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Also by Ankie Hoogvelt


MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE: An Encyclopedic Dictionary
of Concepts and Terms (with A. Puxty)
Postcolonial World

The New Political Economy of


Second Edition

Ankie Hoogvelt

e, UJ!-\,C' ,.",J
(}.)-tl.' ~-~,~t[)- f'i).l..; . tt·,

© Ankle Hoogvelt 1997. 2001

* All rights reserved. No reproduction, copy or transmission of

this publication may be made without wntten permission.

No paragraph of this publicaticn may be reproduced, copied

or transmitted save with written permission or in accordance
with the provisions of the Copyright. Designs and Patents Act
1988. or under the terms of any licence permitting lirruted

copying issued by the Copynght Licensing Agency, 90

Tottenham Court Road. London WIP OLP.
LISt of Figures and Tables X
Any person who does any unauthorized act m relation to this
publication may be liable to criminal prosecution and civil
claims for damages. Preface to the Second Edition Xl

The author has asserted her right to be identified as the author Acknowledgements xviii
of this work In accordance with the Copyright, Designs and
Patents Act 1988.
First edition 1997
Repnnted 1998. 1999. 2000 Introduction 3
Second edition 2001
Published by PALGRAVE International political economy 6
Houndmills, Basmgstoke, Hampshire RG21 6XS The cntical theory of Robert Cox: historical
Companies and representatives throughout the world structnre 10
Historical structure and stage theory 12
ISBN 0-333-91419-8 hardback
ISBN 0-333-91420-1 paperback
1 The History of Capitalist Expansion 14
This book IS pnnted on paper suitable for recycling and made
from-fully-managed and sustained forest sources. The political nature of the capitalist world economy 15
The dialectical development of capitalism as a world
:A'.ca-talogue record for tills book IS available from the British
Library. system 16
A periodization of capitalist development and
10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 expansion 16
10 09 08 07 06 05 04 03 02 01 The mercantile phase of European expansion 17
Pnnted and bound m Great Britain by The colonial phase of European expansion 18
Creative Print & Design (Wales), Ebbw Vale Marxist theories of capitalist imperialism 21
Critiques of Marxist theories of imperialism 25

2 NeocoIonialism, Modernization and Dependency 29

Global economic pressures 29

Domestic tensions 32

vi Contents COil tents vii

Geopolitical relations 33 6 Globalization 120

Modernization theory 34
Dependency theory 37 The sociology of globalization 121
Roland Robertson: world compression and global
3 Crisis and Restructuring: Tbe New International consciousness 122
Division of Labour 43 David Harvey and Anthony Giddens: time and space 123
M anuel Castells: The global. mfonnational network
Material capabilities: global Fordism 44 society 126
Neocolonial economic relations 46 The economics of globalization 131
Economic nationalism in the Third World 47 A global market discipline 131
Changing geopolitical relations 50 A new global division of labour 135
Critical theory: diversity and micro-studies 52 Financtartzation 139
Gender and development 53 Conclusion 142
'Dependency associated' development theory 56
Postimperialism and world system theories 57 7 Global Governance: Regulation and Imperialism 144

PART IT CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION Global governance and the internationalization of

the state 148
Introduction 63 Globalization and globalism 153
Globalization and US strategic dominance 155
4 From Expansion to Involution 67 Imperialism and hegemony 159
Conclusion 162
World trade: long-term trends 67
Foreign direct investment (FDI) and the growth of PARTIII THE POSTCOLONIAL WORLD
multinational enterprises 77
World capital flows: other resource flows 80 Introduction 165
Global financial deepening and the structural position
of the Third World 85 The postcolonial: condition and discourse 166
Core-periphery: from structural exploitation to structural Postcolomal formations 17l
irrelevance 89
Conclusion 91 8 Africa: Exclusion and the Containment of Anarchy 173

5 Flexibility and Informationalism 94 Debt and developmentalism 176

Debt, globalization and the neo-liberal agenda 178
Pathways ont of Fordism 95 The role of the IMF and the World Bank 180
Informational production and the network enterprise 103 Structural adjustment in Africa: the social and
The New Economy 109 economic record 181
Theorizing the transition 113 Structural adjustment: intensifying global relations 183
Conclusion 118 Democracy and economic reform 185
Economic reform and anarchy 187
I Contents

Impenalism and resource wars 189 Imagining postdevelopment 254
I The reverse agenda of aid and global management 191 Conclusion 256
in NGOs and the politics of exclusion 193
Humanitarian relief and complex political emergencies 194 Conclusion 258
Conclusion 195
:1 Reconstructmg universalism, regional mercantilism
,- 9 Islamic Revolt or postdevelopment? 261
i1; 197
The global and the local 264
Spiritual renewal 200
The West confronts Islam 203 Notes and References 268
Education and Orientalization 206
The failure of dependent development 208 Index 311
The nse of Islamist new intellectuals and the politics
of antI-developmentalism 211
Conclusion 214
10 The Developmental States of East Asia 216
The role of the state m econonuc development 218
Theories of the developmental state 220
ComparatIve political economy 222
International political economy 223
Globalization and the limits of the East ASIa
developmental model 226
Regionalization: the next lap? 229
The crash of '97 232
Conclusion 238
11 Democracy, Civil Society and Postdevelopment in
Latin America 239
The Latin Amencan intellectual left 240
Postwar developmentalism and dependency theory 242
Military regimes, internationalizatIOn and
US imperialism 244
The dance of the millions 246
The new democracy: state, civil society and market
reforms 248
Civilian rule and political democracy 249
The new social movements and civil society 252
List of Figures and Tables Preface to the Second


10.1 The economic growth of the world's regions 217 The original aim of this book was to write a text that would be a
sequel to my book, The Third World in Global Development, pub-
Iished m ]982. Like its predecessor, this text would describe recent
Tables trends m world political economy and introduce students to current
debates regarding the' development prospects of the Third World.
4.1 The ratio of commodity world trade to world The problem With this ambition IS that the Thrrd World as such no
output, 1800-1996 (per cent) 69 longer exists. That is to say, it is no longer there as a unitary
4.2 Share of commodity world trade by economic classificatory descnptor of the econormc, social and political condi-
areas. 1800-1996 (per cent) 72 tions of the countnes of Africa, Latin America and Asia, and with
4.3 Shares of developing economies m world exports It, development studies has disappeared. Indeed, as early as 1979,
and imports. by region. 1950--95 (per cent) 73 Dudley Seers, one of the doyens of development studies, had writ-
4.4 Inter- and intra-group trade, 1876-1996 74 ten, 'Development Studies is over the hill or downright dead' .'
4.5 The world population among groups of At the start of the twenty-first century, we no longer encounter
countries. 1800-1997 75 development studies as a body of knowledge with a coherent iden-
8.1 Sub-Saharan Africa: selected indicators of tity, or even coherent identities, as m competing schools of theory or
stagnation and decline ]74 paradigms. It no longer has pretensions of being, or becoming, a
full-blown academic discipline. Development studies as a discrete
subject in degree schools in higher education is gradually being
replaced by, or mergmg with, other subjects, and one would be
hard put to find designated Chairs being appointed to the discipline
in universities. I can think of few comprehensive texts on develop-
ment or the Third World published since the early 1990s. Of course,
there have been collections of essays or readers still loosely gathered
under the label 'development studies', but such readers reflect the
fragmentation of the subject, mirronng the dissolution of the!Third
World Itself, as some regions of the Third World have shamed the
pundits of doom by becoming the dynamic growth centres of the
world economy (for example, East Asia), and others have declined
to the point of extinction, snuffing out all belief m progress. As
x Xl
Xll _ Preface to tile Second Edition Preface to the Second Edition xiii

Wolfgang Sachs writes: 'The idea of development was once a towe- understanding we shall lose Sight of the continuity in change of the
ring monument inspiring international enthusiasm. Today, the historical process.
structure is falling apart and m danger of total collapse." At the time of wntmg there are over 1.3 billion people m the
In the early 1980s, development studies became stranded in what world living in absolute poverty and imnuseration, and their num-
was widely referred to as 'the impasse'. and work m the field of ber is growing, increasmgly enveloping those who previously
development studies disbanded into a diverse range of intellectual formed part of the rich, First World, and of the semi-developed
pursuits without any sense of common direction or purpose. First, it Second World.' The Human Development Report. 1999, notes that
fragmented mto area studies, m which the success of the East ASian between 1980 and 1996 gross national product (GNP) per capital
'aevelopmental' states offered a promising focus for theoretical declined m no less than fifty-nine countnes. It reports that the
renewal, albeit rather more to the field of comparative political income gap between the fifth of the world's population living m
economy than to the subject of development studies itself. Second, the richest countries, and the fifth in the poorest, widened from 30
there were meta-theoretical critiques of those theoretical constructs to I m 1960 to 74 to I in 1997, and that income disparities mcreased
that had long constituted the tool box of development theory. m many countries, including the rich, durmg the 1980s and the
Dependency, exploitation, unequal exchange, mode of production, 1990s: On the other hand, it is also the case that some countnes,
modernization, rationalization. progress - all these came under the notably m East Asia, have grown, and are still growmg, very fast
deconstructing axe of postmodernists, postlvlarxists and poststruc- indeed, and that they have managed to translate that growth into
turalists alike. Third, some development literature to all mtents and improved standards of living for the masses of the population.
purposes merged with international political economy literature, However, the rising fortunes of new regions or groups of countnes
focusing in particular on issues of debt, poverty and penpheraliza- in the world economy, and the decline of others, should not blind us
tion, perceived as the downside of a quickening process of global- to the way that wealth and poverty are connected. I remam con-
ization of the world economy. Fourth, other development literature vmced that poverty and wealth creation are but two sides of the
found succour in the discovery of gender relations as welcome relief same histoncal process, even if that historical process itself under-
from the tedium of class relations that previously had dominated so goes fundamental changes in the manner m which it is organized.
much of the development agenda. Fifth, development studies But when the understanding and interpretation of wealth and pov-
engaged With environmental studies, as poverty m the poor world erty themselves become fragmented, divorced from one another, as
came to be seen as even more damaging to 'our' ozone layer than they are today, there is a danger that we shall end up celebrating, m
the pursuit of wealth in the rich world, true postmodern style, poverty as 'difference',
; This certainly is not an exhaustive list, but it serves to show how While there is continuity in the fact that wealth and poverty
development studies has been scattered by the wmds of change over creation are connected, it is nevertheless one of the mam organizing
a wide terrain of intellectual enquiry, making the task of synthesis a themes of the book that at begmmng of the twenty-first century we
prIOri impossible, What, then, should be the purpose of wntmg a are expenencmg a complete, radical break, a qualitative change, in
general mtroductory text on the subject? And if one did find such the histoncal development of capitalism. The world economic crisis
purpose, how would it help to organize the sequencmg.of chapters that began m the 1970s has led, not just to a restructuring of the
m a manner that will ensure that at least some of the new agendas world economy, but to a major transformation of the way m which
are incorporated In a coherent way? production and distribution are organized, There is a new political
i It seems to me that an important purpose should be to under- economy m the making. But, in contrast to the past, this new
stand the processes of crisis and transformation of the world eco- political economy is not a political economy that first developed
nomy which constitute the wmds of change that are now blowing and became organized within one specific territorial space and then
;development studies mto different directions. Without such an expanded outwards; rather it is a new political economy that was
global from the very beginning. This has consequences for our
xiv Preface to the SecondEdition Preface to the Second Edition xv
understanding of the locational distribution of wealth aud poverty, described in turn and we review the theories that emerged, whether
of development and underdevelopment. The familiar pyramid of the as hegernonic, legitimating, ideology or as counter-hegemonic crit-
core-periphery hierarchy is no longer a geographical but a social ique, within each evolving phase. In this way the historicalspecificity
division of the world economy. The designation 'postcolonial' world of theories of imperialism, of modernization and dependency, of
m preference to 'Third World' serves to artIculate at once the shift postimperialisrn, and world system, and of the New International
from national origin to subject-position in the global political eco- Division of Labour, will become clarified.
nomy, and a movement beyond a specific period in history, that of Part II begins, in Chapter 4, with a statistical portrait of
colonialism and Third World nationalist struggles. the dialectical development of capitalism since the beginning of the
runeteenth century. We discover that world trade and capital flows,
at first expanding to embrace ever more areas of the world, gradu-
Outline of the Book ally turned into a process of involution when capital relations
became intensified within the core, while selectively withdrawing
Thus, as the subtitle suggests, the book is about the new political from the periphery. Meanwhile, this process resulted in cumul-
economy of development. These very words beg at least two ques- atively growing differences in income between rich and poor nations.
tions: (i) that there is an understood and generally accepted meanmg The historically generated structure of deepening inequality pro-
of the term 'political economy'; and (ii) that there is an old version vides the backdrop for our understanding of the present crisis and
of it, now distinct from and discarded by different interpretations, transformation debate to which we turn m subsequent chapters. By
As we shall see in the introduction to Part I. there is no such thing as the 1970s, capitalism had reached the limits of its own expansion,
a unified methodology or theory of political economy. What there and this became the crucible of fundamental change. This change is
is, IS a set of questions about the relationship between power and becoming visible in an information-technology (IT) driven new
wealth, between politics and economics, between states and mar- political economy that characterizes the production process and its
kets. Depending on how this relationship has been understood and global, though not worldwide, embrace, In Chapter 5, we discuss
conceptualized, different theories of world order have held sway for the changes m economic production and industrial organization
a considerable time: namely realism, institutionalism, and Marxism/ widely referred to as flexible production, and the emergence of the
structuralism. Their common ground was the state-market interac- new, 'knowledge' or 'digital', economy that by some accounts has
tion as the embodiment of politics and economics in the modern been responsible for the renewed growth in the core of the capitalist
world. And a central question became how to grasp the conflicting system. Chapter 6 addresses the global aspects of the process of
logic of an evolving and progressively integrating world market, on transformation, Pertinently, in contributing to a theory of global-
the one hand, with the continuing compartmentalization of the ization, I privilege the social dimension of globalization over the
world political order into sovereign nation states on the other. economic dimension. I argue that the reconstitution of the world
Within the Marxist/structuralist traditIon the evolving interna- into a single social space today drives the economics of globaliza-
tional state/market nexus was analyzed in tenus of the dialectical tion, even though the preceding period of economic international-
development of capitalism in historical periods. Capitalism's inher- ization has itself created the conditions for the emergence of this
ent contradictions were said to be worked out in different phases of single social space. The contemporary process of globalization Sig-
expansion, punctuated by crises, in which state and interstate rela- nals a 'higher' level of intensifying economic, financial, cultural and
tions were time and again rearranged as political structures that social cross-border networks than before. Meanwhile, ever .larger
held m place the exploitative economic relationship between core segments of the world population, evident inside advanced coun-
and peripheral economies. In Chapters I, 2 and 3, we look back on tries, but more numerous still inside the Third World, are being
this tradition from the vantage point of Robert Cox's critical theory expelled from the emerging 'thickening' network of human social
of historical structures. Thus each phase of capitalist expansion is and economic interaction. Rather than being a process of expansion,
XVi Preface to the Second Edition Preface to tile Second Edition xvii

the process of globalization appears to be a shrmktng one. How IS A Word about tbe Secoud Edition
such a system of widening global disparities managed and perpetu-
ated? Who IS m control; who runs this system? Chapter 7 discusses In a world of busllless@the speed-of-thought, as in the snazzy title of
these questions, examines the emerging forms of transnational gov- Bill Gates' book. printed texts on globalization are doomed to date
ernance and regulation. and points to the increasing geostrategic pretty quickly. In prepanng this second edition, I have not merely
dominance of the USA m maintaining the stability of neo-liberal needed to find last-minute factual data and statistics. more espec-
regunes. ially those pertinent to Chapter 4, but have also revised the analytic
Part III of the book addresses the Implications of globalization content of substantial sections.
for the postcolomal world. The term postcolonial is a recent arrival There are several new trends in the global political economy that
m development literature. It IS a term of complex origins and we have needed to be addressed. First, the appearance of the new,
shall explore these in the introduction to the final part of the book. knowledge or digital economy; second, the resurgence of the USA
For now it is sufficient to note that the concept has merits simply after decades of putative relatIve decline, and the question of
because it groups together all former colomal societies despite dif- renewed US dominance in the global system: and third, the volat-
ferences in their relationship to the global capitalist system, while at ility of the global financial markets culminatmg m the East Asia
the same tune offering a point of entry for the study of those crisis of 1997. In consequence, Part Il of the book has 'been thor-
differences. This point of entry IS the 'aftermath' of the colonial oughly reconfigured and expanded.
relationship and the manner m which this becomes reconstituted One SIgnificant theoretical departure from the previous edition in
and contested m the process of the present transformation of the this second part of the book, IS the replacement of the concept of
global political economy. Thus we may study the postcolomal con- 'capitalist implosion' by that of capitalist 'involution', Work on the
dition as a state of being that is the combined outcome of external first editIon developed in a time frame when the contmumg crisis
pressures (globalization, the post-Cold War order and so on), and and instability of the global capitalist system still dominated theor-
locally and historically specific characteristics and struggles arising etical debates. The vigorous growth of the information driven 'new
out of the (neo )colomal relationship. -econorny' and its potential to overcome the crisis of capitalist accu-
I consider four types ofpostcolonial 'conditions'. 'situations' or 'so- mutation, was yet to be revealed. E-business and e-commerce
cial formations', each exemplified in one of four regions of the world, exploded only after 1998. Moreover, Manuel Castells' path break-
though not necessarily exclusive to that region. Neither are these four ing oevre, the first volume of which appeared m 1996, had not been
exhaustive of all social formations m the postcolonial world. There available to me when I worked on the first edition. His work has
are plenty of postcolonial conditions that we do not discuss in this been a profound mfluence on my tlunking since. And thus I have
book - for example, India, China and South Africa. We shall examine come to the VIeW, expressed m this edition, that the long capitalist
in' turn the following regions and conditions: Sub-Saharan Africa: cnsis which began in the 1970s has temporarily been 'resolved',
exclusion and anarchy (Chapter 8); the Middle East: Islamic revolt albeit in a manner that provides stability and prosperity for a global
and anti-developmentalism (Chapter 9); East Asia: state-led develop- mmonty wlule keeping at bay the global majority.
mentalism and regionalization (Chapter 10); and Latin' America: Also amended and extended are the chapters on East ASIa and on
democracy, civil SOCIety and postdevelopment (Chapter 11). Africa. Very rmnor updates have been worked into other chapters.
I The Conclusion revisits the varIOUS arguments and explores likely The final conclusions of the book have been rethought m light of the
and unlikely scenarios for the future. mushroormng cloud of antI-globalist protests.
Acknowledgements 1 XIX

encouragement, patient persistence and good ideas. I have, how-
Acknowledgements ever, resisted his suggestion that seJections of further reading be
added at the end of each chapter. Instead, I prefer to encourage my
readers to make full use of the detailed notes and references, because
It IS these that will guide them to what I believeare the most relevant
works in a field that IS rapidly bemg swamped by a cacophony of
If I mention them last It is not because of their contribution being
least, but because theirs happened to come at the very end of all the
To write about so many different parts of the world IS an audacious
other work: scrubbing the text clean and makmg it presentable for
undertaking. It would not have come to pass had it not been for the
the publisher. Marg Walker, Penny Draper and Sylvia McCoJm
inspiration and help, direct and indirect, that has been given to me
have been variousJy invoJved WIth the 'fiddly' work of presentation,
by my research and graduate students. who are a pretty interna-
and I thank them a Jot.
tional bunch. They have taught me many things I didn't know and
brought to my attention literature I had never read. Where appro-
priate I have referred to their theses in the normal way through
references in the text. Here I want to thank them: Masae Yuasa,
Rongyan Qi, Lucy Walker, Gillian Koh, Rachel Tibbett, Dong
Sook Gills, Fithri Othman, Anne Holgate Lowe, Mark Chnstian
and many others, for pushing me all the time to keep up with them.
In so doing they have turned teaching into a real learning experience
and a delightful vocation! I also thank my friend Jan Burgess,
managing editor of the Review of African Political Economy for
her ready knowledge and the generous use of the ROAPE library
and Alistair Allan of the University of Sheffeld Library, for his help
in a constant stream of information retrieval!
It hasastonished me that m these times of intensified workloads,
and ever more oppressive working conditions in universities, one
can still find colleagues willing to sit down and completely selflessly
read through a long manuscript, make meticulous comments and
constructive criticisms, and tune their minds to somebody else's
intellectual problems. I am deeply grateful to my colleagues Tony
Payne, Lena Dominelli and Nick Stevenson, who each went
through some or all sections of the first edition and made helpful
comments and encouraging suggestions as I went aJong. Naturally,
they are relieved of any responsibility for the contents. But in the
preparation of the second edition I did not have the heart to ask
them again. Therefore, this time the entire burden of reading and
advising on earlier drafts has fallen to my publisher, Steven Ken-
nedy. OnJy now that the task is finished do I appreciate fully hIS

.... _--_....--.-_.... ._-----~, ... __...._-_..

1~2 Crtsis and Transfonnauon Globalization 133
~: '
goods and services produced in different nations. Such intemational For many observers and analysts of the world economy, this
trade dominated the prewar and Immediate postwar periods. It was development of an integrated international production system was
essentially complementary - that is. countnes specializing m the sufficient evidence of the emergence of a truly 'global economy'.
export of one type of product would exchange that product for And in some ways It was. That IS to say, it prepared the structural
other types that they themselves did not produce. . conditions for the emergence of a global economy. Because It meant
As a result of the growth and orgamzauonal evolution of multi- that a global market principle (a dominant standard of price, quality
national companies, this pattern of interproduct trade gradually has and efficiency) began to impose Itself on the domestic supply of
given way to tntraproduct trade. There is no longer a neat division of consumer goods, intermediate and half-processed goods, techno-
labour between countnes: there IS nOW export compcunon between logy, and mdeed the factors of production. capital, labour and
producers m different conntries offermg the same product lines. raw materials. As a consequence of the shift from interproduct
Countries that are high-volume exporters of cars are also high- trade to intraproduct trade. global competition intensified. Instead
volume Importers of cars. How did this srtuauon come about? of being complementary, international trade became predatory or
LiberalizatIOn and technological progress have steadily altered the 'adversarial', as Peter Drucker put it.z 3
way in which mternauonal production is bemg undertaken. At first, The corollary of global competition IS that even goods and ser-
multinational companies adopted simple integration strategies where vices that are produced and exchanged within the national domestic
they set up foreign affiliates producmg, typically with technology sphere have to meet standards of quality and costs of production
obtained from the parent company, standardized cornmodiues that that are set globally. A good example IS the USA. the country WIth
previously had been subject to cross-border trade. Second, parent the largest domestic market. As Stephen Cohen remmds us in a
companies would set up foreign affiliates engaging in a limited range revealing statistic: whereas in the early 1960s only4 per cent of US
of activities m order to supply their parent firms with specific inputs domestic production was subject to international competition, by
that they were m a more competitive positron to produce. the early 1990s OVer 70 per cent was. 24 The contrast between the
" Next. multinational companies began to adopt complex mtegra- global marketplace and the global market principle could not
tion strategies where they turned their geographically dispersed have been put more sharply, as m the 1960s the US-dommated inter-
affiliates and fragmented production systems mto regionally, or national manufacturing trade contributed 25 per cent of all
even globally, mtegrated production and distribunon networks. mternational trade flows, whereas by the 19905 ItS share of world
Thus multinational companies (by this time - that is, the 1970s- manufacturing trade had dropped to Just 12 per cent.z'
often referred to as 'transnattonal' companies or even 'global' com- However, of still greater significance IS the manner in which such
panies) fanned out different parts of the production process to structural integration is becoming tnternalized m the behaviour of
affiliates ill different national locations. Each subsidiary took part economic agents. be they entrepreneurs or workers, consumers or
in the production process. bnt no smgle affiliate produced the producers. If the expression 'market principle' refers to a structural
whole product from beginning to end. The hallmark of this global constraint, I use the expression 'market discipline' to address the
fragmentation and organic integration of the production process internalization -of this structural constraint by individual agents ill
was an enormous increase ID international trade ID components and their own conduct. Writers of the Regulation School, discussed m
semi-processed manufactures. This began in the 1960'; and soon Chapter 5. have tried to stretch their concept of 'mode of regulation'
overtook the growth ill world trade Itself 2 l Telling evidence of to include the mternalization of relevant social valnes and norms,
tins global integration at the level of production IS found m data For example. Aglietta'" speaks of the 'socialisation of the mode of
4 n intrafirm trade. Whereas in the early 1970s. mtrafirm trade was life', Boccara refers to 'anthroponomic factors,,2? while Lipietz uses
estimated to account for around 20 per cent of world trade. by the the term 'habitus' borrowed from Bourdieu to indicate that values
1 arly 1990s that share was around a third, excluding mtra-TNC and norms that might sustam a mode of regulation are internalized
transactions in servlces. 22 m individual conduct." Yet. as Bob Jessop has pomted out. none of

134 Crisis and Transformation Globalization 35
these writers has succeeded m pmpomting the precise process of vation, because they know that otherwise they will lose their m:ar-
transformation because they have failed to theorise how modes kets and someone else will move in. The same holds true at the
of regulation in fact become internalized in individual conduct." consumer end of the organization of economic life. Consumer~ in
Our discussion of time/space compression and the 'shared phe- Chma can see on their satellite TV screens Western lifestyle pro-
nomenal world' clarifies thts internalization process. It IS the aware- ducts they want to own, regardless of their government's desire to
ness of global competinon (an aspect of Robertson's 'global limit foreign imports and boost local producers. The Clunese gov-
consciousness') that constrains individuals and groups, and even ernment tned to ban satellite television for this very reason, but to
national governments, to conform to internanonal standards of no avail. '
price and quality. People are remmded constantiy, m the experience
of their own daily lives, but even more so m the way that this A /Jell' globaldivision oflabour; a /Jell' SOCial core-peripheryhierarchy
expenence is remforced by media coverage, of the experience of ,
otbers elsewhere, that unless they conform to these standards they As the costs of transporting standard products and of cornmunicat-
will lose the competition, lose their own jobs. Workers come to m' mformation about them continue to drop (another example of
accept that it IS 'proper' that jobs should be lost because the" "
time/space compression), modern factones and state-of-the-art
company 'has to' move elsewhere Where wages and SOCIal conditions machinery can be installed almost anywhere in the world. Routine
are less demanding. producers m the UK and the USA are therefore m direct competi-
In 1992, the American company, Hoover. was faced with pressure tion WIth millions of producers m other nations. In Ius book, The
for higher wages from 1tS Dijon workforce and decided to move the Work of Nations. Robert Retch, one time Secretary of State, for
plant to Glasgow. The point about the 'discipline' of the global Labor m US President Bill Clinton's Adnunistration, gives spec-
market 1S that such companies do not in fact have to move. It IS tacular examples of the speed with which factones and productive
sufficient for tbem to 'threaten' to move. Time/space compression capital investments have become footloose. For example, until the
has permitted us all to share in the phenomenal world of the Dijon late 1970s, the Amencan telephone and telecommunications com-
workers (and m that of numerous other victuns of company reloca- pany AT&T had depended on routine producers m Louisiana to
nons elsewhere). This has imposed a social discipline on workers all assemble standard telephones. It then discovered that producers m
over Europe, indeed all over the world, tbat unless they conform, Singapore would perform the same tasks at a far lower cost. Faced
companies bave the power to move plant to another country. with intense global competitton they then had to switch to cheaper
Because of the existence of a global market discipline, It IS sufficient routme producers m Singapore. But by the late 1980s they switched
for a company merely to threaten to set up a plant abroad, for it to production again, this time to Thailand."
successfully drive down wages to a globally competitive level. Such transferable routme production IS no longer the preserve of
Charles Sabel reports on German plants where charts of defect deskilled Jobs III 'old economy' industrial plants. The fusion of
rates for particular processes are displayed on video screens next computer technology WIth telecommumcanons makes it possible
to equrvalent data for thetr Brazilian subsidiancs.'? Th1S establishes for firms to relocate an ever-widenmg range of operations and
a global SOCIal discipline that constrains the behaviour of Brazilian functions to wherever cost-competitive labour, assets and infra-
and German workers alike. structure are available. The new technologies make 1t feasible to
Thus, while global competition has created the structural condi- standardize, make routine and co-ordinate activities that previously
nons for the emergence of a global market discipline, rt is time/space were subject to the friction of space and therefore regarded as non-
compression that creates the shared phenomenal world that sup- tradable. They enable such activities to be turned into 'real-time'
ports and reproduces this discipline on a daily basis. And not just on activities. Take, for example, data processing services of all kmds.
workers. Companies too know they have to adopt the best quality Airlines employ data processors from Barbados to Bombay to key
methods and the most efficient costs, and engage m constant inno- m names and flight numbers into giant computer banks located in
136 Crtsts and Transformatton Globalization 137

Dallas or London. Book and magazme publishers use routme with the operation of the global market principle, are altenng the
operators around the world to convert manuscripts into com- landscape of the global division of labour. It IS no longer one that
puter-readable form and send them back to the parent firm at strictly follows economic geography.
the speed of electronic impulses. The New York Life Insurance There was a time when the geography of the global division of
Company was dispatchmg insurance claims to Castleisland m the labour ran parallel With the sequential transformation of goods-m-
Repnblic of Ireland, where routine producers, guided by simple production from low value-added activities to high value-added
directions, entered the clanns and determined the amounts due, acnviues. To explain this we need to first say something about the
then instantly transnutted the computations back to the USA. 32 concept of value-added.
Software firms export much of their development work to Banga- 'Value-added' IS the market value of a firm's output minus the
lore m India, which sees itself as the Silicon Valley of Asia. market value of the mputs It purchases from other firms. Essent-
The 1970s, and still more so the 1980s, witnessed the global ially, therefore, it is the sum of the factor incomes. the wages and
restructuring of industry and a redistribution of jobs through integ- profits of the firm. The concept of a value-added chain anses
rated international production enabled by the new technologies. because in the transformation of a raw matenal - say, cotton _
The .haemorrhaging of Jobs m the core countnes benefited the into an end consumer product - say, a garment in a shop window-
periphery, particularly Pacific ASia. A French govermnent report there IS a sequence of intermediate stages of fabrication and proces-
m 1993 estimated that in the previous twenty years no fewer than 6.6 sing: spinning, running, dyemg, weaving, designing, cutting, sewing,
million Jobs were lost to the EC and the USA and gained by the Far wholesaling, advertising, marketing and retailing. At each stage, the
East. 33 US manufactunng employment in the developing countnes labour involved adds value to the process of transformation, mak-
as a whole grew at ahnost five tunes the rate of such employment m mg the product progressively more expensive to the final consumer.
the developed econornies.:" Moreover, at each stage, capitalist entrepreneurs intervene to organ-
Optimists argue that the loss ofjobs in manufactunng activities m IZe the discrete activity in the chain. each in turn adding a mark-up
the core economies will be compensated by a growth of service to make some profits for themselves. This implies that the market
mdustnes, including services related to manufacturing Itself. 'New pnce for the final product incorporates all the wages and mark-nps
U.S ..Factory Jobs Aren't m the Factory' ran a headline m Business of all the previous stages. The history of multinational enterprise
Week in 1994, argumg that support industries With their high com- may be summed up by saying that it has moved from trymg to
ponent of knowledge skills constitute a second tier of manufactur- internalize all these stage-like transactions Within ItS own organiza-
mg industries. While a smaller percentage of the US workforce will tional embrace, to once more, as under global networking, 'extern-
be m production, a much larger percentage will be supportmg this alizing' all, or many, of these stages and transactions.
production with computer software, robot-making, and countless So It may be seen that the concept of a value-added chain
services that will add Jobs to supply the 'leaner' manufacturers." On expresses a sequential progression from lower value-added to higher
the other hand, pessimists such as Jeremy Rifkin in his book. The value-added activities. But there IS more to the hierarchical progres-
End-of Work. point to the wholesale destruction of agricultural and sion than mere sequencmg of transformation. The Instoncal deve-
industrial labour as smart machines replace workers m both of these lopment of capitalism on a world scale. for all the reasons spelt out
'old i economy' sectors, while the emerging knowledge sector - m in the first part of this book, also concentrated 'higher-value activ-
Rifkin's view - will only be able to absorb a small percentage of the ities' at the final, consumer, end of the chain (consumer markets in
displaced labour.'6 the rich countnes), while largely (though not exclusively) leaving
But even if the overall equation of job losses and gains is open to low-value activities in underdeveloped lands. There was a double
dispute, there IS no denying that the complex integration strategies effect, therefore, in so far as the wages of labour at higher stages of
of international producers. coupled With new forms of co- the transformation process are likely to be higher, and therefore
ordination that are enabled by the new technologies, together also the pass-on pnces, than at the lower end of the production
138 Crisis and Transformation Globalization 13p

chain. Furthermore, the more specialized the final product, again extracted. At this end of the mternational production cham it is
more typically at the rich-consumer end of the chain, the higher the capital and not labour that is mobile, a situation perpetuated by
profit mark-up for such products because of the effect of limited political intervention designed to stem the free migration of labour.
demand. For all these reasons, bulk or volume production, which IS The mobility of capital here implies that wage rates equalize at the
concentrated at the lower end of the cham, yields lower value-added lowest possible denominator, and this mcludes wage rates for such
than specialized, high-tech products, WhICh are concentrated at the activities ill the advanced countries. i
higher end of the value chain. In this way, globalization alters the balance of social classes on la
Today something curious IS happenmg. As Paul Krugman put worldwide scale. David Coates is nght to pomt out that, looking at
it. It IS now possible to 'slice up' the value cham in a different It tlns way, 'globalization m its modern form IS a process based less
way, and locate the labour-intensive slices m the production of on the proliferation of computers than on the proliferation of
those goods traditionally viewed as skill-. capital- or technology- proletariats ... The world proletariat has doubled m SIZe in a gen-
intensive, in low-wage locations. A classic example is the notebook eration.r'"
computer. It looks like a high-technology product, but while the
American microprocessor and the Japanese flat-panel display are Financiarization
indeed high-tech. the plastic shell that surrounds them and the
wiring that connects them are not, so the assembly of notebook We have referred before to the contemporary phenomenon of
computers becomes an industry of the 'newly mdustrializing 'financial deepenmg' or 'financiarization'. which occurs when the
economies'." Furthermore, many mformation-intensrve activities growth of financial transactions far exceeds the growth of the
previously classed as high value-added activities have now become underlymg econonuc fundamentals of production and trade (see
'real- time' actrvrties that may be earned out anywhere m the global Chapter 4, page 85). It too IS brought about by the effects of the
system. 'shared social space' which, m fact, IS most m evidence in the time-
Thus, the global division of labour IS rendering a core-periphery less flows of financial capital, By financial capital we mean capital
relationship that cuts across national and geographic boundaries, that circulates m pure money form, as distinct from capital tied up
bnngmg on board, WIthin the core. segments of the Third World, in productive assets. The annihilation of space through time by
and relegatmg segments and groups m both the traditional core of electromc means enables this money capital to scan the entire planet
the system and m the Third World to peripheral status. Core- for mvestment opportunities and to move from one location to
penphery IS becoming a social relationship, no longer Just a geo- another m a matter of seconds. However, the sheer velocity of
graphical one. Circulation of money capital does not explain by itself why this
ThIS new SOCIal core-periphery hierarchy is set to become still money form of capital should have become the dommant form in
more uneven than was previously the case. Many high-value-added the age of informational global capitalism. It does not explain why,
activities that are contributed by so-called 'knowledge workers'. are m Castells' words, 'firms of all kinds, financial producers, manu-
extremely mobile. Marketing experts, computer consultants, legal facturing producers. agricultural producers. service producers; as
affairs specialists, financial accountants and top managers can go to well as governments and public institutions, use global financial
wherever they can obtain the highest pnce for their services. And, networks as the depositories of their earnmgs and as their potential
because of the operation of the global market principle, payments source of higher profits'." Why indeed have they become the nerve
for their services are bemg equalized across national boundaries, centre of informational capitalism?
mcreasmgly at the highest price. But at the lower end of the value It IS worth trying to unravel the process whereby this has come
cham exactly the opposite IS happening. Low-value-added activities about, if only to debunk a common myth that this IS something of a
are still typically tied to tools and equipment - that is, to knowledge historical accident, not of anybody's doing, and therefore indeed
embodied in capital- and/or to the locatron where raw materials are not of anybody's undomg. And the Implication is that we are
140 Crisis and Transformation Globalization 141

helpless onlookers m an unfolding drama m which the world finan- money and wealth were previously embedded. It is because of this
cial system lurches from cnsis to cnsis, repeatedly delivering shock- 'disembedding' that globalization entails a process of intensification
mg body blows to the livelihoods of millions of ordinary people. of linkages within the core of the global system, while ItS counter-
The reasons are m fact partly political, partly technological. part, 'peripheralization', becomes a process of marginalization and
Deregulation of the financial markets put m place by the OECD expulsion that cuts across terntones and national boundaries, ren-
and developing countnes alike during the 1980seffectively loosened denng areas within the traditional core subject to the same processes
the restnctions on the form that money can take. It brought down of expulsion as large swathes of territory ID Afnca, Latin Amenca
the 'Chinese walls that previously had separated the vanous uses to and Asia. So here too, as was the case With the global orgamzation
which borrowed money could be put, 111 particular the distinction of work. we see that the structure of core-penphery becomes a
between long-term capital and short-term capital mvestments. This SOCIal division rather than a geographical one.
topic was discussed at some length m Chapter 4. Here we might sum Let us explore the meaning of this heightened mtemational
up this process, which was the result of active and collectrve govern- mobility of money capital a little further. In particular, let us
ment mtervention, as one that increased the [uncuonal mobility of examme why this should represent a form of Imploding capitalism
capital, contrasted with the spatial mobility of capital. Imagine the rather than a further expansion of world capitalism,
functional mobility of capital as a vertical process: monies tied up m When pension funds invest in. say, Hong Kong stocks, they can
productive assets can convert in an instant into pure money form. benefit from the nsing values of the stocks and. if they are clever fund
escapmg into the cyberspace of electromc circulation. managers, switch out of a stock when It goes down and mvest in
So what happens to money circuiating in this cyberspace? Why IS another rismg one somewhere else. There IS no need for them to wait
It so profitable, more profitable indeed than when It is busy making and see what happens to the companies that build skyscrapers in
commodities and paymg labour? Enter diginzanon, a straightfor- Hong Kong, or sell textiles back to Europe. But, of course, the
ward technological process. It IS hest explained m a story about a connections between the world of high finance and the economic
hedge fuud dealer, a 'Master of the Universe', in Tom Wolfe's fundamentals of wo~ld trade and production are not completely
novel, The Bonfire of the Vanities. One day this Master of the severed. There is stil1 no such thing as a free lunch. What has hap-
Umverse IS at a family party and bIS seven-year-old daughter asks, pened, rather, IS that the integration of the world's financial markets
'Daddy, what IS it that you do?' And the Master of the Universe IS and the development of a whole range ofnovel financial instruments.
lost for words - how indeed would one describe bond dealing to a permitted since the deregulation of these markets. have made It
seven-year-old? And Ius wife jumps in and says, 'Well, darling, Just possible to connect up the artenes of real production and trade,
imagme that a bond IS a slice of cake, and you didn't bake the cake. and thus squeeze the last drop of surplus out ofworkers and peasants
but every time you hand somebody a slice of the cake a tiny little bit al1 over the world, m a manner that makes these innumerable threads
comes off. like a little crumb, and you can keep that."? Now that lead to our pension fund invisible and therefore unchallengeable.
the point about digitizatton IS that, m the physical world, none To stick to the same example: the rise and nse of the Hong Kong
of'.the tiny crumbs would be worth picking up and col1ecting, but stock market pnor to ItS dramatic fal1 ID 1996 was due m large
in the virtual world. where telecommunications combine with com- measure to Chinese provincial authorities investing borrowed money
puter-assisted data processing, money can be made by gathenng up m Hong Kong's stock market and real estate, With dire conse-
infinitesimally fractional differences m the movement m prices, be quences for the Beijing government's ability to hold the value of
they interest rates. commodity pnces or currency values. ItS currency and pay the peasants in northern China for ItS gram
upshot IS that money IS increasingly
being made out of the procurements. The world IS now like this: if our pension fund works
ci~culatIOn of money, regardless of traditional restnctions of space well for us, the peasants m northern China willJust have to go a bit
and tune, as when money transforms into bricks and mortar. Cap- more hungry. If people m the West. as they did dunng the consumer
ita',l IS being disconnected from the SOCial relationships m which boom of the 1980s, push up interest rates through their incautious
142 Cnsis and Transformation Globalization ,143

use of credit cards. it has a knock-on effect on the interest rates that of historical capitalism which - as Wallerstem and many others in
Brazil pays on Its loans, and this in turn prejudices the livelihood of the Marxist tradition have argued - had a 'globalizing' imperative
peasants in Brazil. from the begmnmg. The development of transnational corporations
The speed with which money can move across borders removes and the growth of international finance in particular. testify to a
the need to anchor It firmly in (national) social relationships. Glo- complex multicausal logic of globalization. Rather, what has been
balization makes national SOCIal solidanty (as expressed in transfer argued here IS that, through the reconsutution of the world into a
payments to the old, the sick, the unemployed, and the lower smgle social space, that self-same historical process has now lifted
mcome groups) dysfunctional from the point of view of the rational off and moved into new terntory. If, previously, global mtegration
economic mterests of those who participate m the global economy. In the sense of a growing unification and interpenetration of the
This process IS being sharpened still further by recent policies of human condition was dnven by the economic logic of capital accu-
deregulation m the core countries, which encourage the globaliza- mulation, at present it IS the unification of the human condition that
non of small private investors and undercut the last remaining dnves the logic of further capital accumulation. It is a logic that
vestiges of national social solidanty. The privatization. for example, draws a new line m the sand, a new primary cleavage in the world
of pension schemes (a transition from 'defined benefit' or occupa- [
economy which is neither one between nations, nor between classes,
tional and state pension schemes, to 'defined contribution' schemes but mstead between those individuals and groups who can particrp-
or 'personal' pension schemes) is a case in point. ate m the timeless, 'spaceless' flows of money, production and con-
Thus, m the advanced countnes, the pressures for globalization sumption, and those who cannot, and who are thus, in the words of
(maintainmg liberal and deregulated markets for finance and trade, i Zygmunt Baumann, 'glebae adscnpti' - forcibly localized. Bau-
and resistance to policies of protection for national territonal eco- I: mann writes: 'The top of the new hierarchy is exterritorial; its
normc activities) come not just from a tiny group of international lower ranges are marked by varymg degrees of space constaints,
capitalists - that IS, from those dominant fractions of corporate while the bottom ones are, for all practical purposes, glebae
capital that have global mterests - but also from a broadly-based adscnpti.'42
stratum of society, the 13 per cent ofsemor citizens and those with an Neither does this SOCIOlogical take on globalization deny the role
eye to thetr pensionable future, whose contmued survival, to put It of political mtervention whether in the manner of its birth, or in the
bluntly, IS better secured m the rismg economies of the Far East than manner of its future denuse. What It does, however, IS to take issue
by reproduction ofthe labour power (and pension premiums paid) by with those who believe that the political actors (the global business
the shnnkmg younger generation that steps mto their shoes. As The elite and their supporting political classes in the nation-states) who
Economist has put It: 'Ageing populations m nch countnes and freer have contributed to ItS emergence can now be called upon to roll
flowing capital the world over are changmg the way people save and back the consequences of their ill-fated actions. For this IS the nub:
mvest. American and British instituuonal money IS flooding foreign once the structural power of global financianzed capital was put m
markets.'?' ThIS deterntonalization of economic rationality as It place successfully, It m turn began to limit the scope for action of
affects not just organized capital but also the mass of middle-class national governments whose previous policies made it happen. The
mdividuals in bourgeois SOCieties, IS a key consequence of globaliza- political dimension of globalization IS the subject of the next chapter.


My pnvilegmg of the sociological aspect of globalizatIon IS not to

deny the Importance of other factors, more especially the dynamics
Global Governance: Regulation and Impenalism 145

doing It wants to overcome ItS Marxist. 'structuralist' bearings, and

7 reintroduce the role of human agency into the formulation of what
constitutes a period of stable economic growth m WhICh cnsis ten-
dencies are contained and neutralized. In other words, they couple
stability with poliucal legitimacy, and. indeed. in more recent wnt-
Global Governance: ings, even WIth ecological balance. All this on an international scale.
As D. Leborgne and A. Lipietz put It:
Regulation and Imperialism
I On the ruins of Fordism and Stalinism, humankind IS at the
crossroads. No technological determinism will light the way. The
present industrial divide is first and foremost a politIcal divide.
The search for social compromise, around ecological constraints,
macroeconomic consistency, gender and ethnic equality, all medi-
ated by the nature and degree of political mobilization will decide
In Chapter 5 we began the story of the recent cnsis and transforma- the outcome ... The macroecononucs of the future may be based
non process by describing the principal features of a new techno- on a downward spiral of social and ecological competition,
econonuc paradigm of mdustrial production. and a new informa- leading to recurrent financial, business and environmental crises,
tional economy. These. however, constitute supply-side innova- or an ecologically sustamable and macroecononucaIly stable
tions. What about the demand side? FoIlowmg the perspectIve of model ... Radical economists and geographers may be part of
the Regulation School, we recaIl that long-term macro economic finding the better pathway, both by identifying the possibilitIes
stability also requires a resolution of the demand side of the equa- forprospenty ,and by criticizing unrealistic optimism for
non, with supply and demand together informing a 'regime of flexibility as a panacea. 1
accumulation'. Moreover, a regime of accumulation m turn will
only come about through an appropriate mode of regulation, m Their socio-political engagement has led many to judge, and reject,
the shape of relevant norms, habits and laws, as well as contemporary neo-liberal regimes as being mternally contradictory
governing mstitutions. Crucially, this mode of regulation describes and cnsis-prone, even if according to some they do appear to be
not only the mlcro-mstItutional context of the organization of pro- able to create a distmctrve ensemble of regulatory practices which is
ducuon and work, but also the macro-instItutiOnal context m WbICh reproducible m the medium term. Bob Jessop, for example, has most
expanded economic reproduction takes place, namely a coherent succinctly summarized tile emerging nee-liberal, postFordist mode
production-distribution and consumption relationship, of regulation, describing its various features m respect of the wage
There are three problems a theory of regulation has to address. The relation. the enterprise system. the money form. the consumption
first relates to Its notion of reproducibility, or of stability and sustam- sphere, and tile state form. The latter be identifies as the emerging
ability. The Regulation School rejects a mechanistic and deterrrunis- Schumpetenan workfare state which IS supply-side orientated. pro-
tIC form of theonzing, where, for example, one would deduce (and motes inter-nation compeution, displaces welfansm and uses SOCIal
thus predict) the emerging contours of a mode of regulation from an policy instruments 1I0t to generalize norms of mass consumption.
understanding of the 'logic' of the techno-econonuc paradigm and but rather to encourage flexibility and niche marketing for elite
the way this dnves the process of accumulation. Instead, the Regula- consumption, Meanwhile econormo powers of the nation-state are
tion School has reserved Its opmion about tile shape of things to 'hollowed out'. as powers are displaced upwards (to global and pan-
come by stressing the voluntaristic genesis of any mode of regulation regional bodies) and downwards (to local and sub-regional bodies)
asi the outcome of locally and historically specific struggles. In so which begin to integrate with one another in ways that by-pass the

146 Crtsis and Transformation Global Governance: Regulation and Imperialism 1147
nation-state? Such a regime may well balance production and con- by intertwining it with US national. industnal and financial ihter-
surnption at the level of the international economy as a whole, at ests through the medium of the Bretton Woods agreement and the
least in the medium tenn. But only by excluding ever-growmg establishment ofGATI, the IMF, the World Bank and the Ol:lCD.
segments of the world population from it, including large social These contained disturbances and mamtained a set of rules I, that
sectors in the core capitalist economies. stabilized the system through US overall hegernornc power (eco-
In the opmion of some regulatiomsts, such a social-rnmority- nomic and ideological, as well as political and military). The spread
focused regime of accumulation is not a regime of accumulation of the Fordist regime of accumulation to other countries coincided
proper, but a 'monstrosity' that needs weeding out as part of a WIth the strategic mterests of the US financial and mdustnal com-
political project to develop an alternative SOCial comprormse, an munity, and thus global Fordism formed an mtegral part of the US
alternative mode of SOCial regulation. Many favour a new 'institu- social transformation of Fordism Itself. s
tional fix' which separates the global from the local.' In this new Between 1970 and 1990 the scholarly Consensus was that the crisis
social compromise, social democracy would become embedded m of Fordism was accompanied by, and even contributed to, a decline
the sub-national 'local sphere', replacmg the national 'orgarncist' in US hegemony - that IS, the ability of the USA to 'make and
model of Fordist SOCial solidanty and democracy. In a recent contri- enforce the rules for world political economy'." Hegemony IS more
bution, Lipietz, for example, has described the characteristics of such than rule by a dommant state. It mvolves the acceptance by the
a new social compromise, but m the nature of such debates It does dommant strata m the states compnsmg the world system of a
not add up to more than a wish list of the good life. In the conclusion structure of values which they share With the dominant power,
of this book we shall take up this theme of an alternative political and which they regard as being legitimate and JUst. This US hege-
project implied m the separation of the global from the 10ca1. mony. or Pax Americana, was perceived to be declining, III a manner
The second problem relates to the question of where exactly IS the analogous to the decline of Pax Britannica, which had accompamed
space in which the macro-institutional context IS articulated? Is It the crises of the mterwar period in the 1920s and 1930s. US hege-
local, regional, national, supranational, or is It internauonal? Early monic decline was said to have been caused by a number of factors
regulation theory had taken ItS clues from the breakdown of the which mdicated a relative decline m America's material strength
structural coupling between Fordist production systems and Key- that had underpmned its hegemoruc position. For example, ItS loss
nesian welfare modes of regulation at the national level, and their of strategic nuclear dommance: its decline in conventional military
search for a new 'institutional fix' was at first directed at the national capabilities; ItS dimmished economic size m GNP per head relative
economic space. But with globalization the space problem has begun to other countries such as Japan, Germany and Sweden; its loss of
to inspire much of the so-called 'second generation' research agendas productivity and the erOSIOn of its lead m some areas of high techno-
of the Regulation School, with work focusing on the links between logy, With the gains gomg to Japan; ItS loss of influence m the UN
sub-national (for example, industrial districts), national, and supra- and other international orgamzauons; and its shift from bemg the
national (for example, the European space) and international levels." world's largest creditor nation to bemg its largest debtor nation."
The third, and related, problem IS the one that will occupy us in In this penod of the 'interregnum', much analysis in the disciplines
this chapter. It is a problem that anses from Regulation Theory's of mternational relations and of mternational political economy
ongmal scnpt reading of the golden age of Fordism and IS related to was devoted to speculation about plausible successors. For ex-
the question of global hegemony. Co-ordination of the mternational ample, some considered a possible role for Japan as a world leader
system of global Fordism was achieved under the hegemony of the (Pax Nippontcai.: others imagined the emergence of a multi-polar
USA. US hegemony first presented the Fordist model for develop- world order With balance of power being divided equally between
ment to other conntnes and then financed these conntnes with the three regional blocs? Again, others looked to an oligarchy of
Marshall Aid and MacArthur plans for setting up new regimes of powerful states that might concert their powers to underpin 'inter-
acccumulation. It institutionalized this international configuration national regimes' formulated under the auspices of international
148 CrISIS and Transformation Global Governance: Regulation and Impenalism 149

bodies.'" Some even hoped for a form of post-hegemonic multi- agenda-setting role within the WTO, the EU, the OECD and many
Iateralism in which there would be a broader diffusion of power other international forums that are busy deregulatmg and pnvatiz-
between a large number of collective forces, mcluding states, that 109 the world economy m the interest of transnational capital. To
might achieve some agreement on universal principles of an alter- give just two examples, the European Round Table of Industrialists
native order WIthout dominance, based on mutual recognition of (ERT), compnsing the leaders of forty-five key European TNCs has
distinct traditions of CIvilization. 11 largely been responsible for the EU's post-1992 move towards flex-
But behind these diverging speculations, or aspirauons, there was ibility, privauzation and deregulation, as well as Monetary Union
also common ground m so far as it was widely recognized that what WIthItS stnct controls over national fiscal pclicres.!" Meanwhile, the
was going on in the meantime was a restructurmg of state and capital US Council for International Business, which includes Just 150
relations toward a more globally integrated and competitive mar- senior-level private executives WIth IBM and AT &T in the lead,
ket-dnven system involving a transnational process of structural has played a key role m the formulation of the Multilateral Agree-
power and even of transnational class formation. ment on Investments (MAn proposals.!?
As Stephen Gill and David Law" have noted, there are elements
of a common perspective, or a hegernonic ideology, emerging on the
Global Governance and the Internationalization of the State role of international business and private enterpnse which cuts
across and umtes all these mstitunonal forums. At the heart of
Globalization restructures relations between state and capital. It has this 'neo-liberal' political project IS the idea that private property
led to what Robert Cox refers to as the zilternaliOllalizalioll of the and accumulation are sacrosanct, and that the prune responsibility
state, ill WhICh the state becomes a vehicle for transmitting the of governments IS to ensure 'sound finance" they must 'fight infla-
global market discipline to the domestic economy. 12 Cox argues that tion' and maintain an attractive 'business climate III which, among
the .globalization of the world economy gives nse to a global class other.things. the power ofumons IS circumscribed. These ideas both
and social structure that deeply affects the forms of state. He sugg- underpin, and are 'the result of, the 'structural power' of capital that
ests that globalization IS led by a transnational managenal class'" IS so internationally mobile that the investment climate of each
consisting of distmct fractions, but which together constitute what country IS Judged continually by business WIth reference to the
Susan Strange has called the mternational 'business crvilization' ,14 climate that prevails elsewhere.
The term 'business civilization', however, has a positive ethical Under the previous epoch of world order, under Pax Americana,
connotation that is arguably not warranted. It is perhaps better to there was also a world economy and internationalization of produc-
refer to a transnational business 'culture' of shared norms and tion, but the role of the state was still largely autonomous. States had
values that underpin and interweave With the structural power of the recognized responsibility for domestic economic progress and
transnauonal capital. Together these have become institutionalized capital accumulation. employment and welfare, under the aegis of
ill a,plethora of organizational forms and practices: Within interna- the hegemonic structure of the American-led Bretton Woods-
tional organizations such as the World Bank and the IMF; in managed world economy, which laid down the rules of mterstate
interstate summit agendas and agreements (for example GAIT, competition and co-ordination. All states, advanced and underdeve-
subsequently WTO) and other forms of co-operation between loped alike, had a recognized 'developmental' role. Although the
nations; Within emerging institutional forms of 'elite interaction' prevailing ideology was supportive of free markets and of the mter-
between members of the international business class, state bureau- nationalization of capital, it was nevertheless, as John Ruggie has
crats and members of international orgamzations." and WIthin the argued, a period of 'embedded' liberalism'? - that IS to say,
adriunistratlve bureaucracy of national governments. There IS a liberalism 'embedded' in the nation-state. This contrasts WIth pre-
growing body of resarch on the nature of these elite interactions sent-day globalization, which we might describe as a period of
and the manner in which a global business class performs an 'unembedded' liberalism.
150 Crisis and Transformation Global Governance: Regulation and Imperialism llSI

Good examples of the institutionalization of 'unembedded' liber- Although developmg countries. spearheaded by India, fought ard
alism may be gleaned from the Uruguay GATT agreements. during successive phases of the Uruguay round against both
concluded m 1994, in particular the protocols relating to so-called TRIMS and TRIPS, they eventually bowed to the hegemony of
'trade-related investment measures' (TRIMS) and 'trade-related the nee-liberal trade agenda. Nothing illustrates this better than
mtellectual property rights' (TRIPS). These circumscribe severely the agreed statement of the United Nations Conference on Trade
the sovereign rights of all states (including those of the developing and Development in February 1992: !

countries) to regulate foreign mvestment and external trade m the I

pursuit of perceived developmental needs." Under the TRIMS The Conference recognizes that the establishment and imple-
protocol, a number of domestic measures which used to be 'normal' mentation of internationally agreed standards of protection for
and 'accepted' elements in any development strategy must be intellectual property nghts ... should facilitate international
phased out - for example, local content requirements, domestic flows of technology and technology cooperation amongst all
sales requirements, trade balancing requirements, remlttance and participating nations, particularly to developing countries on
exchange restricnons." terms and conditions agreed to by the parties concerned., and
Equally corrosive of independent developmental state action is the notes the Important role of the World Intellectual Property
agreement on TRIPS. This agreement strengthens the international Organization and the important efforts in the ongoing GATT
property nghts of foreign investment and it extends intemational Uruguay Round negotiations in this regard. The Conference
patent protection to a whole range of products and processes pre- further recognizes that a national regime for the adequate
viously not subject to patent. Take. for example, genetic material and effective protection of intellectual property nghts IS
collected by agribusinesses or pharmaceutical companies. which are Important because it can create market incentives for indigenous
harnessed to fabricate a particular industnal process or product. mnovation and the transfer, adaptation and diffusion of
These processes and products may now be patented by the corpora- technologies.P
tions and sold back to the country in which the genetic material
originated. under international property nghts protection. Under Whereas, up to that tune UNCTAD had been the platform where
GATT provisions, the recipient country has to allow free competitive developing countries had always demanded adjustment of the inter-
entry for such processes and products. and, furthermore. It must national patent system to their development needs, It now expressed
prohibit the development and use by local companies of 'identical' the belief that adoption of adequate and effective Internauonal
products and processes. As Kevin Watkins has argued. this provision Patent Protection (IPP) laws and related efforts in WIPO, and
amounts to an act of unbridled piracy by transnational capital: GATT would facilitate technology transfers to developing coun-
tnes. 24
the main beneficianes will be the core group of less than a dozen If the Uruguay GATT agreement had already achieved a. far-
seeds and pharmaceutical companies which control over 70 per reaching dispensation for international capital to exercise ItS nghts
cent of the world's seeds trade ... this attempt to mcorporate mto over national econonuc mterests, the subsequent proposals for the
the GATT a biotechnology patentmg code dictated by corporate MAl, work on which was begun by the OECD and the WTO in
mterest appears an act of unbridled piracy. The overwhelnung 1995, attempted to complete the institutional framework in which
bulk of genetic materials used m the laboratories of western the rights of international investors and corporations would prevail
companies are derived from Third World crops and wild at all tunes, in all econonuc sectors and under all circumstances. For
plants ... Once incorporated into a patentable mvention. they the MAl not only sought to make It mandatory for all member
can become the property of the company which can claim royalty states to treat foreign mvestors at least as well as any local investor:
payments and restnct access to them, even clainung royalties It even wanted to prohibit all national or local policies that nught
when they are imported mto the country of origin." have unintended discrimmatory effects - for example, employment,
152 Crisis and Transformation Global Governance: Regulation and Imperialism 153

labour and human rights, and environmental protection policies. ctes (quangos), unaecountable and undemocratic, for this purpose.
The US Trade Secretary, Charlene Barshefsky, even went so far as When the Conservative government first took office in 1979, there
to argue that all forms of labelling of consumer products could. be were about 770 000 civil servants m government service, but by 1995
considered a 'political' act and hence be treated as contravenmg there were estimated to be only around 50 000.08
pro-competition rules. And while the MAl has temporarily been In the indebted developing world, privatization has been imposed
shelved thanks to a tremendously successful grassroots counter- by multilateral agencies within policy frameworks provided by
offensive culnunatmg in a veto by France, more or less identical structural adjustment programmes, The World Bank and the IMF
proposals have been resurrected through a different route, namely use the arguments of neo-Iiberalism to impose pnvatization. By
an IOECD-sponsored amendment to the IMF Articles of Agree- 1992, more than eighty countries around the world had privatized
ment which will force all member countries to accept the removal some 6800 previously state-owned enterprises, mainly monopoly
of all' bamers to international capital flows ' suppliers of essential public services such as water, electricity and
Hand m hand with the open trade and capital mobility agreements telecommunicanons.P Because of the fragility of domestic stock
fostered by the WTO and IMF, are the various structural adjustment markets in these countnes, the shares of these utilities were bought
policies imposed by the World Bank and the IMF upon indebted by international financial conglomerates. The same processes of
Third-World countnes since the 1980s. We shall examine these more global governance are m evidence m the former centrally-planned
closely in Chapter 8, but here It IS worth pomtmg to the novelty of the economies of Eastern Europe. In total, the value of global privat-
policy-based loans that have been devised since the 1980s. New loans izations in the developing and former socialist world amounted to
to help countries to payoff old debts are only disbursed if countries over US$58 billion between 1988 and 1995.30
followed strict policy guidelines on how to introduce overall struc-
tural reforms of their economies. They are no longer related to
investment programmes, as in conventional project lending. Further- Globalization and Globalism
more, the underlying, or overarching, nee-liberal ideology ensures
cross-referencing of separate negotiations between individual coun- From the point of view of theory, we may conceptualize the emer-
tries with different international institutions. The government of gmg governance by the global capitalist class as a complex process
India went m the mid-1990s, begging bowl in hand, to the World which institutionalizes structural power through the widespread
Bank and the IMF. and returned with a deregulation and liberal- adoption of cultural values and legitnnating ideology. But this
ization deal (the New Economic Policy) that included the signmg of legitunatmg ideology, while often parading under the banner of
the GATT 1994 agreement as part of the package." 'deregulation', draws governments into an ever-widening circumfer-
The structural, and indeed institutionalized power of transna- ence' of 'regulation' m the form of policy initiatives and legislation.
tional capital has not Just informed the policy agenda oLderegula- These include monetary and fiscal policies, industrial legislation,
tion, it IS also responsible for the drive towards privattzation of the SOCial policies, the restructunng of the welfare state, and even the
state sector in alJ countries of the world. Throughout the 1980s, the reconstitution of social obligations: for example, an ideological
advanced countries witnessed a vigorous policy of privauzatton of attack on alternative lifestyles, and priontization of traditional
th~ public sector involving, first, public utilities, and then welfare family values through social policy initiatives."
services, In Britain, for example, in the 1980s, a total of £60 billion The difficulty for any theorist of regulation IS that the forms of
of ~tate assets were sold at knock-down prices to the pnvate sec- regulation of the new epoch are - compared with the past - qum-
torl 27 In addition, Bntain has pioneered 'government by contract', tessentially a form of deregulatIOn. That is the paradox. Deregula-
or [arm's-length' government, which involves the government con- tion in one sense Implies a dismantling of state-sponsored forms of
tracting out to the pnvate sector everything from the issuing of regulation of the domestic market, a shrinking of the public sector,
passports to the pnson services, setting up quasi-independent agen- even a diminution of the public domain. Yet, at the same time,

154 Crisis and Transformation Global Governance: Regulation and Impenalism.l 155

national governments adjust their economies to globalization by that develops outside of human agency, ccnditionmg and li itmg
regulating for deregulation. It is this confusion over regulation the scope for action of individuals and collectivities alike, ~e they
and deregulation that explains why there is so much controversy J
nation-states or local groups. Globalism as an ideology adds belief
within international relations theory and mternational political in the inescapobility of the transnationalization of economic and
economy literature between those who hold so called 'declinist' financial flows to the existing credos of neo-liberalism, namely the
views of the nation-state, and those who observe a strengthemng belief in the efficiency of free competitive markets and the be~ef that
of national authority. tlus efficiency will maximize benefits for the greatest number of
In an impressive book, The Trouble with Capitalism, Harry Shutt people in the long run. These beliefs are based on what [Pierre
catalogued the many ways m which state policy in the OECD Bourdieu has described as "doxa' - 'an evidence not debated and
countries since the late 1970s has been geared towards keeping the undebatable'<' I
return on finaucial assets high, whatever the cost to the underlying
economy and the livelihoods of ordinary people. His argument is
that. while capitalism has always been blessed (or has blessed Itself) Globalization and US Strategic Dominance
with a ruling class m power that would look after Its interests, today
the dominant form of capital is the financial form (which, as we However, I would argue that the globalism discourse does more
have seen before, is most completely globalized), and hence public than this: It also serves to obscure the fact that global capitalism IS
policy is predicated on helping to maintain the value of financial an American political project serving the interests primarily lof US
assets as contrasted and even opposed to those of productive and capital and the US domestic economy. Set against a backdrop of
commercial assets. Shutt's list of policies include bail-outs, as m the twenty years of alleged US hegemomc decline, and the consequent
US government's bail-out of the Savings and Loans disaster in the perceived problematic of global governance, globalization is usually
late 1980s, and the more recent bail-out of the hedge fund LTCM; presented as an anarchic, chaotic. crisis-prone process in WhICh 'the
government purchases of securities on the stock markets: radical power of flows take precedence over the flows of power' in Castells'
reforms of the pension fund regulations, moving them from pay-as- elegant phrase." Global financial markets are variously described
you-earn systems to other schemes run by private financial institu- as being irrational, unpredictable and out of control. Recurrent
nons and invested on the stock markets; tax breaks to investors and cnses such as the Mexican peso crisis of 1994, the Asian financial
savers: repeal of legislauon that forbade the buy-back of shares by cnsis of 1997, and the subsequent financial collapse of Russia, are
companies; curtailment ofcapital gains: cuttmg mterest rates to help all presented as testimony to the dnverless machme that globaliza-
unfortunate speculators to borrow money at lower rates to 'close' tion has become. I
their positions: and, most importantly, political legitimation of all There are other ways of looking at this driverless rnachiner In an
of the above through the dispersal of share ownership." Important book, provocatively titled, The Global Gamble: Waslllllg-
The active regulation and SOCIal manipulation by governments so ton's Faustian Bid jar Global Dominance, Peter Gowan notes that
as to adjust their economies and societies to the forces of globaliza- most ofthe literature on globalization, on international regimes and
tion IS an entirely political project that is coherently, even if falsely, on general developments m the international political economy have
framed m an ideology that IS perhaps best summed up as the SImply iguored the great levers of American power. 35 He argues that
ideology of 'globalism'. The distinction between globalization and there IS a dynamic, dialectical relationship between private actors in
globalism IS all-important. Whereas globalization is an objective, internanonal financial markets and US government dollar policy.
real historical process which marks. m a sentence, the ascendancy of He calls this interface the Dollar-Wall Street Regime (DWSR). In
real-time, trans-border economic actrvity over clock-time economic chronological order. key features of this DWSR were deliberately
activity (whether domestic or trans-border), globalism IS the reifica- put m place. first by US President Richard Nixon when he insisted
non of this process of globalization as some mcta-historical force on the recycling of petro-dollars through the Atlantic's' world
156 'Crisis and Transformation Global Governance: Regulation and Imperialism 157

pnvate banks (led by US banks at that time), and next by Nixon's 1. Since the early 1980s. net capital InflOWS mto the USA have
strategy of 'liberating' international financial markets, replacing continuously exceeded net outflows. and yet at the same time,
American hegemony based on direct power over states to a more the economy has frequently been a net exporter of FDI. 42 What
market-based or structural form of power." Then came US control this implies is that US corporate capital has unique advantages
over iMFIWorld Bank and the subsequent Washington Consensus of leverage. being able to mvest and control direct investments
(under President Carter), m which the US government developed abroad while also being able to raise the funds for it from debt
ways] of extending the influence of Wall Street over international m perpetuity.
finance without putting its own big commercial banks at risk: 2. In the short period between 1994 and 1998. US corporations
'Washington discovered that when its international financial oper- resumed their previous commanding heights m the .worldwide
ators! reached the pomt of insolvency through their internationa] corporate hierarchy, with five corporations m the top ten (up
activities. they could be bailed out by the populations of the bor- from three in 1994); thirty-five in the top 100 (up from twenty-
rower countries at almost no significant cost to the US economy', 37 three), and 187 m the top 500. up from 12543 - there are no
Third, under the Reagan and Bush Administrations there came the prizes for guessing that the outcome of the East Asian cnsis,
yo-yoing dollar-yen policy from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s. when currencies collapsed and businesses were bankrupted, was
when first the yen was made to nse against the dollar. drrving that US corporations were particularly well-placed to pursue
Japanese companies into East ASia. and then a forced reversal of take-over acuvity."
this exchange rate was followed by an imposed liberalization of the 3. The greater the volatility of the global financial system. and
East !Asian capital markets." These policies may well be argued to hence the greater the perceived risks. the more the 'safe haven"
have i caused the financial collapse that ensued, And finally, this effect kicks in. The nsk premium spread on mtemational secu-
agam was followed by IMF rescue packages. widely condemned rrues is now m the region of 1500 basis points between Wall
but supported and upheld by the USA with very convenient con- Street and many 'emerging' stock markets" This has led some
sequences for US corporations and the US domestic economy 39 stock-market analysts to claim that the Amencan stock market
Attempts by Japan and China (with strong support from govern- is even now 'undervalued'. In any case. the consensus of aca-
ments m the region) to establish an Asian Monetary Fund to demic opinion is that the relanonslnp between stock perform-
stabilize the currencies of the affected countnes were immediately ance on Wall Street and economic growth has become
scuppered by the USA 4 0 We shall examine these issues more fully in essentially 'patterntess'." Whatever the US economy does,
Chapter 10, money from all over the world will go into Amencan stocks,
Thus. mstead of bemg au unstoppable force of nature against 4. The US dollar enjoys unnvalled dominance in the global finan-
which every nation-state IS powerless. Gowan argues compellingly cial markets, on allY count: in 1995 It compnsed 61.5 per cent of
that the process of globalization has been driven relentlessly by all central bank foreign exchange reserves; It was the currency in
deliberate US Treasury and business interests m a conscious bid to which 76.8 per cent of all international bank loans and 39.5 per
extend strategic dominance over the world economy, cent of all international bond Issues were denominated: It con-
Since the early 1990s. this reassertion of US power over stituted 44.3 per cent of all Eurocurrency deposits; It served as
the iPtemational economy has begun to pay dividends for the the invoicing currency for 47.6 per cent of world trade: and it
American economy. Joe Quinlan, a senior analyst for was one of the two currencies in 83 per cent of all foreign
the ~mencan investment bank Morgan Stanley, fears .that global- exchange transacuons.f'.As Antomo Negri aptly stated: 'Money
IZatIOn might be commg to an end precisely because 'no one has has only one face. that of the boss, ,48 No less a person than the
reaped more benefits from globalization than the United States and US President, Bill Clinton hunself, has adrmtted that there IS a
Co~orate America'."! Here are just a few examples of how the US so-called 'seigneurial' advantage to the dollar's key currency -
econrmy has benefited from its super power position: and mternational creditor status. This means that the US effect-

158 CrISIS and Transformation Global Governance: Regulation and Imperialism 'I 159

ively gets a zero-interest loan when dollar bills are held abroad. politician's dream of intervention, the more effectively the idedlogy
In the President's Economic Report of 1999 this seigneurial works. Indeed, the very accusation that markets behave 'irration-
advantage was estimated to amount to $13 billion dollars per ally'. as when, for example, stock markets m East ASia collapse
year." In other words, this is a 'gift' from the world to the US despite the economic fundamentals of the affected economies
every year to an amount that is about twice the level of total reportedly being sound, and nobody could have expected. or did
'official' lending and grants to the whole of Sub-Saharan Africa expect, it. the more people believe m God or 'neutral' market forces
m anyone year. commanding their destmies, rather than politIcal thuggery. The very
5. Linked to this there IS the huge and continuing benefit of net notion that global financial markets are subject to speculative beha-
capital inflows that permit the perpetual running of a current- VIOur of which nobody approves (least of all the leading speculators
account deficit. Commentmg on the large capital mflows, the themselves: for example, George Soros)," the very admission that
American President put the srtuation very clearly 'The invest- nobody, not even the cleverest men and women at the Bank for
ment boom that the US enjoyed since 1993... the growth of International Settlements, quite understands how the financial mar-
output and employment ... would all have been smaller had the kets 'work' - all this adds up to a great narrative and theatre behind
US not been able to run a current account deficit m the 1990s.'50 which real power, push and bullymg hides. The American political
Many commentators of the 'new economy' paradigm (see Chap- scientist. Samuel Huntmgton, m an article m 1999, catalogues a full
ter 5) have noted the importance of 'venture capital' m the USA page of US bullymg tactics that were applied at the latter end of the
that has been there at the right time to enable the super-smart 1990s, including the targeting of thirty-five countnes with economic
Silicon boys to get going. 51 And venture capital IS what the USA sanctions." Last. but not least, the resurgence of US strategic
has in abundance, but It would not have It had the USA not been dominance IS also in evidence Within those mternational forums of
the pole of attraction for monies from all over the world. There elite interaction we have described above, and which some analysts
is a parallel here with what economic historians such as Panl have identified as a platform for a new form of global regulation.
Baran used to say about the decisive roJe played by economic The World Bank and the IMF are dominated by the USA as a
surplus expropnated through mercantile adventures from for- consequence of a system of voting rights that IS weighted according
eign lands dunng the industrialization of Bntain 5 2 If indeed to economic SIZe and contribution, while the WTO, which prides
there proves to be such a tlung as a 'new economy', begmnmg Itself in being an entirely democratic mstitution of over 130 nations
in America in the 1990s, future economic historians may With a one-member-one-vote system, arrives at decisions through a
well attribute a similar decisive role to the abundance of 'consensus' approach m which the capacity of large nations who can
foreign surplus capital that flowed mto the USA at this precise afford many legal experts and permanent representations has power
time. over outcomes of deliberations. Such capacity IS all that matters.
For example. m 1997-8 the USA brought more disputes than the
The fiction that all of this IS the product of a historrcal accident IS rest put together, and achieved more settlements m its favour (ele-
constantly bemg peddled. The US economy Just 'happens' to be the ven out of fifteem." Dunng the ill-fated MAl drafting, the USA
largest economy in the world; people all over the world have 'con- added over 600 pages of exceptions for itself. including a general
fidence' ill the dollar (as the American President puts it); globaliza- exceptIon for all Its federal, state and local laws.56
tion IS creating a level playing field m which the most productive
economy with the most competitive conditions wins. and so on.
Here is where the globalist discourse performs its most important Imperialism and Hegemony
function: it is designed to make people believe m fair play, and what
could be fairer than the neutral forces of the market? The more we What has been described as the 'deafenmg silence over imperial-
can be persuaded that 'the markets' control events beyond any ism,57 is probably the most cunmng achievement of neo-liberal
160 Cnsis and Transformation Global Governance: Regulation and Imperialism 161

brainwashing that has accompanied US corporate control over the Menwith Hill), but completely under the control of the Amencan
world economy, Imperialism exists whenever there IS deliberate Security Agency."
transnational political interference, including (though not exclu- It further explains why, since the collapse of the Soviet Union and
srvely) military intervention, for the purposes of the mobilization, the end of the Cold War, the USA has negotiated 'access' arrange-
extraction and external transfer of economic surplus from one ments for troop and equipment deployment m thIrty-eIght countnes
political terntory to another. Those who argue that imperialism is (thirty m the Third World), m addition to the hundred bases in
stnctly a feature of interstate relations and therefore no longer on SIxteen foreign lands that it already possessed, As Dame! Shirmer
the agenda of capitalism under the conditions of globalization" writes, the reasons for this type of US 'forward deployment' m the
simply miss the point that capitalism at all times produces a network Third Worldhav,e to do WIth what the Pentagon calls 'challenges to
of hierarchical relations m which the wealth of some areas. groups regional stability', but they also have direct commercial advantages.
or peoples are dependent on the transfer of economic sur- and he quotes a senior Pentagon official:
plus, and hence the underdevelopment of other areas, groups and
people, We are protecting those countnes and they owe us, Don't think It
In the age of globalization. imperialism manifests Itself m ways does not Come up m our trade negotiations. It gives us leverage.
that are m some respects distinct from. and additional to, other The Japanese know we are protecting their investments in Korea.
forms of unpenalism that have accompanied, respectrvely, pre- Taiwan, and all over ASia, and that gets their attention when we
colomal, colomal and neocolomal times. For globalization, as we ask them for money. For years we had an understanding with
have seen, IS linked systemically WIth SOCIal exclusion, meanmg that Taiwan that If an Amencan company's bid came within 10
as globalization proceeds. more and more social groups. segments percent of a Japanese bid. we could get the contracts. They would
of population, as well as whole areas and regions, are bemg tell us: 'The Japanese make It better, but you're protecting US,62
excluded from ItS benefits,
Tills has two implications for the type of impenalist mtervention Second, SOCIal exclusion within nations builds up pressures for the
that we see happenmg around us. First, it makes more (and not less) territorial expulsion of excluded groups. The resultmg spectre of
pressmg the need for state-sponsored and militarily-backed strategic economic and political refugees m turn threatens the social stability
control over vital resources ill foreign lands, as host nations ill the of the rich natrons to which they 11ee. In this way, globalization,
periphery collapse into zones of instability, and fracture into nval paradoxically, remforces the need to maintain. at all costs, the de
factions and groups, warlordism and banditry. Tills would explain Jure mterstate system and to uphold the legal sovereignty of states
the USA's increasingly belligerent geopolitical preparedness around (while crushmg them politically, and wiping them out economic-
the world. Notably, III 1999 alone. there has been: the enlargement ally), so as to enforce the obligations of states to keep withm their
of NATO to reach a new line of defence from Estoma to Bulgana; a borders the people who carry their passports. Here IS where the 'new
new dispensation of NATO's strategic defence commitment. which doctrine of internatIonal community', coined by the British Prime
now includes 'out of area' operations: a revised US-Japan security Minister. Tony Blair, in hIS speech on the eve of NATO's fiftieth
alliance, which commits Japan's military to an actively supportrve anniversa~l comes Into its own. The 'new doctrine' overrides the
role in the event of US mvolvement m any conflict breakmg out m UN Secunty Council's general principle of non-interference m those
the rareas surrounding Japan' Tills revised secunty pact has rightly cases where domestic human rights abuses present 'threats to inter-
been dubbed: 'the ASian corollary of Nato d 9 Next. there IS the new national peace and security'. 63 The application of this doctrine,
ThJatre Defence Missile Defence system m East ASla.60 and the more aptly. dubbed the 'new military humanism' by Noam
new 'son of Star Wars' project, the US$100 billion Nauonal Missile Chomsky'" m the recent war over Kosovo IS an example that is
De~ence system, the super-sensitive electronic surveillance centre of set to be followed by others,
which IS located high on the Yorkshire moors in the UK (at RAF
162 Cnsis and Transformation

By the end of the 1990s It appeared that the long penod of cnsis and
transformation of the world capitalist system had at last come to
some sort of conclusion. New production technologies and new THE POSTCOLONIAL
product innovations have combined with a reconfigurauon of the
map of the world economy through processes of globalizatlon to WORLD
create a new market equilibnum. A new, social rather than geo-
graphic, core-periphery ltlerarchy has developed which enables
minonty segments of the Third World to participate m the benefits
of this new capitalist world economy, together with majority popu-
lations m Its traditional heartlands. But this reconfignratlon draws
an ever-sharper divide between those who are in and those who are
outside it. The longer-term lHlsustainability of this world order is
witnessed in mcreasmgly chaotic disturbances, violence and conflict
m the periphery. International regulation of the globalized core of
the world economy has drawn in the political class of nch countnes
and many poor countnes alike m abandoning national programmes
of econorruc development and social solidarity m favour of interna-
tional competitiveness and transnational engagement. While the
structural power of international capital has become interwoven
with a culture of 'international busmess civilization' to become
instltutionalized in international regimes of governance of the
IMF, World Bank and the WTO, none of this adds up to a stable,
sustainable regime of geogovernance. Instead, new forms of US
Imperialism have taken hold, both to direct global markets and
the globalist imperative, and to confront and subjugate the crises
in the penpheries. Whether all this adds up to a new US 'hegemony'
IS a moot point, and remains for the time being open-ended. The
USA prefers to have its geostrategic. and particularly ItS military,
operations conducted with the full consent of its NATO allies, and
the role of Britam, for the moment at least, seems to be as a bridging
partner to an often reluctant European Union. We shall return to
this question of the hegemonic nature of US resurgence m the
conclusion to this book, when we discuss possible scenarios for
the future.

In Part IT we described the transformatrve directions of the world

capitalist system. While it is over-ambitious to pID one label on the
totality of all the complex, interactive changes, some writers never-
theless suggest that these changes add up to a transformation of
capitalism from its modern stage to a postmodern stage. j This stage
is characterized by new, flexible systems of production; a predom-
mance of high-tech industries: econonuc. enterprise orientation
towards mche markets and consumerism: globalization of markets
and of forms of regulation; fictitious capital formation; and the
ascendancy of a hegemonic neo-liberal ideology.
Crucially, as Fedric Jameson has argued, this transformation
does not penmt developmg countries to complete the project of
modernity. For international capital, moving rapidly from one
low-wage situation to the next, only cybernetic technology and
postmodern investment opportunities are ultimately attractive. Yet,
ill the new international system, few countries can seal .themselves
off in order to modernize ill their own tune and at their own pace.
Thus the disappearance of the 'Third World' is a constitutional I
feature of postmodern, or what I prefer to call - globalized capital-
Acknowledging that the Third World is no longer a umtary
category or has a homogeneous identity, the aim ill this part of
the book is to capture the differential unpact on, and responses to,
globalization m those regions of the world that used to be gathered
under the label 'Third World'. Nevertheless, in describing those
regions and those responses as 'postcolomal' I borrow a theoretical
concept for which I first must give some Justification and offer
clarification. For what indeed is the pomt of erasmg one unitary
label, only to scribble in another?
Part of the answer, pragmatically, lies m the popularity that the
concept enjoys today. And since a central purpose of this book is to
introduce key contemporary trends and issues, I cannot ignore the

166 The Postcolonial World Introduction 1167
rising tide, even institutional endorsement." of postcolonial studies, torical analysis by which the epochal succession IS diagnosed. Need-
which claims as Its special provenance the field that used to go by less to say, this has led to largely fruitless debates between the two
the name of 'Third World studies' or 'development studies', camps,
But over and above this, I do believe that the concept has heur- In her critique of postmoderrusm. Ellen Meiksms Wood reminds
istic value because of its timeliness: it has entered the lexicon of us of how the sociologist C. Wright Mills had formulated! this
development studies simultaneously as the product of. engagement intellectual conundrum: the crisis of reason and freedom which
with, and as contestation of globalization. In the reshuffled order of marked the onset of the postmodern age. he said. presented 'struc-
the global economy, where First Worlds have appeared in the Third tural problems. and to state them requires that we work in the
World, and Third Worlds m the First World, postcolonial studies claSSIC terms of human biography and epochal history, Only in
opens up three windows. or angles of VISion. First, such such terms can the connections of structures and milieux that affect
studies dispute that one can infer 'identity' by looking at matenal these values today be traced and causal analyses be conducted"
, relations alone. The politics of cultural identity and recognition But, comments Meiksins Wood, 'this statement IS in nearly every
\, have become as Important as the politics of redistribution: and. as particular anti-thetical to the current theones of postmodernity
N ancy Fraser argues. they can support the politics of redistribu- which effectively deny the very existence of structure and structural
tIOn3 Second. postcolomal studies puts a referent emphasis on the connections and the very possibility of "causal analysis" 6 Exactly

\ cultural 'complexity of identity formation. Cross-border migrations so, and thus it is With postcolonial theory! In fact, much of the ,
have resulted m fragmentation and heterogenous rruxes of belong- debate surrounding the use of the term 'postcolomal' repeats muta- '
ing, and loyalties and political allegiances. in which class and nation lis mutandis the debates around the term 'postrnodem'.
have become 'decentred' as a source of identity. Third. postcoloni- With regard to postmodermsm, those wnters who have engaged
alism is suggestive and reflexive of a world no, longer structured with it from a historical structural. or Marxist, perspecuve, - for
along binary axes, be they First World/Third World; North/South. example, David Harvey and Fednc Jameson - have done so by
East/West or SOCialist/capitalist. resorting to the only theoretical opuon available under the circum-
The concept IS. however, far from bemg unproblematic. While It stances, namely to distmguish between postmodernism as 'condi-
seems to be succeeding in 'destabilizing' the development debate. It non' and postmodernism as 'critique'. And. again, so It is with the
has also been accused of intellectual escapism and critical paralysis: concept 'postcolonial'. Following Arif Dirlik, who has tried to bnng
Let us first examme the concept and these debates more fully before the postcolonial discourse into the arena of global political eco-
deciding on how we can best make use of It in orgamzmg the nomy," I mtend to treat postcolonial discourse as a 'cultural condi-
chapters m this part of the book. tion' or 'logic' that corresponds to the specific geopolitical and
economic configuration of what we have earlier referred to as post-.
modern or globalized capitalism. In short, we shall understand what'
The Postcolonial: Condition and Discourse 'postcolonial' is from an understanding of how, and why it all began.
Based on a stnct semantic mterpretation one would tlunk that the
The term 'postcolorual' is a member of a family of 'post' literature. of word 'postcolonial' refers to the penod after independence - that IS,
which 'postmodernism' IS the all-embracing genenc term. And, as IS after formal colonialism has ended. Yet this is not what the term IS
the case with all this 'post' literature, the word 'p~st.JlUlls us mto a intended to mean now. Ella Shohat, in her cnsp interrogation of the
semantrc trap. It expresses an eprstemologicakbreak "with the all- concept, describes It as 'a designation for cntical discourses which the-
encompassmg totality of Western thought andscientific tradition matize Issues emerging from colorual relations and their aftermath,
while also SIgnalling an epochal sequentiality. The problem, how- covering a long historical span (including the present)." This also
ever. is that those who make the epistemological break reject covers, pointedly, the postindependence, neocolonial, period which
the 'foundationalism' and the 'essentialism that underpms the his- was stabilized under the American-led Bretton Woods postwar order.
168 Th~ PostcO/Ollia/ World Introduction 169

Thusl 'postcolonial' implies a movement going beyond ann-colonial In First-World academe, Third-World scholars found a welcome
natronalist theory as well as a movement beyond a specific point in home and symbiotic environment in the burgeoning discipline, and
history, that of colonialism alldTlurd-World nationalist struggles. polemics, of 'cultural studies'. Cultural studies began as literature
Noting how historical specificity collapses under chronological critique in English literature and linguistics departments, as did
diversity, Shohat asks, somewhat impatiently, 'When, exactly, then, postcolonial studies subsequently. The central terrain and mode of
does the "post-colonial" begin?" To which ArifDirlik quips, 'When quesnonmg in studies such as The Empire Writes Back,!3 Colonial
d O
Third World mtellectuals have arnved m First World academe Discourse and Postcolonial TheOli 4 and Decolonistng the Mind'?
The term originated, in the mid-1980s, among Tlurd-World scholars are literature and literature criticism. Tlns too matches the careers
In First-World universities. who were caught up m diasporic err- of Third-World intelligentsia, many of whom first found a voice
cumstances caused by the crisis of the Tlurd World and the failure through literary wrinng.!"
of the developmental and democratic project m many Third-World Cultural studies, in Raymond Williams' claSSIC definition, invest-
countnes. Whether forced into exile, or as voluntary emigres, they igates the creation of rneanmg m, and as a formative part of, a
have regrouped around a discourse of identity that owes less to whole way of life, the whole world of sense-making (descnptions, I
geographicJocation and national origin than to subject POSIt 1011. This explanations, interpretations, valuations of an kinds) in societies
confluence of historical and biograplucal details explains much of understood as historical material organizations.'? Its terrain of
the epistemology and substantive theory that was to emerge. inquiry IS 'mass' or 'popular' culture in an Its manifestations: lan-
As Arif Dirlik notes, the release of postcoloniality from the fixity guage, film, magazines, TV soap operas, shopping, advertising and
of Third-World location. means that the identrty of the postcolonial so on. It IS political and polemical (and massively irritating to
IS no, longer structural but discursive. That IS to say, It IS the parti- structural Marxists) in so far as It argues that the masses are not
cipation m the discourse that defines the postcolonial. The postco- merely passive recipients of a culture wickedly designed by capital- \
Ilonia'l discourse or critique resonates With concerns and orientattons IStS to suck them.into consumensm, exploitation and subjugation,
I that have their origins in a new world situation created by transfor- but instead are actively participating and contributing. Their parti- -v.,
mations witlun the capitalist world economy, by the emergence of cipation can be deliberate, creative, selective and even subversive. f-
what has vanously been described as 'global capitalism', 'flexible Culture IS also the vehicle or medium whereby the relationship
production", 'late capitalism' and so on, terms that have disorga- between groups IS transacted. The emancipatory promise and pur-
nized earlier conceptualizations of global relations, especially rela- pose of cultural studies IS to discover resistance and subversive
tions comprehended earlier by such binaries as colonized/colomzer, creativity m the cultural relationship between dominant and sub-
First WorldlThird World, and 'the West and the Rest', m all of ordinated groups, and help to reverse it, as when Frantz Fanon once
I which the nation-state was taken for granted as the global unit of argued that Europe is literally the creation of the Third World.
I political orgamzation.. .'
But here comes the epistemologICal twist: even as postcolonial
. Cultural studies does this first by deconstructing the texts, words,
names, labels and definitions of the situation that have been
discourse thus engages with global times, postcolonial cnttcs, with authored by the dominant groups, and next by givmg people of an
few exceptions, do not interrogate that relationship because they subordinated groups - women, blacks, gays, peasants and indigen-
repudiate a foundational role to capitalism III history." By ignormg ous peoples - their voices back through a 'new historicism', or
the political economy approach they have invited cnticism of being through a new style of anthropology, as in ethnographic accounts
apoytical and ahistorical, and even complicit m the 'consecration of of local cultural practices of resistance and protest. Third, cultural
hegemony' ,12 studies IS emancipatory in so far as It links, through its interven-
\ nons, the experience of these diverse SOCial groups, and potentially
S6 much for the 'condition' ofpostcoloniality. Let us now turn to
postcolonial discourse, or postcolonial critique, Itself. brokers new political alliances between them.

170 The Postcolonial World Introduction

Within this broad field and style ofenquiry, postcolonial discourse Postcolonial Formations
nestled organically to engage m a radical rethmk and reformulation i
of forms of knowledge and SOCIal identities authored and authonzed One does not have to buy into the whole of the postcolonial discourse
by colonialism and Western domination. For example, It critiques to appreciate that the concept has merits in helping us to understand
both the idea and the practice of 'development' as well as the concept the diversity of development and underdevelopment trajectories m
of the Thud World as part of a Eurocentnc discourse of control and these global times. It IS the colonial and neocolonial expenence land
subordination. Much of this literature rewrites and 'counter-appro- the manner in which the aftermath interacts With globalization,",that
priates' the history of the 'subalterns' (the subordinated 'others'), illummates the different outcomes, namely a different postcolonial
makmg their voices of resistance heard (past and present), reversing formation m various parts of the world system at the same tune. As
onentalist thought, and decolonizing the mind. The goal is to undo the titles of these chapters suggest, we shall stndy these different
all partitioning strategies between centre and periphery as well as all forms of the postcolomal condition in four major zones of the
other 'binarisrns that are the legacy ofcolonial ways of thinking, and world. While the word "zone' still carries WIth It a notion of area-
to reveal societies globally in their complex heterogeneity and con- specific location, there is nevertheless a certam fluidity and ambiguity
tmgency. In this way, postcolomal discourse alms to reconstruct the between the area-referennal emphasis and the subject-positional one.
identities of subordinated peoples, give them back their pride of place Thus, in Cbapter 8, we loole at the penpheralizmg consequences
m history, and with it the confidence to build on the record of their of globalization prevalent in many parts of the Third World, but we
own 'hybrid position of practice and negotiation' 18 focus on how these have become exemplified and, in a manner of
The concept of 'hybridity' occupies a central place m postcolonial speaking, bave gone furthest in Sub-Saharan Afnca. Debt, and
discourse and It IS a good example of the 'reverse value-coding' that deregulation following punitive structural adjustment programmes,
Gyan Praleash speales of as one of the strategies of the discourse. 19 In have more tightly integrated the wealth of many Tlurd-World elites
colonial days, 'hybridity was a term of abuse, signifying the lowest m the global economy, while emasculating politically the states in
possible form of human life: mixed 'breeds' who were 'white but not these regions, thus undermmmg their capacity to relaunch 'any
quite' 20 In postcolomal discourse, by contrast, hybridity IS celeb- national territorial developmental project. Moreover, the ImpOSI-
rated and privileged as a kind of supenor cultnral mtelligence non of the neo-liberal orthodoxy, coupled WIth tbe insistence on
through the advantage of 'in-betweenness', the straddling of two electoral reform and democracy, has not only underrruned the state
cultnres and the consequent ability to 'negotiate the difference'. but has also contributed directly to tbe descent into anarchy and
Remterpeting Fanon. for example, HOlm Bhabha argues that the CIvil war of many countnes in Africa. The ensumg political emer-
liberatory 'people' who mitiate the productive instability of revolu- gencies have drawn m the international donor cornrnunity m a form
tionary cultural change are themselves the bearers of hybrid iden- of contamment activity that may be summed up as the management
tlty.2l In development studies, an analysis m terms of hybrid cultures of exclusion rather tban a programme of development and mcor-
leads to a reconceptualization of established views. Namely that, poration. It IS a management of exclusion that IS becommg char-
rather than being eliminated by modernity, many 'traditional cul- actenstic of the manner m which other areas at the edge of'the
tnres' survive through their transformative engagement With global system are also being treated.
moderruty.P In the ensumg chapters of this book we shall encounter In Chapter 9 we examine the postcolorual condition of militant
illustrations of this 'hybridization' in each of the 'zones' of develop- Islam. We argue that the failure of the neocolomal, developmental-
ment that we shall be discussing, whether It be the Confucianization 1St period has interacted WIth the historical cultural tradition of
of modernity, as in East ASIa, or the postdevelopment trajectories of Islamic spiritual renewal and ItS subjection to cultnral imperialism.
Latm-American peasant communities and slum dwellers. feeding a process of cultural denial of globalization and modernity.
While we sball not develop the theme of its resonance m other parts
of tbe world, including the diasponc Muslim communities of tbe
172 The Postcolorual World
West. It IS dear that this anti-developmental postcolomal posinon,
again, IS one m which the area referent and subject positron become 8
fused. The anu-devetopmentatism of militant Islam IS different m ItS
origins and expression from both the managementofexclusion m Sub-
Saharan Afnca and the postdevelopment response m Laun Amenca.
The global process of transformation IS neither even nor unop-
posed. In Chapter 10 we look at the expenence of the 'dev-
Africa: Exclusion and the
elopmental' states in East Asia which testify to the possibilities of
national territorial accumulation and defensive regional alliances. It
Containment of Anarchy
IS an experience that owes as mnch to the end of the Cold War and
Pax Americana as it does to the very same historical process of
capitalist expansion and integration that penpheralized and margin-
alized other areas and communities m the world system. Here too
there are lessons to be learnt from the locally-specific contestation
ofthis postcolorual condition that may hold out the promise of Debates on Sub-Saharan Afnca (SSAj usually begin with a "enu-
successful replication m other areas of the periphery of the global ,I flexion, to .the size and vanety of the continent, and the conse~uent
system too. I unpossibility of making generalizatIOns. Yet once such qualifica-
Chapter 11 looks at Latm America, where the postmodern turn m nons are out of the way, the commonality of Africa's colonial and
development studies has gone furthest in promoting a postdevelop- I postcolonial history asserts Itself soon enough, to reveal comparable
mentalist philosophy of liberation. Postdevelopment theory and econonuc structures and political dynanucs.
practice IS different from anti-development sentiments in so far as Sub-Saharan Afnca contains thirty-two out ofthe UN's forty 'least
It does not deny globalization or modernity, but wants to find some de~eloped' member countnes. Early post-mdependence growth,
ways oflivmg With It and imaginatively transcending it. Muchofthe while still externally dependent, was nevertheless a source of hope
creative thinking about new social movements and thedevelopment and optmusm. But tills was followed by stagnation and negative
of crvi! society ongmates on this continent. Yet, as before, the growth In all but a very few countnes (for example, Mauritius,
hybrid forms of struggle and local experimentations with alternallve Botswana) as earlier forms of mcorporation into the international
social and economic organization are not exclusive to Latin Amer- division of labour were rendered obsolete when the world economic
tea] but are also found elsewhere, including the heartland of the system globalized and entered what Manuel Castells has referred to
traditional core of the capitalist system. Thus, these 'postdevelop- as the 'newest' international division of labour. I Since the mid-1970s,
ments' also reflect conditions, and inspire responses, that may be of Afnca's primary commodities trade has collapsed, from Just over 7
relevance to other social groups and localities withm the global per cent of world trade to less than 0.5 percent m the 1990s,2Its share
system. of manufacturmg trade never really got a chance to lift off and went
down from an already puny 1.2 per cent m 1970 to 0.4 per cent in
the late 1990s. The exclusionary logic of the present globalized
world order IS most dramatically attested in foreign direct invest-
ment (FDI) flows. Africa's share of all FDI flows to developing
countnes has dropped from 13 per cent in 1980 to less than 5
per cent in the late 1990s. Pnvate (non-public guaranteed)
finance now contributes less than a tenth of the resource flows
into the continent, the rest being made up of various forms of

180 The Postcolonial World Africa: ExclUSIOn and the Containment of Anarchy 181

investment wars. However, the prevailing monetarist ideology WIth anda of agreement and letters of intent exchanged between tbem
Its emphasis on deregulation and privatization, and on the reduc- and the debtor countnes tbat bas released, in complex and inter-
tion of the SIze and influence of the public sector, pernuts only one active packages, official and commercial credit flows. 14
instrument to achieve this objective: manipulation of interest rates. Structural adjustment is the genenc term used to describe a
It is therefore no coincidence that the 1980s, at least until the package of measures which the IMF. tbe World Bank and indi-
Louvre Accord in 1986, stand out as a period of historically unpre- vidual Western aid donors persuaded many developing countnes to
cedented tngh and nsing interest rates of tbe core currencies, Most adopt dunng the 1980s, in return for a new wave of loans. As
of the outstanding stock of Thud-World debt was ongmaIJy con- Adrian Leftwich notes, tbe aim of adjustment was to shatter the
tracted at low, fixed interest rates m the mid-1970s. They were, donunant postwar, state-led development paradigm and overcome
however, rescheduled m the early 1980s when floating (and rIS1Og) the problems of developmental stagnation by promoting open and
interest rates prevailed. The sharply increased conunercial world- free competitive market economies. supervised by mimmal states, IS
market interest rates of that period (of between 13 per cent and 16 Between 1980 and 1990, World Bank structural adjustment loans
per cent) coupled WIth tbe resuJtmg improvement m the value of the mcreased from seven to 187 m sixty countnes.!"
core denommation currency (tbe US dollar) throughout the 1980s The inventory of IMFlWorld Bank prescriptions IS by now weIJ
added to the debt service burden of the Third World. known. It includes currency devaluation, deregulation of pnces and
The outcome was that, since 1983, and for the first tune in the wages, reduction of public spending on social programmes and state
postwar penod, officially recorded capital outflows from the Third bureaucracies, removal of food subsidies and others on baSIC neces-
World countries to the core countries annually exceeded the monies sities. trade liberalization, pnvatizanon of parastatal enterprises.
flowing into them.'? F C. Clairrnont and J. Cavanagh.P m an and the expansion of the export sector: the latter - in the case of
article published m 1987 and covering the period 1981-6, have agriculture - often at the expense offood production. The officially-
added to these figures an estimate of flight capital and profit remitt- stated aims of these policies was to stabilize domestIc economies. to
ances. Togetber these lifted tbe total net financial transfers over the stimulate economic growth, and to ensure the country's ability to
period 1981-6 to a figure weIJ over US$250 billion, representing the earn the foreign exchange needed to service Its foreign debts.
total financial contribution of the Third World to the advanced, However, there is anotber way of looking at tills. According to
core countnes over that penod. Allowing for pnce inflation, tlus cntics.!" debt peonage has given the international financial msutu-
figure was four times that oftbe US$13 billion m Marsball Aid with tions (IFIs) a stranglehold over states and economies, especially in
which the United States financed postwar recovery m Europe. Africa. In a joint declaration to UNCTAD IX, held in Midrand,
South Africa m 1996, African NOGs condemned the Imposition of
tbe nee-liberal paradigm through structural adjustment programmes
The Role of the IMF and tbe World Bank (SAPs) as no less than a form of recolonizatIon of the continent. 18
SAPs, It IS argued, amount to the pillage of what remains of Africa's
Since the debt cnsis broke m 1982, the year MeXICO first declared a economic wealth.
moratorium on its internauonal debt payments, the IMF and World
Bank bave been commissioned and dispatcbed to tbe frontiers of tbe
global economy to exact payments from and supervise tbe credits to Structural Adjustment in Africa: tbe Social and Economic Record
the Thud World. In this capacity tbey have been able to affect
profoundly the organization of production and trade m the pen- The 1980s saw twenty-nine Sub-Saharan African countries accept
phery to tbe benefit of the core of tbe world capitalist system. In all the IMFlWorld Bank medicine. Even m the stated objectives of the
debt rescheduling exercises m tile 1980s it bas been tbe seal of multilateral agencies themselves, the results were very disappoint-
approval of the IMFlWorld Bank as expressed in official mernor- ing. Hewitt de AIcantara and Dbaram Glial estimated that, m the
182 The Postcotonial World Africa: ExcluSIOII and the Containment of Anarchy i 183
region as a whole, per capita incomes declined by 30 per cent over at the time, are not among the strong performers today' 23 In: any
the period 1980-8,19 and while It IS true that political cnses and civil case, the UNCTAD report argues that the observed surges of
wars in many countnes have contributed to thrs staggenng loss of growth can be explained by one-off factors and are unlikely to be
income, the adverse international economic environment (as partly sustained. The critical point IS that, despite the implementation of
mediated through structural adjustment and debt management poli- structural reforms in about two-thirds of the Sub-Saharan Africa
cies) can be held responsible for most of it. They argue that this is countries, the private investment response to SAPs contmues to be
so, first, because of the simultaneous deterioratron in nearly all of weak."
the countries of the region, including those relatively free from By the end of the millennium, the average growth rate for the
internal turmoil; and second because of the magnitude of the dete- continent had yet to catch up with population growth. Its debt
riorating external financial position of Sub-Saharan Africa over the burden in relation to both GDP and m relation to export earnings
penod. Based on UN figures, they note an annual loss of US$6.5 had nsen steeply. Indeed, as a proportion of GDP and of exports,
billion over the penod, even without taking into account capital the debt burden IS the highest for any deve Iopmg country."
flight. This total amounted to roughly a tlurd of total annual Im- Outside IMFfWorld Bank circles, few observers have a positive
ports, 45 per cent of export earmngs, 10-1 I per cent of the region's word to say about structural adjustment. Non-government organ-
combined GDP, and 60 per cent of gross caprtal formanon." izations (NGOs) working m the field m Afnca are particularly
The result was, in fact, so disappointing that a World Bank- scathing in their criticism, none more so than Kevin Watkms of
sponsored report m 1992, given the frank title 'Why Structural Bntish Oxfam. He sums up his devastating critique as follows;
Adjustment Has Not Succeeded in Sub-Saharan Africa', was
retrieved from the publishers, reissued with a less controversial the application of stnngent monetary policies, designed to reduce
title and embellished WIth an introduction WhICh pointed out that inflation through high interest rates, has undermmed mvestment
the analysis was in any case flawed, because It failed to distmguish and employment. At the same time, poorly planned trade-
countnes that merely SIgned up to a reform programme from those liberalisation measures have exposed local mdustnes to extreme
that carried it out." It next Issued a more optimistic report on the competition. Contrary to World Bank and IMF claims, the
lessons of structural adjustment in Sub-Saharan Afnca?2 Unsubtly position of the poor and most vulnerable sections of SOCIety
shifting the blame for failure on to the governments of the countries have all too often been undermined by the deregulation of
themselves (for not having implemented the World Bank/IMF labour markets and erosion of SOCIal welfare provisions, and
adjustment policies properly), it argued that only six countries got by declining expenditures on health and education. Women
their macro-economic fundamentals 'about' right (Ghana, Tanza- have suffered m extreme form. The erOSIOn of health expendi-
nra, Gambia, Burkina Faso, Nigeria and Zimbabwe). ThIS, the ture has increased the burdens they carry as carers, while
report claimed, has resulted in restored export competitiveness falling real wages and rismg unemployment have forced
WIth low inflation and unproved fiscal balance. But even these star women into multiple low-wage employment in the mformal
performers, although eventually returning to positive GDP per sector."'7
capita growth rates, had deteriorating rates of investment. The
other countries which Implemented the policies only partially or
not at all, or which backslid. the report argued, paid the price
WIth negligible or deteriorating growth. But, as UNCTAD noted Structural Adjustment: Intensifying Global Relations
five years later, the 'recent faster growth' that has taken place m
Sub-Saharan Afnca 'has occurred in countries that were not among Even if the structural adjustment programmes (SAPsj achieved little
the World Bank's "core group of adjusters" and most of the or nothing from the point of VIew of national terntonal develop-
countnes that were thought to be pursuing relatively sound policies ment and the Improvement of standards of living of the masses m

184 The Postcolonial World Africa: Exclusion and the Containment of Anarchy 185

Afncan countries. the programmes were a resounding success when I Third, imposed devaluations and interest rate liberalizations have
measured in terms of the acceleration of the process of globaliza- been Justly criticized as encouraging lugh profits for the largely
tion. Structural adjustment has tied the physical resources of Afnca foreign-owned financial sector. while production IS undermmed.P
more firmly into servicing the 'old' segment of the global economy. Devaluation mcreases foreign debts m local currency terms while
At the same time, It has oiled the financial machinery by which interest rate liberalization means that governments have to pay
wealth is being transported out of the region. thereby removing the higher interest rates on domestic debt. The net result IS that budget
very resources which are needed by dynamic adjustment to the 'new' deficits actually worsen, and because governments are not all-
global economy. owed under SAP rules to pnnt money they find themselves even-
i Commodity specialization and debt go hand in hand. Both the tually borrowmg more from the IFIs and the pnvate financial
World Bank and the IMF have used their leverage on indebtedness to markets."
require that production be concentrated on commodity exports. The
consequence of this has been a flooding of the commodity markets
which forced prices downwards. Dunng the 1980s. the terms of trade Democracy and Economic Reform
for Sub-Saharan African commodities fell more rapidly than for any
other region of the globe. 28 In fact, the terms of trade of Sub-Saharan As the debt decade of the 1980s wore on, the political nature of the
Afnca in the late 1990s were lower than in 1954.29 ThIS is by far the structural adjustment programmes, and of bilateral and other multi-
most pertinent cnucism to make against the SAPs. namely that the lateral (for example. EU) programmes, became ever more strident
excessive focus on export-orientated production has contributed to a and outspoken. Previously, Western governments and multilateral
decline m food production, thus making many countnes vulnerable agencies, while professing a genuine interest m liberal democracy
to famme and epidenucs dunng periods of drought, war or other and human rights, had nevertheless been qurte happy openly to
catastrophes. Food production per head was lower at the end of the sponsor repressive. authoritarian regunes for the sake of a stable
1990s than It was m the early 1970s.3o political climate. US President Bill Clinton, on tour m Afnca m
i Second. forced privatization was a standard feature of all SAPs. 1997. m candid contntion, even apologized for past US 'support'
In the words of one senior World Bank manager who resigned after for brutal Afncan despots because of his country's obsession with
twelve years' service: 'Everything we did from 1983 onwards was the Cold War. The World Bank. forbidden by ItS own articles of
based on OUf new sense of mission to have the south "privatised" or agreement to use overtly 'political' critena, had sunilarly been unin-
die; towards this end we ignominiously created economic bedlam in terested m the nature of regimes.
Latm America and Africa.'!' According to the World Bank, 400 However, in the drive for structural adjustment. Western govern-
mdustries were privatized m Afnca m the 1980s. These included ments from the late 1980s became increasmgly outspoken in their
public utilities such as telecommunications, electncity companies, preference for electoral, multiparty democracy as a precondition for
railways and credit orgamzations.Y Inevitably, while national stock further loans and grants. The World Bank. while still unable to
markets are still small and in the process of being formed. these insist on 'political' adjustment. began to favour a none-too-subtle
privatization policies ensured that foreign investors got a large slice fonu of 'good governance' . which it defined as including the follow-
of the action. The under-capitalization of the emerging stock mar- ing features: an efficient public service: an independent Judicial
kets proved an attractive hunting ground for the active money system and legal framework to enforce contracts; the accountable
managers of core countnes' mvestment funds and more speculative admimstration of public funds; an independent public auditor,
instruments such as hedge funds." The World Bank reports that responsible to a representative legislature; respect for the law and
between 1989 and 1995 US$1630 million-worth of foreign exchange human rights at all levels of government: a pluralistic institutional
was raised through pnvauzation m Sub-Saharan Africa. well over structure; and a free press. All this adds up. as Adrian Leftwich
h~lf of the total of pnvatization revenues m the contment. 34 wntes, 'to a comprehensive statement of the minunnm institutional,
186 The Postcolontal World Africa: Exclusion and the Contauunent of Anarchy i 187
legal and political conditions of liberal democracy, though the Bank authoritanan regimes." They have also pomted out that economic
never stated this explicitly'. 37 reform policies benefit certain factions of African elites withl close
For its part, the European Union (ED) formally adopted political links to international capltal. 42 Others have argued that the ernpha-
conditionality as an 'aid regime principle' in 1989, while the Unrted SIS on quality of governance merely serves 'as an efficient means of
States added a 'democracy initiative' under the auspices of USAID focusing responsibility on governments of developmg countries,
m 1991. At the time of writing, almost withont exception. African both for past ills and for Implementation of reform packagesj."
states have moved in the direction of competitive multiparty sys- While thus, one view in the academic literature regards the new
tems, WIth contested elections either having been held or due to be political conditionalities m the manner of serving up old wmes in
held in the near future. Between 1988 and 1993, the United Nations new bottles - that IS, as new ways of servmg the mterests oflinter-
monitored ballot-box elections in some thirty Sub-Saharan coun- national capital - there is also a new turn m the analytical literature
tnes. on Africa which explores the 'new donor agenda' more widely and
What could explam this curious change of heart? Adnan Leftwrch rather differently, namely as being reflectIve of a generalized recon-
identifies four main mfluences: the expenence of structural adjust- sideration and reformulation of bilateral and multilateral relations
ment lending; the resurgence of neo-Iiberalism m the West: the WIth Africa and, indeed, WIth other marginalized, politically
collapse of official Communist regimes; and the nse of pro-democ- unstable, areas of the global economy. As we shall see further
racy movements in the developmg world and elsewhere. In short, we below, there is a new kind of postmodernist type of analysis that
might say: the new world order. 39 exammes the political conditionality of the economic reform agenda
How does this 'democracy IS good, state IS bad' agenda assist as a discourse which, whether Intended or not, both creates and
econonuc reform? The link between democracy and debt restructur- manages a new relationship between the 'new world order' and
ing m the case of Africa IS very puzzling, since it assumes a positive Africa. This IS a relationship of exclusion, rather than of continuing
correlation between democracy and economic development. But incorporation. But before we turn to this literature, we examine how
such assertions were not made by the leading mternanonal organ- far economic reform Itself has contributed to fragmentation and
izations when commenting on and 'explaining' the Success of eco- political mstability.
nomic development m the newly-industrializing countries of East
Asia. As we shall see in Chapter lOon East Asia, in relation to that
part of the world, the new orthodoxy singled out the VIrtues of Economic Reform and Anarchy
strong) authoritarian and dirigiste states as the most important
factor contributing to the development of the region. In many African countries, the imposition of a neo-liberal ortho-
Many analysts have focused on this apparent contradiction, doxy, including pnvatization of the public sector, the emasculation
arguing that while prescriptions of a minimal liberal state treat the of the state apparatus, and the insistence on electoral reform, has
state as a pariah, economic reforms nevertheless depend on a proact- contributed directly to the descent into anarchy and civil war.
ive mtervenuornst government. Reform cannot be delivered without Recent wars have scarred Angola, Sudan, Sierra Leone, Liberia,
local capable hands bolstered by an efficient bureaucracy.f'' Somalia, R wanda, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and EthIO-
For such authors, the suspicion then anses that there IS a hidden pia and Eritrea. Banditry, warlordisrn and low-intensity conflict
purpose behind the ostentatious ignoring of this obvious contra- have come to prevail m some other parts of the continent too.
diction, Falling back on classical structuralist explanations, some What IS the link between nee-liberal reform and the descent into
have explamed away the contradiction in terms of concepts such as chaos? Surprisingly, there is relatively little theoretical literature
'low mtensity democracy', argumg that electoral reforms merely available that addresses this question. Although there are studies
permit changes acceptable to mternational capitalism to be put in that report on the empiricalconnection between structural adjust-
place with greater case and less resistance than m more overtly ment and food nots.?" there are few attempts to theorize the link
188 The Postcolonial World Africa: Exclusion and the Containment of Anarchy 189

between reforms, weakened state apparatuses and disintegrating want to do IS to 'free' poor peasants from corrupt state marketing
state-civil relations. One plausible explanation, however, is offered boards, and liberate urban enterprise from the punitrve shackles of
by William Reno:' bureaucratic licences and petty government regulations. Their
In a compelling study of the reform process m Sierra Leone, Reno grand design IS to use the economic discipline of global markets to
argues that neo-liberal reforms dissolve the 'patrimonial' state form promote SOCIal restructunng. But this strategy backfires, because
that emerged after decolonization and encourage disaffected elites to Africa IS simply too far behmd to make a living m the global market.
strike out on their own. After independence. the newly-independent Because of ItS structural Irrelevance to the global economy, any
states in Afnca were typically weak, they lacked legitimacy and were enforced return to global markets as agents of economic discipline
confronted by formidable coalitions of rent-seeking strongmen cannot even be excused on the grounds that the adverse effects of
using alternauve, often tribal, power bases. The patrimonial state adjustment will be 'temporary'
form emerged naturally to deal With this srtuation. In the patrimo- Nor, it seems to me, can the officialdom of the international
nial form, rulers use the state's resources available to them to buy mstitutions be excused on the grounds that they could not have
off .the opposition. The larger the state sector, the greater the foreseen the political consequences of their neo-liberal programmes.
amount of money and lucratrve posinons of privilege m the gift of Theories of the patrimonial state and the positive function of cor-
the rulers. Undoubtedly, this state form created unwieldy, ineffi- ruption were part of mainstream political development literature m
cient and corrupt administrations, and led to economic decline and the 1960s and 1970s. Political SCIentists such as Samuel Huntmgton
debt. But what IS often overlooked IS that 11 also kepI the peace. had commonly Viewed political corruption as the only means of
Imposed neo-liberal reform, by contrast, attacks the patnmomal mtegratmg marginal groups into a disjointed SOCIal system." Some
state, removes the corrupt bureaucracy and pulls state officials out were objective enough to recognize that the growth of corruption,
of the framework of patron-client politics. In its efforts to get the for example in England m the seventeenth and eighteenth centunes.
state bndget under control, the IMF has even negotiated with was a necessary alternative to VIOlence, an historically inevitable
governments to subcontract tax collection to foreign firms. But this step m the long haul towards the mstitutionalization of a political
manner of reining in the rent-seeking state and ItS officials dissolves structure and administration relatively independent of the compet-
the patrirnonial glue that holds the society together. It bnngs about ing demands of economic agents." It IS the tragedy of Afnca that
fragmentation as erstwhile clients are forced to seek their own bene- history has not given it time to catch up.
fits independent of the central authonty. This hastens the collapse
into 'warlordism'. As Reno sums up the situation for Sierra Leone:
Imperialism and Resonrce Wars
much recent fighting, especially ItS terntorial spread, is directly
related to the elimination of opportunities for powerful strong- Even when critical academic analyses do have a background under-
men under 'reform' and the efforts of these strongmen to strike standing of the wider adverse international context, the portrayal of
out on their own for personal gam. Meanwhile, ordinary citizens contemporary Afncan communal Violence Itself is nevertheless one
conclude that Freetown has less and less to offer in the. way of that IS often focused, even if not entirely blamed, on the victims. It
services or protection from predations of wayward elites. The IS an analysis that stubbornly Ignores the direct imperialist
reformist state IS attacked from two sides - from below, by those connections that stoke the fires, supply the weapons, purchase the
W!lD believe It wi11 have little to offer them, and from above, by commodities (oil, diamonds, gold) and in so doing erect a self-
who make irresistible claims on reform policies:' reproducing architecture of a war economy. The expanding ki11ing
I fields of Afnca are ultimately attributed to resource scarcity push-
Workl Bank and IMF officials protest their innocence as country ing primordial ethnic cleavages towards escalatmg violence, while
after country tumbles into Civil strife and despair. After all, all they the battlefield itself is often characterized as being of a premodern
190 The Postcolonial World Africa: Exclusion and the Containment of Anarchy 191

'formlessness', or as 'criminal anarchy', in which hordes of men global system: foreign bank accounts, computers, mobile phones,
move around like 'loose molecules in a very unstable social advanced technological secunty systems, electric generators, twater
fluid',"" and for whom fighting and killing becomes, not a means supplies, helicopters and even private Jets to take their families out
to an end. but a purpose In itself and even a 'liberating' expenencc.P'' of the country for hospital treatment in the West, and their children
To the casual observer, this descent into barbarism IS complete to schools abroad. !
when one encounters evidence of a revival of the Irrational spmt As two recent reports on the wars in West Africa conclude, uotil
power of animist beliefs. 51 the international connections of the war economies are dealt WIth
Belatedly, however, analysts are beginnmg to describe, as Reno decisively by the international community, the prospects for peace
indeed himself does, 52 the numerous ties that cement the pnvate are bleak." A tlnrd study confirms tlus finding with an instructive
interests between state officials. rulers and warlords on the one counter-example. Braathen, Boas and Saether compared the civil
hand, and foreign commerce and investors on the other. In Sierra wars in Mozambique and Angola. They point out that, in the case
Leone, for example, where rebels have controlled the diamond of Mozambique, a UN-mounted peace operation was genumely
areas, the profits of war have been fostered by clandestine supplies supported and completed successfully, whereas m the case of
of diamonds smuggled across the border into Libena and sold to a Angola, UN intervention proved to be a complete failure. The big
number of Canadian companies. with links to the central selling difference is that, in the case of Mozambique, the FRELIMO state
organizatron of the De Beers Company. 53 There are other studies was almost entirely dependent on foreign aid, and the OppOSItIOn
that lay bare the murderous intertwmmg of international rivalnes party RENAMO, WIth little outside funding, had to make do with a
for Afnca's mineral wealth, and the fractinous explosion of resource 'beggar's barefoot army' ThIS meant that both parties were amen-
wars on the ground. 54 able to a foreign-assisted peace deal. By contrast, m Angola, the
Angola IS probably the country that has most clearly advanced to MPLA finances 95 per cent of its state and war machinery through
a self-perpetuating war economy. On one side there is the MPLA oil revenues, and UNITA has become one of Africa's largest traders
government m Luanda, and a war oligarchy comfortably endowed in diamonds and ivory. This encourages both sides to pursue the
with oil wealth obtained through the operations of Shell, while on war indefimtely."
the other side, Jonas Savnnbi's UNlTA rebels control the diamond
areas in the mtenor which wind their way through circuitous routes
to the central selling organization of De Beers. Arms are smuggled The Reverse Agenda of Aid and Global Management
through equally circumspect and illicit trails from Eastern Europe.P
The essential characteristic of a functioning war economy IS that As was intimated earlier, some ofthe present-day analytical literature
neither side has any real incentive to end the fighting, not even WIth on Afnca explores the political conditionality of the 'new donor
the prospect of winning a decisive victory. Since an arms-for- agenda' in a wide sense as articulating a generalized reconsideration
resource economy IS relatively simple In its transactional infrastruc- and reformulation of bilateral and multilateral relations WIth Africa
ture, it offers massive opportunities for pnmitrve accumulatton by a and, indeed. WIth other margmalized areas of the global economy.
very small social minority. War also offers an eminent excuse for the Ground-breaking theoretical work by Mark Duffield, for example,
neglect of expenditure on public works or social welfare, or on theorizes that the new aid agenda reverses earlier developrnentalist
forms of national productive accumulation. At the same time, the goals of 'incorporation' of penpheral areas mto the world system,
technological affluence of the globalized world economy enables the and instead now serves as a policy of management and containment
elites of each warlord domain to mamtam a comfortable and secure of politically insecure territories on the edge of the global economy. 58
lifestyle amid the debns of the public landscape. Cocooned within What IS particularly striking about some of this literature IS Its
their gated enclaves they SImply import all the technological fixes epistemological orientation. which is reminiscent of, though not
necessary for their own pnvate state-of-the-art participation m the openly indebted to. postmodern 'discourse' cnttque, That IS to
192 The Postcolontal World Africa: Exclusion and the Containment 0/ Anarchy 193

say, there is a preoccupation with when and why particular state- One manifestation of a growing common ground has been the
ments, such as 'pluralist democracy'. or 'institutional capacity'. way that most donors have broadened their aid objecti-
'strengthening civil society', and 'human rights' came about, how ves ... [they] now view actron to enhance human rights and
these statements have merged into a consensus agenda mediated democratic processes as a constituent part of their development
through collective structures of consultation and co-ordination agenda. Additionally, many donors have taken up 'strengthemng
between previously disparate donor countries, and last but not CIVIl society' as a specific aid objectrve.P'
least - how these statements translate into practices of policy which,
using Michel Foucault's phrase, 'systematically form the objects of
which they speak'." For this IS the epistemological difference NGOs and the Politics of Exclusion
between the modem (Marxist) and postmodern critiques of know-
ledge, namely that, where the former merely expose the use of In Symphony of the Damned, Mark Duffield'f uses discourse ana-
theories, policy statements or doctrinal assertions as ideologies lySIS to deconstruct the new, or reverse, aid agenda. He argues that
that legitimate anterior, existing SOCIal practices, the latter study With economic globalization has come a new discourse of develop-
such statements as constituting the very conditions of their histor- ment. Previously, development was theonzed as a process of societal
ical appearance. And thus, some analytic studies of the 'new aid convergence between hierarchically conceptualized state-societies
agenda' now seem to appreciate that SOCIal relations within African (rich-poor; developed-underdeveloped). In this theortzation the
countries, and between Africa and the global economy, are being state was seen as the accepted engine of growth. The failure of
shaped through the discourse of the new aid agenda Itsele'o modernization in many parts of the Third World, however, brought
Political condinonality is the deliberate use of 'aid' to improve criticism of 'top-down' approaches, and the disparagement of big
'governance' We have already discussed the definition of 'govern- government and the state, thus making way for 'bottom-up' inter-
ance' m World-Bank-speak. Ostensibly, It IS aimed at creating an ventions concerned with the vulnerability of the poor, which ann to
enabling environment for economic reforms. Leverage through 'aid' strengthen local structures and empower local commumties.
may be achieved through threats of Withdrawal of promised momes Duffield next contextualizes these donor adaptations within a
in the event that certain conditions of project or programme Imple- wider, reshaped world view, in which cultural pluralism has replaced
mentation are not met. Some people may be quick to retort that, m universalist preoccupations and goals. In the West, cultural plural-
this sense, aid was always politically conditional. TIllS IS true, but Ism, or muluculturalism. has been the liberal establishment's answer
the difference is that, m the past the recipients of aid were mainly to racism. Tbat IS to say, it has replaced biologically-derived notions
national governments or programmes designated With their appr- of racial supenority WIth an appreciation of cultural difference. On
oval, and this offered the donors the excuse to say that aid was 'non- the pOSitive side, the discourse of multiculturalism alms to promote
political' - that IS, not interfering in the internal affairs of state. societal harmony and integration by encouraging mutual respect
However, what characterizes the new political conditionality, IS and recognition. The idea that violence can be avoided fosters the
that through ItS own conceptualization of good governance and an organizational adaptations among mternational aid agencies and
enabling environment, It wilfully and openly does meddle in the donor governments towards civil SOCIety and democratization in the
internal affairs of state, targeting a plurality of actors, be they non- periphery, m the same way as it supplies the motivation and opera-
governmental organizations, micro-busmesses, local communities tional logic for multicultural acuvities at home.
or grassroots organizations. In addition, they pay for programmes Unfortunately, the fundamental prermse of multiculturalism has
an~ projects that stimulate and strengthen pluralist local structures. also bred a darker, opposrtional structure of beliefs that has been
This redirection of 'aid' away from national governments and labelled 'the new racism' " The basic, generic assumption, namely
towards civil society has become known as the 'reverse aid agenda'. that cultural difference IS both natural and unavoidable, has also fed
As the British Overseas Development Institute (ODI) put It in 1995: into notions that these differences are unmutable and that they have
194 The Postcolonial World Africa: ExclUSIOn and the Containment of Anarchy 195

an innate and non-rational qnality that leads 'inevitably' to inter-

- . I
government controlled areas, today the organizational optionsjhave
ethnic conflict. This new racism has come to underpin popular been widened to mclude effectively all SItuations of contested Igov-
explanations of growing political instability and intercommunal ernance. ThIS further undermines the responsibilities previously
conflict m the marginal areas of the global economy. A special held by governments. I
variant of the new racism as applied to contemporary Africa has The agenda of cultural pluralism agam informs the nature and
come to be called 'the new barbarism'. direction of relief operations. That is to say, It is avowedly apolitical
One mfluennal version of thrs theory appears m the work of - less concerned with power and power relations, or with rights and
Robert Kaplan." who interprets the collapse into anarchy as an wrongs, or with human rights abuses, than with managing and
unfocused and mstmctrve response, to mountmg pressures resulting contammg the SItuation. Relief agencies intervene in the hope -that,
from environmental and economic collapse. However, other writers by feeding the victims, they will in some way free the warring parties
give the 'new barbarism' a positive connotation. Paul Richards, and allow them to resolve the conflict eventually. In this way,
who is credited with having comed the term in 1995,65 in fact cultural pluralism translates into cultural functionalism: the: idea
welcomes the new barbarism as a form of Iiberation. He describes that natural order and stability will resume m due course.
the often grotesque acts of warlord violence and terror as rational However, because of their robustly apolitical stance these agen-
responses to the failure of modernity, and as exhibiting poteutially cies are unaware that. their humamtarian aid IS gradually being
new and innovative ways of knowing and interacting with the incorporated mto the socio-political fabric of the internal conflict.
environment. Thus, argues Duffield, both assertive cultural plural- For cultural functionalism prescribes a stance of balance and even-
Ism and the new racism are mirror Images of a common structure of handedness that legitimizes both, or all, of the warring factions.
beliefs. They share a common glass of cultural pluralism, yet each Such legitimation operates not only at the ideological level, but also
foretells a different future. materially. For example, humamtanan relief agencies negotiate
access for emergency deliveries of food and medicme equally. WIth
all warrmg parties, routinely having to offer a proportion of the aid
Humanitarian Relief and Complex Political Emergencies to warlords. Such aid IS diverted immediately and commutes iuto a
fresh supply of arms. A further step in this process of 'incorpora-
Drawing conclusions from the previous sections, we may argue that tion' occurs when warnng parties use the promise of relief aid as a
both the economic reforms imposed under structural adjustment means of mobilizing local populations for practical and political
and the new or reverse agenda of aid have, at the minimum, put an purposes.
extra spin on the centrifugal forces already present in the weak,
underdeveloped states of Africa. The advent of humarutanan relief
to cope WIth the ensuing political emergencies, furthermore, has the Conclusion
effect of protracting such crises by making them more 'complex'.
According to Duffield, the possibility that hurnanitarianmterven- Thus, WIth Duffield, we conclude from this sorry tale of the West's
tion encourages fragmentation is a factor that makes a political recent relations WIth Afnca that there IS an emerging system of
emergency 'complex'. 66 global governance WIth methods and mstruments geared to contain-
Since the mid- 1980s, as several countries m Afnca have fallen into mg and managmg symptoms rather than removmg causes." The
chaos and political conflict, humanitarian relief operations have lack of poliucal will to remove such causes attests to a process of
mcreased sixfold. As emergency food and medical aid has been disengagement from the periphery of the world economy. The ago-
rushed III to support war VIctims, the legal mandates of relief agen- nizingly thm line of UN peace-keeping in countnes such as Sierra
cies (UN-connected and independent NGOs) have been refrarned: Leone ('keeping the peace' that IS not there, while lacking the
whereas previously it was nearly impossible to operate m non- mandate or military wherewithal to enforce peace) has been con-
196 The Postcolontal World

trasted rightly with the swift and decisive NATO intervention ill
Kosovo WhICh is within the heartland of the global system.
A further cynical example of this disengagement IS reflected in the
politics surrounding the AIDS epidemic. The World Health Organ-
ization estimates that 23 million people are infected by AIDS in
Sub-Saharan Africa, with new cases running at 5000 per day. One in
four AIricans IS expected to die of the disease. Even so, 90 per cent
Islamic Revolt
of AIDS research and investment is spent on the development of
expensive drugs for the treatment of the 8 per cent of people who
have contracted the disease m the rich countries. thus squeezing out
the funds and the research agendas for cheap vaccmes to prevent its
further spread m the Thud World. When the govermnent of South
Africa, where the rate of AIDS IS nsmg fastest, passed legislation to Today there are twenty-eight countries m the world. WIth a total
enable the domestic production of genenc drugs, the USA and the
EU immediately applied pressure to have the legislation rescinded, I population of 836 million. ill wluch Muslims have an overall major-
ity, and many more countnes have sizeable Muslim mmorities. The
on the grounds that the South African legislation violated the total world Muslim population IS around 1.2 billion, ora quarter
mternational patent nghts of the big international pharmaceutical of the total world population. Even m Europe. the heartland of
finns. It was only when a US government study identified the I Christianity, Muslim immigration and conversion has led to Islam
AIDS pandemic m Africa as a potential national security problem being the second largest religion.
for the USA69 that a dramatic change of heart followed and phar- Since around the mid-1970s a number of apparently related polit-
maceutical companies were anntwisted into making their drugs ical and SOCial events all over the world have led Western comment-
available at very low concessionary prices. on condition that the I ators to speak of a militant Islanuc revival. The definmg moment
recipient countnes would desist from contravemng established was no doubt the overthrow, m 1979, of the Shah of Iran's pro-
international trade laws. Profits definitely remain more important Western monarchy, and the establishment there of the modern
than the lives of millions m Africa where. as one World Bank
official observed: 'if Aids disproportIonately fan on the poor in I
world's first theocratic Islanuc Republic. In Lebanon, the Hamas
movement sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood has since forced

these countries then the fact they they will die of it will have a an mcreasmgly brtter split WIthin the Palesnman struggle against
positive Impact on the economic growth of these nauons'." Israel. In Sudan, Islanusts are preventing the military Junta from
making concessions to the non-Muslims of the south, thus dragging
I out the civil war there. In Algiers. the fundamentalist party, the PIS,

I won the elections in 1990 onJy to find ItS victory at the ballot box
snatched from it by the unposition of martial law (backed by
Western governments), resultmg m near CIvil war. In Egypt, the
tourist industry has been badly affected by attacks from fundamen-

I talists, and the Mubarak regime onJy holds on to power by a

massive, and precarious. security clampdown involving the impri-
sonment, WIthout tnal, of thousands of fundamentalist Muslims. In
India, tensions between Muslims and Hindus, always simmermg
Just below the surface. have been threatening to boil over since the
Muslim revolt in Kashmir, and the destruction by Hindus of the

198 The Postcolonial World Islamic Revolt 199

mosque m Ayodhya. The dismtegration of the Soviet empire has or an Onitsha Ibo m what was the Eastern region of Nigeria. In
created new Muslim states searchmg for an identity m Islam. In Lagos he is simply an Ibo. In London he is a Nigerian. In! New
Afghanistan, an especially virulent and extreme fundamentalist York, he is an African', !
Islamic movement, the Taliban, have taken power, and allegedly Civilization. according to Huntmgton, IS the 'highest' cultural
given sanctuary to Osama bm Laden. widely suspected of having grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people
mastermmded the bombing of the Amencan embassies in Kenya have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It
and Tanzania m 1998. Terronst attacks m the West, alleged or real, IS defined both by common objective elements, such as language,
have raised the spectre of the jihad. or holy war. bemg fought out history, religion. customs and institutions, and by the subjectrve
abroad as well as at home. As The Economist m 1995 summed up m self-identification of people, 6 '
colourful language: 'Islam at its most ferocious IS cutting a blood- As far as the immediate future IS concerned, Huntington expects
stained path to the front of the world's attention.' 1 the clash between civilizations to rage between the West and Islam.
In a provocative article m Foreign Affairs m 1993, Samuel Hun- However, it IS a mistake to argue, as he does, that this is so because
tington predicted a new clash of civilizations." The nation-state, of the potent contradiction between oil and poverty, since, apart
he said, IS disappeanng as the primary unit of international rela- from the combined population of 10 million who live m SIX very nch
tions and therefore conflict and competition between the world's Gulf states, the vast majority of Muslims live m countries WIth
peoples will m future be worked out at a different level, chiefly mmimal or no oil resources. These countnes belong to the world's
among the larger units known as cultures or CIvilizations. He iden- poorest and middle-income groups.
tified as the most important among a total of eight, three such More decisive for a correct analysis of the roots of the contempor-
crvilizations: the West (the Euro-American culture); the East (the ary Islamic revolt, in my VIew. is the circumstance that the Islamic
Confucian culture); and Islam. His artrcle is well worth reading, world contains withm It millions upon millions ofpeople who do not
particularly as a counter-argument to the facile statements of the have any prospect of being mcorporated mto the new global system,
'end of ideology' or 'end of history' theologians (for example, while - Similarly- Muslim mmorities in the advanced countries often
F. Fukuyamaj.:' The latter are based on an economic/technological find themselves also excluded from the global system. The analysis
deterministic mterpretation of an inevitable course of human evolu- presented in this chapter IS that, rather than the West's domination of
tion. H untmgton, on the other hand, says. 'The great divisions oil, It IS the failure of the national developmental strategies m the
among humankmd and the dommatmg source of conflict will be neocolomal period, coupled WIth the recent episode of globalization.
cultural." that drives the contemporary Islamic crescent. Islamic resurgence is
Huntmgton argues that, precisely because of economic modern- best understood as a politics of identity in response to exclusion,
ization and social change throughout the world, people are being rather than (as was the case during the heyday of Arab nationalism)
separated from long-standing local identmes, while at the same time as a response to subordinated incorporation. But thrs politics of
the nation-state is weakened as a source of identity. Religions move identity has not brought a new model of society, nor has the orgarn-
in to fill the gap left by the nation as a source of identity. A zational programmatic umty become a geostrategic factor.
complementary factor about which he theonzes relates to what In developing this analysis I put forward two themes that
Anthony Giddens, David Harvey and other writers on globalization appear to prevail m much recent discourse about the Islamic
have variously referred to as the 'time/space compression' or 'dis- revolt:
tantiatron' phenomenon.l Increased cross-border social interaction
of people around the world has the paradoxical effect of signifying 1. The contmuity of spmtual renewal throughout Islam's history;
the larger social, cultural or ethnic group to which people belong as and
a source of identification for 'the other', By way of example, Hun- 2, The cultural impact of the West's historical confrontation WIth
tmgton quotes Donald Horowitz: 'an Ibo may be ... an Owerri Ibo Islam.
200 The Postcolomal World Islamic Revolt 20 I

Spiritual Renewal from A1i.cousm and son-m-law of the Prophet Muhammed. The fact
that the twelfth and last Imam, Muhammad al-Mahdi, disappeared
Islam IS more than a religion: It IS a complete way of life. It concerns m Ao878, did not become an effective bar to this divine basis of
not only God's relationship with His people, but It also orders SOCIal authonty. On the contrary, He became the 'Hidden One', still in this
relations among people. including legal, contractual institutions, world and In contact WIth Ius chosen agents. who have the right to
social and politIcal instrtutions. and Issues of economic propnety pronounce ex cathedra an opinion on any matter affecting the Sharia,
and practice. G. H. Jansen, ill hIS book, Militant Islam, quotes two or canon law. In Persia, at an early date, the Shi'ites lent themselves
fundamentalist Islamic scholars as saying that 'Islam provides guid- to the nationalist movement, which in time displaced Arab domina-
ance for all walks of life, individual and social. matenal and moral, uon by purely Persran rule. In this way, Shi'ism ultimately became
econonuc and political, legal and cultural, national and mterna- the national religion of Persia, later Iran." The Ayatollah Khomeini
tional'." Islam IS particularly detailed about matters relating to successfully led the revolution that overthrew the Shah, With the
family, marriage, divorce and inheritance; It also addresses ques- Ayatollah claiming to be the incarnation of the twelfth Imam.
nons of dress and etiquette, food and personal hygiene - ill short, Although the system of authority thus differed between Sunnis
the obvious and public signifiers of identity and belonging, poten- and Shi'ites, and led to mutual enmity between them, both systems
tIally therefore the msigma of lifestyle politics. have features that make for powerful religious revivals. In the case
The two principal sources for Islam are: of the Shi'ite religion, the Withdrawal of the !mam and his continued
existence as the 'Hidden One' would periodically fire up hopes of a
I. The Ou'ran, the book of direct revelations by God to the messianic return and salvation that enabled strong personal leaders
Prophet Muhammed through the Archangel Gabnel: and to emerge as new Imams leading a SOCIal revolt against the orthodox
2. The Sunna, literally, the 'trodden path'. a compilation and establishment. In the case of the Sunni religion, as we see below. it
codification of the sayings of the Prophet plus the official bIO- was the doctrine of the ijtihad that allowed social protest to be
graphy of the Prophet's life, IhIS Including all the things He did battled out at the level of theological disputes, and m this way
as well as said. challenge existing powers.
According to Ernest GeHner; the sociological SIgnificance of the
After the Prophet's death m 632BC (AH 10) naturally It took some ijtihad was twofold, and it implanted a deep dialectic into the very
time to compile and codify the entire body of holy scnptures. There heart of Islam: on the one hand It provided a power-base for the
was confusion, mterpretatIon and counter-InterpretatIOn, by com- scholar/jurists, the learned men, ulema. who could pontificate on the
peting schools of law. until, some tune around Ao900. consensus basis of analogous reasonmg, and declare any conduct or event in
among the scholars triumphed. From that moment 'the Gates of the I changed historical Circumstances to be, or not to be, in accordance
ijtihad were closed' (ijtihad meaning independent Judgement). This I with Islamic law. This gave them a power-base independent of
Implied that. from then on, no further augmentation to the scnp- temporal authorities, and there was therefore always an institu-
tural body could be countenanced. and that henceforth only past tional separation between political and religious authority. On the
precedent counted. other hand. the subordination of the former to the latter meant that,
As an aside we should note at this pomt that while the above \ m principle. as Gellner has put it. :« socially and politically trans-
descnption of religious authority holds for the vast majonty of cendent standard of rectitude was ever accessible, beyond the reach
Muslims. who are called Sunni, there IS a SIZeable minority, called of manipulation by political authority, and available for condemn-
Shi'ites, for whom, by contrast, religious authority centres on an ing the de facto authority if sinned agarnst it'. 10
inspired person, the Imam. Shi'ites have constituted themselves as a Thus, despite the institutiona! separation between politics and
separate sect since the early days of Islam, and at first traced the religion, there was never a cultural separation between the two. In
authority of religious inspiration through a direct line of succession tills sense. Islam was not a secular civilization. Where Christ had
202 The Postcolomal World Islamtc Revolt 203

accepted the separation between God and Caesar and had advised The West Confronts Islam
people to 'render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's', Muham-
med and Islam never recognized such separation III their universe of i
Compared with all other areas of the world, the world of Islam has
discourse and belief.'! Further, the non-mampulability of divine law had the unique, if dubious. distinction of havmg always been r,ega-
proved time and again to be a source of legitimacy for acts of self- rded by the West as a cultural adversary- a cultural 'other'. No doubt
correction, as when the disgruntled, oppressed masses could trans- nvalry over exclusive claims to a smgle, indivisible transcendent God
late their grievances mto the discourse of theological disputation, had a lot to do WIth this, as had their claims on the Holy Land" and
challenging political authonty On those grounds, As we shall see their geographic proximity. And no doubt the onginal contest of
below, much of the present-day Islamic revolt may be mterpreted m wills on the battlefield dunng the Crusades helped to strike enduring
precisely those terms, terror in the hearts and minds of Europeans and Muslims alike,
Thus the spirit of renewal has been Immanent m Islam as a But probably of greater SIgnificance is the fact that, m confront-
cultural belief system. But It was also sourced by the peculiar ing Islam, from the ume of the Crusades and m distinct episodes
material circumstances and social relations of production of the smce, the West has come to define Itself, The need to know the
histoncal environment m which It developed and was consolidated. enemy also became an inspiration for self-identification, While it
As Simon BromJey wntes, m the course of ItS history, Islamic can be argued, as in Edward Said's celebrated account.P that
civilization came to straddle two SOCIal formations, each grounded 'orientalism' was a product of Western culture, equally it may be
in a different ecology and economy, On the one hand, there was said that the West's concept of its own culture and society denved
the urban society of the Sultanates (consolidated during a five- from the same discourse, It is this dependency engendered through
century-long penod of rule m the Ottoman Empire), It was a binomial opposition, m different phases of their intertwmmg his-
society of state officials, military personnel and Islamic scholars tories, that explains the West's special fear of Islam, and Islam's
(ulema), Together. m tacit co-operation WIth the merchants, they endurmg search for self-identity.
maintained order, networks of trade and finance, and exacted In his overview of the history of the West's Image of Islam,
tribute from the surrounding peasantry. On the other hand, beyond Maxime Rodinson opines that: 'The Image of Islam arose, not so
the compass of the urban social formation lay the tribal forces that much as some have said from the Crusades, as from the slowly
remained outside central control. In these regions. 'the tributary welded ideological unity of the late Christian world which led
state was unable to control the rural areas, essentially because of the both to a clear view of the enemy's features and also to a channel-
greater weight of pastoral nomadism with its mobile means of ling of effort towards the Crusades."6 The fight havmg become
production, armed populations and absence of urban growth', 12 more concentrated and better-focused, the enemy must of necessity
These two different social fonnations, Gellner states WIth abso- be given sharper, more specific, features and thus ItS Image simpli-
lute confidence, gave nse to, 'the really central, and perhaps most fied and stereotyped. In these stereotypes, Islam was given a sys-
Important feature of Islam namely that it was internally divided into temic civilizational unity It did not possess.
a High Islam of the scholars and the Low Islam of the people' 13 Later, m the medieval period, when Latin Europe was beset by
While high Islam was puritamcal, scnpturalistic and mindful of the internal factions and struggles. the ideological conflict WIth Islam
prohibition of claims to- mediation between God and man, low lost ItS pre-emmence. But in Europe, intemal ideological strife also
Islam (or folk Islam) was SImple, adaptive and flexible, inspired by sowed the seeds of a relativity of belief that m fact opened up a
saintlike mystic heroes (SllftS) and centred on grassroot tarikas certam ideological space for Christian scholars to pursue the study
(Muslim brotherhoods). Periodically the two religious styles would of Islam WIth some 'objectivity' From there, Islam graduated to
clash, as when the scholars of high Islam would launch 'a kind of become a subject of cunosity and exoticism, as witnessed in the
internal purification movement' in an attempt to reimpose itself on flourishmg of Arabian scholarship, notably 10 the fields of philo-
the whole of society. 14 logy, arts and religion. With the birth of the SCIences, followed by
204 The Postcolonial World r Islamic Revolt 205

the Age of Reason, Islam even became an unwitting partner ill the eighteenth century enligbtenment and tbe resulting ideology of
project of Enlightenment: 'People could now view the religious faith the French Revolution tbe Oriental was, underneath his disguise,
which competed with Christianity in an impartial light and even essentially a buman being; but ill the 19th century he became a
With some sympathy, unconsciously seeking (and obviously finding) creature apart, impnsoned m hIS specificity, an object of
in it the very values of the now rationalised trend of thought that condescending praise. Tbus tbe concept of homo islamtcus was
was opposed to Chnsuanity.' 17 born, and IS still far from being overthrown.r"
However, m the nineteenth century, specialist knowledge about
Arabia and Islam turned mto rorientalism'. a special discipline dev- The end of the First World War resulted m the demise of the Otto-
oted to the study of the East. But It was a special discipline which man Empire. Against the backdrop of fierce competition between
would serve European imperialist conquest from that time onwards. European nations, tbe scramble for the Middle East and ItS vast oil
While buttressing the confidence of Europe m its own cultural super- resources began. Everywbere the Europeans established two new
iority, it cast the Muslim ill the role of contemptible VIctim, m need of principles: the freezing of boundaries, and the freezmg of dynasties.
correction. This was so because the specialist knowledge of Arab Arbitrarily drawing lines in the sand, they made permanent terntor-
language, customs, religion and art transmitted Itself to other fields tal boundaries tbat had either been non-existent or were constantly
of SCIentific enquiry (notably social philosophy, later sociology and shifting." In a cynical move that would pre-empt any future pan-
econonucs) m ItS most vulgarized, mechanistic form, dnven as It was Arabism or pan-Islamism, the colonial powers drew the borders of
by the general ideas of the time, which attributed a boundless mflu- states m such a manner as to ensure that there were oil-rich territor-
ence to religion, language and race as explanatory factors m the ial states WIth small populations and oil-scarce states with large
diverse trajectories of human social evolution. IS populations.
ThIS particular form of social theonzmg climaxed m Max This new age of imperialism again changed tbe cultural and
Weber's enduringly authoritative typification of West and East, political relationship between the West and Islam. ThIS time It was
whereby the Oriental became no more than a nurror image of the marked by an 'active tide of Imposing responsibility on the local
accidental. As Edward Said writes: peoples'. turning the unchanging Onental passivity into militant
modern life.22 In the creation of Arab protectorates, mandates and
Weber's studies ... threw him into the very terntory onginally outright colonial terntones there began the process of imposed
charted and claimed by Orientalists. There he found encourage- political state formation, which grew dialectically into independence
ment amongst all those nineteenth century thmkers who believed movements.P and was sealed by constitutional sovereignty granted
that there was a sort of ontological difference between Eastern at various moments in the mterwar and postwar epoch.
and Western economic (as well as religious) 'mentalities' ,19 We, shall return to the refractory effect of the imposition of
artificial nation-states shortly. First a word about how the impact
ThIS ontological difference became theonzed ill a self-serving con- of the West was received and resisted m the Islamic world. G. H.
trast of identity and progress: while the West was economically Jansen renunds us tbat smce 1500 scarcely a decade. or even half a
dynarmc because It was universal, rational, pluralist and secular, decade, bas passed without a Muslim area somewhere fighung
the Onent was economically stagnant because It was particulanstic, agamst encroachment by some Western power.i" Rioting and inter-
traditional, despotic, wallowing ill religious obscurantism, and nal armed upnsrngs were endermc, especially after the First World
therefore stagnant. War, For the Muslims tbese were a1J wars, both in defence of Islam
l As Rodinson writes: and in defence of hearth and home. They mainly took place at tbe
I local level, at the grassroots of popular 'low Islam'. ratber than at
In the Middle Ages, the Oriental had been regarded as a fierce tbe level of tbe urban scholars of 'high Islam'. This was hardly
! enemy, but nevertheless on the same level as Western man; in the surprising, since European conquests were frequently accompanied
206 The Postcolomal World I
Islamic Revolt 1207

by a vigorous policy of support for the Chnstian missionary effort, and sent abroad for higher education, including, perversely, fori the
Many a time this forced the Muslim brotherhoods to go under- study of subjects such as 'Islamic' and 'Oriental' studies. There they
ground, and to become 'secret' societies. The creation, through learnt to see the Onent through accidental eyes. Jansen turns up,the
conversion, of Christian communities, deliberately fostered and arrestinz statistic that until 1955, 95 per cent of all books written
.0 ')9 I
favoured by the colonial powers and living as separate enclaves about Islam were written by Western scholars." ,
amid the mass of Muslims, had the paradoxical effect of keepmg The colonially-imposed. yet arbitrary, process of state-formation
Islam militant. 25 combined with this conscious policy of educating native elites
who would see their own world through European eyes; it succeeded
in forging a deep rift between modernizers and reformers on' the
Education and Orientalization one hand and traditionalists and neofundamentalists on the other.
Nevertheless, all these movements also had a common ongm. Indeed,
It IS probably a function of the nsmg pre-ernmence of cultural in one sense, all these groups may be classed as 'Islamists'. or repre-
studies m the Humanities that recent literature on the Arab world sentatives of'political Islam', As Oliver Roy pomts out, from a SOCID-
singles out European education and European cultural domination logical and mtellectual point of view they were products of the
generally as the most Important, lasting and damaging legacy of modern world, and more particularly of their subordinated position
the colonial penod. In the introduction to the third part of this in the West-dominated world system, Thus, m this sense, the Islamist
book we have referred to cultural studies and Its connection with movement was and still IS a Third-Worldist movement. It conceives
postcolonial studies, so we shall not dwell on that here. Edward of Itself explicitly as a SOCIOpolitical project, founded on an Islam
Said, in hIS ground-breakmg book, Onentalism. and agam in its defined as much in terms ofpolitical ideology as m terms ofreligion. 30
sequel, Culture and Impenatismi" has probably done more than But where the modernizers (in different ways and WIth different
anyone to redefine imperialism in terms of cultural power. Takmg emphases on seculanzation) sought to reform or rationalize Islamic
as his frame of reference Michel Foucault's notion of "discourse'. thought and mstitutions m order to bring them mto line withthe
he has examined Orientalism as a discourse m which power and new order introduced by the Europeans (particularly the 'order' of
knowledge are linked dialectically. European imperialist power m the interstate system and of developmentalism), and the reformers
the nmeteenth and twentieth centuries drew on knowledge of sought to Islamize the Western model, attemptmg to create a synth-
the Orient to rule and manage, and m so domg produced the esis between modernity and Islam, the neofundamentalists and
Orient: politically, sociologically, militarily, ideologically, SCIentific- traditionalists are obsessed with the corrupting mlluence of Western
ally and imagmanvely. While European culture gained in strength culture. They reject the Western model and eschew any compromise
and identity by setting Itself off agamst the Orient as a sort of with it. Instead, they seek a return to the scnptures and a lifestyle
surrogate and even underground self, the Onent itself became signifying, in dress, in body language, in SOCIal practices of convivi-
'Orientalized' 27 ality and prayer, and most prominently m respect of the status of
The most tangible concretization of thrs Orrentalization was women, the exclusivity of the true believer as a member of a select
effected through colomal educational policies. Jansen writes; 'foreign and holy commumty. As Roy says, 'Neofundamentalism entails a
rulers with rare unanmuty and unusual purposefulness and pertma- shrinking of the public space to the family and the mosque.r"
city, sought to give as little education as possible, the wrong sort of After mdependence, in the neocolomal period, the modernizers
education when It had to be given, and also to bring about a schism in were in the ascendancy, but in more recent times radical reformers
the soul of the Muslim community' 28 The local education system and neofundarnentalists have begun to hold sway. The reasons for
was either destroyed or allowed to collapse through benign neglect, this are both external and internal; the dependent development
while new schools using European languages and curricula were project of the modernizers was corrupted by continning and divisive
mtroduced. A new breed of intellectual elite was selected, nurtured interventions of the West m the pursuit of its strategic interests m
208 The Postcolontal Worfd Islamic Revolt 209

oil, and 'legitimated' with reference to the Cold War. For Its part, of the capitalist system was an appropriate reconstruction of
the political establishment failed to deliver matenal benefits or a formal political relations which served to maintam the mterests of
coherent system of meanings. the core within the periphery. But inevitably It also opened up
opportunities for national development and liberation for those
peripheral states wluch played the sovereignty card to the full, and
The Failure of Dependent Development which knew how to play off the superpowers to their nation's
advantage. There is no doubt that Saddam Hussain and his Ba'ath-
The defeat in the Yom Kippur War and the economic cnsis that 1St Party had succeeded in doing Just that. Wc may not like the way
followed put paid to fragile attempts at pan-Arab unity which had he set about tlns task, and morally condemn the fascist brutality
been the hallmark of the radical reformers in the immediate post- that accompanied the building of a militarily-powerful, industrially-
independence era. It meant that everywhere Arab nationalism bad advancmg and even socially-commendable welfare state, but we can-
to give way to ever more 'pragmatic' and corrupted leaderships not deny that national economic and social progress had been made.
dancing to the tune of the USA and IMFfWorld Bank donors and The pertinent historical, as opposed to moral, question onc should
aid givers: As their hold over their populations weakened, they ask IS: what was it that blocked internal advance towards progressive
became still more dependent on military and other handouts from democratization and mstead propelled this brutal leadership mto
their Western masters. external aggression? It IS here that a structuralist analysis, without
Meanwhile, the conservative regimes of the oil-rich Gulf states condemrung or condoning, directs attention to the entire web of
became mcreasmgly implicated m the geostrategic interests of the core-peripheral and semi-peripheral relations m the region which
USA and the West. The Shi'ite Islamic revolution m Iran was had reached a crisis point because of the combmed effect of global
followed by a cynically-exploited divide-and-rule-backed war With capitalist integration and the collapse of the bipolar world order.
Iraq which did much to identify the Iranian revolution With Shi'ism What was the structure of these relations and why was It m crisis?
and Iranian nationalism. Conservative Arab states financed a Sunni The core has, of course, economic interests in the oil of the
fundamentalist pole of attraction outside their own borders m order Middle East. But this is only a startmg pomt. In order to access
to break the momentum of the Islamic revolution. The second Gulf the oil, m the past it was m the interest of the oil compames backed
War spread even more confusion in the Arab world by organizing a by the political power of the imperialist core countries to make deals
conservative Arab and Western coalition against Iraq. with local feudal rulers, kinglets or sheiks in exchange for conces-
A structuralist understanding of the geopolitical dynamics that sions for exploration and so on. Now, when one is only interested m
led to the Gulf War of 1991 may help us to understand the forces a raw material such as oil. and not in labour or consumer markets,
that gave nse to the present-day neofundamentalist crescent as welL one's profit strategy at that stage dictates a preference for dictator-
In the structuralist perspective we have adopted in much of tlus ships rather than democratic regimes. A sovereign ruler is all that is
book, the advanced capitalist countries. with the USA at the bead. wanted: Oil and dictatorship go together.
form the core of the system. the rest IS either semi-periphery or Similar reasons prompt a divide-and-rule strategy - that IS, an
periphery. But we have also seen that the capitalist world system uneven distribution of populations over the oil-rich regions. Small
IS continually developing towards higher, more complex forms of countries With large quantities of oil and small populations are less
mtegration. Periodically this forces a reshuffling of the relationships demanding than large ones. After the demise of the Ottoman
between the parts, and a destruction and reconstruction of the Empire at the conclusion of the First World War, such deliberately
fprmal political organization of these relationships, uneven diVISIOns of states were drawn up under Bntish and French
! Following the Second World War, and withm the context of the colonial rule. Tbere are six very rich Gulf states (joined together m
emerging bipolar world order, the process of decolonization and the Gulf Co-operation Council) with a combined population of ten
the creation of a multitude of sovereign states within the periphery million: and six very populous states outside with a combined
210 The Postcolonial World Islamic Revolt 211

population of about 200 million. It IS these latter states that parti- What has been worrymg the West smce the late 1980s i~ that
cularly have to cope with the displaced and restless Palestinians mcreasmgly withm Sunni territory a fundamentalist mterpretation
within their borders who lost their land to the Israelis. of Islam as a potent, popular, anti-Western force IS nsmg, For the
When, however, oil pnces did eventually mcrease as a result of real strength of neofundamental Islamists lies in their peaceful,
organized cartel-type rebellion in the oil-producing countries community,based activities. The Muslim Brotherhoods, so-called,
(1973), the links between the peripheral and senu-peripheral states offer welfare, health care and educational services to thousands of
m the region, and between them and the core became more complex. people neglected by the secular state.
Arms trade and financial links, III addition to oil now formed a
triangle of interests, consolidatmg the mterests of the rulers of the
small states with the core. Tlus is the significance of the developing The Rise of Islamist New Intellectuals and the Politics of
integration of the world capitalist system. Anti-developmentalism
For every hundred US dollars the West spends on oil in the Middle
East, US$40 comes back through the arms trade, and roughly After independence, having been grven the mantle of sovereignty,
another US$40 comes back mto Western banks, underpinning the the modernizing, Westernized elites set about the task of SOCIal and
financial system m the core nations. Noam Chornsky nicely illus- economic development. As Simon Bromley has noted, whether they
trated this pomt with a joke gomg around on Wall Street at the time adopted a capitalist or a SOCIalist model, the outcomes m terms of
of the second Gulf War: 'Why do the United States and Kuwait need social structure were not all that different. First of all, the state
each other? Answer: Kuwait is a banking system without a country everywhere became the mam site of surplus appropnation. ThIS was
and the United States IS a country without a banking system,'32 the case regardless of whether the source of revenue was oil
While a blanket of secrecy is wrapped around the exact amount exported under the aegis of international oil cartels, WIth the state
of oil dollars invested in the West, the highest estimate of Gulf thus becoming a 'renner-state', or whether, in the absence of oil,
countries investments m the USA alone amounts to US$1 trillion. nationalist elites - as in Egypt, Iraq and Sudan - occupied the state
In 1989, Kuwait earned more income from its vast overseas invest- centre to secure more or less complete control over internal resource
ments located m the capItalist metropoles than from its domestic oil mobilization, ifnot state control over all property. The pomt IS that,
production (US$8.8 billion, compared with US$7.7 billionj.P m both cases, what was lackmg was a degree of separation between
The mterwovenness of the 'reformist', 'modernising' Muslim the mstitutions of rule and surplus appropnauon. ThIS, as Bromley
elites m the Third World WIth the core of the Western capitalist pomts out, led everywhere to an absence of the conditions for
system widened the gap mcreasmgly between them and the masses democratic participation, and ushered m the politics of clientel-
of the population whom they rule and who are dispossessed. Much ism." Second, m the oil-poor, populous countries, strategies of
of the rise of neofundamentalist Islam can be understood as a import-substitutrve mdustrialization became stranded on the. same
popular and anti-imperialist protest movement. But two features rocks of deepened foreign indebtedness as they had in Latm Amer-
that are unique to the Islamic tradition give it its VItality: the ica. By contrast, the oil-nch countnes WIth small populations had
tradition of spiritual renewal and the concept of 'unnna' (the corn- an income far in excess of their needs. Possession of vast oil reserves
mumty ofthe faithful). While the former perrmts, at least m pnnci- m fact reduced the incentive to rely upon the skills and quality of the
ple if not in practice. as we shall see below, the conversion and people, The oil-rich Gulf states invested their money in the metro-
reabsorption of governmental elites and 'exploiters' m the revivalist politan countnes, and Imported labour from elsewhere in Arabia
movement, the latter gives priority to the WOrld-wide community of and the Indian subcontinent, thus creatmg enclaves of second-class,
Islam and denies its nationalist or even supranationalist (as m pan- disenfrancluzed non-citizens. The obvIOUS solution should have
Arabic) pretensions. This, I believe, makes a historical fit with the been some form of regional economic integration, and for a time
denatlOnalizmg forces of globalization. pan-Arab nationalism was a potent rallymg force III the postwar
212 The Postcolorual World
II Islamic Revolt 213

settlement. But, time and again, the West, and more especially the In an unusual and provocative analysis of the Islamic world
USA and Its bridgehead client state, Israel, managed to divide and
break the incipient regional solidarities. I today, Roy dissects the ideological pretensions, the SOCial basis
and the political project, of this lumpen intelligentsia that forms
A third charactenstrc consequence of the dependent development the core of the contemporary neofundamentalist crescent. In domg
strategies of the neocolomal period was the process of urbanization so, he debunks as a myth the theory that It could consolidate into a
coupled with a rapid population explosion. Dependent incorpora- new force m mternatronalrelations or indeed pose a threat to the West.
tion into the world capitalist economy implied a neglect for sub- According to Roy, the lumpen intelligentsia are differentiated
sistence agriculture, rural-urban migration, and swelling numbers from, and resent, the clerical scholars (the ulema. or scholars of
of unemployed and underemployed city-dwellers. This movement of high Islam) because, unlike these scholars, they have no state-
the social location of Islamism engendered an important shift m the legitimated and supported relationship to that corpus of know-
ideological realm as well. Today's masses who follow the Islamists ledge." At the same tune they have smatterings ofWestern education
are not 'traditionalists', wntes Oliver Roy, instead: without, again, having an mstitutional connection to that body of
they live with the values of the modern city - consumensm and Roy makes the important point that there is a direct relationship
upward social mobility; they left behind the old forms of convivi- between the configuration of the new intellectual's 'conceptual'
ality, respect for elders and for consensus, when they left their space and the SOCIal space that he occupies. As a self-proclaimed
villages ... they are fascmated by the values of consumerism impa- mullah or as a militant he preaches among the urban poor. He
rted by the shop windows of the large metropolises; they live m a operates in meetmg houses, sites of worship, educational centres,
world of movie theatres, cafes, Jeans, video and sports, but they and new suburban settmgs not yet socialized by the state. He rejects,
live precariously from menialjobs or remain unemployed in immig- and is marginalized by, both the Westernised professionals and the
.rant ghettos, WIth the frustration inherent m an unattainable con- governmg class on the one hand, and the state-legitimated clerics
sumenst world ... Their militant actions exist in symbIOSIS With (the ulema) on the other. His conceptual apparatus reflects how he
.their urban environment: except m Afghanistan and Kurdistan, the operates on the fringes of both.
guerillas of the contemporary Muslim world are crty-dwellers." The Western-style intellectuals and the clerical scholars have m
common the fact that both their social status and their methodology
A fourth social structural charactenstic of dependent development is guaranteed by processes of investiture and authorization that
m the neocolonial period is the emergence of a new category of distinguish them from the masses. Their claims to truth, each m
educated individuals produced by the expansion in state-funded their own way, albeit m methodological opposition to each other,
education established along Western lines. Roy variously refers to have an assured connection to their own procedures of acceptance
this class of intellectuals as 'lumpen intelligentsia', or the 'Islamist and institutional validation, whether these are the rules oflogic and
new intellectuals' or 'neofundamentalists'. They are young people objectivity and peer scrutiny, as WIth Western SCIence and intellec-
With school, and even umversity, education who cannot find pOSI- tual positions. or the norms of analogous reasoning and peer con-
tions or professions that correspond to their expectations or VISIOns sensus within the clerical community of the ulema. They are both
oftthemselves, either m the saturated state administrative sector or validated by exammatron and titles that accord social positions to
in, industry because national capitalism IS weak, m the traditional them. But the neofundamentalist. small-time mullahs operate out-
network because of the devaluation of religious schools, or in side these approved networks of knowledge transmission. And thus,
modern unrversiues which are also saturated and' experiencing a argues Roy, the neofundamentalist intellectual IS quintessentially an
loss of social status. Thus, the newly-educated of the Muslim world auto-didact. He is a tinkerer, creatmg a montage of fragments of
find no social ratification, either real or symbolic, for what they knowledge combined from these different conceptual universes.
perceive as their new status." using a method of invocation and incantation as emblematic display
214 The Postcolonial World Islamtc Revolt [215

of knowledge, rather than as an object of systematic study. Frag- projects have originated as a socio-cultural movement of pr1test
mentary modern knowledge drawn from an immense variety of and frustration of a generation of youth that has been excluded
immediately accessible (through TV, newspapers and so on) fields SOCIally, economically and politically from the accelerated mdder-
of Western knowledge, including economics, sociology, nuclear mzation of Muslim societies and their partial and disjointed art}1icu-
physics and biology, is Immediately mtegrated withm a Qu'raruc lation to the global economy. However, for reasons to do witl the
framework in which claims to truth drawn from the Qu'ran or the cultural history Islam, the exclusion from modernity takes a, reli-
Tradition and cited as verses. are positioned as the equivalents of gious meaning, and self-immolation becomes the way to fight
concepts drawn from modern science and ideologies. against. excluslOn. 39 In this way, as Castells writes, 'Through the
There is nevertheless a unity in this montage of borrowed frag- negation of exclusion. even in the extreme form of self-s~cnfice, a
ments. It is the mystical site of the divine Tawhid, the Oneness of God new Islamic identity emerges III the historical process of building the
which extends to all his Creation, including, most Importantly, the umma, the communal heaven for the true believers.'40 But the.pre-
Perfect Man (Insan Kamil i, According to the myth of the Perfect occupation WIth the politics of identity by makmg politics sacred
Man, it is the ethical disposition of one's soul that gives umty to one's and by transformmg Islamic pseudo-legal institutes into 'social
knowledge and practice. Hence there IS an emphasis on mental devotions'. also means that Islamic fundamentalism cannot be
conversion. on devotion, on lifestyle and on punty. But there is no taken senously as a geostrategic counter-hegemonic project, '
political programme of action, no model of a new CIVIC society, no
worked-out alternative system of economic and social organization.
As the radical or 'political' Islam of the postindependence years
slides into neofundamentalism, it assembles the outcasts of a failed
modernism, mobilizing them around the myth of a return to an
Islamic authenticity that has never existed'. Such Islamism, Roy
concludes, is not a geostrategic factor: it will neither unify the
Muslim world nor change the balance of power in the Middle
East. For It cannot withstand power. What today's Islamists advoc-
ate: 'is not the return to an incomparably rich classical age. but
the establishment of an empty stage on which the believer strives
to realize with each gesture the ethical model of the Prophet'r"
The empty stage is that of civic SOCIety which IS non-exrstent.
The Islamization of officially secular and moderate regimes targets
personal law and penal law, leaving intact the existmg econormc
formation and the political model mherited from previous regimes.
Through processes of globalization, the business elites and govern-
mg classes may contmue to be picked off, divided agamst one
another, corrupted and incorporated into the global system.


Islarmc fundamentalist projects have emerged in all Muslim societ-

ies, and among Muslim mmorities in non-Muslim SOCIeties. These
The Developmental States oJ East ASia 217

10 East ASIa

East Asiawithout HPEAs

The Developmental States of South ASia ~1IIIII1IIIi1IIIi1IIIi

East Asia Middle East and Mediterranean

Sub-Saharan Africa

OEeD economies

Latin America and Caribbean

o 1 2 3 456
GNP per capita growth rate (per cent)
In the 1980s and 1990s, and until the cnsis of 1997, the fast and
sustained pace of growth of seven countries m East Asia, collect-
Source: World Bank. The East ASIan Miracle (New York: Oxford Unr-
ively sometunes referred to as the seven 'Dragons', had forced a versity Press, 1993) p. 2. Reproduced with permission,
major rethink in development studies. The seven countnes were:
Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand Figure10.1 The economic growth of the world's regions (average growth
of GNP per capita, 1965-90)
and Indonesia. Cunously, It took rather a long time for the rethink
to occur. Because, as a World Bank study in 1993 discovered, smce grouping'.' Thus, presentation by economic mcome groupmg can
1960 these high-performmg East ASian countnes (HPEAs) had hide and prevent other possible classifications. such as those based
grown faster than any other group of countries m the world, includ- on growth, changmg composition of structure of production, dis-
ing the rich countries (see Figure 10.1). tribution of income, and so on.
One reason for this Iag hetween reality and our perception of it Classifications are the cornerstone m any theonzmg. For a long
owes something to the statistical presentations of world order pro- time, development theory took as ItS starting pomt the income gap
duced annually by international organizations in their 'state of the between nch and poor countries, between North and South. First
world' reports. For over thirty years It had been commonplace to World and Third World. It was this gap that prompted the search
rank the nations of the world not by growth rates or economic for the 'sameness' within each group as well as the differences
performance. but by economic groupings based on mcome. 11,e between them. The task which development theory set itself was to
rankmg of the world's economies m ascending order of gross theorize, and explain, what made the former rich, and what the
national product (GNP) per capita yielded classifications of eco- latter had to do to become rich (modermzauon theory), or what
nomic groupings by arbitrary cut-off pomts in the ascending order made the former rich and kept the latter poor (dependency theory).
of GNP per capita. Modernization theory was closely allied to neoclassrcal liberal eco-
Conventional World Bank rankings used to be low-income. mid- nomics, which stressed the benefits to developing countries of part-
dle-income and high-income countries but, as the World Bank itself icipatmg in the mternational economy, on the baSIS of their
acknowledged m ItS 1993 report. The Eost Asian Miracle, classifica- comparative advantage arising from natural factor endowments.
tion by income does not necessarily reflect development status. This theory advocated the pursuit of open-door policies towards
Moreover, 'once the classification IS fixed for any publication, all trade and investment, emphasizing the growth-related benefits
the historical data presented are based on the same economic of'-recervmg technology and capital mputs from the advanced

218 The Postcolonial World The Developmental States of East Asia 219

countries. Modermzation theory added to this the argument that. basic education. Where Interventions m credit and fiscal policies did
because of the structural compatibility between economic institu- occur, these were said to be mainly in order to 'get the prices!right'
tions and practices on the one hand, and political, social and cul- (in line with international prices and not as a distortion of them).
tural institutions on the other, less-developed countnes should Eventually, some writers within the neoclassical tradition,
model their SOCIal and political structures after the example of the dubbed revisionists or instItutiOnalists, came to admit that state
West (see Chapter 2). interventions in East Asian economies were not merely 'market con-
Dependency theorists argued exactly the opposite: they pointed forming' hut rather 'market guiding', even deliberately 'market
to the debilitatmg limitations of the historically-developed mterna- distorting' 5 It was beginning to be appreciated that East ASIan
tional division of labour, the resultmg deterioration of the terms of countries used very selective financial instruments (credit and tax
trade for less-developed countries, and the distorted internal social policies), trade policies, inward investment screenmg policies, and
structure dommated by transnational class alliances WhICh pre- mdustnal relations policies to channel investment decisions into
vented internal autonomous development and industrialization. directions that conformed with national pnonties. These interven-
Their policy prescnption was either a radical break with the world nons did not just remain at the level of macro-econorruc policies but
system or, in watered-down, more pragmatic versions. policies of were sector- and firm-specific.
self-reliance and selective delinking. Thus they placed emphasis on This marked the begmning of an understanding of the nature of
import-substitutive industrialization with all the pnce-distorting 'state capitalism', in which the primary purpose of government
state intervention m the economy that this entails. intervention was to promote the interests of the business sector as
a whole, and to do so by creating conditions for capital accumula-
non and productIvity improvement, even if this meant extensive
The Role of the State in Economic Development bureaucratic regulation and neglect (or repression) of the interests
of specific sectors and groups.
By the mid-1970s, some East ASIan states - South Korea, Hong For their part, neo-Marxlst dependency writers had for a time
Kong, Singapore and Taiwan, collectively known as the 'four dismissed the success of the East Asian Tigers as an underdevelop-
Tigers' - had notched up a decade of near double-digit growth. In ing by-product of the productive decentralizatiOn of multinational
contrast to the Latm American newly-industrializing countries corporations from the core of the world system. These wnters had
(NICs) of that period, this growth was export-led, and at first glance argued that the 'success' of these countries resulted from a tempor-
seemed to confirm the thesis of orthodox neoclassical writers, that ary comparative advantage based entirely on the super-explOItatiOn
the fast pace of economic development in these countnes resulted of cheap labour m specially-desiguated 'free export processing
from liberal, 'market conforming' regimes and 'open-door' policies zones' WIth few linkages to the surrounding economy, and that it
towards inward investment and foreign trade. But the neoclassical eventually deepened inequalities and margmalizatlOn. This position
tradition gradually had to come to terms with the incontrovertible came to be known as the new international division of labour
evidence of extensive direct govenunent intervention in the East (NIDL) thesis (Frobel et al.).6 ,
Asian economies. In an effort to salvage the neoclassical tradition, In applying the dependency paradigm to dirnrnish the achieve-
the nature of state intervention was at first argued to be m line with ments of the observed process of industrializatIOn, NIDL theorists
the prevailing orthodoxy, rather than going agamst it. Thus Bela contended that the stimulus for the industrialization of certain
Balassa.r Chalmer Johnson," E. K. Y, Chen," and vanous World peripheral countries came from the deepenmg crisis in the core
Bank documents of the period argued that government interven- economIes of the world system. and the associated problems of
tions were merely of the kind that aimed at creatmg macro- valorization of capital. This pushed core capital into the periphery
economic stability, and a suitable environment for entrepreneurs III search of large amounts of unskilled labour power. TechnologICal

to perform their functions by providing certain public goods, such as advances m global communications and transport permitted the
220 The Postcolonial World The Developmental States of East Asia 221

spatial dispersal of mtermediate production processes, creatmg One way m which the neoclassical argument tned to square the
branch-plant mdustnalization massively dependent on corporate circle was by reintroducing Listian political economy into the
decisions and techmcal inputs from the core economies. The origin- debate." Fnedrich List was a nineteenth-century German political
ators of the NIDL thesis (Frobel et al.) asserted that the 'world economist who was concerned with how Germany could fashion
factory' had overtaken the world market. As to the question of why national policies to develop Its manufacturmg mdustry m the face of
some penpheral nations were selected in tills way rather than others, competition from the more advanced industnes in Britain, III a
or all, NIDL theorists merely pointed to the availability m these world where a belief ill free trade was enshrined ID the canons of
countries of vast armies of cheap, unskilled labour helpfully offered classical economics. List had argued that when societies at different
to international capital by repressive regnnes that restncted trade levels of development come into contact with one another, the more
uniomzauon and offered tax incentives to boot. highly-developed SOCIety and the more productive economy
. In the course of the 1980s, as the economic success of these unleashes a process of 'displacement competition' wrthm the less-
countnes was consolidated in real, autonomous upgrading of pro- developed and Iess-efficient SOCIety and economy. Tills results in
ductrve capacity as well as m undeniable, if yet limited, social and peripheralization and structural deformation unless It IS counter-
CIvic advance of the masses, the NIDL thesis looked increasingly acted by effecnve political steering (strong state intervention) aimed
threadbare. In the generalist versions of the world system and at temporarily 'dissociating' the economy and society from the
dependency theses, the states of tbe core countnes had been international compennon.
regarded as being 'strong'. while those in the periphery were natur- Neo- Listian theory added to tins the observation that, m the
ally assumed to be 'weak' - that IS, a mere instrument of mterna- contemporary world, 'delayed' development had become increas-
tional capital. But m the more detailed, specific examinations of real mgly more difficult, and m the process the salience of dissociative
cases, It was now adnutted that, while some developing states were conditions for such development has become more pronounced.
'weak', others were 'strong'. Wnters standing in the neo-Marxist As a' result, development strategy had to become even more
tradition began to take a closer look at the SOCIal origins and 'political'. That IS to say, the social agents of delayed develop-
functions of the state in these countnes. Historical structuralist ment had changed, from pnvate enterpnse needing a .little mer-
analysis showed that strong states were associated WIth a degree of cantilist state protection Cas in List's days) to the strong nationalist
autonomy of the state bureaucratic apparatus that owed to a spe- state.
cific class composinon, coupled with a specific geopolitical situa- Neo-Listian theory explained the success of the East Asian coun-
tion.? tries with reference to the strategic role of the state in taming
domestic and mternanonal forces and harnessing them to a national
economic interest. coming the tenn 'the developmentalist state' for
Theories of the Developmental State this purpose. It was pointed out that the developmentalist state had
a role different from that of the Keynesian welfare state m the
The two intellectual traditions converged somewhat m theones of already advanced countries. The Keynesian welfare state, it was
the developmental state. This convergence broke the .debilitating argued, serves to restrain market rationality by measures to protect
mould that had dommated the agenda of development studies for groups vulnerable to the consequences of market rationality. By
so long and that had up to that point equated capitalism WIth contrast, the devetopmentalist state restrains market rationality in
democracy, and state bureaucracies with socialism. But this is not order to pursue a policy for mdustnalization per se. 9 The difference
ito say that the convergence settled on only one theory of the devel- between the two forms IS made evident m the difference in the sizes
iopmental state. Rather, there were vanations on a theme: neoclas- of the public sectors: m the advanced countries the public sectors are
~ICal and neo-Marxist traditions did not so easily relinquish their twice as large as those in the developmentalist countnes. In the
methodologies or their world views. developmentalist state u IS not the size of the public sector that

1 Notes and References 269

Notes and References 6. On Marxs concept of mode of production and Its hrstorical evolution,
see Eric Hobsbawm's edition of Marx and Engels' Pre-capitalist Eco-
nomic Formations (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1964); see also
Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, Pre-capttalist Modes of Productio~l
(London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1975), and Umberto Melotti,
Marx and the Third World (London: Macmillan, 1977).
7. R. Gilpin, The Political Economy ofInternational Relations (Pnnceton,
NJ: Pnnceton Unrversity Press, 1987), p. 15.
8. K. Waltz, Man, the State and War (New York: Columbia University
Preface Press, 1959), and Theory of World Politics (Reading, Mass.: Addison
Wesiey, 1979). Among the prmcrpal early prophets of these realist
perspectives are H, Morgenthau, Politics Among Nations (New York:
1. .Dudley Seers, 'Introduction', in D. Seers (ed.), Dependency Theory, A Knopf. 1948); K. Thompson, Political Realism and the CriSIS of World
Cnucat Assessment (London: Francis Pinter, 1979). Politics (Pnnceton. NI: Princeton University Press, 1960); and E. H.
2, Wolfgang Secus. 'Development: A Guide to the Ruins". The New Carr, The Twellty-Years' Crisis. 1919-1939: All Introduction to tile
Internationalist, June 1992, p. 5. Study of International Relations (London: Macmillan. 1939).
3. In 1991 the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) esti- 9. R. O. Keohane. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the
mated that about 100 million people in the neh industnalized countries World Political Economy (pnnceton, NJ: Pnnccton Umverstty Press,
and another 100 million livmg in the erstwhile socialist countnes of 1984).
Eastern Europe had joined the ranks of the poorest m the world 10. S. Amin, Class and Nation, Historically and in the Current Cnsis (New
(UNDP, HI/man Development Report. 1991 (Oxford University Press, York: Monthly Review Press, 1980).
1991), pp. 23-6). The 1999 Report notes that, measured by the Human 11. C. Chase-Dunn, Global Fannauou. Structures of the World Economy
Poverty Index, 'one m 8 people living In the nch, OEeD countnes,IS (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989).
-affected by some aspect of poverty: long term unemployment, a life 12. For a schematic companson of the three conceptions of political
.shorter than 60 years. an Income below the national poverty line, or a economy. see Robcrt Gilpm, US Power and the Mnttmauonal Cor-
lack of the literacy needed to cope In SOCIety' (UNDP, Human Devet- poration: The Political Economy of Foreign Direct Investment (Lon-
opment Report. 1999 (Oxford Urnversity Press, 1999), p. 28). don: Macmillan, 1976), p. 27, table 6.
4. See UNDP, Human Development Report, 1999 (Oxford University 13. See J. George and D. CampbelL 'Patterns of Dissent and the Celehra-
Press, 1999) overview and eh. 1. tion of Difference: Critical SOCIal Theory and International Rela-
nons'. International Studies Quarterly, 34, 1990, pp. 269-93.
14. For example. the relatively recent Journal Review of Incernattonal
Part I Introduetion Political Economy claims to represent ttus 'new' international political
economy; see the Editors' Statement, 1. Issue 1.
1. is. Horvat. 'Political Economy'. in Encyclopaedia oftile SOCial SCiences IS. In a seminal paper In 1981, Robert Cox outlined the first brush strokes
ofthe new theory. The diSCUSSIOn that is presented here is based on
,(New York: Collier Macmillan. 1968), p. 611.
2. T. Mun. England's Treasure by Forraign Trade (1664) (Oxford: this article: R. Cox, 'SOCial Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond
'reprinted for The Economic History SOCIety by Basil Blackwell, International Relations Theory'. Millennnun: Journal of Intemauonal
Studies, 10(2), 1981, pp. 126-55. See also his 'Multilateralism and
'1928), p. 5. . .
3. '1. Wallerstetn. The Capitalist World Economy (Cambndge Uruversity
World Order', ReVIew of International Studies, 18, 1992, pp. 161-80.
and his book Production. Power and World Order: Social Forces 11l the
''press, 1979). .
4. lA.
Smith, The Wealth ofNations, book IV, quoted III B. Horvat (1968),
Makmg of History (New York: Columbia Unrverstty Press, 1987).
A. Gramsci, Selections from Prison Notebooks (originally wntten
'I'Politlcai Economy', p, 611.
5. A. Smith, The Wealth of Nations (New York: Random House, i937), 1929-35) (London: Lawrence & Wishart, 1971).
[p. 423, quoted in T. Sowell. 'Adam Smith m Theory and Practice', III 17. R. Cox, SOCial Forces, (Note 15 above), p. 135.
IOerald P. O'DnscolI, Jr (ed.), Adom Smun and Modern Political 18. Ibid.
IEc01lOmy: Bicentenntal Essays 011 The Wealth of Nations (Ames,
I Iowa: Iowa State Umversrty Press, 1979).

I 268
270 Notes and References
Notes and References 271
1 The History of Capitalist Expansion 22. See Fieldhouse on the difference and complementanty of peripheral or
core explanations of colonial impenalism, in D. K. Fieldhouse,
1. S. Kuznets, 'Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of Economics and Empire 1830-1914 (London: Macmillan, 1973), esp.
Nations: X-levels and Structure of Foreign Trade: Long-term Trends', ch. 4. j

ECOn01JHC Development and Cultural Change, 15 (2) part If, January 23. See V. 1. Lenin, Imperialism, the Highest Stage a/Capitalism (MO:sCQw:
1967, pp. 1-45. Progress Publishers, 1978; first published 1916); N. Bukharin, Imperi-
2. In 1996, the latest year for which the trade figures are available. See alism and World Economy (New York: International Publishers,' 1929;
ch. 4, table 4.2 for notes and references. first published 1917); and R. Hilferding, Finance Capital. a Study III
3. 1. Wallerstem, The Capltalisl-'fVorld Economy (Cambridge Umversity the Latest Phase of Capitalist Development (London: Routledge &
Press, 1979), p. 15. Kegan Paul, 1981; first published 1910). '
4. 1. Wallerstem, ibid. For an excellent diSCUSSIOn on Wallerstem's addi- 24. J. A. Hobson, Imperialism. a Study, 3rd edn (London: Unwm Hyman,
noes to Marx's model, see Christopher Chase-Dunn, Global Forma- 1988 first published 1905).
tion. Structures a/the World-Economy (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1991), 25. 'Necessity' as being a necessary policy of finance capital, not, however,
esp. part I, eh, l. in the sense of 'not bemg able to be overcome'. Bukharin condemned
5. S. Armn, Imperialism and Unequal Exchange (New York: Monthly this meaning of 'necessity' as a limit to action, as serm-impcnalism.
Review Press, 1977). Impenalism was the policy of finance capitalism which was itself
6. A. G. Frank, Dependent Accll1lllllation and Underdevelopment (New a highly-developed capitalism implying the ripeness of the object-
York: Monthly Review Press, 1979). ive conditions for a new socio-economic form. And while finance
7. E. Mandel, Late Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1976). capital cannot pursue any other policy (this is the meaning of necessity)
8. A. Szymanski, The Logic ofImperialism (New York: Praeger, 1981). it IS not necessary In terms of not being able to overcome it. Bukhann,
9. H. Magdoff, Imperialism: From the Colontat Age to the Present (New Imperialism and World Economy (Note 23 above), pp. 141-3.
York: Monthly Review Press, 1978), 26. N. Bukharin. ibid.. p. 28.
10. For a diSCUSSIon of these periodizations, see C. Chase-Dunn, Global 27. V. G. Kiernan, Marxism and Imperialism (London: Edward Arnold,
Formation (Note 4 above), eh. 3. . 1974).
I!. P. Baran, The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly 28. Fieldhouse. Economics and Empire, (Note 22 above), p. 66.
Review Press, 19671 (originally published m Spanish III 1957). 29. For example. France after the the Franco-Prussian war - see H.
12. See \V. Rodne¥, How Europe Underdeveloped Africa (Dar es Salaam: Daalder, 'Irnpenalism', in Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences (New
Tanzania Publishing House; and London: Bogle L'Ouverture, 1972). York: Collier Macrnillan, 1968).
See also A. M. M. Hoogvelt, The Sociology of Developing Societies 30. Ibid., pp. 103-4.
(London: Macmillan. 1976), eh. 4. 31. For a cnuque of the alleged refutations of econorruc theories of
13. Ibid. for a more.extensive diSCUSSIOn. imperialism. see P. Baran and P. M. Sweezy, 'Notes on the Theory
14. H ..Magdoff, Imperialism, (Note 9 above), p. 102. of Imperialism'. Monthly RevleIV, 17 (March 1966), pp. 15-31. The
15. Ibid., pp. 29-35. authors argue that there IS a fatal methodological error in companng
16. See B.. Thomas, 'The Histoncat Record of Capital Movements to costs and rewards for nations as a whole, because the relevant actors
1913', In J. H. Adler (e~.), Capital Movements and Economic Develop- on the imperialist stage are classes and their sub-divrsions down to and
ment (London: Macmillan. 1967), pp. 3-32, repnnted m John H. including their individual members.
Dun?mng, International Investment (Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1972), 32. B. Warren, Imperialism. Pioneer of Capitalism (London: Verso, 1980).
pp. _7-58. 33. J. A. Schumpeter, Imperialism and Social Classes (New York: KeIley,
17. A. K. Carrncross. Home and Foreign Investment (New York: Harvester 1951).
Press, 1975), pp3; first published by Cambridge University Press, 1957. 34. B. Warren, Imperialism. Pioneer of Capitalism (Note 32 above), p. 65.
18. Quote~ ID A. Thomton, The Imperial Idea and its Enemies (London:
A • Note. however, Anthony Brewer's observation that this line of criti-
Macmillan, 1985), p. 76. cism follows In part from a semantic confusion caused by different
19. See H. Wesselinck. Verdeel ell Heers. De Deting VQ11 Afrika 1880-1914 uses oftbe term 'imperialism'. For Lenin in particular, imperialism did
(Amsterdam: Bert Bakker, 1991), openmg citation. not refer specifically to the possession of colonies. He recognised
20. B. Kidd. The Control a/the Tropics (1989), quoted m A. P Thomton, explicitly that earlier stages of capitalism also involved colonial expan-
Doctrmes o/Impenalism (New York: John Wiley, 1965), p. 85. SIOn - Just as he recognized that the 'serru-colomes' of South America
21. A. P. Thornton, The Imperial Idea and Its Enemies. (Note 18 above), were really VIctImS of imperialist control and dormnatron, See A.
p.76. Brewer. Marxist Theories of Imperialism (London: Routiedge &
Kegan Paul, 1980), p. 117.

Notes and References 273

272 Notes and References
10. See N. J. Smetser, 'Towards a Theory of Mcderruzation', in A. Etzroni
35. A. Lipretz. 'New Tendencies ill the Intemattonal Division of Labour: and E. EtZIODl. Social Change (New York: BaSIC Books. 1964), pp.
Regimes of Accumulation and Modes of Regulation", in A. SCOll. M. 258-74. This IS probably the most widely quoted theoreucat text on
Storpor and contributors. Production. Work. Territory: The Geogra- modermzation. Another early work of great influence was B. F.
pineal Anatomy of Industnal Capitalism (Winchester. Mass.: Unwm Hoselitz and W. E. Moore (eds), Industrialisation and Society (The
Hyman. 1988), p. 21. Hague: Mouton, 1963). For an extensive diSCUSSIOn on modermzancn
theones. see A. M. M. Hoogvelt, The Sociology of Developing Societies
2. i Neocolonialism, Modernization and Dependency (London: Macmillan, 1976), eh. 3.
11. For an excellent diSCUSSIon on the mstorical specificity of the idea of
development as a form ofWestern-nnposed adtrunistrauve reform of
1. J. O'Connor. 'The Mearung of Econonuc Impenaiism'. m R. Rhodes. the Third World, see P. \V. Preston, Theories of Development (London:
Imperialism Gild Underdevelopment (New York: Monthly Review Routledge, 1982), eh. 2 (the idea of development).
Press. 1970). See esp. p. 117, which lists the chief manifestauons of 12. L. Trotsky, The Permanent Revolution (1928) (New York: Merit Pub-
neocolonialism as identified by the African leaders at the conference. lishers, 1969). See also M. Lowy, The Politics of Combined and Uneven
2. For confirmation of both the long-term downward trend, and the Development (London: Verso, 1981), eh. 2.
fluctuations of all non-oil commodity prices SInce 1950. see \Vorld 13. P. Baran. The Political Economy of Growth (New York: Monthly
Bank, World Development Report (Oxford University Press, 1987), Review Press, 1967) (first published m Sparush m 1957).
p. 17, fig. 2.3. and the Appendix on the tenus of trade, p. 176. 14. A. G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment 11l Latin America (New
3. ErnestMandel firstcomed tills term.He defined 'technological'rentsas York: Monthly Review Press. 1967).
15. T. dos Santos. 'The Structure of Dependenee', m C. K. Wilher (ed.),
surplus profits denved from the monopolization of techrncal The Poltucai Economy of Development and Underdevelopment (New
progress, from discovenes and inventions which lower the cost York: Random House. 1970).
price of commodities but cannot (at least in the medium run) 16. L. Pearson et at.. Partners ill Development (London: Pall Mall, 1970),
become generalised throughout a given branch of production and p.81.
applied by all competitors, because of the structure of monopoly 17. R. Jenkins, Exploitation (London: Paladin, 1971).
capital Itself: difficultres of entry, size of minimum Investment, 18. For a further diSCUSSIOn, see Chapter 11 of this book.
control of patents, cartel arrangements and so on. See E. Mandel, 19. For a diSCUSSIOn on autocentnc versus peripheral development, see S.
Late Capitalism (London: New Left Books, 1978), p. 192. Anun, Unequal Development (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1976).
20. R. Prebisch. The Economic Development of Latin Amenca and the
4.. P. Worseley, The Third World (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, Pnncspal Problems (New York: UN Econonuc Comrrussfon for
1964), p. 52. Latm Amenca, 1950); and H. Singer, 'The Distribution of Gains
5. F. Fanon, The Wretcned of the Earth (Harmondsworth: Pengum, between Investing and Borrowing Countries', American Economic
1963), eh. 3. ReView, Supplement, May 1950.
6., N. Chomsky, 'Foreword' III Y. Flu. A. Faire and J. P. Vigter, The 21. A. Emmanuel. Unequal Exchange. A Study oftlTe lmpenalism of Trade
World Economic Crisis (London: Zed Press, 1972), p. 4. (London: New Left Books, 1971).
7. Quoted 10 Jenny Pearce. Under the Eagle: US Intervention .m Central 22. For an extensive diSCUSSIon on the programmatIc achrevements of
Ame1'lca and tne Caribbean (London: Latm Amenca Bureau, 1981), the Third \Vorld in putting its case on the agenda of the Inter-
p.27. national community, see A. M. M. Hoogvelt, The Third World ill Global
8. D. Harnson, The Sociology of Modermzauon and Development (Lon- Development (London: Macmillan, 1982), eh. 2. See also P. Willets, The
don: Unwm Hyman, 1988). Non-aligned Movement: Tile Origins of a Tlurd World Alliance (Lon-
9.' See W. W. Rostow, The Stages of Economic Growth- somewhat super- don: Frances Pinter, 1978); and M. Ul Haq, 'Intelleetual Self-Reliance',
fluously subtitled 'A non-Communist Manifesto' (Cambridge Unrver- opening speech at the establishment ofThird World Forum ID Karachi,
srty Press, 1960). This work has no doubt been the most influential. January 1975; pnnted in International Development Review,!. 1975,pp.
Other unportant econouusts who brought social andevenpsychological 8-13. About a hundred leading Tlurd-Wcrld scholars and officials of
variables mto their economic development tbecnes were; A. Lewis, The mternational orgarnzations attended this conference.
Theory ofEconomic Growth (London: AlIen & Unwm. 1955),and E. E.
Hagec. 011 lite Theory ofSocial Cltallge(Homewood. Ill.: Dorsey, 1962).
I By far the most comprehensrve of all these approaches was Gunnar

, Myrdal et al.. Asian Drama, vols r-ru (New York: Pantheon. 1968).
274 Notes and References I
Nates and References !275

3 Crisis and Restructuring: The New International Division of IS. S. George, A Fate Worse than Debt {Harmondsworth: Pengum, 1?88),
esp. ch. L ""bll J
16. The term <world market factory' was first coined by F. Fro ~. .
1. See S. Arnin, The Law of Valueand Historical Materialism (New York: Hemnch and O. Kreye, The New International DivISIOll of L~bolll'
Monthly Review Press. 1978), eh, 6. (Cambridge Uruversrty Press. 1980), p. 6. I
2. D. Becker, 'Development, Democracy and Dependency in Latin 17. P. Jalee. Imperialism III the Seventies (New York: The Third Press,
America: A Postimpenalist View', Third World Quarterly, 6(2), April
1984, pp. 411-31.
1972), p. 8 3 . . . . .
18. See G. Arriglu, 'A CriSIS of Hegemony'. m S. Amin, G. A(Nrnghl,y' k'

3. S. Amm. 'Towards a New Structural Crisis of the Capitalist System'; Frank and 1. Wallerstem, Dynamics of Global Crtsis ew or:
Paper submitted to the Third World Forum, Karachi, Pakistan, 5-10 Monthly Review Press. 1982), pp. 55-108. .
January 1975; and The Law of Value Gild Historical Matenalism, 19. F. Halliday, Cold War. Third World (London: Hutchmson RadIUS.
(Note 1 above). 1989), p. 33. I f h
4. We shall return to the defimtion and description of 'Fordism: exten- 20. P. Evans, "Transnational Linkages and the ECO?OffilC Ro e ~ t e
sively in Chapter 5 of this book. State: An Analysis of Developing and Industrialised Nations in the
5. D. Harvey, The Condition of Postmodermty (Oxford: Basil BIackwell, Post-World War IT Period', In P. Evans and D. Rueschemeyer et at.,
1989), p. 135. Brmging the State Back In (Cambridge Umversity Press. 1985).
6. See A. Lipietz, 'How Monetansm has Choked Third World Indus- 21. A good example are the regional volumes of the 'SOhCIdO!bogyMOf De
tnalization', New Left Review, 145. 1984. pp. 71-88, 73. opmg Societies' senes, edited by T. Shanin, publis e y acrrn1vlan el-
7. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1981), p. 102. and the Monthly Review Press In varIOUS years m the 1980s.
8. P. R. OdeIl, Oil and World Power 7th edn (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 22. A pathbreakmg essay on the new approaches to developmsent thleory
1983) figure, p. 138. m this period was D. Booth, 'Marxism and Development OCID ogy:
9. For a discussion of the relative pnce movements between primary Interpretmg the Impasse', World Development, 13(7), 1985. See also
products and manufactures over the colonial and neocolonial periods, Ins contribution to F, J. Schuurman (ed.), Beyond the Impasse, New
see M. Barratt Brown, The Economics of Impenaiism (Harmonds- Directions 1Il Development Theory (London: Zed Books, 1993).
worth: Penguin, 1974), ch. 10. 23. For examples of this bottom-up 'empowerment ap(Lproacdh', sLee R.
10. On the concept of the social wage, see L Gough, The Political Econ- Cbalmers. Rural Development, Putting the Last First on on: _ong-
amy of the Welfare State (London: Macmillan, 1979), pp. 108 ff. and man, 1983); and P. Oakley and D. Marsden. Approaches to Parttcipa-
Appendix D. On the link between the social wage and Imperialist tton m Rural Development (Geneva: ILO. 1984). .
profits, see R. Sutcliffe, Hard Times (London: Pluto Press, 1983). 24. E. Boserup is widely credited with havmg been the fidrst w nter t~
I!. An oft-quoted study by Vartsos m 1970 propelled 'technologicat rents' explore systematically the role of women III economic eve Iopmen .
to the forefront of the dependency debate. Vaitsos discovered that, m While her work was a lour de force III ItS novelty. It ~a5 underdevel-
the pharmaceutical mdustry in Colombia, for example, as little as 3.4 oped theorettcally. Nevertheless, it alerted donor agencies to the ~xciu­
per cent of effectrve returns to the parent company consisted of S10n of women from the benefits of progress and 1S said to
'declared' profits. Another 14 per cent were accounted for by royalty have inspired the 'UN Decade for Women' that was to follow. E.
payments. while 82.6 per cent were contributed by the parent compa- Boserup, r.:voman's Role 111 Economic Development (London: Earth-
ny's overpricmg of its sales to the affiliates. See C. V. Vansos, 'Bar- scan, 1970).
gaining and the Distribution of Returns in the Purchase of 25. M. Mies, Pamarctty ond Accumulation on a r1' orld SBcalek' HI01'91l8e161)lfl the
Technology by Developmg Countries', Bulletin of the Institute of International DiVISiOJl of Labour (London: Zed 00 5, , pp.
Development Studies, 3(1), 1970, pp. 16-23. 122ff. See also B. Mass, The Polincal Economy of Population Control
12. S. Amm, The Law of Value and Historical Matertalism, (Note J 111 Latin Amenca (Montreal: Women's Press, 1975);.and N. Kardam,
above), p. 77. 'Bringmg Women In'. in fVomell"s Issues l1J 1lllernall?nalDew:[opmelll
13. See, for example, the argument developed by J. Toye in 'Development Prog;ams (Boulder, CoL: Lynne Riermer, 1991). WhIle mos~ literature
Policy In the Shadow of Keynes", eh. 2 in his book Dilemmas ofDevel- is confident about the 'double' burden of women III the Third ~orId,
opment (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1987). the concept of'tnple' exploitation has been developed by D. Gills I?
14. ThIS calculation IS based on the statistical tables in Annexes of the 1970 'The Forgotten Workers: Rural Women III Korean Development,
and 1982 ISSues of Development Cooperation: ReView of the OECD (phD thesis, University of Sheffield, 1994).
Development ASSIstance Committee (pans: OECD, 1970 and J982).
276 Notes and References Notes and References 277
26. M. Mies, Patriarchy and Accumuianon Oil a World Scale. Women 111 the
Part IT Introduction
International Division of Labour (London: Zed Books. 1986); see also
V. Bennholdt-Thompson. 'Investment m the Poor: Analysis of World
Bank Policy'. Sacral SCientist, 8(7), February 1980, part I: and 8(8), I. A. M. M. Hoogvett, The Third World in Global Development (London:
March 1980, part 11: C. von Werlhof, 'The Proletarian IS Dead. Long Macmillan, 1982), p. 208.
Live the Housewife?', ID 1. Wallcrstem et al. (eds), Households and the 2. R. Cox, 'Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond Interna-
World Economy (New York: Sage, 1984); and K. Young et at. (eds), Of tional Relations Theory'. Millennium: Journal ofInternational Studies.
Marriage and tile Market: Women s Subordination 11l International 10(2), 1981, pp. 126-55.
Perspective, 2nd cdn (London: Routledge, 1984). 3. See B. Warren, Imperialism. Pioneer oj Capualism (London: New Left
27. M. Mies, Patriarchy and Accumulation, (Note 25 above), p. 127. Books, 1980); and F. H. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Dependency and
28. For a good coverage of the Issue of women versus gender m develop- Development 11l Latin Amenca (Berke1ey, Calif.: University of Califor-
ment, see G. Waylen, Gender 11l Ttnrd World Politics (Buckingham: rua Press. 1979), esp. the Preface to the American edition.
Open University Press. 1996); a good introduction IS also R. Pearson, 4. For an example of the restatement of this VIew. even after the collapse of
'Gender Matters m Development', m T. Alien and A. Thomas (eds), the SOCialist experience. see S. Amm. 'The Future of SOCialism', m
Poverty Gild Development m the 1990s (Oxford Umversuy Press and Monthly RevlelV. July/August 1990; also S. Armn, G. Arrrght, A. G.
Open Umversity Press, 1990). Frank and 1. Wallerstem, Transforming the Revolution. Social Move-
29. M. Mitra. 'Women In Dairying In Andhra Pradesh', Term paper, ments and the World System (New York: Monthly Review Press. 1990).
Mimeo, institute of Social Studies, The Hague (1984), CIted m Mies, 5. For a repeat of this mgrained View, see S. Amm. G. Arnghi. A. G.
Patriarchy and Accumulauon, (Note 25 above), p. 131. Frank and 1. Wallerstem. Transformmg tile Revolution. (Note 4 above).
30. C. Mohanty, 'Introduction', In C. Mohanty, A. Russo and L. Torres 6. P. Sweezy, 'Globalization - To What End?', Monthly RevlelV. 42(9),
(eds), Third World Women and The Politics ofFeminism (Bloonungton February 1992, p. 1.
and Indianapolis, Ind.: Indiana University Press, 1991), p. 11. 7. R. Boyer, 'Technical Change and the Theory of "Regulation"', in G.
31. J. H. Momsen and J. Townsend, Geography 0/ Gender m tne Third DOSI and C. Freeman et al.. (eds), Technical Change and ECOl1Ol1l1C
World (New York: SUNY Press, 1987). Theory (London: Pinter, 1988).
32. C. Mohanty, 'Under Western Eyes', m C. Mohanty, A. Russo and L.
Torres (eds], Third World Women, (Note 30 above), pp. 51-80.
33. A. Ong, 'Colonialism and Modernity: Feminist Re-presentations of
Women In Non-western Societies', Inscnpuons. 3-4, 1988, pp. 79-93; 4 From Expansion to Involntion
cited ID J. Townscnd. 'Gender Studies: Whose Agenda?', 10 F. Schuur-
man (ed.), Beyond the Impasse, New Directions m Development Theory 1. I am indebted to Dr Rongyan Qi for her land help with some of the
(London: Zed Books, 1993), pp. 169-86,183. tables m tlns chapter.
34. The Brazilian SOCIOlogIst and poliucian (later elected President of 2. P. Dicken. Global Shift. The Intemanonattsauon of Economic Activity
Brazil) Fernando Heurtque Cardoso was one of the key contributors (London: Paul Cbapman. 1992), p. 16.
to the 'dependency associated development' VISIon. See F. H. Cardoso, 3. S. Kuznets. 'Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of'Natrons:
'Associated-dependent Development: Theoretical and Practical X-level and Structure of Foreign Trade: Long- Term Trends', ECOllOl1HC
Implication', ID A. Stepan (ed.), Aumontanan Brazil: Ongms. Poiicies. Development and Cultural Change, 15 (2), part u, January 1967.
and Future (New Haven. Corm .. Yale University Press, 1973). 4. Ibid.. pp. 7-8.
Together with Enzo Faletto he wrote the classic text Dependency and 5. For a diSCUSSIOn, see Shigeru Otsubo, Glooaltzauon. Accelerated Integ-
Developmentin Latin Amel'lca (Berkeley, Calif.: Umversity of Califor- ration through World Trade. A New Role for Developing Countnes m an
rua Press. 1979; translation, with new mtroduction and post-scnptum Integrating World, (Washington DC:World Bank. International Eco-
of their original Spanish volwne published m 1969). nomics Department, DiSCUSSIOn Papers. November 1995).
35. D. Becker (1984) 'Development, Democracy and Dependency m Latin 6. World Development Report (Washington DC: World Bank, 1999), table
America' (Note 2 above). 20.
36. J. Wallerstem, The Capztalist World Economy (Cambridge Unrverstty 7. Otsubo. Globalization, calculates that, of the 16% nse In the trade
Press. 1980), p. 5. integration ratio of low and middle income countnes smce the mid-
37. jfhlS section IS a summary of Wallcrstein's arguments In Chapters 4 1960s, 15% was observed only after the mid-1980s and resulted from
and 5 of The Capitalist World Economy. the developing countries' shift 10 development strategy.
8. World Trade Orgamzanon. Annual Report 1998 (Geneva: WTO,
1998), p. 29.

278 Notes and References Notes and References 279

9. A.Yeats, Just How Big IS Global Production Sharing? World Bank 24. Based on UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report ([999), jI. lI6,
Policy Research Paper No. [87[, (Washington DC: World Bank, chart 5.10. I
[988), cited m WTO, Annual Report 1998, (Note 8 above), p. 36. 25. Ihid .. p. [[6. I
[0. WTO, Annua! Report 1998, pp. [5 and [6. 26. P. Hirst and G. Thornpson, Globalization in Question, 2nd edn,j(Note
11. For a good example, see David Held et al., Global Transformations 14 above), pp. 73/4. :
(Cambridge: Polity Press, [999), p. [67, where the authors cite T. 27. Ibid., p. 74. :
Nierop, Systems and Regions m Global Politics: All Empmcal Study 28. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1999), p. 107.
DJDiplomacy, International Organization Gild Trade 1950-1991 (ChI- 29. J. Henderson, 'Danger and Opportunity III the Asra-Pacific', in G. F
chester: John Wiley, [994). As Held et al. put it: 'over the postwar Thompson (ed.), Economic Dvnannsm 111 tile Assa-Paciftc (London:
period. trade has become much more extensive than ever before as a Routledge, [998), Cited m Paul Hirst and Graham Thompson, Global-
world widenetwork of trading relations between regionsand countnes tzation m QllestlOn, 2nd edn (London: Polity Press, 1999), p. [56.
has developed.'
30. UNCTAD, World Investment Report (1997), figure 1.2.
12. S. Kutznets, 'Quantitative Aspects of the Economic Growth of 31. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1999), p. [18.
Nations' (Note 3 above), p. 10.
32. The term 'emerging markets' refers to those countnes m the develop-
13. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report 1999 (UN: New York and ing world as well as among the so-called transinon economies of
Geneva, [999), p. 85.
Central and Eastern Europe which have either set up or opened their
14. Other academic authors have come to similar conclusions. For ex- stock markets to foreign penetration Since the wave of free market
ample, Paul Hirst and Graharne Thompson, In Globalization ill Ques- reforms began in the 1980s. The main emerging markets are: Chma,
non (London: Polity Press, [995), p. 28, argue that using gross figures Malaysia. South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Indonesia. I~dia, "MeXICO,
of ratios of trade relative to output 'confirms unequivocally that Brazil, Korea, Argentina. Russia and the Czech Republic, '
"openness" was greater dunng the Gold Standard period than even 33. For this classification. see International Monetary Fund, Balance of
m the 1980s' The second edition (1999) of this book confirms their Payments Siansncs Yearbook. (Washmgton: IMF: 1997), annex Ill.
posttion even regarding the 1990s and they cntique In even greater 34. B. Thomas, 'The Historical Record of Capital Movements to 1913', m
detail than before the methodologies used by those who take trade/ J. H. Adler (ed.), Capital Movements and Economic Development
GDP ratios as a proxy for 'globalization'. (London: Macmillan, [967), pp. 3-32, repnnted m J. H. Dunlll~g,
15. UNCTC, Transnauonat Corporations 11l World Development, Trends Intemanonal Investment (Harmondsworth: Pengum. 1972), pp. 27-)8.
and Prospects (New York: UN, 1988), p. [6. 34, table I.
16. C. Tugendhat, The Multinanonais (London: Eyre & Spotttswoodc. 35. C. Crook, 'Fear of Finance'. The Economist, 19 September 1992,
[971), p. 24.
36. State of the Union Address, Economic Report ofthe President (Washing-
17. UNECOSOC, Mulnnanonal Corporations 111 World Development ton DC, US Government Pnntmg Office, January [999), p. 224.
(New York: UN, 1973), pp. 13-[4.
37. UN, World Economic and Social Survey 1997 (New York: UN; 1997),
18. For a discussion of the methodology used, see the footnote on p. 135 p. 267, table A31.
of the sequel to the report, UNCTC, Transnational Corporations 111 38. International Finance Corporation, Emerging Stockmarkets Factbootc.
World Development, a Re-Bxammatton (New York: UN, 1978). 1997 (Washington DC: IFC, [997).
19. UN Department of Economic and SOCIal Affairs, Economic Report 39. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1999), p. 99.
1947 (Lake Erie, NJ: United Nations, 1948). 40. lbid.. p. 106.
20. J. H. Dunning, Studies m International Investment (London: Allen & 41. The term 'net capital inflow' denotes acquisitions rrunus sales of
Unwm, [970), see pp. 23 and 19, respectively. See also The Problem of demesne assets by non-residents. while the term 'net capital outflow'
International Investments. A Report by tile Study Group of Members of denotes acqursmons of foreign assets mmus sales of foreign as~ets by
the Royal Institute of International Affairs (Oxford University Press, residents. Thus the term net capita! flow refers to net capttaltinflow
mmus net capital outflow. See ibid., p. 100.
21. For the 1960 figure, see M. Barratt Brown, The Economics of Impen- 42. Economic Report of tile President, 1999 (Washmgton, DC; US Gov-
alism (Harmondsworth: Penguin, [974), pp. 206-7. For 1966, see L. B. ernment Printing Office, 1999), pp. 22[-2.
Pearson, Partners 11l Development (London: Pall Mall Press, (970), 43. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1999), p. 101.
p. lOO. For 1974, see Transnattonai Corporations 111 World Develop- 44. United Nations Development Programme. Human Development
ment (as m Note 18 above), p. 242, tahle m.For [989, see UNCTC, Report 1999 (New York: UN; 1999), eh, I, figure I.!.
World Investment Report (New York: UN, 1991), p. l I. table 4. 45. Ibid., ch. I.
22. See UNCTC, World Investment Report ([991), p. I r, table 4. 46. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1995), p. 77.
23. Ibid., p. 68.
47. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1999), p. 61.
280 Notes and References Notes and References 281

48. Dani Rodrik. 'Who Needs Capital Account Convertability?', Essays table IX; and G. Amgtu. 'World Income Inequalities and the Future of
m International Finance, 20-27. May 1998, p. 55. See also, Economic SOCialism', New Left RevIe"" 189, 1991.
Report of the President, (see Note 42 above), p. 241. 63. P. Bairoch, The Economic Development of the Third World smce 1900
49.. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1990), p, 110. (London: Methuen, 1975), p, 193.
50. F. F. Clairmont, The Rise and Fall of EC01l01JllC Liberalism (Penang: 64. UNDP, Human Development Report 1991 (Oxford Umversrty Press,
Southbound Press/Third World Network. 1996), p. 29. 1999), p. 23.
51. On the orthodox economics distmction between 'real' and 'monetary' 65. UNDP, Human Development Report 1999 (Oxford Univensty Press,
economy. see H. Magdoff and P. M. Sweezy, 'Production and 1999), p. 38.
Finance', Monthly Review, May 1983, repnnted m H. Magdoff and 66. UNDP, Human Development Report 1992 (Oxford University Press,
, P. M. Sweezy, Stagnation Gild the Financial ExpLOSIOn (New York: 1992), p, 35.
Monthly Review Press, 1987), pp. 93-105. See also S. Strange, Casino 67. WTO, Annual Report 1998, pp. 62-3.
Capitalism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1986), p. 118, where she says the 68. See P. Mos1ey, 'Globalization, Economrc Policy and Growth Perform-
consequences for the real economy, for production, trade and employ- ance', In UNCTAD, International Monetary and Financial Issues for
ment can 'only be guessed at'. tile 1990s, voL x , UN publications. ref. E.99. n.D.14. (New York and
52. P. Vo1cker, Chairman of the US Federal Reserve Board during much Geneva: UN, 1999). For a critical assessment of the empincal evi-
· of the 19805. is quoted in an interview with Anthony Sampson as dence. see also F. Rodnguez and D. Rodrik. 'Trade Policy and Eco-
saying: 'it seems to be easier to make money in some sense. with nomic Growth; A Skepuc'a Guide to the Cross-national Evidence',
: paper chasing paper. than In investing In real goods and services. If National Bureau of Economic Research Working Paper No. 7081
you're doing some research and the pay-off is commg in fifteen years (Cambridge, Mass.. April 1999).
or twenty years at today's interest rates. It's hard to envisage a big 69. UNDP, Human Development Report 1999, p, 3.
-enough pay-out to Justify the investment that you make today' 70. Ibid., p. 39.
Quoted in A. Sampson, The Midas Touch: Money, People and Power 71. M. Castells, 'The Informational Economy and the New International
from West 10 East (London: Hodder & Stoughton. 1989), p. 13. Division of Labor, III M. Camoy, M. Castells. S. S. Cohen and F. H.
53. .For a simple explanation of secunnzation, see A. Hamilton, The Cardoso, The New Global Economy ill the Information Age (New
, Financial Revolution (Harmondsworth: Penguin. 1986), esp. pp. 71- York: Pennsylvania State University Press and London: Macmillan,
· 2. See also Barclays Bank Briefing No. 87, January 1992 and The 1993), p. 37.
Economist, 'Corporate Finance', June 1986, pp. 7-13.
54. Longmans. Dictionary 0/ English.
55. The Economist, 'Corporate Finance'. Survey, 7 June 1986, p. 23. 5 Flexibility and Informationalism
56. The Economist, 19 September 1992, p. 30.
57. Quoted In A. Sampson, The Midas Touch, (Note 52 above), p. 179. 1. Throughout the 19705 and 19805, 'crisis' literature dominated the
58. A. Sampson, ibid., p. 179. general social SCIence agenda. In Journals such as the Marxist Monthly
59. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1990), p, 35, table 17. ReView not an Issue could pass without some reference to It. For
60. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report (1999), p. 107. comprehensive guides to the 'crisis'. see Y. Fitt. A. Faire and 1. Vigier,
61. For example, after the East ASian CriSIS of 1997, the governments of The World Economic Cnsis: US. Imperialism at Bay (London: Zed
both Japan and Hong Kong piled taxpayers' monies into their stock Press, 1980); S. Anun. G.. Arngfu. A. G. Frank and L Wallerstem,
'markets to buy falling stocks and support the markets. The US Dvnanucs of Global CrISIs (New York: Monthly Review Press, 1982);
, Federal Reserve bailed out LCTM, the hedge fund that collapsed as R. J. Johnston and P. J. Taylcr (eds), A World III Crisis? (New York:
t a result of the cnSIS, with US$3 trillion worth of 'uncovered' IpOS I_
Basil Blackwell, 1986); and R. Sutcliffe, Hard Times. The Warld Eco-
, trons', For details about the regular support for financial markets by nomy m Turmoil (London: Pluto. 1983).
governments, see Harry Shutt. The Trouble wall Capitalism (London: 2. J. P. Womack, D. T. Jones and D. Roos, The Machine that Changed
: Zed Press, 1998), pp. 124-31. the World (New York: Rawson Associates. 1990), p. 27.
62. UNDP, Human Development Report 1992 (Oxford Umversity Press, 3. J. P. Womack et 01.. ibid., p. 37.
1992), p. 36. Note that the UNDP III this report includes the countnes 4. D. Harvey, The Condition of Postmoderntty (Oxford: Basil Blackwell.
i of Eastern Europe and the SOVIet Union In the mdustnalized group.
1989) p. 142.
, For confirmation of the widening gap ill Incomes between traditional 5. See D. Harvey, ibid. The summary of 'Fordism' ill this chapter owes
! core and periphery countries. see also P. Sweezy, 'Globalization to much to Harvey's excellent discussion ID eh, 9 of hIS book.
· What End?'. part 11, MOll/My ReVIew, 43(10), March 1992, p, 10,
282 Notes and References Notes and References I, 283

6. M. J. Piore and C. F. Sabel, The Second Industrial Divide (New York: dUCti011 Systems? JVh)' Are They a Strategic Issue for Europe? Report
Basic Books. 1984). EUR 13968 EN (Brussels; 1992). I
7. Ibid .. p. 265. 25. Ibid .• p. 3. 1

8. Ibid .• p. 266. 26. Ibid .• p. 2. I,

9. For a full diSCUSSIOn. see F. Fukuyama, Trust: The Social Virtues and 27. Labour Research Department, Human Resource Management Survey,
tile Creation of Prosperity (London: Harmsh Hamilton, 1995). Bargammg Report (London: February 1995), I

10. R. Jaileumar and D. Upton, 'The Co-ordination of Global Manufac- 28. UNCTAD. World Investment Report 1994, Transnanonal Corpora-
turing', in S. P. Bradley, J. Hausman and R. NoIaD. Globalization. tIOns, Employment and tile Wortcplace (New York and GenevaiLlruted
Technology, and Competition (Boston, Mass.: Harvard Business Nations, 1994), p. 271. . '
School Press. 1993), pp. 178-9. 29. M. Castells, The Rise 0/ tile Network SOCIety, vol. 1 of a trilogy The
11. The description of the Toyota model III this chapter draws substan- Information Age: Economy, Society and Culture (Cambridge; Mass.
tially on the excellent book by J. P. Womack et al. The Machine that and Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1996).
Changed the World (Note 2 above) on the same subject. 30. Ibid .• p. 171.
12. K. Dohse et al.. <From "Fcrdism" to "Tcyotism"? The SOCial Orga- 31. Ibid .. p. 170.
nisation of the Labour Process in the Japanese Automobile Industry', 32. R. Jaikurnar and D. Upton, 'The Co-ordination of Global Manufac-
Politics and Society. 14 (2), 1985. pp. 115-46. tunng' (Note 10 above), p. 169.
13. I.P. Wornack, Tlte Machine that Changed the World, (Note 2 33. A. Toffler, Future Shock (New York: Bantam Books. 1970); ~nd
above), eh. 3. H. Mintzberg, The Structuring of Organizations (Englewood Cliffs,
14. A. Toffler, Power shift. Know/edge. Wealtlz and Violence at the Edge of NJ: Prennce Hall. 1979).
the 21st Century (New York: Bantam Books, 1992) pp. 102 and 239. 34. F, Ostroff, The HOrizontal Organization: What tile Organization of the
15. J.P. Womack et 01.. The Machme that Changed the World (Note 2 Future Actually Looks Like and How It Delivers Value to Customers
above), p. 62. Note the authors' use of the word 'machine' in this (Oxford Umversity Press. 1999).
context. A deliberate, if mistaken analogy. 35. R. Moss Kanter, 'The Future of Bureaucracy and Hierarchy', In
16. R. Murray, 'Fordism and Post-Fordism'. in'S. Hall. D. Held and P. Bourdieu and J. S. Coteman, SOCial Theory for a Changmg Soctety
T. McGrew. Modernity and us Futures (Cambridge: Polity Press and (Boulder. Col.. Westview Press. 1991).
Oxford: Basil Blackwell In association with Open University Press 36. UNCTAD World Investment Report 1994. (Note 28. above), pp. 193-4.
1992), p. 218. • 37. 'Benetton: The Next Era', The Economist, 23 April 1994.
17. Good examples of such advocacy are J. MacDonald and J. Piggot, 38. K. Ohmae, Triad Power, tile Conung Shape a/Global Competition (New
Global Quality. The New Management Culture (London: Mercury, York; The Free Press and Collier Macmillan, 1985), pp. xvi-xvii.
1990). See also C. Lorenz, 'Power to the People', Financial Times. 30 39. J. Womack et al.. The Machine that Changed (Note 2 above), pp.
March 1992; T. Stewart, 'A User's Guide to Power', Fortune. Spring 218-22.
1991; A. Toffler. POlI'er shift. (Note 14 above) p. 210. 40. See for example, Th. Malone and R. Laubacher. 'The Dawn of the
18. See the collection of contributions m T. Eiger and C. Smith (eds), E-lance Economy', Harvard Business Review. September/October
Global Japantzanon: The transnational transformation of the labour 1998. pp. 145-52.
process (London: Routledge, 1994); see also R. Delbridge. P. Thurn- 41. Ibid •. p. l46.
bull and B. Wilkrnson, 'Pushmg Back the Frontiers: Management 42. C. Freidheim. 'The Global Corporations - Obsolete So Soon'?', quoted
Control and Work Intensification under JITrrQM Factory Regimes', in The Global Firm R.IP. " The Economist, 6 February 1993.
New Technology, lYork and Employment, Autumn 1992, pp. 97-107; 43. C. F. Sabel. 'Expenmental Regionalism and the Dilemmas of RegIO-
and H. WilIiamson and G. Coyne. New Management Techniques: New nal Economic Policy', Paper presented to the Conference on SOCIO-
Union Strategies. (LIverpool: CAITSIMTUCURC; 1991). Economic Systems of Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom,
19. UNCTC. Transnanonal Corporations, Fourth Report, 'Trends and Germany and France, at the Institute of Fiscal and Monetary Policy,
Prospects' (New York: UN. 1988). p. 42. Tokyo. Japan. 16 February 1996. ' .
20. UNCTC. ibid.. p. 42. 44. C. Leadbeater, Living all Thin Air: The New Economy (London: Vlk-
21. J. Tldd, Flexible Manufacturing Technologies and International Com- mg, 1999), pp.137-8.
petitiveness (London: Pinter, 1991). 45. Ibid .• p. 143.
22. Ibid .• p. 92. 46. M.Castells. The Rise of the Network: Society. (Note 29 above), p. 199.
23. Ibid .• p. 96. 47. C. Leadbeater, Livmg on TIllS Air (Note 44 above), p. 143.
24. Commission of the European Commumnes, Directorate General 48. R. Putnam, Making Democracy fVork: Civic Traditions m Modern
SCience, Research and Development. 'What Are Anthropocentric Pro- Italy (Princeton, NI.: Pnnceton UmversIty Press. 1993).
284 Notes and References Notes and References 285

49. There arc many 'Silicon Valley' imitations all over the world. from Change and Economic Theory (London and New York: Pinter, 1988),
Cambridge m England to Bangalore m India; see C. Leadbeater, pp. 38-66. See also C. Freeman, 'Preface' to part u of that volume.
Living 011 Ttun Air. (Note 44 above), p. 143. 63. S. Hall and M. Jacques (eds), New Times: The Changing Face of
50. From the annals of general business and management literature the new Politics 111 the 1990s (London: Lawrence and Wlsuart. 1ll association
economy VOIces have been heard for longer than those emanatingfrom with Marxism Today, 1989).
the general econorruc discipline. Among the fanner. useful general 64. P. Hirst and 1. Zeitlin, 'Flexible Specialization versus post-Fordism:
introductory books are: D. Coy le, The Weightless World (Oxford: Theory, Evidence and Policy Implications', Economy and Society,
Capstone, 1997); JOhn III Hagel, and A. Armstrong, Net GOIll (Boston, 20(1), 1991, pp. I-55, H.
Mass.: Harvard Business School Press, 1997); K. Kelly, New Rules for 65. See Hall and Jacques, (Note 63 above), p. 129.
the New Economy (New York; Vikmg, 1998); and B. Davis and 66. Ibid., p. 127.
D. Wessel. Prosperity: The Coming 20-Year Boom and What It Means 67. For a concise summary of the Regulation School's main conceptual
to You (New York: Times Business. 1998); Bill Gates. Business @the apparatus, see R. Boyer, 'Technical Change and the Theory of
Speed ofThought, Succeeding ill the Digital Economy (Hannondsworth: "Regulation" " In G, DOSI et al. (eds), Technical Change and Economic
Penguin. 1999). Among economists. see R. Lester, The Productive Theory (London and New York: Pinter, 1988). For a comprehensive
Edge: How u.s. Industries Are POinting The Way to a New Era of review of the diverse approaches loosely federated under the label
ECOll0l111C Growth (London: W.W. Norton, 1998). For a sober assess- "Regulation School". see R. Jessop, 'Regulation Theories m Retro-
ment of pros and cons, see GEeD, The Future of the Global Economy, spect and Prospect', Economy and Society, 19(2), May 1990, pp. 153-
1999. Surveys of the new economy debates may also be found in recent 216. See also Ius more recent update III R. Jessop, 'Twenty Years of
Issues of The Economist: for example, 'Business and the Internet Sur- the (Pansian) Regulation Approach: The Paradox of Success and
vey', 26 June 1999, and 'The New Economy'. 24 July 1999. Failure at Home and Abroad', New Political Economy, 2(3), Novem-
51. Cited in 'How Real Is the New Economy?', The Econonust, 24 July ber 1997. For a cruicat reVH~W of regulation theories III comparison
1999; p. 17;also III 'The New US Economy, Part I', Financial Times, 13 with other contemporary CrISIS and transformation theones, see P.
December 1999, p. 8. Hirst and J. Zeitlin, 'Flexible Specialization versus Post-Fordism:
52. C. Leadbeater, Ltvtng on Thin Air, (Note 44 above), p. 9. Theory. Evidence and Policy Implications'. Economy and Society,
53. The Economist. 24 July 1999. p. 21. 20(1) February 1991 pp. I-55. A thorough critique of the substantive
54. M. Castclls. The Rise of the Network Society, (Note 29 above), p. 91. theses of the Regulation School has been written by R. Brenner and
55. W. Arthur, 'Increasmg Returns and the New World of Business', M. Glick, 'The Regulation Approach: Theory and History', NeJI' Left
Harvard Business RevlCw, Julyl August 1996. Review, 188, pp. 45-99. Finally, some more recent regulation conrn-
56. Ibid., p. 100. Also Dan Schiller, m Digital Capitalism: Networking tile bunons can be found III the excellent Reader edited by A. Amm, Post-
Global Market System (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999) argues Fordism (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994).
much the same thing and points to the consequences of increased 68. A. Lipretz, 'New Tendencrea III the International Division of Labor:
corporate control over expression and education. Regimes of Accumulation and Modes of Regulation', m A. Scott and
57. The Econotrust; 24 July 1999, p. 21. M. Storper et al., Production. JVork, Terntory (Loudon; AlIen &
58. In a glowing article on the new economy, Willam Sahlman says Unwm, 1986), pp. 16-39, 19.
'inflation IS dead - dead as a doornail'. He lists a number of onlinc 69. K Lipietz, Mirages and Miracles (London: Verso, 1987), pp. 12-/6.
auction companies that push prices down. There IS even one m which 70. R. Jessop, 'Post-Fordism and the State', In A. Amm, Post-Fordism,
consumers themselves post what they are willing to pay for products (Note 60 above), pp. 251-79.
or services ( Sahlmnn, 'The New Economy
Is Stronger Than You Thmk'. Harvard Business Review, November/
December 1999.
59. M. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society, (Note 29 above), p. 92. 6 Globalization
60. M. Elam, 'Puzzling out the Post-Fordist Debate: Technology, Mar-
kets and Instituuons'. m A. Anun (ed.), Post-Fordism (Oxford, UK I. D. Held and A. McGrew, D. Goldblatt and J. Perraton. Global
apd Cambridge, Mass .. Basil Blackwell, 1994), pp. 43-70. Transformauons: Politics. ECOllOflUCS and Culture (Cambridge: Polity
61. J~ Schumpeter. Busmess Cycles; A Theoretical, Historical and Statis- Press, 1999), p. 8.
[{cal AnalYSIS of tne Busl1less Cycles (New York: McGraw-Hill, 2. A clear exposition of the Sceptics' VIew is III P. Hiret and G. Thomp-
1S39). son. Globalization 11l QuestlOll, (London: Routledge: 1999).
62. G. Freeman and C. Perez. 'Structural Crises of Adjustment, Business
Cycles and Investment Behaviour'. ill G. DOSl et at. (eds), Techmcol
286 Notes and References Notes and References I 287
3. For a classic statement see S. Strange, The Retreat of the State: The 27. P. Boccara, 'Qu'est-ce-que l'anthroponomie?', III Calners du l'~RM,
Diffusion of Power III the World Economy (Cambridge University Individues et Societe. 1; and CIted in R. lessor, 'Regulation Theories In
Press: 1996). Retrospect and Prospect', In Economy and Society, 19(2), May 1990,
4. M. Castells. The Rise of the Network: Society (Cambridge. Mass. and pp. 153-216, 168. i
Oxford. UK, 1996), p. 92. 28. A. Lipretz. Mirages and Miracles (London: Verso, 1987), p. 15.
5. For a compact review of sociologrcal theories of globalizatton. see M. 29. R. Jessop, State Theory (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1990), pp. 317-18.
Waters, Globalization (London: Routledge, 1995). 30. C. Sabel, 'Ex penmental Regionalism and the Dilemmas of Regional
6. See R. Robertson, Globalization (London: Sage, 1992), and J. Nett! Economic Policy') Paper presented at the conference, 'Soda-Eco-
and R. Robertscn, International Systems and tile Moderntzatmn of nomic Systems of Japan, the United States. the United Kingdom,
SOCieties (London: Faber, 19681. Germany, and France', at the Institute of Fiscal 'and Monetary Policy,
7. D. Harvey, The Condition ofPostmodernity (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, Tokyo, Japan, 16 February 1996.
1989). The summary here IS based on chs. 14, 15 and 17 of lus book. 31. R. Retch, The Work DJ Nations (London: Simon & Schuster, 1991).
8. R. Delbridge, P. Tumbull and B.Wilkmson, 'Pushing back the Fron- 32. Ibid., p. 211.
tiers: Management Control and Work Intensification under JITfI'QM 33. UNCTAD, World Investment Report 1994, Transnanonal Corpora-
Factory Regimes", New Technology, Work and Employment, Autumn nons, Employment and the Workptace (New York and Geneva: UN.
1992, pp. 97-107, 104. 1994), p. 188. The report refers to the much-publicized study by a
9. Dava Sobel, Longitude (London: Fourth Estate, 1998). special committee of the French Parliament under the direction of
10. D. H.arvey, The Condition of Posnnodernity, (Note 7 above), p. 241. Senator Jean Arthurs, winch gave a very pessmusuc assessment of the
1I. A. Giddens, The Consequences of Modernity (Cambridge: Polity Press, link between relocation and unemployment.
1990), p. 64. 34. P. Dicken. Global Shift, (Note 25 above), p. 67.
12. M. Castclfs. The Information Age. Economy, Society and Culture, 35. Business Week, 19 December 1994 pp. 28-30.
volume r, The Rise of tile Network Society (Cambridge, Mass. and Ox- 36. J. Rifkm, The End DJ Work, The Decline DJ the Global Labor Force and
ford, UK. Basil Blackwell, 1996); vol n, The Power DJ Idenuty (Basil the Dawn of tile Post-Market Era (New York: G. P, Putnam's Sons,
Blackwell, 1997);and vol. JIl, End DJMillelll/lI/Ill'CBasilBlackwell, 1998). 1995).
13. M. Castells, End DJ Millennium, (Note 12 above), p. 336. 37. P. Krugman. 'Growing World Trade: Causes and Consequences', in
14. M: Castells. The Rise of the Network Society (Note 12 above), p. 106. Brookings Papers on Economic Acnvny, 1, 1995 pp. 327-77.
15. Ibid.. pp. 471-2. 38. D. Coates, Models ofCapztalism, Growth and Stagnation in the Modern
16. Ibid., pp. 436--7. Era (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2000), p. 256.
17. Ibid., p. 14. 39. M. Castells, End of Mtllemnum. (Note 12 above), p. 343.
18. M. Castells, End of Millennunn, (Note 12 above), p. 82. 40. Tom Wolfe, The BOilf ire DJ the Vanities (London: Pan 1988), p. 260.
19. New Political Economy, 4(3), November 1999, p. 385. 41. Tlte Economist, 27 November 1993.
20. M. CastelIs, End of Millennium. (Note ]2 above), p. 93. 42. Zygmunt Baumann, Globalization, the Human Consequences (London:
21. UNECOSOC, Multinational Corporations tn World Development Polity Press, 1998), p. 105.
(New York: UN, 1973).
22. UNCTAD, World Investment Report. 1993 (New York and Geneva:
UN, 1994) p. 143.
23. P. Drucker, The New Realities (London: Hememann, 1989), pp. 123-5. 7 Global Governance: Regulation and Imperialism
See also K. Ohmae. Triad Power. the Coming Shape ofGlobal Compen-
tton (New York: Free Press, 1985); and The Borderless World: Power 1. D. Leborgne and A. Liptetz, 'Conceptual Fallacies and Open Ques-
and Strategy 11l the Interlinked Economy (London: Collins. 1990). tions on Post-Fordism'. In M. Storper and A. Scott (eds), Pathways IT1
24. S. S. Cohcn. 'Geo-econorrucs and America's Mistakes', m M. Carnoy Indusmalizanon and Regional Development (London: Routledge,
et af. The New Global Economy III the Information Age (London: 1992), p. 347-8. Cited m J. Peck and A. Tickell, 'Searchmg for a
Macmillan. 1993), p. 98. New Institutional Fix: The After-Fordist Crisis and the Global-
25. For the figure for 1990, see P. Dicken. Global Shift, The Internationa- Local Disorder'. In A. Amm. Post-Fordistn. A Reader (Oxford. UK..
lization of Economic Activity, 2nd edn (Manchester: Paul Chapman. and Cambridge, Mass.: Basil Blackwell, 1994), pp. 280-315, 283-4
1992) p. 30, table 2.5. 2. Bob Jessop, 'Post-Fordism and the State', m A. Amm, Post-Fordtsm. A
26. M. Aglietta, The Theory of Capitalist Regulation (London: Verso, Reader, pp. 251-97. See also Bob Jesscp, 'Post-Fordism and Flexible
1976), p. 122. Specialisauon: Incommensurable, Contradictory, Compjem~ntary, or
Just Plain Different Perspectives?'. ill H. Ernste and V. Meider (eds),
288 Notes and References Notes and References 289

Regional Development and Contemporary Response: Extending Flexible 17. See J. Davis and Ch. Bishop, 'The MAl: multilateralism from above',
Specialisation, (London: Bclhaven Press), pp. 25-44. m 'The Threat of Globalism', Race & Class, special Issue, 40(2&3),
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see R. Jessop, 'Twenty Years of the (Parisian) Regulation Approach'. 19. J. Ruggie, 'International Regimes. Transactions and Change -
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Political Economy (princeton, NJ: Prmceton University Press. 1984), International Relations, 1992).
p.37. 21. GATT, Uruguay, Final Protocol, quoted in L. Walker, 'Gatt: The
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World Leaders/up and Hegemony (London: Lynne Rienner, 1990). For sity of Sheffield (19961 eh. 7, section 4.
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Fall of tile Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 23. UNCTAD. Strengthening National and International Action and Mul-
1500 to 2000 (London: Fontana, 1988); R. Keohane, After Hegemony, tilateral Cooperation for a Healthy, Secure and Equitable World Eco-
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Europe', in S. Gill (ed.), Gramsci. Historical Materialism and Interna- the 1990s saw further swingeing pnvatizaticns (for example. the rail-
tionat Retanons (Cambridge University Press, 1993), p. 261. ways) not mcluded m the total here.
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3(2), 1998, and B. van Apeldoorn, 'Transnatronal Class Agency and Globat Econonuc Failure (London: Zed Books, 1998), esp. cb. 8.
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290 Notes and References
Notes and References I 291
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Oxford, UK. 1996), p. 469. 64. N. Chomsky, The New Military Humanism: Lessonsfrom Kosovo (Com-
35. P. Gowan, The Global Gamble: Washington's Faustian Bid/or rYorld mon Courage Press, 1999);
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36. Ibid., p. 23.
37. Ibid., p. 29.
38. Ibid., p. 104. ThIS argument has also been made by others see Ronald Part ill Introduction
McKi~non and Kemclu Ohno, Dollar and Yen: Resolvl1;g Economic
Conflict Between the Umted States and Japan (Cambridge. Mass.: MIT 1. For example. F. Jameson. 'Actually Exrstmg Marxism', Polygraph: all
Press, 1997). International Journal of Culture and Politics, 617,1993, pp. 171-95. In
39. There IS no doubt about the strong US backing for the IMF course. See hIS earlier, best-known, work. Jameson focused on postmodem cul-
the nngmg endorsement of it In the Econonnc Report of the President ture as the logic of late capitalism. Today, Jameson appears to equate
~ashmgton DC. February 1999), pp. 245ff. See also Stephen Gill, a subsequent development in late capitalism, 'late, late' capitalism
The Geopolitics of the ASian CrISIS'. Monthly ReVIeW. 50(10), 1999. with postmodern capitalism. E Jameson. Postmoderntsm, or, tile
40. For further discussion, see Chapter 10 of tfus book. Cultural Logic of Late Capitalism (Durham: Durham University
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42. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, 1999. p. 107. 2. 'Institutional endorsement' is particularly noticeable In the US where
43. See 'The Fortune 500', Fortune Magasme. May 1994 and May 1998. courses in 'postcolorual studies' and 'postcoloniai' literature abound.
44. W. K. Tabb, 'The East ASIan Financial Crisis', Monthly Relllell', 50(2) See E. Shohat. 'Notes on the "Post-Colomal"'. Social Text. 31!32.
1998. p. 25. 1993, pp. 99-113, 99. In the UK too the term 'postcolornal' is begin-
45. UNCTAD, Trade l'f!ld Development Report, 1999, p. 57. nmg to work its way onto curricula of university courses.
46. D. Henwood. Wall (London and New York: Verso, 1998), p. 125. 3. For an excellent argument, see N. Fraser, 'From Redistribution to
47. Gowan. The Global Gamble. (Note 35 above), pp. 35-6. Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a "Post-socialist Age" ', New
48. Antonio Negri, quoted m Henwood, (Note 46 above), p. 231. Left Remll'. 212, 1995, pp. 68-93. I
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1999, p. 100. (2), 1993. pp. 257-72. 262.
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1999). • . ductIon', Monthly ReVIeW. July/August 1995. special Issue <In Defense
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November 1990. p. I. 10. A. Dirlik, (Note 7 above), p. 329. I
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Review, I July 1999. pp. 22-6. and A. Ahmad who, like Dirlik himself, relates postcolomaliry to
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1999, p. 26-7; and 'The New Star Wars'. Newsweek; 22 February 1999. Literatures (London: Verso, 1992).
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ReVlelt',45. 1993. pp. 38-51. 1993, pp. 84-97. I
292 Notes and References Notes and References 293

13. B. Ashcroft, G. Griffiths and H. Tiffin, The Empire Wraes Bactc: 8. R.T. Naylor, Hot Money and the Politics of Debt (Toronto: McClel-
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17. Quoted in F Mulhern. 'The Politics of Cultural Studies', Monthly and World Bank-imposed reforms, see M. Chossudovsky, The Globa-
Review, July/August 1995, pp. 31-40,32. lisatton ofPoverty, Impacts of LNIF and World Bank ReformsCLondon
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Theory, Culture and Race (London: Routledge, 1995), p. 175. of the Journal ReVIew of African Political Economy (ROAPEj, 47,
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L M. Castells, The Rise of the Network Society (Cambridge, Mass. and versuy Press, 1994); S. George and F Sabelli, Faun & Credit, the
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2. Centre d'Etudes Prospect Ives et d'Informatrons Intemationales D. Ghai (ed.), The IMF and the South (London: Zed Books, 1991).
(CEPI!), L "ecollolllle mondiale 1990-2000: l'imperatif de la crOISSGnCe 18. African NOO Declaration to UNCTAD IX, prepared by the parallel
(Pans: Econormca. 1992), cited in M. Castells, The Rise of tile Network NGO Conference to UNCTAD IX, held 2+-28 April 1996, Midrand,
SOCiety (Note I above], p. 134. South Africa; circulated by email - contact
3. See UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report. 1998 (New York and 19. D, Ghai and C. Hewitt de Alcantara. 'The Crisis of the 1980s 10 Africa,
Geneva: UN; 1998) p. 127. Latin America and the Caribbean: An Overview', m D. Ohm (ed.), The
4. World Bank, Global Development Finance. 1997 (Washington. DC IlvIF and the South (London: Zed Books, on behalf of United Nations
. World Bank, 1997), p. 202. Research Institute for Social Development, 199[), pp. 1+-[7.
5. .Kof Annan. 'The Causes of Conflict and the Promotion of Durable 20. D. Ghat and C. Hewttt de Alcantara 'The Crisis of the 1980s' (Note 19
. Peace and Sustainable Development In Africa' ( above), p. 16.
dev/genmfo/afrec), cited m S. Lone, 'Confronting Conflict tu Africa', 21. Reported III The Economist, 5 March 1994.
Africa Recovery, August 1998, p. 20. 22. World Bank, Adjustment III Africa: Reform. Results, and tile Road
6. J. Ihonvbere. ECOII0J111C Crisis, Civil SOCIety, and Democrauzauon: The Ahead. a World Bank: Palicy Research Report (New York: Oxford
Case of Zambw, (Trenton, NJ: African World Press, 1996), p. 25. Umversrty Press, 1994).
7. Tills calculation IS based on the statistical tables III Annexes of the 23. UNCTAD. Trade and Development Report, 1998, p. 125.
1970 and 1982 Issues of GECD, Development Cooperation, Review of 24. UNCTAD, ibid., p. 125.
the DEeD Development Assistance Comnuttee (Paris: OECD, 1970 25. Inrernanonal Monetary Fund, World Econonnc Outlook: (Washington
and 1982). DC. IMF, October, 1999), statisncal appendix.
26. UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, (Note 23 above), p. 127.
294 Notes and References Notes and References 295

27. K. Watkms. 'Debt Relief for Africa'. Review of African Political New Political Conditionalities of Aid: An Independent View from
Economy, 62, 1994, pp. 117-27, 126. For further reading on the Africa'. lDS Bullettn, 24(1), 1993, pp. 16-23. .' I
evolution of poverty, social conditions and Income inequality under 43. For example, R. Sandbrook, The Politics of Africa 's Econonuc
structural adjustment, see also G. Corma, S. JoJIy and F. Stewart Recovery (Cambridge University Press, 1993); C.L. Baylies, I'Polit-
(eds), Adjustment WIth a Human Face: Protecting the Vulnerable and teal Conditionality and Democrausation' (Note 38 above), p. 333
Promoting Growth (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1987); and P. Gibbon, passim. I
'The World Bank and African Poverty 1973-91', Journal of Modem 44. J. Walton and D. Seddon, Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics
African Studies. 30(2) 1992, pp. 193-220. See also M. Chossudovsky, of Global Adjustment (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1994). See also M.
The Globaltsanon of Poverty, Impacts of IMF and World Bank Chossudovsky, who holds the World Bank team in Rwauda directly
Reforms, (Londou and New Jersey: Zed Books. 1998). responsible for the political and SOCIal repercussions of shock therapy
28. D. Avramovtc, 'Depression of Export Commodity Prices', Third that brought the country to Civil war, m 'IMFlWorld Bank Policies
World Quarterly, July 1986. and the Rwandau Holocaust', Third World Resurgence, 52, 1994. He
UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report, (Note 23 above), p. 119.
M. Castells, End of Millennium, (Note 10 above), p. Il7.
makes a .similar argument ID the case of Somalia.. !
45. W. Reno, 'Markets, War, and the Reconfiguration of Political
31. B. Martin, 'Gains without Frontiers", New Statesman and Society, 9 Authority in Sierra Leone', Canadian Journal of African ~tudies,
December 1994, pp. 22-3. The senior manager whom Martin quotes IS 29(2), 1995. See also W. Reno Corruption and State Politics in Sierra
Davison Budhoo. See also B. Martm, In the Public Interest? Pnvatisa- Leone (Cambridge University Press, 1995).
ItOIl and Public Sector Reform (London: Zed Books, 1994). 46. Ibid., p. 217. .
32. B. Martin. 'Gain without Frontiers', (Note 31 above), p. 23. 47. S.P. Huntmgton, Political Order in Changing Societies (New Haven,
33. See B. Riley, 'Funds Pour Into New Growth Regions', The Economist, Coun. and London: Yale University Press, 1968). I
7 February 1994. 48. J.c. Scott, Comparative Political Corruption (Englewood Cliffs. NJ:
34. World Bank, Global Development Finance (Washington DC: World Prenttce-Hall, 1972) p. 35. i
Bank, 1997), pp. 120-1. 49. R. Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity. Crime, Overpopu-
35. See M. Mandant, 'Uganda: Contradictions .in the IMF Programme lauon and Disease are Rapidly Destroying the SOCIal Fabnc 'of Our
and Perspective'. ill D. Ghat (ed.), The IMF and the South: The Planet', Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, pp. 44--76, 46. i
Social Impact of CriSIS and Adjustment (London: Zed Books, 1996); 50. Ibid., p. 72, Kaplan approvingly quotes Martin van Creveld, who
P. Lewts and H. Stem, 'Shiftiug Fortunes: The Political Economy of suggests in the Transformation of War that by compelling the senses
Financial Liberalization in Nigeria', World Development, 25(1),1997, to focus on the here and now, people at the edge of existence can find
pp. 5-22.
liberation in violence.
36. P, Carmody, 'Construcung Alternatives to Structural Adjustment III 51. Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy', (Note 49 above), p. 46.
Africa', (Note 17 above), p. 29. 52. W. Reno, 'Corruption and State Politics m Sierra Leone', (Note 45
37. A. Leftwtch, <Governance, Democracy and Development In the Third above). describes the involvement of the Nimba Mining Company
World'. Third World Quarterly, 14(3), 1993, pp. 605-24, 610. For (NJMCO).
further reading on the pressures towards democratrzation III Africa, 53. 1. Smillie, L. Gberie and R. Hazelton, The Heart ofthe Matter: Sierra
see ot~er cont~ibutions to .the same issue of Third Ti/orld Quarterly, Leone, Diamonds and Human Security (Toronto: Partnership' Africa
mcluding the literature review by E. Remierse, pp. 647-64. Canada: 1999), available at www.web.netJpac
38. C. L. Baylies, <Political Ccndinonaliry and Democratisation', Review 54. See C. CoIlins, 'Reconstructing the Congo" Review ofAfrican Political
of African Political Economy, 65, 1995, pp. 321-37. Economy, 74. 1997, p. 591-600; Quentm Outram, 'It's Termmal Either
39. A. Leftwich, 'Governance, Democracy and Development', (Note 37 Way: Au Analysis of Armed Couflict III Libena, 1989-1996'. Review
above), p. 606. ofAfrican Political Economy. 73, 1997; pp. 355-71. On Angola, see lan
40. For an excellent review of the literature on the links between political Hunt, 'Rough Diamonds', The Guardian, 14 September 1999. Also, m
and economic reform in Africa, see CiL. Baylies, 'Political Condition- Africa Report 1998 (Note 5 above) Kofi Anuan observed (while not
alityand Democratisation', (Note 38 above). naming names) that foreign interests contmue to play a large role ID
41. B. Gills, J. Rocamora and R. WiIson (eds), Low Intensity Democracy, sustaining some conflicts in the competition for oil and other African
Political Power in the New World Order (London: Pluto Press, 1993). resources.
42. A. Sawyer, 'The Politics of Adjustment Policies', ECLA Document 55. 'A Crude Awakening: The Role of the Oil and Banking Industnes in'
ECAllCHD/88/29, quoted m Ghai and Hewitt de Alcantara. 'The Angola's Civil War and the Plunder of State Assets', Global Witness,
Cnsts of the 1980s' (Note 19 above), p. 27. See also J.-J. Barya, 'The December 1999. .
56. See Notes 53 and 55 above.
296 Notes and References
Notes and References 297
57. E. Braathen, M. Boas and G. Saether, Ethnicity Kills? The Politics of
War, Peace andEthmczty ill Snb-Sanaran Africa (London: Macmillan; see Yusnf Bangura. 'Understanding the Political and Cultural
2000). Dynamics of the Sierra Leone War: A Critique of Paul Richard's
58. M. Duffield, The Symphony of the Damned: Racial Discourse. Com- "Fighting for the Ram Forest" '. Africa Development. Afrique & Devel-
plex Political Emergencies and Humannanan Aid. Occasional paper, oppement.wxu (3 &4),1997. pp. 117-47.
School of Public Policy, University of Birmingham, 2 March 1996. 66. M. Duffield, The Symphony of the Damned. (Note 58 above). p. 12.
59. See M. Barrett, Tile Politics of Truth (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991), For a discussion of 'complex emergency' theory, see J. Edkins, 'Leg-
p. 130 passim. ality with a Vengeance: Fammes and Humanitarian Relief m
60. Examples of tbts 'discourse analysis' approach to the new aid agenda "Complex Emergencies?", m S. Owen Vanderslurs and P. Teras,
are A. Leftwich, 'Goverance, the State and the Politics of Develop- Poverty m World Politics (London: Macmillan ID association with
ment', Development and Change, 25, 1994, pp. 363-86: M. Robinson, Millennium: Journal of International Studies, 2000), pp. 59-90.
'Aid, Democracy and Political Conditronality ill Sub-Saharan Africa', 67. M. Duffield (Note 58 above), pp. 42-3.
ID G. Sorensen (ed.), Political Conditicnaiity (London: Frank Cass. 68. Ed Vulliamy, 'How Drugs Giants Let Millions Die', The Observer, 19
1993), pp. 85-99: and 'Strengthening Civil SOCIety ill Africa: The Role December 1999.
of Foreign Political Aid', IDS Bulletin. 26(2), 1995, pp. 70-80. 69. The Guardian, I May, 2000.
61. OD!, NGOs and Official Donors. Briefing Paper 1-4, August 1995, 70. Comment III an interview on the BBC TV documentary programme,
(London: Overseas Development Institute), quoted m M. Duffield, 'Horizon: The Battle for Aids'. 4 December 1995.
(Note 58 above). p. 8. For a comprehensive review and detailed
advocacy of the NGO approach to 'development' see M. Edwards 9 Islamic Revolt
and D. Hulme (eds), Makmg a Difference. NGOs and Development Ell a
Changing World (London: Earthscan, 1992). See also J. Clerk, Demo-
cratizmg Development: The Role of Voluntary Organtsattous (London: 1. Tile Econonust, Editorial, 'Living with Islam', 18 March 1995.
Earthscan, 1991). Clark notes some 4000 development NGOs working 2. S. Huntington, 'The Clash of Civilizations?', Foreign Affairs, Sunamer
m OECD member countnes, dispersing almost US$3 billion-worth of 1993, pp. 22-49.
assistance every year. and that they work with between 10000 and 3. F. Fukuyama, The EIId ofHistory and tile Last Man (London: Hamish
20000 southern NGOs. For a entreat assessment on the role ofNGOs Hamilton, 1992).·
In development. see A. Fowler. 'Distant Obligations: Speculations on 4. S. Hunttngton. The Clash of Civilizations', (Note 2 above),p. 26.
NGO Funding and the Global Market', ReView of African Political 5. See the diSCUSSIOn of this m Chapter 6 of this volume.
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62. M. Duffield, The Symphony of tile Dawned (Note 58 above). Much of 7. G. H. Jansen, Militant Is/am (London: Pengmn, 1978) p. I, quoting K.
tills section of Chapter 8 is based on Duffield's thesis as developed 1U Ahmad, 'Islam, Its Meaning and Message'.
this work. Note. however, that Duffield has also elaborated his thesis 8. See W. M. Patton, 'Shi'ahs'. m J. Hastings (ed.), Encyclopaedia of
in connection with other zones of insecurity on the edge of the Religion and Ethics (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1908), pp. 453-8.
global economy, notably the Balkans. In an outstanding report for 9. E. Gellner, Postmodemism. Reason and Religion (London: Routledge,
UNICEF m 1994, DulIield first developed his theory of 'complex 1992).
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See M. Duffield. 'Complex Political Emergencies', An Exploratory 11. G. H. Jansen. Militant Islam, (Note 7 above), p. 29.
Report for UNICEF' (School ofPnblic Policy, University of Birnung- 12. S. Bromley, 'The Prospects for Democracy m the Middle East', III
ham, 1994). D. Held (ed.), Prospects for Democracy (Oxford: Polity Press, 1993),
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64. R. Kaplan, 'The Coming Anarchy: How Scarcity, Crone, Overpopu- ttcs, State Formation and Development (Oxford: Polity Press, 1994).
lation and DISease are Rapidly Destroying the Socral Fabnc of Our 13. E. Gellner, Postmoderntsm. Reason and Religion. (Note 9 above), p. 9.
Planet', Atlantic Monthly, February 1994, pp. 44-76. This article 14. E. Gellner, ibid., p. 10.
Formed the baSIS of the BBC's dramatic documentary Puln Futures 15. E. W. Said, Orientalism (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1978).
In 1995. ' 'r: • 16. M. Rodinson. 'The Western Image and Western Studies of Islam', m
65. ¥. Duffield, The Symphony ofthe Damned, (Note 58 above), p. 10. See J. Schacht with C. E. Bosworth (eds), The Legacy of Islam (Oxford:
1'. Richards, 'Fighting for the Ram Forest: Youth, Insurgency and Clarendon Press, 1974), pp. 9-62, 11.
Environment ill Sierra Leone', Mimeo (London: Universrty College. 17. M. Rodinson, ibid.. p. 37.
feparlment of Anthropology, 1995); For a critique of Richard's thesis, 18. M. Rodinson, ibid., pp. 49-50.

298 Notes and References Notes and References ! 299

19. E. Said, Ortentalism (London: Penguin Books, 1985), p. 259. 5, A. Amsden, 'The State and Taiwan's Economic Developrnebr. m
20. M. Rodinson 'The Western Image'. (Note 16 above), p. 48. P. Evans, D. Rueschemeyer and T. Skocpol (eds}, Bnngtng th~ State
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22. E. Said, Onentalism. (Note 19 above), p. 240. quotmg T. E. Lawrence. See also A. Amsden, Asia's Next Giant: South Korea and Late Indus-
23. See Chapter 2 of thrs book on the roots of neocolornalisrn. trtaliztation (New York: Oxford University Press, 1989). !
24. G. H. Jansen, Militant Islam, (Note 7 above), p. 14. 6. F. Frobel, J. Hemnchs and O. Kreye. The New International DlVlSrOIl
25. G. H. Jansen, ibid., p. 62. of Labour: Structural Unemployment ill Industrialized Countries and
26. E. Said. Culture and Imperialism (New York: Vintage Press, 1994), Industnalization lfl Developing Countries (Cambridge UmversiryPress.
27. E. Said, Orientalism. (Note 19 above), p. 3. 1980).
28. G. H. Jansen, Militant Islam, (Note 7 above), p. 68. 7. See M. Castells, 'Four Asian Tigers with a Dragon Head: A Compara-
29. G. H. Jansen. ibid., p. 75. uve Analysts of the State, Economy, and Society m the Asian Pacific
30. O. Ray, The Failure of Political Islam (London: 1. B. Tauris, 1995), Rim', in R. P. Appelbaum and J. Henderson, States and Development
p.3. 111 the ASlall Pacific Rim (California: Sage. 1992), pp. 33-70.
31. O. Ray, ibid., p, 83. For similar classifications, see also G. H. Jansen, 8. One of the first such attempts was D. Senghaas. The EUrOpeQlI Expert-
Militant Islam, (Note 7 above), p. 134. ence: A Histoncai Cnnque of Development Theory (Leamington Spa:
32. P. Aarts, quoting N. Chomsky, in 'Democracy, Oil and the Gulf War', Berg, 1985). The nec-Lisnan pOSItIOn IS fully developed by G. White
Third World Quarterly, 13(3), 1992, p, 527. and R. 'Wade in their introduction to G. White (ed.), Developmental
33. S. Brcmley, American Hegemony and World Oil: The Industry, the State States 111 East Asia (London: Macmillan. 1988).
System and the World Economy (Oxford: Polity Press. 1991), p. 250. 9. See R. Wade, 'State Intervention in "Outward-looking" Development:
34. S. Bromley, 'The Prospects for Democracy in the Middle East', m Neoclassical Theory and Taiwanese Practice', m G. White (ed.),
D. Held (ed.), Prospects Jar Democracy (Oxford: Polity Press, 1993), Developmental States, (Note 8 above), pp. 30-67.
pp. 380-406. 10. P. L. Berger, The Capitalist Revolution. Fifty Propositions about-Pros-
35. O. Ray, The Failure of Political Islam, (Note 30 above), p. 4. penty, Equality and Liberty (Aldershot: Wildwood House. 1987).
36. Ibid., p. 93. 1L See for example. L. Pye, 'The New ASIan Capitalism: A Political
37. Ibid., pp. 98-9. Portrait', in P. L Berger and Hsin-Huang M. Hsiao (eds), In Search
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pnntmg, 1990), p. 7.
13. See R. MacFarquhar. <The Post-Confucian Challenge', The Econo-
10 The Develnpmental States of East Asia mist, 8 February 1980; M. Monsfurna. fVhy has Japan Succeeded?
fVestern Technology and the Japanese Ethos (Cambridge University
L World Bank. The East Asian Miracle (New York: Oxford University Press, 1982); G. Rozman (ed.), The East ASIa Region: Confucian
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2, B. Balassa, 'Trade Policies m Developing Countries', Amencan Eco- versity Press, 1991); Wong Siu-Iun, 'Moderrnzauon and Chinese Cul-
nomIC ReView, 61, May 1971; Policy Reform m Developing Countries ture In Hong Kong', The Cluna Quarterly, 106, 1986, pp. 306-25; and
(New York: Pergamon Press, 1977); and The Newly Industrializing J. P. L. Jiang (ed.), Confuaomsm and Modernization: A SympOSIUm
Countries 11l the World Economy (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981), (Tarper: 1987).
3, C. Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle (Stanford, CaIiL Stan- 14. See W. Bello and S. Rosenfe1d. Dragons ill Distress: Asia's Miracle
ford University Press. 1982). See aiso 'Polincal Institutions and Eco~ ECOTIOIIIles 11l Crtsts (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1990): ill Taiwan.
nomic Performance: The Government-Busmess Relationship III more than 2900 labour disputes were registered in 1987 and 1988
Japan. South Korea and Taiwan', ID F C. Deyo (ed.), The Political atone, and over 4540 disputes went into arbitration in the district
Economy of the New ASIan Industrialism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell UnI- courts (pp. 227. 223); emigration from Singapore, negligible III the
versity Press, 1987), pp. 136-64. 1960s, rose to 2000 families a year In the mid,1980s, and to 4700 by
4. E. K. Y. Chen, Hyper-growth 11l ASIan Economies: A Comparative 1989 (p. 333); and In South Korea. between 1987 and 1989 more than
Study of Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Singapore and Tmwan (New 7100 labour disputes erupted, while the number of umons more than
York: Holmes & Meier, 1979). doubled, from 2725 to 7358 (p. 41).
300 Notes and References Notes and References 301

15. See New Internationalist, January 1995; and W. Bello and S. Rosen- 30. E. Paul. 'Prospects for Liberalization in Singapore', Journal of Con-
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pp. 18-19. 41. K. Fukasaku, Economic Regionaliztuton and Intra-industry Trade:
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likely to admit to shortconungs III SOCial distribution and equity. above), p. 336.
Meanwhile, local cnucs are often censured and cowed, making It 42. P. Bowles and B. Macl.ean, 'Understanding Trade Bloc Formation'
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28. W. Bello and S. Rosenfeld, Dragons 111 Distress, (Note 14 above), of Economic Cooperation', Paper presented to the conference 'The
I pp. 37, 38. Here they CIte Choi Jang-Jip, 'Interest Control and Political Political Economy of Foreign Policy in Southeast ASIa in the New
Control m South Korea: A Study of the Labor Unions III Manufac- World Order', University of Windsor, Canada, September 1992.
tunng Industries 1961-1980', PhD Dissertation. Department ofPoli- 43. P. Bowles and B. Mncf.ean. 'Understanding Trade Bloc Formation'
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Song Byung-Nak, 'The Korean Economy' (unpublished manuscnpt, 44. For authontative papers on these two opposmg camps, see the special
Seoul, 1989), p. 27. Issue of Cambridge Journal of Econonncs. 2. 1998.
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Korea. The Fraudulent Miracle, Monthly ReVIew, December 1987.
302 Notes and References Notes and References I 303

Hazard, Untangling the ASian CrISIs', World Development, 28(4), . - - I

the baSIS of a non-cnsis output scenano of4 per cent per year from 1997
April 2000, pp. 775-88. onwards. This non-cnsrs scenano assumed a slowdown in the growth
46. US Government, Economic Report a/the President, transmitted to the
Congress, February 1999. p. 279.
rate of about 4 per cent. I
61. See World Bank. fVorld Bank Poverty Update: Trends m Poverty,
47. Cited by W. Bello, 'The Asian Economic Implosion: Causes, (Washington DC: World Bank, 1999), available on the Internet at
Dynamics, Prospects', in Race & Class, 40(213), March 1999, special See also T. Manuelyan
ISsueon 'The Threat of Globalism', p. 138. Atine and M. Walton. Sacral Consequences of the East Asian Fi11allcral
48. Between 1994 and 1996 net external financmg into Asia-5 (Indonesia, Crisis, (Washmgton DC World Bank, 1998) available at http://
Malaysia, the Philippines. the Republic of Korea and Thailand
increased from US$47.5 billion to US$92.8 billion. See Institute of 62. SeeW. Bello, 'The ASIanEconorruc lmplosion', (Note 47 above), p. 139.
International Finance, Capital flows to emerging market eC01l0mIes 63. P. Gowan, The Global Gamble. (Note 33 above), p. 128.
(Washington, DC: 29 January 1998, p. 2) cited m UNCTAD, Trade 64. For discussions on the failed AMF initiatives. and the US role m this,
and Development Report, (New York and Geneva: United Nations, see R. Higgott, The ASIan Economic CnSIs: A Study m the Politics of
1998), p. 66. Resentment', New Political Economy 3(3), 1998, pp. 333-57; S. Gill,
49. For a discussion on how short-term flows and particular risk arbitrage 'The Geo-politics of the Asian Crisis', Monthly Review. March 1999.
dominated such flows, see J. Kregel. 'Derivatives and Global Capital pp. 1-9; and \V. K. Tabb. 'The East ASIan Financial CriSIS', Monthly
Flows: Applications to ASIa', Cambridge Journal of Economics; (22), Review. June 1998, pp. 24-38.
1998, pp. 677-92. 65, J. Garten, 'Lessons for the Next Financial Crisis', Foreign Affairs.
50. Within one year of the crisis, a net inflow of US$97.1 billion mto March/April 1999, pp. 76-92, 84.
Asia's emerging markets In 1996 had become a net outflow of almost 66. The distinguished neo-Iiberal economist. J. Baghwati, provides a com-
US$12 billion. See UNCTAD, Trade and Development Report. (Note pelling demonstrauon of how the actors. values and interests 'of the
48 above), p. 69. group he identifies as the 'Wall Street-Treasury' complex have been at

;:j! 51. Robert Wade, 'From Miracle to Cronyism: Explaining the Great the heart of the US and IMF policy response. J. Bhagwan, 'The
, ASIan Slump" Cambridge Journal of Economics (22), 1998. pp. 693- Capital Myth: The Difference between Trade m Widgets and.Trade
. 706,693. m Dollars', Foreign Affairs. 77(3), 1998, CIted m R. Higgott, 'The
52. For an easy-to-read explanation about the role of hedge funds m the Asian Economic Crisis' (Note 64 above), p. 344; J. Garten too has
East Asia crisis, see Paul Krugman. The Return of Depression Econom- argued that. when ASIa blew up, It was the Treasury Department, and
ICS, (Harmondsworth: Penguin 1999), pp. 133 ff. not the State Department WhICh had 'the crucial relationships with
53. On the implication of custom-based denvatives In the East ASia Crisis, finance rmmsters and central bank directors. and understood both the
see J. Kregel, 'Denvanves and Global Capital Flows'. (Note 49 technical details and policy issues" 'Lessons for the Next Financial
above). CriSIS' (Note 65 above), pp. 84-5. See also Gowan, The Global Gamble
54. UNCTAD. Trade and Development Report, (Note 48 above), p. 103. (Note 33 above), pp. 107ff. In all this literature two names are reg-
55. P. Gowan, The Global Gamble. (Note 33 above), p. 104. ularly CIted as key actors - Robert Rubin and Larry Summers of the
56. R. McKinnon and K. Ohno, Dollar and Yen: Resolving the Economic US Treasury Department.
Conflict between the United States and Japan (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT 67. Cited m P. Gowan, The Global Gamble, (Note 33 above), p. 115.
Press. 1997), cited In R. Mclcinnon. 'Wading In the Yen Trap', The Korea ID particular has been forced to grant foreign investors control
Economist, 24 July, 1999, pp. 83-6. See also R. Taggart Murphy, The over Korean companies and banks. something It steadfastly refused to
Welgllt of the Yen: How Dental Imperils America's Future and Rllms do until forced by the crisis. For examples, see W. K. Tabb. 'The East
and Ailiiance (New York: W.W. Norton, 1996). Asian Cnsis', Monthly Review. June 1998. pp. 24--38, 37.
57. There IS no space In this chapter to discuss the decline and long 68. The Economist. 'Survey of South East Asra', 12 February 2000.
recession of Japan m the 19905. But for a quick resume see Paul 69. World Bank, World Bank Poverty Update. (Note 61 above).
Krugman's chapter on Japan's crisis in The Return of Depression 70. IMF, World Economic Outlook (October 1999), p. 54, box 2.4.,
Economics, (Note 52 above), And Chalmers Johnson, 'Economic Cri- 71. Thrs IS the view of Alan Greenspan of the US Federal Reserve Bank, as
SIS In East ASia: The Clash of Capitalisms', in Cambridge Journal of expressed in Far Eastern Economic Review. 14 May 1998, p. 65. Cited in
Economics, 22, 1998, p. 653-61. R. Higgott, 'The ASian Economic Crisis', (Note 64 above), p. 349.
58. P. Gowan, The Global Gamble, (Note 33 above), pp. 97-9. 72. For a balanced assesment of the 'regional' effects of the Crisis, see
59. W. Bello, 'The ASian Econonuc ImplOSIOn'. (Note 47 above), p. 136. R. Higgott, (Note 64 above).
60. IMF, World Economic 011tiook(Washmgton DC: IMF, October 1999),
p. 64, box 2.6. Note that the IMF has estimated these output losses on
Notes and References 305
304 Notes and References
20. K. Roberts, 'Democracy and the Dependent Capitalist State in Latm
11 Democracy, Civil Society and Post-development in Latin Amer- America', MOll/lily Revrew October 1985, pp. 12-26.
ica 21. J. Schatan, World Debt: Who Is to Pay? (London: Zed Books, 1987),
22. P. Calvert, 'Demilitarisation In Lann America', Third World Quar-
1. N. Lechner. 'De la Revoluci6n a la Democracia', La Ciudad Futura, 2, terly, 7(1), January 1985, pp. 31-43.
1986, p. 33, quoted by R. Munck, 'Political Programmes and Devel- 23. See E. Galeano, Open Vems of Latin America. especially ills introduc-
opment: The Transformative Potential of Social Democracy', ID F. J. non to the new edition (New York: Monthly Review Press. 1978),
Schuurman, Beyond the Impasse: New Directions 111 Development The- reprinted m Monthly Review, 30(7), December 1978. On the Amencan
ory (London: Zed Books, 1993), pp. 113-21, 115. backing for the coup that toppled President Allende m Chile, see also
2. J. G. Castafieda, UtoPIQ Unarmed (New York: Vintage Books, 1994), A. Sampson, Sovereign State, the Secret History of [TT (London:
p. 177. Hodder & Stoughton. (973).
3. Ibid., p. 177. 24. N. Chomsky and E. S. Sherman, The Washington Connection (Not-
4. Ibid.. p. 183. tmgham; Spokesman, 1978). Note m particular the illummatmg pIC-
5. Ibid., p. 183. ture of 'the Sun and Its Planets' on the inside cover of-the book. Tills
6. Ibid., p. 179. gives statistics on US financral backing and army trarrung for coun-
7. Ibid., p. 196. tnes using 'torture on an admmistratrve basis ID the 1970s'. In Chile, a
8. V. 1. Lenin, Impenaltstn. the Highest Stage of Capitalism (New York group of economists who came to power with Pinochet were dubbed
and London: International Publishers, 1939; first published 1916), 'the Chicago Boys' because many of them had studied at Chicago
p.85. University under Milton Friedman, guru of neo-iiberal econonucs (see
9. R. Prebrsch. The ECOllOl1llC Development of Latin Asnenca and Its S. Branford and B. Kucmski, The Debt Squads, the Us. tile Banks and
Pnncipal Problems (New York: Economic Commission for Latin LaWI America (London: Zed Books, 1988), p. 85.
America. 1950). This paper was later reworked and served as the 25. E. Galeano, Open Vellls of Latin America, (Note 23 above), p. 21.
founding document for the United Nations Conference on Trade 26. Jackie Roddick presents figures for the respective shares of public and
and Development (UNCTAD), of which Prebisch became the first pnvate net mflows mto the region, 1961-78. In the period 19.6~-5.
Secretary General. See R. Prebiscn, 'Towards a New Trade Policy for banks contributed only 2.1 per cent of a total of US$1.6 billion,
Development'. vol. 11 of Proceedings of the United Nations Conference while public flows (bilateral and multilateral lending) contributed
Oil Trade and Development (Geneva: UNCTAD, 1964). 60.2 per cent. In 1978, of a total of US$21.8 billion, public flows
10. A. M. M. Hocgvelt, The ThIrd World in Global Development (London: contributed a mere 7.3 per cent, while banks contributed the lion's
Macmillan, 1982), pp. 167-8. share of 56.6 per cent. See J. Roddick. The Dance ofthe Millions. Laun
11. D. Green, Silent Revolution. tile Rise of Market Economics III Latin America and the Debt CriSIS (London: Latin America Bureau, 1988),
America (London: Cassell and Latm Amenca Bureau, 1995), p. 16. pp. 27-8.
12. Ibid., p. 17. 27. Quoted m J. Roddick, ibid., p. 65.
13. A. G. Frank, Capitalism and Underdevelopment 111 Latin America (New 28. See S. Branford and B. Kucmski. (Note 24 above), esp. eh, 9, 'Rea-
York: Monthly Review Press, 1967) (ongmally published m Spanish " ganormcs against Latin America'.
m (957). 29. J. Petras, 'Chile and Latin America', Monthly ReView, 28(9), February
14. T. dos Sautes. 'The Structure of Dependence', m C. K. Wilber (ed.), .1 1977, pp. 13-24, 17.
The Political Economy of Development and Underdevelopment (New 30. Ibid., p. 18.
York: Random House, (970). I,
31. A term ongmally corned by G. O'Donnell In Modermzauon and
15. C. Furtado, Diagnosis of the Brazilian Cnsts (Berkeley, CaUL Uru- Bureallcratic-Allthorirarzamsm. Studies lit Soutu American Politics

versity of California Press, 1965).
N. Girvan, 'The Development of Dependency Economics III Latin
j 32.
(Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press, 1973).
See. III parucular, F. Cardoso and E. Faletto, Dependency and Devel-
America', Social and ECOn0J111C Studies, 22 (1),1973. optnent 111 Latin America (Berkeley, Calif.: University of Califorma
17. O. Sunkel, 'National Development Policy and External Dependency Press, 1979), esp. their mtroducuon to the American edition.
in Latin America', Journal of Development Studies, 6(1),1969. 33. D. Green. Silent RevolWlOll, (Note 11 above), p. 164.
18. For a review of these arguments, see A. M ..M. Hoogvelt, The Third 34. See in particular, N. Bobbio, Democracy and Dictatorship (Minneapo-
J¥orld 11l Global Development, (Note 10 above), Ch. 5. lis. Minn.: University of Minnesota Press. 1989), and D. Held. 'Democ-
19. R. Gott, 'Introduction', Rural Guerillas in Latin Antenca (Harmonds- racy, the Nation-state and the Global System', m D. Held (ed.), Political
worth: Penguin, 1973), pp. 51-2. Theory Today (Oxford: Polity Press, 1991). Both are referred to In D.
306 Notes and References Notes and References I 307

Slater's excellent review of the region's new SOCIal movements: D. • Absolute poverty: Durmg 1980-9 the estimated number of the
Slater, 'Power and Social Movements In the Other Occident', Latin absolute poor in Latin Amenca increased from 136 million to
American Perspectives, issue 81. 21(2), Spring 1994, pp. 11-37. 183 million. See C. Reilly, New Pat/Is to Democratic Develop-
35. D. Held. ibid., p. 231. me/It 111 Latin America(Boulder. Col.: Lynne Riennerj.p. 5. By
36. R. T. Naylor, Hot Money and the Politics of Debt (Toronto: McClel- 1993 the figure had risen to over 200 million. or46 per ceIl;t of the
land & Stewart, 1987), eh, 22. total population (D. Green. Silent Revolution, (Note 11 above),
37. J. Roddick. The Dance of the Millions (Note 26 above), p. 109. p.202). I

38. In 1982, Ronald Reagan launched a new project 'exporting democracy I

world wide'. setting up a special orgamzation for the purpose. The 43. S. Ellner, 'Introduction', in B. Carr and S. EUner (eds), The Latin
function of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) was to Amerlcafl Left: From the Fall of Allende to Perestroika (Boulder, CoL
distribute government money to citizens. organizations and unions Westview Press, 1993).
fighting for the 'restoration of democracy m totalitarian countries' 44. See D. Green, Silent Revolution, (Note 11 above), p. 188.
or in countries where democracy is still precancus', see International 45. lbid., p. 192.
Labour Reports, 13, January/February 1986, p. 7. 46. R. Munck, Politics ami Dependency m Latin Amenca (London: Zed
39. Eduardo Galeano grves a vivid description of this in the new edition of Books, 1985), p. 117. . " .
Open VeillS of Latin America (Note 23 above): 47. Cited by C. Reilly (ed.) in 'Introducnon' to New Paths to Democratic
Development ill Latin Amenca, the Rise of NGO-Nfwllclpal Collabora-
To operate effectively, the repression must appear arbitrary, Apart non (Boulder, Col.: Lynne Riermer. 1995) p. l.
from breathing, any human activity can constitute a cnme. In J. G. Castafieda. Utopza Unarmed. (Note 2 above), eh. 7. 'The Grass
Uruguay torture IS applied as a routine system of interrogation: Roots Explosion',
anyone may be its victim, not only those suspected or guilty of 49. J. Daudelin and W. E. Hewrtt. 'Churches and Politics In Latin America:
acts of opposition. In this way panic fear of torture IS spread Catholicism at the Crossroads', Third World Quarterly, 16(2) 1995, pp.
through the wnaie population, like a poratyzmg gas that invades 221-36, 224. Note the decline of these groups in recent years, which
every home and Implants itself in every ctttzen 's soul . . . Each crime these authors blame III part on the Vatican's response (stimulated also
builds horrible uncertainty in persons close to the victim and 1S also by the contemporary Protestant Evangelical Invasion), and partly by
a warlllng for everyone else. State terrorism alms to paralyze tile the general failure of the Catholic left to set the social agenda of the
population wult fear. Church firmly. They argue that today there IS developing somethmg
(Gaieano, p. 32, emphasis m original) more akin to a throwback to traditional state-Church relations.
40. Cited In J. G. Castafieda, Utopia Unarmed. (Note 2 above), p. 202. 50. P. Berryman, 'Basic Chnstian Communities and the Future of Latin
America", Monthly Review, 36(3) July/August 1984 pp. 27-40. 28.
41. J. G. Castafieda, ibid., p. 197.
42. There is a plethora of statistics on the region's economic decline and 51. Ibid.. pp. 29-30.
Increased poverty over the whole of the period 1970-95. Here I shall 52. J. G. Castafteda, Utopia Unarmed, (Note 2 above), p. 223.
mention just a few salient facts ofthe crincal penod in the 1980s when 53. H. Oporto, La Revolucioll democnitica: WIa lluel'a man~ra de pensor
structural adjustments were imposed: Bolivia (La Paz: Los Arnigos del Libro, 1991), CIted In D. Slater,
'Power and Social Movements'. (Note 34 above), p. 23.
• In the penod 1980-8, the combined GDP for Latm America 54. C. Reilly, New Paths to Democratic Development, (Note 42 above),
and the Caribbean declined by 6.6 per cent. Add to tills the p.13.
losses incurred as a result of a detenorauon of the terms of 55. Food noting and the deterioration of the urban poor led the World
trade (-3 per cent) and those caused by resource transfers out Bank in 1990 to mitiate a senes of SOCIal emergency programmes In
of the region (-6 per cent), and the fall ID per capita income some Latin Amencan countnes to cushion the worst effects of the
was 16 per cent over the period. Meanwhile. the rate of structural adjustment programmes. As Reilly observes. 'these emer-
inflation rose from 46 per cent in 1978-9 to 336 per cent m gency funds occasioned the Bank to begin dealing directly with sub-
1987-8. Breaking down the decline in per capita income by national political actors and NGOs - perhaps mttiatmg new ~att,ern,s
two sectors. owners of capital. and workers, their respective for a multilayered presence for the development bank m the region'.
declines were 12 per cent and 26 per cent. See D. Ghai and C. (C. ReiUy, ibid., p. 14).
Hewttt de Alcantara, The IlvfF and the South, the SOCial 56. A recently published Guide to Directories of NGOs by the Inter-Amer-
Impact of Cnsts and Adjustment (London: Zed Books, 1991). rcan Foundation refers to over 11 000 Latin Amencan NGOs. ~arious
The authors base therr calculatrons on CEPAL. Notas sobre la
economic y e/ desorrollo, December 1987 and 1988.
308 Notes and References Notes GIld References 309

contributorsill C. Reilly's edited volume tracethe mteracnons between 71. \V.I. Robinson. 'Latin Amenca and global capitalism'. Race & Class.
NGOs and their financial backerswith the municipal authonues. special ISsue. "The tbreat of globalism'. 40 (2/3), October1998-Marcb
57. See C. Reilly, New Paths to Democratic Development, (Note 42 above), 1999. pp. 133-144.
p.263. 72. Economic Comnussion for Latm Amenca and the Caribbean
58. J. S. Jacquette, 'Conclusion', III J. S. Jaquette (ed.), The Women. (ECLAC), 'SOCial Pauorama of Latin America, 1999'. httpv/www,
Movement m Latin Amel'lca (Boston Mass.: Unwin Hyman, 1989).
59. The best-known example was the 'Madres de la Plaza de Mayo' in 73. {Great reforms, nice growth. but where are the Jobs?', The Economist,
Argentina - the mothers of the disappeared who held rallies for years 21 March 1998. cited in W. 1. Robmson, 'Latm America and global
in Buenos AIres. They becamea symbol not only of the 'need to know' capitalism' (Note 71 above).
but also of the necessity for Argentine society to come to terms with
the dirty war. There were similar groups in other countries. for exam-
ple the 'Confederation of Widows' of Guatemala; see J. G. Castafieda,
Utopia Unarmed, (Note 2 above), p. 227. Conclusion
60· The emancipatory story of Domitla Barnos de Chugara, leader of the
Housewives Comnnttee of the Siglo xx Mines In Bolivia, becameworld 1. These are, of necessity, very rough calculations. WillHutton hasargued.
famous, partly also as an example of the power of the ethnographic as othershave done, that In the richcountnes thereIS an emerging SOCial
methodology in WhICh Latm Americanscholar intellectuals went out of structure of40-30-30%, while theconsensus among Third Worldobser-
their way to record the authentic voice of the people: see D. Bamos de vers is that the the proportions thereare reversed. See W. Hutton. The
Chungara (with M. Viezzier), 'Let Me Speak', Monthly Rel'lell' (New State We're III (London; Jonathan Cape, 1995), pp. 105fT. The World-
York; 1979) (see also 'Excerpts'. Monthly Rel'leIV. 30(9), February 1979. watch Institute. quoting the International Labor Organization. has
61. F, Calderon (ed.), Los Movinnentos Soaales ante ia Crtsts (Buenos estimated that over 1 billion people. or about a third of the global
Aires; CLASCO, 1986). Cited m A. Escobar, 'Imagmmg a Post-Devel- workforce, are unemployed or under-employed, working substantially
opment Era? Critical Thought, Deveiopment and Social Movements'. less than full-time. or eammg less than a living wage. The global work-
Social Text. 31132. 1992, pp. 20-55.32. force is set to swell by f.5 billion new Job seekers by 2050. almost all
62. A. Escobar, ibid .. p. 33. liymg ID the developing world. where about half of the population is
63. A. Peterson, 'SOCial Movement Theory', Acta Sociologica. 32(4), 1989. under tbe age of25. See http://www.worldwatch.orglalerts/pop2.htmJ
pp. 419-26, cited in D. Slater, 'Power and Social Movements; (Note 34 2. P. Kennedy, 'The Global Gales Ahead', New Statesman/Society, 3
above), p. 29. May 1996. pp. 28-9.
64. A. Escobar, Encountering Development: The Making and Unmaking of 3. For a balanced, sensitive and detailed account of the differences
tlte Third World(pnnceton. NJ; Prmceton University Press. 1995),p.221. between the SOCial policy discourses of various global agencies, see
65. R. Mangabeira Unger, False Necessity, Anti-necessuanan Social The- B. Deacon, with M. Hulse and P. Stubbs, Global SOCial Policy, Inter-
ory 11l the Service of Radical Democracy (Cambridge University Press. national OrganizationS and tile Future 0/ r-Velfare (London: Sage.
1987), p. 362. See also his SOCial Theory: Its Situation and its Task 1997). Also B. Deacon, Globalization and Soctat Policy, The Threat
(Cambridge Unrversny Press. 1987). A1tbough Unger acknowledges no to Equitable Welfare, United Nations Research Institute for Social
debt to Foucault, the message and the effort of his anti-enlightenment Development, Occasional Paper 5 (Geneva; UNRISD, 2000).
project is much the same as that of other postmodermsts. Where he 4. POSItive grassroots strategies are documented In M. Barratt Brown,
differs. however, IS ill the illusion of revolutionary refornusm, in which Africa's ChOICes (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1995); In W. Rau, From
the developmentof new participatory democracycan be a path of cum- Feast to Fannne, Official Cures and Grassroots Remedies to Africa's
ulatrve institutional mnovauon that can reconcile objectives of eco- Food Crisis (London: Zed Books, 1991); and In J. Gelinas, Freedom
nomic growth with the overconung of the present brutal mequalities. from Debt. The Re-appropriation of Development through Financial
A. Escobar. 'Imaguung a Post-Development Era', (Note 61 above), Self-reliance (London aud New York; Zed Books; Ottawa: Inter
p.27. Pares; and Dhaka: University Press; 1998).
A. Escobar. Encountenng Development. (Note 64 above), p. 219. 5. The Guardian. 22 June 2000.
Ibid., p. 216. 6. For a robust defence of this position, see A. Giddens, The Third fVay
A. Escobar, 'Imaguung a Post-Development Era', (Note 61 above), and lis Critics (London: Polity Press, 2000).
p.44. 7. See Ch. Leadbeater, Ltvmg 011 Ttun Air. The New Economy (London:
D. Slater. <Power and Social Movements', (Note 34 above), p. 29. Viking, 1999), p. 109.
8. D. Harvey, Justice. Nature & the Geography ofDifference (Cambridge.
Mass. and Oxford. UIe; Basil Blackwell, 1996), p. 360.
310 Notes and References

9. A. Hoogvelt, 'Prospects In the Periphery for National Accumulation

m the Wake of the Cold War and the Debt Crisis', m B. Gills and S.
Qadir (eds), Regimes m Crisis (London: Zed Books, 1995), pp. 72-81. Index
Fora similar argument, see also C. Hines and T. Lang, The New
Protectionism (London: Earthscan, 1993).
10. A. Quijano, Estettca de la Utopia, David J' Gnliatl1 (Lima: Sociedad y
Politica Endiciones, 1990) p. 37; quoted passim In A. Escobar,
Encountering Development, The Making and Unmaking of tile Third
World (Princeton. NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995), p. 221.
11. See D. Boyle, 'Time Is a Great Social Healer', New Statesman, (23
August 1999), p. 18. There IS now a growmg literature on such local accumulation 21, 22, 29. 44, 64, Arthur, B. HI ,
exchange trading schemes. See, for example. P. Lang, LETS lYork: 92,116,118,144.146,147,261 ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFT A)
Rebuilding The Local Economy (Bnstol: Grover Books, 1994);J. Croall, accumulation model 44, 256 230-1 I
global capital accumulation 46. ASIan cnsis of 1997 83,85,89,155
LETS Act Locally: The Growth of Local Exchange Trading Systems
(London: Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, 1997); M. Pacione, 'Local 60, 89. 143 ASian Tigers 73. 74
ExchangeTradingSystemsas a Responseto the Globalization ofCap it- national temtonal ASiaPacificEconomic Cooperation
alism', Urban Studies, 34(8), 1997, pp. 1179-99. And C. Williams. 'The accumulation 3, 26 Forum (APEC) 69.230,238
New Barter Economy: An Appraisal of Local Exchange and Trading adhocracy 104 ASIan Monetary Fund 156
Systems (LETS)' ,Joumal ofPublic Policy, 16(1), 1996, pp. 85-101. advanced manufacturing Association of South East Asian
12. Cited, passnn, m G. Mulgan, 'Creatmg a Twin Economy', Demos, 2, technology (AMI) 102 Nations (ASEAN) 230, 238
1994. See also D. Boyle. Funny Money: In Search of Alternative Cash Africa 173-96 AT&T 135, 149
(New York: HarperCollins, 1999). economic refann and austenty programmes
13. P. Hawken, A. Lovins and L. Hunter Lcvms. Natural Capitalism: anarchy 187-9 in Africa 182
Aglietta, M. 115, 133 in Latin America 248
Creating tile Next Industrial Revolutio/l (London:Little, Brown, 1999).
aid autocentnc development 40
14. Cited, passim. in U. Beck. 'Beyond the Nation State" New Statesman,
6 December 1999, pp. 25-7, 26. The New Statesman 's article IS an and economic reform 192 automation 100
edited extract from Beck's book fI1wt Is Globalizanont (London: new aid agenda 191-3 Ayatollah Khomeini 201
Pluto Press, 1999). A semor staff member of the IMF, V. Tanzi, has political condittonality of, 192
warned that there are 'termites' working away at the foundations of reverse agenda 191-3 Ba'athtst Party 209
the fiscal house of governments. He lists the growth of e-commerce, AIDS 196 Bairoch, P. 90
the use of transfer pnce mechanisms. the spread of tax havens and All-African People's Conference. Balassa, B. 218
hedge funds. and the mobility of capital and labour. He concludes that Third 30 Bangkok International Banking
the world must prepare Itself for what could prove to be significant Allende, S. 246 Facility 234
falls m tax levels. See V. Tanzr, International Dimensions of National Amm, S. 9,16,43,47,64 Baran, P. 17,38,64, 158
Tax Policy, Paper presented at the Expert Meeting on International Angola 190--1 Barshefsky, C. 152
Economic and Social Justice. UN Division for Social Policy and Annan, K. 175 Baumann, Z. 143
Development, New York. 12-14 November, 1998; cited m B. Deacon, annihilation of space through time Becker, D. 43, 57
Globalization and SOCial Policy, (Note 3 above), p. 3. 125,131, 139 Bello. W. 226. 227
IS. Personal communication from Environmental Information Services. anthropocentric production system Benetton 105
London, 1997. (APS) 103 Berger, P. L. 222-3,226
16. World Utatch. 1999, cited in The ECOIlOll!iSt, 11 December 1999, p. 24. anti-imperialist revolt 51, 211 Bhabha. H. 170
17. An. NGO swarm has been defined by a recent RAND study Arab nationalism 199 Blair, T. 161
as 'amorphous groups of NGO's, linked OIl line. descending on a Arabia scholarship 203 Boas, M. 191
target - It has no central leadership or command structure; It is area studies xii Boccara. P. 133
multi-headed. impossible to decapitate'; cited In The Economist, Argentina 245, 247 Boff, L. 253
(Note 16 above). am15 for resource economy 190 Bolivia 245
18. Yearbook of International OrgamzotioJlS. CIted m The ECOllOl1l1St. 'arm's-length' government 152 Bourdieu, P. 123, 133, 155'
(Note 16 above). Arnglu, G. 50 Bowles, P. 231-2

312 Index Index 313

Boyer, C. 115 inherent contradictions of 4, computer-aided manufacturing trade 82

Braathen, E. 191 25, 115-16 (CAM) 105 value 179
branch plant economies 47,220 integration 121 computer numerical control customer care 103
Braudel Center 58 mvolution xv. 66. 89-90 (CNC) 102. 105 customized production 97,99. 102
Brazil 245. 247 laws of rnotion of 6, 16.23 concertaaon 56.251
Bretton Woods system 34, 50, 82, monopoly capitalism 23 Confucianism 198. 222 data-processing services 135-6
147. 149. 167.246 penphery 64 Confuciamzation 170 De Beers 190
Britain see under Great Bntam profit rates 21. 22, 24 Confucian ethic 222-3 debt cnsrs
BritishLabour Research reproduction of 115 postf'onfuncianism 223 III Africa 176-85
Department survey 103 Calderon, F. 254 continuous improvement practices m Latin Amenca 180.246-7.
Broqiley.S. 202.211 Cardoso, F. H. 64 100. t03 249
Bukharin, N. 21.22. 23. 37 Carter. J. 156.249 contract government 152 debt-equity ratio 49
bureaucratic authoritarian casino SOCiety 86 core-periphery debt pconage 49. 50. 176. 181
'regunes 247 Castells, M. 92. 104. 109. Ill. economic exchanges 19 deht restructurmg 186
business civilization 148 112.121.126-31,139,173.215 explottation of penphery 59 declining rate of profit 21. 22
Business Week 136 Castenada, J.G. 240-1. 250, 252 hierarchy in world system XlV, Delbridge, R. 124
Cavanagh.J. 180 13.15.20-1,59.64.89-90.91. de-linking 42
Cairncross, A. K. 18-19 CEPAL 242 93.135-9.141.209-10.219,258 democracy.
capital accumulation 18,22, 89, Chase-Dunn. C. 9 relauons 63 Africa 185-7
92. 118 Chen, E. K. Y. 218 trade stausucs 7Q.-4 consociational democracy 253
capital exports 24. 27. 37 Chile 245. 247 corpora te taxes 266 democratization 64, 223
capital flight 89. 180 China 79. 135, 141 corruption 179. 189 formal democratization 57
capital flows 80-5. 139. 179. 180 Greater China CIrcle 230 Cox. R. XIV. 10-13.63. 65.148. low-intensity democracy 186
capital, mobility Greater China concept 230 258 m Latm Amenca 57. 239,
functional mobility versus spacial Chomsky, N. 161. 210 cntical SOCIal theory 10-12, 65. 248-52
mobility 140 crvilizanon 199 253 . multi-party 186
mtematronal mobility 85, 139. civil SOCiety in Latin critical theory of historical political democratization 249
140. 229. 259. 262 Amenca 252-4 structures 10-12. 65 SOCIal democrauzauon 57, 249
capital. structural power of 149, Clatrmcnt, F.F. 86. 180 Crash of '97 83.85,89.155,232-7 substantive democratization 57
152 Clinton. W. 157-8. 185 crisis and transformation 65-6 dependency
capitalism Coates, D. 139 creative destruction 108 dependency and
capitalist rmpenalism 21-8, 64. Cohen. S. S. 133 cross-border activity 121 underdevelopment 38-4-2
160 Cold War 34.35. 172 cross-border alliances 106. 126 'dependency-associated'
capitalist world economy 15. colonialism 18. 19. 26. 28. 29. 30. cross-border mergers and development theory 56
59. 165.210 32.170.240 acquisitions (M&A) 79 Latin American aependtsta
centralization of capital 23-4 colonial period 17. 18-21 cross-border migrations 166 wnters 56, 64
concentratIon of capital 23-4 Commission of the European cross-border services trade 70 theory 37-42.48. 58. 217-18.
cnsis and transformation Commuruties 103 cross-penetration of financial flows 219,242-4
65-6 commodity markets 184 82-3 deregulation 87.89. 140, 142. 152.
development of xv, 8. 15. 16-17. commodity specialization '184 Crusades 203 153-4. 179 cannnunidades ectesiasncos de base Cuba 245 detenoratmg terms of trade 41
East Asian 222 (CEB) 252-3 cultural functionalism 195 deterntonalizanon 142
expansion 63-64.66. 141 comparative political cultural pluralism 193-4. 195 development studies 166. 172. 216
historical stages of xiii, XlV, economy 222-3 cultural studies 169 antidevelopmentalism 172. 260
6, 14--28. 137 complex political emergencies 194 culture of creatrve destruction 108 development aid 35
mformational 129. 139. 265 computer-aided design currency development theory 31. 52. 53.
Implosion 141 (CAD) 102. 105 interest rates 180 217
314 Index Index 315

development studies (com.) Economic Commission for Latin extractive resource sector. Frobel, F. 219-20
developmental state 60, 172, Amenca (ECLA) 242, 243 nationalization of 51 Fukuyarna, F. 11, 198
220-2, 226-9 Economic Cornrrussion for Latin Furtado, C. 244
developmental ism 31, 52, 178, Amenca and the Caribbean Faletto, E. 64 future time 129
242-4 (ECLAC) 256 Fanon. F 32
developmentalist economic globalization 112, 173, fermnists 55-6 garrison states 245
bureaucracy 222 193 fertility 55 Gates, Bill xvii
developmentalist state 48, 207, economic nationalism 47-50 ficunous capital formation 86 Gellner, E. 201
221 economic networking 103-9 finance capital 23, 24, 139 gender
gender Issues 53-6 Econonuc Report of the President financial architecture 87 blindness 55
identity Xl, xii (USA) 232-3 financial deepernng . 85 issues in development
postdevelopmentalism 172, economic surplus 17, 40, 49 financial flows 80-5 studies 53-6
254-5 economics of place 266 cross-penetration 82-3 General Agreement on Tariffs and
dialectic 11 economies of scale 44, 96, 99 net flows 83-5 Trade (GATT) 34, 75, ,147,
dialectical development of economies-of-scope 99 financial instruments 82. 88. 141 148, 150, 15t, 152
capitalism 16 Economist. The 87, 142. 198,257 financianzatton 85, 139-4-2 Gesell, S. 264
digital economy xv, 112. 140 economy First-World racism 54 Gh ai, D. 181
digital education 130 knowledge-based 110-13 flexible production xv, 93. 97, Giddens, A. 123-6,198
digttization 140 'weightless: 93 98-102 Gill, S. 149
digital computability 112, 140 Ecuador 245 flexible specialization 97-8 Girvan, N. 244
Dirlik, A. 167,168 Egypt 211 flight capital 178, 180 global banking 234
'disappeared', the 254 Elam, M. 113 'flymg geese' pattern of trade 231 global capital accumulation 46,
disintermediation 87 e-Iance economy 107, 108 Ford, H. 95 60, 89, 143
doctrme of domicile 57 Ellner, S. 251 Fordism 45,95-7, 98, 114, 124, global capitalism 129, 165,260,
dollar-yen policy 156, 234 Emrnanuel, A. 41 147 267
Dollar-Wall Street Regime employment. changing patterns of Fordist model of 'global' companies 106, 131, 132,
(DWSRl 155-6 135-7 production 44, 98, 100 133, 136
Dommican Republic 246 empowerment 54 Fordist rigidities 96 global competition 129, 133, 134,
'dOL corn' company 107 encryption technology 107 Fordist-Keynesian modes of 259,262
'doxa' 155 environment regulation 116 global consciousness I22-3
dragons of East Asia 216,227 costing of 265 Fordist-Tayionst production global division of labour 13t,
Drucker. P. 133 environmental paradigm 45,95, 124 135-9, 178, 259
Duffield, M. 191, 193, 194, 195 associations 254,266-7 global Fordism 44,45,47, 147 global financial deepening 85
Escobar, A. 255 peripheral Fordism 47, 226 global financral markets 234
East ASIa Economic Caucus eurodollar 49 foreign direct Investment global financial network 128
(EAEC) 230, 238 Euro-Amencan culture 198 (FDIl 49,69,77-80, 173, global Fordism 44,45,47,147
East ASIa Economic Grouping European Round Table of 228, 231 global formations 9
(EAEG) 230 Industrialists (ERn 149 Foucault, M. 192,206 global governance structure
East ASIan capitalism 222 European Uruon 69, 149, 186 'four Tigers' 218,219,223 144-62, 194-5
East ASIan cnSIS of 1997 83, 85, Evans, P. 51 Fourth World 92 global hegemony 146
89, 155,232-7 exclusion Frank, A.G. 16,38,58,64,244 global informationalism 129,265
East ASIan Tigers 218,219, management of exclusion 161, Fraser, N. 166 global management 191
223 171, 172, 187 Freeman, C. 113 global market discipline 131, 133,
e-business 111,121 politics of exclusion 65, 130, Freire, P. 253 134
ecclesiastical base communities 160, 259 FRELIMO 191 global markets 105,106,132-3,
(CEBs) 252-3 export-oriented mdustrialization 'friction of space' 131 134, 137, 155, 159, 189
e-commerce Ill, 121 (EOn 227,243,261 Friends of the Earth 267 global networking 126-31
316 Index Index 317

global political economy 154, 167 Gulf Cooperation Council 209 Ihonvbere, J. 175 inter-group trade 74, 75
global production structures 70. Gulf War 208 ijlihad 200-1 mtcrnatronal 'business
132 IKEA 105 civilization' 148
global reforms 30, 136, 139 Habermas. J. 255 [mum 200~1 mternauonal division of
global social formations 9 habitus 133 imperialism 159-61, 189-91, 205 labour 14,30,40,58,131,173
global sourcmg 105 Haggard, S. 225 classical theories of 20,21-8,37 mternauonal financial msutunons
global village 125 Hall, S. 114 formal 25 (IFIs) 181
globalism 153-5,265 Halliday, F. 51 ideology of 63-4 international Iinancrat
globalization 19, 64, 65, 120-43, Hamas movement 197 informal 34 markets 51, 141, 143
184,233,258 Hams, N. 228 necessity of impenalism mternauonal market
defined 65,83,120 Harnson. D. 35 thesis 20, 22, 64 exchange 131
economics of xv, 29-31, 85-9, Harvey, D. 123-6, 167, 198,262 and resource wars 189-91 mternauonal mobility of
,92,120,127,131-42,154,173, Hawken, P. 265 imperialist profit 46 capital 85
'193,260 Hegel, F. 252 Implosion 89 International Monetary Fund
implications for postcolonial hegemony 10, 33, 50, 51, 56, unport substttutron 242 (IMF) 34,89, 147, 148, 153.
world XVI 146-7, 151, 155, 162 Import subsnmnve 156,159, 176, 180, 188,233,
integration of markets 66 hegemomc ideology 149 Industnalizatron (IS!) 39, 235-6,238
pertpheralization 171 Held, D. 120 211,218,243-4 Articles of Agreement 152
politics of 120 Hewitt de Alcantara. C. 181 India 151, 152 International Patent Protection
sociology of xv, 121-31, 142-3 'Hidden One' 201 Indian-rights groups 254 (!PP) Laws 151
and globalism 153-5, 265 high performing East ASian indigenization policies 48 mternatronal political
and space 146 countries (HPEAs) 216,227 Indonesia 235, 236, 238 economy 6-10, 154,223-6
and US strategic highly indebted poor countnes mdustnal district model 97-8 mtemational production 23,77,
'dominance 155 (HIPCs) 175 industnal governance 108 133
Garden, R. 11 0 Hi1ferding, R. 21,22, 24, 37 mdustnaf relocation 46, 134-6 mtemauonal property nghts 150,
Gorz, A. 266 Hirst, P. 79 mdustnalizauon 151
Gott, R. 245 histoncal matenalism 11 export-oriented strategy. international relations
Goulart, President 246 historical structure 11, 12, 13, 63. (EOl) 227, 243 theones 10, 154
governance (industrial) 108 258 import substitutrve 39.211, mternattonal trade 77,131-2
'government by contract' 152 Hobson. J. A. 21 218, 243-4 interna tionalizati 0 n
Gowan. P. 155-6, 234, 236 Hong Kong 79, 141,224 mformauon of capital 25, 37
Gramsci. A. 10 Hoover 134 as source of value 111 of production 23, 77
Grand Area Plan 33 'horizontal orgamsauon' 104 mformation-dnven of the state 148
grassroots movements 40, 250, Horownz, D. 198-9 economies 97 of the world economy 67, 81
252,254,266 Hoselitz, B. F. 35 mfonnation teehno1ogy (IT) xv, Internet 107, Ill, 121
Great Bntam 152 Human Development Index 102, 104, 105, 107-9. economy 265
Green, D. 243,248,251 (UNDP) 92 110-12, 126, 135-6, 178,267 mter-unpenalist rivalry 51,56
greenfield Investments 79 human resource management mformauonal capitalism 129, 139 mterproduct trade 132. 133
Greenpeace 267 (HRM) 103 mformational mode of mtra-firm trade 132
Greenspan, A. 110 human rights 193, 249, 250 production III mtra-group trade 74, 75
Gross Domestic Product (GDP), humarutanan relief 194-5 informanonal network mtraproduct trade 132, 133
idefined 5-6 Huntmgton, S. 159, 189, 198-9 society 126-31 investment
Gross Nauonal Product hybridity 170 mformauonalism. spmt of 109 measures 150, 151
I(GNP) 216 Hyperglobist thesis 120 Insan Kamil 214 portfolio 27
growth triangle 230 hypotlucated taxation 266 mstitutionalism. In mtemational involution xv, 89-90
guerilla movements in Latin relations theory 7-8 Iran 201
IAmenca 245 IBM 149 'intelligent regions' 108 Iraq 211
318 Index Index I 319
Islam 171, 197-215 or digital economy xv Malaysia 216.223 Mchamed, Mahatir 230. 233
antidevelopmentalism 172, Korea 51,226--8.235,236 Malone, Th. 107-8 Mohanty, C. 55 i
211-14, 260 Krasner, S. 224 Mandel, E. 7 Momsen, 1. H. 55 i
as politics of identity 198, 199, Krugman, P. 138 market deepening 129 Monetary Union 149
207,260 Kuwait 210 market-guiding regimes 219 money
as religious precept 200-2, 207, Kuznets, S. 68-75 versus market-conformmg changmg nature of 131
210 regimes 219 laundenng 179
high Islam versus low labour, individualized 262 versus market-distorting monopoly capitalism 23
Islam 202, 205 Latin America 39, 172,239-57, regimes 219 MOSANTO 267
homo tslamicus 205 261 market place Mozambique 191
Islamist New Intellectuals civil society 252-4 versus market discipline 131-5 MPLA 191
212-14 colomalisrn 240 versus market principle 131-5 Muhammed-al-Mahdi 201
militant revival 197 Intellectual Left 240-2, 250 Marquez. G. 241 Mulgan. G. 264
neofundamentalists 207,210, SOCial SCIence Council Marshall Aid 146 multiculturalism 103
212-14 study 254 Mar>, K. 5-6, 15, 124 Multilateral Agreement on
scholarship 203, 207 Laubacher, R. 107-8 labour theory of value 41 Investments (MAI) 149,151,
urbanization 212 Law, D. 149 Marxism 159
West's Image of 203 Jaws of motion 6. 16,23 historical and dialectncal multmational corporations
Israel 212 lean production 93, 100. 102-3 materialism 115 (MNCs) 77, 132
Leborgne, D. 145 Marxist left m Latm evolution 131, 137
Jacques, M. 114 Leftwich, A. 181, 185-6 Amenca 250 postwar 77
Jaikumar, R. 104 Lenm, V. L 21,22,24,27,37,242 Marxist theories of impenalism multiregional companies 106
Jalee, P. 50 liberalism 63 20-1,21-8.37,64 multr-skilling 103
Jameson, F. 165, 167 liberal economics 5 SOCial change 9 Mun, T. 4
Jansen, G. H. 200, 205, 206 embedded versus mass production 44,96,99,100, Murray, R. 100,264
Japan 73-7,98-102,230,231,236 unembedded 149. 150 114 Muslim Brotherhood 197. 202.
dollar-yen exchange rate 234-5 nee-liberalism 145,151, 153, McNarnara. R. 246 206,211
Japanese Ministry of Trade and 155. 187-8,241.248 Meiksms Wood, E. 167
Industry (MITI) 198 liberalization of capital mercantilism 3-4, 5, 225 nation-state 48, 145-6, 149,176,
Jessop, R. ll5, 119, 133-4, 145 accounts 235. 238 mercantile phase 17-18 198
jihad 198 Lirn. L. 231 Mexico 247 national developmentalism 36.
Job rotation 103 LINUX 107 peso crash 89, 155 228
Johnson, C. 218 Lipietz, A. 28,115.116--17,133, Microsoft III National Endowment for
Jubilee 2000 267 145. 146 Middle East 205 Democracy 249
Junta 247, 249 List, F. 221 Mies, M. 54 nattonal Iiberatton forces 51
just-in-time (TIn 99, 100, 102 Listian politicat economy 221 military developmental states 245 National Missile Defence system
neo- Listian theory 221 military dictatorships. III Latin 160-1
kanban (just-in-tune) 99 loan selling 87 America 245 national taxation 266
Kaplan, R. 194 'long night of the generals' 245 ·if
Mimstry of Industry and Trade national terntona!
Keynes. J. M. 264 Louvre Accord 180 (M1TI) of Japan 234 accumulation 3, 26
Keynesiamsm 44.45,48, 96, 21 Lovens, A. 265 mobility of capital 85, 139. 140 national territorial
Kidd. B. 20 Lovens, L. Hunter 265 Monroc doctnne 33 development 183
Kieman. V. G. 25 Luxemburg, R. 37 modermzauon 193 nationalism 23, 32
Kipling, R. 20 modemizatton theory 31. 34-7. nationalization policies 48, 177
knowledge MacArthur plans 146 48,217-18 native peasant movements 254
added value III MacLean, B. 231-2 modes of development 129 Naylor, R.T. 177, 179
-based economy llO-13 Magdoff, H. 16. 18 modes of production 6.219 neighbourhood associations 253
- - - - - _ .._---_. __ ..

320 Index Index 321

neoclasstcat econonucs 5 North American Free Trade Peru 245 privatization 89, 152-3
neocolorualtjsrru 17,29,30--4,44, Agreement (NAFrA) 69 Peterson, A. 255 In Africa 177, 184
49 North Atlantic Treaty Petras. J. 247 In Bntam 152-3
neocolomai economic Orgarnzauon (NATO) 34, petrodollar recycling 49, 155, 177 In Latin Amenca 184,261
relations 47-8 160, 161 Pinochet. A. 247 In the Third World 89,153,
neo-libcralism 145, IS!. 153, 155, North-South relations 43 Piore. M. J. 97-8, 114 177-8, 184
187-8,241,248,256 Plaza Accord 231, 234 production
neo-Listian theory 221 off-balance-sheet acnvities 87 pluralism 7-8, 193, 195 consumer goods 31
nee-Marxist 16,64, 113, 114, 115 Offe, C. 264 pluralist 8 flexible XV, 93, 97, 98-102
neomercantilism 48 Ohmae, K. 106 pluralist democracy 192 intemauonalizauon 23
nco-Schumpetenans 113 oil 205,209-10, 260 Pomt Four Programme of producer goods 31
neo-Smithsonians 113. 114 and dictatorship 209 Development Aid 35 specialization 97-8, 184
network enterpnse 103-9 Ong, A. 55 political economy xiv, 3. 5 profit rates 21. 22, 24, 180
network society 126-31 open-door policy 33, 217 international 6-10 Programme of Action for the
networked firm 107-9 Organization for Econonuc IT dnven xv Establishment of a New
new aid agenda 191 Cooperation and Development laws of motion 6 Internauonal Economic Order
new barbarism 194 (OECD) 83, 140, 147, 149, modes of prcductron 6 (NIEO) 42
new doctnne of international 151 politics of cultural identity 166 Prophel Mnhammed 200-1
community 161 Organization of Petroleum politics of exclusion 65,193--4,259 prosumer 99
new donor agenda 174,187,191-3 Exportmg Countnes politics of incorporation 65 protecuve tariffs 24
new economy 93,109-13,121. 158 (OPEC) 51 politICS of place 266, 267 Putnam, R. 109
new 'hrstoncrsm 169 Onentalism 204, 206-8 politics of redistribution 166
new international division oflabour Osama bin Laden 198 popular movements 10 Latin quality assurance management 101
(NIDLl 46, 50,51,219-30 Ottoman Empire 202, 205 America 252 quality CIrcles 100, 101
New InternationalEconomic Order outsourcing 104 populism 243 quasi-independent orgaruzanons
(NIEO) 42, 177 over-production 22 postcolonial (quangos) 152
new military humanism 161 Overseas Development Institute definition XIV, XVI, 165-70 Qutnlan, J. 156
new political economy XlV, 10 (OD!) 192-3 discourse 166-70 Qu'ran 200, 214
New Political Economy 129 Oxfam 183, 267 formation 171
new racism 193 implicauons of globalization XVI racism. new racism 193-4
new social movements. m Lann pan-Arabtsm 208, 211 in East Asia 223 Reagan, R. 249
America 252 paper entrepreneunalism 86 mtellectuals 168 Reaganomics 246
'new times' theorists 114 patriarchy 54 studies 166 realism 7
new world order 187 patnmoniaJ state form 188, 189 postConfucianism 223 real trme 104, 112, 127, 128, 135,
newly industrializing countnes patron-client politics 188 postdevelopmentIsm 172, 264 138
(NICs) 60 Paul, E. 227 'post-entrepreneurial' firm 104 J'erSIlS material actrvrttes 131.
newly mdustnalizing economies Pax Americana 34, 147. 149, 172 postFordist 93,94, 114, 119, 145 264-5
(~nEs) 50, 73. 138,226 Pax Bruannica 147 postimpenalism 17, 43, 57 versus physical tune 121
MKE 105 Pax Nipporuca 147 postmdustrial 94 Reed, J. 88
Nixon, R. 155-6 pension schemes 142 postlvlarxrsm 53 regionalization 229-32,238,261,
'no strike' clauses 103 Perez, C. 113 postmatenalisr 94 263
'uomudt scrence 256 penodizauon 16 postmodcrmsm 9-10, 53, 94, 114, open regionalism 230
N onanka. H. 237 peripheral economy/society 40 166, 167,255,262 regulation theory 65,144,146,153
'non-bank' banks 87 penpheral mdustnalization 47, .'! post structuralism 53 mode of regulation 116,1l7,1l8,
non-governmental orgaruzauons 59, 64 Prakash. G. 170 134, 144, 145, 146, 153--4,261
(jNGOs) 53, 181. 183, 193--4, penphery 16, 19,64, 89-90, 93, Prebrsch, R. 40,41. 242 regime of accumulation 116,
252, 253, 267 136, 140,208-9,210 President's Economic Report 158 117, 119, 144, 146, 147,261


322 Index Illdexl 323


Regulation School 45,65, 115-18, Shohat, E. 167, 168 Sudan 211 identity 165 i
133, 144-5 snort-terrmsm 86 sufi 202 mdusnal progress 46 I
Reich, R. 135 Shutt, H. 154 Sultanates 202 population explosion 53 i
relationship enterpnsmg 106 Sierra Leone 188. 190 Summers, L. 233 scholars 168, 169 I
relief agencies 194--5 Silicon Valley lOB. 262 Sunkel.D. 244 solidanty 30, 34 I
relocation of industry 46, 134--6 Singapore 135, 224, 226-8 SWUla 200 studies 166
RENAMO 191 Singer, H. 40 Suntu 200-1 Third Wor1dism 42.48, 207
Reno, W. 188.190 'single' enterpnse unions 103 supply and demand 41 world trade 14
rent-seeking state 177 Slater, D. 256 surplus extraction 31 Thompson, G. 79
resource bondage 30. 34 Smith, A. 3. 4--5 Sweezy, P. M. 64 Thornton. A.P. 19
resource wars 189-91 Sobel, D. 124--5 systemation 100 Tidd, J. 102
reverse agenda of aid 191-3 SOCIal capital 108. 109 Szymanski, A. 16 'Tiger' economies 73, 74
reverse value-coding 170 social change, theory of 9 time-and-motion studies 95. 124
Rhodes. C. 19-20 social evolunon 35 Tabb, W.K. 231 time-dollar projects 264
Richards, P. 194 SOCial mclusion 130 Ta~van 224. 226-8 time/space compression 121,
Ritkm, J. 136 SOCial reform 22, 255 tarilca 202 123-6, 127, 134, 198
Robertson. R. 121-3 social wage 47 Tawhid 214 time/space distantration 125
Robinson, W. 256 Soros, G. 159,233 Taylor. F. C. 95 timeless time 127, 128
Rodinson, M. 203, 204--5 South Korea 224 taxation Toffler. A. 99
Rodney, W. 17 stage theory 12-13.44. 57 266
of corporate profits Torres, C. 253
Rosenfeld, S. 226, 227 state, declinist View of 120 hypothecated 266 Torvalds, L. 107
Roy, O. 207, 212-14 state capitalism 219 teamworkmu 103 total quality management
Ruggie, J. 149 state-centrism 48. 247 technical m~ovatlOn 113 (TQM) lOO, 101,103,
RUSSIa, financial collapse 155 state-led developmentalisrn 48. techno-econormc paradigm 65, Townsend, J. 55
207,221 96,113. 144 Toyotism 98-102
Sabel. C. 97-8.108, 114, 134 State University of New York's technological dependency 34 trade 77, 131-2
Sachs. \V. xii Braudel Ccntcr 58 technological rents 34 currencies 82
Saddam Hussain 209 stausm 7 technological trajectory 113 derivatives 82
Saether, G. 191 Strange, S. 148 telecommunications 125, 135 inter-group 74, 75
Said, E.W 204.206 strategic alliances 106 territorial annexations 18. 20 Inter-product 74,75
Samoya, S. 250 structural adjustment Thailand 135, 236 intra-firm 132
Sautos, T. dos 38, 244 programmes (SAPs! 89, 181, Theatre Defence Missile defence Intra-group 74,75
Sceptres 120 183; and debt rescheduling system 160 Intra-product 132, 133
Sohumpctcr, J. 27. 113 152, 181-2; as imposed 'thin air' economy 93 loss 76
Schumpeterian workfare state econonuc reform 152 Third All-African People's supply and demand 41
145 devaluation 185 Conference 30 trade-related intellectual property
Seattle 267 prtvatrzation 184 'ThIrd' Italy 105 rights (TRIPS) 150, 151
secunnzauon 87 structuralism 8-10, 263 Third World trade-related Investment measures
Seers, D. Xl 'subaltern' 170 bourgeoisie 89 (TRIMS) 150, 151
self-help associations 252 Suo-Saharan Africa 130, 173-5, debt 49. 176. 177-8.180 transfer of wealth 5
'semi-colony: 242 179, 1B1, 259 developmentalism 51, 177 transformation, process of xv
serru-penpherial nations 59 commodities 184 division 52 transformattonalist thesis 121
Sbana 201 food production 184 economic development 60 transnational business culture 148
Shaw. B. 20 foreign debt 175.182,183 economic nationalism 47 transnational corporate
Shell 267 growth 182 fermmsts 55-6 bourgeoisie 56
Shi'ites 200-1 pnvatrzation 184 grassroots movements 40, 250, transnational corporations (TNCs)
Shirmer, D. 161 trade 184 252, 254, 266 51,57"-8, 131, 132, 143, 149
- - - - - _ .._.. _---_. __..

324 Index Index 325

transnattonal expansion of US United States of Amenca Weber, M. 126.204 world capitalist development 58.
capital 50 Council for Intemauonal 'weightless' economy 93 165
transnanonal loan capital 51 Business 149 welfare state 221 world compression 122-3
transnauonal political destabilizatron of regimes 34 Western-educatedclass 32 world-economy 15,59, 121
interference 160 dollar-yen exchange rate 234-5 WhIte Man's Burden 20 'world-e.cprre' 58
transnational managerial class East Asian crisis of 1997 235-7 Williams. R. 169 world factory versus world
148 hegemony 33,50,51,56, 146-7, Wolfe, T. 140 market 50
transuauonalism 148 155,162;cnSlsofhegemony 51 Womack, J. P. 99, 100, 106 World Health Organization
Triad countries 79. 106 military mtervenuon 34, 244 women 10 development (WID) (WHO) 196
Trotsky, L 37 Pacific dommance 224 54 World Intellectual Property
Law of Combined and Uneven power 156, 157-62 women's movement In Latm Orgarnzation (WIPO) 151
Development 37 resurgence xvii Amenca 254 world population 75-6
Truman Doctrme 34 secuntyarrangements 160-1, UN Decade for Women 53 world system 4.9,38, 59
trust, role of 98. lO8 224 UN World Conference on world system theory 58, 60
turnover time of capital 124 Washmgton Consensus 156 Women 53 world system wnters 63
UNIX 107 women's studies 53 world trade 67, 68-75
utema 201, 202. 213 unsustamability 162 work mtensificauon 100. 124 World Trade Organization
ultra monetarism 247 Upton, D. 104 workfare state 145 (WTO) 70,76,91, 148, 149,
wnma 210 urban dwellers' movements 253 World Bank 34, 68. 89. 147, 148, 151, 159
under-consumptton 22 Uruguay 245 153, 159, 176. 180, 182, 184, World Wide Web 107
unequaJ exchange 40.41,47,59 GATT agreements 150. 151 185,188,216-17,227,236, Wnght Mills. C. 167
unequal trade 31 USAID 186 246, 249, 253
Unger. R. 255 world capital flows 80-5 Yam, J. 229
UNITA 191 value-added chain 137-8 direct flows 80
DOlledNations Iugh versus low value Indirect flows 80 zero defect principle 100
Centre on Transnational added 137. 138-9
Corporations 102 Venezuela 247
Charter of ECOllOIlllC Rights and Vietnam 51
Duties of States 42, 177 virtual firms/teams 107-9
Conference on Population 53 virtual shopping 111
Conference on Trade and volume-through-bulk 99
Development (UNCTAD) volume-through-variety 99
46,73,76,79.84,85.89,91, voluntansm
151, 182-3,234 In theories of development 56
Decade for Women 53 m Regulation School 116
Declaration on the Establishment voluntary organizations 10 Latin
of a New International Amenca 252
.Economic Order (NIEO) 42,
177 Wade, R. 233
Development Programme Wall Street 156. 157
(UNDP) 90, 92 Wallerstem, L 4,9, 15. 58-9, 143
Econormc Commission for Latin warlordism 190-1
i America and the Caribbean Warren, B. 27-8, 64
I(ECLAC) 256 Washington consensus 248
World Conference on Women 53 waste elimmation 100
Yearbook of International Trade Watkms, K. 150. 183
!Statisucs 71 Watteville. M. de 3