MARYLAND:

IN THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY

Brett Kimberlin,
Plaintiff
v.

Case No. 403868V

National Bloggers Club, et al.,

Defendants

DEFENDANT WALKERS OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFFS MOTION TO STRIKE

DEFENDANT WALKERS MOTION TO DISMISS (DKT NO. 7)
NOW COMES Defendant Aaron J. Walker, Esq. and files this opposition to the Plaintiffs
Motion to Strike Defendant Walkers Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 7) and states the following:
INTRODUCTION
The Plaintiff argues that Mr. Walkers1 Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 6) should be stricken
1) because he claims it was filed too soon, and 2) because he claims Mr. Walker has no right to
represent himself. Both of these contentions are without merit, and the Plaintiffs arguments
already have been rejected both by this Court and the U.S. District Court for the District of
Maryland. Indeed, by filing this motion the Plaintiff has violated Md. R. 1-341 prohibiting
proceedings maintained in bad faith or without substantial justification, thereby justifying
sanctions. Finally, the Plaintiff willfully failed to properly sign his Motion to Strike while citing
the Maryland Rule requiring him to sign it, which justifies the sanction of having his Motion to
Strikeironicallystricken.
Mr. Walker refers to himself in the third person for stylistic purposes and to de-personalize this
case.
1

I.
THE MOTION TO DISMISS IS TIMELY
The Plaintiff claims in paragraphs 1 and 2 of his Motion to Strike that Mr. Walkers
Motion to Dismiss is untimely because the Plaintiff has failed to serve the original complaint on
Mr. Walker. In other words, the Plaintiff is attempting to claim that Mr. Walker is prohibited
from filing a motion to dismiss until he is served in this case. 2 He does not cite any authority for
this proposition because there is no such prohibition. Nothing in Md. R. 2-322, for instance,
requires a defendant to wait until service is accomplished before filing a motion to dismiss. In
fact, Rule 2-322(a) contemplates motions to dismiss based on insufficiency of service of
process which logically can only be filed before proper service of process occurs.3
Further, the Plaintiff knows that the Defendants can file motions to dismiss before they
are served. As noted in Mr. Walkers Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Dkt. No.
9), the same Plaintiff never served Mr. Walker and co-Defendant Hoge with his second amended
complaint in Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club, et al. (I), No. GJH-13-3059 (2013). Despite
this fact, Messrs. Walker and Hoge were not only allowed to file motions to dismiss that
complaint, but also those motions to dismiss were granted. So the Plaintiff has personally
witnessed defendants moving to dismiss before being served as an ordinary process of this
countrys courts, but he now he feigns being scandalized when it is happening again.
Finally, a requirement that Mr. Walker wait until he is served would fly in the face of MD
CODE Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-807(d)(1)s mandate that when a bad faith lawsuit designed to

With Kafkaesque logic, the Plaintiff is asserting Mr. Walker should wait for service in a Motion
to Strike that he never bothered to serve on Mr. Walker.
3
Indeed, Mr. Walkers Motion to Dismiss constitutes a general appearance that has the effect of
waiving any objections based on initial service of process. McGinnis v. Rogers, 262 Md. 710,
733-734, 279 A.2d 459, 471 (1971). In other words, Mr. Walker is deemed served, as of the date
of that motion.
2

suppress freedom of expression is filed, the court shall hold a hearing on the motion to dismiss
as soon as practicable. Mr. Walker has invoked this statute in his Motion to Dismiss, but the
Plaintiff would have this Court hold that Mr. Walker cannot even ask for speedy disposition of
this matter until the Plaintiff gets around to serving Mr. Walkerif he ever does. The fact is, it is
practicable, i.e. possible,4 to hear this matter after the parties are given a reasonable
opportunity to oppose and reply. Indeed, a hearing is not necessary: this Court can rule entirely
on the papers. Having offered no authority to support his position and advancing a legal theory
that is at odds with statutory law, the Plaintiffs objection based on timeliness has no basis.
Of course, it might be unusual to file a motion to dismiss this quickly, but then again, this
case is unusually frivolous given that it is based on a complaint entirely barred by res judicata. 5
The case is also unusually duplicative, 6 making it easy to quickly write a motion to dismiss.
Ultimately, around two-thirds of Mr. Walkers Motion to Dismiss is identical to the final motion
to dismiss Mr. Walker filed in Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club, et al. (I) (ECF No. 152).
One might suppose this should make it easy for the Plaintiff to oppose such a motion to dismiss,
but after nearly a year and a half of litigating these claims, the Plaintiff evidently has no response

Practicable is that which may be done, practiced, or accomplished; that which is performable,
feasible, possible[.] BLACKS LAW DICTIONARY 1172 (6th ed. 1990).
5
See Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant Walkers Motion to
Dismiss (Dkt. No. 6), pp. 7-8.
6
As noted in Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Defendant Walkers Motion
to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 6), p. 5, the present complaint before this Court is substantially identical to
the second amended complaint in Kimberlin v. NBC, et al. (I), filed on March 7, 2014, the final
amended complaint filed in that case before being dismissed.
4

to the majority of the flaws Mr. Walker has pointed out in his Complaint. 7 He doesnt know how
to answer the Motion to Dismiss, so he is trying to make it go away, at least for a while.
II.
MR. WALKER IS OBVIOUSLY HAS A RIGHT TO REPRESENT HIMSELF
The Plaintiff also attempts to claim that Mr. Walker is not allowed to proceed pro se
because he happens to be an attorney in Virginia and the District of Columbia but is not admitted
in Maryland.8 This is absurd and frivolous, and the Plaintiff knows it.
The Plaintiff makes this claim by a creative misinterpretation of Md. R. 1-311(a), 1312(a), and 1-313. First, the Plaintiff wants this Court to think that the mere fact that Mr. Walker
notes that he is an attorney and provides one of his bar numbers in his signature block means that
Mr. Walker is appearing in this Court as an attorney, rather than as a pro se who happens to be
an attorney.9 This claim is absurd on its face.
Further, the Plaintiff is likely to hope this Court will conclude this is the rookie mistake
of an ignorant pro se despite his extensive courtroom experience, 10 but any such claim that he
made an honest mistake is belied by the fact that he made the same argument and saw it rejected
See, e.g. Reply to Plaintiffs Opposition to Defendant Walkers Motion to Dismiss, filed in
Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club, et al. (I) (ECF No. 240), pp. 2-7 (outlining twenty-two
critical failings Mr. Walker had pointed out in his motion to dismiss that the Plaintiff did not even
contest in his opposition).
8
The Plaintiff apparently believes that while every other person, from a captain of industry to a
homeless man wearing a tinfoil hat, can appear pro se (with few limitations), the courts of
Maryland have chosen to exclude all foreign lawyers from being able to appear pro se. The
Plaintiff gives no cogent explanation why Marylands courts would adopt a rule categorically
excluding every person who has demonstrated sufficient competency and character to be
admitted to the practice of law in a foreign jurisdiction from appearing pro se, and, indeed, such
discrimination would be so illogical as to fail the rational basis test. Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S.
620 (1996) (stating that under the equal protection clause if a law neither burdens a fundamental
right nor targets a suspect class, we will uphold the legislative classification so long as it bears a
rational relation to some legitimate end).
9
See, e.g. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike, 4 (asserting that Defendant Walker... cannot file as an
attorney).
7

in the related case of Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club, et al. (I). Specifically, on February
11, 2014, the same Plaintiff filed a motion asking that court to reconsider a decision allowing Mr.
Walker to exceed the page limitations in a reply. See Plaintiffs Opposition to Motion for Leave
to File Excess Pages (ECF 61). In it the Plaintiff made a virtually identical argument, claiming
that Mr. Walker, by virtue of the fact that he was an attorney but not admitted to practice in
Maryland, could not represent himself in the District of Maryland. He also laced his argument
with a disgusting and bigoted attack based on Mr. Walkers disabilities.

Mr. Walker

appropriately opposed this motion, and on February 21, 2014, the court issued a letter order
brushing aside that objection, stating that
contrary to Plaintiffs assertions, I do not find that Walker is representing to the
Court that he is a Maryland attorney, see Pl.s Mot. to Reconsider 6. He clearly
identifies himself as having a Virginia bar number only, and the docket identifies
that he is unrepresented.
(ECF No. 88), pp. 4-5. So the Plaintiff has already been told that the mere fact that Mr. Walker
has mentioned that he is an attorney outside this jurisdiction and provided his Virginia Bar
number did not mean that Mr. Walker was appearing in the U.S. District Court as an attorney,
but the Plaintiff repeated this fallacious reasoning here, hoping to trick this Court or, at least,
waste Mr. Walkers time by forcing him to respond. Indeed, the Plaintiff compounded the
inconvenience to Mr. Walker by refusing to serve him, forcing him to drive all the way from
Manassas to get a frivolous two-page motion that he could have mailed for the cost of an
ordinary stamp. The Plaintiffs refusal to obey this Courts rules is as petty as it is cheap.

The Plaintiff is pro se, but is nonetheless an experienced litigator. In Kimberlin v. Unmasked,
Case No. RWT-13-2580 (D. Md., Feb. 28, 2014), Judge Titus noted that [t]he Plaintiff is no
stranger to the processes of this Court and went on to recount how the Plaintiff had filed or
participated in at least ten cases in the U.S. District Court for the District of Maryland alone, all
pro se. The idea that he is some kind of doe-eyed babe in the woods when it comes to litigation
is simply false.
10

The Plaintiffs frivolous motion also takes Md. R. 1-311(a), 1-312(a), and 1-313 out of
context.

It is obvious in context that these special requirements only apply to attorneys

representing parties, but the Plaintiff takes snippets from each out of context in an attempt to
apply these rules to parties who happen to be foreign attorneys. For instance, the Plaintiff states
that Maryland Rule 1-311(a) requires an attorney who files and signs pleadings in any case to
be admitted to practice law. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike, 3. While the quoted phrase is
accurate enough, the Plaintiff is taking it out of context and his characterization of the missing
content is false. Here is the full context:
Every pleading and paper of a party represented by an attorney shall be signed by
at least one attorney who has been admitted to practice law in this State and who
complies with Rule 1-312.
(emphasis added). On the face of the rule, this language does not apply to attorneys who happen
to be parties, but only (potentially) those who purport to represent a party.
The Plaintiff goes on to state that Rule 1-312(a) requires an attorney to maintain an
office in Maryland, which Mr. Walker does not. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike, 3. By selectively
quoting Rule 1-311(a) the Plaintiff is attempting to obscure the fact that not all attorneys are
required to comply with Rule 1-312(a). Rather, Rule 1-311(a) states that if party is represented
by a lawyer, one lawyer must sign who has been admitted to practice law in this State and who
complies with Rule 1-312. (emphasis added). Thus, rather than being a rule for all lawyers,
Rule 1-312 only applies to one attorney signing the paper and only if that attorney is representing
a party. Indeed, the Plaintiffs interpretation is so utterly wrong it would effectively outlaw the
practice of admitting attorneys pro hac vice.
Finally, the Plaintiff claims that Rule 1-313 requires any pleading filed by an out of state
[sic] attorney to be accompanied by the attorneys signed certification of admission to practice

law in this State. Plaintiffs Motion to Strike, 3. This is not the rule. It doesnt apply to any
pleading, just the first pleading or paper signed by the attorney. Md. R. 1-313. Further, Rule
1-313 makes it clear that it only applies to an attorney signing a pleading or paper in
compliance with Rule 1-311, meaning that it only applies to attorneys representing parties
before this Court and not to foreign attorneys who are parties before this Court. Mr. Walker falls
into the latter category.
Thus, by cobbling together multiple partial quotes from the Maryland Rules taken out of
context, along with his mischaracterization of missing text, the Plaintiff weaves a fabric of
deception before this Court that falls apart when the entirety of these rules are quoted and
understood. This is not the first time the Plaintiff has taken rules wildly out of context in an
attempt to misconstrue them. In Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club, et al. (I), the court found
it necessary to file a Case Management Order (CMO) to limit the deluge of filings in this case
in order to prevent this case from consuming an inordinate share of this Courts limited
resources[.]11 The CMO required that before filing most motions, a party would have to file a
short letter request seeking permission to file such a motion. This CMO also included the
following admonition which was sadly necessary: [n]o Request may contain any redundant,
immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter, or any ad hominem attack on any party, any Judge
or employee of this or any Court, or any other person. CMO, p. 3.
A few months later, the Plaintiff filed a request for a hearing against defendants common
to both Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club (I) and the instant case seeking to hold them in

Case Management Order (ECF No. 97) (March 5, 2014) p. 1, Kimberlin v. National Bloggers
Club, et al. (I) (hereinafter CMO). This is mentioned in the Affidavit of Aaron J. Walker, Esq.,
presented as an exhibit to Mr. Walkers Motion to Strike (Dkt. No. 9).
11

contempt of the CMO because they posted things on the internet that the Plaintiff didnt like.
Judge Hazel12 brushed this claim aside as follows:
Finally, Plaintiff has requested a hearing regarding purported violations of the
Case Management Order (CMO). See ECF No. 167. Specifically, Plaintiff
contends that several defendants have continued to defame him through postings
made on various social media outlets, namely Twitter and YouTube. Id. According
to Plaintiff, this conduct violates the CMO because it is impertinent, scandalous,
and [an] ad hominem attack[] on Plaintiff. Id. The Court DENIES Plaintiffs
request.
Not only has Plaintiff misquoted the language from the CMO, but Plaintiff has
taken this language out of context. 2 When read in its entirety, the quoted language
from the CMO reads: No motion, opposition, or reply may contain any
redundant, immaterial, impertinent, or scandalous matter, or any ad hominem
attack on any party, any Judge or employee of this or any Court, or any other
person. ECF No. 97 at 3 (emphasis added). Thus, the quoted language relied on
by Plaintiff relates to content contained in court filings e.g., motions, oppositions,
and replies. The material Plaintiff complains of, however, was not contained in a
court filing; instead, it was material posted on the Internet.
Letter Order of July 28, 2014, Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club, et al. (I) (ECF No. 168)
(emphasis in italics and boldface in original) p. 3, attached as Exhibit A. Further, in footnote 2 of
that passage, the court made it clear that it did not believe that the Plaintiffs misinterpretation
was an honest mistake:
Given Plaintiffs checkered past with representations to the Court, Plaintiff is
cautioned that when he makes a representation to the Court, it ought to be
accurate, in terms of both content and context. See e.g., ECF No. 102 at 3; ECF
No. 122 at 3 (Judge Grimms April 28, 2014 Letter Order characterizing
Plaintiffs manipulation of summons as clearly improper).
Id., p. 3, n.2. Judge Hazel ultimately decided that the Plaintiffs request itself was improper,
stating that [b]ecause Plaintiffs request does not concern filings in this case, it is immaterial
and impertinent, and therefore in violation of the CMO[.] Id., p. 3-4. In other words, the
Plaintiff knowingly filed a frivolous request before that court.
To aid this Courts understanding of Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club, et al. (I), that case
began under Judge Grimm and was eventually transferred to Judge Hazel.
12

In the instant case, the Plaintiff attempted to deceive this Court, insulting its intelligence
by taking passages from several of Marylands Rules out of context to suggest they prevent Mr.
Walker from proceeding pro se in contravention of his constitutional right to represent himself.
Iannaccone v. Law, 142 F.3d 553, 558 (2nd Cir. 1998). Further, the Plaintiff has a documented
history of similar misconduct. Just as Judge Hazel concluded that the Plaintiff had intentionally
attempted to trick his court in Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club, et al. (I), this Court should
conclude that the Plaintiff is not merely mistaken but attempting to deceive this Court.
The belief that this motion was filed in bad faith is cemented when one realizes that this
Court has allowed Mr. Walker to represent himself in the past. In yet another lawsuit filed by the
Plaintiff in this Court, Kimberlin v. Allen, No. 339254V (Md. Mont. Co. Cir. Ct. 2010), this
same Plaintiff sued Seth Allen claiming that he had defamed the Plaintiff by calling him a liar,
terrorist and a pedophileclaims the Plaintiff is presently collaterally estopped from denying are
true.13

A motion for default was granted (Mr. Allen protesting that the Plaintiff falsified

documents related to service) and after a hearing on November 14, 2011, Mr. Kimberlin was
granted nominal damages and an injunction prohibiting Mr. Allen from defaming him in the
future.14
The very next day, the Plaintiff falsely claimed that Mr. Allen had violated this
injunction.15 Further, the Plaintiff had learned that Mr. Walker had provided brief, free legal
advice to Mr. Allen and remarkably sought to obtain Mr. Walkers testimony against his client.
See Kimberlin v. White, 7 F. 3d 527, 528-29 (6 th Cir. 1993) (describing the Plaintiffs terrorist
campaign as the Speedway Bomber), Kimberlin v. Dewalt, 12 F. Supp. 2d 487, 490 n. 6 (D. Md.
1998) (stating that the Plaintiff is a convicted perjurer), Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Support of Defendant Walkers to Dismiss (Dkt. No. 6), pp. 9-12 (demonstrating that the
Plaintiff is collaterally estopped from denying he is a pedophile).
14
See Kimberlin v. Allen, Dkt. Nos. 91-92.
15
Id., Dkt. No. 99.
13

At that time, Mr. Walker wrote anonymously on the internet as Aaron Worthing and the
Plaintiff sought to identify Mr. Walker under Independent Newspapers, Inc. v. Brodie, 407 Md.
415, 966 A. 2d 432 (2009) by subpoenaing Google and Comcast (Mr. Walkers internet service
provider) for information identifying Mr. Walker.16
Mr. Walker sought to oppose the motion pro se, as he was entitled to under Brodie, but
ran into a logistical problem: Md. R. 1-311(a) required Mr. Walker to sign his name and provide
identifying information. That is, by the ordinary operation of Md. R. 1-311, Mr. Walker could
not oppose the Plaintiffs attempt to identify him, without identifying himself in a public
document, defeating the purpose of such an opposition. Thus, Mr. Walker obtained pro bono
counsel, Beth Kingsley, who could fulfill Md. R. 1-311(a)s requirement for Mr. Walker. She
moved to grant Mr. Walker an exception to this rule. Attached as Exhibit B is the Motion to
File Anonymously or to File Under Seal 17 Ms. Kingsley filed seeking to allow Mr. Walker to
either file with this Court under his pseudonym, Aaron Worthing or to file a version of any
filings that included Mr. Walkers identifying information under seal, while serving a redacted
version on the Plaintiff. On January 6, 2012, the Plaintiff filed a motion to withdraw his
subpoenas of Google and Comcast because he had learned of Mr. Walkers true identity by other
means.18 In that Motion to Withdraw, the Plaintiff had improperly placed a great deal of personal
information into that motion to withdraw.19 On January 9, 2012, Mr. Walker appeared before this

Id., Dkt. Nos. 104, 105, 106, and 108.

Id., Dkt. No. 110.
18
Id., Dkt. No. 114.
19
This is a common tactic known as doxxing in which a person places private information or
actionably defamatory claims into the public record through court filings, so that third parties can
publish that private information or defamatory claims under the privilege of publishing court
papers. The Plaintiff has repeatedly engaged in such conduct.
16
17

10

Court to place that motion to withdraw under seal, and in the same hearing this Court granted
Mr. Walkers Motion to File Anonymously or to File Under Seal.20
In other words, the Court not only allowed Mr. Walker to represent himself, but it granted
Mr. Walker special accommodation to preserve his right to anonymous speech 21 while
representing himself. After the motion to file anonymously was granted, the Plaintiff repeatedly
attempted to place Mr. Walkers personal information into the record, and Mr. Walker filed
oppositions and motions to resist that effort. 22 In short, Mr. Walker was allowed to represent
himself despite the fact that Mr. Kimberlin informed this Court that Mr. Walker was an
attorney.23 Thus, not only has this Court granted Mr. Walker the right to represent himself, but
the Plaintiff personally witnessed the Court allowing him to do so. Therefore, the Plaintiff
cannot reasonably pretend that he was confused about Mr. Walkers right of self-representation.
He knew Mr. Walker could represent himself and filed this Motion to Strike asserting that he
couldnt anyway.

See Kimberlin v. Allen, Dkt. Nos. 125. The court also granted Mr. Walkers oral motion to
place the motion to withdraw under seal, Dkt. Nos. 122-23, and denied the Plaintiffs motion to
hold Mr. Allen in contempt, Dkt. No. 121, 124,
21
As the Supreme Court stated in McIntyre v. Ohio Elections Commn, [a]n authors decision to
remain anonymous, like other decisions concerning omissions or additions to the content of a
publication, is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the First Amendment. 514 U.S.
334, 341-42 (1995).
22
See e.g. Kimberlin v. Allen, Dkt. Nos. 128, 131, and 135. The Plaintiff falsely claims in his
complaint that Mr. Walker filed motions before this Court on Seth Allens behalf. As this Court
can see by reviewing the records in that case, Mr. Walker has never purported to represent
anyone before this Court but himself.
23
Transcript of January 9, 2012 hearing Kimberlin v. Allen, No. 339254V (Md. Mont. Co. Cir. Ct.
2010) p. 8. A copy of this transcript is attached as Exhibit C.
20

11

III.
THE PLAINTIFFS ENTIRE MOTION WAS FILED IN BAD FAITH OR WITHOUT
SUBSTANTIAL JUSTIFICATION, WARRANTING SANCTIONS UNDER MD. R. 1-341
Mr. Walker has spent the last 12 pages explaining that he has a right to file a Motion to
Dismiss from the moment the suit is filed and that he has a right to represent himself. The point
of this exercise is not primarily to convince this Court of the obvious. This Court almost
certainly knows without being told that Mr. Walker could file his motion to dismiss at this time,
and that he can represent himself. The greater point in this discussion is to show that the Plaintiff
is arguing in bad faith. The Plaintiff is not only wrong, he knows he is wrong.
For this reason, sanctions are appropriate under Md. R. 1-341. Rule 1-341 provides that
[i]n any civil action, if the court finds that the conduct of any party in maintaining
or defending any proceeding was in bad faith or without substantial justification
the court may require the offending party or the attorney advising the conduct or
both of them to pay to the adverse party the costs of the proceeding and the
reasonable expenses, including reasonable attorneys fees, incurred by the adverse
party in opposing it.
First, the rule requires that this be a proceeding. Maryland Rule 1-202(v) defines the term
proceeding as any part of an action. Subsection (a) in turn defines action as (in relevant
part) collectively all the steps by which a party seeks to enforce any right in a court[.] Thus
even a single motion can constitute a proceeding under Md. Rule 1-341.
Next, the rule requires a finding of either bad faith or a lack of substantial justification.
Both are present in this instance. The absence of substantial justification is shown by the
arguments above demonstrating the frivolousness of the Plaintiffs proffered justification for his
Motion to Strike. The presence of bad faith is demonstrated by the Plaintiffs litigation history
which shows that the Plaintiff knew his arguments were frivolous, as well as his failure to serve
his motion on Mr. Walker.24 As noted infra 16-17, the Plaintiff didnt even sign his filing
As of this filing, Mr. Walker still hasnt received a copy of this document from the Plaintiff. In
order to write this opposition, Mr. Walker had to obtain a copy of the Plaintiffs motion from this
24

12

properly, even though he knew of this rule and had previously been admonished for his failure to
do so.
With bad faith or a lack of substantial justification demonstrated, this Court is granted the
power to sanction the Plaintiff for wasting this Courts and Mr. Walkers time. Mr. Walker
requests a sanction of at least five hundred dollars ($500.00), calculated at five (5) hours of work
at a rate of one hundred dollars ($100) per hour for Mr. Walkers time. Nothing will better deter
the Plaintiff from filing such frivolous motions in the future, than paying a price for his
misconduct, now.
Further, Mr. Walker knows what is likely to be the next shoe to drop: the Plaintiff will ask
for this Court to grant him an extension of time to respond to Mr. Walkers Motion to Dismiss in
order to consider his frivolous Motion to Strike. Thats what the Plaintiff is almost certainly
fishing for: more time to respond to Mr. Walker Motion to Dismiss, because after about a year
and a half in litigation over these matters, the Plaintiff doesnt know how to answer Mr. Walkers
pointed deconstruction of his entire complaint.25
courthouse by driving from his home in Manassas, Virginia, to Rockville, Maryland.
25
An additional reason why the Plaintiff is likely seeking a delay is because his litigious conduct
has created numerous overlapping obligations, in addition to the burdens of this case. For
instance, on May 14, 2015, the Plaintiff will be before this Court again in K. K. v. William Hoge
III, No. 9148D (Md. Mont. Co. Cir. Ct. 2015). That hearing will be the de novo appeal of the
denial of a frivolous petition for a peace order filed by Mr. Kimberlin as the next friend to his
minor daughter, K. K., and also against the same William Hoge who is a co-Defendant in the
instant case. On the next day, the Plaintiff must file an informal brief supporting his improper
interlocutory appeal of Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club, et al. (I) before the Fourth Circuit
Court of Appeals. This is in addition to a second RICO suit Mr. Kimberlin filed against various
members of the same Team Themis he claims (irrelevantly) was out to get him in his current
complaint (Compl. 24-27), Kimberlin v. Hunton & Williams, LLP, et al., No. 15-CV-00723GJH (2015) and the same Mr. Hoge; and a frivolous appeal of a case Mr. Kimberlin filed in this
Court and lost last August, Kimberlin v. Walker, et al., No. 380966V (Md. Mont. Co. Cir. Ct.
2013). The Plaintiff is proceeding pro se in all of them. However, the Plaintiffs self-imposed
burden of litigation is not a justification for delaying justice in this case, especially in the face of
MD CODE Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-807 which commands the courts to dismiss bad faith lawsuits
13

Mr. Walker believes the Plaintiff is about to do this, because he has done it before. In
Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club, et al. (I), the same Plaintiff sought to obtain the identity of
the blogger known as Ace of Spades (hereinafter Ace) under Brodie. Ace obtained pro bono
legal help from Paul Levy of Public Citizen, who was admitted pro hac vice under the
supervision of Maryland Attorney David Rocah of the ACLU. Mr. Levy filed an Opposition to
Motion for Leave to Pursue Discovery to Identify Defendant Ace of Spades (ECF No. 75) on
Aces behalf and in turn the Plaintiff filed a motion to disqualify Mr. Levy as counsel (ECF No.
93),26 attached as Exhibit D. Simultaneously, the same Plaintiff filed a motion for an extension
to file his response to Aces Opposition on the theory that he shouldnt have to file this response
until the court had disposed of the motion to disqualify (ECF No. 92), attached as Exhibit E.
This Court can see on the face of his motion to disqualify Mr. Levy that it was frivolous.
That is, even if every claim the Plaintiff made was true (and it is not), it did not add up to
grounds to disqualify Mr. Levy. The frivolousness of this request becomes even more evident
when one remembers that Mr. Levy was a foreign attorney, and his motion was co-signed by
local counsel David Rocah.

Mr. Kimberlin made no effort to challenge Mr. Rocahs

qualifications as counsel. Thus, even if Mr. Levy was disqualified (which he wouldnt have
been), one undeniably qualified attorney had signed the opposition and, therefore, such
disqualification would not cause the disputed filing to be withdrawn. But the point of the
Plaintiffs filing wasnt to win; it was to frustrate Mr. Levy and to seek a delay.27
designed to suppress free expression early. If the Plaintiffs zealous litigation activity is more
than he can handle, that is a reason relieve him of some of that the burden and dismiss this case
early and for all Defendants.
26
The Plaintiff mischaracterizes this document that Messrs. Levy and Rocah filed as a Motion for
a Protective Order.
27
The motion to disqualify was ultimately stricken because it violated a previous order (ECF No.
96), while the motion to an extension of time to reply was denied (ECF No. 99).
14

This opposition was mailed to this Court on Monday, May 11, 2015. More than likely by
the end of the same week, the Plaintiff will ask for an extension of time to respond to Mr.
Walkers Motion to Dismiss.28 This motion is likely to cite either 1) the Plaintiffs motion to
strike and the desire to see it resolved before filing his opposition, and/or 2) the Plaintiffs desire
to respond to all of Defendants inevitable motions to dismiss at once. Neither are valid reasons
for delay when one considers MD CODE Cts. & Jud. Proc. 5-807(d)(1)s command that the
court shall hold a hearing on the motion to dismiss as soon as practicable. The invalidity of
waiting for this Court to rule on the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike is demonstrated by its sheer
frivolousness. Further, while it might be tempting this Court to set an omnibus deadline for all
motions to dismiss, and the Plaintiffs response and so on, 29 such a delay would be in direct
conflict with 5-807(d)(1). Such a delay might be desirable, but 5-807(d)(1) states that the
hearing must be held as soon as practicable, i.e., possible. This is mandatory language, and it
is certainly possible to rule sooner rather than later. The Plaintiff has filed a complaint in bad
faith that is entirely barred by the principle of res judicata. He had his day in court and wishes to
have another. Mr. Walker shouldnt have to wait a day longer than necessary for this Court to
dismiss this case, and 5-807 states that he doesnt have to. No delays should be granted.
Instead, a dismissal should be considered and granted at the earliest opportunity.
Therefore, the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike should be denied. That was never in doubt.
However, the Plaintiff should also be sanctioned for filing his Motion to Strike without

The Plaintiff has asked for an extension of time to reply to every single one of Mr. Walkers
motions to dismiss in Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club, et al. (I), No. GJH-13-3059 (2013).
29
It is also worth noting that in the past the court in Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club, et al.
(I) attempted to organize the motion to dismiss, opposition and reply cycle, but because of the
Plaintiffs failure to serve all parties on a timely basis, these attempts never worked as planned.
The court was still forced to face seriatim motions to dismiss.
28

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substantial justification and for filing it in bad faith. Therefore, this Court should award $500.00
to Mr. Walker for having to oppose the Plaintiffs frivolous motion, filed in bad faith.
IV.
THE PLAINTIFF HAS FAILED TO PROPERLY SIGN HIS MOTION TO STRIKE,
FURTHER JUSTIFYING THE SANCTION OF STRIKING THE PLAINTIFFS
MOTION TO STRIKE
As noted previously, the entirety of Mr. Walkers Motion to Strike was written without
seeing the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike because the Plaintiff had refused to serve Mr. Walker with
his motion.30 Now, having seen the Plaintiffs motion, Mr. Walker recognizes an additional
ground for striking it: the Plaintiff has failed to sign it properly. Specifically, Md. R. 1-311(a)
states that
Every pleading and paper of a party who is not represented by an attorney shall be
signed by the party. Every pleading or paper filed shall contain the signers
address, telephone number, facsimile number, if any, and e-mail address, if any.
The Plaintiff has failed to do this. The Plaintiff has simply signed it with his name, followed by
a false certificate of service. He has not provided his address, phone number, facsimile number
or email address. Meanwhile, Md. R. 1-311(c) provides for sanctions as follows:
If a pleading or paper is not signed as required (except inadvertent omission to
sign, if promptly corrected) or is signed with intent to defeat the purpose of this
Rule, it may be stricken and the action may proceed as though the pleading or
paper had not been filed.
Thus, the sanction of striking the document is available unless this omission is inadvertent.
The Plaintiff is likely to claim that his failure to properly sign the document was
inadvertent, the product of his ignorance as a pro se. 31 However, any cries of ignorance by this

See Mr. Walkers Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Dkt. No. 9), p. 11, n. 10.
The Plaintiff previously admitted that he committed document forgery, repeatedly, and pled for
mercy based on his pro se status, because apparently the Plaintiff thinks one has to pass the bar to
learn not to forge documents. See Walkers Motion to Strike Plaintiffs Motion to Strike, 6-7.
30
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experienced pro se are not credible for two reasons: he has cited the very rule he has violated and
he has been admonished in the past for failing to obey a comparable federal rule.
First, he surely knows that this rule exists because he cited it in his Motion to Strike. As
noted above, the Plaintiff attempted to get Mr. Walkers Motion to Dismiss stricken in part
because Mr. Walker allegedly failed to obey the first clause of Md. R. 1-311(a). He cant
credibly plead ignorance of the remainder of the same subsection.
Second, the Plaintiff has been admonished for this failure before. At one point in
Kimberlin v. National Bloggers Club, et al. (I), No. GJH-13-3059 (2013), the same Plaintiff was
admonished about his failure to provide the proper signature block as follows:
Defendant Walker also has observed that Plaintiffs signature block did not
comply with the technical requirements of Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(a). Walker Strike
Mot. 10. Although these technical shortcomings do not relieve Plaintiff from his
obligations under Fed. R. Civ. P. 11(b), Plaintiff is cautioned to comply with the
requirements of Rule 11(a) and to include his address, e-mail address, and
telephone number on all future filings.
Letter Order of January 7, 2014, Kimberlin v. Walker, et al (I) (ECF No. 26).32
To sum up, the Plaintiff has already been chided for his failure to obey the parallel Fed.
R. Civ. P. 11(a) in federal court. Further, the Plaintiff knew of the Marylands rule; he had cited
it and he has falsely accused Mr. Walker of failing to comply with it. It takes a special degree of
chutzpah to refuse to obey a rule while citing it. Any claim that the Plaintiffs decision not to
provide the full signature block was inadvertent is not credible. Indeed, his conduct appears to
be willful. As such, the sanction of striking the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike is justified and richly
deserved.
CONCLUSION

A copy of this letter order has already been provided to this court, attached as an exhibit to
Defendant Walkers Motion to Strike.
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As stated above, the purpose of this Opposition was not just to counter the Plaintiffs
Motion to Strike but also to demonstrate that it was not only frivolous but that the Plaintiff knew
it was frivolous when he filed it. Of course Mr. Walker can file a Motion to Dismiss before
being served; the Plaintiff has seen it done before, in litigation involving the same Plaintiff. Of
course Mr. Walker can represent himself; the Plaintiff has seen it done before, in litigation
involving the same Plaintiff. The Plaintiffs Motion to Strike is frivolous, and the Plaintiff
knows it, demonstrating that it was filed in bad faith. Accordingly, the Plaintiffs conduct in
filing this motion is sanctionable under Md. R. 1-341, and Mr. Walker requests sanctions of $500
for filing it. Finally, the Plaintiff has refused to sign his Motion to Strike properly under Md. R.
1-311(a), even though he was obviously aware of the rule and had been previously chided for
failure to comply with the parallel Federal Rule of Civil Procedure in the past. This provides an
additional reason to strike the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike.

WHEREFORE Defendant Walker requests:

That the Plaintiffs Motion to Strike (Dkt. no. 7) is stricken and returned to the Plaintiff
for failure to provide service; and

That the Plaintiff be sanctioned in the amount of $500.00.

Or that this Court grant any other relief as appropriate.

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Monday, May 11, 2015

Respectfully submitted,

Aaron J. Walker, Esq.

Va Bar# 48882
[redacted]
Manassas, Virginia 20109
[redacted]
(no fax)
AaronJW72@gmail.com
VERIFICATION
I, Aaron Walker, solemnly affirm under the penalties of perjury that the contents of the
foregoing paper are true to the best of my knowledge, information, and belief and that all
exhibits are true and correct copies of the originals.
Dated:

__________________________________
__________________________________
(print name of notary public)
NOTARY PUBLIC

My commission expires on:

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