FM 3-05.


Army Special Operations Forces Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

DESTRUCTION NOTICE: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 4 November 2003. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DT-JA, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000. DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTION: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.

Headquarters, Department of the Army

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FM 3-05.104

Army Special Operations Forces Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

PREFACE ......................................................................................................... iv Chapter 1 OVERVIEW ..................................................................................................... 1-1 National Policy ................................................................................................ 1-1 NEO Environments .......................................................................................... 1-3 Notification Phases .......................................................................................... 1-4 Special Considerations .................................................................................... 1-6 ARSOF Capabilities ......................................................................................... 1-7 ARSOF Organizations ..................................................................................... 1-8 Chapter 2 U.S. ORGANIZATIONS AND ROLES ................................................................ 2-1 DOS ............................................................................................................... 2-2 Embassy Organization ..................................................................................... 2-2 Country Team ................................................................................................. 2-4 Other Agencies ............................................................................................... 2-4 WLG .............................................................................................................. 2-6 RLGs ............................................................................................................. 2-6 Geographic Combatant Commanders ................................................................ 2-6 Army Service Component Command ................................................................... 2-7

Distribution Restriction: Distribution authorized to U.S. Government agencies and their contractors only to protect technical or operational information from automatic dissemination under the International Exchange Program or by other means. This determination was made on 4 November 2003. Other requests for this document must be referred to Commander, United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School, ATTN: AOJK-DT-JA, Fort Bragg, North Carolina 28310-5000. Destruction Notice: Destroy by any method that must prevent disclosure of contents or reconstruction of the document.


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Special Responsibilities ......................................................................................... 2-8 Chapter 3 CONTINGENCY AND PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING ..................................... 3-1 EAP ........................................................................................................................ 3-1 Notification Methods .............................................................................................. 3-1 Military Planning and Planning Assistance ............................................................ 3-2 Chapter 4 DEPLOYMENT ..................................................................................................... 4-1 Preparation and Planning ...................................................................................... 4-1 FCE ........................................................................................................................ 4-2 Evacuation Site Party ............................................................................................. 4-3 ISB ......................................................................................................................... 4-4 Deployment of the Evacuation Force ..................................................................... 4-5 Chapter 5 EVACUATION FORCE OPERATIONS ................................................................ 5-1 Main Body Headquarters ....................................................................................... 5-2 Marshalling Element .............................................................................................. 5-2 Marshalling Element Operations ............................................................................ 5-2 Security Element .................................................................................................. 5-11 Logistics Element ................................................................................................. 5-12 Withdrawal of the Evacuation Force .................................................................... 5-12 ECC Organization ................................................................................................ 5-13 ECC Procedures .................................................................................................. 5-15 Classification, Priorities, and Consideration for Evacuees .................................. 5-20 Request for Asylum or Temporary Refuge .......................................................... 5-22 Chapter 6 TEMPORARY SAFE HAVEN OPERATIONS ...................................................... 6-1 Temporary Safe Haven Site ................................................................................... 6-1 Considerations for Safe Haven Sites ..................................................................... 6-1 Organization and Functions ................................................................................... 6-2 Appendix A Appendix B Appendix C Appendix D Appendix E Appendix F Appendix G MONROVIA, LIBERIA, NEO ................................................................................ A-1 GUIDELINES FOR ROE ...................................................................................... B-1 NOTIFICATION FORMS ...................................................................................... C-1 PSYOP .................................................................................................................. D-1 SAMPLE EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN CHECKLISTS ....................................... E-1 NEOPACK ...............................................................................................................F-1 NEO PLANNING GUIDANCE .............................................................................. G-1


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Appendix H Appendix I Appendix J

SAMPLE UNIFIED COMMAND PA PLAN FOR A NEO (HN) ............................. H-1 EVACUEE PROCESSING T&EOs ....................................................................... I-1 LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS ................................................................................. J-1 GLOSSARY .............................................................................................. Glossary-1 BIBLIOGRAPHY .................................................................................. Bibliography-1 INDEX.............................................................................................................. Index-1


Field Manual (FM) 3-05.104 describes Army special operations forces (ARSOF) policies for planning, coordinating, and executing noncombatant evacuation operations (NEOs) across the full spectrum of operational environments. This manual provides direction to ARSOF commanders and staffs charged with conducting NEOs. It clarifies procedures and terminology between the Department of Defense (DOD) and other governmental agencies that may be involved. This manual does not duplicate or supplant established doctrine dealing with tactical or strategic operations, but it does provide a specific framework to apply that doctrine. Commanders tasked to conduct NEOs should ensure that their planning staff is familiar with referenced publications. The proponent of this manual is the United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School (USAJFKSWCS). Submit comments and recommended changes to Commander, USAJFKSWCS, ATTN: AOJK-DT-JA, Fort Bragg, NC 28310-5000. Unless this publication states otherwise, masculine nouns and pronouns do not refer exclusively to men.


Chapter 1

NEOs are conducted to assist the Department of State (DOS) in evacuating civilian noncombatants and nonessential military personnel from locations in a foreign nation to a designated safe haven in the United States (U.S.) or elsewhere. NEOs are normally conducted to evacuate U.S. citizens whose lives are in danger from a hostile environment or natural disaster. NEOs may also include the evacuation of U.S. military personnel and dependents, selected citizens of the host nation (HN), and/or third country nationals (TCNs). NEOs involve swift insertion of a force and temporary occupation of an objective. NEOs end with a planned withdrawal upon completion of the evacuation. ARSOF implementing the Army special operations (SO) imperatives are often the units of choice because of the uncertain conditions found in NEO. Because of the nature of NEOs, understanding the operational environment, recognizing political implications, and facilitating interagency activities are imperatives. Appendix A describes the NEO conducted in Monrovia, Liberia.

1-1. The DOS directs NEOs. During a NEO, the welfare of in-country U.S. personnel is the paramount consideration. However, a decision to evacuate the Embassy and the order to execute a NEO also impacts political elements that may influence the timing of an evacuation. U.S. foreign policy objectives are the determining factor in the timing of an evacuation. The following paragraphs discuss the national policy concerning NEOs. EXECUTIVE ORDER 12656 1-2. Pursuant to Executive Order 12656, Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities, the DOS is responsible for the protection or evacuation of U.S. citizens and nationals abroad and for safeguarding their overseas property. The DOS is the lead agency for planning and conducting NEOs. Executive Order 12656 also directs the Secretary of Defense to advise and assist the Secretary of State in preparing and implementing plans. EMERGENCY ACTION PLAN 1-3. Every U.S. Embassy and consulate is required to maintain an emergency action plan (EAP). One section of the EAP covers the military evacuation of U.S. citizens and designated foreign nationals. The appropriate combatant commander reviews the EAP to ensure it is accurate and adequate to allow support by military operations. Evacuation operations differ from other military operations in that the senior DOS representative directs the


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operation at the time of evacuation. The order to evacuate is usually a political decision, with extensive ramifications. The DOS or Ambassador may not give an evacuation order at the most opportune time. They may delay the order until the last moment to avoid actions that may be viewed as a tacit admission of political failure. 1-4. The DOS or the Ambassador may initiate the evacuation process or plan. Evacuation transportation options, in order of preference, are—
• Scheduled commercial transportation. • Commercial charter. • U.S. military charter. • U.S. military transportation. Transportation options must be coordinated through the Washington liaison group (WLG).

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT 1-5. The rules of engagement (ROE) (Appendix B) for all NEOs should reflect the limited military objective to be accomplished. ROE are positive restrictions on the use of military force to prevent violation of U.S. government national policy. NEO ROE will be limited to the minimum military force needed to successfully complete the mission, provide for the self-defense of evacuation forces, and defend the noncombatant evacuees. Dissemination and enforcement of clearly defined ROE are critical. Use of crowd-control agents (FM 3-11.11, Flame, Riot Control Agents and Herbicide Operations, Chapter 1, gives policy on use) and employment of tactical Civil Affairs (CA) and Psychological Operations (PSYOP) teams may be needed to extract evacuees or discourage hostilities. During a NEO, the objectives are to avoid destroying enemy forces and to avoid armed conflict whenever possible; however, this may be difficult. CA forces are trained and equipped to conduct liaison and coordinate with local authorities. PSYOP forces are trained and equipped to develop, produce, and disseminate information in the local language. 1-6. The environment may require that the evacuation force commander defend the evacuation from hostile forces without first informing higher authorities. Thus, if given the opportunity, the commander must influence the ROE to allow for use of force where necessary. Upon arrival in country, if practical, the commander will discuss the ROE with the Ambassador. Modifications to the ROE must be made and approved by the appropriate authorities, via the supported combatant commander. EVACUATION GUIDELINES 1-7. The DOS or the Ambassador can order the following personnel to depart, and these personnel are eligible for evacuation assistance. Once evacuated, they may not return until approved by the DOS and the chief of mission (COM). Personnel in this category are as follows:
• American civilian employees of U.S. government agencies, except mission-essential DOD employees of military commands.


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• U.S. military personnel assigned to the Embassy (such as Marine security guards, defense attaché, and security assistance personnel). • Peace Corps volunteers. • American citizens employed on contract to a U.S. government agency if the contract so provides. • Dependents of those listed above. • Dependents of other U.S. military personnel, including those assigned to military commands.

1-8. The DOS or Ambassador cannot order the following personnel to depart, but these personnel are entitled to evacuation assistance. They may return at their discretion and at their expense. These personnel are—
• American employees of non-U.S. governmental organizations. • American employees of or assigned to international organizations. • American employees contracted directly by the host government, even if the U.S. government funds the contract. • American employees of private entities, such as relief organizations, even though the employer may receive some U.S. government funding. • Fulbright grantees and private American citizens. • Family members of private American citizens, to include alien spouses, children, and other bona fide residents of the household. • Other individuals designated by the DOD.

1-9. Legal, permanent U.S. residents (green card holders) are not entitled to any special assistance unless they fall into one of the above categories. As a rule, if the U.S. government is controlling the evacuation, the priorities for assistance are as follows:
• Priority I: American citizens. • Priority II: Alien immediate family members of American citizens. • Priority III: TCN and designated Foreign Service national employees of the U.S. government. • Priority IV: Eligible non-Americans who are seriously ill or injured or whose lives are in imminent peril as determined by the DOS (but who do not qualify for a higher priority). • Priority V: Others who the DOS determines are eligible.

1-10. The military command tasked with conducting a NEO tailors its planning and action for evacuation assistance according to the anticipated situation. The three operational environments that the military may face in evacuation operations are permissive, uncertain, and hostile. These environments may exist because of an unfavorable political environment, a conflict, or a natural disaster in the HN. Typically, the more unfavorable the environment is in the HN, the larger the force required to conduct the NEO.


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PERMISSIVE 1-11. In a permissive environment, there is no resistance to evacuation operations expected. The operation should require little or no assembly of combat forces in-country. The host government will not oppose an orderly departure or U.S. military assistance. Military assistance is normally limited to medical, logistical, transportation, and administrative processing. Security forces are tailored to the threat. However, preparations should be in place to enable the force to effectively counter any threats to evacuees. Military assistance may be required because of a natural or man-made disaster or inadequate transportation facilities. UNCERTAIN 1-12. In an uncertain environment, the host government forces, whether opposed or receptive to the NEO, do not have total effective control of the territory and population in the intended area or country of operations. Because of this uncertainty, the joint task force (JTF) commander may elect to reinforce the evacuation force with more security units or a reaction force. The JTF commander, through his subordinate commanders, disseminates the ROE early to ensure troops are trained. Unit commanders must strictly enforce the ROE to avoid escalation of hostilities. HOSTILE 1-13. In a hostile environment, evacuation of personnel may be under conditions ranging from civil disobedience or terrorist actions to full-scale combat. The JTF commander may elect to deploy a sizable security element with the evacuation force. He may position a large reaction force either with the evacuation force or at an intermediate staging base (ISB). Forced entry operations may be required, along with the establishment of defensive perimeters, escorted convoy operations, and personnel recovery operations. 1-14. Regardless of the environment at the onset of the operation, the commander must plan for the possibility that it may change. Volatile situations that would trigger a NEO also provide ripe environments for spontaneous or organized violence. Unfortunately, U.S. citizens are often direct or indirect targets of this violence.

1-15. NEO has two notification phases—draw down and evacuation. Figure 1-1 depicts the notification phases and subphases.

Figure 1-1. Notification Phases and Subphases


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DRAW DOWN 1-16. The Ambassador must request authorized departure status from the DOS. Employees and family members who wish to leave the post must obtain approval from the Ambassador. When the DOS terminates the authorized departure status, the official evacuees must return to the post. 1-17. The Ambassador may determine that a situation has deteriorated to a point that family members and certain employees should leave the post for their safety. Ordered departure is not optional; the Ambassador will issue to family members and employees orders to leave. When the Ambassador terminates ordered departure status, official evacuees must return to the post. EVACUATION 1-18. The decision to evacuate personnel assumes that the decision to draw down, at least in part, has been made. When feasible, notification of potential evacuees involves communicating via the established warden system. As a rule, written messages are more reliable than oral messages and should be used whenever possible. There are four notification phases for an evacuation—stand fast, leave commercial, evacuation, and Embassy or post closing. Stand Fast 1-19. When a country’s political or security environment has deteriorated and it is perceived that U.S. citizens are threatened, but an evacuation is either not required or is temporarily impossible, the Ambassador requests all U.S. citizens to stand fast and gives them preliminary instructions for preparing to evacuate the country. The Embassy identifies the wardens and activates its emergency action organization. The Embassy’s personnel review the evacuation plans, options, and support requirements, and the Ambassador may consider requesting military assistance. The combatant commander may direct the deployment of a liaison team, activate crisis action response teams, and assign a subordinate joint force commander (JFC), as appropriate. Appendix C provides a sample stand fast notice. Leave Commercial 1-20. When the situation is grave, the Ambassador may tell nonessential U.S. citizens to leave by commercial transportation as soon as possible. It is assumed commercial transportation will be available and adequate. The following other actions may take place:
• Additional Marine security guards and/or DOS security personnel may reinforce the Embassy’s internal security force. In lieu of the above, a JTF or joint special operations task force (JSOTF) may be established to assist in the evacuation. • The Ambassador might request the deployment of a small JTF and/or JSOTF liaison team to the Embassy to assist in evacuation planning and in anticipation of the requirement for military assistance to conduct the evacuation. NOTE: Appendix C provides a sample leave commercial notice.


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Evacuation 1-21. When the political or security environment is believed to have deteriorated to the point that the safety of U.S. citizens is threatened, the Ambassador, with DOS approval, orders the departure, keeping only missionessential members of the Country Team. The Embassy assembles, documents, and assists the movement of U.S. citizens, TCNs, and host-country nationals to designated safe haven sites. A mix of commercial charter, private, or military transport might be necessary, depending on the availability of scheduled commercial transportation. At some point in this phase, the Ambassador might request military assistance, either because the transportation means are inadequate or because of the severity of the threat to the evacuees. Once requested, the combatant commander, upon direction from the Secretary of Defense through the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), commences military evacuation operations. These may range from simple transportation support to the deployment of the JTF and/or JSOTF. A sample evacuation notice is provided in Appendix C. Embassy or Post Closing 1-22. The final notification phase is when the situation has deteriorated to the point that the Embassy must close and all remaining U.S. citizens and Embassy employees must be evacuated. This does not include private U.S. citizens and their dependents that desire to remain in the country. A list of personnel who cannot be ordered to depart a country is provided in paragraph 1-8, page 1-3. Military assistance might not be required until this phase of the evacuation. Military operations could range from removing the remainder of the Country Team to full-scale evacuation operations. A sample Embassy or post closing notice is provided in Appendix C.

1-23. The geographic combatant commanders have the responsibility to plan and conduct NEOs in support of the DOS. Once directed to do so by the DOD, the combatant commander will order assigned and or attached forces to conduct evacuation operations in support of the DOS and the appropriate U.S. Ambassador. In addition to the operational environment, the HN’s support capabilities may influence the development of courses of action (COAs) to conduct the NEO. 1-24. Although the combatant commander can designate a single Service force to conduct a NEO, the more common response is to form and deploy a JTF. Historically, the JTFs formed to conduct NEOs predominantly consisted of in-theater forces or other forces deployed in the theater at the time of the NEO. In many instances, special operations forces (SOF) have been the most readily available and best-prepared forces to conduct these operations. Forward-stationed forces may form the nucleus for a larger tailored force to be deployed over time. 1-25. A situation that would cause the U.S. to execute a NEO may cause a similar response from other countries. Consequently, multinational forces may be militarily or politically expedient. While SOF are traditionally


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prepared to participate in multinational operations, approval rests with the President of the United States.

1-26. Future military operations will occur in an environment focused on short and decisive conflicts in complex terrain. Military operations other than war (MOOTW) missions will become predominant, not only in their number, but also in their variety. Operations in this environment will be increasingly complex and politically sensitive. In a NEO environment, ARSOF may face hostile forces of a failed state that is in chaos and is suffering from disease, poverty, and internal ethnic or tribal strife. 1-27. ARSOF units provide unique capabilities for geographic combatant commanders and operate in hostile, uncertain, or permissive environments. Because NEOs are tactical operations with the potential of strategic impact, they require soldiers with unique qualifications. ARSOF are specially selected, organized, equipped, and trained to achieve military, political, and informational objectives by using conventional and unconventional means. This combination of tactical proficiency and strategic awareness makes ARSOF an ideal choice for politically sensitive NEO. 1-28. ARSOF organization, equipment, training, personnel selection, and tactics have evolved as threats have changed. Regardless of the environment, ARSOF will execute their missions based upon the foundations established in their core competencies and current capabilities and the following SO characteristics:
• Highly trained personnel. ARSOF soldiers provide the maturity, experience, and professionalism required to conduct politically sensitive NEOs. ARSOF soldiers possess mission-specific training beyond basic military skills to achieve entry-level SO skills. Being proficient in SO skills also requires a competency in more than one military specialty. • Cultural awareness. ARSOF are regionally oriented and languagequalified with broad-based experiences for employment. These skills enable the ARSOF soldier to effectively support sensitive NEO tasks. • Multiple force options. ARSOF units are routinely task-organized for operations to complement their lethal and nonlethal capabilities. ARSOF provide specially trained units that are highly effective in conducting low-signature operations that are politically acceptable. • Joint, interagency, and multinational operations. In-theater SO experience and forward presence can serve as a skeleton or network for organizing a joint interagency task force or multinational organization to support a NEO. • Tailorable force packages. ARSOF can be task-organized and deployed rapidly. The cellular nature of ARSOF, compared with the echeloned maneuver force, permits rapid and precise tailoring unlike that of every other Army element.


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• High-tempo environment. SO are high-risk operations that have limited windows of execution and require first-time success. First-time success is achieved by ARSOF units through—

ƒ Employing full battlespace awareness. ƒ Integrating intelligence assets. ƒ Employing agile, lethal, and nonlethal attack capabilities. ƒ Gaining information dominance to support operations at a specific time and place.
• Responsiveness. ARSOF employs sophisticated communications systems and means of insertion, support, and extraction to penetrate and return from hostile, denied, or politically sensitive areas.

1-29. As mentioned earlier, ARSOF consist of Special Forces (SF), Rangers, Army special operations aviation (ARSOA), PSYOP, and CA. The following paragraphs discuss SF, Rangers, ARSOA, PSYOP, and CA operations in a NEO. SF 1-30. SF make up a unique, unconventional, combat arms organization. They are mature, highly trained, and seasoned professionals. They can plan and conduct SO across the range of military operations. Their tactical actions often may have operational or strategic effects. 1-31. SF operations, although carried out at the tactical level, are characterized by their strategic and operational implications. The unique SF skills—language qualification, regional orientation, area studies, and interpersonal relations—are keys to the successes experienced by the SF units in the field. SF soldiers frequently are familiar with foreign capitals and knowledge of local infrastructure. SF operations require flexible and versatile forces that can function effectively in diverse and contradictory environments. SF have become the force of choice to deal with the broad spectrum of operations that affect the political, social, religious, and humanitarian aspects of today’s uncertain environment. FM 3-05.20, Special Forces Operations, has more information. RANGERS 1-32. The Ranger regiment is ARSOF’s light infantry force. Its specially organized, trained, and equipped soldiers provide the Secretary of Defense and President with the capability to deploy a credible military force quickly to any region of the world. The Ranger regiment performs specific missions with other SOF and often forms habitual relationships. Its missions differ from conventional forces’ missions in the degree of risk and the requirement for precise and discriminate use of force. It uses specialized equipment, operational techniques, and several modes of infiltration and employment. The Ranger regiment is ideally suited to conduct forcible entry into hostile environments in support of NEO. FM 3-21.85, Ranger Operations (currently published as FM 7-85, Ranger Unit Operations), has more information.


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ARSOA 1-33. ARSOA supports other SOF units by planning and conducting special air operations in all operational environments. ARSOA has specially organized, trained, and equipped aviation units. These units provide the joint force special operations component commander (JFSOCC) with the capability to infiltrate, resupply, and exfiltrate SOF elements with unmatched precision aviation capability. FM 3-05.60, Army Special Operations Forces Aviation Operations, has more information. PSYOP 1-34. The total Army PSYOP force provides strategic, operational, and tactical support to the geographic combatant commanders. The Army PSYOP force consists of one Active Army Psychological Operations group (POG) and two Reserve Component (RC) POGs. The Active Army POG is comprised of regional, tactical, and dissemination battalions. The RC POGs are comprised of tactical, dissemination, and enemy prisoner of war/civilian internee (EPW/CI) battalions. 1-35. At the strategic and operational levels, PSYOP support involves area and target audience analysis, product development, and product production. At the lowest tactical level, PSYOP support involves information collection and product distribution and dissemination. The organic dissemination capabilities of a POG include—
• Fixed and deployable printing presses. • Television. • Amplitude modulation (AM) radio. • Frequency modulation (FM) radio. • Shortwave radio broadcasting stations. • Fixed and deployable audio, visual, and audiovisual production capabilities. • Tactical loudspeaker dissemination.

1-36. A strategic studies detachment (SSD) supports each regional battalion. The SSD fulfills the PSYOP studies production program directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. It contributes analyses and expertise to PSYOP mission planning. It also serves as a response cell for PSYOP analytical support to deployed PSYOP forces for mission planning and execution. FM 3-05.30, Psychological Operations, and Appendix D provide more information on PSYOP. CA 1-37. CA units provide the commander with an important tool to help plan and execute civil-military operations. CA units support conventional forces and SOF at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. The vast majority of the Army CA force is in the RC. The RC of CA taps into a pool of skilled specialists experienced in government, economic, and other public administrative functions, such as public transportation, communications, education, public health, and public works and utilities. Many of these specialties are not found in the Active Army force structure, and as such,


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provide a unique capability. CA commands, brigades, and battalions support the five geographic combatant commanders and their supporting forces. There is also an Active Army battalion with a worldwide mission to serve as CA generalists. The battalion provides unified commanders with rapid operational access to CA assets. It provides rapidly deployable, languagetrained, theater-oriented, CA forces to support planning and execution of NEO. It is the only CA unit available for immediate deployment. 1-38. CA units plan, manage, and help conduct civil-military operations supporting the geographic combatant commander and his subordinate forces. CA assets may also provide staff support to theater Army component services and joint theater staff, as required. FM 3-05.40, Civil Affairs Operations (currently published as FM 41-10, Civil Affairs Operations) provides more information. Civil Affairs planning teams often support nEOs. These may be either Civil Affairs planning teams A (CAPT-As) drawn from the CA company or Civil Affairs planning teams B (CAPT-Bs) formed from battalion elements. Figure 1-2 shows the CA team composition.

Figure 1-2. CA Team Composition, CA Battalion (Active Army)


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1-39. CA forces—by the nature of their mission—are well suited for planning and coordinating support of a NEO involving contact with civilians—domestic and foreign. CA activities in support of a NEO include—
• Advising the commander of the CA aspects and implications of current and proposed NEO plans, including writing the CA annex to the U.S. Embassy NEO plan and respective theater plans. • Supporting operation of evacuation sites, holding areas for non-U.S. nationals denied evacuation, and reception or processing stations. • Assisting in the identification (ID) of U.S. citizens and others to be evacuated. • Screening and briefing evacuees. • Performing liaison with the Embassy, to include acting as a communications link with U.S. forces in the operational area. • Recommending actions to the commander to minimize population interference with current and proposed military operations. • Assisting in safe haven activities.

1-40. Military planners of NEOs must, therefore, include elements of intelligence on terrain, weather, hydrography, designation and number of evacuees, and other facts on the infrastructure of the area, including dissidents. Civil-military operations planners should play a role in the planning process, starting with the preparation or review of existing evacuation plans and continuing through implementation.


Chapter 2

U.S. Organizations and Roles
A variety of government agencies, DOD elements, combined working groups, and military organizations support NEOs. It is through effective planning and coordination by these entities that ARSOF and other military units successfully complete these complex, sensitive missions. Figure 2-1 shows the chain of command for a NEO.

Figure 2-1. NEO Chain of Command


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2-1. The DOS, acting on the advice and recommendation of the COM, decides when to initiate a NEO. Normally, evacuation commences according to the Embassy EAP and requires scheduled commercial transportation, commercial charter transportation, or U.S. military transportation. The DOS’s Under Secretary for Management arranges charter transportation— civilian or military. 2-2. If evacuation requirements exceed the capability of the diplomatic mission, the Secretary of State may request military assistance from the DOD. The need for military assistance may occur when the threat to U.S. citizens makes it impractical to wait for other means of evacuation, or if military forces are required to actively protect U.S. citizens. 2-3. The CJCS, when directed by the Secretary of Defense, tasks this mission to the appropriate geographic combatant commander. The geographic combatant commander initiates appropriate military planning and coordinates with the DOS chair or his regional liaison group (RLG).

2-4. The primary responsibility for NEOs lies with the DOS. The COM is the Ambassador. He is the ranking U.S. official in-country and directly responsible to the President of the United States. In the absence of the Ambassador, the deputy chief of mission (DCM) becomes the chargé d’affaires. As the President’s representative in-country, the Ambassador is the senior representative of the U.S. Government and is therefore ultimately in charge. The COM, not the senior military commander, has the ultimate responsibility for successfully completing the NEO and safeguarding the evacuees. 2-5. The administrative officer (AO) is often the third in command in the Embassy hierarchy. In a small post with no security officer assigned, the AO assumes the functions of the security officer, and if a Marine security guard (MSG) detachment is assigned, has operational control (OPCON) of the detachment. The AO is also responsible for the Embassy communications unit. 2-6. The general services officer (GSO) has many of the same functions as a J-4 or S-4. The GSO is normally responsible for all buildings, grounds, construction, vehicles, and maintenance. 2-7. The chief of the consular section is responsible for many functions relating to U.S. personnel and is an appropriate point of contact for the J-2 or S-2 and J-3 or S-3. Consular officers are, in general, responsible for the welfare of all U.S. citizens visiting and residing in their country, knowing the whereabouts of U.S. citizens, and maintaining an estimated count of U.S. citizens. 2-8. The chief of the security assistance office (SAO) may be the senior military person at the Embassy. He maintains liaison with the HN’s military forces. He is authorized by law to perform specific military functions with HN military that are barred to all other Embassy staff members. 2-9. The defense attaché (DATT) is a military person attached to the Embassy in diplomatic status representing the DOD. He has access to the daily Embassy situation report (SITREP) and other written intelligence. The


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chief of station and defense attaché are ideal points of contact for the J-2 or S-2. They can provide information about HN civil and military capabilities, such as order of battle. 2-10. The public affairs officer (PAO) is responsible for media relations and approves all media contacts during a NEO. He is the point of contact for the JSOTF PAO. 2-11. The regional security officer (RSO) is a diplomatic security officer responsible for the security functions of U.S. Embassies and consulates in a given country or group of adjacent countries. The RSO oversees the post security officer (PSO), the special security force (SSF), and the contract security force at the post. 2-12. The PSO has general security duties at a specific Embassy (or consulate). The PSO is a special staff officer under the control of the AO and exercises OPCON over the MSG detachment assigned to the station. The SSF are DOS employees who respond to crises in foreign countries. They work for the RSO and provide additional bodyguard security for the COM, the DCM, and others as directed by the RSO. 2-13. The political officer reports on political developments, negotiates with the host government, and represents views and policies of the U.S. government to his contacts. The political officer maintains regular contact with HN government officials, political and labor leaders, and other influential citizens and third-country diplomats. The political officer is a major contributor to the overall intelligence picture. 2-14. The economic officer analyzes, prepares reports on, and advises appropriate Embassy and DOS personnel on economic matters in the HN. Economic officers negotiate with the host government on trade and financial issues. They also work closely with relief organizations. 2-15. The medical officer is the senior medical person who is able to respond to and set up triage, trauma, and mass casualty operations. The medical officer can also advise the joint task force on medical threats and preventive medicine measures necessary for forces introduced in-country. However, this advice should not take the place of good medical intelligence by the evacuating force before the operation. 2-16. The MSG detachment has, at a minimum, a commander and watch standers. The MSG detachment missions and duties include—
• Exercising access control and providing stationary guard coverage of the principal buildings. • Conducting visual inspections of controlled access areas to detect possible physical or technical penetrations. • Performing other duties required by circumstances that need immediate action and which are directed by the COM or chargé d’affaires and RSO or PSO. • Protecting the principal buildings as outlined in the mission EAP or as directed by the COM or chargé d’affaires and the RSO or PSO.


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2-17. The MSG detachment commander is normally a member of the emergency action committee (EAC). The EAC is the interface between the Embassy and the DOS. The mission of the EAC is to brief, coordinate, and plan for the evacuation and protection of U.S. noncombatants and certain designated aliens. The EAC is a subset of the Country Team. It advises the Ambassador on security issues, emergency preparedness, drawdowns, and evacuations. The EAC prepares the EAP.

2-18. The Country Team is a council of senior officers, normally section heads, working under the COM’s direction to pool their skills and resources in the national interest of the United States. The Country Team system makes possible rapid interagency consultation, action, or recommendations from the field and effective execution of U.S. missions, programs, and policies. The organization of each Country Team varies, depending on the COM’s desires, the specific country situation, the number and size of U.S. programs, and the qualifications of the senior officers representing the agencies. The Country Team normally consists of the following members:
• COM. • DCM. • Consular officer. • Chief of station. • RSO. • Political counselor. • Commercial attaché. • Agricultural attaché. • Science officer. • PAO. • Administrative officer. • Economics officer. • Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) attaché. • Director of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID). • Director of the Peace Corps. • Defense attaché. • Chief of the SAO.

2-19. During NEOs, the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) may need to coordinate with agencies outside the DOS. Other agencies that may have important responsibilities during NEOs are discussed in the following paragraphs.


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USAID 2-20. The USAID is a quasi-independent agency that funds developmental projects representing the nationwide efforts of the Country Team. Administratively, it functions within the DOS and operates under an administrator who also serves as the Director of the International Development Cooperation Agency. USAID—
• Carries out economic assistance programs designed to help people of developing countries advance their productive capacities, improve their quality of life, promote economic and political stability, and assist other missions in providing the HN with supplies and equipment to construct needed projects. • Maintains liaison with all charitable organizations capable of conducting humanitarian assistance (HA). • Responds to virtually any disaster abroad, with emphasis on humanitarian relief in the form of equipment and funds.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES 2-21. By law (Title 42, United States Code [USC], Section 1313, Assistance for U.S. Citizens Returned From Foreign Countries) and Executive Order 12656, the Department of Health and Human Services (DHHS) is the lead federal agency for the reception of all evacuees in the United States. DHHS personnel meet and assist evacuees at the U.S. port of entry. The Embassy and DOS will coordinate DHHS assistance rendered to evacuees. DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF FOR PERSONNEL 2-22. The Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, is responsible for the reception and repatriation of all DOD family members, nonessential employees, and DOD contractors. The Department of Defense Directive (DODD) 3025.14, Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad, provides guidelines for reception and repatriation. IMMIGRATION AND NATURALIZATION SERVICE 2-23. If the United States is designated as the safe haven, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) may meet evacuees at the port of entry. INS representatives in country can help identify the foreign nationals to be evacuated. Responsibilities of the INS include the following:
• Facilitate the entry of legally admissible persons as visitors or as immigrants to the United States. • Grant benefits under the Immigration and Nationality Act, including those seeking permanent resident status or naturalization. • Prevent unlawful entry into the United States. • Apprehend and remove persons whose entry is illegal or not in the best interest of the United States.

2-24. In addition to the INS, the U.S. Customs Service may also be required to meet and process non-U.S. government evacuees. The WLG is responsible for coordinating INS and U.S. Customs Service support to the NEO.


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2-25. A representative of the DOS chairs the WLG. Representatives from the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD), the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), and the military departments are members. The Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) (ASD[SO/LIC]) is the NEO coordinator for the DOD. The DOS invites other U.S. government departments and agencies to participate as appropriate. 2-26. The WLG is responsible for coordinating the planning and implementation of DOS and DOD plans for the protection and evacuation of noncombatants abroad. The representatives of the WLG are the points of contact for their departments on all matters pertaining to evacuation planning and implementation. The WLG arranges transportation beyond that routinely available to the Embassy. It designates the ISB, safe haven, and repatriation site. (Unless otherwise designated by the OSD, the ultimate safe haven for DOD employees and dependents is the United States.) 2-27. The WLG coordinates with the DHHS, INS, and the U.S. Customs Bureau. The WLG ensures all non-U.S. government evacuees are met at the initial port of entry in the United States, processed into the country, and assisted in making onward travel arrangements. 2-28. The DHHS meets and assists evacuees at the U.S. port of entry. The DHHS provides assistance only if evacuees are without adequate resources to resettle on their own, the Embassy and the DOS recommend assistance, and the individual wishes it.

2-29. RLGs are joint monitoring and coordinating bodies established by the DOS. RLGs are chaired by their political advisors to the geographic combatant commander, with representation from the DOD. 2-30. RLGs ensure coordination exists between the various Embassies and military commands. RLGs ensure that Embassies (or posts) and geographic combatant commanders coordinate NEO planning. They provide advice and guidance to diplomatic and consulate posts and military commands in their areas by—
• Helping Embassies and commands plan evacuation and protection of U.S. citizens and certain designated aliens in case of emergency. • Providing liaison between the WLG and the Embassy. • Reviewing EAPs and forwarding them to DOS with comments and recommendations. • Ensuring coordination exists between the various Embassies and military commands.

2-31. Geographic combatant commanders may be tasked to assist the DOS in the event of imminent or actual hostilities, significant civil disturbances, or natural and manmade disasters. Geographic combatant commanders prepare


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and maintain contingency NEO plans to help the DOS protect and evacuate U.S. noncombatants and designated aliens. 2-32. The geographic combatant commanders have developed general contingency plans for the support of the DOS should such assistance be ordered by the Secretary of Defense. These plans include support for the evacuation of noncombatants. When a situation develops where U.S. military assistance might be needed in a NEO, the CJCS will designate the supported and supporting combatant commanders for planning purposes. 2-33. Guidance to the geographic combatant commanders by higher authority is provided in the CJCS warning order. This guidance normally covers areas of key concern to the President or Secretary of Defense and provides the geographic combatant commander with an overview of the political context within which the NEO is being considered. The scope and objective of U.S. involvement in a developing situation requiring a military response is often provided in general terms to allow maximum flexibility in the preparation of appropriate COAs. The CJCS warning order—
• Defines command relationships, the anticipated mission, and any planning constraints. • Identifies available forces and strategic mobility resources and establishes tentative timing for execution. The CJCS may state that the geographic combatant commander specify the forces, mobility resources, and timing as part of COA development.

2-34. Upon request by the Embassy, the geographic combatant commander in whose area of responsibility (AOR) the Embassy is located and who is the supported combatant commander will dispatch a small advanced echelon (ADVON) team. The ADVON team will maintain contact with the Embassy and coordinate the initial military effort. The team will have the communications equipment needed to maintain effective contact between the geographic combatant commander, subordinate JFC, and the Embassy. 2-35. Although each Embassy will have an EAP, the information may not be accurate or current. Prior coordination and a site survey may not be possible. The commander must be prepared to deal with the situation as it exists at the time of evacuation or may have to depend on information provided by Embassy personnel or other assets. 2-36. Evacuations may be politically sensitive and are monitored, if not controlled, from the highest level. The DOS determines the evacuation sites and timing of the operation. As a situation develops, the evacuation force secures assembly areas and an evacuation site, establishes defensive perimeters, and locates and escorts evacuees. Protecting the force and its charges may include establishing physical barriers to protect assembly areas and evacuation sites.

2-37. Commanders of Army service component commands of geographic combatant commands (ASCCs) may be tasked to provide conventional army units in support of ARSOF-conducted NEOs. Coordination between the ASCC staff and the JSOTF or ARSOF should occur during preparation and


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planning (FM 4-93.4, Theater Support Command). Conventional Army, military police (MP), infantry, aviation, signal, and logistical units may be necessary augmentations to an ARSOF conducting a NEO.

2-38. Under conditions of a nonemergency evacuation, the Commander, United States Joint Forces Command (COM USJFCOM), and Commander, United States Pacific Command (COM USPACOM), are the safe haven commanders for DOD repatriation in their respective areas of responsibility. Additionally, COM USPACOM is responsible for repatriation operations in Hawaii, Alaska, and U.S. territories in the Pacific. COM USJFCOM has delegated the responsibility for repatriation to the Army component commander, who is the Commander, U.S. Army Forces Command. 2-39. Because of its reputation as a humanitarian Service, the Coast Guard may be called upon to play a vital role in certain emergency evacuation situations. The relatively nonbelligerent nature of Coast Guard cutters and aircraft make them an option in cases where a DOD presence may exacerbate a potentially hostile situation. 2-40. As a member of the WLG, the SOF representative coordinates with the DOS, the geographic combatant commanders, and the Services to ensure the adequacy and timeliness of SO planning and coordination in support of NEOs. The Commander, United States Special Operations Command (COM USSOCOM), prepares and provides SOF in support of NEOs conducted by geographic combatant commanders.


Chapter 3

Contingency and Predeployment Planning
Evacuation operations differ from most other military operations. The direction of the operations may remain with the American Ambassador at the time of evacuation. Further, the order to evacuate is a political, rather than a military, decision with extensive ramifications. It indicates to the local population and other governments that the situation has deteriorated to such a point that the U.S. has lost faith in the ability of the HN to maintain control of the situation. Therefore, the Ambassador may delay the evacuation order longer than would normally be considered militarily sound. As a result, the evacuation, when it is ordered, is more urgent and dangerous.

3-1. U.S. Embassies and consulates are required to have EAPs for the area under their cognizance. The COM is responsible for the preparation of an EAP. The EAP should address, among other things, the military-assisted evacuation of U.S. citizens and designated foreign nationals from a foreign country. The supporting military commander is solely responsible for the conduct of military operations to assist in the implementation of EAPs. EAPs (to include photographs) give details on—
• Evacuation sites. • Number of evacuees (total and by area). • Assembly areas. • Command posts. • Key personnel (names, location, and means of contact).

3-2. The 12 FAH-1, Emergency Planning Handbook (EPH), is a consolidated source of guidance for Foreign Service posts. The EPH provides information on planning for and dealing with certain emergencies. The EPH is the principal reference for posts preparing and revising the EAPs. Appendix E of this manual contains sample EAP checklists from the EPH.

3-3. Evacuation notification methods (Figure 3-1, page 3-2) involve various ways of communicating with potential evacuees. These methods include wardens, radio or telephone, and runners. 3-4. Wardens are usually volunteers who have agreed to notify a certain number of U.S. citizens when evacuation is possible. As a rule, the wardens prepare, update, and maintain a list of phone numbers and addresses of U.S. citizens residing in their area. During an evacuation, each warden distributes


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messages, keeping individuals informed about the evacuation and other relevant information. 3-5. U.S. citizens and foreign nationals living outside of large population centers may require an alternate means of notification. Shortwave radio and commercial telephone may be used to contact personnel living at great distance from the Embassy. However, because of the insecure nature of these means, only unclassified information should be transmitted. In some instances, communications outages may require runners to disseminate information to personnel outside the Embassy area.

Figure 3-1. Evacuation Notification Methods

3-6. Particular HN and DOS events create a probability of a NEO occurring. NEOs progress through five stages that require prior planning. NEO TRIP WIRES 3-7. Possible events that may lead to a NEO are as follows:
• DOS issues travel advisories (Defense Intelligence Agency [DIA] Watch Condition [WATCHCON] III). • Threats exist against U.S. citizens or U.S. facilities. • DOS implements voluntary departure. • Mass protests are directed at U.S. citizens, facilities, or policies. • DOS implements authorized departure (DIA WATCHCON II). • Security conditions have deteriorated. • Rioting or general lawlessness exists. • Violence is directed at U.S. citizens or facilities. • The local government has placed limitations on the free movement of U.S. citizens. • International airports or borders are closed. • Insurgency exists that may threaten U.S. citizens. • Invasion by a third nation may threaten U.S. citizens. • DOS implements ordered departure (DIA WATCHCON I). • Other nations evacuate their citizens. • COM requests assistance.


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As more events on the list occur, the higher the probability of a NEO occurring in that country. This list is not all-inclusive. It is not arranged in sequential order or chronological order. Also, the list does not represent an escalating scale of probabilities culminating in the immediate necessity to execute a NEO. PHASES OF A NEO 3-8. A military-assisted NEO usually consists of the following phases:
• Phase I. Predeployment begins upon receipt of the CJCS warning order. It extends through the commencement of the deployment. • Phase II. Deployment commences with the departure from home station. It is completed upon linkup with the supported JTF, JSOTF, or Army special operations task force (ARSOTF). • Phase III. Lodgement includes the establishment of assembly areas, departure airfield/port facilities, landing zones (LZs), and if necessary, safe havens. • Phase IV. Evacuation involves the collection, processing, preparation, and evacuation of desired personnel. • Phase V. Redeployment includes the return of all forces to home station after the evacuation is complete.

PREDEPLOYMENT PLANNING 3-9. Predeployment planning begins when the subordinate JTF and/or JSOTF receives the warning order from the combatant commander. Predeployment planning continues until the evacuation force reaches the ISB or the evacuation site. Prior coordination between the combatant commander and the Embassy staff can greatly improve planning. The combatant commander can provide the JTF and/or JSOTF with information to begin the planning, such as the general contingency plans developed by the combatant command. During this period, the advance party may be deployed. The combatant commander must request diplomatic support from DOS. His request will result in DOS requesting required overflight agreements. 3-10. Time may be critical. The JTF and/or JSOTF commander obtains the information he needs to conduct planning from the unified command. As a minimum, he must determine the following:
• Whether and where he must establish an ISB (if one has not been designated by the WLG). • How many evacuation sites he needs and their general locations, points of embarkation, approximate number of evacuees, and how evacuees will leave the country. • The location of the safe haven and any intermediate safe havens and whether or not he must establish and operate them.

3-11. The combatant command can provide the JTF and/or JSOTF commander with preliminary planning information. The first is the operation plan (OPLAN) or concept plan (CONPLAN) for the emergency evacuation of citizens from the country or region in question. This is the combatant


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commander’s baseline guidance for the operation. In most cases, this document contains an analysis of the area of operations and valuable background information about the geography and demography of the HN. Additionally, it identifies the headquarters that has responsibility for the operation. The combatant command develops the CONPLAN for each country in their AOR on the basis of priority and resources. The CONPLAN is reviewed and updated often to allow for expeditious planning should a NEO be required. 3-12. The second major document that should be immediately available is the EAP. The plan contains much of the information the JTF and/or JSOTF and evacuation force commanders will need to plan the operation. It includes a checklist for U.S. military-assisted evacuation and information on routes, assembly areas, and helicopter landing zones. It also contains airfield and seaport survey data. (Samples of the EAP checklists are in Appendix E.) Other critical sources of information available include the following: • Noncombatant evacuation operation pack (NEOPACK).
• Regional survey team (RST) report. • Joint Expeditionary Support Product—Noncombatant Evacuation Operation (JESP-NEO). • Contingency support packages (CSPs).

3-13. The combatant command staff and the Embassy must coordinate regularly to ensure the OPLAN and the EAP are consistent. Failure to coordinate and update either plan can cost precious planning time or, even worse, cause disaster. The evacuation of Mogadishu, Somalia, in January 1991, is one such example. Although the Embassy in Mogadishu had moved in 1989, the evacuation plan provided to the JTF and/or JSOTF contained a map from 1969. Helicopters carrying the evacuation force spent an additional 20 minutes above hostile forces while looking for the Embassy. In this case, the failure to update plans could have resulted in the loss of aircraft, personnel, and evacuees. 3-14. Other agencies may provide key information for planning NEO. The National Imagery and Mapping Agency provides selected U.S. missions with NEOPACKs. These NEOPACKs contain specific maps, charts, and other geographic material to support evacuation planning and operations. NEOPACKs are a vital element of information. (Appendix F has more information concerning NEOPACKs.) The DIA provides the DOS, selected Embassy defense attaché officers (DAOs), appropriate military commands, and the Services with CSPs and/or U.S. diplomatic facilities graphics for use in evacuation planning. Other intelligence products that may be available and applicable to the NEO include the gridded reference graphic and the contingency support study. Additionally, the DIA is responsible for nationallevel evasion and recovery intelligence production. JTF AND/OR JSOTF 3-15. If military forces are employed in a NEO, they are usually comprised of units from more than one Service and/or country. The geographic combatant commander, on being ordered to conduct a NEO, designates a


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commander, joint task force (CJTF), to exercise overall control of the operations involved in the NEO. The CJTF is responsible for all activities from initial planning and deployment to establishing an ISB, conducting the evacuation, and if required, operating the safe haven. 3-16. The combatant commander may elect to form a JSOTF. A JSOTF is organized similarly to a conventional JTF. A higher or senior JFC normally establishes a JSOTF to plan and conduct SO. The JSOTF may be established subordinate to another JTF or directly subordinate to a geographic combatant commander or subunified command. Likewise, a theater special operations command (SOC) commander may establish a JSOTF to focus on a specific mission or region within the operational area assigned by the geographic combatant commander. Also, the JSOTF could operate as a JSOTF afloat— embarked at sea in a forward area. This option may be required when force protection and security is of concern and an HN may not allow a land-based JSOTF on its territory. 3-17. The JSOTF, when formed, is a temporary joint SOF headquarters. This SOF headquarters controls a JTF composed of SOF of more than one Service in a specific theater of operations. The JSOTF is formed to carry out a specific operation or prosecute SO in support of the theater campaign or other operations, as directed. The JSOTF may have conventional nonspecial operations units under its OPCON or tactical control (TACON) to conduct assigned missions. A typical JSOTF is depicted in Figure 3-2.

Figure 3-2. Typical JSOTF

ARSOTF 3-18. If there is only one group, regiment, or battalion in charge of Army SO, it is generally called ARSOTF. The commander, joint special operations task force (COMJSOTF), may establish multiple subordinate ARSOTFs. Each ARSOTF is organized around the nucleus of an SF or a Ranger unit and includes a mix of ARSOF units and their support elements. The COMJSOTF


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assigns each ARSOTF an area within the joint special operations area (JSOA) or functional mission under the ARSOTF’s OPCON. 3-19. The ARSOTF is a mission-dependent organization that may be constructed of theater SOF assets and forces based in the continental United States (CONUS). Because of possible time constraints, ARSOF elements stationed in-theater may provide the nucleus that CONUS-based forces arriving in-theater build upon. INTELLIGENCE PREPARATION 3-20. NEO involves managing large groups of people with little to no military training across a collapsing infrastructure with an ever-changing threat. The military forces have ultimate responsibility but little authority over the personnel they are charged to protect. Because conventional intelligence preparation of the battlespace (IPB) focuses on combat between two conventional military forces, the S-2 or J-2 must draw techniques from other disciplines to complement his analysis for NEO operations. The methods of IPB for urban operations are one source (FM 3-06, Urban Operations). 3-21. Accurate and timely intelligence is key to the success of any NEO. To provide useful intelligence, the J-2 or S-2 must ensure the intelligence effort is fully engaged at all times. Current military intelligence doctrine emphasizes the following five main considerations: • Consideration 1. Initially, the commander drives the intelligence effort. He focuses on the intelligence system by clearly designating his priority intelligence requirements (PIR) and mission requirements. He ensures the intelligence effort is fully employed and synchronized. He demands that the intelligence effort provide the intelligence he needs when he needs it and in the form he needs it.
• Consideration 2. The intelligence officer synchronizes intelligence collection, analysis, and dissemination with operations. By synchronizing intelligence information, the intelligence officer ensures the executing commander receives the intelligence he needs in a form he can use and in time to influence the decision-making process. Intelligence synchronization is a continuous process that keeps intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) operations tied to the commander’s critical decisions and concept of operations. • Consideration 3. Broadcast dissemination of intelligence is the simultaneous broadcast of near-real-time intelligence from collectors and processors at all echelons. It permits commanders and operational elements at different echelons to simultaneously receive the same intelligence. This provides the commander, evacuation control center (ECC), Embassy intelligence personnel, evacuation teams, ISB personnel, and home base or safe haven personnel with a common picture of the mission area. • Consideration 4. Split-based intelligence operations enable the commander to have top-driven, high-resolution intelligence, regardless of which organic intelligence collection and production assets are currently employed and in-country. Split-based intelligence operations employ collection and analysis elements from all echelons, national to tactical, in


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HNs, sanctuaries, or the CONUS. Typically, collection elements operate in the HN while analysis occurs in a sanctuary or HN.
• Consideration 5. The J-2 or S-2 tactically tailors ISR support for each phase of the operation on the basis of the mission requirements and the availability of resources. He must decide which key intelligence personnel and equipment to deploy immediately to the mission area and when and if to phase in his remaining military intelligence (MI) assets. (FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, provides more information.)

3-22. Uncertain and hostile NEO environments presuppose regime resistance to the operation or regime incapacity because of partial or full breakdown of law and order and partial or full breakup of the regime’s defense and security establishments. With regime resistance, the threat profile will consist of regime military and paramilitary (police) forces and auxiliaries. Here, order-of-battle analysis can derive unit strengths, types and amounts of weaponry and mobility assets, garrison locations, and so forth. With regime incapacity, the threat force profile may be even more diverse. The threat force profile may consist of— • Military or police mutineers.
• Political party or factional militias. • Mobilized trade- or student-union groups. • Street gangs. • An enraged mob.

Apart from the mutineers, the “civilian” groups cannot be discounted for lack of weapons, because they may loot arsenals or otherwise receive weapons from local power brokers. Information on numbers of hostiles will be harder to attain. 3-23. Threat force location is a critical factor. The nonconventional threat types noted above will not necessarily assemble at or near military installations. Therefore, intelligence analysis must be attentive to their presence at stadiums, parks, or other mass assembly areas near the NEO site. As with the location of the nonconventional threat types, their modus operandi also merits special consideration. One key concern would be their inclination to take American citizens hostage. Another would be their inclination to resort to arson or infrastructure sabotage. In either case, the NEO could be jeopardized by such actions, which forego the use of firearms against U.S. soldiers. A final key consideration is identification of the key motivators of hostile action. If the regime opposes the NEO, the task would be easier than if antiregime or nonregime elements oppose it. Regime leaders and spokesmen are much more likely than factional or mob leaders to be known entities. In any case, it is essential to identify those individuals who are most likely to stir up opposition to the NEO. 3-24. ARSOF units use three techniques to collect intelligence—the bull’seye technique, the threat model, and the CARVER (criticality, accessibility, recuperability, vulnerability, effect, recognizability) targeting matrix factors. Used in sequence, they allow the S-2 or J-2 to focus his collection effort,


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characterize the threat, and predict possible threat courses of action (COAs) by analyzing friendly operations through enemy eyes. Bull’s Eye 3-25. In the original bull’s-eye concept, the commander tailors his level of intelligence support to the geographic proximity an area has to a mission. The outermost ring consists of the country and region in which the operation is taking place. The middle ring represents the mission area analysis conducted by the S-2 or J-2, which provides area-specific intelligence for the team. The innermost circle covers the specific operational or target areas and provides mission-specific analysis. 3-26. Unlike an SF direct action or special reconnaissance mission, in NEO it is possible to have several locations at which key events will be occurring simultaneously, such as multiple concentrations of U.S. nationals and other potential evacuees. These places will shift as the operation progresses, for example, from the Embassy to the point of embarkation. Therefore, the S-2 can have several bull’s-eyes upon which he focuses his collection and analysis efforts on, reallocating resources in time to provide predictive analysis during progressive phases of the operation. Threat Model 3-27. In a NEO environment, the S-2 is faced with a larger variety of threats than in a conventional scenario and with threats that can change quickly as the physical and governing infrastructure continue to deteriorate. Some aspects of conventional IPB could be used for analyzing military forces and well-organized resistance groups. However, such techniques depend on the threat having relatively stable organization and institutionalized tactics, which, in a NEO environment, may not be present. To complement established IPB techniques, the S-2 or J-2 can use the threat model. Using the threat model, the S-2 or J-2 can look at a wider array of factors in the battlespace in terms of their functional effects on the operation, rather than just those identified in terms of conventional warfare. 3-28. The threat model is a color-coding system that allows the analyst to categorize aspects of the threat environment, enabling him to evaluate features that would not normally be considered in conventional IPB. The colors white, red, blue, black, and green correspond to the battlefield environment, the threat, friendly forces, physical objects, and the local civilian population. CARVER Targeting Matrix 3-29. The original use for the CARVER targeting matrix is for SF to determine the most effective and expedient means of identifying, selecting, and attacking targets. In a NEO, the military force commander can use this matrix as a heuristic for evaluating key installations and critical points in the operation to make them less desirable targets for red forces. Within an installation, he could evaluate a critical subsystem, such as the electrical system, and within the operation, a key element such as the egress route from the Embassy to the point of embarkation.


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The factors in the CARVER targeting matrix are as follows:
• Criticality. The importance of a system, subsystem, complex, or component. A target is critical when its destruction or damage has a significant impact on the output of the targeted system, subsystem, or complex. • Accessibility. The ease with which a target can be reached, either physically or by fire. A target is accessible when an enemy action element can physically infiltrate or hit the target by direct or indirect fires. • Recuperability. A measure of the time required to replace, repair, or bypass the destruction or damage inflicted on the target. Recuperability varies with the sources and ages of targeted components and the availability of spare parts. • Vulnerability. A measure of the ability of the action element to damage the target using available assets (both men and materials). A target is vulnerable if the enemy has the manpower and expertise to successfully attack it. • Effect on the population. This is defined as the negative or positive influence on the population because of the action taken. The impact on the evacuee’s comfort and safety because of electrical system failure are key. • Recognizability. The degree to which a target can be recognized under varying weather, light, and seasonal conditions without confusion with other targets or components.

NOTE: FM 34-130, Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield, provides more details on the intelligence-gathering techniques.


Chapter 4

As early as possible in the planning process, the commander should form and request permission to dispatch an advance party to the HN. The advance party may consist of two elements: the forward command element (FCE), which is similar to a battle staff, and the evacuation site party. The advance party should be small and inconspicuous to avoid drawing attention. Personnel must deploy with the required specialized equipment to accomplish the mission. Once the advance party has deployed and set up the ECC, the main body may be inserted. Appendix G provides guidance for NEO planning.

4-1. Deployment of the advance party depends on the mission, enemy, terrain, troops and support available—time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). The least conspicuous method is for the advance party to arrive in the HN in civilian clothes and on civilian aircraft. This is possible only in a permissive environment and if the necessary passport and visa arrangements can be made. 4-2. An uncertain or hostile environment may require forcible entry. Use of military aircraft allows the advance party to carry additional equipment that may be needed in setting up the evacuation site and establishing communications and liaison. The advance party should accomplish the following tasks before deployment:
• Forward the number of members in the advance party to the Embassy for approval. • Develop and brief a communications plan. • Acquire and review appropriate maps. • Review the Embassy EAP and the EAP checklists. • Assemble and inspect required equipment. • Develop and brief an advance party evasion and recovery plan. • Obtain visas for the advance party. • Determine whether the advance party should deploy in civilian clothes. • Consider weapon and ammunition requirements. • Examine the need for specialized equipment. • Determine the medical requirements. • Identify translator and linguistic requirements. • Review all available intelligence on the proposed NEO.


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• Assess news media interest in the situation, JTF and/or JSOTF activities, and JTF or JSTOF involvement in the evacuation.

4-3. The FCE, upon arrival in the HN, accomplishes the following tasks:
• Initiates liaison with the diplomatic mission as follows:

ƒ Briefs DOS representatives on the capabilities and missions of the advance party and the JTF and/or JSOTF. ƒ Establishes a forward command post that can be expanded to the JTF and/or JSOTF headquarters staff.
• Provides a continuing presence for planning complementary role with DOS personnel.




• Determines whether the operational environment is permissive, uncertain, or hostile. • Advises the CJTF regarding the size and composition of forces required. If specified in the initiating directive, determines whether the JTF and/or JSOTF is appropriate for the mission. • Advises the CJTF regarding the time, place, and method for the arrival of the evacuation force. • Determines existing political and sociological considerations. • Determines attitude of and support available from the local population and authorities. • Establishes communications between the FCE and the CJTF as follows:

ƒ Makes the communications link to NEO commander available to the senior DOS representative. ƒ Maintains continuous communication for exchange of planning data and intelligence. 4-4. The FCE establishes communications between the evacuation site and the Embassy and provides a link with the evacuation force commander. The FCE provides the commander with updated SITREPs. The FCE may include the following personnel:
• Officer in charge. • Intelligence representative. • Operations representative. • Logistics representative. • Communications team. • Medical representative. • Air and/or naval representative. • PAO representative. • CA representative. • PSYOP representative. • Legal adviser.


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4-5. The evacuation site party, the second functional group in the advance party, secures and establishes the ECC site. In some cases, it may be impossible for the evacuation site party to secure the ECC site without a supporting security force. In this case, the commander may consider augmenting the party or having the evacuation site party reconnoiter the ECC site and develop plans for occupying it when security forces arrive. 4-6. The evacuation site party may consist of the following personnel:
• Officer in charge. • Operations representative. • Intelligence representative. • Communications representative. • Personnel representative. • Logistics representative. • Security representative. • CA representative. • PSYOP representative. • Legal adviser.

4-7. Upon arrival in the HN, the evacuation site party must accomplish the following:
• Plan, organize, and establish the ECC in preparation for the main body. • Provide direct liaison with the Chief, Embassy Consular Office. • Maintain liaison with civilian or local host government agencies involved in the evacuation. • Conduct ground reconnaissance of proposed assembly areas, evacuation sites, beaches, helicopter landing zones and/or drop zones, airports, and ports. • Conduct initial preparation of assembly areas and evacuation sites, to include the following:

ƒ Collect essential planning information. ƒ Assist DOS personnel with news media. ƒ Establish and maintain communications with the FCE and Embassy. ƒ Coordinate additional security requirements that the HN police may be able to provide. ƒ During permissive NEOs, coordinate for overflight rights. 4-8. The desired advance party members listed previously for the FCE and the evacuation site party are unconstrained. Mission requirements or guidance from DOS may preclude the deployment of such robust elements. Consequently, commanders must be prepared to prioritize and accomplish advance party requirements with smaller elements.


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4-9. Use of an ISB during deployment provides many advantages over deploying directly from the home station. The ISB becomes more important as the distance from the home station increases and the likelihood of hostilities increases. The ISB may be located in another country close to where the evacuation is taking place or may be any ship under U.S. control. Ideally, the ISB will also function as a temporary safe haven, if one is required. The ISB may also serve as an airfield for support forces when forced entry is required. Support forces may include additional aircraft and personnel for unforeseen movement requirements and/or combat forces (such as air units capable of offensive attacks and airborne infantry units). 4-10. The advantages of an ISB are as follows:
• The commander can finalize evacuation plans. • The staff can gather additional intelligence information. • The joint force can conduct rehearsals and briefings. • Units have the ability to redistribute and finalize loads. • Personnel can recuperate following deployment from home station. • Reaction force or additional security personnel can prestage for contingency operations. • The ISB can function as the temporary safe haven for the operation.

COORDINATION 4-11. When an ISB is located in a country other than the United States, the DOS is responsible for coordinating with the government of that country. If the ISB is an established U.S. base in a foreign country, using the ISB as a staging point for launching forces into another country can pose significant political problems. The CJTF should advise the DOS of the requirements for the ISB. The ISB should meet the following criteria:
• Be capable of handling the aircraft or ships used in the evacuation. • Possess effective communication with JTF and/or JSOTF and combatant command headquarters, advance party, ECC, temporary safe haven, and the ISB Embassy. • Have adequate facilities for shelter, food, and sanitation if the ISB is used as the temporary safe haven. Facilities should accommodate the evacuation force and evacuees. • Possess repair and refuel capability for aircraft. • Have storage facilities for perishables; petroleum, oils, and lubricants; medical supplies; and ammunition. • Be close to major medical facilities, if possible. • Be located to provide maximum possible operations security (OPSEC). • Have overflight rights. • Have public affairs (PA) contingency plan for planned or “no-notice” media presence. Appendix H shows a PA plan for a NEO (HN).


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• Be close enough to the evacuation site that aircraft or ships used in the evacuation can transit without refueling. • Have adequate local and area security forces to protect U.S. personnel and equipment. This protection could be accomplished either by the HN or by security forces from the deployed ISB support element.

ISB COMPOSITION 4-12. The composition of the ISB force depends on what support is required and what is already on site at the ISB. An ISB at an established, modern facility requires substantially less than one at a lesser-developed location. Some considerations for the ISB force are as follows:
• Maintenance and service requirements for aircraft. • Liaison with the Embassy and civilian agencies (police, military, customs, and others, as required). • Interpreters. • Facilities for maintenance, refueling, billeting, messing, and sanitation. • Contracts for local services and supplies. • Local security. • Air traffic control and movement control. • HN medical infrastructure. • Overflight rights.

4-13. After the advance party contacts the Embassy and establishes the ECC, the evacuation force may be inserted. There are three options to accomplish the deployment. They are as follows:
• The evacuation force may land at the ECC and then deploy marshalling teams to the assembly areas. • The evacuation force(-) may deploy to the Embassy while the marshalling forces may deploy directly to the assembly areas. • The evacuation force may simply land at the ECC and wait for the evacuees to come to that location.


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4-14. With the first option (Figure 4-1), the entire force lands at the ECC. The commander issues final instructions and dispatches the marshalling force to collect the evacuees. This is the best option when the situation is vague and the advance party has been unable to provide the commander with adequate information to disseminate to his subordinate units. The commander and his staff plan in detail after they arrive and have been briefed by the advance party leader or Embassy staff representatives.

Figure 4-1. Option 1, Evacuation Force Lands at ECC


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4-15. The second option (Figure 4-2) allows the marshalling teams to deploy directly to their respective assembly areas. The evacuation force deploys to the Embassy. This option is more complicated than the first. This option is used when there is enough time to plan for detailed execution or when the time available is so short that marshalling forces cannot be delayed at the ECC.

Figure 4-2. Option 2, Marshalling Teams Land at Multiple Assembly Areas


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4-16. The third option (Figure 4-3) is to deploy the force to the ECC where it evacuates only those citizens who make their own way there. With this option, citizens who miss the notification also miss the evacuation and the deploying force only partially completes its mission.

Figure 4-3. Option 3, Single Point Evacuation

4-17. Aircraft remaining on the ground with the military force are subject to sabotage or outright attack from hostile units or individuals. A large evacuation force increases the unit’s security problems because the unit must guard more aircraft. If the aircraft do not remain with the evacuation force, the air component commander and evacuation force commander coordinate to ensure enough aircraft return at the right time. Ideally, as soon as there are an appropriate number of passengers, one aircraft lands, picks up the passengers, and departs. Precise timing reduces waiting time for evacuees and ground time for aircraft. The evacuation force commander must find a suitable location for the aircraft to wait.


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4-18. Naval evacuation is a likely alternative to aircraft evacuation. Naval operations could include any of the following:
• Loading ships pier side at the seaport. • Ferrying evacuees from seaports to amphibious ships. • Transporting evacuees aboard helicopters to ships. • Using landing craft and beach operations. Beach operations (Figure 4-4) are ideal for moving large numbers of evacuees at one time. Use of Navy ships as intermediate safe havens may allow a faster turnaround for tactical evacuation assets. If the situation warrants, marshalling teams and search squads may deploy from and return to offshore ships, allowing the ECC to be shipboard. Crews of aircraft ferrying soldiers and evacuees to and from ships must be qualified for deck landing.

Figure 4-4. Beach Operation


Chapter 5

Evacuation Force Operations
As the main body of the evacuation force (Figure 5-1) deploys into the HN, the elements of the advance party will join with the related main body organizations. The number of evacuees, evacuation sites, assembly areas, and the tactical situation will determine the size and composition of the main body.
NOTE: Appendix I provides sample evacuee processing training and evaluation outlines (T&EOs).

Figure 5-1. Organization of Evacuation Force


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5-1. The main body headquarters directs and coordinates the evacuation operation. The headquarters consists of the FCE and the administrative team. The FCE, which is from the advance party, joins the headquarters and maintains effective liaison with the Embassy staff. The administrative team combines with the evacuation site party from the advance party to ensure the smooth operation of the ECC.

5-2. The marshalling element moves to and secures the designated assembly areas. It brings evacuees to the assembly areas and then escorts them to the ECC. The size of the marshalling element is based on the number of sites and evacuees supported. 5-3. A marshalling element may consist of multiple subordinate marshalling teams. A marshalling team is organized to secure and support evacuations through a single assembly area and the surrounding area. The marshalling team must be large enough to organize several search and security teams. Search teams may not be required if the Embassy’s notification plan has successfully alerted evacuees to report to predetermined assembly areas. If all evacuees have been informed, then search teams should not leave the assembly area except in emergency cases. 5-4. The search teams locate evacuees and escort them to the assembly area. Each search team should have an interpreter or a SOF soldier capable of speaking the HN language and, if possible, a guide. A lost team in a potentially hostile environment can create significant problems for the evacuation force. Language-qualified personnel may be required to help the search teams move from the assembly areas and locate evacuees who are not at home or whose addresses are incorrect. 5-5. A security team provides security to the team during movement and in the assembly area. Also, a tactical psychological operations team (TPT) may be attached to the marshalling teams. The TPT can use its organic loudspeakers to communicate with the local populace and noncombatant evacuees.

5-6. The marshalling element locates evacuees at or near their homes and moves them to the ECC. In its most complete form, the operation has several marshalling teams under the control and direction of a marshalling element headquarters. Leaving the ECC, the teams—
• Proceed by designated routes to their respective assembly areas. • Secure assembly areas to use as bases of operation. • Dispatch elements to contact, identify, inform, and return the evacuees to the assembly areas. • Escort the evacuees back to the ECC. • Turn evacuees over to ECC personnel for transportation out of the country.


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The marshalling element should verify there is enough transportation for the search and/or security teams and evacuees. All evacuees should be prepared to evacuate by helicopter, small boat or craft, and tracked or wheeled vehicles. The marshalling elements should also consider the following:
• Use local drivers, if available, because of their experience and familiarity with the local road network. • Ensure there are enough mechanics available for emergency repairs. • Brief military drivers on the HN traffic laws and customs.

5-7. Movement control requires the marshalling element to do the following:
• Issue available local road maps to each driver. • Plan for convoy control and security. • Identify safe houses or areas for when vehicles break down and drivers become separated or lost. • Ensure that adequate communications equipment is available for convoys.

5-8. Assembly area operations require the marshalling element to do the following:
• Establish perimeter security, even in a permissive environment. • Ensure there is enough transportation to move evacuees to the ECC. • Use, as needed, vehicles belonging to the evacuees to transport personnel to the ECC.

5-9. Search team operations require the marshalling element to do the following:
• Have a list of potential evacuees from the consular officer. • Obtain copies of the instructions given to each potential evacuee. • Have copies of the “Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity” (Appendix C) readily available for evacuees who refuse to leave. • Brief each evacuee on the baggage limitations set by the Embassy, ID requirements at the ECC, and restricted items that may not be transported. • Record the name, sex, age, potential medical problems, and citizenship of each evacuee. • Escort evacuees from the vehicle parking area to the ECC. Evacuees may drive their vehicles directly to the ECC, and search personnel should note the individual’s name and intent. • Identify evacuees not on the list provided by the Embassy.

ROUTE SELECTION 5-10. The marshalling element commander first obtains the information collected by the advance party. Significant information may include the following:
• An updated list of evacuees’ names and addresses. • Specific medical conditions that will affect the evacuation effort.


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• Current maps. • Current developments in the political situation. • Sources of help should a confrontation develop. Marshalling teams then use the above-listed information to determine their routes and ensure transportation is on hand.

5-11. The evacuation force commander and his staff confirm the suitability of routes to and from each assembly area. They may have had insufficient information available at home station to plan the routes in detail. Some planned routes may be unusable. 5-12. The evacuation force commander considers several factors when selecting these routes. Air movement of marshalling teams and U.S. citizens is best because it involves minimal confrontation and requires less time. However, the evacuation force commander must also plan an overland route to use should air operations be unsuitable. 5-13. Conducting the evacuation during darkness helps avoid unnecessary publicity and reduces the likelihood of confrontation. The HN government may have a curfew in effect, and the local citizenry will be less active. With less vehicular traffic, marshalling force vehicles will likely avoid traffic congestion. The disadvantage to using darkness as a cover is that marshalling teams may get lost or have greater difficulty locating evacuees. 5-14. If the unit moves in daylight by vehicle, the unit should avoid routes through densely populated areas, on main traffic arteries, and through potential roadblocks (such as construction sites, railroad crossings, and narrow bridges). The operations center coordinates the routes so that vehicles from separate assembly areas do not intermingle. Again, the use of multiple routes enhances security and reduces signature. 5-15. Once the evacuation force commander selects the routes, the operations center staff informs the marshalling element commander. He in turn passes the routes to the marshalling teams on strip or topographical maps that exhibit enough detail to be useful. If possible, marshalling team commanders reconnoiter the routes by helicopter before movement. 5-16. If the evacuation force commander decides not to send out search teams, the marshalling teams remain in their respective assembly areas and the evacuees come to them. After waiting a suitable amount of time, the marshalling team escorts the evacuees to the ECC, or sends out search teams to contact U.S. citizens that have not appeared. TRANSPORTATION 5-17. Key planning for the marshalling force includes choosing the best method to transport the marshalling teams and the evacuees. Options for moving marshalling teams include helicopter, airborne insertion, vehicle, and foot. If volunteered, vehicles belonging to the evacuees may be used to move the marshalling teams and evacuees to the ECC. 5-18. Marshalling teams moving on foot must reduce their vulnerability as much as possible. A close tactical formation reduces the chance of separation


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and enhances the commander’s control of his unit if someone tries to disrupt the march. 5-19. Vehicular movement is preferred to foot movement but requires more coordination. Drivers must be oriented to primary and alternate routes and provided accurate maps. Local drivers may be used. In some situations, their experience with the road network may aid timely evacuation. Movement by convoy requires security and sufficient radios to maintain control. A traffic circulation plan is needed to identify main and alternate evacuation routes, critical points, and checkpoints. The traffic circulation plan will simplify reporting. The Embassy staff and evacuation force commander’s staff identify safe houses or areas for drivers and passengers if vehicles break down. 5-20. Each team should have an attached mechanic with enough equipment to make emergency repairs. If a vehicle breaks down, the marshalling team commander decides whether to repair or to abandon it. The mechanic can expedite repairs and provide the marshalling team commander with an expert opinion. The marshalling team commander must not allow anyone to remain with the vehicle without adequate security. MOVEMENT CONTROL 5-21. The marshalling element monitors the progress of the teams and reports their locations to the operations center. Teams report reaching and departing all checkpoints to the marshalling element. Teams submit additional reports when they secure their assembly areas, when they are prepared to return with the evacuees to the ECC, and at any other time the commander considers appropriate. 5-22. Team commanders use a similar reporting system to control the movement of their search teams. Such a system, improperly prepared and coded, can add to the mission’s OPSEC by reducing radio transmission time. Using specially prepared, coded execution checklists is ideal. Doing so allows the team commander to pinpoint immediately the exact location of each team. ASSEMBLY AREA OPERATIONS 5-23. The marshalling team has two basic functions once it arrives at the assembly area. It secures the area itself, and it assembles all the evacuees inside this secured location and begins processing them for evacuation. Securing Assembly Area 5-24. The marshalling team occupies the assembly area just as any tactical unit clearing and occupying any assembly area would. The marshalling team operates within the constraints of the tactical environment and according to the ROE. Once the commander places his security, no one should be allowed inside the perimeter without an escort. Security personnel maintain contact with the command group by using short-range radios or telephones. 5-25. NEOs are tactical operations, even in a permissive environment. The team commander must remember that the population, or elements within it, may turn hostile, and he must be able to defend the assembly area if it is


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attacked. Consequently, the area must be defensible and the security team and those search squads present must be in defensible positions. 5-26. A member of the Embassy staff (PSO or RSO) generally chooses the assembly area. If the assembly area cannot be suitably defended, the team commander should direct evacuees to an appropriate place nearby. The team commander should attempt to get approval of the new location from an Embassy representative. If doing so proves impossible, the team commander is still responsible for protecting his force and its charges. As a minimum, the team commander should inform the marshalling element commander of his decision. Dispatching Search Teams 5-27. As soon as possible after arriving in the assembly area, the marshalling team commander dispatches his search squads, assigning search responsibilities according to the Embassy’s most current evacuee list. If the Ambassador and his staff have successfully implemented the evacuation plan, all U.S. citizens know that evacuation is necessary and are prepared to act accordingly. Inevitably, some people will not have heard, and search teams must locate and accommodate them. In this situation, TPTs can be invaluable. The marshalling team commander must, however, weigh OPSEC and force protection requirements against notification capabilities. 5-28. If all evacuees have been informed, the team commander may not need to dispatch search teams. If conditions allow for their free movement, evacuees may come to the assembly area on their own. 5-29. The search team proceeds to the addresses it has for the potential evacuees. If the individual or family is not present, the team leader tries to determine their location by asking the neighbors. He may leave instructions in a visible place, but he must consider the effect these instructions will have if they fall into unfriendly hands. If the individual or family is present, the search team leader follows the procedure described in the following paragraphs. 5-30. Each search team leader has a complete list of the instructions he must give to each individual. If possible, the Embassy advance party obtains enough copies of the instructions to supplement the team leader’s oral briefing and give a written copy to each potential evacuee. 5-31. Once he makes contact, the search team leader gets one of two responses. Either the individual or family will go, or he or they will stay. If someone decides to remain in the HN, the search team leader repeats the Ambassador’s warning. The situation is extremely dangerous, and the Embassy cannot assist evacuees if it closes. 5-32. If the above warning has no effect, the search team leader leaves the address of a point of contact (if available) and asks the individuals to sign a waiver certificate (Appendix C). The waiver certificate shows that the U.S. government has given the evacuee the opportunity to depart under U.S. protection and they have refused the offer. If the evacuees will not sign, the search team leader makes a note of the time, date, and circumstances surrounding the offer. He should also remind U.S. government employees and


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their dependents that they may not disregard an evacuation order. (The evacuation force may locally produce certificates of waiver.) 5-33. If the evacuees decide to go with the search team, the search team leader explains the conditions of the evacuation. Again, if possible, he gives them a written document expressing these conditions. 5-34. Baggage limitations (usually one 66-pound bag per person) are usually indicated on the Embassy evacuation notice. The marshalling team must use common sense in making allowances for evacuees with infants and for other special circumstances. The search team leader must also be thoroughly briefed on what to do with pets. If time and space allow, the evacuation force commander may authorize evacuation of pets. If not, evacuees should leave pets with friends. The evacuation force commander may also have arranged for euthanasia as an alternative. If pets are to be evacuated, owners should bring immunization records to speed processing. 5-35. Each evacuee must have documentation that provides positive ID. Normally, documentation includes any or all of the following:
• Passport. • Consular report of birth. • DOD dependent ID cards. • Seaman’s papers.

Unless the Embassy has specified otherwise, the search team should not delay operations because of lack of documentation. The search team should identify, segregate, and move questionable people to the processing center with other evacuees. Processing center personnel may have to delay individuals or separate families if they cannot provide positive ID. 5-36. Evacuees wishing to go with the search team must act quickly. While evacuees are preparing their belongings for departure, the search team leader records their names so that he has a record of who his team brings back to the assembly area. 5-37. U.S. citizens wishing to be evacuated may travel without escort to the ECC. If they drive their cars to the ECC, they may park there and turn the keys over to an Embassy official. However, for security reasons, the search team leader should discourage evacuees from using their cars. If an evacuee uses his own car, the search team leader notes the individual’s name and indicates his intent is to report directly to the ECC. The search team commander reports this information to the processing center officer in charge (OIC) when the marshalling team returns to the ECC. 5-38. The search team leader asks each evacuee if he knows of other U.S. citizens in the area. If evacuees identify citizens who are not on the list the Embassy provides, the team leader notes the names and addresses and reports them to the marshalling team commander, who reports them to the operations center. 5-39. The search team leader or marshalling team commander may be asked to evacuate alien or HN personnel such as servants or close friends. These requests may come from U.S. citizens speaking in their behalf or directly from


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the individuals seeking evacuation. Regardless of the source of the request, the marshalling team commander has authority to evacuate only U.S. citizens or those on the list provided by the Embassy. The marshalling team commander must refer any questionable individuals to an Embassy official. 5-40. U.S. policy is that no one may grant asylum within the territorial jurisdiction of another power. The on-site commander, regardless of grade, may grant temporary refuge under conditions of urgency to save a person from imminent danger. Because such an action may result in retribution against U.S. forces or citizens, he must weigh his decision to grant refuge against the potential danger. U.S. Embassy representatives must assume responsibility for these individuals as soon as possible. 5-41. The search team proceeds, in turn, to each assigned location and then returns to the assembly area. To preclude infiltration at the assembly area, the search team leader vouches for each evacuee. He then turns the evacuee over to the marshalling team command group for in-processing. The commander may send the search team on another search mission or incorporate it into the perimeter security force. Processing Evacuees 5-42. While the security force prepares positions and search teams deploy, the marshalling team command group prepares to take in evacuees. Members of the marshalling team command group must not spend significant amounts of time compiling administrative data. They must, however, identify each individual entering the area, identify medical problems, and take appropriate actions (such as administer first aid or arrange for medical evacuation [MEDEVAC]). Individuals arriving at the assembly area on their own must be given the same information the search teams have already provided their groups. 5-43. The marshalling team command group conducts the processing at the assembly area. A senior noncommissioned officer (NCO) and several assistants can easily do this while the remainder of the marshalling team secures the area. 5-44. The security team must positively identify each individual from a passport or other official documentation. The security team should allow no one into the assembly area who does not have positive ID as an individual to be evacuated. The marshalling team commander resolves any discrepancies by having the individual provide reasonable proof that he is a U.S. citizen. U.S. Embassy personnel are the final arbiters in disputes. Individuals in question must be segregated and returned to the ECC, where the marshalling team commander turns them over to Embassy personnel. 5-45. Embassy-designated wardens can help the marshalling team commander immensely. Wardens are personnel who have knowledge of the individuals in the area and can verify their status. To speed up the processing, the wardens may have already prepared processing packets for each evacuee. Unfortunately, the warden system is not foolproof. Wardens may arrive at the assembly area too late to be of help.


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5-46. Some problems with U.S. citizen ID may be avoided if each marshalling team has a complete list of evacuees’ names. The marshalling team commander can then check to see if an evacuee from another area reported to his location. The marshalling team commander must remember, however, that Embassy personnel must make the final decision to deny evacuation to anyone who is not on the list. The only exception will be someone posing a direct threat. (Figure 5-2 shows a marshalling area.)

Figure 5-2. Marshalling Area

5-47. Evacuees must submit to individual inspections before entering the assembly area. This inspection ensures the safety of the evacuees and marshalling team. Amnesty boxes may be provided. The marshalling team commander should avoid strip-searching or other physically intrusive forms of search unless he determines that such procedure are necessary for security and safety. He may want to use metal detectors (for personnel and baggage) and dogs (for baggage only) to speed up the inspection, but without demeaning the evacuees. Evacuees should be treated with the utmost courtesy. 5-48. Conflicts may occur between individual evacuees and members of the marshalling team. Disputes may arise over the amount of baggage, speed of the operation, confiscation of contraband, or deportment of specific individuals. Marshalling team members must remember they have no legal jurisdiction or control over U.S. citizens. They cannot force any civilian to do anything against his or her will unless the civilian is threatening them with bodily harm.


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5-49. The relationship between the military escort and the civilian evacuees is one of voluntary cooperation. If a citizen becomes disruptive, the team commander gives him the choice of conforming to the rules or departing to fend for himself. The marshalling team commander should make allowances for the despair felt by the evacuees, but he cannot endanger the welfare of the other evacuees or his command. He should document the incident and obtain written statements from witnesses. 5-50. The marshalling team command group should tell evacuees arriving with more than the allowed baggage about baggage restrictions. As long as enough transportation is available, the search team should allow evacuees to carry baggage with them to the processing center. At the processing center, the Embassy can arrange for disposition of excess baggage. This would be an ideal time for the marshalling team command group to mark or tag all baggage for future ID. If evacuees are to be separated from their baggage during transport, the marshalling team commander may want to inventory pieces and provide receipts. The simple two-piece tag system used by airlines is one method. Unless an evacuee declares something of high value in his baggage, the marshalling team commander should not be concerned about contents beyond inspections already discussed. Evacuees with high-value items should be warned that under no circumstances would the government assume responsibility for them. The marshalling team commander may desire to obtain a written statement to this effect. 5-51. The next step in processing evacuees is to record the requisite information on each evacuee. A detailed history is not necessary, but the information recorded must be scrupulously accurate. The marshalling team command group enters the individual’s name, age, sex, citizenship, ID type and document number, and next of kin or permanent home address in an alphabetically tabbed logbook. Figure 5-3, page 5-11, shows a sample logbook. The marshalling team command group handwrites all entries accurately and legibly. The laptop or notebook computer is an alternative for inputting evacuee information into a database for quick retrieval upon return to the ECC. Computer users must back up information to ensure it can be retrieved later. 5-52. Once the marshalling team command group makes the proper entries in the logbook, the marshalling team commander briefs the evacuees. He gives them an updated SITREP, the anticipated schedule for the remainder of the evacuation, and any other useful information. He strives to make the evacuees feel as comfortable as possible. He cautions the evacuees against distracting the security personnel by engaging them in conversation. He asks the evacuees to remain in the most protected portion of the assembly area. 5-53. The marshalling team attends to evacuees with special needs first. Medical personnel determine if medical problems require immediate evacuation or special transportation. If so, the commander reports the emergency and acts to move the ill or injured evacuee to the ECC.


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Figure 5-3. Sample Evacuee Logbook

5-54. Once the marshalling team accounts for the evacuees on its list, its commander requests permission from the marshalling element commander to close out the assembly area and return to the ECC. When returning to the ECC, the marshalling team usually follows the same procedures that it followed when it conducted its earlier movement. Helicopter or vehicular transportation is more desirable than foot marches—especially with a large number of civilians with varying physical capabilities. 5-55. When the marshalling team arrives at the ECC, it moves directly to the processing center. The commander turns his charges and logbook over to the reception station OIC for the final processing and embarkation. If his team is assigned another assembly area, he obtains another logbook.

5-56. The security element has two missions. First, it is used as necessary to secure the ECC perimeter, evacuation sites, LZs, staging and/or parking areas, and landing sites for naval craft. Second, it may serve as a reaction force in the event the marshalling element or other units require assistance. The following factors determine the size of the security element required to support the evacuation:
• Enemy threat to evacuation operations. • Anticipated response of HN police, military forces, and other friendly forces in and around the evacuation objective area. • Crowd control requirements at each site. • Number of evacuees. • Number of marshalling and search teams required to search for evacuees. • Number of evacuation sites. • Size of the ECC. • Transportation available to cover the assigned areas.


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• Personal security of the Ambassador. • Type of resources used to evacuate personnel.

5-57. The logistical support provided by the logistics element should be limited to the minimum essential support required for the evacuation. The logistics element commander should consider the following factors in determining requirements for logistical support of the JTF:
• Characteristics of the evacuation area.

ƒ Resources available: (1) existing and potential facilities for support to the JTF, such as facilities for the storage and distribution of supplies, transportation means, airfields, fuel points, medical facilities, medical supplies, and other facilities; and (2) food, water, fuel, and consumables. ƒ Climate, weather, and terrain. ƒ Number of evacuees and their needs.
• Potential threats to the evacuation.

ƒ Adversary and/or potential adversary strength and activity. ƒ Disposition and location.
• Strength and composition of the JTF.

ƒ Total troop strength. ƒ Composition of the JTF in terms of ground, air, and naval combat forces, combat support, and combat service support units. ƒ Logistical support capabilities of each component and separate unit. ƒ Time constraints and duration of operation. ƒ Logistical support required by the Embassy and evacuees. ƒ Availability and suitability of host-nation support (HNS) as an alternative to deploying U.S. military logistical support. ƒ Experience in conducting NEOs. ƒ Prearranged HNS and/or inter-Service support agreements, as appropriate. ƒ Capabilities and dependability of the HN transportation system to provide rapid evacuation of combat and noncombat casualties.

5-58. Once all the marshalling teams return, the ECC has processed all evacuees, and all evacuees have departed, the evacuation force commander notifies the tasking headquarters that the evacuation phase is completed. The evacuation force commander asks the senior DOS representative remaining in the HN if he may conclude the evacuation. Once permission is granted, he conducts his withdrawal.


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5-59. The situation in the HN may be deteriorating and locals may know that the Americans are withdrawing. These two factors along with possible looters may heighten the possibility of an armed attack on the remaining U.S. forces. Once the civilians leave, the evacuation force adopts a defensive position until the last unit departs. 5-60. In a hostile or uncertain environment, support elements should depart first with all equipment not essential to the withdrawal. Once this is accomplished, the evacuation force commander moves his force to the least exposed portion of the airfield or port. He deploys a mobile security team to protect aircraft on final approach from hostile forces’ attempts to destroy the aircraft. Pilots should be aware of the danger and use deception tactics as long as possible before landing and as soon as possible after taking off. 5-61. The last security element to withdraw should be of a size that it could be extracted in a single lift using available aircraft or ships. With this method, no unit remains on the ground without the capacity to temporarily withstand hostile action. Leaving a smaller force might tempt some unfriendly element to inflict casualties on the last group to leave. 5-62. If the situation deteriorates, the evacuation force commander can decide to leave nonessential items of equipment on the ground and evacuate the force. He must recognize the propaganda value this precipitous action has for an observer who can then say the United States withdrew in disorder. Because such an action might have awkward repercussions, the evacuation force commander takes this action only in dire circumstances. 5-63. In a permissive environment, the withdrawal sequence for units may be reversed. Combat elements may withdraw initially, while the support elements along with a small security element may remain in the HN and be the last elements to redeploy. 5-64. Once the entire evacuation force has departed, the JTF and/or JSOTF commander notifies the geographic combatant commander that the evacuation is complete. He gives similar notification when the last aircraft or ship leaves the airspace or territorial waters of the HN. 5-65. The tasking headquarters determined the destination of the evacuation force in the initial planning process. If there is no reason why it must go to a safe haven, the evacuation force returns to home base as soon as possible. If another mission exists for it, the evacuation force commander adjusts accordingly.

5-66. The ECC staff, supporting the DOS, conducts processing, screening, and selected logistical functions associated with emergency evacuation of noncombatants. However, the JTF and/or JSOTF should be prepared to perform or augment these functions, if required. The number of evacuees, evacuation environment, and location of the evacuation area will determine size and composition of the ECC.


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5-67. The three guiding principles for any ECC are as follows:
• Accuracy. Everyone who should be accounted for is accounted for. • Security. Evacuees and the JTF are safeguarded from all threats. • Speed. Processing must be accomplished quickly and efficiently.

5-68. As the marshalling teams bring the evacuees to the ECC, the processing center assumes control of the evacuees. The ECC’s purpose is to prepare the evacuees for eventual overseas movement to a temporary safe haven or the United States. The ECC screens all evacuees to certify ID, ensure that documentation is accurate, and verify all information provided is current. Representatives from the consular affairs section should be in the ECC to help determine the eligibility of questionable evacuees. If evacuees arrive without escort, processing personnel should verify their identity and eligibility for evacuation before allowing the evacuees to enter the ECC. The processing center performs the necessary screening, registration, medical, and transportation functions to ensure an orderly evacuation. The processing center consists of the following:
• Headquarters section. Personnel perform the following:

ƒ Plan, organize, and supervise the operation of the ECC. ƒ Maintain liaison with local representatives of the DOS and other agencies involved in the evacuation. ƒ Advise the CJTF on the progress of the evacuation. ƒ Maintain communications with all elements of the evacuation force, to include ships, control aircraft, remote sites, evacuation vehicles, DOS personnel, and HN security.
• Reception station. Personnel collect all available information from the marshalling teams, who escort the evacuees. Information from the marshalling team’s logbook is valuable since it may reduce the processing time. • Security screening station. All evacuees and their baggage will be searched for restricted items. Evacuees suspected of possible criminal or enemy agent activity will be separated and screened individually. • Registration station. Personnel should complete all administrative paperwork before evacuees leave the country. • Debriefing station (optional, depending on the situation and the time available to conduct the evacuation). Counterintelligence personnel should staff this station. Personnel debrief each evacuee to obtain information that may affect the evacuation force, its mission, the evacuees, or other U.S. government activities in the country. • Medical station. Personnel provide emergency medical treatment and immunizations required by the safe haven country. As required, injured or ill evacuees may proceed through the medical station for first aid and to identify medical conditions that may have an effect on the evacuation process. Serious medical cases receive top priority for evacuation. However, the medical officer ensures that any seriously ill, injured, or wounded persons complete processing.


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• Transportation station. Personnel prepare each group of evacuees for embarkation aboard aircraft, ships, or surface vehicles. • Comfort station. Personnel provide a temporary waiting area for evacuees until they board evacuation aircraft. • Temporary refugee holding area. While the OIC of the ECC cannot grant requests for asylum, he can provide temporary refuge for persons in imminent physical danger, if such measures do not compromise the security of the ECC. Requests for asylum must be handled through DOS representatives.

5-69. ECC personnel process evacuees through the stations discussed in paragraph 5-68. The following paragraphs discuss each station’s processing procedures. RECEPTION STATION 5-70. Upon arrival at the reception station, personnel move the evacuees into a holding area. In the holding area, personnel receive and brief the evacuees. Senior officials should give the initial briefing. The briefing should provide enough information to ease fears about the evacuation process. The briefing should include the following:
• Summary of the reasons for the evacuation. • Stations through which the evacuees will process. • Need for an inspection of personnel and baggage. • What support to expect at the temporary safe haven. • What to expect upon arrival in the United States. • What the repatriation center will provide.

5-71. Reception station personnel will perform the following:
• Organize evacuees into groups (maintain family integrity where possible). • Maintain a roster of each evacuee, with nationality, date of birth, evacuation classification, profession, destination, and name, address, and/or phone number of a point of contact (POC) in the United States for notification. • Collect information from marshalling and search teams on evacuees. • Ensure each evacuee proves his identify by using passports, dependent ID cards, seaman’s papers, or anything that unquestionably establishes U.S. citizenship. Check evacuee’s ID against list of potential evacuees provided by the consulate. • Provide an escort for groups of personnel going through the processing center. Very important persons (VIPs) and emergency medical cases should be provided individual guides, if available.


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SECURITY SCREENING STATION 5-72. Security screening station personnel search evacuees and their baggage for restricted items. Personnel separately screen evacuees suspected of being enemy agents or criminals. Personnel should escort foreign diplomats, VIPs, and emergency medical cases and their families through the security station. Security station personnel will perform the following:
• Inspect for restricted items. Each evacuee and all baggage should be inspected at the conclusion of the briefing. Areas used for individual inspections should be screened. Handheld metal detectors can expedite the inspections. All restricted items should be confiscated.

NOTE: Many foreign countries sell drugs over the counter that U.S. law requires a prescription to obtain. Medical personnel on the inspection team can aid in identifying these drugs.
• Impound all weapons, excluding those of U.S. government personnel, and issue receipts to the owners. Embassy or customs officials should be consulted about the disposition of these weapons. Unless the weapons are illegal in the United States, they will be returned to the owners at the repatriation center. • Without specific direction from the DOS, do not under any circumstances search the persons, property, papers, and families of foreign ambassadors or diplomats.

NOTE: Personal baggage that is suspected of containing restricted items can be denied passage, but will not be searched. Based on reasonable belief, the ECC OIC may refuse to evacuate any baggage suspected of containing weapons or explosives or other restricted items.
• Do not search diplomatic pouches. • Ensure searched evacuees are not permitted to return to the reception holding area, and vice versa, to ensure all are properly searched. • Separate evacuees suspected of being enemy agents or criminals, and escort them to the screening and interrogation station. The screening should be voluntary and considered a prerequisite to evacuation. At the conclusion of the interrogation, the evacuees will be allowed to continue the processing, set free, or placed in a detainee area.

REGISTRATION STATION 5-73. At the registration station, foreign nationals must either be on the list of potential evacuees provided by the Embassy or post or secure approval from the U.S. Embassy staff before they can continue processing. Personnel maintain a roster of each evacuee, with nationality, date of birth, evacuation classification, profession, destination, and name, address, and/or phone number of a POC in the United States for notification. Personnel complete this roster in duplicate. The Ambassador or designated representative will be the final authority on acceptability of evacuee ID. If there are doubts about a person’s identity, registration station personnel should turn the matter over to the DOS, and the person should be evacuated. 5-74. Registration station personnel should ensure that foreign nationals are supervised until they are cleared for evacuation or escorted outside the


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ECC. Security personnel should be available to react to any hostile incidents. Each evacuee should do the following:
• Prove identity by using passports, dependent ID cards, seaman’s papers, or anything that unquestionably establishes U.S. citizenship. • Sign a Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity, if one is available. • Provide information concerning background and personal history to the registration clerks. The State Department’s EPH provides for Optional Form (OF) 28, (Evacuation Documentation). The OF 28 is a standard one-page form that has three carbon copies. The form contains critical information such as personal data, citizenship status, privacy warning, and promissory note. The original of the form remains at the ECC while the copies can be used as boarding passes for evacuation transportation and for in-processing at the temporary safe haven. • Receive a copy of Department of Defense (DD) Form 2585, (Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet). The DD Form 2585 should be completed before arrival at the repatriation center.

5-75. Foreign nationals must either be on the list of potential evacuees provided by the Embassy or post or secure approval from the U.S. Embassy staff before they can continue processing. The Ambassador or designated representative will be the final authority on acceptability of evacuee ID. DEBRIEFING STATION 5-76. The debriefing station is optional, depending on the situation and the time available to conduct the evacuation. Counterintelligence personnel should staff the debriefing station. Debriefing station personnel debrief each evacuee to obtain information that may affect the evacuation force, the evacuation force’s mission, the evacuees, or other U.S. government activities in the country. Information that might be of interest to the debriefing station personnel includes the following:
• Locations of other potential evacuees. • Changes in the political situation. • Movements and activities of indigenous groups, entities, and parties that might oppose the evacuation. • True intent of a threatening third party, to include considering the following:

ƒ What is the capability and likelihood of the third party carrying out a threat? ƒ Can the third party be influenced? ƒ Can the potential threat be stopped or countered? MEDICAL STATION 5-77. As required, injured or ill evacuees may proceed through the medical station for first aid (Figure 5-4) and to identify medical conditions that may have an effect on the evacuation process. Serious medical cases receive top priority for evacuation. However, the medical officer ensures that any


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seriously ill, injured, or wounded persons complete processing. Medical personnel should—
• Screen evacuees to determine if an evacuee requires emergency medical treatment or evacuation. • Verify inoculations required for safe haven country, if required. • Be prepared to treat trauma injuries should the situation deteriorate. • Perform emergency treatment, as required. • Isolate evacuees infected with contagious diseases.

Figure 5-4. Evacuees Screened at Medical Station

TRANSPORTATION STATION 5-78. Personnel assigned to the transportation station—
• Prepare each group of evacuees for embarkation aboard aircraft, ships, or surface vehicles. • Coordinate surface or air transportation (Figure 5-5, page 5-19), to include movement of personnel to the evacuation area, transportation of evacuees to designated aircraft and/or landing craft, and internal evacuation site requirements. • Provide loading control personnel to supervise loading of personnel aboard vehicles, aircraft, and/or landing craft. • Maintain roster of all embarked personnel, showing destination and identifying information. • Organize evacuees into transportation groups (chalks), issue boarding passes for aircraft, and verify baggage tags.


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• Verify that information on the passenger manifest agrees with information provided on the evacuee register. • Ensure there are enough transportation assets to transport evacuees and their baggage to the point of embarkation.

Figure 5-5. Evacuees Transported by Air

COMFORT STATION 5-79. The comfort station is a temporary waiting area for evacuees until they board evacuation aircraft. Comfort station personnel should make the evacuees’ stay as untroubled as possible and provide some degree of privacy. Some considerations are as follows:
• Sufficient shelter, cots, blankets, food, water, and infant supplies. • Senior personnel, medical personnel, unit ministry teams, and assistants available to counsel evacuees, especially families with young children. • Male and female personal items. • Restroom or latrine facilities.

TEMPORARY REFUGEE HOLDING AREA 5-80. The temporary refugee holding area is provided for personnel who are not eligible for evacuation but are in imminent physical danger. The ECC can choose not to provide this area if resources are not available or if it might compromise the security of the operation. The temporary refugee holding area personnel will perform the following:
• Ensure the refugees are securely separated from actual evacuees. • Search all refugees for restricted items, especially weapons. • Brief the refugees on the following items:


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ƒ They have been provided temporary protection because they were in immediate physical danger. ƒ Admission to this station does not constitute asylum. ƒ Only the DOS can consider and grant requests for asylum. ƒ Requests for asylum will be handled on an individual basis. ƒ A DOS representative will brief you on the criteria for asylum.
• Release, retain, or evacuate the refugees in accordance with instructions given by the COM.

5-81. For organizational purposes, all evacuees receive a number priority and classification designator. These categorizations are critical to the smooth execution and success of the operation and are used when identifying, moving, and locating evacuees. The staff should keep abreast of changes in the total numbers of potential evacuees by receiving periodic updates from the Embassy’s staff. These updates will be provided in the form of a total number for all evacuees and a number for each evacuee category. CLASSIFICATION 5-82. The classification system shown in Figure 5-6, governs priorities of evacuations. A priority designator includes a combination of a Roman numeral and capital letter indicating major and minor priorities assigned to each individual. Aliens for whom the United States has accepted responsibility are afforded the same major and minor category consideration as U.S.-sponsored evacuees.

Figure 5-6. Classifications of Evacuees


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FIRST PRIORITY 5-83. U.S. citizens have first priority and are evacuated in the following order:
• Those with current ID such as passports, birth certificates, DOD ID cards, seaman’s papers, and aircrew cards and anyone designated as first priority by the Ambassador, regardless of national affiliation. The Ambassador is the final authority. • Those with expired U.S. passports that have been expired for less than 10 years. • Those with expired U.S. passports that have been expired for over 10 years.

Priorities for other evacuees are noted in Figure 5-6. GUIDELINES 5-84. Some guidelines for interaction with evacuees are as follows:
• Evacuees are not enemy prisoners of war (EPWs). • The minimum force required should be used. • Evacuation can be an unsettling experience—especially for children and families who have become separated. As a rule, presenting a patient, courteous, and professional attitude will do much to calm the situation and all evacuees. • Depending on the situation, personal baggage may be limited. • People should not be separated from their baggage. • Baggage should be searched for firearms, explosives, ammunition, or restricted items. ECC personnel should be considerate but firm; safety of personnel is paramount. • The JTF and/or JSOTF should establish a policy concerning pets. Whenever possible, ECC personnel should allow pets to accompany evacuees except in situations where health will be jeopardized or security compromised. If pets arrive for evacuation, ECC personnel should establish a pet control facility. • ECC personnel should not accept gifts, tips, or bribes. All personnel must be aware of this prohibition. • All questions about an evacuee should be referred to the DOS representative in the ECC. • Persons of higher priority may elect evacuation in a lower priority to avoid separating families. If it is necessary to MEDEVAC a member of a family, the entire family will be evacuated medically. • Well-established liaison with local airport security and ambulance service is essential. • Medical personnel should consider wearing distinctive clothing or markings to aid in ID. • When possible, patients should be given written instructions for medical care—especially care for children.


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5-85. International law and custom have long recognized the humanitarian practice of providing temporary refuge to anyone, regardless of nationality, who may be in imminent physical danger. The United States’ policy to grant temporary refuge in a foreign country to nationals of that country or to TCNs solely for humanitarian reasons when extreme or exceptional circumstances put in imminent danger the life or safety of a person, such as pursuit by a mob. The OIC of an aircraft, ship, station, or activity decides which measures can prudently be taken to provide temporary refuge. 5-86. ECC personnel will not release information to the media concerning requests for asylum until the DOS clears the information for release. ECC personnel must report any requests by foreign governments for the return of an individual to the DOS representative. 5-87. Until the Ambassador determines the status of an evacuee who has requested asylum or refuge, ECC personnel should safeguard the evacuee. ECC personnel should not release personnel against their will to a third party force. ECC personnel must consider the safety of JTF personnel and security of the unit along with the following:
• Grant temporary refuge in cases where the requesting individual is in imminent danger, irrespective of whether asylum or temporary refuge is requested. • Let DOS representatives handle asylum requests through the appropriate channels. • Establish procedures to notify the combatant commander of actions taken in cases of requests for asylum.


Chapter 6

Temporary Safe Haven Operations
A temporary safe haven, designated by the DOS, is a location in an area or country to which evacuees may be moved quickly and easily. Ideally, the safe haven will be in the United States; however, circumstances may exist that require an intermediate or temporary safe haven.

6-1. Adequate transportation may not be available to move all evacuees directly from the evacuation sites to the United States. An intermediate safe haven may be a U.S. Navy ship; however, the evacuees should be removed from the ship to land-based safe havens (in the United States or a third country) as quickly as possible. If a temporary safe haven is required, the DOS coordinates with the government where it will be located. Coordination for the use of facilities, customs requirements, security, transportation, and billeting is required.

6-2. The DOS considers the following factors when selecting a site:
• Presence of OPSEC before and during the evacuation operation to ensure mission success and prevent undue pressure against the temporary safe haven government. • Capability to communicate with the ECC, JSOTF headquarters, and local Embassy. • Suitability of airfield or port capacity for the aircraft or ships being used, both for the evacuation and later onward movement for the evacuees. The DOS considers the following:

ƒ 24-hour operations for the airfield and port. ƒ Availability of HN controllers to control the airfield and the requirement for JTF controllers. ƒ Balance of airflow restrictions against anticipated dates and timing of anticipated airflow. ƒ Total numbers and types of aircraft involved in the operation. ƒ Condition of aircraft parking areas. ƒ Length, width, and condition of runways and taxiway. ƒ Airfield search and rescue, security, fire fighting, and logistic support. ƒ Airfield maintenance support. ƒ Capabilities of airfield facilities.


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ƒ Channel and harbor depth. ƒ Berthing space, pier information, and location of anchorages. ƒ Types and capabilities of tugs. ƒ Availability of equipment to load and/or off-load ships, if required. ƒ Climatological, meteorological, and oceanographic considerations. ƒ Proximity to major transportation hubs. ƒ Adequate billeting, rations, and potable water for evacuees and the temporary safe haven force. 6-3. Although the temporary safe haven operates under the authority of the host government, it may not have the goodwill of the local population. It may be a prime target for terrorism and riots. The JSOTF should plan for such situations and protect the evacuees and the JSOTF personnel.

6-4. The temporary safe haven force, organized similarly to the ECC’s processing section, operates under the control of the CJSOTF. It should deploy no later than the evacuation force; however, logistic requirements to support a large number of evacuees may require that it deploy earlier. A limited security force can provide necessary internal and perimeter security. The force may consist of the following elements:
• Command group. • Reception team. • Processing team. • Comfort team. • Scheduling team. • Security team.

COMMAND GROUP 6-5. The command group coordinates the overall operation and should consist of the commander, executive officer, staff noncommissioned officer in charge (NCOIC), communications officer, Family Center staff, chaplain, liaison officers, and interpreters. The Family Center staff provides and coordinates human and social service support for evacuees. The chaplain ministers to the spiritual needs of the safe haven force and evacuees and helps them deal with the stress and hardship created by the evacuation. The liaison officers and interpreters maintain contact with the U.S. Embassy and the host government. The command group is responsible for the following:
• Plans, organizes, and supervises the operation of the temporary safe haven. • Maintains liaison with local representatives of the DOS and other agencies that may be involved with the operation. • Advises the CJTF on the progress of the temporary safe haven operations.


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• Establishes procedures for government officials and TCNs if not previously established by the JTF. • Establishes provisions for searching women, children, disabled persons, and injured persons.

RECEPTION TEAM 6-6. This team consists of a briefing section and a PA section. The briefing section should brief the evacuees upon their arrival concerning the following:
• Current political situation in the HN. • Description and operation of the temporary safe haven. • Travel options and arrangements. • Customs requirements in the temporary safe haven. • Projected departure times for flights to the United States.

6-7. The PAO, working with the HN personnel, releases accurate and timely information to the media. However, release of information on the NEO or temporary safe haven operations within each country is the responsibility of the Ambassador. Temporary safe haven PAO responsibilities are as follows:
• Advise the temporary safe haven commander on all aspects of PA. • Coordinate and supervise all PA and command information functions to include planning and production of bulletins, newsletters, and other information media. • Keep the JTF PAO advised on all aspects of PA. • Distribute information pertaining to the temporary safe haven and its operations to the news media per JTF policies. • Escort civilian and military news media representatives. • Ensure that the news media are restricted from evacuee billeting areas. • Ensure that interviews of JTF personnel and evacuees are held only with the permission of the CJTF and the individual concerned. • Determine and disseminate JTF guidance on the release of information to the public.

PROCESSING TEAM 6-8. This team does not duplicate processing completed at the ECC, but should verify that all information obtained from the evacuees is complete and correct. The administration, transportation, intelligence, and medical sections are part of the processing team. Administrative Section 6-9. The administrative section registers and accounts for all evacuees and ensures that all information required by the DOS or the JTF has been collected. The administrative section should have legal personnel advise evacuees on claims procedures and assist in relations between evacuees, safe haven personnel, and host-country nationals. (Appendix J provides legal


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considerations in the event of a NEO.) The administrative section should accomplish the following:
• Receive and register incoming evacuees in conjunction with DOS representatives. • Maintain a roster of each evacuee who passes through the temporary safe haven. The roster should list the following:

ƒ Nationality. ƒ Date of birth. ƒ Evacuation classification. ƒ Profession. ƒ Destination. ƒ Name, address, and/or phone number of a POC in the United States for notification.
• Provide escorts for groups of personnel. Very important personnel and emergency medical cases should be provided individual guides, if available. • Provide for safekeeping and security of valuables while evacuees wait for onward transportation to the United States. • Provide assistance as needed in locating separated family members.

Transportation Section 6-10. The transportation section is responsible for assisting in the onward movement of evacuees to their final destination. The U.S. government does not provide for the movement of persons other than U.S. employees and family members. Nongovernmental employees evacuated by U.S.-funded charter, whether commercial or military, are asked to sign promissory notes to cover the cost of transportation. To ensure an orderly movement, the transportation section should consider the following:
• Coordinate surface or air transportation for the movement of evacuees to the United States. • Coordinate movement flow of evacuees with the JRCC. • Provide loading control personnel to supervise loading of personnel aboard aircraft, ships, or vehicles. • Maintain a roster of all embarked personnel. The roster should include destination and identifying information. • Expedite the departure of all evacuees who are sick, injured, or wounded.

Intelligence Section 6-11. The intelligence section may debrief each evacuee if a debriefing was not conducted at the JTF ECC. If the temporary safe haven is also acting as a temporary ISB, intelligence section personnel should arrange to pass information gained from evacuees to those forces that are returning to a threat area for follow-on operations. Intelligence section personnel should also report information to the joint intelligence center.


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Medical Section 6-12. The medical section provides support to the temporary safe haven force. Additionally, this section may need to conduct evacuee medical screening if this was not performed at the ECC. Medical section services may include any or all of the following:
• Determine if an evacuee requires emergency medical treatment. • Perform emergency treatment, or coordinate with a local hospital to perform the treatment. • Advise the temporary safe haven OIC on hygiene and preventive medicine. • Inspect food and water obtained from local sources. • Evaluate the general health of the evacuees, particularly in regard to pregnancies and the possibility of communicable diseases.

COMFORT TEAM 6-13. This team provides logistical support for the operation. It is responsible for supplies, billeting, sanitation facilities, food, and local transportation. A contracting or purchasing officer should be assigned to coordinate services with the HN. Some considerations are as follows:
• Billeting is ideally accomplished through facilities or hotels provided by or contracted from the temporary safe haven country. However, the JTF may be required to establish a tent city. In this event, the temporary safe haven force arrives early enough to accomplish this before evacuees begin arriving. The CJTF may consider contracting locally for the labor and sanitation facilities. • Because evacuees will normally leave the HN with little or no food supplies of their own, meals, ready to eat can be used as a temporary solution. However, the temporary safe haven OIC should be prepared to establish a food service section to provide special diets to foreign nationals or TCNs involved in the evacuation. • If the climate of the country is substantially different from the evacuee’s former residence, the team may need to provide adequate clothing. • Because of the situation, evacuees may have not had the opportunity to pack personal, comfort, or hygiene items before arriving at the evacuation site. The following is a partial list of items the evacuees may need:

ƒ Baby formula. ƒ Trash bags. ƒ Baby food and/or juice. ƒ Diapers. ƒ Toilet paper. ƒ Feminine hygiene supplies. ƒ Toothpaste and/or toothbrush. ƒ Soap.


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ƒ Shampoo. ƒ Razors. ƒ Washing powder. ƒ Sheets. ƒ Towels. ƒ Blankets. ƒ Candy. ƒ Wash bucket. NOTE: Logistical support for NEO has historically been the most prevalent challenge. Thousands of civilians personnel, pets, babies, elderly, sick, and associated issues make feeding and supporting these people very cumbersome. This fact is complicated by a military supply system that does not provide these types of required items. SCHEDULING TEAM 6-14. The scheduling team coordinates and plans the departure of evacuees from the temporary safe haven. The scheduling team should do the following:
• Coordinate with the transportation section the arrangements for leaving the temporary safe haven. • Coordinate with the comfort team to transport evacuees to the points of embarkation. • Create a manifest for authorized passengers aboard military or commercial charter flights.

SECURITY TEAM 6-15. This team provides, or arranges for, adequate security at the temporary safe haven site. The security team should provide the following:
• Personnel to safeguard any aircraft located at the site. • The processing team and related facilities. • Perimeter security to prevent unauthorized entry into the safe haven. • A reaction force to respond to possible emergencies within the safe haven.


Appendix A

Monrovia, Liberia, NEO
In early April 1996, the fighting between two warring factions—the Patriotic Front of Liberia and the various ethnic Krahn elements—tore Liberia apart. United Nations observers and the Economic Community of West African States Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) were unable to stop the fighting. Over a 4-day period, the U.S. Embassy was surrounded by an estimated 10,000 Liberians engaged in intense fighting. The Ambassador requested more security and help in evacuating. In this appendix, the United States Special Operations Command, History and Research Office, describes the NEO conducted by U.S. forces. Figure A-1 shows the NEO timeline, and Figure A-2, page A-2, shows the organization for the NEO.

June-September 1990: ƒ Liberian rebels lay siege to Monrovia to oust President Samuel K. Doe. ƒ ECOMOG peacekeeping force enters Liberia to end siege, rebels break up into ethnic warlord militias, and 7 years of civil war begin. August 1995: ƒ Peace plan (13th since 1989) is signed that establishes a Ruling Council and mandates the presidency rotate among Council members until elections can be held. 6 April 1996: ƒ Fighting erupts between warlord factions in and around Monrovia after Ruling Council attempts to oust Roosevelt Johnson. 9 April 1996: ƒ Special Operations Component, European Command (SOCEUR) security elements secure U.S. Embassy. ƒ Air Force SOF helicopters begin evacuating the first of 2,200 personnel to Freetown, Sierra Leone. 11 April 1996: ƒ Elements of an Army airborne company based in Italy augment SOCEUR forces. 12 April 1996: ƒ CONUS-based ARSOF and ARSOA begin air evacuation from Monrovia. ƒ Air refueling operations are underway. 19 April 1996: ƒ Cease-fire is declared, but sporadic fighting continues. ƒ ECOMOG leaders meet to get the peace process back on track. 20 April 1996: ƒ 250 Marines from 22d Marine Expeditionary Unit (MEU) relieve SOF security, air evacuation elements, and Army airborne company security forces at the Embassy. ƒ 22d MEU begins evacuation of remaining 750 civilians. ƒ Commander, 22d MEU, assumes command of ASSURED RESPONSE JTF.
Figure A-1. Monrovia, Liberia, Timeline


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Figure A-2. Organization for ASSURED RESPONSE

On 7 April 1996, the U.S. Ambassador, William B. Milam, requested additional security forces. Because of this request, the National Command Authorities officially notified the United States Commander-in-Chief, Europe (USCINCEUR) to prepare for a NEO. USCINCEUR assigned this mission to the SOCEUR. The mission was assigned the code name ASSURED RESPONSE. When SOCEUR was notified of the NEO, the command was supporting ongoing operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina and the recovery mission for the personnel killed in the crash of a U.S. Air Force CT-43. Fortunately, the SOCEUR staff and its components—1-10th Special Forces Group (Airborne) (SFG(A)), Naval Special Warfare Unit 2 (NSWU-2), and the 352d Special Operations Group (SOG)—had developed NEO plans. Limited options were available for the insertion of the evacuation force and the removal of evacuees. The two airports in Monrovia were in poor condition and surrounded by warring factions. The lack of airfields and abbreviated time lines impacted the possible COAs. One COA called for about 20 to 30 sea-air-land teams (SEALs) to fly by MC-130 to the coast off Monrovia and parachute into the ocean. The MC-130 aircrew would also drop two combat rubber raiding crafts into the ocean. The


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other COA called for deployment of SOF helicopters to reassembly at Freetown, Sierra Leone, and then to the Embassy to deliver security forces (a 90-minute insertion flight). Both COAs required the exfiltration of evacuees by using helicopters. On 6 April, the United States European Command (USEUCOM), Operations Director, had authorized the deployment of a USEUCOM Survey and Assessment Team (ESAT) to Monrovia. The ESAT would review the security situation and provide SOCEUR an evaluation of the situation. On 7 April, 18 SEALs on an MC-130 and the initial battle staff on a second MC-130 departed for Freetown, the ISB. The SOCEUR battle staff established the ASSURED RESPONSE JTF headquarters while the SEALs prepared to reinforce the Embassy when directed. A JTF headquarters element ran the ISB operation at Freetown. The ISB was responsible for the following:
• Conducting helicopter operations to and from the Embassy. • Resupplying the Embassy with food, water, and medical provisions. • Handling the aircraft bringing supplies, equipment, and personnel. • Managing the transfer of evacuees to the C-130s for the flight to the safe haven in Dakar, Senegal.

MH-53J helicopters deployed from Brindisi, Italy, and Mildenhall, England, by C-5 transport to the ISB, arriving on 8 April. After a helicopter was reassembled on 9 April, the ESAT and 12 SEALs departed for the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia. The ESAT and 12 SEALs were tasked with providing the JTF with an update on the situation and increasing security at the Embassy. Later, on 9 April, a portion of the JTF staff, additional SEALs, and an element from 1-10th SFG(A) arrived in Monrovia. The JTF staff established the JTF headquarters in the Embassy, while the 1-10th SFG(A) assumed responsibility for the ECC and Embassy security. Throughout 9 and 10 April, more SF personnel arrived. On 10 April, the ECC became operational. Members of the 1-10th SFG(A) established and maintained reception, registration, medical screening, and transportation stations. During 10 through 14 April, the ECC processed around 1,800 evacuees. On 15 April, elements of the 3-325th Infantry relieved the SEALs and SF, who returned to the ISB. The MH-53Js and MH-47s continued to support evacuation flights through 19 April, completing 98 sorties and evacuating over 2,100 personnel from 76 different countries. On 20 April, the Commander, Task Force 62, relieved the Commander, Special Operations Command, United States European Command (COMSOCEUR) as the commander of the ASSURED RESPONSE JTF. During a few days, SOF had successfully accomplished a complex mission using a variety of units from in-theater and CONUS.


Appendix B

Guidelines for ROE
NEOs are not strictly under the control of either the geographic combatant commander or the JTF commander. These commanders are responsible for conduct of military operations in support of the NEO. The COM has responsibility for the NEO and final responsibility for the ROE.

B-1. The ROE for NEOs should reflect the limited military objective to be accomplished. The ROE are positive restrictions on the use of military force to prevent a commander and his soldiers from violating the national policy of the U.S. government or the Law of Land Warfare. The ROE for NEOs shall limit the use of military force to that necessary to successfully complete the mission, provide for self-defense of the military force, and defend evacuees. Figure B-1, page B-5, shows a sample ROE card for soldiers. B-2. The ROE may be coordinated with HN authorities and disseminated to the indigenous population as part of the CA and PSYOP programs. This will inform them of the reasons for U.S. actions and help minimize civilian interference with the operation. Commanders (and soldiers) have an inherent right to protect their forces (and themselves) from attack. The ROE do not diminish this responsibility. However, the ROE do enable the commander to determine the fine line between aggressive or offensive actions and defensive actions. B-3. Defensive actions are conducted only as aggressively as necessary to protect U.S. lives, property, and equipment. They may include pursuit only until the attacker is no longer in a position to inflict casualties upon U.S. personnel, property, or equipment. Subordinate commanders will ensure that all personnel are thoroughly indoctrinated in the need for minimum force, for humane treatment of evacuees, and for good order and discipline when conducting NEOs. Commanders at all echelons will use only the force necessary and take no action that might be interpreted as initiating hostilities. B-4. Ideally, the ROE should allow for centralized control at JTF level and decentralized execution of fire support, close air support, and employment of riot control agents. The evacuation force commander, if possible, should have authority to employ supporting arms to ensure the safety of his force and the accomplishment of his mission. However, the ROE are usually based on national strategic and political considerations rather than on tactical considerations. If directed by the commander, prohibitions from The Hague and Geneva conventions may be included in the ROE. The following are prohibitions from the Hague and Geneva conventions:
• Personnel are prohibited from declaring that no quarter will be given. • No person will kill or wound an enemy who has laid down his weapon, has no means of defense, or has surrendered.


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• Personnel will not shoot small arms, crew-served weapons, or artillery into populated areas or buildings that are not defended. • Personnel will not fire on religious, social, civic, and historic monuments or facilities and on hospitals or places where the sick or wounded are collected, unless they are being used at the time for military purposes. In this instance, military purpose is defined as a threat to the accomplishment of the NEO. Attack on any of the abovenamed facilities can only be warranted if the facility is being used to initiate hostile, aggressive acts; endanger the lives of evacuees or members of the task force; or prevent mission accomplishment. • Personnel are prohibited from looting. • Personnel will not destroy or seize any property unless such destruction or seizure is demanded by operational necessity (within above parameters). Personnel will not destroy medical supplies and equipment. • In addition to the above, personnel will ensure that—

ƒ All money, effects, and articles of personal property, except arms, military equipment, and military documents, remain in the possession of the prisoners and detainees. ƒ All captured or detained personnel are afforded humane treatment.

B-5. Permissive and uncertain environments may involve U.S. personnel being attacked or threatened by unarmed hostile forces. The on-scene commander may reduce or overcome the threat with—
• Warnings to demonstrators. • Show of force, including the use of crowd or riot control formations. • Additional force, as necessary, to meet and overcome the threat. Additional force is authorized to prevent loss of life and major damage to property and equipment. Firing on unarmed personnel should be a last resort. The use of force will be discontinued when it is no longer necessary to accomplish its immediate purpose. • Riot control agents. These will be employed only when authorized by the President and geographic combatant commander, subject to the effective ROE, and then only defensively, to protect U.S. personnel and installations. If the use of riot control agents has not been previously granted, the JTF commander should request approval from the geographic combatant commander during the planning phase.

B-6. In a hostile environment, if U.S. personnel are attacked by an armed, hostile force, the on-scene commander may be governed by the following rules:
• Use adequate force to control the situation. • Respond to hostile fire directly threatening U.S. personnel or equipment with timely fire directed only at the source of the hostile fire. Exercise restraint to avoid escalation. If possible, use sniper or marksman fire to reduce the threat.


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• Use air attack only when it is apparent it is the only means of protecting U.S. personnel. • Return fire across the boundaries or territorial waters of a third country only if a hostile force persists in committing hostile acts after it has retired across that boundary. • Discontinue the use of force when it is no longer necessary to accomplish its purpose. After hostilities cease, institute necessary measures to control the situation and assist all the injured.

B-7. For aircraft operations, suggested ROE in permissive and uncertain environments are to report any threatening actions to higher authority by fastest means available. Threatening actions include—
• Small arms aimed at or following the aircraft. • Medium-caliber or antiaircraft weapons aimed at or following the flight path of the aircraft. • Electronic indications that fire control radar is tracking aircraft. • Low passes or simulated gun runs by fixed- or rotary-wing aircraft.

B-8. In a hostile environment, suggested ROE for aircraft operations are as follows:
• Limit actions to those required to reduce the threat to an acceptable level. • Report any fire to the next higher authority. Fire may be returned to reduce the threat to acceptable levels, protecting the aircraft and aircrew. • Return fire immediately to protect the aircraft and aircrew if fired upon by radar-controlled guns or missiles. • Report immediately against helicopters.






B-9. The new CJCS standing rules of engagement (SROE) went into effect on 15 January 2000, the result of an all-DOD review and revision of the previous 1994 edition. It provides implementation guidance on the inherent right of self-defense and the application of force for mission accomplishment. It is designed to provide a more common template for development and implementation of ROE for the full range of operations, from peace to war. APPLICABILITY OF SROE B-10. The SROE applies to all U.S. forces responding to all military attacks within the United States and to all military operations outside the United States, with limited exceptions, the most prominent being for multinational force operations. The SROE no longer applies to peacetime domestic support operations. CJCSI 3121.02, Rules on the Use of Force by DOD Personnel Providing Support to Law Enforcement Agencies Conducting Counterdrug Operations in the United States, and Department of Defense Instruction (DODI) 5210.56, Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DOD Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties, apply to these operations.


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ORGANIZATION OF SROE B-11. The SROE is organized as follows: • Enclosure A (SROE). This unclassified enclosure details the general purpose, intent, and scope of the SROE, emphasizing a commander’s right and obligation to use force in self-defense. Critical principles, such as unit, individual, national, and collective self-defense; hostile act and intent; and the determination to declare forces hostile are addressed as foundational elements of all ROE.
• Enclosures B through I. These classified enclosures provide general guidance on specific types of operations: maritime, air, land, and space operations; information operations; NEOs; counterdrug support operations; and domestic support operations. • Enclosure J (supplemental measures). Supplemental measures found in this enclosure enable a commander to obtain or grant those additional authorities necessary to accomplish an assigned mission. Tables of supplemental measures are divided into those actions requiring Presidential approval, those that require Presidential or combatant commander approval, and those that are delegated to subordinate commanders (though the delegation may be withheld by higher authority). The new SROE now recognizes a fundamental difference between the supplemental measures. Those measures that are reserved to the President or the combatant commander are generally restrictive; that is, either the President or the combatant commander must specifically permit the particular operation, tactic, or weapon before the field commander may use it. The remainder of the supplemental measures, those delegated to subordinate commanders, are permissive measures. These measures allow a commander to use any weapon or tactic available and to employ reasonable force to accomplish his mission, without getting permission first. Supplemental ROE relate to mission accomplishment, not self-defense, and never limit a commander’s inherent right and obligation of self-defense. • Enclosure K (combatant commander’s theater-specific ROE. Enclosure K contains specific ROE submitted by combatant commanders for use within their AOR. Those special ROE address specific strategic and political sensitivities of the combatant commander’s AOR and must be approved by the CJCS. They are included in the SROE as a means to assist commanders and units participating in operations outside their assigned AORs. • Enclosure L (ROE process). This new, unclassified enclosure provides guidelines for incorporating ROE development into military planning processes. It introduces the ROE Planning Cell, which may be used during the development process.


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Rules of Engagement Before Hostilities Note: Leaders refer to complete ROE in OPLAN/OPORD. 1. If you are operating as a unit, squad, or other formation, follow the orders of your leaders. 2. As a sentry, follow challenge procedures and the orders of the officer or sergeant of the guard and these ROE. 3. If you are not operating as a unit or other formation, you may use deadly force when necessary to— a. Defend yourself from serious injury or death. • Do not use deadly force to protect yourself from the threat of mere harassment, such as someone throwing rocks at you, or minor injury. b. Defend other U.S., allied, and coalition soldiers and U.S. citizens from life-threatening attack. c. Defend critical buildings, supplies, and equipment. • Your leaders will point out critical areas and outline challenging procedures. Rules of Engagement During Hostilities Note: Leaders refer to complete ROE in OPLAN/OPORD. 1. If you are operating as a unit, squad, or other formation, follow the orders of your leaders. 2. As a sentry, follow challenge procedures and the orders of the officer or sergeant of the guard and these ROE. 3. If you are not operating as a unit or other formation, you may use deadly force when necessary to— a. Defend yourself from serious injury or death. b. Defend other U.S., allied, and coalition soldiers and U.S. citizens from life-threatening attack. c. Defend critical buildings, supplies, and equipment. 4. Use indirect fire only when approved by the task force commander. 5. Avoid injuring innocent civilians or their property, medical personnel, and chaplains; they are protected targets. • Someone attacking you is not a protected target. • Avoid firing into a crowd of apparent noncombatants, because you may start a riot or injure innocent people. • Do not fire automatic weapons into a crowd unless ordered to do so or absolutely necessary to save your life or the lives of other U.S., allied, and coalition soldiers and U.S. citizens. 6. Your leaders may change these ROE; follow their orders.

Figure B-1. Sample ROE Card for Soldiers


Appendix C

This appendix contains NEO notification forms. Figures C-1 through C-5, pages C-1 through C-4, provide samples of the NEO notifications.

Because of the current local situation, this office recommends that Americans remain in their homes. Only the most essential outside activities should be conducted, and public areas should be avoided until the situation improves. Since there is always the possibility the situation will deteriorate and you will be required to move elsewhere, this office recommends that you promptly take the following precautions: 1. Without hoarding, try to keep on hand a reasonable supply (7 to 10 days) of food, water, and fuel. If you have a personal automobile, be sure it is ready for immediate use. Fill the gas tank, and check the oil, water, tires, and battery. 2. If your passport, exit visa, or registration with this office is not current, contact us immediately at telephone . 3. Collect all important papers and documents, such as passports; birth, marriage, divorce, and naturalization certificates; inoculation cards; insurance policies; bankbooks; and U.S. and local currency. 4. Make or update a complete inventory of your household effects in duplicate. 5. Prepare for each family member one suitcase (66 pounds or less) to contain, as applicable, warm clothing regardless of season, eyeglasses, babies’ and children’s supplies, and special medications. 6. Listen to the local media and Voice of America, U.S. Armed Forces Radio, or the British Broadcasting Company closely for announcements from the local government or this office. Your warden is , who can be reached at.

We are monitoring the situation and will provide you with further guidance. Please pass the contents of this notice to other U.S. citizens, and keep it handy for reference.
Figure C-1. Sample Stand Fast Notice


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1. In view of the gravity of the current local situation, this office recommends that Americans whose presence in the country is not essential depart by commercial transportation as soon as possible. If adult U.S. citizens have compelling reasons for remaining in the area, we suggest that dependents depart with their pets while normal commercial facilities are still available. 2. American citizens with valid passports and foreign dependents with valid passports or visas should not come to this office for travel arrangements. Rather, they should make their own arrangements directly with transportation companies or travel agents. 3. Persons departing are requested to inform this office by telephone ( ) or mail of their departure plans, providing the following information: name(s), date(s) and place(s) of issuance of passports; probable date(s) and mode(s) of transportation; and names and addresses of next of kin, other point of contact in the United States, or travel agents. 4. This office cannot accept any personal or real property for protection, but will accept copies of inventories of property left in the country and attempt to arrange for protection of such property through the local authorities. 5. American citizens without valid passports or who are unable to arrange for their own travel or that of their dependents because of insufficient funds or other reasons should report to this office as soon as possible. They should bring the following items with them. a. American passports or other proof of U.S. citizenship. b. For non-American spouses, children, and dependents: passports or identification cards and proof of relationship (birth or marriage certificates). 6. Please pass the contents of this notice to other U.S. citizens, and keep it handy for reference.
Figure C-2. Sample Leave Commercial Notice


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Because of the situation in this country, the Ambassador has determined that the evacuation of all U.S. citizens is advisable. As the operations of this office may be terminated with little or no advance warning, American citizens wishing U.S. government assistance should contact their wardens or this office telephone ( ) immediately. The Embassy/consulate is arranging chartered transportation to the United States or another safe haven. The issuance of tickets is not feasible, and all persons being evacuated will be asked to sign promissory notes to cover the cost of their transportation. The Department of State will bill evacuees later for the costs incurred. (U.S. government personnel and their dependents travel on official orders; therefore, their respective agencies will be billed.) To provide proper protection and to help you leave safely, we ask you to follow these instructions: 1. Your warden is 2. Your assigned assembly area is at a. Please be there at b. You will be told later when to report. c. Do not bring your vehicle to the assembly point. d. Bring enough food for each family member to have meals. e. Cooking facilities are not available, so bring ready-to-eat food (canned items, sandwiches, and so on). f. Bring an unbreakable container with quart(s) of water per person. and may be contacted at

g. Pets will be transported during this NEO and are allowed at the assembly point. (NOTE: Only checked items apply.) 3. Prepare to bring with you all important personal papers (passports, inoculation cards, cash, credit cards, and checkbooks) and one suitcase (66 pounds or less) per person containing clothing suitable for the local climate as well as for a change of climate. Remember eyeglasses, special medicines, and baby/children supplies. Do not bring firearms or liquor. Pets are allowed only if specifically authorized above. 4. Adult family members should consider the possibility of becoming separated temporarily. Problems can be avoided by exchanging data concerning bank accounts, addresses and telephone numbers of relatives in the United States, and powers of attorney.
Figure C-3. Sample Evacuation Notice


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EMBASSY/POST CLOSING NOTICE NAME OF POST: DATE: The situation in this country is such that the U.S. government is closing its offices here effective The Embassy of located at will protect U.S. interests until further notice. We recommend that American citizens leave the country immediately. Until this office ceases operations, we will make every effort to assist U.S. citizens still wishing to depart. Those who plan to remain should provide their names, addresses, and next of kin so this office can pass the information to the Department of State and to the Embassy. Please pass the contents of this notice to other U.S. citizens, and keep it handy for reference.
Figure C-4. Sample Embassy/Post Closing Notice

WAIVER OF EVACUATION OPPORTUNITY 1. Agreement made, this day of , 20 , between

and the military forces of the United States. 2. Whereas the military forces of the United States agree to evacuate

3. Said offer of evacuation is declined by the above-named individual(s) with the understanding that the offer will not be repeated. 4. Evacuee Signature Evacuee Signature Evacuee Signature Evacuee Signature
Figure C-5. Sample Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity


Appendix D

All Active Army and RC Army PSYOP units are subordinate to the United States Special Operations Command (USSOCOM). The 4th Psychological Operations Group (Airborne) (POG[A]) at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, is the only Active Army PSYOP organization. The 2d POG and 7th POG comprise the RC Army capability. Select organizations of other Services have unique capabilities that can be employed in the conduct and/or support of PSYOP.

D-1. Army PSYOP personnel (soldiers and civilian) include regional experts and linguists who understand the political, cultural, ethnic, and religious subtleties of target audiences. PSYOP personnel at the tactical level offer expertise in loudspeaker operations and face-to-face PSYOP and are trained in cross-cultural communications. PRINCIPAL CAPABILITIES D-2. Principal capabilities of PSYOP forces are as follows:
• Analyze potential targeted audiences to identify critical communicators and media, cultural and language nuances, and applicable themes and symbols. • On the basis of the above analysis, plan, coordinate, and execute PSYOP plans and programs that support the missions and objectives of the supported geographic combatant commander. • Employ organic and nonorganic assets to develop and disseminate the following types of products to support the programs developed:

ƒ Audio. ƒ Visual. ƒ Audiovisual products. ORGANIZATIONS D-3. During contingency operations, the senior PSYOP headquarters is doctrinally OPCON to the supported geographic combatant commander, JTF commander, or combined task force (CTF) commander. In accordance with the Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan, the 4th POG(A) is charged with providing the joint PSYOP headquarters with joint operational level focus and developing the geographic combatant or JTF commander’s joint or combined PSYOP information campaign plan. This includes the integration of sister service PSYOP assets into the plan. Maneuver units will normally have tactical PSYOP elements attached to provide tactical PSYOP support.


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D-4. PSYOP battalions or their subordinate elements are task-organized to provide the required PSYOP support. The major task organizations are as follows:
• Psychological Operations task force (POTF) (group level). The grouplevel POTF employs on a large scale for sustained operations. The Commander, 4th POG(A), commands the group-level POTF. The grouplevel POTF consists of group headquarters, appropriate regional PSYOP battalions, a dissemination battalion, one or more tactical PSYOP battalions (potentially including RC units), and, if required, an EPW PSYOP unit. Commander, 2d or 7th POG, could also command a second POTF in case of two large-scale contingencies. When augmented with assets from other services, the group-level POTF becomes a joint psychological operations task force (JPOTF). • POTF (battalion level). The battalion-level POTF is employed for a wide range of operations. A regional PSYOP battalion commander commands the battalion-level POTF. The battalion-level POTF consists of a task force headquarters, appropriate regional PSYOP battalion assets, elements of a PSYOP dissemination battalion, and elements of a tactical PSYOP battalion. The battalion-level POTF can range in size from 20 to almost 300 personnel, depending on the mission. • PSYOP assessment team (POAT). The POAT is employed as a temporary staff augmentation to a joint headquarters or for assessment and planning of a contingency where no previous OPLAN and CONPLAN exist. A major usually leads the POAT, and the POAT has appropriate functional area experts attached—usually less than 12 personnel. The POAT is the most likely PSYOP element to augment the staff of a JTF or CTF formed to conduct a NEO. • Psychological Operations detachment (PSYDET). The PSYDET is a flexible and tailored organization, is normally task-organized from the psychological operations development center (PDC) or tactical psychological operations company (TPC) and is located at a critical node or information center within the AOR. Its purpose is to further the objectives and campaigns of the geographic combatant commander and to facilitate military or national objectives within the joint operations area (JOA). Also, PSYDETs often operate in situations where it is not feasible or necessary to establish a POTF in support of a JTF or in support of a Service or functional CTF. • International military information team (IMIT). An IMIT is a PSYDET that has been deployed forward to execute missions in support of a geographic combatant commander’s theater engagement plan. The IMIT provides PSYOP expertise to non-DOD agencies, such as the U.S. Country Teams. The capabilities of the IMIT are similar to those of a PSYDET, but with interagency and regional expertise. • Tactical Psychological Operations battalion (TPB). The TPB provides tactical PSYOP support to corps-level units and below. The TPB can develop, produce, and disseminate tactical products with the guidance (themes, objectives, and target audiences) assigned by the POTF and


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authorized by the product approval authority (geographic combatant commander or CJTF).
• TPC. The TPC provides tactical PSYOP support at division level and below. Support elements are tailored to provide PSYOP staff planning and conduct PSYOP support. The TPC coordinates with the TPB for the development and production of PSYOP products to meet the division commander’s requirements. The TPC also has an organic product development and production capability. • Tactical Psychological Operations development detachment (TPDD). The TPDD provides the supported division-level commander with timely, responsive, and effective multimedia PSYOP product development and production. The TPDD synchronizes PSYOP product dissemination among subordinate brigade- and battalion-level detachments and teams. The TPDD is usually located with the TPC headquarters element. • Tactical Psychological Operations detachment (TPD). The TPD provides PSYOP support to a brigade-size element or equivalent. The TPD consists of a four-man headquarters and three TPTs of three personnel each. The TPD exercises staff supervision over TPTs allocated to battalions or equivalent units, monitoring their status and providing assistance in PSYOP planning. The TPD does not have any product development capability. • TPT. TPTs normally provide PSYOP support at battalion level and below. They can work for the TPDD, the TPD, or directly for a maneuver battalion or equivalent-size unit. When attached to a maneuver battalion, the TPT chief acts as the PSYOP staff advisor to the battalion commander. TPTs can disseminate PSYOP products (loudspeaker messages, leaflets, and posters) and conduct face-to-face communications with target audiences.

PSYOP STAFF PLANNER RESPONSIBILITIES D-5. The geographic combatant commander’s PSYOP officer is responsible for preparing the PSYOP appendix to the operations annex of the geographic combatant commander’s NEO OPLAN/CONPLAN. Authority for approval for PSYOP programs and products may be delegated to the JTF commander in the geographic combatant commander’s PSYOP appendix. Upon approval of the PSYOP appendix by the Joint Staff and OSD, the geographic combatant commander’s PSYOP officer will request development of a PSYOP supporting plan from USSOCOM, Special Operations Plans and Policies Directorate (SOOP). This request is forwarded through channels to the 4th POG(A) and appropriate regional PSYOP battalion. On the basis of the geographic combatant commander’s PSYOP appendix, the PSYOP information campaign plan should include—
• PSYOP annex or appendix to the supported commander’s plan. • PSYOP product books. • Command information plan.


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The rather intensive process of developing products for specific targets and situations necessitates the development and production of generic PSYOP products to support crisis-situation (limited notice) NEOs. D-6. Responsibilities of the PSYOP staff officer on the combatant command and JTF staff include the following:
• Advises the commander on PSYOP-related matters. • Works under staff supervision of the operations officer (J-3, G-3, and S-3). • Prepares the PSYOP annex or appendix to the OPLAN or OPORD. • Serves as liaison between commander or staff and the supporting PSYOP organization. • Assists supporting PSYOP organization in coordinating and monitoring the execution of the PSYOP campaign to support NEO. • Coordinates with staff PAO and U.S. Embassy PAO and international public information (IPI) group, if established, to ensure themes and messages are congruent.

D-7. PSYOP efforts in support of a NEO can—
• Reduce interference by the local populace and military forces. • Disseminate NEO information to U.S. citizens and selected TCNs. • Explain the purpose of the U.S. and allied action to counter confusion or misinformation. • Assist in crowd control. PSYOP themes should emphasize the following:

ƒ U.S. actions are in accordance with international law. ƒ U.S. and/or allied forces are in the country only to protect the evacuation of U.S. and/or allied citizens and not to occupy the HN or take sides with any faction. D-8. General PSYOP actions (PSYACTs) in support of a NEO may include any or all of the following: • Leaflet drops over populated areas.
• Dissemination of printed materials to include handbills (Figure D-1, page D-5). • Radio and/or television (TV) broadcasts using COMMANDO SOLO, 4th POG(A) assets, U.S. Navy command and control warfare group (C2WG) assets, and/or HN assets, if available. • Loudspeaker broadcasts in support of air, naval, and ground forces.


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Figure D-1. Dissemination of Printed Materials

D-9. During a NEO, the PSYOP headquarters will normally be under OPCON to the CJTF. This PSYOP headquarters will be a regionally oriented POTF charged with the supervision and execution of all PSYOP activities conducted in the CJTF’s area of operations. Usually, the POTF will include a planning cell to orchestrate PSYOP activities at the JTF level and supporting PSYOP elements such as COMMANDO SOLO, 4th POG(A) assets, and/or U.S. Navy assets. Ultimately, the POTF size and composition will be tailored according to the operational requirements and situation when the CJCS execute order is issued. D-10. The planning cell is employed as a temporary staff augmentation to a joint headquarters or for assessment and planning of a contingency where no previous OPLAN or CONPLAN exists. A PSYOP officer who has the appropriate regional expertise usually leads the planning cell. The planning cell works closely with the Country Team in the Embassy. D-11. A TPD would most likely be the PSYOP package attached to the evacuation force headquarters. The TPD conducts staff planning based upon the supported commander’s guidance and the PSYOP campaign plan. The


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TPD would collocate with the evacuation force tactical operations center (TOC) and provide command and control for its TPTs. D-12. TPTs can work under the command and control of the TPD or directly for an evacuation force commander. TPTs can provide tactical PSYOP support with organic man-pack, vehicle/watercraft, or aerial loudspeaker systems. When attached to a maneuver battalion, the TPT chief acts as the PSYOP staff advisor to the battalion S-3. In addition to loudspeaker broadcasts, TPTs can conduct face-to-face PSYOP or acquire PSYOP-relevant information from and on the local populace. TPTs are force multipliers for NEO marshalling teams and/or security forces and are attached to evacuation force units. TPTs provide the evacuation force commander with a means to employ graduated response to belligerents’ actions through a series of escalating ultimatums and corresponding force. Tactical PSYOP elements also enhance force protection by encouraging civilian noninterference with evacuation efforts. D-13. A NEO may be required on short notice as the result of a rapid and unexpected escalation of instability within the HN. In these situations, loudspeakers may be the principal medium for providing PSYOP support to a NEO. Printed products might not be available because of insufficient time to prepare, staff for final approval, pretest, produce, deliver, and disseminate leaflets, posters, and so on. Therefore, PSYOP plans might rely almost exclusively on loudspeaker broadcasts. TV and radio broadcasts are possible, but again, are dependent upon enough time for production and coordination. Additionally, assets may not be available for TV or radio broadcasts within the HN.

D-14. The following paragraphs discuss basic PSYOP objectives and themes that could be incorporated into the PSYOP supporting plan for a NEO. Interagency policy-makers have approved the majority of these objectives and themes as a model for application by all geographic combatant commanders. These objectives and themes are not all-inclusive. However, these objectives are generic enough to have applicability for all NEOs while maintaining the flexibility to be quickly modified in accordance with U.S. government crisisspecific policies, Country Team guidance, and the geographic combatant commander’s current military situation. PSYOP OBJECTIVES D-15. PSYOP objectives are as follows:
• Enhance the safety and security of U.S. and allied forces conducting the NEO and of the evacuees. • Dissuade interference with U.S. and allied operations to minimize casualties and collateral damage. • Demonstrate resolve and capabilities of U.S. and allied forces to protect evacuees. • Limit the effectiveness of hostile propaganda, disinformation, and other forms of political warfare against U.S. and allied forces.


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• Provide evacuation instructions and other pertinent information to evacuees. • Provide continuing analysis of political and cultural factors to help maximize political and psychological effects of the operation. • Gain and maintain active support of neighboring states for U.S. coalition efforts. • Gain and maintain active support for overflight privileges.

THEMES TO STRESS D-16. The following are typical NEO themes:
• The NEO force is only in-country to withdraw selected noncombatants. • NEO forces will depart upon mission completion. • Impartiality of U.S. and allied forces. • Capability and resolve of U.S. and allied forces to successfully complete the NEO. • NEO forces will defend themselves and personnel under their control if the forces are threatened. • Benefits of noninterference with U.S. and coalition operations. • U.S. and coalition forces are operating under international law (legitimacy). • U.S. and coalition forces provide accurate, credible information.

THEMES AND ACTIONS TO AVOID D-17. PSYOP units should avoid the following themes and actions:
• Themes or actions that may appear to favor one faction over another. • Themes that imply that the force is establishing itself as a military government or supra-government force. • Degradation of local ethnic, cultural, and religious values. • Any actions that show lack of resolve to complete the mission and/or use force. • Themes that appear to indicate the U.S. forces are staying beyond the duration of the NEO.


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POTENTIAL TARGET GROUPS D-18. Potential PSYOP target groups are as follows:
• Evacuees. • Nonbelligerent local populace. • Belligerent local populace. • HN military elite. • HN political elite. • HN religious leaders. • Political organizations and paramilitary units.

ACTIONS CONTRIBUTING TO MISSION ACCOMPLISHMENT D-19. Actions that contribute to mission accomplishment are as follows:
• Deployment of U.S. and allied forces outside of U.S. facilities should be restricted to establishment of evacuee marshalling areas and security cordons with suitable protection. • Maximum use of fixed- or rotary-wing assets for movement of forces and evacuation to reduce confrontations with the local populace on the ground. • Discriminate use of firepower—especially indirect fire. • Maintenance of strict discipline and professionalism of U.S. and allied forces will establish favorable impressions among the target groups.

ACTIONS TO AVOID D-20. Actions PSYOP units should avoid are as follows:
• Indiscriminate use of firepower in populated areas will negate any positive aspects of PSYOP and must be strictly curtailed. • Operations that appear to support one faction over another. • Operations that damage local historical, cultural, or religious sites.

D-21. While the principal medium for NEOs may be loudspeaker broadcasts, printed products also have a place in NEOs. The following paragraphs discuss media and the approval process for media. LOUDSPEAKER BROADCASTS D-22. The principal medium for NEOs may be loudspeaker broadcasts. Loudspeakers are particularly appropriate for tactical operations since they can deliver messages on the spot in fast-moving situations. The mobility of the loudspeaker allows PSYOP personnel to move wherever a target audience may be found. For greater mobility, loudspeakers can be mounted on wheeled or armored vehicles or in aircraft. They also can be man-packed for access to areas inaccessible to vehicles. Loudspeaker broadcasts can be pretaped in the local languages (if time permits) or read from scripts (Figure D-2, page D-9) provided by the U.S. Embassy. PSYOP linguists or local nationals read the


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scripts. Loudspeaker broadcasts in support of a NEO typically focus on four areas:
• Evacuation instruction. • Crowd control. • Measures to enhance the safety and security of U.S. and allied forces and the evacuees under their protection. • Demonstration of U.S. and allied resolve to complete the NEO.

ATTENTION! ATTENTION! We are moving you onto the helicopter in as timely and safe a manner as possible. Anyone needing special assistance to board the helicopter, please move to the front of the line. All others, please form an orderly line to speed boarding. Thank you for your cooperation. ATTENTION EVACUEES! ATTENTION EVACUEES! Please form an orderly line in front of the reception station. Have your bags open and identification documents ready. Give the team your full cooperation. We are searching you to ensure your safety and welfare. Anyone ill or needing special assistance, please notify the team at the reception station. We will process you through as quickly as possible. Thank you for your patience and cooperation.
Figure D-2. Example of Loudspeaker Scripts

PRINTED PRODUCTS D-23. The time constraints of a NEO may not permit use of printed products. The time required for developing, gaining approval for, printing, delivering to theater, and disseminating leaflets or handbills cannot be compressed into the few hours available in the event of a short-notice NEO. If printed products are used, they will most likely be preprinted, generic posters. These posters, placed around traffic control points, assembly areas, checkpoints, and aerial ports of embarkation (APOEs) and seaports of embarkation (SPOEs) will be used to dissuade interference and to control crowds. Preprinted leaflets may also be available and could be used for providing evacuation instructions to evacuees. D-24. Leaflets and other printed products may be disseminated in a variety of ways. The effectiveness of techniques depends on many factors. A few of these factors are the political and military situation, weather, and availability of printed products and/or leaflet dissemination means (weapons and aircraft). D-25. A POTF or TPDD may deploy with a Product Development Workstation (PDW)—heavy or light, a Risograph digital duplicator, a deployable semiautomatic electric paper cutter, or a Deployable Print Production Center (DPPC) equipped with a PDW. This deployable printing package will normally include a basic load of paper and other consumable printing supplies. The DPPC is capable of producing up to 93,000 single-color leaflets in 24 hours. If PSYOP product approval authority has been delegated


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to the CJTF, the POTF could develop, staff, produce, and print over 250 thousand products in a 12-hour period. D-26. Many times the POTF will be in support of a joint force comprised of Marine or Naval forces. The normal package will consist of an amphibious ready group (ARG). Within the ARG, there are print facilities normally consisting of two Risograph machines, a medium print asset, and a papercutting machine. The commander, joint psychological operations task force (COMJPOTF), will need to coordinate with the ARG commander to use these printing assets. RADIO AND TELEVISION PROGRAMS D-27. Radio scripts and TV programs are possible if time and facilities permit. Radio and TV programs could be broadcast by using HN assets, U.S. Navy offshore transmitters organic to the Information Warfare Element, 4th POG(A) organic assets, or COMMANDO SOLO. The objectives of radio and TV broadcasts are similar to loudspeaker operations: to dissuade interference, to provide evacuation instruction, and so on. Radio and TV broadcasts could be used to supplement or reinforce the messages from print and loudspeaker medium. These broadcasts can also be used to reach target audiences located in isolated areas inaccessible to print or speaker operations. COMMANDO SOLO D-28. Coordination with the l93d Special Operations Wing, Pennsylvania Army National Guard, is required if COMMANDO SOLO assets are desired. Because of the rapid, “in-and-out” nature of NEOs, COMMANDO SOLO support may be unlikely. However, if COMMANDO SOLO assets have already been tasked in the approved OPLAN/CONPLAN or ample planning time still exists, COMMANDO SOLO aircraft could be used for radio and TV broadcasts, to include intrusive broadcasting, in the target country. THE APPROVAL PROCESS FOR PSYOP PRODUCTS D-29. The approval process for PSYOP products is as follows:
• Appropriate authority has approved a planned PSYOP campaign. Authority’s approval is required before the execution of any PSYOP. • The President and Secretary of Defense have approved a generic PSYOP support plan for NEO. The objectives and themes of the plan are generic enough to be applicable for all NEOs and flexible enough to quickly modify this preliminary PSYOP concept. The modification is consistent with crisis-specific policies, Country Team guidance, and the geographic combatant commander’s current military situation. • The geographic combatant commander’s PSYOP planners identify the desired parameters for the conduct of PSYOP in support of the geographic combatant commander’s NEO mission and the forces desired through the PSYOP appendix to the OPLAN or CONPLAN. The PSYOP appendix provides broad parameters of PSYOP objectives, themes, and target audiences. The PSYOP appendix is forwarded to the Joint Staff for coordination and approval. Upon approval, the Joint Staff notifies the geographic combatant commander and directs the


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COM USSOCOM to provide planning and execution support through a CJCS deployment order.
• An imperative of a successful PSYOP effort is the requirement for Country Team approval. The Country Team may grant approval during precrisis preparations. In addition, the PSYOP liaison officer attached to the FCE may seek approval. • In the PSYOP appendix, theater PSYOP planners will normally request delegation of PSYOP approval authority to respective CJTF upon receiving the CJCS execute order. The PSYOP campaign plan, which includes recommended products, programs, activities, and time lines, is submitted to the supported CJTF and/or geographic combatant commander for approval in accordance with theater policy. Upon approval by respective commander, the supporting PSYOP organization prepares and pre-positions products in anticipation of the CJCS execute order (and subsequent geographic combatant commander and CJTF execute orders).

D-30. Throughout the approval process, the senior PSYOP headquarters establishes and maintains liaison with all supported component commanders and other government agencies in-theater. All component commanders, if not serving as a JTF commander, may request products through their respective PSYOP liaison channels.


Appendix E

Sample Emergency Action Plan Checklists
This appendix contains sample checklists (Figures E-1 through E-5, pages E-1 through E-8) from 12 FAH-1 EPH. Checklists similar to these are normally found in an Embassy EAP.
CHECKLIST FOR U.S. MILITARY-ASSISTED EVACUATION 1. Name and title of American official in charge of the evacuation:

2. American officials remaining behind: (Attach list with names and means of contact.) 3. Post officials available to assist in the processing and evacuation: (Attach list of officials. See DOS Emergency Planning Handbook, Exhibit 120. Update the list to show name, probable location, and means of identification and contact information of officer performing each relevant function). 4. Where and at how many stations will the military be conducting screening of evacuees? Who will assist the military? 5. Is the environment permissive, uncertain, or hostile? 6. Perimeter security needs: embarkation points: assembly areas and

7. What security will host government or controlling authority provide?

8. If required, are alternate evacuation, assembly, or reception sites available? Where are the NEOPACKs located and who has custody of them?

9. Could unauthorized persons forcibly attempt to join the evacuation? If so, what action does the post recommend? 10. What action does the post propose if someone asks for political asylum?

11. Will the OIC of the post vouch for the baggage and personal property of all or some evacuees, or should a search for weapons and explosives be conducted?

Figure E-1. Sample Checklist for U.S. Military-Assisted Evacuation


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12. Does the post desire the military to physically search those evacuees for whom the post cannot vouch? 13. If it becomes necessary to physically search a woman, who can conduct the search? 14. If the evacuation priority is different than stated in the post plan, give the modified priority: 15. Will food be required? 16. Is potable water available? If yes, total meals: Quantity of bottled water required:

17. Does the post anticipate that any Americans will refuse evacuation? 18. What is the policy on evacuees taking pets? If evacuees are authorized to transport pets, have requirements such as customs and quarantine restrictions been considered to ensure the pets will be allowed into the safe haven? If pets are not allowed to travel, what will happen to the pets evacuees bring with them to the evacuation processing centers? 19. Does the post anticipate that military personnel will be needed to search for missing evacuees? If so, in which areas are evacuees likely to be located? (Give radio call sign frequencies, if known.) 20. Would a search operation meet armed resistance? 21. Will the post need help to destroy sensitive materials or equipment? 22. Portable radios available to assist in assembly, movement, and control of evacuees (consider all likely points): How many sets? What frequencies? Additional needs? 23. Who will prepare manifests of evacuees? Post: Military: 24. Other items that may affect NEO are: • Travel restrictions, curfew, and roadblocks. • Local military activities. • Political or security factors affecting evacuation. • Public affairs considerations. 25. If interpreters are needed, can Embassy provide them? 26. Provide updated copies of the post’s— • Emergency Planning Handbook, Section 1540, and exhibits for same. • Communications annex. • Logistics annex. • Transportation annex.
Figure E-1. Sample Checklist for U.S. Military-Assisted Evacuation (Continued)


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• •

F-77 (Potential Evacuees) Report. NEOPACKs.

27. Give number of evacuees who are— • Wounded, injured, or ill: litter • Wounded, injured, or ill: ambulatory • Pregnant 28. What medical assistance (to include special equipment) will be required? 29. Breakdown of evacuees by age and sex: 0–7 yr 8–16 yr 17–20 yr Male Female

21+ yr

30. Will doctor(s) and nurse(s) be among the evacuees? 31. Will any influential religious or community leaders be among the evacuees? 32. What are the weight and volume of any sensitive materials or equipment requiring evacuation: lb cu ft. NOTE: Attach an intelligence estimate of the local situation and HN military status.
Figure E-1. Sample Checklist for U.S. Military-Assisted Evacuation (Continued)

ASSEMBLY AREA LOCATION: Assembly Area Embarkation Point 1. Location: 2. Grid coordinates: 3. Reference points: 4. Size: 5. Shelter: 6. Cooking facilities: 7. Food stocks: Estimated people and days on hand: Water:

DATE: Primary Alternate

Estimated capacity:

Figure E-2. Sample Checklist for Assembly Area


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8. Latrine and shower: 9. Security: 10. Control point: 11. Telephone: 12. Access and choke points: Alternates: 13. Nearest police station: 14. Nearest medical facility: 15. Emergency power supply: 16. Distances to embarkation points: 17. If helicopter landing zone, identify: This report prepared by: Sketch attached Video attached Photo attached Radio call sign:

Figure E-2. Sample Checklist for Assembly Area (Continued)

HELICOPTER LANDING ZONE LOCATION: 1. Designator: 2. Location: 3. Grid and latitude and longitude: 4. Reference point(s): 5. *Dimensions: 6. Surface: 7. Obstacles: DATE:

8. Recommended air approach(es):
Figure E-3. Sample Checklist for Helicopter Landing Zone


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9. Recommended ground approach(es): 10. Distance(s) to assembly area(s):


This report prepared by:

Sketch attached Video attached Photo attached *The minimum size for an MH-47 LZ and MH-60 LZ is 100 x 100 feet.
Figure E-3. Sample Checklist for Helicopter Landing Zone (Continued)

AIRFIELD SURVEY LOCATION: 1. Name of airfield: 2. Location (map coordinates): 3. Fuel (type and availability): 4. Materials handling equipment: 5. Elevation: 6. Runway length: 7. Runway width: 8. Surface composition and estimated single-wheel loading factor: DATE:

9. Available parking area: 10. Largest aircraft accommodated: 11. Instrument approach facilities and navigation aids:

Figure E-4. Sample Checklist for Airfield Survey


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12. Aircraft obstacles:

13. Are runways and taxiways lighted? 14. Communications (frequencies and call signs used): 15. Physical security: 16. Is the airfield under civilian or military control?

17. Status of commercial air traffic into and out of the airfield during the period in issue:

18. Does the airfield meet International Civil Aviation Organization standards for signs, markings, and other applicable requirements?

19. What is the availability of air traffic controllers certified by the Federal Aviation Administration?

20. Key contacts: 21. Distance from assembly area to airport: Primary: Secondary: 22. Conditions of roads leading to airport:

23. Conditions and weight limits of bridges leading to airports:

24. On-site assembly areas and capacity:

25. Latrine and shower facilities: 26. Feeding facilities and capacity:
Figure E-4. Sample Checklist for Airfield Survey (Continued)


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27. Text or copy of description in “Airfield and Seaplane Stations of the World”:

This report prepared by: Sketch attached Video attached Photo attached

NOTE: Complete a separate form for each airfield considered feasible for use during an evacuation.
Figure E-4. Sample Checklist for Airfield Survey (Continued)

SEAPORT SURVEY LOCATION: 1. Name of seaport: 2. Location (map coordinates): 3. Entrance restrictions and minimum anchorage: 4. Channel depth, depending on season: 5. Tide, depending on season: 6. Pilots required or available: 7. Navigational aids: 8. Port or beach obstacles: 9. Wharf (description and capabilities): DATE:

10. Materials handling equipment: 11. Fuel (type and availability): 12. Physical security available and in use:

13. Distance from post to seaport:
Figure E-5. Sample Checklist for Seaport Survey


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14. Conditions of roads leading to the seaport:

15. Condition and weight limit of bridges leading to seaport:

16. On-site assembly areas and capacity:

17. Dining facilities and capacity: 18. Latrine and shower facilities: 19. Location of nearest medical facility: 20. Key contacts and key personnel:

This report prepared by: Sketch attached Video attached Photo(s) attached

Figure E-5. Sample Checklist for Seaport Survey (Continued)


Appendix F

This appendix provides information regarding the NEOPACK products produced by the National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA). The NEOPACK is a collection of products used in planning a NEO. It is a mission-planning tool for communication between the U.S military and U.S. diplomatic facilities during evacuation operations. The availability of NEOPACKs at diplomatic posts in foreign countries and at various military commands permits improved contingency planning and communication of information during emergencies.

F-1. NEOPACKS were first developed in the early nineteen-eighties following the Iran hostage crisis. Since that time, NIMA has developed products covering 144 countries that include 641 NEO sites within these countries. NEOPACs are reviewed on a one-, three-, or five-year cycle according to State Department and NIMA customer service guidance. F-2. The NEOPACK is available in two formats—hard copy or compact disk– read-only memory (CD-ROM). Currently, the CD-ROM version has not been developed for every country or NEO site. Therefore, until all locations are converted, the hard copy version may be the only available option. HARD COPY VERSION F-3. The hard copy version is the original NEOPACK format. The hard copy version provides a NEOPACK booklet along with a variety of charts, maps, and graphics. The content of the hard copy version of the NEOPACK includes the following:
• City products—graphics, image city maps, and digital image city maps. • Topographic line maps—1:25,000, 1:50,000, and 1:100,000. • Harbor and approach charts. • Combat charts. • Coastal charts. • Joint operations graphics. • Tactical pilot charts. • Operational navigation charts. • Nonstandard products—commercial and native maps.


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CD-ROM VERSION F-4. The CD-ROM version of the NEOPACK provides a digital supplement to the traditional hard copy NEOPACK. The CD-ROM version allows planners easy access to the wealth of digital data available to NIMA. CD-ROMs supply integrated NIMA products and intelligence information about selected NEO sites. These products and intelligence information cover urban and/or regional areas. These NIMA products are specifically designed to aid in evacuation planning. The CD-ROM has the following features:
• Facilitates 3D visualization. • Allows access to information without connection to the Internet. • Presents a foundation for the overlay of mission-specific data and intelligence information. • Offers a level of detail for urban mission planning. • Integrates NIMA data into commercial off-the-shelf software.

F-5. The digital data found on the CD-ROM include the following:
• Automated air facility information file (AAFIF). • Digital vertical obstruction file (DVOF). • Digital terrain elevation data (DTED). • Digital nautical charts (DNCs). • Imagery coverage. • Foundation feature data (FFD). • Urban vector map data. • Vector map data.

F-6. To order a NEOPACK or present questions on current NEOPACK distribution, contact either the Defense Supply Center/Defense Logistics Agency at commercial (comm) (804) 279-6505 or Defense Switched Network (DSN) 695-6577. Another source is the NIMA NEOPACK distribution office at comm (703) 264-7359.


Appendix G

NEO Planning Guidance
This appendix provides questions that may be used to provide a common framework for evacuation planning and operations. These questions may serve as focus for the detailed planning and operational dialog between diplomats and military forces that must precede any successful evacuation operation.

G-1. The S-1 should consider the following questions:
• Who will screen the evacuees? • Are there Embassy personnel assigned to screen? • Are there any evacuees (for example, wardens) who will be able to help with processing and screening? • What are the JTF requirements for screening? • Have the screening and processing areas been verified? • What action should be taken if someone asks for political asylum? • Will it be necessary to search the baggage and personal property of all evacuees for weapons or explosives? • Who will be available to physically search female evacuees? • What proof of U.S. citizenship is acceptable? • Are there any changes in the standard priorities for evacuation? • Will the U.S. Embassy be able to assign evacuation priorities before it schedules the evacuation? • Are any animals (pets) prohibited from traveling on the designated transportation? Have restrictions concerning animals been identified at the safe haven location?

G-2. The S-2 should consider the following questions:
• What is the current situation in the country? In the Embassy? Near the U.S. citizens? • Are there any members of the JTF, or anyone reasonably available, who have been in the HN recently? • Is there any intelligence needed immediately from the evacuees? • What discipline problems are expected from the evacuees? Who are the potential troublemakers?


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• Is there any sensitive equipment or material that will need to be evacuated or destroyed? Will personnel with requisite clearances be required to help evacuate or destroy sensitive equipment or material? • Who are the key HN personnel, and what are their attitudes toward the evacuation? • Where are the HN police forces located? Are they available and capable? Are they loyal to the host government or are they hostile to the United States? Is there factional infighting? • Where are the HN fire services located? Are they available and capable? • Where are the HN military forces located? Are they available and capable? Are they loyal to the host government or are they hostile to the United States? Is factional infighting present? • Will the host government be providing any security for the assembly areas of evacuation sites? Where are the assembly areas located? Which unit will provide security, and what will be the size of the security force? • What is the potential threat? What are the strength, composition, disposition, weapons capability, and probable tactics of the potential threat? • Will interpreter support be available from the Embassy or the HN? • Who provides country studies for JTF with information such as landing zones, concentration of U.S. citizens, port facilities, and landing beaches? How will this information be transmitted to JTF? • Who will provide climatological, meteorological, and oceanographic information? • Are map products of the JOA and the Embassy compound available? What are the sources? • Who controls and ensures familiarity with NEOPACKs and other geographic information?

G-3. The S-3 should consider the following questions:
• Will this be a permissive, uncertain, or hostile NEO? If the evacuation is permissive, are unarmed hostilities expected? If the evacuation is uncertain or hostile, will pursuit forces be necessary? What is the likelihood of terrorist activities? • What multinational forces will be operating in the area? Are multinational forces integrated into the JTF plan? How are plans being deconflicted if the evacuations are separate? • Who is the senior U.S. official in charge of the evacuation operation? • Who will give the JTF permission to complete the evacuation and to leave the evacuation site? • What is the chain of command for U.S. military forces? • What is the relationship between the CJTF and the Ambassador?


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• Will all U.S. mission and/or Embassy officials be leaving? If not, who will remain? What action should be taken when an Embassy official refuses evacuation? • Who makes the final determination of evacuee accounting before final evacuation departure? • Is the Embassy’s EAP available? Is it up to date? • Who is the primary point of contact within the Embassy to work with the JTF on details of the operation? • What steps are being taken by the Embassy to get the evacuees ready for evacuation? • Have the primary and alternate assembly areas, evacuation sites, and routes been verified and surveyed? • What is the total number of U.S. personnel to be evacuated? • What action should be taken concerning individuals not on the list of evacuees (for example, TCNs)? What is the total number of TCNs to be evacuated, and what is their total number per priority category? What ID is required for TCNs? • What will be the composition of the evacuees? Will there be a cross section of those listed in the EAP? • What action should be taken if there is an outbreak of violence among evacuees? • Will JTF search teams be sent after missing evacuees? • What are the ROE for the JTF? • What is the guidance on the use of PSYOP? • What is the role of Civil Affairs in NEO? • Does the JTF have permission to drop sensors? • Have all requirements for the strategic transportation system been directed to the United States Transportation Command center and/or crisis action team? • What is the best means of transportation to evacuate personnel? Can commercial airlift provide more timely evacuation than deploying U.S. military assets? Have air requirements for units and equipment been identified in the Joint Operation Planning Execution System? Are U.S. naval assets readily available to stage off the coast? • What are the appropriate command and control arrangements if the NEO is conducted as a combined operation? • What support is available from other U.S. sources? • What support is required by other U.S. agencies? • What support is available from other participating nations? • What support is required by other participating nations? • Are trained explosive ordnance disposal personnel available through the HN? • What are the ROE?


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• Is an ISB available? Where? How extensive are its facilities and support capabilities? • Will the Ambassador allow an FCE to deploy?

G-4. The S-4 should consider the following questions:
• What are the arrangements for evacuee housing, security, and transfer? Where should the evacuee housing be located, and how much housing is needed: If required, what type and quantity of clothing is needed: What type and quantity of food is needed? Will protective clothing be required? Will food be required? • Are there procedures to handle claims against U.S. civilians? • If required, who will provide an emergency resupply of ammunition for the advance party? • Will transportation support be available from the Embassy or the HN? Where is the transportation located and what condition is it in? What type of transportation is needed, and what type is available? How many people can the available transportation carry? Are operators required?

G-5. The S-5 should answer the following questions:
• What is the attitude of the local population toward U.S. personnel? Will the local population help or hinder U.S. operations? • What support is available from HN civil authorities? • What support is available from international organizations represented in the area? • What cultural nuances and customs should be known by the JTF evacuation force to avoid confrontation?

G-6. The communications-electronics following questions: personnel should consider the
• What communications support will be available from the Embassy, and how will the communication architecture be set up to support the operations (that is, networks, frequencies, secure equipment, or relays)? • Can portable communications equipment be sent to the Embassy to facilitate improved and secure communication? • How will outstations (safe haven site, marshalling elements, security elements) talk to headquarters JSOTF?


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G-7. The medical officer should consider the following questions:
• Will medical support be available from the Embassy or HN? Have MEDEVAC procedures been coordinated with the HN? Where are the HN health services? What are the capabilities of the HN and Embassy health services? • What is the policy concerning seriously wounded evacuees? Should they be given precedence over all other evacuees? What is the physical condition of all evacuees? Are aeromedical evacuation assets required? If so, is there a need to prestage those assets nearby, and what are the medical evacuation procedures? • Which evacuees have special medical needs such as pregnancy, infectious disease, exceptional family member, or pediatric health care problems?

G-8. The PAO should consider the following questions:
• Who will prepare the PA plan? How often will it be updated? Who is the lead PA director? Will media representatives be evacuated? • Are there areas from which the media have restricted access? Is there a media support plan? • What coordination has been made with the HN media to support the NEO and/or the NEO PSYOP plan? • Will the HN media provide support for the NEO and/or the NEO PSYOP plan?

G-9. Because each NEO is unique, situations may arise that require special considerations. JTF personnel should be briefed and prepared to deal with the following:
• Questions concerning use of deadly force or a given weapon system in a given situation. When is deadly force authorized? • Interpretation of the ROE. • Hostile detainees who present themselves or are captured by the JTF. • Civil disturbance, from passive resistance or civil disobedience to violence. • Terrorism. • Bomb threats. • Snipers. • Nonambulatory evacuees. • Language problems. • Religious problems. • Potential evacuee’s name not on list provided by the Embassy but appearing to be a bona fide evacuee.


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• Deaths of evacuees and evacuation of remains. • Listed evacuees or unlisted potential evacuees with unknown IDs. • Evacuees carrying contraband and disposition of the contraband. • Overwhelming numbers of civilians coming to assembly areas or at the evacuation sites to request evacuation. • Listed evacuee refusing evacuation. • Evacuee trying to give bribes to gain favor. • Inaccurate evacuation lists. • Large numbers of international journalists converging on the area.


Appendix H

Sample Unified Command PA Plan for a NEO (HN)
This appendix includes a sample unified command PA plan for a NEO (HN) that provides PA guidance. The sample plan is shown in Figure H-1, pages H-1 through H-9.
Section I. Situation, Mission, Execution, and Security 1. Situation. a. General. This plan provides specific PA guidance, PA tasking, and overall concept of operations for in-theater U.S. military PA activities conducted in support of the evacuation of American citizens, TCNs, and selected host country nationals from a foreign (host) nation. The COM has authority over media coverage of the NEO in the HN. He may authorize coverage contrary to the commander’s desires. b. Policy. Pursue a vigorous PA program to keep U.S. and international publics informed of NEOs to the maximum extent possible consistent with OPSEC and personnel safety. The PA mission seeks to allow the JTF commander to conduct the mission in a manner that safeguards lives of assigned personnel and OPSEC while keeping the American public informed through the news media. c. Assumptions. (1) News media pools will not deploy for this operation. (2) Media coverage and PA notification is authorized. (3) Open media coverage in HN is possible. 2. Mission. a. Contribute to public confidence in U.S. procedures for this operation by providing the media access to unclassified, timely, and accurate accounts of the operation. b. Accurately describe the operation as effective use of flexible U.S. military force for an evacuation of noncombatants endangered by a hostile environment. c. Characterize U.S. military involvement in this operation as nonconfrontational and humanitarian. d. Illustrate U.S. forces’ capabilities and readiness, as well as their professionalism. e. Promote accurate media coverage of NEOs. 3. Execution. a. Concept of Operations. This plan outlines PA support for any COA. Because the situation can rapidly deteriorate from a permissive to a hostile environment, be prepared to support each COA separately, sequentially, or concurrently. (1) General. A PAO deploys with theater military forces and serves as the JTF commander’s spokesman when there is on-scene media coverage of the operation. (2) Media Coverage and Opportunities. Anticipate that initial media coverage will focus on evacuees and their reaction to departing (HN). Expect focus to then turn to effectiveness of a military NEO and treatment of evacuees during transport and final destination. Access to and interviews with evacuees will be as authorized by the senior on-scene State Department PA representative. The JTF PAO and commanders concerned will authorize any interviews with U.S. military personnel. The following list of media opportunities for the possible COAs is not intended to be an exhaustive list nor should it be used to limit additional coverage in any way. Anticipate additional opportunities under each COA. (a) Media opportunities for permissive and uncertain evacuation include— • Interviews, as appropriate, and photo opportunities of evacuees awaiting transport from assembly areas to ECC and point of embarkation (POE). Figure H-1. Sample of Unified Command PA Plan for NEO (HN)


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• Interviews and photo opportunities with military personnel at ECC and POE. • Photo opportunities of evacuees departing assembly areas en route to and arriving at ECC, preparing to depart and departing, and arriving at safe haven. • Photo opportunities of aircrews conducting NEOs and interviews with aircrews about the operations and how they prepared for it. • Photo opportunities of military personnel as they prepare to secure, and of secure assembly areas and/or ECC and POE. • Photo opportunities of American Embassy evacuees preparing to depart and departing Embassy, and interviews with senior Embassy spokespersons and/or officials. (b) Media opportunities for hostile evacuation include— • Interviews and photo opportunities with military personnel who secured assembly areas and POE. • Interviews and photo opportunities with evacuees at assembly areas awaiting transport to ECC and POE while en route to, arriving at and departing POE, and en route to and arriving at safe haven. • Photo opportunities of Embassy evacuees preparing to depart and departing Embassy and interviews with senior Embassy spokespersons or officials (c) The media will be given the chance to cover all aspects of NEOs. Personal safety is not a reason for excluding the media from an area of ongoing operations. The goal, as far as possible, should be to treat reporters as members of the units, allowing them to move with the units without recklessly exposing them to hostile fire. Security at source applies. Personal safety and OPSEC for U.S. forces and evacuees are paramount. (d) Media representatives will receive cooperation from all forces participating in the operation on a not-to-interfere basis to keep the American public informed of the activities of the U.S. Armed Forces. This will include reasonable access to key command and staff personnel for briefings and interviews. (e) As feasible, the JTF commander will ensure media representatives are given needed military support to facilitate their reporting on the operation. He will help media representatives file their stories and products, including granting them access to military communications facilities where feasible when commercial facilities are not available. (3) SITREP Requirement. JTF PAO will provide daily PA input, as appropriate, to JTF SITREP and ensure unified command PA, Secretary of State, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs (OASD-PA), Joint Staff, and component PAs are included in the message plain language address dictionary (PLAD). ITREP should include assessment of media coverage, number of news media representatives present, text of communiqués, and any other significant issues or events. (4) After Action Evaluation. A written after action report with lessons learned will be submitted to OASD-PA by the unified command PA within 60 days of completion of the operation. This report will outline procedures that worked well, define problem areas, and provide proposed solutions. b. Tasks. The commands and agencies indicated will complete the following tasks: (1) Request that OASD-PA do the following: (a) Confirm that information and combat camera visual documentation release authority resides with unified command PA. (b) Provide ongoing changes to approved PA guidance to unified command PA. (2) Unified command PA will do the following: (a) Retain theater PA responsibility for noncombatant evacuation operations. (b) Carry out an active PA program, in collaboration with Embassy (HN) and DOS representatives, consistent with personnel safety and OPSEC. (c) Coordinate initial announcement, questions, and answers with appropriate U.S. Embassy representatives and OASD-PA. (d) Provide JTF PAO. (e) Provide unified command PA representative to direct and coordinate PA operations at POE.

Figure H-1. Sample Unified Command PA Plan for NEO (HN) (Continued)


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(3) Component commands will implement internal information program in support of this operation. (4) Component PA will provide PA and visual information documentation (VIDOC) support to unified command PA representatives as required to facilitate news media coverage of evacuees arriving at POE. (5) Embassy (HN) will provide coordination and assistance to JTF PAO as feasible and appropriate. (6) TF PA will do the following: (a) Provide comprehensive, unclassified operational briefings for media representatives in (HN) if operationally feasible. (b) Direct local JTF PA activities in coordination with Embassy (HN) press officer. (c) Provide copies or text of unclassified PA news releases or operational summaries to unified command PA. c. Coordinating Instructions for Release of Information. (1) The initial public release of information will be made concurrently by the Embassy (HN), unified command PA, and at their discretion, appropriate national authorities in Washington, D.C. (2) Information about this operation will not be released by any military command until after the initial release is made. Unless otherwise directed by the geographic combatant commander, or unified command PA, all supporting commands involved in the NEO will forward queries and proposed responses to unified command PA or the JTF PAO for clearance before public release. Release authority may be delegated to subordinate commands, if requested. (3) Security classification of information will be in accordance with current DOD and State Department security directives. All interviews will be “on the record.” (4) If the geographic combatant commander delegates release authority, component commanders may issue statements and news releases within the context of approved PA guidance and information previously released. The geographic combatant commander may delegate original release authority to the JTF. The JTF PA maintains records of releases, press conferences, and responses to queries and provides significant information to the geographic combatant commander by the fastest available means. News conferences and interviews will be recorded on tape. (5) The right and privacy of individuals will be protected according to applicable directives. No evacuee will be required to grant a media interview or photo without his consent. (6) All media requests for interviews with military personnel involved in this operation will be coordinated through unified command PA, its representatives, or the JTF PAO. (7) Transcripts or accurate accounts of news conferences and interviews will be forwarded to unified command PA and OASD-PA by the fastest available means. 4. Security of Operations and Personnel. a. Hostile Evacuation. In a hostile evacuation, implementing this PA plan may present a variety of problems in maintaining a balance between security and release of information to the public. This will not preclude providing all possible assistance to the media to support their coverage of the operation. b. Guidelines to Follow When Correspondents are Present. (1) Media must not have access to intelligence centers or other classified areas or information. (2) “Off the record” statements will not be made in briefings or discussions with members of the media. Public or media knowledge of any classified activity associated with an operation does not imply that the information is unclassified or may be released or confirmed. (3) Security at the source applies. c. Operations Security. All PA activities will comply with OPSEC. 5. Combat Documentation (COMDOC) or VIDOC. COMDOC and VIDOC are operations functions. During an operation, COMDOC or VIDOC is required for use in official briefings, for service to visual and audio media that are not in the area, for internal information programs, and for later PA use, such as stock footage. The following guidelines apply to providing coverage of the operation: • Before executing NEOs, unified command operations arrange to deploy a combat camera team. • The JTF PAO provides the VIDOC team guidance on PA VIDOC requirements. • VIDOC material is dispatched in a timely manner to the combat camera center (CCC) at POE. Deploying teams ensure the following dispatch procedures are as follows: • Shipments containing video tape, unprocessed film, and sound tapes with captions must be addressed to CCC. Ship VIDOC products to POE via military transport from POE. Initial VIDOC products must be on first and fastest transport.

Figure H-1. Sample Unified Command PA Plan for NEO (HN) (Continued)


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The CCC will ensure VIDOC products are processed, edited, and reproduced quickly and forwarded to the unified command PA representative. The unified command PA representative releases the VIDOC products locally and forwards copies to OASD-PA, as appropriate. JTF PAO ensures that aircrew member, by name, is responsible for material en route for delivery to unified command PA representative. Shipment must be marked “EXPOSED FILM—DO NOT X-RAY.” Complete caption data are included. 6. Internal Information. Commanders and PA officers make maximum use of command information resources to explain the NEO within the bounds of what is releasable to the external public. Section II. General Ground Rules for the Media. 7. General. a. The principle of maximum information flow to the public is to be followed, consistent with OPSEC and personnel safety. However, situations may arise where correspondents gain possession of information not yet officially released under the rules of this section. Such information is not to be transmitted or publicly released until officially coordinated and cleared for release. b. The movements of correspondents will, at times, be restricted in certain areas. These restrictions will be kept to a minimum, but they will be applied by the JTF and/or his PAO when the security of the operation warrants. The JTF PAO will advise correspondents of restrictions. c. Any violation of the conditions or ground rules by a correspondent will be regarded as a basis for withdrawal of support. 8. Ground Rules. a. Releasing Authority. The geographic combatant commander’s PA or JTF PAO will make available information concerning the protection and evacuation of noncombatants cleared for official release to the media through one of the following means: (1) Press releases. (2) Press briefings or conferences. (3) Special press handouts. (4) Interviews. b. Categories of Releasable Information Following Initial Official Release. (1) Confirmation that U.S. forces are participating in the emergency protection and evacuation of American citizens, TCNs, and selected HN nationals. (2) Confirmation of evacuation vehicles, ships, or aircraft plainly visible to the media during the operation. (3) Nonsensitive, unclassified details of the operation. (4) Approximate number of noncombatants to be evacuated. (5) Approximate friendly force strength figures. (6) Casualty figures, if any. Names of casualties or fatalities will not be released until confirmation of next of kin notification. c. Categories of Information not Releasable. (1) Information regarding classified aspects of the NEO plan or the operation. (2) Information on the vulnerabilities, weaknesses, or shortfalls of operational command, control, personnel, or support. (3) Details of ROE for security personnel, military and civilian, assigned to the operation. (4) Information on intelligence collection activities, methods, targets, and results. (5) In hostile action, information on missing or downed aircraft or ships while search and rescue operations are planned or in progress. (6) Listing of all U.S. elements involved in the operations. Figure H-1. Sample Unified Command PA Plan for NEO (HN) (Continued)


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Section III. Media Statements for COAs 9. Proposed Statements, Questions, and Answers. Proposed statements, questions, and answers for each COA are outlined below. Statements, questions, and answers are declassified upon public release. 10. COA 1 PA Guidance. PA guidance for COA 1 includes the statement for release in paragraph a concurrent with initiation of the COA and OASD-PA approval. a. “In view of the military coup and continued unrest in (HN) and the potential danger to U.S. citizens, the U.S. government has authorized evacuation of U.S. and other third country personnel desiring to leave (HN). To assist with the evacuation, the unified command has dispatched military aircraft and personnel at risk. As a result of the unrest, voluntary evacuation at this time is prudent.” b. Questions and answers for use overall are: Q1. How many people are being evacuated? A1. Because it is a voluntary evacuation, assessing exactly how many people may desire to leave is difficult. There are approximately (to be determined [TBD]) private Americans, (TBD) U.S. government employees, and (TBD) U.S. government dependents living and working in (HN). There are also (TBD) Peace Corps volunteers. Plans are to evacuate other people as well, including personnel from other countries. Q2. Are there any indications of threats of violence directed specifically against Americans in (HN)? A2. No, there are not. It is strictly an internal matter and has not threatened any citizens of other countries now living in (HN). Q3. Are American military personnel supporting the government forces? A3. No, American military personnel have been dispatched only to support the evacuation of U.S. and third country personnel. Q4. Are U.S. military personnel armed? A4. U.S. forces are prepared to defend themselves. They are armed to provide security to evacuees and assembly and departure points such as the airport. Q5. How are Americans being evacuated? A5. Evacuees are being flown out on military aircraft from the (TBD) airport near (TBD). Q6. Where are the evacuees going? A6. Those evacuated on C-141 aircraft will be flown to airport (TBD). Those evacuated by C-130 aircraft will first be flown to the (TBD) airport in (TBD) and then to (TBD). Q7. Was the action coordinated with the government of (HN)? A7. (TBD) by State Department. Q8. Why has the U.S. government issued a travel advisory for (HN)? A8. (TBD). Q9. Is this an evacuation? A9. Yes. Q10. Is the local airport open? A10. The airport has been closed to regular traffic. Q11. Are you taking private Americans out with the diplomats? A11. Yes. The staff at the U.S. Embassy in (HN) will assist private American citizens in (HN) who wish to leave. We are urging American citizens in (HN) to contact the Embassy. We are using our warden system to advise all American citizens in (HN) to consider leaving the country and to keep them abreast of all developments. Q12. What about TCNs? A12. Obviously, our first obligation is to U.S. citizens and their immediate family members. We have asked other embassies to coordinate efforts on behalf of their own citizens. Q13. Have you received any requests from other countries to take their people out? A13. We have received a few requests. Q14. Are we coordinating with other countries? A14. Yes. We are in close contact with other embassies in (HN). Q15. What happens to private Americans once they get to (TBD)? A15. We will help evacuees make onward travel plans to their final destination. Q16. Are they on their own from there on? Figure H-1. Sample Unified Command PA Plan for NEO (HN) (Continued)


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A16. Yes. Q17. Who pays for the departure of private Americans and third country nationals? A17. As in all such evacuations, Americans will be required to sign promissory notes to cover the cost of their transportation. Q18. What about Peace Corps members? Are they ordered out, too? Would they go out with our diplomats and dependents? A18. Yes. The Peace Corps volunteers will depart with other Americans. Q19. Is this a one-shot effort, or are we making contingency plans for further flights and convoys if the need arises? A19. We are planning to evacuate all Americans who desire to depart (HN). No arrangements have been made at this time for future contingencies. We urge all Americans to depart now. Q20. How many Embassy employees will remain in (HN)? A20. (TBD) Embassy employees are expected to remain. Q21. What is the U.S. Ambassador’s name? A21. The Ambassador’s name is (TBD). Q22. Does this operation have a nickname? A22. Yes, it is operation (TBD). Q23. Do you anticipate any problems removing the Americans from (HN)? A23. No. Q24. Who is the commander of the JTF? A24. The commander of the JTF is (TBD). Q25. What are the units conducting the NEO? A25. Elements from (TBD). 11. COA 2 PA Guidance. PA guidance for COA 2 includes the following statement for release concurrent with initiation of the operation. a. “Seizure of the airfield is necessary to allow for evacuation of American and third country noncombatants from (HN). Rebel and government forces in (HN) have not specifically targeted Americans. However, fighting has prevented those desiring to leave from doing so. The military action was ordered to save lives, protect endangered American citizens, and ensure evacuation to safe havens.” b. Additional questions and answers to COA 2 are: Q26. Why are SOF being used in (HN)? A26. These forces provide the commander in chief with the flexibility needed to provide security for American citizens during this unstable situation. Q27. How long will U.S. forces be deployed? A27. Only as long as necessary. Q28. Were any additional combat forces brought from (TBD)? A28. No. Q29. Can the media accompany the SOF or interview individuals? A29. Requests will be taken case-by-case and accommodated if possible. Section IV. Joint Information Bureau (JIB) 12. General. This section outlines the responsibilities of the JIB during the employment of a U.S. joint task force (JTF) or other major U.S. forces to conduct contingency NEOs within the unified command AOR. 13. Objectives. The objectives of the JIB are to— • Provide a balanced PA program that supports the policies and objectives of the U.S. government. • Coordinate PA activities at all levels under the guidance of the geographic combatant commander. • Keep the public informed of contingency NEO by providing the media with timely unclassified information to the maximum extent possible consistent with OPSEC and personnel safety. Figure H-1. Sample Unified Command PA Plan for NEO (HN) (Continued)


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14. JIB Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the JIB are: • Verify media correspondents’ credentials, and operate a badging system. • Support on-scene commander’s news briefings and press conferences, as required. • Escort media to PA activities such as photo opportunities, briefings, and press conferences. • Request official still photo and video combat documentation coverage of evacuation operations for PA purposes. • Serve as clearinghouse for news releases, photographs, and audiovisual and visual information products. • Produce news analyses and summaries, and issue consolidated reports to the OASD-PA, unified command, and appropriate COM, as required.Produce transcripts of all media briefings, interviews, press conferences, and so forth. • Respond to media queries quickly (goal is within 2 hours) and maintain logs of media queries and responses. • Ensure all speakers or briefers are fully informed on PA policy and guidance. • Provide guidance concerning PA requirements to assigned military audiovisual and combat camera teams. 15. Service Component Tasks. The JIB provides public information personnel, as requested. 16. JTF PAO and JIB Director Responsibilities. The responsibilities of the JTF PAO and JIB director are: • Review, update, and prepare appropriate plans for the employment phases, including the request for PA augmentation, if required. • Deploy with the JTF commander or advance echelon. • Establish the JIB in the final staging or forward operating area, and conduct an active information program based on guidance from Department of Defense, Department of State, and theater geographic combatant commander. • Serve as the principal PA advisor to the JTF commander. • Coordinate PA matters with the appropriate American diplomatic or U.S. Information Service representative in the HN. • Supervise all military PA activities in the area of operations and schedule, as appropriate, press briefings and news conferences. Support an active command or internal information program. Section V. Principles of Information for News Media Coverage of DOD Operations 17. Coverage. a. Open and independent reporting will be the principal means of coverage of U.S. military operations. Pools are not to serve as the standard means of covering U.S. military operations. They may, however, provide the only feasible means of early access to a military operation. b. Pools should be as large as possible and disbanded at the earliest opportunity—within 24 to 35 hours, when possible. The arrival of early access pools will not cancel the principle of independent coverage for journalists already in the area. Even under conditions of open coverage, pools may be appropriate for specific events, such as those at extremely remote locations or where space is limited. 18. Combat Zone. Journalists in a combat zone will be credentialed by the U.S. military and required to abide by a clear set of military security ground rules that protect U.S. forces and their operations. Violation of the ground rules can result in suspension of credentials and expulsion from the combat zone of the journalist involved. News organizations will make their best efforts to assign experienced journalists to combat operations and to make them familiar with U.S. military operations. 19. Access. Journalists will be provided access to all major military units. Special operations restrictions may limit access in some cases. Military PA officers should act as liaison but should not interfere with the reporting process. 20. Transportation and Facilities. a. Under conditions of open coverage, field commanders should be instructed to permit journalists to ride on military vehicles and aircraft whenever feasible. The military will be responsible for the transportation of pools. Figure H-1. Sample Unified Command PA Plan for NEO (HN) (Continued)


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b. Consistent with its capabilities, the military will supply PAOs with facilities to enable timely, secure, compatible transmission of pool material and will make these facilities available whenever possible for filing independent coverage. When government facilities are unavailable, journalists will, as always, file by any other means available. The military will not ban communications systems operated by news media organizations, but electromagnetic OPSEC in battlefield situations may require limited restrictions on the use of such systems. NOTE: The principles discussed in Section V also apply to the operations of the standing DOD National Media Pool system. Figure H-1. Sample Unified Command PA Plan for NEO (HN) (Continued)


Appendix I

Evacuee Processing T&EOs
This appendix contains the T&EOs for the ECC processing (Figures I-1 through I-10, pages I-3 through I-28). However, the T&EOs in Figures I-1 through I-7 do not include the supporting individual tasks. T&EOs are the foundation of the mission training plan (MTP) and the collective training of the company. T&EOs are training objectives (task, conditions, and standards) for all collective tasks necessary to perform evacuee processing. Units tasked to conduct a NEO should also consult their appropriate unit MTP and standing operating procedures.

I-1. The T&EOs in this appendix are listed in Table I-1, page I-2, and are a composite of NEO T&EOs produced by 1-10th SFG(A), 2-3d SFG(A), and 75th Ranger Regiment. The T&EOs are prepared for collective tasks that support critical ECC operations. Each T&EO contains the following:
• Element. This identifies the unit that performs the task. • Task. This is a description of the work or action to be performed by the unit.

ƒ Task number. The task number is in parentheses following the task title. The number identifies the task throughout the MTP. ƒ References. The references for each task are in parentheses following the task number. The primary reference is underlined. The underlined reference contains the most information concerning the task. If there is only one reference, it is not underlined.
• Iteration. This is used to identify how many times the task is performed and evaluated during training. • Commander/leader assessment. This is used by the unit leadership to assess the proficiency of the unit in performing the task to standard. The unit leadership circles a rating each time the leadership assesses the task. The unit leadership then uses the ratings to establish their future training strategy for that task. The ratings are as follows:

ƒ T – Trained. The unit is trained and has demonstrated its proficiency in accomplishing the task. The unit’s training strategy is: sustainment training every 6 months will suffice. ƒ P – Needs practice. Performance has demonstrated that the unit does not achieve standard without some difficulty or has failed to perform some task steps to standard. The unit's training strategy is: practice the task.


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ƒ U – Untrained. The unit cannot demonstrate an ability to achieve proficiency. The unit’s training strategy is: include the task within the next quarter training program, and develop a comprehensive strategy to address it.
• Condition. This statement describes the contingency environment in which the task is performed. It also lists the equipment, manuals, or supervision necessary to perform the task. The condition begins with an initiating cue. • Training notes. This statement informs the unit that in a few cases expected conditions can significantly change the way the unit performs a task (night, day, or limited visibility). • Task standard. This statement prescribes the overall task criteria the unit must meet to receive credit for successful task execution. • Task steps. These task steps are actions or events that the unit performs sequentially. Each task step identifies the leader, individuals, unit, or element responsible for performing that step. An asterisk identifies leader task steps. • Performance measures. These measures identify how well the unit must perform the task for the desired outcome. Detailed measures are listed for each task step. • GO and NO-GO columns. The commander or evaluator uses these columns to record the results achieved in executing task steps.

I-2. The unit commander can use a T&EO to train a single task. However, he can use a single T&EO in sequence with other T&EOs to train and evaluate a larger group of tasks, such as a field training exercise or situational training exercise. Table I-1. NEO T&EO Tasks and Task Numbers Task Title Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center Establish and Operate a Reception Station Establish and Operate a Security Screening Station Establish and Operate a Registration Station Establish and Operate a Medical Screening/EMT Station Establish and Operate a Transportation Station Establish and Operate a Debriefing Station (Optional) Establish and Operate a Holding Area Establish and Operate a Temporary Refugee Holding Area Establish and Operate a Comfort Station Conduct Security Element Activities in Support of a Processing Center Task Number NEO-001 NEO-002 NEO-003 NEO-004 NEO-005 NEO-006 NEO-007 NEO-008 NEO-009 NEO-010 NEO-011


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ELEMENT: Evacuation Control Center TASK: Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (NEO-001) (FM 3-05.104) ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 T 5 P (CIRCLE) U (CIRCLE)


CONDITIONS: Given an order from higher HQ requiring establishment of a processing center within a specified time, and provided a designated center location with or without permanent facilities. TASK STANDARDS: The reception station, registration station, medical screening/EMT station, transportation station, and security element are fully operational within a specified time of receipt of order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The operational environment is permissive to uncertain. TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES *1. Processing team OIC develops the plan for the layout of the processing center. A generic schematic of a processing center is shown in Figure 5-1. Each processing station is sequentially ordered to support an orderly and logical flow to processing similar to the preboarding procedures for a civilian airline. The plan includes the following: a. Reception station (NEO-002). b. Security screening station (NEO-003). c. Registration station (NEO-004). d. Medical station (NEO-005). e. Transportation station (NEO-006). f. Debriefing station (optional) (NEO-007). g. Holding areas (hostile, unknown, and evacuees) (NEO-008). h. Temporary Refugee Holding Area (NEO-009). i. Latrine(s) (NEO-010). j. Security element (NEO-011).
Figure I-1. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center




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Figure 5-1. Processing Center Schematic

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES *2. ECC OIC orders stations to establish a processing center. The stations perform the following tasks before processing: a. Physically secure ECC. b. Erect physical barriers. c. Implement crowd control measures. d. Establish link-up with the ECC TOC, security element, and marshalling force. e. Prepare signs to identify routes and stations.



Figure I-1. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (Continued)


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TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES f. Mark station boundaries (engineer tape, and so on). g. Check and ready equipment for processing. h. Brief processors and escorts on responsibilities and responses to possible dilemmas (Figure 5-2). i. Establish amnesty boxes and sites. j. Place control or guards at all access points to the center. k. If possible, have a female available for female searches (MPs or AF security forces are recommended). l. Have designated guards or guides for latrine usage. m. Locate EOD pit near inspection area. n. Ensure there are interpreter or language cards at each station. o. Ensure refreshments and food are available. p. Ensure handcuffs and restraints are available. q. Ensure public address system is operational. r. Ensure limited health and comfort items for evacuees (for example, supplies for women and children) are available. s. Ensure travel comfort items (motion sickness bags, antinauseants, and hearing protection) are available. t. Establish special holding area for persons requiring thorough inspections, special handling, detention, and so on. u. Establish and monitor secure FM voice communications with the ECC and TOC.



When is deadly force authorized? Use of weapon system (Mark-19 or mortar). Hostile detainee who presents himself or is captured by the evacuation force. Civil disturbance from passive resistance or civil disobedience through violence. Terrorism. Snipers.
Figure 5-2. Possible Dilemmas Figure I-1. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (Continued)


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Nonambulatory evacuees. Evacuee with special medical needs: pregnancy, infectious diseases, exceptional family member as pediatric health care problems. Evacuee suffering from trauma resulting from current situation. Language problems. Religious problems. Potential evacuee name not on list provided by the embassy but appearing to be bona fide evacuee. Deaths of evacuees; evacuation of remains. Evacuee carrying contraband, and disposition of the contraband. Evacuee carrying weapon, both authorized and unauthorized, and disposition of both. Evacuee desiring to bring a pet. Evacuee desiring to bring excess luggage. Overwhelming numbers of civilians presenting themselves at assembly areas or at the evacuation site to request evacuation. Listed evacuee refusing evacuation. Listed non-U.S. government employee/evacuee refusing to sign waiver. Classified courier needing segregation. Treatment of VIPs versus other evacuees, both U.S. and HN. Disruptive evacuee. Evacuee attempting to give bribe to gain favor. Inaccurate evacuation lists. Note: Dilemma response will be mission-specific.
Figure 5-2. Possible Dilemmas (Continued) Figure I-1. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (Continued)


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*3. Processing team OIC orders stations to conduct processing. The following tasks are accomplished during evacuee processing: a. Establish and operate a reception station (NEO-002). b. Establish and operate a security screening station (NEO-003). c. Establish and operate a registration station (NEO-004). d. Establish and operate a medical station (NEO-005). e. Establish and operate a transportation station (NEO-006). f. Conduct security element activities in support of a processing center (NEO-011). g. Protect force and evacuees from direct and indirect fire. h. Complete prioritized roster of all evacuees. i. Treat evacuees with courtesy—maintain strict control, high military appearance, and a nonaggressive attitude to evacuees, but maintain a strict military bearing. Note: The DOS representative or the representative from the Embassy's consular affairs office must be prepared to decide what to do with unauthorized evacuees; for example, turn custody of them over to host nation paramilitary/police.

Figure I-1. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a NEO Processing Center (Continued)








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ELEMENT: RECEPTION STATION, ECC TASK: Establish and Operate a Reception Station (NEO-002) (FM 3-05.104) ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 T 5 P (CIRCLE) U (CIRCLE)


CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of a reception station within the processing center within a specified time, and provided a designated station location with or without permanent facilities. TASK STANDARDS: The reception station is fully operational within a specified time of receipt of order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The operational environment is permissive to uncertain. TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES *1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes sheltered reception station. a. Clearly mark area, to include boundaries and routes. b. Establish and mark holding and briefing area(s). 2. Processing team receives evacuees from the ECC security team, from the marshalling force, or as walk-ins. a. Ensure evacuees are on an approved list or the representative from the Embassy’s consular affairs office or a DOS representative authorizes their entry. b. Perform initial search of evacuees that have not had an initial search from a marshalling or recovery team before allowing them to enter the processing center. 3. Processing team moves evacuees into a holding area. 4. Processing team welcomes and briefs evacuees. a. Brief summary of reason for evacuation. b. Stress need for and benefits of evacuee cooperation during processing. c. Briefly outline processing stations. d. Explain procedures for latrine use. e. Explain purpose of and need for personnel and baggage inspection. f. Notify evacuees that no pets will be allowed. g. Notify evacuees that they are limited to one bag. h. Notify evacuees that all weapons will be confiscated.
Figure I-2. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Reception Station




FM 3-05.104

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES i. Ensure authorized weapons are signed for and turned over to the representative from the Embassy’s consular affairs office or a DOS representative. j. Describe contraband items (for example, weapons and illegal drugs), and provide an amnesty box/area (screened if possible). k. Briefly describe support to be expected at temporary refugee holding area. l. Describe what to expect upon arrival in the United States. m. Describe what the repatriation center will provide. n. Provide opportunity to ask questions. 5. Processing team provides water and any other immediate comfort items. 6. Processing team establishes and operates a security screening station. a. Clearly mark area to include boundaries and routes. b. Establish and mark holding and individual inspection areas. c. Screen off all individual inspection areas. d. Inspect all evacuees and their baggage for restricted items. e. Confiscate all restricted items. f. Impound all weapons, excluding those of U.S. Government personnel, and issue receipts to the owners. g. Do not search the persons, property, papers, or families of foreign ambassador or diplomatic unless directed by the DOS. h. Do not search diplomatic pouches. i. Separate suspected enemy agents or criminals, and escort them to a separate screening and interrogation station. (The screening should be voluntary and considered a prerequisite to evacuation.) j. After their interrogation, allow evacuees to continue processing, set evacuees free, or place evacuees in a detainee area. 7. Processing team visually inspects each individual in a rapid manner, looking for weapons, contraband, excess baggage, and so on. 8. Processing team separates evacuees into manageable groups for processing; however, the team maintains family integrity. 9. Member of processing team security element escorts groups through the stations.



Figure I-2. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Reception Station (Continued)


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Figure I-2. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Reception Station (Continued)








FM 3-05.104

ELEMENT: SECURITY SCREENING STATION, ECC TASK: Establish and Operate a Security Screening Station (NEO-003) (FM 3-05.104) ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 T 5 P (CIRCLE) U (CIRCLE)


CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of a security screening station within the processing center within a specified time, and provided a designated station location with or without permanent facilities. TASK STANDARDS: The security screening station is fully operational within a specified time of receipt of order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The operational environment is permissive to uncertain.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES *1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes sheltered station. a. Ensure area is clearly marked, to include boundaries and routes. b. Ensure search areas (personnel and baggage) are marked. *2. Station OIC/NCOIC explains the procedure at this station and its purpose. a. Notify evacuees that all weapons will be confiscated. b. Ensure evacuees sign for authorized weapons, and turn the weapons over to the representative from the Embassy’s consular affairs office or a DOS representative. c. Use a DA Form 3161, Request for Issue or Turn-In, or like form. d. Describe contraband items (for example, weapons and illegal drugs), and provide an amnesty box/area (screened if possible). 3. Security screening personnel conduct a detailed inspection of the individual and baggage before allowing the evacuee to enter the processing center. An initial search must be conducted either by the marshalling/recovery team(s) or by the reception station before an evacuee can enter the processing center. a. Do not use electronic wand for searches; they miss too much and are difficult to hear in this environment. b. Use hand searches, which are quick, provide better results, and allow better control of the person being searched.



Figure I-3. Example of T&EO for Establish and Operate a Security Screening Station


FM 3-05.104

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES c. Try to have a female searcher (MP or AF security forces) available to search female evacuees. d. If there are adequate searchers, use three searchers per evacuee—two dedicated searchers to each side of the person being searched and a dedicated guard that will move to keep from flagging the searchers. e. If a gun is found or pulled during the search, dedicate one searcher to controlling the gun and the other searcher to controlling the gun bearer. 4. Security screening personnel tag all bags, one per evacuee, with the evacuee’s name and control number. 5. Security screening personnel confiscate all weapons. 6. Security screening personnel confiscate all contraband or prohibited items. 7. Security screening personnel confiscate excess baggage and turn it over to the Embassy’s consular affairs office or a DOS representative. 8. Security screening personnel confiscate all pets and turn them over to the Embassy's consular affairs office or a DOS representative.



Figure I-3. Example of T&EO for Establish and Operate a Security Screening Station (Continued)








FM 3-05.104

ELEMENT: REGISTRATION STATION, ECC TASK: Establish and Operate a Registration Station (NEO-004) (FM 3-05.104) ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 T 5 P (CIRCLE) U (CIRCLE)


CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of a registration station within the processing center within a specified time, and provided a designated station location with or without permanent facilities. TASK STANDARDS: The registration station is fully operational within a specified time of receipt of order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The operational environment is permissive to uncertain.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES *1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes sheltered registration station. a. Ensure area is clearly marked, to include boundaries and routes. b. Ensure registration tables/points are established and marked. *2. Station OIC/NCOIC explains the procedure at this station and its purpose. 3. Registration personnel ensure evacuee proves his identity by using a passport, ID card, or anything that unquestionably establishes his/her identity. Note: The COM or his representative must make the final determination not to evacuate someone. 4. Registration station NCO ensures each evacuee provides his/her information to him. 5. Registration station NCO records evacuee information in duplicate in an evacuee register (Figure 5-3). Note: The transportation station uses the evacuee register for final manifesting purposes. a. Send one copy to the TOC. b. Provide the escort to the transportation station with the second copy. c. Ensure all evacuees sign the evacuee register.



Figure I-4. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Registration Station


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(Shown smaller than actual document.) Figure 5-3. Evacuee Register




6. Registration personnel post a sign by each registration point that states that any evacuee who is not a U.S. government employee waives any claims for damage and injury against the U.S. government and that he/she does so by signing the evacuee register. 7. The registration NCO fills out an evacuee information card (Figure 5-4).

Figure I-4. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Registration Station (Continued)


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Figure 5-4. Evacuation Information Card TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

a. Ensure these cards are color-coded according to evacuation priority (Figure 5-5). b. Affix the evacuee information card to the evacuee so that it can be easily seen.
Figure I-4. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Registration Station (Continued)


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Figure 5-5. Evacuation Priority Criteria

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES 8. Registration personnel ensure personnel desiring not to evacuate sign a waiver of evacuation opportunity (Figure 5-6).



Figure I-4. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Registration Station (Continued)


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WAIVER OF EVACUATION OPPORTUNITY 1. Agreement made, this________________day of______________, 20__, between __________________________________________________ and the military forces of the United States. 2. Whereas the military forces of the United States agree to evacuate _________________________________________________________________________________. _________________________________________________________________________________. 3. Said offer of evacuation is declined by the above-named individual(s) with the understanding that the offer will not be repeated. 4. Evacuee Signature ________________________________________________ Evacuee Signature ________________________________________________ Evacuee Signature ________________________________________________ Evacuee Signature ________________________________________________
Figure 5-6. Example Waiver of Evacuation Opportunity




9. Situation dependent, registration personnel provide each evacuee with a DD Form 2585, (Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet), which they must complete before arrival at the repatriation center. 10. Registration personnel place all unknowns or problem cases in the holding area. 11. Registration personnel should ensure foreign nationals are supervised until they are cleared for evacuation or escorted outside the ECC. 12. A security element member should be stationed inside the ECC to react to any hostile incidents.

Figure I-4. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Registration Station (Continued)


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Figure I-4. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Registration Station (Continued)








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ELEMENT: MEDICAL STATION, ECC TASK: Establish and Operate a Medical Station (NEO-005) (FM 3-05.104) ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 T 5 P (CIRCLE) U (CIRCLE)


CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of a medical station within the processing center within a specified time, and provided a designated station location with or without permanent facilities. TASK STANDARDS: The medical station is fully operational within a specified time of receipt of order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The operational environment is permissive to uncertain.

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES *1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes sheltered station. a. Ensure area is clearly marked, to include boundaries and routes. b. Ensure medical tables/points are established and marked. *2. Station OIC/NCOIC explains the procedure at this station and its purpose. 3. Medical station personnel process all evacuees by asking each evacuee his state of health, whether he/she possesses prescription drugs, and whether he/she needs any emergency treatment. a. Confirm that all evacuees are healthy. Screen for any conditions that will affect the evacuation process. b. Ensure that all prescription drugs are authorized, or confiscate them. c. Provide emergency medical treatment, as needed. 4. Medical station personnel coordinate priority evacuation for serious medical cases while ensuring the evacuee has been completely processed. 5. Medical station personnel must be prepared to handle trauma cases should the situation digress.



Figure I-5. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Medical Station


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Figure I-5. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Medical Station (Continued)








FM 3-05.104

ELEMENT: TRANSPORTATION STATION, ECC TASK: Establish and Operate a Transportation Station (NEO-006) (FM 3-05.104) ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 T 5 P (CIRCLE) U (CIRCLE)


CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of an embarkation station within the processing center within a specified time, and provided a designated station location with or without permanent facilities. TASK STANDARDS: The embarkation station is fully operational within a specified time of receipt of order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The operational environment is permissive to uncertain. TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

*1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes sheltered station. a. Ensure area is clearly marked, to include boundaries and routes. b. Ensure manifesting point(s) are established and marked. c. Ensure holding areas (personnel and baggage) are established and marked. *2. Station OIC/NCOIC explains the procedure at this station and the station purpose. 3. Embarkation station personnel manifest evacuees into flight order. a. Make five copies (maintain one, one to TOC, two to escort, and one to the DOS representative). b. The escort delivers the copy of the evacuee register with each group. *4. The station OIC/NCOIC ensures that the information on the manifest agrees with the information provided on the evacuee register. 5. Embarkation station personnel place boarding pass information on the back of the evacuee information card to assist in keeping evacuees together. 6. The DACO collects the evacuee information card at plane side to assist in maintaining an evacuation status.

Figure I-6. Example of T&EO for Establish and Operate a Transportation Station (Continued)


FM 3-05.104

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES 7. Embarkation station personnel verify evacuees’ baggage tags to ensure that each evacuee has only one bag and that it is his/her own bag. 8. Embarkation station personnel place evacuees into holding areas by flight or chalk and provide a minimal comfort station (water, food, latrine, and supplies for women and children). 9. Embarkation station personnel coordinate the link-up of the evacuation escorts with the evacuee flight groups. Note: The duties as DACO/manifest control for the entire JSOTF (evacuation force) and evacuees will be done by the TOC. They will maintain a status of all departing personnel.



Figure I-6. Example of T&EO for Establish and Operate a Transportation Station (Continued)








FM 3-05.104

ELEMENT: DEBRIEFING STATION, ECC TASK: Establish and Operate a Debriefing Station (Optional)(NEO-007) (FM 3-05.104) ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 T 5 P (CIRCLE) U (CIRCLE)


CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of a debriefing station within the processing center within a specified time, and provided a designated station location with or without permanent facilities. TASK STANDARDS: The debriefing station is fully operational within a specified time of receipt of order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The operational environment is permissive to uncertain. TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

*1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes sheltered station. a. Ensure area is clearly marked, to include boundaries and routes. b. Ensure individual debriefing areas are established and marked. *2. Station OIC/NCOIC explains the procedure at this station and its purpose. 3. Station is staffed with counterintelligence personnel. 4. Debriefing personnel process selected personnel to gain information that may affect the evacuation force, the mission of the evacuation force, the evacuees, or other U.S. Government activities. 5. Debriefing personnel screen evacuees suspected of being enemy agents or criminals to determine if they should be allowed to continue processing, set free, or placed in a detainee area. (Screening is voluntary, but the evacuee will be informed that it is a prerequisite to evacuation.) 6. Debriefing personnel maintain a registry on the disposition of all interrogated persons. 7. When possible, female debriefing personnel conduct questioning of female evacuees.
Figure I-7. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Debriefing Station (Optional)


FM 3-05.104

TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES 8. Debriefing personnel use the following potential subjects for questions during interrogation: a. Locations of other potential evacuees. b. Changes in political situation. c. Movements and activities of groups, parties, or entities that might oppose the evacuation. d. Intents of threatening third parties.











Figure I-7. Example T&EO for Establish and Operate a Debriefing Station (Optional) (Continued)


FM 3-05.104

ELEMENT: HOLDING AREA, ECC TASK: Establish and Operate a Holding Area (NEO-008) (NEO-009) (FM 3-05.104) ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 T 5 P (CIRCLE) U (CIRCLE)


CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of a holding area to include, an asylum holding area, within the processing center within a specified time, and provided a designated station location with or without permanent facilities. TASK STANDARDS: The embarkation station is fully operational within a specified time of receipt of order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The operational environment is permissive to hostile. TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

*1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes holding area, to include a temporary refugee holding area. a. Ensure area is clearly marked, including boundaries and routes. b. Ensure internal security measures are established. 2. Station personnel erect physical dividers to ensure separation of held personnel from other evacuees, if necessary. *3. Station OIC/NCOIC places guards at access points, if necessary.








Figure I-8. Example of T&EO for Establish and Operate a Holding Area


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ELEMENT: COMFORT AREA, ECC TASK: Establish and Operate a Comfort Station (NEO-010) (FM 3-05.104) ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 T 5 P (CIRCLE) U (CIRCLE)


CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of a comfort station within the processing center within a specified time, and provided a designated station location with or without permanent facilities. TASK STANDARDS: The comfort station is fully operational within a specified time of receipt of order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The operational environment is uncertain to hostile. TASK STEPS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES GO NO-GO

*1. Station OIC/NCOIC establishes comfort station. a. Ensure area is clearly marked, including boundaries and routes. b. Ensure comfort item distribution points are properly manned to control issue. 2. Comfort station personnel ensure there are sufficient cots, blankets, food, water, and infant supplies. 3. Senior personnel, medical personnel, unit ministry teams, and assistants are available to counsel evacuees. 4. Comfort station personnel ensure male and female personal items are available.









Figure I-9. Example of T&EO for Establish and Operate a Comfort Station


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ELEMENT: SECURITY ELEMENT ACTIVITIES, PROCESSING TEAM TASK: Conduct Security Element Activities in Support of a Processing Center (NEO-0011) (FM 3-05.104) ITERATION: 1 2 3 4 T 5 P (CIRCLE) U (CIRCLE)


CONDITIONS: Given an order from the battalion HQ requiring establishment of the processing center within a specified time, and provided a designated station location with or without permanent facilities. TASK STANDARDS: The security element is conducting all their assigned duties and the processing center station is fully operational within a specified time of receipt of order or upon arrival at the center location. Required outer security measures are established. The operational environment is permissive to uncertain. TASK STANDARDS AND PERFORMANCE MEASURES 1. Physically secure the processing center. 2. Erect physical barriers, if necessary. 3. Implement crowd control measures. 4. Physically guard or ensure that all access points are guarded. 5. Be prepared to provide guards/guides for evacuee latrine usage. 6. Establish and maintain a special holding area for persons requiring special handling, detention, and so on. 7. Escort groups through the processing stations, and turn the groups over to the aircraft escorts after the group is in the embarkation station holding area. 8. Hand-carry the evacuee register from the registration station to the embarkation station. 9. Station a security element member at the registration station to react to any hostile incidents. 10. Establish a safe haven, if possible, within the processing center to protect against direct and indirect fire. If no safe haven is designated, ensure that there is a plan that is briefed to everyone on what to do and where to go.
Figure I-10. Example of T&EO for Conduct Security Element Activities in Support of a Processing Center




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Figure I-10. Example of T&EO for Conduct Security Element Activities in Support of a Processing Center (Continued)


Appendix J

Legal Considerations
International law and ROE govern personnel participating in a NEO. Because of the complexity of domestic and international law, commanders must include legal advisers in the planning process for NEO.

J-1. The COMJSOTF and subordinate commanders must ensure that JSOTF personnel abide by the standards of international law, as well as the provisions of the operation’s ROE. The COMJSOTF should establish procedures and policies for immediately reporting and investigating violations. The JSOTF must report all suspected violations in accordance with applicable DOD and Service regulations, and should notify the Embassy of a suspected violation within 24 hours of its occurrence. ROLE OF JSOTF LEGAL ADVISER J-2. The JSOTF legal adviser will provide guidance on legal issues involving NEOs, in coordination with higher headquarters, DOS agencies, nongovernmental organizations, international organizations, foreign governments, and the HN government. The key emphasis will be on assisting with interpretation of and compliance with applicable U.S. laws and regulations; relevant international agreements, including any pertinent status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs); and multilateral and bilateral transit agreements impacting on NEOs. LEGAL IMPERATIVES J-3. When planning and conducting NEOs, commanders must be cognizant of legal imperatives derived from the U.S. Constitution, domestic law, international agreements, and customary international law. In view of this governing framework of laws and regulations and the complexity of legal issues relating to NEOs, commanders must obtain legal guidance at all phases of NEO planning and execution. Legal guidance is particularly important during the early planning stage. LEGAL INPUT FOR OPERATIONAL PLANNING J-4. Commanders should ensure that legal advisers at all levels are full participants in all aspects of NEO planning, operational guidance and decisions, and national policy directives. The JSOTF legal adviser should systematically review OPLANs, warning orders, commander’s estimates, ROE, OPORDs, executive orders, and other operational documents. By reviewing these operational documents, the JSOTF legal adviser ensures compliance with international and domestic law.


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J-5. The following paragraphs discuss terminology and guidance related to the legal aspects of a NEO. FOREIGN DIPLOMAT J-6. A foreign diplomat of an Embassy staff authorized to go to the United States for evacuation is entitled to special treatment in accordance with international law. Ideally, the individual and his personal effects and papers are not to be searched, detained, or seized. Family members are also entitled to the same immunity unless they are citizens of the United States. The diplomatic pouch of a diplomatic courier from a state recognized by the United States shall also be immune from any search, inspection, detention, or seizure by U.S. personnel. POLITICAL ASYLUM OR TEMPORARY REFUGE J-7. JSOTF commanders may not grant political asylum to any foreign national. They may grant temporary refuge under emergency conditions when there is imminent danger to the safety, health, or life of any person. All requests for asylum should be referred to the Embassy or senior DOS representative available. SOFA J-8. Any SOFA between the HN and the United States should be reviewed to determine how it applies, if at all, to the current situation involving the NEO. If time permits, it should be modified as necessary before the JSOTF arrival. If no agreement exists, the Embassy may negotiate a temporary agreement with the HN, if time permits, covering criminal jurisdiction, procurement, customs, and other legal matters. Given the emergency nature of the NEO, however, it is likely that no special SOFA provisions will be negotiated. STATUS OF DETAINEE J-9. The Embassy should determine the status of a detainee in advance of the JSOTF deployment. In the absence of this determination, it is U.S. policy to treat a hostile detainee humanely and in accordance with international humanitarian law. Anyone actively detained by U.S. forces in an attempt to deter or in response to hostile action will be accorded the rights of an EPW, even though they may not be an EPW within the context of the Geneva Convention. The Embassy, with the HN, will negotiate the disposition of the detainee. CLAIMS J-10. The JSOTF legal adviser or designated claims officer shall develop a plan for the processing and adjudication of claims against the United States. The plan will be coordinated with the appropriate Embassy staff member. INTERNATIONAL LEGAL CONSIDERATIONS J-11. The JSOTF legal adviser or designated claims officer consider the following in reference to international law:


FM 3-05.104

• Law of armed conflict. Traditional legal issues associated with the law of armed conflict will not normally arise in the context of NEO, since NEOs typically occur during times of escalating confrontation short of armed conflict. However, the protections afforded civilians, sick, and wounded under the law of armed conflict are almost universally accepted humanitarian norms that are respected in many cases despite the absence of international armed conflict. NEO planning and execution should adhere as closely as possible to international humanitarian law principles as a matter of consistent practice. • National sovereignty. Commanders must ensure that the NEO does not violate the sovereignty of foreign nations other than the HN. NEO planners and operators must be aware of the potential impact of operations on relations with other nations and of all relevant international agreements, including pertinent SOFAs and multilateral and bilateral transit agreements.

LEGAL ASSISTANCE J-12. Implementing plans should provide for preventive law programs designed to avoid sudden and overwhelming demands for emergency legal assistance when evacuation becomes imminent or is implemented. To the extent practical, legal assistance and advice will be made available at safe haven points and collection processing points, in coordination with the U.S. diplomatic mission. MILITARY JUSTICE J-13. Military justice will be administered in accordance with The Uniform Code of Military Justice and Joint Publication (JP) 0-2, Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). REPORTING VIOLATIONS OF THE LAW OF ARMED CONFLICT J-14. Commanders shall plan and provide for reporting, investigating, and initiating appropriate disciplinary disposition of allegations of law of armed conflict violations as follows:
• With respect to alleged violations of the law of armed conflict committed by or against members of, or persons accompanying or serving with, their commands, promptly investigate, collect and evaluate evidence, and report in accordance with applicable DOD and military department guidance. Additionally, immediately forward reports through operational command channels. • With respect to alleged violations of the law of armed conflict committed by or against allied military or civilian personnel, conduct an appropriate preliminary investigation to determine involvement of JSOTF personnel and report as required through U.S. operational channels. Once a determination is made that the JSOTF was not involved, do not investigate further without direction to do so by the combatant commander. • In all instances of reported law of armed conflict violations, make immediate message notification to the appropriate combatant commander.


FM 3-05.104

NOTE: Service component commanders should provide notification of reported law of armed conflict violations as soon as the tactical situation permits, rather than awaiting complete investigation. Additional details may be supplied by supplemental reports. HN SUPPORT J-15. When planning and executing NEO, commanders must be aware of applicable basing rights and the status of U.S. forces within the country. Commanders must pay particular care to ensure advance procurement of necessary landing, embarkation, and transit rights required to support a given operation. J-16. Additionally, commanders must consider the changing political and military situation before relying on previously negotiated HN support agreements. Commanders must accomplish liaison in a timely manner with DOS officials responsible for the particular NEO site. LEGAL REVIEW OF ROE J-17. In all cases in which use of force is contemplated, legal advisers shall—
• Be consulted in the planning phases or before execution to determine the legal basis for intervention and use of force. • Shall review proposed ROE. • Shall assess the legal risks or potential liabilities entailed under international law.

APPLICABLE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT J-18. Commanders at every level must ensure all personnel understand the ROE. Requests for supplemental ROE must be handled in accordance with Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 3121.01, Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces. INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS AND CONGRESSIONAL ENACTMENTS J-19. Operations conducted may require consultation with, or reporting to, Congress consistent with Title 50, USC, Chapter 33, War Powers Resolution. War Powers Resolution reports will be initiated, as required, by the DOS.


AAFIF admin ADVON AF AFSOA AFSOC AFSOD AFSOE AM AMCIT AO AOR APOE ARG ARSOA ARSOF ARSOTF ASD(SO/LIC) ASSC C2WG CA CAPT-A CAPT-B CARVER CATA CATB CATC CCC CD-ROM automated air facility information file administrative advanced echelon air force Air Force special operations aviation Air Force special operations command/component Air Force special operations detachment Air Force special operations element amplitude modulation American citizen administrative officer area of responsibility aerial port of embarkation amphibious ready group Army special operations aviation Army special operations forces Army special operations task force Assistant Secretary of Defense (Special Operations and Low Intensity Conflict) Army service component command command and control warfare group Civil Affairs Civil Affairs planning team A Civil Affairs planning team B criticality, accessibility, recognizability Civil Affairs team A Civil Affairs team B Civil Affairs team C combat camera center compact disk–read-only memory recuperability, vulnerability, effect,


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Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff instruction commander, joint task force course of action chief of mission Commander, United States Joint Forces Command Commander, United States Pacific Command Commander, United States Special Operations Command combat documentation commander, joint Psychological Operations task force commander, joint special operations task force Commander, Special European Command concept plan continental United States contingency support package combined task force cubic Department of the Army departure airfield control officer defense attaché officer defense attaché deputy chief of mission Department of Defense (form) Drug Enforcement Administration Department of Health and Human Services Defense Intelligence Agency digital nautical chart Department of Defense Department of Defense directive Department of State Deployable Print Production Center digital terrain elevation data digital vertical obstruction file Operations Command, United States


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emergency action committee emergency action plan evacuation control center Economic Community of West Cease-Fire Monitoring Group emergency medical treatment explosive ordnance disposal Emergency Planning Handbook enemy prisoner of war/civilian internee USEUCOM Survey and Assessment Team forward command element foundation feature data field manual; frequency modulation forward operational base feet division or higher operations staff officer general services officer humanitarian assistance host nation host-nation support headquarters identification international military information team Immigration and Naturalization Service intelligence preparation of the battlespace international public information intermediate staging base intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance intelligence directorate of a joint staff operations directorate of a joint staff logistics directorate of a joint staff Joint Chiefs of Staff Joint Expeditionary Support Product—Noncombatant Evacuation Operation joint force air component commander


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joint force commander joint force special operations component commander joint information bureau joint operations area joint publication joint Psychological Operations task force joint reception coordination center joint special operations area Joint Special Operations Air Component Commander joint special operations task force joint task force pound landing zone medical evacuation mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available—time available, and civil considerations Marine expeditionary unit middle initial; military intelligence military operations other than war military police Marine security guard mission training plan Navy special operations aviation naval special operations forces noncommissioned officer noncommissioned officer in charge noncombatant evacuation operation noncombatant evacuation operation pack National Imagery and Mapping Agency number next of kin naval special warfare task group naval special warfare task unit Naval Special Warfare Unit 2


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Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Public Affairs optional form officer in charge operational control operation plan operation order operations security Office of the Secretary of Defense public affairs public affairs officer Psychological Operations development center Product Development Workstation priority intelligence requirements plain language address dictionary Psychological Operations assessment team point of contact point of embarkation Psychological Operations group (airborne) Psychological Operations group (airborne) Psychological Operations task force post security officer Psychological Operations action Psychological Operations detachment Psychological Operations Reserve Component regional liaison group rules of engagement regional security officer regional support team adjutant battalion or brigade intelligence staff officer battalion or brigade operations staff officer battalion or brigade logistics staff officer security assistance office


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sea-air-land team Special Forces Special Forces group (airborne) Special Forces operational base situation report special operations special operations aviation special operations command Special Operations Command, United States European Command special operations forces status-of-forces agreement special operations group Special Operations Plans and Policies Directorate seaport of embarkation strategic studies detachment special security force special tactics squadron training and evaluation outline tactical control tanker airlift control element to be determined third country national tactical operations center table of organization and equipment tactical Psychological Operations battalion tactical Psychological Operations company tactical Psychological Operations detachment tactical Psychological Operations development detachment tactical Psychological Operations team television United States United States Agency for International Development United States Army John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center and School


FM 3-05.104


United States Code United States European Command United States Special Operations Command visual information documentation very important person watch condition Washington liaison group year


12 FAH-1. Emergency Planning Handbook. 17 March 1998. CJCSI 3121.01. Standing Rules of Engagement for U.S. Forces. 15 January 2000. CJCSI 3121.02. Rules on the Use of Force by DOD Personnel Providing Support to Law Enforcement Agencies Conducting Counterdrug Operations in the United States. 31 May 2000. DA Form 3161. Request for Issue or Turn-In. May 1983. DD Form 2585. Repatriation Processing Center Processing Sheet. November 1998. DODD 3025.14. Protection and Evacuation of U.S. Citizens and Designated Aliens in Danger Areas Abroad, Change 2. 13 July 1992. DODI 5210.56. Use of Deadly Force and the Carrying of Firearms by DOD Personnel Engaged in Law Enforcement and Security Duties. 25 February 1992. Executive Order 12656. Assignment of Emergency Preparedness Responsibilities. 18 November 1988. FM 3-0. Operations. 14 June 01. FM 3-05. Doctrine for Army Special Operations Forces. 1 August 1999. FM 3-05.10.1. ARSOF Command, Control, Communications, and Computers. 6 June 2000. FM 3-05.20. Special Forces Operations. 26 June 2001. FM 3-05.30. Psychological Operations. 19 June 2000. FM 3-05.60. Army Special Operations Forces Aviation Operations. 16 October 2000. FM 3-05.102. Army Special Operations Forces Intelligence. July 2001. FM 3-06. Urban Operations. 1 June 2003. FM 3-07. Stability Operations and Support Operations. 20 February 2003. FM 3-11.11. Flame, Riot Control Agents and Herbicide Operations. 19 August 1996. FM 4-93.4. Theater Support Command. 15 April 2003. FM 7-85. Ranger Unit Operations. 9 June 1987. FM 34-130. Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield. 8 July 1994. FM 41-10. Civil Affairs Operations. 14 February 2000. JP 0-2. Unified Action Armed Forces (UNAAF). 24 February 1995.


FM 3-05.104

JP 2-0. Doctrine for Intelligence Support to Joint Operations. 9 March 2000. JP 3-0. Doctrine for Joint Operations. 1 February 1995. JP 3-05. Doctrine for Joint Special Operations. 17 April 1998. JP 3-05.1. JTTP for Joint Special Operations Task Force (FD). 19 December 2001. JP 3-05.2. JTTP for Special Operations Targeting and Mission Planning (FD). April 2001. JP 3-07. Joint Doctrine for Operations Other Than War. 16 June 1995. JP 3-08. Interagency Coordination During Joint Operations. 9 October 1996. OF 28. Evacuee Documentation Card. February 1993. OPERATION ASSURED RESPONSE: SOCEUR’s NEO in Liberia, April 1996. HQ, United States Special Operations Command, History and Research Office. September 1997. The Uniform Code of Military Justice. Title 42, USC, Section 1313. Assistance for U.S. Citizens Returned From Foreign Countries. 5 November 1990. Title 50, USC, Chapter 33. War Powers Resolution. Title 50, USC, Section 1542. Consultation: Initial and Regular Consultations.


administrative officer, 2-2 advance party, 4-1 airfield survey checklist, E-5 ambassador, 1-2, 2-2 ARSOTF, 3-5, 3-6 assembly area, 3-3, 5-5 through 5-11 asylum requests, 5-22 authorized departure, 1-5 evacuation control center organization, 5-13 through 5-15 evacuation force, 5-1 evacuation guidelines, 1-2, 1-3, 1-6 evacuation notice, C-3 evacuation site party, 4-3 evacuee classification system, 5-20, 5-21 evacuee logbook, 5-11 Executive Order 12656, 1-1, 2-5 legal aspects of NEO, J-2 through J-4 logistics element, 5-12

Marine security guard, 2-3, 2-4 marshalling element operations, 5-2 through 5-11 medical station, 5-17, 5-18 movement control, 5-5

national policy, 1-1 through 1-3 NEO Phases, 3-3 NEO Trip wires, 3-2, 3-3 NEOPACK ordering, F-2 notification phases, 1-4 through 1-6

ahain of command, 2-1 Chief, Consular Section, 2-2 Chief, Security Assistance Office, 2-2 Civil Affairs, 1-9 through 1-11 classification, 5-20, 5-21 combatant command, 2-7 comfort station, 5-19 Country Team, 2-4

foreign nationals, 1-1 forward command element, 4-2

general services officer, 2-2

operational environments, 1-3, 1-4 ordered departure, 1-4

host nation, 1-1 hostile environment, 1-4

debriefing station, 5-14, 5-17 defense attaché, 2-3 Department of the Army, Deputy Chief of Staff for Personnel, 2-5 Department of Health and Human Services, 2-5 Department of State, 2-2 deputy chief of mission, 2-2 draw down, 1-4, 1-5

phases of NEO, 3-3 processing evacuees, 5-8 through 5-11 PSYOP objectives and themes, D-6 through D-8 PSYOP product approval process, D-10, D-11 PSYOP task organizations, D-2, D-3 public affairs plan, H-1

identification documents, 5-7 intelligence preparation, 3-6 through 3-9 intermediate staging base, 4-4, 4-5

joint special operations task force, 3-4, 3-5 joint task force, 3-4, 3-5

economic officer, 2-3, 2-4 Embassy closing notice, C-4 Embassy organization, 2-2 through 2-4

reception station, 5-15 regional liaison group, 2-6 registration station, 5-16, 5-17

leave commercial, 1-5


FM 3-05.104

rules of engagement, B-1, B-2

search teams, 5-6 through 5-8 security element, 5-11, 5-12 security screening station, 5-16 stand fast, 1-5 station processing procedures, 5-15 through 5-20

temporary safe haven organization, 6-2 through 6-6 third country nationals, 1-1, 1-3 transportation, 5-4, 5-5

waiver form, C-4 wardens, 3-1, 3-2 Washington liaison group, 2-6 withdrawal, 5-12, 5-13


FM 3-05.104 2 FEBRUARY 2004

By Order of the Secretary of the Army:

PETER J. SCHOOMAKER General, United States Army Chief o f Staff


JOEL B. HUDSON Administrative Assistant to the Secretary of the Army 0401407

DISTRIBUTION: Active Army, Army National Guard, and U. S. Army Reserve: To be distributed in accordance with initial distribution number 115917, requirements for FM 3-05.104.

PIN: 080218-000