Probabilistic Analysis of Systems Availability

Designing Ships for Post-Damage Return to Port

Safe Return To Port
• Ship abandonment is a very dangerous undertaking. There is a broad category of accidents for which it is safer to stay within the ship in the wake of the accident than abandoning her in lifeboats. • In such cases ships must return to a nearby port to offload her occupants. This return journey must, despite the damages, satisfy some basic minimum conditions in order to be safely viable.

Functionality Critical to Safe Return to Port
• Habitability : The ability of the ship to ensure health and safety of her occupants. • Propulsion and Steering : The ability of the ship to travel to one of the nearest ports for offloading.

Conditions for Viable Return to Port
• A large ship has to serve as a (temporarily) selfsufficient microcosm of urban settlements in terms of facilities such as fresh-water supply, food supply, illumination, sewage, air conditioning, waste treatment, communication, fire safety services, emergency medical provisions etc. • Most of these provisions are critically important for people to live in the ship an extended period of time.

A Natural Next Step from Index-A
• Index-A : Probability of post-damage sustenance of stability. In addition we could target higher degrees of robustness through a similar approach to other functions besides ‘stability’. • Index-X : Probability of post-damage sustenance of X. X could be functions such as habitability, propulsion, steering.

Dependency Tree Based Analysis
The dependency tree for a system represents a Boolean expression describing whether the system can function properly based on the condition (``failure'' or ``working'') of its components and dependencies. Here the systems don’t necessarily refer to tangible machinery or equipment – they can be functions or facilities. The high level functionality is expressed in terms of their dependency on their sub-functions or sub-systems.

Dependency Model for Safe Return to Port
“Safe return to port” would be the top level function, and hence the root of the tree. The leaves of the tree would be localized subsystems or machinery components.
Increasing Level of Detail

High Level Functionality

Localized Subsystems

Dependency Notation (the negated form of usual fault trees) Z works if all of A,B and C work. Z works if of A or B or C works.
A B C A B C Z Z

Z works if A works and, B or C works.

A B Z

C

Locality of Systems
Below a certain level of detail, systems and sub-systems are localized, i.e. they are located in a confined region onboard the ship. Several high level systems and functions are not localized – they have their components spread out widely across the ship. In order to associate systems with damage cases, it is necessary to reason about their location in the shipboard environment. The damages are expressed in terms of subdivisions of the shipboard space. This is addressed by the spatial data model of Helios.

Damage Cases
The damage cases defined for probabilistic damage stability are the damage cases considered for probabilistic analysis of safe return to port. Maybe the non-survivable cases could be excluded because they render return-to-port irrelevant. If p(i) is the probability of the i-th damage case, and g(F,i) is a function that takes the value 1 if the functionality F fails in the i-th damage case and takes the value zero otherwise. Then we can define a probabilistic failure index for that functionality as follows:

idx(F)=

∑ p(i) g ( F , i)
i =1

N

∑ p(i)
i =1

N

[as Proposed for simplicity, but the expression could be slightly different if Monte-Carlo trials are used to accommodate probabilistic failure rates for flooded systems]

Towards Computing the Probabilistic Index
As to what will be the exact mathematical formulation for the index may be decided at a later stage, but to start with we must devise the technology for evaluation of system availability vis-à-vis damage situations. We would need a computing tool that allows (i) modelling of the ship systems and their inter-dependence, (ii) modelling of damage cases and their probabilities and (iii) calculate availability of systems and functions relevant to “return to port” for each damage case. An extension of our simulation tool viz. Helios has been developed to address the above. It allows both the modelling and analysis tasks involving ship systems and damage cases.

The Modelling Task

Produce a labelled drawing showing the subdivisions along with their names as labels. Hull surface (in IGES or any other surface format is nice to have.

Loading the 3d Subdivision in Helios
The drawing is automatically converted into a 3D spatial database faithfully representing the subdivisions and located objects. Interactive 3d interface is available for grouping of spaces, if necessary. The hull or superstructure does not play a role in the computation involved in this analysis but may be used for virtual reality look-and-feel.

Placement of Systems
Systems can be placed on the spatial subdivision model by mouse clicks. They may be moved around, renamed or deleted interactively. All such interactive operations are recorded in a journal file for inclusion in the model file. One can also assign the probability of failure of a system in the event of its space being flooded. This is 1.0 by default but may be 0.0 or any other value for sealed systems.

Specification of System Functionality and Interdependence
Interdependence of systems can be entered by mouse clicks. Simple and/or dependencies can be specified only using mouse clicks ( e.g. Select n systems, and click the and-dependency hyperlink, this specifies the first selected system to be dependent on all of the rest of the selected system through an and node.
The dependencies may also be scripted as follows:
declareDependency Z {& A {| B C}}

More complicated dependencies may be typed in easily, e.g. {& A {| B C}} represents the following tree branch : A B C

Systems may be declared as non-local, by which they are not directly damaged by the location of their graphic avatar in a damaged compartment.

Description of Damage Cases
Probability Case ID Rooms Flooded

Damage cases as used for index-A calculation may be used directly. Since “return to port” is relevant to survivable damages, severe damage cases may be excluded.

The Required Information Model
3D Subdivision/GA

R7002 A B C

Room Names

Systems Dependency and Location Damage Cases

Graphic User Interface : Just another Helios Input Page

Display of Model Structure and Results
•The dependency graph and its expanded form is visualized and interactively manipulated. •Results are displayed on the 3d viewer and dependency graph viewer. •Numerical results are also saved in an Excel file for post-processing.

The Algorithm used for Availability Calculation
The dependency expressions are syntactically expanded as much as possible. That is : If A refers to {| B {& P Q}}, B refers to {& R Q} and Q refers to {| M N} then A would be expanded into {| {& R {| M N}} {& P {| M N}}, assuming M,N,P,R are leaf level components. The failures are also translated into such expanded expressions. For example the failure of Q becomes the expression {~ {| M N}}. Binary decision diagrams (BDDs) are made out of such expanded expressions, where the leaf level systems represent independent Boolean variables. System expressions are composed by conjunction (i.e. &-node) with failure expressions to give BDDs representing the state of the systems. Satisfiability of such a BDD for a system is equivalent to the propositional value that it can work. Satisfiability problem for a BDD is a simple vertex reachability problem which has been implemented within our system.

Binary Decision Diagram
Based on the idea of Shannon expansion i.e. the following expansion: f(X1,X2,...,Xn) = X1f(1,X2,...,Xn) + X1'f(0,X2,...,Xn) followed by the expansion for two variables, and noting that expansion can be continued for any number of variables.

f(x1, x2, x3) = -x1 * -x2 * -x3 + x1 * x2 + x2 * x3 Shanon expansion leads to a tree structure which can be folded into a DAG by eliminating duplicate sub-expressions. Whether folded or not, “SATISFIABILITY” of the original expression is equivalent to “REACHABILITY” on this graph. The general problem itself is NP-hard (i.e. there is no guarantee of efficient solution yet), but BDDs are “usually” efficient for most expressions.

References
• Fault Tree Handbook For Aerospace Applications: Dr. Michael Stamatelatos, NASA HQ, OSMA, Dr. William Vesely, SAIC, Report prepared for NASA Office of Safety and Mission Assurance, NASA Headquarters, Washington, DC 20546, August, 2002 Graph Based Algorithms for Boolean Function Manipulation, Randal Bryant, IEEE Transactions on Computers, C-35-8, pp. 677-691, August, 1986 Fault Tree Analysis and Binary Decision Diagrams, R. Sinnamon and J. Andreas, Proceedings of the Reliability and Maintainability Symposium, January 1996, pp 215-222. New Algorithms for Fault Tree Analysis, A. Rauzy, Reliability Engineering and System Safety, Vol. 40, 1993, pp 203-211. The Synthesis of Two-Terminal Switching Circuits, Claude Shannon, Bell System Technical Journal, vol.28, pp.59-98

• •

• •

System Availability Analysis of [Name Witheld]
• We have received a large dataset of drawings and documents and are currently in the process of interpreting the data. • There was an initial phase of difficulty with interpreting the data, it has been addressed by collection of data from the site. • Systems availability analysis has been carried out with the collected data.

Data Collection

[Name Witheld] went to [Name Witheld] and collected data on the systems locations and interdependence. He came back with a 880 node dependency tree involving 100 sub-systems of steering and propulsion.

Progress on [Name Witheld]
• The ship subdivision and the damage cases have been modelled for the availability analysis tool. • Some ambiguities in the subdivision labels have bee resolved in consultation with Tony. • A new feature of propagating damage along “compartment connections” was necessary for modelling the damage cases of [Name Witheld]. • Availability analysis has been performed for the propulsion+steering systems onboard [Name Witheld].

• Systems spanning multiple rooms is supported.

Damage Cases for [Name Witheld]

560 damage cases have been modelled 657 three-dimensional sub-divisions have been modelled.

Probabilistic Analysis of Propulsion and Steering

100 systems and functions were defined along with their dependencies.

Dependency Tree

Dependency Graph and Systems Placement Constructed from Data Collected Onsite

Individual and Aggregated Damage Cases
Effect of individual damage cases can be studied. Aggregated distribution of damage cases can be used as a design aid. Bayesian analysis for probabilistic quantification criticality of components is being investigated.

Systems Placement Method
System placement can be made according to damage probability distributions (joint distributions over space pairs).

Results (1/14)
% Cases of Failure to Return to Port
Failure in %-age of cases 80.00 70.00 60.00 50.00 40.00 30.00 20.00 10.00 0.00
ag e ag e ag e ag e ag e ag e ag e ag e ag e am am am da m da m da m da m da m en td en td en td da m en t en t en t en t en t co m pa rtm co m pa rtm co m pa rtm co m pa rtm pa r tm pa r tm pa r tm pa r tm pa r tm pa r tm en t en td am ag e

co m

co m

co m

co m

co m

1

2

3

co m 3 to 4

2

3

3

4

to

to

to

to

1

1

2

1

Damage Case Category
% of damage cases that lead to failure to return to port for each damage category defined by the number of damage compartments

2

to

4

4

Results (2/14)
Probability of Steering System Failure
0.1600 Probability of Failure 0.1400 0.1200 0.1000 0.0800 0.0600 0.0400 0.0200 0.0000 1 compartment damage 2 compartment damage Damage Case Category All SOLAS 2009 damage

Probability of Failure to Return to Port
0.5000 0.4500 0.4000 0.3500 0.3000 0.2500 0.2000 0.1500 0.1000 0.0500 0.0000 1 compartment damage 2 compartment damage Damage Case Category All SOLAS 2009 damage

Probability of Failure

Probability of Propulsion Failure
0.4000 Probability of Failure 0.3500 0.3000 0.2500 0.2000 0.1500 0.1000 0.0500 0.0000 1 compartment damage 2 compartment damage Damage Case Category All SOLAS 2009 damage

Probability of failure to return to port for three significant damage categories, and probability of failure of the two main sub-functions thereof, viz. Propulsion and Steering.

Probability 0.2 0.4 0

Results (3/14) : RTP Failure Probability for All Solas 2009 cases

Failure Probability : All Systems

Systems/Functions

_Return_To_Port_ Port_Propeller Prop_Shaft_P Propeller_Pitch_Control_P Prop_Shaft_S Propeller_Pitch_Control_S Propulsion_System Starboard_Propeller Cooling_Water_System _P Engine_Driven_Pum p_P Gearbox_P Hydraulic_Control_P Lube_Oil_System _P Main_Engine_3_P Main_Engine_4_P Prelube_Pum p_P Pum ps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_P SW_Cooling_System _P SW_Heat_Exchangers_P Booster_Pum ps_S Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P Main_Switchboard_P AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S Cooling_Water_System _S Engine_Driven_Pum p_S Gearbox_S Hydraulic_Control_S LO_Transfer_Pum p_P LO_Transfer_Pum p_S Lube_Oil_System _S Main_Engine_1_S Main_Engine_2_S Main_Switchboard Main_Switchboard_S Prelube_Pum p_S Pum ps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_S SW_Cooling_System _S SW_Heat_Exchangers_S AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_P AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S Port_Rudder_P Rudder_Stock_P Rudder_Stock_S Starboard_Rudder_S Steering_System Service_Tank_S AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Fuel_System Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Service_Tank_P FW_Cooling_S Pneum atic_Fuel_Pum p_Blackout_Pum p_S LO_Tank Air_System _Control_P Engine_Casing_P Exhaust_System s_P Engine_Casing_S Exhaust_System s_S Gearbox_Lubrication_P Gearbox_Lubrication_S Heat_Exchangers_S ME_Room _Reservoir_S Self_Contained_Lubricating_Oil_System _P Self_Contained_Lubricating_Oil_System _S AE_Room _Reservoir_P Em ergency_Closing_Control

Probability 0.2 0.4 0

Results (4/14) : Propulsion Failure Probability for All Solas 2009 cases

Failure Probability : Propulsion Systems

Systems/Functions

Port_Propeller Prop_Shaft_P Propeller_Pitch_Control_P Prop_Shaft_S Propeller_Pitch_Control_S Propulsion_System Starboard_Propeller Cooling_Water_System _P Engine_Driven_Pum p_P Gearbox_P Hydraulic_Control_P Lube_Oil_System _P Main_Engine_3_P Main_Engine_4_P Prelube_Pum p_P Pum ps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_P SW_Cooling_System _P SW_Heat_Exchangers_P Booster_Pum ps_S Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P Main_Switchboard_P AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S Cooling_Water_System _S Engine_Driven_Pum p_S Gearbox_S Hydraulic_Control_S LO_Transfer_Pum p_P LO_Transfer_Pum p_S Lube_Oil_System _S Main_Engine_1_S Main_Engine_2_S Main_Switchboard Main_Switchboard_S Prelube_Pum p_S Pum ps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_S SW_Cooling_System _S SW_Heat_Exchangers_S AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_P AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S Service_Tank_S AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Fuel_System Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Service_Tank_P FW_Cooling_S Pneum atic_Fuel_Pum p_Blackout_Pum p_S LO_Tank Air_System _Control_P Engine_Casing_P Exhaust_System s_P Engine_Casing_S Exhaust_System s_S Gearbox_Lubrication_P Gearbox_Lubrication_S Heat_Exchangers_S ME_Room _Reservoir_S

Probability 0.1 0.2 0.3 0 Booster_Pum ps_S AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P Main_Switchboard_P AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S Main_Switchboard Main_Switchboard_S AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_P AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S Port_Rudder_P Rudder_Stock_P Rudder_Stock_S Starboard_Rudder_S Steering_System Service_Tank_S AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Service_Tank_P FW_Cooling_S Pneum atic_Fuel_Pum p_Blackout_Pum p_S Heat_Exchangers_S ME_Room _Reservoir_S AE_Room _Reservoir_P Booster_Pum ps_P HFO_Storage_Tanks Em ergency_Steering_S Hydraulic_Pum ps_P Hydraulic_Pum ps_S Steering_Gear_P Steering_Gear_S AE_Control_System ECR Working_Air_System _Service_Air Bridge Control_System Em _Gen_Fuel_Tank Em _Gen_Pum psControl_System Em ergency_Generator Em ergency_Switchboard Systems/Functions

Results (5/14) : Steering Failure Probability for all Solas 2009 cases
Failure Probability : Steering Systems

Probability 0.1 0.2 0.3 0 Booster_Pum ps_S AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P Main_Switchboard_P AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S Main_Switchboard Main_Switchboard_S AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_P AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S Service_Tank_S AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Service_Tank_P FW_Cooling_S Pneum atic_Fuel_Pum p_Blackout_Pum p_S Heat_Exchangers_S ME_Room _Reservoir_S AE_Room _Reservoir_P Booster_Pum ps_P HFO_Storage_Tanks AE_Control_System ECR Working_Air_System _Service_Air Bridge Em _Gen_Fuel_Tank Em _Gen_Pum psControl_System Em ergency_Generator Em ergency_Switchboard Systems/Functions

Results (6/14) : Common Systems for all Solas 2009 cases
Failure Probability : Shared Systems

Probability 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0

Results (7/14) : RTP Failure Probability for All 1 CMPT cases

Failure Probability : All Systems

Systems/Functions

_Return_To_Port_ Port_Propeller Prop_Shaft_P Propeller_Pitch_Control_P Prop_Shaft_S Propeller_Pitch_Control_S Propulsion_System Starboard_Propeller Cooling_Water_System _P Engine_Driven_Pum p_P Gearbox_P Hydraulic_Control_P Lube_Oil_System _P Main_Engine_3_P Main_Engine_4_P Prelube_Pum p_P Pum ps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_P SW_Cooling_System _P SW_Heat_Exchangers_P Booster_Pum ps_S Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P Main_Switchboard_P Port_Rudder_P Rudder_Stock_P Rudder_Stock_S Starboard_Rudder_S Steering_System AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S Cooling_Water_System _S Engine_Driven_Pum p_S Gearbox_S Hydraulic_Control_S LO_Transfer_Pum p_P LO_Transfer_Pum p_S Lube_Oil_System _S Main_Engine_1_S Main_Engine_2_S Main_Switchboard Main_Switchboard_S Prelube_Pum p_S Pum ps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_S SW_Cooling_System _S SW_Heat_Exchangers_S AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_P FW_Cooling_S AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S Service_Tank_S AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Fuel_System Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Service_Tank_P LO_Tank Em ergency_Steering_S Hydraulic_Pum ps_P Hydraulic_Pum ps_S Steering_Gear_P Steering_Gear_S Air_System _Control_P Engine_Casing_P Engine_Casing_S Exhaust_System s_P Exhaust_System s_S Gearbox_Lubrication_P Gearbox_Lubrication_S Heat_Exchangers_S ME_Room _Reservoir_S

Probability 0.1 0.2 0.3 0

Results (8/14) : Propulsion Failure Probability for 1 CMPT cases

Failure Probability : Propulsion Systems

Systems/Functions

Port_Propeller Prop_Shaft_P Propeller_Pitch_Control_P Prop_Shaft_S Propeller_Pitch_Control_S Propulsion_System Starboard_Propeller Cooling_Water_System _P Engine_Driven_Pum p_P Gearbox_P Hydraulic_Control_P Lube_Oil_System _P Main_Engine_3_P Main_Engine_4_P Prelube_Pum p_P Pum ps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_P SW_Cooling_System _P SW_Heat_Exchangers_P Booster_Pum ps_S Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P Main_Switchboard_P AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S Cooling_Water_System _S Engine_Driven_Pum p_S Gearbox_S Hydraulic_Control_S LO_Transfer_Pum p_P LO_Transfer_Pum p_S Lube_Oil_System _S Main_Engine_1_S Main_Engine_2_S Main_Switchboard Main_Switchboard_S Prelube_Pum p_S Pum ps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_S SW_Cooling_System _S SW_Heat_Exchangers_S AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_P FW_Cooling_S AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S Service_Tank_S AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Fuel_System Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Service_Tank_P LO_Tank Air_System _Control_P Engine_Casing_P Engine_Casing_S Exhaust_System s_P Exhaust_System s_S Gearbox_Lubrication_P Gearbox_Lubrication_S Heat_Exchangers_S ME_Room _Reservoir_S Self_Contained_Lubricating_Oil_System _P

Probability 0.1 0.2 0 Booster_Pum ps_S AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P Main_Switchboard_P Port_Rudder_P Rudder_Stock_P Rudder_Stock_S Starboard_Rudder_S Steering_System AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S Main_Switchboard Main_Switchboard_S AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_P FW_Cooling_S AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S Service_Tank_S AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Service_Tank_P Em ergency_Steering_S Hydraulic_Pum ps_P Hydraulic_Pum ps_S Steering_Gear_P Steering_Gear_S Heat_Exchangers_S ME_Room _Reservoir_S Pneum atic_Fuel_Pum p_Blackout_Pum p_S HFO_Storage_Tanks Booster_Pum ps_P AE_Room _Reservoir_P AE_Control_System ECR Working_Air_System _Service_Air Bridge Control_System Em _Gen_Fuel_Tank Em _Gen_Pum psControl_System Em ergency_Generator Em ergency_Switchboard Systems/Functions

Results (9/14) : Steering Failure Probability for all 1 CMPT cases
Failure Probability : Steering Systems

Probability 0.1 0.2 0 Booster_Pum ps_S AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P Main_Switchboard_P AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S Main_Switchboard Main_Switchboard_S AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_P FW_Cooling_S AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S Service_Tank_S AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Service_Tank_P Heat_Exchangers_S ME_Room _Reservoir_S Pneum atic_Fuel_Pum p_Blackout_Pum p_S HFO_Storage_Tanks Booster_Pum ps_P AE_Room _Reservoir_P AE_Control_System ECR Working_Air_System _Service_Air Bridge Em _Gen_Fuel_Tank Em _Gen_Pum psControl_System Em ergency_Generator Em ergency_Switchboard Systems/Functions

Results (10/14) : Common Systems for all 1 CMPT cases
Failure Probability : Shared Systems

Probability 0.2 0.4 0

Results (11/14) : RTP Failure Probability for All 2 CMPT cases

Failure Probability : All Systems

Systems/Functions

Port_Propeller Prop_Shaft_P Propeller_Pitch_Control_P _Return_To_Port_ Cooling_Water_System _P Engine_Driven_Pum p_P Gearbox_P Hydraulic_Control_P Lube_Oil_System _P Main_Engine_3_P Main_Engine_4_P Prelube_Pum p_P Pum ps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_P SW_Cooling_System _P SW_Heat_Exchangers_P Prop_Shaft_S Propeller_Pitch_Control_S Propulsion_System Starboard_Propeller Booster_Pum ps_S Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P Main_Switchboard_P AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S Cooling_Water_System _S Engine_Driven_Pum p_S Gearbox_S Hydraulic_Control_S LO_Transfer_Pum p_P LO_Transfer_Pum p_S Lube_Oil_System _S Main_Engine_1_S Main_Engine_2_S Main_Switchboard Main_Switchboard_S Prelube_Pum p_S Pum ps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_S SW_Cooling_System _S SW_Heat_Exchangers_S AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_P AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S FW_Cooling_S Service_Tank_S AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Fuel_System Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Service_Tank_P LO_Tank Air_System _Control_P Engine_Casing_P Engine_Casing_S Exhaust_System s_P Exhaust_System s_S Gearbox_Lubrication_P Gearbox_Lubrication_S Heat_Exchangers_S ME_Room _Reservoir_S Self_Contained_Lubricating_Oil_System _P Self_Contained_Lubricating_Oil_System _S Pneum atic_Fuel_Pum p_Blackout_Pum p_S Em ergency_Closing_Control AE_Room _Reservoir_P HFO_Storage_Tanks Port_Rudder_P Rudder_Stock_P Rudder_Stock_S Starboard_Rudder_S

Probability 0.2 0.4 0

Results (12/14) : Propulsion Failure Probability for 2 CMPT cases

Failure Probability : Propulsion Systems

Systems/Functions

Port_Propeller Prop_Shaft_P Propeller_Pitch_Control_P Cooling_Water_System _P Engine_Driven_Pum p_P Gearbox_P Hydraulic_Control_P Lube_Oil_System _P Main_Engine_3_P Main_Engine_4_P Prelube_Pum p_P Pum ps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_P SW_Cooling_System _P SW_Heat_Exchangers_P Prop_Shaft_S Propeller_Pitch_Control_S Propulsion_System Starboard_Propeller Booster_Pum ps_S Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P Main_Switchboard_P AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S Cooling_Water_System _S Engine_Driven_Pum p_S Gearbox_S Hydraulic_Control_S LO_Transfer_Pum p_P LO_Transfer_Pum p_S Lube_Oil_System _S Main_Engine_1_S Main_Engine_2_S Main_Switchboard Main_Switchboard_S Prelube_Pum p_S Pum ps_Engine_Heat_Exchangers_S SW_Cooling_System _S SW_Heat_Exchangers_S AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_P AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S FW_Cooling_S Service_Tank_S AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Fuel_System Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Service_Tank_P LO_Tank Air_System _Control_P Engine_Casing_P Engine_Casing_S Exhaust_System s_P Exhaust_System s_S Gearbox_Lubrication_P Gearbox_Lubrication_S Heat_Exchangers_S ME_Room _Reservoir_S Self_Contained_Lubricating_Oil_System _P

Probability 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0 Booster_Pum ps_S AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P Main_Switchboard_P AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S Main_Switchboard Main_Switchboard_S AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_P AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S FW_Cooling_S Service_Tank_S AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Service_Tank_P Heat_Exchangers_S ME_Room _Reservoir_S Pneum atic_Fuel_Pum p_Blackout_Pum p_S AE_Room _Reservoir_P HFO_Storage_Tanks Port_Rudder_P Rudder_Stock_P Rudder_Stock_S Starboard_Rudder_S Steering_System Booster_Pum ps_P AE_Control_System ECR Working_Air_System _Service_Air Em ergency_Steering_S Hydraulic_Pum ps_P Hydraulic_Pum ps_S Steering_Gear_P Steering_Gear_S Bridge Control_System Em _Gen_Fuel_Tank Em _Gen_Pum psControl_System Em ergency_Generator Em ergency_Switchboard Systems/Functions

Results (13/14) : Steering Failure Probability for all 2 CMPT cases
Failure Probability : Steering Systems

Probability 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0 Booster_Pum ps_S AE_3_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P AE_4_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_P Main_Switchboard_P AE_1_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S Main_Switchboard Main_Switchboard_S AE_2_FW_Cooling_Lub_Oil_Storage_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_S HFO_Heating_Boiler_P AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_S FW_Cooling_S Service_Tank_S AFS_Separator_Settling_Tank_Service_Tank_Lub_Oil_Separation_P Service_Tank_P Heat_Exchangers_S ME_Room _Reservoir_S Pneum atic_Fuel_Pum p_Blackout_Pum p_S AE_Room _Reservoir_P HFO_Storage_Tanks Booster_Pum ps_P AE_Control_System ECR Working_Air_System _Service_Air Bridge Em _Gen_Fuel_Tank Em _Gen_Pum psControl_System Em ergency_Generator Em ergency_Switchboard Systems/Functions

Results (14/14) : Common Systems for all 2 CMPT cases
Failure Probability : Shared Systems

Further Development
• The development team has been extended to develop a high quality visualisation and highusability user interface for systems availability analysis. [Name Witheld] has been assigned to develop the new user interface for this tool. • The following few slides give a few glimpses of this development. • This tool will serve to make the systems availability analysis accessible to a wider audience – (e.g. so that it could be used by operational personnel to learn about criticality in the systems).

Dedicated Tool For Systems Availability Analysis

Systems and their Dependency are Marked by Line Diagrams

New Tool for Systems Availability Analysis

Systems can be placed and their connections routed in the 3D subdivision model of the ship. Currently the data connection is set up using XML communication with helios. Eventually it will be independent of helios.

Future Directions
• This system would allow block diagram method of modelling of system dependencies. This tool would also be used for coupling systems failure with flooding and fire models (similar to the way passenger evacuation is dynamically coupled with flooding and fire models). This line of development was initiated quite recently, we are expecting this to be a very efficacious design tool.

Thank You