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Medieval Greek Commentaries

on the Nicomachean Ethics

Studien und Texte


zur Geistesgeschichte
des Mittelalters
Begrndet von

Josef Koch
Weitergefhrt von

Paul Wilpert, Albert Zimmermann und


Jan A. Aertsen
Herausgegeben von

Andreas Speer
In Zusammenarbeit mit

Tzotcho Boiadjiev, Kent Emery, Jr.


und Wouter Goris

BAND 101

Medieval Greek
Commentaries on the
Nicomachean Ethics
Edited by

Charles Barber
David Jenkins

LEIDEN BOSTON
2009

This book is printed on acid-free paper.


Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
Medieval Greek commentaries on the Nicomachean ethics / edited by Charles Barber, David
Jenkins.
p. cm. -- (Studien und Texte zur Geistesgeschichte des Mittelalters; 101)
Includes bibliographical references and index.
ISBN 978-90-04-17393-4 (hardback : alk. paper) 1. Aristotle. Nicomachean ethics. 2.
Ethics. I. Barber, Charles, 1964- II. Jenkins, David. III. Title. IV. Series.
B430.M43 2009
171.3--dc22
2008055371

ISSN 0169-8028
ISBN 978 90 04 17393 4
Copyright 2009 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands.
Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Hotei Publishing,
IDC Publishers, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers and VSP.
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in
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Fees are subject to change.
printed in the netherlands

Charles Barber dedicates this book to his daughters,


Cleome and Josephine
David Jenkins to his parents, Marv and Joyce Jenkins

CONTENTS
Preface . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xv
Classical Scholarship in Twelfth-Century Byzantium . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
Anthony Kaldellis

The Literary, Cultural and Political Context for the


Twelfth-Century Commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics . . . . . . . . . 45
Peter Frankopan
Aristotelian Ethics in Byzantium. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63
Linos G. Benakis
Neoplatonic Source-Material in Eustratios of Nicaeas
Commentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
Michele Trizio
Eustratios of Nicaeas Definition of Being Revisited . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
David Jenkins
Eustratios of Nicaea on the Separation of Art and Theology . . . . . . . 131
Charles Barber
The Anonymous Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics VII:
Language, Style and Implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 145
Elizabeth A. Fisher
Michael of Ephesus on the Empirical Man, the Scientist and the
Educated Man (In Ethica Nicomachea X and In de Partibus
Animalium I) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 163
George Arabatzis
Some Observations on Michael of Ephesus Comments on
Nicomachean Ethics X . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 185
Katerina Ierodiakonou
Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 223

PREFACE

Most of the papers collected in this volume were first presented at a


workshop held in February 2006 at the University of Notre Dame. This
meeting was organized by Charles Barber and David Jenkins and was
devoted to discussion of twelfth-century Byzantine commentaries on
the Nicomachean Ethics. This topic gave the participants in the meeting
an opportunity both to evaluate the condition of philosophy in twelfthcentury Byzantium and to advocate for the real significance of the
often-overlooked contribution of Byzantine thinkers to the medieval
reception of classical philosophical texts.
Given the enduring importance of Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics, it
is remarkable to find that there is no extensive surviving commentary on this text from the period between the second century and
the twelfth century. Our workshop focused on the first of the medieval
commentaries: that produced in the early twelfth century by Eustratios,
Metropolitan of Nicaea (ca. 1050ca. 1120), Michael of Ephesus (fl. first
half of the twelfth century), and an anonymous author in Constantinople. Under the patronage of the imperial princess Anna Komnene,
these Byzantine scholars prepared commentaries on books I, V, VI,
VII, IX and X. This endeavor was to have a significant impact on the
reception of the Nicomachean Ethics in Latin and Catholic Europe. In
the mid-thirteenth century, Robert Grosseteste translated into Latin a
manuscript that paired these Byzantine commentators with anonymous
ancient commentary on books II, III, IV and V as well as Aspasius
second-century commentary on book VIII. Both Albertus Magnus and
Bonaventure then used this translation as a basis for their discussions
of Aristotles book. Given the potential significance of this Byzantine
project, it is surprising to find that discussion of these commentaries
has not been extensive and that the quality of the philosophical enquiry
contained within them remains little known and certainly undervalued.
In order to go some way towards correcting this situation, the collection of papers contained within the present volume attempts to contextualize the production of these twelfth-century commentaries and,
from a variety of disciplinary perspectives, to oer some precise investigations of aspects of the philosophical thought to be found in these
works.

preface

The first three papers, those by Anthony Kaldellis, Peter Frankopan


and Linos Benakis, oer some framings for our readings of these commentaries. Kaldellis essay positions the work of these twelfth-century
philosophers within the compass of a diuse and creative classical
scholarship in twelfth-century Byzantium. In so doing, he not only
argues that Byzantine scholarship has provided the defining model
for the study of the classics, but that our recognition of the value of
this particular legacy can continue to enrich and inform the fields
found within Classical Studies today. Frankopans paper also considers this philosophical project in light of the classical past. In particular, Frankopan shows that Anna Komnenes patronage of these scholars was part of her wider interest in Hellenism. For Anna, Hellenism
oered a means by which to articulate the distinctiveness of Byzantine culture in an age when its power seemed to have fallen away and
into the hands of the Seljuk Turks and the Latin Christians. Benakis
paper provides the reader with an introduction to the circulation of the
Nicomachean Ethics and the production of commentaries on the Ethics
in Byzantium. While this survey reveals an extensive interest in ethical
questions, the implications of this interest, as Benakis indicates, remain
to be fully studied.1
The next three essays focus on the writings of Eustratios of Nicaea.
Eustratios had been a student of John Italos in the years around 1080.
He had then, perhaps in the early 1090s and while he served as a deacon of Hagia Sophia in Constantinople, written two short discourses
on icons. These were directed against Leo the Metropolitan of Chalcedons understanding of the image. In the 1110s we find Eustratios acting as a court theologian and engaged in debates with Latin Catholics
and Armenian Monophysites. This role came to an end in 1117, when
Eustratios was condemned for his theological method and recorded in
the Synodikon of Orthodoxy for having been overly attached to syllogisms.
It is in the years following this condemnation that Eustratios appears
to have written his commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics. Eustratios
wrote commentaries on two books of the Ethics, I and VI. He also
wrote a commentary on the second book of Aristotles Posterior Analytics. Michele Trizios paper demonstrates that Eustratios commentary
on book 6 was profoundly indebted to the language of Proklos. In par1 This paper was originally published in Greek: Linos Benakis,
, in   , ed. D.N. Koutras

(Athens: 1995) 252259.

preface

xi

ticular, Trizio argues that even when Eustratios diers from Proklos
position, he articulates his own philosophy in the language of his distinguished forebear. David Jenkins essay questions whether it is appropriate to describe Eustratios as a nominalist. Jenkins shows that this identification is an oversimplification, even as he demonstrates that Eustratios limited his discussion of being to the formal logic of predication.
Charles Barbers paper examines Eustratios extensive writing on art.
In particular, Barber argues that while Eustratios discussion of art in
book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics betrays continuities with his essays on
the icons from the 1090s, these later comments also reveal that Eustratios wished to distinguish art from theology.
The next study is Elizabeth Fishers philologists reading of the anonymous commentary on Book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics. The anonymous writer of this commentary has long been considered an incompetent linguist, stylist, and philosopher. Fishers essay shows that, while
not of the highest philosophical order, Anonymous language, style and
learning would not have been out of place in a twelfth-century schoolroom. This knowledge does not, however, allow for a more precise
identification of this particular scholar.
The final two essays are written by George Arabatzis and Katerina
Ierodiakonou and are devoted to Michael of Ephesus. Michael was a
prodigious Aristotelian commentator, who worked in the first half of the
twelfth century and who wrote commentaries on books V, IX and X of
the Nicomachean Ethics. In addition to these books from the Nicomachean
Ethics he commented on the Metaphysics, the Sophistical Refutations, the
Generation of Animals, the Parva naturalia, the Parts of Animals, the Movement
of Animals, the Progression of Animals, the De coloribus, the Politics, the Prior
and Posterior Analytics, the Topics, the Physics, the De caelo, and the Rhetoric.
This breadth of work suggests that there was an extensive interest in
Aristotles writings in the early twelfth century Constantinople. Our
two essays focus on the commentary on book X. Arabatzis argues that
Michael of Ephesus draws careful distinctions between the educated
man and the scientist. In having drawn this distinction, Arabatzis is
able to show that Michael then uses the scientist and the educated
man as models of the classificatory process. Ierodiakonou, in turn,
argues that it is only by a close reading of particular texts and by
attending to the play of particular concepts (such as eudaimonia) that
we can begin to characterize appropriately both Michaels work as a
philosopher and the nature of philosophical thought in twelfth-century
Byzantium.

xii

preface

The papers gathered together in this volume remind us that much


work remains to be done in the field of Byzantine philosophy. We
still have far too many works that remain unedited and far too few
communities of scholars who are willing and able to bring the work
of these Byzantine thinkers into the wider discourses of intellectual
history. For these Byzantine commentators did not simply reiterate or
paraphrase an existing and extensive tradition of commentary. Rather,
we witness acts of reading and interpretation that both belong to and
speak from the Greek world of the twelfth century, voices that open
these texts to their world and inform our reading of these texts for our
world.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Many institutions and colleagues contributed to the success of the workshop that produced the papers published in this volume. Financial
support came from the Graduate School of the University of Notre
Dame, from the Medieval Institute at the University of Notre Dame,
and from the Institute for Scholarship in the Liberal Arts in the College
of Arts & Letters at the University of Notre Dame. Harriet Baldwin
provided logistical support. Kent Emery, Andreas Speer, Sten Ebbesen,
and Stephen Gersh brought additional lively and intelligent discussion
to the workshop and contributed to a roundtable on Byzantine Philosophy that was joined to the Nicomachean Ethics workshop and that was
organized by Kent Emery under the auspices of the Socit Internationale
pour ltude de la Philosophie Mdivale. Finally, the organizers of this workshop would like to thank all of the participants for their contributions
to this intensive and rewarding weekend of convivial conversation.

ABBREVIATIONS

Mansi
PG

Mansi, J.D. Sacrorum Conciliorum Nova et Amplissima Collectio. Florence


and Venice: A. Zatti, 17591798.
Patrologiae cursus completus, Series graeca. Ed. Jacques-Paul Migne. 161
vols. in 166 parts. Paris: Migne, 18571866.

CLASSICAL SCHOLARSHIP IN
TWELFTH-CENTURY BYZANTIUM

Anthony Kaldellis*
This chapter aims to survey what may justly be called classical scholarship in twelfth-century Byzantium, especially the commentaries on
ancient texts. By discussing the dierent methods, goals, audiences, and
ideological parameters of these largely neglected works, I intend to situate the commentaries on Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics into a vibrant
culture of scholarly production and consumption. But the very notion
of classical scholarship in Byzantium calls for explanation and requires
an ideological accounting.
1. Byzantium vs. the Classics
Byzantine classicism, both creative and scholarly, has received a
mostly negative press in modern discussions. It has been denied its
rightful place in the history of classical scholarship largely because its
strengths and contributions have been taken for granted by those who
have delighted in highlighting its shortcomings. This calls for a swing
in the opposite direction. But the ideological obstacles are formidable,
especially the notion that has been widely disseminated in the West
regarding the position of Byzantium in our system of civilizations.
This notion is fatally entangled in the ideological construction of the
enlightened West itself and its leading nations in opposition to designated Others. The eect can be observed in popular perceptions,
where Byzantium stands in conceptual opposition to the classical (both
the ancient and its modern rightful heirs), and in specialized literature on the history of classical scholarship, which practices a special
form of forgetfulness. The two volumes of R. Pfeiers History of Classical Scholarship cover antiquity to the end of the Hellenistic Age and then
the years 13001850 (of course, in the West). The entries on schol* The author thanks Niels Gaul for his valuable comments on an earlier draft of
this study.

anthony kaldellis

arship in the Oxford Classical Dictionary reflect this division while the
Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium has no entries on scholarship. Studies of
the transmission of ancient texts overwhelmingly favor the Hellenistic and modern periods, limiting discussion of the Byzantine period
which was as long as the other two put together and just as crucial if
not more so for the formation of the classical canonto just a few
pages.1 N.G. Wilsons Scholars of Byzantium, the only study devoted to the
issue, is useful and immensely learned but also condescending: virtually
every page contains derogatory comments and unnecessary adjectives.
One can stand in awe of its erudition yet find it an unpleasant read
delivering an unfair verdict. Wilson takes the Byzantines groundbreaking contributions for granted and focuses on their failings. I will do the
opposite.
In modern scholarship, Byzantium as a cultural system has rarely
been studied on its own terms, free of comparison, that is, with its
neighbors and antecedents. I will concentrate here on the most influential of these comparisons, the one with classical antiquity. Byzantine literature, philosophy, and society have until recently been measured and
basically defined against the yardstick of their classical antecedents
and found wanting. Theology is the one exception among textual genres, though normally the modern scholar has to be a believer for the
balance to tilt in its favor. Byzantine art and architecture have established themselves on their own terms. But when it comes to intellectual
history and literary culture, antiquity stands for reason, originality, and
literature while Byzantium is associated with rhetoric, imitation,
and superstition. Countless quotations can be given to this eect from
both Byzantinists and non-specialists. There are historical and disciplinary reasons why this culture has been so closely linked to another
and defined in relation to it. Many Byzantinists were and often still are
trained in Classics before moving to later material. Byzantine history,
including the state, society, and language, emerges gradually during the
course of late antiquity, allowing for the transference of scholarly skills
from one culture to the other, a temptation that occludes many pitfalls. As their written languages were virtually identical, classical Athens
1 E.g., Sandys (1921) devotes 37 pages (out of 1700 in the three volume set) to
Byzantium (namely v. 1, 387424); Groningen (1963) almost none. Reynolds and Wilson
(1991) oer 26 pages (4854, 5878) out of 240, which is an improvement. Dickey (2007),
a major new resource, appeared after this chapter was finished; only targeted citations
to it could be included.

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

and Byzantium are superficially easy to compare despite being separated by 1,500 years. In part, the Byzantines brought this on themselves by admiring and preserving ancient literature and thought. They
drew attention to the inferiority, belatedness, and derivativeness that
they often felt in the presence of their classical models. In some respects
their cultural practices were fundamentally defined in relation to antiquity.
As a result, Byzantium has been dealt with unfairly, especially when
it is approached by observers whose expertise and commitments lie
elsewhere, and it was precisely such scholars who constructed the field
in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries and who fashioned the
representations of it that hold sway in the general culture. Classicallyoriented scholars were predisposed, even trained, to view it unfavorably
in comparison to Greece. Moreover, Byzantium generally gained the
attention of Medievalists in the context of its shameful defeats, both
military and ideological, to the Crusaders. One such defeat was the
insistence of the medieval West that the Byzantines were not true
Romans as they claimed but merely degraded GreeksGreeklings
to be conquered as the ancient Greeks were conquered by the ancient
Romans. This suppression of the Roman identity of Byzantium in
favor of a model of Greek degeneration (whether ethnic, cultural,
or linguistic) fundamentally shaped the field and still holds sway.2
Finally, as a culture with a modern progeny, Byzantium was observed
indirectly by European travelers to the Ottoman empire, who as ethnographers were prejudiced against Orthodox society in its oppressed and
degraded state. They naturally viewed Europe as the legitimate heir of
Greece, not Byzantium, which they blamed even for the eects of centuries of Turkish rule. Western travelers sought a genuine encounter
with classical Greece, and imagined it by suppressing all that they associated, rightly or wrongly, with the post-classical culture that had so
sullied and degraded it.3 For these reasons, and others that have to do
with the discipline of philology, Byzantium has been unable to escape
from the shadow of ancient Greece.
The damage done to our view of Byzantium may prove to be permanent unless a serious concerted eort is mounted. Yet we need not
2 Cf. Kaldellis (2007) c. 2 for a rehabilitation of Byzantium as Romania; c. 6 for the
polemic with the medieval West.
3 The contribution of this group to the making of modern notions about Byzantium
has been insuciently appreciated. A good place to start is Augustinos (1994).

anthony kaldellis

engage in a form of scholarly cultural wars, taking on the values that


have created and sustained our basic perceptions of ourselves and others. At this preliminary stage, we are not dealing with irreconcilable
dierences in values but with politically motivated misrepresentations
and double-standards, lies, and ignorance. It will suce for now to state
some basic facts and establish a sense of proportion.
My topic is classical scholarship. Here too Byzantium has been put
down, although in a special way. The problem is this: the Greek classics
did not fall out of the sky into the waiting hands of modern Europeans.
There was a long process of transmission and a thousand years of it
passed directly (and even exclusively) through Byzantium. The Byzantines are occasionally praised for preserving what otherwise might have
been lost, but this praise is double-edged for it implies that they have
done us a service, not that they were doing anything for themselves,
at least not anything that was significant to them (because conceptually Byzantium and the classics are opposites). So they are thanked for
serving as a conduit, for inexplicably and against their own values and
tastes preserving Greek literature in order that Europe could one day
revive the true spirit of antiquity, however that revival is imagined (as
the Renaissance; Enlightenment; science; or critical scholarship). In this
schema, then, Byzantium is only a vessel, one moreover that is imagined as so well insulated as to leave no permanent mark on its precious
contents. It is as if the classical scholar thinks of our cherished texts as
having survived in cold storage for the thousand years between the end
of antiquity and the beginning of the Renaissance;4 or as if cultural
goods existed in a sort of strong box, separated from the process by
which one appropriates them.5 The opposite is in fact true: the Byzantines not only established the canon of what we today regard as the
classics but they also set down some of the basic modes and orders of
classical scholarship as we practice it today.
Many will be surprised by this statement. Yet when we look at the
Loeb Classical Library (the green shelves), or the orange Teubners, or
the blue OCTs, what we are seeing is basically a Byzantine classical
library, that 10 % of ancient Greek literature that the Byzantines chose
to keep. For many of the authors in that library, including all those
whom we regard as most important today, the choice was a meaningful
one, that is they were deemed worth preserving by most educated
4
5

Smith (1996) 395.


Brague (2002) 150.

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

Byzantines. Others survive due to the decisions and eorts of smaller


groups (reflecting an interest in a specialized field or the eccentricities of
personal taste), and a few due to chance. Also, there are more surviving
ancient authors than are found in the standard collections named
above. All in all, the preservation of ancient texts was a massive cultural
and economic enterprise, larger than is usually imagined. Moreover,
this was a distinctly Byzantine cultural enterprise (there is a striking
description of its early phase in one of Themistios orations).6 Our
classical library is a Byzantine classical library.
This is not the only way in which we should gaze upon this corpus, but it is one with which every Hellenist should be familiar, though
today most are not. Ancient Greek texts are reconstructed entirely
from Byzantine manuscripts with the exception of a small number
found on papyri, stone inscriptions, and gold tablets. Yet classicists
tend to take the composition of this corpus for granted, as though (to
repeat the metaphor) it fell from the sky and was not fundamentally
shaped by Byzantine choices. Astonishingly, there has been no concerted eort to determine why the Greek corpus is what it is, an eort
that would require long-term and far-reaching collaboration between
classicists and Byzantinists. I know of only scattered, partial, and brief
inquiries, usually by Byzantinists and a few paleographers.7 The most
detailed studies focus on the incidence, the material mechanisms, and
the strictly circumscribed contexts of transmission and do not often
pose the matter of Byzantine classical scholarship as a cultural problem in its own right. Besides, we are too used to defining the Byzantines
on the basis of what they said they believed rather than on what they did
(consider, by contrast, how dierently we come to terms with ancient
Greek culture). This too serves to limit the Byzantines to a separate

Themistios, Oration 4 To Constantius 59d60c; cf. Lemerle (1971) 5657.


Cavallo (2002) 31175 is excellent for late antiquity but does not reach far into
Byzantium; 206233 briefly surveys the Byzantine period; also Treadgold (1984) for the
period 600900 and the Byzantine preference for later Greek literature; Dain (1954)
for the period 850950; Lemerle (1971) c. 8 for Arethas contribution, and 280300
for tenth-century encyclopedism; Easterling (2003) for Sophokles; Easterling (1995) and
Blanchard (1997) for the comedian Menandros; Brunt (1980) 477478 and Treadgold
(2007) c. 1 for historians and tragedians; Browning (1964) 12 for Marcus Aurelius
Meditations; Cavallo (2002) 186194 for Dioskorides; Wilson (1983a) 1920 on the role
of the curriculum, and 4142 for Epiktetos; Fowden (1986) 810 for the Hermetica; Jones
(2001) 13 for the loss of ancient local antiquarianism. For transmission as a cultural
problem, see Brague (2002) c. 4, who largely omits Byzantium.
6
7

anthony kaldellis

sphere (defined theologically) and eliminate them as active participants


from a dierent process that has been claimed by others.
Among classicists, on the other hand, aloofness and utility tend to
prevail: antiquity is surgically extracted from the mechanisms of Byzantine transmission and then treated as a self-standing corpus whose form
and content require no explanation. Fragments are cut out from the
authors who quote them, and it is assumed that students of pre-Socratic
philosophy need not study Simplikios or know his name, and that students of Polybios need not know who Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos was and what his circle did to the History. Moreover, few editors of ancient texts recognize those Byzantines who prepared our best
manuscripts as professional counterparts. Most postulate a direct relationship between themselves and ancient authors that is illusory, if not
misleading. Not all scribes were mere copyists who mindlessly preserved (and invariably corrupted) texts that were eectively meaningless
to them (see below), for some were diligent scholars.8 In the case of one
modern editor of Aristophanes, Victor Coulon, it has even been suggested that one consequence of his procedure was concealment of the
fact that some good emendations attributed by him to editors of the
modern era were actually made by Byzantine scholars before 1350, and
when the attributions have been corrected we get a much better idea of
Byzantine scholarship.9
2. The Concept of Classical Culture
Byzantium was not merely a conduit for classical literature that we can
discard given that we have received its contents. Its scribes, scholars,
and even the complex ideology of its intellectual culture played a
crucial role in the formation of the very notion of classical scholarship
and devised many of its basic tools that we take for granted today.
8 E.g., Lemerle (1971) 167171 and c. 8; Markopoulos (1982); Hunger (1989) 6569,
132133; Wilson (1983a) 193194, 201202; Reynolds and Wilson (1991) 6061, 7677;
and Gaul (2007), for various figures of the middle and later period; Cavallo (2006) 7173
for ecclesiastical texts. The survival in greater numbers of later manuscripts tilts the
balance of interest toward the Palaiologan period, as do Demetrios Triklinios metrical
discoveries. The basic studies of the manuscript traditions of ancient authors are listed
by Friis-Jensen et al. (1997) 199205, but I know of no sustained inquiry into Byzantine
textual-critical practices of the middle period.
9 Dover (1994) 77.

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

These tools were both practical and ideological. I will briefly discuss
the latter first.
Modern classical scholarship studies ancient Greece at a huge historical remove. Most of us are not Greeks, we do not believe in the
gods of the Greeks, and, despite our interest in or enthusiasm for Greek
things, we also feel the pull of modern systems of society, technology,
and knowledge. The Byzantines were in fact the first culture to consume classical literature from such a detached albeit respectful perspective. They did not see themselves as Greeks but as Romans and Christians. They did not believe in the gods who figure so prominently in
much Greek literature, as Julian had awkwardly pointed out; and they
were loyal to dierent social and political systems, which they did not
trace back to the ancient Greeks. Byzantine classical scholarship was,
therefore, the study of an admired but foreign society. In the polarities of
inside vs. outside, Greek vs. Christian, ours vs. theirs, Greece
was almost always the Other, and could destabilize Byzantine assumptions if it were not kept carefully in check; this threatening aspect has
been a feature of modern classicism too.10
The taming, domestication, and transformation of ancient Greece
from a living culture into a discipline of scholarship was a Byzantine achievement, and could in fact only have been accomplished by
Greek-speaking Christians, inside outsiders. We take it for granted
that Homer can be appreciated by those who do not believe in his
gods, but this assumption is itself a product of Byzantine technologies
of scholarship. It was not held by Julian, or the Neoplatonists, or, for
that matter, most ancient readers. For instance, one commonly finds
modern summaries of the plot of the Iliad that, like many Byzantine
paraphrases of the poems, omit the role of the gods, despite the fact
that Homer signals the crucial importance of Zeus in the first verses.11
As we will see, Byzantine summaries of the Trojan War also tended to
omit the gods, because one could not regard as literature a text that was
religious. But when did it become literature? And when did ancient
artlargely statues of gods and templesbecome art? To be sure,
such approaches can be traced in antiquity. Julian was wrong that
Thucydides was inspired by the Muses, and the aesthetic appreciation
of religious art can be documented for most periods of antiquity.12 But
10
11
12

See Goldhill (2002) for some moments; Kaldellis (2007) for Byzantium.
E.g., Alden (2000) 13.
Bounia (2004).

anthony kaldellis

these were not the dominant modes of perception in antiquity and,


more importantly, they never coalesced into a discipline with interpretive authority over the cultural productions of the Greeks defined as
an ancient and foreign people. That was a Byzantine moment. We can
observe its emergence in the fourth century, for instance in Basil of
Caesareas Address to young men on how they might profit from Greek literature
(ca. 370), which became a standard discussion of the problem in Byzantium and early modern Europe. We also observe the transformation of
statues and architecture into art in the edicts and practices of the first
Christian emperors, who legislated against its religious use and for its
preservation on aesthetic grounds, and who put it on display in their
capital.13
In short, the idea of classical scholarship (as outside paideia) was
largely created by the Byzantines. It would be nice to say that this fact
is obvious, but the reality is that it their role in this story has been
obscured. The Byzantines receive credit for preserving some things but
nothing more, and prejudice has managed to drain even that of value.
Consider Nigel Spivey on the assemblage of ancient statuary in Constantinople: beyond whatever good intentions . . . they were, we might
say, simply knocking around: components of an urban pastiche which
was eectively meaningless.14 Many statements to the same eect can
be adduced regarding the Byzantine attitude toward ancient literature in particular (they are known and need not be rehearsed here).
To support this preposterous conclusion Spivey notes that the Byzantines did not try to imitate ancient sculptural art. That they went to
all the trouble to gather it from the provinces and transport it to
the capital; established special collections; wrote poems and antiquarian works about it; incorporated its architectural elements into their
churches; and lamented its destruction by the Crusaders; is all, apparently, meaningless by comparison to the absence of imitation. But
this is a dubious criterion, perhaps one designed to result in this precise
conclusion. And the Byzantines cannot win this fight, for even imitation can easily be turned around and presented negatively as sterility, as
happens in the case of their (often very successful) attempts to imitate
ancient literature.

13 For Julian, Basileios, and the contest over ancient literature, see Kaldellis (2007)
c. 3; for statues and temples, see Bassett (2004).
14 Spivey (1996) 11.

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

What is going on here? The ideological imperative has again prevailed according to which Byzantium isand must be upheld asthe
antithesis of all that we stand for, e.g., classical antiquity, the Renaissance, Enlightenment, science, scholarship, etc. They had no right to
it and their labor of preservation has no claim on us; we may freely
plunder what they saved, because we cannot eectively steal from
one who has no conception of the worth of what is stolen. It was in
this way that the conquering West, more broadly, conceived its relation
to the New World (to look in one direction) and the Orient (to look
in the other). To ameliorate the debt (or deny it), it has become almost
mandatory in the case of Byzantium to cite palimpsests where a work of
ancient literature was erased to make room for a monastic or liturgical
text. The problem is not that this did not happen (though cases where
the opposite happened are less frequently noted),15 but rather with the
ideological work that this evidence is supposed to do.
A critical evaluation of the polarity Classics-Byzantium is long overdue, for in addition to making antiquity possible in the first place the
Byzantines devised or perfected many of the practical tools of the discipline which we tookand still take for granted. In this chapter, I will
survey, first, the basic tools of classical scholarship in Byzantium and
then highlight the specific forms that they took in the twelfth century.
The rich and vibrant picture that emerges from this survey should lay
to rest the idea that the classics were eectively meaningless for the
Byzantines, that they made no contribution to progress, or that they
never comprehended the spirit of the pagan classics.16 It will also, as
promised, provide a broader context against which the commentaries
on Aristotle can be appreciated more fully.
3. Tools of the Trade
Basic things are most easily taken for granted. In the ninth century, the
book took on the form that it basically still bears today, namely bound
hard-cover pages with margins around a text in minuscule script. The
codex had finally replaced the roll during late antiquity, while the
minuscule bookscript became established ca. 800 ad. Gradually, surviving texts were recopied (transliterated)at least, all that were
15
16

Cf. Hunger (1989) 20.


cenko, and C. Mango.
Treadgold (1984) 95 citing P. Lemerle, I. Sev

10

anthony kaldellis

deemed worthy of passing to this next phase of transmission. We know


some of the scholars who were involved in this unprecedented project,
for example Leo the Philosopher and Arethas of Caesarea in the ninth
century. The physical aspects of the learned professions were henceforth unlike those of antiquity, which relied on papyrus rolls inscribed in
capital letters. Each ancient roll individually contained only a fraction
of what a book could hold, and many were collected together in boxes,
taking up much more space and being less easy of access and reference.
Minuscule economized on both material and time.17 In this sense, the
physical appearance of the edition of classical texts has changed little
since the ninth century, certainly in comparison with the changes that
were introduced then. Printing has, of course, made crucial changes,
among which are cheap mass production, standardization, and conventional numbering systems such as page and line numbers (although the
pages of some manuscripts were numbered).18 But otherwise the basic
format remains the same.
Many of the non-Semitic vowel names (epsilon, omikron, omega,
ypsilon) were of Byzantine origin and made possible only by the conflation of sounds in the Byzantine pronunciation: e-psilon had to be differentiated from ai; o-mikron from o-mega; and y-psilon from oi. The iota
subscript and regular use of breathing marks and accents were also
features of what specialists on Greek scripts name the Byzantine system.19 The Byzantines were aware of the Phoenician origin (via Kadmos) of the alphabet, a point on which many ancient Greek, Jewish,
and Christian writers had insisted. It is worth noting in this connection a daring hypothesis that was made by the twelfth-century scholar
John Tzetzes. In a chapter of his Histories (to be discussed below), Tzetzes reviews many theories about the invention of the alphabet, chiefly
those which ascribed it to Kadmos or Palamedes. He claims that they
are false. Seizing on Homer, Iliad 6.167170, the verses on the baneful
signs on a tablet given to Bellerophontes, and calculating the date of
that hero to before both Kadmos or Palamedes, Tzetzes arrived at the
correct conclusion that the Greeks had a script before the Trojan War.
It would be too much to expect him to know about Linear B, though

17 Basic surveys of these developments are Hunger (1961) and (1989); Lemerle (1971)
109122; Roberts and Skeat (1983); Wilson (1983a) 6368; Ronconi (2003).
18 Hunger (1989) 25.
19 E.g., Allen (1987) 20, 41, 69, 84, 125, 130, 173; Powell (1991) 10, 4344, 123 n. 15.
See Mazzucchi (1979); Hunger (1989) 128129.

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

11

some historians of the Greek Bronze Age take this passage of the Iliad,
the only one in Homer in which writing is indicated, as reflecting a
memory of the more ancient system. What is important is that Tzetzes was eager and able to propound a new theory about an important
philological matterhe called such theories his Tzetzian inquires
and that did so successfully on the basis of his detailed knowledge of
Homer.20
Next to the ancient texts on our scholars desk lay dictionaries.
Glancing there, we plunge into the tangled jungle of Byzantine lexicography. Given the near total loss of Hellenistic and Roman-period
dictionaries, the partial state of publication of their Byzantine descendants, and the largely unexplored history of this tradition, it would be
prudent to avoid discussing its development and focus instead on what
was available in the twelfth century. The outline of some high imperial works of Attic lexicography have been reconstructed from the middle Byzantine compilations, for instance Ailios Dionysios and Pausanias from the evidence of Eustathios of Thessalonikes Commentaries on
Homer (see below) and from some of the lexika.21 But the completion of
this major labor, which is now in suspension, must await the publication
of the Byzantine dictionaries themselves, for which the outlook is bleak:
such an eort would require teams of philologists, funding, and can
probably not be carried out in the US, given the structure of academic
careers.
The Lexikon of the patriarch Photios (ninth century) included some
8,000 brief entries. A complete manuscript was discovered in Greece
in 1959, but the whole has still not been published. The Lexikon of
Zonaras was larger19,000 entriesand proved to be more popular,
supplanting its competitors. Over 100 manuscripts survive, which is in
part why we have no comprehensive edition. This massive work dates
to the twelfth or the thirteenth century; its ascription to the twelfthcentury historian and canonist John Zonaras still finds defenders. These
lexika were used for both reading and composition, as a comparison of
rare words in Anna Komnenes Alexiad and the Lexikon of Zonaras has
demonstrated; conversely, the latter cites usages from John Tzetzes and
seems to have culled entries from his commentary on Aristophanes.
20 John Tzetzes, Histories 12.29118 (pp. 469472). For hints in the classical period
regarding a pre-Phoenician script, see Pfeier (1968) 21.
21 Erbse (1950). For Byzantine lexicography, the basic survey is Hunger (1978) v. 2,
3350.

12

anthony kaldellis

This dictionary, then, has been described as the product of a serious


and industrious eort to present a source of reference which combines
a wealth of entries with brevity and comprehensiveness of expression.22
It was popular with scholars and put to good practical use.
Another class of Byzantine dictionaries were the so-called Etymologika. There is no reason to go into their messy textual and editorial
histories.23 The only ones that have been published (both in the nineteenth century) are the Etymologicum Gudianum of the ninth century and
the Etymologicum Magnum of the twelfth; we still await the full publication of their ninth-century prototype, the Etymologicum Genuinum (i.e.,
Magnum). The published Magnum is a massive volume, the size of the
LSJ, but with a larger font. It has 2,306 columns of text on 14-inch
pages, though about half of each page consists of modern commentary.
Each section begins with an entry on the letter itself. Most entries are
34 lines long, though sometimes longer. Focusing on etymology, they
also oer basic and variant meanings, occasionally synonyms and crossreferences to other entries, and quotations illustrating the word. There
are also entries on rare names and places. We do not know who the
editors of the Etymologicum Magnum were, but their work was used by
Eustathios, a contemporary, for one.
These dictionaries are a major source of ancient poetic fragments
and continue to yield new words and verses.24 But this treasure-trove
approach minimizes their importance for the history of scholarship.
It was based on these works, brought to the West in the fourteenthfifteenth centuries by Byzantine scholars, that all modern lexika of
Greek are ultimately based, given that their ancient sources were long
lost by that time. The genealogy of the LSJ, in other words, goes back
through Henri Estiennes (a.k.a. Henricus Stephanus, 15311598) great
Thesaurus graecae linguae (1572) to the dictionaries that sat on the desks
of the scholars who wrote the commentaries discussed in this volume,
and were among the first Greek books to be printed (the Etymologicum
Magnum in Venice as early as 1499).25

22 Grigoriadis (1998) 183208, quotation from 208. For the manuscript tradition, see
Alpers (1981) 2235.
23 The key study is Reizenstein (1897), and is not likely to be superseded soon; for a
summary, see Hunger (1978) v. 2, 4547; see now Dickey (2007) 8792, 99103. For the
concept of etymology, see Robins (1993) 21, 47.
24 E.g., Tsantsanoglou (1984).
25 Hunger (1989) 137.

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

13

Byzantine scholars had more specialized dictionaries and reference


works as well, for instance of Attic or legal words. In the eleventh
century, for example, Michael Psellos had drawn up a list of Athenian place-names (with commentary) from Strabo; an explanation of
Athenian legal terminology; and a list of Roman legal doctrines and
Republican leges by name. I note them because Psellos was revered by
the twelfth-century humanists.26 There were encyclopedias too. The
epitome of Stephen of Byzantions Ethnika (sixth century), originally
in fifty-five books, provided an exhaustive list of places, peoples, and
ethnonyms, along with grammatical instructions on how to use them.
Better known is the Souda, a tenth-century encyclopedia with 30,000
entries on prosopography, places, rare words, sayings, and other information that help one understand ancient texts (in all, then, an Oxford
Classical Dictionary of sorts). This too was very widely used in the twelfth
century.27
Lexicography in motion requires grammar and leads to rhetoric.
Scholars were well equipped with ancient and late antique treatises
and manuals, which they relied on heavily in their own studies, for
teaching, and for writing more commentaries. Some of the scholia and
prolegomena to Hermogenes in Walzs Rhetores Graeci may date from
the twelfth century.28 I consider here the works of two early twelfthcentury scholars, both of whom become bishops, Niketas of Herakleia
and Gregory Pardos of Corinth. But before looking at these figures
we must outline the social background of scholarship in this period.
Both men began their careers as professors of rhetoric, possibly aliated with the sequence of chairs established in Constantinople for
teaching rhetoric and Scriptural exegesis, which has become known as
the Patriarchal Academy.29 Holding these posts they were as likely to
produce handbooks of classical rhetoric, for lecturing perhaps, as they
were to write scholia on the Church Fathers or compile commentaries
on the Gospels. Like so many professors, orators, and scholars of the
26

Michael Psellos, On Athenian Place-Names; To his students, on trial terminology; On New


Doctrines and Definitions of Roman Legal Terms; see Rhoby (2001) for the first; for Psellos in
the twelfth century, see Kaldellis (2007) 225228.
27 For the genesis and purpose of these works, see Lemerle (1971) 297299; Hunger
(1978) v. 2, 3637, 4041; Wilson (1983a) 145147.
28 For grammatical and rhetorical theory in Byzantium, see Hunger (1978) v. 2,
1018 and v. 1, 7591 respectively; Robins (1993) and Schneider (1999) for aspects of
grammar, and Kustas (1973) for rhetoric; Conley (1986) focuses on teaching.
29 Browning (19621963) esp. 1517, 1920; further studies cited in Kaldellis (2005a)
143144.

14

anthony kaldellis

Komnenian age (e.g., Eustathios), they were subsequently appointed


bishops in provincial cities, where many felt they had basically been
exiled to uncultured backwaters. Still, there is reason to think that they
may have continued teaching there. Eustathios student in the capital,
Michael Choniates, who was appointed to Athens, instructed a local,
George Bardanes, who went on to become an important bishop of
Kerkyra in the early thirteenth century. So we cannot draw a firm distinction between secular and ecclesiastical careers, authors, or dierent
career phases, in this period. To be sure, some men were occupied
exclusively or mostly with secular studies and literature (e.g., John Tzetzes, Theodore Prodromos) and others only with theological or liturgical
works, but most of the men whom we may call classical scholars fell
somewhere in between.30
Niketas of Herakleia, for instance, wrote scholia on orations of Gregory of Nazianzos and a series of catenae on books of the Bible (these
were excerpted quotations from dierent commentaries, arranged in
the order of the original text so that one could handily consult everything that had been written on, say, John 18.38). He was also involved
in the condemnation of Eustratios of Nicaea in 1117, another bishopscholar and the author of commentaries on Aristotle (whom we will
discuss below).31 Niketas wrote mnemonic-didactic poems on grammatical-lexicographical subjects, for the benefit of students mastering Attic
composition. One is fascinating, being a list of the epithets used for
each of the twelve gods of Olympos, only set to the tune of various hymns of the Orthodox Church, for mnemonic reasons most likely.
This is a strange mixture of the most pagan and the most Christian elements of Byzantine civilization.32 A set of orthographical poems were
also modeled on liturgical kanons.33
Another of Niketas works is a synopsis of grammar and syntax in
1,087 verses addressed to a noble and decent young man, but this
need not refer to a particular student. Niketas claims that he wrote
it in one night (v. 5). Most of the material is taken from Dionysios
Thraxs Grammatical Art (of the second century bc), the standard work
on grammar and syntax used throughout the Byzantine period. Niketas
In general, see Kaldellis (2007) c. 5.
Niketas of Herakleia, Apologia; with Joannou (1954).
32 Niketas of Herakleia, Verses on the Epithets of the Twelve Gods; cf. the ancient treatise
of Apollodoros on the gods names: Pfeier (1968) 261262.
33 See Antonopoulou (2003), citing the latest bibliography on Niketas.
30
31

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

15

refers students to Dionysios for further elaboration on certain topics


(vv. 2930) and lifts examples from him, such as citing the son of
Peleus as the aristos among heroes, Homer as the wisest among
poets, and Zeus as the greatest among gods, all under the category
of superlatives (vv. 4143). There is no overt Christian editorializing in
calling Zeus the greatest among the gods, even if only as an illustration
in a grammatical work, except perhaps in the subtle intrusion of the
clause according to Homer. A few verses later he cites under active
nouns the Judge of the living and the dead, the Maker of all, and
Creator and Demiurge, God, He Who was before the Ages (vv. 5051).
We thus observe the classical (even the pagan) and the Christian sitting
side-by-side, a recurring feature of the poem (cf. Saul and Dareios in
vv. 156157) and typical of twelfth-century scholarship.34
Gregory Pardos wrote ecclesiastical works and liturgical commentaries, but much of his scholarly activity focused on language, primarily
rhetorical composition. First, let us note a singular treatise that fell from
his hand, On the Dialects (of Greek), the most important surviving example of its kind. By printing between 0 and 5 lines of this text per page
and filling the rest with his comments, the modern editor (in 1811) managed to extend this treatise to 624 pages! A new edition is desired. Gregory acknowledges as his main authorities Tryphon (late first century
bc) and John Philoponos (sixth century ad), then surveys the features
of Attic, Doric, Ionian, and Aiolic. He cites authors for each dialect,
whom he knew at first-hand (even Synesios of Cyrene is cited for
Doric), and uses their scholia as well (except for Aiolic, which section
is oddly truncated).35 The treatise was possibly used by Eustathios for
the Homeric Commentaries, showing again how interconnected scholarly
activity was during this period.36 It also provided the basis for the modern study of the dialects: a Latin paraphrase was appended by Henri
Estienne to his Thesaurus graecae linguae, and Gregory even today provides a springboard for the study of the Greek dialects.37

34 Niketas of Herakleia, Verses on Grammar; for the attribution and discussion, Tovar
(1969).
35 For Gregory Pardos in general, see Kominis (1960) esp. 6173 for On the Dialects;
also Bolognesi (1953), a positive verdict; Hunger (1978) v. 2, 2933; Wilson (1983a) 187
190 (typically negative); Dickey (2007) 8283. It is preposterous to judge this work by
the critical standards of modern linguistics and peer-reviewed publication (though this
is frequently done for the purpose of putting down Byzantine scholarship).
36 Kominis (1960) 20 n. 2.
37 E.g., Davies (2002).

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anthony kaldellis

Gregorys main rhetorical commentary was on Hermogenes 


  (On Method of Forceful Style). The original treatise is
not considered an authentic work of Hermogenes, and Gregory was
of course following previous Byzantine scholars in compiling his commentary, but it is worth outlining the nature and goals of this work as
it throws light on the practices of commentary-writing in this period.
Hermogenes work is 43 pages long (in the Walz edition); Gregorys
is 262 (in the same edition). Hermogenes has 37 categories of forceful
style, to each of which he devotes roughly a page. Gregory has the same
37 types, but each of his entries is longer by far. His entries are divided
into smaller sections that correspond to specific words in the original
treatise: these lemmata enabled Gregory to comment on the examples,
historical episodes, and texts used by Hermogenes while expanding,
elaborating on, and illustrating the main points. The commentary is
thus philological, historical, and theoretical-rhetorical. Gregory adds
examples and case-studies of his own, many from Scripture, thereby
again mixing classical and Christian elements. This is a book for use by
scholars, not beginners. The contemporary context of learned debate
is again present: Gregory twice cites Tzetzes Epitome of Hermogenes
Rhetoric. On the first occasion he comments derisively (but fairly) on
Tzetzes garrulous little verses (); the second mention
is on the distinction between a hetaira and a porn. Gregory also quotes
some of Tzetzes iambic verses on the establishment of public funerals
in Athens.38 (It has been suggested that these references are later interpolations, as the chronology of Gregorys life and the authenticity of
the works ascribed to him are still not secure.)
Before we discuss Byzantine scholars critical engagement with the
ancient poets and philosophers, we should note one aspect of this
culture that can easily be overlooked because it does not loom as large
in modern scholarship, namely imitation. The Byzantines had a far
closer and natural relation to the language of ancient Greek literature
than we can ever hope to achieve and their scholars were trained to
imitate it both in writing and in performance. In his History of Classical
Scholarship, 13001850, Pfeier says this about Henri Estienne: he was

38 Gregory Pardos, Commentary on Hermogenes On Method of Forceful Style, esp.


pp. 10981099, 1186, and 11571158 for Tzetzes. For this work, see Kominis (1960) 73
77. For the tradition of rhetorical commentaries in Byzantium, Conley (1986) esp. 344
345 on Gregorys borrowing from Demetrios On Style and 365366 for some of the
rhetorical-theoretical matters he treated.

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

17

imbued with the deepest love for the Greek language and became
incredibly familiar with its idiom. He really thought in Greek and could
speak it; to him it was simply not a foreign language at all.39 The pride
of modernity in such scholars must be tempered by the realization that
Byzantine intellectual life consisted entirely of such people, who took
the qualities that are here ascribed to Estienne to a level that few or
no Europeans have ever attained. This is not the place to discuss the
theory and practice of mimesis in Byzantium or counter the polemical
adjectives attached to it (e.g., sterile, artificial). What is important
is that we not forget the practical dimension of the study of ancient
literature in Byzantium: it provided models in the sense that they were
supposed to be imitated, not only appreciated and studied. Gregory
did not write commentaries on Hermogenes merely to make reading
Hermogenes easier but so that the dozens of orators at the court and
theatra of the capital could better put his prescriptions into eect (on an
ethical level, the same may be said of the commentaries on Aristotles
Ethics; see below). Byzantium under the Komnenoi was one of the great
ages of Greek rhetoric, and this was a rhetoric rooted in scholarship.
The principles of Hermogenic style have accordingly been detected
in Eustathios panegyrics, as consciously followed and cleverly adapted
guidelines.40 Students were trained to master the classical language for
their own use, not just to be able to read and appreciate the great works
of the past.41 Their level of attainment and command of the language
far surpassed our Greek prose comp.
In a separate brief treatise on style, Gregory Pardos recommended
four speeches as models for imitation: Demosthenes On the Crown,
Ailios Aristeides Panathenakos, Gregory of Nazianzos Funeral Oration for
Basil of Caesarea, and Michael Psellos Encomium for his Mother, striking,
again, a typical balance between Greeks and Christians.42 He goes
on to cite various ancient authors as exemplars of flowery grace,
sober grace, solemnity, and so on. Many of these same aestheticstylistic categories are employed by Photios in his reviews of ancient

Pfeier (1976) 109.


Stone (2001). For the apogee of rhetoric in this period, see Magdalino (1993) c. 5;
Kaldellis (2007) c. 5.
41 Webb (1994) 84.
42 Gregory Pardos, [On Composition] 3133, 36, 38 (pp. 320322); see Kominis (1960)
8089, 127129; Donnet (1967) 110111; Wilson (1983a) 185187; for the theoreticalgrammatical aspect of this work, see Robins (1993) c. 9.
39
40

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anthony kaldellis

literature in his Bibliotheke.43 These categories remind us that in at least


this one respect, that is, in having a feel for the style of the language,
Byzantine readers had a definite advantage over us. Our appreciation
of Greek is almost one-dimensional by comparison, based on reading
rather than on hearing and on content rather than on composition.
We can instantly and perhaps instinctively tell the dierence in style
between, say, Francis Bacon, Edward Gibbon, and A.H.M. Jones, but it
is unlikely that we could do the same with Demosthenes, Gregory, and
Psellos, or with dierent orations of Libanios, if we were given a blind
test.
4. Scholia and Commentaries: An Introduction
Equipped, then, with their editions of the texts, lexika, etymologika, grammatical and rhetorical manuals, encyclopedias such as the Souda, and
prosopographical guides to the main ancient writers (typically ascribed
to Hesychios of Miletos),44 Byzantines scholars were well prepared for a
scholarly engagement with classical literature, chiefly with the ancient
poets and philosophers. (I draw a distinction between scholarly and creative engagement with the classics; the latter also calls for fundamental
rehabilitation, and is receiving it now on many sides.)
First, a word on scholia, a tool that lies somewhere between lexika
and interpretive commentaries. There were, of course, specialized lexika, keyed to individual authors or genres (e.g., for Plato or the Attic
orators), but these were self-standing texts of their own. Most scholia
in Byzantium were not. The history of their transmission was roughly
as follows. Though ancient papyrus rolls could have short comments
on the verso, in the margins, in indented block sections, or interlineally, ancient commentaries were generally written on separate rolls
and keyed to the text through lemmata. With the adoption of the
codex, scholia and longer commentaries were gradually copied into
the margins of new editions (or even interlineally) and could be written in a dierent font or color ink. Toward the end of the eleventh
century, scribes found a way of breaking the original text into sections
and adding the commentary in the bottom half of the page, which cre43 Cf. Wilson (1983a) 103109; Efthymiades (2000) 3439. The best place to start with
this vocabulary is rhetorical theory: Kustas (1973).
44 See Kaldellis (2006).

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

19

ated a format similar to our own. Sometimes the commentary took up


the bulk of the page, engulfing the few lines of primary text, and often
dierent commentaries were amalgamated in the preparation of a new
edition (resulting in brief catenae on a single page). This transfer to the
margins was eected partly in late antiquity and partly after the ninth
century (one of its casualties were the names of the authors of the nowexcerpted ancient commentaries themselves).45
For the most part, then, Byzantine scholia contained carefully excerpted ancient material, going in some cases as far back as the third
century bc, though some scholia on individual words were copied
from their etymologika entries and some scholars added original comments of their own, especially after the twelfth century. It was not
until the eighteenth century that modern philologists began to systematically reassemble the scholia, most importantly of Homer, into separate editions that we have today (though their state of publication
still leaves much to be desired in some cases).46 This procedure had
Byzantine precedent. To give one example, in the fourteenth century
Demetrios Triklinios collected the scholia on Hesiods Works and Days,
Aristophanes, and the tragedians.47 For the most part, however, when
a Byzantine approached a well-prepared edition of a classical text, its
appearance must have made ours seem stripped naked by comparison.
There was no apparatus criticus, but the commentary, being on the
same page, was more user-friendly in some respects.
Scholia clarified various aspects of the text, ranging from the grammatical to the lexicographical and even the historical background of
topics mentioned in the primary text (which is why scholia are cited so
frequently in discussions of Greek religion). They were typically good
for classroom use, or rather for the instructors preparation for the
classroom, but also facilitated individual study of the text.48 What is
distinctive, then, about the twelfth century, is the sudden and unprece45 Wilson (1967); (1983a) 3336, 136142; (1984); Irigoin (1984) esp. 99, with a gallery
of illustrative plates; additional studies cited by Budelmann (2002) 143144; Dickey
(2007) 1117. For a list of published scholia, see Friis-Jensen et al. (1997) 215226; for
a study of ancient literary theories in the scholia, Meijering (1987). Wilson (1983b) is an
indispensible survey of the ancient scholia; for the scholia, old and new, in Byzantium,
Smith (1996).
46 Smith (1996) 395399.
47 Budelmann (2002) 146.
48 For late Byzantine grammatical scholia on Philostratos and their use, see Webb
(1997), an excellent study marred by one instance of prejudice on 16: an education
system whose final aim was the active use of the classical language, rather than the

20

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dented production of independent commentaries on so many ancient


authors, including Homer, Pindar, Hesiod, Aristophanes, Lykophron,
Aristotle, and others, by scholars such as Eustratios of Nicaea, Michael
of Ephesus, John Tzetzes, Eustathios of Thessalonike, John Galenos,
and others who remained anonymous. This movement represented a
new direction in classical scholarship whose importance and originality
has not been recognized. It was not, however, as coherent as it might
appear at first sight: the commentaries on Aristotle were part of a different tradition than those which were now written on the poets, and
aimed at dierent audiences. These dierences can partly explain the
variety of their forms and methods.
Self-standing interpretive commentaries had been the rule since antiquity for philosophical, scientific, rhetorical, and theological works (as
we saw in the case of Gregory Pardos commentary on Hermogenes).
A huge corpus of them had been produced in late antiquity and copied
in Byzantium. Scholia were not unknown for thinkers such as Plato
who were also regarded as model authors and whose works could be
taught to less philosophically advanced students, but they tended to
cluster mostly around poets and orators. However, the revival of philosophical commentaries was not an innovation of the twelfth century.
It was the original intention of Michael Psellos in the eleventh century to bring Greek philosophy back up from the depths in which he
believed it had been buried. He studied Plato, Aristotle, and the Neoplatonists, and infused their thought into the lectures that he delivered
on every conceivable topic. Psellos authority among contemporaries
and succeeding generations was immense, stemming from his awesome
polymathy, eloquence, and patronage (as Consul of the Philosophers
he was in charge of higher education in the capital, though his duties
and powers remain unclear). Psellos engagement with ancient thinkers,
however, was more philosophical then scholarly: he was more interested
in promoting philosophical ways of thinking among his students than
in merely commenting on ancient thought. His lectures and treatises
constitute a training in looking at every aspect of the world philosophically. But he did write paraphrases and scholia on some of Aristotles
works.49

interpretation of classical texts, i.e., Byzantine classicism was purely linguistic and had
no meaning.
49 For Psellos and philosophy, see Hunger (1978) v. 1, 2022, 3233 for a summary;

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

21

Psellos was the progenitor of much of the philosophical, humanistic,


and literary interests of the twelfth century. There was nothing quite
like him in the Byzantine past and he was admired by the twelfthcentury humanists. I do not wish to imply that the twelfth-century commentaries on Aristotle were part of some self-conscious Psellian program, only that Psellos attempt to restore Greek philosophy as a viable
system of thought spurred later works and was perhaps a necessary precondition for them. Anna Komnene idolized Psellos for attaining the
peak of all knowledge and for becoming famous for his wisdom.
Not only did she in some way sponsor the production of at least some
of the philosophical commentaries of the twelfth century (see below),
she herself wanted to be known for her exact knowledge of Plato and
Aristotle, boasting of it in the preface of the Alexiad.50 Moreover, one of
the luminaries of her circle, Eustratios of Nicaea, was a student of John
Italos, who was in turn Psellos famous and controversial student and
successor as Consul of the Philosophers. Eustratios was old enough to
have known Psellos as a student himself. In short, whatever they owed
to the circumstances of the early twelfth century, the Aristotelian commentaries also constituted a revival and extension of a genre that was
well represented in the scholarly world since antiquity and had its roots
in the revolutionary project of a unique man who tried to resuscitate
ancient Greek thought in eleventh-century Byzantium. They were written by and for students of philosophy, and aimed to revive the method
and style of the philosophical commentaries of late antiquity.
By contrast, the commentaries on the poets were the products of
dierent needs, circumstances, and ideological currents.51 Interest in
the Iliad, on the one hand, was deepened by the new Komnenian
aristocracys need for heroic models that Scripture and the saints could
not provide. The Alexiad was a prose Iliad for Annas father (thereby
making her a rare nexus of the philosophical and literary-Homeric
currents of the time). Theodoros Prodromos wrote panegyrical poems
for emperors in heroic hexameter verse; in one he declared that Homer
would have to be resurrected from the dead and given ten mouths in

and Duy (2002) and Kaldellis (2007) c. 4 for more interpretive approaches; for paraphrasis, Ierodiakonou (2002).
50 Anna Komnene, Alexiad 5.8.3 on Psellos; for her circle, see Browning (1962);
Magdalino (1993) 332; and below.
51 For a fuller study of the context, albeit with dierent emphases, see Kaldellis
(2007) c. 5.

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anthony kaldellis

order to praise the emperor John II Komnenos. Such praise was not
limited to the emperors and the aristocracy. Michael Choniates, the
student of Eustathios and later bishop of Athens, was compared after
his death by a nephew to the ancient heroes: whole new Iliads would
not suce for him.52 Homer was in the air, fueling a shift in values
among rulers and writers. Quite possibly, this warrior-aristocracy knew
more about the spirit of Homer than do modern philologists in their
studies. Their zest for war, sex, the hunt, and exquisite artwork was
also reflected in a new form of quasi-vernacular heroic poetry that
centered on the frontiersman Digenes Akrites and explicitly tried to
rival Homers fame.53 Nor was Homer less alive in the imagination of
the sophists. In the hands of politically active scholar-bishops such as
Eustathios, Homers language became a skilful instrument, as praise
and blame sat on a razors edge of subtle irony.54 The accusation, then,
that the classics were eectively meaningless in this society, a mere
instrument of grammar, is false.
On the other hand, the twelfth century witnessed a vast multiplication of the occasions that called for the composition of celebratory
orations. The number of orations and honorands swelled out of proportion to precedent in Byzantium. More works survive and more performers can be named for this period than for any other in the history
of Greek rhetoric (before the nineteenth century, that is). But the aristocracy was not so boorish as to patronize only its own praises. The
sophists indulged in original compositions, such as the romance novels, another genre that was revived toward mid-century, mostly in verse.
References abound to the so-called theatra, a word that signified the
venues for the performance of new works, whether they were physical assemblies or the collective opinion of the educated class.55 All this,
required more teacherswho themselves became the objects of praise
by their studentsand more textbooks and scholia. In fact, many of
the commentaries on the poets that survive from this period had their
origin and fulfilled their purpose in the classroom.
52 For Theodore Prodromos life and the imperial Poems, see Hrandners edition
and introduction (here citing Poem 4.251257; cf. 11.1819); Choniates: Anonymous,
Monodia for Michael Choniates 2 (p. 237). For the Homeric twelfth-century in general,
see Basilikopoulou-Ioannidou (19711972); for Homer in Byzantium in general, see
Browning (1975a); Pontani (2005) 137340.
53 Lasithiotakes (2005).
54 E.g., Sarris (19951997).
55 Mullett (1984).

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

23

So both the aristocracy and the class of teachers and orators grew
in size and became more self-conscious of their place in society. The
sophists depended on the princes for patronage (though exact prosopographical ties cannot easily be worked out today), while the latter
depended on the former for the glorification and culture that only
Greek paideia could oer. From this mutual, albeit uneven, dependency,
sprung a new type of commentary, Classics for Dummies. Let us
then begin with these and work up to the more technical scholarly
productions, before situating the Aristotelian commentaries against this
broader background.
5. Classics Made Easy
Michael and Elizabeth Jereys have identified the sebastokratorissa
Eirenethe wife of the sebastokrator Andronikos, the second son of the
emperor John IIas the patroness of a large number of contemporary poems. What these works have in common is that they are written in relatively easy Greek, have a simple structure and patronizing
didactic tone, and rehearse information that would have been familiar to any educated Byzantine (e.g., a list of the gods and heroes in
Homer or, as in Constantine Manasses Historical Synopsis, a survey of
world history). It is likely that the writers of these works were working on commission and needed the money (they are sometimes frank
about that); on the other hand, Eirene was likely a foreign lady, possibly
Norman, married into the Byzantine imperial family. Her native language was not Greek and so works such as these would have helped her
to catch up with her peers, though certainly not to the level of someone like Anna Komnene. This reconstruction illuminates the nature of
some of the surviving works by reference to the specific forms of patronage that produced them. Eirene, after all, was not alone. Other foreign
brides also required primers, for example Bertha-Eirene, first wife of
the emperor Manuel, commissioned an introduction to Homer from
Tzetzes.56 And beyond this class of patrons, there were probably many
in twelfth-century Byzantium, both men and women, native and foreign, who required elementary instruction and had the coin to procure
it.
56 Jereys and Jereys (1994); for struggling poets, see Beaton (1987); Magdalino
(1993) 340343.

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This explanation allows us to dispense altogether with the contempt


that has often been directed against these works. We can now see them
in a new light, as classics-cribs for an audience of non-scholars. The
first author whom we can discuss here was a member of the Komnenos
family, a born-in-the-purple prince named Isaac, a son of Alexios I.
He wrote two brief introductions to Homer for general audiences,
though for dierent personal motives, certainly, than did commissioned
writers like Tzetzes. As we saw with Anna, some of the princes wanted
to be praised by the sophists for their paideia, as Isaac was in fact by
Prodromos.57 The Preface to Homer, only 190 lines of text, summarizes
the poets life, the history of the Trojan Warthough carefully excising
the gods from the narrative of the Iliadand the fates of Agamemnon
and Odysseus. The second text (30 pages long) consists of two parts:
first, a narrative summary of The Events Homer Left Out, mostly the
fall of Troy to Herakles and then the later one to the Greeks; and,
second, The Physical Properties and Moral Qualities of the Greeks and Trojans,
a prosopography of names followed mostly by adjectivesPatroklos,
it seems, was fat and had a thick beard. The prose is uncomplicated
and Isaac calls his own style simple and lucid. It has recently been
argued that these brief treatises originally accompanied Isaacs edition
and commentary on the Iliad, the first of its kind by a Byzantine scholar,
which survives in a single manuscript and is not yet fully published.58
In compiling his summaries, Isaac followed ancient sources, especially Diktys of Crete, whom he cites at the end apparently accepting
the fiction that he was a follower of Idomeneus (the story of the Trojan
War ascribed to this man posed as a translation for the emperor Nero
of some Phoenician tablets found by some shepherds in the ruins
of Knossos, the only reference to Linear B tablets found in antiquity).
Isaac claims to have consulted other authorities too. He calls Homer
wise and does not editorialize from a Christian standpoint when talking about the gods.
The last question requires further attention, and will recur in this
survey. The gods were one of the main stumbling blocks in accepting
Greek literature in Byzantium, and the matter had certainly not been
cleared up in any decisive way by Isaacs time. In fact, his own father

57 Theodore Prodromos, Oration for Isaac Komnenos; for Isaac in general, see Kindstrands introduction to the Preface; also Hunger (1978) v. 2, 58.
58 Pontani (2007).

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

25

Alexios I Komnenos had enforced hard-line Christian strictures against


Greek philosophy, taking down Psellos student John Italos in a rigged
show-trial and adding the famous condemnations of autonomous philosophy to the Synodikon of Orthodoxy. Alexios may have been prompted
more by cynical policy than conviction, but the chilling eect was the
same. According to the eulogist of his daughter, Alexios had prohibited
his own children from having too much to do with Hellenic studies,
especially poetry. Tornikios says that Alexios and his wife Eirene
believed that grammar, based as it is on poetry, is characterized by
polytheism, or rather atheism; by the qualities of myths, which tell of the
love-aairs of infatuated gods; the rape of maidens; and the abductions
of boys; and contain other such splendid things that are indecent in both
word and speech. All this they deemed dangerous enough for men, but
for women and maidens they rightly deemed it utterly pernicious.59

The imperial couple obviously failed to instill this dread in their children, who included two among the leading scholars of the first half
of the twelfth century. Isaac wrote prefaces and summaries of Homer
while Anna learned all about the myths too (secretly, according to
Tornikios), though armored by her faith. Was it subtle revenge on her
part to compare her parents throughout the Alexiad to Greek gods and
heroes? Certainly, she revered her parents memory. In the Preface to
her Diataxis, she claims that they did not hinder her from learning, but
this statement is oddly defensive, and Anna is an untrustworthy witness
when it comes to her family.60
As for Isaac, he may also be the author of some short summaries of
the Neoplatonist Proklos, the philosopher who had inspired Psellos and
led Italos on the path to condemnation. Even after the stern warnings
in the Synodikon, a son of the imperial family was dealing in Proklos.
It should be noted that the author of these summaries carefully omits
much that was oensive to Christians and somewhat distorts Proklos
thought to make it more acceptable. Still, the desire to Christianize
such a pagan thinker ran counter to the later eort of Nicholas, the
bishop of Methone, who, in the spirit of Alexios and the Synodikon,
wrote a long refutation of Proklos from an explicitly Christian point
of view. There was a debate going on behind the scenes of our texts on
59 George Tornikios, Funeral Oration for Anna Komnene (pp. 243245). See also Jereys
(1984) 205 for the monk Iakobos; for the period in general, Reinsch (2000) 87; for the
trial of Italos, Clucas (1981); for repression, see Browning (1975b); Magdalino (1991).
60 Anna Komnene, Preface to the Diataxis 16 (p. 99); for the authorship, see Buckler
(1929) 910.

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this matter that we cannot see. In any case, the evidence for the study of
Proklos and the brazen promotion of Platonic philosophy in the spirit
of Psellos is scant for the later twelfth century, when scholarly attention
turned to the poets and orators.61
The most prolific popularizing classicist in this period was undoubtedly John Tzetzes, whose output was so vast and its publication in modern times still so disordered that we can only discuss a small part of it
here. Consider, for example, three short poems: the Events before Homer
(406 vv.); the Events in Homer (490 vv.); and the Events after Homer (780
vv.). These summarize the events of the Trojan War, framing the Iliad.
They are written in hexameters, which vary from Homeric to modern
Greek in vocabulary and style. But Tzetzes aim here was not to imitate
Homeric morphology, vocabulary, and meter with scholarly precision
(which he probably could do). It was, rather, to provide an introduction
to the world of the Iliad in verses that could be read by a beginner.
Tzetzes tells events from his own point of view and in his own chatty
poetic voice, and even adds material to the Homeric section that is not
in the Iliad. In the Events after Homer, he often cites Kontos, i.e., Quintus of Smyrna (ca. third century ad), whose fourteen books of verse
Posthomerica survive. His physical descriptions of the heroes are adapted
from those in Isaac Porphyrogennetos short treatise or, more probably,
from a common source.
Curiously, Tzetzes wages in these poems a personal polemic against
an Isaac, who appears to have been the governor of the city of Berroia
and had employed Tzetzes, probably as a secretary. In various places in
the poems, the poet alludes to a scandalous episode involving himself
and the governors wife, as a result of which Isaac had ordered Tzetzes
to leave the city on foot. These bitter digressions, dubiously linked
to the Trojan War, illustrate Tzetzes inability to keep his troubles
and comically annoying personality out of his scholarship. It is not
known who this Isaac was; it is too premature to identify him with
the Porphyrogennetos scholar. An Isaac Komnenos is the addressee of
Tzetzes unfriendly Letter 6, though it is not clear that this was actually
sent (see below); the recipient of the letter (in which Tzetzes mentions
Diktys of Crete among other ancient figures) was variously identified
61 Cf. Nicholas of Methone, Refutation of Proclus Elements of Theology (and Angelous discussion in the introduction of philosophy in the twelfth century) with Isaac,
On the Hypostasis of Evil (for Christian editing, see Rizzos introduction, iiixxiv; for
authorship, Kindstrands introduction to Isaacs Preface to Homer, 1820).

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

27

with the Porphyrogennetos, the governor of Berroia, or both, but a


recent study dissociates them all.62
Tzetzes does not suppress the gods in his summaries, but he does not
make them the central characters that they are in the Iliad either. In
one place he alludes to his favored allegorical-Euhemeristic interpretations, here regarding Zeus.63 He does not, on the other hand, intrude
Christian material. Tzetzes idolized Homer, believing him to have been
perfect in all ways, yet he sang the poets praises to a Christian society.
This meant that he had to make some sense of the gods, who could
not be presented at face value. In other poems, he categorically denies
that Homer actually believed in the demons, arguing that the gods
in poetry are in fact a concession to the entertainment young readers
require; or he Euhemerizes them; or he allegorizes them, as natural elements, physic properties, stars, or whatever.64 Tzetzes promoted these
approaches in exegetical poems addressed to Komnenian patrons, for
instance in his Allegories on the Iliad and Allegories on the Odyssey, written for Manuel Is foreign wife Bertha-Eirene. The latter work, for
instance, is a book-by-book explanation of the gods and monsters in the
poem, with between 100 and 200 verses devoted to each book (the Iliad
commentaries are typically longer, with between 200 and 400 verses).65
Tzetzes postures here as an expert interpreter of Homers wisdom, but
allegory was for him not part of a consistent philosophical approach.
When he had toperhaps, in this case, when he was specifically asked
to do sohe faced the problem of the gods head-on with much allegory and little apology, but on other occasions he tended to avoid the
topic. This is not surprising, given the condemnation that they elicited
in some quarters. Still, the court of Manuel was unlike that of Alexios.
Moreover, Bertha wanted or needed to know who all these heroes,
gods, and goddesses were who were constantly being mentioned in all
62 John Tzetzes, Events in Homer 142 .; Events after Homer 284290, 620624, 701, 753
758; Letter 6. Various opinions have been expressed regarding the identity of these men:
Wendel (1948) 1961 (still the only survey of Tzetzes life) identifies the governor with
Alexios son; Magdalino (1993) 348350 implies that identification, but is more cautious;
Barzos (1984) v. 1, 286 n. 56 and Grnbart (1996) identify the addressee of the letter with
the son of Constantine Komnenos (the son of Alexios brother Isaac).
63 John Tzetzes, Events before Homer 102106.
64 Cesaretti (1991) pt. 2 is the most extensive treatment; more briefly: Hunger (1954)
4652; Wilson (1983a) 193; Kazhdan and Epstein (1985) 134135; Budelmann (2002)
156157; Roilos (2005) 124127; Kaldellis (2007) 301307.
65 See also John Tzetzes, Allegories from the Verse-Chronicle.

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the orations that she had to endure for so many long hours. Having
a riposte handy for the sophists when they made an allusion would no
doubt improve her standing in their eyes; an allegorical comment might
even earn her praise for wisdom. An anecdote in Psellos Chronographia
(6.61) illustrates the scholarly demands that were sometimes placed on
imperial women. A subtle flatterer, whom Psellos does not name,
whispered the following half-verse from Homer to Constantine IX
Monomachos concubine Maria Skleraina as she passed by: Surely
there is no blame . . . She then had to ask him to complete the tag: . . .
on Trojans and strong-greaved Achaians if for long time they suer
hardship for a woman like this one (Iliad 3.156157; tr. R. Lattimore).
Note that Psellos does not quote the end of the verse in his account,
assuming that we, his readers, will recognize it, as Skleraina apparently
could not.66
There is no reason to list all the poems and short commentaries
written in the twelfth-century for the benefit of lay patrons. One last
work of Tzetzes must, however, be mentioned, because it has not yet
been studied in detail and is odd enough to warrant comment. This
is in fact his longest and most cited work, the so-called Histories or
Chiliades (Thousands, i.e., of verses). It consists of over 12,000 fifteensyllable (political) verses divided into 660 sections, each covering
some item from ancient history and literature, including people, events,
texts, sayings, facts and words of many kinds, so a chrestomathia of
sorts (assemblage of useful knowledge). The Histories remains to this
day a major source for fragments of lost authors and otherwise lost
antiquarian knowledge (but mythology is mostly absent, conforming to
Tzetzes habit of either confronting it head-on or largely leaving it out).
The style is easy, fluid, and bouncy, and Tzetzes intrudes himself and
his name often, posing, arguing, showing o, and pouting. He knew
how to write in a lively way. I suppose one could read through the
Histories as they are and learn (or review) much about ancient history.
But that is not how this huge text was meant to be used. The Histories
is in fact a running commentary on Tzetzes own 107 Letters, which
are crammed with classical allusions and require all this antiquarian
lore to be understood.67 The Letters are written in a more elevated
For the training and duties of imperial princesses, see Connor (2004) c. 10.
The commentary on the Letters proper begins at Histories 4.780; the entries before
that are a running commentary on the letter to a grammarian that is included in
Histories 4.471779. In general, see Wendel (1948) 19922000.
66
67

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

29

Attic style, which suggests an interesting textual relationship. Tzetzes


used his own letters, which are brief but dense, to teach Attic prose;
he then supplemented linguistic instruction with the content of the
more colloquial Histories, which supplied background in an easy format
to students struggling with the Attic style of the letters. These works,
then, are more textbooks than sources, and provide a pedagogy in
grammar, composition, and classical knowledge. (Tzetzes outdid himself
here, adding additional scholia to both the Letters and the Histories!)
Based on this relationship, we may speculate that the Letters, or some
of them at least, were not real; they may have been epistolary exercises
posing as letters but in reality designed to include as many launchingpoints for classical instruction as could be crammed into them (this may
explain the lists of ancient figures that they sometimes include). Not
that they altogether lack contemporary informationthey are, after
all, posing as real lettersbut perhaps some were not delivered, e.g.,
the angry Letter 6 to the sebastos Isaac. There are indications, however,
that the collection did circulate in Tzetzes time. This is a problem that
historians may have to examine in detail.
6. Scholarly Commentaries on the Poets
It is time to turn to professional scholarship, that which was meant for
use by teachers at the higher levels of instruction and by those who
wished to deepen their understanding of ancient poetry and thought.
Admittedly, it is not always possible to draw a fine line between this
group of commentaries and the one that we discussed above, but in
most cases a distinction can be made between texts addressed to lay
patrons who wanted summaries and texts meant to be used by professional classicists. Eirene sebastokratorissa and Bertha-Eirene were not
likely to peruse a commentary on Lykophrons Alexandra or on Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics.
The twelfth century witnessed the writing of original commentaries
on the poets by known Byzantine scholars; in some cases, these were
self-standing texts. This innovation in scholarly practice has not been
recognized. A list of the most well-known works should give an impression of the extent of this labor. Tzetzes wrote his idiosyncratic
commentaries and scholia on the Iliad, Hesiod, tragedy, Aristophanes,
Lykophrons Alexandra, Oppians Halieutika, on two poems of Nikander,
and others (for example, the scholia on his own letters). Eustathios

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wrote massive commentaries on the Iliad and Odyssey, Pindar, and


Dionysios Periegetes. A deacon named John Galenos, who has not been
firmly dated, wrote a commentary on Hesiods Theogony. Then we also
have the commentaries on Aristotle by Michael of Ephesus, Eustratios
of Nicaea, Stephanos (possibly Stephanos Skylitzes), and Anonymous.68
The study of their works is still in its infancy, so we can ask only
preliminary questions here, some of which have been laid out in Felix
Budelmanns useful study of Tzetzes scholia on the Iliad.69 What is the
relation between the text and the commentary, and how personal is the
commentators voice? Is the commentary a single text, i.e., can it be
read by itself ? How was it or how could it have been used?
The original scholarship of the twelfth century does not follow any
one rule in regard to these issues. It includes marginal scholia and
commentaries; self-standing commentaries keyed to the original text
through lemmata (such as the commentaries on Aristotle); and separate works, such as Eustathios Homeric Commentaries. The proportion of comment to text also varies. For example, the Hellenistic poet
Lykophrons Alexandra has 1,474 verses and would, if printed without
apparatus, take up 40 pages, while the scholia that Tzetzes compiled
(citing over 50 authorities) take up almost 400 pages in the modern edition.70 Tzetzes, moreover, prefaced his scholia with a discussion of the
dierent kinds of poetry, listing the famous ancient poets and the contexts of their works; he then comments on the life of Lykophron, his
works, and his Alexandrian context; and gives the background to the
plot of the Alexandra. The scholia then go through the text verse-byverse, giving vast amounts of grammatical, lexicographical, dialectical,
rhetorical, mythological, and historical information, in addition to literary parallels and illustrations. Some are small treatises in their own
right, e.g., on Pegasos and Bellerophontes in v. 17. What we need is an
explanation for why all this information is here, an explanation that
attempts to work through the pedagogical and scholarly uses of these
commentaries, which are not well understood. Grammatical scholia
make sense for the classroom, but all this?71 Granted, Lykophron had
In general, see Hunger (1978) v. 1, 3435, and v. 2, 5867; Wilson (1983a) c. 9.
Budelmann (2002); see also Smith (1996).
70 The manuscripts attribute the work to John brother Isaac, but Tzetzes claims it as
his own in Letter 21, explaining that he had only dedicated it to his brother; see Hunger
(1978) v. 2, 6263; in general, Wendel (1948) 19781982.
71 Cf. Webb (1997) for teaching grammar from scholia; Budelmann (2002) 158161
for Tzetzes on the Iliad.
68
69

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

31

composed a deliberately antiquarian poem that begged for commentary, as the Tzetzian poem at the end of the scholia admits; it baited
scholars to show o their knowledge. In his scholion on Aristophanes,
Frogs 897, Tzetzes tells a story which implies that text and scholia were
read aloud by him to an audience of either students or colleagues, some
(or all) of whom had their own copies of the text, and that corrections were made. We need a closer analysis of his account and a better
understanding of how all this unsynthesized and unfocused knowledge
was used in practice, given that it often goes beyond what is needed
to simply understand the text.72 (We will return to this question below,
when we look at Eustathios Homeric Commentaries.)
Questions of scholarly form, moreover, or format, are as important as those of content. What we observe emerging in this period are
useful scholarly editions of the poets that anticipate ours in having a
scholarly introduction that discusses the varieties of ancient poetry, the
life of the poet, and the style of his work; followed by the text with massive scholia compiled by a modern scholar such as Tzetzes who had
a distinctive personal voice (today we would put the commentary at the
back).73 I gather that nothing like this had existed in antiquity. Even if
much of the content on which these Byzantine editions was based
was culled from ancient sources, the synthesis was original, as was the
decision to place all this material together and its precise arrangement.
So, for example, we have, besides the preface to Lykophron, Tzetzes
prolegomena to Hesiods Works and Days, which begin with an attack on
Proklos exegesis, then list the kinds of poetry, and end with a brief life
of the poet (focusing on the relation between him and Homer), all in
Tzetzes typical style and voice; also, Eustathios prologue to the Commentary on Pindar, focusing on topics of literary appreciation, especially
Pindars notorious obscurity (asapheia), and concluding with a summary
of what is known about his life; and the preface to Eustathios Commentary on the Iliad, which defends the study of the poem against Christian objections (ironically, I believe, as Eustathios considered Homer to
be sublime and the objections are rendered irrelevant anyway by the
mass of commentary that follows them); he outlines all the benefits con72 John Tzetztes, Scholion on Aristophanes Frogs 897 (pp. 951955). The story is discussed by Wilson (1975) 6 and (1983a) 192193, but its dynamics elude me, and I think
that Wilson has also not entirely understood what happened. For scholarly gatherings
in the twelfth century, see also Cavallo (2006) 7576.
73 Budelmann (2002) 145 for such an edition of Hesiod.

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ferred by Homer; explains his own methods; and ends by summarizing


Homers life and works.74
These works will hopefully soon be studied in their own right. Usually they are mined for fragments of ancient authors and for information from or about antiquity, and what remains is then discarded
as Byzantine. But it should be apparent that no rigid separation can
be enforced between Byzantium and antiquity in these works. For one
thing, we have to acknowledge the variety of methods followed by the
Byzantine scholars, in other words, their scholarly decisions that gave
form to everything that they preserved. Tzetzes, for his part, made
every eort to instill his voice and persona in his commentaries. It has
been suggested that he did so to escape the oblivion of anonymity and
to prevent plagiarism. The history of the scholia, as he knew, had obliterated their authors names, and he was determined not to let this
happen to him; moreover, he had experience of students taking notes
during his lectures and then publishing them without permission. That
is one reason why he keeps sticking his name into his writings, a thesis that improves upon the superficial accusations of vanity and conceit
that have prevailed so far.75 These scholars were people, not anonymous
vessels for the preservation of ancient content.
So the commentaries diered in voice, scope, approach, and page
layout. Whereas Tzetzes were attached to the original text, Eustathios
commentaries on Homer and Dionysios were self-standing continuous
prose texts. In fact, he even suggested that one could read his Iliad
commentary straight through.76 In contrast to Tzetzes, however, it is
more dicult to identify Eustathian elements in Eustathios. But there
are some common themes that run through their works, chief among
them the imperative to protect the poets from Christian odium. We
have seen Tzetzes passionate defense of Homer against the charge of
believing literally in the pagan gods. Eustathios marshals the same allegorical techniques to defend him, indeed these were a major aspect of
his approach and he devotes a section of his preface to the Commentary on the Iliad to the problem of reading the myths against the more

74 For the texts, see the bibliography. For Tzetzes Hesiod, see Colonna (1953); for
Eustathios Pindar, Kambylis (1991); Negri (2000); Hamilton (2003) 132, 176177; for his
Homer, Dickey (2007) 2324.
75 Budelmann (2002) 150152.
76 Eustathios of Thessalonike, Com. ad Hom. Il., preface 2.4042 (v. 1, 3).

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

33

historical aspects of the poem.77 On the other hand, he ironically dismissed the idea that Christians should abstain from the pagan wisdom
of the ancient poets.78 In the biographical section of his Prologue to the
Commentary on Pindar, he reports on Pindars (pagan) piety as though it
were a virtue; Eustathios and his student Michael Choniates were willing to view pagan piety as praiseworthy and undeserving of Christian
condemnation.79 This was genuine humanism.
One more scholar should be mentioned in this connection, a deacon
named John Galenos, who wrote an allegorical commentary on Hesiods Theogony that runs to 70 pages. It is addressed to young students
of Hesiod rather than to the non-academic laity, and its chief concern
is to protect their piety from the pagan nonsense of the Greeks. In
his preface, he praises Plotinos and Sokrates, despite the fact that they
were pagans (  ), for encouraging their listeners to look beyond
the literal sense of things and on to higher realities, and that is what
he does in his commentary, namely to uncover what he calls the hidden truths of the Theogony. In fact, he adds, the poem should not have
been called that in the first place, but rather the Physiogonia. The preface is only a page long; the commentary is keyed by lemmata, though
there are occasionally large gaps between the verses discussed. This is
a problem of the lemma format, but can partly be explained in this
case by the fact that Galenos was not writing a thorough study of the
poem, but was interested only in ameliorating one aspect of it from a
Christian point of view. His Christianization of the Theogony is bold, in
some cases turning the gods into Christian figures and concepts, for
example Zeus is God, the Titans evil, Herakles Jesus. Anything will do
here (Pythagorean number theory, physics, astronomy, psychology) if it
saves appearances. He even praises Hesiod for being grateful to the
Muses, despite their being goddesses; the virtue of piety again overrides
its pagan context. Galenos intention, as he puts it, is to transubstantiate myth into a more divine form, to beautify the ugliness of Greek
myths by making it look more like our Truth. He concludes with an
invocation of Christ the King.80

77 Eustathios of Thessalonike, Com. ad Hom. Il., preface 3.10 . (v. 1, 4); see Cesaretti
(1991) pt. 3 for an extensive discussion.
78 Cf. Kaldellis (2007) 314 on Eustathios and Basil of Caesarea.
79 Eustathios of Thessalonike, Prologue to the Commentary on Pindar 27.
80 John Galenos, Allegories on Hesiods Theogony pp. 295296, 336, 365; see Roilos
(2005) 128130.

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anthony kaldellis

I conclude this section by looking more closely at the most impressive scholarly labor of this period, Eustathios Homeric commentaries,
but these are so vast and have received so little attention in their own
right that I must restrict the discussion to a few general comments on
their nature and purpose, especially to define their place in the complex world of twelfth-century scholarship. They have been criticized
for being enormous, confusing, unwieldy, and unenjoyable for the student.81 The Iliad has 15,600 verses; Eustathios Commentary on the Iliad
(of which an autograph copy survives) has 3,575 pages in the modern
edition: this works out to an average of four and a half verses per page,
though some verses receive longer treatment (Iliad 1.1 receives eleven
pages) while others are clustered together for collective comment. After
writing the first draft, Eustathios added further scholia in the margins
and then on little slips of paper pasted into his copy.82 But before we
groan at the weight of them, let us not forget that the Iliad is in fact a
long poem, one of the longest. Four verses discussed per page is really
rather dense. Eustathios could have written an even longer commentary.
In his comments Eustathios tries to cover, well, everything: etymology, grammar, syntax, meter, dialect, rhetorical theory (largely based
on Hermogenic categories), and mythology, the allegorization of which
was a chief concern; also the poets meanings; the ethical and literary aspects of the plot and characters; the cultural and historical background of words, phrases, and actions; as well as contemporary Byzantine sayings and customs that illustrate the ancient text, all the while
citing ancient authorities at first or second hand.83 What purpose could
such a work have served? Eustathios provides some hints in the preface,
but this must be read carefully.
Eustathios claims that he was not instigated to write the Commentary
by powerful men but rather by friends (  ), which are
ambiguous words (note that his commentary on Dionysios Periegetes
was dedicated to a certain John Doukas). He then modestly (and, I
believe, ironically) states that the work will benefit not the learned, who
will not be unaware of anything in it (!) but rather young men who are
studying as well as those who have studied but need to be reminded
E.g., by Browning (1964) 16; Reynolds and Wilson (1991) 7071.
Wilson (1984) 110; in general, Hunger (1978) v. 2, 6466.
83 For a sample of Eustathios literary reading of Iliad, book I, see Lindberg (1985);
for the contemporary folkloric aspect, see Koukoules (1950).
81
82

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

35

of certain thingsthereby negating his first claim that the learned will
not need it! He goes on to say that he has included only necessary
and not superfluous things, which perhaps we can take at face value,
at least at first. Eustathios then lists the categories of analysis for each
verse and explains who will benefit from them, adding that he has also
included ten thousand more things that are useful for life, and not
briefly either, but rather in a rich varietyso again undercutting his
initial disclaimer. When he proceeds to talk about how young students
should use the book, we need not believe that they were the only
readers he had in mind. There is often irony in Eustathios style, in
this as well as in his other works.84 The Commentary can be used in two
ways, he says: one can read through it as a work in itself or read it to
elucidate specific passages of the Iliad.85
In the preface, then, Eustathios says much about his methods and
intents, but he does not always say exactly what he thinks or all of what
he means. We are left with conflicting impressions about the works
intended audience and use: Is it for those who are now studying or
who have already studied? Is it to be read straight through or consulted selectively for individual verses? Eustathios seems to be keeping
his options open, presenting the Commentary safely as a work for teaching but implying that it has many more uses as well. After all, on the
first page of the preface he makes it clear (at length) that Homer has
something good to oer all people, whether they are thinkers or writers or more active in life. He casts his net widely. This, along with
the nature of the book itself, suggests to me that we should not see it
exclusively or primarily as a teaching textbook. Though its compilation
must have been linked to or grown out of Eustathios lectures in Constantinople, the finished product was probably not read out to students
just as it is (far less assigned, given the cost) no more than our own
multi-volume commentaries on the Iliad are meant to be read aloud
to students. Sections of it may have been recited just as they are, but
the Commentaries overall were more of a repertoire of material for teachers to consult before class on any passage of the text or even to have
at hand for reference and student questions. But Eustathios may have
had something even more ambitious in mind, something that extended
beyond the classroom.

84
85

Cf. Sarris (19951997).


Eustathios of Thessalonike, Com. ad Hom. Il., preface 2.1746 (v. 1, 3).

36

anthony kaldellis

What we are dealing with here is more a labor of encyclopedism


than of pedagogy, though it certainly had pedagogical uses. This is
nothing less than an Encyclopedia Homerica in commentary form for all
future generations to use, as each has, in its own way. The problem
with the modern disdain for the work is that, again, we take the benefits conferred by Byzantine scholarship for granted and then criticize it
for flaws that appear only after we have built our own edifices upon
its foundations. Let us consider what was involved. Eustathios must
have collected, sorted through, excerpted, summarized, compiled, and
smoothed out vast amounts of knowledge, not merely scholia, epimerismoi, and more philosophical commentaries on Homer, but also texts
and information from other authors who, he believed, had something
to say that was relevant to the Iliad. Moreover, he made the end product readable by smoothing out the prose into his own Attic standard, so
that modern scholars cannot easily tell where the fragments begin or
end. The list of his sources is long.86 For all we know, the basic building blocks of his Commentaries were inaccessible or in a wretched state
in his time. Who had access or leisure to consult them all, and why go
through dozens of works to find what could be made available in one?
This was basically a work of preservation, compilation, and collation;
it was probably intended as a standard reference work. And Homer
was not just any poet; we have seen his importance for many classes of
Komnenian society. Teachers, orators, scholars, historians, scribes, bishops, philosophers, and government ocials would have benefited from
such a reference work. Who of them didnt have something to look
up in Homer? A few copies of the Commentaries would have served the
needs of the entire capital. And what a delicious rhetorical coup it was
for one professor to cast, in his preface, all these people as his young
pups!
7. The Commentaries on Aristotle
Let us then turn, finally, to the original commentaries on Aristotles
Nicomachean Ethics.87 They fit well into the patterns of scholarly activity in the twelfth century, despite being slightly earlier in date than the
Cf. van der Valks introduction, v. 1, lixcxix.
See, in general, Mercken (1973) c. 1 and (1990); Wilson (1983a) 182184; for all
Aristotelian commentaries in Byzantium, Benakis (2002).
86
87

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

37

poetic commentaries, addressing a more specialized audience, and selfconsciously imitating an ancient tradition of philosophical scholarship.
They are scholarly works, rather than philosophical, in three important
senses. First, in attempting to fill the gap left by the late-antique commentators, Eustratios, Michael, and the rest were subordinating themselves to a larger ongoing project of textual elucidation and clarification; it was this project that defined what and how they wrote.
Second, it was a collaborative project, something for which we have
little evidence in Byzantium since the days of Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos team that produced the Excerpta and other encyclopedic
works.88 In a brief section of his long funeral oration for Anna, George
Tornikios says that it was she who had commissioned these works. The
orator adds that he had personally heard Michael of Ephesus complain
that the all-night labor involved had ruined his eyes.89 And in the preface to his commentary on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, Eustratios
hails and praises his learned royal patrona woman, though he does
not name herin terms that are very reminiscent of Tornikios oration; he says that it was she also who had previously asked him to write
the commentary on book I. Anna, in turn, praised Eustratios for his
wisdom, both divine and external (  ), in the Alexiad (14.8.9).
Third, as a collaborative project the commentaries theoretically (but
not fully in practice) subsumed the individuality of the contributors;
they were assigned books of the Ethics in a way that made them seem
interchangeable as scholars. It is fitting from this point of view that
some of the contributors remain anonymous.
The new commentaries were placed in manuscripts along with the
old, in the order of the Ethics books. They were more self-standing texts
than the scholia on the poets, but less so than Eustathios Commentary on
the Iliad, being keyed to the original text through lemmata and not
covering every single line of Aristotle. We saw above that John Galenos
commentary on the Theogony jumped across long sections of the poem.
What is the extent of the coverage in the Aristotelian commentaries?
Predictably, they vary. Books I and II of the Ethics are roughly as long
(about 20 OCT pages), but Eustratios commentary on book I has 121
pages in the CAG edition with almost 200 lemmata, while the scholia
on book II have 18 pages with 27 lemmata; only the length of the
average entry remains the same, at about two-thirds of a page. Michael,
88
89

cenko (1992).
Cf. Lemerle (1971) 280300; Sev
George Tornikios, Funeral Oration for Anna Komnene (p. 283).

38

anthony kaldellis

on the other hand, tended to write longer entries for each lemma,
twice as long in fact. For example, his commentary on book IX is
68 pages long with only 50 lemmata, thus half in length compared to
Eustratios on book I but with only one-fourth the number of lemmata.
In other words, Eustratios goes through the text of book I very closely,
leaving few lines without comment, whereas Michael makes longer
jumps from lemma to lemma. This impression, however, is in part
deceptive, because each of Michaels entries actually goes on to discuss
later portions of the text than that quoted at the head. We are dealing
with dierent ways of organizing the material and of breaking the
original text into sections.
Michael is a lucid writer of philosophical Attic Greek. He prefers
short and concise sentences, illustrates the basic points with appropriate
and vivid examples, and is a very competent scholar.90 He stays close
to the text, avoiding digressions and editorials. Moreover, he sticks to
Aristotles ideas and eschews grammatical and historical commentary.
The standards of relevance in these commentaries are much higher
than what we find in, say, Tzetzes: the works are for those who want to
understand the ideas of Aristotles philosophy. Whether what Michael
wrote is useful or not will depend, as always, on who reads him and
why. Throughout he maintains a sense that Aristotle is immediately
relevant to us, creating a textual space in which the moral world
of the Ethics and of twelfth-century Constantinople do not dier in
their essentials, which is possible to believe on the assumption that in
Aristotle we find discussions of perennial problems of human nature.
On occasion, Michael makes this relevance direct, as when he refers
to those thrice-damned loan-sharks we have (  ) to illustrate
a point about contracts (IX; 469.3536); or when he notes that the
education of children in Constantinople is handled haphazardly, by
each man as he sees fit, like Homers Cyclopes (X; 610.1116).
On the other hand, he does not allow Christian values to interfere
with his explication of Aristotles virtues and vices, staying close to the
philosophers spirit and to his text. He sometimes uses Byzantine moral
languagee.g., ! " # $ % & '  )" ' $* , & "  + ' , &. ' # /0  (IX; 484.1820)but
there is nothing here that an ancient thinker would take issue with. At
90 For a discussion of Michaels commentaries on the Politics, see Triantari-Mara
(2002) c. 3.

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

39

one point, Michael even mentions the rewards given by our God
 & + +  + & to support an Aristotelian
position (IX; 506.3132). He uses Greek exempla for illustration, except
when he cites Basil of Caesarea and Gregory of Nazianzos as an example of perfect friendship (IX; 462.1920, 479.56; the Christian tradition
was wrong about their relationship, but Michael could not have known
that). His comments are sometimes opaque. In discussing unequal relationships, he has this to say: but the friendship of the father for the
son or of the son for the father are not simply of the same kind or
equal, given that the father is not equal to the sonbut consider this
in relation to our beliefs () )and vice versa (IX; 462.2124).
What exactly does he want us to consider? It may have been something that he could not have said openly in a period when intellectuals
were in danger of being tried precisely for considering such problems
again.91
One final passage from Michael illustrates the verbal skill of these
scholars who had to weave together the classical and Christian traditions. Commenting on the phrase that one does not sacrifice everything to Zeus, Michael notes that there were things that the Greeks
were not permitted to sacrifice to Zeus . . . who was the father, according to the Greeks ( 3), of both men and gods; likewise, we
do not owe everything to our fathers, for we will not obey if they should
call on us to turn away from the living God (+  +) or betray
our fatherland (IX; 473.713). The paradox of a father forcing his son
to betray his fatherland is nice, but note also that, having used a famous
Homeric verse for Zeus, Michael appropriately then quotes a Biblical
expression for the God of his Byzantine readers.
In turning from Michael to Eustratios, I want to conclude with a different point about the purpose of the commentaries, one partly linked
to this constant juxtaposition of Greek and Christian texts, exempla, and
ideas. Eustratios, as is well known, had close personal experience of theological repression. His teacher Italos was condemned in 1082 and he
himself in 1117. He probably wrote the commentaries after that; at any
rate, in the preface to the commentary on Ethics VI he refers to old age
and illness. His condemnation in 1117 involved the charge of employing
Greek philosophy to clarify the faith and lapsing into heresy. This is

91 Browning (1975b); Clucas (1981) 38, 6773. For Father-Son rhetoric and the
Kappadokian Fathers, see Van Dam (2003).

40

anthony kaldellis

not the place to ascertain the truth behind this or to follow Eustratios
subtle negotiation of (Greek) philosophy and (Christian) theology in his
various works. In any case, the accusation of philosophizing according
to the Greeks was very unfair in that it was dicult if not impossible to rebut, as the entire intellectual and ecclesiastical class of Byzantium was acquainted with and relied on Greek thought to some degree.
For example, in a doctrinal letter against the Armenian Monophysites,
Eustratios had cited as his theological sources the wise thinkers among
the Greeks and those who dogmatize about God on our side.92 But,
as we have seen, this juxtaposition was common among the scholars,
philosophers, churchmen, and humanists of the twelfth century. Consider two of Eustratios own enemies within the Church, from dierent periods. Leo of Chalcedon, a sti-necked hardliner on the matter
of icons and opposed by Eustratios on the emperor Alexios behalf in
the 1080s, cited the legal status of temples in antiquity in his defense
of ecclesiastical property; for his part, Alexios had cited Perikles use
of the treasury of Athena to justify his confiscations (at least so says
Anna).93 And Niketas of Herakleia, one of Eustratios chief accusers in
1117, wrote, as we have seen, poems on the epithets of the gods in the
form of liturgical hymns. It was not possible to avoid doing such things
in an intellectual culture whose roots were so diverse and so tangled.
We noted above the same juxtaposition of passages from both pagan
and Christian authors in Gregory Pardos commentary on Hermogenes
as well as in his prescriptions for what authors one should imitate. The
study of rhetoric, as we saw, was not entirely theoretical, as it is with
us, but was supposed to help Byzantine orators imitate the classics: it
was practical. So too ethics. The twelfth-century philosophical commentators hoped and expected that their texts would help readers not
merely to understand Aristotle better but also to become better people
by applying his Ethics to their lives. Eustratios is explicit about this in
the preface to his commentary on book I (2.1 .). Ethics is a branch
of practical philosophy and can morally benefit individuals, cities, or
even whole nations. And one may find many exempla in books, both
ours (  ) and those that are outside (  ). For many good
92 Eustratios of Nicaea, Refutation (pp. 163164); for his condemnation, see Joannou
(1954); for Christian and Platonic passages in the Ethics commentaries, see Mercken
(1973) 12*13*.
93 Glavinas (1972) 110111; cf. Alexios in Anna Komnene, Alex. 6.3.3 (this may be an
elaboration or addition to the speech by Anna herself).

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

41

men lived well among both the barbarians and the Greeks. He goes
on to name Abraham, Isaac, Jacob, Job, Moses, Jesus the son of Nun,
and, if you want, Solon among the Greeks. But enough about them
(I; 3.264.8).
8. Conclusions
Classical scholarship flourished in twelfth-century Byzantium; it had
a diverse and extensive social background; its constituent branches
grammar, rhetoric, philosophy, manuscript editions, etc.were interconnected at all levels; and it was pursued by serious and intelligent
scholars who had a sound knowledge of Greek history and literature.
Byzantine scholars, in short, were not interested only in the preservation of ancient texts but they wanted to understand them, to come
to terms with their otherness, to find a way to integrate their virtues
into their Christian society. They were willing to consider a wide range
of strategies to make that possible. As a result, one can actually learn
much about antiquity by studying the works of these scholars in a way
that would not have been possible in the West for many centuries. This
was because it was during the middle and late period of Byzantium
that the basis for all subsequent Classical Studies was established. Much
has been written about how methodologies, critical tools, and scholarly
habits were transported from Byzantium to Italy in the Renaissance,
active skills to complement inert manuscripts, the form to go
along with the matter. I will mention here only Robert Grosseteste,
a scholar of a slightly earlier period (the thirteenth century), who translated the new commentaries on Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics and other
Greek works into Latin using, among other aids, the Souda and the Etymologicum Genuinum.94
More importantly, in ways both ideological and practical the Byzantines basically invented what we recognize today as Classical Studies.
Whether we like it or not, it was they who made most of the key
decisions, and their choices about what to keep and what not were
essentially what ours would have been.95 In part, that is because we
94 Mercken (1973) c. 2; Dionisotti (1988). For the Byzantine scholars role in the
Renaissance, see the studies by D.J. Geanakoplos, N.G. Wilson, J. Monfasani, and
others.
95 Littlewood (2004) 19.

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anthony kaldellis

are their heirs; as classicists we are all Byzantines. This is dicult to


accept if we subscribe to the polarity of Classical vs. Byzantine, but that
polarity is not legitimate; it was devised for polemical ideological purposes. Certainly, there were some in Byzantium who were fundamentally opposed to all that the ancient Greek world stood for (or at least
what they thought it stood for), but that was precisely how the idea of
classical culture as something foreign yet compelling at the same time
originated in the first place. Moreover, hard-line elements were never
dominant in Byzantium and could be mocked or ignored by scholars.
Besides, modernity has likewise defined itself in fundamental ways in
opposition to antiquity,96 but most of its scholars have not on that count
given up in their endeavor to access or even revive the spirit of the
ancient world.
The implications of this must be as practical for us as scholars as they
are challenging ideologically. For example, it is being recognized that
fragments of ancient authors can no longer be so neatly extracted
from the later sources that quote them. We must look more closely at
the authorial practices and literary contexts of those sources.97 As has
been said about a comparable art-historical topic, the taste of a later
age is as much a part of an ivorys biography as its production and
purpose, even if this truth inordinately complicates the job of those who
seek to write its history.98
There are hopeful signs of progress. Late antiquity is gradually
being reintegrated into the study of antiquity, so that one day we may
again enjoy the holistic view that the Byzantines took for granted.99
Diachronic studies of the Greek tradition are also picking up, in dierent disciplines, which now recognize that the philosophical and scholarly reception of the classics did not jump from antiquity to the Renaissance (the standard western view, with brief nods to the Arabic and
Byzantine contributions). But serious obstacles must be overcome before Byzantium can be restored to its rightful place in this history.100
There is a widespread reluctance to engage with untranslated texts,
96 Philosophers such as Nietzsche and others forcefully argued that modern scholarship makes a travesty of classical Greece precisely because it is entangled in the ideological imperatives of modernity.
97 E.g., Flinto (1976) 365; Brunt (1980); Pelling (2000). Many classicists who rely on
collections of fragments are unaware of these problems.
98 Culter (1994) 141.
99 Cf. Treadgold (1984).
100 And the dangers pointed out by Brague (2002) 138 should be carefully avoided.

classical scholarship in twelfth-century byzantium

43

especially when they come from a foreign and forbidding culture. On


the other hand, there is also too much ignorance about Byzantium
among classicists, the very ones who have the linguistic skills with which
to approach it. This ignorance is not merely of the esoteric aspects that
I have surveyed, but of its basic history and society.
In this respect we are now worse o than in the nineteenth century, when modern Altertumswissenschaft was created. The pioneers of
that disciplineand not only the likes of Mommsen and Burywere
essentially Byzantinists in that they were conversant with the material,
were not afraid of it, and recognized its worth.101 That many of them
did not call themselves Byzantinists is an ideological question. Classicists who now work with the basic tools crafted in the nineteenth century, have largely forgotten where it all came from. I will close with a
story told about Arnaldo Momigliano by Peter Brown, both rare birds
in this respect:
He was as active in the early Byzantine period as ever Baynes and Jones
had been. . . To a suggestion that the library might cancel its subscription
to the Byzantinische Zeitschrift, on the grounds that it was unlikely to be
frequently consulted, he replied that he himself consulted it regularly and
that, in any case, if this should ever be so, the problem would not be what
to do with the Byzantinische Zeitschrift, but what to do with a professor
of ancient history who remained ignorant of such a periodical.102

101
102

See the portraits in Momigliano (1994).


Brown (1988) 423.

THE LITERARY, CULTURAL AND


POLITICAL CONTEXT FOR THE TWELFTH-CENTURY
COMMENTARY ON THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

Peter Frankopan
One of the great challenges posed by study of the age of the Komnenian Emperors is that of trying to work out what kind of Empire
Byzantium was in the late eleventh and the twelfth centuries. Was this
an Empire that was introverted or one which looked to the outside for
inspiration? Was it an Empire which was buoyant or one struggling to
stave o imminent destruction by the forces which surrounded it? Was
it an Empire which was becoming more and more liberal or one which
was increasingly repressive and dogmatic? The answer, of course, is that
it was both and it was neither. Under the Komnenoi, Byzantium was
highly stratified, and yet individuals of low and obscure origin could
and did rise to the summit; it was closed in some ways, and yet open to
outsiders in others; it was deeply conservative, and yet it was also open
to new ideas. One of the reasons for this ambivalence is that there are
competing images at play for the period which started with the usurpation of Alexios I in 1081. The evidence for the century or so which
followed is abundant and often colorful, and as such allows for a wide
range of perspectives. The skill, then, is to set out conclusions which are
both suitably nuanced, but which do not simply park contradictory or
dicult source material on one side in order to drive home expansive
arguments which raise as many problems as they solve.
A case in point is that of assessing the interest in, value and importance of philosophy in Byzantium in the twelfth century, a topic that
is not as straightforward as might first seem. The aim of this paper
is to try to provide a context for the commissioning of Eustratios of
Nicaeas commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, or, to be more precise,
his commentaries on a part of that work. It will seek to provide a literary, cultural and political context for the observations on Aristotles
work, which proved enormously influential not least in Western Europe
and to Western European political thought.
Eustratios makes it clear that his commentary on the Ethics was not
his own idea. Rather, as he tells us at the start of his observations on

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peter frankopan

Book I, he was prompted to write by a person of high status in contemporary Constantinople. Refusal was out of the question, according to Eustratios, since this individual had been his benefactor in the
past, including through some very dicult times.1 The author gives
little else away as to the identity of his patron, saying nothing more
about who this individual was, or what their motivation was for seeking a guide to the Ethics. At the start of his commentary on Book VI,
however, he returns to the subject of his patron, whom he describes
this time as a high-ranking member of the imperial family, addressing
her as ' , ' ., '  ' ..2
Although Eustratios does not provide the name of the empress
in question, there is little doubt that he must be talking about Anna
Komnene, the eldest daughter of Alexios I Komnenos, sister of John II
and aunt of Manuel I.3 Anna was the author of one of the most famous
all medieval texts and one of the most celebrated Byzantine histories,
the Alexiad, which covers the reign of Alexios I from his seizure of
the throne in 1081 to his death in 1118. This cavernous text provides
ample opportunity to pick out areas and themes of specific interest to
the author. These certainly include philosophy in general and perhaps
Aristotle specifically, who is quoted directly or indirectly on a handful
of occasions in the Alexiad.4
Coupled with Annas own composition is the reputation that she
acquired during and shortly after her lifetime from other intellectuals in Byzantium. Theodore Prodromos called her wise Anna, absolute intellect, home of the Graces, and referred to her as the fourth
Grace and as the tenth Muse, stating that she loved both truth and
philosophy.5 We learn of her love of literature, her unquenchable thirst
for truth, and, again, her keen interest in philosophy from an oration

1    . &   6 &   ) "


+ 7  8" 8   )", : ; <
, *  ) , ; & =,  6 )> & , ?
 @    ' ,   ) A
B ' &.. In EN 1.1318. On this passage, see also Mercken (1973) 10* f.

In EN 256.3 f. For the full dedicatory passage, see 256.3257.12.


Browning (1962) 112, esp. 67.
4 Alex. Prologue, I.2.13, p. 5; II.1.26 ., p. 6; II.4.v.84 f., 89 f., p. 64; III.6.iv.52 f.,
p. 101; V.8.v.93 f., p. 163; V.9.i, p. 165; V.9.iv.82 f., p. 166; X.11.iv.63 ., p. 318; XII.5.ii.85,
p. 371; XII.5.iv.33 ., p. 372; XIII.1.iii.32 f.; XIII.4.i.40 f., p. 394; XIV.7.iii.16 f., p. 450.
5 Kurtz (1907), 88.43 f.; Epithalamium col. 1401.
2
3

the literary, cultural and political context

47

delivered by George Tornikios in her honor some time after her death
in the early 1150s.6
It is helpful too, then, that Annas reputation is confirmed by two
authors hostile to the Komnenoi, for this allows us to allay concerns
that Prodromos and Tornikios praise is biased by their own panegyrical praise for the porphyrogennetathat is to say, that their record
of Annas intellectual curiosity should be read primarily as a rhetorical
device in the portrayals of the imperial princess. That Choniates praises
Anna for her philosophical interests is significant therefore; so too are
Zonaras comments about her natural intelligence and the sheer hard
work which led to her mastery of the Greek language.7
Zonaras also reveals that Anna not only engrossed herself in books,
but also surrounded herself with scholars or learned men, and, moreover, took discussions with them very seriously.8 This strikes a chord
with Tornikios oration too, for the author of this speech specifically
talks of a group of scholars who surrounded Anna and who were
engaged in intellectual pursuits.9 So striking is this image that modern historians have come to talk of a circle or salon of Anna Komnene.10
Tornikios goes further than Zonaras, though, for while the latter
presents Anna Komnene as being surrounded by intelligent men, Tornikios suggests that she did not simply allow a circle of intellectuals
to gather around her, but lay at the very heart of this group. It was
Anna, according to Tornikios, who prompted, cajoled and inspired
those around her. It was Anna, says George, who sought out individuals
and prompted them to work on Aristotle and Plato, on Euclid and
Ptolemy.11 She was no passive patron, therefore, indulging those around
her with funds and scholarly comforts; rather, her patronage was active,
at times even aggressive. One scholar from Ephesus, certainly Michael
of Ephesus, whom she commissioned to work on Aristotle, complained
that Annas relentless goading to provide commentaries had made him
lose his sight, as he had been forced to work through the night by
6 Lettres 221323. For the dating of the speech to c. 1155 and Annas death to c. 1153,
see 21 f.; cf. Browning (1962) 4.
7 Historia 10.1316; Epitome Historiarum v. III, XVIII.26.1215, p. 754.
8 Epitome Historiarum v. III, XVIII.26.15 f., p. 754.
9 Lettres 281 .
10 Browning (1962) 8 (although Browning does not emphasise the word, preferring
the less contentious circle); Magdalino (1993) 332.
11 Lettres 281.

48

peter frankopan

flickering and weak candle-light, presumably in order to meet deadlines


of some kind imposed by his patron.12
We can identify other members too of the circle of intellectuals
whom Anna surrounded herself with. To Eustratios of Nicaea and
Michael of Ephesus should perhaps be added two scholars who wrote
on the Rhetoric, one of whom remains anonymous but the other, one
Stephen, most likely Stephen, metropolitan of Trebizond, also taught
Theodore Prodromos.13 Whether this identification is correct or not,
the fact that we know that Stephanos had previously written on the
Ethics (as well as on the Rhetoric) makes him a prime candidate for
inclusion as one of Annas scholarseven though, as far as we know,
his views on the Ethics have not survived to the present day.
There is, of course, a reason to seek to identify scholars who were
patronized by Anna, other than simple laziness to associate any writer
or commentator on philosophy in the mid-twelfth century with a lightning rod patron. This comes from the fact that it is possible to deduce
an obvious coherence to what Anna was trying to achieve, and to assert
that her choice of texts, if not of scholars, was deliberate and specific.
George Tornikios makes much of Annas interests in Aristotle, Plato,
Euclid and Ptolemy (repeating this grouping of authors names twice
in his speech).14 It goes without saying that Anna may have sought,
commissioned and even received commentaries on works by all these
authors, and it is simply a matter of chance that we posses those on
Aristotles treatises but not on those of any of the others. However,
there may be another explanation here, namely that Annas interests
were primarily directed at the works of Aristotle specifically, an observation not without some significance.
The obvious clue here comes from the work of Michael of Ephesus.
We know that in addition to providing a commentary on Books V,
IX and X of the Nicomachean Ethics, Michael also provided notes on a
wide range of other Aristotelian works, including the Organon, the Metaphysics, the Rhetoric and the Politics, as well as on the zoographical and
anthropological works.15 It is no coincidence then that it was Aristotle
whom Michael of Ephesus was studying as his eyesight failed: he had
Lettres 283.912.
Magdalino (1993) 332; Browning (1975b) 17; Wilson (1996) 182.
14 Lettres 281.15; 301.16.
15 Tatakis (2003) 174; Browning (1975b) 16; Browning (1962) 6; Wilson (1996) 182;
Mercken (1973) 24*.
12
13

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49

been set the task of providing commentaries on all those treatises on


which either none existed or which were, for whatever reason, considered inadequate.16
The sheer workload and productivity of Michael of Ephesus and
the obvious commissioning of Eustratios of Nicaea to work on the
Ethics has perhaps understandably led to the view that Anna had
devised a collaborative approach which was focused on providing a
new corpus on Aristotle, and on Aristotle alonea conclusion which
quite naturally and obviously begs the questions of how she set about
addressing his works, what she hoped to achieve by commissioning
commentaries and why this particular author stood out for Anna.17
It is dicult to be precise about the mechanics of how Anna delegated work on the Ethics for there are precious few clues provided in
the commentaries as to when they were composed. Moreover, the fact
that individual scholars did not address consecutive sections of the text
does not make it any easier for us to understand how (or why) Aristotle was parceled out to Annas stable of commentators. We know, for
example, that Eustratios did his commentary on Book I before turning
to deal with Book VI, because he tells us this himself.18 What is more
obscure, however, is why this individual did not cover Books IIV, or if
he did, why these do not survive.
Certainly, in the absence of any meaningful evidence, particularly
on Michael of Ephesus (who has been variously placed in the first half
of the eleventh century to the 1080s but now seemingly decisively to
the first half of the twelfth), it is hard to assert who wrote what when.19
Inferences which we can draw from Eustratios career and the apparent
start-point of Annas patronage of scholars might lead us to conclude
that he preceded Michaelwhich is to say that the commentaries were
consecutive, rather than collaborative, with the obvious implication this
has for our understanding of the why Anna was seeking to address the
text.
Eustratios was a deacon, apparently at Saint Sophia by the early
1080s, and so by the time of Alexios death must have been in his sixties
16
17
18

Lettres 283.912.
Browning (1962) esp. 7 f.; Wilson (1996) 181 .; Magdalino (1993) 332.
In his introduction to his commentary on Book VI, Eustratios writes:  )'

 .  )  ) " #    
+ 8" 8 , ' , " : &C . . . In EN

256.26257.3.
19 See Mercken (1991) 13*17*.

50

peter frankopan

at the very least.20 Meanwhile, his limited output on Aristotle might sit
easily with a hypothesis that he did not have the chance to produce
more than the two books that survive, whether because of infirmity, old
age or death. In this respect, we might also note that George Tornikios
does not mention Eustratios by name. This could be because the latter
had been involved in scandal, as we shall see.21 It was not long after
Tornikios delivered his oration in the early 1150s, though, that we find
Eustratios name being used in a context which suggests that the stigma
which may have been attached to it had dissipated somewhat.22 So
perhaps another explanation for his omission from Tornikios speech
is that he was not part of living memory (as Michael of Ephesus
obviously was), and had been alive too long ago to have a resonance
with Tornikios or Tornikios audience.
If it is dicult to draw any firm conclusions about when the commentaries were commissioned (other than in the first half of the twelfth
century), which order they were tackled in, and how or indeed if they
were divided up, then at least we can say something about whom Anna
turned to in order to address the texts in question. Michael of Ephesus,
for one, may not have been an entirely original thinker, and indeed his
limitations have been stressed, perhaps a little unfairly, by at least one
modern scholar who argues that his interest in the biological works and
his unfailing observations on physiology and psychology may indicate
that he was a physician.23 However, whatever he may have lacked in
vision, he made up for in terms of his diligence, for his output was
prodigious, an indefatigable accumulator who paid for his hard work
with his eyesight.
Eustratios of Nicaea, in contrast, had an impressive pedigree as a
theologian, prominent as a leading authority on icons during the trials
of Leo of Chalcedon in the 1080 and 1090s, and, later, on the errors
of the Latins as well as on the Armenian heresy.24 Eustratios is modest
about his abilities in his commentaries, stating that he had turned his

20 Mercken, following Draeseke, gives Eustratios dates as c. 1050c. 1120 (Mercken


(1973) 6*), although within this there is room for manouevre. In 1082, at the time of
the trial of John Italos, Eustratios and his fellow accused were termed ;"
. Gouillard (1985) 59.432.
21 Cf. the comments by Mercken (1991) 24*.
22 See above, note 24.
23 Mercken (1991) 16* f.
24 For the various stages of Eustratios career, see Mercken (1973) 6* .

the literary, cultural and political context

51

hand to them not because of any particular aptitude, but because he


had been forced to undertake this task, for reasons he leaves obscure.25
Eustratios, it should be stressed, had been a loyal supporter of Annas
father, the Emperor Alexios. But he had become a tainted figure in
Constantinople: he had saved his skin once in 1082 when he had
been tried alongside other pupils of John Italos, only to be acquitted
on signing a document denouncing and anathematizing his former
master.26 But in 1117, he had not been able to escape the hounding of
other members of the clergy, in particular by Niketas Seides. In spite of
the eorts of the Emperor and the Patriarch to intervene on his behalf,
Eustratios had been anathematized, with his errors promptly added to
the Synodikon, the register of Byzantine Orthodoxyeven though he
had publicly renounced all the errors of which he had been accused.27
It is true that even the most severe punishments that came with
anathematization did not necessarily mean that Eustratios became an
outcast. A compelling case has been made, for example, that John
Italos was rehabilitated and played a role at Antioch liaising with the
Crusaders some fifteen years after his condemnation. But exceptional
circumstancesand in this case Italos knowledge of southern Italy and
his personal involvement in diplomatic relations between Byzantium
and the Normans in the 1070slay behind Johns re-emergence later
in Alexios reign.28 It is likely and indeed probable that the stain of
Eustratios condemnation lived with him for some time. So even though
we know that Eustratios reputation eventually was restored, or at least
was restored suciently for him to be cited as an authority at one of
the Blachernai councils of 1156, there should be little doubt that Annas
patronage of and involvement with him should be seen as striking, not
least since the commentaries logically post-date Eustathios disgrace
and for that matter, that of Anna shortly after her fathers death in
1118.29

25

In his commentary on the Posterior Analytics, Eustratios insists that he is not a


profesional commentator, but has done the work ) "D. Mercken (1991) 25*. At
the beginning of his commentary on Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics he is also very
coy about his abilities (In EN 256.2226), but this is very much a topos.
26 Gouillard (1985) 133174; for Eustratios involvement, see esp. 158161.
27 Gouillard (1967) 1313; for Eustratios, esp. 6871.
28 Magdalino (2003) 50 f.
29 For Eustathios rehabilitation (at least in so far as being cited positively) see
Magdalino (1993) 279. For Annas fall following an apparent attempt to seize the throne
for herself and for her husband, see for example, Hill (2000) 4562.

52

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This is particularly true given the ultra-conservative views that Anna


regularly articulates in the Alexiad, and particularly in matters to do
with the church. John Italos receives a brutal treatment from the author; Leo of Chalcedon and Neilos of Calabria fare little better.30 Not
surprisingly, given her own championing of Eustratios, the trial and
condemnation of this individual is not even mentioned in the text,
with Anna instead mentioning her favoured scholar in suitably fond
and adulatory terms.31 Nevertheless, there should be little doubt that
Anna had turned to a figure whose reputation had been tainted in
contemporary Byzantium.
It may be that it was Eustratios disgrace which lay behind his
opaque identification of Anna as his patron. Anna is not named by
Eustratios, perhaps for fear of embarrassing her or compromising her,
or possibly both.32 But while it is tempting to see his reticence as a
shield to protect his sponsor, it is also important to stress that Anna
too at this time was persona non grata in Constantinople and Byzantine
society. According to Anna herself, she had been secluded in a convent
and excluded from contact with her friends, family and peers.33
Some modern scholars have tried to pair the scandal of the cleric
with that surrounding Anna herselfalthough the issue of Annas apparent disgrace and isolation following her fathers death is perhaps
less dramatic and certainly more complicated than is usually assumed.34
The logical extension of the argument hereof seeing Anna and those
around her such as Eustratios, and presumably others too, as a concentration of victims of Komnenian poweris too outlandish to take seriously; and in any event leads discussion in a direction which is neither
welcome nor useful, since this predicates a view that Aristotle and Aristotelian thought was somehow part of a Komnenian counter-culture
something which should be dismissed out of hand.
In fact, the more productive question to ask here is not whether the
personal circumstances of Anna Komnene and Eustratios of Nicaea
are significant and interesting, but rather why it was that there was
a specific focus on Aristotle in the early part of the twelfth century.
The answer here lies in the first instance in assessing the philosophical
30 On John Italos: Alex. V.89, pp. 161167. On Leo of Chalcedon: Alex. V.2.iviv,
p. 144 .; VII.4.i, p. 215. On Neilos: Alex. X.1, pp. 281283.
31 Alex. XIV.8.ix.28 .
32 Mercken (1973) 10* f.
33 Alex. XIV.7.vi, p. 452.
34 e.g. Thomas (1991) 294 .

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53

enquiry prompted and funded by Anna in the wider context of a period


of profound change in Byzantine social, literary, and intellectual culture
in this period. This was, after all, a time that saw increasing experimentation with literary forms. Texts such as the Timarion, Digenis Akritis
and even the Alexiad itself are but a small number of writings from the
twelfth century which are (rightly) perceived as doing something new in
Byzantine literature and Byzantine thought.35
Alongside literary innovation, we can note evidence of increasing
social mobility. The founding of the Orphanotropheion, set up with the
express intention of educating not only the poor but also foreigners,
can be seen as the prime example of the expansion of access to education and the obvious implications that brought with it.36 We can pick up
smatterings from the sources about the greater availability of the written word, with Theodore Prodromos noting with approval the eorts
of the Patriarch John IX Agapetos (11111134) to put more books into
circulationincluding, it is worth noting here, those by Aristotleby
having teams of scribes make copies of selected texts.37 Even the introduction of schedography, a light-weight short-cut to gaining knowledge
of the classics, can be seen as a companion to the increasing dissemination of ideaseven if Anna Komnene and John Tzetzes can barely
contain their horror at the impurity of this approach.38
Indeed, we might go even further still and try to place Annas desire
for commentaries on Aristotle in the context of the multiple heresies
that were proclaimed and dealt with in the reign of her father, Alexios, and of her nephew, Manuel I, though apparently not in that of
her brother. What the various trials show, of course, is that Orthodoxy was coming under greater scrutiny, that it was being stretched
time and again beyond its traditional defense of simply being able to
answer theological and Christological questions from authority.39 In the
case of Eustratios himself, the oence which he caused stemmed from
his claim that Christ had argued with the help of Aristotelian syllogisms, something which provoked a wild reaction from enough senior

35 For an overview of changes in Byzantine literature in the 12th Century, see


Kazhdan (1984). Also Magdalino (1993) 126.
36 Alex. XV.7.iiivii, pp. 482485.
37 Logos 239241.
38 For Annas brief comments on schedography: Alex. XV.7.ix.31 f., p. 485. For Tzetzes, see Chiliades IX.710715, p. 351; XI.575576, p. 424.
39 See e.g. Angold (1997) 141 ., 260266. Also Browning (1975b) esp. 1219.

54

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members of clergy to outgun both Emperor and Patriarch and, of


course, the metropolitan of Nicaea, Eustratios himself.40 In this respect,
therefore, it only seems natural to seek to place Anna Komnenes
interest in Aristotle within a framework of innovation, of new ideas,
of stretching the boundaries and taking theology and philosophy into
new territory.
But we need to caution excitement about the apparent sudden
change in Byzantium in the twelfth century. There should be no doubting that all the indicators pointing towards liberalism, experimentation and innovation are valid. As Paul Magdalino has rightly stressed,
though, these can be easily counter-balanced with negatives too. For
example, any discussion about an ignition of interest in philosophy
should be o-set by at least noting that, as far as we know, the position of hypatos ton philosophon lay vacant for much of the twelfth century, until finally filled by Michael (later Patriarch of Constantinople)
towards the end of the 1160s.41 The placing of Theodore of Smyrna
firmly in Hades in the Timarion likewise gives an important signal that
not everyone in Byzantium was thrilled by change, or at least by philosophical inquiry.42
And we should also add that, while the trials of John Italos, Neilos of
Calabria, Leo of Chalcedon, Eustratios and others in this period might
at first glance seem to provide examples of reactions by a conservative
regime, desperately trying to defend itself, a more convincing case can
be made that the condemnation of these individuals had little or nothing to do with their ideas; rather, they tell us more about more practical
problems experienced in contemporary Byzantium, principally that of
imperial image-making, and, later, of imperial control of the clergy.
So what was it about Aristotle that Anna Komnene was so interested
in? Why, of all the authors she could have sought enlightenment on,
did she choose this one? Was her choice reflective of an attempt to
reconcile the pagan world with Christianity, and, if so, why was there
a greater eort to do this in the twelfth century than in previous
generations? Was Annas interest in philosophy in any way driven by
her personal experiences, and indeed by her education, where by all

Angold (1995) 73 .
Browning (1975b) 16; also, for Michaels presentation of Aristotle, philosophy and
theology in his inaugural lecture, see Browning (1961) 181 f., 189 f.
42 Browning (1975b) 16; Timarion 71 .
40
41

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55

accountsincluding her own, but also those of her contemporaries


she was remarkable for her curiosity and intelligence; that is to say,
was her interest the natural culmination of a life which had seen her
study grammar and rhetoric in secret without her parents knowing
and which had progressed to take in more erudite and challenging
questions?
Anna Komnene answers this last question for us emphatically in
the Alexiad. According to the author, philosophical inquiry had all
but died out before her father took the throne. The result was that
most people enjoyed fatuous pursuits, seeking out luxury and pleasure,
and wasting their time doing things like catching quail, or playing
draughts.43 As Anna makes quite clear on regular occasions in the
text, the study of philosophy was the highest prize for an individual
to pursue.44 Unfortunately for those concerned, figures like John Italos
and John Solomon were simply poor scholars, who in spite of their
apparent vast learning had entirely failed to grasp the deepest truths of
philosophyaccording to Anna Komnene at any rate.45 Both, indeed,
were guilty of misunderstanding Aristotle specifically, a point which
Anna labors in an obvious attempt to contrast her own aptitude on
Aristotle with the failings of these others.46
As a matter of fact, Annas study of Aristotle appears in almost the
very first line of the Alexiad. Her proud claim to have studied the treatises of Aristotle (* 8* ") as well as the dialogues of
Plato, appears in the same sentence in which Anna introduces herself
in the text. In other words, she chooses at the outset to define herself as an Aristotelian and Platonic scholar, a point she underlines by
stressing that she has not only studied these texts, but has done so
at great length.47 Indeed, Annas armation of her own philosophical interests is a theme that runs through the course of the Alexiad. The
fact that the theme of authorial objectivity is also pervasive is perhaps
no coincidence, then. In each case we can read into Annas interests
and pre-occupations a desire to parade both her classical training and

Alex. V.8.ii.5057, p. 162; XV.7.ix.25, p. 485.


e.g. Alex. V.9.iii, p. 165 f.
45 On Italos inability to grasp the depths of philosophy: Alex. V.8.iii.68 ., p. 162 .;
on John Solomons philosophical pretensions and inadequacies: Alex. XII.5.iv.3336,
p. 372.
46 Ibidem.
47 Alex. Prologue, I.2.917, p. 5 f.
43
44

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her scholarly pretensions, something which is in turn underscored by


the frequent allusions to antique literature and imagery which appear
in the text.48
This, then, brings to a head Anna Komnenes promotion of philosophy, her patronage of Aristotle, the funeral oration of George Tornikios
and the Alexiad itself. The ideal, of course, would be to find a consistency between Annas interests and her life and work, a connection
between her patronage of Eustratios of Nicaea and her composition
of the Alexiad. However, a reading of the Alexiad proves highly disappointing in this regard. Anna devotes precious little coverage to serious
philosophical discussion. Apart from the occasional dismissal of quail
hunting or of schedography, coupled with appropriate token comments
about the importance of study, of literature and of philosophy, there is
almost nothing that would indicate that the author had more than the
briefest of interests in Aristotle, let alone had commissioned the first
commentaries on some of his works.49
Indeed, Anna deliberately passes up the opportunity to go into any
detail, even when oered the perfect opportunity to do so. For example,
the author devotes considerable attention to the heresy of John Italos,
whom she exposes to a brutal personal attack, which focuses on the
shortness of his temperament, the crudeness of his grammar, and the
roughness of his style. While noting that he had a particular expertise on Aristotle (indeed, the first of the anathemata proclaimed against
him concerned his use of syllogisms), she neither goes into what this
expertise was in order to critique it positively or otherwise (as we might
have expected), nor considers whether the charges which were brought
against him had any merit or intellectual value.50
If Annas reluctance to engage is surprising for someone whose
avowed interests, according to herself and to George Tornikios, and
witnessed to by her patronage of the commentaries, were firmly centered on Aristotle, then so too is the limited use she makes of his
work. Aristotle is quoted, directly or indirectly, fewer than ten times
in the Alexiad. This is scarcely more than the number of times Anna
draws on Euripides, John Chrysostom or Galen, and is similar to her
Buckler(1929) 165221.
See for example, Alex. V.8.iii.5768, p. 162, XV.7.viii.2534, p. 485.
50 For Anna Komnenes vitriolic condemnation of Italos, see Alex. V.8.iV.9.vii,
pp. 161167. The author notes Italos specific focus on Aristotle, V.8.v.9394, p. 163.
For the proclamations against him, see Gouillard, (1967) 137161.
48
49

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57

use of Plato. In other words, to judge from the Alexiad alone, independent of Eustratioss dedication and the speech of George Tornikios, it
would be fair to say that there is nothing in the Alexiad that would suggest that the author of the text had devoted a considerable amount of
time, energy and resources to overseeing work on Aristotle or on the
Ethics.
The significance of this should be stressed by noting that Annas
commissioning of the commentaries certainly pre-dates the composition of the Alexiad; that is to say, therefore, that the omission of discussion of Aristotle, of the Ethics and of philosophy in general is all
the more surprising. We can assert this time-line with some confidence.
First, Tornikios states that Anna brought her intellectual interests fully
into the open following the death of her father in 1118.51 Secondly, to
judge from the formulaic speech, it would seem that Annas philosophical investigations certainly preceded the death of her own husband,
Nikephoros Bryennios, at the end of the 1130s.52 Moreover, the presumptions we can make about Eustratios age again points clearly to
the fact that Annas patronage naturally dates to 1120s and perhaps the
1130s. By contrast, then, we learn that Anna only began work on the
Alexiad after the death of Bryennios and, indeed, only took up her history of Alexios reign following the accession of Manuel I Komnenos
in 1143, a statement which sits comfortably with the subtext provided
by this Emperors reign which runs right through the course of the
text.53 That is to say, therefore, that Annas interest in and concern with
Aristotle were well-established by the time that she came to write an
account of her fathers reign.
The invisibility of Aristotle in the Alexiad should prompt the question
of why Anna had sought out commentaries in the first place, and what
she hoped these would teach. One thing is clear: they certainly did
not teach her a great deal about Aristotle. Of the seven references to
the Nicomachean Ethics in the Alexiad, three are inaccurate. Moreover, in
more than one case, Anna has misunderstood the fundamentals of what
Aristotle was saying. In the case of John Taronites, for example, Anna
seems to equate her cousins flattery of the Emperor with Aristotles
Lettres 269271.
Ibid. 295.
53 There seems little reason to doubt Annas comment that she began work in
earnest during the reign of Manuel I Komnenos, Alex. XIV.7.v.4751, pp. 451452. For
the context of Manuel, see Magdalino (2000) 1543.
51
52

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model of the Magnanimous Man, failing to see that Taronites praise of


Alexios is precisely the opposite of the quality Aristotle advocates for an
independent check on a ruler and his power.54
More troubling still is a quote which comes towards the very end
of the Alexiad, which either represents a case of show-boating by the
author, or is remarkable for its sloppiness. Returning to the theme that
hers is an objective account of Alexios reign, she is at pains to note that
her first love was not the law of nature (i.e. her father), but rather the
truth. In a casual throwaway, Anna notes that a philosopher once said
(E  F .) that both were dear, but of these the truth
is the most excellent.55 Perhaps we should understand Annas standoshness in the most generous way we can, that is, as an aside for
those who knew whom she was quoting, and an almost ironic nod
to Aristotle. The simplicity of the quote does nothing to re-assure us,
however, and it is hardly the level of intellectual artistry practiced by
skilled performers like Michael Psellos.
Indeed, if we advance the argument further, we soon find other hints
which support the conclusion that Anna was perhaps not as interested
in philosophy or in Aristotles philosophy as might be inferred from
her sponsorship of the commentaries. There is little, for example, in
George Tornikios oration which suggests that Annas interests were
high-powered. If anything, Tornikios says rather the opposite, oering
enough to paint a picture of an intellectual butterfly, flitting from grammar and rhetoric one minute, to medicine the next and philosophy the
minute after that.56 We can surely read something into his comments
about Anna, which even for a panegyric are on the edge of being farfetched: according to George, although Anna was fascinated by Euclid,
Ptolemy, Plato and Aristotle, she did not always agree with these sages.
Indeed, many a time came that she did not yield to them. In fact, says
Tornikios, Anna often took these ancient scholars on, with the implicit
suggestion that she was able to out-manoeuvre them with ease. It comes
as no surprise that George does not go into detail here, and chooses not

54 Alex. XIII.1.iii.2228, pp. 384385. Anna appears to think that by indulging and
flattering her father, Taronites was a true dialectician (), meaning this
approvingly. Not only does Aristotle use this word in a negative sense, but he specifically
states that tyrants appreciate weak menlike Taronites in other wordswho praise
them, EN, VIII.6, p. 1157.
55 Alex. XIV.7.iii.1317, p. 450.
56 Lettres 269271, 283.

the literary, cultural and political context

59

to record which points Anna specifically disagreed with, nor what


arguments she articulated which dealt with these once and for all.57
But the intention here is not to belittle Anna, whose erudition,
curiosity and intellect are patently clear from the Alexiad as well as from
her peers. She was emphatically not a cosseted and vacuous patron of
imperial blood who allowed herself to be flattered and manipulated by
dullard scholars. Rather, a re-evaluation needs to be done of precisely
what her interests and indeed her aims were when it came to commissioning commentaries from Eustratios of Nicaea and others. For there
is a coherence here that unites the various elements and which we can
pull together about her lifeher patronage, her intellectual interests,
and her own work.
The theme that unites these more naturally and credibly than the
pursuit of philosophy itself is that of Hellenism. This is the prism that
we need to look through if we are to understand Annas work and,
indeed, her interest in Aristotle. Anna Komnene was not so much interested in the ideas that Aristotle or, indeed, the other classical philosophers was promoting, as in what he and they stood for. And what
they stood for was an identity that Byzantium was rapidly coming to
embrace as it sought to define itself relative to the peoples around
it. The Alexiad is nothing if not a modern re-working of an ancient
Greek epic. Its name, self-consciously lifted from Homer, places the
narrative from the outset in a classical traditionsomething Anna
rapidly confirms at the start of the text by reference to the greatest of
the scholars of classical antiquity and, specifically, of classical Greece:
Plato and Aristotle. Alexios and his actions are repeatedly described
in heroic language in the course text, the struggles facing Emperor
and Empire routinely compared with those of Herakles, or Odysseus,
the qualities and characteristics of the eponymous hero likened to
those easily identifiable in classical Greek literaturethat is, military
prowess, tirelessness, religious orthodoxy (albeit in a Christian context) and above all courage in the face of seemingly insurmountable
odds.58
Annas own interests too fit the mould of the classical scholar, with
a focus on rhetoric, style and grammar. For Anna, far more important than Italos heresies or even his use of Aristotelian methodology
a charge which led to the condemnation of Eustratios and, more57
58

Ibid. 301.
Dyck (1986) 113120; Buckler (1929) esp. 197 f.

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peter frankopan

over, something which she implicitly promoted herself through her own
patronage of the commentatorswas his improper use of the Greek
language, his failure to stick to the rules of grammar, and his lack of
literary style. Anna was less interested in the wider philosophical questions about the eternity of matter, or about the relationship between
the human and the divine Christ, than she was about the integrity of a
Hellenic ideal in Byzantium. This was why she paid little attention to
detailed discussion and barely referred to the former in the Alexiad, but
focused closely on the latter, repeatedly articulating characteristics that
she considered to be truly Byzantine, and those that she did not.
In this context, then, there is an obvious and striking consistency
to Annas account of her fathers reign that is significant here. For
the author of the Alexiad, all foreigners, or more specifically, all nonByzantines, were barbarians. The term  is used indiscriminately about the Turks and steppe nomads; and tellingly, also applies
it willingly to Christians, frequently referring to Latins, whether Crusaders or not, as barbarians.59 And in fact, Anna does rather more, for
as Jonathan Shepard astutely noted, she identifies characteristics common to all those outside the sphere of Constantinople, regardless of ethnic origin, linguistic or social background, or indeed religious persuasion. Latins, Turks and nomads (the three major groupings of peoples
in the text) are all untrustworthy, avaricious, immoral and inconsistent.
In other words, then, an important part of the Alexiad is as much about
setting up an ideal in terms of the figure of the Emperor Alexios Komnenos, as it is about establishing a strong sense of behavior, ethics and
norms which are specifically not Byzantineand consequently underscoring those which are.
And of course, Anna was not alone in her promotion of Hellenism,
nor conversely in her treatment of the world outside Byzantium. The
attempts to reconcile the classical (pagan) scholars with Christianity
had moved on a long way since John Chrysostom dismissed the ancient
philosophers views uniformly as ashes and dust, comparing their
throats to an open grave with everything inside it reeking of foulness,
and calling their teachings worm-eaten.60 By the eleventh century, we
can even find John Mauropous not just defending Plato, as his friend
John Xiphilinos had done, but praying for his soul and that of Plutarch

59
60

Shepard (1988) 9798.


Tatakis (2003) xxii, citing Homily 66 of John Chrysostom, 224 f.

the literary, cultural and political context

61

(though curiously not that of Aristotle).61 Other writers too routinely


talk of barbarians and barbarianismeven when talking about the
Christian west in this period.62 But it was in the twelfth century, at precisely this time, that the concept of Hellenism, the renewed and sustained interest in the classical Greek world, really took o.
It is in the context of Hellenic and indeed Hellenistic inspiration
behind works such as those of Theodore Prodromos and Constantine
Manasses on Rodanthe and Dosikles and Aristandros and Kallithea respectively, that we should place Anna Komnenes patronage of Eustratios
of Nicaea. Annas primary interest was in linking the Byzantium of
her father, her brother and her nephew with the classical world. And
indeed, this is precisely what the Alexiad isa text where Gods, giants,
heroes and impossible quests feature alongside mortals, their struggles,
and the protection shown by (a Christian) God. In this sense, then,
the references to the authors of classical Greece, and to the imagery of
antique Hellenism is significant in so far as it showcases the framework
in which Anna sought to present not only Byzantium during the reign
of her father, but which also reflects the time of the composition of
the text in the 1140s and the context which that in turn provides. That
Anna was not concerned with consideration of philosophical analysis,
but rather with the promotion of philosophy per se and more importantly, with Hellenistic philosophy, is something which is consistent during the course of the Alexiad, but which also carries a resonance with
her promotion of Aristotle through her stable of commentators.
For Anna Komnenes primary concern was with resurrecting or at
least promoting scholarship (including but not limited solely to philosophy). In spite of her criticisms of the rich and powerful in Constantinople who had allowed figures like Italos, Theodore Blachernites
and even Bogomils into their houses, Anna was herself interested in the
promotion of ideas. The fact that it is possible to identify a specific set
of ideas that she sought to advance in the Alexiad and beyond through
her commissioning of the commentaries on Aristotle is invaluable in so
far as it establishes not only what she was trying to promote and also
what she was avoiding through her silence.
In this way, therefore, the significance of her patronage of Eustratios
of Nicaea lies in precisely the act of sponsorship, rather than necessarily
the value (or even the understanding) of precisely what was being pro61
62

Tatakis (2003) 129.


Shepard (1988) 9697.

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peter frankopan

moted. For Anna Komnene, the age of Classical Greece brought with
it parallels with Byzantium in the late eleventh and twelfth centuries
that were appropriate and natural. It is no coincidence, then, that Latin
scholars of both republican and imperial Rome are entirely ignored in
Annas own writing as well as by her circle of scholars (at least by implication); not for nothing either, then, that Tornikios too excludes these
from her funeral oration. In death, as in life, Anna Komnene was a
Hellenist.

ARISTOTELIAN ETHICS IN BYZANTIUM

Linos G. Benakis
This paper is primarily technical in nature. It will argue that when
one begins to examine a less investigated area of the field of Byzantine
Philosophy, research in the primary sources must still precede every
interpretative act and critical approach. Here, research in the primary
sources means:
a. The gathering of texts. This is not always an easy task, although the
publication in recent decades of new critical editions of texts by
Byzantine philosophers has made it more feasible.1 Older editions
of Byzantine philosophers, some of which have been reprinted,
also remain useful, some unexpectedly so.2
b. The study of texts in relation to their sources. Namely, the identification
of sourcesdistinguishing between instances of mere borrowing
and instances of a more critical incorporation of such sources into
Byzantine textsthe identification of original elements, of direct
or indirect influences, of tendencies in the use of source materials,
etc. Here, the ever-expanding secondary bibliography needs to
be consulted with caution, since some studies contain errors of
interpretation which may be more or less obvious.3
This paper will, therefore, necessarily consider both the external evidence and, as far as possible, the internal evidence regarding our texts.
While its nature and methods remain to be justified, this paper will
have served its purpose and satisfied its writers aims if it stimulates
an interest among new scholars in conducting research and writing
about this highly productive area of Greek philosophy, one that has
1

Benakis (1991).
One such is the collection of texts by Nikephoros Blemmydes edited by Dorotheos
Voulismas and published in Leipzig in 1784, where the treatise On Virtue can be found.
3 There is, for example, the case of the article by Giocarinis (1964), where Eustratios
seems to be a defender of the Platonic theory of ideas, when in fact the opposite is
true, as is evident from the texts cited. It is also inexcusable for A. Lloyd to speak of
nominalism in Eustratios in the article cited in note 10, when he himself concludes that
Eustratios method may be defined as a form of conceptualism!
2

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linos g. benakis

been somewhat neglected. I am certain that they will find such research
richly rewarding, whether they engage in technical research work or a
more broadly conceived examination of the most significant problems
of Byzantine philosophy.
As a starting point, one external fact of particular importance to
our topic is the large number of manuscripts containing the Nicomachean Ethics which have been preserved from the Byzantine period.
There are approximately 120 manuscripts, to which one might add 45
manuscripts of the Major Ethics and 25 of the Eudemian Ethics. In order to
put these numbers into perspective I cite the corresponding numbers of
manuscripts of other key works by Aristotle. There are 160 manuscripts
of the Categories from the Byzantine period, 140 of the De interpretatione,
120 for the Prior Analytics, 120 for the Physics, 60 for the Metaphysics,
60 for the De caelo, and 40 for the Poetics. I have discussed the Politics
elsewhere.4 It is, therefore, essential to consider these numbers when
considering the knowledge and interest of the Byzantines in the moralpolitical ideas of Aristotle.5
Of even greater importance is an examination of the internal elements that constitute this interest, so that one might then understand
the relation between our Byzantine authors and the political thinking of the state philosophers of antiquity. The same point can apply
to the Ethics, where the identification of elements of Aristotles moral
teaching in the works of Byzantine philosophers might be considered in
relation to the presence of moral problems and issues within both academic teaching and within a Byzantine Lebensphilosophie that was firmly
embedded in Christian dogma.
There are numerous Byzantine commentaries on Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics. Among the earliest of these was that of Michael of Ephesus
(eleventh-twelfth century), who can be found in the circle of philosophers associated with Anna Komnene and who wrote commentaries
on book V and on books IX and X of the Nicomachean Ethics.6 A first
edition (by contemporary criteria) of these commentaries appeared in

Benakis (1982b) 230236.


See the testimony of Adamantius Korais, who, in his Hellenic Library published
Aristotles Politics in 1821 as the first volume of the collection. This was followed in 1822
by his publication of the Nicomachean Ethics. He wrote the following in his prologue,
claiming that Ethics is a part of Politics: both are one and the same science, of which
Ethics can be considered the theoretical part, and Politics the practical.
6 In EN 5 and In EN 910. For Michael, see Browning (1962).
4
5

aristotelian ethics in byzantium

65

Venice in 1541.7 We must not overlook the fact that Michael of Ephesus was an experienced commentator, with extensive commentaries on
Aristotles work: including books VVIII of the Metaphysics, the Parva
Naturalia, the Sophistici Elenchi, the De partibus and the De motu animalium, which, fortunately, were included in the publishing endeavor of
the Prussian Academy.8 The commentaries by Michael of Ephesus on
Physics, De caelo and the Rhetoric have not been preserved. For details of
his knowledge and treatment of the Politics see my article mentioned
above. In addition, the recent secondary literature on Michael is reliable.
In the same period, Eustratios of Nicaea (c. 1050c. 1120) composed
commentaries on books I and VI of the Nicomachean Ethics.9 Eustratioss commentaries were also included in the 1541 Venetian edition.
Parts of them were also, surprisingly, included in E. Pargiters 1745 London edition entitled Aristotle of Morals to Nichomachus I. For the importance and impact of Eustratios commentaries on Aristotles work in
the West one should consult a significant series of articles by Mercken, Sorabji, Lloyd, Trizio, and Benakis.10 According to Sorabji, the
esteemed scholar of the whole tradition of Greek commentaries on
Aristotle, Eustratios of Nicaea introduced Platonic, Christian and antiArabic elements into his texts, whereas Michael of Ephesus can be seen
to have mainly followed the existing commentaries by Alexander of
Aphrodisias and the Neoplatonic school of Alexandria. Also of significance for any assessment of Eustratios is the study by Lloyd, which
argues that Eustratios Aristotelian commentaries were the most interesting of any of those produced by a Byzantine philosopher, as the
subject of his discussion was not limited to the philosophers style or
definitions, but rather addressed the philosophers views and his teachings. Indeed, Eustratios appears to have been a competent philosopher in the tradition of Michael Psellos and John Italos, whose student
he was. One finds within his work a combination of Aristotelianism
and Neoplatonism. This is evident in his resolution of the problem of
general concepts (the universalia), in which resolution Lloyd also finds

7 Aristotelis Stagiritae Moralia Nichomachia cum Eustratii, Aspasii, Michaelis Ephesii nonullorum aliorum Graecorum explanationibus, ed. B.B. Felicianus, Venetiis 1541.
8 In metaph., In GA, In PN and In PA.
9 In EN.
10 Mercken (1990); Sorabji (1990) 2021; Lloyd (1987); Trizio (2006); Benakis (1978
1979).

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linos g. benakis

that Eustratios has resolved the problem of conceptual realism (conceptualism) that can be found in the Alexandrian commentators, i.e. those
of the school of Ammonius and thence of all Byzantine scholars.11
In his study, Lloyd does not treat Eustratios work on the Ethics systematically. There is undoubtedly fertile ground for future research
here. One strand that remains noteworthy is Eustratios influence on
Western Christian philosophy. Here, it should be noted that the first
Western commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics, that by Albertus Magnus (Cologne 12501252), appeared approximately 130 years later than
that by Eustratios. Eustratios was already known in the West by that
time, first through James of Venice (approx. 1130) and primarily
through the translation and use of his commentaries, particularly on
Logic, by Robert Grosseteste in England. The latter called Eustratios
Commentator Graecus or simply Commentator (compared to the
plain Philosophus reserved for Aristotle). On the subject of Eustratios
influence in the West, we have the reliable studies by H.P.F. Mercken
on Robert Grossetestes Latin translations of the Greek commentaries.12
Mercken is also the author of a paper, Ethics as a Science in Albert the
Great and Eustratios of Nicaea,13 where the key issue, as to whether
a scientia moralis rather than a practica moralis was possible in the Middle Ages, is examined on the basis of the first Latin commentary on
the Nicomachean Ethics, that of Albertus Magnus. Albertus only wrote on
books I and VI. It is in these books that Aristotle deals with issues of
method in the Ethics and it is where he discusses the intellectual virtues,
of which science or scientia is one. Eustratios, of course, had commented
on these same books and his authority is invoked by Albertus, who
refers to him as Commentator Graecus. Clearly, an area of enquiry that
then arises from this relationship and that deserves greater attention
would be an investigation of the extent to which Albertus Magnuss
views on the scientific understanding of ethics were influenced by the
writings of his Byzantine predecessor.
Another Byzantine commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics is the
Anonymous commentary on books II to V.14 This text is a compilation of mainly Alexandrian commentaries made by a Byzantine
scholar, probably of the thirteenth century. There is a further anony11
12
13
14

See Benakis (19781979).


Mercken (1973).
Unfortunately all I know of this article is a short summary.
In EN 25.

aristotelian ethics in byzantium

67

mous Byzantine commentary on book VII of the Nicomachean Ethics.15


No reliable research has yet been carried out on either of these commentaries.
There are also a number of paraphrases that deserve our attention.
In 1889 Heylbut published a Late Byzantine paraphrase of the whole of
the Nicomachean Ethics.16 This paraphrase is attributed to Heliodoros of
Proussa in this Berlin edition. It has also been attributed to Andronikos
Kallistos (14001486) and to Andronikos Rhodios (!) in a first edition
that was published in Cambridge in 1679, and has also been attributed
to John Filagrios from Crete (s. Wartelle for cod. Napol. Gr. 335). The
most likely case is that this paraphrase was the work of Constantine
Paleokappas, a 14th century monastic scholar.17 This work, which was a
useful teaching tool for the Byzantines, was widely known.
George Pachymeres (12421310) paraphrase of the Nicomachean Ethics
was written as part of his extensive work, the Philosophia, which sought
to provide commentaries on the whole Aristotelian Corpus in 12
books and 238 chapters. These had only been published in a Latin
translation: Venetiis 1545, Lugduni 1547, Parisiis 1547, 1555, and Basileae 1560. A first critical edition of book ten has now been published
within the series Corpus Philosophorum Medii AeviCommentaria
in Aristotelem Byzantina of the Academy of Athens.18 This great
Byzantine historian and philosophers method was to select significant
passages from Aristotles work and then to provide them with explanations in simpler, more comprehensible terms, using language and ideas
drawn from the ancient commentators.
Lastly, there is a commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics that is attributed to the emperor John Kantakouzenos, or, under his monastic
name, Ioasaph (after 1355), which remains unpublished. This work,
however, is identical to the commentary by Pseudo-Olympiodoros (a
paraphrase of the commentary by the Alexandrian Olympiodoros). It
is believed that Kantakouzenos had probably commissioned a copy of
this text and that this was later mistakenly attributed to him.19
It is not dicult to locate both brief and lengthy references, explicit
or otherwise, to Aristotle, the Ethics, or commentators on the Ethics in

15
16
17
18
19

In EN 8.
Heliodoros of Proussa, Paraphrasis.
This paraphrase is known from Hatch (1879).
George Pachymeres, Paraphrasis.
See Nicol (1968).

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linos g. benakis

other texts by Byzantine philosophers. For example, we can readily


find references in the recent editions of Michael Pselloss writings: in
chapter seven of the Philosophica Minora I and in chapters twelve and
thirty-two of the Philosophica Minora II.20 In paragraphs 6681 of Pselloss
De omnifaria doctrina there are numerous references to book 2 of the
Nicomachean Ethics, as well as to the Pseudo-Aristotelean On Virtue and
Vice and the Ethica Eudemia.21 These instances suggest that Aspasiuss
commentaries on Aristotles writings on morality are a common source
for Psellos as well as other Byzantines.
A further example is oered by the chapter On moral virtue and
other matters, which is found in the collection Queries and Solutions
written by the eleventh-century philosopher John Italos.22 Here, Italos
suggests that the ancient philosophers, primarily Aristotle, have given
the most exact definition of what might be termed ethical virtue. Italos
includes seven passages from books I, II, V and VI of Aristotles Nicomachean Ethics in his chapter. The presence of Aspasiuss commentary
can also be detected throughout.
The philosopher Nikephoros Blemmydes of Nicaea (11971272) also
wrote a Discourse on Virtue.23 This, like his better-known works,
Epitome on Logic and Epitome on Physics, follows closely upon the structure
and language of Aristotles own works and thus cleaves to the model
provided by the Nicomachean Ethics.
The Miscellanea philosophica et historica by Theodore Metochites (1270
1337), is accompanied by a brief table of the names of ancient writers.24
This contains approximately forty references to Aristotle, without, however, always referencing the specific work by Aristotle cited in the text.
The Nicomachean Ethics, like the Metaphysics, Politics and Rhetoric, does not
appear to have been mentioned by Metochites. A fuller investigation of
the Miscellanea and his other writings may show that Metochites did, in
fact, know and use these works.25
Lastly, in this purely descriptive overview, I would like to mention the
pre-eminently moral dissertation by George Gemistos Plethon (1360
1452), his On Virtue. A new critical edition of this text contains an
20 See my critical review for these two valuable volumes from the Teubneriana,
Benakis (1995). Phil min. I 2228 and Phil min. II 2330, 109111.
21 Omni. doc. 4349.
22 QQ 8795.
23 Nikephorou monastou kai presvyterou tou Vlemmidou Epitome logikes 121140.
24 Misc. 838.
25 See now the notes in Hult (2002).

aristotelian ethics in byzantium

69

enlightening introduction, from which it is clear that Plethons main


sources are Plato, Plutarch, Epictetus, Marcus Aurelius, and the pseudo-Aristotelian On Virtue and Vice.26 Plethons method itself shows the
influence of Aristotle, and the Mystran philosophers knowledge of the
Aristotelian corpus is in any case well-known from his entire body
of work (for Nicomachean Ethics, see, for example, De dierentiis, V,12
and elsewhere.) Here, however, we can draw a significant distinction:
while in Aristotle moral philosophy is phenomenological, and for that
reason largely descriptive, morality in Plethon is the object of science in
the strict meaning of the term, and thus is wholly based on the first
principles of Metaphysics. Therefore, Plethons method can be seen to be
Platonic, for it is to a great extent analytical. But in the case of the last
great Byzantine philosopher, too, research will need to address other
important aspects of his moral teachings, such as his basic belief in the
dual nature of man, in absolute providence, and in the moral-political
character of free will, and other such areas.

26

Trait des vertus.

NEOPLATONIC SOURCE-MATERIAL
IN EUSTRATIOS OF NICAEAS COMMENTARY ON
BOOK VI OF THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS

Michele Trizio*
Eustratios of Nicaeas acquaintance with arguments and formulas depending directly or indirectly upon Neoplatonic sources is not entirely
a new issue. For instance, Zervoss famous 1920 monograph on Psellos
briefly sketches some notes on Eustratios Neoplatonic background and
explicitly mentions Proklos as his source while linking this influence
directly to the Psellian legacy.1 However, it was with Giocarinis and
Steels studies on Eustratios defense of the Platonic ideal Good in his
commentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics that the Neoplatonic
influence on Eustratios became evident.2 In particular, Steel found
direct evidence of a dependence upon Proklos commentary on the
Parmenides, as well as the presence in Michael of Ephesus commentary
on book X of the Nicomachean Ethics of Damaskios commentary on the
Philebus, probably one of the few traces of the influence of this latter
work in Byzantium.3
Until now scholars have devoted their attention mainly to Eustratios
commentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, whereas the aim of the
present paper is to investigate the role played by Neoplatonic sources
in his commentary on book VI of that same work. Here, although the
commentator does not deal directly with the Aristotelian criticism of
the Platonic theory of knowledge, Eustratios still seems to regard the
Platonic and Neoplatonic tradition as a reliable set of sources for the
exegesis of the Aristotelian text.

* I would like to thank Charles Barber and Dave Jenkins for their scrupulous editing
of the present paper.
1 Zervos (1973) 225227.
2 Giocarinis (1964). Cf. also Podskalsky (1976) 519; Lloyd (1987) 350; Steel (2002).
3 Cf. Steel (2002) 5457.

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michele trizio
1. The Objects of Physics, Mathematics and First Philosophy

In a previous article I proved that the influence of the Neoplatonists,


in particular Proklos, is evident in both the terminology and the arguments developed by Eustratios. This influence seems to be widespread
throughout the three commentaries written by this Byzantine author.4
Focusing on the problem of the Aristotelian distinction between absolute (G) and conditional necessity () = "), I emphasized that
Eustratios interprets this distinction within a non-Aristotelian framework. Despite the complementarity in Aristotle of the two kinds of
necessity, he strictly applies the absolute one to what he calls beings
in the proper sense of the term ( H), which he describes as
those beings properly so-called which always remain self-identical (*
&' * * ;* ' I F); and the conditional one to that
which is never a proper being (H ;" H), which he associates
with what is subject to coming to be and passing away.5 He also situates
this particular interpretation of Aristotles dierent kinds of necessity
within the framework of the Neoplatonic distinction between causes
(J) and concomitant causes (). Only the first can be considered causes properly so-called as they are the only ones which transcend their eects (.  # )C ).6 In both cases, Eustratios quotes Proklos literally.7
This preference for Neoplatonic sources is reflected in the peculiar
argumentative structure which often seems to characterize Eustratios
commentary on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics. His comments on the
dierent lemmata are often introduced by an initial safe explanation
of the Aristotelian text, in which Eustratios seems to simply expand
the lemma with material of his own or taken from the tradition of the
Late antique commentators. He then introduces a further interpretative
level by using a terminology referable to the Neoplatonic tradition,
in particular to Proklos, which seems to be more representative of
Eustratios position.8
4

Trizio (2006).
In EN 293.1020.
6 In EN 267.1822.
7 Cf. for example Inst. 75:   J . )CL + &" = In EN 267.1922 L ? * 7 &' $ M ' * &7 ) 
&, L ? = * * ' * . + * .  , M
' .  # .
8 For a sample of this structure, cf. Trizio (2006) 4153.
5

neoplatonic source-material

73

Eustratios account of the objects and status of the three theoretical


sciences can be considered a particular instance of his view on the
status and functionning of the cognitive process. The occasion for
such a discussion came from a famous passage of book VI of the
Nicomachean Ethics, where Aristotle says that a young boy can become
a good mathematician ( .), but he cannot become a man of
wisdom (.) or a natural philosopher (.).9 The reason is that
the principles of wisdom and physicsas well as the knowledge of the
particular facts belonging to the field of practical wisdomderive from
experience () )), and experience requires time in order to be
acquired (L * . , N )).10
The commentator does not seem to be particularly concerned with
the link established by Aristotle between time, experience and the
acquisition of the capacity of dealing with the particulars: he merely
expands the Aristotelian lemma, which is in the end a similar strategy to that found in Eustratios commentary on another famous Aristotelian reference to this topic, in book I of the Nicomachean Ethics.11
Interestingly, however, a variant in Eustratios text of the Nicomachean
Ethics appears only in two of the extant manuscripts. Instead of L * . , N ) Eustratios has L *
), which allows him to remark on the protreptic value of this
particular Aristotelian sentence.12 By contrast, he devotes five pages
one of the longest explanations of the whole commentaries on book I
and VI of the Aristotelian work at staketo the status of the objects of
physics, mathematics and first philosophy (). Following Eustratios
exposition, I shall start from his account on mathematical objects and
discuss the objects of physics and the objects of first philosophy.
1.1. The Objects of Mathematics
According to Eustratios, mathematical objects are known by abstraction () &") from the subjects in which they actually exist
() ;* ' &+ &  =" ) O = -

Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea VI,9,1142a1620.


Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea VI,9,1142a1415.
11 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea I,1,1095a24; Eustratios, In EN 25.426.5. In Aristotle,
Ethica Nicomachea II,1,1103a1516, time and experience are said to be the prerequisites
for the acquisition of the intellectual virtues.
12 In EN 344.1315.
10

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).13 Abstraction (&) seems to be the technical term, not


immediately identical with induction () ), used by Aristotle to

describe the way in which mathematical objects are graspable. It entails


a logical separation or subtraction of arithmetical and geometrical
objects from their subjects.14 This description of the status of mathematical objects seems to be a standard account of the Aristotelian
standpoint grounded in the commentary tradition.15 Numbers, magnitudes and figures of magnitudes cannot exist in actuality outside the
subjects in which they exist ('  =" )" = N ). They are, on the contrary, abstracted by thought
( )) from the subjects in which they actually exist () 
=" ) O = ).16 Such terminology can be traced back
to Alexander of Aphrodisias commentary on the Metaphysics where he

13 In EN 344.30345.10: F ?  . +, M * ? * * ' * ' ) P ' P F N , ) ? CL P


, = ? L  ).> * ? + ) &" , Q ) ;* ' &+ &  =" ) O = '
+ ;* ) CL P & ' & "C + & L # , R &" I # , 6 ' ) ="D ;, ), " CL
P 0  ;L,  ) /CL  " ' + E
 = CL P ;,  I H L L ;, ) )
' ; '  /" ;, ' = + ' 0 . ; &. + ?  )'  &  ' , T = , ,
) #.
14 Aristotle, Physica II,2,193b36194a1. The natural philospher and the mathematician deal both with lines, figures and shapes. However, the first must deal with both,
matter and form, like a craftsman, while the second does not treat these concepts in so
far as they are boundaries of each natural body (; CU + 7 " V),
nor does he deal with their accidental determination as they happend to be in each natural body (;? * . , CU  6 "). On the contrary,
he separates them (), i. e., he treats them as separated by thought from movement (* * CL 7 )). Cf. Philippe (1948), the excellent Cleary
(1985) & (1995). See also Aristotle, Metaphysica XIII,2,1076a3237; XIII,3,1077b1720.
Here Aristotle uses the elliptic relative subclause CU  to justifiy the possibility for
a science, in this specific case, mathematics, of investigating its objects as separated
() although they do not exist under the status of separation (N ").
15 On the commentators understanding of Aristotles view on mathematical objects,
starting from Alexander of Aphrodisias, cf. Mueller (1990).
16 In EN 345.39346.7: ) &" ? 6 * * ", & ' H
' " Q , M * " # ' , ' ) ="
; N =. F, '  =" )" = N
, &+ ? ) )  =" ) O = ' I )
P =. ' L  N )" " *  /" ;,.
&+ ", M N V D " = F & ) . ="
  .

neoplatonic source-material

75

explicitly rejects the Platonic views on mathematical objects as intermediate entities between the Ideas and the sensible particulars. According to Alexander these objects do not exist per se, independently from
the actual conditions (primarily matter and movement) in which they
subsist (;  ) ;* =* =) but by thought (&
)P).17
Eustratios provides a more detailed and dynamic accountechoing
a passage from Ammoniuss commentary on the Isagoge18that begins
the abstractive process in the imprint of sense-perception data on the
imaginative faculty () CL P), which has already received them
without matter and bodily circumstances (& ' &). Senseperception oers those imprints to the imagination, which preserves
them in itself, like on a tablet (), and submits them to the dianoia.19
Here Eustratios refers to Alexander of Aphrodisias image of the blank
tablet as an analogy for the material intellect ( =. +) to describe
the imaginative facultys state of receptivity towards sense-perception
data.20 Notably, Eustratios description of imagination as a blank tablet
reflects the Aristotelian analogy between sense and sense-perception
data, on the one hand, and intellect and object of intellection, on the
other.21
Therefore, Eustratios discussion of mathematical objects seemingly
corresponds to the standard Peripatetic view.22 Such an interpretation
can be found in contemporaries of Eustratios, like the approximative
account of it given by his former master John Italos.23 However, there
are elements in Eustratios description of the status and graspability of
mathematical objects which seem to belong to a dierent tradition. As
it has been said, the general cognitive process sketched by our com-

Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Metaph. 52,1321; In Sens. 12.2427. Cf. also Flannery


(2003). Cf. also Eustratios, Syllogistic Demonstration 159.57: * ' & '
F /" )' )., /* ? ; =.
18 Ammonius, In Porph. 11.3112.6: A circle or a square, claims Ammonius, does not
exist by itself ( /). However, when we perceive a wooden or a copper or a stone
circle we receive the form (X) of the circle in the dianoia, preserving these imprints
apart from matter, in the same manner that wax receives the imprint of a signet ring
without receiving its matter. The circle, in this specific case, is separable in the sense
that it is separarated by thought (  CL )P ).
19 In EN 344.32345.4.
20 Alexander of Aphrodisias, De An. 84.25 .
21 Aristotle, De anima III,4,429A1618.
22 Another example is John Philoponos, In de An. 57.2858.6.
23 QQ 63,90.32 .
17

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mentator in regard to mathematical objects entails the passage from


sense-perception to the imagination, and from the imagination to the
dianoia. But there is one more passage in this process that can hardly
be traced back to Aristotle or to the Aristotelian tradition: Eustratios
description of the dianoia as the eye of the soul ( I H L
L). As such, the dianoia directly grasps ()) mathematical
objects and their related properties, and attributes to them their correspondent definitions (0 . ; &). Aristotle also uses
the expression eye of the soul in book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics,
arguing that phronesis as a truth-attaining disposition cannot be acquired
by that eye of the soul without moral virtue.24 Eustratios, however, is
obviously not referring to this passage. That (D) eye of the soul is
in fact a reference to Platos Republic (533c) where dialectic is described
as the only science which aims directly at the first principle, dismissing
hypothesis and thus securing its ground. Dialectic lifts the eye of the
soul ( L L H) upwards, which was buried in an outlandish
filth () .D D). The handmaids of dialectic are the other
sciences discussed earlier in the text by Plato, of which mathematics is
included (533bc), and these can be labelled sciences as well as generically dianoia.25
Without reservations the Neoplatonists identify dianoia with the Platonic eye of the soul, linking it to the consideration of mathematical
objects and its purgative function. In the prologue to his commentary
on book I of Euclids Elements, Proklos refers to this very passage of the
Republic, claiming that only mathematics can enlighten and awake the
eye of the soul, which was blinded and obscured (& '
.) by other kinds of occupations. In doing so, mathematics has the function of turning the eye of the soul from images (& 
#7) to the true realities ()' * & L), bringing it from darkness to
intellectual light.26 According to Proklos, Aristotelian abstraction cannot account for the way in which we grasp mathematical objects.27 On
the contrary, projectionism, within a general theory of recollection, is
the right account for the knowability of these objects. Projections occur
24

Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea VI,13,1144a2930:  V D H D  L

L ; A &L.

Plato, Respublica 533cd.


In Euc. 20.1723. Here Proklos states that the only way to account for mathematical objects is to rely on the generative projections of forms already existing in the soul
($ '  ) ;CL . #).
27 Cf. In Euc. 12.1513.13.
25
26

neoplatonic source-material

77

due to the logoi which constitute the essence of our soul. Thus, Syrianus explicitly says that geometrical objects are in the imagination, but
they are located there insofar as they are parasitic () upon
the logoi present in the dianoia, since that which derives from abstraction
cannot be considered suciently accurate.28
Proklos commentary on book I of Euclids Elements further associates
the dianoia and the eye of the soul. Ordinary mathematics, as distinguished from Pythagorean mathematics,29 is here described as the path
of knowledge (*  .) because it has the same relation to
knowledge as education has to virtue. In this respect the function of
mathematics is to prepare the dianoia and the eye of the soul ( H
L L) for the turning toward the upper realm.30 Proklos adds that
if the eye of the soul remains closed, we would not be able to attain
our proper perfection. This perfection is obtained through what Proklos calls mathesis, namely the recollection of the logoi eternally present in
our soul (  & ) CL . &), mathematics being the
science that brings us to this recollection. It is due to the investigation
of mathematical objects, then, that we awaken this innate knowledge,
purifying the dianoia and ridding ourselves of ignorance.31
I believe that there is no other way to explain Eustratios reference to
the eye of the soul than by linking it to the function of the dianoia within
the cognitive process according to the Neoplatonists. Indeed, Eustratios account ignores the deeper Proklean arguments related to the
topic of projectionism as the true account of mathematics. For example, Proklos argues that projections take place in the dianoia, but the
dianoia cannot operate because of its weakness regarding the concept
of an unextended formnamely the geometrical logoi in the souland
so needs to project it into the imagination.32 Thus geometry deals with
universal concepts but only in terms of their being distributed (") to the imagination, which means that the dianoia must somehow unfold them. The same is true for numbers, where the final projection takes place in opinion, doxa, which is thus elevated in its role and

28 Syrianus, In Metaph. 91.2934; see also In Metaph. 95.2936, where Syrianus explicitly states that sense-perception cannot be considered as a solid basis for the knowledge
of mathematical objects. On Syrianus theory of mathematics, see Mueller (2002).
29 On this distinction, see Mueller (1987) in part. 317.
30 In Euc. 20,1017.
31 In Euc. 46.1347.6.
32 In Euc. 54.1455.13; 141.219.

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function.33 Nonetheless, these dierences remain insucient to exclude


a dependence upon Proklos and the Neoplatonic tradition.
Understanding the reason for Eustratios twofold account attains
greater importance when we note that the first reference to abstractionism is followed by a nod towards the Neoplatonic theory of mathematics. The reason can be found in a doxography on mathematical objects
that was elaborated by the same Eustratios, one in which Aristotelian
abstractionism and Platonic innatism are described as the two opposite positions on the matter at hand. According to the Platonists, says
Eustratios, abstractionism cannot be considered a reliable account
of mathematical objects because that which is derived by abstraction,
i.e. that which is later born (=), is considered to be inferior to sense-perception data and physical realities (* ) &"
 #  ) '  ). It would be inappropriate for
the soul to derive from the sensible particulars the logoi which already
exist in itself () /CL 0 . ="), since these logoi are
in the soul before sense-perception data (  #  J ' . # ;CL  '  )). The pre-existing
logoi are superior and prior by nature ( H '  ") to the material forms ( )), the sense perception-data
(# ), and the sensible particulars ( V).34
This account, which is devoted to discussing the Platonic view, vastly
exceeds the one devoted to the Aristotelian position, obviously suggesting which of the two positions Eustratios prefers. Moreover, the whole
argument seems to combine perfectly abstractionism with the purgative function of mathematics according to the Neoplatonists. Since the
soul, continues the commentator, ignores (&+) these logoi from
the beginning, because of the bond with generation (*   L
"), i.e. because of the shock of birth, it needs to rely in some
way on sense-perception (CL # ) and on the forms and intelligi-

In Euc. 95.2196.11. On the distinction between the dierent faculties dealing with
geometrical and arithmetical objects, see Cleary (2002).
34 In EN 320.2129: # * ' 8" ' * ) &" " N N  , &* + ; Q ,  ' + ,
. * ) &"  #  ) '  , I ) ; N " F ' = ; =. ' A X N , D
 6 L  )  V '  F ) /CL 0 .
=", &* N F   #  J ' . # ;CL  '
 ),  H '  "  ) ' # 
' V.
33

neoplatonic source-material

79

ble contents derived by abstraction from matter (, &" )


L @ J ' .). It is due to this abstractive cognitive process
that the soul, says Eustratios, is able to re-light the spark of knowledge
in itself ( L 7 7). This fire is said to exist in us both
because of our specific nature and because it has been put in us by the
Creator. However, it needs to be awakened because of its mixture with
the passions. This fire needs to be purified in order to become visible
again (, &  # ") as it is covered in ash and
obscured under the form of vapor () # C " )).
It shines forth through this dispersed vapor when it comes into contact
with wood, and therefore it often starts to burn again (# 
 &).35 Such an extended description of the Platonists
viewpointtoo long to be just a doxographyis evidently dependent
upon Proklos.36
Even though the starting point in this doxography was the status of
mathematical objects, it is clear that the point here is more general
since it entails the problem of the value of Aristotelian a-posteriori con-

35 In EN 320.2936: Z ) &L &+  *   L "


L CL # ' , &" ) L @ J ' ., M & CL
) ; ) ;CL  L 7 7, : ) L #  ' + = ;CL " , ) L "  , ' , & 
# ", I ) # C " ), : N " L # 
) ' . @ #   &. Eustratios had already

expounded a similar argument in In APo. 257.33258.14.


36 See for example, In Alc. 7.37: ' *  /0 = L 
. ' = L L  &. # L L )., '
#. * 7 [  * 0 ; ,  .
In Euc. 46.1347.6:  ? H '  H L L  ; N
, . . @  )'     & )
CL  &, ' N *    * & , *
) +  . ). '  F A L )

 , N  ) ) + \. +  L ) 7 '
) L '  L  ' )  ;
, =. , '  &., [ &  F,
' &  ) L & , *   H  L )
 F, :  ? #  )? * * , , ?   
., , ? * * )' +, ' E )  " &, *
? )"  /, ' *  ,, ' =" + + +
  N  . In Alc. 188.1115: M ? ' *  .
) ,   , $   ; ' = $
+, ) ? N   M , ,,  ? L 
   ' 0 !  0 &. See also Theol. Plat.

1,7.18; In R. 1,18.22. Eustratios reference to later-born concepts as inferior to senseperception data strongly echoes In Prm. 980.1013.

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cepts and the functioning of the process of concept formation. Eustratios explicitly states that even according to the Platonists one cannot
get rid of what is derived from sense-perception data. Eustratios evidently follows a Proklean model since, according to Proklos, mathematics begins precisely with reminders and reminiscence coming from
without (F ) and ends with the logoi existing within the soul (#
0 F .). Mathematics is awakened (&) by the lower
realities but it strives for the higher forms.37 Abstraction in itself cannot
account for the very knowledge of mathematical objects, but it serves
the purpose of activating the recollection process. This Proklean doctrine constitutes the framework of Eustratios account of the knowability of mathematical objects.
1.2. The Objects of Physics
In two of the passages from this section of the text Eustratios addresses
the status of the objects proper to natural philosophy. These passages
are extremely interesting because they take two dierent approaches
to the topic at hand. In the first one (348.722), Eustratios provides
the reader with a mere explanatory account of the objects of physics,
namely material forms and sensible particulars (* F ' V). In this sense, the one who intends to deal with physical realities
cannot investigate them according to the logical method (N )
as in the case of mathematical abstractionbut according to the the
method proper to physical examination (&* ). In considering the physical objects one cannot get rid of matter. Eustratios further
argues that the natural philosopher somehow employs logical methods (, , .). However, it is clear that it is not the same
logical procedure that characterizes mathematics. On the contrary, it
consists in deriving the universal determination ( .) through discernment of the common element among the particular individuals ()'
 ).38 Such an account might disappoint the reader since it
simply proposes by way of explanation that which can be found in Aristotle himself 39 and avoids mentioning the widely attested terminological
distinction between mathematical objects, which are said to arise from

37
38
39

In Euc. 18.1020.
In EN 348.722.
Aristotle, Physica II,2,193b31 .

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81

abstraction () &"), and natural or physical objects, which are


said to arise by addition () ") of the determining properties.40
In the second passage (347.1015), Eustratios reminds us that enmattered forms cannot be separated from their subjects and that physical
objects cannot be defined without their material component. Eustratios explains that this is the case in irrational souls and physical objects
in general. Because of this status material forms are neither perfect by
themselves (;L) nor self-established (; ") and therefore
need a subject in order to be settled and established (=" 
  / L .), and only from this subject can they be
abstracted by thought () ) & )).41
Eustratios terminology becomes increasingly interesting with the use
of the term ; ", which rarely occurs in late antique philosophical literature. For instance, it occurs in Priscianus Lydus commentary on On the Soul during his discussion of Aristotles reference to
the thesis that the soul might be composed of elements. In particular,
Priscianus mentions an example of what he assumes to be the meaning of Aristotles reference to elements of each kind (/ "
) as an instance of what belongs to substance, namely being selfestablished ( ; ") and not subsisting in a substratum or subject (N ) =").42 If this is the case, one might consider ; " synonymous with ; .. In the end, this is what a famous
Byzantine expert on Ancient and Late Antique philosophical literature,
Michael Psellos, defends in his discussion of one passage from Gregory
of Nazianzos Oratio de Filio.43 Discussing Gregorys counter-argument
to the Arian idea that the generation of the Son involves time, Psellos makes clear that this use of time, which he defines as the measure
of movement, here refers to Aristotle and is neither self-established
(; ") nor self-subsistent (; .).44 That the term ; " was also synonymous with ; . for Eustratios is
made clear by the author when he distinguishes the mental separation
that allows mathematical objects to be grasped from the separation that
distinguishes substantial forms (;7 J). The latter are said to
40 Cf. Aristotle, De Caelo III,1,299a1317. Simplikios, In Cael. 567.717; John Philoponos, In APr. 26.23.
41 In EN 347.1015.
42 Priscianus Lydus, In de An. 68.3132.
43 Gregory of Nazianzos, Or. 29, 9.15 .
44 Theol. I 53.101105.

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be immaterial (A) and self-subsisting (; .); they are not


liable to mental separation from their subjects (; ="
#' . )), such as is the case with mathematical
objects, insofar as they are not settled in any subject but are settled
in themselves (;* /, # V). Unsurprisingly, the terms used
by the commentator seem to recall once again certain formulas to be
found in Proklos, particularly one passage of the commentary on the
Parmenides, where enmattered forms (* ? J * F) are said to
be in and of other things since they are settled in particular subjects (F
=" /.).
Therefore, the description of the objects of physics must be understood in terms of the distinction between that which is liable only
to mental separation, that which exists as separate from matter, and
that which can neither exist nor be defined without matter. Moreover,
Eustratios clearly compares the status of enmattered forms with the status of those forms that exist in themselves as separate. The latter are
self-subsistent and perfect, and therefeore do not exist in something
else. These forms are the objects of sophia.45
1.3. The Objects of First Philosophy
As argued above, according to Aristotle, young people can be good
mathematicians, but they cannot be natural philosophers or men of
wisdom, since the principles of mathematical knowledge are by abstraction, while the principles of natural philosophy and sophia are by experience, which requires time for their acquisition. Yet, if it is clear in what
sense the principle of physics are experiential, then there remains the
problem of explaining how the principles of sophia are also derived from
experience. In fact, the objects of sophia, which Eustratios calls sophia
par excellance ( ) ), are described as divine, immaterial and above sense-perception.46 Thus, to explain in what sense sophia
45 In EN 346.3538: * ? ;7 J ; @ F, & A H '
; . ; #' A ' ; =" #' . ),
M ? F ="D / & ;* /, # V. = In Prm. 1136.7
11: # * ) L N  H , H * ? J * F )
A H . ' A H ' " # $. See also his
      81.1114: + ., M I * "
 #, T  " ; "  =., & &' " ) (
&, ) /, / ), ' L # , & ..
46

In EN 348.2324.

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83

can be said to derive from experience, he elaborates on the meaning


of the word experience. Experience should not be understood in
the usual and common sense way, i.e., a non-rational practice, but as a
form of direct and intuitive knowledge concerning substantial matters.47
I would like to point out that the term 7, laborious or
concerning substantial matters, which is here used to describe this
knowledge, occurs in Proklos commentary on the Parmenides, where it
refers to the laborious game of producing hypothesis and arguments.
Every external argument, says Proklos, is a kind of game, as stated by
Plato himself (Parm., 137b), expecially when compared to the unitary
intellection of Being. This game is also laborious because it relates to
the contemplation of beings.48 Proklos supports Eustratios explanation
of the term 7 in terms of a direct and intuitive knowledge
( ) ) since the latter expression refers to the direct apprehension of the Forms, as I will show later. Both these expressions make
it clear that, according to Eustratios, the kind of experience proper to
sophia is a form of contemplation of separate realities.
In the case of sophia, as in the case of physics, the first principles
of the related kind of knowledge are represented by that which is
first known to us (*   ) and not by what is prior in nature
(*  = .).49 As is well known, this very same
distinction is to be found in the incipit of the Physics (I,1,184a1725),
where Aristotle elaborates on the the nature of the principles of the
science of Nature, saying that the path of the investigation in this
field leads from what is more recognizable and clear to us () 
" ,   ' ") to what is clearer and
more recognizable in itself or in its own nature ()' * "
CL  ' 7). What is first ( ) cognizable to us
are the particulars, while elements and principles are known to us
after (@) an analysis of the concrete data.50 Aristotle elaborates
a similar argument in the Posterior Analytics (I,1,71b3372a5) where the
In EN 347.37348.5: + ? J   + CL ? CL ) C
) &" X * =, CL ? CL ' 7C P, ] '
)  ,, ;.  ) ) $ &' CL P ' CL CL, F
, . X N  ) )+ ; *   . J,
% N A C , & &' L 7 ' )N 7.
47

48 In Prm. 1036.912; 1051.381052.3. Here Proklos claims that the method followed
by Parmenides is not an empty logical exercise but a laborious game, which concerns
the nature of things.
49 In EN 348.2426.
50 Aristotle, Physica I,1,184a1725.

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premises, the true statements of a demonstration, are said to be causes,


better known and prior (J ' 7 , X ' .).
He therefore distinguishes between two senses in which something can
be said to be prior and better known: that which is prior in nature and
that which is prior or better known to us, i.e. that which is nearer to
our sense-perception (* ) L # ) vis--vis that which is
further (* 7) from it, namely the most universal concepts (*
. ).51
The same distinction occurs in the tradition of the Late Antique
commentators and is used to describe the dierent statuses of the three
theoretical sciences, namely physics, mathematics, and metaphysics.
Such a scheme can be found in Ammonius commentary on the Isagoge, where theology is said to come first, insofar as divine things are
causative principles of everything (&' *  * ,). Physics,
on the contrary, is what is first in relation to us (  ) since
we would be unable to grasp the intelligible substance without its relation to sense-perception. That which is first in relation to us is in truth
the last (F): the enmattered is the last substance () * ;
 F). Mathematics is intermediate, becuase its essential character
is to be intermediate.52 He himself speaks in dynamic terms regarding
the necessity of moving from the realm of physics, i.e., from what does
not exist outside of matter, to the realm of the divine things, namely
that which is fully separate. This movement cannot take place without
the mediation of mathematics, which serves as a kind of bridge between
physical and metaphysical investigation.53
Aristotle, An. Post. I,1,71b3372a5. See also Themistios, In APo. 6,1418.
Ammonius, In Porph. 10.1319; cf. also the general argument to be found in In
Porph. 52.911: E * CL  . CL 7  @  ' * CL
 @  CL 7 .> " 6  , &" ? 
. Cf. on Ammonius and the so-called Alexandrian school, cf. Kremer (1961)
and (19611962). See also Asclepius, In Metaph. 1.13. On this commentary, and on the
Neoplatonic involvements of Ammonius position, see Verrycken (1990) in part. 204
210.
53 Ammonius, In Porph. 12.813.7. Ammonius quotes Plotinus famous invitation to
study mathematics (Enn. 1,3,3) because it allows an acquaintance with the incorporeal
realm. This very same exortation is found in Asclepius, In Metaph. 151.46; Simplikios,
In Ph. 14.46; Olympiodoros, Proll. 9.3710.2; David, In Porph. 59.1719. But an account
of the dierent types of priority can also be found in Proklos, In Euc. 12.2613.26;
13.2714.11; 14.1720; In Prm. 980.1721. It seems that in these passages Proklos refers
to Aristotles Posterior Analytics (I,1,71b3372a5), remarking that the natural priority of
the premises within scientific demonstration has to be undertsood as the priority of the
a-priori reasons within our soul.
51
52

neoplatonic source-material

85

Although Eustratios reference to the dierent types of priority


strongly echoes the tradition of Late Antique commentatary, Eustratios refers again to Proklos when he provides the reader with examples
of priority according to nature. This kind of priority can be found in
the class of divine things () , ,): that which produces ( ), remarks Eustratios, is prior to that which is produced (+ "); that which perfects ( .) is prior to that which
is perfected (+ "); that which protects ( .) is prior to that which is protected (+ "); that which
purifies ( .) is prior to that which is purified (+ "); that which illuminates ( .) is prior to that which
is illuminated (+ "); and, in general, that which is transcendent ( =") is prior to that which is transcended (+ =").54 These examples are adopted terms often used by Proklos to describe the general terms of the process of causation, namely
the transcendence of that which causes in respect to that which is
caused, or to describe specific powers and operations performed by
the dierent ranks of gods.55 Furthermore, they can also be found in
In EN 348.2629.
(1)  + " = Inst. 7.2728: C A )  ,
L  . Inst. 28.1214: )' * , ) & )'  ) , * ;* ? G ' J *  ; A J & .
Inst. 65.1519: R * ) *  )   , I ) #P ,
.  J ) /D  # , 7 _ M ), ">
R ) D "D )  (' * +, "  , ) /D
 " : )  = 7). In Prm. 739.12: )' * ; <  ;?  *  ; X ) . Theol. Plat. I,19,88.2324:
& * X   )  ". Cf. also Damaskios,
Pr. I,239.2223: + ? 6 ) *  0 0  & 
# . ,   . (2)  . = In Alc.
82.1821: . ? F " M  . $ ? N F 
' A, $ ? , $ ? , $ ? , ' M * *
#. CL   ' *  = T ) . (each intra-mundane
God rules over one order of demons according to its characteristics and powers); In R.
1,136.2326: + * $  . F, )'  " #
*  ' &'  ) =, &  ' (  =". (On
the Gods bringing to perfection and reversion the lower realities); In Ti. 1,87.2526: *
*   * . )' N )  M .. (it is through the
dyad that the monad communicates its perfecting providence to the whole). Theol Plat.
4,52.15; 4,58.1112; 4,75.1417; 4,77.1719 (on the preserving/ and perfecting/ Gods); 4,108.58 (the third order of intelligible and intelligent Gods
according to the Parmenides and the perfective/. character of its activity).
(3)  .+ ": In Ti. 1,154.12; 1,156.56; 3,312.1516; Inst.
154.13, In Alc. 30.912 (on the protective Gods and their powers); In Ti. 2,106.15
54
55

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Proklos description of the status of the transcendent Forms and their


powers.56
Eustratios states that if we begin with that which is prior in nature,
then accounting for or defining that which is secondary will remain
impossible. Therefore, we must start from what is first for us, namely
the last terms of the causation process: sense-perception data and individuals. From here we can return to that which is prior in nature by
way of our admiration of their variety and constitutions. In this way,
we are supposed to trace back, by means of rational and intellectual contemplation, through the immediately proximate cause until we
arrive, by way of the intermediate realms, at the First Cause.57 In this
16; 2,107.1617; 2,292,10 . (on the protective activity of the World-Soul); Theol. Plat.
1,78.1921 (quoting the Chaldean Oracles on the celebrations of the paternal, protective/, governing, and healing powers); Theol. Plat. 1,123.710:  ? =" &   &   L & , * ? 
N N &+ ' F * ' , ' * * +
"   . . . (on the class of gods resembling the paternal principle); 4,53.2226
(the first triad of intelligible and intelligent gods has three properties: revealing, gathering, and protecting/ ); 5,122.1315 (the properties of the second triads of
immaculate Gods depend upon the protective/ cause); Inst. 151.2325:
?  L . J )   " , ; F ? )
) D D " ;.. (On the relation between the protective and
the purificatory); Inst. 154.46: # * . ,  L /  " &"
7 ' "  , / ) CL #P .. Theol. Plat. 6,67.56:
* )  .   ) / (The divine
protection protects all the objects in their proper perfection). (4)  .: In Ti.
1,38.910: M ? ' ' ;* *  # ' &'  ' 
(There are anagogic and purgative Potencies that take care of the souls) In R. 1,122.5
7 (on the dierent ranges of demons responsible for the care of the souls that still
requires correction and purification: there are the vengeant, the corrective, the purgative/ , and the one encharged to judge); Theol Plat. 1,86.2324 (on  as the
divinity purgative of the wickedness of the souls). (5) .":
Iamblichos, Myst. 1,9.1022: 3 6   " * ., =' ' 
   *  ;L F . (Light and that which
receives light as metaphors for the causal power of the Gods); In R. 1,289.2124: 
? 6 #. + " ' & ' D ' M +,
; .,  X  * #., ' I * &  
&" ) . . . Finally, Inst. 145.3 . for a passage in which these
divine activities are all mentioned together, in regard to the influence of the divine
orders on the inferior kinds.
56 E.g. In Prm. 911.3740 (The Forms are not mere patterns but also productive,
perfective/ and protective or conservative/ of sensible particulars).
57 In EN 348.3037: & , ; F ; 0 ) &L " * .,
& L  ), )L 0 '  " . &., &* L
7 , * ) ), &. + ? * ) 7 , B

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87

way Eustratios justifies the Aristotelian claim that sophia, like physics,
requires experience. In other words, to grasp what is prior by nature
we must start from what is prior to us, and it is this anagogical process
that allows the contemplation of the separate substances and the First
Cause.
Everything in this description is taken from Proklos. The term ) used by the author to describe the mode of knowledge which
allows us to grasp that which is prior by nature is found in Proklos
in regard to the knowledge of the intelligibles.58 The very same expression that which is secondary to describe that which comes after what
is prior in nature might also be traced back to a Neoplatonic context.
For example, it is used by Proklos within the general description of
the hierarchic nature of the causative process.59 The amazed admiration for sensible particulars mentioned by Eustratios, which is meant to
arouse in us the knowledge for the higher realities, can also be found
in Proklos. As a matter of fact, Eustratios speaks about our being
astonished ().) by the characteristics of sense-perception
data. Precisely this term occurs in Proklos for his description of the
eects of beauty on souls during their conversion to the Good.60 Thus,
according to Eustratios, our astonishment at the features and characteristics of sense-perception data leads us to a kind of anagogic ascension in the order of causes that always requires a tracing back to the
next proximate cause. The words used in this argument are taken
from a passage of Proklos commentary on the Parmenides (879.1719)
where Proklos describes the ascent to reason-principles in nature as the
upwards procession from the element that is common to individuals

) # * ' V, O ) ' N   ' 


' N ' N ). &'   ? * L L '
 &" J, F Z *  " . # N 7 '
 &N .

See on this topic Ierodiakonou (2005b) 81.


See for instance Inst. 36.3032. In Eustratios this expression might also be understood to refer to what Eustratios had already written in his commentary on book I of
the Nicomachean Ethics, where he mentions the followers of Parmenides and Plato on the
nature of the ideas (' ?  # G), which can be intelligent and intelligible
(  ' ) as well as primary and secondary ( 7 ' ") In EN 49.79. Needless to say, Eustratios reference to the the dyptic intelligentintelligible is another reference to Proklos although our commentator does not deal
with this topic in all its complexity.
60 This is clear in Theol. Plat. 3,64.612; In Alc. 328.610.
58
59

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and to their proximate cause.61 Moreover, this anagogic ascension, adds


Eustratios, proceeds through intermediate realms (*  " .), which are identified by the term  or ., an
important technical expression found in Proklos for the description of
dierent realms, planes of beings or world-orders.62
In another passage, Eustratios claims that sophia is the absolute
knowledge of beings, namely of substances. Its object is not a particular qualified or accidental being (;  M H )) but the
substance or Being in an absolute sense (& ; R G H).63 This
argument can be found in the Aristotelian identification of the object
of metaphysics with being qua being. In fact, says Aristotle in book IV
of the Metaphysics, none of the other sciences treat being generally qua
being ( . ' + H CU H), but just some portion or part of it
( .), like, for instance, the mathematical sciences.64 Needless
to say, Eustratios reference to the concept of substance (;) can also
be traced back to the Metaphysics, book VII, where Aristotle explicitly
links the problem of being with the problem of substance. His formulation is akin to Eustratios argument where he states that that which
is primary, i.e., not in a qualified or particular manner, but absolutely,
will be substance (E  7 _ ' ; ' _ & _ G  ;
Z J).65 Moreover, the idea that metaphysics deals with  G H
can be found in many relevant passages of the late antique tradition.66
61 In Prm. 879.1719: & *  ) , "  )' ) 0
;  , : )  X ..
62 Esutratius speaks about intermediate realms (*  " .) through

which we proceed upwards towards the One and First Cause. This exact expression
also occurs in Proklos in order to describe the declining procession to the last terms of
the causation process. See for instance In Alc. 112.15, where beauty and greatness are
said to come from above, from the most primary principles all the way to the visible
world through all the intermediate realms (*   " .). See also
the account of the dierent . in Theol. Plat. 3,20.9 . Needless to say, 
is an important term for the Neoplatonists in general. Syrianus, for example, mentions
five main .: divine, intellective, psychic, natural, and sensible. They are all said
to be filled by the Dyad with the numbers proper to them; cf. Syrianus, In Metaph.
112.35113.3. Ammonius uses the term  to describe the three primitive orders
or realms of the natural substances, which he identifies with the divine, the intellective
and the psychic one; cf. Ammonius, In Int. 24.2229.
63 In EN 320.710:  ?  G ' N  H  ", Q
 ;, c _ 7 & G H, Q ;  M H ) &
; R G H [)].
64 Aristotle, Metaphysica IV,1,1003a2126.
65 Aristotle, Metaphysica VII,1,1028a2920.
66 Cf. e.g. Asclepius, In Metaph. 226,6 .

neoplatonic source-material

89

What is more interesting is that Eustratios finishes this argument by


stating that the best part of sophia is the one that deals with the more
principle beings (&7). Sophia is in this respect theology.67 In stating this Eustratios follows the Neoplatonic interpretation of Aristotles
First Philosophy,68 which is also found in other Byzantine authors closer
to Eustratios, like Michael Psellos and in Eustratios teacher John Italos.69
Metaphysics deals with higher realities, that which is immaterial
and divine, and not liable to mental separation (like the mathematical
objects), but existing as such as separated,70 which Eustratios, following
Proklos, defines as the causes in the proper sense of the word, those
beings which exist by absolute necessity.71 In this respect, says Eustratios, First Philsophy/theology also provides the particular sciences with
their indemonstrable principles since it relates directly to the causative
principles of every being, and is, therefore, the supreme science. Only
in this way, according to Eustratios, can the man of wisdom, the sophos,
clarify and strengthen the principles of each science by referring them
to their true and supreme causes or principles.72
Eustratios proposes a description of the statuses of the three theoretical sciences following the tradition of the commentators through a
consideration of their dierent types and degrees of separation from
their object. He often uses terms taken from Proklos work in order to
describe the anagogic ascent from the level of perishable realities to the
level of true beings. The starting point for this upwards procession is the
sensible knowledge that awakens in us the desire to strive towards the
separate forms. Eustratios account of the nature and status of human
intellect is linked to this idea.

In EN 320.1319.
Cf. e.g. Syrianus, In Metaph. 80.1618; Ammonius, In Int. 27.3233; Asclepius,
In Metaph. 1.78; 1.1718; 4.13; 134,1012; Elias, In Porph. 20.2122; Simplikios, In
Ph. 364.1516; John Philoponos, In APo. 331.1011. Nevertheless, that the subject of
Aristotles Metaphysics was a theological one had been already argued by Alexander
of Aphrodisias; cf. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Metaph. 171.511. For a detailed study
on Alexanders view, cf. Genequand (1979); Kremer (1961) 577; 105129; 142172; 209
216; Verbeke (1981); OMeara (1986); Steel (2005).
69 Psellos, Orat. min. 37.210211; Phil. Min. II 69.1516; Italos, QQ 26.1617.
70 In EN 346.3639.
71 Cf. Trizio (2006) 4753; 53, 60.
72 In EN 322.1219; 323.2223. It might be useful to compare the whole set of
arguments provided by Eustratios with two similar passages taken from Asclepius
commentary on the Metaphysics, e. g., 3.214.3 and 361.2833.
67
68

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2. The Doctrine of the Intellect

In his commentary on EN,6,1141a38, where Aristotle identifies the


intellect with the only truth-attaining disposition that can grasp the first
principles, Eustratios provides a twofold classification of the dierent
types of intellect. On the one hand, there is an intellect by essence (
;) that posseses all the intelligibles in itself ( F ) /D *
) and grasps them by means of direct and immediate apprehension (G, ), ' & . ). On the other, there
is an intellect by disposition or habit ( V), which is identified with
our human intellect. This intellect initially possesses common notions
(* * )) as the result of its proper operations and intelligible contents, which are echoes of the Intellect that exists in an absolute
and pure way ( &  ) /D + G =
+). Eustratios says that the human intellect does not share the perfect
intellection that characterizes the intellect by essence. It can recover
from this gap once it becomes free from the confusion caused by the
passions. But even after gaining a purer form of knowledge, the human
intellect cannot perform intellection in the same way as the intellect
;. In fact, human intellection is still neither simultaneous
nor eternal (; & . ; ) #) as is the Intellect described by
Eustratios as existing in an absolute and pure manner, whose presence
in us is witnessed by the intelligibles possessed as echoes. On the contrary, human intellect is only allowed a temporal form of knowledge,
only grasping the intelligibles singularly ( d ' ) .D) while
passing from one to the other ( & /" # V).73
Specialists in late antique philosophy will readily recognize this passage as a puzzle pieced together from Proklos arguments. For example,
the distinction between intellect ; and intellect V is to
be found in Proklos commentary on Platos Timaeus, where the author
distinguishes between three types of intellect. The first one is the divine
intellect, the demiurgic one; the second is the one participated ( 73 In EN 317.1928:  ? * ; +  F ) /D * *
' G, ), ' & .  ;* ;" ) & ;, 
? ) , + V F  X, . F ) &L * * ) #,
) ' &  ) /D + G = +, M ?
L   &CL  '  " = CL  ' 
" ;+ = /+ . ., . ' /D   G
) , ; & . ; ) # I   +  ;*
&* d ' ) .D '  & /" # V, I .

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91

.) by the Soul, which is substantial and by itself perfect; the third


one is the intellect by disposition ( V), by means of which the
Soul is intelligent.74 Proklos seemingly refers this last distinction to the
World-Soul, and Eustratios extends the term to include the particular
souls, on the grounds that that which is valid for the World-Soul should
also be valid for the particular ones.
Proklos also seems to be the source of Eustratios argument regarding
the dierent manners in which the intellect ; and the intellect V possess the intelligibles. The first one contains all forms
in itself in a unitary manner and never abandons them (;" ) & ;).75 The latter contains all forms as well, although in
a secondary and discursive manner.76 Thus, Eustratios contends that at
the beginning we possess only common notions (' F) as the
souls proper (discursive) operations. In doing so, he follows the Neoplatonists in describing the type of knowledge that is coordinated with
discursive reason as proceeding from common notions or axioms from
which the soul produces arguments or demonstrations.77 However, even
74 In Ti. II,313.14. The same distinction is found in In Alc. 65.1966.6, where
the author compares the above mentioned types of intellect with three types of love,
describing the third kind of love, which exists by irradiation in the souls as analoguous
to the intellect by disposition ( V). See also the argument elaborated by Proklos in
In Ti. I,406.1425, where one can find a discussion on the nature of the principle that
makes the soul intelligent, i.e., whether the intellect is substantial and situated above
the soul, or whether it is a disposition or state of it.
75 In EN 317.21: ;" ) & ;. = In Alc. 187,811: c * *

 " L " L * R ="  L /


.> &' *  , / , ' &  & ;?
)L  L # 7. Here Proklos states that the classes superior to our

soul do not attain perfection through a learning process since they are always united to
their objects of knowledge and never leave them (;" & ;).
76 Inst. 194.30: N  F * J, T  + 7 F.
77 On this Neoplatonic theory, cf. OMeara (1986) 1213. That the knowledge of
the intelligibles is somehow not properly coordinated () with the discursive
reason is clearly stated in an argument expounded by Proklos in In Prm. 949.11
19. Cf. Steel (1997) 293309, 295297. The term common notions (' F)
to describe the starting points of discursive reasoning and the principles of scientific
demonstrations might be traced to Syrianus, In Met. 18.910; 21,3134; Proklos, In Euc.
240.1114; Ammonius, In Int. 7.1622; Asclepius, In Metaph. 158.1113; John Philoponos,
In APr. 2.2427. For a survey on the Neoplatonic usage of the expression common
notions it might be useful to refer to Proklos, Theol. Plat. v. 1, p. 155, n. 4. In regard
to the more techinical meaning of the expression common notions, it is interesting
to note that, beginning probably with Alexander of Aphrodisias, common notions are
sometimes identified tout-court with the axioms upon which the sciences are based. Cf.
e.g. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Top. 18.1921. This is also what Eustratios does in In
EN 319.89 and in In APo. 45.2733.

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this discursive activity of the soul is grounded on contents which the


soul somehow already possesses in itself. Eustratios defines these contents as the echoes in us of an absolutely existing Intellect (& 
) /D + G = +). The term & used by
Eustratios to describe the innate knowledge in the particular soul, is
another sign of the Proklean influence on this and other arguments
elaborated by Eustratios.78
The commentator refers to the possibility that the human intellect
might be freed from the passions, adding that it is this that enables it
to transcend the potencies related to these passions ( "
").79 This argument reflects a passage from Proklos commentary on the Alcibiades where the author describes the dierent vestures
that the soul assumes in its descent into the body and which obstruct
the contemplation of beings. The soul has to control and regulate, says
Proklos, the secondary and tertiary potencies related or attached to
it (* " '   * " ;CL).80 These
potencies are basically lower powers that the soul brings forth from
itself when it is embodied and guarantee the functionning of the bodily vital functions. Following the Neoplatonists, Eustratios calls these
lower potencies acts ()"), or lives (), which cannot be
separated from bodies.81 These lives are necessary insofar as it is not
possible for the soul to be attached directly to physis and bodies82 since
a soul is an incorporeal essence and, as such, never comes in contact
with a body. In entering the body the soul never loses its essential unity
in this ensouling process of the body.83
This whole argument strongly echoes a formula found in Proklos
commentary on the Timaeus. Here Proklos rejects the opinion of those,

Cf. e.g. In Alc. 99.1319; Theol. Plat. 1,125.38; Inst. 129.2628. Other occurrences
of the term & are listed in Ierodiakonou (2005b) 81, n. 30. The terms &
and & occur as well in Ps.-Dionysios; cf. e.g. De divinis nominibus 147.12; 191.5;
201.12. However, none of the passages of Ps.-Dionysios in which these terms occur can
be linked to Eustratios argument since they only refer generically to the lower degrees
of perfection found in the last terms of the causation process and not to concepts found
in the human soul.
79 In EN 317.2425.
80 In Alc. 224.19, in part. 89.
81 In EN 317.33; see also 276.3738. For Neoplatonic occurrences of the term  to
describe the lower lives or potencies of the enbodied soul, see Proklos, In Prm. 818.33
35; Priscianus Lydus, In de An. 219.3234; 242.4; 246.37.
82 In EN 217.3033.
83 For this Neoplatonic doctrine, see Steel (1978).
78

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93

probably referring to Aristotle, who believe that the soul is just a series
of acts, potencies or lives inseparable from the body. Furthermore,
according to Proklos, the embodied soul organizes the vital functions
of the body through potencies or lives such that simply declaring that
the soul is only the animating principle of the body would be wrong.
Eustratios echoes Proklos doxographical account as he speaks about
other lives which are responsible for the bond between the soul and
the body, which some call acts. He simply takes this expression
from Proklos without regard to the fact that in Proklos the whole
argument has been rejected.84 This passage, as do many others from
the commentary on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, seems to show
that for Eustratios Proklos is not only a source, but source-material, i.e.,
a kind of terminological repertoire, which he freely employs in order
to construct his own arguments. A highly educated Byzantine reader
would probably have immediately noticed that the whole of Eustratioss
commentary on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics is constructed in
this way. It is an amazing piece of philosophical rhetoric, in which the
author deepens the interpretation of the Aristotelian text by a careful
line by line reconstruction of the source material oered by Proklos
works. Eustratios seems to regard the original context and doctrinal
framework of Proklos arguments and formulas as secondary since he
uses Proklos vocabulary mainly as a means to construct coherent and
consistent arguments, which pay more attention to form and style than
to content.
Returning to Eustratios view on the status of the human intellect,
the condition according to which the soul acts discursively is not a
definitive one. In fact, these lower potencies or lives can be somehow
transcended so that the soul regains its essential purity. However, even
when this happens, claims Eustratios, the soul cannot grasp the intelligibles in the same way as the + ;. The operational gap
between the human and the separate Intellect remains, as the intellectual and non-discursive operation of the soul is neither simultaneous

84 In EN 317.3235: I ' * N N N ;   ; 0 ' * 7


&*  V, T ) ' X, & c  '
# ; )" ,  '  " . = In
Ti. 2, 286, 2326: F N N  &. ", % ? ", I
,  '  ' 1  L L D 7 ;
. Proklos doxographical account introduced by the formula ? " is
clearly reflected in Eustratios use of the form .

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nor eternal (; & . ; ) #). The soul can grasp the intelligibles by means of direct apprehensionthe above mentioned )that are singular and distinct acts of intellection, in the sense that
one follows the other. In this way the intelligibles can be grasped one
by one ( d) and in time () .D) insofar as time is that which is
involved in the process of passing from one intelligible content to the
other ( & /" # V).
This latter argument can be safely traced back to Proklos.85 If the
Nous and the divine souls which attend upon the gods act and think
with no interruption, then the particular souls, which exist within a
realm of becoming and division, act and think in a discontinuous way.86
In the first entities, intellection is co-extensive with their essence; in
the second, intellection is other than their essence.87 This separation
between essence and activity characterizes the particular souls. They
remain eternal in their essence, but they act within a temporal dimension.88 The terms and the formulas employed by Proklos are clearly
reflected in Eustratios own arguments.89 In fact, he explains that the
soul qua soul (I ? ) acts by unfolding (&") the intelligible contents within the realm of discursive reasoning, i.e., by means of
syllogisms, passing from the order of the premises to the order of the
conclusions ( #  ) ).90 However,
the soul, when participating in the Intellect (I ? " +), acts
by means of direct apprehensions, insofar as it already possesses in itself
the principles and the definitions (* &* ' 0 M) as echoes
of the Nous (I + & ), and it recollects the projections of the
innate reasons of the soul in the dianoia. When it becomes intelligent,
i.e., capable of intellectual operation, it acquires an intellection that is
finally coordinated to the nature of the intelligible and no longer simply
discursive even though it is not simultaneous and immediate like the
knowledge proper to what Eustratios calls Intellect by existence (
85

On this theory see OMeara (2000).


Cf. Steel (1997) 307.
87 See In Prm. 895.3240. Further examples of this argument in the Neoplatonic
tradition can be found in Steel (1978) 132141.
88 For this principle see Inst. 191.
89 See e.g. In Prm. 1165.3035; In Ti. 1, 245.67; 1,246.19. Here Proklos claims that
our knowledge does not grasp all at once (;  ? B) but passes from one content
to the other (&*  & A ) A). Not only the content, but also the
terms used by Proklos are the same as those used by Eustratios, as is clear from the use
of the form  to describe the passing from one intelligible to the other.
90 A quotation from John Philoponos, In de An. 2.23.
86

neoplatonic source-material

95

@).91 Intriguingly, this distinction between the soul qua soul and
the soul as participating in the intellect, I ? and I ? " +, seems to be drawn directly from an argument in Proklos

commentary on the Timaeus. Here Proklos mentions two ways in which


the logos knows the eternal Being: the first one is I ? ., that is
discursively; the second one is I ? , namely intellectually, which
takes place by means of the direct apprehensions introduced above.92
Proklos argues that, although true intellection and knowledge are above
the soul, they can be participated (" ) by the same soul when
the logos acts intellectually (M  . )CL ).93
Eustratios seems to follow Proklos in admitting that our knowledge
functions  in two senses. First, discursive reasoning forces
us to move from the order of premises to that of conclusions. Second,
because the soul cannot, in a purely intellectual operation, grasp the
intelligibles simultaneously, it needs to move from one content to the
other.94 More interestingly, Eustratios concludes that the condition by
means of which the soul becomes intelligent is not a natural one ()
but a dispositional one (V).95 He clarifies that this dispositional status
comes upon the soul from outside (I F )+ ))
as something acquired ()).96 The term ), acquired,
used by Eustratios to describe the dispositional and habitual nature of
human intellect, can often be found in Proklos as a description of a

In EN 303.1916:  * N I ? N &" ),, " '


 #  ) , I ? " + G ),
F ? ' * &* ' 0 M I + & , " ? '  )", M * ", , ,  ), # ' N & . ' +
I  @, &* d " *  ' + V,  '
   ;  &* V L L \, I F )+
' " ). The soul is all forms in an unfolded manner (&") =
91

In Euc. 16.1016; In Prm. 987.3739. When the soul becomes intelligent it grasps the
intelligibles by means of direct apprehensions (G )/, ,  )) = In Prm. 704.2834; In Alc. 246.1518; In Ti. 2,313.1315. Even after the
souls self reversion, it will grasp the intelligibles in a dierent manner than the Intellect. The soul cannot grasp the intelligibles all at once and simultaneously (N & .
' +) = In Prm. 1165.2425: 2 * M ;N (scil. the soul) 3 , + +
 > & * ' ;* " P .
92 In Ti. 1,246.57.
93 In Ti. 1,245.2831.
94 Cf. e.g. Theol. Plat. 4,43.2022; In Ti. 1,219.13; 2,219.45.
95 This idea can be traced back to the tradition of the Neoplatonic commentators.
Cf. Tempelis (1997) 317320.
96 In EN 303.2526.

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state or condition that does not belong to something essentially or substantially (H) but only in a participatory or dispositional manner.97
A similar consideration can be made for the notion of @,
which Eustratios associates with that Intellect that he also defines as
;,  or  +, referring to the Supreme Intellect.98
In fact, the concept of @ is to be found in Proklos within
a threefold distinction of the modes in which characters exist, namely
in their causes ( #), substantially or existentially ( @),
and by participation (* " ).99 Sometimes, however, Proklos simply refers to the opposition @* " independently
from the general description of the triadic structure of reality in order
to draw a more general distinction between the substantial inherence
of a character or property as opposed to possession through mere participation in the same character.100 Eustratios seems to refer precisely to
this latter opposition when he compares the Intellect @, i.e.,
the Intellect which is essentially such, with the intellect by disposition
or habit ( V), which is said to be adventitious and participated.
Eustratios confirms this himself by making it clear that V, by
disposition, means * " , by participation.101
Elsewhere, Eustratios elaborates a similar argument when he refers
again to the idea that the soul, even after transcending the discursive
dimension of its knowledge, cannot grasp the intelligibles in the same
way as that found in what Eustratios defines as the supreme Intellect (  +). The intelligent soul can only grasp them one by
In R. 1,28.1720. In this passage Proklos says that every god is essentially or
substantially (H) good insofar as he is constituted in his substance (;")
according to the good and does not possess it as something acquired ()) or
as a disposition (I V). In fact, continues Proklos, that which is good in this latter way
is neither essentially nor truly good (D H) but has only participated in the good (+
& + "). See also In Ti. 1,352.1922. If knowledge among the gods belongs to
them essentially and substantially ( ;), and if their intellection is not acquired
()), then they will know what they know in a way coordinated to their essence.
However, it is also true that in the Inst. Proklos clearly states that since the substance of
every god is supra-substantial goodness, he has goodness neither as a disposition (
V) nor substantially or essentially ( ;) but in a supra-substantial manner. Cf.
Inst. 119.1619.
98 In EN 314.16; 317.27.
99 Inst. 65; 140.1718. On this topic, cf. Steel (1994). Cf. also Giocarinis (1964) 176,
n. 39.
100 Cf. e.g. In Alc. 104.78. Here the gods are said to be self-sucient @,
whereas the other things are self-sucient only * " .
101 In EN 303.1617.
97

neoplatonic source-material

97

one, dancing around the Intellect ( + ).102 This


latter expression is found in a similar context in Eustratios commentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, where it is clear that it is
a quotation from Proklos commentary on the Parmenides.103 By referring to it, Eustratios stresses that the souls capacity for operating in
an intellectual manner is not an essential condition (;) but is
something acquired (.), a disposition or a habit supervening (I
V ).) to the soul. According to Eustratios it is because of
this status, i.e., acquired from outside (7 F ) but also potentially losable (&.), that the Philosopher mentions the intellect among the other truth-attaining dispositions, namely Art, Scientific
Knowledge, Practical Wisdom and Wisdom.104
Despite attributing this description of the dispositional and habitual
state of the intellect to Aristotle himself, Eustratios seems to refer once
again to Neoplatonic source-material. The term . means the same
as ), and it characterizes the participatory nature of the intellectual activity that belongs to the particular souls, as opposed to the
essential (;/ ;) possession of the same character. It is
remarkable, then, that the two expressions, I V ). and
I F )+, which are found in the two dierent passages
here under discussion,105 appear almost verbatim in Proklos in the same
passage from his commentary on the Parmenides, where Proklos distinguishes between two types of multiplicity among beings, one essential,
and the other that which supervenes from outside and is adventitious
(F ). ' )).106
It might be objected that in one passage of Alexander of Aphrodisiass De anima one can find the notion of + V described
In EN 314.818: # * ' * " N N ' + = ' )
;CL, & ; ; = ) ;CL  +  , &  ' I
V )., * ' . J. * + ' , & , V
;  ,  ; ' 7 F ' &.. * *
" ' ) "    , ) ? CL  + ,
" ? ),   ),, ' @ N  H  
G, ), )" ;, ; & . I   + ;?  +,
&* d V ;  +  ' ) /"  = ;+
" # V .
102

103 In EN 47.411, where the author quotes In Prm. 807.29808.11. See also Giocarinis
(1964) 191, n. 86, and Steel (2002) 5253.
104 Cf. Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea VI,3,1139b1517.
105 Respectively in In EN 314.10 and in 303.26.
106 In Prm. 1187.411188.3. Cf. Psellos, Theol. I 4.2829.

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in terms recalling the one used by Eustratios. Alexander distinguishes


between an intellect that he calls natural or material, which is common to all men who are not physically incapacitated, and an acquired
one ()) that comes to be only afterwards (@ ).),
which Alexander calls form and disposition or habit (V), i.e.,
the perfection of the natural and material intellect.107 In this passage the
term ) and the expression @ )., similar to the
forms I V ). and I F )+ used by Eustratios, characterize Alexanders notion of + V. Nevertheless,
Alexanders dispositional intellect seems to refer to the habit or disposition that happens to be in those who go through a process of practice
and learning, namely the possession of the intelligibles without actually
thinking them. On the contrary, as previously seen, in Eustratios the
expression V has to be understood within the general metaphysical scheme, borrowed from Proklos, which is characterized by the distinction between that which exists and acts by its own essence and that
which exists and acts by participation of something else. Indeed, the
term V thus interpreted entails the possession of an unactivated science, which is why, as we will see, Eustratios will follow Proklos in stating that we need to reactivate this knowledge. This Neoplatonic framework is even clearer when Eustratios remarks that the soul is able to
act intellectually only in so far as it participates in a principle superior
to it (+ =? ;N " "), adding a verbatim quotation from Proklos Platonic Theology demanding that this participation
requires the proximity to the Intellect (CL   + ).108
This doctrine of the dierent types of intellect is, according to
Eustratios, part of a more general account of the whole causation process. Eustratios explains the souls proximity to the Intellect by referring
to the necessary unity and uniformity of the processions of beings from
the First Cause ( H $ . ) L 7 # $
) in such a way that each term of the causal chain is strictly
Alexander of Aphrodisias, De An. 81.2682.1. Cf. also Themistios, In de An. 95.30
31; 98.2124; 100.23; John Philoponos, In de An. 490.27. On this topic, see Davidson
(1992) 1012; De Libera (1990) 254255. However, in Aristotle, De anima, 3,5,430a1415
the term V is referred directly to the active intellect.
108 In EN 317.2830: , * N N CL   +  F 
+ =? ;N " ". = Theol. Plat. 1,66.2023: N ? ;
107

6 L * + " L ' * . )+  L ) A
' N A N )  ) )  F . The expression + =?
;N " " is freely borrowed from In Ti. 3,269.1520, where Proklos

discusses the way in which the Indivisible is present in the particular souls.

neoplatonic source-material

99

related to the one immediately superior to it by the possession of an


element of similitude between the two terms (&' + =" " D  ;+   ), " ).109
The attentive reader can easily recognize a rough version of Proklos
more complex and detailed description of the causation process found
in the Elements of Theology.110 In fact, compared with Proklos, Eustratios
simply proposes a rough metahysical scheme characterized by the sole
presence of a Separate, Supreme Intellect, a dispositional or habitual
intellect, i.e. the intelligent soul, and the bodies to which the soul is
attached through its lower potencies or lives. However, despite Eustratios simplified account of the process of causation, Proklos is clearly the
shadow behind most of the arguments expounded by the commentator.
This is not only true for Eustratios theory of the intellect but also for
the commentators description of the process of concept formation.
3. Intellection and Recollection
As previously shown, Eustratios alludes to intellections anagogical process, which starts from the last terms of the causation process, i.e.,
that which is first according to us, and gradually arrives at the First
Cause.111 Sense-perception data play an essential role in our striving
for the knowledge of higher realities. By producing in us astonishment
and admiration for the exterior features of things, they can be considered the starting point for the whole process of intellection insofar as
they stimulate and awaken the knowledge already present in our soul.112
When understood in light of Eustratios account of the graspability of
mathematical objects, abstraction from sense-perception becomes necessary to reactivate the innate knowledge of our soul, a knowledge
of which the soul itself is no longer aware, thanks to the shock of
birth.113
Being of a participatory disposition, the human intellect bears in
itself the traces of its cause. It possesses that which is possessed by the
Nous, the separate Intellect, only in a secondary manner. As Eustratios

109
110
111
112
113

In EN 317.3032.
Cf. e.g. Inst. 11.8; 21.1518; 29.34; 132.2930; Theol. Plat. 5,103.56.
Cf. n. 57, 61, and 62.
Cf. n. 35.
Ibid.

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says, there are echoes in us of an absolutely existing Intellect.114 The


activity of the soul, however, confers common notions, as these notions
are gathered together through induction from sensory data.115 In this
respect, it has been argued that Eustratios position becomes inconsistent since he admits that we possess both the existence of a full knowledge of universals when we are already born and a full knowledge of
the existence of universals that are abstracted from the common characters of individuals.116 While agreeing that one can find this twofold
account for intellection in Eustratios, I reject the charge of inconsistency because Eustratios reconciles both abstraction from the individual particulars and innatism in one and the same theory of intellection.
Evidence for my position can be found in Eustratios similar but
more detailed explanation of how we pass from sense-perception and
discursive reasoning to the pure knowledge of the intelligibles. Interestingly, this account has many more Christian elements than the one
previously seen as it relates the temporary loss of the purely intellectual
capacity to the loss, as it seems from the text, of our original Adamic
condition.117 Human being, claims Eustratios, was created in a state
of perfection, without lacking any of the dispositions that could have
brought him to perfection. If he would have mantained this condition,
he would be a man of wisdom (.), and he would not only be able
to act dianoetically or discursively () but also intellectually,
according to his rank in the hierarchy of beings (*  & L
L ;D ).118
This description of the Adamic condition is again strongly influenced
by Proklean terminology. The term , in fact, is to be found
in Proklos as opposed to the knowledge which Eustratios defines as by
direct apprehensions, characteristic of the intellectual operation properly so-called.119 However, as has been said before, the framework of
Cf. n. 73.
Ibid.
116 Cf. Ierodiakonou (2005b) 82.
117 In EN 297.16298.6. This account apparently shows similarity with Basil of Caesarea, Homiliae in Psalmos 48.21 (col. 449452); Gregory of Nyssa, De opificio hominis 136
144. Also compare Eustratios passage with the Neoplatonic one, inspired by Proklos,
quoted in n. 35. Finally, this passage is quoted verbatim by the 14th century philosopher and theologian Nicephoros Gregoras; cf. Nikephoros Gregoras, Solutiones quaestiones, I,493.178494.191.
118 This latter expression seems to be borrowed from John of Damascus, Contra
Manicheos, 81.78.
119 Cf. e.g. In Ti. 2,61.1617; Cf. also n. 128.
114
115

neoplatonic source-material

101

this argument remains a Christian one. Had man, claims the commentator, not transgressed the rank and the law which he received from
the Creator, he would have remained in his state of perfection. Since
he preferred to strive for the lower realities and to enjoy life according
to the senses, he fell from the condition of perfection to the realm of
coming to be and passing away.
In this argument it is dicult to distinguish pagan from Christian
sources. Eustratios refers to the Platonic, but also Christian image, of
mans intellectual eye (  H) as closed and completely veiled
(" ' ) because of the loss of the state of
perfection.120 He then clearly refers to typically Christian terminology
when he claims that the eye of the soul was made turbid by the thicker
and mortal flesh (L "  ' L), which echoes a
passage from Gregory of Nazianzos in which the author describes, like
Eustratios, the loss of the Adamic condition.121
Despite these Christian elements, Eustratios aim seems to be neither moral nor eschatological but mainly epistemological. As a matter
of fact, the main consequence of the fall and the loss of mans perfect
and original condition is that human knowledge now depends on senseperception. However, he remarks once more that sense-perception
plays the relevant role of awakening us from the sleep induced by
the generation process.122 The terminology changes once again when
Eustratios provides a basic account for the process of induction: from
particular individuals we inductively ()) form or assemble
together common notions (* * )), which are able to produce scientific conclusions.123 The common notions are immediate insoFor the expression   H see Synesios, Epistulae 154.86; Syrianos, In
Metaph. 25.6; Proklos, In Prm. 1128.32; Ps.-Dionysios, De caelesti ierarchia 50.1314; Maximus the Confessor, Quaestiones ad Thalassium, 59.112; John of Damascus, Dialectica 1.27;
Photios, De spiritus sancti mystagogia 77AB; Epistulae et Amphilochia, 284.278; Psellos, Omni.
doc. 95.7.
121 Gregory of Nazianzos, Or. 45 633A; This passage by Gregory is quoted literally in
In EN 276.16. For other related passages, see Bianchi (2005) 30, n. 46.
122 In EN 297.3233: & ? ' ; E CL " .
This expression is freely borrowed from Platos Phaedo, where the process of generation
is said to be in one case falling asleep, and in the other waking up: Plato, Phaedo, 71d:
' * ;, N ? ' X, N & .
123 In EN 297.3338. Cf. also n. 99, where the common notions are said to be the
product (#, ) ) of the (inductive) activity of our intellect, dierent from
those concepts which on the contrary are echoes in our intellect of an absolutely
existing Intellect ( &  ) /D + G = +). For
similar formulas related to the formation of universals by induction from individual
120

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far as the intellect forms them with sense-perception data, which in


themsleves are immediate because they are in direct contact with our
sensitive faculties. In this case, the terminology of the whole argument
can easily be found in the tradition of the late antique commentators.124
But it seems that this account is insucient for Eustratios since he
adds that the constitution of the universal from individuals is only a
preliminary step towards a further level in the process of concept formation. After induction man rids himself of the veil of ignorance and
again becomes capable of striving for those realities that are superior
and nobler than he and, ultimatively, for his Creator.125 The expression veil of ignorance refers to the veil that Moses had to wear,126
and to which St. Paul refers in his second letter to the Corinthians.127 However, it is interesting to notice that the expression veil of
ignorance does not explicitly occur in either the Old or New Testament. Rather it seems to be borrowed from Origens interpretation of
Moses veil in his Contra Celsum and can also be found in Theodore of
Stoudios.128
In conclusion, induction, i.e., the constitution of the axioms of the
sciences from individual particulars, is a consequence of the loss of
mans intellectual perfection and the subsequent fall into the realm
of coming to be and passing away.129 Clearly, then, Eustratios position cannot be regarded as inconsistent, if, following the commentator,
induction is understood to be a necessary step that leads to a higher

particulars, see In APo. 89.56:  * )N * =   . +


V, @  . .; 268.3031: ) , , ' 
J ),  ., )  V  .  +.
Elsewhere (In APo. 22.2428), Eustratios seems somehow to regard the common notions
as innate concepts in our soul, or more probably as the dianoetical projections of these
innate concepts.
124 I refer in particular to Eustratios use of the verb  to account for the constitution of universals from the manifold of particulars. See e.g. Alexander of Aphrodisias, In Top. 537.78; John Philoponos, In APo. 438.23; In Ph. 12.2021. See also Proklos aporematic argument in In Euc. 13.2714.4. Cf. In EN 297.3637: ) [ &" ; M ' ) &" & ;*  + . . . = John Philoponos, In APo.
439.1920: & & # , I ", ) , ( 4  .
 ' )7. Similar arguments are also found in In EN 399.2931.
125 In EN 297.3840.
126 Ex. 34.2935.
127 II Cor. 3.1315.
128 Origen, Cels. VI,50.57; Theodore of Stoudios, Sermones Catecheseos Magnae,
30,84.36.
129 In EN 298.46.

neoplatonic source-material

103

form of knowledge and awakens in us a knowledge that appears at the


beginning to be only a confused echo of what is possessed in a concentrated and unified manner by the Supreme Intellect. Furthermore,
this position can be easily traced back to Proklos and to the positive
role that, according to this author, later-born concepts play as the point
of departure for the process of recollection.130 That this might be the
case is confirmed by the occurrence in Eustratios of the root &to describe the awakening in us of an innate form of intellection.131 As
a matter of fact, this expression frequently occurs in Proklos precisely
in regard to the awakening function of a later-born concept, and more
generally in regard to the teaching-learning process and the process of
anamnesis.132
All the evidence suggests that Eustratios follows Proklos in depicting the process of concept formation as starting from sense perception
and from the concepts that the soul derives by induction from the individuals. Nonetheless, later-born concepts cannot fully account for the
attainment of the true knowledge, but they are helpful in reactivating
the inner knowledge of the soul and in enabling the same soul to act
towards the intelligibles in a purely intellectual way and not in a merely
discursive way. What is less clear is whether or not Eustratios treats
the separate intelligible forms as if they exist outside of and prior to
the Intellect. When he discusses Aristotles reference to the objects of
science as being eternal and unperishable he describes them as selfsubsisting realities with a certain causative power, but when he elaborates on the characters of the separate and supreme Intellect he simply
describes them as unitarily contained in it. The two solutions are not
contradictory since Eustratios main source, Proklos, ranked the Intellect as the third member of a triad of which the first member is Being,
which is described, in terms that Eustratios knew well, as the true being
( H H) and the intelligible, not in the sense of the content of the
Intellect, but as the transcendent cause of that content.133 Apparently,
Eustratios is not interested in the further elaboration of this topic.134
Cf. Steel (1997) 301.
In APo. 265.2223; 22.2428.
132 Cf. e.g. Theol. Plat. 5,87.2288.4.
133 See Inst. 161.2127.
134 An echo of this problem is found in Giocarinis (1964) 200203. The author
resolutely concludes that according to Eustratios Ideas do not subsist outside of the
divine mind although he recognizes that according to Eustratios main source, namely
Proklos, the intelligible being exists outside of the Knowing Hypostasis. However, if this
130
131

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As shown by Ierodiakonou, Eustratios does not want to elaborate


further on the status of Aristotles practical wisdom,135 although his
comments on specific passages of the Aristotelian text regarding ethical
problems are sometimes illuminating for this topic. Those passages in
which Aristotle distinguishes science from art and practical wisdom by
means of their dierent types of objects attracted Eustratios attention.
Aristotles definitions of the object of science as being that which is eternal, non-generated and not subject to corruption, as well as Aristotles
reference to the intellect as that which apprehends the first principles,136
provide Eustratios with the possibility of presenting a Neoplatonic theory of intellect and intellection inspired by Proklos.
That this is the case is confirmed by Eustratios interpretation of
Aristotles observation that, when contingent realities are out of the
range of our consideration (M F + ,), we do not know
whether they exist or not.137 Eustratios claims that the term , can
be understood in two ways. First, the term can be interpreted in the
sense of perceiving (&' +  ) so that contingent realities are comparable to that which is in potency (*  H). One can have
sensory knowledge only when these objects are present in actuality;
otherwise, it is not clear whether or not these objects exist.138 This interpretation seems to be rooted in one passage of Aristotles Metaphysics, in
which the Philosopher asserts that there is no definition of individuals
as they are apprehended by intelligence or sense-perception, although
when they are out of the sphere of actuality (& . ? ) L )) it is unclear as to whether they exist or not (; L .
#' R ; #).139
However, Eustratios prefers another interpretation of Aristotles passage, as he devotes most of his comments to the idea that by ,
the Philosopher meant to have intellection (&' + ,) or to
inquire ()) into something. In this sense, the focus is no longer
on the definitional unknowability of individuals, but on the notion of

seems to be the case in Eustratios commentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics,


in his commentary on book VI of the same work the situation appears a bit more
complicated.
135 Cf. Ierodiakonou (2004) in part. 237238.
136 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea VI,6,1141a37.
137 Aristotle, Ethica Nicomachea VI,3,1139b1923.
138 In EN 292.2227.
139 Aristotle, Metaphysica VII,10,1136a37. Cf. also Gauthier & Jolif (1970) 453, where
Gauthier refers to Ethica Nicomachea VII,5,1146b3135 and Metaphysica VII,15,1040a25.

neoplatonic source-material

105

universality as such. Eustratios resolutely remarks that necessary realities, the objects of science, are independent from ones thinking activity.140 Plato and the Neoplatonic tradition seem to be the direct sources
of this interpretation of Aristotle M F + ,. The objects of
science, claims Eustratios, exist by absolute necessity; they are eternal
and non-generated and therefore above time.141 They are true beings
( H), whereas contingent realities are never truly beings (H
;" H) for they do not possess the ontological status that Platos Timaeus ascribes to true beings, i.e., to remain always self-identical
and unchanged (* &' * * ;* ' I F).142 Eustratios is most probably referring to Timaeus (27d528a4) where one can
find the distinction between what is intelligible by means of rational thought ( ? N * . .), which remains
unchanged, and that which can only be an object of opinion, namely
a non-rational activity. The object of opinion, says Plato, is subject to
becoming and perishing, and it is never truly a being (H ? ;" H).
The terminology used by Eustratios, however, suggests that he read
Plato while aware of the interpretation and formulas that he found in
Proklos work. Eustratios quotes a passage from Proklos commentary
on the Parmenides in which the author seems to refer to the same passage
from Platos Timaeus discussed above (27d528a4): the explanation of a
sensible particular is neither stable nor fixed but merely conjectural,
while the knowledge of intelligibles is stable and irrefutable. This is
because the intelligibles are true beings ( H).143 The expression is the same as the one employed by Eustratios, who adds that
by true beings he means that which remains always self-identical
(* &' * * ;* ' I F).144 It is clear then that what
Eustratios defines as that which exists by absolute necessity, what Aristotle himself had defined in the lemma as the object of science ( ).), is none other than the separate intelligible forms.
Eustratios attributes a certain causative power to these realities.
These forms, above generation and time, are the medium through
In EN 292.2833.
On this point see Trizio (2006) 5361.
142 In EN 293.1519.
143 In Prm. 994.2632.
144 For the expression * &' * * ;* ' I F see first Plato, Phaed.
80b2; Resp. 484b4. But also Proklos, In R. 1,72.5; In Alc. 21.13; In Prm. 906.2223. Cf.
also Trizio (2006) 5859.
140
141

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which creation and providence proceed into the realm of coming to


be and passing away, reaching as far as the last terms of the causation process.145 That which is subject to generation and corruption is
described by Eustratios, in Platonic terms, as a shadow that must refer
to its archetype.146 Without the causative activity performed by the true
separate beings, that which is subject to coming to be and passing away
would remain uncaused and self-produced, which according to Eustratios is impossible.147 The intelligibles are described as purely good (# & ), graspable only by the intellect (D .D ) when
free from the disturbance of the passions (D L   &"D \ ) because the intellect receives the illumination of the
First Light (D 7D "D ), whereas contingent realities can be grasped only by sense-perception and imagination (#
' P ).148
Once again, a puzzle of quotations from Neoplatonic sources and
sprinkled with sporadic Christian elements emerges.149 More importantly, Eustratios clearly states that the intelligibles are separate forms

In EN 294.1416.
In EN 294.1619. For the term , shadows, see Plato, Resp. 510a1; 515a7.
147 In EN 293.38: & ' ;.. = Inst. 97. The entire argument that Eustratios advances in order to prove the existence of transcendent causes seems to depend
on this proposition.
148 In EN 294.1925: F A * * ' # & * '  &"
' D .D * =, ' & + . ? L 7 ;L F ,
N ) \. ' M ="  CL, J + ? # ' P
, ), ? P '  D L   &"D \ ' )
145
146

D $"D ' D 7D "D ' ' , & ) &


).
149 For the expression # &  cf e.g. In Alc. 108,13. For the expression D .D  referred to the intelligibles, see Alcinous, Didaskalikos 10,4.1, but also Clement

of Alexandria, Strom. 8,8,23,6.56; Gregory of Nazianzos, Or. 38 321B; Hermias Alexandrinus, In Phdr. 41.10; John Philoponos, In Nic. arith. introd. 18.6. See also In EN 278.15
18, where the author claims that those who become mad for fame (,), those
who enjoy themselves ( ,), and those who pursue pleasures ( ) all strive
only for sense-perception data, being incapable of reverting (N ).) upon
that which is graspable by the intellect ( ? D ). For the expression #
' P  see e.g. Themistios, In APr. 95.2728; Proklos, In Prm. 892.1011;
John Philoponos, In APr. 271.1516. For the expression L   &"D \ see John Philoponos, In APr. 276.26: ) * N "
' *  ' 56. The expression D 7D "D , which
echoes In EN. 106.2223, seems to occur under similar forms in many patristic authors,
as well as in many pagan Neoplatonists. However, it might be useful to refer in particular to Psellos, Phil. min. I 36.350353.

neoplatonic source-material

107

with generative and noetic power, being the archetype of the perishable
realities and the cause of our knowledge. The commentator avoids
any reference to the status of these intelligbles as divine thoughts, as
he did in his commentary on book I of the Nicomachean Ethics.150 On
the contrary, he simply stresses that they exist as such, independently
from ones investigation or thinking activity, that is to say, that their
universality does not depend on thought. They are prior to our intellect
although, as has been said before, it is not clear whether or not they are
also prior to the absolutely existing Intellect.
Eustratioss argument seems to be a more or less direct refutation
of a well-known passage from Alexander of Aphrodisias De anima, in
which the author seems to state that universals are thought-dependent
entities.151 Universals are intellect when they are thought (' . )'
+ M L), but when they are not thought Alexander seems to
state they no longer exist (# ? N ,, ;? F F), that is to
say, that outside the thinking activity they vanish (E " +
+ ;* + ). It might be possibile that by claiming
that the intelligible forms, the true beings, exist independently from
ones thinking activity and investigation, Eustratios is really criticizing
this passage of Alexanders De anima. What is certain is that he rejects
the idea that universals are thought-dependent entities. The commentator definitely allows the existence of later-born concepts, i.e., concepts resulting by induction from sense-perception data. But they are
only a means of bringing the soul from its birth-induced state of ignorance to true knowledge, the one related to the self-subsisting separate
forms, which, as already discussed, Eustratios describes in Proklean
terms. Therefore, this passage deserves to be mentioned alongside all
the arguments elaborated in Late Antiquity, expecially by the Neoplatonists, against a thought-dependent theory of universals and in favor
of their priority to our intellection.152
Eustratios position cannot be labelled as either nominalistic, i.e.,
the view according to which universals are just names independent
from things but dependent on thoughts, or conceptualistic, i.e., the
view that universals exist through thought. These two views, respecIn EN 40.2224; 41.2627.
Alexander of Aphrodisias, De An. 90.211. However, scholars still debate this
and other related passages by Alexander. Cf. e.g. Tweedale (1984); De Libera (1999);
Sharples (2005).
152 On this subject, cf. Sorabji (2001); OMeara (2001).
150
151

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tively held by Joannou153 and Lloyd,154 strictly reflect the context of


the passages investigated by these two scholars. This context is mainly
theological and involves the application to a greater or lesser extent
of late antique logical theories. But I am not sure that one can consider a position developed in some of Eustratios theological writings
to be fully representative of the authors position on the topic at hand.
On the contrary, in reconstructing Eustratios view of universals one
must carefully distinguish between his general account and its concrete
application to specific problems, e. g., as the proper way to define the
co-existence of two natures in one and the same hypostasis. Moreover,
the standard Neoplatonic account of the threefold status of universals
that is found in Eustratios must be read in comparison with the Neoplatonists dynamic account of the nature and functioning of the process of concept formation. Admittedly, as stated by Benakis,155 Eustratios accepts, like the Neoplatonists, the existence of all three types of
universals: separate forms before the many; in the particular individuals; and, as concepts derived by induction from sense-perception data.
However, one should not forget that the admission of this threefold status for universals also entails a recognition of a qualitative dierence
between these three types of universals.
As I have tried to show in this paper, Eustratios follows Proklos and
in general the Neoplatonic tradition in believing that concepts derived
from induction and enmattered forms do not have the same value
as the separate intelligible forms: only separate intelligible forms are
granted the status of true beings. Furthermore, the Neoplatonists do
not confine themselves to the recognition of only three dierent types
of universals. They also admit the existence of creative logoi in the mind
of God, as Eustratios himself does in his commentary on book I of
the Nicomachean Ethics, and of logoi ousiodeis in our soul, namely innate
contents which the soul has to recall gradually and which Eustratios
calls echoes in us of the absolutely existing Intellect.156

153

Cf. Joannou (1954a) and (1954b).


Cf. Lloyd (1987) 346.
155 Cf. Benakis (19781979) and (1982a).
156 A brief account of the dierent universals known to the Neoplatonist can be found
in Sorabji (2004) 133146.
154

neoplatonic source-material

109

4. Conclusions
Far from being inconsistent, Eustratios position is simply Proklean in
admitting that later-born concepts, derived by induction from senseperception data, only play the role of awakening our innate knowledge,
bringing the human soul to the direct apprehension of the separate
forms. By reading Eustratios commentary on book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, one realizes how dicult it is to locate Eustratios within
the traditional scheme that is used to define Byzantine literature of the
XI and XIIth centuries. To label him as a Christian, as a Neoplatonist,
or as a Christian Neoplatonist does not fully account for the very complex character of this Byzantine commentator. In the present paper I
have tried to avoid these kinds of characterizations and to have instead
focused upon Eustratios methodology and his textual approach, in particular, his peculiar way of constructing his arguments from his mainly
Neoplatonic sources.
Eustratios acquaintance with Neoplatonism should be understood
in light of the authors erudition and personal interest in Neoplatonic
literature. The arguments expounded by the commentator seem to be
carefully constructed even if at first glance they appear to be drawn
piecemeal from Proklos own arguments and formulae. Just as the
modern reader may notice the erudition of this author, he may also
remark that this commentary was surely written for highly educated
readers. Eustratios suggests this himself when he rhetorically concludes
one of the many Neoplatonic explanations of the nature and function
of the process of concept formation by writing that one could probably
consider us redundant for having extended this explanation too far,
and so deviating from our initial purpose. But, taking our cue from
the words of Aristotle, we prolonged this argument so that it might be
useful to the ., i.e., to those who are fond of learning and
literature.157

157

In EN 294.2528.

EUSTRATIOS OF NICAEAS
DEFINITION OF BEING REVISITED

David Jenkins
In 1954 Pericles Joannou published two short articles in Byzantinische
Zeitschrift on Eustratios of Nicaea, our commentator of books I and VI
of the Nicomachean Ethics.1 In the first of these articles, Joannou edited
and commented briefly on an extended scholion attributed to Eustratios, in which he interprets a particularly enigmatic passage from John
of Damascus second oration on the dormition of the Virgin Mary.
Joannou argued that the scholion, which he titled the Definition of
Being, showed Eustratios to be Byzantiums first nominalist, a conclusion he supported with his second article, a similar edition and commentary on the semeioma from the synodical proceedings against Eustratios in 1117. In 1990 the four manuscripts which contain the Definition
of Being were reedited and a new reading was published by Klaus
Alpers, who put forward arguments that better established its attribution and date.2 However, Alpers did not address the philosophical content of the scholion itself but hoped to leave competent scholars a better
philological foundation upon which to do so.
The frequent citation of Joannou in subsequent overviews of Eustratios life and works suggests that his conclusion regarding Eustratios
nominalism has gained at least a tacit acceptance.3 In his entry on
Eustratios in the Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium Alexander Kazhdan
claimed that Eustratios developed the concept of the universalia as
pure names, whereas he regarded only the individual as existing.4 On
the other hand, A.C. Lloyd made a qualified use of these documents
as evidence of Eustratios commitment to the Aristolelian logic of universals since he considered Joannous interpretation of the Definition
of Being to be questionable.5 Linos Benakis had deeper reservations

1
2
3
4
5

Joannou (1954a); (1954b).


Alpers (1990).
Mercken (1973) 6*; Hunger (1978) 34.
Kazhdan (1991).
Lloyd (1987) 346. Lloyd acknowledged that the work was dicult and based

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david jenkins

and claimed that Joannous evidence for Eustratios nominalism was


based on a superficial reading.6 Therefore, given the naturally problematic definition of nominalism and in light of the questions regarding
its application to Eustratios, it might be worth revisiting the philosophical content of this so-called Definition of Being.
Although Joannou refers to Eustratios scholion as his Defintion of
Being, our two best manuscripts identify the passage itself as the most
universal definition of Platos philosophy.7 The meaning of this passage
has baed commentators and translators for centuries since it appears
far too abstract for its place within the orations narrative.8 Although
Joannou argues against the possibility that the passage is an interpolation, this suggestion is not implausible since 1) the section of the oration
that immediately follows the passage deals with the beyond being
nature of Gods attributes, which, as we will see, is the critical concept
found within the passage itself, and 2) the oration is already well-known
for an obvious interpolation, the so-called Historia Euthymiaca.9 Nevertheless, the passage is certainly philosophically ambiguous enough to
allow an interpretation that is consistent with the thought of John of
Damascus, to whom Eustratios clearly attributes the passage and to its
place within his second oration on the Virgins dormition.
his argument primarily on another frequently cited instance of Eustratios alleged
nominalism, his polemic against the mononphysitism of Tigranes.
6 Benakis (19781979) 333, note 46.
7 3 7  . Alpers (1990) 155.
8 See Second dormition 524, n. on lines 3437. Kotter notes the following: 1) that
Jacobus de Billius did not even include the passage in his 1577 edition; 2) that Michel
Lequien, who translated the work in 1712, found these lines extremely obscure and
incongruent with what was said immediately above and decided to include in the place
of his own translation that of Aloysius Lipomanus (1558), hoping that he had had a
better text to work with: There is no heavenly order that was not unanimously present, nor was
anyone found who, simply because they lived in heaven and were incomparable to lower beings, refused
to descend and perform all the services that I have mentioned (qui eo qoud in supernis versabatur,
nullique inferiorum comparandus esset, descendere, et omnia quae dixi munera obire
recusavit; PG 96.731); and 3) Pierre Voulets 1961 translation: No being made an exception.
No one, even among the most elevated of those who are incomparable to any other, refused to lower oneself
and to discharge all these services (Aucun tre ne faisait exception. Aucun, mme parmi les
plus levs de ceux qui ne sont comparables nul autre, ne refusa de sabasisser et de
sacquitter de tous ces services; Sources chrtiennes 80, p. 141).
9 Second dormition 7.1 (p. 524): 8+ . . ' . . 8+ 
@ , ' ).. gL * )L ' )' D + + N

= & . '  =" " ' N &  '


N  @ ' " )"   ;+ .,  ="
+ L & ., N A L & A. For the

Historia Euthymiaca, see Second dormition 504505.

eustratios of nicaeas definition of being revisited

113

Alpers is undoubtedly correct in claiming that the title of the passage


is a later emendation, but I would qualify Lloyds suggestion that its
identification as the most universal definition of Platos philosophy is
erroneous since, taken on its face, the passage is not at all inconsistent
with Neoplatonism, which might be the reason Eustratios was drawn
to its interpretation (and why a later scribe attributed it to Plato).10
Eustratios was the student of John Italos, Michael Psellos successor
as the Consul of Philosophers. Italos focused primarily on Aristotles
logic, but like Psellos his metaphysical orientation owes much to the
Neoplatonism of Proklos.11 We would assume then that Eustratios was
well versed in the Platonism of his teachers, and in fact, in his
commentary on Book 1 of the Nicomachean Ethics, he begins his defense
of Plato against Aristotles critique of a single good by characterizing
Platos philosophy in the following way:12
For Plato said that the one and the unspeakable and the good is the cause
of all beings, and he placed the One beyond all beings, saying that it is
the cause of all and therefore not one of the all, but beyond being and
not existing, though not in the sense of lacking being but lying beyond all
being.

Michael Psellos described Platos philosophy in very similar terms in


one of his theological lectures:13
[Plato] said that the first good was one and before all and from all, both
because it is not a being and because it is itself the cause and life of all
beings.

In both instances, the One is described first as beyond being and


therefore not a being in the proper sense, and second as the cause
of all beings and therefore in all beings. It is to these two points

Alpers (1990) 154. Lloyd (1987) 346.


We should keep in mind that when Italos and Psellos refer to Plato, they are more
often than not referring to what we have come to identify as Neoplatonism.
12 In EN 43.1114:  ? *   d ' A ' &  N N
#  H  X, ' =? * H   d F, J ? 
), ", ;? ?   * + ' =? _ ' N H, ; I + H
., & I H  =>
13 Theol. I 4.9092: ), * d "   &  '   F
d ' ) ,  ? M ?  H,  ? M  ; &N ' >
Psellos characterization of Platos philosophy served as the basis of his own: Let us
then consider the creator of all to exist as the first and transcendent mind, or rather as
God and the good and the one, being both all things and no thing, both beyond beings
and in beings. Theol. I 90.2628.
10
11

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david jenkins

precisely that our passage is the immediate corollary, whose translation


I now hazard, assuming, as did Eustratios, that its meaning is abstractly
philosophical:14
There is no being, which is not by nature a particular being or which
is an individual as one. Because no being is beyond-being, and no being
descends apart from and to everything, creating and not allowing itself to
be acted upon.

Whereas the One is both transcendent and the cause of all, particular
being exists in being and is caused. Only the One descends apart from
and to everything, creating and not allowing itself to be acted upon;
particular being is fated to its own particular relatedness within existence. This is the fundamental point that Eustratios elaborates throughout the scholion. However, he makes one critical qualification: he does
not equate God with the Neoplatonic One. For Eustratios, God too is
a particular being. He begins his commentary on the passage in this
way:15
Nothing whatsoever is called a being that does not exist, and there is
nothing whatsoever that is not a being by nature or does not exist. For
how does something exist if it is not a being? For example, God is a
being, as is fire, air, water and earth, all of these things exist by nature
and are said to be; and not only these things, but all beings in so far as
they are.

From there, Eustratios proceeds to clarify the existence of a particular


being, which is characterized in each of his arguments by a relatedness
that undermines its identity as one, whether this relation is to other
particular beings or to its own substantial predicates. For instance, he
understands the phrase [no] individual is as one to clarify the point
that each particular being is not as one. This would include the
particular being of the divine Logos, who, although he is one person,
14 Second dormition 6.34 (p. 524): i *  H ;", : N + ", R 
. I V> M ?  H  =,, '  ;? " ,
' .  B, ' +, ' N  .. Joannou translated

the first part of the passage as: Nothing can exist without being a particular thing, with the
exception of the Unique considered from the point of view of the One (Nichts kann existieren ohne
ein Einzelnes zu sein, mit Ausnahme des Monos unter dem Gesichtspunkt des Hen
betrachtet). Joannou (1954a) 360, n. 1.
15 Joannou (1954a) 366.14: ; F _ ., : N =, ' ; F , :
N H, " Q =>  * =, # N H ); I ) >
_ = ., _ j +, _  & , _  @, _  L, + H  '
">

eustratios of nicaeas definition of being revisited

115

is not as one since he is both God and man. Even God Himself is
not as one since the divine is known to be of three persons. Further,
fire, air, water and earth are also not as one since there are clearly
dierent kinds of each.16 The clause because no being is beyondbeing is understood to mean that a particular being (H) is not beyond
or prior to its being in general (X). Again, this distinction applies
to God Himself, whose particularity as God does not precede His
being in general or vice versa.17 Eustratios then extends his assertion
of particular being to the clause no being descends apart from and
to everything, creating and not allowing itself to be acted upon: there
is no being, including God, that exists in isolation from other beings
or is unparticipated by some other. Everything descends, creating
and being created. God too exists among angels and human beings
and is placed next ( ) to all creation, found complete in
everything. He even makes us gods by adoption, thereby allowing us to
become what He is Himself by nature. Fire, air, water and earth are
likewise intertwined, both creating and being created by one another.18
Finally, the scholion ends with Eustratios applying all four of these
points to Mary. First, she is a particular being. Second, she is not as
16 Joannou (1954a) 366.718:  * + . * + ; I d
), # ' O ). A *  ' A A . & ;   / O
7. A *  N ' A  $ ' A   . . . & ; 
+, Q  , I d ). &" * '    ) CL JC '  =,
+ . . . & ;  &N I O ' F. , *  ) ? P '
.D ' , , . . . ;  @ I d ).  * " '   '
l '  L  . . . ;  L I d ). L *  ? &7 ' L  7
' L  " . . .
17 Joannou (1954a) 367.15:  *  + O F  H; V, M
H ), . '  O ".  * ., m &, '  O " &n,
' ;  D D  _ + O, c  O + H. & ;? V
 H  + /+ O, R  O + /+ H. Asserting that

God is a being is not inconsistent with the thought of John of Damascus. While John
acknowledged that the substance of divinity is beyond substance he also claimed that
substance comprehends God. In his Institutio Elementaris, he clarifies this point by saying,
substance is the highest genus, which supernaturally (=) comprehends the
uncreated divinity as it intellectually () and comprehensively ()
encompasses all of creation (Institutio Elementaris 7.25).
18 Joannou (1954a) 367.916: " ; F  H ;", Do N 
;D  H. ' ; F , : N , Q " ' " B.
' ; F  H, : , ' ; N ,, Q : N " ;., = A
..  * ., # ' =?  ), &*  ' &" ' & 7,
' C CL   , Q = ) ". ' , )? ., 
)  , , ? = )+, Q + )l ".  ,
Q " )' .,  : U.

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david jenkins

one since she is both a virgin and a mother. Third, these attributes
exist in general when they come to exist in Marys particularity and are
in no way beyond being. And finally, Mary is both celebrated by the
angels and saints and illuminates them in turn with her brilliance, in
this way aected by others just as she aects them.19 So, in each case,
we see that Eustratios characterizes a particular being by its relation to
something else. Whether in relation to other beings as causes or eects,
or to substantial predicates or universals, a particular being is never an
isolated and pure unity.
Joannou concludes his own analysis of the scholion by saying that
here we see how the doctrine of universals first penetrated theology
in Byzantium before it was taught by Abelard several decades later in
the West.20 He argues that in the case of Eustratios this penetration
was of a decidedly nominalistic bent, which can be distilled to three
points: 1) the restriction of existence to particular being reduces the
ontological status of the universal to a mere concept; 2) essence and
existence are indistinguishable, i.e, a particular beings participation in
being in general is simultaneous and coextensive, and 3) the identity of
a particular beings essence and existence, i.e., its definition by means
of its substantial predicates or universals, determines its particularity
and distinguishes it from other particular beings, an identity in which
God too participates.21 If we collapse points 2 and 3, we are left with
two fundamental issues: the ontological status of the universal and the
identity of essence and existence. Let us proceed then to the first of
these.
While his emphasis on particular being might appear to suggest that
Eustratios was, in the words of A.C. Lloyd, like Aristotle, turning the

Joannou (1954a) 368.29: _ * ) ' @ ' =  _ & ' ; I


d  . 7, F * ' " ' . + @ H ; =? 
O #, & M +, Q " ' , =  _ ., . ' 
O " ' ; =?  O # . . . ' ) ? ; , M " ,
, /L 0 ., " ? '  , M  =
+ , ' : " .
19

Joannou (1954a) 365.


Joannou (1954a) 360: Das Allgemeine ist nur als Begri gegeben . . . (p. 362)
Essenz und Existenz sind nicht unterscheidbar . . . (p. 363) Der Identitt EssenzExistenz zufolge ist das einzig wirklich existerende Einzelding (+, ), ein in der
eigenen Gesetzlichkeit autonomes Wesen, d. h. nicht nur von den anderen Dingen,
sondern auch, wenn man den schpferischen, gttlichen Akt des Anfangs der Welt (&
&L) voraussetzt, sogar von Gott in seinem Dasein unabhngig: es ist wahrhaftig ein
Einzelding (.).
20
21

eustratios of nicaeas definition of being revisited

117

relative positions of the intelligible and sensible worlds upside down,


he does not specifically address the problem of universals in the Definition of Being.22 For that we must turn to his Aristotelian commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics and Posterior Analytics. We should begin
by noting at least two important aspects of the relationship between
these commentaries and the Definition of Being. First, it is more than
likely that many years separate the commentaries from our scholion.
Klaus Alpers has ably argued that the scholion dates from 1082 to 1086,
after Eustratios diaconate and before his promotion to metropolitan,
or during the period in which he would have been, as the manuscripts
identify him, a presbyter. It is also more than likely that his commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics and Posterior Analytics date from a
period after his anathema in 1117.23 Further, the scholion was written in
response to an inquiry by a certain Tzetziros and is remarkably untechnical in its language, reminding us of the many short pedagogical lectures written by Psellos, whereas the commentaries make full use of
both Aristotelian and Neoplatonic terminology.24
Lloyd has observed that the three-fold division of what may loosely
be called the universal is the most fundamental for the interplay between Aristotelian and Neoplatonic logic.25 Eustratios deals explicitly
with this traditional division several times in his commentaries, most
famously on Book I of the Nicomachean Ethics, where he introduces the
wholes before, from and in the parts (  , )  , )
, ").26 Kimon Giocarinis has argued that Eustratios used these
distinctions to defend the Platonic doctrine of Ideas, whereas Linos
Benakis has specifically identified our author as an heir to the conceptual realism of the Alexandrian Neoplatonists, who both maintained
the substantial primacy of a transcendent universal (  )
and accepted Aristotles argument that the conceptual or abstracted
universal ()' , ,) is subsequent to the substance of a particular
Lloyd (19551956) 67.
Browning (1962) 6; Alpers (1990) 151.
24 It is tempting to identify the Tzetziros of our scholion with the Tziros who was
present with Eustratios at the condemnation of their teacher John Italos in 1082.
Eustratios was then a proximos, or teacher, at the School of Saint Theodore of Sphorakion, and perhaps this Tziros, a student of lesser philosophical ability, sought clarification from Eustratios a few years later after reading this passage in John of Damascus.
For examples of Psellos lectures, see: Psellos Phil min. I 3, 6, 13, 36, 48; Phil min. II 74,
93, 95, 160; Theol. I 53, 107.
25 Lloyd (1955) 61.
26 In EN 4041.
22
23

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david jenkins

beings inseparable form () , ,).27 There can be no question


that in his Aristotelian commentaries Eustratios maintains the primacy
of a transcendent universal. He addresses Aristotle with an exasperated
vocative four times in the context of defending this universal in his commentary on Book I of the Ethics.28 In each instance, Eustratios cannot
understand Aristotles implication, in essence, that an image is prior to
its paradigm, that a universal whether innate or abstracted from sensible particulars is somehow prior to its causative transcendent form.
However, regarding the universals from and in the parts, his position
is perhaps less Alexandrian than Benakis claims. In a recent article,
Katerina Ierodiakonou has stressed that for Eustratios the main distinction which matters is the distinction between the universals which
are paradigms of perceptual individuals and exist in Gods mind, and
the universals which are later-born than the perceptual individuals and
subsist in them.29 In other words, Eustratios operates with two universals, one before the parts (  ) and one after the parts ()
  or )' , ,). I think Ierodiakonou is correct here,
but the identification of this whole after the parts might be better clarified. Whereas Ierodiakonou questions whether Eustratios recognized a
whole ) , " I would argue that Eustratios understood the universal after the parts ()' , ,) to be one of three dierent states
of the universal ) , " (the apparent conflation of these two
wholes led Lloyd to wonder if Eustratios wasnt just plain confused).30
In other words, the two wholes with which Eustatios is concerned are
in fact the    and the ) , ". In both his most
developed discussions of this issue (In EN 4041 and In APo. 194195),
Eustratios does acknowledge the whole )  , but he understands it to be a collection (A ,  ) of extensional objects
(whether of similar or dissimilar parts), and not a conceptual genus of
logic, to borrow the terminology of Sten Ebbesen, who has noted how
Porphyry also finessed this distinction.31 What Eustratios restricts to the
27 Giocarinis (1964). Benakes (19781979) 330333. Developed by Ammonius and his
successors though explicit in Proklos as well, see Ammonius, In Porph. 42; Proklos, Inst.
67.
28 In EN 49.25, 50.30, 53.25, 56.2.
29 Ierodiakonou (2005b).
30 Lloyd (1987) 345.
31 In APo 195.34: )   ? *  ' # * ., J L
I  #  M _  " # T ' . ), [ V . H
'  . + M )", J &L I A # , .

eustratios of nicaeas definition of being revisited

119

universal ) , " is precisely the three genera of logic that Ierodiakonou identifies when she clarifies Eustratios understanding of "
and J (In APo. 194.26), namely, as wholes subsequently abstracted after
the parts ()' , ,; ) &"); as seen commonly in the parts
at the moment of perception ( ) ;,  ); and
as wholly existing in each particular () , V). These genera
of logic are therefore all in the parts, but dierentiated as existing, perceived or abstracted.32 What Ierodiakonou correctly identifies as critical
is the fact that Eustratios assigns definite existence only to the whole
existing in each particular (I" =), while he grants partial
existence to the whole seen in the parts (=, & ; /.) and no existence at all to the whole abstracted from the parts (;
=).33 These ontological distinctions lead her to conclude that for
Eustratios apart from Gods thoughts, only individuals exists and that
such a position clearly dierentiates him both from the nominalism
which Joannou has ascribed to him and from the conceptual or moderate realism which Benakis has talked about in connection with the
Neoplatonic tradition.34 In other words, on the one hand, his denial of
the abstracted wholes existence disqualifies him as a conceptual realist,
and on the other, his granting of existence to the whole existing in each
particular and of partial existence (subsistence) to the whole commonly
seen in particulars distances him from a nominalism that sees every universal as a mere concept. I would say that this is a fair characterization
of the position on universals that Eustratios developed in his later commentaries and does qualify the nominalism Joannou claims to see in the
scholion. Nevertheless, even if we argue that Eustratios was or became
less nominalistic than Joannou would have believed, his later position

> ;? *   + & 7 M D MD, I c


 . + M .> In EN 40.37:  ? )  A M )' I )
  * "   ". Ebbesen (1990b) 156.
32 Sten Ebbesen has lucidly explained the inevitable conflation of these apparent
modes. He identifies the abstraction with the unranked universal (for the sake of his
example, /common dog/), the common element of each particular with the ranked
universal (/this particular dog/) and the particular instance with the particular itself
(/Snuy/) and goes on to say, If you cannot quite make up your mind on the question,
and I think Porphyry could not, /this particular dog/ has a strange intermeidary status
between /Snuy/ and /common dog/. In a sense it is identical with the former, in
a sense with the latter and in a sense, maybe, it is a compound of the two. Ebbesen
(1990b) 153.
33 In EN 281.25; In EN 346.3; Refutation 165.
34 Ierodiakonou (2005b) 77.

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david jenkins

on universals does dier from the conceptual realism of the Alexandrian Neoplatonists for precisely nominalistic reasons: we can at least
say that Eustratios was always more nominalistic than the Alexandrians
in this regard.
Let us turn now to Joannous second characterization of the Definition of Being: the identity of what he calls essence and existence.
Although Joannou acknowledges that Eustratios admitted a conceptual
distinction between essence and existence, or between being in general and particular being, he rightly points out that Eustratios denied
any temporal precedence or material distinction to essence.35 Particular being was simultaneous and inseparable from its being in general.
If we assume, as I think we can, that Eustratios thought in more or
less Neoplatonic terms, we might consider looking at this issue from
within a simplified representation of Neoplatonism which will allow
us to correlate this identity with our discussion of universals.36 For
this purpose I will borrow the first six propositions of Proklos Elements of Theology, which describe and relate the most comprehensive
elements of his thought: the One, unity, the unified and the not-one
(matter). These elements can be understood as the possible combinations of two distinctions, namely, an unparticipated and participated
unity and a non-participating and participating plurality where the
unparticipated generates the participated and unity is prior to plurality.37 This generation is conceptualized as a procession that meets its
own return in the shared participation of unity and unified plurality. If we assume for the sake of representation that the relationship
between the unparticipated and the participated is horizontal and that
between unity and plurality is vertical, we might expect the following
scheme:38

35

Freilich gibt Eustratios den Begrisunterschied zwischen Sein und Dasein, Essenz
und Existenz zu, aber er spricht jeder Wesenheit das Frhersein im Sinne eines Duns
Scotus und noch meher jegliche wirkliche physische Unterscheidung ab . . . Joannou
(1954a) 362.
36 See Trizio (2006) and Steel (2002) for the Eustratios Neoplatonism.
37 We should be clear that there is no non-participating plurality per se in Proklos. Nevertheless, as was generally accepted, he clearly understood matter to be the
constituent of particulars that did not share in form (A, Inst. Prop. 72, p. 68).
Damascius a generation later described matter precisely as non-participating ( N
"  #  @ )', In Prm. 281.1314).
38 Proklos cannot sustain the clarity of this logic throughout his deductive system
since he is forced to expand the single vertical relationship that I have represented

eustratios of nicaeas definition of being revisited


The One
Unparticipated unity
(procession )

121

Unity
Participated unity
Unified
Participating plurality

Not One (matter)


Non-participating plurality
( return)

Proklos later correlates these elements with a triad of what we might


call existence, which states that every existent exists in three senses,
in its cause, ( #), in its own substantial existence ( @), and in its participation as an eect (* " ). These three
types of existence are then identified with our three dierent wholes:
the whole before the parts (unparticipated unity) exists # as
the pre-existing cause of all parts; the whole from the parts (participated unity) exists @ as the parts taken together as an existing whole; the whole in the part (the participating plurality) exists
* " in its particular participation of an existing whole from the
parts.39 Proklos is aware of but does not clarify the ambiguity inherent
in the whole from the parts we have discussed above; while he acknowledges that parts taken together as wholes are of two kinds, either wholes
whose parts are themselves wholes or wholes whose parts are not (e.g.,
man taken as a whole of whole men as opposed to man taken as
a whole composed of a head, feet and hands), he does not address how
this whole can also be thought of as either a collection of extensional
objects or as a logical collection, be it a species or genus.40 In any event,
we would add these relations to our Proclean scheme in the following
way:

between unity and the unified to a series of vertical relationships that accommodate
the descending continuity of the Neoplatonic hypostases, i.e., to the Henads, Being,
Mind, Soul and Matter, since each hypostasis possesses its own unparticipated unity.
Only when this series of hypostases is telescoped back into a single vertical relation are
the four elements related with logical consistency, a tendency which, I would argue,
is characteristic of the Byzantine appropriation of Proklos that begins with Psellos.
For Psellos, Unity is identified with Nous and the Unified with Soul; for Italos and
Eustratios, these associations become more logically conceived as genus/species and
immanent form respectively. See Jenkins (2006) 134142.
39 Inst. 65, 67 (pp. 6265).
40 Inst. 67.1114 (p. 64).

122
The One
Unparticipated unity
#
Whole before the part

david jenkins
Unity
Participated unity
@
Whole from the parts
Unified
Participating plurality

Not One (matter)


non-participating plurality

* "

Whole in the parts

These correlations are the basis of the conceptual realism of the Alexandrian Neoplatonists, with the important clarification that for them,
following Aristotle, the whole from the parts, understood now specifically as a logical abstraction, is subsequent to the substance of the
whole in the parts, whereas for Proklos the whole in the parts remains
clearly and logically subordinate to the whole from the parts (prop. 68:
Every whole-in-the-part is a part of a whole-of-parts).
As we have seen in his Aristotelian commentaries, Eustratios has
moved beyond the Alexandrians in removing substance entirely from
the abstracted whole from the parts and by clearly identifying this
whole as a kind of whole in the parts, while confining the whole from the
parts ()  ) to a collective whole of extensional objects, separate
from the genera of logic.41 Further, Eustratios understands perception
to be the simultaneous awareness of the common element shared by
particulars and the individual instance of that element in each particular. Perception falls on both indiscriminately ("), and it is
only later (= ) that abstraction allows their separation.42 The
whole commonly seen in the parts is then in some sense both the whole
of abstraction and the whole of particular existence since, on the one
hand, it is subsequently comprehended as an abstraction and on the
other, it exists in each particular prior to perception (this simultaneEbbesen (1990b) 156.
In APo. 266.1728: ; * Z # N  J )7 M  A ,
p Z  N * L ;N 7 # N & 7 #"  '
, '  . &  ) /CL. + ? +  ;CL> #  A.
'  J . * + +, # ' N I +, & I V. R
Z J I + R I V #  + V. # *
,  J & & p /N * V, I V
Z ; #  F> + & ) ;, ' "
7 ;. , M ' *    " 0 A
' " * ,, I J )+ . ' N V
 / # F.
41
42

eustratios of nicaeas definition of being revisited

123

ous identification is reflected in the hybrid existence attributed to this


whole).43 We could then map Eustratios understanding of universals
onto our diagram in the following way:
The One
Unparticipated unity
#
Whole before the parts

Unity
Participated unity
@
Whole in the parts
(abstraction/perception)
Unified
Participating plurality

Not One (matter)


non-participating plurality

* "

Whole in the parts


(perception/existence)

We see then that Eustratios has confined the genera of logic, his three
states of the whole in the parts, to the relationship between unity
and the unified, or between the Neoplatonic existences @
and * " . The whole from the parts falls away since it is in
some sense pre-logical as a collection of extensional objects,44 and the
whole before the parts remains supra-logical as paradigm, an element
of Neoplatonic metaphysics with no apparent role within the operations
of Aristotelian logic.45
Nevertheless, the whole-before-the-parts is still very much alive in
the thought of Eustratios of Nicaea. Joannou is undoubtedly correct in
attributing his insistence on the identity of essence and existence to
43 Sten Ebbesen has lucidly explained the inevitable conflation of these apparent
states. He identifies the abstraction with the unranked universal (for the sake of his
example, /common dog/), the common element of each particular with the ranked
universal (/this particular dog/) and the particular instance with the particular itself
(/Snuy/) and goes on to say, If you cannot quite make up your mind on the question,
and I think Porphyry could not, /this particular dog/ has a strange intermediary status
between /Snuy/ and /common dog/. In a sense it is identical with the former, in
a sense with the latter and in a sense, maybe, it is a compound of the two. Ebbesen
(1990b) 153.
44 At the very beginning of the Isagoge he [Porphyry] examines the meaning of
genos. The first use of the word, he says, was to designate the origin of each mans birth,
and next it came to designate the set (plthos) or collection (athroisma) of people sharing
a common origin of birth. It is not in any of these sense, he continues, that we use the
word when we speak of the genos to which the species are subordinate, but probably
the logical use was established in imitation (kath homoiotta) of prior usage . . . Ebbesen
(1990b) 155.
45 See Lloyd (1990) 73.

124

david jenkins

an armation of creation ex nihilo and a refutation of any pre-existing


forms that the Creator was obligated to follow in the manner of Platos
Demiurge. When God created a particular existent, He also created its
essence as a divine thought. As Ierodiakonou has argued, for Eustratios
only these thoughts and individuals truly exist, the former the simultaneous paradigms of the latter. So in terms of our diagram, we would
locate essence with the whole before the parts and existence with
the substance (;) of the particular, or the whole in the parts which
exists in each particular (Aristotles immanent form). However, as we
have seen, the common element existing in each particular is not so easily disentangled from its perception and subsequent abstraction in the
human soul. In other words, the insistence on the identity of essence
and existence, while perhaps intended as a refutation of Platos Demiurge, results in arming the existence of a particulars common elements, however subtly that existence is later defined in relation to its
paradigms in the mind of God. The images of these paradigms are the
common elements of particulars, which undoubtedly exist, but they are
also perceived and abstracted, and the distinction between paradigm
and abstraction begins to blur in the apparent and operative logic of
simple predication: no being is as one because no being is beyond
the predication implied by part and whole. This is what Lloyd has
called the nominalism of Porphyry, whose pedogogical appropriation
of Aristotle gave one the impression that at the cost of making the
logic purely formal, any significant name, simple or composite, could
fall under its rules.46 That every particular existence has an essence
is then no more than saying every part has a whole or every particular has a universal or every subject has a predicate, and vice versa.
In the Definition of Being Eustratios provides examples that are no
more than this, a subject possessing multiple predicates and a predicate encompassing multiple subjects: while the Logos can be thought
of as a particular one, he is not as one since he is both God and
man. So too is Mary a particular individual, but she is also a virgin
and a mother; conversely, God and even the elements of fire, water, air
and earth, can be thought of as one, but each is not as one since
God encompasses the three divine persons, Father, Son and Holy Spirit
just as the elements encompass their particular kinds. The simplicity
of this logic also lies behind his polemic against the monophysitism of

46

Lloyd (1957) 156.

eustratios of nicaeas definition of being revisited

125

Tigranes (ca. 1114). In order to rationalize Christs two natures, Eustratios urges theologians to consider applying the distinction that Greek
philosophers make between a particular and a universal to the distinction between a person and a nature: a person is particular, a nature
universal. Since a particular can possess several substantial predicates,
so too can the Logos possess two natures. Although he again prefers to
identify the particular with primary existence and the universal with
subsequent abstraction, he sees no reason to fret over the fact that
sometimes the Greeks claim that the particular is subordinate to the
universal and its participant and at other times that the universal is
either subsequent to the particular or nothing at all: whenever these
claims are useful, they can be used; whenever they are not, they should
be ignored.47
It is therefore dicult to assess the implications of Eustratios understanding of universals given, on the one hand, that he denies the
abstracted whole of its existence, and on the other, that he arms the
whole before the parts and its operation within logical predication as
the paradigm of an image which apparently stretches from existence
to abstraction. What we can say is that in at least the Definition
of Being and his polemical works, where Eustratios hopes to rationalize the two natures of the Logos and three persons of the Trinity, these positions seem to converge almost exclusively on particular
being understood as the logical relationship between a particular and
its defining universals (between the participating unified and the participated unity of our scheme). In fact this convergence is so strong
that it defines what I consider the most significant feature of Eustratios thought: the identification of God Himself with particular being.
Though perhaps understandable in the context of a Porphyrian nominalism that extends formal logic to every name, this identification is still
striking and seemingly at odds with the long and orthodox tradition
of Ps.-Dionysios, who understood God to be beyond all being, particular or otherwise.48 Not that Eustratios denies this; in fact, even in the
Definition of Being he specifically acknowledges that God is beyond
47 Refutation 162166. His representation of this alleged Greek position is not entirely
Aristotelian since the Neoplatonic universal before the parts and existence #
are both specifically acknowledged as elements of that same argument.
48 As Gerhard Podskalsky has pointed out, Eustratios did not hesitate to use the
apophatic character of Pseudo-Dionysius thought when it suited his polemical intentions, but this appropriation seems disingenuous at best given seine im brigen fast
positivistischen Einstellung zur Theologie. Podskalsky (1977) 117.

126

david jenkins

everything (=?  ). However, his admission here is clearly concessive and occurs in a passage where Eustratios not only asserts that
God exists among men and angels but also that He creates me a god
composed from [the] elements and is created by me (' , )? .,
 )  , , ? = )+). Joannous reading immediately clarifies this remarkably heretical statement to mean,
in language reminiscent of John Italos, that is to say, I am made a
god by adoption (Q + )l ").49 Not surprisingly, our four
manuscripts dier significantly here, and Alpers rejects Joannous reading, dropping altogether He is created by me (a phrase which in both
its instances was crossed out by later hands) in preference for: ' , ? )? .,  )   , Q + )7,
' : ) ), ,  )7 ". This reading better clarifies the distinction between divinized by adoption ( ") and divine
by nature (), but Alpers makes no attempt to explain or fails to
recognize that the particle " would more than likely require its correlative ", which is of course supplied by , ? = ). Only
Vaticanus Graecus 711 preserves the passage as a " " construction:
' , ? )? .,  )  , , ? = ),
Q  A )? N G, ' : ) ), ,
 )7 " ( . . . that is to say, He became a man without sin
on account of me and what He is by nature I become by adoption).
Though this reading is perhaps theologically acceptable the language
remains provocative. Nevertheless, the notion is understandable if we
push for the particularity of God within the metaphysics of Neoplatonism. If God as the One descends the chain of being in His procession,
He is also met by us in the ascent of our return, a notion Michael
Psellos himself had suggested.50 In the Definition of Being Eustratios
makes it clear that God not only descends to and is found complete in
everything, but like all particular being He is also acted upon in return
and participated by something else, in His case, as Eustratios suggests,
by our sinfulness which required the incarnation of the Logos. However, the opposite movements of procession and return, both logically
necessary as binding the cause and eect of particular being, imply in
the case of God that the movement that begins in His transcendence is
conditioned by or related to the movement that returns from matter, or
as our alleged emendation suggests, that God is also created by us.
49
50

QQ 81.21.
Theol. I 64.

eustratios of nicaeas definition of being revisited

127

This is not the only time we see Eustratios experimenting with this
particular implication of Neoplatonic theology. In his commentary on
Book VI of the Nicomachean Ethics, he justifies the partition of the soul
by comparing it to the composition ( ) of divinity, which,
although one in itself, is participated (* ) by others that
are dierent =, so that the whole is made up of both
divinity and the divinized ( ).51 Morever, like Italos before
him, Eustratios was specifically condemned in 1117 for applying the
idea of the return to the Logos, in his case, for claiming that the
humanity of Christ worships his divinity as a servant, , and
that his humanity was perfected only upon its return to the divine.
Jesus was, in theory, like any man, but he is the Logos because the
return of his humanity to the divine was perfectly accomplished.52 To
his accusers, the economy of this theosis was too logically conceived, and
Eustratios was finally charged with reducing the nature of Christ to
an Aristotelian syllogism.53 In spite of this, in his later commentary on
the Nicomachean Ethics, Eustratios would continue to claim that a beings
perfection depends on its appropriate return to the transcendent cause
of everything.54
So even if we claim that Eustratios tended to restrict the possibilities
of philosophy to the logic of predication, he was still operating from
within the thought world of Neoplatonism.55 It is well worth noting
in this context that forty years after his condemnation, Nicholas of
Methone wrote a refutation of Proklos Elements of Theology, which allows
us to compare his views on the specific chapters that interest us here,
namely, those that address the three-part division of existence and the
relationships of wholes to parts.56 In both instances, Nicholas makes

In EN 287.2837.
Niketas of Herakleia was among his accusers, specifically citing Eustratios speculation concerning the theosis of Christs humanity. See Apologia 304.1725.
53 As Kapriev points out, the charge of Aristoteliansim simply means the use of
syllogistic thinking, which was condemned since it implies a formal structure within
which the divine is comprehended. Kapriev (2005) 214.
54 In EN 288.1822: g  H R "  ? ; * N ) +
+ # , .,  ? . * N  ), )N L
 ), &" )" &, * " , , % I
), ", @ ' ; " * N ;D G. . .
55 Recent commentators have qualified Joannous insistence on nominalism by reminding us of Eustratios Neoplatonism. See Kapriev (2005) 214; Podskalsky (1989)
col. 117.
56 Refutation 6971.
51
52

128

david jenkins

it his point to reestablish the transcendence of God. He accepts the


three-part division of existence with one important qualification: it
does not, as Proklos claims, apply to every existent, but only to God.
Only God exists * " in that He exists in everything; the
reciprocal movement of every existent in return to God is rejected.
Likewise, in discussing wholes and parts, Nicholas states that there is
only one whole, the transcendent God before the parts. The other
wholes are mere relations found in objects and can make no claim to
a fundamental structure of reality or a scheme of participation. The
refutation seems aimed directly at Eustratios: God is a transcendent
and not a particular being, and the logic which might have suggested
His particularity is only valid when it arms His transcendence.
In fact, it could be argued that the identification of particular being
with God does inevitably compromise His transcendence. John Italos
and Michael Psellos, who clearly associated the being of God with
the Neoplatonic One, would have undoubtedly interpreted the final
lines of our passage from John of Damascus in a significantly different way: the phrase, Because no being is beyond-being, and no
being descends apart from and to everything, creating and not allowing
itself to be acted upon, could not possibly refer to the One since the
One is beyond being and descends with its transcendence uncompromised. This is the striking departure of Eustratios, who, without denying that God is beyond being, nevertheless understands His descent
through existence in the same way as that of any other particular
being.57 Like the Neoplatonic One, God descends perfectly to and
encompasses everything, but unlike the Neoplatonic One, He descends
aected and participated by his creation. This is perhaps another reason why Eustratios can acknowledge the paradigm of Gods thought as
the whole before the parts but inevitably only require it as the most
comprehensive universal that can be predicated of particulars. Every
particular participates in God * " , but its substantial existence
= only requires a participated universal. For Eustratios this
seems to be the operative sense of the identity of essence and existence:
the simultaneity of particular and universal. While the abstracted whole

57 Eustratius argument is of more than historical interest. It implies that the


meaning of exists is the same in, say centaurs exist, frozen air exists, and God
exists, for the dierence between the states of aairs which the sentences describe is
to be looked for only in the dierence between centaurs, frozen air, and God. Lloyd
(1990) 7475.

eustratios of nicaeas definition of being revisited

129

is subsequent, it is the same whole in the parts that exists and is simultaneously perceived.
So was Eustratios a nominalist? We agree with Ierodiakonou that
Joannous claim that Eustratios understood universals to be mere concepts (or pure names as Kazhdan claims) is an oversimplification
of his position as developed in the Aristotelian commentaries even
though his rejection of the existence of the abstracted universal is
clear (there is no explicit argument about universals in the Definition of Being).58 However, as regards Joannous second observation,
that Eustratios equated essence and existence, I think the case is
clear: Eustratios does tend to limit the discussion of being to the formal logic of predication, both in his engagement with Aristotle and in
the Definition of Being. Whether for reasons of philosophical anity
in the first instance or polemical clarity in the second, this reduction
tends to eclipse the paradoxical being of both God and matter in so
far as they name, as our simple scheme suggests, the unparticipated
correlates of predications universal and particular constituents. Eustratios philosophical predecessors, John Italos and Michael Psellos, were
less willing to ignore the problematic implications of this lack of participation. Italos still armed the existence of universals, granted at
least subsistence to abstraction, and openly pondered the significance
of being both above and below particulars, identifying these types of
non-being specifically with God and matter.59 Psellos maintained a
thoroughly Dionysian understanding of Gods being as an apophatic
regress of beyonds that transcend all comprehension:60
But further, if you want to be theologically precise, God is neither everything nor beyond everything, neither a definition nor a comprehensive
term, neither light, nor life, nor mind, nor being, nor the One, nor even

58 Lloyd has a dierent explanation for what I am considering nuance: Byzantine


authors had not suciently focused the question what exactly the fundamentum in re
amounted to. Consequently it is in a sense anachronistic to expect in each case to assess
their commitment to nominalism. Lloyd (1990) 7374.
59 QQ 19.1517 (p. 21): ;? *  =? * H N H, E ;?  = +>
A * + H, [  ? I ,  H N H,  ? I ,, ' 
? .,  ? @.
60 Theol. I 56.56: ", #  N &L  ,, c  
c =?  , c M c , ; , ; , ; +, ; H, ; V, &
; =?  V> * * + \. " # ' L " L
q,> ), ? A ' =, ' ; . M )' ; ) , &
;? N  &+ A, ' * '  A ;+ &. See
also Phil. Min. I 7.80; Theol. I 26.80.

130

david jenkins
beyond the One. These names are the products of our experience and
the pangs of our soul, but God is unspeakable and beyond unspeakable
and not only do we not know what He is, we have no idea how to determine our ignorance of Him since even His unknowablility is incomprehensible.

EUSTRATIOS OF NICAEA ON THE


SEPARATION OF ART AND THEOLOGY

Charles Barber
Eustratios, Metropolitan of Nicaea was one of the more sophisticated
and engaged writers on the nature of art and painting in Byzantium.1 Yet, his work remains little used by art historians and theologians who seek to conceptualize the object that we call icon. Rather,
the literature on Byzantine aesthetics has tended to privilege the theologians of Late Antiquity, of the iconoclastic era, and the Palaeologan period.2 As such, Eustratios remains one of our more underappreciated thinkers on Byzantine art. Modern editions, translations,
and a richer secondary literature will no doubt help change this situation.3 Until these become available, this essay, like the other rare
accounts of Eustratioss writing on art, must be considered preliminary.
Given this condition, my essay will attempt to show how Eustratios
developed a consistent account of the image, one that led him to reject
the post-iconoclastic elevation of the icon to the status of theology or
philosophy. In order to do this, I will focus on three of Eustratioss writings. His discussion of art in his Commentary on Nicomachean Ethics 6 and
his two closely linked essays on icons: the Dialogue and the Syllogistic
Demonstration.4 While the three works discussed here reveal the consistency of his thought, even though the Ethics might date to ca. 1120 and
the icon essays belong to the early 1090s, they also reveal one notable
1 Draeseke (1896) 319336; Joannou (1952) 2434; Joannou (1954a) 358368; Joannou (1954b) 369378; Joannou (1958) 130; Browning (1962) 112; Browning (1963) 173;
Giocarinis (1964) 159204; Gouillard (1967) 206210; Glavinas (1972) 195198; Mercken
(1973) 6*14*; Lloyd (1987) 341351; Mercken (1991) 5*7*; Trizio (2006) 3563. This
paper on Eustratioss thinking on art draws on materials published in Barber (2007)
99130.
2 There is no mention of Eustratios in such standard if aging works as: Mathew
(1963), Bychkov (1977), or Ouspensky (1992).
3 Mary Fox and Dave Jenkins have prepared the translations from Eustratioss
Syllogistic Demonstration. This forms part of a collaborative project that is working under
my direction to prepare editions, translations and commentaries on the materials
bequeathed us by Komnenian discussions of the icon.
4 In EN 299321; Dialogue 127151 and Syllogistic Demonstration 151160.

132

charles barber

addition in the later text.5 I will turn to this at the end of the paper,
where I will suggest that this addition, an identification of the best
wisdom with theology, presents an attempt by Eustratios to remove
the icon from the contentious theological position it had occupied in
eleventh-century Byzantium by lessening its status in regard to theology proper.
The passage from the Ethics commentary that introduces this addition is towards the end of the section that concerns Aristotles distinction of art from prudence and the respective values of doing and making and contains Eustratioss response to section 1141a9 of Aristotles
text, which reads:
The term wisdom is employed in the arts to denote those men who
are the most accurate masters of their art, for instance, it is applied to
Pheidias as a sculptor and to Polykleitos as a statuary. In this use then
wisdom signifies nothing other than artistic excellence.
N ?  ) , " , & * " &,
X    '  &., )+
? 6 ;? A  N , R M &N " )>6

In the course of his lengthy commentary on this passage Eustratios


elaborates on the nature of the particular wisdom that belongs to the
arts. Both Pheidias and Polykleitos are praised for the accuracy of their
imitations in stone of natural things, for example:
Polykleitos is called a wise sculptor, making accurate imitations in the
stones according to what is possible as regards the subject.
 &  q, &, ' ; *
) ,  *  )+ D ="D .7

In this phrase we can hear a condition introduced by Eustratios, as he


notes that these imitations are determined by that which is: possible
as regards the subject. This suggests that the artist is dependent upon
what the subject discloses of itself. Eustratios then expands upon this:
Since substance is being proper, the things in and around substance are
not beings proper, but each is said to be a kind of being and a kind
of being of substance, as the quantity of substance, or the quality of
substance or the relation or position, like lying, standing and leaning,
or substance being in a place or in time or any of the other nine
5 The date for the commentaries draws on Browning (1962). The date for the icon
essays is suggested at Dialogue 129, where the essays are linked to a Synod.
6 In EN 318.2730.
7 In EN 319.1921.

on the separation of art and theology

133

categories. Each of the arts is likewise, since something is worked from


the underlying substance in the substance and around the substance.
That which is known is that which is worked out and inheres in and
around substance. This is artistic form, which is brought forth by the
artist in the material proper to that art. And this is an accident, and
therefore something that is not properly being, so that the excellence and
perfection concerning it (i.e. accidence) is a kind of wisdom. But wisdom
proper derives from the knowledge of beings, that is, of substances, which
are not a kind of being, but being proper, namely, not accidence, which
is a kind of being, but substance or being proper. Just as we say about
coming-to-be, on the one hand, that the coming-to-be of accidence from
non-being is not coming-to-be proper but a kind of coming-to-be, and on
the other, that the coming-to-be of substance is complete and not a kind
of coming-to-be on account of its actually being complete, as Aristotle
has taught us, so too is the knowledge and wisdom of each accidence a
kind of knowledge and a kind of wisdom. And the wise man concerning
this wisdom is a kind of wise man about something kind of wise, and the
wise man concerning substances and the things in themselves that follow
upon substances is completely wise and wise in the proper sense, and
moreover he is the best of all in wisdom, who concerns himself with the
most fundamental aspects of beings and the best wisdom is his science,
namely, theology.
I *  ? ; _ G, * ? ) CL ;P ' ' N ;
; G H, & _ V  ",  L ; H,
O . ; R . ; R " R ", I  , '
% ' & , R  ) .D X N ; R  ) .D
Q A  , @ '   /, )' L ;
=" ) CL ;P ' ' N ; ) , ) )'
, ! ) ' : ) CL ;P ' ' N ; ) .
+ " )  * N " X, : ) CL #P @C L "
= +  &,. + " ) ., ' * +.
_ ; G, ' * +.   ; . ' & ,
 ?  G ' N  H  ", Q 
;, c _ 7 & G H, Q ; . M H
) ; R G H [).] I 6 )'  " N ?
+ . ) + N X " ; G " &
" ", N ? L ; " M, & c *  M
H X ", I ' ;  8" , ", @
' N  ' N   ? . / 
'  , '  ;N .   ., 
? * * ;  ' * = , ; /. M
 ' G .,  #" ) P   ' *
&7  H . '   N )
;+, s )'  .8
8

In EN 319.37320.19.

134

charles barber

I want to develop two strands from this passage. First, I would like
to show that his accidental account of art is consistent with Eustratios
discussion of art elsewhere. Second, I will, as mentioned earlier, return
to the implications of his separation of the work of art from the practice
of theology.
The points made in the passage above build from the preceding
discussion of art in the Ethics. So that by the time the reader reaches
this section he or she has seen that Eustratios has elaborated upon but
not really extended the scope of Aristotles text. Art is therefore already
understood to be a rational process of making that proceeds under its
own conditions.9 As it proceeds art moves that which is external to
the substance being worked.10 It brings something into existence and
the cause of this is the artist,11 who is obliged to be accurate as it is
this that puts the material of the image and the form of the subject
in contact with one another (' F  I ) CL CL @C
' D D ="D + &+ )).12 Furthermore, art,
unlike natural things, is not necessary.13 It is therefore of little surprise
that when we come to the passage quoted above that the wisdom
accredited to art is of a second order. While the artist might be called
wise, with reference to his or her accurate rendering of the accidents
that adhere to or surround substance, this wisdom is of a dierent,
lesser, order when compared to the wisdom of one who attends to
being proper. This last, in its best form, is designated the work of the
theologian.
Eustratioss account of art in his Ethics commentary follows upon the
assumptions that underpin his earlier and extended engagement with
the question of art in the two essays on the icons that were written in
the early 1090s. In these, we find a rigorous and philosophical rendering
of the prevailing discourse on icons, veneration, and the visible, as
bequeathed in the writings of the ninth-century iconophile authors
Nikephoros of Constantinople and Theodore of Stoudios. Eustratioss
two essays were written in response to a theory of iconic depiction
proposed by Leo, Metropolitan of Chalcedon in a dispute that ran
from 1082 until 1094. This theory was developed in the course of

9
10
11
12
13

In EN
In EN
In EN
In EN
In EN

299300, 307308.
301302.
300301, 307308.
319.2628.
301.

on the separation of art and theology

135

Leos defense of his charge that the Emperor Alexios I Komnenos had
been guilty of iconoclasm when he had melted down church silver that
bore sacred images. The core of Leos definition was that the formal
relation between the image and its subject, their common likeness,
made the icon of Christ worthy of adoration. While Leo resisted the
argument made by Basil of Euchaita that the material of an image was
transformed by the impression of divine form into its surface, he did
argue that the form seen in the image not only gave the one looking at
the object immediate access to the divine hypostasis of Christ himself,
but also made the object as a whole sacred.14
In response Eustratios presented an array of arguments intended to
define more precisely an icons proper limits. These arguments were
grounded on two key themes. First, there was a need to draw a clearer
distinction between knowledge of the Logos and knowledge of the
incarnate Christ. Second, there was a need to define more clearly the
kind of knowledge that an icon could convey.
I would like to begin with a passage from the Syllogistic Demonstration
that Antony Lloyd and others have drawn to our attention.15 This
reads:
But they [Leo of Chalcedon] then say that we consider it [the icon] worthy of adoration not by isolating its material outlines, but by perceiving
the ground of the human per se, which is the divine hypostasis adored
in this portrait. But the essential ground of a particular man is nothing
other than humanity itself, which is seen equally in all men, and the one
who adores this would no more adore the assumed existing in God the
Logos than the humanity of any other particular man. And the one adoring this would seem rightly to be an anthropolater. Since God the Logos,
having assumed humanity, divinized nature, it follows that the perfection
of nature exists in the one in number [i.e. the particular]. Therefore the
essential ground of all enmattered and natural things is perceived per se,
not existing outside of particulars, but having its existence in them: not
as a whole from parts, but in the parts existing whole in each of them.16
And the one who adores the bare ground adores a concept more than a
thing.
' ? 6 , I ; L @ &+ L  &+, &*  + & 7 . / )+, I D D L . 8  .  ;7 + & 7 ;" ) V R  & . ; ,  ) & 7 )

14
15
16

Stephanou (1946) 190198; Carr (1995) 579584; Barber (2007) 131157.


Lloyd (1987) 348.
cf. In APo. 195196.

136

charles barber
", '  C  ;  D ) D D .D = , R /D  * " & 7. ' 
C  . Z  & > )' '   . @ * + N  ) ", I L  
) D /' &  =. i  .  ;7 )'   ) '  ), ? /., ; =
? '  V, )  F N @> I M ; )
, & ) " I ) /D = M ;> '  D .D
 D, )  R .17

Eustratios makes several points here. First the ground (.) of man
is humanity rather than divinity. Second, it follows from this first point
that man cannot be adored. Third, the incarnation has divinized all of
nature. Fourth, it follows from this that the divine may be perceived
in the post-incarnational particular. Fifth, if one tries to adore the
groundin this instance divinitybeyond the particular, one will only
adore a concept rather than the thing that mediates and presents that
ground to us.
It is this last point that leads Eustratios to criticize the distinction
that Leo has tried to draw, namely that we can perceive Christ through
the icon but not in it. For Eustratios, Leo has overlooked the icon as
a medium whose very material particularity allows Christ to be knowable. Granted this, it is important then to recognize the constraints that
this medium imposes. Foremost among these is the understanding that
the description and definition of an icon, as an artifact, is not to be confused with the physical account of the implications of the incarnation
identified in this passage.
This leads Eustratios to argue that:
The portrait of the particular is nothing else, that is a portrayal that
both depicts and impresses the accidents specific to it, the accumulation
of which would never be found in any other thing of a similar nature;
therefore, depicting it from these [accidents], or sometimes describing it
with words, we are able to portray and distinguish it from others; nor
will the universal ever be depicted, so that someone could adore this in
images, but rather only the material outline of the particular and this
according to appearance.
N ? + V ;? V, R  ' O  '   # . ;D, [  Z ;
Z ) Z    =  ">  ' )  ;
#, R .D ? =,  Z ' -

17

Syllogistic Demonstration 157.

on the separation of art and theology

137

  > ; # Z  ., % ' ) #. D  , & R . L ' w + V ' ;


 ).18

Here, Eustratioss insistence that a portrait is only an accumulation of


visible traces of a particular subject, leads him to reiterate that there
can be no portrait of a universal, such divinity, without the mediation
of the particular.
This line of reasoning is also developed in Eustratioss Dialogue. Here,
too, Eustratios begins by arguing against the possibility of seeing the
divine in an icon, by pointing out that painting can pertain to the
human alone:
It follows then that the human alone is to be depicted . . . just as, clearly,
therefore the divine cannot be painted . . . the divine is undierentiated
and undivided; it follows that it cannot be painted . . . By the same
argument they cannot be depicted together. For if they were to be, then
the divine would again have dimension and measure, as it is united
unconfused to the flesh within the one person. It follows therefore that
only the human can be depicted: either in its own right or in relation to
something else.
 B . X N & .  . . . . M ?
6  . ; V #., L . . .  ? . &".
' &> ; B #. . . . D ? ;D .D ;? 
. V #.. # * V,   . .
' .> ) *  =. & Q CL .
 6 . #N X N & .. c ? ] G ]
 .19

This passage hints at the problem of representing Christ that concerns


Eustratios. Christs person consists of two natures, the human and the
divine. One is bounded by time and space, the other is not. Because
the divine is without these bounds it is, in itself, unrepresentable. All
that can be depicted in the icon is that which is manifest through the
human.
Furthermore, that which is seen by these means is not even humanity
proper, it is the accidental traces external to the human substance:
Form is the visible or rather that which is seen or manifest, thence the
shape is exact in accordance to appearance. For vision is not cast into the
abyss, nor does it grasp the essential, but only the colors of this and their
common sensible outlines, I speak of number, movements and other such
18
19

Syllogistic Demonstration 157.


Dialogue 131132.

138

charles barber
things, which are all accidents. One must also transfer the name on to
the essential form as it is named in accordance with the likenesses of the
shape. For these simulate and adorn and beautify the substance.
i * X  #. Q . ' ., M )'
 N / * ). ; * #   H ),
;? L ; ), . ? /N ' 
 #  , " & +, , ' x +
V, B . ). ? c ' )' *
* ; J . L L \ ". 8
* ' + ' , '   =.20

Eustratioss opponent is unwilling to accept such a rigidly formalist


understanding of the icon and argues that the traces in the work of
art disclose the entirety of their subject:
But since the accidents artistically portrayed according to the shape in
Christ disclose him in this divine portrait, we say that [we are able] to
worship [him] in this in terms of adoration through what is disclosed by
them.
8 )' * . * N N D D .
 ; ),   . L, )D ?
,  D "D = ;.21

This leads Eustratios to ask:


What then is disclosed in the image, that which is painted or that which
is not painted?
 N  ) ;,; : , R : ; ;22

In answer to his own question he reiterates the importance of the dual


aspect of Christ, who has two natures in a single hypostasis. This leads
him to argue that while the icon can only show one of these natures,
that is the human,23 the icon can lead us to contemplate the divine,
which resides elsewhere. Similarly, we may venerate the icon, but the
adoration addressed to the divine cannot be mediated by such an
object.24 Worship by means of an icon must therefore be distinguished
from the direct worshipthat is adorationof God.25 Hence:

20
21
22
23
24
25

Dialogue 142.
Dialogue 144.
Dialogue 144.
Dialogue 145.
Dialogue 147.
Dialogue 149.

on the separation of art and theology

139

For while our worship [understood as adoration] of him is unmediated,


the imitation [of him] is mediated.
), ? * &" + ;D, )+ ? * " >26

This mediating function for the icon is founded upon its accidental
nature. It cannot oer direct access to the substance of its subject, as it
can only convey the external qualities of that subject. Hence:
Yet the icon takes the outline and the shape of the depicted, not the
essence. The outline and shape are simply a quality and the fourth kind
of quality. Every quality is simply an accident. No accident should be
adored. Equally no outline or shape should be adored. What we are
talking about when we talk about the icon is perfectly obvious: the
artistic and the mimetic. The pre-eternal Divine Logos has assumed
into himself at the end of days the additional from the holy virgin and
Theotokos, the first fruit of our mixture. The hypostasis of the Divine
Logos has required the adoption of our nature, so that the two natures
might be contemplated in the one hypostasis. So, just as the Son of
God has maintained his infallible hypostatic particularities, according
to which the hypostasis is distinguished from the Father and the Spirit.
So, too, did the Son of Man possess other particularities by which he
diers from the mother and other men. What are these secondary things,
substance or accident? By which I mean, colors, size, perhaps the curve
of a nose, or the hair for instance, or the outlines from which he has
emerged: the eyebrows, the eyes, and each part that is manifest on his
exterior, by means of which when we see them on icons we recognize
who each icon is representing.
i  #l  L ' N N + #"  ; N
;>  ? L '  N . G ' " " .> ? G . .> ;? ?  .>
;? A L R N ..  ? ; A ' 
" L #. )   . ,> ' * L L ' * > M   . 7 z ) )
  /  . ) L G " ' .
= , N &N + " > ' =. ;
  . L   , ), I ) = *  , . g ? ; $ + + )
& * =* ;+ #7, T  + 
' +  =.> I ? $ & 7 F ;
#7 V, T " L  '   & 7.
+ N *   ) ; R .; $. ",  ,
" ,  . .,   ,    

26

Dialogue 148.

140

charles barber
,  ",  \ , ' /  * N
F ), B ) , #. ,  ) 
N /  #" #..27

The answer to his last question is, of course, accident. What Eustratios
sets forth in these texts is an account of painting that wishes to distinguish precisely the icon, a man-made object, from its natural subject.
This dierence is substantial. While Eustratios identifies the availability of the divine through a post-incarnational divinized nature, he is
unwilling to allow this presence to the work of art. It becomes necessary, then, for him to distinguish that which is in nature from that
which is visible in a painting. A painting remains the trace of the visible, a record of the accidents that describe the particular manifestation
of a given subject but that should not be confused with their substance.
These writings on the icons provide early insight into Eustratioss
thought. They show an engagement with the philosophical world of
eleventh-century Byzantine philosophy. This did not go unnoticed by a
late, fierce critic of Eustratioss thought. When, in the summer of 1117,
Niketas, Metropolitan of Herakleia, wrote a discourse that demanded
the removal of Eustratios from his episcopal see, he chose to link the
Syllogistic Demonstration text to Eustratioss discourse addressed to the
Armenians, which had been written in 1114.28 Read together, Niketas
argued that these texts betrayed an incautious application of philosophical technique to a theological problem. The relevant passage reads:
We find that the vow taken by the metropolitan of Nicaea, where he
states that: I have been suspected of professing a bad doctrine that I
have never borne in mind, as God knows, and that I do not now bear
in mind. was for the pleasure of those listening, for he has clearly had
these things in mind many times before. For in his discourse concerning
icons he considers that the assumed should not be adored. At the start
of this discourse he demonstrates that when one is a creature one cannot
be adored, and so he divides the one Christ into the adored and the
non-adored, the worshipped and the non-worshipped, while at the end
of the discourse he introduces a rational distinction for the assumed,
and considering on its own terms that which has never existed without
the Logos that has assumed it, he excludes this [the assumed] from
the adoration and worship which is rendered to the heavenly powers
themselves. Having also applied this rational distinction for the assumed
in the two discourses for which he is being criticized [the Armenian
texts], he has fallen into the abyss of a contrary doctrine. It follows
27
28

Dialogue 154155.
The Armenian discourse can be found at Refutation 160198.

on the separation of art and theology

141

therefore that one cannot say that he has repented these errors, rather
one is indeed suspicious regarding his approach.
M = N ). ]   ) , " M> 3 ). )' .C ; & CL R ;" )., I   X, ;? + , ) )C  &. "> 
* '  + * ;* ).. ' * ) D ' #. .D ;+  . X &, ) &CL ? + . #
+ & X &.  X .,  V 
#  ' &,  ' &, A
, ) ? D " + . CL )P   + , '  " / = ' + .
. /  ' L  ' , ] '
= ;  ; , , + &. C ? CL ) + " ' ) , ' .
O & , #  L &. . )"  .  6  & ; A JC +, @ ?
' ' ;N N ".29

Niketas here criticizes Eustratios for applying logical distinctions to theological problems. In particular, he objects to Eustratioss construction
of his argument from the premise that one can separate the adopted
(Christs human nature) from the Logos that has adopted this nature in
the person of Christ. For Niketas, the distinctions drawn by this manner
of thinking were problematic because they appeared to betray Eustratioss continued adherence to the thought of John Italos, Eustratioss
teacher, who in 1082 was condemned for his own application of philosophical premises to theological matters. Consequently, we can see that
Eustratios is condemned in regard to the question of the icons for failing to live up to the vow he had taken to distance himself from his
teachers method.
Given that the primary complaint against Eustratios was defined
by his Armenian discourse, the additional reference to the Syllogistic
Demonstration might at first glance appear superfluous. I would, however,
like to suggest that this reference served a purpose that went beyond
simply establishing a heretical genealogy for the Armenian text. It
also introduced the question of the icon into Niketass description of
Eustratioss orthodoxy. This was a significant gesture in eleventh- and
twelfth-century Byzantium, as ones understanding of icons was an
important means of evaluating the orthodoxy of ones thinking. This
29 Darrouzs (1966) 302.23304.3. The reference to the discourse on icons appears
to cite discussions at Syllogistic Demonstration 152 and 159.

142

charles barber

function for the work of art was annually rehearsed in the Feast of
Orthodoxy, which at this period was beginning to expand around the
core question of the image, and is also attested in the trials of Symeon
the New Theologian and John Italos, as well as the professions of faith
by Michael Psellos and John Italos. In each instance the icon played a
significant role as a means of defining or testing the orthodoxy of the
figure on trial.30
This function for the icon was a legacy of the iconoclastic era,
whose theologiansprimarily Theodore of Stoudios and Nikephoros
of Constantinoplehad established the centrality of the icon for the
definition of orthodoxy, thus implicitly elevating the icon to the level
of theology. This status was confirmed by the seventh canon of the
Constantinopolitan council of 869870, which had declared:
Setting up holy and venerable icons and teaching the similar disciplines
of divine and human wisdom are very beneficial. It is not good if this is
done by those who are not worthy. For this reason no one is to paint the
holy churches who has been anathematized by what has been decreed,
nor to teach in a similar place, until they have turned back from their
deceit. Therefore, if anyone after our declaration were to allow these in
whatever manner to paint holy icons in the church or to teach, if he is
a cleric he will endanger his rank, if he is a layman he will be banished
and deprived of the divine mysteries.
 * G ' * #. &+ ' 0  
* L  ' &  ,  \.> ;
 ? + N *  &  >    #, ) , $, , 0 & " , N
) $D .D , " Z ) ) L # &.
J ! * +   M  N G #. )
)P R N ;0 + " , # ? . ), #  J " ., # ? ., &" ,
'    .31

Here, painting, theology and philosophy are placed on the same plane
and are subject to the same policing. It is this legacy that Eustratios
sought to dismantle when he followed Aristotle in distinguishing wisdom in the arts from wisdom proper. For, while wisdom proper encompassed substances and the things in themselves, the wisdom of the
arts only addressed the accidental qualities of such a thing. This distinction leads Eustratios to distinguish theology, the highest manifestation
30
31

This thread can be found throughout Barber (2007).


Conciliorum Oecumenicorum Decreta 148.

on the separation of art and theology

143

of wisdom proper, from what is now a dierent and secondary wisdom,


namely that of the arts. In so doing, it can be suggested that by linking and then distinguishing artistic and theological wisdom in his Ethics
commentary, Eustratios was attempting to escape from the problems
that had arisen throughout the eleventh century and now in his own
career from the use of the icon as a litmus test of orthodoxy.

THE ANONYMOUS
COMMENTARY ON NICOMACHEAN ETHICS VII:
LANGUAGE, STYLE AND IMPLICATIONS

Elizabeth A. Fisher
The anonymous commentator on NE VII has gained a tripartite reputation for incompetence among the scholars of the past two centuries who have examined his work. Their verdict is unanimous: he
is incompetent in managing the morphology and vocabulary of Greek,
incompetent in mustering adequate Greek style to express himself, and
incompetent in understanding and explicating philosophical ideas. As a
philologist by training and inclination, I cannot discuss Anonymous as
a philosopher, but his capabilities as a writer of Greek and some peculiarities of his interests as a commentator seem to be worthy of further
examination. My observations on this topic at the Notre Dame workshop also elicited some very interesting observations from the other
workshop participants on the similarity of Anonymous commentary
to the work of other known Aristotelian commentators as well as on
the possible identity of our elusive subject. Accordingly, I shall treat not
only Anonymous language and style but also the implications of those
topics for contextualizing his commentary.
Whatever his own limitations, Anonymous travels in the company of
respectable commentators whose treatments of individual books of the
Nicomachean Ethics were assembled by Eustratios and Michael of Ephesus at the instigation of Anna Komnene.1 These early twelfth-century
scholars selected existing commentaries on some books and supplied
their own commentaries to Books I and VI (Eustratios) and to Books V,
IX and X (Michael).2 Did Michael and Eustratios invite Anonymous
and his commentary on Book VII into their select circle, or did his
work intrude into the collection without their endorsement later in its
textual history? The question is open, since the first evidence of this
collection as it now survives dates from the mid-13th century, when
Robert Grosseteste, bishop of Lincoln, translated into Latin these com1
2

Browning (1990) 399.


Mercken (1990) 407441.

146

elizabeth a. fisher

mentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics.3 The surviving Greek manuscripts


that contain the Anonymous Commentary on Book Seven all postdate
Grossetestes translation.4
In the opinion of H.P.F. Mercken, editor of Grossetestes translation,
Anonymous is so incompetent that Michael and Eustratios could not
possibly have approved his commentary on Book VII for inclusion in
their collection; Anonymous must be an intruder who arrived late.5
Inferior to the other commentators in matters both of style and of
substance, Anonymous is now considered an egregious interloper in
their company.
In 1816 F. Schleiermacher distinguished Anonymous from the other
commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics by labeling his work not so
much scholia as exegesis; Schleiermacher then lodged a series of complaints against Anonymous:6
1. His understanding of familiar philosophical concepts is flawed
(e.g.,  . . Anon. 414.2128)
2. His remarks are tasteless (abgeschmakkter), e.g., regarding the
child-eating monster Lamia (Anon. 427.3840)
3. His Greek syntax is faulty, for he always (immer) uses a neuter
plural subject with a plural verb
4. His vocabulary is corrupted by the Latinism  for A (Anon. 428.13 and 29)
Schleiermacher characterized Anonymous commentary as exceeding
everything in its poverty (an Drftigkeit alles bertreend) and concluded that it is a shoddy eort (Machwerk). Concerning the identity of Anonymous, Schleiermacher speculated that he was a physician,
because he frequently incorporates examples from medicine into his
commentary.
H.P.F. Mercken not only took up Schleiermachers complaints
against Anonymous but also further multiplied and interpreted them.
After reiterating the poverty of the commentary on Book VII and the
commentators inadequacy as a philosopher, lack of good taste and
Rose (1871) 6566.
Heylbut (1892) lists three manuscripts of the fourteenth century, five of the fifteenth, one of the late fifteenth or early sixteenth century, two of the sixteenth century,
and one of the seventeenth century; the Aldine Edition dates from 1536. All citations of
Anonymous text are to the Heylbut edition.
5 Mercken (1991) * 26.
6 Schleiermacher (1838) 309326.
3
4

the anonymous commentary on nicomachean ethics vii

147

lapses in elementary aspects of classical Greek such as his combination


of plural verbs with neuter plural subjects and use of the Latin calque
, he conceded that sixth-century authors do combine plural
verbs with neuter plural subjects but declared the usage unclassical and
foreign to the practice of Michael and Eustratios in their commentaries
on the Ethics.7 Mercken added to the list of stylistic lapses committed by
Anonymous his use of a present form built on the aorist , and his
relentless repetition of Q in explanations in his commentary. Repeating Schleiermachers suggestion that Anonymous was a physician, Mercken dated his activity before Grossetestes mid-13th century translation
of the Ethics commentaries but after the work of Michael and Eustratios.8
Leaving aside the issue of his abilities (or lack thereof) as a philosopher, let us examine in detail the aspects of Anonymous language and
style that have so oended Schleiermacher and Mercken. First, regarding their charge that Anonymous is tasteless in commenting upon the
child-eating monster mentioned by Aristotle, we may compare the original passage from Aristotle with Anonymous comment upon it. When
Aristotle says I mean monsters, like the female who they say ripped
open pregnant women and ate their children,9 Anonymous makes
Aristotles general statement about monsters more precise by noting
that such behavior characterized the Lamia: [Eating children] seemed
sweet to the Lamia. The Lamia was a woman in the Pontus region
who, because she had killed her own children, devoured the infants of
other women.10 Anonymous brief remarks on the Lamia are standard
in the folktale tradition surrounding her except for his observation that
the Lamia was native to Pontus. This information is unique to Anonymous,11 who is apparently attempting to integrate the Lamia with the
savage and cannibalistic tribes '  . mentioned immediately
after her by Aristotle (1148b2224) and further specified by Anonymous as $ . . .  ' . (428.1). Although his remarks on
the Lamia might suggest that Anonymous displays shoddy scholarship
Mercken (1990) 437438.
Mercken (1990) 408409.
9 " ? * 7, O N A ] " *  &
*   (EN 1148b2022).
10 ). ? CL P .   < '  ., s . &7 *
#, ", *  A  " Q (427.3839).
11 The online Thesaurus Linguae Graecae (hereafter, TLG) cites only Anonymous for the
combination of Lamia with Pontus.
7
8

148

elizabeth a. fisher

or a pedantic disposition, on this topic he is no more tasteless than


Aristotle himself.
If the remarks of Anonymous are not incongruous with Aristotles
original text in the matter of taste, does his practice regarding neuter
plural subjects with plural verbs indicate that his Greek falls short of
the classical standard? According to Herbert Weir Smyth, no; a singular verb is regular with a neuter plural subject in Attic Greek, but
the plural verb does occur in Homer, Thucydides and Xenophon.12
Moreover, Anonymous does not, as Schleiermacher claimed, always
(immer) employ the less regular usage. A sampling of Anonymous
neuter plural subjects using the TLG isolates this example of the regular and less regular Attic usages in one sentence: *  * +
; " &L, . ; F N . =. (422.23).13
Similarly, Anonymous uses singular and plural verbs in equal proportion with neuter plural subjects within the space of 21 lines on p. 433
(lines 323). Some passages, on the other hand, demonstrate Anonymous fixation on one usage or the other. Neuter subjects occur with
singular verbs three times within four lines on p. 419 (lines 25) and
with plural verbs five times within nine lines on p. 425 (lines 2836).
Anonymous may be following the preference of his source closely in
these latter instances; however, the examples of regular and less regular
usage in close proximity suggest to me that Anonymous was indierent
to this matter. In his dialect and to his native speakers ear, both usages
were acceptable.
Pace Schleiermacher and Mercken, both Eustratios and Michael of
Ephesus demonstrate a similarly casual attitude regarding this point.
Checking the incidence of singular and plural verbs with neuter plural subjects in the TLG turns up instances of both usages in Michaels
commentary,14 even in the same sentence on p. 502 lines 1920: #' ?
* *  &   , T \ { .
Eustratios also wavers between neuter plural subjects with either singular or plural verbs;15 an example of each appears juxtaposed on p. 9
lines 13n14n: | #' " * * * , )  
"  ) * F and on p. 21 lines 2425: )' * c *
Smyth (1956) 959.
See also ; M F *  . &*  " , 433.23.
14 For example, see the plural verbs at 463.17, 473.19, 495.17, 507.19, and 512.7; a
singular verb occurs at 464.10.
15 For example, see the plural verbs at 8.27n, 12.9, 19.20, 49.35, 66.1, and 67.32;
singular verbs at 7.27, 10.28, 13.1.
12
13

the anonymous commentary on nicomachean ethics vii

149

H c * . ) & #' R  . Regarding this

point of grammatical usage, Anonymous modern critics prove to be


much more rigorous that two notable early twelfth-century commentators on Aristotle. Perhaps their lapses are not as frequent as those of
Anonymous, but they are nonetheless evident.
Anna Komnene herself demonstrates twelfth-century stylistic practices consistent with the usage of Anonymous. In a list of Annas deviations from the rules of classical Greek grammar, Georgina Buckler
notes the frequent occurrence of neuter plural subjects with plural
verbs in Annas prose.16 Further, both Anna and Anonymous share a
penchant for sometimes choosing Latin words when native Greek
words exist. In Annas Alexiad we find . (forum replacing &),
. (gate instead of ),  (gorge or pass from Latin
clausura for # ), etc.17 Annas choice of Latinisms apparently in contemporary use over their more dignified and classical Greek synonyms
resembles Anonymous use of  instead of A at p. 428
line 29 and also in close conjunction with the classical word that he also
knew (428 lines 1213: F ? 0 , , *  ? ,,  )  A . ) M *    ., 0 ,
 )  ). The root - is not unusual in the vocabulary of twelfth-century authors: e.g.  (John Phokas), 7
(Typikon of the Pantokrator), nor unprecedented in the tenth century.
Constantine Porphyrogennetos uses . in De cerimoniis.18 These
authors write to instruct and to inform their readers rather than to dazzle them with rhetorically sophisticated vocabulary and constructions
imitated from classical Greek. Robert Browning has discussed the linguistic register they adopt as coexisting with the formal and artificial
style aected by Atticising authors and quotes Constantine Porphyrogennetos justification for using it: So that what I write may be clear
and easy to distinguish, I have employed a conversational and simple
style, using the same words, and the appellations long attached to each
object and uttered in regards to it.19 Browning terms the stylistic register they employ technical Koine, typified by a toleration of vocabulary drawn from contemporary speech, simplified sentence structure,
Buckler (1929) 483, n. 7.
Buckler (1929) 487.
18 Lexikon zur byzantinischen Grzitt, s. v.
19 Browning (1978) 103104; translation of Constantine Porphyrogennetos De caerimoniis 5.2.4, by Robert Browning.
16
17

150

elizabeth a. fisher

and a relaxed attitude towards the syntax and morphology of classical


Greek.20 Commentators on law, medicine, rhetoric and literature typically settled into this register as the most appropriate and useful for
instruction and explanation; in the twelfth century, Eustathios of Thessalonike used both an Atticising style in making rhetorically dazzling
speeches and technical Koine in explicating Homer. When placed in
this stylistic environment, Anonymous indierence to the niceties of a
verbs number with neuter plurals, his use of the Latinism ,
his toleration for the unclassical form , (a present form generated
from the aorist of ) ), and his unsophisticated style marked by the
repetition of Q may be seen as practical in terms of the needs of his
contemporary audience, even if not acceptable to Schleiermacher and
Mercken.
Karl Praechter sketches a situation in which a commentator like
Anonymous might present his exegesis of a text that he first read out
to students listening to his lecture.21 In the context of a lecture hall
or classroom, Anonymous use of , may provide a useful example of his strategy to engage his audience. Commenting upon Aristotles views on bodily pleasures, Anonymous observes, For if someone
is hungry and gobbles and feeds, pleasure then follows for him.22 In
switching between the colloquial Koine word , and the Atticising
,23 Anonymous accomplishes a juxtaposition of linguistic registers that could be interpreted as a sort of humorous device intended to
engage and divert his students; I have tried to replicate this eect by
contrasting the register represented by gobbles with the more formal
one reflected in feeds.
In the context of such a classroom environment, Anonymous habit
of accumulating explanations with the repetitive and unimaginative
conjunction Q does have some purpose. His audience, eager for
instruction and grateful for explication of each concept he introduced,
might find repeated illustrations marked by the familiar Q welcome
as the modern reader/ philosopher does not. Anonymous reliance
upon this pedagogical strategem is easy to cite but too frequent to
document in full. Two examples will illustrate Anonymous practice.
Browning (1978) 107108; for the twelfth century, see 119123.
Praechter (1990) 4044.
22 #  P ' , ' , . V ;D  (448.16).
23  occurs in Chrysostom, Theophilos, Aesop and Georgios Monachos;  occurs in Aelian, Hesiod, Eubolos and the Septuagint.
20
21

the anonymous commentary on nicomachean ethics vii

151

On page 408 eight instances of Q occur within ten lines of text (12
21), and on page 410 eleven instances occur within eighteen lines (17
36). To gauge the eect of this prominent aspect of Anonymous style
as a commentator, let us examine Aristotles text at the opening of NE
VII (1145a1520) with Anonymous commentary following it:
* ? + ", A " & , M  ' * Q
  )' J,  & .. * ) , ?
' L>  ? * &N  ) +>  ? N
.  Z G. " N =?  & , 
' 

Anonymous resorts repeatedly to Q as he comments upon this passage:


3  ,     ' * Q   "
) , p , &,,  #' J .  *  &
 , p , &,.  *  '   '  &,
CU , & , p , &, I . , 0 , 
&    $ &, % # ) , , CL P
' CL &P,  #.  ? ,   ) CL P,
+ & ( *  & CL p CL &CL),  ",  
) CL &P, + ). ) 0 7 ', 
CL ? .,  G. #, & , N =?  & ,
 N N ' . (p. 408. 1221)

Although Michael and Eustratios occasionally use Anonymous beloved


conjunction, their commentaries on the NE do not present the dense
thickets of Q typical of Anonymous style.24 A desire to be at once
comprehensive, organized and precise typifies this commentary and
also the derivative eleventh-century rhetorical commentaries of John
Sikeliotes and John Doxopatres.25 As we shall soon see, other commentators punctuated their explications with Q or with Q as persistently
as Anonymous resorted to Q.
Does Anonymous commentary reveal that he was a physician as
well as a pedagogue? Citing his frequent references to medical matters,
Schleiermacher and Mercken believed that he was. Among such references is his hapax legomenon ,, which he identifies as , (kidney
disease): , F , . R , (423.25). Here Anonymous
24 Eustratios uses pairs of Q at p. 18.4041, p. 101.2223, p. 119.56, p. 119.16
17 and p. 352.2728; he uses Q alone at p. 366. 29. Michael uses pairs of Q at
p. 480.1920, 571.23, 583.35, and 614.35615.1.
25 Browning (1975) 9.

152

elizabeth a. fisher

demonstrates the same enthusiasm for medical synonyms that we have


seen in the case of his Latinized reference to  (428.1213) used
in conjunction with & , the classical word occurring in Aristotles text: \ 7, F &  ' L (1148b28). Anonymous reference to charcoal eating rewards examination in the fuller
context of his remarks, where he explains the phenomenon according to the theory of humors, central to post-Galenic medical thinking.26 Paraphrasing Aristotle, Anonymous states, It is seemingly pleasurable to some, although contrary to nature, to eat charcoal. For in
persons with an excess of melancholic humor, it is seemingly pleasurable to eat charcoal. In others, however, for whom the acidic humor
predominates, it is seemingly pleasurable to eat earth or clay. From
some symptom, then, either of the melancholic or acidic humor, this
(condition) results.27 The theory of humors is by no means obscure
medical knowledge restricted to practicing physicians; it survives still
in such expressions as bilious temperament and sanguine disposition. Robert Todd observes that medical references are in fact common in the medieval commentaries to Aristotle and that John Philoponus, the sixth-century commentator on Aristotles De anima, left us
the best extant example of Greek philosophical commentary employing medical ideas but was neither a physician nor a philosopher by
profession but rather a grammatikos.28 Since the commentators generally
relied heavily upon the works of their predecessors,29 a philosopher of
Anonymous modest attainments should not be described as a physician
simply on the basis of his desire to display general medical knowledge
in his commentary.
Whatever his status vis--vis the medical profession and his deficiencies as a philosopher and stylist, Anonymous is at times a resourceful and colorful source of unusual and memorable literary tidbits. His
rather eccentric remarks regarding the child-devouring Lamia at page
427 lines 3839 have already been noted. Aristotles introductory remarks on the bestial man (1145a30) prompt Anonymous to remark,
Such a one was Echetos (O <  i 409.32), reminding his
Sarton (1952) 338339.
F ? 0 , , *  ? ,,  )  A . ) M *
   ., 0 ,  )  . A ? 0 ,
 )  L, Q ., M \7  F. &. 6 7 R
+ + R \7 + ;, ). (428.1116).
28 Todd (1984) 103105.
29 Todd (1995).
26
27

the anonymous commentary on nicomachean ethics vii

153

audience of Homers cruel tyrant, notorious mutilator of men (Odyssey


18.8587, 116; 21.308). When Aristotle cites Niobe and Satyros as examples of excessive devotion between parents and children (1148a35
1148b2), Anonymous supplies the full stories justifying Aristotles allusion (426.1629), not only fulfilling the role expected of a commentator
but also exceeding it; to the well-known narrative of Niobes insult to
Leto, mother of Apollo and Artemis, he adds information particular to
Homer, namely that Niobe had six sons and six daughters (Iliad 24.602
604). By adding Homeric allusions to Echetos and to Niobes children,
Anonymous reveals his own literary interests and his conviction that a
reference to Homer is always useful to engage and to inform an audience. He could be sure that his audience would recognize and appreciate allusions to Homer, for he observes that the Iliad provided the basis
for education in his time. Responding to Aristotles comment that students at an elementary level of instruction parrot words without understanding their real meaning, ($  .  ? 0
., J c> 1147a22), Anonymous specifically cites the first
few words of the Iliad: Similarly, contemporary children who are first
beginning to learn also parrot and say, Sing, Muse, the wrath although
they do not know nor understand what they are saying ( ? '
$ , $ +  &   ? ' "
L A , c ? J ' +  " 420.2729). Here,

Anonymous sounds like a grammatikos all too familiar with the frustrations of teaching students who grasp only superficially the texts their
teacher knows intimately and values profoundly.
Perhaps it is too generous to attribute details of the commentary to
deep-seated humanistic convictions on the part of Anonymous, since
he is persistently eager to supply literary context for mundane aspects
of Aristotles text. To illustrate the aection of an unrestrained person (& , cf. 434.19) for debilitating luxuries mentioned by Aristotle
as inducing softness ( .) at 1150a914, Anonymous specifies
Pramnian wine (,  ., O # ) , X 
, 434.30 and 32),30 apparently anticipating Aristotles characterization two pages later of the unrestrained person ( & ) as one who
gets drunk quickly and easily ( & ) , 0 "
' = \ J ' ) R I $  1151a56). Although
Anonymous may be an incompetent philosopher, at least he has read

30

Perhaps an allusion to Homer; cf. Iliad 11 line 639 and Odyssey 10 line 235.

154

elizabeth a. fisher

and remembered Aristotles text. He also appreciates wines other than


Pramnian. When the master mentions in general terms restorative
pleasures ( &" L  1153a28), Anonymous cites wine drinking among such pleasures and specifies Chian
wine (D , X 7 449.910).
Anonymous may at times be suspected of simply indulging his penchant for making Aristotles text more elaborate and more precise in
detail. When Aristotle cites lines from the sixth-century bce elegiac poet
Demodocus remarking upon the foolish Milesians (1151a810), Anonymous not only follows tradition in identifying Demodocus as a Milesian but also adds the detail that he was born on the island of Leros
( . " <  " 439.1516). Anonymous and
Diogenes Laertius (I. 84) are the only extant sources for this last tidbit
of information.31
In this highly selective discussion of Anonymous literary interests,
I have reserved to the end a particularly tantalizing instance either
of his scholarly industry and resourcefulness or of his willingness to
present pseudo facts without any basis in sources. Aristotle refers to
an unnamed monster who oered up for sacrifice and then devoured
his own mother (E  N "  ' 7 1148b26);
Anonymous confidently identifies this depraved person as Xerxes, king
of the Persians ( "    0 ' F N /+ " 428.1011). I can find no other source for this
astonishing revelation, although a second anonymous commentator on
the Nicomachean Ethics repeats it in the fourteenth century, apparently on
the authority of Anonymous or perhaps relying upon an unidentified
source they both share.32
At this point it may be helpful to summarize a philologists sketch of
Anonymous based on characteristics of his commentary.
1. His Greek vocabulary and syntax are neither inappropriate nor
without precedent for a Middle Byzantine writer using the technical Koine register of the language.
2. His writing style reflects the needs of students in a lecture environment.
3. His citations of medical information in his commentary indicate
that he is conversant with the tradition of Aristotelian commen31
32

Cf. Greek Elegiac Poetry from the Seventh to the Fifth Centuries bc, 404407.
Anecdota Graeca e codd. manuscriptis Bibliotecae Regiae Parisiensis, v. I, 423.

the anonymous commentary on nicomachean ethics vii

155

tators but not that he is necessarily a physician by profession; he


may have been a grammatikos.
4. He is well informed about literature and enthusiastic about incorporating into his commentary allusions to literary sources and
identifications of persons and places drawn from literature.
Might it be possible to identify Anonymous, or at least to situate his
activities in a particular time and place? Scholars have made some
intriguing attempts to do so. In the 1973 Introduction to the first volume of his Grosseteste edition, Mercken tentatively suggested that it
was Anonymous himself who compiled the NE commentaries rather
late (i.e., shortly before Grosseteste translated them) and who completed the set by supplying a commentary for Book VII where it was
lacking.33 In 1990, however, Mercken dropped this suggestion entirely
from the revised Introduction printed by Sorabji.34 In the 1991 Introduction to the third volume of his edition, Mercken specifically repudiated his earlier suggestion and remarked further that the incompetence of Anonymous disqualified him from any possible association
with Michael of Ephesus or the circle of Anna Komnene. Was it perhaps, he wondered, not in Byzantium that the last gap in the compilation was filled? (italics mine).35 Merckens rhetorical question is
somewhat ambiguous, at least to my ear. It is generally assumed that
the set of commentaries on NE originated in Constantinople; therefore,
I take Merckens question to imply a dierent place of origin. Since
Robert Grosseteste, working in Italy, assembled a group of Greek scholars to assist him in his Aristotelian studies,36 we might speculate that
Anonymous belonged to this circle. Lacking any supporting evidence,
however, a speculation it must remain.
An animated discussion at the Notre Dame Workshop centered on
the possible identity of Anonymous and produced some interesting
candidates. Peter Frankopan observed that Stephanos Skylitzes claims
to have written a commentary on the Nicomachean Ethics that is now
lost. Stephanos mentions this commentary incidentally in his scholia on
Aristotles Rhetoric, noting the succession pattern of Georgian and Celtic
kings and advising, Concerning such governmental practices, consult

33
34
35
36

Mercken (1973) * 28.


Mercken (1990) 437438.
Mercken (1991) * 2627.
Mercken (1973) * 3437.

156

elizabeth a. fisher

my scholia on the Ethics (' ?    & * )


, 8 , ., 277.2728).37 Could Stephanos Skylitzes be the
anonymous commentator on Book VII? In several respects, the little
that is known of his career and writings fits the profile of Anonymous.
Like Anonymous, Stephanos adopted the technical Koine appropriate for a commentary or collection of scholia. Although he exhibits
no inhibitions in using neuter plural subjects with plural verbs, as
in 8" ' )'  CN ? * , + [ # ,
(266.20),38 he also follows on occasion the classicizing usage combining
a singular verb with such subjects (e.g.,  *  &'
* *  &. 266.1112). Stephanos admits into his
vocabulary words of Latin origin like 8 (Aprilis, 272.19), # (iudicialis, 296.32) and + (clausura), which Stephanos labels
a word of the popular dialect (O * # * , "  269.23).39 He also resorts to the tedious repetition of Q
in a passage like 267.1319, where this alternative to Anonymous Q
occurs twelve times in seven lines:
? ? ; " {* &* * * )* ' # ' " ' . ' L 7
, # '  X ' .. # 6 *  L {L J
l ' . ' . '  &
+ ) , ' ) + U + +, {*
+ #? * >

Careful examination of Stephanos Skylitzes commentary on Aristotles


Rhetoric has enabled scholars to date its composition to 11221123, when
Stephanos was a mere twenty-six years old, and to locate its author
in Constantinople; since his lost commentary on the NE predates his
work on the Rhetoric, the earlier commentary was a notably precocious
eort.40 Stephanos enjoyed a truly meteoric rise as a scholar, appointed
hyperedros, then proedros at the St. Paul school directly upon completing
his own education there and revealing in his commentary great enthusiasm for the logical writings of Aristotle and a remarkable breadth of
literary knowledge.41 O. Schissel, for example, cites Stephanos refer37

Rabe (1896). All citations of Stephanos text are to this edition.


E.g., 264.1819, 271.16 and 272.11.
39 Buckler (1929) 487, notes that  (important mountain pass with a fortress
and garrison) occurs four times.
40 I have derived my summary of Stephens career from Wolska-Conus (1976) 599
603.
41 Wolska-Conus (1976) 605606.
38

the anonymous commentary on nicomachean ethics vii

157

ence to the Souda Lexicon (285.18) and to an unidentified lexicon to


Homer (306.89), as well as his aection for obscure mythological data
such as the details he provides on the career of Meleager (276.25 and
295.22, drawn from Apollodoros Bibliotheka).42 Nevertheless, he was not
a particularly talented or original philosopher. Wolska-Conus remarks
that the composition, language and inspiration of his scholia breathe
mediocrity.43 He moved, however, in an elevated social circle. Named
metropolitan of Trebizond at the age of thirty, Stephanos soon returned
to Constantinople mortally ill and died; his student Theodore Prodromos delivered a monody for his teacher and friend.
Chronologically and socially, the career of Stephanos Skylitzes fits
the circle of scholars who provided Anna Komnene with a commentary on the NE, and in some respects he resembles our mysterious and
unidentified Anonymous commentator on NE Book VII. Like Anonymous, he writes in a technical Koine style with an eye to the needs
of students and with a pronounced taste for literature and mythology; he is familiar with the works of Aristotle, but he is not an outstanding philosopher. That said, some of Stephanos characteristics as
a commentator are at odds with those of Anonymous. When stringing
together a series of alternatives, his preferred conjunction is not Q
but Q; unlike Anonymous, he includes in his commentary a significant
number of references to Scripture. The social and intellectual proximity
to the circle of Michael of Ephesus and Eustratios that Stephanos evidently enjoyed might militate against identifying him with Anonymous.
In the view of Mercken, Anonymous commentary on Book VII is so
egregious in its incompetence that Michael and Eustratios could not
possibly have selected it for inclusion in their collection.44 In the current
state of our knowledge, we cannot identify the Anonymous commentary on NE VII with Stephanos Skylitzes lost scholia.
During the discussion of Anonymous and his commentary at the
Notre Dame Workshop, Sten Ebbesen proposed an additional direction
for inquiry regarding his identity. Ebbesen observed that Leo Magentinos, bishop of Mytilene, supplied a popular commentary on Aristotles
Sophistici Elenchi that was frequently used by later medieval commentators despite its rather mediocre content and inelegant style. Although
little is known of Leo Magentinos career, Ebbesen dates his activity to
42
43
44

Schissel (1929) col. 2366.


Wolska-Conus (1976) 602.
Mercken (1991) * 26.

158

elizabeth a. fisher

the late twelfth or early thirteenth century.45 Just as Anonymous relies


heavily upon Q in his scholia on NE VII, so Leo resorts with annoying frequency to its equivalent Q in commenting upon the SE. An
example comes readily to hand in Leos scholion on 174b23, where
Q occurs five times within six lines of text:
,  ' 0 ) D,  D ,  , J ) $ &. I N ) ", J I' ",
 ) A "  ,   ) L '
& L ;, I' ",  ) A ", ,  ;
  & L ' ) L (Scholion 284 lines 1217).46

Not surprisingly, Leo Magentinos adopts the technical Koine register


in his scholia, generally pairing a neuter plural subject with a plural
verb as in his note on 164a22, ) [  *  , 
* N " ' * ) L ".  ? + # * 
 C (Scholion 2, lines 67, Ebbesen (1981) v. 2, p. 284). His practice
is not consistent, however. In his remarks on 168b31, he uses neuter
plural subjects with a plural, then a singular verb in close succession:
)' & ) I ! D ;D ' /' " ' & $
;, J  N )' D ' " = '  " X
'  D, % A &!  " '   '  A
&". ; & ? ? I * D ;D = ' &
#' ;> (Scholion 124, lines 1925, Ebbesen (1981) v. 2, p. 289).

Any detailed analysis of Leos Greek style and personal interests as


revealed by his scholia is complicated by the derivative nature of his
work. He was no philosopher of distinction, Ebbesen remarks, He
quarried the works of earlier commentators and he did not always
understand them.47 It is dicult, therefore, to characterize Leo as a
commentator or to compare him in specific terms to Anonymous or to
Stephanos Skylitzes. I cannot, for example, find any instance of Latin
vocabulary in Leos scholia; that may be because Leo adhered closely to
sources that did not use Latinate words. Literary and cultural references
in Leos commentary represent his interests inasmuch as he chose to
include rather than avoid them, but such references are rare.
Perhaps we see Leo briefly assume the role of cultural impresario
as he elucidates Aristotles text at 167a7. Aristotle states, . . . Owing
to the similarity of the language, to be something appears to dier
45
46
47

Ebbesen (1981) v. 1, 303.


Ebbesen (1981) v. 2, 292. All citations of Leos text are to this edition.
Ebbesen (1981) v. 1, 303.

the anonymous commentary on nicomachean ethics vii

159

only a little from to be, and not to be something from not to be.
In like manner when something is predicated in a certain respect and
absolutely . . . (i. e., anyplace and without qualification)48 (
? *   L " '  "  X + X,
'  N X + N X.  ? '  *  CN ' 
G> 167a57). Leo Magentinos expands vividly upon this passage:
Thus, if it seems good among the Triballoi to sacrifice their elders,
by this very fact and without qualification and in every place is this
considered good. Once there was this example of such; all the people
in the Golden Age were good according to Hesiod,49 but according to
him no person in the Iron Age was good (" # ) ,
, &   0 " , Q ' G ' # 
. &  + . + ? ?  +> 
$ ) D D " A *  g & ' <> ;' ?
A ) D D " ; &  <. Scholion 71, lines 7

12, Ebbesen (1981) v. 2, p. 287). According to the TLG, Leo shares this
particular combination of arresting examples only with an anonymous
scholion, where the similarity is striking: Both all people are just and
no person (is), but not at the same time nor always, but the one sort in
the Golden Age, the other in the Iron (Age). And in some places (it is
considered) good to sacrifice fathers. For (it is so) among the Triballoi,
but without qualification, (it is) not (good) ('  A 
' ;, ; B ? ; &, & $ ? )' + + ", $ ?
)' + +.   0 ,  .> ) , ,
G ;. Anonymi in Aristotelis Sophisticos Elenchos paraphrasis, Scholion
24, lines 1315). Did the anonymous scholiast rely upon Leo for this
combination of examplesor vice versa? Alternatively, did the two
commentators rely upon the same hitherto unidentified source?
Michael of Ephesus (= ps.-Alexander-2)50 also mentions the Golden
and Iron Ages from Hesiods myth in his scholion to this passage of
the SE, but without citing Hesiod by name: But also (there is) the
one who says that every person in the Golden Age was good and no
person in the Iron (Age was) good, then concludes that every man and
no man was good (&* '  "  A )' + +
" &  X ' ;" A )' + + & .,
Forster transl. (1955) 27; explication mine.
Cf. Op. 106201.
50 Ebbesen identifies ps.-Alexander-2 as the first edition of Michaels commentary
on the SE; cf. Ebbesen (1981) v. 1, 268.
48
49

160

elizabeth a. fisher

X l  A ' " A &  X,

lines 3034, Ebbesen [1981] v. 1, p. 268). Ebbesen identifies Michael


of Ephesus as a source favored by Leo Magentinos;51 Leo may have
adopted his reference to the myth of the Five Ages of Man from
Michaels commentary, adding Hesiods name in the process.
The reference to Triballoi is unusual applied to the SE; I can find
no instance in the TLG earlier than Leos. Leos wording resembles
Aristotles discussion of Triballoi in the Topics (115b2125); In the same
way, also, it is honourable in some places to sacrifice ones father, for
example amongst the Triballi, but without qualification it is not honourable. (Or is a relativity to persons rather than places indicated here?
For it makes no dierence where they may be; for, wherever they are,
it will be honourable in their eyes because they are Triballi.)52 (
; ? . ' 0 ?   " , O ) ,, G ; .. R + ? ; 0  &* > ;? * " M Z o> + * ;, F ., 6
,). Since Leo composed commentaries upon all Aristotles
logical works,53 he may have supplied the reference to the Triballoi
independently, based on his recollection of the passage from the Topics.
Does Leo Magentinos scholion on SE 167a7 help to redeem his
reputation as a commentator on Aristotle? Can we conclude that he,
like Stephanos Skylitzes and the anonymous commentator on NE VII,
demonstrates enthusiasm for specifying literary details and displays
some independent knowledge of Aristotles writings? The possibility
is open. However, certainty eludes us because the medieval commentaries on Aristotles works are still imperfectly and incompletely known.
Wolska-Conus noted thirty years ago that the task of preparing manuscript inventories of the myriad medieval Aristotle commentaries had
only just begun.54 Among them may lie Leos source for his scholion on
SE 167a7, quietly awaiting publication and recognition.
Our investigation of the anonymous commentator on NE VII leads
us to the same impasse. In the present state of scholarship, we cannot identify Anonymous nor even specify the period of his activity. His
commentary shares features both with the work of the twelfth-century
51
52
53
54

Ebbesen (1981) v. 1, 306.


Forster transl. 379.
Ebbesen (1981) v. 1, 302.
Wolska-Conus (1976) 604.

the anonymous commentary on nicomachean ethics vii

161

commentators in the circle surrounding Anna Komnene, and also with


the scholia of the late twelfth- or early thirteenth-century commentator
Leo Magentinos. Although he may be a mediocre philosopher, Anonymous remains a master of evasion.55

55 I am grateful to my colleague Professor Denis Sullivan (University of Maryland)


for helpful suggestions, valuable citations, and unfailing encouragement as I prepared
this paper; I also wish to thank Brje Bydn for his careful reading and helpful
suggestions on portions of the argument advanced here.

MICHAEL OF EPHESUS ON THE EMPIRICAL MAN,


THE SCIENTIST AND THE EDUCATED MAN
(IN ETHICA NICOMACHEA X
AND IN DE PARTIBUS ANIMALIUM I)*

George Arabatzis

I
Michael of Ephesus, when commenting on the last book of Aristotles
Nicomachean Ethics, gives lengthy consideration to the empirical man
and to a lesser extent the degree how this figure relates to the world
of education/culture. In my paper, I will not discuss the Aristotelian
text, but will concentrate on the structure and the possible coherence
of Michaels ideas. To facilitate this reading, I will present a series
of translations I have made of passages from Michaels commentary.
These will not give the total of Michaels thinking on this book, but
should oer the reader a good understanding of Michaels analysis. The
references in my text are to the CAG edition of Michaels commentaries,
although the punctuation of the translated passages is often mine.
In his commentary, Michael underlines the traditional Aristotelian
position regarding the importance of experience for the sciences and
the arts, noting that they combine logos and action:
. . .experience contributes greatly to the medical and other arts, whose
objective is not pure knowledge, but whose work consists of logos and
action. . .
(617.1214)

In a previous passage, Michael says that the problem of experience is


related to the question of the distinction between the general and the
particular and states that the domain of particular things possesses a
certain autonomy in relation to the world of generalities. Among the
knowers of particular things from experience, he not only mentions
doctors, but also fathers:
* A part of this paper is developing arguments from my book on Michael of
Ephesus; see Arabatzis (2006).

164

george arabatzis
he who knows the general will care for the particular; but the one who
does not know the general, there is nothing preventing him from caring
through experience about a particular thing and about what is good and
what is bad for him. Among those who are good for people are the
doctors who know from experience what can save them [their health]
and consequently, the father who knows by experience what sports are
good for his son so that he may train him better than a coach.
(614.1824)

The whole question is finally linked to the condition of the empirical man as knower: the empirical man is distinguished from the layman, who can possibly judge what is good and bad, but who lacks
the knowledge proper to the empirical man, meaning a dexterity
in accomplishing the practicalities of every particular thing in general:
empirical men [are prudent men and knowers] not only in music but in
everything in general; I call empirical men those scientists and artists
who occupy themselves in everything. In everything the empirical man
judges works appropriately, namely by which means and how we accomplish them. The doctor knows what is health and by which means and
how it is accomplished. The doctor knows what is health and by which
drugs and which diet it comes along and how to use them; but not the
layman. In the same manner, the painter knows which icon is the best
and where somebody makes an error and in which part [of the image]
and it is impossible for inexperienced and unskillful men to conceive and
realize such a work; but it is dear to them [the laymen] to know if the
work has been well done or not. Accordingly, those who are not politicians cannot legislate but possibly they can judge if the laws are good.
(618.212)

The last remark introduces us to the question of the role of laws as


models of knowledge for the empirical man. This point follows upon
Michaels identification of a contradiction inherent in the nature of law.
At first, Michael points to the weakness of law as a generality that may
be surpassed by the reality of action:
law for general issues and actions for particular issues are what is best;
as for medicine, we should not always follow the generalities, but there
are things for which general laws are erroneous and say otherwise; so the
doctor does otherwise according to each case; it follows then that neither
should the law command the whole reality.
(612.2025)

In another passage, Michael points to the strength of law which is its


power to compel; this power is not due to violence but to the prudence
and the intelligence of the eldest, that follows upon long experience,
and to the legitimacy granted them by the people who are convinced

michael of ephesus on the empirical man

165

that laws are indeed products of prudence and intelligence and that
they also produce prudence and intelligence:
It is habitual for Aristotle to name intelligence that which is superior by
art or prudence or experience or prediction or discovery of the good
and the useful. We need intelligence to become good. But the fatherly
intelligence, meaning someones father, possibly will choose the good,
unless he is vulgar and of the populace, and will convince healthy men
directed toward the good to act for the good; but for vulgar characters,
he [the father] is feeble and set aside and does not have what it is needed,
meaning the violence of law; because the natural [fatherly] filter blocks
the violence toward the son. So, what can one say about the father? One
man cannot wholly command all the sons of a state unless he is a king or
a tyrant. These latter can accomplish this task because they have plenty
of power. But, for the reason that not all states are under the command
of one king or tyrant, we need laws. Every law has the power to compel
because it is a discourse that derives from prudence and intelligence
and posits prudence and intelligence. And prudence and intelligence
concerning actions come after long experience. And he [Aristotle] said
when he spoke about prudence that we should accept the sayings of the
experienced and the eldest as Principles. Because they possess an eye
gained from experience; he called the prudence through which they can
see that which will be useful eye. So, people obey laws believing that the
legislators made the laws because they were able to perceive in advance
through their eye the good and the useful.
(608.27609.10)

The two passages above go beyond the stated contradiction in the law:
that is, that the law as a mixture of logos and action is simultaneously
complete and incomplete. As logos it can account for great experience
and can also produce good actions. At the same time, it is incomplete
because it cannot account for the totality of reality. Yet, the law can
overcome a gap in reality: the father who is sucient for the supervision
of one son is insucient for the supervision of all sons, while a king or a
tyrant cannot stand as fathers for the whole of society. Later, Michael
does not forget to raise the question as to whether laws can eectively
make many people good. The problem is there related to the legislator,
who is conceived as an educator. Like the teachers of arts and sciences,
the legislator who can make one man good can also do the same for
many:
The distinction between laws that are fair and evil is the work of the
legislator, just as it is the work of the doctor to distinguish what is good
from what is bad for the health . . . it is to be considered, they say,
whether the law that can make somebody good can make many like him
and whether that which is useful for many is also useful for one. This is
one and the same question. He who is right and without error does the

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same regarding the other arts and sciences and the artists and scientists.
As it happens there, where the one capable of teaching and making him
a doctor or a musician can make many like him and, respectively, he who
can make many can make one, the same happens with the law: who can
make one great can make many likewise and vice versa.
(611.2431)

Still, in a previous passage, Michael declares that many are estranged


from the virtue of the educated man. While the educated man is
characterized by aidos (shame, self-respect, sense of honor), the many
only obey the good because of fear and the threat of legal punishment:
the educated are accustomed to stay away from the evil and to listen to
the words of those who profess the good and run toward them; but as for
the many, it is impossible to turn them toward the good. . . because the
many, if they ever show themselves unfaithful to evil and respond to the
good, they dont act out of aidos but because of fear or the threat of legal
punishment.
(606.16)

Aidos is a dicult word to translate and even more dicult to understand in the context of the Byzantine society of the eleventh-twelfth
centuries. It is, however, very probable that it had an anity with the
concept of timiteron in science that we are going to examine below.

II
In order to understand the relation between the empirical man and the
educated man we must turn now to other texts by Michael of Ephesus.
Thus, in his scholia and glossae In Politica, he states that:
we call the craftsman an empirical man and the architectural man a
logical man. We call craftsmen those who are actually identified as
the subordinate assistants, architectural men those who are now named
doctors and chief doctors. The proemium of the first book of the de
Partibus Animalium correctly identifies the educated man in every art
and science, and I myself also discuss this in my commentary on the
book.1
(306.2834)

Let us now follow this reference to the following assertions in Michaels


commentary in de Partibus Animalium I:

1 This is for the present time the only non CAG edition of a Michael of Ephesus
text; see In Pol.

michael of ephesus on the empirical man

167

in terms of geometry, the educated man is not the man who is accustomed to geometrical theorems (such a man is called the chief [kyrios]
scientist), but is he who possesses the geometrical principles and knows
some theorems and is able, on the basis of these, to judge whether his
interlocutor is a geometer according to geometrical principles and if he
converses as a geometer ought. The man who has [the knowledge] of
geometrical, mathematical, astronomical, physical principles and simply
[hapls] of every art and science ( . . .) such a man should be identified as
being completely educated, as one who is educated about everything and
possesses the principles of everything, and who is thought to be capable
of judging everything, and is one in number; such a man is not many but
one ( . . .). It is obvious from the above that the scientist is an educated
man but that not every educated man is a scientist; even if he ever theorizes (theorei) about it [the truth of a scientific assertion], the educated
man does not determine (skopei) in advance the truth or not of the object
(that is the work of the scientist), but his work is to theorize whether the
object is geometrical and is shown according to geometrical principles.
(1.32.10)

The original Aristotelian text that Michael comments upon states that:
Every study and investigation, the humblest and the noblest (timiteran)
alike, seems to admit of two kinds of proficiency; one of which may be
properly called educated knowledge of the subject, while the other is a
kind of acquaintance with it. For an educated man should be able to
form a fair judgment as to the goodness or badness of an exposition. To
be educated is in fact to be able to do this; and the man of general education we take to be such. It will, however, of course, be understood that
we only ascribe universal education to one who in his own individual
person is thus able to judge nearly all branches of knowledge, and not to
one who has a like ability merely in some special subject. For it is possible
for a man to have this competence in some one branch of knowledge.
(639a112, transl. W. Ogle, p. 994)

We see that Michaels commentary points firstly to the fact that the
educated man is one in number, a this, and more precisely one not
many. Another interesting statement concerns the scientist being an
educated man but not every educated man being a scientist. Michaels
definitions ought to be of interest to modern scholars, in that his commentaries refer to notions like numerical identity and numerical dierence concerning the educated man and the scientist, to the asymmetrical relation between them, or rather, to the referential opacity that
covers the two terms as well as to their ontological status.2 It seems that,

For a summary of the relevant research see Gil (2005).

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according to Michael, Aristotle makes a classification of the educated


men and the scientists before he proceeds with his other classifications
of the animals.
This is a view that is generally neglected in modern analysis of the
above passage of the Parts of Animals. Characteristically, Kullmann insists
on the many possibilities of interpretation that this text oers.3 Balme
makes a threefold distinction between the specialist who knows the data
of his particular science, the educated man that, whether a specialist or
not, can distinguish if an explanation is based on the proper Principles,
and the man who can do that for one science and not for another.4
For Terence Irwin, the Aristotelian educated man is the man capable of
distinguishing between sciences, that is to state the dierence between
mathematical and philological sciences; it is the educated man, he says,
and not the scientist, to whom Aristotle addresses the greater part of his
work.5 For J.-M. Le Blond the near identification of the educated man
with the dialectician clearly shows Aristotles withdrawal from his scientific rigor for the benefit of his dialectics. The reason for this withdrawal
was that, having returned from Asia Minor to Athens, he addresses an
Athenian public that held dialectics in the highest esteem. The praise
of the educated man shows also, according to Le-Blond, that general
education needs some deep knowledge of science and cannot be exclusively formal.6 For Dring, who does not refer extensively to the passage
examined here, there is not the slightest withdrawal in the Introduction to Parts of Animals towards dialectics but the continuation of the
Aristotelian interest for speculative philosophy.7 It is Pierre Aubenque
who has examined the above passage more thoroughly; he rejects Le
Blonds view that Aristotles thesis is conditioned by the fact that he was
addressing the Athenian public and instead insists on the critical epistemological function of the educated man. The turn towards general
culture is an anti-Platonic step taken by Aristotle under sophistic influence. Science cuts o humans from the totality of their existence and
the scientist, as a specialist, is alienated from other humans and even
from himself. As long as dialectics is not a science it can be re-evaluated
by Aristotle with the intent of humanizing science. The reason for the

3
4
5
6
7

Kullman (1974) 67.


Balme (1972) 7071.
Irwin (1988) 2729.
Le Blond (1945) 5254, 130.
Dring (1943) 34 .

michael of ephesus on the empirical man

169

need of this dialectics of general culture is that the foundations of science itself escape scientific reasoning. Aubenque, therefore, in declaring
that Aristotle, although a scientist himself, refused to consider science as
an absolute value, interprets the Aristotelian text in light of some very
modern anxieties about the role of science in society.8

III
Before we continue with Michaels analysis of the relations between
the empirical man, the scientist and the educated man we have to
acknowledge and answer two questions: What is modern scholarships
opinion regarding both Michaels commentaries In EN and his wider
activity as a commentator? And, are the dierent positions proposed in
the dierent commentaries logically consequent? I will deal briefly with
these questions.
The latest theory about the scholiastic activity of Michael of Ephesus is that he, together with Eustratios of Nicaea (c. 10501120), wrote
commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics for the sake of the Byzantine
princess Anna Komnene;9 Michael produced scholia on the books V,
IX, X and Eustratios on books I and VI. Ancient scholia were used
for most of the rest of the books. Friedrich Schleiermacher held these
scholia in very high esteem, especially the ones by Eustratios.10 According to Mercken, it is probably the Christian Platonism of Eustratios
that attracted Schleiermachers interest, while Michael is said to be the
more Aristotelian of the two commentators.11 Anna Komnene, in her
famous historical book the Alexiad has only good things to say about
Eustratios but does not mention Michael at all.12 The modern editor
of the Nicomachean Ethics R.A. Gauthier has a remarkably lower opinion
of these commentaries than Schleiermacher.13 More recently, Michaels
activities as a commentator have attracted the attention of scholars
like Nussbaum, Preus and Konstan (see Bibliography). The fact that
Michael was the first to have commented on the biological works of

8
9
10
11
12
13

Aubenque (1960) 144149.


Browning (1990).
Schleiermacher (1838) 309326.
Mercken (1990) 416, 418, 434436.
Alex. 14.8.
Gauthier & Jolif (1970) 100105, 121.

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Aristotle and on his Politics after many centuries is most intriguing for
the modern historian of philosophy.
The question is whether and to what extent we can claim that
Michael of Ephesus views on the relations between education and
science in the commentary In PA are coherent with those expressed in
his commentary In EN. According to Browning, this latter commentary
is dated after 1118, the year of Anna Komnenes forced retirement to
the Monastery of Kecharitomeni.14 At one point in Michaels commentary
In Parva Naturalia (149.816), the author refers to his commentary In
PA in a list of his other commentaries that includes In Parva and In de
Motu Animalium. He also announces a commentary In Metaphysics V
XIIIa much debated question in modern scholarship as we will see
belowand says that what remains for him to do is a commentary In
de Coloribus. We find no mention here of his work In EN.
Michaels life is also very dicult to date. At the beginning of the
twentieth century Praechter, on the evidence of some anonymous scholia written before 1040 that contained passages by Michael, defended
the position that Michael was not, as it had been believed until then,
a pupil of Michael Psellos, but his contemporary. Ebbesen showed that
both the anonymous scholia and the passages attributed to Michael
were based on more ancient commentaries, so there was no need for
a co-dependency of the two. This point supports Brownings thesis that
Michael belonged to the circle of Anna Komnenes scholiasts. In his
commentary In Politica, Michael gives some information about himself,
as Ernest Barker has already noted.15 Here, Michael manifests a critical
attitude towards the government of his times. If we were to follow the
earlier date for his life and work, Michael would have been referring to
the reign of Alexios I Komnenos, but if we accept the newer hypothesis, then it can be suggested that he was thinking of Emperor John II
Komnenos, Annas brother and, arguably, the usurper of her throne.
Another passage that is critical of the Byzantine Emperor also indicates
that John Komnenos and not Alexios Komnenos was the subject of
the comment. Within the same scholia and glossae, Michael remarks
that the Turks desired the maintenance of a status quo with the Byzan-

14 Anna Komnene, first-born child of the Emperor Alexios I Komnenos, had the
ambition to rule the state together with her husband Nikephoros Bryennios after her
fathers death. It was her younger brother John who took over the command probably
with the collaboration of the dying Emperor and later forced Anna to monastic life.
15 Barker (1957) 140.

michael of ephesus on the empirical man

171

tines, even though they were superior in number. According to Barker,


who, following Praechter on this point, dated Michael in the eleventh
century, Michael is referring to the year 1096 when Byzantines and
Turks had a common enemy to face, namely the Crusaders. Following the more recent dating of his life and works, I think that Michael
is, in fact, referring to the period after 1130 when the Emperor John
chose not to attack the Sultanate of Ikonion, an ally of the Byzantines
at the time, but to march against the emirate of Melitene in Syria.16
Consequently, on the basis of this last comment, the scholia In Politica
must have been written after 1130 a date that should be considered as
the terminus post quem for the work. A commentary on the Politics must
have been of prime interest for Anna Komnene given her politically
ambitious personality. We can then assume that the views that Michael
held In PA were still representative of his views even after 1130. This
same year must be considered to be the terminus ante quem for this latter commentary. It is obvious from the above that both the scholia In
EN and In Politica belong to the later phase of Michaels commenting activity and that the author still maintained the positions expressed
In PA.

IV
It is now time to examine Michaels approach to the problem of the
relations between the empirical man, the scientist and the educated
man. At first, we may summarize his definition of the empirical man
following his commentary In EN in the following terms
(1) The empirical man is the man of particular experiences in general
Furthermore, any scientist/artist 1,2,3 . . . n is an empirical man, in that
he is interested in every particular thing, so that
(2) scientist / artist 1 is an empirical man
scientist / artist 2 is an empirical man
scientist / artist 3 is an empirical man
...
...
scientist / artist n is an empirical man
16

Ostrogorsky (1997) 45.

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Of course, (2) presupposes that


(3) every empirical man is not a scientist
In his scholia In Politics, Michael distinguishes between the empirical
man and the logical man with the dierence being between the arts
and the sciences.17 However, in his commentary In EN the dierence
becomes weaker as it is shown by the example of the doctor as a
scientist who cares for particularities and not only for general laws if
he wants to be eective in his science.
As for the educated man, Michael states that
(4) the educated man can identify the dierent sciences and know
some of their conclusions
Now, if we turn to the position of the educated man, in relation to the
scientist, we see that according to Michael
(5) every scientist is an educated man
but
(6) every educated man is not a scientist
It is clear that for Michael, and according to (5) and (6), unlike the
modern scholars I have mentioned earlier, the perception of the educated man does not mean any kind of withdrawal from the scientific
ambitions of Aristotle. The scientist of particular sciences continues to
be the peak of learning and not some educated man/dialectician that
would reign platonically over the sciences as one over many. In that,
Michael stays close to the Aristotelian idea of the autonomy of sciences.
If we phrase (5) in terms similar to (2) we should have
(7) scientist 1 is an educated man
scientist 2 is an educated man
scientist 3 is an educated man
...
...
scientist n is an educated man

17 We should keep in mind that for Aristotle this dierence is not always valid; see
NE 2,5,1106b515; Met. 981a12b9; however, see the subsequent passage Met. 981b25
982a3 where he returns to the distinction between the sciences and arts stated in NE
6,3,1139b1436.

michael of ephesus on the empirical man

173

What is then the status of the educated man? If we suppose that


some educated man is a scientist, we would have
(8) some educated man is a scientist 1
But in no case we can come up with
(9) some educated man being a scientist 1 is a scientist 2
because that would mean
(10) scientist 1 is a scientist 2
and would allow
(11) scientist 1 is a scientist 3
...
scientist 1 is a scientist n
This is absurd and would mean the end of the distinctiveness of the different particular sciences, a position very much unlike the Aristotelian
project; it would also be the end of the chief scientist according to
Michael. So (9), (10) and (11) are false.
Thus, the educated man is seen by Michael as a kind of limit permitting the distinction between the dierent particular sciences. Furthermore, the educated man being one in number, i.e. a this, cannot be
infinite and so stands as a limit equally for the infinite multiplication of
the sciences; thus in the series of sciences 1,2,3 . . . n, the n cannot stand
for infinity.
The final question about education concerns the relation between
the empirical man and the educated man and has to do with the
possibility that the scientist/artist 1,2,3 . . . n is the third term permitting
us to say that the educated man is an empirical man or an empirical
man is an educated man. The second inference would be absurd
according to (3), but the first could have some degree of truth, meaning
that in some aspects the educated man is an empirical man and more
precisely she/he is empirical in regard to the perception of empirical
data. The question is whether we could have a repetition of (5) and (6),
when the two terms are now the educated man and the empirical man
and are expressed in the following way
(12) every educated man is an empirical man
(13) every empirical man is not an educated man

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Would the dierence be that the educated man refers to sciences


and the empirical man to sciences/arts? That cannot be true, not only
because the status of sciences and arts is often identical in Aristotle, as
I mentioned above, but because Michael does not state the dierence
in his commentary In PA I, a passage that he himself considers authoritative on the subject. We have seen earlier that on the moral level the
educated man is entirely alien to the empirical man. I will try to show
that this also comprises the epistemological level and thus that (12) is
false.

V
It is important to investigate the way in which Michael faces the world
of empirical facts or in other terms the material world. In his commentary In PA I, writing about the famous passage that constitutes (for
Jaeger) Aristotles praise of empirical research,18 Michael states:
if someone thinks the theory of the parts of which animals consist to
be ignoble (atimon), for not producing pleasure to our senses, he must
think the same of himself; for, what pleasure can the menses of women
or the foetal membranes that cover the baby when it comes out of
his mothers belly, or the flesh, the nerves and such-like of which man
consists produce? It is significant that we cannot see without much
discomfort that of which the human species consists; we call discomfort
the sorrow that is produced in the senses or, as we might say, disgust.
(23.39)

The question of material bodies and their painful or pleasurable perception must be related, I think, to the following passage from the
commentary In EN, where Michael uses the term somatoeidis = bodily material, corporeal.
sight, for this species, is a perception without materiality, as Aristotle has
shown in the second book of De anima . . ., being without the material
from which they derive. Hearing and smell are more corporeal (somatoeideis) and they perceive the sensed objects more passively together with
their material.
(569.814)

We find only one occurrence of somatoeidis in the Aristotelian corpus, in


the Problems, XXIV, 936b35, where we read:

18

PA 5,644b22645b3; see Jaeger (1934) 337.

michael of ephesus on the empirical man

175

but substances which have body in them, like thick soups and silver,
since, owing to their weight, they contain much corporeal matter (somatoeides) and other resistance, because they are subjected to violent force
as the heat tries to make its way out, form bubbles wherever the heat
prevails.
(transl. E.S. Forster)

In Michaels passage, in contrast to Aristotle, we perceive a change of


perspective from objects to senses, from the knowable to the knowing
subject. This departure from Aristotle is combined in Michael with
some allegiance to a Platonism that is manifest in the following text
from In EN :
He (sc. Aristotle) says, that once the omissions and that which must be
supplied from elsewhere are brought together, in accordance with the
assumptions of the Epicurean and later Stoic philosophers concerning
happiness, one can attribute a share of happiness even to non-rational
animals, while according to myself and Plato and others who along with
us would place happiness in the intellective life, it is impossible for nonrational animals to be happy in that way. . . 19
(598.19 .)

The animals in the above passage must be considered to be bodies


without reason but not somatoeide because this last term refers explicitly
only to human beings. It is a term we find, in the way that Michael uses
it, in Platos Phaedo where it is said about the soul that:
Because each pleasure or pain nails it as with a nail to the body and
rivets it on and makes it corporeal (somatoeide), so that it fancies the things
are true which the body says are true.
(83d)

And, at another point, Plato speaks of the soul contaminated by the


body:
so that it thought nothing was true except the corporeal (somatoeides),
which one can touch and see and drink and eat and employ in the
pleasures of love, and if it is accustomed to hate and fear and avoid that
which is shadowy and invisible to the eyes but is intelligible and tangible
to philosophy (81b).
(transl. Harold North Fowler, 1960, Loeb Classical Library)

Furthermore, Michael in relating the distasteful vision of the parts of


the human body with science, he refers to the timiteron of science; it is a
relation that reminds us of the discussion in Platos Parmenides about the
existence or not of the ideas of the humblest, ignoble things =atimotaton
(Parmenides, 130c .). In response to this problem, Michael seems to
19

Quoted in Praechter (1990) 40, translated by Victor Caston.

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answer in the most unequivocal way: the timiteron of things depends


on the degree of the timiteron of human perception.
The question of pain and pleasure in relation to somatoeidis introduces
us to the way that Michael relates them to perception and to science
in his commentary In PA of the famous Aristotelian encomium of the
scientific work quoted above. It is obvious that the empirical world is
at the same time the world of facts and the world of the morally good
and evil. The second point is evident in the way Michael promotes the
higher (intellectual) pleasures against the lowersomatoeideis?ones:
Every mind is searching its proper good and intuits it or dreams about
it and submits to the animal and oppressive pleasures, which are not
properly pleasures because of their evil lessons and the necessary and
consequent ignorance of real pleasures. Because the judging mind is
overtaken by darkness regarding the nonesuch, real pleasures . . .
(In EN 910 538.12 .)

Michaels intellectualism seems to draw not only from Plato but also
from Proclus as it is shown in the next passage, where the Proclian
influences were noted by Carlos Steel20 and are indicated here in italics:
. . .escaping from the appetites of every kind and the consecutive sensations that
deceive the intellect and introducing fantasies as introducing forming and dividing
principles and something like an unsolvable multiplicity, rejecting the opinions as
multiple and in themselves and for the other things, and mixed to the senses and the
imagination (because every opinion acts together with irrational sensation
and imagination), returning to science and intellect, and after that to the life of
intellect and the simple intuition, and on the process receiving the illumination
from the divine and filling inside with the immaculate light. What is the
good by which the divine rewards those who engage themselves in the
intellect that is relative to it?
(In EN 910 603.1630)

We can see in the above that alongside the Proclian references are
expressions that remind us of a Christian orthodox vocabulary, such
as that of the Greek fathers of the Church, for example: filling inside
with the immaculate light. Michaels attitude is that of a Christian
or of a man that has been raised in a Christian cultural environment
or in a culture with a monotheistic ground. This is also evident in
another passage from his In de Motu Animalium, where Michael relates
the timiteron to the prior. We read:
Saying [Aristotle] that the first mover always moves, he adds, for the
eternally noble and the primarily and truly good, and not just occasion20

See Steel (2002) 5556.

michael of ephesus on the empirical man

177

ally good, like our goods (for these are not always goods), is too divine
and precious to have anything prior to it, i.e., that it is so divine that
nothing is prior in worth to it; for such a thing is more precious [timiteron] than anything.
(114.1115, transl. Preus)

How, then, is the question of the timiteron to be linked to Michaels


Aristotelism in a more precise manner than by simply positing some
vague Platonic or Neoplatonic influence? A critical reading of a remark
by Nussbaum allows us to do this.21 Nussbaum thinks that Michaels
expression: if there were, among beings and having reality, some powers greater than the powers of heaven and earth, they would move
tomorrow or some time (In MA 110.1416, transl. Preus) is a real
contribution to the comprehension of Aristotles expression: if there
are superior motions, these will be dissolved by one another (Movement of Animals 699b2526, transl. A.S.L. Farquharson). She thinks that
the Byzantine scholiasts hypothesis about a moving principle is correct, in that, if it could exercise a force greater than the forces of earth
and heaven, it would do so and thence destroy the world. Nevertheless, Nussbaum believes that Michaels interpretation of one another
as interaction of forces and bodies (for the words by one another are
equivalent to the earth by the force greater than its power, and the
heaven by the force greater than its power, op. cit., 110.1617, transl.
Preus) is erroneous. For Aristotle, according to Nussbaum, states that
the moving principle that has a force capable of moving and eventually
destroying the world must also be a bodya sixth body dierent from
the five physical ones; the reason being that Aristotle continues by saying that the force of the aforesaid body cannot be infinite because there
cannot be an infinite body: for they cannot be infinite because not
even body can be infinite (op. cit., 699b2728). In that way, Michaels
interpretation, Nussbaum says, is half rightas long as it points to one
moving principle for Aristotles passageand half erroneousfor not
attributing to this moving principle the quality of being a body. However, for a Christian or a man brought up in a Christian environment
as Michael was, his interpretation is placed midway between Aristotle
and his cultural setting. Furthermore, Michael includes physics among
the theoretical sciences and not, as certain commentators have tried to
defend, following a confusing statement in Parts of Animals, distinct from
the theoretical sciences.22 Yet, I dont think that Michael would wholly
21
22

Nussbaum (1978) 317318. For a dierent view, see Preus (1981) 75.
Balme (1972) 76 . and Dring (1980) 213221 for an opposite view.

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subscribe to a speculative worldview where first philosophy plays the


role of theology. He would rather leave this role to Christian theology. Thus Michael inherits the Neoplatonic intellectualism but not the
Neoplatonic metaphysics. This disposition allows him to value the exterior world, even its discomforting sides, as part of the creationin an
almost eucharistic mannerand at the same time to conceive what I
will describe below as a scientific intentionality towards the world.

VI
In view of the above, the problem of the relations between the educated
man and the empirical man becomes less crucial than the question
concerning the relations between scientists and empirical men. How
can (2) and (7) be true at the same time? Neither the distinction between
the sciences and the arts nor the criterion of practicality can be decisive
here. I think that what we need is to see the scientist in a more complex
way and the qua device can be of great utility. For Michael the scientist
of the particular sciences, the chief scientist (kyris), as he calls him, is
(14) a scientist qua doctor. . . qua geometer. . . qua naturalist, etc.
(14) is equivalent to the series: scientist1, scientist2, scientist3 . . . scientistn.
It is only this scientist of (14) that can be appropriately called an
educated man. Only a scientist of the particular sciences is an educated
man; in virtue of the fact that both the scientist and the educated
man may be called thises. We should note the conceptual aliation
between the hapls of the simply educated and the kyris of the
chief scientist from the commentary In PA, a similarity to which
Bonitz has already pointed in the Aristotelian corpus. So (7) must be
formulated in the following manner
(15) every scientist qua doctor. . . qua geometer. . . qua naturalist, etc. is
an educated man
There is also a scientist as a generic name that does not need a definition in terms of particular sciences; we can put this second scientist
between quotation marks and call him a scientist. It is this second scientist that must be called an empirical man since both the scientist
and the empirical man are rather generic names than thises. Thus (2) is
false and must be replaced by the following
(16) a scientist is an empirical man

michael of ephesus on the empirical man

179

We can see here how Michaels intellectualism, although inspired by


Platonism, finds itself in Aristotelism (the combination of the two traditions is a constant mark of Byzantine philosophy, before its final phase
anyway). The scientist and the empirical man are generic names due
to the fact that they are dealing with the material world that is itself
indefinite, informal, vague. By the same token, we can understand what
is the proper content of the educated man. The educated man marks
the dierence from the natural, material world and shows that intelligence is the proper nature of man. Thus, we can say
(17) the educated man delimits the dierent sciences, restricts the number of sciences and demarcates the intellectual man from nature

VII
It is clear by now that Michaels analysis of Aristotles introduction in
the Parts of Animals I is dierent from most of the analyses of modern scholars. Michael conceives of neither a humane critique of science, as Aubenque does; nor of a retreat in the face of dialectics, as
does Le Blond; significantly, he does not focus on the educated man, as
Irwin does; his approach is also distinguished from the question of Aristotelianism as speculative philosophy, that Dring emphasizes. I think
that while most of the above scholars perceive the relation between the
educated man and the scientist only in terms of Michaels first articulation concerning principles/theorems, this Byzantine thinker goes
beyond this (which for a medieval commentator such as him probably follows upon the dierence of proprieties found in Porphyrys commentary In Categories) and advances the articulation of Skopein/Theorein.
The first articulation, although implied in Aristotles Posterior Analytics, is
more clearly stated in Proclus Commentary in Euclids First Book of Elements. We may here perceive another filiation between Neoplatonic philosophy and the Michaels work as a commentator. The second articulation, like the first, is not a clear-cut distinction, and so diers from
Proclus, who would like to attribute dierent functions to dierent levels
of the intellect. For Michael, the two terms characterize both the educated man and the scientist, as the whole question is, I think, part of a
theory or proto-theory of scientific intentionality suggested by the terms
skopein and theorein. The first is the more immediate and proto-reflexive
intentionality, the one that probably causes the pain and the pleasure in

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george arabatzis

perception. The second intentionality produces the theorems, or otherwise the objects of theoretical activitythese objects are linguistically
formulated as terms / horoi but that does not mean that the objects
of the first intentionality are pre-linguistic; the activity of theorein can be
called theorization of the objects. In that way, the distinction between
skopein and theorein can be described as a distinction between intentionality of the content and intentionality of the object, a classical distinction
in the theories of intentionality after Brentano.23 The existence of such
a theory or proto-theory of intentionality is to be found in Michaels
commentaries. To the relevant passages quoted above, we must add the
following that Stan Ebbesen has drawn our attention to as the sole original contribution by Michael in his commentary in Sophistici Elenchi:24
The phrase the science is not in the species is equivalent to the science
is not said by the species although it is in the species. Such as the
medicine is a species of science (what is meant by the suppose it to be
the medical science, as it is in general) is clear that it [the science] is in
the medicine; yet, although it is in the medicine, it is not said by it; for, he
who says medicine does not say science; the reason for that is induced by
him [Aristotle] by saying the science is of the knowable, meaning that
science is said potentially of the knowable but the medicine is not said of
an object; neither grammary is said grammary of an object nor any of
the other particular sciences, as we have learnt from the Categories; so,
if somebody saying science means science of an object but he who says
medicine does not mean of an object, it is clear that the species is not
said together with the genre. Better, the assertion the science is not in
the species is equivalent to the science is not appearing in the species.
It is habitual for him [Aristotle] to use such interpretations as one who
says science does not say medicine although this last is under the science;
likewise, one who says double does not say half.
(183.824)

Michaels text refers to Sophistical Refutations, 181b25 . where, in relation


to the science of an object, the caution against repeating the same
things many times is discussed:
With regard to those which draw one into repeating the same thing a
number of times, it is clear that one must not grant that predications
of relative terms have any meaning in abstraction by themselves, e.g.
double apart from double of half, merely on the ground that it figures in
it. For ten figures in ten minus one and do in not do, and generally the
armation in the negation; but for all that, if someone says that this is
not white, he does not say that it is white. Double, perhaps, has not even
23
24

Simons (2001).
Ebbesen (1981) 270.

michael of ephesus on the empirical man

181

any meaning at all, any more than half; and even if it has a meaning,
yet it has not the same meaning as in the combination. Nor is knowledge
the same thing in a specific branch of it (suppose it, e.g., to be medical
science) as it is in general; for in general it is science of the knowable
(transl. W.A. Pickard-Cambridge; translation modified: science instead of
knowledge for the Greek word: episteme).

Concerning Michaels remark that it is habitual for him [Aristotle] to


use such interpretations, Ebbesen states that Michael means that Aristotle has the habit of turning his sentences upside down.25 I think that
Michael is saying something more here, meaning the caution about
what in the Sophistical Refutations is called repeating the same thing
many times. By drawing attention to the principle of not repeating
the same thing many times Michael refers to a passage of his commentary In PA (10.1030) and so relates this to the critique of the Platonic
dichotomy. I have located a very similar passage in the commentary In
Metaph. Z (521.1936)
As the animals are divided in animals endowed with feet and footless
ones, the feet-endowed animals must be distinguished by their proper
dierentiae and not say something like, from the feet-endowed animals
others have feathers and others not, if we are to divide appropriately;
because these are not dierentiae of the feet-endowed animals. But we
must distinguish them qua feet-endowed and say that other are clovenfooted and other not cloven-footed; this is the dierentia of the foot; the
cloven-footness is a kind of footness like the logical animal is a kind of
animal. But some people who are incapable and have not the power to
define the dierentiae of every kind, they do that, I mean they divide
by improper dierentiae. But the feet-endowed animals, even if they are
something else also, should be divided by their proper dierentiae until
we arrive to undivided ones that would be impossible to distinguish by
another dierentia. And then, there would be as many kinds of feet
as the last dierentiae of the feet-endowed animals that can not be
further divided. Because if, as he has often said, the genus after the
last dierentia is the species, it is evident that the feet-endowed animals
happen to be as many as the subsequent dierentiae; and if so, it is
obvious that the last dierentia is the substance and the definition of
the thing and we should include in the definition only this one and the
genus if we are not to say many times the same thing and babble.
(521.1936)

In the parallel text from the commentary In PA, after a similar argument, Michael concludes:
25

Ibid.

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george arabatzis
. . . If then the last dierentia is the main [kyria] one in distinguishing the
species, then the rest are said in vain; the last dierentia is implying the
previous dierentiae. If someone says that this is not the main dierentia
but the rest also and that we have to utter them as well then he arrives to
repeat many times the same thing; thats what he said in the book Z of
the Metaphysics.
(10.1030)

If there was a general agreement that the commentaries In Metaph.


EN are written by Michael, then this passage would be of great
interest for the present study. As it now stands, the disagreement of the
scholars about the paternity of the commentary In Metaph. EN ends
up unfavorably disposed towards Michael: for he is either the author of
these commentaries but not a great scholiast or he is making an untrue
statement when he says that he is the author.26 As for the passages In
Metaph. Z and In PA I that I have introduced as being very similar to
one another, if we follow Sten Ebbesens account of Michaels working
method (described as a hasty picking from every kind of source), then
this similarity does not allow us to identify conclusively the authorship
of the commentaries In Metaph. EN.
In relation to the rule of not repeating the same thing many times
could we refer here to a nominalistic intuition (opposed to an essentialists stand that is often connected with Aristotles Biology) in addition
to the intellectualism that I have ascribed to Michael? I think that we
ought to avoid such hasty categorizations when speaking of a Byzantine
commentator; his intellectualism or nominalism does not follow the
well-known Western Medieval philosophical concepts. For the purposes
of this study, it would be better to speak of a principle of economy in
expression that is possibly situated in the field of the notorious Byzantine aection for rhetoric. The originality of Michaels position is rather
to be found in his theory of the intentionalities related to culture and
the sciences.
It is a fact that the theories of intentionality are also well rooted in
the philosophical tradition of the Western Christianity (intentio), especially after Augustine; the presence of the concept in Greek philosophy
is a much debated question while the presence of Augustinian thought
in Byzantium is rather late and in any case, at least for the period that
goes from the Photian schism to the conquest of Constantinople by the

26 See In PN 149.1415; in fact, Michael speaks of the books Z to N. See Luna (2001)
and Taran (2005); see also Arabatzis (2006) 162170.

michael of ephesus on the empirical man

183

Crusaders, never too great.27 As to whether there was or was not a


theory of intentionality in classical philosophy that might have inspired
Michael remains an open question. Victor Caston is in favor of such
a theory in classical thought.28 For him, we must include among the
Greek terms that suggest intentionality the ones related to purpose,
like the verb skopein, especially in connection with books, letters and
discourses.29 I would like here to add, commentaries, as I believe the
distinction between skopos and theoria refers to the technique of commentary itself. In fact, commentaries are divided according to the purpose/skopos of the redaction and to a general discussion/theoria of its
topics.30 If Michaels paternity of the commentaries In Metaph. 513 can
be accepted, then the hypothesis of a proto-theory of scientific intentionality in him is strengthened by the fact that the commentary In
Metaph. 10 states precisely the manner in which philosophy is characterized by the activities of skopein and theorein:
[Aristotle] teaches that the philosopher is determining (skopein) and theorizing (theorian) being and that it is the proprium of a science to theorize
being qua being, just as the mathematician, when abstracting from his
discourse the harshness, weight, softness and heat and all that pertains to
the sensible nature of bodies, that is the contrarieties of the senses, leaves
only the continuum of size, lines, levels, solids.
(645.610)

However, Caston doubts as to whether theoria serves as a metaphor for


vision and, consequently, as a paradigm, such as Michaels, concerning
whether the viewing of parts of the human body could suggest some
kind of intentionality. Others defend the position that vision has a special meaning in Aristotle as being the most immaterial of the senses
and for having an epistemological significance as the paradigm for the
theoretical life.31 In Nic. Eth. X, theoria is presented as the pleasantest of
excellent activities (1177a2324, transl. W.D. Ross revised by J.O. Urmson). This leads to the following question: since for Aristotle every activity is characterized by its own pleasure on the basis of which there cannot be deduced any hierarchy of pleasures, how then can theoria be said
to be the pleasantest activity? This happens in much the same way as
vision is conceived as superior to other senses:
27
28
29
30
31

See Lssl (2000).


See Caston (2001) 2348.
Caston (1993) 219.
See Praechter (1990) 45 .
See Gonzalez (1991).

184

george arabatzis
sight is superior to touch in purity, and hearing and smell to taste; the
pleasures, therefore, are similarily superior, and those of thought superior
to these, and within each of the two kinds some are superior to others.
(1176a13, transl. W.D. Ross revised by J.O. Urmson)

Michaels commentary In EN 910 569.814, as well as the metaphor


of the eye of prudence from In EN 910 609.610, respond to this
passage. These and other passages discussed above speak in favor of a
theory or proto-theory of scientific intentionality in Michael. To these,
might be added the use of terms such as emphainesthai = appearing
from In SE 183.824, that does not point to perception alone, but also
to intellectual perception or, as I have said, to scientific intentionality. If
we notice that Michael defined the educated man as The man who has
[the knowledge] of Geometrical, Mathematical, Astronomical, Physical Principles
and simply [hapls] of every art and science and if every scientist is an
educated man (and if the philosopher purposes and theorizes like a
scientist does, as the passage In Metaph. 10 claimsif it is by Michaels
hand), then it seems possible that Michael has distinguished himself
from the long tradition, following Philoponus and John of Damascus,
that had promoted the First Philosophy as an art of arts and science of
sciences.
We can conclude by stating that according to Michael the relations
between the scientist, the empirical man and the educated man are
the following: (a) science is prior (timitera) in regard to intellect; (b)
following upon (a) Michael opposes the idea of the educated man as
an hyper-scientist such as Platos dialectician; (c) the educated man is
dierent from the empirical man as thisness is dierent from generic
names; (d) the above statements are part of a more general classification of science, culture and experience. In fact, by commenting on the
relations between the three, Michael not only underlines the classificatory power of the scientist, but also uses the scientist and the educated
man as model objects of classification. We therefore have every right to
speak here of a philosophy of sciences.32

32 The question left open is that of empirical data. We have seen in his commentary
In EN and In PA that Michael refuses to enlist in speculative philosophy and also
permits the infiltration of purified empirical objects into his theory of science. Yet,
the full presuppositions and implications of his positions remain to be clarified.

SOME OBSERVATIONS ON MICHAEL OF EPHESUS


COMMENTS ON NICOMACHEAN ETHICS X

Katerina Ierodiakonou
A study of the Byzantine twelfth-century composite commentary on the
Nicomachean Ethics cannot pass over Michael of Ephesus contribution
to it. For it is not only that Michael is undoubtedly the writer of the
comments on books V, IX and X,1 it has also been plausibly suggested
that it was he who compiled this commentary, bringing together the
comments of Aspasius, Eustratios and two anonymous commentators.2
He thus produced an invaluable tool for a better understanding of
Aristotles ethical theories, a tool which proved to be of great help
not only to the Byzantines, but also to the students of Aristotle in
the medieval West, who extensively used its Latin translation made by
Robert Grosseteste in the thirteenth century.
Nevertheless, we know next to nothing about Michaels life, and little
attention has been given so far to the content of his comments on the
Nicomachean Ethics. At least we now can say with confidence, thanks to
Brownings and Ebbesens research, that he lived not in the eleventh
century, as Praechter had argued, but in the twelfth century, and moreover that he most probably, together with Eustratios, belonged to Anna
Komnenas circle of intellectuals.3 It still remains unsettled, however,
whether Michael wrote his commentaries only while he was working
under Anna, or whether he worked on Aristotle also before and after
this period.4 On the other hand, we seem to be well informed about
the remarkable breadth of his writings as an Aristotelian commentator. He not only wrote commentaries on the Nicomachean Ethics, but also
on Metaphysics VVIII and on the Sophistical Refutations, both wrongly
attributed to Alexander, on the Generation of Animals, wrongly attributed
to Philoponos, on the Parva naturalia, on the Parts of Animals, on the MoveIn EN 5, In EN 910.
Ebbesen (1990) 451, n. 23; Mercken (1990) 437.
3 Praechter (1931); Browning (1990) 399400; Ebbesen (1981) 268285; Mercken
(1990) 430432.
4 Preus (1981a) 10, n. 22; Mercken (1990) 437.
1
2

186

katerina ierodiakonou

ment of Animals, on the Progression of Animals, all edited in the CAG series;5
furthermore, he wrote comments on the pseudo-Aristotelian treatise De
coloribus, which are still unedited,6 on the Politics, which have only partly
survived,7 and finally, on the Prior and Posterior Analytics, on the Topics, on
the Physics, on the De caelo and on the Rhetoric, which are unfortunately
lost.8
But Michaels surviving commentaries have not been studied in great
detail. It is only due to Ebbesens work that we know something about
Michaels logical comments on Aristotles Sophistical Refutations, and we
owe it to Preus and Arabatzis eorts that we know something about
Michaels comments on Aristotles zoological writings.9 Now, concerning the comments on the Nicomachean Ethics, there is no systematic study
of them. Mercken has discussed them in general terms, and he has
raised the general issue of whether Michael should be regarded as a
Platonist or as an Aristotelian. On his view, Michaels task as a commentator was to clarify Aristotles doctrines without taking sides; that is
to say, without being a militant Aristotelian, but also without trying to
force Aristotle into a Platonic, or for that matter, a Christian mould.10
Since there is no detailed study of any of Michaels comments on
the Nicomachean Ethics, I want to focus here on these comments, and in
particular on the comments on book X of the Nicomachean Ethics. To be
more precise, I want to discuss three issues which arise from Michaels
comments:
1. The use of medical examples
2. The distinction between two kinds of eudaimonia
3. The issue whether non-rational animals can achieve eudaimonia
I choose these three issues because I think that they themselves are
philosophically interesting, though I am not sure that what Michael has
to say about them is original. The fact that we have no other ancient

In metaph.; In SE; In GA; In PN ; In PA.


A graduate student in the University of Hamburg, V. Papari, is now preparing
under the supervision of Prof. D. Harlfinger an edition of these comments as part of
her doctorate thesis. The Latin translation of these comments, together with a German
translation, can be found in Col. 103129.
7 Pol. xviixxi and 293327 (translated in Barker 1957).
8 Praechter (1990) 5152. Conley (1990) 38 suggests that the anonymous Rhetoric
commentary in In Rh. is Michaels.
9 Ebbesen (1981); Preus (1981a) and (1981b); Arabatzis (2006).
10 Mercken (1990) 434436.
6

michael of ephesus comments on ne x

187

or Byzantine commentary on book X of the Nicomachean Ethics makes it


very dicult to judge whether Michael here just copies and rephrases
old material, as Ebbesen and Preus have claimed in the case of his
logical and zoological comments,11 or whether he has something new to
say. There is no doubt that if one wants to make an overall judgement
about Michaels originality, or give a general characterisation of him as
an Aristotelian commentator, one would need to work through all of his
commentaries in a systematic way; but this is beyond the scope of my
paper.
1. The Use of Medical Examples
Even a hasty reader of Michaels ethical comments cannot fail to notice
his frequent references to medicine. Aristotle, of course, does the same
in many places throughout the Nicomachean Ethics, but in Michaels
comments the occurrences of medical examples are certainly more
numerous and more striking; for they are more detailed and seem to
require a certain amount of in depth medical knowledge (cf. 618.25
619.4). It really is peculiar that this fact has not until now been used
as further evidence to support the claim that perhaps Michael was a
medical doctor.12
In the majority of cases Michael uses medical examples in his comments on Nicomachean Ethics X in order to clarify something in Aristotles ethical theory. For instance, in order to clarify the view that
pleasure is something which we desire for itself and not for the sake
of something else, Michael uses the example of medical treatment as
an illustration of the distinction he has in mind; obviously, drugs or
bloodletting are not desired for themselves but only because they can
restore a patients health (534.2934).13 Again, in order to clarify the
view that ethical virtues should be regarded as the final end of an
agents actions, Michael puts forward as an analogous case the example of health, which undoubtedly constitutes the final end of a doctors

Ebbesen (1981) 284; Preus (1981b).


Praechter (1906) 863864; Mercken (1990) 432433.
13 + ?   . ;' * )P  ., *  s, E 
. R " ,   , ., *   V $,.
+ * J F, *  )' N  %,  Z J % =C,
), ? J F *  N N 7, J Z ;N ' ; A .
11
12

188

katerina ierodiakonou

actions (594.2934).14 And there are many other similar cases in which
medicine is used as an example which Michael seems to consider as
simpler and easier to understand.15 But there are also at least two contexts in which Michaels use of medical examples is particularly interesting and enlightening.
The first case I want to focus on concerns Michaels comments on
Aristotles sentence right at the beginning of book X of the Nicomachean
Ethics. Aristotle verbatim says After these matters we ought perhaps next
to discuss pleasure (1172a19),16 and Michael undertakes to explain why
Aristotle here uses the adverb perhaps (isos). In doing so, he tries to
make sense of the reason why Aristotle includes in his ethical treatise
an account of pleasure, and thus raises the issue of the relation between
pleasure and eudaimonia.
According to Michaels comment (530.212),17 if Aristotle had
thought that pleasure actually is a part of eudaimonia, he would have
said that it is necessary in this context to talk about pleasure. For just
like in the case of a horse it is necessary to talk about the non-rational,
since it is part of a horse to be non-rational, similarly in the case of
pleasure, if pleasure is a part of eudaimonia, it would be necessary to talk
about pleasure in an ethical treatise on eudaimonia. If, however, pleasure is not a part of eudaimonia, but only its symptom, as it were, and
shadow, it would not be obligatory to talk about pleasure in this context, though of course we would still have the option to do so. Now,
from the two examples used here, that of the symptom and that of the
shadow, Michael in the rest of the passage chooses to further elaborate
14 I * #+  J '  ! V  , ' , M , '
, =, ' #. &N N  # ' + , 7. 
  , @ ' L , I " M '  F, $
* * p * &* \ ' ' " #' ' J  " ) V.

15 E.g. 531.2427; 542.2831; 543.23; 1618; 1922; 544.1015; 547.1417; 557.24


41; 562.2226; 564.1013; 573.1113; 1921; 585.1724; 585.35586.2; 611.2831; 614.35
615.2; 615.1014; 615.35616.2.
16 * ? + ' L J V ,.
17  R * . X ; R ), M # " )  N
" L &L, I ' + %  A, ; J & & ' L #,.
&, * #" * " ) [  M , " ,   M, M
" ). # ; F " & O  ' * ,  )
), J , " ' ;L. *  J; . . ) '  
).  * , O V *  7.  
)    ' A  /" ;D ,  '
$ '  A, ' ; ;  + 7  )  , # N
" ;L ), &  . ;CL.

michael of ephesus comments on ne x

189

on the medical example of the symptom (symptoma), and this as follows:


he claims that it is not necessary to discuss pleasure when talking about
eudaimonia, because just as it is possible to understand the nature of
tertian fever without knowing its symptoms, namely sweat and vomiting of bile, it similarly is possible to understand the nature of eudaimonia without knowing much about pleasure; for pleasure supervenes on
(episymbainousa) eudaimonia, just like symptoms supervene on what they
are symptoms of.
The relation between pleasure and eudaimonia is a central issue in
Aristotles ethics, since it is important for him to demarcate his ethical
theory from those of his predecessors or contemporaries; they either
identified pleasure with the ultimate good, and thus its possession with
eudaimonia, or they claimed that pleasure is not at all a good, and thus
not desirable in itself, or, finally, that eudaimonia involves some pleasure
as a good. Aristotles account of pleasure as an activity (energeia), rather
than a movement (kinesis), of the soul marks his innovation in understanding pleasure as an activity which completes or perfects (teleioun)
virtuous human action without actually being its final aim (telos). It is
well-known that many dierent interpretations have been suggested by
modern scholars in connection with Aristotles notion of pleasure and
its relation to eudaimonia. More specifically, many dierent interpretations have been oered to explain the alleged inconsistency between
Aristotles account of pleasure in book VII and that in book X; for
though in book VII Aristotle talks of pleasure as an activity of the soul,
in book X pleasure seems at times to be taken as what completes or
perfects an activity, and thus appears as an end in itself.
I do not intend to get involved in this debate. Still, I want to draw
attention to the way Michael understands Aristotles notion of pleasure
and to what he consequently has to say about the relation between
pleasure and eudaimonia in his comments. For what seems novel in
Michaels understanding of Aristotles notion of pleasure is his analogy of pleasure as a symptom of eudaimonia, an analogy which we
find nowhere in Aristotles text. Furthermore, Michael explains what
it means for pleasure to be a symptom of eudaimonia, namely that pleasure supervenes on it; and it is interesting to note here that, instead
of Aristotles verb epigenesthai (1104b4; 1174b33), Michael twice uses the
verb episymbainesthai (530.7; 8),18 a verb which we find repeatedly in

18

Cf. also symbainesthai in 530.12.

190

katerina ierodiakonou

Galens medical treatises.19 Finally, Michael also explains what it means


for something to supervene on something else, by putting forward an
epistemological criterion; for, according to him, something supervenes
on something else, if the knowledge of what supervenes is not a necessary prerequisite for the understanding of the nature of the thing on
which it supervenes (530.712).
I do not know whether the medical example of a symptom in connection with the view that pleasure supervenes on eudaimonia as its
symptom for the first time was introduced into the discussion by Michael in the twelfth century, or whether he simply followed an earlier interpretation of Aristotles text in a commentary which has been
lost. But leaving aside the issue of originality, I think that Michaels use
of this medical analogy is indeed helpful in understanding Aristotles
notion of pleasure and its relation to eudaimonia; for it indicates that the
relation between pleasure and eudaimonia is certainly not an accidental
one, but pleasure is inseparable from eudaimonia without being a part of
it. The analogy which Aristotle himself uses, namely that of pleasure as
an end which supervenes as the bloom of youth on those in the flower
of their age (1174b),20 has proved to be more cryptic and much more
dicult to decipher.
The second case I want to discuss concerns Michaels references to
medicine as a paradigmatic discipline. That is to say, in his attempt
to determine the position of ethics and politics among the sciences,
Michael, as Aristotle before him, uses the example of medicine in
order to establish its epistemic status and then compare it with that of
ethics and politics. But though the example of medicine as a scientific
discipline proved useful to Aristotle himself in the Nicomachean Ethics,
Michaels account of medicine as a science is more systematic and
interesting in its details, especially in its exposition of those particular
characteristics of medicine responsible for its scientific character.
Michael claims that medicine is a science. In his commentary of
book V of the Nicomachean Ethics he draws the distinction between
sciences and rational abilities (3.616).21 According to him, rhetoric
19
20

E.g. XV 528.2K; XVIIA 164.2K; XVIIIA 89.18K; 396.8K.


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michael of ephesus comments on ne x

191

and dialectic are rational abilities, because they attempt to do one or


the other of two contraries (ta antikeimena epicheirein), whereas medicine
and music are sciences, because, though they require knowledge of
both contraries (ginoskein ta antikeimena), they aim at only one of them.
A similar distinction between sciences and rational abilities also is
found in Michaels commentary of book X of the Nicomachean Ethics,
though medicine is not explicitly mentioned there (616.36).22 Hence,
medicine on Michaels view is a science, because, though it presupposes
knowledge of both contraries, namely how to cure and how to harm
patients, medicine aims only at restoring patients health.
To establish medicine among the sciences, and consequently also
ethics and politics, Michael seems to closely follow the tradition of the
other ancient and Byzantine commentators on the Nicomachean Ethics.
This subject I have already discussed in another paper.23 What I want
to focus on now is what Michael has to say about those particular
characteristics of medicine that give it the status of a science, and
especially about the type of knowledge medicine requires. Michael
often points out in his comments on book X of the Nicomachean Ethics
that medicine, just like the theoretical sciences, involves knowledge of
the universal. He says, for instance, that medicine is knowledge not of
Parmenides, but of all old men in general, and not of Socrates, but of all
men with Socrates temperament. Sometimes, though, Michael adds, it
is more important for treating a patient to know from experience the
particular case than to know the general rules of medicine (614.1527).24
Thus, according to him, it is perfectly justifiable that doctors often do
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L> )' ? L #L ; @, & F ;CL  X ) D 7 *
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23

Ierodiakonou (2005a).

M ? $ )L * * , J B $  ..  *
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#., M   . #l 0 Z # ' 0 Z &" ,
24

192

katerina ierodiakonou

not follow the general rule; for example, although in general those who
have fever should not eat, doctors realise that sometimes not eating
is not beneficial to certain patients (cf. 612.2233). And again this is
something doctors learn from experience. Hence, medicine does not
only involve knowledge of the universal but presupposes a great deal
of experience, which means that medicine as a discipline should be
closely connected with its practical exercise.25 Michael explicitly says
that doctors do not only have knowledge of the universal, but most
importantly they cure patients; this after all is the reason why it is
crucial not only to know what the medical textbooks say, but also how
to combine this with practical experience in treating patients (618.25
619.4).26
Michaels insistence on the importance of combining reason and
experience in medicine is not novel; on the contrary, it is very much
in the spirit of Aristotle as well as of Galen. For Galen, too, suggests
in many places of his voluminous writings that we should, on the one
hand, learn as much as possible from experience and develop a body of
empirical knowledge that is quite uncontaminated by any theory, and,
on the other hand, develop a general theory, and then check the results
of this theory against our body of empirical knowledge. He thus tries to
find a position from which one can see that there is an important place
in medicine for the approach of the Empiricist doctors, just as there
is a need for the general theories which the Rationalist doctors adhere
to, that the two do not exclude but rather complement each other, and
that they depend on each other in an accomplished doctor. Indeed,
it may be Galens influence which accounts in good part for the fact

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? *  .

Cf. V 8.1528; 63.220; 64.314; IX 513.1922; 617.1014; 618.47.


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michael of ephesus comments on ne x

193

that, after his time, doctors as well as those who discuss the theory and
practise of medicine, like Michael does, seem to have lost their interest
in the ancient dispute between the ancient medical schools, namely the
Empiricists, the Rationalists and the Methodists.27
But Michael does not agree with Galen only in his understanding
of medicine as a science which depends both on theory and on practical experience. He also gives an explanation similar to that of Galens
as to why in the case of medicine it is not enough to have knowledge of the universal (540.338).28 For Michael points out that there is
something indefinite in the practice of medicine, namely that medicine
when it comes to restoring the health of particular patients accepts of
degrees. This does not mean, according to Michael, that health itself
accepts of degrees, or in other words that medical knowledge is anything but universal. However, as soon as we consider, not health in

27

Frede (1985).

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28

194

katerina ierodiakonou

general, but the health of a particular person, we should consider different degrees of health. And this is what Galen claims, when he distinguishes between the general nature of a disease and the treatment of a
particular patient; the former should be diagnosed through a scientific
and certain method, whereas the latter can only follow a conjectural or
stochastic procedure. According to Galen, this distinction results from
the unpredictable and unique features of the individuals temperament,
whereas the theorems of medicine are universal and certain.29
2. The Distinction between Two Kinds of Eudaimonia
Let me now turn to the second issue, namely Michaels distinction
between two kinds of eudaimonia. There are indeed many passages in
his commentary on book X of the Nicomachean Ethics in which Michael
distinguishes between what he calls theoretical eudaimonia and political
or practical eudaimonia (529.911 et passim), a distinction which we find
nowhere in Aristotles text, at least not in these terms. But is it a distinction which Aristotle himself implicitly adheres to, or does Michael
interpret Aristotles text in a way which clearly is not Aristotelian?
But we should begin with another relevant distinction also drawn by
Michael, namely the distinction between two kinds of virtues, the ethical or political or practical virtues and the theoretical virtues (571.31
572.12).30 At first one could think that this distinction corresponds exactly to Aristotles distinction of ethical (ethikai) and intellectual (dianoetikai)
virtues at the end of book I of the Nicomachean Ethics. But the terminology used here, i.e. the characterisation of virtues as political and

29

Ierodiakonou (1995).
' & ", M  ? N ' N " ; " )'
  ' p  &,  ? N ; " )'  
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, N ? *  ) =". ) ? " + 7 =, N L @ , N ;" ' N ;. ' #. + " '
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 & L &",   '  .
30

michael of ephesus comments on ne x

195

theoretical, reminds us more of the distinction between political and


theoretical virtues which we find, for instance, in Plotinus and then in
Porphyry; though they both add to these yet another category, that of
the purificatory virtues which help us to be free of bodily passions.31
And moreover, when Michael explicitly says that the Peripatetics do
not further distinguish between political and ethical virtues, whereas
the Platonists do (578.1225),32 what most probably he is aware of is
Iamblichus and later Platonists distinction between political and ethical virtues.33 According to Michael, then, the person who has the political virtues achieves political eudaimonia, whereas the person who has
both the political and the theoretical virtues achieves theoretical eudaimonia. Hence, political eudaimonia is an imperfect kind of eudaimonia,
whereas theoretical eudaimonia is the only perfect eudaimonia the virtuous
person can have.34 But is there only a terminological similarity between
Michaels and the Platonists view? Or does Michael present us with
an interpretation of Aristotles text which is influenced to a significant
degree by Platonic views?
There is no doubt that Michaels theoretical eudaimonia is the eudaimonia which Aristotle discusses in book X of the Nicomachean Ethics and
which can be achieved through contemplation (theoria). On the other
hand, political eudaimonia seems to be the kind of eudaimonia which can
be achieved both by the acquisition of external goods and by the exercise of the ethical virtues, i.e. what Aristotle might appear to discuss
in the early books of the Nicomachean Ethics. But should political eudaimonia be regarded as a kind of eudaimonia in Aristotles sense? For Aris31

Plotinus, Enneads 1.2.1.1516 et passim; Porphyry, Sent. 32.

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32

33 On the dierent kinds of virtues, cf. Dillon (1990); Wildberg (2002); OMeara
(2003) 4049.
34 For the Neoplatonic background of the notion of political eudaimonia, cf. OMeara
(2003), 90. For further discussion of the notion of political eudaimonia in Michael of
Ephesos and in Eustratios of Nicaea, cf. OMeara (2004) 113 and (2008) 4849.

196

katerina ierodiakonou

totle does not suggest that, if one acquires external goods and exercises the ethical virtues, then one can be said to have reached eudaimonia. There is, of course, in contemporary Aristotelian scholarship a
disputed question about whether eudaimonia can be reached only by
contemplation or whether ethical virtues and external goods are also
required; this is the famous issue of the so-called inclusive or the dominant conception of the end in Aristotle, and hence of his notion of
eudaimonia. But Michaels distinction between political and theoretical
eudaimonia seems to try to circumvent this issue. For Michael does not
talk of one kind of eudaimonia, but of two kinds; one can achieve political eudaimonia just by acquiring external goods and exercising ethical or
political virtues, while someone who exercises both political and theoretical virtues achieves theoretical eudaimonia. And theoretical eudaimonia
is obviously considered as the highest form of eudaimonia (kyrios, kratiste,
teleia eudaimonia),35 since it presupposes practical eudaimonia; for it is not
possible, according to Michael, to devote ones life to contemplation, if
one does not first manage to master the bodily passions and to live an
ethically virtuous life.
Does the dierence between Aristotles theory and Michaels interpretation merely lie in the fact that Michael attributes to the person of
ethical or political virtues a kind of eudaimonia, even if this is not the
perfect kind? There is a further distinction drawn by Michael in this
context which is very illuminating, especially in revealing the motivation behind the distinction between political and theoretical eudaimonia
(580.318).36 On Michaels view a human being should be thought of in
two ways: firstly, the human being as the composite of body and soul,
and secondly, the human being as reason or intellect (nous); indeed, this
35

E.g. 558.7; 578.9; 580.4; 9; 600.31.

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36

michael of ephesus comments on ne x

197

latter notion of the human being is, according to him, the true human
being (alethes, alethinos, ontos, malista, protos anthropos).37 Moreover, political or ethical virtues characterise the human being as the composite of
body and soul, whereas theoretical virtues characterise the true human
being. But this is not a distinction we find in Aristotles Nicomachean
Ethics. Of course, in book X Aristotle does talk about the composite
nature of human beings to which the ethical virtues belong, whereas
the exercise of the virtue of reason is contemplation and we should try
so far as we can to achieve this. But this does not mean that Aristotle would accept Michaels distinction between the human being as the
composite of body and soul and the true human being. Rather, the terminology used here of the true human being is again Platonising, and
the distinction itself between the composite human being and the true
human being can be found, for instance, in Plotinus Enneads.38
In addition, the similarity to Platonic views extends further to the
way Michael describes the condition of theoretical eudaimonia. For he
defines theoretical eudaimonia not only as the knowledge of the divine,39
something we would expect from a reading of Aristotles Ethics or
Metaphysics, but as the knowledge of and connection with (epafe) the
divine.40 In this context, moreover, Michael talks of the attempt to
separate oneself from the animal which resides in us and unite ourselves
(enosis) with the divine,41 by being drawn to it (anatasis)42 and accepting
its illumination (ellampsis).43 We are clearly reminded here not only
of Plotinus terminology, but also of Platonic doctrines.44 It could be
argued, however, that Aristotle also claims that we as rational beings
must try, so far as we can, to, in contemplation, share in the life of
the divine. But in this case, too, Aristotle thinks of the human being
who, being the composite of body and soul, tries to exercise theoretical
wisdom as far as humanly possible, rather than of the true human being

37 529.56; 576.2532; 578.21; 579.1516; 580.68; 585.8; 11; 588.3536; 589.34;


591.1522; 592.22.
38 E.g. Enneads 1.1.7.20; 1.1.10.7; cf. 1.1.8.10; 4.7.14.1013; 6.7.6.913.
39 580.1415; 581.12; 586.10; 1819; 589.20.
40 586.10; 589.20; 596.11.
41 579.4; 580.14; 591.3.
42 529.15; 580.14.
43 586.17; 591.4; 603.31; 33.
44 epafe: 1.2.6.13; 6.7.36.4; 6.9.7.25; ellampsis: 1.1.10.11; 1.1.11.2; 1.1.11.14; 1.12.25. Cf.
Proclus, In Alc. 3.103104; 2.235236; In Parm. 5.273; In Tim. 21; 75; 76; 79; 121; De prov.
et fato 2122; 24.

198

katerina ierodiakonou

who separates itself from its bodily existence in order to be illuminated


by and connected with the divine.
Hence, I do not think that Michael simply uses philosophical language coloured by Neoplatonism, as Mercken suggests; rather, it
seems to me that Michael does try to force Aristotle into a Platonic
mould, or, in other words, he does attempt to make Aristotle fit into
a Neoplatonic strait jacket.45 But to stress the Platonic influence on
Michaels notion of eudaimonia to the exclusion of other sources also
would be misleading. For the way he talks in particular of theoretical eudaimonia indicates that his reading of Aristotles text is not close
to Aristotles spirit, but is rather an interpretation influenced by different traditions; Neoplatonism is certainly one, but Christianity is also
present. For instance, Michael claims that, apart from being perfect, the
most pleasant, continuous, chosen for itself and self-sucient, a feature
of theoretical eudaimonia is that in this state there is no need for regret
and repentance (metameleia / metanoia).46 Aristotle does not characterise
the life of contemplation in these terms, nor do the Platonists stress
such a characteristic of eudaimonia;47 on the other hand, both the notion
of regret and that of repentance are very much part of the Christian
outlook.
Finally, there is an interesting passage in Michaels comments of
book X on the issue of the true human being, in which it becomes
clear that Michael is conscious of the fact that what he presents is
an interpretation of Aristotles text which is not at all unchallenged
(576.2532).48 For Michael here claims that the allegedly Aristotelian
distinction between the true human being and the human being as
the composite of body and soul implies that the true human being
is separated from the body, and thus continues to live after death.
According to Michael, therefore, those who interpret Aristotle as not
believing in the immortality of the soul are fundamentally wrong. But
we can recognise here Michaels attempt to reconcile his Christian
Mercken (1990) 434435.
566.3435; 575.78; 582.3539; 582.36; 589.24.
47 Cf. Plotinus, Enneads 2.1.4.30; 2.9.6.23.
48 ' P , M  H '  A ) CL CL  ' 
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&* ' ?  ) A.
45
46

michael of ephesus comments on ne x

199

beliefs with Aristotles doctrines, though this might have been facilitated
by an already Platonising interpretation of Aristotle.
3. The Issue as to Whether Non-Rational
Animals Can Achieve Eudaimonia
It is time now to turn to the last issue I want to discuss briefly, namely
Michaels comment about Aristotles claim that non-rational animals
cannot achieve eudaimonia (598.18599.38). Michael says that, since the
perfect kind of eudaimonia is theoretical eudaimonia, and one can achieve
theoretical eudaimonia only by exercising both political and theoretical
virtues, and theoretical virtues crucially involve the excellence of reason, non-rational animals cannot achieve theoretical eudaimonia. This is,
according to Michael, Aristotles view, but he crucially adds that it is
also his own view, Platos view and the view of all those who identify
eudaimonia with intellectual life (598.1825).49
Mercken mentions this text as an example of a passage in which
Michael summons Plato in support of Aristotles views. He claims
that such passages serve to clarify Aristotles text, without necessarily
proving Michaels interest in defending or attacking Platos doctrines.50
Indeed there is no doubt that Michael here summons Plato in support
of Aristotles view, since Plato, too, would agree that non-rational animals cannot attain eudaimonia. I think, though, that the way Michael
refers to Plato is not as neutral as Mercken presents it. For it seems
that Michael summons Plato in support of Aristotles views, because
Michael considers him as an important authority, whose views have
particular weight for him.
And a final short remark about the content of Michaels comment.
Although it seems that Plato and Aristotle are in agreement that nonrational animals cannot achieve eudaimonia, according to Michael the
Epicureans and the later Stoics claim that this is possible. For in the
case of the Epicureans, Michael says, eudaimonia is identified with eupa49  )" N  ", Q N * N '   &
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& *  ;, * A  D7, )" + ' L L.
50

Mercken (1990) 435, n. 86.

200

katerina ierodiakonou

theia; but non-rational animals can achieve eupatheia, therefore nonrational animals can achieve eudaimonia. In the case of the later Stoics,
eudaimonia is identified with well-being, well-being is identified with living in accordance with nature, non-rational animals live in accordance
with nature, and therefore non-rational animals can achieve eudaimonia
(598.2534).51
It is, I think, very interesting that Michael here refers at all to
the Epicureans and the later Stoics, though there is a question as to
what exactly he has in mind when he talks about the later Stoics.
And it is striking that he tries to present their theories in a syllogistic
form, though there is no evidence that the Stoics, or for that matter
the Epicureans, argued about this topic and in this particular way.
Moreover, Michaels presentation of the Stoic position is really unfair.
The Stoics would never claim that non-rational animals can achieve
eudaimonia, for what is important in their understanding of what it
means for human beings to live in accordance with nature is that
human beings can live in accordance with their rational nature, and
thus can have a grasp of what they should or should not do in order
to achieve eudaimonia. But Michaels criticism of the Epicurean and the
Stoic position is not at all original; for he clearly follows Plotinus, whose
views on this subject he reworks or even almost quotes.52
In conclusion, I discussed three dierent issues which arise from Michael of Ephesus comments on book X of the Nicomachean Ethics. It has
become clear by now that in the relevant passages Michael seems to
have been influenced by the views of Plato, Galen, Plotinus and the
Neoplatonists; he even refers to the Hellenistic philosophers, though
only to argue against them. That is to say, Michaels comments seem to
do much more than simply present and elucidate Aristotles views.
Zervos has pointed out the Platonic influences on Michael, Praechter
has contrasted Michael of Ephesus, the Aristotelian, with Michael PselM ?  * 0 8  ' 0 0 " ; ' * A D, *  A > #  ; , 6 L )
8,  ? 6 L ;. ) 8 ' 0 0 D ;,,
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51

52 Enneads 1.4.12. I would like to thank Dominic OMeara for pointing out to me
the source of Michaels comments here.

michael of ephesus comments on ne x

201

los, the Platonist, Preus has claimed that Michael tries to stay as close as
possible to the spirit of Aristotle, Mercken has suggested that Michaels
Aristotelianism is never a militant one.53 It seems that modern scholars
have moved from regarding Michael as a Platonist to regarding him
as an Aristotelian, even if not a militant one. To stress once again the
Platonic roots of Michaels comments, as I have done, does not mean
that I want to return to the view that he is a Platonist. On the contrary,
what I have tried to show by working my way through these passages
of his commentary is that perhaps it is rather dicult to put a specific
label to Michael. For Michael is a commentator of Aristotle, and this
means that he thinks that Aristotles work is significant, and thus in
explaining it wants to stay close to his spirit. But this does not mean
that he agrees with Aristotle in everything. At the same time, Michael
often follows Plato, Plotinus and the Neoplatonists, or other ancient
thinkers, like for instance Galen. Besides, it may have been important
for him, as a Christian commentator of ancient philosophical texts not
to adhere uncritically to an Aristotelian, Platonic or other ancient viewpoint. Hence, it is, I think, essential in the future not only to closely
read all of Michaels commentaries, before we attempt to assess his
overall contribution in Byzantine thought, but to carefully reflect on the
role of a commentator in twelfth-century Byzantium, as he no doubt is.

53

Zervos (1920) 222223; Praechter (1931); Preus (1981b) 22; Mercken (1990) 434.

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des tudes byzantines, ed. M. Berza and E. Stanescu (Bucharest: 1976) 599
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Zervos, C., Un philosophe neoplatonicien du XIe sicle, Michel Psellos: sa vie, son uvre,
ses luttes philosophiques, son influence; prf. de Franois Picavet. Burt Franklin
research and source work series. Byzantine series; 41 (New York: 1973).

INDEX
Abelard, Peter, 116
Abraham, 41
Agamemnon, 24
Ailios Aristeides, 17
Ailios Dionysios, 11
Albertus Magnus, 66
Alexander of Aphrodisias, 65, 7475,
9798, 107, 185
Alexios I Komnenos, 2425, 27, 40,
4546, 49, 51, 53, 5760, 135, 170
Alpers, K., 111, 113, 117, 126
Ammonius, 75
Andronikos, son of the emperor
John II, 23
Andronikos Kallistos, 67
Andronikos Rhodios, 67
Antioch, 51
Apollo, 153
Apollodoros, 157
Arabatzis, G., 186
Arethas of Caesarea, 10
Aristophanes, 6, 11, 1920, 29, 31
Aristotle, 1, 14, 17, 2021, 2930,
3638, 4041, 4550, 5259, 61,
6469, 7274, 76, 8182, 8890,
93, 97, 103105, 109, 113, 116
118, 122, 124, 129, 132, 134, 142,
147154, 156158, 160, 163, 165,
168170, 172, 174175, 177, 179,
181, 183, 185190, 192, 194199,
201
Artemis, 153
Aspasius, 68, 185
Athena, 40
Athens, 14, 16, 22, 168
Aubenque, P., 168169, 172
Augustine, 182
Bacon, Francis, 18
Balme, D.M., 168
Bardanes, George, 14
Barker, E., 170171

Basil of Caesarea, 8, 39
Basil of Euchaita, 135
Baynes, N., 43
Bellerophontes, 10, 30
Benakis, L., 65, 108, 111, 117119
Berroia, 2627
Bertha-Eirene, 23, 27, 29
Blachernai, 51
Blachernites, Theodore, 61
Bogomils, 61
Brentano, F., 180
Brown, P., 43
Browning, R., 149, 170, 185
Bryennios, Nikephoros, 57
Buckler, G., 149
Budelmann, F., 30
Bury, J.B., 43
Bywater edition, 73
Caston, V., 183
Constantine IX Monomachos, 28
Constantine Paleokappas, 67
Constantine VII Porphyrogennetos,
6, 37, 149
Constantinople, 35, 38, 46, 51, 156
157
Coulon, V., 6
Crete, 67
Crusaders, 3, 8, 51, 60, 171, 183
Cyclopes, 38
Damaskios, 71
Dareios, 15
Demodocus, 154
Demosthenes, 1718
Digenes Akrites, 22
Diktys of Crete, 24, 26
Diogenes Laertius, 154
Dionysios Periegetes, 30, 32, 34
Dionysios Thrax, 1415
Doxopatres, John, 151
Dring, I., 168, 179

224

index

Ebbesen, S., 118, 157158, 160, 170,


180182, 185187
Echetos, 152153
Eirene, 23, 25, 29
Epictetus, 69
Estienne, H., 12, 1517
Euclid, 4748, 58, 7677
Euripides, 56
Eustathios of Thessalonike, 11, 14
15, 17, 20, 22, 2937, 150
Eustratios of Nicaea, 14, 2021,
30, 3740, 4546, 4854, 56
57, 59, 61, 6566, 7173, 7583,
85, 87109, 111114, 116120,
122129, 131132, 134, 136138,
140143, 145148, 151, 157, 169,
185
Farquharson, A., 177
Forster, E.S., 175
Fowler, H.N., 175
Frankopan, P., 155
Galen, 56, 190, 192194, 200201
Gauthier, R., 169
Gibbon, E., 18
Giocarinis, K., 71, 117
Greece, 3
Gregory of Nazianzos, 14, 1718, 39,
81, 101
Grosseteste, Robert, 41, 66, 145147,
155, 185
Hades, 54
Hagia Sophia, 49
Heliodoros of Proussa, 67
Herakles, 24, 33, 59
Hermogenes, 13, 1617, 20, 40
Hesiod, 1920, 2931, 33, 159160
Hesychios of Miletos, 18
Heylbut, G., 67
Homer, 7, 1011, 15, 1925, 2728,
3132, 3536, 38, 59, 148, 150,
153, 157
Iamblichos, 195
Idomeneus, 24

Ierodiakonou, K., 104, 118119, 124,


129
Ikonion, 171
Ioasaph, 67
Irwin, T., 168, 179
Isaac I Komnenos, 2426, 29
Isaac, son of Abraham, 41
Jacob, 41
Jaeger, W., 174
James of Venice, 66
Jereys, E., 23
Jereys, M., 23
Jesus Christ, 33, 60, 135139
Jesus, son of Nun, 41
Joannou, P., 108, 111112, 116, 119
120, 123, 126, 129
Job, 41
John Chrysostom, 56, 60
John Filagrios, 67
John Galenus, 20, 30, 33, 37
John I Doukas, 34
John II Komnenos, 2223, 46, 170
171
John Italos, 21, 25, 5152, 5456, 61,
65, 68, 75, 89, 113, 126129, 141
142
John of Damascus, 111112, 128,
184
John Sikeliotes, 151
John Solomon, 55
John Taronites, 5758
John VI Kantakouzenos, 67
Jones, A.H.M., 18
Julian, 7
Kadmos, 10
Kazhdan, A., 111, 129
Kerkyra, 14
Knossos, 24
Kointos, 26
Komnene, Anna, 11, 21, 2325, 37,
40, 4662, 64, 145, 149, 155, 157,
161, 169171, 185
Komnenoi, 17
Konstan, D., 169
Kullmann, W., 168

index
Lamia, 147, 152
Lattimore, R., 28
Le Blond, J.M., 168, 179
Leo Magentinos, 157161
Leo of Chalcedon, 40, 50, 52, 54,
134136
Leo the Philosopher, 10
Leros, 154
Leto, 153
Libanios, 18
Linear B, 10, 24
Lloyd, A.C., 6566, 108, 111, 113,
116118, 124, 135
Loeb Classical Library, 4
Lykophron, 20, 2931
Magdalino, P., 54
Magnanimous Man, 58
Manasses, Constantine, 23, 61
Manuel I Komnenos, 23, 27, 46, 53,
57
Marcus Aurelius, 69
Maria Skleraina, 28
Mauropous, John, 60
Meleager, 157
Melitene, 171
Mercken, H.P.F., 6566, 146148,
150151, 155, 157, 169, 186, 198
199, 201
Metochites, Theodore, 68
Michael Choniates, 14, 22, 33
Michael of Ephesus, 20, 30, 37
39, 4750, 6465, 71, 145148,
151, 155, 157, 159160, 163
201
Michael, later Patriarch of Constantinople, 54
Momigliano, A., 43
Mommsen,T., 43
Moses, 41, 102
Muses, 7
Neilos of Calabria, 52, 54
Nero, 24
Nicholas of Methone, 25, 127
Nikander, 29
Nikephoros Blemmydes, 68

225

Nikephoros I, patriarch of Constantinople, 134, 142


Niketas Choniates, 47
Niketas of Herakleia, 1314, 40, 51,
140141
Niobe, 153
Nussbaum, M., 169, 177
Odysseus, 24, 59
Olympiodoros, 67
Olympos, 14
Oppian, 29
Oxford Classical Texts, 4
Pachymeres, George, 67
Palamedes, 10
Pardos, Gregory, 13, 1517, 20,
40
Pargiter, E., 65
Parmenides, 191
Patriarch John IX Agapetos, 53
Patroklos, 24
Paul, 102
Pausanias, 11
Pegasos, 30
Peleus, 15
Perikles, 40
Pfeier, R., 1, 16
Pheidias, 132
Philoponos, John, 15, 152, 184185
Phokas, John, 149
Photios, 11, 17
Pickard-Cambridge, W., 181
Pindar, 20, 3031, 33
Plato, 18, 2021, 4748, 55, 5760,
69, 76, 83, 90, 105, 112113, 124,
175176, 184, 199201
Plethon, George Gemistos, 6869
Plotinus, 33, 195, 197, 200201
Plutarch, 60, 69
Polybios, 6
Polykleitos, 132
Pontus, 147
Porphyry, 118, 124, 179, 195
Praechter, K., 150, 170171, 185, 200
Preus, A., 169, 177, 186187, 201
Prisianus Lydus, 81

226
Prodromos, Theodore, 14, 21, 24,
4648, 53, 61, 157
Proklos, 2526, 31, 7172, 7680,
8283, 8588, 90100, 103105,
108109, 113, 120122, 127128,
176, 179
Ps. Dionysios the Areopagite, 125
Psellos, Michael, 13, 1718, 2021,
2526, 28, 58, 65, 68, 71, 81, 89,
113, 117, 126, 128129, 142, 170,
200
PseudoAristotle, 6869, 186
PseudoOlympiodoros, 67
Ptolemy, 4748, 58
Quintus of Smyrna, 26
Ross, W.D., 183184
Satyros, 153
Saul, 15
Schissel, O., 156
Schleiermacher, F., 146148, 150
151, 169
Shepard, J., 60
Simplikios, 6
Smyth, H.W., 148
Socrates, 33, 191
Solon, 41
Sorabji, R., 65, 155
Spivey, N., 8
Steel, C., 71, 176
Stephanos Skylitzes, 30, 155158,
160
Stephanos, Metropolitan of Trebizond, 48
Stephen of Byzantion, 13
Symeon the New Theologian, 142
Synesios of Cyrene, 15
Syrianus, 77

index
Teubner, 4
Themistios, 5
Theodore of Smyrna, 54
Theodore of Stoudios, 102, 134,
142
Thucydides, 7, 148
Tigranes, 125
Titans, 33
Todd, R., 152
Tornikios, George, 25, 37, 4748, 50,
5658, 62
Trebizond, 157
Triballoi, 159160
Triklinios, Demetrios, 19
Trizio, M., 65
Trojan War, 7, 24, 26
Troy, 24
Tryphon, 15
Tzetzes, John, 1011, 14, 16, 20, 23
24, 2632, 38, 53
Tzetziros, 117
Urmson,J.O., 183184
Venice, 65
Virgin Mary, 115116, 124, 139
Walz, C., 13, 16
Wilson, N.G., 2
Wolska-Conus, W., 157, 160
Xenophon, 148
Xerxes, 154
Xiphilinos, John, 60
Zervos, C., 71, 200
Zeus, 7, 15, 27, 33, 39
Zonaras, John, 11, 47

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