3G Security Principles

• Build on GSM security • Correct problems with GSM security • Add new security features

Source: 3GPP
Myagmar, Gupta

1
UIUC 2001

GSM Network Architecture
PSTN/ISDN MS
Um

BTS
A-bis

MSC

BSC

A

OMC

Mobility mgt
VLR HLR AUC EIR

Voice Traffic

Circuit-switched technology
Myagmar, Gupta

2
UIUC 2001

GSM Security Elements, 1
Key functions: privacy, integrity and confidentiality

• Authentication
Protect from unauthorized service access Based on the authentication algorithm A3(Ki, RAND)=> SRES Problems with inadequate algorithms

• Encryption
Scramble bit streams to protect signaling and user data Ciphering algorithm A8(Ki, RAND) => Kc A5(Kc, Data) => Encrypted Data Need stronger encryption

• Confidentiality
Prevent intruder from identifying users by IMSI Temporary MSI Need more secure mechanism

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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001

GSM Security Elements, 2
• SIM
A removable hardware security module Manageable by network operators Terminal independent

• Secure Application Layer
Secure application layer channel between subscriber module and home network

• Transparency
Security features operate without user assistance Needs greater user visibility

• Minimized Trust
Requires minimum trust between HE and SN

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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001

Problems with GSM Security, 1
• Active Attacks
Impersonating network elements such as false BTS is possible

• Key Transmission
and Cipher keys and authentication values are transmitted in clear within between networks (IMSI, RAND, SRES, Kc)

• Limited Encryption Scope
Encryption terminated too soon at edge of network to BTS Communications and signaling in the fixed network portion aren’t protected Designed to be only as secure as the fixed networks

• Channel Hijack
Protection against radio channel hijack relies on encryption. However, encryption is not used in some networks.

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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001

Problems with GSM Security, 2
• Implicit Data Integrity
No integrity algorithm provided

• Unilateral Authentication
Only user authentication to the network is provided. No means to identify the network to the user.

• Weak Encryption Algorithms
Key lengths are too short, while computation speed is increasing Encryption algorithm COMP 128 has been broken Replacement of encryption algorithms is quite difficult

• Unsecured Terminal
IMEI is an unsecured identity Integrity mechanisms for IMEI are introduced late
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001

Problems with GSM Security, 3
• Lawful Interception & Fraud
Considered as afterthoughts

• Lack of Visibility
No indication to the user that encryption is on No explicit confirmation to the HE that authentication parameters are properly used in SN when subscribers roam

• Inflexibility
Inadequate flexibility to upgrade and improve security functionality over time

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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001

3G Network Architecture
Circuit Network
Circuit Switch
IN Services

Circuit/ Signaling Gateway Feature Server(s)

Mobility Manager

RNC Voice Radio Access Control
Data + Packet Voice

Call Agent

IP Core Network
IP RAN

Packet Gateway

Packet Network (Internet)

2G

2G/2.5G

3G 8
Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001

New Security Features, 1
• Network Authentication
The user can identify the network

• Explicit Integrity
Data integrity is assured explicitly by use of integrity algorithms Also stronger confidentiality algorithms with longer keys

• Network Security
Mechanisms to support security within and between networks

• Switch Based Security
Security is based within the switch rather than the base station

• IMEI Integrity
Integrity mechanisms for IMEI provided from the start

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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001

New Security Features, 2
• Secure Services
Protect against misuse of services provided by SN and HE

• Secure Applications
Provide security for applications resident on USIM

• Fraud Detection
Mechanisms to combating fraud in roaming situations

• Flexibility
Security features can be extended and enhanced as required by new and services threats

• Visibility and Configurability
Users are notified whether security is on and what level of available Users can configure security features for individual services security is

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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001

New Security Features, 3
• Compatibility
Standardized security features to ensure world-wide interoperability and roaming At least one encryption algorithm exported on world-wide basis

• Lawful Interception
Mechanisms to provide authorized agencies with certain information about subscribers

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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001

Summary of 3G Security Features, 1
• User Confidentiality
Permanent user identity IMSI, user location, and user services cannot be determined by eavesdropping Achieved by use of temporary identity (TMSI) which is assigned by VLR IMSI is sent in cleartext when establishing TMSI
USIM IMSI request IMSI TMSI allocation TMSI acknowledgement VLR

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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001

Summary of 3G Security Features, 2
• Mutual Authentication
During Authentication and Key Agreement (AKA) the user and network authenticate each other, and also they agree on cipher and integrity key (CK, IK). CK and IK are used until their time expires. Assumption: trusted HE and SN, and trusted links between them. After AKA, security mode must be negotiated to agree on encryption and integrity algorithm. AKA process:
USIM VLR HLR AV request, send IMSI RAND(i) || AUTN(i) Generate RES(i) Generate authentication data V(1..n) Compare RES(i) and XRES(i)
Myagmar, Gupta

13
UIUC 2001

Summary of 3G Security Features, 3
Generation of authentication data at HLR:
Generate SQN Generate RAND SQN AMF K

RAND

f1

f2

f3

f4

f5

MAC

XRES

CK

IK

AK

AUTN := SQN ⊕ AK || AMF || MAC AV := RAND || XRES || CK || IK || AUTN

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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001

Summary of 3G Security Features, 4
Generation of authentication data in USIM:
RAND f5 AK SQN ⊕ AK ⊕ SQN K AUTN AMF MAC

f1

f2

f3

f4

XMAC

RES

CK

IK

Verify MAC = XMAC Verify that SQN is in the correct range

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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001

Summary of 3G Security Features, 5
• Data Integrity
Integrity of data and authentication of origin of signalling data must be provided The user and network agree on integrity key and algorithm during AKA and security mode set-up
COUNT-I DIRECTION FRESH COUNT-I DIRECTION FRESH

MESSAGE

MESSAGE

IK

f9

IK

f9

MAC -I Sender UE or RNC

XMAC -I Receiver RNC or UE

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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001

Summary of 3G Security Features, 6
• Data Confidentiality
Signalling and user data should be protected from eavesdropping The user and network agree on cipher key and algorithm during AKA and security mode set-up
COUNT-C DIRECTION LENGTH COUNT-C DIRECTION LENGTH BEARER BEARER

CK

f8

CK

f8

KEYSTREAM BLOCK

KEYSTREAM BLOCK

PLAINTEXT BLOCK Sender UE or RNC

CIPHERTEXT BLOCK Receiver RNC or UE

PLAINTEXT BLOCK

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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001

• IMEI

Summary of 3G Security Features, 7

IMEI is sent to the network only after the authentication of SN The transmission of IMEI is not protected

• User-USIM Authentication
Access to USIM is restricted to authorized users User and USIM share a secret key, PIN

• USIM-Terminal Authentication
User equipment must authenticate USIM

• Secure Applications
Applications resident on USIM should receive secure messages over the network

• Visibility
Indication that encryption is on Indication what level of security (2G, 3G) is available
Myagmar, Gupta

18
UIUC 2001

Summary of 3G Security Features, 8
• Configurability
User configures which security features activated with particular services Enabling/disabling user-USIM authentication Accepting/rejecting incoming non-ciphered calls Setting up/not setting up non-ciphered calls Accepting/rejecting use of certain ciphering algorithms

• GSM Compatibility
GSM user parameters are derived from UMTS parameters using the following conversion functions: cipher key Kc = c3(CK, IK) random challenge RAND = c1(RAND) signed response SRES = c2(RES) GSM subscribers roaming in 3GPP network are supported by GSM security context (example, vulnerable to false BTS)
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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001

Problems with 3G Security
• • • IMSI is sent in cleartext when allocating TMSI to the user The transmission of IMEI is not protected; IMEI is not a security feature A user can be enticed to camp on a false BS. Once the user camps on the radio channels of a false BS, the user is out of reach of the paging signals of SN Hijacking outgoing/incoming calls in networks with disabled encryption is possible. The intruder poses as a man-in-the-middle and drops the user once the call is set-up

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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001

References
• • • • • • • • • 3G TS 33.120 Security Principles and Objectives
http://www.3gpp.org/ftp/tsg_sa/WG3_Security/_Specs/33120-300.pdf

3G TS 33.120 Security Threats and Requirements
http://www.arib.or.jp/IMT-2000/ARIB-spec/ARIB/21133-310.PDF

Michael Walker “On the Security of 3GPP Networks”
http://www.esat.kuleuven.ac.be/cosic/eurocrypt2000/mike_walker.pdf

Redl, Weber, Oliphant “An Introduction to GSM”
Artech House, 1995

Joachim Tisal “GSM Cellular Radio Telephony”
John Wiley & Sons, 1997

Lauri Pesonen “GSM Interception”
http://www.dia.unisa.it/ads.dir/corso-security/www/CORSO-9900/a5/Netsec/netsec.html

3G TR 33.900 A Guide to 3rd Generation Security
ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/TSG_SA/WG3_Security/_Specs/33900-120.pdf

3G TS 33.102 Security Architecture
ftp://ftp.3gpp.org/Specs/2000-12/R1999/33_series/33102-370.zip

3G TR 21.905 Vocabulary for 3GPP Specifications
http://www.quintillion.co.jp/3GPP/Specs/21905-010.pdf

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Myagmar, Gupta UIUC 2001

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