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(game
theory)

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von Neumann kais Morgenstern

,
.


.

(game theory)
John von Neumann Oskar
Morgenstern Theory of games and economic behaviour

(zero-sum games).
()
(strategic interdependence).

John Forbes Nash ( "


"),

(Nash Equilibrium)

Reinhard Selten

(Subgame

Perfect

Nash

Equilibrium) (trembling
hand perfect equilibrium)

John

Harsanyi

(Incomplete Information).
1994
Alfred
Bernhard Nobel.
.

30 ,
,
8

, .. (industrial
organisation), (mechanism design)
(auctions)
..
,
(Collective
action), .
, (Cooperative
Game Theory).
.
.
,
, , .
2005 Thomas Schelling Robert Aumann
.

1

:

(reward payoff
matrix).
,
(win/lose
games).
:
MONOPOLY ( )
poker
bridge


( !)


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, ).

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(positive sum games)


--
(win/win games).
:



,

Anatol Rapoport,
( )
(
tit for tat),

. , .

12

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,
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Netscape, ,

Netscape
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13

1994

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... ,
.

level-k-model


, Crawford
level-k-model.
level-k-model ,

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,
.

( ) Viktor
Yushchenko: ...
.

14

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Yushchenko , , ,
.

B'
D-Day, ,

, American Economic Review (2003).

15

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), .
.
,

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.


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.

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,

16

- ;

n2

( Nash)
17

, Nash
( )

n>2


( Nash)

, 8


8, . .

18

6
2

2, 6

2 6

7 .

19

( -5 )

4
( -1 )

2 ( -3
)

20

( )

21

: 50% ,
.

22

Axelrod

Winprisoner

23


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,
1994.
2000 1,5
, Poker World Series Champion
. 500 ,

24

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Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour (1944)

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27

: 100%
10%, 20%, 30%
40%,
: 8,3%, 25%, 25%, 41,6%.
...
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29


.

,
,

1994. , 1997
.
1% :

5.000

500.000.


,
.

:
1.537.000 1.537.385
,

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:
, 1.537.385 1.537.000.
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31

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32

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minimax
minimax
.
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minimax. ( minimax)
minimax ,
,
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33

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34


,
.

,
. H
, - 30
-


.

-
Vernon Smith - 1962 Journal of
Political Economy Smith
2002.

(
) Test of a Stochastic Theory of Choice,
1957 (University of California Press).

,
,

. ,

35

(.. )
. H
18 . .
;

, ;
H
,
.
, , ,

.
:

,
. , Microsoft
Netscape, ,

Netscape
.
,
... ,
.
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H
(Nash) - John Nash,
1994

36

2000 -
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, - -
,
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... ,
.

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.

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( 18 - 24 ),
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37

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38

, von Neumann
,

, ,
.
,
,
,
-


von Neumann.
.
, ,
.
1936 1938 Alan Turing
Princeton
Alonzo Church. Von Neumann
Turing
.
Turing
Bletchley Park, 1934

. Neumann Turing,
39


(IAS ) Princeton .
Von Neumann

,
.
, ,
, , ,
, .

.
Neumann ENIAC,
Harvard Mark I,
Howard Aiken (ASCC).
1944
Aiken (
) George Stibitz, Jan
Schilt Watson
.
ENIAC,

IAS.

""
.
Neumann

Los Alamos ( ).

40


, 1 1952.
'50 von Neumann
.

Nash

Cournot

Bertrand

(mixed strategies)

Nash

Stackelberg

Leontief

Rubinstein


41

: (static games
of incomplete information)

Counrot

: (dynamic
games of incomplete information)

Signaling Games

Spences model of job-market signalling


,
,
,
.

42


.
.
,


.
, .


. ,

.
. ,
.
,
.

Lakatos.
Nash

.

.

, ,
.

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43

,
Nash.


. ,
,
,



()
.

.

Nash.

Nash .
Nash ,
,
,

44

Nash PPAD,

Nash,


- Nash
.
=3/4 =(2+)/4 ,
, Nash,
. ,
, Nash, 0
.
.


.
,
. , n ,
,
.
,
.

,
,

45



. ,
,
1, 2'.
(..

)
Nash. Y
(

),
,

.
.
,


.
,
. ,
:
n ,
n
v 0
,
v.

46

Nash, Nash
.
Nash ,
. ,

Nash

Nash


Nash.

, Nash


,
, .
.

47

, ,
.

48

-1

(
) :
(
) { 1,., n}
S1,
S2,,Sn


ui(s1, s2, ...sn), s1S1, s2S2, ...
snSn

-2

49

-3-

-4-

. .

i si

.
i
ui(s1,,sn).
.

50

{1,2,,n}

S1 S2 ... Sn

u1 u2 ... un
ui : S1 S2 ... SnR


2 : 1 2

: S1={s11, s12, s13}


S2={s21, s22}
Player 2
s21

s22

s11

u1(s11,s21), u2(s11,s21)

u1(s11,s22), u2(s11,s22)

Player 1 s12

u1(s12,s21), u2(s12,s21)

u1(s12,s22), u2(s12,s22)

s13

u1(s13,s21), u2(s13,s21)

u1(s13,s22), u2(s13,s22)

51

B1

B2

B3

A1

-2,2

1,-1 10,-10

A2

-1,1

2,-2 0,0

A3

-8,8

0,0

B1

B2

B3

A1

-2

10

A2

-1

A3

-8

-15

-15,15

52

:


.
Firm A :

Standard, medium risk, high risk

Firm B :

Defend against standard, defend against


medium, defend against high risk

Firm A

Firm B
Defend
Defend
Standard Medium
Standard 20%
50%

Defend
High
80%

Medium 60%
Risk
High Risk 90%

56%

70%

40%

10%

53

Maximin-Minimax

Firm B
Firm A
Firm A

.
Maximin: Firm A

Maximin: Maximize your minimum payoff

Minimax: Firm B

Minimax: Minimize your maximum loss

Defend Defend
Standard Medium
Standard 20%
50%

Defend
High
80%

Min

Medium
Risk
High
Risk
Max

20%

60%

56%

70%

56%

90%

40%

10%

10%

90%

56%

80%

54

: { 1, 2}
: {S1 ,S2 }= { , }
:
u1(, )=-1, u1(, )=-9, u1(, )=0, u1(, )=-6;
u2(, )=-1, u2(, )=0, u2(, )=-9, u2(, )=-6
2

-1 , -1 -9 ,

0 , -9 -6 , -6


.
:

.
:

.
2

-1 , -1 -9 , 0
0 , -9 -6 , -6

55


(strictly dominated strategy)

{S1 , S2 , ..., Sn ,
u1 , u2 , ..., un}, si', si" Si
i.
si'
si"
ui(s1, s2, ... si-1, si', si+1, ..., sn)< ui(s1, s2, ... si-1, si", si+1, ..., sn)

s1 S1, s2 S2, ..., si-1Si-1, si+1 Si+1, ..., sn


Sn.


(weakly dominated strategy)

{S1 , S2 , ...,
Sn , u1 , u2 , ..., un}, si', si" Si
i.
si'
si"
ui(s1, s2, ... si-1, si', si+1, ..., sn)
( =) ui(s1, s2, ... si-1, si", si+1, ..., sn)

s1 S1, s2 S2, ..., si-1Si-1, si+1 Si+1, ..., sn


Sn.

56


Player 2
Left

Player 1

Up
Down

1 ,
0 ,

Middle

0
3

1 ,
0 ,

Right

2
1

0 ,
2 ,

1
0

Right
Middle.
Down
Up.
Left
Middle

&


2 or 4 or 5
6000
4000

1:

2 5,000
10,000

2:

1 4, 2 5
1 3000+4000=7,000 28,000
2 3000 15,000

57


2
2
1 4
5

2
10 , 10
12 , 14
15 , 14

4
14 , 12
20 , 20
15 , 28

5
14 , 15
28 , 15
25 , 25

4
5

4
20 , 20
15 , 28

5
28 , 15
25 , 25

58




.

.

.
.

2, 1


.

.

1, 2

0, 0



;

;

.
.


.

59






y1, y2,..., yn
yi yi+1
, for
i=1, 2, ..., n-1.

x0


x0 x4

x2

x1

x4

x3

x5



x1 x5

x7

x6

x8


.

(predecessor).

(successor) (terminal).

.



.

60







.





.

Player 1
H

Player 2
H
-1, 1

Player 2
T

1, -1 1, -1

-1, 1










.

.

61


Extensive form

Ads

In

1,1

3,3
Out

In
No ads

2,4

4,2

Out

Nash

,
,



Nash


.

2, 1

0, 0

2, 1

62

0, 0

1, 2


1
C

2
E

2, 0

1
G

1, 2

3, 1

0, 0

Nash (DG, E)

O 1 D 2
G
2

Nash
(1)
Player 1
C
Player 2
F
0, 1

D
Player 2

G
1, 0

H
1, 1

Player 2
I
2, 1

J
2, 2

Nash (D,
FHK).

63

K
1, 3

Nash
(2)
Player 1
C
Player 2
F

Player 2
G

0, 1

Player 2

1, 0

1, 1

2, 1

J
2, 2

K
1, 3

Nash(E,
FHK).

Nash
(3)
Player 1
C
Player 2
F
0, 1

D
Player 2

G
1, 0

H
1, 1

Player 2
I
2, 1

J
2, 2

K
1, 3

(D, FIK).

64



.


.

.

:
,
,


,
,

,

65

(S,B)

(W,W)

(B,S)

B: best

S: second best

W: worst


.
(Q)
().
1 1
2 4.
2
1
1.
1
2.

66

-5

-3

4
K
0,5

0,5



4
2

1
2

2
2

2
4

67

,
,
. (..
)
(.. ),
.
. ,

!
. . .
.


.
,
.
,
.

68

1944, - John Von


Neumann Oskar Morgenstern
Theory of Games and
Economic Behavior
, . Neumann Morgenstern

. ,

.

20 .
( ),
.
,
,
.

69

In 1944, the Austro-Hungarian mathematician John Von Neumann and the


Austrian economist Oskar Morgenstern published the pioneering work Theory
of Games and Economic Behaviour, and launched a new science, the theory of
games.

The

Neumann

and

Morgenstern

standardization

essentially

mathematical terms the problem of conflict of interest. In the decades that


followed, the theory of games has affected several areas of catalyst science and
especially

the

scientific

scope

of

negotiations.

The theory of games is considered one of the most important discoveries of the
20th century. Its basic premise is that the conflict (as in gaming alliance), both
collaborative and competitive interests of the parties are interdependent.
However, the development of the theory of games related mainly to the net
competitive conflict, namely that which occurs in zero-sum games.

70

Fisher, Ronald (1930) The Genetical Theory of Natural Selection


Clarendon Press, Oxford.

Luce, Duncan and Howard Raiffa Games and Decisions:


Introduction and Critical Survey Dover ISBN 0486659437

Maynard Smith, John Evolution and the Theory of Games,


Cambridge University Press 1982

Morgenstern, Oskar and John von Neumann (1947) The Theory


of Games and Economic Behavior Princeton University Press

Nash, John (1950) "Equilibrium points in n-person games"


Proceedings of the National Academy of the USA 36(1):48-49.

Poundstone, William Prisoner's Dilemma: John von Neumann,


Game Theory and the Puzzle of the Bomb, ISBN 038541580X

Camerer, Colin (2003) Behavioral Game Theory Princeton


University Press ISBN 0691090394

Gauthier, David (1987) Morals by Agreement Oxford University


Press ISBN 0198249926

Grim, Patrick, Trina Kokalis, Ali Alai-Tafti, Nicholas Kilb, and Paul
St

Denis

(2004)

"Making

meaning

happen."

Journal

of

Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence 16(4): 209-243.

Kavka, Gregory (1986) Hobbesian Moral and Political Theory


Princeton University Press. ISBN 069102765X

Lewis, David (1969) Convention: A Philosophical Study

Maynard Smith, J. and Harper, D. (2003) Animal Signals. Oxford


University Press. ISBN 0198526857

71

Quine, W.v.O (1967) "Truth by Convention" in Philosophica


Essays for A.N. Whitehead Russel and Russel Publishers. ISBN
0846209705

Quine, W.v.O (1960) "Carnap and Logical Truth" Synthese


12(4):350-374.

Skyrms, Brian (1996) Evolution of the Social Contract Cambridge


University Press. ISBN 0521555833

Skyrms, Brian (2004) The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social
Structure Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521533929.

Sober, Elliot and David Sloan Wilson (1999) Unto Others: The
Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior Harvard
University Press. ISBN 0674930479

72

Yale Economic Review: The Rise of Game Theory.

Paul Walker: History of Game Theory Page.

David Levine: Game Theory. Papers, Lecture Notes and much


more stuff.

Alvin Roth: Game Theory and Experimental Economics page Comprehensive list of links to game theory information on the
Web

Mike Shor: Game Theory .net - Lecture notes, interactive


illustrations and other information.

Jim Ratliff's Graduate Course in Game Theory (lecture notes).

Valentin

Robu's

software

tool

for

simulation

of

bilateral

negotiation (bargaining)

Don Ross: Review Of Game Theory.

Bruno Verbeek and Christopher Morris: Game Theory and Ethics

Chris Yiu's Game Theory Lounge

Elmer G. Wiens: Game Theory - Introduction, worked examples,


play online two-person zero-sum games.

Web sites on game theory and social interactions

http://www.lygeros.org/1044-gr.php
http://www.ceid.upatras.gr/ceidsem/index.php?action=preview.200
8.33

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