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1 Now serving as Commander Mass . Air Nat i onal Guard

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7 Now serving as Superintendant o f Security Forces

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE

HEADQUARTERS 102D FIGHTER WING (ACC)

MASSACHUSETIS

AIR NATIONAL GUARD

OTIS AIR NATIONAL GUARD BASE, MASSACHUSETIS

02542-5028

MEMORANDUM FOR HAFIXOHP, ANGCAT

FROM: 102 FSfDO 165 Izzea Street, BId 165 Otis ' ANGB, MA 02542

3 September 2003

SUBJECT : National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States

L

This list of key personnel for the 102 Fighter Wing, Otis ANGB, Massachusetts, comes in response to a request for information from USAFIXOHP relayed through the Air National Guard Crisis Action Team senior director bye-mail dated Friday, 29 August 2003 .

. 2.

Some of participants are now.retired and the current addresses are supplied where known . We will provide further address information when it becomes available.

3.

Listing of personnel follows (current rank):

Rank Name

Position on 11 Sep 01

Status

Col QUE~VTILLE,Don~d

Wing Commander 1

HQIMAANG ·

Col

WICKEL, Albert S .

Vice Wing Commander'

102FW

Col

SCHIAVI, Anthony E .

Operations Group Commander 3

102FW

Col

DUPUIS, Richard R.

Support Group Commander"

102FW

Col

WORCESTER, Paul G.

Logistics Group Commander'

102FW

Col

ELLIS, Mark F.

Logistics Squadron Commander 6

102FW

CMSgt SILVA, John D.

Command CMSgt'

102FW

ColTREACY, John D .

Fighter Squadron Commander''

ACCfDOG

Lt Col RAMSAY, William M.

Operations Officer

retired ,

Lt Col LYNCH, Timothy M .

Operations Support Flight Commander/

102FW

Lt Col FRENCH, Phillip S.

Mission Support Flight Commander

retired

Major DOONAN, Virgina I.

Aircraft Generation SQ Commander'"

l02FW

Lt Col STEVENS, Christina G.

Maintenance Squadron Commander

102FW

Lt Col DUFFY , Timothy

Alert Pilot (1 SI to scramble)

102FW

Major NASH, Daniel S.

Alert Pilot (1st to scramble)

102FW

Major MARTYN, Robert S.

NYC CAP Pilot

102FW

Major RICHARD, Martin J.

NYC CAP Pilot

l02FW

Lt Col RAY, Douglas L.

Boston CAP Pilot

l02FW

Capt BECKEL, Jeffrey S. ,

Boston CAP !,ilot

102FW

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UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

MEMORANDUM

FOR THE RECORD

Event: Interviews at Otis Air National Guard Base (Otis ANGB)

Type of event: Interview with Brigadier General Donald J. Quenneville

Date: January 7,2004

Special Access Issues : None

Prepared by: Geoffrey Brown

Team Number: 8

Location: 102 nd Fighter Wing, Otis Air National Guard Base, Massachusetts Air National

Guard

Participants - Non-Commission: Andrew Huddleston (Dep Ch, Plans, Integration & Transformation Div, AF/XOHP, 703696-0024, Fax: 703 588-0636)

Participants - Commission: John Farmer, John Azzarello, Geoffrey Brown

Background:

. Quenneville has been in the military for 33 years. Eight years of which was active

duty. He came to the 102 nd Fighter Wing in 1978, and last year became the commander of the Massachusetts Air National Guard.

Please see the attached biography for further details.

Alert Site Mission:

Quenneville recalled that in 1972 NORAD's Air Defense mission included fifteen or sixteen alert sites. Between 1972 and 2001 the number of sites declined due to the perception of the Cold WaI threat. Most ofthose bases were at the maritime borders in 2001, as opposed to the northern alert sites that were active in the Cold War, and meant to respond to an attack from over the North Pole and Canadian airspace .

Quenneville explained that the alert site mission was relatively constant through its changes. He noted that the mission at Otis ANGB was mostly focused on responding to Russian Bear (a type of aircraft with the capacity to carry air-to-surface missiles) activity. When the Russians developed the Bear H model - that has the capability of launching a cruise missile - Otis had a high priority on shadowing those aircraft; but as the Russian defense capability declined with the worsening ofthe Russian economy, the number of alert sites declined.

Quenneville remarked that prior to 9/11 the focus of the alert bases was still an outwards-looking monitoring mission. Quenneville noted that Dr. Finklestein, a policy maker at NORAD, analyzed possible threats to national airspace. Quenneville opined that

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

25

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

his answer to the need of the air alert mission despite the end of the Cold War was that rogue states looking for high level weaponry had a free market in the former Soviet Union . He believed that until those weapons were accounted for , it was still necessary for Otis ANGB to have an air alert mission. He noted that those focused on assessing the need for the air defense mission decided that seven air defense bases was the minimum needed.

Hijack Mlssionr

Quenneville noted that the hijack procedure and responsibility did not change

over his career. He believed that NORAD developed the procedures that were used by the . Air Force to intercept a hijacked aircraft. He noted that in addition to the radio signals to

indicate a hij ack that a pilot uses - signals Commission

both hand signals and internationally developed signals that were familiar to the fighter

pilots (for instance, Quenneville noted that the direction and orientation from which a fighter performs an intercept is a way of signaling the pilot of the target of interest).

staff is familiar with - there were

Hijack chain of command:

According to Quenneville, ideally the FAA would notify NORAD of an ongoing hijacking; but ifNORAD became aware of a hijacking through a discreet IFF system code change then, since both entities used joint-use radar, the coordination would be "sorted out" between a NORAD sector like NEADS and the FAA before fighters are launched.

Drug Interdiction Component:

Quenneville noted that the F-l 06 did not participate in many drug interdictions, circa 1986 . He noted that fighters were deployed for forty-five days to Panama in the early nineties. They would mostly intercept what was believed as a drug running aircraf t , then shadow the target aircraft until it landed.

F-I06 and F-15

Quenneville noted that the firing exercise he was involved in was to test different aircraft's ability to fire a tactical nuclear weapon. This is one of the designs for the F-106 - to launch a missile referred to as the "Geanie Rocket" .

Though the F ~15 was developed as an air interceptor, it quickly showed its ability as a tactical fighter . It was never designed to carry a nuclear weapon. He noted also that the radar and ability to carry better missiles were improved from the F-I06 to the F-15 .

NORAD/FAA Cooperation:

Quenneville noted that the Otis ANGB take-off route, which points off the coast and was designed to respond to an externally orientated threat, did not at all times call for

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

26

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

FAA air traffic guidance. The route is designed to point out of the main air traffic, and that coordination could exist directly between NEADS controllers, who have the ability to find a target on their radar systems, and the fighter pilots. He noted that exercises were conducted at night on occasion specifically because there is less air traffic at that time .

Quenneville noted that he does not recall a live exercise involving the FAA and an airliner to practice a hij ack. He explained that the standard procedure was to never approach to closer than five models and to trail the hijacked aircraft to monitor its actions.

Threats:

Quenneville noted that though he was aware of Osama Bin Laden before 9 / 11, he never received a link between Bin Laden and the post-Cold War threats that were typified

by the 9/11 attacks. He continued, and noted that even though the quantity of threats had changed over his career, the outlook and operational approach to those threats had not. The adequacy of the air defense mission ofNORAD was based. on the ability to perceive

a threat with enough time to respond.

Quenneville noted that as of9/01 the fighters "sat alert" with an external tank and live guns; it was possible they would sit with heat seeking missiles as well. He said that because of the Russian Bear exercises that were scheduled on 9 / 11 the fighters were

configured as 3-2-2-1. He noted this is a higher state of readiness than the fighters would

normally have been at. ·

.

Quenneville noted that the last intercept he recalls for Russian Bears was in 1988.

9/11:

Quenneville was advised during a weekly meeting that the pilots were put at Battle Stations due to a possible hijack. The Operations Group Commander briefed him, and he continued the meeting. It ended, and he went to get paper work for the next meeting. Quenneville went into the break room, and was told that a commuter airplane had just hit the World Trade Center (WTC) . He told Commission staff that he thought at the time that it was a large whole for a commuter airplane. He was watching the broadcast when United Airlines Flight 175 (UAL 175) hit the second tower. He immediately called to convene the Battle Staff, and headed to the Command Post.

Quenneville noted that the fighters at alert status were NORAD assets , and controlled by NORAD. He said that as the Wing Commander on 9/11, he was considered

a "force provider". He noted that NORAD always specified how to posture their air alert assets.

At the Command Post the Battle Staff convened. He noted that the initial intelligence that they relied on was that the suspected hijacked aircraft was the first aircraft to . hit the WTC . He did not recall if they initially knew the second aircraft was

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

27

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

hijacked as well. He also noted that their aircraft were communicating with NEADS entities since the aircraft were too far away to communicate with directly.

Quenneville noted that two of the training sortie fighters backed up the PA N T A flight while the other aircraft were being refitted . Quenneville believes that the training sortie fighters launched around 8 : 52 AM, very close to the time the PANT A flight was airborne . He noted that the training missions were recalled at 9:25. The Maine 85 tanker that was used by PANT A was deployed in support of those fighters' training. He noted there was another tanker in the air that they used as well.

Rules of Engagement (ROE):

He noted that the operations group commander would have communicated changes in the ROE to the pilots who were launched subsequently of the i nitial scrambled fighters. Quenneville explained that Duffy and Nash received the information from NEADS , and that the other pilots were briefed per the direction ofNEADS by Otis ANGB staff. Quenneville noted that the procedure created for this was in place and pract i ced s i nce it was the Same procedure that was used when DEFCONS were changed due to the Cold War threat.

Quenneville noted that the ROE was developed based on "bigger picture" inputs .

On 9 / 11 there was a specific set of ROEs, and these were adjusted accordingly. The adjusted ROEs redefined where authority would be issued from to have an order to

engage an airliner.

.

Assets at Otis:

He noted that following direction from NEADS, Otis ANGB began manning combat air patrol (CAP) missions. They recalled and refitted the training assets, and launched fighters in support of the PANTA flight. He noted that over the course of the day Otis ANGB changed the fighters from their training configuration to full armament. As airplanes "recovered" they began loading heavier armament. Within four hours they had a full configuration on five airplanes. Within seventeen hours, during continual flying operations, they had fourteen out of seventeen airplanes fully configured. All this was done in coordination with NEADS .

CAPs:

Quenneville noted that the role of Otis ANGB Was as a force provider for the NEADS mission. Otis ANGB would tell them their capability , and NEADS would make deployment decisions ' based on that. He noted that Otis flew airplanes 24 / 7 for six or seven weeks following 9 / 11.

Post 9/11:

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED

28

UNCLASSIFIED Commission Sensitive

Quenneville noted that, as an example of the changes in personnel, Otis ANGB was a training organization. He noted that the dining facility was only open one weekend a month. But after 9111 it served four meals a day for months. He noted this displays the amount of recall of personnel that occurred to fulfill their orders after the attacks .

Current Status:

Quenneville noted that Otis ANGB performed combat air patrols through the end of January 2001, and those operations continued in part at Otis ANGB beyond February 2002. Most ofthe personnel that were placed on active duty on 9/11 were stood down by a year later.

Quenneville noted that from a public interest level it is important for the public to know that there are airplanes at alert. He also noted that they are not restricted to "looking outward", but that this threat still exists.

Recommendations:

Quenneville noted that to recognize an internally generated threat is important, and that by watching the country's protective system react to different threat levels he believes there is better sharing of information.

He noted that from an air defense perspective the stand-up

of North Com has

assisted in bridging the gaps between agencies to help the defense of the country .

He noted in terms of the Otis ANGB mission, the increased view to 360 degrees has not changed the need of Otis ANGB to defend the sovereignty of the United States, and that the ability to "scale up" quickly cannot be underestimated.

Commission Sensitive UNCLASSIFIED