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2009
2009
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(game
theory)
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von Neumann kais Morgenstern
,
.
.
(game theory)
John von Neumann Oskar
Morgenstern Theory of games and economic behaviour
(zero-sum games).
()
(strategic interdependence).
Reinhard Selten
(Subgame
Perfect
Nash
Equilibrium) (trembling
hand perfect equilibrium)
John
Harsanyi
(Incomplete Information).
1994
Alfred
Bernhard Nobel.
.
30 ,
,
8
, .. (industrial
organisation), (mechanism design)
(auctions)
..
,
(Collective
action), .
, (Cooperative
Game Theory).
.
.
,
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2005 Thomas Schelling Robert Aumann
.
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(reward payoff
matrix).
,
(win/lose
games).
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, American Economic Review (2003).
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2000 1,5
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34
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, - 30
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Vernon Smith - 1962 Journal of
Political Economy Smith
2002.
(
) Test of a Stochastic Theory of Choice,
1957 (University of California Press).
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35
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(Nash) - John Nash,
1994
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38
, von Neumann
,
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.
,
,
,
-
von Neumann.
.
, ,
.
1936 1938 Alan Turing
Princeton
Alonzo Church. Von Neumann
Turing
.
Turing
Bletchley Park, 1934
. Neumann Turing,
39
(IAS ) Princeton .
Von Neumann
,
.
, ,
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, .
.
Neumann ENIAC,
Harvard Mark I,
Howard Aiken (ASCC).
1944
Aiken (
) George Stibitz, Jan
Schilt Watson
.
ENIAC,
IAS.
""
.
Neumann
Los Alamos ( ).
40
, 1 1952.
'50 von Neumann
.
Nash
Cournot
Bertrand
(mixed strategies)
Nash
Stackelberg
Leontief
Rubinstein
41
: (static games
of incomplete information)
Counrot
: (dynamic
games of incomplete information)
Signaling Games
,
,
,
.
42
.
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Lakatos.
Nash
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43
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Nash.
. ,
,
,
()
.
.
Nash.
Nash .
Nash ,
,
,
44
Nash PPAD,
Nash,
- Nash
.
=3/4 =(2+)/4 ,
, Nash,
. ,
, Nash, 0
.
.
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,
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45
. ,
,
1, 2'.
(..
)
Nash. Y
(
),
,
.
.
,
.
,
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:
n ,
n
v 0
,
v.
46
Nash, Nash
.
Nash ,
. ,
Nash
Nash
Nash.
, Nash
,
, .
.
47
, ,
.
48
-1
(
) :
(
) { 1,., n}
S1,
S2,,Sn
ui(s1, s2, ...sn), s1S1, s2S2, ...
snSn
-2
49
-3-
-4-
. .
i si
.
i
ui(s1,,sn).
.
50
{1,2,,n}
S1 S2 ... Sn
u1 u2 ... un
ui : S1 S2 ... SnR
2 : 1 2
s22
s11
u1(s11,s21), u2(s11,s21)
u1(s11,s22), u2(s11,s22)
Player 1 s12
u1(s12,s21), u2(s12,s21)
u1(s12,s22), u2(s12,s22)
s13
u1(s13,s21), u2(s13,s21)
u1(s13,s22), u2(s13,s22)
51
B1
B2
B3
A1
-2,2
1,-1 10,-10
A2
-1,1
2,-2 0,0
A3
-8,8
0,0
B1
B2
B3
A1
-2
10
A2
-1
A3
-8
-15
-15,15
52
:
.
Firm A :
Firm B :
Firm A
Firm B
Defend
Defend
Standard Medium
Standard 20%
50%
Defend
High
80%
Medium 60%
Risk
High Risk 90%
56%
70%
40%
10%
53
Maximin-Minimax
Firm B
Firm A
Firm A
.
Maximin: Firm A
Minimax: Firm B
Defend Defend
Standard Medium
Standard 20%
50%
Defend
High
80%
Min
Medium
Risk
High
Risk
Max
20%
60%
56%
70%
56%
90%
40%
10%
10%
90%
56%
80%
54
: { 1, 2}
: {S1 ,S2 }= { , }
:
u1(, )=-1, u1(, )=-9, u1(, )=0, u1(, )=-6;
u2(, )=-1, u2(, )=0, u2(, )=-9, u2(, )=-6
2
-1 , -1 -9 ,
0 , -9 -6 , -6
.
:
.
:
.
2
-1 , -1 -9 , 0
0 , -9 -6 , -6
55
(strictly dominated strategy)
{S1 , S2 , ..., Sn ,
u1 , u2 , ..., un}, si', si" Si
i.
si'
si"
ui(s1, s2, ... si-1, si', si+1, ..., sn)< ui(s1, s2, ... si-1, si", si+1, ..., sn)
(weakly dominated strategy)
{S1 , S2 , ...,
Sn , u1 , u2 , ..., un}, si', si" Si
i.
si'
si"
ui(s1, s2, ... si-1, si', si+1, ..., sn)
( =) ui(s1, s2, ... si-1, si", si+1, ..., sn)
56
Player 2
Left
Player 1
Up
Down
1 ,
0 ,
Middle
0
3
1 ,
0 ,
Right
2
1
0 ,
2 ,
1
0
Right
Middle.
Down
Up.
Left
Middle
&
2 or 4 or 5
6000
4000
1:
2 5,000
10,000
2:
1 4, 2 5
1 3000+4000=7,000 28,000
2 3000 15,000
57
2
2
1 4
5
2
10 , 10
12 , 14
15 , 14
4
14 , 12
20 , 20
15 , 28
5
14 , 15
28 , 15
25 , 25
4
5
4
20 , 20
15 , 28
5
28 , 15
25 , 25
58
.
.
.
.
2, 1
.
.
1, 2
0, 0
;
;
.
.
.
59
y1, y2,..., yn
yi yi+1
, for
i=1, 2, ..., n-1.
x0
x0 x4
x2
x1
x4
x3
x5
x1 x5
x7
x6
x8
.
(predecessor).
(successor) (terminal).
.
.
60
.
.
Player 1
H
Player 2
H
-1, 1
Player 2
T
1, -1 1, -1
-1, 1
.
.
61
Extensive form
Ads
In
1,1
3,3
Out
In
No ads
2,4
4,2
Out
Nash
,
,
Nash
.
2, 1
0, 0
2, 1
62
0, 0
1, 2
1
C
2
E
2, 0
1
G
1, 2
3, 1
0, 0
Nash (DG, E)
O 1 D 2
G
2
Nash
(1)
Player 1
C
Player 2
F
0, 1
D
Player 2
G
1, 0
H
1, 1
Player 2
I
2, 1
J
2, 2
Nash (D,
FHK).
63
K
1, 3
Nash
(2)
Player 1
C
Player 2
F
Player 2
G
0, 1
Player 2
1, 0
1, 1
2, 1
J
2, 2
K
1, 3
Nash(E,
FHK).
Nash
(3)
Player 1
C
Player 2
F
0, 1
D
Player 2
G
1, 0
H
1, 1
Player 2
I
2, 1
J
2, 2
K
1, 3
(D, FIK).
64
.
.
.
:
,
,
,
,
,
65
(S,B)
(W,W)
(B,S)
B: best
S: second best
W: worst
.
(Q)
().
1 1
2 4.
2
1
1.
1
2.
66
-5
-3
4
K
0,5
0,5
4
2
1
2
2
2
2
4
67
,
,
. (..
)
(.. ),
.
. ,
!
. . .
.
.
,
.
,
.
68
69
The
Neumann
and
Morgenstern
standardization
essentially
the
scientific
scope
of
negotiations.
The theory of games is considered one of the most important discoveries of the
20th century. Its basic premise is that the conflict (as in gaming alliance), both
collaborative and competitive interests of the parties are interdependent.
However, the development of the theory of games related mainly to the net
competitive conflict, namely that which occurs in zero-sum games.
70
Grim, Patrick, Trina Kokalis, Ali Alai-Tafti, Nicholas Kilb, and Paul
St
Denis
(2004)
"Making
meaning
happen."
Journal
of
71
Skyrms, Brian (2004) The Stag Hunt and the Evolution of Social
Structure Cambridge University Press. ISBN 0521533929.
Sober, Elliot and David Sloan Wilson (1999) Unto Others: The
Evolution and Psychology of Unselfish Behavior Harvard
University Press. ISBN 0674930479
72
Alvin Roth: Game Theory and Experimental Economics page Comprehensive list of links to game theory information on the
Web
Valentin
Robu's
software
tool
for
simulation
of
bilateral
negotiation (bargaining)
http://www.lygeros.org/1044-gr.php
http://www.ceid.upatras.gr/ceidsem/index.php?action=preview.200
8.33
73