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Caseres vs Universal Robina

Facts:
Universal Robina Sugar Milling Corporation (respondent) is a corporation engaged in the cane sugar
milling business. Pedy Caseres (petitioner Caseres) started working for respondent in 1989, while Andito
Pael (petitioner Pael) in 1993. At the start of their respective employments, they were made to sign a
Contract of Employment for Specific Project or Undertaking. Petitioners' contracts were renewed from
time to time; until May 1999 when they were informed that their contracts will not be renewed anymore.
Petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, regularization, incentive leave pay, 13th month pay,
damages and attorneys fees.
Issue:
Whether or not the petitioners are seasonal/project/term employees and not regular employees of
respondents

Article 280 of the Labor Code provides:
ART. 280. Regular and Casual Employees. The provision of written agreement to the contrary
notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties, an employment shall be deemed to be
regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or
desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer, except where the employment has been fixed for
a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time
of the engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature
and the employment is for the duration of the season.
An employment shall be deemed to be casual if it is not covered by the preceding paragraph: Provided,
That, any employee who has rendered at least one year of service, whether such service is continuous or
broken, shall be considered a regular employee with respect to the activity in which he is employed and
his employment shall continue while such actually exists.
The foregoing provision provides for three kinds of employees: (a) regular employees or those who have
been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade
of the employer; (b) project employees or those whose employment has been fixed for a specific project
or undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the
engagement of the employee or where the work or services to be performed is seasonal in nature and
theemployment is for the duration of the season; and (c) casual employees or those who are neither
regular nor project employees. The principal test for determining whether an employee is a project
employee or a regular employee is whether the employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement
of the employee. A project employee is one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or
undertaking, the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement
of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is
for the duration of the season. A true project employee should be assigned to a project which begins and
ends at determined or determinable times, and be informed thereof at the time of hiring. Petitioners
contend that respondent's repeated hiring of their services qualifies them to the status of regular
employees.


Cocomangas Beach Hotel Resort v. Visca
Doctrine:
the repeated and continuing need for respondents services is sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not
indispensability, of his services to petitioners business and, as a regular employee, he could only be
dismissed from employment for a just or authorized cause.
ROY D. PASOS v. PHILIPPINE NATIONAL CONSTRUCTION CORPORATION, G.R. No. 192394,
July 3, 2013

Project employee is deemed regularized if services are extended without specifying duration; While for
first three months, petitioner can be considered a project employee of PNCC, his employment thereafter,
when his services were extended without any specification of as to the duration, made him a regular
employee of PNCC. And his status as a regular employee was not affected by the fact that he was
assigned to several other projects and there were intervals in between said projects since he enjoys
security of tenure.
Report of termination required upon project completion. In this case, records clearly show that PNCC did
not report the termination of petitioners supposed project employment for the NAIA II Project to the
DOLE. Department Order No. 19, or the Guidelines Governing the Employment of Workers in the
Construction Industry, requires employers to submit a report of an employees termination to the nearest
public employment office every time an employees employment is terminated due to a completion of a
project.


HANJIN HEAVY INDUSTRIES vs. IBANEZ| GR 170181 | June 26 2008

Hanjin was unable to prove they were not regular employees The rehiring of construction workers on a
project to project basis does notconfer upon them regular employment status, since their re-hiring is only
anatural consequence of the fact that experienced construction workers are preferred. Employees who are
hired for carrying out a separate job, distinct from the other undertakings of the company, the scope and
duration of which has been determined and made known to the employees at the time of the employment,
are properly treated as project employees and their services may be lawfully terminated upon the
completion of a project. Should the terms of their employment fail to comply with this standard, they
cannot be considered project employees. Hanjin was unable to show the written contracts it had with the
workers. White the absence of the contract does not grant permanent status it is the burden of the
employer to prove that the employees were aware that their contract with the company is for per project
only. While Hanjin submitted a termination report including the workers names to prove that the services
of their services were only contracted for a per project basis, Hanjin only submitted one report. It was
unable to disprove the allegation of the workers that they were part of a pool that Hanjin contacts once a
project is to bec ompleted. Employers cannot mislead their employees, whose work is necessary and
desirable in the former's line of business by treating them as though they are part of a work pool from
which workers could be continually drawn and then assigned to various projects and thereafter denied
regular status at any time by the expedient act of filing a Termination Report. This would constitute a
practice in which an employee is unjustly precluded from acquiring security of tenure, contrary to public
policy, morals, good customs and public order. Hanjin alleged that per Department Order 19, Series of
1993 of DOLE

PNOC EDC vs NLRC
FACT:
PNOC-Energy Development Corporation, to augment its need for manpower hired persons on varying
dates and for varying purposes. The earliest person who was contracted for the purpose was Roberto
Renzal, as a pipe fitter, in January 1995, and like the others concerned, his contract was renewed or
extended every time his contract expires.
Later, PNOC-EDC informed DOLE, Regional Sub-branch No. VII in Dumaguete City, that 6 of its
employees will be terminated. Subsequently, Roberto Renzal and 5 others were furnished with letters
stating that their employment will be terminated on June 1998.
Renzal, et. al., filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC against PNOC.
The Labor Arbiter found the group of Renzals, claim to lack merit, hence their termination legal on the
ground that they were dismissed because their contract with PNOC expired.
The NLRC, upon Renzals appeal, adjudged contrary to the decision of the Labor Arbiter stating among
others that Renzal and the others were regular non-project employees for having worked for more than
one year in positions that required them to perform activities necessary and desirable in the normal
business or trade of petitioner. The CA affirmed the NLRCs decision.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not Renzal, et.al., were project employees or regular employees.
2. Whether or not they were illegally dismissed from employment.
HELD:
1. Renzal, et.al, are Regular Employees.
2. Yes, Renzal, et.al, being Regular Employees are entitled to security of tenure, were unjustly
dismissed from work.
RATIO:
1. PNOCs act of repeatedly and continuously hiring respondents to do the same kind of work belies
its contention that respondents were hired for a specific project or undertaking. The absence of a
definite duration for the project/s has led the Court to conclude that Renzal, et.al, are, in fact,
regular employees.
2. In termination cases, it is incumbent upon the employer to prove by the quantum of evidence
required by law that the dismissal of an employee is not illegal; otherwise the dismissal would be
unjustified. In the case at bar, PNOC failed to discharge the burden.
The notices of termination indicated that PNOC services were terminated due to the completion
of the project. However, this allegation is contrary to the statement of petitioner in some of its
pleadings that the project was merely substantially completed. There is likewise no proof that
the project, or the phase of work to which respondents had been assigned, was already completed
at the time of their dismissal.

INTEGRATED CONTRACTOR V NLRC (SOLON)
464 SCRA 265
QUISUMBING; August 9, 2005
NATURE
Appeal from a decision of the CA affirming the NLRCs findings
which declared respondent Solon a regular employee of the
petitioner and awarded him with 13th month pay, service
incentive leave pay, reinstatement to his former position with
full backwages from the time his salary was withheld until his
reinstatement.
FACTS
- Petitioner is a plumbing contractor. Its business depends on
the number and frequency of the projects it is able to contract
with its clients.
- Respondent Solon worked for petitioner several months at a
time from 1994 to 1998.
- On Feb. 1998, while Solon was about to log out from work, he
was informed that it was his last day of work as he had been
terminated. He went back to petitioners office to sign a
clearance so he could claim his 13th month pay and tax refunds.
However, he refused to sign when he read the clearance
indicating that he had resigned. He then filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal without due cause and due process.
- The Labor Arbiter ruled that Solon was a regular employee
and could only be removed for cause. NLRC affirmed with only a
modification as to the computation of 13th month pay. CA also
affirmed.
ISSUE
WON respondent is a regular employee
HELD
YES
Ratio The test to determine whether employment is regular or
not is the reasonable connection between the particular activity
performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or
trade of the employer. Also, if the employee has been
performing the job for at least one year, even if the
performance is not continuous or merely intermittent, the law
deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as
sufficient evidence of the necessity, if not indispensability of
that activity to the business. (De Leon v NLRC)
Reasoning
- While length of time may not be the controlling test for project
employment, it is vital in determining if the employee was hired
for a specific undertaking or tasked to perform functions vital,
necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of
the employer. Here, private respondent had been a project
employee several times over. His employment ceased to be
coterminous with specific projects when he was repeatedly rehired
due to the demands of petitioners business.
Disposition assailed Decision dated October 30, 2001 and the
Resolution dated February 28, 2002 of CA are AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION. The petitioner id hereby ORDERED to (1)
reinstate the respondent with no loss of seniority rights and
other privileges; and (2) pay respondent his backwages, 13th
month pay for the year 1998 and Service Incentive Leave Pay
computed from the date of his illegal dismissal up to the date of
his actual reinstatement.

Mercado v. NLRC

Facts:
1. Petitioners were agricultural workers of the private respondent's sugar land who were dismissed. They
had worked in all agriculture phases for several years in the said sugar land. The respondent denied that
petitioners were regular employees alleging that their services were engaged through 'mandarols' or
supply workers to do a particular phase of the agricultural work.

2. As a result, the petitioners filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. The Labor Arbiter held that the
petitioners were not regular employees and the NLRC affirmed this ruling.

Issue: W/N the petitioners are regular and permanent farm workers

RULING: No, they are project/seasonal employees. A project employee is one whose employment has
been fixed for a specific project or undertaking, the completion has been determined at the time of
engagement, or where work or service is seasonal in nature and employment is for the duration of the
season.

As such, the termination of employment cannot be considered as illegal dismissal. The petitioners are free
to contract their services to work for other farm owners.


Hacienda Fatima vs. Natl Federation of Sugarcane Workers
Facts:
When complainant union (respondents) was certified as the collective bargaining
representative, petitioners refused to sit down w/ the union for the purpose of entering into a CBA. The
workers including complainants were not given work for more than 1month. In protest, they staged a
strike w/c was however settled upon the signing of a MOA. Subsequently, alleging that complainants
failed to load some wagons, petitioners reneged on its commitment to bargain collectively & employed all
means including the use of private armed guards to prevent the organizers from entering the premises. No
work assignments were given to complainants w/c forced the union to stage a strike. Due to conciliation
efforts by the DOLE, another MOA was signed by the parties & they met in a conciliation meeting. When
petitioners again reneged on its commitment,complainants filed a complaint. Petitioner accused
respondents of refusing to work & being choosy in the kind of work they have to perform. The NLRC
ruled that petitioners were guilty of ULP & that the respondents were illegally dismissed. The CA
affirmed that while the work of respondents was seasonal in nature, they were considered to be merely on
leave during the off-season & were therefore still employed by petitioners.
Issue: Whether the CA erred in holding that respondents, admittedly seasonal workers, wereregular
employees, contrary to the clear provisions of Article 280 of the Labor Code,which categorically state
that seasonal employees are not covered by the definition of regular employees under paragraph 1, nor
covered under paragraph 2 which refersexclusively to casual employees who have served for at least one
year
Held: No. For respondents to be excluded from those classified as regular employees, it is not enough that
they perform work or services that are seasonal in nature. They must have also been employed only for
the duration of one season. The evidence proves the existence of the first, but not of the second, condition.
The fact that respondents repeatedly worked as sugarcane workers for petitioners for several years is not
denied by the latter. Evidently, petitioners employed respondents for more than one season. Therefore, the
general rule of regular employment is applicable. If the employee has been performing the job for at least
a year, even if the performance is not continuous & merely intermittent, the law deems the repeated &
continuing need for its performance as sufficient evidence of the necessity if not indispensability of that
activity to the business. Hence, the employment is considered regular, but only w/respect to such activity
& while such activity exists. Seasonal workers who are called towork from time to time & are temporarily
laid off during off-season are not separated from service in said period, but merely considered on leave
until re-employed
Respondents, having performed the same tasks for petitioners every season for several years, are
considered the latter's regular employees for their respective tasks. Petitioners' eventual refusal to use
their services even if they were ready, able and willing to perform their usual duties whenever these
were available and hiring of other workers to perform the tasks originally assigned to respondents
amounted to illegal dismissal of the latter. The Court finds no reason to disturb the CA's dismissal of what
petitioners claim was their valid exercise of a management prerogative. The sudden changes in work
assignments reeked of bad faith. These changes were implemented immediately after respondents had
organized themselves into a union and started demanding collective bargaining. Those who were union
members were effectively deprived of their jobs. Petitioners' move actually amounted to unjustified
dismissal of respondents, in violation of the Labor Code

Magsalin et. al. V National Organization of Working men et. al. (Vitug, 2003)

Facts:
Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils., Inc., herein petitioner, engaged the services of respondent workers as "sales
route helpers" for a limited period of five months. After five months, respondent workers were employed
by petitioners company on a day-to-day basis. According to petitioners company, respondent workers
were hired to substitute for regular sales route helpers whenever the latter would be unavailable or when
there would be an unexpected shortage of manpower in any of its work places or an unusually high
volume of work. The practice was for the workers to wait every morning outside the gates of the sales
office of petitioner company. If thus hired, the workers would then be paid their wages at the end of the
day. Ultimately, respondent workers asked petitioner company to extend to them regular appointments.
Petitioner company refused. Subsequently, the respondents filed with the NLRC a complaint for the
regularization of their employment with petitioner company. Claiming that petitioner company
meanwhile terminated their services, respondent workers filed a notice of strike and a complaint for
illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice with the NLRC. The parties, later on, agreed to submit the
controversy, for voluntary arbitration but the VA dismissed the complaint on the ground that the
respondent workers were not employees of Coca-cola.CA reversed VA. Hence, appeal.

Issue:
WON the nature of work is deemed necessary and desirable in the usual business or trade of petitioner
that could qualify them to be regular employees.

Ruling
YES
The SC ruled that he argument of petitioner that its usual business or trade is softdrink manufacturing
and that the work assigned to respondent workers as sales route helpers so involves merely
postproduction activities, one which is not indispensable in the manufacture of its products, scarcely
can be persuasive. If, as so argued by petitioner company, only those whose work are directly involvedin
the production of softdrinks may be held performing functions necessary and desirable in its usual
business or trade, there would have then been no need for it to even maintain regular truck sales route
helpers. The nature of the work performed must be viewed from a perspective of the business or trade in
its entirety and not on a confined scope. The repeated rehiring of respondent workers and the continuing
need for their services clearly attest to the necessity or desirability of their services in the regular conduct
of the business or trade of petitioner company. The Court of Appeals has found each of respondents to
have worked for at least one year with petitioner company. While this Court, in Brent School, Inc. vs.
Zamora, has upheld the legality of a fixed-term employment, it has done so, however, with a stern
admonition that where from the circumstances it is apparent that the period has been imposed to preclude
the acquisition of tenurial security by the employee, then itshould be struck down as being contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order and public policy. The pernicious practice of having employees,
workers and laborers, engaged for a fixed period of few months, short of the normal six-month
probationary period of employment, and, thereafter, to be hired on a day-to-day basis, mocks the law.

Any obvious circumvention of the law cannot be countenanced. The fact that respondent workers have
agreed to be employed on such basis and to forego the protection given to them on their security of
tenure, demonstrate nothing more than the serious problem of impoverishment of so many of our people
and the resulting unevenness between labor and capital. A contract of employment is impressed with
public interest. The provisions of applicable statutes are deemed written into the contract, and the parties
are not at liberty to insulate themselves and their relationships from the impact of labor laws and
regulations by simply contracting with each other.

Case dismissed



Rural Bank of Cantilan vs. Julve

Under the doctrine of management prerogative, every employer has the inherent right to regulate,
according to his own discretion and judgment, all aspects of employment, including hiring, work
assignments, working methods, the time, place and manner of work, work supervision, transfer of
employees, lay-off of workers, and discipline, dismissal, and recall of employees; Employees are not
excused from complying with valid company policies and reasonable regulations for their governance and
guidance.

Under any standard, the work of the bookkeeper and bank assistant branch head, charged with preparing
financial reports and monthly bank reconciliations, as well as head of the Accounting Department of a
branch, constitutes supervisory and administrative tasks which entail great responsibility.
Not all transfers or re-assignment of work from one office or area of operations to another are demotions.
There is a demotion when there is a downward change in the rank, salary, benefits and other privileges of
the employee.
The mere title or position held by an employee in a company does not of itself determine whether a
transfer constitutes a demotion. It is the totality of circumstances in each case such as:
the economic significance of the work
the duties and responsibilities conferred
the rank and salary of the employee
and other circumstances
In one case, an employee claimed that the abolition of his position as planning and marketing officer and
his appointment as bookkeeper I and assistant branch head of one of the companys branches is a
demotion.
The Supreme Court viewed the functions of his new position vis-a-vis the previous one and eventually
came out with a decision stating that the new position entailed great responsibility with supervisory and
administrative tasks. Coupled with the observation that there was no decrease in pay, the Supreme Court
did not consider the change in position as a demotion. (Rural Bank of Cantilan v. Julve, Feb 27, 2007).


Echeverria vs. Venutek Medika digest

Misconduct has been defined as an improper or wrong conduct, and to be categorized as serious, it must
be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial and unimportant.

Misconduct has been defined as an improper or wrong conduct, and to be categorized as serious, it must
be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial and unimportant.

A breach of trust is willful if it is done intentionally, knowingly and purposely without justifiable excuse,
as distinguished from an act done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently

The standard of substantial evidence is satisfied where the employer has reasonable ground to believe that
the employee is responsible for the misconduct which renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence
demanded by his position.



BENGUET ELECTRIC COOPERATIVE, INC., petitioner, vs. HON. PURA FERRER-CALLEJA,
Director of the Bureau of Labor Relations, and BENECO EMPLOYEES LABOR UNION, respondents.

Facts: Beneco Worker's Labor Union-Association of Democratic Labor Organizations (BWLU- ADLO)
filed a petition for direct certification as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the rank
and file employees of Benguet Electric Cooperative, Inc. (BENECO) alleging that BENECO has in its
employ 214 rank and file employees; that 198 or 92.5% of these employees have supported the filing of
the petition; that no certification election has been conducted for the last 12 months; that there is no
existing collective bargaining representative of the rank and file employees sought to represented by
BWLU- ADLO; and, that there is no collective bargaining agreement in the cooperative. An opposition to
the petition was filed by the Beneco Employees Labor Union (BELU) contending that it was certified as
the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the subject workers pursuant to an order issued by the
med-arbiter; that pending resolution by the NLRC are two cases it filed against BENECO involving
bargaining deadlock and unfair labor practice; and, that the pendency of these cases bars any
representation question. BENECO, on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss the petition claiming that
it is a non-profit electric cooperative engaged in providing electric services to its members and patron-
consumers; and, that the employees sought to be represented by BWLU-ADLO are not eligible to form,
join or assist labor organizations of their own choosing because they are members and joint owners of the
cooperative. The med-arbiter issued an order giving due course to the petition for certification election.
However, the med-arbiter limited the election among the rank and file employees of BENECO who are
non-members thereof and without any involvement in the actual ownership of the cooperative. The med-
arbiter found that there are 37 employees who are not members and without any involvement in the actual
ownership of the cooperative. BELU and BENECO appealed but the same was dismissed for lack of
merit. So BENECO filed with the SC a petition for certiorari which the SC dismissed for lack of merit in
a minute resolution dated April 1986. The ordered certification election was held in October 1986. Prior
to the conduct thereof BENECO's counsel verbally manifested that "the cooperative is protesting that
employees who are members-consumers are being allowed to vote when they are not eligible to be
members of any labor union for purposes of collective bargaining; much less, to vote in this certification
election." BENECO submitted a certification showing that only 4 employees are not members of
BENECO and insisted that only these employees are eligible to vote in the certification election. Canvass
of the votes showed that BELU garnered 49 of the 83 "valid" votes cast. Thereafter BENECO formalized
its verbal manifestation by filing a Protest. The med-arbiter dismissed the protest. BLR director Calleja
affirmed the med-arbiter's order and certified BELU as the sole and exclusive bargaining agent of all the
rank and file employees of BENECO.

Issue: W/N employees of a cooperative are qualified to form or join a labor organization for purposes of
collective bargaining.

NO

Ratio: Under Article 256 LC, to have a valid certification election, "at least a majority of all eligible
voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the valid votes cast
shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all workers in the unit." BENECO asserts that the
certification election held was null and void since members-employees who are not eligible to form and
join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining were allowed to vote therein. The issue has
already been resolved and clarified in the case of Cooperative Rural Bank of Davao City, Inc. vs. Ferrer
Calleja, et al. and reiterated in the cases of Batangas-Electric Cooperative Labor Union v. Young, et al.
and San Jose City Electric Service Cooperative, Inc. v. Ministry of Labor and Employment, et al. wherein
the Court had stated that the right to collective bargaining is not available to an employee of a cooperative
who at the same time is a member and co-owner thereof. With respect, however, to employees who are
neither members nor co- owners of the cooperative they are entitled to exercise the rights to self-
organization, collective bargaining and negotiation as mandated by the Constitution and applicable
statutes.

Calleja argues that to deny the members of petitioner cooperative the right to form, assist or join a labor
union of their own choice for purposes of collective bargaining would amount to a patent violation of
their right to self-organization.

The above contention is untenable. Contrary to respondents' claim, the fact that the members-employees
of BENECO do not participate in the actual management of the cooperative does not make them eligible
to form, assist or join a labor organization for the purpose of collective bargaining with petitioner. The
Court's ruling in the Davao City case that members of cooperative cannot join a labor union for purposes
of collective bargaining was based on the fact that as members of the cooperative they are co-owners
thereof. As such, they cannot invoke the right to collective bargaining for "certainly an owner cannot
bargain with himself or his co-owners." It is the fact of ownership of the cooperative, and not involvement
in the management thereof, which disqualifies a member from joining any labor organization within the
cooperative. Thus, irrespective of the degree of their participation in the actual management of the
cooperative, all members thereof cannot form, assist or join a labor organization for the purpose of
collective bargaining.

Respondent union further claims that if nominal ownership in a cooperative is "enough to take away the
constitutional protections afforded to labor, then there would be no hindrance for employers to grant, on a
scheme of generous profit sharing, stock bonuses to their employees and thereafter claim that since their
employees are stockholders, albeit in a minimal and involuntary manner, they are now also co-owners and
thus disqualified to form unions."

The above contention is based on the erroneous presumption that membership in a cooperative is the same
as ownership of stocks in ordinary corporations. While cooperatives may exercise some of the rights and
privileges given to ordinary corporations provided under existing laws, such cooperatives enjoy other
privileges not granted to the latter. Similarly, members of cooperatives have rights and obligations
different from those of stockholders of ordinary corporations. It was precisely because of the special
nature of cooperatives, that the Court held in the Davao City case that members-employees thereof cannot
form or join a labor union for purposes of collective bargaining.

The Court held that:
A cooperative is by its nature different from an ordinary business concern being run either by persons,
partnerships, or corporations. Its owners and/or members are the ones who run and operate the business
while the others are its employees. As above stated, irrespective of the number of shares owned by each
member they are entitled to cast one vote each in deciding upon the affairs of the cooperative. An
employee therefore of such a cooperative who is a member and co-owner thereof cannot invoke the right
to collective bargaining for certainly an owner cannot bargain with himself or his co-owners.


Article 256 of the Labor Code provides, among others, that: To have a valid, election, at least a majority
of all eligible voters in the unit must have cast their votes. The labor union receiving the majority of the
valid votes cast shall be certified as the exclusive bargaining agent of all workers in the unit.

In this case it cannot be determined whether or not respondent union was duly elected by the eligible
voters of the bargaining unit since even employees who are ineligible to join a labor union within the
cooperative because of their membership therein were allowed to vote in the certification election.
Considering the foregoing, the Court finds that respondent director committed grave abuse of discretion
in certifying respondent union as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of the rank and file
employees of petitioner cooperative.

Republic of the Philippines/SSC/SSS vs. Asiapro Cooperative
[G.R. No. 172101 November 23, 2007]
Facts:
Asiapro, as a cooperative, is composed of owners-members. Under its by-laws, owners-members are of
two categories, (1)regular member, who is entitled to all the rights and privileges of membership ; and (2)
associate member, who has no right to vote and be voted upon and shall be entitled only to such rights
and privileges provided in its by-laws. Its primary objectives are to provide savings and credit facilities
and to develop other livelihood services for its owners-members. In the discharge of the aforesaid primary
objectives, respondent cooperative entered into several Service Contracts with Stanfilco

a division of DOLE Philippines, Inc. and acompany based in Bukidnon. The owners-members do not
receive compensation or wages from the respondent cooperative. Instead, they receive a share in the
service surplus which Asiapro earns from different areas of trade it engages in, such as the income
derived from the said Service Contracts with Stanfilco. In order to enjoy the benefits under the Social
Security Law of 1997, the owners-members of Asiapro assigned to Stanfilco requested the services of the
latter to register them with SSS as self-employed and to remit their contributions as such.On September
26, 2002, petitioner SSS sent a letter to respondent cooperative informing the latter that based on
theService Contracts it executed with Stanfilco, Asiapro is actually manpower contractor supplying
employees to Stanfico and so, it is an employer of its owners-members working with Stanfilco. Thus,
Asiapro should register itself with petitioner SSS as an employer andmake the corresponding report and
remittance of premium contributions. Despite letters received, respondent cooperative continuously
ignored the demand of petitioner SSS. Accordingly, SSS filed a petition on June 12, 2003 before SSC
against Asiapro and Stanfilco praying that either of them be directed to register as an employer and to
report Asiapros owners-members as covered employees under the compulsory coverage of SSS and to
remit the necessary contributions. Respondent cooperative filed its answer with Motion to Dismiss
alleging that noemployer-employee relationship exists between it and its owners-members, thus,
petitioner SSC has no jurisdiction over the respondent cooperative.

Issues:
1.

Whether or not there exists an employer-employee relationship between Asiapro Cooperative and its
owners-members.2.

Whether or not petitioner has jurisdiction over the petition-complaint filed before it by SSS against the
respondent cooperative.
SC Ruling:
1.

In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship, the following elements are
considered: (1) the selection andengagement of the workers; (2) the payment of wages by whatever
means; (3) the power of dismissal; and (4) the power to control the
workers conduct, with the latter assuming primacy in the overall consideration. The most important
element is the employers
control. All the aforesaid elements are present in this case.The existence of an employer-employee
relationship cannot be negated by expressly repudiating it in a contract, when the terms and
surroundingcircumstances show otherwise. The employment status of a person is defined and prescribed
by law and not by what the parties say itshould be.A cooperative acquires juridical personality upon its
registration with the Cooperative Development Authority. It has its Board of Directors,which directs and
supervises its business; meaning its Board of Directors is the one in charge in the conduct and
management of itsaffairs. With that, a cooperative can be likened to a corporation with a personality
separate and distinct from its owners-members.Consequently, an owner-member of a cooperative can be
an employee of the latter and the employer-employee relationship can existbetween them.2.

Petitioner SSCs jurisdiction is clearly stated in Section 5 of R.A. No. 8282 as well as in Section 1, Rule
III of the 1997 S
SS RevisedRules of Procedure.Sec. 5 of R.A. 8282 provides:
Sec
. 5 Settlement of Disputes

(a) Any dispute arising under this Act with respect to coverage, benefits, contributions and
penaltiesthereon or any other matter related thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission
, xxx (Emphasis Supplied)
Similarly, Section 1, Rule III of the 1997 SSS Revised Rules of Procedure states:
Section 1. Jurisdiction
Any dispute arising under the Social Security Act with respect to coverage, entitlement of
benefits,collection and settlement of contributions and penalties thereon, or any other matter related
thereto, shall be cognizable by the Commission after the SSS through its President, Manager or Officer-
in-charge of the Department/Branch/Representative Office concerned had first taken action thereon in
writing.

It is clear then from the aforesaid provisions that any issue regarding the compulsory coverage of the SSS
is well within the exclusive domain of the petitioner SSC. It is important to note that the mandatory
coverage under the SSS Law is premised on the existence of an employer-employee relationship.
Consequently, the respondent cooperative being the employer of its owners-members must register as
employer and report its owners-members as covered members of the SSS and remit the necessary
premium contributions in accordance with the Social Security Law of 1997.Accordingly, based on the
allegations in the petition-complaint filed before the petitioner SSC, the case clearly falls within its
jurisdiction.

Sim vs. NLRC


CORAZON C. SIM, petitioners, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and
EQUITABLE PCI-BANK, respondents
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

FACTS:

Corazon Sim (petitioner) filed a case for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter, alleging that she was
initially employed by Equitable PCI-Bank (respondent) in 1990 as Italian Remittance Marketing
Consultant to the Frankfurt Representative Office. Eventually, she was promoted to Manager position,
until September 1999, when she received a letter from Remegio David -- the Senior Officer, European
Head of PCIBank, and Managing Director of PCIB- Europe -- informing her that she was being dismissed
due to loss of trust and confidence based on alleged mismanagement and misappropriation of funds. The
Labor Arbiter dismissed the case for want of jurisdiction and/or lack of merit stressing that the labor
relations system in the Philippines has no extra-territorial jurisdiction. The National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision and dismissed petitioner's appeal for lack of
merit.

ISSUE: WON the LA has extra-territorial jurisdiction

RULING:

Article 217 of the Labor Code provides for the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the National Labor
Relations Commission x x x Moreover, Section 10 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8042, or the Migrant
Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995,18 provides:

SECTION 10. Money Claims. Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and exclusive
jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the complaint, the
claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms
of damages.

Also, Section 62 of the Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing R.A. No. 804219 provides that the
Labor Arbiters of the NLRC shall have the original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all
claims arising out of employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law or contract involving
Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual, moral, exemplary and other forms
of damages, subject to the rules and procedures of the NLRC.

Under these provisions, it is clear that labor arbiters have original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims
arising from employer-employee relations, including termination disputes involving all workers, among
whom are overseas Filipino workers.


Philips Industrial Development, Inc. vs NLRC

Facts:- PIDI is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing and marketing of electronic
products.Since 1971, it had a total of 6 collective bargaining agreements with private respondent
PhilipsEmployees Organization-FFW (PEO-FFW), a registered labor union and the certified bargaining
agent of all rank and file employees of PIDI.- In the first CBA, the supervisors (referred to in RA 875),
confidential employees, security guards,temporary employees and sales representatives were excluded in
the bargaining unit. In the second to thefifth, the sales force, confidential employees and heads of small
units, together with the managerialemployees, temporary employees and security personnel were
excluded from the bargaining unit. Theconfidential employees are the division secretaries of
light/telecom/data and consumer electronics,marketing managers, secretaries of the corporate planning
and business manager, fiscal and financialsystem manager and audit and EDP manager, and the staff of
both the General Management and thePersonnel Department.- In the sixth CBA, it was agreed that the
subject of inclusion or exclusion of service engineers, sales personnel and confidential employees in the
coverage of the bargaining unit would be submitted for arbitration. The parties failed to agree on a
voluntary arbitrator and the Bureau of Labor Relationsendorsed the petition to the Executive Labor
Arbiter of the NCR for compulsory arbitration.- March 1998,

Labor Arbiter: A referendum will be conducted to determine the will of the serviceengineers and sales
representatives as to their inclusion or exclusion in the bargaining unit. It was alsodeclared that the
Division Secretaries and all staff of general management, personnel and industrialrelations department,
secretaries of audit, EDP, financial system are confidential employees are deemedexcluded in the
bargaining unit.- PEO-FFW appealed to the NLRC; NLRC declared PIDI's Service Engineers, Sales
Force, divisionsecretaries, all Staff of General Management, Personnel and Industrial Relations
Department, Secretariesof Audit, EDP and Financial Systems are included within the rank and file
bargaining unit, citing theImplementing Rules of E.O 111 and Article 245 of the Labor Code (all workers,
except managerialemployees and security personnel, are qualified to join or be a part of the bargaining
unit)

Issue:
-Whether service engineers, sales representatives and confidential employees of petitioner are qualified to
be part of the existing bargaining unit
- Whether the "Globe Doctrine" should be applied

Held: NLRC decision is set aside while the decision of the Executive Labor Arbiter is reinstated.
Confidentialemployees are excluded from the bargaining unit while a referendum will be conducted to
determine thewill of the service engineers and sales representatives as to their inclusion or exclusion from
the bargaining unit, but those who are holding supervisory positions or functions are ineligible to join a
labor organization of the rank and file employees but may join, assist or form a separate labor
organization of their own.Ratio:The exclusion of confidential employees:The rationale behind the
ineligibility of managerial employees to form, assist or join a labor union equally applies to confidential
employees. With the presence of managerial employees in a union,the union can become company-
dominated as their loyalty cannot be assured. In Golden Farms vs Calleja,the Court states that confidential
employees, who have access to confidential information, may becomethe source of undue advantage

As regards to the sales representatives and service engineers, according to the OSG, there is no doubt
thatthey are entitled to form a union as they are not disqualified by law from doing so.


Globe Doctrine:Globe Doctrine states that in determining the proper bargaining unit, the express will or
desire of the employees shall be considered, they should be allowed to determine for themselves what
union to joinor form. The best way is through a referendum, as decreed by the Executive Labor Arbiter.
However, inthis case, since the only issue is the employees' inclusion in or exclusion from the bargaining
unit inquestion, the Globe Doctrine has no application in this case. The doctrine applies only in instance
of evenly balanced claims by competitive groups for the right to be established as the bargaining unit.
(manyunions 'competing' to be the bargaining representative?)





GOLDEN FARMS VS SECRETARY OF LABOR AND PFL FACTS: Petitioner Golden Farms, Inc., is a
corporation engaged in the production and marketing of bananas for export. On February 27, 1992,
private respondent Progressive Federation of Labor (PFL) filed a petition before the Med-Arbiter praying
for the holding of a certification election among the monthly paid office and technical rank-and-file
employees of petitioner Golden Farms. Petitioner moved to dismiss claiming that PFL failed to show that
it organized a chapter within the petitioner establishment, that there was already an existing CBA between
the rank and file employees represented by NFL and petitioner, and that the employees represented by
PFL are disqualified by the courts. PFL countered that the monthly-paid office workers and technical
employees should be allowed because they were expressly excluded from the coverage of the CBA
between Petitioner and NFL. Petitioner argued that the subject employees shoull have joined the existing
CBA if they are not managerial employees. On April 18,1991, the Med-Arbiter ordered the conduct of the
certification elections. Petitioner appealed to the Secretary of Labor which the LabSec denies the appeal
for lack of merit.

ISSUE: WON the Monthly Paid rank and file employee can constitute a bargaining unit separate from the
existing bargaining units of its daily-paid rank and file employees

HELD: Wherefore, Petition dismissed for lack of merit. RATIO: Yes, the Monthly Paid office and
technical rank and file employee of the petitioner enjoy constitutional rights to self organization and
collective bargaining. The duties of the monthly paid employees primarily administrative and clerical
which is of different nature from daily paid employees whose main work is the cultivation of bananas. To
be sure, the monthly paid group have even been excluded from the bargaining unit of the daily paid rank
and file employees. In the case of UP vs Ferrer-Calleja, the SC sanctioned the formation of 2 separate
bargaining units within the establishment. Finally, the SC note that it was Petitioner company that filed
the motion to dismiss the petition for election violating the general rule that the employer has no standing
to question a certification election since this is the so that the employer has no standing to question a
certification election since this is the sole concerns of the workers (Bystander Rule)

SUGBUANON RURAL BANK, INC. v CA

FACTS: Petitioner Sugbuanon Rural Bank, Inc., (SRBI, for brevity) is a duly-registered banking
institution with principal office in Cebu City and a branch in Mandaue City. Private respondent SRBI
Association of Professional, Supervisory, Office, and Technical Employees Union (APSOTEU) is a
legitimate labor organization affiliated with the Trade Unions Congress of the Philippines
(TUCP).1wphi1.nt

On October 8, 1993, the DOLE Regional Office in Cebu City granted Certificate of Registration No.
R0700-9310-UR-0064 to APSOTEU-TUCP, hereafter referred to as the union.

On October 26, 1993, the union filed a petition for certification election of the supervisory employees of
SRBI. It alleged, among others, that: (1) APSOTEU-TUCP was a labor organization duly-registered with
the Labor Department; (2) SRBI employed 5 or more supervisory employees; (3) a majority of these
employees supported the petition: (4) there was no existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA)
between any union and SRBI; and (5) no certification election had been held in SRBI during the past 12
months prior to the petition.

On October 28, 1993, the Med-Arbiter gave due course to the petition. The pre-certification election
conference between SRBI and APSOTEU-TUCP was set for November 15, 1993.

On November 12, 1993, SRBI filed a motion to dismiss the unions petition. It sought to prevent the
holding of a certification election on two grounds. First, that the members of APSOTEU-TUCP were in
fact managerial or confidential employees.

ISSUES:

(1) Whether or not the members of the respondent union are managerial employees and/or highly-placed
confidential employees, hence prohibited by law from joining labor organizations and engaging in union
activities.

(2) Whether or not the Med-Arbiter may validly order the holding of a certification election upon the
filing of a petition for certification election by a registered union, despite the petitioners appeal pending
before the DOLE Secretary against the issuance of the unions registration.

RULING:

(1) Petitioners explanation does not state who among the employees has access to information
specifically relating to its labor to relations policies. Even Cashier Patricia Maluya, who serves as the
secretary of the banks Board of Directors may not be so classified.

Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, in regard (2) to persons
who formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies [specifically in the field of labor
relations].9 The two criteria are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a
confidential employee that is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his
superior officer; and that officer must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.

Art. 245 of the Labor Code does not directly prohibit confidential employees from engaging in union
activities. However, under the doctrine of necessary implication, the disqualification of managerial
employees equally applies to confidential employees. The confidential-employee rule justifies exclusion
of confidential employees because in the normal course of their duties they become aware of management
policies relating to labor relations. It must be stressed, however, that when the employee does not have
access to confidential labor relations information, there is no legal prohibition against confidential
employees from forming, assisting, or joining a union.

(2) One of the rights of a legitimate labor organization under Article 242(b) of the Labor Code is the right
to be certified as the exclusive representative of all employees in an appropriate bargaining unit for
purposes of collective bargaining. Having complied with the requirements of Art. 234, it is our view that
respondent union is a legitimate labor union. Article 257 of the Labor Code mandates that a certification
election shall automatically be conducted by the Med-Arbiter upon the filing of a petition by a legitimate
labor organization.Nothing is said therein that prohibits such automatic conduct of the certification
election if the management appeals on the issue of the validity of the unions registration. On this score,
petitioners appeal was correctly dismissed.


DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY, petitioner,
vs.
DELA SALLE UNIVERSITY EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION-NATIONAL FEDERATION OF
TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES UNION (DLSUEA-NAFTEU), respondents.
FACTS:
Dela Salle University (UNIVERSITY) and Dela Salle University Employees Association National
Federation of Teachers and Employees Union (DLSUEA-NAFTEU), which is composed of regular non-
academic rank and file employees,(UNION) entered for a new collective bargaining agreement which,
however, turned out to be unsuccessful.
After several conciliation-mediation meetings, five (5) out of the eleven (11) issues raised were resolved
by the parties.
The parties entered into a Submission Agreement, identifying the remaining six (6) unresolved issues for
arbitration, namely:
(1) scope of the bargaining unit,
(2) union security clause,
(3) security of tenure,
(4) salary increases
(5) indefinite union leave, reduction of the union presidents workload, special leave, and finally,
(6) duration of the agreement.
The parties appointed Buenaventura Magsalin as voluntary arbitrator.
Voluntary arbitrator rendered the assailed decision as follows:
On the first issue, ruled that the Computer Operators assigned at the Computer Services Center, should
be included as members of the bargaining unit; The discipline officers, belong ) to the rank-and-file on the
basis of the nature of their job; and with respect to the employees of the College of St. Benilde, they had a
personality separate and distinct from the University and thus, they are outside the bargaining unit of the
Universitys rank-and-file employees.
On the second issue regarding the propriety of the inclusion of a union shop clause, the voluntary
arbitrator opined that a union shop clause is a valid form of union security while the CBA is in force and
in accordance with the Constitutional policy to promote unionism and collective bargaining and
negotiations.
With respect to the use of the last-in-first-out method in case of retrenchment and transfer to other
schools or units, the voluntary arbitrator upheld the elementary right and prerogative of the management
of the University to select and/or choose its employees, a right equally recognized by the Constitution and
the law.
Regarding the fourth issue concerning salary increases, the voluntary arbitrator opined that the proposed
budget of the University for SY 1992-93 could not sufficiently cope up with the demand for increases by
the Union.
As to the Unions demand for a reduction of the workload of the union president, special leave benefits
and indefinite union leave with pay, the voluntary arbitrator denied the Unions demand for special leave
benefits.
On the last issue, regarding the duration of the collective bargaining agreement, the voluntary arbitrator
ruled the same became a binding agreement between them.
Subsequently, both parties filed their respective motions for reconsideration .
ISSUES:
(1) whether the computer operators assigned at the Universitys Computer Services Center and the
Universitys discipline officers may be considered as confidential employees and should therefore be
excluded from the bargaining unit which is composed of rank and file employees of the University, and
whether the employees of the College of St. Benilde should also be included in the same bargaining unit;
(2) whether a union shop clause should be included in the parties collective bargaining agreement, in
addition to the existing maintenance of membership clause;
(3) whether the denial of the Unions proposed last-in-first-out method of laying-off employees, is
proper;
(4) whether the ruling that on the basis of the Universitys proposed budget, the University can no longer
be required to grant a second round of wage increases, is correct;
(5) whether the denial of the Unions proposals on the deloading of the union president, improved leave
benefits and indefinite union leave with pay, is proper;
(6) whether the finding that the multi-sectoral committee in the University is the legitimate group which
determines and scrutinizes the annual salary increases and fringe benefits of the employees of the
University, is correct;
(7) whether the ruling that the 70% share in the incremental tuition proceeds is the only source of salary
increases and fringe benefits of the employees, is proper.
RULING:
The Court affirm in part and modify in part.
On the first issue, the Court agrees that the express exclusion of the computer operators and discipline
officers from the bargaining unit of rank-and-file employees in the 1986 collective bargaining agreement
does not bar any re-negotiation for the future inclusion of the said employees in the bargaining unit.
As to the discipline officers, the Court agree that based on the nature of their duties, they are not
confidential employees and should therefore be included in the bargaining unit of rank-and-file
employees.
As to the the employees of the College of St. Benilde, they should be excluded from the bargaining unit
of the rank-and-file employees of Dela Salle University, because the two educational institutions have
their own separate juridical personality and no sufficient evidence was shown to justify the piercing of the
veil of corporate fiction.
On involving the inclusion of a union shop clause, the Court affirm the ruling.
On the issue regarding the use of the last-in-first-out method, the Court agree that as an exercise of
management prerogative, the University has the right to adopt valid and equitable grounds as basis for
terminating or transferring employees.
On the issue involving the Unions proposals on the deloading of the union president, The Court we agree
with the rejection of the said demands, there being no justifiable reason for the granting of the same.
On the sixth issue, the Court finds that the voluntary arbitrator did not gravely abuse his discretion on this
matter.
On last issue involving the ruling that the 70% share in the incremental tuition proceeds, the Court deems
that any determination of this alleged error is unnecessary and irrelevant.
WHEREFORE , premises considered, the petitions in these consolidated cases, are partially GRANTED.
The assailed decision of voluntary arbitrator Buenaventura Magsalin is hereby AFFIRMED with the
modification that the issue on salary increases for the second and third years of the collective bargaining
agreement be REMANDED to the voluntary arbitrator for definite resolution within one month from the
finality of this Decision, on the basis of the externally audited financial statements of the University
already submitted by the Union before the voluntary arbitrator and forming part of the records.
SO ORDERED.

SAN MIGUEL CORPORATION SUPERVISORS AND EXEMPT UNION vs.
HONORABLE BIENVENIDO E. LAGUESMA
FACTS:
Petitioner union filed before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) a Petition for Direct
Certification or Certification Election among the supervisors and exempt employees of the SMC
Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis. Med-Arbiter Danilo L. Reynante
issued an Order for the conduct of certification election among the supervisors and exempt employees of
the SMC Magnolia Poultry Products Plants of Cabuyao, San Fernando and Otis as one bargaining unit.
Respondent San Miguel Corporation opposed arguing that the Med-Arbiters committed an error in
grouping together all three separate plants into one bargaining unit, and in including supervisory levels 3
and above whose positions are confidential in nature.
The public respondent citing the doctrine enunciated in Philips Industrial Development,
Inc. v. NLRC issued an order excluding the employees under supervisory levels 3 and 4 and the so-called
exempt employees from the proposed bargaining unit and ruled out their participation in the certification
election.
ISSUES:
1. Whether Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of the company are considered
confidential employees, hence ineligible from joining a union.
2. If they are not confidential employees, do the employees of the three plants constitute an appropriate
single bargaining unit?
HELD:
1. NO. Supervisory employees 3 and 4 and the exempt employees of the company do not fall within the
term confidential employees who may be prohibited from joining a union.
Confidential employees are those who (1) assist or act in a confidential capacity, (2) to persons who
formulate, determine, and effectuate management policies in the field of labor relations. The two criteria
are cumulative, and both must be met if an employee is to be considered a confidential employee that
is, the confidential relationship must exist between the employee and his supervisor, and the supervisor
must handle the prescribed responsibilities relating to labor relations.
An important element of the confidential employee rule is the employees need to use labor relations
information. Thus, in determining the confidentiality of certain employees, a key question frequently
considered is the employees necessary access to confidential labor relations information.
In the case at bar, supervisors 3 and above may not be considered confidential employees merely because
they handle confidential data as such must first be strictly classified as pertaining to labor relations for
them to fall under said restrictions. The information they handle are properly classifiable as technical and
internal business operations data which, to our mind, has no relevance to negotiations and settlement of
grievances wherein the interests of a union and the management are invariably adversarial. Since the
employees are not classifiable under the confidential type, this Court rules that they may appropriately
form a bargaining unit for purposes of collective bargaining. Furthermore, even assuming that they are
confidential employees, jurisprudence has established that there is no legal prohibition against
confidential employees who are not performing managerial functions to form and join a union.
2. YES. An appropriate bargaining unit may be defined as a group of employees of a given
employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of employees, which the collective interest
of all the employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law.
A unit to be appropriate must effect a grouping of employees who have substantial, mutual interests in
wages, hours, working conditions and other subjects of collective bargaining.
It is readily seen that the employees in the instant case have community or mutuality of interests, which
is the standard in determining the proper constituency of a collective bargaining unit. It is undisputed that
they all belong to the Magnolia Poultry Division of San Miguel Corporation. This means that, although
they belong to three different plants, they perform work of the same nature, receive the same wages and
compensation, and most importantly, share a common stake in concerted activities.
In light of these considerations, the Solicitor General has opined that separate bargaining units in the three
different plants of the division will fragmentize the employees of the said division, thus greatly
diminishing their bargaining leverage. Any concerted activity held against the private respondent for a
labor grievance in one bargaining unit will, in all probability, not create much impact on the operations of
the private respondent. The two other plants still in operation can well step up their production and make
up for the slack caused by the bargaining unit engaged in the concerted activity. This situation will clearly
frustrate the provisions of the Labor Code and the mandate of the Constitution.

San Miguel Corp. VS Mandaue
Facts
-CA affirmes DOLE Undersecretary for Labor Relations, Rosalinda Dimapilis-Baldoz, ordering the
immediate conduct of a certification election among the petitioners rank-and-file employees.
-Federation of Free Workers (FFW/ respondent) filed a petition for certification election with the DOLE
Regional Office No. VII. It sought to be certified and to represent the permanent rank-andfile monthly
paid employees of the petitioner. The following documents were attached to the petition: (1) a Charter
Certificate certifying that respondent as of that date was duly certified as a local or chapter of FFW; (2) a
copy of the constitution of respondent prepared by its Secretary, Noel T. Bathan and attested by its
President, Wilfred V. Sagun; (3) a list of respondents officers and their respective addresses, again
prepared by Bathan and attested by Sagun; (4) a certification signifying that respondent had just been
organized and no amount had yet been collected from its members, signed by respondents treasurer Chita
D. Rodriguez and attested by Sagun; and (5) a list of all the rank-and-file monthly paid employees of the
Mandaue Packaging Products Plants and Mandaue Glass Plant prepared by Bathan and attested by Sagun.
-SMC (Petitioner) filed a motion to dismiss the petition for certification election on the sole ground that
herein respondent is not listed or included in the roster of legitimate labor organizations based on the
certification issued by the Officer-In representative, then right to be represented by a bargaining agent
should not be denied to other members of the bargaining unit.
HELD
1. NO. Ratio EFFECT NON-PARTICIPIATION PREVIOUS ELECTION. No law, administrative rule or
precedent prescribes forfeiture of the right to vote by reason of neglect to exercise the right in past
certification elections.
2. NO. Ratio RELIGION/PAST NON-PARTICIPATION. Neither law, administrative rule nor
jurisprudence requires that only employees affiliated with any labor organization may take part in a
certification election. On the contrary, the plainly discernible intendment of the law is to grant the right to
vote to all bona fide employees in the bargaining unit, whether they are members of a labor organization
or not.
6.3.
CERTIFICATION ELECTIONPROCESS
1. The Union as Initiating Party ART. 212. Definitions. -(h) Legitimate labor organization means any
labor organization duly registered with the Department of Labor and Employment, and includes any
branch or local thereof. Charge, Regional Director of the DOLE Regional Office No. VII, Atty. Jesus B.
Gabor.
-Respondent submitted to the Bureau of Labor Relations the same documents earlier attached to its
petition for certification. The accompanying letter, signed by respondents president Sagun, stated that
such documents were submitted in compliance with the requirements for the creation of a local/chapter
pursuant to the Labor Code and its Implementing Rules; and it was hoped that the submissions would
facilitate the listing of respondent under the roster of legitimate labor organizations.The Chief of Labor
Relations Division of DOLE Regional Office No. VII issued a Certificate of Creation of Local/Chapter
No. ITD. I-ARFBT-058/98, certifying that from 30 July 1998, respondent has acquired legal personality
as a labor organization/workers association, it having submitted all the required documents.


SAMAHANG MANGGAGAWA SA CHARTER CHEMICAL SOLIDARITYOF UNIONS IN THE
PHILIPPINES FOR EMPOWERMENT ANDREFORMS (SMCC-SUPER), ZACARRIAS JERRY
VICTORIO-UnionPresident, Petitioner,vs.CHARTER CHEMICAL and COATING CORPORATION,
Respondent
FACTS:
SamahangManggagawasa Charter Chemical Solidarity of Unions in thePhilippines for Empowerment and
Reforms (petitioner union) filed apetition for certification election among the regular rank-and-
fileemployees of Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation (respondentcompany) with the Mediation
Arbitration Unit of the DOLE.
Company filed an Answer with Motion to Dismiss on the ground thatpetitioner union is not a legitimate
labor organization because of (1)failure to comply with the documentation requirements set by law,
and(2) the inclusion of supervisory employees within petitioner union.
Med-Arbiters Ruling :dismissing the petition for certification election.The Med-Arbiter ruled that
petitioner union is not a legitimate labororganization because the Charter Certificate were not executed
underoath and certified by the union secretary and attested to by the unionpresident as required by Section
235 of the Labor Code. The unionregistration was, thus, fatally defective.
That the list of membership of petitioner union consisted of 12batchman, mill operator and leadman who
performed supervisoryfunctions. Under Article 245 of the Labor Code, said supervisoryemployees are
prohibited from joining petitioner union which seeks torepresent the rank-and-file employees of
respondent company.
As a result, not being a legitimate labor organization, petitioner unionhas no right to file a petition for
certification election for the purpose of collective bargaining.

Department of Labor and Employments Ruling :the DOLE grantedthe certification election among the
regular rank-and-file employees of Charter Chemical and Coating Corporation
Court of Appeals Ruling : nullifying the decision of the DOLE, theappellate court gave credence to the
findings of the Med-Arbiter that petitioner union failed to comply with the documentation requirements
under the Labor Code. It, likewise, upheld the Med-Arbiters findingthat petitioner union consisted of
both rank-and-file and supervisory employees
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employee[s] of petitioner
[unions] membership is [a] ground for the cancellation of petitioner [unions] legal personality and
dismissal of [the] petition for certification election.

RULING: The mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees in petitioner union does not nullify its
legal personality as a legitimate labor organization.The inclusion of the aforesaid supervisory employees
in petitioner union does not divest it of its status as a legitimate labor organization.While there is a
prohibition against the mingling of supervisory and rank-and-file employees in one labor organization, the
Labor Code does not provide for the effects thereof. Thus, the Court held that after a labor organization
has been registered, it may exercise all the rights and privileges of a legitimate labor organization. Any
mingling between supervisory and rank-and-file employees in its membership cannot affect its legitimacy
for that is not among the grounds for cancellation of its registration, unless such mingling was brought
about by misrepresentation, false statement or fraud under Article 239 of theLabor Code. As a result,
petitioner union was not divested of its status as a legitimate labor organization even if some of its
members were supervisory employees; it had the right to file the subject petition for certification election.

Mariwasa Siam Ceramics vs. Secretary of Labor and Employment, et. al.
Facts:
On May 2005, private respondent Samahan Ng Mga Manggagawa Sa Mariwasa Siam Ceramics, Inc.
(SMMSC-Independent) was issued a Certificate of Registration as a legitimate labor organization by the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), Region IV-A.On June 2005, petitioner Mariwasa Siam
Ceramics, Inc. filed a Petition for Cancellation of Union Registration against private respondent, claiming
that the latter violated Article 234 of the Labor Code for not complying with the 20% requirement and
that it committed massive fraud and misrepresentation in violation of Article 239 of the same code.

The Regional Director of DOLE IV-A issued an Order granting the petition, revoking the registration of
respondent, and delisting it from the roster of active labor unions. SMMSC-Independent appealed to the
Bureau of Labor Relations. BLR ruled in favor of the respondent, thus, they remain in the roster of
legitimate labor organizations. The petitioner appealed and insisted that private respondent failed to
comply with the 20% union membership requirement for its registration as a legitimate labor organization
because of the disaffiliation from the total number of union members of 102 employees who executed
affidavits recanting their union membership. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court.
Issues:
1) Was there failure to comply with the 20% union membership requirement?
2) Did the withdrawal of 31 union members affect the petition for certification election insofar as the
30% requirement is concerned?
Ruling:
No.While it is true that the withdrawal of support may be considered as a resignation from the union, the
fact remains that at the time of the unions application for registration, the affiants were members of
respondent and they comprised more than the required 20% membership for purposes of registration as a
labor union. Article 234 of the Labor Code merely requires a 20% minimum membership during the
application for union registration. It does not mandate that a union must maintain the 20% minimum
membership requirement all throughout its existence.
On the second issue, it appears undisputedly that the 31 union members had withdrawn their support to
the petition before the filing of said petition. The distinction must be that withdrawals made before the
filing of the petition are presumed voluntary unless there is convincing proof to the contrary, whereas
withdrawals made after the filing of the petition are deemed involuntary. Therefore, following
jurisprudence, the employees were not totally free from the employers pressure and so the voluntariness
of the employees execution of the affidavits becomes suspect.
The cancellation of a unions registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to
self-organization. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration
under the Labor Code, the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling
enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members.

Eagle Ridge Golf & Country Club vs. CA, et. al.

G.R. No. 178989, March 18, 2010
Facts:

Petitioner Eagle Ridge Golf and Country Club(Eagle Ridge), which has around 112 rank-and-file
employees, alleges that Eagle Ridge Employees Union(EREU) committed fraud, misrepresentation and
false statement when it filed for its registration and that EREU failed to comply with the membership
requirement for the registration as a labor organization. Eagle Ridge seeks to have EREUs registration
cancelled when the Union filed a petition for certification election. Eagle Ridge alleged that the EREU
declared in its application for registration having 30 members, when the minutes of its December 6, 2005
organizational meeting showed it only had 26 members. The misrepresentation was exacerbated by the
discrepancy between the certification issued by the Union secretary and president that 25 members
actually ratified the constitution and by-laws on December 6, 2005 and the fact that 26 members affixed
their signatures on the documents, making one signature a forgery.
DOLE Regional Director granted Eagle Ridges petition and delisted EREU from the roster of legitimate
labor organizations. EREU appealed to the BLR, which initially affirmed the order of the Regional
Director, but upon filing of the EREU of a motion for reconsideration it was reinstated in the roster of
legitimate labor organizations. Eagle Ridge filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied, thus a
petition for certiorari to the CA. The CA dismissed Eagle Ridges petition for being deficient as the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping was subscribed to by Luna C. Piezas on her
representation as the legal counsel of the petitioner, but sans [the requisite] Secretarys Certificate or
Board Resolution authorizing her to execute and sign the same. The CA denied a motion for
reconsideration.
Issue:
Did the CA commit grave abuse of discretion in denying Eagle Ridges petition to cancel EREUs
registration?
Ruling:
No. A scrutiny of the records fails to show any misrepresentation, false statement, or fraud committed by
EREU to merit cancellation of its registration. The Union submitted the required documents attesting to
the facts of the organizational meeting on December 6, 2005, the election of its officers, and the adoption
of the Unions constitution and by-laws. EREU complied with the mandatory minimum 20%
membership requirement under Art. 234(c). when it had 30 employees as member when it registered. Any
seeming infirmity in the application and admission of union membership, most especially in cases of
independent labor unions, must be viewed in favor of valid membership.
In the issue of the affidavits of retraction executed by six union members, the probative value of these
affidavits cannot overcome those of the supporting affidavits of 12 union members and their counsel as to
the proceedings and the conduct of the organizational meeting on December 6, 2005. The DOLE
Regional Director and the BLR OIC Director obviously erred in giving credence to the affidavits of
retraction, but not according the same treatment to the supporting affidavits. It is settled that affidavits
partake the nature of hearsay evidence, since they are not generally prepared by the affiant but by another
who uses his own language in writing the affiants statement, which may thus be either omitted or
misunderstood by the one writing them. It is required for affiants to re-affirm the contents of their
affidavits during the hearing of the instant case for them to be examined by the opposing party, i.e., the
Union. For their non-presentation, the six affidavits of retraction are inadmissible as evidence against the
Union in the instant case. Twenty percent (20%) of 112 rank-and-file employees in Eagle Ridge would
require a union membership of at least 22 employees. When the EREU filed its application for
registration on December 19, 2005, there were clearly 30 union members. Thus, when the certificate of
registration was granted, there is no dispute that the Union complied with the mandatory 20%
membership requirement. Prior to their withdrawal, the six employees who retracted were bona fide
union members. With the withdrawal of six union members, there is still compliance with the mandatory
membership requirement under Art. 234(c), for the remaining 24 union members constitute more than the
20% membership requirement of 22 employees.

THE HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA vs. NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN THE
HOTEL,RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES-HERITAGE HOTEL MANILA SUPERVISORS
CHAPTER(NUWHRAIN-HHMSC)

GR 178296, January 12, 2011

Facts:
The National Union of Workers in the Hotel, Restaurant and Allied Industries-Heritage HotelManila
Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC) was issued an order for certification election.
Subsequently, when Heritage Hotel Manila (Heritage) discovered that NUWHRAIN-HHMSC had failed
to submit to the BLR its annual financial report for several years and the list of its members since the time
it filed its registration papers, Heritage filed a Petition for Cancellation of Registration of NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC and requested the suspension of the certification election proceedings. Nevertheless, the
certification election pushed through and NUWHRAIN-HHMSC emerged as the winner. Thereafter,
Heritage filed a Protest with Motion to Defer Certification of Election Results and Winner contending
that the petition for cancellation should be first resolved before the proclamation of the winner in the
certification election. The Med-Arbiter held that the pendency of a petition for cancellation of registration
is not a bar to the holding of a certification election. The DOLE Secretary likewise dismissed the appeal
and the subsequent MR. In the meantime, the Regional Director of DOLE-NCR finally resolved the
petition for cancellation of registration. While finding that respondent had indeed failed to file financial
reports and the list of its members for several years, he, nonetheless, denied the petition, because the
freedom of association and the employees right to self -organization are more substantive considerations.
The DOLE Secretary Sto.Tomas dismissed the subsequent appeal, holding that the constitutionally
guaranteed freedom of association and right of workers to self-organization outweighed respondents
noncompliance with the statutory requirements to maintain its status as a legitimate labor organization.
MR was denied. CA affirmed the decision of the DOLE Secretary.
Issue:
Is the cancellation of union registration a ministerial duty of the Regional Director upon the existence of
any of the grounds enumerated under Article 239 of the Labor Code?

Ruling: No
The use of the word shall in Article 238 does not make the cancellation of registration a mere
ministerial duty, once it is determined that a ground enumerated in Article 239 of the Labor Code is
present use of the word shall. This is because, the same provision of the Article 238 if it has reason to
believe, which thereby indicates an ample discretion in dealing with a petition for cancellation of a
unions registration, particularly, determining whether the union still meets the requirements prescribed
by law. It is sufficient to give the Regional Director license to treat the late filing of required documents
as sufficient compliance with the requirements of the law. After all, the law requires the labor
organization to submit the annual financial report and list of members in order to verify if it is still viable
and financially sustainable as an organization so as to protect the employer and employees from
fraudulent or fly-by-night unions. With the submission of the required documents by NUWHRAIN-
HHMSC, the purpose of the law has been achieved, though belatedly.
The union members and, in fact, all the employees belonging to the appropriate bargaining unitshould not
be deprived of a bargaining agent, merely because of the negligence of the union officers whowere
responsible for the submission of the documents to the BLR.
Labor authorities should, indeed, act with circumspection in treating petitions for cancellation of union
registration, lest they be accused of interfering with union activities. In resolving the petition
consideration must be taken of the fundamental rights guaranteed by Article XIII, Section 3 of the
Constitution, i.e., the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and
peaceful concerted activities. Labor authorities should bear in mind that registration confers upon a union
the status of legitimacy and the concomitant right and privileges granted by law to a legitimate labor
organization, particularly the right to participate in or ask for certification election in a bargaining unit.
Thus, the cancellation of a certificate of registration is the equivalent of snuffing out the life of a labor
organization. For without such registration, it loses - as a rule - its rights under the Labor Code. More so,
it is worth mentioning that the amendment introduced by RA 9481 to the Labor Codes provisions on
cancellation of union registration and on reportorial requirements further strengthened the
Constitutionally guaranteed right of the worker to self-organization because the said new law enhanced
the Philippines compliance with its international obligations as embodied in the International Labor
Organization (ILO) Convention No. 87, pertaining to the non-dissolution of workers organizations by
administrative authority. Thus, R.A. No. 9481 amended the Labor Code making the failure to file an
annual financial report within thirty (30) days after the close of every fiscal year as herein assailed not
aground for cancellation of union registration but shall subject the erring officers or members to
suspension, expulsion from membership, or any appropriate penalty.

Rural Bank of Alaminos Employees Union vs. NLRC

Facts
The Petition stems from three cases originally instituted before Sub-Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1 of
the National Labor Relations Commission in Dagupan City. The first case, NLRC Case No. 01-03-7-
0049-89, was commenced by the herein petitioner, Ismael Tamayo, Sr., against Rural Bank of Alaminos,
Inc. (RBAI) for illegal dismissal and damages. The second case, docketed as NLRC Case No.01-04-7-
0059-89, was filed by the herein private respondent, Rural Bank of Alaminos, Inc., against the Rural
Bank of Alaminos Employees Union for unfair labor practice, declaration of illegality of strike and
damages. While the third case, docketed as NLRC Case No. 01-06-0097-89, was filed by the Employees
Union against the Bank, charging the latter with unfair labor practice and damages.
Issue:
WON filing a petition for cancellation of the Unions registration is ULP?
Held:
A lock-out means the temporary refusal of an employer to furnish work as a result of an industrial or
labor dispute
.
As correctly found by the NLRC, in the case under consideration evidence of illegal lock-
out is wanting such that there can be no conclusive determination by the NLRC as to the
charge. Petitioners failed to present sufficient proof to support the allegation of illegal lock-out. No
evidence was adduced by the Union to show that the Bank really refused them employment during the
pendency of the strike. As to the allegation that the Bank was interfering with and restraining the
employees in the exercise of their right to self-organization, suffice it to state that filing a petition for
cancellation of the Unions registration is not per se an act of unfair labor practice. It must be shown by
substantial evidence that the filing of the petition for cancellation of union registration by the employer
was aimed to oppress the Union.

San Miguel Employees Union-PTGWO vs. San Miguel Packaging Products Employees Union
Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipino (PDMP), 533 SCRA 125 [2007]
FACTS:
San Miguel Corporation Employees Union Philippine Transport and General Workers Organization
(SMCEU-PTGWO) filed with DOLE-NCR a petition seeking the cancellation of San Miguel Packaging
Products Employees Union Pambansang Diwa ng Manggagawang Pilipinos (SMPPEU-PDMP)
registration and its dropping from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations on the ground that the latter
instituted fraud and falsification, and non-compliance with registration requirements in obtaining its
certificate of registration. SMCEU-PTGWO also alleged that PDMP is not a legitimate labor
organization, but a trade center; hence it cannot directly create a local or chapter.
The RD of DOLE-NCR issued an order dismissing the allegations of fraud, misrepresentation, and
irregularity in the submission of documents for certification of registration purposes by the SMPPEU-
PDMP. However, on the ground that PDMP is indeed a trade center, SMPPEU, not complying with the
20% membership requirement, was ordered to be dropped from the rolls of legitimate labor organizations.
On the appeal made by SMPPEU-PDMP to the BLR, the BLR reversed and set aside the decision of the
RD stating, among others that, although PDMP is a trade union center, it is also a legitimate labor
organization capable of creating or charter a local as per the Department Order No. 9; hence, the 20%
membership requirement does not apply on SMPPEU-PDMPs case.
SMCEU-PTGWO elevated the case to the CA via Rule 65, but the latter dismissed the case and affirmed
the decision of the BLR.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a trade union center can charter a local.
HELD:
No. A trade union center is not one of those entities empowered by law to create or charter a local.
RATIO:
Department Order No. 9 mentions two labor organizations either of which is allowed to directly create a
local or chapter through chartering a duly registered federation or a national union. Department Order
No. 9 defines a chartered local as a labor organization in the private sector operating at the enterprise
level that acquired legal personality through a charter certificate, issued by a duly registered federation or
national union and reported to the Regional Office.
In sum, although PDMP as a trade union center is a legitimate labor organization, it has no power to
directly create a local or chapter. Thus, SMPPEU-PDMP cannot be created under the more lenient
requirements for chartering, but must have complied with the more stringent rules for creation and
registration of an independent union, including the 20% membership requirement.

Samahan ng mga Mangagawa sa SAMMA-LAKAS sa Industriya ng Kapatirang Haligi ng Alyansa
(SAMMA-LIKHA) v. SAMMA Corporation
G.R. No. 167141, March 13, 2009
Facts :
Petitioner, SAMMA-LIKHA, filed a petition for certification election in DOLE. Respondent moved for
the dismissal of the petition. In an Order of Med-Arbiter, the petition was dismissed on the ground of (i)
lack of legal personality; (ii) prohibited mixture of rank-and-file and supervisory employees; and (iii)
failure to submit a certificate of non-forum shopping. Petitioner moved for a motion for reconsideration.
Meanwhile, respondent filed a petition for cancellation of petitioner registration. The Secretary of Labor,
treating petitioners MR as an appeal, rendered a decision reversing the order of the med-arbiter.
Meanwhile, the DOLE revoked the charter certificate of petitioners local chapter. Respondent filed a
petition for certiorari before the CA which reversed the decision of Secretary of Labor. Hence, this
petition was filed by petitioner.
Issue:
Whether petitioner had the legal personality to file the petition for certification election.
Ruling:
Respondent, as employer, had been the one opposing the holding of a certification election among its
rank-and-file employees. This should not be the case. We have already declared that, in certification
elections, the employer is a bystander; it has no right or material interest to assail the certification
election. The petition is granted. The record of the case is remanded to the office of origin for
determination of the status of petitioners legal personality.

Legend International Resorts Limited (Legend) vs Kilusang Manggagawa ng Legenda (KML-
INDEPENDENT)

Facts:
- June 6, 2001, KML filed with the Med-Arbitration Unit of the DOLE, San Fernando, Pampanga,
a petition for certification election. KML alleged that it is a legitimate labor organization of the
rank and file employees of Legend. It was issued its Certification of Registration by DOLE on
May 18, 2001.
- Legend moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds that it is not a legitimate labor organization
because its membership is a mixture of rank and file employees and supervisory employees.
KML also committed acts of fraud and misrepresentation when it made it appear that certain
employees attended its general membership meeting on April 5, 2001 when in reality some of
them were either at work, have already resigned, or were abroad.
- - KML argued that even if the supervisory employees were excluded from membership, the
certification election could still proceed because the required number of total rank and file
employees necessary is still sustained. It also claimed that its legitimacy as a labor union cannot
be attacked collaterally.
- Med Arbiter judgment September 20, 2001: dismissed KMLs petition for certification election.
Since its membership included supervisory employees, it was not a legitimate labor organization.
KML was also guilty of fraud and misrepresentation; 70 employees who were claimed to be
among those who attended its organizational meeting were either at work or elsewhere.
- Office of the Secretary of DOLE May 22, 2002 decision: reversed Med-Arbiters decision.
KMLs legitimacy as a union cannot be attacked collaterally. The presence of supervisory
employees does not ipso facto render the existence of a labor organization illegal. Mixed
membership is not one of the grounds for dismissal of a petition for certification election. Ordered
the immediate conduct of the certification election.
- Legend filed a Motion for Reconsideration. It also alleged that it filed a petition for cancellation
of union registration of KML which was granted by the DOLE Regional Office, November 7,
2001. MFR was denied in a resolution dated August 20, 2002: a final order of cancellation is
required before a petition for certification of election may be dismissed on the ground of lack of
legal personality, and that the November 7, 2001 decision was reversed by the BLR March 26,
2002.
- CA: held that the issue on the legitimacy of KML as a labor organization has already been settled
with finality. The March 26, 2002 decision upholding the legitimacy had long become final and
executor for failure of Legend to appeal.KML being a legitimate labor org, it could properly file a
petition for certification election. Legend filed MFR stating that it has appealed to the CA the
March 26, 2002 decision and is still pending. CA denied MFR.

Issues:
1. Whether Legend has timely appealed the March 26, 2002 decision (re: cancellation of union
registration)
2. Whether the cancellation of KMLs certificate of registration should retroact to the time of its
issuance (it was cancelled in the November 7, 2001 decision)
3. Whether the legitimacy of the legal personality of KML can be collaterally attacked in a petition
for certification election

Held:
1. Yes. The March 26, 2002 decision has not yet attained finality considering that it has timely
appealed to the CA and which at that time is still pending resolution. Legend timely filed on Sept
6, 2002 a petition for certiorari before the CA assailing the March 26, 2002 decision.

On June 30, 2005, CA reversed the March 26, 2002 decision of the BLR and reinstated the
November 7, 2001 decision cancelling the certificate of registration of KML. KMLs MRF was
denied. KML filed a petition for certiorari before the SC which was denied. KML moved for
reconsideration but it was denied with finality. The decision to cancel KMLs certificate of
registration became final and executory and entry of judgment was made on July 18, 2006.

2. No. According to ACA vs Calleja, a certification proceeding is not a litigation in the sense that
the term is ordinarily understood, but an investigation of a non-adversarial and fact-finding
character. An order to hold a certification election is proper despite the pendency of the petition
for cancellation of the registration certificate of the respondent union. The rationale is that at the
time the union filed the petition, it still had the legal personality to perform such act absent an
order directing the cancellation.

There is no basis for Legends assertion that the cancellation of KMLs certificate of registration
should retroact to the time of its issuance or that it effectively nullified all of KMLs activities,
including its filing of the petition for certification election and its demand to collectively bargain.

3. NO. The legitimacy of the legal personality of KML cannot be collaterally attacked in a petition
for certification election proceeding. Such legal personality may not be subject to a collateral
attack but only through a separate action instituted particularly for the purpose of assailing it.

SC affirmed the May 22, 2002 decision (KMLs legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally, presence of
supervisory employees does not render it illegal) and the August 20, 2002 resolution (a final order of
cancellation is required before a petition for certification election may be dismissed on the ground of lack
of personality, reversed March 26, 2002 decision)
Cruz vs Ferrer-Calleja

There is no merit in the petitioners' contention that the public respondent gravely abused her discretion in
annulling the February 10,1988 election of officers. The public respondent correctly noted that in ordering
the postponement of the election for one year (in effect extending their term of office for one year), the
ABEU Interim Board "overstepped its bounds" for it was constituted and authorized only "to sign for and
in behalf of the union the Collective Bargaining Agreement with the Bank and administer the CBA and
the operation of the union."

The second issue regarding the validity of the one-year extension of the CBA, as observed by the BLR,
has become moot and academic. The public respondent's view that the one-year extension was also null
and void is not quite correct for the extension was approved by the Union in a referendum which was
properly supervised by the Department of Labor. It was accepted by the Bank which gave a "signing
bonus" to the employees who voted for it. Since the holding of the referendum was within the authority of
the Interim Board to "administer the CBA and operate the union," and the extension was acceptable to
both of the parties to the agreement, and did not violate any law, it is valid and binding on them.

PALACOL
vs.
CALLEJA

Facts:
On October 12, 1987, the respondent Manila CCBPI Sales Force Union (hereinafter referred to as the
Union), as the collective bargaining agent of all regular salesmen, regular helpers, and relief helpers of the
Manila Plant and Metro Manila Sales Office of the respondent Coca-ColaBottlers (Philippines), Inc.
(hereinafter referred to as the Company) concluded a new collective bargaining agreement with the latter.
Among the compensation benefits granted to the employees was a general salary increase to be given in
lump-sum including re-computation of actual commissions earned based on the new rates of increase.

On the same day, the president of the Union submitted to the Company the ratification by the union
members of the new CBA and authorization for the Company to deduct union dues equivalent to P10.00
every payday or P20.00 every month and, in addition, 10% by way of special assessment, from the CBA
lump-sum pay granted to the union members. As embodied in the Board Resolution of the Union dated
September 29, 1987, the purpose of the special assessment sought to be levied is "to put up a cooperative
and credit union; purchase vehicles and other items needed for the benefit of the officers and the general
membership; and for the payment for services rendered by union officers, consultants and others. "This
"Authorization and CBA Ratification" was obtained by the Union through a secret referendum held in
separate local membership meetings on various dates.
The total membership of the Union was about 800. Of this number, 672 members originally authorized
the10% special assessment, while 173 opposed the same.

Subsequently however, one hundred seventy (170) members of the Union submitted documents to the
Company stating that although they have ratified the new CBA, they are withdrawing or disauthorizing
the deduction of any amount from their CBA lump sum. Later, 185 other union members submitted
similar documents expressing the same intent. These members, numbering355 in all (170 + 185) ,added to
the original oppositors of 173, turned the tide in favor of disauthorization for the special assessment, with
a total of 528 objectors and a remainder of 272supporters.

Petitioners assailed the 10% special assessment as a violation of Article 241(o) in relation to Article
222(b) of the Labor Code. The Union however contended that the deductions not only have the popular
endorsement and approval of the general membership, but likewise complied with the legal requirements
of Article 241(n).

Med-Arbiter ruled in favor of the petitioners directing the Company to remit the amount it had kept in
trust directly to the rank-and-file personnel. On appeal to the Bureau of Labor Relations, however, the
respondent Director reversed the order of the Med-Arbiter upholding the claim of the Union that the
special assessment is authorized under Article 241 (n) and that the Union has complied with the
requirements therein.

Issue:
Whether or not the 10% special assessment deduction by the respondent labor union was made in
accordance with the requirements provided by law.

Ruling:

No. We are convinced that the deduction of the 10% special assessment by the Union was not made in
accordance with the requirements provided by law.

Xxx the failure of the Union to comply strictly with the requirements set out by the law invalidates the
questioned special assessment. Substantial compliance is not enough in view of the fact that the special
assessment will diminish the compensation of the union members. Their express consent is required, and
this consent must be obtained in accordance with the steps outlined by law, which must be followed to the
letter. No shortcuts are allowed. The applicable provisions are clear. The Union itself admits that both
paragraphs (n) and (o) of Article 241 apply. Paragraph (n) refers to "levy" while paragraph (o) refers to
"check-off" of a special assessment. Both provisions must be complied with. Under paragraph (n), the
Union must submit to the Company a written resolution of a majority of all the members at a general
membership meeting duly called for the purpose. In addition, the secretary of the organization must
record the minutes of the meeting which, in turn, must include, among others, the list of all the members
present as well as the votes cast.

As earlier outlined by petitioners, the Union obviously failed to comply with the requirements of
paragraph (n). It held local membership meetings on separate occasions, on different dates and at various
venues, contrary to the express requirement that there must be a general membership meeting. The
contention of the Union that "the local membership meetings are precisely the very general meetings
required by law" is untenable because the law would not have specified a general membership meeting
had the legislative intent been to allow local meetings in lieu of thelatter. It submitted only minutes of the
local membership meetings when what is required is a written resolution adopted at the general meeting.
Worse still, the minutes of three of those local meetings held were recorded by a union director and not by
the union secretary. The minutes submitted to the Company contained no list of the members present and
no record of the votes cast. Since it is quite evident that the Union did not comply with the law at every
turn, the only conclusion that may be made therefrom is that there was no valid levy of the special
assessment pursuant to paragraph (n) of Article 241 of the Labor Code.


Paragraph (o) on the other hand requires an individual written authorization duly signed by
everyemployee in order that a special assessment may be validly checked-off. Even assuming that the
special assessment was validly levied pursuant to paragraph (n), and granting that individual written
authorizations were obtained by the Union, nevertheless there can be no valid check-off considering that
the majority of the union members had already withdrawn their individual authorizations. A withdrawal
of individual authorizations is equivalent to no authorization at all. Hence, the ruling in
Galvadores that "no check-offs from any amounts due employees may be effected without an individual
written authorization signed by the employees ... " is applicable. The Union points out, however, that said
disauthorizations are not valid for being collective inform, as they are "mere bunches of randomly
procured signatures, under loose sheets of paper."

The contention deserves no merit for the simple reason that the documents containing the
disauthorizations have the signatures of the union members. The Court finds these retractions to be valid.
There is nothing in the law which requires that the disauthorization must be in individual form.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Order of the Director of the Bureau of
Labor Relations is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, while the order of the Med-Arbiter is reinstated.


EVANGELINE J. GABRIEL, TERESITA C. LUALHATI, EVELYN SIA, RODOLFO EUGENIO,
ISAGANI MAKISIG, and DEMETRIO SALAS, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE SECRETARY OF LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT and SIMEON SARMIENTO et.
al (AND ALL OTHER SOLID BANK UNION MEMBERS)

FACTS: Petitioners comprise the Executive Board of the SolidBank Union, the duly recognized
collective bargaining agent for the rank and file employees of Solid Bank Corporation. Private
respondents are members of said union.
The unions Executive Board decided to retain anew the service of Atty. Ignacio P. Lacsina (now
deceased) as union counsel in connection with the negotiations for a new Collective Bargaining
Agreement (CBA); majority of all union members approved and signed a resolution confirming the
decision of the executive board to engage the services of Atty. Lacsina as union counsel.

As approved, the resolution provided that ten percent (10%) of the total economic benefits that may be
secured through the negotiations be given to Atty. Lacsina as attorneys fees. It also contained an
authorization for SolidBank Corporation to check-off said attorneys fees from the first lump sum
payment of benefits to the employees under the new CBA and to turn over said amount to Atty. Lacsina
and/or his duly authorized representative.

The bank then, on request of the union, made payroll deductions for attorneys fees from the CBA
benefits paid to the union members in accordance with the abovementioned resolution.
Private respondents instituted a complaint against the petitioners and the union counsel before the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) for illegal deduction of attorneys fees as well as for
quantification of the benefits in the 1992 CBA.

Med-arbiter granted the complaint; Secretary partially granted and the Order of the Med-Arbiter dated 22
April 1993 is hereby modified as follows: (1) that the ordered refund shall be limited to those union
members who have not signified their conformity to the check-off of attorneys fees; and (2) the directive
on the payment of 5% attorneys fees should be deleted for lack of basis. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: WON the deductions made by petioner-company is valid.

HELD: NO

Private respondents contention: claim that the check-off provision in question is illegal because it was
never submitted for approval at a general membership meeting called for the purpose and that it failed to
meet the formalities mandated by the Labor Code.

In check-off, the employer, on agreement with the Union, or on prior authorization from employees,
deducts union dues or agency fees from the latters wages and remits them directly to the union. It assures
continuous funding; for the labor organization. As this Court has acknowledged, the system of check-off
is primarily for the benefit of the union and only indirectly for the individual employees.

The pertinent legal provisions on check-offs are found in Article 222 (b) and Article 241 (o) of the Labor
Code.
Art. 222 (b) states:

No attorneys fees, negotiation fees or similar charges of any kind arising from any collective bargaining
negotiations or conclusions of the collective agreement shall be imposed on any individual member of the
contracting union: Provided, however, that attorneys fees may be charged against unions funds in an
amount to be agreed upon by the parties. Any contract, agreement or arrangement of any sort to the
contrary shall be null and void. (Emphasis ours)

Art. 241 (o) provides:

Other than for mandatory activities under the Code, no special assessment, attorneys fees, negotiation
fees or any other extraordinary fees may be checked off from any amount due to an employee without an
individual written authorization duly signed by the employee. The authorization should specifically state
the amount, purpose and beneficiary of the deduction. (Emphasis ours).

Art. 241 has three (3) requisites for the validity of the special assessment for unions incidental expenses,
attorneys fees and representation expenses. These are: 1) authorization by a written resolution of the
majority of all the members at the general membership meeting called for the purpose; (2) secretarys
record of the minutes of the meeting; and (3) individual written authorization for check off duly signed by
the employees concerned.
Clearly, attorneys fees may not be deducted or checked off from any amount due to an employee without
his written consent.

After a thorough review of the records, we find that the General Membership Resolution of October 19,
1991 of the SolidBank Union did not satisfy the requirements laid down by law and jurisprudence for the
validity of the ten percent (10%) special assessment for unions incidental expenses, attorneys fees and
representation expenses. There were no individual written check off authorizations by the employees
concerned and so the assessment cannot be legally deducted by their employer.

From all the foregoing, we are of the considered view that public respondent did not act with grave abuse
of discretion in ruling that the workers through their union should be made to shoulder the expenses
incurred for the services of a lawyer. And accordingly the reimbursement should be charged to the
unions general fund or account. No deduction can be made from the salaries of the concerned employees
other than those mandated by law.

Petition is DENIED.

VOLKSCHEL LABOR UNION VS. BUREAU OF LABOR RELATIONS, ASSOCIATED LABOR
UNION FOR METAL (ALUMETAL)
FACTS:
-Volkschel Labor Uniion was once affiliated with ALUMETAL.
- Both Volkschel and Alumetal entered into a CBA.
-They agreed that ALUMETAL will apply payroll deductions twice a month on the members of the
UNION as membership dues and other fees/fines, as may be duly authorized by the UNION AND ITS
MEMBERS. They called this check-off authorization.
- Subsequently, a majority of Volkschels members decided to disaffiliate from ALUMETAL in order to
operate on its own as an independent labor group, pursuant to *Art. 241 of the Labor Code. Moreover, the
same want to revoke their check-off authorization in favour of ALUMETAL.
- On the other hand, ALUMETAL assailed that the disaffiliation is contrary to law and the members are
still obliged to pay their dues.

ISSUES:
1. (MAIN ISSUE) Can a local union like Volkschel disaffiliate from its mother union like
ALUMETAL?
2. Should the local union still pay union membership dues even upon disaffiliation from its mother
union?

HELD:
1. YES. A local union, being a separate and voluntary association, is free to serve the interest of all
its members including the freedom to disaffiliate. This right is consistent with constitutional guarantee of
FREEDOM OF ASSOCIATION. (Art. IV, Sec. 7, Phil. Constitution)
2. NO. The obligation of an employee to pay union dues is coterminous with his affiliation/
membership.