The Evolution of The Palestinian Refugee Camps in Jordan. Between Logics of Exclusion and Integration

Villes, pratiques urbaines et... - The Evolution of the Palestini...
- Jalal al-Husseini - Institut franais du Proche-Orient
9/5/12 9:28 AM
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Villes, pratiques urbaines et construction nationale en Jordanie

- Myriam Ababsa and Rami Daher
Deuxime partie. Politiques urbaines et disparits sociales / Second Part. Urban Politics and Social Disparities
The Evolution of the Palestinian

Refugee Camps in Jordan.
Between Logics of Exclusion and
Integration
Lvolution des camps de rfugis palestiniens en Jordanie. Entre logiques dexclusion et dintgration
JALAL AL-HUSSEINI
p. 181-204
Abstract
Lvolution des camps de rfugis palestiniens en Jordanie. Entre logiques dexclusion et
dintgration
Bien quils nabritent que 20 % des rfugis palestiniens, les dix camps de rfugis officiels grs
conjointement par lUNRWA et la Jordanie sont le symbole officiel de la volont des rfugis de
prserver leur droit au retour . Mais ces espaces urbains trs denses sont aussi perus, de faon
plus ngative, comme des foyers dopposition islamiste et de marginalisation socioconomique
dont lexistence menace potentiellement les efforts mis en uvre par les autorits jordaniennes
http://ifpo.revues.org/1742
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Villes, pratiques urbaines et... - The Evolution of the Palestini... - Jalal al-Husseini - Institut franais du Proche-Orient
9/5/12 9:28 AM
afin de moderniser le pays.

Larticle analyse la manire dont la Jordanie et lUNRWA ont gr, travers lvolution de leur
administration des camps, les diffrentes dimensions symboliques lies la question des rfugis.
Ce faisant, il souligne limpact de leurs politiques sur les rapports quont entretenus les camps et
leurs habitants avec leur entourage immdiat travers les dcennies en termes dintgration ou
dexclusion. La spcificit politique des camps en tant quespaces dans lattente dun retour aux
foyers originels a impos llaboration de directives urbanistiques dexception (hors des plans
municipaux des villes de Jordanie) destines maintenir leur aspect temporaire et, partant, leur
signification politique particulire. Aucun plan durbanisation des camps ne fut jamais dvelopp.
Ce sont leurs habitants qui, sans grande assistance, entreprirent dtendre horizontalement les
units dhabitation initiales. Cela explique laspect anarchique des camps, labsence despaces
rcratifs ainsi que lexigut de leurs ruelles.
Ce mode de gouvernance semi-informel, d en partie la sensibilit politique de toute
intervention dans les camps ( sanctuaires du droit au retour) a t mis en cause par la
conclusion dun accord de paix avec Isral en 1994 et lchec du processus de paix isralopalestinien ds 2000. La volont subsquente des autorits jordaniennes de modernisation du
pays en dpit de labsence dun accord sur la question des rfugis a conduit les autorits
jordaniennes intgrer les camps des programmes nationaux de rhabilitation des quartiers
dfavoriss. Ce dveloppement, qui se conjugue une diminution des services humanitaires de
lUNRWA, laisse prsager une marginalisation politique des camps dont la reprsentation risque
de ne plus se formuler quen termes de lieux de pauvret et de dclassement social.
Full text
1
Jordan hosts ten official refugee camps, namely camps that are managed jointly by
local authorities and UNRWA1. This article analyzes the evolution of their physical and
housing infrastructure against the background of the countrys socioeconomic and
political development and within the context of the Arab-Israeli conflict/peace process.
How relevant is it to analyze refugee realities through the prism of a host countrys
internal policies? Six decades after their exodus, the Palestinian refugees spread across the
Middle East (about 90% of the Palestinian refugees worldwide) remain generally defined
as temporary stateless exiles vying for their return to their homes in historic Palestine.
Their situation in Jordan differs somewhat from this general picture. Unlike the other
Arab host countries that have kept Palestinian refugees stateless, Jordan has granted them
formal citizenship without denying their right of return. In 1949, the refugee population
under Jordanian sovereignty amounted to about 70,000 in (Trans)Jordan and 280,000 in
the West Bank. Citizenship was also conferred on the 462,000 indigenous West Bankers
(DE BEL-AIR, 2003: 83). The Palestinian refugees thus became fully fledged Jordanian
citizens, endowed with the same rights and duties as any native Jordanian citizen, pending
the day when they would be given the opportunity to choose between repatriation to
Palestine or permanent settlement in Jordan or elsewhere.2 This unique citizen/refugee
status has placed them within a web of formal and informal balancing mechanisms of
inclusion/exclusion meant to guarantee their integration within Jordans society while
preserving their right of return.
Although they are presently home to less than one fifth of the total refugee population
living in Jordan, namely 338,000 out of 1.9 million refugees (UNRWA, 2009),3 the
refugee camps epitomize the dilemma pertaining to the refugees dual
Palestinian/Jordanian identity. Generally viewed as the most vivid markers of the
refugees and Jordans unified commitment to the right of return, they are simultaneously
portrayed either as hubs of potential political dissent or as places of social marginalization
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that affect the countrys drive towards liberal modernization.

This article explores this dilemma through the analysis of the camp management
policies pursued by national and international stakeholders since the early 1950s.
Following a first historical section that investigates the origins of the camps in Jordan and
tackles their representations within the Jordanian society at large, the article goes on
highlighting the political and socioeconomic stakes involved in the development of camps
physical and housing infrastructure. In so doing, it sheds a new light on the right of
return. A rallying slogan across the Palestinian society and the Arab world as a whole,4
the right of return has also constituted an operational norm that has deeply influenced
the camps evolution patterns as well as Jordans urban landscape.
A) The evolving significance of the

Palestinian refugee camps in Jordan
1) The terms of the refugee camps establishment
5
Plots of land placed by the host government at the disposal of the League of the Red
Cross/Crescent societies (LRCS - 1949-1950) and of UNRWA (from May 1950 onwards),
the refugee camps were designed to accommodate those scattered groups of destitute
refugees, mostly jobless farmers and labourers who had not been able to afford any decent
lodging.5 Their transfer from the caves, mosques and various types of informal habitat to
well-organized camps made it possible to improve the channelling of humanitarian relief
and trim operational costs. It also enabled the local authorities and UNRWA to better
control a potentially destabilizing population primarily characterized by its attachment to
Palestine. In March 1949, refugees residing in Jordans first camps (in Zarqa, Irbid,
Sukhneh and Shuneh) made up 21% of the total registered refugee population, a
percentage similar to the current proportion of refugees living in camps (18%) (LRCS: 38).
In order to facilitate the transportation of goods and services, the camps were
established near the Kingdoms cities and towns and/or with rapid access to main roads
(RAMZOUN, 2001: 252-3; DPA, 2004: 23). Four of Jordans current official camps were set
up in the years that followed the Palestinian exodus of 1948: the Zarqa camp in 1949; the
Irbid camp in 1950; Ammans al-Hussein camp in 1952 and Amman New Camp (Wihdat
camp) in 1955. Six other camps, labelled emergency camps, were set up in the wake of
the 1967 Arab-Israeli war to accommodate homeless displaced Palestinians, be they first
time displaced or second time displaced 1948 refugees : the Talbiyeh camp in the
Amman governorate, the Marqa camp (also known as the Hitteen or the Schneller
camp) in the Zarqa governorate; the Baqaa camp in the Balqa governorate, the Jerash and
Souf camps in the Jerash governorate, and the Husn (or Azm al-Mufti) camp in the Irbid
governorate.6
Unlike most refugee camps across the world, Palestinian refugee camps were not
designed to separate their inhabitants from the host population or to provide them with a
different legal status from non-camp refugees. Quite the opposite, UNRWAs initial
mandate, as defined by resolution 302 (IV) of the UN General Assembly in December
1949, provided for the rapid integration of the refugees within the local and regional
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labour markets through the gradual replacement of relief assistance (food rations, medical
care and primary education) by a program of public works involving terracing,
afforestation, irrigation schemes and road construction. Camp refugees were the first
targets of UNRWAs integration policy. Their re-housing in Jordans towns and villages
and the camps dismantlement were expected to follow suit.
Zoom Original (jpeg, 356k)Source : UNRWA (http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/

jordan.html)
2) Evolving contexts, lasting representations

8
The persistence of the camps across the Near East thus reflects UNRWAs and to a
lesser extent the host authorities- failure to resolve the socioeconomic aspect of the
Palestinian refugee issue. The key factor here is the refugees staunch opposition to any
project likely to jeopardize their right of return. And as UNRWA put it in 1955, the strong
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desire of the refugees to return to their homeland also influenced the policies of Near East
governments in this matter.7 The refugee camps have since then embodied the
humanitarian and political plight borne by the palestinian refugees. They have also been
portrayed as the guardians of a preserved intrinsic Palestinian-ness in exile (FARAH, R.
1997); the ultimate custodians of the right of return; or, as a UN official recently put it
after a visit to the Irbid camp in 2008, the real face of Palestine outside Palestine.8
Other representations triggered by the rise of Palestinian nationalism amongst refugee
communities since the late 1960s have stressed the political challenges the camps have
posed to the the countrys social and political stability. Independent republics
encroaching on Jordans sovereignty during the heydays of the Palestinian resistance in
the late 1960s (SALIBI, 1993: 230; MASSAD, 2001: 238-246), the camps have also been
portrayed by other sources as places of relative political estrangement, whose
inhabitants are little concerned by Jordanian politics. As a matter of fact, little campaign
activity was recorded before national elections and turnouts in such elections have been
low since 1989 (RAJFUS, M., 1990; AL-SIJILL, November 2007). Morevoer, the communitybased organizations leadership in the camps is elected primarily on the candidates
allegiance to Palestinian factions (Fatah for instance) or Jordanian parties sympathetic to
them, typically the Jordanian Islamic Action Front vis--vis Hamas.9
However, since the Black September events of 1970, the refugee camps have remained
relatively calm. In the early 2000s, demonstrations did take place in support of the
Intifada al Aksa and Jordans normalization policy with Israel. But since September 2001,
when scores of people were arrested for holding unauthorized rallies in the Baqaa refugee
camp, virtually no demonstrations have taken place in the camps and there have been few
breaches to this ban.10
From a socioeconomic perspective, the stigma of poverty and destitution that initially
characterized the camps has lingered on despite their gradual socioeconomic integration
within their surrounding environment. This representation is supported by numerous
surveys that indicate that camp refugee households are on average poorer than non-camp
refugees or than the Jordanian population as a whole.11 This and the allegedly more
conservative (backward) attitudes of the camp refugees have contributed to maintain
them in relative social confinement. Such a phenomenon has also been observed in the
other host countries and even within the sister native populations of the West Bank and
the Gaza Strip (SHAMIR, 1980; AWAD, 2008). Poverty, social confinement and political
estrangement have led some observers to question the allegiance of the camp refugees to
the Jordanian polity, as is emblematically demonstrated in S. al-Khazendars book on
Jordan and the Palestinian question. Tackling their status as the most underprivileged
[enduring] low standard of living, education and employment, who still contribute to the
strength of any opposition, whether it be the Islamist movement, the leftist parties, or the
PLO, this author denies them the label of Jordanians of Palestinian origin (ALKHAZENDAR, 1997: 35-36).
In recent years, the Jordanian authorities have sought to counter these divisive
stances by developing a unifying narrative underpinning the authorities reform agenda
under the names of Jordan first, the National Agenda and We are all Jordan. In this
context, the camp refugees status as fully-fledged citizens has been repeatedly confirmed
through public statements stressing they were part and parcel of the Jordanian people
with the same rights and duties as any other Jordanians12 and as a dear part of Jordan
that should be given the same attention and services as other parts of the country such as
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the countryside and the semi-desert areas.13
B) Who runs the camps? The

institutional management of
temporariness
13
The governments rallying statements also reflect a new approach to the management of
the camps social and physical infrastructure. Centred on the power sharing between
UNRWA and the governmental authorities involved in such management, the following
analysis highlights its operational and political underpinnings as well as its influence on
the future of the refugee issue in Jordan.
1) UNRWA the extent and limits of non territorial

jurisdiction
a) UNRWA as a key stakeholder in the camps
14
15
Since its establishment in December 1949, the Agency has seen its temporary mandate
extended by the UN General Assembly on a three (sometimes five) year basis.14 Although
camp refugees have always constituted a minority of the total number of registered
refugees across the Near East, UNRWA has generally been viewed as inseparable from the
camps it services in its fields of activity. This may be explained by the political significance
the refugees and host authorities have ascribed to both UNRWA and the camps as key
markers of the refugee issue.15 Operational considerations are also to be taken into
account. While the Agencys facilities cover nearly all strong refugee concentrations inside
and outside camps,16 only camps host the full range of UNRWA elementary and
preparatory schools, health clinics, relief distribution and social centres. Dependency on
UNRWA services has for that matter been comparatively stronger among camp dwellers.
In the field of education for example, 85% of camp children attended the Agencys primary
schools compared to 36% of non-camp refugee children during the school year 20042005.17 UNRWAs operational significance in the camps is also reflected in the additional
responsibilities it bears there, such as garbage collection and the maintenance and
rehabilitation of shelters. Outside camps, these tasks fall under the responsibility of the
municipalities. The Agencys quasi-municipal presence in the camps is illustrated by the
concentration of blue UN flags that adorn its facilities and, more concretely, by the
presence of an UNRWA Camp Services Officer officially responsible for the overall
management of the Agencys facilities, the updating of the camp refugees family records,
and the channelling of their requests and concerns to UNRWAs central administration
(i.e. the Jordan Field Office).
The wide range of responsibilities taken on by UNRWA in the camps, together with the
international dimension of its UN mandate, have contributed to conferring to the Agency
the informal status of an alien governmental body holding extra-territorial sway over
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the camp communities. Historically, this particular representation originates from the
early decades of its existence, when camp refugees were fully dependent on the Agencys
relief services. The control the Agency exerted through its Camp Services Officer (more
appropriately entitled camp director in Arabic) on the camp population was drastic: he
would decide whether to accept new refugee families in the camp and regularly verify the
camp inhabitants status as bona fide refugees according to strict eligibility rules.18 He also
checked any improvements the refugees brought to their shelters to verify their conformity
to the housing regulations devised by UNRWA and the host authorities. Conceived to
maintain the shelters temporary character, these regulations initially prevented the
construction of a first floor, except in exceptional circumstances.
b) The decline of UNRWAs influence

16
17
18
19
20
In the 1970s, the Agencys control over camp matters, in Jordan and elsewhere, started
to decline, which led its Headquarters to redefine its role as a mere service provider. As
illustrated by the statements of its Commissioner-General in 1972:
[A]n emphasis on UNRWA camps and on relief, while correctly conveying an
impression of the refugees displacement from their traditional homes and of their
continuing need for help, has also contributed to certain misconceptions. UNRWA
provides services in rather than administers camps [] the camps are not extraterritorial areas under United Nations jurisdiction (UNRWA, 1972: parag.2; 1975:
parag.22).
The decline of UNRWAs influence stems from various factors. Mounting budget
constraints compelled the Agency to gradually reduce its services, delay acquisition of
educational and medical equipment and put a ceiling on the recruitment of additional
employees.19 Lack of resources combined with demographic growth and restrictions on
camp expansion (see below) led to a deterioration of its social infrastructure.20
Overworked, its staff also lost the capacity and authority required to enforce housingrelated regulations.
The decline of UNRWAs influence in the camps is also due to more positive
developments. As early as the 1960s, a younger, more educated, generation of camp
refugees managed to access the local and the Middle Eastern job markets (especially the
Gulf countries). They left the camps, thus reducing their material dependence on
UNRWA.21 But those refugees who remained in the camps, including the newcomers
replacing those who had moved out - see below section 2.b) also started to show signs of
empowerment, engaging in self-help activities for the improvement of their shelters as
well as the camps amenities.22 In some camps, committees, such as the residents
association set up in the Wihdat camp in 1969, were created in order to channel more
efficiently the camps needs to the stakeholders and to undertake various communitybased activities. UNRWA has promoted and supported these initiatives, even pushing the
various community-based organizations it once created, such as the Women Program
centres and the Community rehabilitation centres for disabled, to operate
autonomously.23
Present opinions about UNRWAs role and performance are rather mixed. While the
Agency has kept its aura as the embodiment of the international communitys
commitment in favour of the refugees humanitarian and political rights, criticisms against
its inability to sustain its mandate have mushroomed in refugee circles and among
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Jordanian officials. Reminding the international community that the decrease in its
humanitarian services strained the countrys finances and created social problems, the
government has repeatedly made it clear that Jordan should not be expected to take over
UNRWAs activities or normalize the camps: the latters symbolic power as guardians of
the refugees cause is at stake.24
2) The rise of the host authorities as territorial

institutions
a) The mixed legacy of integrated extra-territoriality
21
22
Initially, the governmental authorities role in the camps was mainly limited to
maintaining law and order and assisting UNRWA in carrying out its humanitarian
mission.25 Because they were to remain temporary places vested with the symbolism of the
right of return, camps were subsequently left aside from Jordans urban development
policies at national and municipal levels. Camp refugees themselves also opposed any
infrastructural improvement that could be interpreted as an acceptance of permanent
resettlement outside Palestine. It thus took UNRWA and the host authorities ten full years
(1951-1961), and countless numbers of persuasion campaigns, to replace tents with more
durable shelters made of more permanent materials such as mud, concrete, stone, iron,
zinc and asbestos (UNRWA, 1961). These housing units have nevertheless kept their initial
label shelter (mawa, malja) and were not called homes (bayt, dar). In the same vein,
the camps are still named moukhayyam (i.e. tent camp). Moreover, in the first decade of
their existence, the early camps shelters were not connected to municipal services: toilets
were public, drinking water was provided in distribution centres, and there was no
sewerage system. It is only in the early-mid 1960s that the sprawling municipalities
started integrating the camps within their public services systems. It is also during this
period that some of the main alleys were asphalted (DESTREMAU, 1994: 93-94). Today, the
camps remain excluded from the municipalities development plans, but almost all of their
shelters are connected to municipal services. In urban areas, their inhabitants pay taxes to
the adjoining municipalities for the use of water, electricity and telephone lines.26
Exclusion from local development plans has entailed a lack of decent urban planning.
UNRWA and the host authorities actually elaborated specific regulations designed to
maintain the camps temporary character. These regulations concerned the camps
boundaries, which were considered non-extendable for fear that any extension might lead
to the camps incorporation with neighbouring areas. They also dealt with the use of land
plots and shelters. Camp refugees were initially allotted plots of land not exceeding 80100 square meters per household, which included a shelter comprising one 12 square
meter room for a family of 4-5 members; or two rooms for families of 6-8 persons.27 While
refugees were in principle allowed to construct additional rooms beside the original core
shelter in order to accommodate new family members, any vertical extension of the
shelters was prohibited. Finally, camp inhabitants were not entitled to ownership - or
rental - rights to the plot of land, or to use the shelters for commercial purposes. The
status of most camp land as private land rented by the authorities for a period of 99 years
also explains such restrictions.28
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Over time, however, the expansion of the camps population (due to natural
demographic growth and to the arrival of newcomers as from the mid-1950s) challenged
these temporary regulations. The figures are striking, indicating a multi-fold increase in
the camps population over the decades. In Amman for instance, the al-Hussein and
Wihdat camps, which initially sheltered 8,000 and 9,500 refugees, currently house about
30,000 and 50,000 inhabitants, respectively.29 However, neither UNRWA nor the host
authorities have ever endorsed the responsibility for developing a sound urban
management policy in the camps. The host authorities implicitly laid the onus on
UNRWA, which is responsible for building shelters and handing them over to the
Palestinian refugees.30 Conversely, the Agency has stigmatized the host countries
neglect. In its own words: The host governments have not enforced adherence to urban
planning and architectural guidelines in camps nor have they brought camp infrastructure
to standards adhered to in non-camp areas. UNRWA has no mandate for and cannot
enforce such adherence (UNRWA, 2004).
The demographic explosion of the refugee population, combined with the existing camp
regulations, has had two consequences. First, density and rates of overcrowding have
attained extremely high levels, sparking acute social problems and substandard
environmental conditions. UNRWA figures indicate that density in the camps varies from
70,000 to 103,000 persons/sq. km in the early 1950s camps; and from 34,000 to 69,000
persons/sq. km in the post-1967 emergency camps (see table at the end of this article).
In comparison, the overpopulated cities of Mumbai and Kolkata in India claim fewer than
30,000 persons per sq.km.31 Overcrowding figures in the camps shelters are also
impressive. About 58 percent of camp households endure overcrowding in terms of room
occupancy (over two persons per room) as opposed to 38% of refugee households living
outside camps32. According to living condition surveys carried out in Jordan in the early
2000s, overcrowding increases the incidence and transmission of respiratory diseases,
forces children and young adults onto the streets, sparks domestic violence and provides
children with a poor study environment, thus causing problems of school dropout and
illiteracy (KHAWAJA, TILTNES, 2002: 128-130). Second, the refugees unguided adaptation to
the expansion of their households has resulted in the narrowing of pathways, the virtual
absence of recreational areas and unsatisfactory environmental conditions in terms of
ventilation, sunlight, humidity, temperature, storage, and privacy.33 As horizontal space
was soon exhausted, refugees started to expand their shelters vertically, benefitting from
or taking advantage of-UNRWAs leniency or inability to control the situation.
b) The Jordanian authorities flexible governance of the

refugee camps
25
Jordans current involvement in refugee camp management far exceeds that of any of
the other host countries. This may be due to the citizen status of most camp refugees. As
early as 1975, it took over from a financially-stricken UNRWA in the task of controlling the
expansion of shelters. It also took direct charge of the maintenance and the rehabilitation
of the camps housing and physical infrastructure comprising water, sewerage, electricity
and road networks. These are responsibilities endorsed by UNRWA in the other host
countries. Ultimately, as the Jordanian officials have publicly admitted, they have come to
accomplish for humanitarian reasons- what UNRWA cannot do or what exceeds its
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27
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financial capability (DPA: 2004: 77).

Although camp refugees (except the Gazan displaced persons) are entitled to
participate in national and local elections, the camps municipal affairs have been run alongside UNRWA - by specific governmental agencies.34 Established in 1988 following
King Husseins decision to disengage Jordan from the West Bank, the Department of
Palestinian affairs (DPA) focuses solely on the camps located in Jordan proper.35 The
extensive mandate falling upon the DPA in the camps has lent it such impressive labels as
a state in the state (Destremau, B; 1995: 21), a label that once blessed UNRWA. Its
duties include assistance to UNRWA and non-governmental bodies operating in the
camps,36 the monitoring of refugees usage of the shelter units, the registration of
commercial ventures and the rehabilitation of the physical infrastructure (DPA, 2004: 1314).37 Based in Amman, with regional offices, its leverage in the camps is secured through
camp services committees. Responsible for the channelling of the refugees claims and
the implementation of community projects, these committees are, unlike the 1960s
residents associations, almost governmental bodies composed of 7-13 members (not
necessarily camp dwellers) whose budgets, operations and membership are monitored by
the DPA. The committees lack of autonomy has at times emerged as a bone of contention
with the refugee communities. These communities, supported by members of parliament,
have repeatedly demanded that the committees membership be elected by the camps
inhabitants, not imposed upon them. But to no avail: the Jordanian authorities have been
unwilling to support any initiative likely to encourage political factionalism at a time when
they are striving to promote national unity.38
Yet, the DPAs management of the camps infrastructure may be described as relatively
flexible. It has sought to adapt the housing regulations to the refugees evolving needs.
Thus, the construction of an additional floor above the initial shelter for residential
purposes is now permitted upon authorization by its services; commercial buildings may
even add two floors provided the extension does not exceed 6 metres.39 Probably on
account of the political sensitivity related to camp matters, the DPA has generally not
taken legal action in order to pull down illegal constructions, unless public safety was at
risk. Rather, it has endeavoured to prevent such illegal initiatives through persuasion and
pre-emptive measures (DESTREMAU, 1994: 97). This relatively liberal attitude has
accelerated the urbanization of camps located within large city boundaries. The examples
of the Wihdat and the al-Hussein camps in Amman are telling. Most shelters have two
floors (i.e. one floor on top of the original shelter) and the number of commercial
buildings with three floors has mushroomed. Besides the traditional small and family
businesses (grocers and jewellers for instance), new commercial ventures comprising
banks, electronics shops, taxi agencies, fast food outlets and pharmacies have opened in
the past two decades, turning these camps into relatively affluent commercial areas
(HAMARNEH, 2002: 180-181; JABER, 2002: 252-56). In contrast, refugee camps located
outside the cities have been deprived of such developments. For instance, the Talbiyeh
camp, which lies about 30 km south of Amman, still appears mired in poverty with few
work opportunities.
Another example of governmental flexibility pertains to land transactions. Despite the
camps temporary status, the refugees have developed a sense of ownership towards their
shelters. This was first reflected, as seen above, in the extensions and upgrades they
brought to them. Then, in the 1960s, those refugees seeking and able to afford more
comfortable housing outside camps started renting out or selling their shelters to
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newcomers in need of extra-space or impoverished non-camp refugees, including

returnees from Kuwait and other Gulf countries in the early 1990s.40 Such transactions,
also involving commercial ventures, have become such a regular feature of the camps
dynamics that the informal transaction acts (hujjas) are recorded in real estate offices
located within the camps themselves (AL-HAMARNEH, 2002: 182). Over time, the urban
camps inclusion within the citys booming real estate market and commercial activities
has resulted in the increase in the actual value of the land. The Wihdat camp, for instance,
has seen the value of its shelters increase dramatically, from an average of JD 3,000 in
1970 to around JD 19,000 in 2007.41
c) The impact of the peace process with Israel

29
30
Jordans Wadi Araba treaty with Israel in 1994 announced a further increase of its
involvement in camp affairs. Titled Refugees and Displaced Persons, article 8 recognized
the massive human problems caused to both Parties by the conflict in the Middle East
(par.1) and recommended their alleviation, notably through the implementation of
agreed United Nations Programs and other agreed International economic programs
concerning refugees and displaced persons, including assistance to their settlement
(par.2.c). In the following years, and for the first time ever, Jordan unilaterally included
the refugee camps in a national development program aimed at upgrading living
conditions in the countrys impoverished areas (also covering informal squatter areas and
remote villages). Named the Economic and Social Productivity Program (ESPP), this
program tackled the refugee camps infrastructural conditions through two sub-programs:
first, the Community Infrastructure Program (CIP) that aimed at upgrading the camps
physical infrastructure in terms of water supply, sewerage and drainage systems, roads
and footpaths, pedestrian crossings at major roads, street lighting and retaining walls42;
second, the Housing Projects for the Poor (HPP) scheme, which has aimed at upgrading
deteriorated shelters inhabited by poor refugees.43 The novelty of these interventions also
resides in the involvement in their design and implementation of a governmental agency
that had so far been alien to camp matters; the Housing and Urban Development
Cooperation (HUDC).44
Equally remarkable is the relatively positive response the HUDC interventions elicited
amongst refugees. This confirmed the view that, several decades after the 1948 and the
1967 exoduses, Palestinian refugees and displaced people were favourable to the notion of
durable upgrading in the camps provided this did not affect their temporary status. Yet,
some observers, including members of opposition parties, have contended that such a
trend inevitably induced the refugees permanent resettlement in Jordan45 and led to the
gradual disappearance of the camps through their transformation into poor housing
neighbourhoods.46 It may be too early to jump to such conclusions. The Jordanian
authorities made it clear from the outset that the ESPP programs would remain ad hoc
interventions that would not affect the camps temporary character and political
symbolism (AL-DALY, 1999). The camps political significance actually affected the
modalities of the interventions, drastically restricting their scope: unlike interventions
outside camps, the social infrastructure, mainly under UNRWA supervision, was left
untouched; no demolition of shelters occurred; and the rehabilitation of the most
dilapidated of them was limited to a single room and/or kitchen and bathroom. Most
importantly, no solutions could be brought to the camps most crucial problems, namely
Page 11 of 21
9/5/12 9:28 AM
high demographic densities and overcrowding. Finally, even though the HUDC kept a
leading role, the DPA was not sidelined. It continued to play a significant role by
participating in and/or approving the design criteria of the interventions, and took part in
their implementation as well as in their follow-up (AL-DALY, 1999; DPA, 2004: 83-85).47
Ultimately, the camps overall status has not changed. In the recent words of the Greater
Amman Municipality :
Although these camps are now permanent and well-established communities
within Amman, they retain a distinct identity based on their origins, socioeconomic conditions, land tenure status (land rental) and political organization
(UNRWA administration) (Greater Amman Municipality, 2008 : Appendix4).
31
Keeping the original UNRWA-Refugee Camp-DPA trinity alive also serves Jordans
strategic interests. It contributes to maintain the authorities good relations with the
refugees and their representatives, while reminding Israel and the international
community that Jordan should not be considered an alternative state for the Palestinians,
as some Israeli political circles would have it. In a longer term perspective, it may also
serve as a basis for compensation claims the Jordanian state may raise in order to ensure
the orderly re-housing and permanent resettlement of those refugees who will not return
to Palestine.48
Conclusion
32
33
34
35
The Palestinian refugee camps do not easily lend themselves to assessment. Indeed,
how can one analyze spaces still defined as temporary six decades after their
establishment ? Following which criteria should one evaluate their management :
relevance to the principle of the right of return or adaptation to the modernization
policies pursued by the host country ?
In Jordan, because most camp refugees are citizens, the issue of their integration/nonintegration has been more sensitive than in any other host country. Although camps are
still considered temporary spaces, they have gradually been covered, with large variations
depending on their urban/rural character, by the surrounding municipalities services.
More recently, they have been included in national developmental policies. The
commercial development that has taken place in some urban camps has reinforced this
trend of socioeconomic integration.
The sensitivity surrounding camp issues has compelled the main stakeholders, namely
UNRWA and the DPA, to implement a relatively flexible mode of governance marked by
adaptation and informality. In the face of mounting demographic pressure, the early
regulations aimed at preserving the temporary character of the camps were informally renegotiated with the refugees in accordance with their evolving needs. However, flexibility
and informality have at times proven tantamount to sheer neglect, for instance with
regard to the absence of decent urban planning schemes. The poor environmental health
conditions prevailing in the camps result from such neglect.
The peace agreement concluded with Israel in 1994 has somewhat questioned this mode
of management. Jordans socioeconomic policies of the 2000s, bent on socioeconomic
modernization and political integration, have prompted the authorities to undertake
unprecedented developmental interventions in the camps. The decline of UNRWAs
Page 12 of 21
9/5/12 9:28 AM
margin of manoeuvre as well as the camp refugees new acceptance of large-scale

development schemes have contributed to this policy shift. However, the camps
demographic situation and the structural defects accumulated over decades by its overall
infrastructure are such that only a (highly unlikely) total reconstruction of the camps may
lead to a durable improvement in living conditions.49 Pending the advent of a
comprehensive Arab-Israeli peace agreement, it is likely that the refugee camps will
continue to be sidelined from the major modernization trends affecting Jordans cities in
the future.
Table : Camps of Jordan, main characteristics according to UNRWA sources 50
Camp
Population (mid2000)
Area
Initial
(dunums =0.001
population
sq. km)
Density
(persons
/dunum)
1940s-1950s
Zarqa (1949)
18,509
8,000
180
103
Irbid (1950)
25,250
4,000
244
102
Jabal al-Hussein
(Amman-1952)
29,464
8,000
421
70
Amman New Camp

(Wihdat, Amman 1955)
51,443
5,000
488
103
500
44
>9,000 (6,970 reg.)
5,000
130
69
93,916
26,000
1400
65
1967-1968 emergency camps

Souf (Jerash - 1967)
al-Talbieh (Amman 1968)
Baqaa (Balqa -1968)
>21,900 (20,142
registered with
UNRWA)
Husn (Azm-al-Mufti,
Irbid - 1968)
>26,965 (22,194
reg.)
12,500
774
34
Jerash (Gaza
Jerash - 1968)
>27,600 (24,090
reg.)
11,500
750
37
Marka (Hitteen,
Zarqa - 1968)
>62,379 (45,593
reg.)
15,000
917
68
Source: http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/jordan.html.
Bibliography
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Lessons
Learned,
HUDC,
1999
http://www.hdm/lth.se/fileadmin/hdm/alumni/papers/ad1999/ad1999-09.pdf.
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AL-HAMARNEH, A., The Social and Political Effects of Transformation Processes in Palestinian
Refugee Camps in the Amman Metropolitan Area (1989-99), in : Jordan in Transition, edited by
G. Joffe, London, Hurst & Company, 2002, pp. 172-190.
AL-HUSSEINI, J. and BOCCO, R., The Status of the Palestinian Refugees in the Near East : The Right
of Return and UNRWA, in Refugee Survey Quarterly, volume 28, no.2-3, 2009, pp. 260-285.
AL-HUSSEINI, J., CALV, C., SKHIRI, C. Education profile of the Palestine Refugees in the Near East,
IUED/Louvain-La-Neuve/UNRWA survey, Geneva/Amman, UNRWA intranet, May 2007.
AL-HUSSEINI, Jalal, UNRWA and the Palestinian Nation-Building Process. Journal of Palestine
Studies, volume XXIX, Number 2, Winter 2000, pp. 51-64.
AL-KHAZENDAR, Sami, Jordan and the Palestine Question The Role of the Islamic and Left Forces
in Foreign Policy-Making, Reading, Ithaca Press, 1997 :
AWAD, Ahmad, The Culture of the Palestinian Refugee Camp in Jordan (in Arabic), paper
presented at the conference : The National Identity and Culture and their Role in the Reform and
Modernization Process, Amman, The Hussein Cultural Centre, 8-9 March 2008.
BOCCO, Riccardo, UNRWA and the Palestinian Refugees : a history within History, Refugee
Survey Quarterly, no. 2-3, 2009, pp. 1-24.
Community Development and Refugees : Infrastructure, Environment, Housing and Social
Development, paper presented at UNRWA Geneva Conference, Meeting the Humanitarian Needs
of the Palestine Refugees in the Near East : Building Partnerships in Support of UNRWA
(Working Group II, chaired by the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan). 7-8 June 2004.
CRISP, J. ; JACOBSEN, K., Refugee camps reconsidered, Foreign Migration Review, December
1998, pp. 27-30 (http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR03/fmr307.pdf).
DE BEL-AIR, Franoise, Population, politique et politiques de population en Jordanie, 1948-1998,
Thse de doctorat en Dmographie et Sciences sociales sous la direction de Philippe Fargues,
EHESS, Paris, 2003.
Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA), 55 years in serving refugee camps, Amman, The
Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2004.
Department of Palestinian Affairs (DPA), Five Decades of Responsibility in the Refugee camps of
Jordan, Amman, The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, 2002.
DESTREMAU, Blandine, Lespace du camp et la reproduction du provisoire : les camps de rfugis
palestiniens de Wihdat et de Jabal Hussein Amman . Moyen-Orient : migrations,
dmocratisation, mdiations, ed. Riccardo Bocco et Mohammed-R. Djalili, Paris, Presses
Universitaires de France, 1994.
FARAH, Randa, Crossing Boundaries : Reconstruction of Palestinian identities in al-Baqa Refugee
Camp, Jordan, Palestine, Palestiniens territoire national, espaces communautaires (les
cahiers du Cermoc no.17), Beirut, Cermoc, 1997.
AL-HAMARNEH,
Ala, The Social and Political Effects of Transformation Processes in Palestinian

Refugee Camps in the Amman Metropolitan Area (1989-99), in : Jordan in Transition, edited by
Georges Joffe, London, Hurst & Company, 2002, pp. 172-190.
JABER, Hana. Qu-est-ce quun camp de rfugis , Le Droit au Retour, le problme des rfugis
palestiniens, Paris, Sindbad-Actes Sud, 2002, pp. 233-261.
KHAWAJA, M. and TILTNES, A. On the Margins : Migration and Living Conditions of Palestinian
Camp Refugees in Jordan, Fafo Report 357, 2002. http://www.fafo.no/pub/rapp/357/index.htm.
LAPEYRE, F., BENSAID, M., Socio-economic profile of UNRWA Registered Refugees, IUED/LouvainLa-Neuve/UNRWA survey, Geneva/Amman, UNRWA intranet, 25 July 2006.
League of Red Cross Societies, Relief Operation in behalf of the Palestine Refugees 1949-1950,
Geneva, 1950.
MASSAD, Joseph, Colonial Effects : The Making of National Identity in Jordan, New York,
Columbia University Press, 2001.
RAJFUS, Maurice, Retour de Jordanie : les rfugis palestiniens dans le royaume hachmite. Luc,
La Brche-PEC, 1990.
RAMZOUN, Hussein, The Historical Development of the Refugee Camps in Jordan, in The
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Palestinian Refugees Old problems new solutions, ed. Joseph Ginat & Edward J. Perkins,
Brighton, University of Oklahoma Press, 2001, pp. 249-254.
RUEFF, H., VIARO, H., Assessment of Housing Conditions of Palestine Refugees, IUED/Louvain-LaNeuve/UNRWA survey, Geneva/Amman, UNRWA intranet, May 2007.
SABBAGH-GARGOUR, Rana, Controlling the Camp, Jordan Business, July 2006, pp. 114-117.
SALIBI, Kamal, The Modern History of Jordan, London, I.B. Tauris, 1993.
SHAMIR, Shimon, West Bank Refugees-Between Camp and Society, Palestinian Society and
Politics, ed. by J. S. Migdal, Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1980, pp. 146-165.
Tepidness of the Jordanians of Palestinian Origins enthusiasm (special report), al-Sijill, 8
November 2007, p. 5.
UNRWA, Interim Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for
Palestinian Refugees in the Near East, Supplement no.19 (A/1451/Rev.1), 1951.
UNRWA, Report of the Commissioner-General of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency
for Palestinian Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 1954 - 30 June 1955, Supplement no.15
(A/2978), New York, 1955.
(A/4861), New York, 1961.
(A/6313), New York, 1966.
UNRWA, Report of the Director of the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestinian
Refugees in the Near East, 1 July 197130 June 1972, Supplement no.13 (A/8713), New York,
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UNRWA, Figures as of 31 December 2008, Public Information Office, UNRWA Headquarters
(Gaza), March 2009.
Notes
1 UNRWA (the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East)
is the humanitarian agency created by the UN General Assembly in December 1949 in order to
Page 15 of 21
9/5/12 9:28 AM
cater for the basic needs of poor refugees and promote their social integration in its five fields of
operations: Jordan, Lebanon, Syria, the West Bank and the Gaza strip. Today, there are 58 official
refugee camps in the Near East : 10 in Jordan, 12 in Lebanon, 9 in Syria, 19 in the West Bank and
8 in the Gaza Strip.
2 The only refugee category that was not granted citizenship are the 40,000-50,000 persons from
the Gaza Strip who were transferred to Jordan in the years following the 1967 Arab-Israeli
conflict, and their descendents. See http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/jordan.html.
3 Only a minority of registered refugees across the Near East lives (or has lived) in the camps:
29%. Lebanon is the only host country with a majority (53 %) of refugees living in camps,
although the number of camp refugees there (223,000) is lower than in Jordan (UNRWA, 2009).
4 The refugees and the Arab world as a whole consider that the right of return has been
endorsed by UN General Assembly Resolution 194 (III) of 11 December 1948. Its paragraph 11
resolves that the refugees wishing to return to their homes and live in peace with their neighbors
should be permitted to do so at the earliest practicable date, and that compensation should be
paid for the property of those choosing not to return and for loss of or damage to property which,
under principles of international law or in equity, should be made good by the governments or
authorities responsible.
5 Former farmers and labourers made up about three quarters of the total refugee population in
(Trans)Jordan (League of Red Cross Societies, 1950: 44). According to the same source, 99.5 % of
the refugee population was of Palestinian nationality, 84 % of them were Muslim and their
principal districts of origin were Jerusalem, Haifa and Bisan.
6 Apart from these official camps, Jordan hosts three camps (Sukhneh (1969), Prince Hassan
Quarter (1967) and Madaba (1956) that are recognized only as such by the local authorities, and a
series of informal refugee gatherings, namely urban neighborhoods inhabited predominantly by
Palestinian refugees.
7 In UNRWAs opinion, the obstacles to the long-term integration of refugees in the host
countries across the Near East included: (a) the absence of a solution to the Palestine problem
along the lines of General Assembly resolutions regarding repatriation and compensation; (b)
scant physical resources made available for development; and (c) the attitude of the refugees and,
in some cases, of the Governments of the area (UNRWA, 1955: par.34-35).
8 As stated by the Chairman of the Committee on the Exercise of the Inalienable Rights of the
Palestinians (http://www.reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/MUMA).
9 Since the 1990s, the waning influence of the PLO in Jordan has benefitted the Islamists
(Sabbagh-Gargour, R., July 2006; Hamarneh, A., 2002). It is to be borne in mind that in Jordan,
the PLO officials are not allowed to pay any official visit to the camps.
10
See
Freedom
of
assembly
restricted
in:
http://www.humanrightsfirst.org/middle_east/jordan/hrd_jordan.htm. During one of these
breaches, marchers protesting against the killing of the Hamas founder Sheikh Yassin by the
Israelis in Gaza in 2004 created havoc in the Wihdat camp, damaging shops and cars and burning
the Jordanian flag. In the days that followed, the camps leading figures lambasted these actions
and assured that their initiators did not belong to the camp community ; see al-Dustours
opinion : investigating the Wihdat events, al-Dustour, 30/03/2004.
11 In 2005 for example, a survey carried out by the Geneva University and the University of
Louvain-la- Neuve in coordination with UNRWA showed that in Jordan as many as 57% of camp
refugees belonged to the lowest or the lower-mid income quintile compared to 35% of non-camp
dwellers. The gap is wider than in Syria (respectively 49 % and 35 %) and in Lebanon (47 % and
33 %) ; source : Lapeyre, F., Bensaid, M., Socio-economic profile of UNRWA Registered Refugees,
IUED/Louvain-La-Neuve/UNRWA survey, Geneva/Amman, UNRWA intranet, 25 July 2006,
p. 31. Similarly, in 1999, the Norwegian centre FAFO found that 22 % of camp dwellers had a
minimum income of JD 900 or less per year versus a national average of 10 % (Khawaja, M ;
Tiltness, A.A., 2002 : 55-56).
12 In the words of Abdel-Karim Abul Heija, then Director of the Jordanian Department of
Palestinian Affairs in Arab al-Yawm (Jordanian daily), 28 January 2004, p. 2.
13 According to Marouf Bakhit, then Prime Minister, in Arab al-Yawm, 1 June 2006, p. 5.
14 It is widely assumed that UNRWA will only be phased out in accordance with an agreed
Page 16 of 21
9/5/12 9:28 AM
timetable of five years following the reaching of such an agreement, as provided for instance in
the informal Taba Accords concluded in January 2001 between Israeli and Palestinian
negotiators. See : From Moratinos Non-Paper, Taba, January 2001, in :
http://www.pij.org/documents/moratinos.pdf
15 In this respect, the fact that the vast majority of the Agencys staff comes from the refugee
communities (namely 29,629 local employees versus 119 international employees in 2009) may
have reinforced the Agencys identification with the refugee cause.
16 In 2009, UNRWAs facilities in Jordan include notably 174 elementary and preparatory
schools; 2 vocational and technical training centres;122 clinics of various types; 14 womens
program centres (including kindergartens); 10 community rehabilitation centres; and 29
distribution centres. About 42 % of these facilities are located in camps (UNRWA, March 2009 ;
internal UNRWA documents).
17 According to the poll carried out by the Institute of Development Studies of the Geneva
University and the Catholic University of Louvain, in cooperation with UNRWA in 2005 (See: J.
AL-HUSSEINI, C.CALV, Ch. SKHIRI, Education profile of the Palestine Refugees in the Near East,
IUED/Louvain-La-Neuve/UNRWA survey, Geneva/Amman, UNRWA intranet, May 2007 : 37).
18 The definition of a Palestine refugee has evolved over time but the main criteria have been the
following: habitual residence in Palestine during the period 1 June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and loss
of both home and means of livelihood as a result of the 1948 conflict (and poverty until 1992).
From 1950 to 1970, one of UNRWAs main concerns was the relatively high number of false
registrations due to unreported deaths, duplication of registration cards, and fraudulent
registration of non-refugees. While the actual number of Palestinian refugees was estimated at
about 750,000 in 1950, UNRWAs records included 922,000 persons (UNRWA, 1951 : par.35).
Jordan, which was reported to be the host country claiming most of these false refugees, was the
main target of rectification list campaigns undertaken by the Agency until the late 1960s (see for
instance UNRWA, 1966 :22).
19 UNRWAs average annual spending per refugee has fallen from about $ 200 in 1975 to around
$ 110 today. Source: http://www.un.org/unrwa/overview/qa.html.
20 For example, in 2003 the number of primary health facilities per 100,000 persons stood at 1.4
for UNRWA compared to 24 in similar governmental facilities (UNRWA, 2005: 7). In the field of
primary education, the pupil/teacher ratio in UNRWA elementary schools in the academic year
2003-4 reached 34 as opposed to 26 in governmental schools. More strikingly, 92 per cent of
UNRWA schools used the double shift system against 15 % in government primary schools
(UNRWA, 2005 : 8).
21 The number of those refugees who left the camps is undetermined. Informing UNRWA about
address changes is not mandatory. In this way, many refugees who left the camps years ago are
still registered with UNRWA as camp residents.
22 As witnessed by UNRWA in Jordan and other host countries since the early-mid 1970s
(UNRWA, 1973/4: 21, 27; 1974/1975: 29).
23 UNRWA provides occasional technical and financial support to these bodies. The Youth Clubs
presently operate under the authority of the governmental Higher Council of Youth.
24 See for instance: Azayzeh: the preservation of the camps symbolism in order to guarantee the
rights of the refugees to return and compensation in al-Ghad (Jordanian daily), 14 February
2007.
25 The terms of the cooperation between Jordan and UNRWA are notified in a formal agreement
signed
on
14
March
and
20
August
1951
(see:
http://untreaty.un.org/unts/1_60000/3/33/00005646.pdf).
26 Rural camps access to such services has long been less satisfactory. Their inhabitants pay such
taxes to Camp Improvement Committees monitored by the DPA.
27 See http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/jordan.html.
28 Most of the camps established in the 1950s are fully built on private land, except the Zarqa
camp, which was erected on predominantly public land (85%). In contrast, the Emergency
camps were mostly built in 1967-1968 on a combination of private and public plots of land,
except the Talbyeh camp (fully on public land). In total, 30.7 % of camp land is public land (DPA,
2002 : 21).
Page 17 of 21
9/5/12 9:28 AM
29 Source: http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/jordan.html. For an overview of all the camps,

see table Camps of Jordan, main characteristics according to UNRWA sources at the end of the
report. We notice that the emergency camps built following the 1967 Arab-Israeli War are
smaller and less congested than those established in the 1950s.
30 See: http://www.dpa.gov.jo/
31 See http://www.citymayors.com/statistics/largest-cities-density-125.html. Compared with
other host countries, Jordans camp density figures are higher than those of Gaza and the West
Bank (on average 68 and 53 persons per dunum, respectively), and lower than those of Lebanon
and Syria (on average 129 and 77, respectively). Source : UNRWA data in www.unrwa.org/s
Comparatively, the UNHCR warns against setting up of high density camps with populations of
over 20,000 persons because of the environmental and social hazards they bring about (CRISP, J ;
JACOBSEN, K., 1998). As can be seen in table Camps of Jordan, main characteristics according to
UNRWA sources below, some of the camps that were erected in the 1950s host four times as
many refugees (CRISP, J ; JACOBSEN, K., 1998).
32 According to the poll carried out by the Institute of Development Studies of the Geneva
University and the Catholic University of Louvain in cooperation with UNRWA in 2005 (RUEFF,
H., VIARO, H., Assessment of Housing Conditions of Palestine Refugees, IUED/Louvain-LaNeuve/UNRWA survey, Geneva/Amman, UNRWA intranet, May 2007).
33 In: Community Development and Refugees: Infrastructure, Environment, Housing and
Social Development, 7-8 June 2004 (see bibliography), p. 6.
34 The mandate of these agencies has varied over time, mainly in accordance with the evolution of
the Arab-Israeli conflict. The first of these bodies was the short-lived Ministry of Refugees (19491950) which was followed by the Ministry of Development and Reconstruction (the MDR -19511980). In 1980, the Ministry of Occupied Land Territory was established, taking over the MDRs
tasks, although its main aim was to gather information on the situation of Palestinians in the West
Bank and Gaza. (1980-1988). Since 1988, the Department of Palestinian Affairs mandate has
been limited to the camps located on the East Bank of the River Jordan ; see
http://www.dpa.gov.jo/
35 The DPA functions under the umbrella of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
36 In past years, numerous medical, relief and social-oriented NGOs, such as the zaqat (alms)
committees and various CBOs have sought to fill the gaps in the provision of services by UNRWA
and governmental institutions.
37 The DPA also carries out various specific tasks outside camp management, such as
representing the Jordanian government in local and international forums and coordinating with
other governmental bodies on issues related to the movement of people and goods to and from
the West Bank (DPA, 2004: 15-16).
38 The tensions between the authorities and the camp communities have sometimes made it to
the national media. See for instance, Why arent the camp committees elected ? al-Sabil,
(Jordanian islamist weekly (now daily) 12 June 2006, p. 4. or A memorandum demands the
independence of Irbids camp committee at elections, al-Ghad, 7 January 2007, p. 5.
39 See Azayzeh: in favor of the opening of the committees to civil society, al-Ghad, 7 September
2006.
40 According to a survey conducted by Fafo in late 1999, most departures from the camps are
motivated by marriages or other family-related reasons and by work-related considerations (Fafo,
2002: 35-37). Since the 1990s, camps in Amman have also housed foreign immigrants seeking
low-cost housing (Egyptians, Sri-Lankans, Iraqis, etc.). According to informal sources, the Wihdat
camp alone accommodated some 8,000 foreigners in the early 2000s (AL-HAMARNEH, 2002 : 181).
41 According to authorized sources. The value of a shelter actually depends on its location. The
closer it is to the commercial streets, the higher the price. The boom in land prices prompted the
original landowners to regain control over their property in the second half of the 1990s when an
Israeli-Palestinian peace treaty was in the offing. However, as a result of the interruption of the
peace process in 2000, the landowners legal procedures have been suspended.
42
The
CIPs
covered
most
camps
from
1998
to
2002
(see
www.espp.gov.jo/communityinfrastructure.htm). The CIP also included the three unofficial
governmental camps (see footnote 6) that are not recognized as such by UNRWA.
Page 18 of 21
9/5/12 9:28 AM
43 See: http://www.espp.gov.jo/housingprojects.htm This is explicitly a sector falling within

UNRWAs area of responsibility but the Agency is unable to meet the needs of the refugees due to
a chronic lack of funds. See Annual Reports of the Commissioner-General of UNRWA, 20042005, par.125 ; and 2006-2007, par.102).
44 The HUDC was created in 1992 to be in charge of housing and urban projects across the
country. It is run by a Council including the Minister of Public Works and Housing and the
Ministry of Planning. See HUDCs website : http://www.hudc.gov.jo/GUI/SubDefault.aspx?
PID=350||Flag=4
45 According to Abd al-Aziz Jabr, former spokesman of the Committee for the Defense of the
Right of Return, in al-Masaiyya (daily newspaper), 14 February 2000.
46 Headline of the Islamist weekly newspaper al-Sabil, 24 December 2000.
47 See also http://www.espp.gov.jo/index.htm
48 According to an American non-paper released in June 2000, over 100 billion dollars were to
be invested in the rehabilitation of refugees over the course of 10 to 20 years according to the
following breakdown: $ 40 billion for the Palestinians, $ 40 billion for Jordan, $ 10 billion for
Lebanon
and
$
10
billion
for
Syria.
See
:
http://christianactionforisrael.org/isreport/mayjun00/nonpaper.html
49 The demolition/reconstruction of camps along sounder urban guidelines was undertaken by
UNRWA and the host countries following armed conflicts. The neighborhoods of the Jenine camp
(West Bank) that were destroyed by the Israeli forces during the Intifada in 2002 were rebuilt in
such a way as to provide its inhabitants with improved living spaces and environmental
conditions. The reconstruction of the Nahr al-Bared camp in the North of Lebanon (wholly
destroyed by the Lebanese army during clashes with Muslim militants in 2007) is to be carried
out according to the same principles.
50 UNRWA does not hold a precise list of camp dwellers and does not take into account nonrefugees renting camp dwellings. UNRWAs population figures therefore often differ from DPA or
NGO statistics.
List of illustrations
Caption Source : UNRWA (http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/jordan.html)
URL
http://ifpo.revues.org/docannexe/image/1742/img-1.jpg
File
image/jpeg, 356k
References
Bibliographical reference
Jalal al-Husseini, The Evolution of the Palestinian Refugee Camps in Jordan. Between Logics
of Exclusion and Integration , in Villes, pratiques urbaines et construction nationale en Jordanie,
Beyrouth, Presses de l'IFPO ( Cahiers de lIfpo , no 6), 2011, p. 181-204.
Electronic reference
Jalal al-Husseini, The Evolution of the Palestinian Refugee Camps in Jordan. Between Logics
of Exclusion and Integration , in Villes, pratiques urbaines et construction nationale en Jordanie,
Beyrouth, Presses de l'IFPO ( Cahiers de lIfpo , no 6), 2011, [Online], Online since 06
December 2011, Connection on 05 September 2012. URL : http://ifpo.revues.org/1742
Author
Jalal al-Husseini
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The Evolution of The Palestinian Refugee Camps in Jordan. Between Logics of Exclusion and Integration

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The Evolution of The Palestinian Refugee Camps in Jordan. Between Logics of Exclusion and Integration

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Villes, pratiques urbaines et... - The Evolution of the Palestini...

- Jalal al-Husseini - Institut franais du Proche-Orient

Villes, pratiques urbaines et construction nationale en Jordanie

The Evolution of the Palestinian

afin de moderniser le pays.

that affect the countrys drive towards liberal modernization.

A) The evolving significance of the

Zoom Original (jpeg, 356k)Source : UNRWA (http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/

2) Evolving contexts, lasting representations

the countryside and the semi-desert areas.13

B) Who runs the camps? The

1) UNRWA the extent and limits of non territorial

b) The decline of UNRWAs influence

2) The rise of the host authorities as territorial

b) The Jordanian authorities flexible governance of the

financial capability (DPA: 2004: 77).

newcomers in need of extra-space or impoverished non-camp refugees, including

c) The impact of the peace process with Israel

margin of manoeuvre as well as the camp refugees new acceptance of large-scale

Amman New Camp

>9,000 (6,970 reg.)

1967-1968 emergency camps

Ala, The Social and Political Effects of Transformation Processes in Palestinian

29 Source: http://www.un.org/unrwa/refugees/jordan.html. For an overview of all the camps,

43 See: http://www.espp.gov.jo/housingprojects.htm This is explicitly a sector falling within

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