w

x

a b

2

1

c

1, 5

4, 1

y 0, 3 6, 1 7, 2

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

4.

Equilibrium strategy profile:

5.

(a) Is there an a such that the game has no Nash equilibrium? Circle one: YES NO

If yes, a =

(b) Is there an a such that the game has an efficient Nash equilibrium? Circle one: YES NO

If yes, a =

_________________________________________________________________________________________

Your comments on the course so far:

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

Economics 109 Final Examination

Prof. Watson, Fall 2007

You have two hours and fty minutes to complete this examination. You may not

use your notes, a calculator, or any books during the examination. Keep your eyes on

your own examination sheets. Questions marked with an asterisk (*) will be graded

only on the basis of your nal answers (not your derivations); for these questions,

write your nal answers in the space provided on the separate answer sheet that you

have been given. For the other questions, write your complete answers (including

derivations) on the separate answer sheet. It is important that you include the

essential derivations on the answer sheet, so your knowledge of the appropriate

techniques can be veried. Use scratch paper as you wish, but you may not submit

your scratch paper. Submit only your answer sheet at the end of the examination

period.

ON THE FIRST PAGE OF YOUR ANSWER SHEET, PLEASE SIGN THE

WAIVER IF YOU AGREE TO IT.

1.* Consider the normal form game pictured here:

(a) What is the set of rationalizable strategy proles in this game?

(b) Determine the games pure strategy Nash equilibrium strategy prole(s).

(c) Does this game have a mixed strategy equilibrium in which both X and Y are

played with positive probability?

2.* Consider the normal form game pictured here:

All of the payo numbers are specied, with the exception of those denoted by x

and y. Find numbers for x and y such that the following three statements are all

true.

(U, M) is a Nash equilibrium,

(U, M) is an inecient strategy prole, and

For the belief

1

= (

1

3

,

2

3

), which puts probability 1/3 on U and 2/3 on D, the

set of best responses for player 2 is BR

2

(

1

) = {L, N}.

1

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

3.* Consider the following game.

(a) Solve the game by backward induction and report the resulting strategy prole.

(b) How many proper subgames does this game have?

4. Consider the following stage game.

Suppose this is the stage game in an innitely repeated game. Assuming that

the players discount future payos according to the discount factor , under what

conditions is there a subgame perfect equilibrium in which (C, X) is played in each

period? (Use grim trigger strategies.)

5. Consider a dynamic pricing problem for a monopolist who faces two types of

customers (H type and L type), over two periods of time as in the example

discussed in class and in the textbook. Suppose the types of customers have values

of consuming the durable good in each period as shown in the following table:

Suppose there is one H type customer and one L type customer. The following two

questions refer to the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (in which the three players

are behaving sequentially rationally).

(a) What price would the monopolist set in the second period if neither customer

purchased in the rst period?

(b) What is the monopolists optimal rst-period price?

2

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

6. Consider a four-period bargaining game in which player 1 would make the oer

in periods 1 and 4, and player 2 would make the oer in periods 2 and 3. That is, in

period 1 player 1 makes an oer m

1

to player 2. If player 2 rejects player 1s oer,

then the game proceeds to period 2, where player 2 makes an oer m

2

to player 1. If

player 1 rejects this oer, then the game proceeds to period 3, where player 2 makes

another oer m

3

. If player 1 rejects this oer, then the game proceeds to period 4,

where player 1 makes an oer m

4

.

If an agreement is reached in period t, then in this period the player who accepted

the oer gets m

t

dollars and the other player gets 1m

t

dollars. The dollar amounts

are discounted relative to earlier periods, where is the discount factor for both

players per period. If an agreement is not reached by the end of the fourth period,

then both players get 0.

(a) In the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game, what is the oer that player 1

makes in the fourth period (contingent on agreement not occuring earlier)?

(b) In the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game, what is the oer that player 2

makes in the third period?

(c) In the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game, what is the oer that player 2

makes in the second period?

(d) In the subgame-perfect equilibrium of this game, what is the oer that player 1

makes in the rst period?

7. Consider the following game with nature:

(a) Does this game have any separating perfect Bayesian equilibrium? Show your

analysis and, if there is such an equilibrium, report it.

(b) Does this game have any pooling perfect Bayesian equilibrium? Show your

analysis and, if there is such an equilibrium, report it.

3

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

8. Consider a contracting game between a rm (player 1) and a consumer (player 2).

First the rm chooses what type of contract (Good or Bad) to oer the consumer,

then the consumer decides how thoroughly to read it (Read or Not), and nally

the consumer decides whether to accept the contract (Accept or Dont). If the

consumer selects R, meaning that he exerts eort to read the contract, then the

consumer pays a reading cost of 1 unit and learns the rms choice (G or B). If

the consumer selects N, meaning that he does not exert eort to read the contract,

then he must decide whether to accept it without observing whether the contract

is G or B. The G contract yields a value of 5 to the rm and 5 to the consumer,

whereas the B contract yields a value of 8 to the rm and 4 to the consumer. The

extensive form of this game is shown below.

(a) In this game, is there a pure-strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibrium in which

G is oered by player 1?

(b) Is there a mixed-strategy subgame perfect Nash equilibriumin which G is oered

and accepted with positive probability? If so, in equilibrium what is the probability

that player 1 selects G and what is the probability that player 2 selects R?

9. Consider a rst-price, sealed-bid auction in which there are two bidders (players 1

and 2) vying for one object. Let v

i

be the valuation of player i, for i = 1, 2.

Each players valuation of the object is either 0 (the Low type) or 10 (the High

type). Nature selects these with equal probabilities and chooses the valuations

of the two players independently. Each player knows his/her own valuation but

does not observe the valuation of the other player (knowing only that it is 10 with

probability 1/2 and 0 with probability 1/2). After nature selects the valuations,

the players simultaneously make bids b

1

, b

2

0. The object is given to the player

who bids the higher amount; in the case of equal bids, the winner is determined

randomly (with equal probabilities). If player i wins the auction then he/she gets a

payo of v

i

b

i

. If player i loses then he/she gets 0.

This auction game has a Bayesian Nash equilibrium in which the High type

of each player selects his/her bid randomly according to a continuous probability

distribution over [0, b], for some number b. Let the function p(b) represent this

probability distribution in the sense that, for any b, p(b) is the probability that the

High type bids less than b. Calculate the Bayesian Nash equilibrium and report the

Low types bid, b, and the function p.

4

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

Your name: _________________________________

Economics 109 Final Exam Answer Sheet

Fall 2007, Prof. Watson

_____________________________________________________________________________________

1. (a) The set of rationalizable strategy profiles:

(b) Name the Nash equilibrium/equilibria:

(c) A mixed strategy equilibrium in which X and Y are played? Circle one: YES NO

_____________________________________________________________________________________

2. x = y =

_____________________________________________________________________________________

3. (a) The strategy profile derived by backward induction:

(b) Number of proper subgames:

_____________________________________________________________________________________

4. Analysis:

Condition on *:

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 Total

7 5 6 7 8 8 8 8 7 64

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

5. (a) Analysis:

Second-period price

if no one purchased

in the first period: p =

(b) Analysis:

Optimal first-period

price: p

1

* =

_____________________________________________________________________________________

6. (a) Player 1s fourth-period offer: m

4

=

(b) Player 2s third-period offer: m

3

=

(c) Player 2s second-period offer: m

2

=

(a) Player 1s first-period offer: m

1

=

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

7. (a) Analysis of separating PBE (clearly show whether there is an equilibrium and report all conditions):

(b) Analysis of pooling PBE (clearly show whether there is an equilibrium and report all conditions):

_____________________________________________________________________________________

8. Analysis:

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

8. (continued)

(a) Is there a pure strategy equilibrium in which G is offered? Circle one: YES NO

Explain:

(b) Is there a mixed strategy equilibrium in which G is offered? Circle one: YES NO

Explain:

Probability that

player 1 chooses G:

Probability that

player 2 selects R:

_____________________________________________________________________________________

9. Analysis:

Low types bid:

b & =

Function p(b) =

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

Sample Exam Questions, Jesse Bull 2008

1. An island has 2 lakes and 20 shermen. Each sherman can sh on only one lake.

The current institution is that a sherman gets to keep the average number of sh

caught from the lake on which he chose to sh. On lake 1 the total number of sh

caught is given by F

1

(L

1

) = 10L

1

(L

1

)

2

/2, where L

1

is the number of shermen on

lake 1. For lake 2 the relationship is F

2

(L

2

) = 5L

2

.

(a) Under this institution, what is the total number of sh caught?

(b) The chief of the island asks his economist whether this arrangement is

ecient (that is, whether the equilibrium allocation of shermen to lakes

maximizes the number of sh caught). What is the answer to the chiefs

question? What is the ecient number of shermen on each lake?

(c) The chief decides to require a shing license for lake 1 which would

require each sherman who decides to sh on lake 1 to pay the chief x

sh. If it is to bring about the ecient allocation of shermen to lakes,

what should x be?

2. Each rm in a duopoly can produce any positive quantity of output by paying

only a xed cost of f. Let q

i

denote the output of rm i, and let Q denote the total

output. The inverse demand function for the market is p = 10 Q.

(a) Find rm 2s best response function.

(b) Suppose that the rms interact as in the Stackelberg model with rm 1

choosing its quantity and then rm 2 choosing its quantity (after observing

rm 1s choice). Assume that f = 9. Find the equilibrium quantities and

prots.

(c) Suppose that the xed cost f is the result of an operating fee that

must be paid to the government in order to produce output. At what

level would each rm argue that f should be set, assuming that they

interact as in part (b)?

3. Player 1 (the hider) and player 2 (the seeker) play the following game. There

are four boxes (all turned upside down so that the contents of each cannot be seen)

arranged in a straight line (say left to right) with an equal distance, say x, between

consecutive boxes. For convenience, the boxes are labeled 1, 2, 3, and 4. The boxes

are arranged in ascending order from left to right. Player 1 is given a $100 bill (by

1

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

the administrator of the game) to hide under one of the four boxes. Player 2 does

not observe where player 1 hides the $100 bill. Once player 1 has hidden the $100 bill

under one of the boxes, player 2 must look under one (and only one) of the boxes. If

the money is under the box under which player 2 looks, he gets to keep the $100. If

it is not, player 1 gets to keep the $100.

(a) Describe the Nash equilibrium.

(b) Suppose that the game is modied as follows. Now player 1 chooses

the box in which to hide the money, and then the administrator of the

game places the boxes a large distance apart. (Suppose x is equal to the

length of a city block.) Player 2 is now required to begin a distance of

x to the left of box 1, and must walk to the box that he wishes to look

under. Player 2 really does not like exercise and, given the warm weather,

suers disutility of $10 for each distance x that he walks. (So, for example,

looking under box 1 costs player 2 $10, and looking under box 2 costs him

$20, and so on.) What is the Nash equilibrium of this new game?

(c) Suppose that the game is as in part (b), but player 2 begins at box 2.

Will player 2s equilibrium strategy change? Why?

4. Ashley is negotiating an employment contract with a prospective employer, the La

Jolla YMCA. The contract species two things: (1) Ashleys job description (surng

instructor or tennis instructor) and (2) Ashleys salary t. Ashley is better at teaching

surng and enjoys it more. If Ashley works as a surng instructor for the YMCA,

then Ashleys payo is t 2000 and the YMCAs payo is 102, 000 t. If Ashley

works as a tennis instructor, then her payo is t 6000 and the YMCAs payo is

10, 000t. If Ashley and the YMCA fail to reach an agreement, then the YMCA gets

zero and Ashley obtains w. In other words, the default outcome of this negotiation

problem leads to the payo vector (w, 0), where Ashleys payo is listed rst. The

value w is due to Ashleys outside opportunity, which is to work as a writer for the

San Diego Union Tribune.

Solve this bargaining problem using the Nash bargaining solution, under the as-

sumption that Ashleys bargaining power is

A

and the YMCAs bargaining power is

Y

. Describe the joint decision that is made (the job description and salary).

5. Suppose that the owner of a factory (F) has hired a contractor (C) to improve the

factory machinery. A properly performed job by the contractor allows the production

line to operate at a faster rate (with certainty) that is more ecient. For simplicity,

assume that there are only two possible rates when the improvements have been

made properly. These are the faster rate and the old rate at which the inecient

machinery operated. Further, assume that if improperly improved, the machinery

2

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

can operate only at the slower rate. Denote the high eciency state by H, and

the low eciency state by L. Assume that the contractor possesses no evidence in

either state. The factory owner potentially possesses two pieces of evidence d

L

and

d

H

, which are just the running of the machinery at the possible speeds. In state H

she possesses both d

L

and d

H

, but in state L she only possesses d

L

. The state and

existing evidence are common knowledge between the players.

Suppose that improperly improving the machinery yields the contractor a cost

savings of 4, but that having the more ecient machinery yields the factory a gain

of 100. (Note that any initial payments between the parties have already been made,

and are not modeled here.) Clearly, it is ecient for the improvements to be made.

Following either production decision (by the contractor) the players have scope for

settlement. Assume their bargaining weights are 1/2, 1/2. If no settlement is reached,

they go to court. When they go to court the factory owner can present evidence that

is in her possession. It is costly for the factory owner to present (or produce) evidence.

The factory owner can present d

L

in either state at a cost of 16, while production

of d

H

in state H costs her 4. Producing no evidence (), which is possible in either

state, costs the factory zero. Costs are additive, so producing both d

L

and d

H

, when

available, costs the factory 20.

The courts action (a transfer between the players) is based on the evidence pre-

sented. It is common knowledge that the courts mapping of evidence to transfers is

as follows.

d

L

13 from C to F

d

H

2 from C to F

4 from C to F (4 from F to C)

d

L

and d

H

15 from C to F.

(a) Model this game by drawing the extensive form.

(b) What happens in each state if they go to court?

(c) What is the equilibrium of this game? Is this ecient?

(d) What does this imply about frivolous law suits by the factory? Does

this change if the contractor bears a cost of 5 to go to court?

(e) If evidence production is costless and the same transfer schedule is in

place (and no cost of going to court for the contractor), what will happen?

Is this ecient?

6. Consider the following interaction between a buyer and seller who have agreed

to a contract. The seller chooses whether to perform (P) or to not perform (N).

The buyer observes the sellers production decision (P or N). Following the sellers

production decision, the buyer either has evidence available or does not. If the seller

performed, the buyer has the evidence with probability .2. (With probability .8 the

3

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

buyer does not have the evidence, when the seller has performed.) If the seller did not

perform, the buyer has the evidence with probability .5. Following the realization of

the buyers evidence outcome, which is private information to the buyer, the players

simultaneously and independently decide whether to go to court (C) or not to go to

court (N), and the buyer also decides whether to present her evidence if it exists.

Going to court costs each player $4. When available, the buyers evidence is costless

to disclose. If the buyer wins at court, the court requires that the seller pay $10 to

the buyer. If the buyer loses, the court imposes no transfer. The court outcome is

decided as follows. The buyer wins, regardless of whether she presents evidence, if

she goes to court and the seller does not. The seller wins if she goes to court and the

buyer does not. If both go to court, the buyer must present the evidence in order to

win. Naturally, when no one goes to court, the court takes no action.

Describe the equilibrium. Is this reasonable? Explain. What is the sellers ex-

pected payo in the litigation game when she has performed and when she has not?

If the sellers immediate payo in the productive interaction is $4 higher when she

does not perform than when she performs, does the contract give her the incentive

to perform?

7. Consider the following innitely-repeated game with discount factor . Each

period a principal and an agent contract for the agent to produce a good of quality q,

which costs the agent c(q), where c

upon quality q is delivered, the principal is to pay s to the agent. The principals

payo from the transaction is q s, and the agents is s c(q). Both the principal

and agent are risk neutral. The value of each players outside option is zero.

Suppose that if the contract is breached, the players go to court. With probability

v (0, 1) the court observes both the level of q that is produced and whether s has

been paid. If the court observes these, it will enforce the contract. In each period,

the players agree on q and s, then the principal must write a contract, and then they

play the production/trade game. The principal incurs a cost k of writing the contract

each period. (It is incurred each period.) If it enforces the contract, the court imposes

expectations damagesit requires the breaching player to pay the other an amount

that gives the non-breaching player what she expected to receive under the contract.

(If the agent does not produce the good of the agreed upon quality q, she must pay

an amount that gives the principal q s. If the principal breaches, say by not paying

or partially paying, she must pay an amount that gives s to the agent.)

Suppose that the players agree to the same value of q and s for each period. Under

what conditions are these played in a subgame perfect equilibrium? (Use modied

trigger strategies.) Explain.

8. A buyer and seller can potentially trade a single good of quality i R

+

. The

goods quality is determined by the sellers level of investment, which is made prior

4

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

to trade. An investment level of i by the seller costs the seller i. Let : R

+

R

+

describe the buyers, and : R

+

R

+

the sellers value from consuming a good of

quality i. If they do not trade, the seller can consume the good and receive a (i).

The function is strictly increasing and concave, whereas is weakly increasing and

concave. Both functions and are twice dierentiable, where lim

i0

(i) =

and lim

i

(i) >

(i) for all levels of investment. The trade surplus (i) (i) is, thus, always

strictly positive and strictly increasing in the investment.

The buyer is motivated by his value of the good (i) less what he pays to the

seller. The seller can be of two possible types, which the buyer does not observe.

With probability q, the seller is greedy, which means that the seller bears a large

cost K (assume K > [(i) (i)] for all i) if she sells the good to the buyer at

a price that gives her less than (0, 1) of the trade surplus. That is, given an

investment level i, the greedy seller will not agree to trade if she does not receive

payment from the buyer that is at least [(i) (i)] + (i). With probability

(1 q), the seller is accommodating, which means she will agree to a price that

gives her any non-negative share of the trade surplus. That is, given an investment

level i, the accommodating seller will agree to trade as long as she receives a price at

least as large as (i).

(a) Describe the ecient level of investment.

(b) Suppose that i is veriable and the buyer can oer a contract to the

seller, which she accepts or rejects, before the seller chooses i. When can

the ecient level of investment be implemented? What contract induces

the ecient level of investment?

Suppose now that the buyer and seller cannot contract prior to the sellers in-

vestment decision. Instead, after the investment has been made, the buyer makes a

take it-or-leave-it oer to the seller. The oer p is a fraction of the trade surplus,

given i, that the seller is to receive. So, if the buyers oer is accepted, his pay-

o is (1 p)[(i) (i)]. If the greedy seller accepts an oer p , her payo is

p[(i) (i)] + (i) i. If the greedy seller accepts an oer p < , her payo is

p[(i) (i)] + (i) i K < 0. The accommodating sellers payo from accepting

any oer p 0 is p[(i) (i)] + (i) i.

(c) Under what conditions can you nd a perfect Bayesian equilibrium

of this game that induces a level of investment i

payo from trade is greater than her payo from consuming the good

herself? Even if you cannot describe the conditions, describe what such

an equilibrium would look like.

(d) Under what conditions can you nd a perfect Bayesian equilibrium

that induces the ecient level of investment i

e

? Even if you cannot de-

scribe the conditions, describe the intuition.

5

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

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For instructors only; do not distribute.

(e) Would it be possible to induce the ecient level of investment if,

instead, we focused on sequential equilibria? Explain.

(f) Suppose that, prior to the sellers investment decision, the buyer and

seller can make a non-binding agreement. Does this help attain the e-

cient level of investment?

9. Suppose that two players who may choose to form a rm interact as follows. First

the players each choose whether to make an investment (which are made simultane-

ously and independently). If player i invests, it costs her 3. If she does not invest, it

costs her nothing. The investment decisions become common knowledge. Then the

players decide whether to form a rm and, if they decide to form a rm, how to divide

the prot from the rm. If both have invested, the rms prot will be 16. If one

or both has not invested, the rms prot will be 12. Assume that the players will

divide the surplus from forming a rm according to the standard bargaining solution

with equal bargaining weights. Let d

i

(0) denote the value of player is disagreement

payo when she has not invested, and let d

i

(3) denote the value of her disagreement

payo when she has invested. These are symmetric.

(a) What is the ecient outcome?

(b) Describe conditions on d

i

(0) and d

i

(3) such that, in equilibrium, both

players invest. Show that this is an equilibrium.

(c) In light of your answers to parts (a) and (b), briey provide some

intuition for your answers in relation to the hold-up problem.

10. Two risk-neutral players bid for a single object in an auction. Each player can

invest so as to increase her valuation of the object. (The timing of this and the type

of auction is described below.) The players investment decisions are simultaneous

and independent. Let x

i

denote player is level of investment, which costs her x

i

.

(a) Suppose player is valuation of the object is equal to x

2

i

. The players

invest rst, and their investment levels are then publicly announced before

the good is auctioned in an English auction (ascending oral bids). Describe

an equilibrium of this game.

(b) Suppose player is valuation of the object is equal to x

2

i

. The object is

rst auctioned in a second-price, sealed-bid auction, and then the winner

may make her investment. Describe an equilibrium of this game.

(c) Compare the expected revenue under (a) and under (b).

(d) Instead assume that each player is valuation is given by x

2

i

+w

i

, where

w

i

u[1, 2]. Players invest before a second-price, sealed-bid auction. Now

6

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

they do not observe each others investments or valuations (that is x

i

and w

i

are private information). Describe an equilibrium. What is the

expected revenue for the seller?

11. Consider a Bertrand duopoly in which two rms simultaneously and indepen-

dently select prices. The demand curve is given by Q = 100p, where p is the lowest

price charged by the rms. Consumer demand is divided equally between the rms

who charge the lowest price. Suppose that each rms cost function is c(q) = 20q.

Suppose that this interaction is innitely repeated and rms observe each others

choice of price. Assume that the rms have equal discount factors given by . Describe

all equilibrium prices that can occur in equilibrium (as a function of ), and show

that these are, in fact, equilibrium behavior.

12. Consider the following social choice problem. There are two players (1 and 2)

who know the state, which is either a or b. There is an uninformed social planner

(or external enforcer). (You could think of this as a parent and two children or a

rm and two workers, etc.) The social planner would like to impose public action x

in state a, and impose public action y in state b (call this a social choice function).

These are real or productive actions, and are the only actions the social planner

can take. (You could think of these decisions as being which child gets which toy, or

which worker is assigned which task.)

The social planner does not know the state, but can base his decision (about

whether to impose x or y) on the players simultaneously and independently announc-

ing the state to him. That is, each player can announce a (claiming the state is a)

or b (claiming the state is b).

The task of the social planner is to design a game form that the players will play

by making their announcements. We assume that he would like for both players to

truthfully announce the state. The idea is that the game form will specify a public

action (x or y) as a result of the announcements that players make. So consider

game forms that have x imposed when both players have announced a and have y

imposed when both players have announced b.

Players preferences over x and y are specied below. Your task is to try to design

a game form (a mechanism) that induces, in equilibrium, players to truthfully name

the state and implements x in state a and y in state b.

(a) Suppose that players preferences are represented by the following

utility functions (which do not depend on the state).

u

1

(x) = 10

u

1

(y) = 5

u

2

(x) = 5

7

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

u

2

(y) = 10

Is there a mechanism (as described above) that implements the desired

social choice function?

(b) Now suppose that players preferences are represented by the following

utility functions (which do not depend on the state).

u

1

(x) = 5

u

1

(y) = 10

u

2

(x) = 5

u

2

(y) = 10

Is there a mechanism (as described above) that implements the desired

social choice function?

(c) Suppose players have the same preferences as in part (a). Now sup-

pose that in state b player 2 possesses a document (evidence) that she

does not possess in state a. (Player 1 possesses no documents in either

state.) Suppose that, in addition to making an announcement of the state,

player 2 can also disclose her evidence (when she possesses it). Assume

that evidence disclosure and announcements must occur simulateously

and independently as before. How does this change your answer to part

(a)?

(d) Consider the scenario in part (c), but now assume that in state b

player 1 possesses a document (evidence) that she does not possess in

state a (and player 2 possesses no documents in either state). How does

this change your answer to part (c)?

(e) Briey discuss these in relation to signaling models.

8

Instructors' Manual for Strategy:

An Introduction to Game Theory

Copyright 2002, 2008 by Joel Watson

For instructors only; do not distribute.

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