Karichi Notes

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.
2008-2009
Karichi E. Santos | UP Law B2012
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PERSONS
& FAMILY
RELATIONS
Professor E. A. Pangalangan
Karichi Santos |UP Law B2012
PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009

Beware of false knowledge;

it is more dangerous than ignorance.
- George Bernard Shaw
Caveat lector.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. Intersection of Modern
Constitutional Developments and
Traditional Family Law
Provisions of the 1987 Constitution
Sec 12, Art II
The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect
and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social
institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the
life of the unborn from conception. The natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic
efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive
the support of the Government.
Sec 14, Art II

The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building and
shall ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women
and men.
Art XV (The Family), 1987 Constitution
Sec 1 The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation
of the nation. Accordingly, it shall strengthen its solidarity and
actively promote its total development.
Sec 2 Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.
Sec 3 The State shall defend:
(1) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions and the demands of responsible
parenthood;
(2) The right of children to assistance, including proper care and
nutrition, and special protection from all forms of neglect,
abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to
their development;
(3) The right of the family to a family living wage and income;
(4) The right of families or family associations to participate in
the planning and implementation of policies and programs that
affect them.
Sec 4 The family has the duty to care for its elderly members
but the State may also do so through just programs of social
security.
Sec 1, Art III

No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
the due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws.
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Overview of Due Process and Equal

Protection Cases
GRISWOLD v CONNECTICUT (1964)
381 U.S. 479
Griswold, Executive Director of the planned Parenthood
League of Connecticut and its medical director as
accessories for giving married persons information and
medical advice on how to prevent conception and,
following examination prescribing a contraceptive
device or material for the wifes use.
Griswold said the statute violates the 14th Amendment
(due process clause)
Purpose of the statute was to discourage extra marital
relations and it only prohibits distribution of
contraceptives and not manufacture or sale
ISSUES:
1. WON the appellants have the standing to assert
constitutional rights of people to marital privacy
2. WON the contraceptive ban statute violates right of
marital privacy (from the right of liberty)
HELD: Although not stated in the Bill of Rights, it is included
in the penumbra of rights afforded to the citizens. It also
sweeps unnecessarily broadly and does not prove to be a
sufficient method of family planning. It deprived married
people the due process of law by including people who are
not meant to be included. Statute struck down as
unconstitutional.
* What if the couples intention for using contraceptive was
for medical purposes and family planning?
* Does it mean that people only use contraceptive when
they are having extra-marital affairs? And that if they dont
have access to contraceptives, they will no longer engage in
extra-marital affair?
EISENSTADT v BAIRD (1971)
405 US 438
Baird was arrested for violation of Massachusetts law by
exhibiting contraceptive devices and giving a
contraceptive foam to a woman when he ended his
lecture at Boston University.
The statute prohibited the sale, lending or giving away
of contraceptives unless prescribed by a physician to
married people. Its purpose is to discourage fornication
(pre-marital sex) and prevent spread of sexually
transmitted disease.
However, the medical policy was a mere afterthought,
amended after the Griswold decision in 1966
ISSUE: WON the statute is unconstitutional for denying
equal protection to unmarried people
HELD: Yes. It violates due process clause by providing
dissimilar treatment for married and unmarried persons who
are similarly situated. The deterrence of fornication cannot
reasonably be regarded as the purpose of the statute since
it is riddled with exceptions making contraceptives freely

available for use in premarital sexual relations and its scope

and penalty structure is inconsistent with that purpose. The
protection of public health cannot also be reasonably
regarded as the purpose of the statute since if this were the
case, it would be discriminatory and overbroad. It would
appear that only married people are protected from the evil
which it intends to suppress i.e. STD.
- Depriving unmarried people with contraceptive devices is
tantamount to punishing them with the risk of having
illegitimate children for fornication. So all the more that
unmarried people should be given access to contraceptives.
2 TESTS THAT JUSTIFY LAWFUL STATE INTRUSION INTO
THE FAMILY
1.
2.
Is there a compelling state interest in regulating

peoples rights?
Is there a fit between the state interest and the
measure taken?
*In both Griswold and Eisenstadt cases, there was no fit

between the state interest and the measure taken. The
means employed are not sufficient deterrent of the evils
sought to avoid.
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Page 5 of 151
relations
Indivisible and inherent
Can exist without capacity to
act
II. CIVIL
PERSONALITY
effects
Conditional and voidable
Requires both (1) intelligence
and (2) will.
Capacity is always presumed
KINDS OF PERSONS
STATUS the legal condition or class to which one belongs
in society; the legal or juridical position of the individual in
the society; determines the nature and number of his rights
and obligation
KINDS OF STATUS
A. as a member of society
- resident or non-resident - alien or non-citizen
B. as a member of family
- single, married or divorced
- parent or child; brother or sister
- legitimate, illegitimate or adopted
C. as himself
- age
- sex
- mental condition
- occupation (not a status because not inherent)
CHARACTERISTICS OF STATUS
1. inalienable
2. imprescriptible
3. cant be renounced
4. cant be subject to compromise
5. rights arise from it cannot be exercised by creditors
NATURAL
- human beings
- products of procreation
JURIDICAL
- artificial, abstract
- product of legal fiction
Natural Persons
CC, Art 40 Birth determines personality; but the conceived
shall be considered born for all purposes that are favorable to
it, provided it be born later with the conditions specified in the
following article.
CHARACTERISTICS OF FETAL PERSONALITY

1. limited because it only has rights for purposes
favorable to it
2. provisional/conditional because it should be born alive
later before the rights can be claimed. But when is it
considered born alive? Refer to Art. 41, CC
Birth = total separation from the mother or removal of fetus
in from mothers womb by cutting off the umbilical cord
3.
But it can enjoy rights like inherit from will or intestacy

and be given donations even before birth
A. Concept and Classes of Persons

CHARACTERISTICS OF CIVIL PERSONALITY
1. not a being, but a quality of certain beings
2. not a physical element, but a juridical concept
3. not an object of contract, or of possession, cannot
be impaired by agreement
4. matter of public interest
CC, Art 41 For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it

is alive at the time it is completely delivered from the
mothers womb. However, if the fetus had an intra-uterine
life of less than seven months, it is not deemed born if it dies
within 24 hours after its complete delivered from the maternal
womb.
PERSONALITY v CAPACITY
(These two concepts are intimately related but not identical)
Personality is:
is product of capacity in law
external manifestation of capacity
synonymous to juridical capacity
Generally, cannot be limited
Specifically, may suffer limitations because its merely
the result of capacity to act
CC, Art 37 Juridical capacity, which is fitness to be the

subject of legal relations, is inherent in every natural person
and is lost only through death. Capacity to act, which is the
power to do acts with legal effect, is acquired and may be lost.
Juridical Capacity <- CIVIL CAPACITY -> Capacity to Act
Art 37
Aptitude to holding and Aptitude to exercise of rights
enjoyment of rights
Fitness to be subject of legal Power to do acts with legal
If intrauterine life < 7 months, then the fetus must live

for 24 hours (even if life is machine sustained only)
Otherwise, even if death is by accident without which
fetus could have survived (e.g. the janitor accidentally
tripped on the incubator or life supports plug and
caused the fetus death), kahit 22 hours pa yan, it will
not be considered alive
No special sign of life required. Though complete
respiration may be indicated by crying or floating of
lungs (which you can only do in case of death)
Viability (complete and independent functioning of
internal organs) not required
In case of doubt, there is presumption that the
child was born alive
GELUZ v CA (1961)
2 SCRA 801
- Nita Villanueva had three abortions with Dr. Antonio Geluz
which Oscar Lazo, the husband, is not aware of
- Husband filed for damages of P3000 by virtue of Art 2206
which CA sustained

ISSUE: WON husband can claim damages for the death of

the unborn fetus?
HELD: No. The fetus was not yet born and thus does not
have civil personality. According to Article 40, birth
determines personality. In this case, the fetus does not yet
possess a personality to speak of because it was aborted in
uterus. The child should be born before the parents can
seek any recovery for damages. Action for pecuniary
damages on account of personal injury or death pertains
primarily to the one injured. There could be no action for
such damages that can be instituted on behalf of the
unborn child for the injuries it received because it lacked
juridical personality. The damages which the parents of an
unborn child can recover are limited to moral damages, in
this case, for the act of the appellant Geluz to perform the
abortion. However, moral damages cannot also be
recovered because the wife willingly sought the abortion,
and the husband did not further investigate on the causes
of the abortion. Furthermore, the husband did not seem to
have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases
against the appellant, but was more concerned in obtaining
from the doctor a large money payment.
*According to Maam: In the Philippines, people who seek
pecuniary damages for loss of relatives are seen in a
negative light. It gives the impression that youre just after
the money. But it should not be the case.
CC, Art 42 Civil personality is extinguished by death.
Death means natural or physical death, as there no

such thing as civil death in the Philippines
Rights and obligations are completely extinguished,
while others are transmitted to his successors
After the death, personality is deemed to continue to
estate
PEOPLE v TIROL (1981)

102 SCRA 558
Kosain Manipol and his family were sleeping when he
heard the dog bark. When he went to investigate, two
persons have already come up to their house, asking if
they can borrow his land. After he gave his consent,
Kulas arrived, flashed the light in his face and punched
him. When he fell, the assailants companions (more
than 10 armed men) came in hacked him and his wife
and 7 children. His wife and six of the kids died.
Of the 14 suspects, only 2 were apprehended, Ciriaco
Baldesco and Bonifacio Tirol. After they were found
guilty of the crime of murder of the 7 persons, they
filed an appeal, during which Baldesco died.
ISSUE: WON Baldesco can still be held liable for his offense
HELD: Court dismissed the criminal case since Baldesco is
already dead. However, Baldescos personality is continued
in his estate (Art 42) hence the civil liabilities will be
recovered from his estate.
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CC, Art 43 If there is a doubt, as between two or more

persons who are called to succeed each other, as to which of
them died first, whoever alleges the death of one prior to
the other, shall prove the same in the absence of proof, it is
presumed that they died at the same time and there shall
be no transmission of rights from one to the other.
Rule 123 of Sec 60 of Revised Rules of Court resorted to

only if there are no inferential/circumstantial evidences to
be inferred from
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Both under 15
Both over 60
Under 15 and over 60
Between 15 60
Under 15/over 60 & bet
older
younger
younger
male or if same sex, older
between the 15 and 60
Applicable only when (1) calamity & (2) involves

succession
Weakness of Rule 123 according to Maam: Since this
presumption is based on strength, age and sex of
individuals discrimination between close ages is not
accurately represented e.g. who will survive between 12
and 15 years old considering they have approximately the
same level of strength?
JOAQUIN v NAVARRO (1953)
93 Phil 7
Summary proceeding to resolve the order of deaths of
Joaquin Navarro, JR and his mother Angela Navarro
Setting: World War II. Battle of Manila is considered as
a calamity. Also mentioned in the story was the
neighbor Francisco Lopez and three other daughters
who were shot while trying to escape
It is necessary to establish succession because if JN Jr.
died first, his heirs are not entitled to inherit from their
grandparents.
Refer to the case for explanation of the probable causes
and speculated circumstances of their death (too many
to enumerate here, refer to original!)
ISSUE: Who between the mother and the son died first?
HELD: Inference can be derived from the evidences so no
need to use presumption. That the mother (Angela) died
before her son was based on speculations, not evidence.
Gauged by the doctrine of preponderance of evidence by
which civil cases are decided, this inference should prevail.
Evidence of survivorship may be (1) direct (2) indirect
(3) circumstantial or (4) inferential. Art 43 speaks about
resolving doubt when 2 or more persons are called to
succeed each other as to which of them died first. In the
Civil Code, in the absence of proof, it is presumed that
they died at the same time, and there shall be no
transmission of rights from one to another. In the Rules
of Court, in cases of calamity, there is a hierarchy of
survivorship.

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Juridical Persons
Kinds of Juridical Persons (CC, Art 44) and laws governing
them (CC, Art 45)
1) state and its political subdivisions governed by the laws
creating or recognizing them
2) other corporations, institutions and entities for public
interest created by laws governed by the laws creating
or recognizing them
3) corporations, partnerships and associations for private
interest or purpose to which the law grants juridical
personality, separate and distinct from that of each
shareholder, partner or member stock or non-stock
governed by the provisions of this Code concerning
partnership
CC, Art 47 Dissolution of No 2 - in pursuance of law or the

charter creating them
B. Capacity to Act and Restrictions

Thereon
1. Presumption of Capacity
STANDARD OIL CO. v ARENAS (1911)
19 Phil 363
1908
Vicente Villanueva signed a bond as surety for
Codina Arenas in favor of plaintiff
1909
The plaintiff sued on the bond; Villanueva did not
appear, and was declared in default.
Wife appeared when judgment was about to be
executed and asked that he be relieved from the bond
and the judgment because he was insane (declared
insane by July 24, 1909) with his wife as his guardian.
Case was reopened and tried and the evidence showed
that Villanueva executed the bond with full
understanding of the nature and consequences of the
act performed by him although he was suffering from a
monomania of great wealth.
He was, therefore, held liable on the bond. Hence
appealed to the SC.
ISSUE:
1. WON monomania of wealth necessarily warrants
that the person does not have capacity to act
2. WON Villanueva was actually incapable of entering
into contract at the time the bond was executed
HELD: SC affirmed the judgment of the CA. It would have
been necessary to show that
1. such monomania was habitual and constituted a
veritable mental perturbation in the patient;
2. that the bond executed was the result of such
monomania, and not the effect of any other cause,
that is, that there was not, or could there have been
any other cause for the contract than the ostentation
of wealth and this was purely an effect of such
monomania of wealth;
3. that the monomania existed on the date the bond in
question was executed. Monomania of wealth does
4.
not necessarily imply that the person is incapable of

executing a bond such as that in question.
Capacity to act must be supposed to attach to a
person who has not previously been declared
incapable, and such capacity is presumed to continue
for so long as the contrary is not proved, that is, at
the moment of his acting he was incapable, crazy,
insane, or out of his mind; which, in the opinion of
the court, has not been proved in this case.
2. Restrictions
CC, Art 6 Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary
to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs or
prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
CC, Art 38 Minority, insanity/imbecility, state of being deafmute, prodigality and civil interdiction are mere restriction on
capacity to act, and do not exempt the incapacitated person
from certain obligations, as when the latter arise from his acts
of from property relations.
still civilly liable although criminally not liable

can have obligation except for contracts
SOURCES OF OBLIGATIONS (obligations arise from)
1. law
4. crimes/delicts
2. contracts
5. quasi-delicts
3. quasi-contracts
6. torts
REINTEGRATION OF CAPACITY
1. upon reaching age of majority
2. civil interdiction, extinction of principal penalty
3. judicially determined competence without guardian (for
the first two, no need for court proceeding)
An incapacitated person is not exempt from obligations
civilly liable but not criminally liable. This is kind of
confusing because he is excluded from all except
contracts, BUT what exactly is not a contract
CC, Art 39 Modify, limit or restrict capacity to act
1. age (minority)
7. alienage
2. insanity
8. absence
3. imbecility
9. family relations
4. state of being deaf-mute
10. trusteeship
5. penalty
11. insolvency
6. prodigality
A. Minority
RA 6809 - Lowers the age of majority from 21 to 18
Contracts
Art 1327 (1) unemancipated minors cannot give consent to
contract no more concept of unemancipated minors because age of emancipation =
majority
Art 1390 (1) if one is incapable of contract, valid unless
courts says otherwise VOIDABLE

Art 1403 (3) if both is incapable UNENFORCEABLE unless

ratified
Art 1397
capacitated party cannot allege the incapacity
of other parties
Art 1399
restitution not obliged if not benefited
MERCADO v ESPIRITU (1917)
37 Phil 215
Domingo Mercado and Josefa Mercado were minors
(under the Civil Code), 18 and 19 years old
respectively, on the date the instrument (sale of land to
their uncle) was executed so they seek for annulment
of contract.
However, in the deed of sale they stated that they were
of legal age at the time they executed and signed it;
and they made the same manifestation before the
notary public when the document was prepared.
ISSUE: WON the dead of sale was invalid because the
contractors are minors
HELD: No. The courts have laid down the rule that the sale
of real estate, effected by minors who have already passed
the age of puberty and adolescence and are near the
adult age, when they pretend to have already reached their
majority, while in fact, they have not, is valid, and they
cannot be permitted afterwards to excuse themselves from
compliance with the obligation assumed by them or seek
their annulment.
Their misrepresentation estopped them from claiming
the invalidity of the contract.
Art 1390, CC binding at the discretion of the Court. It
does not favor the offender, come to Court with clean
hands.
BAMBALAN v MARAMBA (1966)
51 Phil 417
Isidro Bambalan, a minor, executed a deed of sale of a
piece of land to the defendant, Genoveva Muerong.
Bambalan made no representation as to his age, which
was well known to the defendant, inasmuch as the
latter was the one who purchased the plaintiffs cedula
to be used in the acknowledgement of the document
before a notary public.
Plaintiff now seeks to annul the sale.
ISSUE: WON a minors non-representation of his age and
knowledge of the other contracting party as to the
incapacity of the minor may render the sale void
HELD: Yes. The sale is void as to the plaintiff, because he
was a minor at the time of execution. Mercado v Espiritu
doctrine is not applicable in this case, because the plaintiff
did not pretend to be of age, and the defendant knew
him to be a minor.
BRAGANZA v VILLA ABRILLE (1959)
105 Phil 456
Rosario along with her two sons (Guillermo and
Rodolfo) loaned 70,000 Mickey Mouse money from
respondent saying theyll pay him equivalent amount
after the war.
Page 8 of 151
They did not disclose the age of the sons so the

respondent willingly gave them the amount they were
asking for.
ISSUES: WON non-disclosure of a minors age may render

the deed void and WON the recipients are obliged to
restitute what they earned
HELD: There was no misrepresentation of age, so it cannot
constitute fraud. But since they benefited from the amount,
they should return it because of Art 1399, CC.
Marriage
Art 35 (1), FC void ab initio

Art 5, FC
male or female of the age of
18 may contract marriage
Art 12, RPC

9 and below*
9 to 15*
*raised to 15 such that age
-- unless with discernment:
Periods of responsibility
absolute irresponsibility
conditional responsibility
of discernment is 15-18
(a) manner of committing
(b) conduct of the offender
-- for mitigated responsibility, penalty is one degree lower
Crimes
B. Insanity
Contracts
Art 1327 (2) insane/demented cannot give consent to
contract
Art 1328 (1) contracted in a lucid interval is valid, but
burden to prove lucid interval on prosecution
Art 1399
restitution not obliged if not benefited
Crime
Art 12(1)
not exempt from criminal liability if lucid
interval
PRESUMPTION OF SANITY
a) circumstantial evidence is sufficient
b) insanity must prove to precede the act
C. State of being deaf-mute
Art 1327
Art 807
Art 820
deaf-mute who are no read, no write cannot

give consent to contract
deaf-mute may write a will but if no read, no
write can designate two (2) persons who
would communicate to him the contents
deaf-mute cannot witness a will because he
wont be able to testify properly in court if ever
the need arises

D. Prodigality
Art 92 (2), RC
wanton waste of ones estate; without

regard for family exposing them to want
and depriving inheritance; morbid state of
mind and disposition to spend
MARTINEZ v MARTINEZ (1902)

1 Phil 182
Pedro Martinez Ilustre appeal after CA rejected his
petition for declaring his dad, Francisco, a prodigal
He was given by dad special powers of attorney but
dad revoked it because son is mismanaging their estate
Son accused dad of splurging and squandering their
properties by giving donation to his second wife and
her family
ISSUE: WON Francisco should be declared prodigal
E. Civil Interdiction
Art 34, RPC Civil interdiction. Civil interdiction shall
deprive the offender during the time of his
sentence of the rights of parental authority, or
guardianship, either as to the person or
property of any ward, of marital authority, of
the right to manage his property and of the
right to dispose of such property by any act or
any conveyance inter vivos.
Art 54, CC
Any male of the age of sixteen years

upwards, and any female of the age
fourteen years or upwards, not under any
the impediments mentioned in Articles 80
84, may contract marriage. (2)
or
of
of
to
Art 123, CC For the validity of marriage settlements

executed by any person upon whom a
sentence of civil interdiction has been
pronounced, the presence and participation of
the guardian shall be indispensable, who for
this purpose shall be designated by a
competent court, in accordance with the
provisions of the Rules of Court.
Art 11.2, RPC
Art 13.5, RPC
Justifying circ: in defense of family

Mitigating circ: immediate vindication
F. Family Relations
Art 37, FC
Art 87, FC
Art 215, FC
incestuous marriage
donation inter vivos not allowed bet spouses
disqualified to testify against each other unless
indispensable to crime against him/another
grand/parent
Art 1109, CC prescription does not run between husband
and wife, parent and child (minority or
insanity), guardian and ward
Art 1490, CC spouses cannot sell property to each other
unless:
(a) separation of property in marriage
settlement
(b) judicial separation of property
G. Absence
HELD: Since prodigality is not defined in our law, it may be

inferred that the acts of prodigality must show a morbid
state of bind and a disposition to spend, waste, and lessen
the estate to such an extent as is likely to expose the family
to want of support, or to deprive the forced heirs of their
undisposable part of the estate. The testimony of the
plaintiff was insufficient to support his allegations against
his father. There was no evidence to show his father has
been transferring by sale or mortgage any property, which
will reflect in the city record of public deeds. The court
found the defendant is far from being prodigal, and is still in
the full exercise of his faculties and still possess the
industry, thrift and ability in managing the estate. In fact,
the father has increased profit while the son himself
possesses propensity to be prodigal.
Page 9 of 151
Art 390, CC after 7 years a person is presumed dead for all

purposes except succession; if 75, 5 yrs only
Art 391, CC if there is a danger of death (4 yrs only)
(a) vessel lost at sea or missing airplane
(b) member of military or armed force in war
(c) other circumstances of danger of death
Art 124, FC if one spouse is incapacitated, other spouse
may assume power of administration

III. PRE-MARITAL
CONTROVERSY
Breach of promise to marry
CC Art 19
Every person must, in exercise of rights and
performance of his duties, act with justice, give everyone else
his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
CC Art 20
Every person who, contrary to law, willfully or
negligently causes damage to another shall indemnify the latter
for the same.
CC Art 21
Any person who willfully causes loss o injury to
another in a manner that is contrary to morals, good customs
or public policy shall compensate the latter for damage.
CC Art 2176 Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for
the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no preexisting contractual relation between the parties, is called a
quasi-delict and is governed by the provision of this Chapter.
BASIS FOR HEARTBALM STATUTE

(1) property
(2) expectation (cultural and societal) they used to
value marriage as the only goal. Impairs honor and
purity of the deserted party
Page 10 of 151
assured returning soon. But he never returned and

was never heard from again.
ISSUE: Whether or not breach of promise to marry is
actionable
HELD: This is not the case of mere breach of promise to
marry. Mere breach of promise to marry is not an actionable
wrong. But to formally set a wedding and go through all the
preparations publicity, only to walk out of it when the
matrimony is about to be solemnized is quite different. This
is contrary to good customs for which the defendant must
be held answerable in damages in accordance with Art. 21
NCC. Defendant is liable for actual damages, as well as to
moral and exemplary damages. Judgment affirmed with
modifications (on amount of damages).
TANJANCO v CA (1966)
18 SCRA 994
Arceli Santos and Apolinario Tanjanco are sweethearts.
Because of the mans promise to marry the woman,
they continually had sexual relationship with each other
for a span of one year with the womans consent.
When she got pregnant, he refused to marry her.
The prayer was for a decree compelling the defendant
to recognize the unborn child to give her support plus
moral and exemplary damages of P100,000. The CFI
dismissed the complaint for no cause of action. The CA
set aside the CFI decision.
ISSUE: WON man seduced the woman entitling her to the
rewards set forth in Art 21
Why is there no success in claiming damages for breach of

promise to marry?
No source of obligation because marriage is purely
voluntary and not compulsory. It should be freely
entered into without any threat.
People marry because of love, so it cannot be imposed
and thus there is no legal basis for action.
In the olden days, women are seen as used
merchandise when their sweethearts abandon them.
Their chances of getting married after being rejected
become slimmer. Marriage was the only goal of women.
Things are different now, especially since women can
have careers. No more pressure to marry!
HELD: No. In Art 21, the essential feature is seduction, that

in law is more than sexual intercourse or breach of promise
to marry, but connoting essentially the idea of deceit,
enticement, or abuse of confidence on the part of the
seducer to which the woman has yielded. The facts stand
out that for one whole year, the plaintiff, a woman of adult
age, maintained intimate sexual relations with defendant,
with repeated acts of intercourse. Such conduct is
incompatible with the idea of seduction. Plainly there is here
voluntariness and mutual passion. If she had been deceived,
she would not have again yield to his embraces, much less
for one year. Besides, she is old enough to know better.
Hence no case is made under Art 21.
DE JESUS v SYQUIA (1933)

58 Phil 866
Cesar Syquia courted Antonia de Jesus who was 20
years old. Amorous relations resulted in de Jesus giving
birth to a baby boy on June 17, 1931. They lived
together for one year until Antonio got pregnant again
after which Cesar left to marry another woman.
Cesar recognized his paternity of first child in writing
with a letter to the priest and uninterrupted possession
of natural child status for one year
Woman files for action for damages for breach of
promise and recognition of the child.
Breach of promise to marry is a quasi-delict

(refer back to Sources of Obligations in Restrictions
on Capacity to Act)
WASSMER v VELEZ (1964)

12 SCRA 648
Two days before the wedding (meaning everything
about the wedding was already set, as well as bridal
showers and gifts) the groom Francisco Velez suddenly
flew to his home in Cagayan de Oro, leaving the bride,
Beatriz Wassmer, only this note: will have to postpone
wedding my mother opposes it.
The next day (day before the wedding) he sent this
message through telegram: Nothing changed rest
ISSUE: WON Antonia is entitled to damages for breach of

promise to marry and kids to paternal support

HELD: Promise to marry not satisfactorily proved so the trial

court was right in refusing to grant De Jesus prayer. Also,
action for breach of promise to marry has no standing for
civil law, apart from the right to recover money or property
advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise.
This case exhibits none of the features necessary to
maintain such action.
- Antonia de Jesus only entitled to the support of the first
child because of Cesars prior recognition. No support for
the second child because no proof of paternity or
recognition presented.
PICCININNI v HAJUS (1980)
180 Conn. 369
Marie Hajus fraudulently induced Robert Piccininni (yes,
the tennis player) to transfer properties to her name for
their mutual benefit and enjoyment as future husband
and wife.
Husband does not sue for her not marrying him but for
cajoling him into transferring property in her name
ISSUE: WON the property is recoverable under Heartbalm
statute because the wife did not marry him
HELD: Yes because marital gifts are conditional until after
marriage so recoverable. Ban on Heartbalm statutes only for
issues of the heart like anguish, moral damages, failed
expectation of financial and social gains. In this case, the
petition is for recovery of unjust enrichment of deferring
wife.
Page 11 of 151

IV. DEFINITION &

NATURE OF
MARRIAGE
FC, Art 1 Marriage is a special contract of permanent union
between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with
the law, for the establishment of family and conjugal life. It is
the foundation of family and an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences and incidents are governed by the
law and not subject to stipulation, except that marriage
settlements may fix property relations during the marriage
within the limits provided by this Code.
COMMIT TO MEMORY!!!
LOVING v VIRGINIA (1967)
388 US 1, 12
Mildred Loving (of African and Native American
descent) marries Richard Perry Loving (a Caucasian) in
violation of Virginias Racial Integrity Act which is an
anti-miscegenation statute that prohibits Whites from
marrying into other races
Interesting phrase: Almighty God created the races
white, black, yellow, Malay and red and he placed them
on separate continents. And but for the interference
with his arrangement there would be no cause for such
marriages. The fact that he separated the races shows
that he did not intend for the races to mix.
The statute fuels White Supremacy because only
Whites are forbidden to intermarry, other races can
marry anyone
ISSUE: WON the statute is unconstitutional for violation of
both the equal protection and due process clauses of 14th
Amendment
HELD: Yes. The freedom to marry has long been recognized
as one of the vital personal rights essential to the orderly
pursuit of happiness by free men. Marriage is one of the
basic civil rights of man, fundamental to our very existence
and survival. Decisions SC and CA of Virginia are reversed.
ZABLOCKI v REDHAIL (1978)
434 US 374, 384
Thomas Zablocki was denied marriage license because
of non-support to prior children. Even if he marries
outside their state, it will still not be valid.
The state interest of this statute was to protect the
welfare of out of custody children and prevent
incurrence of new obligation by the illegitimate parent.
The parent must first prove that he can sustain his two
families and should undergo counseling.
ISSUE: WON statute is unconstitutional for violation of equal
protection and due process clauses
Page 12 of 151
HELD: Unconstitutional for many reasons. As for the state

interests:
1) Counseling also is not even an assurance of permission
2) Protect welfare of out custody children to compel
collection and incentive to delivery of money to prior
children but there are also other means like wage
assignment, civil contempt proceedings or criminal penalty
3) Prevent incurring of new obligation under inclusive
because new marriage is not the only way people spend
their resources, over inclusive because they could be
marrying to a better financed couple. Also it only adds more
children out of wedlock.
*According to Maam Beth: implication of the ban only
those economically stable may marry and this violates equal
protection clause
A. Marriage Models
CHARACTERISTICS OF MARRIAGE
1. civil (independent of any religion)
2. institute of public order and policy
3. natural (organic perpetuation of man)
PRINCIPAL EFFECTS OF A VALID MARRIAGE
1. emancipation from parental authority
2. personal and economic relations between spouses
3. personal and economic relations between parent &
child
4. family relationship
5. legitimacy of sexual union and family
6. modification of criminal liability
7. incapacity to make donations to each other
8. disqualification to testify against each other
MARRIAGE
ORDINARY CONTRACTS
Only between man and
May be same sex
woman
Specified duties and rights of Have the force of law
spouses
between them
May not be subject to
Can be terminated at the
stipulation or terminated
agreement of parties
Breech of obligation not
Breach of contract gives rise
actionable
to action for damages
*In both marriage and ordinary contracts, partys consent is
necessary
TERMS OF A TRADITIONAL MARRIAGE CONTRACT
(1) husband as head of family name and domicile
(2) husband responsible for support
(3) wife responsible for domestic and childcare services
GRAHAM v GRAHAM (1940) (pronounced as /grahm/)
33 F. Supp. 936
James Sebastian Graham, plaintiff sues his former wife,
Margrethe, defendant, to recover what he was allegedly
entitled by a written agreement wherein defendant
agreed to pay the plaintiff a certain some of money.

The agreement was that the wife asked husband to quit

his job so that he can accompany her to his travels, to
which he agreed as long as she will pay him $300 each
month. The monthly payment is to be in force until the
parties no longer desire the agreement.
ISSUE: WON the agreement compels the wife to continue

paying her husband the $300
HELD: No, the contract is not valid. Marriage contract
specifies that its the husbands duty or obligation to support
and live with his wife, and the wife must contribute her
services and society to the husband and follow him in his
choice of domicile. Also, a private agreement between
persons married or about to be married whereby they
attempt to change the essential obligations of the marriage
contract is contrary to public policy.
BRADWELL v ILLINOIS (1872)
93 US (16 wall) 130
Myra Bradwell was denied license to practice law JUST
-
BECAUSE SHE IS A FEMALE.
That God designed the sexes to occupy different

spheres of action and that it belonged to men to make,
apply and execute the laws, was regarded as an almost
axiomatic truth Amazing they were able to talk to
God directly.
Prescribe the qualifications for admission to the bar of
its own courts is unaffected by the 14th amendment
DUNN v PALERMO (1975)

522 S. W. 2d 679
Rose Palermo is a Nashville lawyer who married Denty
Cheatham, also a Nashville lawyer. She has continued
to use and enjoy her maiden name, Palermo,
professionally, socially and for all purposes. Tennessee
had a state-wide compulsory Registration Law.
Subsequent to her marriage, she lodged with the
Registrar a change of address form listing her name as
Palermo.
She was advised that she was required to register anew
under the surname of her husband, or have her name
purged from the registration list. Upon her refusal to so
register, her name was purged from the registration
list. Hence this action.
ISSUE: WON compulsory/mandatory to change name upon
marriage
HELD: No. Woman upon marriage, may elect to retain her
own surname or she may adopt the surname of her
husband and the choice is hers. So long as a persons name
remains constant and consistent, and unless until changed
in prescribed manner, and in absence of any fraudulent or
legally impermissible intent, state has no legitimate concern
as to name used.
*According to Maam Beth the legal name of any person
is the one written on the birth certificate (CC, Art 370)
IN RE SANTIAGO (1940)
70 Phil 66
Page 13 of 151
Ernesto Baniquit and Soledad Colares separated for 9

consecutive years, want to remarry so they sought the
aid of Atty. Roque Santiago
He instituted a document that waives whatever right of
action one might have against each other but realized
mistake after 19 days and cancelled the document
ISSUE: WON the document signed by the spouses

legitimately terminated the marital tie between them.
HELD: No. Termination of the marriage cannot be stipulated
by the parties. Santiago guilty of malpractice and suspended
for 1 year.
SELANOVA v MENDOZA (1975)
64 SCRA 69
Respondent Judge Alejandro Mendoza prepared a
document extrajudicially liquidating the conjugal
partnership of Saturnino Selanova and Avelina Ceniza.
One condition of the liquidation was that either spouse
would withdraw the complaint for adultery or
concubinage which each had filed against the other and
they waived their right to prosecute each other for
whatever acts of infidelity either one would commit
against the other.
This document was also acknowledged before him as
City Judge and Notary Public Ex Officio.
Selanova charged Judge Mendoza with gross ignorance
of the law.
ISSUE: WON marriage is valid
HELD: Agreement is void because it contravenes the
provisions of paragraphs (1) and (2) of CC Art 221. Even
before the enactment of the NCC, this court held that the
extrajudicial dissolution of the conjugal partnership during
the marriage without judicial approval secured beforehand
was void. While adultery and concubinage are private
crimes, they shall remain crimes, and a contract legalizing
their commission is contrary to law and consequently not
judicially recognizable. Respondent is severely censured.
ASSUMPTIONS OF FAMILY LAW (Weitzman article)
1. Marriage is a permanent, indissoluble, lifetime
commitment
2. First marriages (young & no previous marriages)
3. Main reason is procreation
4. Strict division of labor
5. White middle-class family (property and
inheritance)
6. Judeo-Christian tradition (monogamy)
B. Requisites of Marriage
1. ESSENTIAL REQUISITES intrinsic (Art 2)
A. Legal capacity
a.
b.
c.
Sex (must be between man and woman)

Age 18 and above (Art 5)
No impediment which means:

(1) no previous marriage

(2) family relations (not incestuous)
JONES v HALLAHAN (1973)
501 S. W. 2d 588
Marjorie Jones and her female partner were not issued
a license to marry each other in the state of Kentucky.
They contend that the failure of the clerk to issue the
marriage license deprived them of three (3) basic
constitutional rights, namely, the right to marry; the
right of association; and the right to free exercise of
religion.
Appellants also contend that the refusal subjects them
to cruel and unusual punishment.
ISSUE: WON same sex marriage violates constitutional
rights to marry
HELD: No, it does not violate any constitutionally protected
right. Two females cannot marry for marriage has always
been considered as the union of a man and a woman. It
appears that appellants are prevented from marrying not by
the statute of Kentucky but rather by their own incapacity of
entering into marriage as the term is defined. A license to
enter into a status or a relationship which the parties are
incapable of entering is a nullity. Definition of marriage
says, union of a man and a woman. Thus, in the courts
opinion, there is not constitutional issue involved, since
there is no constitutional sanction which protects the right
of marriage between persons of the same sex.
GOODRIDGE v DEPT OF PUBLIC HEALTH (2003)
440 Mass. 309
14 individuals (7 couples) were deprived of marriage
license because they were the same sex
They are professionals and active in socio-civic
activities, there was longevity in the relationship and
defendants were involved (adopted children and
parents)
They met all facial qualifications, list of impediment was
not presented by civil registrar (to prove that same sex
marriage is one of them)
LEGISLATIVE RATIO:
1. favorable setting for procreation
2. optimal setting for child rearing
3. conserving scarce state and private financial
resources
ISSUE:
1. WON licensing law treats same sex as impediment
presented by the plaintiff
2. WON bar of same sex couple is a legitimate
exercise of the States authority to regulation
conduct Court
HELD:
Marriage is a secular institution. No religious ceremony
is required. There are only 3 partners (2 spouses and
the State who defines the entry and exit terms)
PURPOSE NOT TAILOR FIT:
1. law does not distinguish childrens family
background so why deprive children the rights
Page 14 of 151
when they did not choose to be born/grow up in

such a family (coitus v non coitus, e.g. adoption or
assisted), failed to address the changing realities of
American society
2. best interest of the child parents sexual
orientation
3. homosexuals are well off and economically
independent, anyway, the same is not
condition/requirement for heterosexual couples.
IMPLICATION OF PROHIBITION: deprivation of
protection, benefits, obligations and rights exclusive to
married people same reason why these couples want
the benefit of marriage
They do not undermine marriage, In fact, they
appreciate/ show high esteem for of marriage by asking
for it! Statute declared unconstitutional
SILVERIO v REPUBLIC (2007)

537 SCRA 273
Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio wants to change his
name to Mely and sex entry in his birth certificate from
male to female because of his sex reassignment
(transgender).
RTC
granted in 2003
CA
reversed in 2006
ISSUE: WON he is entitled to the change of name action
HELD: NO!
1. Names are for purposes of identification: Art 376, CC
(no change of name without judicial declaration), RA
9048 (Clerical Error Law), Rule 103 (change of name)
and Rule 108 (Cancellation of Correction of Entries;
substantial change)
2. Grounds for Change of Name (Sec 4, RA 9048)
a. Difficult and ridiculous, dishonorable name
b. Habitual and continual use
c. To avoid confusion
3. Petitioner has not shown any reasonable cause and
does not show that his name may prejudice him
4. Case is administrative rather than judiciary
5. Change of sex not allowed because civil status is
immutable and inherent
6. No special law yet for sex change, until then sex is
determined by the sex at the time of birth as resulted
by visual inspection of medical attendant.
7. Though we get your point and sympathize with you, its
not within the province of the Court to amend laws.
Youre barking at the wrong tree. Go to the Congress
and ask them to pass a bill for you.
B. Consent freely given in the presence of

solemnizing officer
PEOPLE v SANTIAGO (1927)
51 Phil 68
Felipe Santiago asked his deceased wifes niece Felicita
Masilang, 18, to accompany him on an errand
Upon crossing a river and reaching municipality of San
Leonardo, Satinago expressed his sexual desire to

which girl declined, but he persisted on with force

against her will
The two proceeded to accuseds uncle house, Agapito
Santiago who called a Protestant minister to conduct a
wedding. After the wedding, Santiago sent home the
girl with some money to buy bread.
ISSUE: WON the marriage exempted him from criminal

liability
HELD: No! Taking into consideration Santiagos behavior
before and after the marriage, there is no serious
intention to marry the girl except for to avoid
criminal liability for the rape case.
- Girl was under duress and therefore, lack of consent
(essential requisite) which makes the marriage void
BUCCAT v MANGONON DE BUCAT (1941)
72 Phil 19
Godofredo married Luida with the belief that she was a
virgin. 89 days after the marriage celebration, Luida
gave birth. Her husband Godofredo herein appellant
filed for annulment on the ground that she concealed
her non-virginity.
ISSUE: WON marriage is valid
HELD: Where there has been no misrepresentation or fraud,
that is, when the husband at the time of the marriage knew
that the wife was pregnant, the marriage cannot be
annulled. Here, the child was born less than 3 months after
the celebration of marriage. Court refuses to annul the
marriage for the reason that the woman was at an
advanced stage of pregnancy at the time of the marriage
and such condition must have been patent to the husband.
EIGENMANN v GUERRA (1964)
5 C.A. Rep. 836
Eduardo Eigenmann married Maryden Guerra on 1957.
Two years later, Eigenmann filed an action to annul his
marriage with Guerra on the ground that he was
between ages 16-20 at that time and his mother did
not give her consent to the marriage.
ISSUE: WON there was parental consent, the absence of
which could render the marriage void.
HELD: Consent may be given in any form be it written, oral
or even by implication. Eigenmanns mother was present at
the time of the celebration of marriage and did not object
thereto, such that consent can be gleaned from such act.
- Eigenmann is also estopped from asserting that he was a
minor at the time of the marriage celebration, having
represented himself to be over 25 years of age.
Art 4
Absence of any essential or formal void, except Art
35(2)
Defect in the essential requirement voidable (Art 45)
Irregularity in the formal requirement no effect in
validity, but the parties responsible will be civilly,
criminally or administratively liable
Page 15 of 151
2. FORMAL REQUISITES extrinsic (Art 3)

A. Authority of solemnizing officer
- Who may authorize the marriage (Art 7)
a. incumbent member of judiciary
b. priest, rabbi, imam or minister of any religious sect
- duly recognized by the religion,
- registered in Civil Registry
- acting within the limit of his authority
- at least one of the spouses is member of the sect
c. ship captain and airplane chief only in Art 31
d. military commander to which chaplain is assigned
in Art 32
e. consul-general, consul, vice-consul for Filipinos
abroad
*Mayors are authorized by LGC to solemnize marriage
NAVARRO v DOMAGTOY (1996)
259 SCRA 129
Judge Hernando Domagtoy solemnized the marriage
between Floriano Sumaylo and Gemma del Rosario
outside his courts jurisdiction.
He has jurisdiction in MCTC of Sta. Monica-Burgos, but
the marriage was solemnized in Dapa which does not
fall under his jurisdictional area.
Mayor Rodolfo Navarro filed this administrative
complaint.
ISSUE: WON respondent judge should be held liable, and
whether this will render the marriage void.
HELD: Marriage may be solemnized by, among others, any
incumbent member of the judiciary within the courts
jurisdiction. Solemnization outside the judges territorial
jurisdiction will not invalidate the marriage. What
results is an irregularity in the formal requisites of a valid
marriage. Respondent judge, by citing Art 8 of the FC as
defense for the exercise of his misplaced authority, acted in
gross ignorance of the law and was therefore held
administratively liable suspension of 6 months.
- Irregularity in formal requisite no effect in
marriage validity
ARAES v OCCIANO (2002)
380 SCRA 402
Petitioner Mercedita Araes charged respondent judge
Salvador Occiano for gross ignorance of the law.
Occiano solemnized the marriage between herein
petitioner and the late Dominador Orobia without the
requisite marriage license and outside his territorial
jurisdiction.
Couple lived together as husband and wife until the
death of Orobia. But then since the marriage was a
nullity, petitioners right to inherit the vast property left
by Orobia was not recognized. Respondent explained
that he solemnized the marriage out of human
compassion and because the parties promised to
present their license the afternoon after the wedding.
ISSUE: WON the respondent judge administratively liable.

HELD: Yes. He was faulted for solemnizing a marriage

without the requisite marriage license and for exceeding his
territorial jurisdiction. He was fined P5000 and was given a
stern warning by the SC that repetition of the same or
similar offense would be dealt more severely. The absence
of a marriage license made the marriage void. And even if
the plaintiff retracted her complaint, thats not how it is
done. Withdrawal of complaint exoneration
Art 19
Art 20
Art 21
Art 22
B. Valid marriage license except for

marriages of exceptional character
Art 9
ML obtained in habitual residence of one of the

parties
Art 10 Requirements of Filipino marriages abroad settled
in the consular office which will take over the
duties of local civil registry
Art 11 Two separate application for one marriage license
which shall specify the following:
1. full name
2. place of birth
3. age and date of birth
4. civil status
5. if previously married, how, when, where the
previous marriage was dissolved or annulled
6. present residence and citizenship
7. degree of relationship of the contracting parties
8. full name, residence and citizenship of the father
9. full name, residence and citizenship of the
mother
10. full name, residence and citizenship of the
guardian, person having charge, in case
orphaned
Art 12 Proof of age
a. original or certified copy of birth certificate
b. original or certified copy of baptismal certif
c. residence certificate witnessed by 2 witnesses
preferably next of kin
Proof of age dispensed with if:
a. parents appear personally
b. local civil registrar convinced by mere looking
(read: mukhang matanda na)
c. previously married
Art 13 If previous marriages, not birthcert is required but:
a. death certificate of deceased spouse if no
death certificate is available, affidavit about
circumstance and civil status
b. judicial decree of absolute divorce/judicial
decree of annulment/declaration of nullity
c. declaration of presumptive death
Art 14 if 18-21, then parental consent
Art 15 if 21-25, then parental advice
Art 16 if anyone is required with parental consent or
advice, both shall undergo marriage counseling.
Failure to attach certificate of accomplishment
suspends issuance for 90 days.
PD 965 (1976) mandatory family planning and responsible
parenthood
Art 17 10 consecutive days of posting in bulletin board
Art 18 impediments noted in the application for marriage
Art 23
Art 24
Art 25
Art 26
Page 16 of 151
pay for issuance of ML; indigents exempted

valid for 120 days anywhere in the Philippines,
automatically cancelled at expiration
Either or both are foreigners: certificate of legal
capacity to marry from consular officials
Stateless persons or refugees: affidavit showing
capacity to marry
Marriage certificate should state the following:
a. full name, sex and age of each contracting
party
b. citizenship, religion and habitual residence
c. date and precise time of the celebration of
marriage
d. marriage license number
e. secured parental consent if needed
f. complied with parental advice if needed
g. if entered into marriage settlement, attach
copy
Duties of solemnizing officer
a. furnish couple with original marriage certificate
b. furnish local civil registrar with duplicate and
triplicate within 15 days after the marriage
c. keep with him the original marriage license,
quadruplicate of the marriage certificate and
affidavit of the contracting party to hold
marriage elsewhere as said in Art 8
Duties of local civil registrar
a. prepare documents required by this Title
b. administer oaths to all interested parties
without any charge
c. exempt from documentary stamp tax
log in registry book every marriage and details
marriages validly solemnized in other countries are
valid here except for the following:
35 (1) under 18
35 (4) bigamous/polygamous except for Art 41
35 (5) mistake of identity
35 (6) void under Art 53
36
psychological incapacity
37
incestuous
38
public policy
MARRIAGES OF EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER

The following are exempted from obtaining marriage license
Art 27 When either or both of the parties are in articulo
mortis, even if the ailing survives (e.g. screenplay
Walang Sugat)
Art 28 If the residence of either party is in a remote
location and transportation is impossible
(horse ride and distant walking does not count)
Art 31 Marriage in articulo mortis between passengers
or crews by ship captain or airplane chief,
whether in sea, in flight or stopovers
Art 32 Military commander of a unit, in articulo mortis,
between civilians or members of armed forces
within the zone of military operations
Art 33 Among Muslims and ethnic communities as
long as in accordance with their custom law
Art 34 Man and woman who have lived together as
husband and wife for five years and no legal
impediment

REPUBLIC v CA and Angelina Castro (1994)

236 SCRA 257
Angelina Castro and Edwin Cardenas were married in a
civil ceremony performed by Judge Pablo Malvar. Their
marriage was unknown to Castros parents aka secret
marriage.
Defendant Cardenas was personally responsible for the
processing of the documents, including the
procurement of marriage license.
Couple did not immediately live together, but only until
Castro became pregnant. They parted ways after 4
months, thereafter she gave birth. Baby was adopted
by her brother with the consent of Cardenas, and is
now in US.
In trying to put into marital status in order before
leaving to the US to follow her daughter, she sought a
judicial declaration of nullity, having discovered that
there was no marriage license issued to Cardenas prior
to marriage celebration.
As proof Castro offered in evidence a certification (due
search and inability to find despite diligence) from Pasig
Civil Register that license number does not appear in
the records. Cardenas failed to answer the complaint,
thus was declared in default.
ISSUE: WON proof of absence of marriage license presented
by Castro as evidence is sufficient to render marriage void.
HELD: Yes.
1. The certification of due search and inability to find
issued by civil registrar of Pasig enjoys probative value. It
was then sufficiently proved that civil registrars office did
not issue marriage license no. 3196182 to the contracting
parties.
2. The failure of Castro to offer any other witness to
corroborate her testimony is mainly due to the peculiar
circumstances of the case secret marriage.
3. For his failure to answer despite notices, Cardenas was
declared in default. Private respondent Castro cannot be
faulted for her husbands lack of interest to participate in
the proceedings.
MORENO v BERNABE (1995)
246 SCRA 120
Marilou Moreno filed this administrative complaint
against Judge Jose Bernabe for grave misconduct and
ignorance of the law.
She and Marcelo Moreno were married before Judge
Bernabe. She averred the Bernabe assured her that the
marriage contract will be released 10 days after
October 4, 1993. She found out that she could not get
her marriage contract because the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar failed to issue a marriage license.
She claimed that respondent judge connived with
relatives of private respondent Marcelo Moreno to
deceive her.
ISSUE: WON the marriage is valid and judge liable
HELD: The marriage was void due to the absence of a
marriage license. The Court affirmed the recommendation of
the Office of the Court Administrator which investigated on
Page 17 of 151
the case that respondent judge was liable for misconduct for
solemnizing a marriage without a marriage license. It also
said that the respondent judges claim of good intentions
could never justify violation of the law.
PEOPLE v BORROMEO (1984)
133 SCRA 106
Elias Borromeo guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
parricide, claiming that he should only be charged with
homicide since he and his partner were not legally
married, there being no marriage contract executed
during their church wedding.
ISSUE:
WON the absence of a marriage contract is
sufficient to render a marriage void.
HELD: The Court ruled in the negative, for the fact that no
record of the marriage existed in the registry is not enough
to invalidate the marriage. For as long as all the requisites
for the marriage were present in the celebration
thereof, the marriage subsists. Presumption is always
for the validity of the marriage.
- Also, during the trial, Elias Borromeo admitted that he was
married to the victim. The Court took cognizance of this fact
and articulated that there was no better proof of marriage
than the admission of one of the parties of the existence of
such marriage. Furthermore, the accused and victim have
lived together as husband and wife and even had one child.
Since the presumption of law is in favor of the marriage, all
evidence points to Elias Borromeo's conviction of parricide.
SEGUISABAL v CABRERA (1981)
106 SCRA 67
Judge Cabrera charged with gross ignorance of the law
for having solemnized the marriage of Jaime Sayson
and Marlyn Jagonoy without a marriage license.
Judge's story: Contracting parties and their families
came to him bearing a marriage contract. Their request
to have the marriage officiated was of such urgency
that the judge conceded after making them promise to
deliver the marriage license that same afternoon.
Unfortunately, no marriage license was delivered.
About a year later, Marlyn Jagonoy went to see the
judge, telling him she needed proof of her marriage to
Jaime Sayson in order to secure the benefits accorded
to Jaime's family after his death as a soldier.
The judge gave a copy of the marriage contract to
Jagonoy and told her to present the same to the local
civil registrar and to have them issue her a marriage
license.
Local civil registrar naturally refused to issue said
license ("for the reason that the parties have not
attended the Family Planning seminar")
HELD: Absent the formal requisite of a marriage license, the
marriage was void. Judge should not have solemnized the
marriage without first securing said license. Despite the
assertions of good faith, the judge was fined an equivalent
of his three months salary.
ALCANTARA v ALCANTARA (2007)
531 SCRA 446

Restituto and Rosita Alcantara went to the Manila City

Hall in 1982 to look for someone who could "fix" the
marriage for them, as they had not then secured a
marriage license.
A fixer conducted the ceremony right then and there
and also contracted a priest who solemnized the
marriage in 1983.
ML was issued by the local civil registrar of Carmona,
Cavite to which neither of them resides. The parties
were given a marriage contract bearing a marriage
license number that, obviously because of a
typographical error, did not accurately coincide with the
original marriage license number.
Page 18 of 151
Rosalia Martinez and Angel Tan sent a petition to the

justice of the peace stating that they wanted to enter
into a contract of marriage.
The justice of the peace, the two contracting parties,
and two witnesses of legal age, then signed a
document ratifying the above petition and affirming
that the signatories were actually present on the day
indicated in the justice's office.
Martinez and Tan were then issued a certificate of
marriage. The justice pronounced them man and wife.
Martinez and Tan did not live together as husband and
wife after the ceremony because Martinez parents were
against the relationship.
ISSUE: WON the irregularities in the issuance of the

marriage license are sufficient to render the marriage void.
ISSUE: WON the ceremony herewith described fulfilled the

formal requisite of a marriage ceremony.
HELD: Since the marriage was contracted before the

effectivity of the Family Code, Article 53 of the Civil Code
applies. It states that "no marriage shall be solemnized the
following requisites are complied with: (1) legal capacity of
the contracting parties; (2) their consent, freely given; (3)
authority of the person performing the marriage; and (4) a
marriage license, except in a marriage of exceptional
character. In this case, a marriage contract bearing the
marriage license number and a certification from the civil
registrar were presented as evidence.
- The inconsistency between the number (7054033) in the
license indicated in the certification of the municipal civil
registrar and the number (7054133) typed onto the
marriage contract was considered a typographical error and
therefore had no bearing.
- The fact that neither of the contracting parties was a
resident of Carmona, Cavite was seen as an irregularity that
cannot invalidate the marriage.
- Plaintiff should not be made to benefit from his own action
and be allowed to extricate himself when situation is no
longer palatable to his taste/lifestyle (he has three children
with mistress and chargeable of concubinage)
- They contracted second marriage (religious) after less
than a year which used the same ML and marriage contract
HELD: Yes. There was a proper ceremony: signing a

statement that declares that they take each other as
husband and wife is sufficient. In short, the declaration of
the parties need not be verbal. Article 6 of the Family Code
clearly articulates that no particular form of marriage
ceremony is required. For as long as the contracting parties
personally appear before a solemnizing officer and make a
declaration in the presence of not less than two witnesses of
legal age that they take each other as husband and wife,
the formal requisite of ceremony is complied with.
C. Ceremony
3. PRESUMPTION OF MARRIAGE
- No prescribed form of ceremony, what matters is: (Art 6)

a. personal appearance of spouses (No proxy allowed.
Marriage via webcam, unlikely to be valid.)
b. take each other as husband and wife in presence
of solemnizing officer
c. sign marriage certificate
d. at least two witnesses of legal age
- Where can the marriage be solemnized? (Art 8)
a. chambers of judge, open court, church, chapel or temple
b. office of consul-general, consul, vice consul
c. EXCEPT
- articulo mortis (Art 27)
- remote place, no means of transportation (Art 28)
- both parties written request, sworn statement (Art 8)
MARTINEZ v TAN (1909)
12 Phil 731
MADRIDEJO v DE LEON (1930)

55 Phil 1
Flaviana Perez was married to Pedro Madridejo in articulo
mortis. She died the day after the wedding. The priest who
solemnized the marriage failed to send a copy of the
marriage certificate to the municipal secretary.
ISSUE: WON the failure to send the copy of marriage
certification would render the marriage void.
HELD: No. The failure of the priest to send a copy of the
marriage certificate is a mere irregularity. Consequently, the
marriage was valid.
CC, Art 220 In case of doubt, all presumptions favor

the solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of
law or facts leans toward the validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds, the legitimacy of
children, the community of property during marriage,
the authority of parents over their children, and the
validity of defense for any member of the family in case
of unlawful aggression.
Sec 3 (aa), Rule 131 of Rules of Court That a man
and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife
have entered into a lawful contract of marriage;
-
Marriage contract is only of evidentiary value, there are

also other means to prove the existence of marriage:

a.
b.
c.
d.
birth or baptismal certificate of children bearing the

name of the spouses as parents
couples public cohabitation as spouses
testimonies from witnesses
documentary photos and videos of the wedding
TRINIDAD v CA, Felix and Lourdes Trinidad (1998)

289 SCRA 188
Patricio Trinidad and Anastacia Briones were the
parents of Inocentes, Lourdes, and Felix.
When Patricio died in 1940, survived by the above
named children, he left four parcels of land. Arturo
Trinidad, born July 1943, claimed to be the legitimate
son of Inocentes making him a compulsory heir.
Lourdes and Felix, on the other hand, denied Arturo's
claim, contending that Inocentes died single.
Arturo now has to prove that Inocentes and his mother
were validly married and that he was born during the
subsistence of said marriage.
ISSUE: WON Inocentes and Arturos mother were validly
married
HELD: The Court cited a particular case which ruled that
when the question of whether a marriage has been
contracted arises in litigation, said marriage may be proven
by (a) the testimony of a witness to the matrimony, (b) the
couple's public and open cohabitation as husband and wife
after the alleged wedlock, (c) the birth and the baptismal
certificates of children born during such union, and (d) the
mention of such nuptial in subsequent documents.
For his part, Arturo was only able to present a
certificate from the local civil registrar that all
documents of birth, marriage, and death (in Aklan)
were either burned, lost, or destroyed during the
Japanese occupation of the municipality.
In place of the marriage contract, petitioner presented
two witnesses, one testified that she was present
during the nuptials, and the other that the couple
cohabited as husband and wife. This last witness also
stated that she visited the couple's house at the time of
petitioner's birth.
Tolentino's annotation to Article 23 of the Family Code
might prove relevant to this case: There is a prima facie
presumption that a man and a woman living
maritally under the same roof are legally married.
The reason is that such is the common order of society, and
if the parties were not what they held themselves out as
being, they would be living in constant violation of decency
and law. The presumption of marriage is rebuttable only
by cogent proof to the contrary. Since Arturo's
witnesses attested to his parents' public cohabitation as
husband and wife, marriage can be presumed. The other
party then bears the burden of proof in contesting the
marriage of Arturo's parents.
Page 19 of 151
VDA. DE JACOB v CA and Pedro Pilapil (1999)

312 SCRA 772
Tomasa Vda. de Jacob claims to be the surviving
spouse of Dr. Alfredo E. Jacob and was appointed
Special Administratrix of his estates by virtue of a
reconstructed marriage contract between them.
Pedro Pilapil, the doctor's alleged adopted son, claims
that the marriage between Tomasa and Dr. Jacob was
void since (1) no marriage license and (2) only a
reconstructed marriage contract.
HELD: Regarding the first issue, the Court recognized that
the contracting parties have been living together as
husband and wife for more than five years before the
solemnization of the marriage so that they were exempt
from the marriage license requirement. In answer to the
second issue, the Court explained that though the primary
evidence of a marriage must be an authentic copy of the
marriage contract, secondary evidence proving the same is
admissible provided that (1) due execution of the document
and (2) subsequent loss of the original instrument are first
proven. Both (1) and (2) were in fact established from the
preponderance of evidence presented during the trial;
photographs of the wedding, letter of the solemnizing
officer, statement of the officer that the marriage certificate
was lost, etc. Also, the testimony of one of the parties to
the marriage has been held admissible as proof of the fact
of marriage. Furthermore, the presumption in cases like this
is always in favor of marriage. Persons dwelling together in
apparent matrimony are presumed, in the absence of any
counter-presumption or evidence special to the case, to be
in fact married.
SEVILLA v CARDENAS (2006)
497 SCRA 428
Sevilla asks for a declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Cardenas on the ground that the marriage was
solemnized without the parties' first securing a
marriage license.
Cardenas argued to the contrary, saying that they were
married in civil rites with Marriage License No.
2770792. The local civil registrar was asked to furnish
evidence affirming the existence of said marriage
license.
The representative who appeared in court claimed that
they could not find the registry book supposedly
containing the relevant information to this case because
the person in charge has already retired.
Irrelevant but interesting facts: Intertuhod sex and
knee fetish. Guys mom sent guy to Spain to go to med
school, but while he was there he didnt really study
HELD: Loss of the registry book cannot be taken as proof of
the non-issuance of a marriage license. No certification like
in Alcantara case saying that due search was conducted.
Instead, the letter said that no full attention given bec of
loaded work
- The presumption of the law is in favor of the validity of the
marriage so that in the absence of sufficient evidence
against it, the marriage subsists.

V. VOID & VOIDABLE

MARRIAGE
A. Void Marriages
1. GROUNDS
I.
Art 4 Absence of formal or essential requisite
II. Art 35 Marriages void ab initio

1. one is under 18 years old
2. solemnized by a person not authorized
to perform marriage, except when either
or both spouses believe in good faith
that he has the power to do so
3. solemnized without a valid marriage
license
4. bigamous or polygamous except under
Art 41
5. mistake of identity
Age essential
requisite
Solemnizing Officer
formal requisite
Marriage License
formal requisite
Legal impediment
essential requisite
Consent essential
requisite
6. subsequent marriage void under Art 53

FC, Art 40 Absolute nullity of the previous marriage for the
purpose of remarriage may be invoked only through a judicial
declaration of nullity
This provision is retroactive, regardless when the

marriage was celebrated. (See Atienza v Brillantes.)
Judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage
protects the spouse and prevents a subsequent
marriage contracted by him/her from becoming
bigamous. Also, so that everything will be crystal clear
between the two ex-spouses.
Other uses of judicial declaration of nullity of marriage:
o Liquidation, partition and distribution
o Separation of property between spouses
o Custody and support of children
o Delivery of childrens presumptive legitime
PEOPLE v MENDOZA (1954)

95 Phil 845
1936
Arturo Mendoza married Jovita De Asis
1941
Mendoza married Olga Lema, with subsisting
marriage
1943
Jovita died in 1943
1949
Mendoza married Carmencita Panlilio, it was for
this last marriage that he was prosecuted for
bigamy.
HELD: Mendoza is not guilty of bigamy for the third
marriage because marriage with Lema was void for bigamy,
being contracted when De Asis was still alive. When he wed
Page 20 of 151
Panlilio, his marriage with De Asis was no longer subsisting

by reason of the latter's death.
TOLENTINO v PARAS (1983)
G.R. No. L-43905
Serafia Tolentino files for rectification of deceased
husbands death certificate to place her as surviving
spouse
Tolentino contracted a marriage with Maria Clemente
during the subsistence of a prior marriage. He was
convicted of and served sentence for bigamy. After
completing the term for his conviction, he went back to
his second wife.
Tolentino's death certificate had the name of the Maria
Clemente as the surviving spouse instead of Serafia.
HELD: Serafia, the first wife, is Tolentino's surviving spouse.
Tolentino's conviction for bigamy is the best proof that his
second marriage was void.
WIEGEL v SEMPIO-DY (1986)
143 SCRA 499
Karl Wiegel files for annulment of marriage with Lilia
Olivia because she previously married Eduardo Maxion.
However Lilia says that the marriage was contracted
under duress.
Although woman believes the marriage is void, when
the husband learned about Olivia's previous marriage,
he filed for a declaration of nullity.
HELD: Olivia's first marriage is merely voidable, her consent
being vitiated by force. Her second marriage is void because
it was contracted while a prior marriage was subsisting.
Although the marriage is void, Sempio-Diy says that
there should be legal declaration of nullity for void
marriages or final judgment of annulment for voidable
marriages
SC dismisses case saying marriage is not a matter of
private contract and personal adventure.
*The decision laid down in this case had NO LEGAL
BASIS. The Civil Code does not require a final judgment of
nullity in marriages void ab initio. To quote Maam Beth:
Inimbento lang yan ni Sempio-Diy!
TERRE v TERRE (1992)
211 SCRA 6
Dorothy and Jordan Terre met when the latter was in
law school. Jordan was persistent in asking for
Dorothy's hand in marriage, even explaining to her that
her marriage to a certain Mercelito Bercinilla was void
ab initio because they were first cousins. enveigled
the woman
He further reiterated that there was no need for
Dorothy to secure a court declaration regarding the
nullity of that marriage. Convinced with Jordan's word,
the two entered into a contract of marriage.
Years later, Jordan suddenly disappeared. It was found
out that he married a certain Vilma Malicdem, giving
Dorothy a ground for filing against him a case of
bigamy. Btw, Dorothy spent for his law school expenses
and even gave him allowances.

ISSUE: WON Jordan may be charged of bigamy

HELD: A judicial declaration that the first marriage is void is
essential for contracting a subsequent marriage. Dorothy's
marriage to Terre is void for being bigamous. Even if the
court were to assume for the sake of argument that Jordan
Terre held in good faith the mistaken belief that Dorothy's
marriage to Bercenilla was void ab initio, a case of bigamy
will still follow.
His first marriage to complainant Dorothy must be
deemed valid and his second marriage to Vilma
Malicdem must be regarded as bigamous.
Even if void marriage, it still needs judicial declaration.
*Maam Beth: Jordan is very inconsistent. Whatta lousy
lawyer.
ATIENZA v BRILLANTES (1995)
243 SCRA 32
Judge Brillantes and Zenaida Ongkiko went through a
marriage ceremony solemnized by a town mayor and
without a marriage license.
They went through another marriage ceremony, again
without securing the necessary marriage license.
Judge Brillantes then married Yolanda De Castro,
saying that he was free to marry because under the
Civil Code his first marriage was void.
HELD: Judge's marriage to Ongkiko was void, but using
Article 40 of the Family Code, he should have first secured a
judicial declaration of the nullity of his previous marriage.
Judge Brillantes argued that the provision does not
apply to him since his first marriage was contracted in
1965 and was still governed by the Civil Code (which
came into effect August 30, 1950; the Family Code
became effective August 03, 1988).
The Court answered this by stating that Article 40 is
applicable to remarriages entered into after the
effectivity of the Family Code, regardless of the date
of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of
the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect
insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or
other laws."
Judge Brillantes has not shown any vested right that
was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his
case.
BORJA-MANZANO v SANCHEZ (2001)
354 SCRA 1
Complaint filed by lawful wife of late David Manzano
whom respondent wed with Luzviminda Payao despite
status of separated
HELD: That the contracting parties have been living apart
from their respective spouses for years did not dissolve
those marriage bonds. Even free and voluntary cohabitation
cannot severe the ties of a subsisting previous marriage.
Furthermore, marital cohabitation for a long period of time
between two individuals who are legally capacitated to
marry each other is merely a ground for exemption from
marriage license. It cannot serve as a justification for
Page 21 of 151
solemnizing a subsequent marriage. Manzano and Payao's

marriage is void for being bigamous. Respondent judge
demonstrated gross ignorance of the law when he
solemnized a void and bigamous marriage.
APIAG v CANTERO (1997)
268 SCRA 47
Maria Apiag and Judge Cantero were married in a
ceremony supposedly set up by their parents. Two
children were born out of their union.
The judge then left Apiag with no financial support
whatsoever for her and the children.
Maria learned later on that the judge had contracted a
second marriage. She then filed a case of bigamy and
falsification of document against the judge.
HELD: The Court reiterated the rule that a marriage though
void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact before any
party thereto can marry again, otherwise the second
marriage will also be void (Article 40 of the Family Code).
However, Judge Cantero's second marriage took place
before the promulgation of Wiegel v. Sempio-Dy (1986)
and before the effectivity of the Family Code (1988).
Hence, the doctrine in Odayat v. Amante, where no
judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of
void marriages, is applicable to his case.
The judge was free to contract a second marriage
without court declaration of the nullity of the first
marriage. And since the charge of falsification is based
on a finding of guilt in the bigamy charge, failure of the
bigamy aspect would likewise render the falsification
angle invalid.
The conduct of the respondent judge in his personal life
falls short of court standards. However, this mistake
should not totally destroy his career and deprive him or
his heirs of the fruits of his labor. For such conduct, the
court would have imposed a penalty. But in view of his
death, dismissal of the case was ordered.
It turns out Apiag and Cantero were only childhood
sweethearts and married to save face because the
woman got pregnant. Speculatively, the Apiags were
after their share in Canteros retirement benefits.
Interesting phrase: Youthful mistake should not
forever haunt judge. Man is not perfect.
III. Art 36 Psychological incapacity
PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
-
An innovation of the Family Code, derived from Art

1095 of the Canon Law
Psychological incapacity is not a vice of consent. In
fact, a psychologically incapacitated party does give a
valid consent. The problem lies in his or her inability to
fulfill the obligations arising from that consent. An
example of vice of consent is insanity.
No examples given of psychological incapacity because
doing so would limit the applicability of Article 36 under
the principle of ejusdem generis.
The psychologically incapacitated person is not
disqualified from marrying again, especially if
he/she can find a partner who would be able to accept

his personality. The fact of his or her psychological

incapacity would be revealed anyway in the application
for a marriage license for the second marriage and the
other party is thus placed on guard to conduct discreet
investigation about the matter.
The following grounds may be mentioned as
manifestations of psychological incapacity,
according to Dr. Veloso of the Metropolitan Marriage
Tribunal of the Catholic Archdiocese of Manila;
(1) homosexuality or lesbianism,
(2) satyriasis or nymphomania,
(3) extremely low intelligence,
(4) immaturity,
(5) epilepsy,
(6) habitual alcoholism, and
(7) criminality.
Other manifestations, according to other experts on
church annulment, would be
(1) refusal of the wife to dwell with the husband
after the marriage,
(2) compulsive gambling or unbearable jealousy,
(3) sociopathic anomalies like sadism or infliction
of physical violence, constitutional laziness or
indolence, drug dependence, or some kind of
psychosexual anomaly.
Either party to the marriage can file for a declaration of
nullity. A spouse's psychological incapacity does not bar
him or her from initiating the action for the declaration
of nullity.
GUIDELINES LAID DOWN IN REPUBLIC v MOLINA

1. burden of proof is on the plaintiff, subject to
investigation for collusion
2. root cause must be medically/clinically identified,
alleged in the complaint and explained in the decision
3. exist at the time of the marriage
4. incurable
5. grave enough to bring about the incapability to fulfill
marital obligation
6. cannot perform Art 68-71, 220-221 and 225
7. decision of the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
of Catholic Church should be observed
8. state participation to protect sanctity of marriage
through the fiscal or prosecuting attorney
MAIN REQUIREMENTS FOR PSYCHOLOGICAL INCAPACITY
1. juridical antecedence (prior to the marriage)
2. incurability
3. gravity
SANTOS v BEDIA-SANTOS (1995)
240 SCRA 20
Leouel Santos and Julia Bedia contracted a marriage in
1986. They often had quarrels because of their living
arrangement. They lived with the wifes parents who
always intervened in their conjugal affairs.
Julia then left for the United States as a nurse. After
seven months, she called her husband to tell him she
will return the following year. She never went home
though.
Page 22 of 151
Leouel tried to locate her when he was assigned in US

for training (he wa member of the Armed Force) but his
search was to no avail.
Leouel then filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage,
arguing that Julia's failure to return home and
communicate with him for more than five years clearly
shows her being psychologically incapacitated.
ISSUE: WON Julia is psychologically incapacitated

HELD: NO. The facts were not enough to show
psychological incapacity. What was shown was lack of
willingness to comply with marital obligations. Through
dicta, the Court also explained that:
(1) There is hardly any doubt that the intendment of the law
has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity
to the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly
demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage.
(2) That the provision is open to abuse. To prevent this, the
court shall order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal assigned
to it to appear on behalf of the State to take steps to
prevent the collusion between parties and to take care that
evidence is not fabricated or suppressed.
(3) In deciding the case, the judge must be guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church
tribunals which, although not binding on the civil courts,
may be given persuasive effect since the provision was
taken from Canon Law.
REPUBLIC v CA and Roridel Molina (1997)
268 SCRA 198
Roridel Molina filed a petition for declaration of nullity
of her marriage to Reynaldo Molina.
She claimed that a year after their marriage, Reynaldo
showed signs of immaturity and irresponsibility (i.e.
spent all his time with his friends, depended on his
parents for support, was dishonest about their finances,
was habitually quarrelsome).
He also lost his job and from then on Roridel became
the family's breadwinner. The couple had been living
separately for more than three years as of the
commencement of this hearing.
HELD: What existed in this case were irreconcilable
differences or conflicting personalities, which in no wise
constitute psychological incapacity. Court further said that it
is not enough to prove that the parties failed to meet
their responsibilities and duties as married persons; it is
essential that they must be shown to be incapable of
doing so, due to some psychological illness.
Mild characterological peculiarities, mood changes and
occasional emotional outbursts cannot be accepted
as root causes of psychological incapacity. The illness
must be shown as downright incapacity or inability, not
a refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less ill will. In
other words, there should be a natal or supervening
disabling factor in the person, an adverse integral
element in the personality structure that effectively
incapacitates the person from really accepting and

thereby complying with the obligations essential to

marriage.
TSOI v CA (1997)
266 SCRA 324
The case of the two incher Chinese (3 in when erect)
Ten months after marriage, Chi Ming Tsoi and Gina Lao
still did not engage in sexual intercourse even if neither
party is impotent. The wife wanted to annul (instead of
declaration of nullity?) the marriage but the husband
did not.
HELD: The Court first explained that the action to declare a
marriage void can be initiated by either party, even by the
one who's incapacitated. This makes it immaterial to
determine which spouse refuses to have sex with the other.
It then went on to articulate that "one marital obligation is
to procreate based on the universal principle that
procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the
basic end of marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this
obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of
the marriage." Insofar as the case presented a breach of
marital obligation, there is psychological incapacity.
*According to Maam Beth: Abnormal reluctance or
unwillingness to consummate marriage is strongly indicative
of a serious personality disorder. It demonstrates utter
insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to
the marriage. Senseless and protracted refusal of one of the
parties to fulfill marital obligations is equivalent to
psychological incapacity.
*Also: Tsois love for his wife is exceptional. He doesnt
mind the risk of divulging to the public his package size to
be discussed by law students in perpetuity if only to save
their marriage. Poor guy.
MARCOS v MARCOS (2000)
343 SCRA 755
Both spouses are members of AFP and PSG for Marcos
Brenda married Wilson Marcos and had five children
with him. Marcos was discharged from his job and this
led to a series of quarrels with his wife, in which he did
her physical harm. He was also wont to mistreating his
own children.
The couple then started living separately. At one time,
the wife went to her husband's house to look for their
son. He was gravely angered by this ran after her with
a samurai.
For failing to find work and treating his family violently,
the Regional Trial Court found the husband
psychologically incapacitated. This decision was denied
by the Court of Appeals, reasoning that, taking the
totality of the pieces of evidence presented,
psychological incapacity was not manifest.
HELD: Supreme Court referred to the guidelines laid out in
Republic vs. Molina. It ruled the case in the negative,
stating that (1) (based on juridical antecedence) there was
absolutely no showing that Marcos' defects were already
present at the inception of the marriage. It was only after
Page 23 of 151
he lost his job that he became intermittently drunk, failed to

give material and moral support, and even left the family
home. Also, (2) (based on incurability) there was no
showing that his defects were incurable, especially now that
he's been gainfully employed as a taxi driver.
Through dicta, the Court further articulated that Republic
vs. Molina included the "medical and clinical
identification" of the root cause of the psychological
incapacity. What is important is the presence of evidence
that can adequately establish the party's psychological
condition. For indeed, if the totality of evidence presented is
enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical examination of the person concerned need
not be resorted to.
The Court even declared that Article 36 should not be
equated with a divorce law or legal separation. It is not a
divorce law that cuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves. It is not legal
separation, in which the grounds need not be rooted on
psychological incapacity but on physical violence, moral
pressure, moral corruption, civil interdiction, drug addiction,
habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity, abandonment and the
like. (At best, the evidence presented by the wife in this
case refers only to grounds for legal separation, not for
declaring a marriage void.)
CHOA v CHOA (2002)
392 SCRA 198
Case of the incompetent psychologist; incompatibility
Alfonso Choa filed for a declaration of nullity of
marriage based on his wife's psychological incapacity.
The case went to trial with the Alfonso presenting
evidence. To this the wife replied with a Motion to
Dismiss or Demurrer to Evidence (which is an objection
or exception by one of the parties in an action at law,
to the effect that the evidence which his adversary
produced is insufficient in point of law (whether true or
not) to make out his case or sustain the issue). The
RTC and CA denied the wife's Motion to Dismiss.
ISSUE: WON wife's (1) immaturity, (2) lack of attention to
their children, and (3) lack of intention of pro-creative
sexuality constitute psychological incapacity.
HELD: The evidence adduced by Alfonso merely shows that
he and his wife could not get along. There was absolutely
no showing of the gravity or juridical antecedence or
incurability of the problems besetting their marital union.
The Court here is of the opinion that a medical
examination is not a condition sine qua non to a
finding of psychological incapacity, so long as the
totality of evidence presented is enough to establish the
incapacity adequately. Here the totality of evidence
presented by respondent was completely insufficient to
sustain a finding of psychological incapacity - the lack of
medical, psychiatric or psychological examination only
worsens the situation.

ANTONIO v REYES (2006)

484 SCRA 353
Case of the pathological liar
Antonio filed for a declaration of nullity of his marriage
to Reyes, whom he alleged is psychologically
incapacitated, as manifested in her habitual lying (that
one brother-in-law attempted to rape and kill, that she
was a psychiatrist and free-lance voice talent who's
distinguished performer, etc.)
There were psychiatrists who testified for both parties.
One used the Comprehensive Psych-Pathological Rating
Scale (CPRS) and said that Reyes passed the test and
so was not psychologically incapacitated. The doctor
from the opposing party countered the finding, saying
that the test was not reliable.
TC declared the marriage null and void. Before its
announcement of its decision, the Metropolitan Tribunal
of the Archdiocese of Manila annulled the Catholic
marriage of petitioner and respondent on the ground of
lack of due discretion of both parties. This decision was
upheld by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
but stipulated that only Reyes was impaired by a lack of
due discretion. Same decision was upheld by the
Roman Rota of the Vatican. CA held otherwise, saying
there was insufficient evidence.
HELD:
(1) The root cause of respondent's psychological incapacity
has been medically or clinically identified, alleged in the
complaint, sufficiently proven by experts (there was no
personal examination, but Court cited Molina ruling saying
that the personal examination of the subject by the
physician is not required), and clearly explained in the trial
court's decision.
(2) That the psychological incapacity was established to
have clearly existed at the time of and even before the
celebration of the marriage.
(3) That the gravity of respondent's psychological incapacity
is sufficient to prove her disability to assume the essential
obligations of marriage. The lies attributed to the
respondent indicate a failure on her part to distinguish truth
from fiction, or at least abide by the truth. One unable to
adhere to reality cannot be expected to adhere as well to
any legal or emotional commitments.
(4) That the Court of Appeals erred when it did not consider
the fact that the marriage was annulled by the Catholic
Church.
Through dicta, the Court also draw a distinction between
the wife's pathological lying and the implications of
Article 45(3) of the Family Code which states that a
marriage may be annulled if the consent of either party was
obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the
circumstances constituting fraud under the previous article,
clarifying that "no other misrepresentation or deceit as to
character, health, rank, fortune or chastity shall constitute
such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment
of marriage." It would be improper to draw linkages
between misrepresentations made by Reyes and
misrepresentation under Articles 45(3) and 46. The fraud
under Article 45(3) vitiates the consent of the spouse who is
lied to, and does not allude to vitiated consent of the lying
Page 24 of 151
spouse. In this case, the misrepresentations of Reyes point

to her own inadequacy to cope with her marital obligations,
kindred to psychological incapacity under Article 36.
REPUBLIC v CUISON-MELGAR (2006)
486 SCRA 177
The wife filed for declaration of nullity of marriage
based on her husband's psychological incapacity as
manifested in his immaturity, habitual alcoholism,
unbearable jealousy, maltreatment, continual laziness,
and abandonment of the family.
HELD: The totality of evidence presented by the wife was
completely insufficient to establish psychological incapacity.
(1) The wife alone testified in support of her complaint.
(2) She failed to establish the fact that at the time of the
celebration of the marriage her husband was already
suffering from a psychological defect.
(3) There was no evidence showing that the husband was
not cognizant of the basic marital obligations. At best, the
circumstances relied upon by the wife are ground for legal
separation.
*Maam Beth points out the inconsistency in the rules: No
need for expert psychological opinion but presenting such
will strengthen your case, as the court decision said
something like could have increased her chances of
winning
PARAS v PARAS (2007)
529 SCRA 81
Rosa Paras filed for a declaration of nullity of her
marriage to Justo Paras on the ground of psychological
incapacity as manifested in his infidelity, failure to
support his children, abandonment of the family, and
falsification of documents.
Death of their two children, the family flew to States to
recover. When they family return, Justo said that Rosa
became cold to him
They had a gasoline station which the husband usually
gives for free for the city government since he used to
be the mayor
The existence of an illegitimate child Cyndee Rose
Paras with an alleged concubine named Loida Ching.
HELD: While the above allegations were true, there was
nothing in the records showing that they were caused by
psychological incapacity. Justo's acts appeared to have been
the result of irreconcilable differences between him and his
wife caused by the death of their children and his failure in
his professional endeavors. There was then no evidence
that Justo's defects were present at the time of the
marriage and only after he lost the mayoralty election.
TONGOL v TONGOL (2007)
537 SCRA 135
Husband filed for a declaration of nullity of marriage
based on his wife's psychological incapacity as
manifested in her being given to tantrums, irritability,
and want of dominance.

A certain Dr. Villegas examined the wife and concluded

that she was suffering from an Inadequate Personality
Disorder with hysterical coloring which rendered her
psychologically incapacitated to perform the duties and
responsibilities of marriage.
HELD: Dr. Villegas failed to link the wife's personality

disorder to a conclusion of psychological incapacity
since (1) he was not able to satisfactorily explain if her
personality disorder was grave enough to bring about
disability to comply with marital obligations, (2) there was
no evidence that such incapacity was incurable.
Also, the psychological incapacity considered under
Article 36 is not meant to comprehend all possible
cases of psychoses - here, the spouses' differences and
misunderstandings basically revolve around and are
limited to their disagreement regarding the
management of their business. In sum, it was not
disputed that the wife was suffering from a
psychological disorder. However, the totality of the
evidence presented did not show that her personality
disorder is of the kind contemplated in Article 36.
IV. Art 37 Incestuous marriage
1. between ascendants and descendants
2. between brothers and sisters, whether half-blood
or full-blood
V.
Art 38 Violation of public policy

1. between collateral relatives up to the 4th degree,
illegitimate or legitimate
2. between step-parent and step-children
3. between parent-in-law and child-in-law
4. between adopter and adopted
5. surviving spouse of adopter and adopted
6. between surviving spouse of adopted and adopter
7. between legitimate children of adopter and
adopted
8. between adopted children of same adopted
9. if one kills own or other wife with the intention to
marry another or the victims spouse
*Stepbrothers and stepsisters are not included in the list.

Reasons why above mentioned marriages contravene public
policy:
1. Recessive genes of families get expressed
2. Causes confusion in the family tree (what is the
relationship of a father to his child with his
daughter?)
3. Legit child and adopted child are presumed to have
been raised as real siblings
4. For Par 9 -> complete moral perversion. Ethics!
VI. Art 41 subsequent marriage UNLESS there is a
declaration of presumptive death of spouse in
appropriate cases
VII. Art 44 if both spouses contracted remarriage from
absence in bad faith (as to absence of one spouse)
Page 25 of 151
2. PERIOD TO FILE ACTION OR RAISE

DEFENSE
FC, Art 39 The action or defense for the declaration of absolute
nullity of a marriage shall not prescribe. (As amended by RA
8533, approved Feb. 23, 1998)
Under E.O. 277, for marriages contracted before the

Family Code took effect, the action for the declaration
of nullity based on psychological incapacity prescribed
in ten years - that is, ten years after 1988, or 1998.
But R.A. 8533 now makes all actions under Article 36
imprescriptible. Its gonna be here forever, at least,
until this law gets repealed.
Mere lapse of time cannot give effect to marriage or

any other contract that is null and void.
3. EFFECTS OF NULLITY
*For provisions refer to the table in the appendix
NIAL v BADAYOG (2000)
328 SCRA 122
Nial and Badayog were married in 1974.
Nial shot his wife Bellones in 1985, causing her death
(why didnt they convict him of parricide???). After a
year and a half, Ninal contracted a second marriage
with Badayog without a marriage license. They
executed an affidavit stating they have cohabited for at
least five years.
Ninal died in 1997. His children with Bellones seek a
declaration of nullity of Ninal's marriage with Badayog.
It is assumed that the validity or invalidity of the
second marriage would affect the children's
successional rights.
HELD: Nial and Badayog's marriage is void for lack of
marriage license. They are not exempt from acquiring a
marriage license because their five-year cohabitation was
not the cohabitation contemplated by law. It should be in
the nature of a perfect union that is valid under the
law but rendered imperfect only by the absence of
the marriage contract. Of the five years that they had
cohabited, only 20 months were without any legal
impediment.
Other than for purposes of remarriage (see Article 40 of
the Family Code), no judicial action is necessary to declare a
marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as
but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy or
illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the
court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is
essential to the determination of the case.
* This is weird Nial should have been disqualified to marry
Badayog because of Art 38 Par 9 (kills own or other wife
with the intention to marry another or the victims spouse)

DOMINGO v CA and Delia Soledad Avera (1993)

226 SCRA 572
Soledad Domingo filed
for separation of property and declaration of nullity of
her marriage to Roberto Domingo.
They
were
married
1976, but unknown to Soledad, Roberto was previously
married to a certain Emerlinda de la Paz.
She came to know of
the first marriage only after Emerlinda sued them for
bigamy.
Roberto claimed that
Soledad's petition for a declaration of nullity was
superfluous in that their marriage was void ab initio.
On the other hand,
Soledad insisted on the necessity of the judicial
declaration of nullity, not for purposes of remarriage,
but in order to provide a basis for the separation and
distribution of the properties acquired during coverture.
HELD: Judicial declaration of nullity can be invoked for
purposes other than remarriage. Separation of property
is also one of the effects of judicial declaration of nullity.
The Court further asserted that a judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for
purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis
acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free
from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the
previous marriage void. In fact, the requirement for a
declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage is also for the
protection of the spouse who, believing that his or her
marriage is illegal and void, marries again. With the judicial
declaration of nullity of his or her first marriage, the person
who marries again cannot be charged of bigamy.
*Emphasis on the word ONLY / SOLELY in Art 40, FC
*Maam Beth thinks this is a weird case because usually its
the first wife that files bigamy against husband. Here, its
the second wife.
DE CASTRO v ASSIDAO-DE CASTRO (2008)
GR No. 160172
Reinelle Anthony De
Castro impregnated Annabelle Assidao, a government
dentist. Their marriage license expired so they (falsely)
executed an affidavit stating that they had been living
together as husband and wife for five years.
By
virtue
of
this
affidavit, they contracted a marriage. The parties,
however, lived separately after the marriage's
celebration.
Assidao
filed
a
complaint for child support, asserting that she was
validly married to De Castro and that her daughter was
De Castro's legitimate child.
HELD: The execution of the false affidavit stating that the
parties had been living together as husband and wife
cannot be considered as a mere irregularity. They
Page 26 of 151
were married without a valid marriage license and so their

marriage was void ab initio.
- The child born to them was illegitimate; however, it does
not free De Castro from the duty of providing financial
support since he has been declaring her as a dependent in
tax exemption and even signed in her birth certificate.
B. Voidable Marriages
-
Valid until annulled by a competent court

Can be convalidated (ratified or annulled) either by
free cohabitation or prescription
Cannot be impugned upon death of either party
1. Grounds for Annulment

FC, Art 45 Grounds for voidable marriages
1. 18-21 yrs old but no parental consent
2. any party of unsound mind
3. consent obtained by fraud
4. consent obtained by force, intimidation, undue
influence
5. incurable physical incapacity to consummate the
marriage (impotency)
6. incurable and serious STD, existing at the time of the
marriage (like AIDS and herpes, since syphilis and
gonorrhea are curable)
For Par 4:
Violence use of serious or irresistible force to wrest
consent (Art 1335, CC)
Undue influence improper advantage of power over
the will of the other, depriving the latter of
reasonable freedom of choice, threat to enforce a
legal claim does not invalidate consent to a marriage
Reverential fear fear of causing distress,
disappointment or anger on part of the victim
For Par 5:
IMPOTENCY is different from STERILITY. Impotency
cannot harden up, so no sex is possible. Sterility, on the
other hand, is characterized by low spermatozoa count.
However, the fact that intercourse is possible, there
remains a possibility, no matter how low or tiny, for the
husband to sire a child.
Old age is not a ground because one who marries an
old person should have been prepared for the others
impotence.
DOCTRINE OF TRIENNIAL COHABITATION: If wife
remains a virgin after three years of living together, the
presumption of impotency commences unless proven
otherwise.
FC, Art 46 What do you mean by fraud in Art 45 (3)?
Concealment of:
1. final conviction of moral turpitude
2. pregnancy by man other than husband
3. STD
4. Drug addiction, habitual alcoholism, homosexuality or
lesbianism
*for Nos 3 and 4:

- Incurability of the STD does not factor in because the

main issue is the concealment of the fact of having
an STD
- Can be a ground for Art 36 if proven to exist at the
time of marriage
Art 47 Who may file the action and when (see Table)
RATIFICATION cures defect existing at the time of marriage
and validates the marriage
PRESCRIPTION bars the remedy because of the lapse of the
period provided by the law for bringing the action to annul
FC, Art 48 The need for a prosecuting attorney to prevent
collusion or suppression/fabrication of evidence between
parties. Stipulation of fact or confession of judgment not to be
accepted.
FC, Art 49 Pendency of the decree

a. support of the spouse (pendent elite)
b. custody and support of the children
c. visitation rights of the other parent
RPC, Art 344 Prosecution of the crimes adultery, concubinage,

seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness
MOE v DINKINS (1981)

533 F. Supp. 623
Maria Moe and Raoul Roe, together with their child Richard
Roe sought the declaration of a New York Domestic
Relations
Law
requiring
parental
consent
as
unconstitutional. Relevant portions of the said law provides
that all male applicants for a marriage license between 16
and 18, and all female applicants between 14 and 18 must
obtain the written consent of both of their parents. Maria
was 15 and Raoul, 18, when this case was initiated. They
continue to be prevented from marrying because Marias'
mother refuses to give her consent to their union. Plaintiffs
contend that the NY Law was unconstitutional since it
deprived them of liberty guaranteed to them by the Due
Process Clause.
HELD: The constitutional rights of children cannot be
equated to that of adults because of:
(1) the peculiar vulnerability of children,
(2) their inability to make critical decisions in an informed
and mature manner,
(3) the importance of parental role in child-rearing.
Court also explained that the State interests espoused in the
NY Law are the protection of minors from immature
decision-making and the prevention of unstable marriages.
The law also assumes that parents naturally act in the best
interest of their children, so that parental consent cannot be
dispensed with.
KATIPUNAN v TENORIO (1937)
38 OG 71
Marcos Katipunan sought annulment of his marriage to
Rita Tenorio on the ground of latter's insanity.
Page 27 of 151
There was no proof that Tenorio was insane at the time

of the celebration of the marriage.
HELD: No ground for annulment. Insanity that occurs after

the celebration of the marriage does not constitute a cause
for nullity.
SUNTAY v COJUANGCO SUNTAY (1998)
300 SCRA 760
Emilio Suntay married Isabel Cojuangco. Prior to the
marriage, Emilio was already suffering from
schizophrenia. The trial court declared their marriage
null and void on the ground of Emilio's insanity.
Now, Isabel Aguinaldo Suntay wants to assert her claim
as Emilio's legitimate heir.
HELD: The marriage was voidable, unsound mind being a
ground for annulment and not for declaration of nullity.
Isabel Aguinaldo Suntay should thus be accorded the same
rights as acknowledged natural children. She was a
legitimate heir of Emilio and their grandmother.
- There was a difference in the dispositive (fallo) and the
body of the court decision. In case of discrepancy (voidable
and not void), the decision should be read as a whole.
BUCCAT v BUCCAT (1941) SUPRA
Godofredo Buccat married Luida Mangonon with the belief
that she was a virgin. Luida gave birth 89 days after the
celebration of the marriage. Godofredo then filed for
annulment on the ground that she concealed her nonvirginity.
HELD: It was not believable for the husband to not have
known his wife's state, her pregnancy being in the advanced
stage (sixth month). The Court refused to annul the
marriage, saying that there was no misrepresentation or
fraud on the part of the wife.
AQUINO v DELIZO (1960)
109 Phil 21
Fernando Aquino married Conchita Delizo, four months
after the celebration of the marriage, Delizo gave birth.
Aquino then filed for annulment on the ground of fraud
or concealment of pregnancy.
HELD: Since Delizo was naturally plump, Aquino could not
have known that she was four months pregnant at the time
of the marriage. According to medical opinion, even on the
fifth month of pregnancy, the enlargement of the woman's
abdomen is still below the umbilicus and hardly noticeable.
It is only on the sixth month of pregnancy that the
roundness of the woman's abdomen becomes apparent.
REMANDED FOR RETRIAL
ANAYA v PALAROAN (1970)
36 SCRA 97
Aurora Anaya wanted to annul her marriage to
Fernando Palaroan on the basis of his failure to disclose
his relationship with another woman prior to their
marriage.

Only married her to evade a premarital affair with a

close relative and no intention to become husband and
wife.
ISSUE: WON disclosure of previous relationship is fraud

HELD: NO because fraud as a vice of consent in
marriage is limited to those enumerated by law,
which in this case would be those mentioned in Article 86 of
the Civil Code. If we were to read the later provision of the
Family Code into this scenario, the clause "no other
misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank,
fortune, or chastity" of Article 46 would bar Anaya's action
for annulment.
RUIZ v ATIENZA (1941)
40 OG 1903
Jose Ruiz impregnated Pelagia Atienza. He was fetched
from his residence by Atienza's relatives who allegedly
intimidated him into marrying her.
An uncle of Atienza was even said to have threatened
to file immorality charges against Ruiz that would
prevent his admission to the Bar.
HELD: There was no ground for annulment. Neither violence
nor duress attended the marriage celebration. Also, threat
cannot come from lawful actions such as threat to obstruct
his admission to the Bar based on immorality. He was also
not kidnapped by his wife's relatives, there being many
occasions for him to escape.
- If guilty of seduction, a man cannot avoid marriage by
duress (come to Court with clean hands) MARRIAGE NOT
ANNULLABLE.
JIMENEZ v CANIZARES (1960)
109 Phil 273
Joel Jimenez filed for annulment on the ground of his
wife's impotency, claiming that her vagina was too
small to allow penetration.
Remedios Canizares refused to have physical exam
despite repeated orders by the court contempt of
court for noncompliance and constitutes collusion
HELD: Since the only evidence presented was Jimenez's
testimony, there was no sufficient basis to establish the
wife's impotency. For all intents and purposes actually,
because only the testimony of the husband, the
presumption of the law is in favor of potency. REMANDED
FOR FURTHER PROCEEDINGS.
SARAO v GUEVARRA (1940)
40 OG 15 Supp 263
In the afternoon of their wedding, Sarao tried to have
carnal knowledge of Pilar Guevarra, but the latter
showed reluctance and begged him to wait until
evening.
When night came, he again approached the wife, but
through he found the orifice of her vagina sufficiently
large of his organ, she complained of pains in her
private parts and he noticed oozing there from some
matter offensive to the smell.
Page 28 of 151
Because of this, coitus had not been successful, and

after the first night every attempt the plaintiffs part to
have a carnal act with his wife proved a failure,
because she complained of pains in her genital organs
and he did not want her to suffer.
Upon the advice of a physician and with the plaintiffs
consent, an operation was performed in which the
uterus and ovaries were removed.
The surgery rendered her incapable of procreation, but
she could copulate.
Plaintiff, however, since witnessing the operation, lost
all desire to have access with his wife. Now, he asks for
annulment.
ISSUE: WON their marriage can be annulled based on the

defendants incapacity to procreate
HELD: The incapacity for copulation was only temporary.
The defect must be lasting to be a ground for annulment,
because the test of impotence is not the capacity to
reproduce, but the capacity to copulate. ANNULMENT
DENIED.
PEOPLE v SANTIAGO SUPRA
2. Marriage when one spouse is absent

FC, Art 41 Is null and void, unless before the celebration of the
subsequent marriage, the prior spouse absent for four
consecutive years, the spouse had a well-founded belief
that the absent spouse was already dead.
Where there is danger of death under the circumstances set
forth in the provisions of Art 391 of the Civil Code, an absence
of only two years shall be sufficient spouse present must
institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of
presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to
the effect of reappearance of the absent spouse.
*In CC, seven years is required for presumptive death and

four years if there is presence of danger of death. Period of
time decreased in FC because of modernized and faster
means of communication technology. There is virtually little
or no excuse for a spouse not to contact his family for a
long time.
*In CC, there has to be a general belief which includes the
belief of ones community regarding the whereabouts of one
spouse. Now in the FC, it is only well-founded belief
because people today no longer care much about their
neighbors like in the yesteryears.

FC, Art 42 The subsequent marriage automatically
terminated by the recording of the affidavit of reappearance
of the absent spouse, unless there is a judgment annulling the
previous marriage or declaring it void ab initio.
A sworn statement of the fact and circumstances of
reappearance shall be recorded in the civil registry of the
residence of the parties to the subsequent marriage at the
instance of any interested person, with due notice to the
spouses of the subsequent marriage and without prejudice to
the fact of reappearance being judicially determined in case
such fact is disputed.
No matter how long it took the spouse absent to

appear, the subsequent marriage will still become void.
Because you only presumed him/her to be dead, and that
is a rebuttable presumption.
If the reappearing spouse did not file the affidavit of
reappearance he/she cannot remarry because he is
dead until he declares hes alive. (So the two spouses
couldnt possibly come to an agreement to not file an
affidavit so the subsequent marriage may subsist.)
FC, Art 43 Effects of termination by reappearance:
(1) children of the subsequent marriage conceived prior to
its termination are legitimate
(2) ACP/CPG dissolved and liquidated, but if either
spouse contracted said marriage in bad faith, his or her
share of the net profits of the ACP/CPG property shall
be forfeited in favor of:
a) common children
b) if there are none, the children of the guilty
spouse by a previous marriage
c) in default of children, the innocent spouse;
(3) Donations by reason of marriage remain valid, except
that if the donee contracted the marriage in bad faith,
such donations made to said donee are revoked by
operation of law;
(4) The innocent spouse may revoke the designation of
the other spouse who acted in bad faith as beneficiary
in any insurance policy, even if stipulated as irrevocable
(5) The spouse in bad faith disqualified to inherit from
innocent spouse by testate and intestate succession.
FC, Art 44 If both spouses of the subsequent marriage acted

in bad faith, said marriage shall be void ab initio and all
donations by reason of marriage and testamentary
dispositions made by one in favor of the other are revoked
by operation of law.
Page 29 of 151
OLD RULES IN THE CC

CC, Art 83 Any marriage subsequently contracted by any
person during the lifetime of the first spouse of such person
with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and
void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive
years at the time of the second marriage without the spouse
present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years,
is generally considered as dead and believed to be so by the
spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent
marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to
Articles 390 and 391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid
in any of the three cases until declared null and void by a
competent court.
CC, Art 85 May be annulled for any of the following causes,

existing at the time of the marriage:
(2) In a subsequent marriage under Article 83, Number 2, that
the former husband or wife believed to be dead was in fact
living and the marriage with such former husband or wife was
then in force;
JONES v HORTIGUELA (1937)

64 Phil 179
Step-daughter versus step-father
Marciana Escao died and a proceeding regarding her
estate was commenced. Her second husband Felix
Hortiguela), the petitioner and daughter of her first
marriage, Angelita Jones, the respondent, were
appointed as the heirs.
The partition of her estate was approved by the court.
A year later, AJ filed a motion to declare her the only
heir, since she claims that the marriage between ME
and FH was null and void.
Jan 1918 MEs first husband, Arthur Jones (Arthur), went
abroad and was never heard from again.
Oct. 1919 ME asked her husband to be judicially declared
an absentee. On the 25th of the said month, the
court issued and order declaring that Arthur is an
absentee and the declaration will not take effect
until 6 months after its publication. It was then
published in the succeeding months.
April 1921 Court issued another order, saying that the
judicial decree has taken effect.
May 1927 FH and ME got married.
AJ now contends that the decree should be understood
as not having taken effect from Oct 1919, the date it
was first published, but in April 1921, the date the court
held that the decree has taken effect.
Therefore, from that date until the time of the second
marriage, only 6 yrs and 14 days has elapsed, thus, in
accordance with sec 3 par 2 of GO no. 68, their
marriage was void.
ISSUE: WON the second marriage was void.
HELD: No. For the celebration of marriage, the law only
requires that the former spouse be absent for 7 consecutive

yrs at the time of the 2nd marriage. The date that should be
considered therefore, is Jan 1918, when Arthur left and was
never heard from again. Therefore, when the 2nd marriage
was celebrated, Arthur was already absent for more than 9
yrs. Also, the fact that their marriage doesnt appear in the
register does not affect the validity of the marriage.
Furthermore, the court also pointed out that ME and even
AJ herself believed Arthur was dead, as evidenced by her
treating FH as her step father.
YU v YU (2006)
484 SCRA 485
Custody of child pending annulment case
Eric Jonathan Yu files for an annulment case in Pasig
RTC for wifes psychological incapacity
Caroline Yu seeks custody of their child, Bianca, in
Pasay RTC litis pendentia (pending case)
Pasig RTC has jurisdiction because of Art 49 (incidents
of a pending decree shall be specified by court wherein
the declaration for nullity was filed)
Custody goes to father because mother is unfit
TAMANO v ORTIZ (1998)
291 SCRA 584
1958
Senator Mamintal Abudul Jabar Tamano married
Haja Putri Zorayda Tamano in civil rites.
1993
Tamano married Estrelita Tamano in civil rites too
1994
Tamano died
- Zorayda and son filed for the declaration of nullity because
of bigamy
- Misrepresentations of Tamano as divorced (they never
divorced) and Estrelita as single (annulment was not final
and executory for non-compliance with Art 53) indicates
lack of intention to invoke Muslim practice of polygamy
- Estrelita contends that RTC has no jurisdiction because
they were Muslims, hence jurisdiction belongs to Sharia
Courts
HELD: Sharia Courts have jurisdiction only over marriages
solemnized in Muslim rites. Law is silent as to marriages
performed both civilly and Muslim. On the other hand,
exclusive jurisdiction of all kinds of marriage (civil and
Muslim) belongs to RTC. Besides, they did not perform
wedding ceremony in accordance to Muslim customs.
Page 30 of 151

VI. LEGAL
SEPARATION
A. Grounds for Legal Separation
FC, Art 57
1.
Repeated physical violence against
a.
petitioner
b.
petitioners child
c.
common child of petitioner and respondent
2.
Moral or physical pressure to convert religious or
political beliefs
3.
Attempt to corrupt or induce (a) petitioner, (b)
petitioners child and (c) common child of petitioner and
respondent into prostitution or connivance in such a
practice
4.
Respondents final judgment of conviction for more than
six years, even if pardoned
5.
Habitual alcoholism, drug addiction
6.
Lesbianism or homosexuality
7.
Bigamous marriage, here or abroad
8.
Sexual infidelity or perversion
9.
Attempt at the life of the petitioner
10.
Abandonment without justifiable cause for one year
OLD RULE IN THE CC

CC, Art 97
1. adultery (wife) or concubinage (husband)
2. attempt at the life of the other
*Compare CC with FC grounds. The FC expanded the

grounds for legal separation and liberated the bias in
concubinage by changing it to sexual infidelity.
PEOPLE v ZAPATA AND BONDOC (1951)
88 Phil 688
Andres Bondoc filed against wife Guadalupe Zapata and
Dalmacio Bondoc
Wife and paramour repeatedly engaged in sexual
intercourse during 1946
Wife pleaded guilty and served sentence
Husband filed another case, which defendants allege as
double jeopardy
HELD: Adultery not a continuous crime. Each commission is
a different count which can be punished separately.
1) plurality of facts performed during separate period
of time
2) unity of penal provisions infringed upon
3) unity of aim or purpose
What Andres forgave/condoned was the previous acts and
not the subsequent acts. Besides excuse of the paramour
that he doesnt know the woman is already married is
untenable because they were previously reprimanded. He
Page 31 of 151
shouldnt have tolerated her when she approached him for

the second time.
MUNOZ v DEL BARRIO (1955)
51 OG 5217
Jose del Barrio maltreats the wife
Judge attempts to reconcile but wife declines, she
pushes for her petition for legal separation on the
ground that husband attempted at her life
HELD: Petition of legal separation not granted because
there was intent to kill was not established. The man only
used his bare hands/fists.
*Maam Beth finds this ruling ridiculous because Arnold
Schwarzeneggers bare hands are in itself lethal weapons.
Likewise, what about martial artists?
GANDIONGCO v PEARANDA (1987)
155 SCRA 725
May 1986 Teresita filed petition for legal separation on the
ground of husband Froilans concubinage,
petition for support and payment of damages
Oct 1986 Teresita filed a criminal suit
For which Froilan files certiorari that civil and pendente lite
should be suspended because of criminal charges. That they
should wait until the decision in criminal case comes, before
civil can proceed.
HELD: Denied Froilans certiorari. 1986 Rules on Criminal
Procedure states that civil may proceed ahead of or
simultaneously with criminal charge. Likewise, no
criminal proceeding is necessary in the action for legal
separation. All that is needed for legal separation is
preponderance of evidence.
LAPUZ SY v EUFEMIO SY (1972)
43 SCRA 177
Carmen filed petition for legal separation against
husband Eufemio Eufemio
Discovered that he cohabits with Go Hiok
Eufemio countered that marriage with Carmen is void
ab initio because he was married to Go Hiok first, under
Chinese customs
Carmen died and her father took over the case in her
place
HELD: Carmens death extinguished the claim for nullity of
marriage. Action for legal separation is purely
personal even if property relations are involved.
These rights are mere effects of a decree of separation,
their source being the decree itself; without the decree such
rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality
of a decree, these claims are merely rights in expectation.
DELA CRUZ v DELA CRUZ (1968)
22 SCRA 333
Case of the mahjongera wife and overworked husband
Estrella files petition of separation of property against
husband Severino because of mismanagement of
business enterprise

Husband never slept in conjugal dwelling, would rather

stay in his office alleged abandonment
Wife even alleged that husband has concubine named
Nenita Hernandez
RTC grants Nenitas petition for legal separation and
division of conjugal assets
HELD: Mere physical separation does not constitute

abandonment. Husband continues to support wife and
children despite absence. She was even able to play
mahjong from the husbands sustenance. Abandonment
defined in Art 178 & in Gay v State: for desertion of one
spouses to constitute abandonment, there must be absolute
cessation of marital relations and duties and rights with
intention of perpetual separation. To abandon is to forsake
entirely. Emphasis is on its finality, hence it means giving up
absolutely and with intent never again to resume or claim
ones rights or interests. Concubinage and mismanagement
of business was not established either because he actually
increased the assets.
ONG ENG KIAM v ONG (2006)
505 SCRA 76
Lucita files a petition for legal separation against Chinese
husband on the grounds of repeated physical abuse. He
would usually beat her up or utter abusive language to her
in front of customers. After 20 years of marriage and 3 kids,
she decides to separate from her husband and went to her
family.
Husband retorted:
Denied all allegations of Lucita, they only fight over the
discipline of children
Ulterior motives of Lucitas family was to encumber
their conjugal properties
It was her who abandoned them when she left the
conjugal home
His son, Kingston and other of his employees testified
for him
To which wife answered:
Positive identification is always stronger than mere
denial
She would not sacrifice/trade her comfortable life and
love of her children with the interests of her family if
nothings really wrong
she left with justifiable cause, because if she didnt, the
beating will continue
Kingston has been with his father since he was child
while the other witnesses livelihood depends on the
husband.
PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION GRANTED.
Page 32 of 151
B. Defenses against Legal Separation

FC, Art 56
1. Condonation (forgiveness)
2. Consent (permission)
3. Connivance (involvement of 3rd party and active
participation of spouse) employment of detectives
not considered as connivance
4. Recrimination (both has given grounds for legal
separation, come to court with clean hands)
5. Collusion (agreement between spouses)
6. Prescription (Art 57)
*Maam Beths mnemonics: 4C and RP (Raul Pangalangan)

STIPULATION OF FACTS v CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT
Stipulation of facts is the agreement between
spouses of certain details and circumstances. It is not
accepted because it can be tantamount to collusion
Confession of judgment, on the other hand, is when
one party admits guilt from which decision is solely
based
PEOPLE v SANSANO & RAMOS (1933)
58 Phil 73
1919: Mariano Ventura and Ursula Sansano got married
and had a child. Shortly after that, Mariano disappeared
to Cagayan and abandoned his family.
Wife did not have any means of survival so she
resorted to cohabiting with Marcelo Ramos.
1924: Mariano returned and filed for adultery, to which
both Sansano and Ramos were sentenced
After conviction, Ursula begs for forgiveness and for
Mariano to take her back.
The latter denied and told her to go do what she wants
to do, so she returned to Ramos while he went to
Hawaii.
Mariano went back to file for divorce (under Act 2710)
ISSUE: WON husband consented to adultery and therefore
barred from action
HELD: YES. Because he gave wife freedom to do whatever
she would like to do.
OCAMPO v FLORENCIANO (1960)
107 Phil 35
1938 - Jose de Ocampo and Serafina got married
1951 - Serafina Jose Arcalas
Husband sends wife to Manila to study cosmetology for a
year where she also had relationship with other men.
1952 - Left the husband and lived separately
1955 - Husband caught wife in the arms of Nelson Orzame
and then told her he wanted legal separation to which the
wife agreed as long as she will not be criminally charged
ISSUE: WON there had been collusion in the form of
confession of judgment by the wife
HELD: Though the wife admitted her guilt, which constitutes
confession of judgment, the husband also presented
other evidences to support the allegation. Refusing to

Page 33 of 151
answer is not necessarily collusion. Also, the husband had

no duty to search for wife because it was her who left the
house and so it was her duty to return or at least inform the
husband of her whereabouts. Hence, collusion may not
bar the action for legal separation.
HELD: YES. Because in his case, everything was done

voluntarily. Sharing the same bed and continual sexual
relations is a conclusive evidence of condonation. Decision
would have been different if he was the wife because of
physiological difference in the strength of man and woman.
SARGENT v SARGENT (1920)

114 A. 428
Husband suspects the wife to be committing adultery with
their driver, Charles Simmons. To support his allegations, he
hired several detectives and enjoined his servants to keep a
close eye on the actions of his wife. They staged a raid to
catch the wife red handed of the crime alleged of her.
BUGAYONG v GINEZ (1956)

100 Phil. 620
Benjamin was a US serviceman, he left his wife Leonila
in the care of his sisters as she goes to school
Valeriana Polangco wrote to him about rumors of wifes
adultery; wife then goes away from the sister-in-laws
house and stayed at her moms place
Leonila wrote to Benjamin as well about a certain
Eliong who kissed her in school
Benjamin went home and searched for her
They stayed together for 2 nights and 1 day at his
cousin, Pedros house
Verified the truth which made her pack up and walk
away
ISSUE: WON the husband connived with his employees to

set-up his wifes adultery
HELD: YES. Petitioner could have taken steps which would
prevent him from casting doubts on the fidelity of his wife
but instead it appeared that he even facilitated his wifes
wrongdoing. It is to be inferred from his conduct that he
did desire his wife to commit the offense in his absence, and
that helping as he did to afford the opportunity which
brought about the desired result, he was consenting
thereto.
*What could have Mr. Sargent done to prevent
occurrence of connivance? He could have just fired
Simmons or brought his wife with him on his business trips.
BROWN v YAMBAO (1957)
102 Phil 168
William Brown files a petition for legal separation
against his wife Juanita Yambao who got pregnant by a
certain Carlos Field while he was interred in Intramuros
(ground: adultery)
Wife did not reply, so fiscal intervened and found that
there was no collusion. However, the fiscal also found
that the petitioner was barred from filing the action
because he had a concubine (Lilia Delito) himself
Petitioner says that the fiscals only duty was to ensure
no collusion took place and not stand in place of the
wife
Fiscal further added that petitioner was also prescribed
from action because he learned about the cause in
1945 but only file ten years later.
COURT DENIED LEGAL SEPARATION.
WILLAN v WILLAN (1960)
2 A11 E.R. 463
Case of the battered husband
Demobilized military man files a petition for legal
separation against his wife for her cruelty and abusive
behavior
He says she tortures him at night, forcing him to have
sex with him and if he declines, she would resort to ear
pinching, hair pulling and using of obscene language
This deprived him of rest and sleep so he had no choice
but to give in to her wishes
ISSUE: WON having sex constitutes condonation
ISSUE: WON Benjamins act of searching for and sleeping

with his wife constitutes condonation
HELD: Yes. Because even if not yet proven, he had a belief
in mind that his wife was already unfaithful yet he still tried
to take her back. The ponencia relied mostly on US cases.
COURT DENIED PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION.
MATUBIS v PRAXEDES (1960)
109 Phil. 789
Socorro Matubis and Zoilo Praxedes agreed to live
separately from each other, they even instituted a
document that allows them to get themselves a new
mate without the intervention of the other.
Jan 1955: Man cohabited with Asuncion Rebulado
April 1956: Wife filed for concubinage
TC dismissed because of prescription and consent
the decision appealed from in the SC
HELD: SC affirmed RTC because there was express consent,
hence she deserved no sympathy from the court. Also, the
action was not instituted within a year of cognizance.

Page 34 of 151
C. When to file/try actions
D. Effects of Filing of Legal Separation
REQUISITES FOR LEGAL SEPARATION

Art 57 The petition must be filed within 5 years from
the time of occurrence of cause (as compared to
the double period of CC)
Art 58 6 months cool off (but does not override provisions
of Art 49 regarding pendency of decree i.e. support
pendente lite, support of spouse and children and
visitation rights)
Art 59 steps taken towards reconciliation
Art 60 stipulation of facts and confession of judgment
should not be accepted in court or participation of
fiscal or prosecuting attorney to prevent collusion
Art 61 a)
b)
CONTRERAS v MACARAIG (1970)

33 SCRA 222
1952
Elena and Cesar were married, had three children
1961
Cesar met Lily while working for his fathers
business
Sept 62
Lubos, the driver, told her that husband was
living with a woman in Singalong
Apr 63
More rumors about her husband being seen with
a pregnant woman
May 63
Husband was usually away and back for only 2-3
days; Elena declined to raise the issue lest it
drive her husband away more
Asked father-in-law and sister-in-law to talk top and
convince her husband to come back to her
Employee saw him with a baby on his arms
Elena talked to Lily who said that it was Cesar who
refuses to leave her
Apr 63
Elena, with of their two children, tried to
convince Cesar to go home, the latter refused to
return to legitimate family
Dec 63
Plaintiff filed petition for legal separation
RTC said that wife became cognizant of husbands infidelity
on Sept 1962 (Lubos report)
SC granted legal separation because wife was only
cognizant of husbands infidelity when she confronted him
and got told that he doesnt intend to return to them
anymore. Hence, there was no prescription.
SOMOSA-RAMOS v VAMENTA (1972)
46 SCRA 11
Lucy Somosa Ramos files petition for legal separation
concubinage and attempt on her life by husband
Clemente (1972 so CC was applicable)
She seeks preliminary mandatory injunction to recover
her paraphernal and exclusive property
ISSUE: WON Art 103 bars judge from such an action
HELD: No. It is not an absolute bar. Management of
property may be decided right away especially if the other
spouse may encumber or alienate the petitioner from her
rightful share in the assets.
entitled to live separately

third person may be appointed to manage
their ACP/CPG
Art 62 pendency of the case, Art 49 applies

a) support of the spouses
b) support and custody of children
c) visitation rights for children
DE LA VINA v VILLAREAL (1920)
41 Phil 13
Narcisa Geopano files divorce complaint against
husband who committed concubinage with Ana Calog
and booted her out of the conjugal home in Negros
Occidental
She lived with her daughters in Iloilo, and now seeks
divorce (this case is in 1920), partition of property and
alimony
Husband rebuts that the court has no jurisdiction over
the case since their domicile was in Negros Occidental
invokes husbands right to fix the marital domicile
and wifes duty to follow. Likewise, the husbands right
to administer marital assets (since wife wants
separation of property)
WON the wifes domicile is still the same with husbands.
No. Husband abolishes this right the moment he furnishes
cause for the wife to leave him and ground for divorce. She
may acquire separate domicile from her husband. Also, he
displaced her from the conjugal dwelling in the first place.
Thus, court had jurisdiction over the case.
WON the wife can obtain preliminary injunction against
husbands encumbering and alienating of their conjugal
property. Yes. The husbands administrative power must
be curtailed to protect the interest of the wife. Even though
wife doesnt have the right to administer, she has the right
to share.
REYES v INES-LUCIANO (1979)
88 SCRA 03
Celia Ilustre-Reyes files petition for legal separation on
husband Manuel Reyes on the ground of attempt to her
life. (Attacked twice, would have been dead if not
saved by father and driver.)
Husband does not want to give her pedente lite
because he allege that she has adulterous relationship
with her physician and the price she was asking was
too high
HELD: Wife not asking for support from husbands personal
funds, rather from the conjugal properties. Also, the
allegation of her adulterous relationship was not sufficiently
established. It is enough for the court to ascertain the kind
and amount of evidence even by affidavits only or other
documentary evidence appearing in the records. It was also
shown that he was capable of providing the said amount.

BAEZ v BAEZ (2002)

374 SCRA 340
RTC granted legal separation to Aida and Gabriel for
husbands sexual infidelity, dissolution of CPG and
division of conjugal assets
Wife kept on asking things and damages from her
husband through the court
RTC denied the damages but gave due course to the
execution pending appeal.
CA set aside the RTC ruling for husband to vacate the
residential house and surrender the motor vehicle.
HELD: Legal separation is not subject to multiple appeals.
Its effects are incidents of the final judgment and not
distinct matters.
LA RUE v LA RUE (1983)
304 S. E. 2d 312
- Plain housewifes contribution to the CPG
- 1950 husband and wife got married, wife worked for the
first seven years but stopped at the request of her husband
- Married for 30 years, housewife performed her duties like
caring for the children and attending to husbands needs
until the relationship went sour
- Obtained divorce but wife was awarded only with alimony
and health insurance
- Court denied her claim to one half of the conjugal assets
because she made no contributions thereto
ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to equitable distribution
HELD: Yes, because she contributed her earnings in the
early days of the marriage and then her service as a frugal
homemaker in the subsequent years.
Page 35 of 151
Rosario did not return them but instead filed for civil
case for custody grant, because he is already living with
another woman and the kids want to stay with her
RTC orders her to return the kids to him within 24
hours
HELD: Custody of children is never final and always

subject to review for the best interest of the
children. However, until decision is modified, the custody is
to the fathers. Besides, Rosario is just living in the charity of
her brothers.
LAPERAL v REPUBLIC (1962)
6 SCRA 357
Elisea obtained legal separation decree from husband
Enrique Santamaria, so now she wants to revert to her
maiden name.
She is a businesswoman and afraid that confusion as to
the name will lead her finances to the dissolution of
conjugal property.
Art 372 mandates that woman retains the name used
prior to legal separation, because it is indicative of
status and legal separation affected no change to her
status.
HELD: SC denied her petition because she relied on the fact
of her legal separation and that there was no conjugal
property to fear of because it has been dissolved with the
decree of legal separation. Likewise, they cannot allow easy
circumvention of Art 372. CASE DISMISSED.
F. Reconciliation
-
There should be voluntary and mutual consent of

the spouses to reconcile.
CPG not automatically revived. Art 67 applies.
E. Effects of Legal Separation Decree
Art 63 1)
2)
Art 65 Joint manifestation under oath in the same court

as legal separation
Live separately from each other

ACP/CPG dissolved; offender no right to any
share in the net profits, forfeit in favor of
common children, children of guilty, and
innocent spouse
3) Custody of minor children goes to innocent
spouse (subject to Art 213)
4) Guilty spouse disqualified as intestate heir
Art 64 revoke all donations, beneficiary in any insurance
policy within 5 years
MATUTE v MACARAIG (1956)
99 Phil 340
Armando files petition for legal separation against wife
Rosario because of adultery with brother and brotherin-law
Legal separation granted; custody of four minor
children to father
Father left them in sisters care in Davao and then went
to US; Rosario lived with them there
Upon his return, he took them to Cebu
Rosario asked permission to bring them to Manila for
grandfathers funeral, were given 2 weeks
Art 66 Consequences of reconciliation:

1) legal separation proceedings shall be
terminated if still pending
2) final decree set aside, but the separation of
property and forfeiture remains, unless they
revive former regime
Art 67 Agreement to revive former regime shall specify:
1) what to contribute anew to restored property
regime
2) what to retain in separate property
3) names of all the creditors

VII. DIVORCES
Is there divorce in the Philippines?
There is just relative divorce. BUT BUT! It recognizes two

kinds of divorce: foreign divorce and Muslim divorces.
A. Foreign Divorces
FC, Art 15 Nationality theory applies in the Philippines.
Philippine laws follow Filipinos anywhere they go.
FC, Art 26 Marriages valid where celebrated are valid
everywhere except when
1) one is below 18
2) bigamous, not under Art 41
3) mistake as to identity of other party
4) void under 53 for non-compliance
5) psychological incapacity
6) incestuous
7) public policy
PROOFS FOR FOREIGN LAWS TO APPLY/ BE RECOGNIZED

IN OUR JURISDICTION
1) Provision of the foreign law
2) Celebration of marriage in accordance to those provisions
VAN DORN v ROMILLO (1985)
134 SCRA 139
Alicia married Upton, US citizen in Hong Kong. Later on
in 1982, they obtained divorce in Nevada. Shortly after
that, Alicia contracted another marriage with Van Dorn.
1983 Upton files suit in Pasay RTC for non-application
of divorce decree to Alicia and hence his right to
administer the conjugal property in Ermita, the Galleon
Shop
Alicia files for dismissal which the RTC denied
decision assailed in SC
HELD: Upton is estopped from the claim because he
declared in Nevada that there were no conjugal assets. He
is American and US law applies to him, therefore, Alicia is
no longer his wife. The marriage tie, when thus severed as
to one party, ceases to bind either. Petition of Alicia
granted. Uptons case dismissed. Prevents the situation
wherein you are married to your husband but your husband
is no longer married to you.
*Maam Beth likes this decision because it proves that we
dont need new laws. We only have to think out of the box.
A change of focus is all we need. Philippine laws apply to
Filipino, ergo, foreigners cannot use our laws against our
citizens. Their own laws shall apply to them. Bravo!
Page 36 of 151
QUITA v CA & DANDAN (1998)

300 SCRA 592
1941
Fe and Arturo got married, no children
1954
Fe got final judgment of divorce with Arturo;
woman remarried twice
1972
Husband dies without will
- Blandina Dandan and her six children with Arturo Padlan
presents themselves as heir of the decedent
- Ruperto Padlan intervened
- RTC grants succession to Quita and Padlan
HELD: RTC failed to establish Quitas citizenship which is
material to the resolution of case. If proven that she was no
long a Filipino citizen, then she was no longer the wife of
Padlan and divorce decree binding on her (application of
Van Dorn)
Time of divorce is the most material and not the time of
the marriage
Remanded the case to determine the citizenship of
Quita at the time of divorce
LLORENTE v CA & LLORENTE (2000)
345 SCRA 592
1927-57 Lorenzo enlisted as US Navy
1937
Paula married Lorenzo
1943
Lorenzos naturalization in the US
1945
Lorenzo went home to find out that Paula got
pregnant by his brother Ceferino
1945
birth of Crisologo Llorente who was illegitimate and
fatherless in his birth certificate
- Lorenzo refused to lived with Paula and instead drew a
written agreement witnessed by her dad and stepmom
that they will dissolve the marital union and she will have
no claims to the conjugal assets, without charges for
criminal act
1952
1958
1981
1985
RTC
CA
SC
Divorce decree became final in the States

Lorenzo married Alicia whos unaware of his
previous marriage with Paula; begot 3 children
Lorenzo drafted his last will and testament
Lorenzo died
Assigned Paula as administratrix, she being the
legal surviving wife
Alicia declared as co-owner
Remand for ruling on the intrinsic validity of the
will. There were four significant point in time:
1) divorce
2) marriage to Alice
3) execution of will
4) death
Citing Quita, once proven that Lorenzos citizenship is

American at the time of divorce, then the divorce will
be valid and should be recognized
Validity of the will is governed by laws of the country in
which they are executed remand to the court for
further clarification
SC recognizes the divorce decree and upholds the
marriage of Alice and Lorenzo

GARCIA v RECIO (2001)

366 SCRA 437
Rederick and Editha Samson married in Australia in
1987, then divorced in 1989
1992 Rederick became US citizen
1994 Rederick married Grace
1995 Grace and Rederick lived separately and then
Grace files for nullity on ground of Reds bigamy
RTC recognized the divorce obtained in Australia and did not
question respondents lack of capacity to marry
HELD: Respondents legal capacity to marry cannot be
determined because he failed to produce the foreign
law as well as the decree proving his capacity to marry. Not
sure if he was granted absolute or probationary divorce.
B. Muslim Divorces
-
Governed by Code of Muslim Personal Laws of the

Philippines (Presidential Decree No. 1083)
Divorce or Talaq (Chapter 3)
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
Repudiation of the wife by the husband (talaq)

Vow of abstinence by the husband (ila)
Injurious assimilation of the wife by the husband
(zihar)
Acts of imprecation (lian)
Redemption by the wife (khul)
Exercise by the wife of the delegated right to
repudiate (tafwid)
judicial decree (faskh)
YASIN v JUDGE, SHARIA (1995)

241 SCRA 606
Hatima Yasin seeks to use her maiden name again after
being divorced to Hajin Idris Yasin, who has already
remarried.
Sharia court dismissed her petition because there has
to be change of name.
HELD: No need to have court proceedings for change of
name because her legal name is the one entered in the civil
register. When the marriage ties no longer exists as in the
case of death of husband or Muslim divorce, the widow or
divorcee need not seek judicial confirmation of the change
in her civil status in order to revert to her maiden name as
the use of her husband's name is optional and not
obligatory for her.
Page 37 of 151

VIII. DE FACTO
SEPARATION
FC, Art 246 If the petition is not resolved at the initial

conference, said petition shall be decided in a summary hearing
on the basis of affidavits, documentary evidence or oral
testimonies at the sound discretion of the court. If testimony is
needed, the court shall specify the witnesses to be heard and
the subject-matter of their testimonies, directing the parties to
present said witnesses.
FC, Art 100 The separation in fact between husband and wife
shall not affect the regime of ACP except that:
1. The spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses
to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the
2.
3.
right to be supported
When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of
the other is required by law, judicial authorization
shall be obtained in a summary proceeding
In the absence of sufficient community property, the
separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the support of the family. The spouse
present shall, upon proper petition in a summary
proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer
or encumber any specific separate property of the
other spouse sand use the fruits or proceeds thereof
to satisfy the latters share
shall not affect the regime of CPG except that:
to live therein, without just cause, shall not have the
2. When the consent of one spouse to any transaction of
the other is required by law, judicial authorization
3. In the absence of sufficient community property, the
separate property of both spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the support of the family. The spouse
present shall, upon proper petition in a summary
proceeding, be given judicial authority to administer
or encumber any specific separate property of the
other spouse sand use the fruits or proceeds thereof
to satisfy the latters share
FC, Art 239 When a husband and wife are separated in fact,
or one has abandoned the other and one of them seeks
judicial authorization for a transaction where the
consent of the other spouses is required by law but such
consent is withheld or cannot be obtained, a verified
petition may be filed in court alleging the foregoing facts.
The petition shall attach the proposed deed, if any, embodying
the transaction and if none shall describe in detail the said
transaction and state the reason why the required consent
thereto cannot be secured. In any case, the final deed duly
executed by the parties shall be submitted to and approved by
the court.
FC, Art 242 Upon filing of the petition, the court shall notify
the other spouse, whose consent to the transaction is required,
of said petition, ordering said spouse to show cause why the
petition should not be granted, on or before the date set in the
said notice for the initial conference. The notice shall be
accompanied by a copy of the petition and shall be served at
the last known address of the spouse concerned.
Page 38 of 151
FC, Art 247 The judgment of the court shall be immediately

final and executory.
PEREZ v CA and Ray Perez (1996)

255 SCRA 661
1996 Ray and Nerissa got married in Cebu.
1992 After 6 miscarriages, 2 operations and a high risk
pregnancy, she finally gave birth to Ray Jr.
1993 The family went to Cebu but only Nerissa went back
to the US although they all had round trip tickets
because Ray had to stay behind and take care of ill
mother.
- She came back no longer in good terms with husband
RTC
followed tender years presumption
CA
reversed and gave custody to father
Art 213 can be taken to mean separation (legal or de facto)
and should take into account all relevant info (material,
social, moral)
shall not be separated from mother is mandatory
unless unfit to exercise sole parental authority
financial capacity not determinative as long as both have
ample means of support
When husband questioned wifes nature of work and its
incapability to care for child:
Its nothing that cant be handled. Shifts can be
adjusted so she can attend to the child. There are also
daycare centers and she could always take a leave until
the child can manage on its own. Petitioner also invites
mother to join them in the States so she could look
after the child.
Husband will also just leave the care of the child to his
mother because of the nature of his work as a doctor
Besides, nothing can be more heart rendering that the
wifes situation who waited so long to have a child only
to be deprived from her before the first year.
PETITION GRANTED. CA SET ASIDE AND REVERSED.
RTC REINSTATED. For immediate execution.
ESTRADA v ESCRITOR (2006)
492 SCRA 1
Administrative case against an employee of the
Supreme Court who is living with a man not her
husband
Declaration of Pledge of Faithfulness practice of the
Jehovahs Witnesses immunized them from being
considered as immoral and gross misconduct
The only thing resolved in this case is that they cannot

be considered immoral in the eyes of their own religious
group but it does not deny the fact that the relationship
is still not legally binding on them.

IX. RIGHTS &

OBLIGATIONS
BETWEEN
HUSBAND & WIFE
A. Cohabitation, Mutual Love and
Respect
RPC, Art 247 Death or physical injuries inflicted under
exceptional circumstances. Any legally married person who
having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual
intercourse with another person, shall kill any of them or both
of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict
upon them any serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty
of destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind,
he shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances,
to parents with respect to their daughters under eighteen years
of age, and their seducer, while the daughters are living with
their parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate the prostitution of
his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have consented to the
infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the
benefits of this article.
FC, Art 68 The husband and the wife are obliged to live
together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity and render
mutual help and support.
CC, Art 34 When a member of a city or municipal police force

refuses or fails to render aid or protection to any person in case
of danger to life or property, such peace officer shall be
primarily liable for damages, and the city or municipality shall
be subsidiarily responsible therefor. The civil action herein
recognized shall be independent of any criminal proceedings,
and a preponderance of evidence shall suffice to support such
action.
RA 8353 (Anti-Rape Law)

Sec 2 Rape as a Crime Against Persons. The crime of rape
shall hereafter be classified as a Crime Against Persons under
Title Eight of Act No. 3815, as amended, otherwise known as
the Revised Penal Code.
RA 9262 (Anti VAWC Act of 2004)
Sec 5 Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children. - The
crime of violence against women and their children is committed
through any of the following acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her child;
Page 39 of 151
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her child physical
harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child physical
harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of imminent
physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her
child to engage in conduct which the woman or her
child has the right to desist from or desist from
conduct which the woman or her child has the right to
engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the
woman's or her child's freedom of movement or
conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or child. This
shall include, but not limited to, the following acts
committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or
restricting the woman's or her child's movement or
conduct:
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical harm on
oneself for the purpose of controlling her actions or
decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman or her child
to engage in any sexual activity which does not
constitute rape, by force or threat of force, physical
harm, or through intimidation directed against the
woman or her child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless conduct,
personally or through another, that alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be
limited to, the following acts:
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or
humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but
not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse,
and denial of financial support or custody of minor
children of access to the woman's child/children.
Sec 26 Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense. Victimsurvivors who are found by the courts to be suffering from
battered woman syndrome do not incur any criminal and civil
liability notwithstanding the absence of any of the elements for
justifying circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal
Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman who was
suffering from battered woman syndrome at the time of the
commission of the crime, the courts shall be assisted by expert
psychiatrists/ psychologists.
Sec 28 Custody of children. The woman victim of violence shall
be entitled to the custody and support of her child/children.
Children below seven (7) years old older but with mental or
physical disabilities shall automatically be given to the mother,
with right to support, unless the court finds compelling reasons
to order otherwise.
A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome shall
not be disqualified from having custody of her children. In no
case shall custody of minor children be given to the perpetrator
of a woman who is suffering from battered woman syndrome.
NARAG v NARAG (1998)

291 SCRA 451
Dominador was a teacher at St. Louis College of
Tuguegarao when he met Gina Espita, a 1st year 17 yo
student. They had a relationship and Dominador
abandoned his family to live with Gina.
Dominador used power as Sangguniang Panlalawigan
to secure employment for Gina at the DTI.

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
-
Dominadors wife instituted a disbarment proceeding

against him for immorality, but after one year she
wanted to withdraw her complaint saying
She fabricated allegations in complaint to humiliate and
spite husband
Love letters between two guilty were forged
She suffered from emotional confusing due to
extreme jealousy
Denied Gina and Dominador ever had a
relationship
Dominador never left the family
But a year later, Julieta filed the same case again due
to her husbands continuous threat.
Dominador filed his answer
He never threatened, harassed, or intimidated her
He never abandoned family, he loves them. He
protected & preserved family. Julieta and two sons
drove him out of their house.
Julieta is emotionally disturbed incurably jealous and
possessive, violent, vindictive, scandalous.
Julietas rich and she abhors poor, he is poor
he was beaten, battered, brutalized, tortured, abused
and humiliated by Julieta in public and at home so he
filed for annulment because they cannot exist together
She has disgraced, shamed and humiliated him by
telling everyone everywhere that hes worthless, goodfor-nothing, evil and immoral
Denied relationship with Gina. No kids either.
Love letters: inadmissible as evidence
He is old thus, unfit to do things alleged by Julieta.
Investigating officer: indefinite suspension from
practice of law. He never denied love letters, didnt
disprove adulterous relationship. Denying two kids
(Aurelle Dominic and Kyle Dominador) ground for
disciplinary action.
IBP: affirmed investigating officers recommendation &
granted disbarment
ISSUE: WON Dominador should be disbarred

HELD: Yes. A lawyer should not engage in unlawful,
dishonest, immoral (shameless showing indifference to
opinion of good members of society) or deceitful conduct,
should not behave in scandalous manner, in public or in
private to the discredit of the legal profession. These are
continuing requirements/qualification of all members of bar.
This includes prohibition against adulterous relationships.
Burden of proof of gross immorality for abandoning his
family proved when Julieta presented witnesses who
attested to adulterous relationship between Gina &
Dominador. Even Ginas brother admitted that Gina and
Dominador had two children. Even though Julieta has
burden of proof, he needs to show that he is morally fit to
remain a member of bar. His denials without proof are
insufficient. His accusations against Julieta were not proven.
Providing for his family, giving them a comfortable life, his
being a successful lawyer and seasoned politician do not
necessarily mean that hes morally fit.
He has duties to his children (support, educate, instruct
according to right precepts and good example, give love,
Page 40 of 151
companionship, understanding, moral & spiritual guidance)

and to his wife (observe mutual love, respect & fidelity &
render help and support). He failed to fulfill these duties. He
was away most of the time because of his paramour not
because of work as he alleges. Sons testimony proved that
he abandoned his family which even affected his sons own
family. Dominador did not merely contract a marriage, he
should have been a partner who lived up to his promise to
love & respect his wife & remain faithful to her until death.
GOITIA v CAMPOS RUEDA (1916)
35 Phil 252
Elisa Goitia and Jose Campos Rueda were married on
January 7, 1915. They established their residence, where
they lived together for a month after which plaintiff returned
to her parents. She alleged that defendant demanded of her
that she perform unchaste and lascivious acts on his
genitals. She refused to perform any act other than legal
and valid cohabitation. Defendant continued demanding
such acts from her. Her continued refusal exasperated him,
inducing him to maltreat her by word and deed and inflict
injuries upon her lips, face and different body parts. Thus,
she was obliged to leave the conjugal abode and is now
asking for support.
CFI held that defendant cannot be compelled to support
wife, except in his own house, unless it be by virtue of a
judicial decree granting her a divorce or separation from the
defendant.
ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to support outside conjugal
abode
HELD: Yes. The rule established in Art. 149 of the Civil Code
is not absolute. The doctrine that neither spouse cannot be
compelled to support the other outside the conjugal abode,
unless it be by virtue of a judicial decree granting them a
divorce or separation is not controlling in cases where one
of the spouses was compelled to leave the conjugal abode
by the other or where the husband voluntarily abandons
such abode and the wife seeks to force him to furnish
support. The nature of the duty of affording mutual support
is compatible and enforceable in all situations, so long as
the needy spouse does not create any illicit situation. A
judgment for separate maintenance is a judgment calling for
the performance of a duty made specific by the mandate of
the sovereign.
Moreland, concurring: A husband cannot, by his own
wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support his
wife imposed by law; and where a husband, by wrongful,
illegal and unbearable conduct, drives his wife from the
domicile fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her
departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital
relation and repudiate his duties thereunder.
Cohabitation includes normal sexual intercourse only.
Husband has to support wife because she had just cause for
leaving.
*Who determines what is acceptable form of sex?
The spouses! Not the judge nor the society!

* Why is missionary position prescribed by the

church? Because it gives the least satisfaction. Sex is not
meant to be for pleasure but for procreation only.
WARREN v STATE (1985)
255 Ga. 151
Daniel Warren was convicted for rape and aggravated
sodomy of his wife while they were living together as
husband and wife. He appealed to dismiss the
indictment.
His grounds:
1. Rape statute implies marital exclusion thus husband
cannot be guilty of raping wife.
2. Aggravated sodomy statute provides for marital
exclusion, too.
3. Interpreting the above-mentioned laws otherwise would
be tantamount to new interpretations & application of
such would deny him of his due process rights.
ISSUE: WON marital exclusion is implied in the rape and
aggravated sodomy statutes
HELD: No. There has never been an express marital
exemption in Georgia rape statute. Theories/bases for
thinking that marital exclusion exists in rape statute:
(a)
Lord Hale by giving matrimonial consent, wife
gave up herself in this kind unto husband and she cant
take that back
(b)
Subsequent marriage doctrine of English law - if
marriage between a rapist and his victim extinguishes
criminal liabilities then corollary, rape within marital
relationship should be given that immunity
(c)
Medieval time wife is husbands chattel or
property thus rape, thus man is merely using his own
property
(d)
Unity of person theory husband and wife
become one, with wife incorporating her existence to
that of the husband, thus husband cannott be convicted
of raping himself.
Justifications:
(a) prevent fabricated charges
(b) prevent wives from using rape charges for revenge
(c) prevent state intervention so as not to thwart possible
reconciliation
All of these theories and justifications are pass. Equal
protection of the laws is being practiced now.
Rape is committed by having carnal knowledge with a
female forcibly and against her will. It violates the moral
sense and personal integrity and autonomy of the female
victim. Implied consent to such in marriage conflicts is
absurd and against the constitution. During era of slavery,
rape was seen negatively and not acceptable even to
chattels.
Sodomy is the carnal knowledge and connection against the
order of nature by man with man or in same unnatural
manner with woman. There has been no implied marital
exemption under this statute even in earlier times. Consent
is not a defense unlike in rape. Anyone who voluntarily
participates is guilty.
Page 41 of 151
There is due process. Due process merely requires that law

give sufficient warning so men may avoid what is forbidden.
Statutes concerned are plain and broadly written. This may
be the first application to this particular set of facts but it is
not an unforeseeable judicial enlargement of criminal
statutes that are narrowly drawn.
There is no marital exemption in rape. A person
commits rape when he has carnal knowledge of a female
forcibly and against her will.
THURMAN v CITY OF TORRINGTON (1984)
595 F. Supp. 1521
Between early October 1982 and June 10, 1983, Tracey
Thurman notified the police officers of the City of repeated
threats upon her life and the life of her child, Charles
Thurman, Jr., made by her estranged husband, Charles
Thurman. This includes breaking her windshield while she
was in the car, where he was convicted of breach of peace,
and stabbing her repeatedly. Attempts to file complaints by
wife against husband based on threats of death and
maiming her were ignored and rejected by the police
because of an alleged administrative classification that
affords lesser protection when the victim is a woman
abused by a spouse or boyfriend, or a child abused by a
father or stepfather.
ISSUES: WON the administrative classification violates the
equal protection clause
HELD: Yes. A man is not allowed to physically abuse or
endanger a woman merely because he is her husband. A
police officer may not knowingly refrain from interference in
such violence, and may not automatically decline to make
an arrest simply because the assaulter and his victim are
married to each other. Whatever may be said as to the
positive values of avoiding intra-family controversy, the
choice in this context may not lawfully be mandated solely
on the basis of sex.
SUB-ISSUES
1. Dismissal of claims of son - Correct. Condition to stay
away from son is not one of the conditions after arrest.
There is failure to adequately allege denial of equal
protection
2. Allegation of custom or policy - A pattern emerges that
evidences deliberate indifference on the part of the
police department to the complaints of Tracey and its
duty to protect her. Such indifference raises an
inference of custom or policy on the part of
municipality.
3. Unidentified police officers - Okay because case was
dismissed even before plaintiff had an opportunity to
discover identity of unidentified defendants.
4. Pendent Jurisdiction over plaintiffs state law claim- The
court has discretion to exercise this power. At the
instant case, court declines to exercise because
needless decisions of state law should be avoided both
as a matter of comity and to promote justice between
the parties, by procuring for them a surer-footed
reading of applicable law.

PEOPLE v LIBERTA (1984)

64 NY 2d 152
Mario and Denise were married but when he started
beating her she sought temporary protection from her
husband.
The order was granted and Mario was directed to move
out, stay away from the family home, stay away from
Denise and he may only visit their child once a week.
Mario wanted to visit son but Denise did not allow him
to go the house so they met instead in the motel where
Mario was staying on the condition that they be
accompanied by a friend. However, the friend left upon
their arrival at the motel. Mario then attacked Denise,
threatened to kill her and forced her to perform fellatio
on him and to engage in sexual intercourse w/him. 2
year old son was there all the time and Mario even
forced Denise to tell their son to watch what was
happening. They were allowed to leave afterwards.
Mario was convicted for rape and sodomy both in their
1st degrees. However, Mario contends that:
o
They are married thus he is covered by
marital exemption to rape and sodomy.
o
Rape and sodomy statutes are
unconstitutional because it treats married and
unmarried persons differently.
ISSUES:
1. WON Mario is covered by the marital exemption
2. WON the statutes are unconstitutional for violating
equal protection clause
HELD:
1. NO. Male guilty of rape when he engages in sexual
intercourse with female by forcible compulsion. Female
is any female person not married to actor.
Sodomy means engaging in deviate sexual intercourse
(sexual conduct between persons not married to each
other consisting of contact between penis and anus,
mouth and penis, or mouth and vulva. Not married
phrase means there is marital exemption for both. But
it has exemptions. One of which is when spouses are
living apart pursuant to a valid and effective (a) order
issued by court of competent jurisdiction requiring such
living apart (b) decree of separation (c) written
agreement of separation, they are considered to be not
married. Thus, forcible rape or sodomy in this instance
would be punishable. In this case, Denise and Mario
were technically, not married, by virtue of the
temporary order of protection.
2.
Constitutionality of Marital Exemption - Married

man ordinarily cannot be convicted of forcibly raping or
sodomizing his wife (marital exemption). State is
allowed to make classifications as long as there is a
rational basis for doing so and it does not arbitrarily
burden a particular group. No rational basis for
distinguishing between marital and non-marital rape.
Rationales are archaic. (See People v Liberta
explanations on theories). Imposing a marital
exemption does not further the cause it purportedly
Page 42 of 151
protects which is marital privacy (e.g. Prevent state

interference to protect privacy not justified by
allowing husband to forcibly rape his wife; Disrupt
marriage the act of rape/sodomy in itself would
disrupt the marriage and reconciliation is quite
impossible; wife will present fabricated info criminal
justice system can take care of this). Marital rape is
more violent and traumatic than non-marital one. IT IS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
3. Constitutionality of Exemption for Females Only
males can be convicted of rape in the 1st degree.
Reason: It aims to protect chastity of women and their
property value to father/husbands. Treating people
differently based on gender can only be justified by its
substantial relation to the achievement of an important
governmental obligation. State defense:
(a) only females can become pregnant its not the
main purpose
(b) female faces probability of medical, sociological
and psychological problems unique to her gender
archaic and overbroad generalization
(c) women cannot actually rape men or if it happens,
its rare not tenable either.
They need to present an exceedingly persuasive justification
for classification. Show that gender-based law serves the
governments interest better than a gender-neutral one. As
it is, only females who forcibly rape males benefit from the
present statute. LIKEWISE, IT IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
4.
5.
Strike out only the unconstitutional parts since the

statute is of major importance. Its not entirely void
anyway.
Due process is observed. His act was already criminal
when he attacked Denise.
B. Fixing the Family Domicile

FC, Art 69 The husband and the wife shall fix the family
domicile. In case of disagreement, the court shall decide.
TENCHAVEZ v ESCANO (1966)

17 SCRA 674
Pastor Tenchavez and Vicenta Escao were married in
1948. In 1950, defendant Escao obtained a foreign
divorce in Nevada.
She further sought papal
dispensation of the marriage although no document
proving the same was presented.
Escaos marriage to American Rusell Leo Moran in the
US in 1954, which was later blessed with three children
ISSUES:
1. WON divorce is valid
2. WON Court may then compel Escao to cohabit with
Tenchavez
HELD:
1. Divorce is invalid for a foreign divorce decree cannot be
recognized in the Philippines especially if it was granted
by court of the place which was not the parties bona

fide domicile and on a ground not recognized by our
2.
law, which does not allow absolute divorce. Even in

private international law, foreign decrees (especially
those confirming or dissolving a marriage) cannot be
enforced or recognized if they contravene public policy.
No. It is not within the province of courts to
attempt to compel one of the spouses to cohabit
with, and render conjugal rights to the other.
However, a spouse who unjustifiable deserts the
conjugal abode can be denied support.
DADIVAS v VILLANUEVA (1929)

54 Phil. 92
Aurelia Dadivas de Villanueva married Rafael Villanueva
and they had three children. (18, 10, 9)
After 22 years, Aurelia filed a case for separate
maintenance due to infidelity and cruelty. 10 years
prior to the institution of the case, Rafael was guilty of
repeated acts of infidelity with four different women.
Even after the institution of the case it was shown that
he has had an illicit relation with another woman.
The incorrigible nature of the defendant in his relations
with other women coupled with his lack of
consideration and even brutality caused Aurelia to leave
the conjugal home and for her to establish her own
abode. Their final separation occurred on April 1947.
There was no sufficient evidence to establish the
cruelty of the husband but there were sufficient
evidence to establish the infidelity of the husband.
ISSUE: WON the wife is entitled for separate support from
her husband.
HELD: YES
In order to entitle a wife to maintain a separate home
and to require separate maintenance from the husband
it is not necessary that the husband should bring a
concubine into the home.
Perverse and illicit
relations with women outside the conjugal home
are sufficient grounds.
Ruling in Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo is not applicable
because in the Arroyo case the only grounds that were
alleged was cruelty and that charge was not proven. In
the present case, the charge of cruelty was also not
proven but the Aurelia also accused her husband of
infidelity and that charge has been proven (repeated
acts of conjugal infidelity) and the husband appears to
be a recurrent, if not incurable offender. This fact gives
the wife an undeniable right to relief.
Goitia v. Campos Rueda husband cannot by his own
wrongful acts, relieve himself from the duty to support
his wife. When he drives his wife from the domicile
fixed by him, he cannot take advantage of her
departure to abrogate the law applicable to the marital
relations and repudiate his duties.
GARCIA v SANTIAGO (1928)
53 Phil. 952
1910 Cipriana Garcia Isabelo Santiago married
1925 Cipriana compelled to leave conjugal dwelling:
1. continued family dissensions
2. Alejo, Isabelos son by his first wife seduced Prisca
Aurelio, Ciprianas daughter by her first husband.
Page 43 of 151
Prisca gave birth to a child. Isabelo, instead of

requiring his son to marry Prisca, refused to
interfere and he seemed to tolerate their illicit
relationship.
3. Isabelo has conveyed/been conveying their
conjugal properties to Alejo to foster latters whims
and caprices and thus, damaging and prejudicing
Ciprianas rights. Some of these properties include
lands acquired during their marriage with money
belonging to the conjugal partnership. Land
annually produces 4,500 cavanes of palay at
P4.00/cavan.
Other allegations of Cipriana/Prayers to the Court:
1. Their separation is necessary to avoid personal
violence. She could not live in the conjugal
dwelling due to the illicit relationship of Alejo and
Prisca tolerated by Isabelo.
2. She is entitled to P500 pendente lite monthly
pension from conjugal partnership. However,
Isabelo refused to provide for her support despite
her demands.
3. She should be in-charge of the administration of
the property of their conjugal partnership because
Isabelo is unfit to do so. He exhibits immoral
conduct and acts by publicly maintaining an illicit
relationship with Geronima Yap.
Isabelo answered with a general denial.
CFI dismissed
ISSUES/HELD:
1. WON their separation is justified - YES. They were
having a stormy life prior to the separation due to the
frequent fights. Isabelo ordered her to leave the house
and threatened to ill-treat her if she returned. Priscas
situation is embarrassing for her mother. Highly
possible that Alejo caused Priscas pregnancy.
Compelling them to cohabit could lead to further
quarrels.
2. WON transfers of property from Isabelo to Alejo are
illegal - NO. Failed to prove that property was
community property. Documentary evidences even
show that it was acquired by him before their marriage.
3. WON Cipriana is entitled to P500 monthly maintenance
= NO. Thats too much. P50 is enough.
ATILANO v CHUA CHING BENG (1958)
103 Phil. 255
Pilar Atilano (plaintiff-appellee), 19 years old, married Chua
Ching Beng (defendant-appellant) on May 1951. They lived
in Manila with the parents of the Ching Beng. In October of
that year, the couple went back to Zamboanga for a
vacation in Pilars parents. She stayed behind, telling the
defendant that she would go back to him later. On
September 1953, however, she filed a complaint of support
against her husband, alleging estrangement since October
1952, incessant bickering and his inability to provide a home
for them without his parents.
Defendant did not disclaim obligation to support; however,
he expressed his desire to fulfil his obligation if she returns
to Manila and lives with him in a domicile separate from his
parents. As the husband, he claims the right to fix the

residence of the family. After plaintiff filed a petition for

pendente lite with the CFI. CFI granted a monthly allowance
of P75.
The defendant then filed a petition wherein he elected to
fulfil his obligation as fixed by the trial court to receive and
maintain plaintiff at his residence in Pasay City. CFI denied
the petition. CA presented to SC for Adjudication.
ISSUE: WON a wife is entitled to receive support from her
husband where she refused to live with him on account of
some misunderstanding she had with the husbands
immediate relatives.
HELD: No. Defendant-appellant gave the option to support
wife at conjugal dwelling apart from his parents home.
Should plaintiff refuse, he is under no obligation to give any
support. The wife cannot be compelled to live with her
husband but support can be denied to the spouse who left.
DEL ROSARIO v DEL ROSARIO (1949)
46 OG 6122
Plaintiff Genoveva del Rosario, a widow with 2 kids and
defendant Teoderico del Rosario, a mechanic, widower with
a son got married. They lived together in the house of
defendant's mother. Because of petty quarrels, plaintiff left
the conjugal home in 1942.
ISSUE: WON plaintiff is justified in leaving and is entitled to
support
RATIO: Yes. As the marriage vow does not include
making sacrifices for the in-laws, there is legal
justification for wifes refusal to live with husband, taking
into account the traditional hatred between wife and her
mother-in-law (nyahaha). It is true that wife is obliged to
follow her husband wherever he wishes to establish the
residence (Art 58, CC), but this right does not include
compelling wife to live with mother-in-law, if they cannot
get along together. Alimony will be set according to
husbands ability to pay.
C. Mutual Help and Support

FC, Art 68 The husband and the wife are obliged to:
1. live together,
2. observe mutual love,
3. respect and fidelity,
4. render mutual help and support
FC, Art 70 The spouses are jointly responsible for the support
of the family. The expenses for such support and other conjugal
obligations shall be paid from the community property and in
the absence thereof, form the income or fruits of their separate
properties. In case of insufficiency or absence of said income or
fruits, such obligations shall be satisfied from their separate
properties.
Page 44 of 151
CC, Art 111 The husband is responsible for the support of the
wife and the rest of the family. These expenses shall be met
first from the conjugal property, then from the husband's
capital, and lastly from the wife's paraphernal property. In case
there is a separation of property, by stipulation in the marriage
settlements, the husband and wife shall contribute
proportionately to the family expenses.
FC, Art 199 Whenever 2 or more persons are obliged to give

support, the liability shall devolve upon the ff persons in the
order herein provided:
1. spouse
2. descendants in the nearest degree
3. ascendants in the nearest degree
4. brothers and sisters
FC, Art 200 When the obligation to give support falls upon two
or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided
between them in proportion to the resources of each.
However, in case of urgent need and by special circumstances,
the judge may order only one of them to furnish the support
provisionally, without prejudice to his right to claim form the
other obligors the share due from them.
When two or more recipients at the same time claim support
from one and the same person legally obliged to give it, should
the latter not have sufficient means to satisfy all claims, the
order established in the preceding Article shall be followed,
unless the concurrent obliges should be the spouse and a child
subject to parental authority, in which case the child shall be
preferred.
MCGUIRE v MCGUIRE (1953)

157 Neb. 226
Lydia (66) and Charles (80) McGuire were married.
They have known each other for 3 years and wife knew
of husbands extraordinary frugality.
She has two daughters from previous marriage, whose
education was supported by the second marriage. They
are now married and living in different states.
They inherited an 80-acre farm from first husband and
Lydia transferred her interest to her daughters but she
can have the rent money which she uses to visit her
daughters.
Wife testified that she used to raise chickens and her
profits were used to buy clothing and groceries because
husband gave her very little money, did not give her
clothes except for a single coat and never took her to a
movie. Their house was not equipped with a bathroom
and kitchen was not modern. The furnace was not in
good condition and she had a hard time scooping coal
for it. The car did not have an efficient heater. She
could not raise chickens anymore due to the 3
abdominal operations she went through which her
husband paid for.
Because of these, wife filed an action for equity to
recover suitable maintenance and support money, and
for costs and attorneys fees. District Court decreed that
wife was legally entitled to use the credit of the
husband and obligate him to pay for certain items in
the nature of improvements and repairs, furniture, and

appliances for the household; purchase a new

automobile with an effective heater in 30 days; pay
travel expenses of wife to visit each daughter at least
once a year; wife be entitled in the future to pledge the
credit of the husband for what may constitute
necessities of life; personal allowance of wife of $50 a
month; awarded $800 for wifes attorney; and as an
alternative, buy a modern house elsewhere.
ISSUE: WON wife is entitled to relief
HELD: No. To maintain an action such as the one at bar, the
parties must be separated or living apart from each
other. Parties are not living apart and wife has been
supported in the same manner without complaint. As long
as home is maintained and the parties are living as husband
and wife it may be said that the husband is legally
supporting his wife and the purpose of the marriage is being
carried out. As for attorneys fees, it is only allowed to the
successful party in litigation only where allowance is
provided by the statute.
PELAYO v LAURON (1909)
12 Phil 453
Arturo Pelayo is a physician who was called on by the
defendants (parents of the husband) to attend to their
daughter in law who was about to undergo labor.
Plaintiff tried his best to help her deliver, but she died
due to childbirth.
Plaintiff is now asking for due compensation for his
services amounting to P500. Defendants claim that her
delivery at their domicile was only incidental, and that it
was her husband who should pay for the services
rendered by the plaintiff.
ISSUE: Who between the parents-in-law and the husband is
liable for the payment of Pelayo?
HELD: The husband, because rendering of medical
assistance in case of illness comprises one of the mutual
obligations to which spouses are bound by way of mutual
support. It is improper for plaintiff to have brought action
against the defendants simply because they were the
parties who called the plaintiff. The defendants were not,
nor are they now, under any obligation by virtue of any
legal provision, to pay the fees claimed, nor in consequence
of any contract entered into between them and the plaintiff.
They are strangers with respect to the obligation that
devolves upon the husband to provide support.
Page 45 of 151
D. Management of the Household

FC, Art 71 The management of the household shall be the
right and duty of both spouses. The expenses shall for such
management shall be paid in accordance with the provisions of
Art 70.
CC, Art 115 The wife manages the affairs of the household.
She may purchase things necessary for the support of the
family, and the conjugal partnership shall be bound thereby.
She may borrow money for this purpose, if the husband fails to
deliver the proper sum. The purchase of jewelry and precious
objects is voidable, unless the transaction has been expressly or
tacitly approved by the husband, or unless the price paid is
from her paraphernal property.
YOUNG v HECTOR ()
740 So. 2d 1153
E. Exercise of Profession
FC, Art 73 Either spouse may exercise any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity without the consent
of the other. The latter may object only on valid, serious
and moral grounds.
In case of disagreement, the court shall decide whether or not:
1. the objection is proper
2. benefit has accrued to the family prior to the
objection or thereafter. If the benefit accrued prior to
the objection, the resulting obligation shall be
enforced against the separate property of the spouse
who has not obtained consent
The foregoing provisions shall not prejudice the rights of
creditors who acted in good faith.
CC, Art 117 The wife may exercise any profession or

occupation or engage in business. However, the husband may
object, provided:
1. His income is sufficient for the family, according to its
social standing, and
2. His opposition is founded on serious and valid
grounds.
In case of disagreement on this question, the parents and
grandparents as well as the family council, if any, shall be
consulted. If no agreement is still arrived at, the court will
decide whatever may be proper and in the best interest of the
family.

Page 46 of 151
6.
RA 7192
Women in Development and Nation-building Act
AN ACT PROMOTING THE INTEGRATION OF WOMEN AS
FULL AND EQUAL PARTNERS OF MEN IN DEVELOPMENT
AND NATION BUILDING AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be cited as the "Women in
Development and Nation Building Act."
Sec 2. Declaration of Policy. The State recognizes the role of

women in nation building and shall ensure the fundamental equality
before the law of women and men. The State shall provided women
rights and opportunities equal to that of men.
To attain the foregoing policy:
1. A substantial portion of official development assistance funds
received from foreign governments and multilateral agencies
and organizations shall be set aside and utilized by the
agencies concerned to support programs and activities for
women;
2. All government departments shall ensure that women benefit
equally and participate directly in the development programs
and projects of said department, specifically those funded
under official foreign development assistance, to ensure the
full participation and involvement of women in the
development process; and
3. All government departments and agencies shall review and
revise all their regulations, circulars, issuances and procedures
to remove gender bias therein.
Sec 3. Responsible Agency. The National Economic and
Development Authority (NEDA) shall primarily be responsible for
ensuring the participation of women as recipients in foreign aid,
grants and loans. It shall determine and recommend the amount to
be allocated for the development activity involving women.
Sec 4. Mandate. The NEDA, with the assistance of the National
Commission on the Role of Filipino Women, shall ensure that the
different government departments, including its agencies and
instrumentalities which, directly or indirectly, affect the participation
of women in national development and their integration therein:
1. Formulate and prioritize rural or countryside development
programs or projects, provide income and employment
opportunities to women in the rural areas and thus, prevent
their heavy migration from rural to urban or foreign countries;
2. Include an assessment of the extent to which their programs
and/or projects integrate women in the development process
and of the impact of said programs or projects on women,
including their implications in enhancing the self-reliance of
women in improving their income;
3. Ensure the active participation of women and women's
organizations in the development programs and/or projects
including their involvement in the planning, design,
implementation, management, monitoring and evaluation
thereof;
4. Collect sex-disaggregated data and include such data in its
program/project paper, proposal or strategy;
5. Ensure that programs and/or projects are designed so that the
percentage of women who receive assistance is approximately
proportionate to either their traditional participation in the
targeted activities or their proportion of the population,
whichever is higher. Otherwise, the following should be stated
in the program/project paper, proposal or strategy;
(a) The obstacle in achieving the goal;
(b) The steps being taken to overcome those obstacles; and
(c) To the extent that steps are not being taken to overcome
those obstacles, why they are not being taken.
Assist women in activities that are of critical significance to

their self-reliance and development.
Sec 5. Equality in Capacity to Act. Women of legal age,
regardless of civil status, shall have the capacity to act and enter
into contracts which shall in every respect be equal to that of men
under similar circumstances.
In all contractual situations where married men have the capacity to
act, married women shall have equal rights.
To this end:
1. Women shall have the capacity to borrow and obtain loans and
execute security and credit arrangement under the same
conditions as men;
2. Women shall have equal access to all government and private
sector programs granting agricultural credit, loans and nonmaterial resources and shall enjoy equal treatment in agrarian
reform and land resettlement programs;
3. Women shall have equal rights to act as incorporators and
enter into insurance contracts; and
4. Married women shall have rights equal to those of married
men in applying for passport, secure visas and other travel
documents, without need to secure the consent of their
spouses.
In all other similar contractual relations, women shall enjoy equal
rights and shall have the capacity to act which shall in every respect
be equal to those of men under similar circumstances.
Sec 6. Equal Membership in Clubs. Women shall enjoy equal
access to membership in all social, civic and recreational clubs,
committees, associations and similar other organizations devoted to
public purpose. They shall be entitled to the same rights and
privileges accorded to their spouses if they belong to the same
organization.
Sec 7. Admission to Military Schools. Any provision of the law to
the contrary notwithstanding, consistent with the needs of the
services, women shall be accorded equal opportunities for
appointment, admission, training, graduation and commissioning in
all military or similar schools of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
and the Philippine National Police not later than the fourth academic
year following the approval of this Act in accordance with the
standards required for men except for those minimum essential
adjustments required by physiological differences between sexes.
Sec 8. Voluntary Pag-IBIG, GSIS and SSS Coverage. Married
persons who devote full time to managing the household and family
affairs shall, upon the working spouse's consent, be entitled to
voluntary Pag-IBIG (Pagtutulungan Ikaw, Bangko, Industriya at
Gobyerno), Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) or Social
Security System (SSS) coverage to the extent of one-half (1/2) of
the salary and compensation of the working spouse. The
contributions due thereon shall be deducted from the salary of the
working spouse.
The GSIS or the SSS, as the case may be, shall issue rules and
regulations necessary to effectively implement the provisions of this
section.
Sec 9. Implementing Rules. The NEDA, in consultation with the
different government agencies concerned, shall issue rules and
regulations as may be necessary for the effective implementation of
Sections 2, 3 and 4, of this Act within six (6) months from its
effectivity.
Sec 10. Compliance Report. Within six (6) months from the
effectivity of this Act and every six (6) months thereafter, all
government departments, including its agencies and
instrumentalities, shall submit a report to Congress on their
compliance with this Act.
Sec 11. Separability Clause. If for any reason any section or
provision of this Act is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other

sections or provisions hereof which are not affected thereby shall
continue to be in full force and effect.
Sec 12. Repealing Clause. The provisions of Republic Act No.
386, otherwise known as the Civil Code of the Philippines, as
amended, and of Executive Order No. 209, otherwise known as the
Family Code of the Philippines, and all laws, decrees, executive
orders, proclamations, rules and regulations, or parts thereof,
inconsistent herewith are hereby repealed.
Sec 13. Effectivity Clause. The rights of women and all the
provisions of this Act shall take effect immediately upon its
publication in the Official Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of
general circulation.
F. Use of Surname
CC, Art 370 A married woman may use:
1.
2.
3.
Her maiden first name and surname and add her

husband's surname (e.g. Miriam Defensor-Santiago)
Her maiden first name and her husband's surname (e.g.
Loi Ejercito)
Her husband's full name, but prefixing a word indicating
that she is his wife, such as "Mrs." (e.g. Mrs. Francis
Pangilinan)
CC, Art 373 A widow may use the deceased husband's

surname as though he were still living, in accordance with
Article 370.
CC, Art 377 Usurpation of a name and surname may be the

subject of an action for damages and other relief.
CC, Art 378 The unauthorized or unlawful use of another

person's surname gives a right of action to the latter.
SILVA v PERALTA (1960)

110 Phil 57
Defendant Esther Peralta accompanied younger sister
Florence in the latters arrest and investigation.
There, defendant met plaintiff Saturnino Silva, a US
citizen and officer of the US Army. Silva then started
courting Esther and she later accepted his proposal of
marriage having been made to believe that he was
single. They started living together as common-law
husband and wife and bore a son, Saturnino Silva, Jr.
They were married on Jan 14, 1945. However, no
documents of marriage were prepared nor executed.
The only evidence offered was testimonies of the
defendant and her counsel.
-
Appellant Silva, however, was married to one Priscilla

Isabel of Australia during such time. It was only after
May 1945, when he was sent back to US for medical
treatments of his battle wounds, did he divorce Priscilla.
To add, on May 9, 1948, he contracted another
marriage with co-plaintiff Elenita Ledesma Silva.
ISSUES:
Page 47 of 151
1.
2.
WON appellants deception and fraud justified

award of damages to defendant - Yes
WON defendant misrepresented herself as Mrs.
Silva - Yes
HELD:
1. Yes. If appellant revealed his true situation, appellee
would never have agreed to be with appellant. Esthers
loss of employment in the Girl Scouts Davao Council
was ultimately a result of Silvas deception and she
should be indemnified therefor. His concealment of his
real status was not mere dolo but actual fraud. He
should then stand solely liable for any and all damages
arising therefrom. Moreover, Esther acted in good
faith since Silva formerly introduced her as Mrs. Silva,
sent her letters thus addressed which implied authority
to use his name.
2. Yes. In the face of evidence, it is safe to conclude that
no marriage had really taken place. It is not proper for
Esther to continue representing herself as the wife of
Saturnino considering that at the time, he was still
married to Priscilla Isabel. And as per Art 370 CC, a
married woman is authorized to use husbands
surname, impliedly, it also excludes others from doing
likewise.
TOLENTINO v CA (1988)
162 SCRA 66
Private respondent Consuelo David Arturo Tolentino
(yes, the one who annotated the law) in 1931.
Marriage was dissolved and terminated in 1943
pursuant to the law during the Japanese occupation by
a decree of absolute divorce on the grounds of
desertion and abandonment by the wife for at least 3
continuous years.
Arturo Tolentino married Pilar Adorable but she died
soon after the marriage.
Constancia married Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945
and they have 3 children. Constancia Tolentino is the
present legal wife of Arturo Tolentino.
Consuelo David continued using the surname Tolentino
after the divorce and up to the time that the complaint
was filed. Her usage of the surname Tolentino was
authorized by the family of Arturo Tolentino (brothers
and sisters).
RTC: Consuelo David should discontinue her usage of
the surname of Tolentino
CA: reversed RTC
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners cause of action has already
prescribed
2. WON the petitioner can exclude by injunction Consuelo
David from using the surname of her former husband
from whom she was divorced.
HELD:
1. Yes
Art 1150 CC The time for prescription of all kinds of
actions, when there in no special provision which
ordains otherwise, shall be counted from the day they
may be brought.

2.
-
Art 1149 CC Period of prescription is 5 years from the

right of action accrues.
The action has long prescribed because she married
Arturo Tolentino on April 21, 1945; Civil Code took
effect on August 30, 1950; She acquired knowledge
that Consuelo David was still using the surname
Tolentino in 1951.
She should have filed the case after she obtained
knowledge that Consuelo David was still using the
surname Tolentino. The case was filed on November
23, 1971 or 20 years after she obtained knowledge.
No
Philippine law is silent whether or not a divorced
woman may continue to use the surname of her
husband because there are no provisions for divorce
under Philippine law.
Commentary of Tolentino as regards Art 370 of the CC:
the wife cannot claim an exclusive right to use the
husbands surname. She cannot be prevented from
using it, but neither can she restrain others from using
it (bias much?).
Art 371 is not applicable because it contemplates
annulment while the present case refers to absolute
divorce where there is severance of valid marriage ties.
Effect of divorce more akin to death of the spouse
where the deceased woman is continued to be referred
to as Mrs. of the husband even if he has remarried.
If the appeal would be granted the respondent would
encounter problems because she was able to prove that
she entered into contracts with third persons, acquired
properties and entered into other legal relations using
the surname Tolentino. Petitioner failed to show the
she would suffer any legal injury or deprivation of right.
There is no usurpation of the petitioners name and
surname. Usurpation implies injury to the interests of
the owner of the name. It consists with the possibility
of confusion of identity
Element of usurpation
o Actual use of anothers name
o Use is unauthorized
o Use of anothers name is to designate personality
or identity of a person
None of these elements were present in the case
Silva v Peralta was cited by the petitioner but the case
is not applicable. In Silva, it was not mere use of the
surname that was enjoined but the defendants
representation that she was the wife of Saturnino
Silva, there was usurpation of the status of the wife.
YASIN v SHARIA DISTRICT COURT (1995)

241 SCRA 606 - SUPRA
No need to file petition to revert to use of maiden name
after divorce since marital ties have been completely
severed.
Page 48 of 151
G. Relief from Courts

FC, Art 72 When one of the spouses neglects his or her duties
to the conjugal union or commits acts which tend to bring
danger, dishonor or injury to the other or to the family, the
aggrieved party may apply to the court for relief.
PEREZ v PEREZ (1960)

109 Phil 657
Antonio Perez, as guardian ad litem of his son, filed a
civil case against defendant Angela Tuason de Perez at
the CFI Manila.
He wants to declare his wife as prodigal and place
under guardianship based on the following allegations:
o she was squandering her estate on a young man
named Jose Boloix
o she was spending the conjugal partnership of gain
o defendant has expressed her desire to marry and
have children with Jose Boloix, if only to embarrass
her husband
CFI dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction
ISSUE: WON the case falls under the jurisdiction of the CFI
or the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court.
HELD: RTC has no jurisdiction. It is the Juvenile and
Domestic Relation Court which has jurisdiction. Material
injury pertains to personal injury (personal relations
between man and wife) and not patrimonial or financial.
ARROYO v VASQUEZ (1921)
42 Phil 54
Plaintiff Mariano and defendant Dolores were married in
1910, and lived in Iloilo City. They lived together with a
few short intervals of separation. On July 4, 1920,
defendant Dolores went away from their common home
and decided to live separately from plaintiff. She
claimed that she was compelled to leave on the basis of
cruel treatment on the part of her husband. She in turn
prayed for a decree of separation, a liquidation of their
conjugal partnership, and an allowance for counsel fees
and permanent separate maintenance.
CFI ruled in favor of the defendant and she was
granted alimony amounting to P400, also other fees
Plaintiff then asked for a restitution of conjugal rights,
and a permanent mandatory injunction requiring the
defendant to return to the conjugal home and live with
him as his wife.
ISSUES:
1. WON defendant had sufficient cause for leaving
the conjugal home
2. WON plaintiff may be granted the restitution of
conjugal rights or absolute order or permanent
mandatory injunction
HELD:
1. On sufficient cause for leaving the conjugal home. Cruelty
done by plaintiff to defendant was greatly exaggerated. The
wife was inflicted with a disposition of jealousy towards her

husband in an aggravated degree. No sufficient cause was

present.
Courts should move with caution in enforcing the duty to
provide for the separate maintenance of the wife since this
recognizes the de facto separation of the two parties.
Continued cohabitation of the pair must be seen as
impossible, and separation must be necessary, stemming
from the fault of the husband. She is under obligation to
return to the domicile.
When people understand that they must live

togetherthey learn to soften by mutual accommodation
that yoke which they know they cannot shake off; they
become good husbands and wivesnecessity is a powerful
master in teaching the duties which it imposes
(Evans v. Evans)
2. On granting the restitution of conjugal rights. It is not
within the province of the courts to compel one of the
spouses to cohabit with, and render conjugal rights to, the
other. In the case of property rights, such an action may be
maintained. Said order, at best, would have no other
purpose than to compel the spouses to live together. Other
countries, such as England and Scotland have done this with
much criticism.
Plaintiff is entitled to a judicial declaration that the
defendant absented herself without sufficient cause and it is
her duty to return. She is also not entitled to support.
Page 49 of 151

X. PROPERTY
RELATIONS
BETWEEN SPOUSES
MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT is an agreement entered
into before marriage and, in consideration thereof, between
an intended husband and wife, by which the enjoyment or
devolution of property is regulated. A contract entered into
by those who are to be united in marriage, in order to
establish the conditions of their conjugal partnership with
respect to present and future property.
A. General Provisions
FC, Art 74 The property relations between husband and wife
shall be governed in the following order:
1. by marriage settlements executed before the marriage
2. by the provisions of this Code
3. by the local customs
FC, Art 75 The future spouses may, in the marriage
settlements, agree upon the regime of ACP, CPG, complete
separation of property or any other regime. In the absence of
marriage settlement, or when the regime agreed upon is
void, the system of absolute community property as
established in this Code shall govern.
FC, Art 76 In order that any modification in the marriage

settlement may be valid, it must be made before the
celebration of the marriage, subject to the provisions of Art
66, 67 , 128, 135 and 136.
Art 66
Art 67
Reconciliation after legal separation: Separation

of property and forfeiture of the share of the guilty
spouse shall subsist, unless spouses agree to revive
their former property regime
Agreement to revive former property regime shall be
executed under oath and specify
1.
Properties to be contributed anew to the
restored regime
2.
Those to be retained as separated properties
of each spouse
3.
Names of all their creditors, address and
amount owing to each
Art 128
If spouse without just cause abandons the other

OR fails to comply with his/her obligations to
the family: Petition for judicial separation of property
or authority to be the sole administrator of the
conjugal partnership
Art 135
Sufficient causes for voluntary judicial separation of

property
Art 136
Spouses joint filing of petition for voluntary dissolution

of ACP/CPG/separation of their common properties
Page 50 of 151
FC, Art 77 The form of marriage settlement:

1. in writing
2. signed by the parties
3. before the celebration of the marriage
Prejudice against third persons: registered in the local civil
registry where the marriage contract is recorded as well as in
the proper registries of property.
FC, Art 78 A minor, who according to law, may contract

marriage may also execute his or her marriage settlements, but
they shall be valid only if the persons designated in Art
14 to give consent to the marriage are made parties to
the agreement, subject to the provisions of the Title IX of this
Code.
* Art 14 FC father, mother, surviving parent or guardian,

or persons having legal charge of them
* Title IX Parental authority
* By applying principles of statutory construction, Art 14
which is specific provision for marriage shall prevail
FC, Art 79 For the validity of any marriage settlements
executed by a person upon whom a sentence of civil
interdiction has been pronounced or who is subject to any other
disability, it shall be indispensable for the guardian appointed
by a competent court to be made a party thereto.
FC, Art 80 In the absence of a contrary stipulation in a

marriage settlement, the property relations of the spouses shall
be governed by Philippine laws, regardless of the place of the
celebration of the marriage and their residence.
This rule shall not apply:
1. Where both spouses are aliens
2. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts
affecting property not situated in the Philippines and
executed in the country where the property is located
3. With respect to the extrinsic validity of contracts
entered into in the Philippines but affecting property
situated in a foreign country whose laws require
different formalities for its extrinsic validity.
FC, Art 81 Everything stipulated in the settlement or contracts

referred to in the preceding articles in consideration of a future
marriage, including donations between the prospective spouses
made therein, shall be rendered void if the marriage does not
take place. However, stipulations that do not depend upon the
celebration of the marriage shall be valid.
COLLECTOR v FISHER (1961)

110 Phil 686
Walter and Beatrice Stevenson, both British citizens were
married in Manila where they lived until they established
permanent residence in California in 1945. Walter died in
1951 and instituted his wife as sole heiress to real and
personal properties in the Philippines, which were assessed
for estate and inheritance tax.
ISSUE: WON in determining the taxable net estate of the
decedent, the net estate should be deducted as the share of
the surviving spouse in accordance with our law on conjugal
partnership.

HELD: Yes. It should be deducted from net estate. It is a

well-known doctrine in our civil law that in the absence of
any ante-nuptial agreement, the contracting parties are
presumed to have adopted the system of conjugal
partnership as to the properties acquired during their
marriage.
WHARTONS PROCESSUAL PRESUMPTIONS apply. Property
relations of the Stevensons should be determined by the
rational laws of the husband. Under Art 1325 OCC, one
spouse is a foreigner and there is no ante-nuptial
agreement, it is the national law of the husband that
becomes the dominant law in determining the property
relations of such spouses. But since both spouses are
foreigners, it is British law that should apply. However, as
there is no proof of what the law of England is in this matter
and the court is justified to indulge in processual
presumption, that the law of England on this matter is the
same as our law.
B. Donation Propter Nuptias

1. Requisites for donations
FC, Art 82 Donations by reason of marriage are those which
are made before its celebration, in consideration of the same,
and in favor of one or both of the future spouses.
REQUISITES FOR DONATIONS PROPTER NUPTIAS (DPN)

1. made before celebration of the marriage
2. made in consideration of the marriage
3. made in favor of one or both of the future spouses
DONATIONS EXCLUDED
1. in favor of the spouses after the marriage (ordinary
wedding gifts)
2. in favor of future spouses, made before the
celebration of marriage, but not in consideration
3. in favor of persons other than the spouses, even
though they may be founded on the marriage
* governed by provisions on ordinary donations
WHO MAY DONATE
1. the spouses to each other
2. the parents to one or both of the spouses
3. by third persons to one or both of the spouses
DONATION PROPTER
NUPTIAS
Does not require express
acceptance
May be made by minors (Art
78)
If present property is donated
and property regime is not
ACP, limited to 1/5
Grounds for revocation in Art
86
ORDINARY DONATIONS
Express acceptance necessary
Cannot be made by minors
No limit to donation of present
property provided legitimes are
not impaired
Grounds for revocation are
found in law on donations
Page 51 of 151
FC, Art 83 These donations are governed by the rules on

ordinary donations established in CC, insofar as they are not
modified by the following articles.
FC, Art 85 Donation by reason of marriage of property

subject to encumbrances shall be valid. In case of
foreclosure of the encumbrance, and the property is sold for
less than the total amount of the obligation secured, the donee
shall not be liable for the deficiency. If the property is sold for
more than the total amount of said obligation, the donee shall
be entitled to the excess.
DOMALAGAN v BOLIFER (1916)

33 Phil. 471
Jorge Domalagan and Carlos Bolifer entered into a
verbal contract wherein the former was to pay
defendant the sum of P500 upon the marriage of the
formers son Cipriano Domalagan with the defendants
daughter, Bonifacia.
Jorge Domalagan paid the sum of P500 plus P16 as
hansel or token of future marriage. However, the
Bonifacia married one Laureano Sisi.
Upon learning of the marriage, Domalagan demanded
return of the said sum of P516 plus interest and
damages arising from the fact that he was obliged to
sell his real property in Bohol to come up with the sum.
Defendant denied complaint and alleged that it did not
constitute a cause of action.
RTC: No evidence to show that plaintiff suffered any
addtl damages. Ruled in favor of plaintiff for the return
of P516 plus 6% interest from Dec 17, 1910 plus costs.
ISSUE: WON Domalagan can demand his P516 since no
marriage took place
HELD: YES. The amount constitutes DPN since it fulfills all
the requirements, thus it may be revoked. Verbal contracts
are valid even if it not clothed in the necessary form.
SERRANO v SOLOMON (1959)
105 Phil 998
Melchor Solomon executed a supposed deed of DPN,
stating among others that if there are no children and
wife dies first, all of his properties and all properties
acquired during the union will be inherited by those
who reared the wife.
The wife Alejandria Solomon died less than 9 months
later without issues, upon which Estanislao Serrano, the
uncle who reared her instituted this action to enforce
the deed.
CFI: Donation was not a donation propter nuptias
because it was not made in consideration of marriage
and it was not made to one or both parties of the
marriage
ISSUE: WON the donation made by Melchor can be
considered as a donation propter nuptias.
HELD: NO and the alleged donation is null & void. CFI
decision affirmed. Estanislao wont get anything. Whether
you apply Art 1327 of the old CC or Art. 126 of the new CC,

the result would be the same, donations propter nuptias are

only those bestowed (1) before the celebration of marriage,
(2) in consideration of the same and (3) upon one or both
of the spouses. Melchors donation violated conditions 2 and
3. It was not in consideration solely of the marriage, it had
additional terms like the marriage had to be childless and
one of the spouses had to die before the other. Also, it was
not in favor of Alejandria. Instead, it was in favor of her
parents and those who raised her. Based on Manresas
commentary, donations granted to persons other than
the spouses even though founded on the marriage
are excluded. Its not a donation inter vivos (during their
lifetime) either, because donee never accepted it by same
instrument of donation or in separate document as required
by law. Its not a donation mortis causa (upon death) either.
It has to be governed by provisions on the disposition
execution of wills to be appreciated as such. Besides, donor
is still alive. It will only be operational upon his death.
SOLIS v BARROSO (1928)
53 Phil 912
Spouses Juan Lambino and Maxima Barroso made a
DPN of certain lands in a private document in favor of
their son Alejo and his soon-to-be-wife Fortunata Solis,
in consideration of their upcoming marriage. One
condition of the donation is that in case one of the
donees dies, half of the lands thus donated would
revert to the donors while the surviving donee would
retain the other half.
On the same month, Alejo and Fortunata got married
and immediately thereafter the donors delivered the
possession of the donated lands to them. A month
later, Alejo died. In the same year, Juan also died. After
Juans death, Maxima recovered possession of the
donated lands. Surviving donee, Fortunata filed an
action against Maxima (surviving donor) et al and
demanded:
1. the execution of the proper deed of donation
according to law,
2. transfer of one-half of the donated property to her
3. to proceed to the partition of the donated property
and its fruits
CFI granted the plaintiffs prayer, basing its judgment
on Art 1279 of the Civil Code. It ordered the defendants
to execute a deed of donation in favor of Fortunata,
valid in form to transfer to her the legal title to the part
of the donated lands assigned to her in the original
donation.
ISSUE: WON the private document is valid as DPN
HELD: NO. DPN is governed by laws on donation. Art
633 provides that for a donation of a real property to be
valid, it must be made in a public instrument. The only
exception to the rule are onerous and remuneratory
contracts, in so far as they do not exceed the value of the
charge imposed, which are then governed by the rules on
contracts. Because the DPN by the spouses were
made in a private instrument, it is not valid and does
not confer any rights.
Page 52 of 151
MATEO v LAGUA (1969)

29 SCRA 864
Spouses Lagua donated half of their owned land to
their son Alejandro in consideration of his marriage to
Bonifacia Mateo. This was executed in a public
document.
Alejandro died so his son would succeed in the
ownership of the land.
The father in law continued tending the farm and giving
the wife her share in the fruits. Until the sustenance
stopped and the wife discovered that the father-in-law
sold the land.
The wife successfully moved for the annulment the sale
in a court proceeding.
However, the Laguas subsequently filed for the
annulment of the donation because it neglected their
own support as well as the legitime of their other son.
Alejandros younger brother, Gervacio, filed a suit for
annulment on the ground that it prejudiced his legitime.
Bonifacia (the wife) appealed the decision raising the
following errors:
o Validity of the DPN have been determined in a
previous case
o Action to annul the donation has already
prescribed since the case was filed 41 years after
the donation
o DPN is revocable only for any grounds
enumerated in Art 132 of the New Civil Code
o Determining the legitime of the Lagua brothers
in the hereditary estate of Cipriano the CA
should have applied the provisions of the Civil
Code of 1889 and not Art 888 NCC
ISSUE: WON an onerous DPR may be revoked
HELD: YES, DPN is without onerous condition and
based on liberalities are subject to annulment due to
inofficiousness. If proved that the value of the DPN
exceeds the disposable free portion of the donor, it may be
revoked. However, in this case, no evidence was
adduced as to the burdensome nature of the DPN.
2. Donation propter nuptias of present

or future property
FC, Art 84 If the future spouses agree upon a regime other
than the absolute community of property, they cannot
donate to each other in their marriage settlements more than
1/5 of their present property. Any excess shall be
considered void.
Donations of future property shall be governed by the
provisions on the testamentary succession and the formalities
of wills.
DONATIONS OF
present property takes effect upon
celebration of marriage
future property takes effect upon death (by
will or mortis causa)

3. Grounds for revocation of DPN

FC, Art 86 Donation by reason of marriage may be revoked by
the donor in the following cases:
1. if the marriage is not celebrated or judicially declared
void ab initio except donations made in the marriage
settlements, which shall be governed by Art 81
2. when the marriage takes place without the consent of
the parents or guardian, as required by law
3. when the marriage is annulled and the donee acted
in bad faith
4. upon legal separation, the donee being the guilty
spouse
5. if it is with a resolutory condition and the condition is
complied with
6. when the donee has committed and act of ingratitude
as specified in the provisions of CC
* What does Par 2 mean? The donor is not the parent

who did not give consent.
* What is a resolutory condition? The DPN is already
received which enjoyment is subject to termination upon
happening of the future and uncertain event. In other words
done is forbidden to do something. (E.g. Car is given but it
will be revoked if you use it anywhere outside NCR.)
* Grounds of revocation in this article is not by operation
of law. Those which revokes by operation of law are the ff:
1. if the DPN is stipulated in the marriage settlement
and no marriage took place (Art 81)
2. for void ab initio and subsequent marriages in a
spouses presumptive death, provided the donee
acted in bad faith (Art 43 (3) in relation to Art 50)
* Art 765, CC Acts of ingratitude
(1) If the donee should commit some offense against the
person, the honor or the property of the donor, or of
his wife or children under his parental authority;
(2) If the donee imputes to the donor any criminal
offense, or any act involving moral turpitude, even
though he should prove it, unless the crime or the act
has been committed against the donee himself, his
wife or children under his authority;
(3) If he unduly refuses him support when the donee is
legally or morally bound to give support to the donor.
Page 53 of 151
4. Void donations
WHAT ARE VOID DONATIONS
1. between spouses during marriage
2. direct or indirect (e.g. stepchild or child of the
other spouse and a person whom the spouses is
presumptive heir at the time of donation)
REASONS FOR PROHIBITION
1. donation inter vivos is dictated by principle of unity
of personality of spouses during marriage
2. prevent weaker spouses from being abused by
stronger spouse, whether by abuse of affection or
threats of violence
3. protect creditors
4. prevent indirect modification of the marriage
settlement
PROHIBITION IS ALSO APPLICABLE TO
1. common-law marriages
2. parties living in a state of adultery or concubinage
* Reasons: possibility of undue influence and that if ruled
otherwise, those living in guilt would be better off than
those in legal union
NAZARENO v BIROG (1947)
45 OG 11 Supp 268
Andrea Rodriguez Juan Aben Alberta Aben
Daughter Alberta Mariano Meleno Nazareno
Bonifacio Nazareno (plaintiff)
When Juan Aben died, Andrea got married to Cirilo
Braganza. Andrea and her second husband Cirilo had
no offspring.
Cirilo executed a deed of donation of land to his then sixyear old step-grandson Bonifacio. The donation was
accepted in the same deed by Alberta and Mariano, parents
of Bonifacio. Cirilo continued to possess and enjoy the land.
Beginning in 1930, Cirilo sold portions of the land:
1930
71 ares and 30 centares to Birog for 1,
100 (paid)
1933
2 hectares to Birog for 2, 200 (initially
with remaining balance of 300, later paid
275, wrote promissory note for 25)
1934
1 hectare and 70 ares to Ariola for 1, 600
(balance of 600, promissory note for that
sum payable at end of Feb or March
1935)
These two buyers immediately took possession of the land
and cultivated them. Cirilo died on Dec.1934 and since
Ariola had not paid by Feb1935, plaintiff wrote him a letter
demanding the payment. Pedro Braganza (brother of Cirilo)
collected balance of 25 from Birog in March 1935).
ISSUE: WON plaintiff, Nazareno, may recover title and
possession of a parcel of land described here?
HELD: NO. Not only did he lose ownership of the two
portions of the land that the Birogs and Ariolas possess, he

signed a deed in favor of Ariola on the third and last

portion; therefore, he is estopped from claiming the land.
More importantly, appeal must be dismissed since plaintiff
has no cause of action. The deed of donation upon which he
bases his claim to land is null and void since it is made by
the donor to a grandchild of his wife by the wifes previous
marriage. The donation falls under the prohibition in
Art.1335, CC. Neither has the plaintiff acquired the land by
prescription for there is no evidence that he ever possessed
it or claimed it against his grandfather (as evidence in deed
in favor of Ariola, signed by Nazareno as witness).
MATABUENA v CERVANTES (1971)
38 SCRA 284
While Felix Matabuena and Petronila Cervantes were
living as common law spouses, the man donated to her
a parcel of land.
They eventually got married and Felix died, leaving
behind his properties to his wife Petronila.
Felixs sister Cornelia questions the validity of the
donation and claims ownership over her brothers
estate.
ISSUE: WON the ban on donation inter vivos applies when
the donation was made during common law relationship
HELD: Yes, common law spouses fall within the prohibition
hence the donation is null and void as contrary to public
policy.
HARDING v COMMERCIAL UNION (1918)
38 Phil 464
Mrs. Harding bought an insurance policy for the car her
husband gave her. A few days later, the car was totaled
in a fire.
The insurance company refused to pay saying that the
donation of husband to the wife was void.
ISSUE: WON the car was validly donated by the husband to
the wife
HELD: YES. The car may be considered as a moderate gift.
Whether a gift is moderate or not would depend upon the
circumstances of the parties, in this case, nothing was
disclosed by the record. Also, the insurance company is not
the proper party to question the moderateness of the gift.
It can only be raised by persons who bear such a
relation to the parties making the transfer interfere
with their rights or interest.
SUMBAD v CA (1999)
308 SCRA 75
Agata Tait died in 1936. Afterwards, Agatas husband,
George Tait, Sr., lived in a common-law marriage with
Maria Tait. In 1974, he donated a certain parcel of
unregistered land in Sitio Sum-at, Bontoc. George died
in 1977. From 1982 to 1983, Maria Tait sold lots
included within the Sum-at property in favor of the
private respondents who purchased the lots on the
strength of a Tax Declaration over the Sum-at property
showing the seller, Maria, to be the owner of the
property in question.
Page 54 of 151
In 1989, petitioners Emilie Sumbad and Beatrice Tait

brought an action for quieting of title, nullification of
deeds of sale, and recovery of possession with
damages against private respondents, alleging that
they are the children and compulsory heirs of George
and Agata. They claim that after the death of their
mother, their father sold the Otucan property and used
the proceeds thereof to purchase a residential lot in
Sum-at, Bontoc and that from 1982 to 1983, Maria sold
lots included within the Sum-at property to private
respondents without their knowledge and consent.
They further alleged that although the private
respondents were warned that the Sum-at property did
not belong to Maria they still purchased the lots from
Maria and that Maria had no right to sell the Sum-at
property so the deeds of sale are null and void and did
not transfer title to private respondents. During the
trial, petitioners and defense presented several
witnesses.
ISSUES:
1. WON the testimony of Shirley Eillenger with respect to
the forgery of the deed of donation should be given
credence.
NO. The court agreed with the trial and appellate courts
decision that Eillengers testimony is vague and incredible
and incapable of impugning the validity of the public
document. Forgery should be proven by clear and
convincing evidence, and whoever alleges it has the burden
of proving the same. Not only is Shirley Eillengers testimony
difficult to believe, it shows is had been rehearsed as she
anticipated the questions of petitioners counsel. Petitioners
should have presented handwriting experts to support their
claim that Georges signature on the deed of donation was
indeed a forgery.
2.
WON the deed of donation is invalid under Art 749 CC,

which requires a public instrument as a requisite for the
validity of donations of immovable property.
NO. Petitioners contend that the person who notarized the
deed had no authority to do so. However, the
acknowledgment clause states that the person who
notarized it was the deputy clerk of court who acted for
and in the absence of the clerk of court who is authorized,
under Sec. 21 of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917,
as amended by C.A. Nos. 270 and 641, to administer oaths.
In accordance with the presumption that official duty has
been regularly performed, it is to be presumed that the
deputy clerk of court who notarized the deed of donation in
this case was duly authorized by the clerk of court.
3. WON deed of donation contravenes Art 133, CC
NO. Art 133 provides that every donation between spouses
during the marriage shall be void. This prohibition does
not apply when the donation takes effect after the
death of the donor. Neither does this prohibition apply to
moderate gifts which the spouses may give each other on
the occasion of any family rejoicing. This prohibition
extends to common-law relations (Matabuena v Cervantes).
In fact, Art 87, FC provides that every donation or grant of
gratuitous advantage, direct or indirect, between the
spouses during the marriage shall be void, except moderate

gifts which the spouses may give each other on the

occasion of any family rejoicing. The prohibition shall also
apply to persons living together as husband and wife
without a valid marriage. However, this point is being
raised for the first time in the SC. Litigants cannot raise an
issue for the first time on appeal as this would contravene
the basic rules of fair play and justice.
Even assuming that they are not thus precluded, petitioners
were unable to present evidence in support of such a claim.
The evidence on record does not show whether George was
married to Maria and, if so, when the marriage took place.
If Maria was not married to George, evidence should have
been presented to show that at the time the deed of
donation was executed, George and Maria were still
maintaining common-law relations. Beatrice Taits (one
of the witnesses presented) testimony is only to the effect
that in 1941, Maria became their stepmother. There is no
evidence on record that George and Maria continuously
maintained common-law relations until the date when the
donation was made (April 2, 1974).
* In short, the donation was valid because there was no
evidence to support the allegation that George was married
to Maria. There was also no evidence that the two were still
living as common-law spouses at the time the donation was
made.
CHING v GOYANKO JR. (2006)
506 SCRA 735
Joseph Goyanko Sr Epifania dela Cruz had seven
children who are the respondents in this case
Respondents claim that their property was named after
their aunt Sulpicia Goyanko because their father was a
foreigner so Sulpicia had to sell it to Joseph first before
Joseph was able to sell it to his common law wife
petitioner herein Maria Ching
Ching claims to be the owner who purchased the
property for a certain price
RTC and CA dismissed the case because of
overwhelming evidence that she was concubine
ISSUE: WON the sale to the concubine was valid
HELD: NO. It falls under the prohibited donation between
spouses.
Page 55 of 151
C. System of Absolute Community

1. General Provisions
FC, Art 88 The absolute community of property between
spouses shall commence at the precise moment that the
marriage is celebrated. Any stipulation, express or implied,
for the commencement of the community regime at any other
time shall be void.
FC, Art 89 No waiver of rights, interests, shares and

effects of the ACP during the marriage can be made except in
a case of judicial separation of property.
When the waiver takes place upon a judicial separation of
property, or after the marriage has been dissolved or annulled,
the same shall appear in a public instrument and shall be
recorded as provided in Art 77. The creditors of the spouse who
made such waiver may petition the court to rescind the waiver
to the extent of the amount sufficient to cover the amount of
their credits.
FC, Art 90 The provisions on co-ownership shall apply to

the ACP between the spouses in all matters not provided for in
this Chapter.
2. What constitutes community

property
FC, Art 91 Unless otherwise provided in this Chapter or in the
marriage settlements, the community property shall consist of
all the property owned by the spouses at the time of the
celebration of the marriage or acquired thereafter.
FC, Art 92 The ff shall be excluded from the ACP:

1. acquired during the marriage by gratuitous title, by
either spouse, and the fruits as well as the income
thereof, if any, unless it is expressly provided by the
donor, testator or grantor that they shall form part of
the community property
2. for personal and exclusive use of either spouse.
However, jewelry shall form part of the ACP
3. acquired before the marriage by either spouse who
has legitimate descendants by a former marriage and
the fruits as well as the income, if any, of such
property
FC, Art 93 Property acquired during the marriage is

presumed to belong to the community; unless it is proved
that it is one of the excluded therefrom.

3. Charges upon the ACP

FC, Art 94 The ACP shall be liable for:
(1) The support of the spouses, their common children, and
legitimate children of either spouse; however, the support of
illegitimate children shall be governed by the provisions of this
Code on Support;
(2) All debts and obligations contracted during the marriage
by the designated administrator-spouse for the benefit of the
community, or by both spouses, or by one spouse with the
consent of the other;
(3) Debts and obligations contracted by either spouse
without the consent of the other to the extent that the
family may have been benefited;
(4) All taxes, liens, charges and expenses, including major
or minor repairs, upon the community property;
(5) All taxes and expenses for mere preservation made
during marriage upon the separate property of either spouse
used by the family;
(6) Expenses to enable either spouse to commence or
complete a professional or vocational course, or other activity
for self-improvement;
(7) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have
redounded to the benefit of the family;
(8) The value of what is donated or promised by both spouses
in favor of their common legitimate children for the exclusive
purpose of commencing or completing a professional or
vocational course or other activity for self-improvement;
(9) Ante-nuptial debts of either spouse other than those falling
under paragraph (7) of this Article, the support of illegitimate
children of either spouse, and liabilities incurred by either
spouse by reason of a crime or a quasi-delict, in case of
absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtorspouse, the payment of which shall be considered as advances
to be deducted from the share of the debtor-spouse upon
liquidation of the community; and
(10) Expenses of litigation between the spouses unless the suit
is found to be groundless.
If the community property is insufficient to cover the foregoing
liabilities, except those falling under paragraph (9), the spouses
shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with their
separate properties.
TABULAR FORM OF ART. 94 (Maam Beths Lecture)

DEBTS &
OBLIGATIONS
TAXES &
EXPENSES
2 incurred by:
- administratorspouse,
- both spouses, or
- by one spouse
with the
consent of the
other
4 including minor or
major repairs upon
community
property
1 of spouse,
3 incurred by one
without the
consent of the
other to the extent
that family may
have been benefited
(E.g. failed business
which was initially
ok)
5 mere
preservation of
separate property
used by the family
6 commence or
complete education
(professional or
vocational) e.g.
language, speech
power, leadership,
law, culinary
- by either spouse
SUPPORT
common children,
legitimate children
- For illegit:
exclusive/ separate
OR ACP advance,
subject to
reimbursement
upon liquidation
Page 56 of 151
7 antenuptial debts
of either spouse
insofar as benefited
the family (no
consent of other
spouse needed)
10 litigation
between spouses,
unless groundless
8 value
donated/promised
to children for
commencement
and completion of
education
- no age limit
9 antenuptial debts,
that do not benefit
family, for support
of illegitimate
children or
crime/quasi-delict
in case of
insufficiency of
separate property,
deductible for his
share upon
liquidation
* Example of ante-nuptial debt in Par 9: amortization of
conjugal dwelling or family vehicle
* Difference between Par 1 and Par 2
* Difference between Par 4 and Par 5
FC, Art 95 Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any
game of chance, betting, sweepstakes, or any other kind of
gambling, whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be
borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the
community but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the
community property.
* To discourage gambling, giving double loss to the gambler

reflection of Catholic virtues
* If the winning ticket in a lottery/sweepstakes given to
spouse by a friend, it is considered a donation under Art 92
(1) and winnings will not form part of ACP unless expressly
provided by donor.

4. Ownership and disposition of the ACP

FC, Art 96 The administration and enjoyment of the
community property shall belong to both spouses jointly. In
case of disagreement, the husbands decision shall prevail,
subject to recourse to the court by the wife for a proper
remedy, which must be availed of within 5 years from the date
of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the common
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition
or encumbrance without authority of the court or the
written consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be
void. However, the transaction shall be construed as a
continuing offer on the part of the consenting spouse
and the third person, and may be perfected as a binding
contract upon the acceptance by the other spouse or
authorization by the court before the offer is withdrawn by
either or both offerors.
* Maam Beth thinks this is wrong because it does

into consideration the expertise of the husband
woman. What if the wife is a BA major while the
does not know a damn thing about economics,
economic decision still prevail?
not take
and the
husband
shall his
* Okay, you say that its not totally unfair because she can
go to Court and assert her views. But is that sufficient
remedy for the wife? Unless you really want to escalate the
fight, resorting to judicial settlement is like raging a war. It
will only turn minor agreements into major brawl. Plus the
cost of lawsuit, it just makes matters worse!
FC, Art 97 Either spouse may dispose by will of his or her
interest in the community property.
FC, Art 98 Neither spouse may donate any community

property without the consent of the other. However, either
spouse may, without the consent of the other, make moderate
donations from the community property for charity or on
occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.
Page 57 of 151
5. Dissolution
FC, Art 99 The ACP terminates
1. death of either spouse (Art 103)
2. legal separation (Art 63 & 64)
3. annulled or declared void (Art 50 to 52)
4. judicial separation of property during the marriage
(Art 134 to 138)
FC, Art 100 The separation in fact between husband and

wife shall not affect the regime of ACP except that:
to live therein, without just cause, shall not have
the right to be supported
2. When the consent of one spouse to any transaction
of the other is required by law, judicial authorization
3. In the absence of sufficient community property, the
separate property of both spouses shall be
solidarily liable for the support of the family. The
spouse-present shall, upon proper petition in a
summary proceeding, be given judicial authority to
administer or encumber any specific separate
property of the other spouse sand use the fruits or
proceeds thereof to satisfy the latters share
FC, Art 101 If a spouse without a just cause abandons the

other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family,
the aggrieved spouse may petition to the court:
1. receivership
2. judicial separation of property
3. authority for sole administration of ACP, subject to
precautionary conditions as the court may impose.
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding
paragraph refer to:
1. marital
2. parental
3. property relations
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or
she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of
returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a
period of 3 months or has failed within the same period to
give any information as to his/her whereabouts shall be prima
facie presumed to have no intention of returning to the
conjugal dwelling.
* Remedies of spouse present in case of abandonment

(Art 101)
1. receivership
2. judicial separation of property
3. authority to be the sole administrator of ACP
* Presumption of abandonment
- Absent from conjugal dwelling for three months
- Failed to inform other of whereabouts for three months

6. Liquidation of assets and liabilities

FC, Art 102 Upon dissolution of the ACP, the following
procedure shall apply:
1. An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all
the properties of the absolute community and the
exclusive properties of each spouse.
2. The debts and obligations of the absolute community
shall be paid out of its assets. In case of insufficiency
of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for
the unpaid balance with their separate properties in
accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph
of Article 94.
3. Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the
spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of
them.
4. The net remainder of the properties of the absolute
community shall constitute its net assets, which shall
be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements, or unless there has been a
voluntary waiver of such share provided in this Code.
For purpose of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and
63, No. (2), the said profits shall be the increase in
value between the market value of the community
property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution.
5. The presumptive legitimes of the common
children shall be delivered upon partition, in
accordance with Article 51.
6. Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the
partition of the properties, the conjugal dwelling and
the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated to
the spouse with whom the majority of the common
children choose to remain. Children below the age of
seven years are deemed to have chosen the
mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In
case there in no such majority, the court shall decide,
taking into consideration the best interests of said
children.
* How to apply the forfeitures in Art 43(2) and Art 63(2)

NET ASSETS what remains after payment of community
debts and obligations
NET PROFITS in Par 4 above, shall be the increase in
value between the market value of the community

property at the time of the celebration of the marriage
and the market value at the time of its dissolution
How to compute net profit:
Market value
debt of community
net assets or remainder
market value at marriage
NET PROFIT
Page 58 of 151
FC, Art 103 Upon the termination of the marriage by

death, the community property shall be liquidated in the same
proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
spouse shall liquidate the community property either
judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the
death of the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six
months period, no liquidation is made, any disposition or
encumbrance involving the community property of the
terminated marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a
mandatory regime of complete separation of property

shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
* Liquidate CP within 1 year from death of spouse. How?

1. judicial settlement in testate or intestate proceedings
2. judicial action, or ordinary action for partition
3. extra-judicial agreement (only if there are no debts)
* 1 year prescription period is not practical. Filipinos have a
tradition of one year of mourning (babang luksa).
* Who may challenge validity? Heirs of the deceased spouse
* If no liquidation, any encumbrance or disposition is void
(you cant sell it, you keep it forever)
* Mandatory for subsequent marriage to be separate
property no logical reason for this according to Tolentino
FC, Art 104 Whenever the liquidation of the community
properties of two or more marriages contracted by the
same person before the effectivity of this Code is carried
out simultaneously, the respective capital, fruits and income of
each community shall be determined upon such proof as
may be considered according to the rules of evidence. In case
of doubt as to which community the existing properties belong,
the same shall be divided between the different communities in
proportion to the capital and duration of each.
* The clause before the effectivity of this Code is there

because simultaneously liquidation of two or more
marriages is no longer legally possible under FC which
imposes a mandatory requirement for marriages
subsequent to an unliquidated marriage to have
complete separation of properties.
ONAS v JAVILLO (1934)
59 Phil 733
Crispulo Javillo married Ramona Levis and they had 5
children. After Ramonas death, he married Rosario
Onas and they had 4 children.
During his first marriage 11 parcels of land were
acquired; while in his 2nd marriage 20 parcels of land
were acquired.
Partition was made on the claim that the properties of
the 2nd marriage were products of the first marriage.
Rosario Onas was opposing the partition that was made
by the administrator of the estate of her husband. She
alleges the following errors:

o
o
All the properties acquired during the second

marriage were acquired with the properties of the
first marriage.
TC erred in approving the partition dated
September 9, 1931, notwithstanding that the same
did not include all properties of the deceased.
ISSUES and RULING:

1) WON the community partnership shall continue to exist
between the surviving spouse and the heirs of the deceased
husband or wife - NO
When the marriage is dissolved, the cause that brought
about the community ceases, for the principles of an
ordinary partnership are not applicable to this
community, which is governed by special rules.
Provisions of law governing the subject should cease to
have any effect for community of property is admissible
and proper in so far as it conforms to unity of life, to
the mutual affection between husband and wife, and
serves as a recompense for the care of preserving and
increasing the property; all of which terminates by the
death of one of the partners.
Community terminates when the marriage is dissolved
or annulled or when during the marriage and
agreement is entered into to divide the conjugal
property. The conjugal partnership exists as long as
the spouses are united.
2) WON the properties of the second marriage can be
claimed as products of the properties of the first marriage NO
Whatever is acquired by the surviving spouse on the
dissolution of the partnership by death or presumption
of death whether the acquisition be made by his or her
lucrative title, it forms a part of his or her own capital,
in which the other consort, or his or her heirs, can claim
no share.
3) WON the partition that was approved by the lower court
is valid - NO
Was based on the erroneous assumption that the
properties of the second marriage were produced by
the properties of the first marriage.
** The property corresponding to the first marriage consists
of the 11 parcels of land. The remaining 20 parcels of land
were acquired during the second marriage.
VDA DE DELIZO v DELIZO (1976)
69 SCRA 216
This is about two cases involving the partition of the
conjugal properties two marriages contracted by
Nicolas Delizo.
He first married Rosa Villasfer which lasted for 18 yrs
(1891-1909) and they had 3 children.
He then married Dorotea de Ocampo which lasted for
46 yrs (1911-1957) and they had 9 children. In 1957
Nicolas died (90 yrs old).
Court originally adjudicated of the land to the 3 children
from the 1st marriage, to the surviving spouse and in
equal shares to the children of both marriages.
Page 59 of 151
This was modified in consideration of the fact that, only the

Caanawan property (67 hectares) was shown to be acquired
during the first marriage and only 20 hectares of which was
made productive during this time. However, it is from the
fruits of this property that enabled the spouses in the 2nd
marriage to acquire all other future property.
1. Caanawan property and on P.Campa
8/39 (1/6 + 1/26) to each of the children from the 1st
marriage;
1/26 to each of the children of the 2nd marriage
2. All other properties acquired during the 2nd marriage
19/195 to each children of the 1st marriage;
2/65 to each children of the 2nd marriage;
28/65 to the surviving spouse
HELD: Since the capital of either marriage or the
contribution of each spouse cannot be determined with
mathematical precision, the total mass of these properties
should be divided between the two conjugal partnerships in
proportion to the duration of each partnership
1.
2.
3.
1st conjugal partnership entitled to 18/64 of the

whole estate (18 yrs)
2nd conjugal partnership entitled to 46/64 of the
whole estate (46 yrs)
The share of Nicolas Delizo is of the net remainder of
CPG of both marriages or 32/64, divided into equal
shares among all his heirs (all 13 of the kids)
Thus the final sharing scheme is

1. Rosas share: 9/64 of the whole estate, to be divided
among their 3 kids (142/1664 each)
2. Doroteas share: 23/64 of the whole estate + her share in
Nicolas estate (662/1664)
3. Nicolas share: 32/64 of the whole estate to be divided
into 13 equal parts (64/1664 each)

D. Conjugal Partnership of Gains

1. General Provisions
FC, Art 105 In case the future spouses agree in the
marriage settlements that the regime of conjugal
partnership gains shall govern their property relations during
marriage, the provisions in this Chapter shall be of
supplementary application.
The provisions of this Chapter shall also apply to conjugal
partnerships of gains already established between spouses
before the effectivity of this Code, without prejudice to
vested rights already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code
or other laws, as provided in Article 256.
FC, Art 106 . Under the regime of conjugal partnership of

gains, the husband and wife place in a common fund the
proceeds, products, fruits and income from their
separate properties and those acquired by either or both
spouses through their efforts or by chance, and, upon
dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the net gains
or benefits obtained by either or both spouses shall be
divided equally between them, unless otherwise agreed in
the marriage settlements.
FC, Art 107 The rules applied in Art 88 and 89 also apply to
CPG.
Art 88 ACP begins at precise moment of celebration of

marriage
Art 89 prohibition on waiver of rights, interest, shares and
effects of ACP during marriage
NATURE OF INTEREST
1. There is no co-ownership, instead partnership
2. Each spouse has mere inchoate rights or
expectancy over partnership property during
marriage
FC, Art 108 The conjugal partnership shall be governed by the
rules on the contract of partnership in all that is not in
conflict with what is expressly determined in this Chapter or by
the spouses in their marriage settlements.
Page 60 of 151
2. Exclusive Property
FC, Art 109 The following shall be exclusive property of each
spouse:
(BY DIRECT ACQUISITION OR ORIGINALLY EXCLUSIVE

PROPERTY)
1.
2.
brought to the marriage as his or her own

acquired during marriage by gratuitous title
(BY SUBSTITUTION)
3.
4.
acquired by right of redemption, by barter or by

exchange with property belonging to only one of the
spouses
purchased with the exclusive money of the wife or
the husband
E.g. of OWNED PRIOR TO THE MARRIAGE

1. property owned before the marriage
2. acquired prior to marriage under defective title
where defect was cured during the marriage
3. those alienated by spouse prior to marriage but
reacquired during due to annulment, rescission or
resolution of the contract, or revocation of
donation, by virtue of which it was alienated
4. property actually delivered to spouse during
marriage where cause or consideration came from
such spouse prior to the marriage
5. property bought by installment prior and fully paid
only during marriage but ownership already vested
on buyer-spouse prior to the marriage; amount
paid by CPG must be reimbursed upon liquidation
E.g. of ACQUISITION BY GRATUITOUS TITLE
1. property acquired during marriage through testate
(heir, devisee or legatee) or intestate succession or
by donation
2. proceeds of insurance where received as
beneficiary of another persons policy
3. gratuity given as bounty or out of pure liberality by
employer for long dedicated service (distinguished
from pension which is conjugal property under Art
117, FC)
4. unearned increment (increase in value due to
ordinary course of time e.g. modernization of a
parcel of land)
5. moral damages awarded for personal injury
sustained
E.g of OTHER SEPARATE PROPERTY
1. collection of credits belonging to one spouse
exclusively
2. money through mortgage, if not used for benefit of
CPG
3. properties in co-ownership

FC, Art 110 The spouses retain the ownership,
possession, administration and enjoyment of their
exclusive properties. strict dominion
Either spouse may, during the marriage, transfer the
administration of his/her exclusive property to the other
by means of a public instrument (notarized) which shall be
recorded in the registry of property of the place where the
property is located.
FC, Art 111 A spouse of age may mortgage, encumber,

alienate, or otherwise dispose of his/her exclusive property,
without the consent of the other spouse, and appear alone
in court to litigate with regard to the same.
FC, Art 112 The alienation of any exclusive property of a
spouse administered by the other automatically
terminates the administration over such property and the
proceeds of the alienation shall be turned over to the ownerspouse.
FC, Art 113 Property donated or left by will to the

spouses, jointly and with designation of determinate shares,
shall pertain to the donee-spouse as his or her own exclusive
property and in the absence of designation, share and share
alike, without prejudice to the right of accretion when proper.
FC, Art 114 If the donation are onerous, the amount of the
charges shall be borne by the exclusive property of the
donee-spouse, whenever they have been advanced by the
CPG.
FC, Art 115 Retirement benefits, pensions, annuities,

gratuities, usufructs and similar benefits shall be governed by
the rules on gratuitous or onerous acquisitions as may be
proper in each case.
LIM v GARCIA (1907)

7 Phil 320
Hilario Lim died in 1903 leaving a widow (defendant)
and 9 children (plaintiffs) and an interest in P50000
estate. The children contend that certain properties
should not be included in the conjugal property
because Lim bought these into the marriage. The
children also allege that the RTC erred in including from
the inventory three parcels of land which Lims widow
claim to be paraphernal property acquired by
exchanging properties exclusively belonging to her.
There is a presumption in Art 1407 CC that all estate of
the married couple will be considered CPG property
unless it is proven that is was part of the separate
estate of husband or wife.
HELD: The three parcels of land were acquired by the
widow through exchanging properties which she inherited
from her father. Thus they are paraphernal. The evidence
presented by the children was not sufficient to overcome
the presumption that the properties included in the conjugal
property belong there. Unless it is proven that the
Page 61 of 151
property is part of the separate estate of one of the

spouses, it will be considered conjugal property.
RODRIGUEZ v DELA CRUZ (1907)
8 Phil 665
Plaintiff Matea Rodriguez is second wife of Hilarion dela
Cruz while defendants are Hilarions children by his first
wife; this is an action to recover parcels of land in
question from defendants.
Matea claims that property given to her by her
deceased father but in prior action by defendants for
partition of Hilarions property, lower court adjudged
lands in question to them on theory that such lands
were acquired during Hilarions first marriage.
HELD: The land belongs to Rodriguez. She is allowed to
retain ownership of the property she brought into the
second marriage (Art 36 CC). She merely had Hilarion
administer her property for her. There is no law that
prohibits this but it cannot be concluded that the
wifes property that he is administering becomes his
simply because he has done so for a long time.
PEOPLES BANK AND TRUST CO v REGISTER OF
DEEDS (1934)
60 Phil 167
Appeal from CFI Manila judgment denying registration of
instrument entitled Agreement and Declaration of Trust in
which Dominga Angeles, married to Manuel Sandoval living
in Palawan, conveyed in trust her paraphernal property,
trustee was to redeem mortgage constituted on such
property with funds derived from the rents or sale thereof,
grant a loan of P10000 with which to redeem mortgage and
collect the rents to be derived from said property while
remained unsold.
ISSUES:
1. WON the rents collected are fruits of the wifes
property which therefore belongs to CPG,
2. WON management belongs to husband
3. WON contract is null and void since husband did
not give consent
HELD: Wife, as owner and administratrix of her paraphernal
property, may appoint trustee to collect the fruits of her
property. The fruits are not yet conjugal property since they
still have to answer to expenses in the administration and
preservation of the paraphernal property. She may likewise
do such without consent of the husband, subject to
recourse by husband or his heirs, thus rendering such
contract merely voidable or void.
PHILIPPINE SUGAR ESTATES v POIZAT (1925)
48 Phil 536
Gabriela Andrea de Costen executed in favor of her
husband, Juan Poizat a general power of attorney
which among other things authorized him in her name,
place and stead, and making use of her rights and
actions to borrow money and execute a mortgage over
he properties now in question.
Defendant secured a loan of P10,000 from plaintiff to
pay a mortgage; however mortgage executed by

husband signed merely in his own name and not as

attorney-in-fact. For failure to pay loan, property
foreclosed and later sold at auction to plaintiff.
Wife opposes confirmation of auction sale on ground
that mortgage was null and void since husband was
unauthorized.
HELD: The husband exceeded the scope of his authority.

Defendant may have had authority to borrow money and
mortgage real property of wife but law specifies how and in
what manner it should be done, which was not duly
complied with in this case. Mortgage in question executed
by him only and not on behalf of wife, thus it is not binding
on his wife.
* One word could have changed everything: for or by
CASTRO v MIAT (2003)
397 SCRA 271
Spouses Moises and Concordia Miat bought a piece of
land in Paco on installment basis on May 17, 1977.
Concordia died the following year.
However, it was only on December 14, 1984 that
Moises was able to pay its balance because he went to
UAE to work. He secured his title over the property in
his name as a widower.
There was also a dispute to the ownership of the two
children (Romeo and Alexander) of the property.
HELD: Since the spouses were married before the effectivity
of the FC, the provisions of CC apply. Records show that the
Paco property was acquired by onerous title during the
marriage out of the common fund, hence it is clearly
conjugal. Art 160 of CC provides that all property of the
marriage is presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership,
unless it be proved that it pertains to the husband or the
wife. The presumption applies even when the manner
in which the property was acquired does not appear.
Page 62 of 151
3. Conjugal Partnership of Gains

a. Presumption that property is conjugal
FC, Art 116 All property acquired during the
marriage whether the acquisition appears to have been
made, contracted or registered in the name of one or
both spouses, is presumed to be conjugal unless
the contrary is proved.
Important points regarding conjugal nature of
properties:
1. presumption applies even if manner in which
property was acquired is not shown
2. the party invoking this presumption must first
prove that the party was acquired during the
marriage
3. proof of acquisition during marriage is a condition
for the operation of this presumption
4. presumption of prevails over ordinary rules of
accession
5. presumption is rebuttable by strong, clear and
convincing evidence
6. presumption is stronger when creditors are
involved
7. the burden of proof is on the party asserting that
the property is exclusively owned by a spouse
In overthrowing the conjugal character
RECITALS IN DEED OF SALE is not sufficient

because to permit such would make a spouse a
sole arbiter of character of property acquired
during marriage
PROPERTY IN NAME OF ONE SPOUSE is likewise

not enough to dispute the conjugality of a property
BUT if there is no date of acquisition, the fact that
the title is named after the spouse makes the
property exclusive
o Thats why you should keep not only the
title but also the deed of sale
PROOFS OF PARAPHERNAL PROPERTY

o possession of some paraphernal funds
under her administration and available for
investment
o sufficiency of such funds for price of
property
o investment of such funds in property in
question
SOURCE OF FUNDS is not material to the

conjugality or exclusivity of property because it is
rather difficult to determine
ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF ONE SPOUSE that the

property in question is conjugal is a strong
evidence against the party making admission or
his/her heirs

JOCSON v CA (1989)
170 SCRA 333
Emilio Jocson Alejandra Poblete Moises Jocson &
Agustina Jocson-Vasquez. Agustina is married to
Ernesto Vasquez. The mother Alejandra died intestate,
and so did the father Emilio in 1972.
June 20, 1973: Moises filed complaint, assailing validity
of 3 documents executed by Emilio (their father) during
his lifetime. He prays that the following be declared null
and void and that the properties involved be partitioned
between him andhis sister:
1. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968 wherein
Emilio sold to Agustina 6 parcels of land in Naic,
Cavite for P10,000.00. Deed included Emilios
manifestation that the lands were sold at a low
price because it was his loving, helpful and
thoughtful daughter who bought the property. He
says his son possesses such qualities too. He
further claims that the sale did not violate any law
and that he did not touch his wifes properties. He
acknowledged receipt of payment.
2. Deed of Sale executed July 27, 1968, selling 2 rice
mills and a camalig in Naic, Cavite to Agustina for
P5,000.00. Emilio acknowledged receipt too.
3. Deed of Extrajudicial Partition and Adjudication
with Sale executed March 9, 1969 wherein Emilio
and Agustina, excluding Moises, extrajudicially
partitioned unsettled estate of Alejandra dividing
such into 3. Emilio sold his share to Agustina.
All documents were executed before a notary public.
Nos. 1 and 2 were registered with the Register of
Deeds. Old certificates were cancelled and new
certificates issued in the name of Agustina.
Moises allegations:
1. #1 is null and void because his fathers consent
was obtained by fraud, deceit, undue pressure,
influence and other illegal machinations. He also
alleges that property was sold for a simulated price
considering that his sister had no work or livelihood
of her own. Also, he claims that the contract is
fictitious, simulated and fabricated.
2. Same allegations re #2 and #3 with additional
allegation that he was deliberately excluded and
they intended to defraud him of his legitimate
share. He also claims that defendants were
employed in their parents business and they must
have used business earnings or simulated
consideration in order to purchase the properties.
3. No real sale between dad and daughter living
under same roof.
4. Dad didnt need money since sold properties were
all income-producitng.
5. #1 and #2 are unliquidated conjugal properties
that Emilio cant validly sell.
6. #3: he only questions sale of dads share to sister
but not extrajudicial partition.
RTC decided in favor of petitioner.
Documents were simulated and fictitious because: 1)
no proof that Agustina did pay for the properties, 2)
prices were grossly inadequate tantamount to lack of
consideration at all, 3) improbability of sale considering
circumstances. Designed to exclude Moises.
Page 63 of 151
RTC further declared #1 and #2 properties as conjugal

by virtue of registration papers which declared: Emilio
Jocson, married to Alejandra Poblete. Ordered
registration of propertiy to two children.
CA reversed. Nos. 1 and 2 barred by prescription
because annulment of contract based on fraud must be
filed 4 years from discovery of such which begins on
the date of the registration with the Register of Deeds.
All documents actually and intended to be binding and
effective against Emilio.
Proof of such: issuance of new titles. Partition with sale
in Number 3 is valid since it was done in accordance
with New CC Art. 996 on intestate succession and
Moises 1/3 share has not been prejudiced.
ISSUES & RULING:

1. WON suit is solely based on fraud and as such is barred
by prescription.
NO. Contract tainted by vitiated consent such as when
consents obtained by fraud is voidable (CC, Art. 1330)
and action for annulment must be filed within 4 years
from time of discovery of fraud (CC Art. 1391 par.4).
Discovery means the time when contract was registered
with Register of Deeds (Gerona v. De Guzman).
If this was the only consideration, then it is barred by
prescription. But he further assailed that sale was
without consideration since amount paid were merely
simulated. Contracts witho cause or consideration
produce no effect whatsoever (CC, Art 1352). A sale
with simulated price is void (CC, Art 1471 and 1409[3])
and action for declaration of its nullity does not
prescribe (CC, Art 1410).
2. WON sales were without consideration.
NO. Since Moises alleges such, it is incumbent upon
him to prove his allegations, especially since documents
show that his dad (vendor) acknowledged receipt of
price and they are notarized. He failed to do so and
thus he was not able to overcome the presumption that
a contract is with consideration (CC Art. 1354). Even his
own witness contradicted his claim that his sister and
her husband had no source of income. Witness Bagnas
said that Agustina and Ernesto were into buy and sell of
palay and rice. Even he himself said that he didnt know
if his sister had other businesses. Agustina testified that
she was into buy and sell even prior to her marriage.
3. WON prices were simulated
NO. No proof of inadequacy of price. In fact, purchase
price was higher than assessed value (#1: P10k vs.
P8920.00, #2 P5k vs. P3,500, and #3 P8k vs.
P24,840.00). Besides difference between market value
and purchase price is understandable considering
fathers filial love for his daughter. Gross inadequacy of
price alone does not affect the contract except perhaps
an indication of defect in consent (CC Art. 1470). No
proof of defective consent.
4. WON sale is improbable.

NO. Improbability of sale is purely speculative. Not

relevant considering that all essential requirements for
contract are clearly present: consent, object and cause.
5. WON properties in #1 and #2 were conjugal properties

of Emilio and his wife.
NO. CC, Art. 160 provides that all property of marriage
is presumed to belong to CP unless proven otherwise.
Condition sine qua non (main thing) would be for party
who invokes this to prove that properties were indeed
acquired during the marriage (Cobb-Perez v Lantin).
Thus, Moises has to present proof that properties
in question were indeed obtained during the
marriage of their parents before he can invoke
the presumption. However, titles used by RTC in
declaring properties as CP (see RTC decision in bold
letters) are insufficient proof. Doesnt say when
properties were obtained. Acquisition of title (actual
owning of land) is different from registration. Possible
that Emilio acquired properties when he was still a
bachelor and only registered such after marriage.
Married to phrase is a mere description of
Emilios civil status at the time of registration
(Litam v Rivera). It should be interpreted as Emilo is
the owner, property registered in his name alone and
that he is married. Consistent with the principle that
registration of property in name of only one spouse
doesnt negate possibility of it being conjugal (Bucoy v
Paulino). Both require sufficient, clear and convincing
proof to rebut the presumption. Moises should have
presented sufficient proof to show that properties were
acquired during the marriage so that he may enjoy the
presumption under Art. 160. Due to lack of proof,
presumption does not exist, thus, properties are
considered exclusive to Emilio.
FRANCISCO v CA (1998)
299 SCRA 188
Case of the sickly man
Teresita (petitioner) is Eusebios (private respondent)
legal second wife. Conchita Evangelista, Araceli F.
Marilla and Antonio Francisco (private respondents) are
children of Eusebio by his first marriage.
Teresitas allegations:
1.
Since their marriage on Feb. 10, 1962, they have
acquired properties in Barangay Balite, Rodriguez,
Rizal, and in Barrio San Isidro, Rodriguez, Rizal
which were administered by Eusebio until he was
invalidated on account of tuberculosis, heart
disease and cancer, which rendered him unfit to
administer them.
2.
Private respondents succeeded in convincing their
father to sign a general power of attorney which
authorized Conchita to administer the house and
lot together with the apartments situated in
Rodriguez, Rizal.
Teresita filed suit for damages and for annulment of
said general power of attorney, thus enjoining its
enforcement and sought to be declared administratrix
of properties in dispute.
RTC ruled in favor of private respondents holding that
Teresita did not show that said properties were
Page 64 of 151
acquired during the second marriage, or that they

pertained exclusively to her. As such, those properties
belong exclusively to Eusebio, and he has the capacity
to administer them. On appeal, CA affirmed this
decision.
Teresita files this petition, claiming that:
1.
CA erred in applying arts 160 and 158, title VI of
new CC as said title has already been repealed by
art. 253, FC
2.
It further erred in not applying art. 124, FC
However, issue in Teresitas reply: WON Art. 116, FC
applies to this case as Art. 253 of the same Code
[which] expressly repeals Arts. 158 and 160 of the Civil
Code" 4
ISSUE: WON properties are not conjugal but capital

properties of Eusebio exclusively.
HELD:
YES. Petition denied. Arts 158 and 160 CC have been
repealed by the FC, specifically by Art 254, FC (not Art
253). Even so, pursuant to Art. 256 in relation to Art
105 (2nd par.), FC, repeal of Art. 158 and 160 does not
operate to prejudice or otherwise affect prior vested
rights. Rights accrued and vested while these articles
were in effect survive their repeal. Issue shall then be
resolved based on provisions of CC.
Art 160 provides that "all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership, unless
it be proved that it pertains exclusively to the husband
or to the wife". However, the party who invokes this
presumption must first show proof of acquisition
during the coverture (marriage). The presumption
refers only to the property acquired during the
marriage and does not operate when there is no
showing as to when property alleged to be conjugal
was acquired. Moreover, presumption in favor of
conjugality is rebuttable with strong, clear and
convincing
evidence
showing
exclusive
ownership of one of the spouses.
In this case, petitioner failed to adduce ample evidence
to show that the properties which she claimed to be
conjugal were acquired during her marriage with
Eusebio.
As regards land in Bgy. Balite, petitioner failed to rebut
Eusebios testimony that he inherited the same from his
parents. She even admitted that Eusebio brought into
their marriage the said land, albeit in the concept of a
possessor only as it was not yet registered in his name.
Whether Eusebio inherited the property before or after
his 2nd marriage is inconsequential as the property
should be regarded as his own exclusively, pursuant to
Art 148, CC.
Acquisitions by lucrative title refer to properties
acquired gratuitously and include those acquired by
either spouse during the marriage by inheritance,
devise, legacy, or donation. Hence, even if it be
assumed that Eusebio's acquisition by succession of the
land took place during his second marriage, the land
would still be his exclusive property because it was
acquired by him, during the marriage, by lucrative
title.

As regards property in Bgy. Balite, petitioner showed

building permits for the house and the apartment, with
her as the applicant although in the name of Eusebio
and the business license for the sari-sari store issued in
her name alone in support of her claim that it was
conjugal property. These, however, do not prove that
the improvements were acquired during the second
marriage. The fact that one is the applicant or licensee
is not determinative of the issue as to whether or not
the property is conjugal or not. They even counter her
claim as her documents all described Eusebio as the
owner of the structures (Art 1431, CC; Rule 129(4),
Revised Rules on Evidence).
Further, she cannot argue that the sari-sari store
constructed on the land of Eusebio has thereby become
conjugal for want of evidence to sustain the proposition
that it was constructed at the expense of their
partnership (Art 158(2), CC). Presumption of
conjugality for lack of absence of evidence on the
source of funding (Art. 160, CC) cannot be invoked
because there is also lack in proof that it was erected
during the alleged second marriage.
Certificate of title upon which petitioner anchors her
claim over the property at San Isidro is inadequate.
The fact that the land was registered in the
name of Eusebio Francisco, married to Teresita
Francisco, is no proof that the property was
acquired during the spouses coverture. Acquisition
of title and registration thereof are two different acts.
Registration merely confirms title already existing and
the phrase married to is merely descriptive of
the civil status of Eusebio.
Lastly, it follows that Eusebio shall remain administrator
of the properties considering that the assets are
exclusively his capital. Even if the properties are
conjugal, petitioner cannot administer them inasmuch
as Eusebio is not so ill as to incapacitate him to
administer property.
Page 65 of 151
b. Properties that compose the CPG

FC, Art 117 The following are CP properties
1. acquired by onerous title during the marriage at the
expense of the common fund, whether the acquisition be
for the partnership or for only one of the spouses
2. labor, industry, work or profession of either or both
3. fruits, natural, industrial, or civil, due or received during
the marriage from the common property AND the net
fruits from the exclusive property
4. share of either spouses in the hidden treasure which the
law awards to the finder or owner of the property where
the treasure is found
5. occupation such as fishing or hunting
6. livestock existing upon the dissolution of the partnership in
excess of the number of each kind brought to the
marriage by either spouse
7. by chance, e.g. winnings from gambling or betting. Losses
shall be borne exclusively by the loser-spouse, though.
ONEROUS TITLE
TEST: origin of the money invested in the purchase,
e.g. if it came from the conjugal fund, the property
acquired is conjugal
SPECIAL RULES ON LIFE INSURANCE:
If the beneficiary is the insured himself or his estate
o If the premiums were paid with the conjugal funds,
the proceeds are conjugal
o If the premiums were paid with separate funds,
proceeds are separate
o If the premiums were paid partly with conjugal
funds, and partly with separate funds, the
proceeds will be partly conjugal and party separate
If the beneficiary is the other spouse
o If one spouse gets insurance, assigned as
beneficiary himself and the other spouse: Proceeds
belong to the other spouse even if the premiums
are paid out of conjugal funds but he/she should
also reimburse half to the conjugal partnership
o If spouses are insured, the surviving spouse gets
the proceed with no obligation to reimburse
(considered reciprocal donations)
o If the insurance comes from a third person,
exclusive property of the beneficiary-spouse
Reconcile this provision with Art 114 which says that
onerous titles are separate property even if CPG funds
were used, subject to reimbursement.
LABOR, INDUSTRY, WORK OR PROFESSION OF
EITHER OR BOTH OF THE SPOUSES
includes all income whether in form of wages, pensions
or retirement pay, honoraria, salaries, commission,
bonuses, back pays, practice of profession, income
from business even if capital comes from the exclusive
properties of one of the spouses
teachers gratuity under special law is not conjugal
because it is remuneratory
FRUITS FROM COMMON AND EXCLUSIVE PROPERTY
Only net income or fruits of exclusive property of the
spouses become conjugal. Expenses for production,
administration and preservation should be taken from

the gross fruits and the owner-spouse is entitled to

retain the gross income until these expenses are paid.
Circumstances under Art 119 FC
SHARE OF SPOUSES IN HIDDEN TREASURE

hidden treasure found by the spouses on the property
of either of them is conjugal
if property where the treasure is found is owned by one
of the spouses and found by a stranger, one-half share
of the owner of the property goes to the conjugal
partnership
if property where treasure is found owned by stranger
and found by one of the spouses, one-half share of
finder is conjugal
FC, Art 119 Whenever an amount or credit payable within
a period of time belong to one of the spouses, the sums which
may be collected during the marriage in partial payments or by
installment on the principal shall be the exclusive property of
the spouse. However, the interests falling due during the
marriage on the principal shall belong to the conjugal
partnership.
* Illustration of Art 119: The wife lent money to another

before her marriage at interest, payable in installment for 10
years. The interests falling due during the marriage are
conjugal, but the installment payments on the principal loan
belong to the wife exclusively.
ZULUETA v PAN-AM (1973)
49 SCRA 1
Spouses Rafael and Carolina Zulueta together with their
daughter were passengers of Pan Am. Mr. Zulueta left
the terminal and went to the beach in search for a
place where he could relieve himself (where it would
not be visible for the people in the plane and in the
terminal). He came to a place abound 400 yards away
from the terminal. He was gone for almost one hour
(but before the plane left) and PanAm was contending
that it could have not taken him that long relieve
himself and that there were eight commodes at the
terminal toilet for men.
Capt. Zentner claims that Mr. Zulueta has been offloaded due to drinking and belligerent attitude but
according to plaintiff (Zulueta) the order to off-load all
Zuluetas, their luggage and overcoats and other effects
hand-carried by them came as a result of the
altercation that happened between Capt. Zentner and
Mr. Zulueta when the latter was not cowed by the
arrogant tone of Capt. Zentner.
After Mr. Zulueta was off-loaded, Capt. Zentner had the
intention of keeping him stranded for a minimum period
of one week at a cost of $13.30 per day.
In an action for damages against PanAm, the Zuluetas
were awarded moral and exemplary damages, as well
as attorney fees. This was based on a breach of
contract of carriage coupled with a quasi-delict.
Pending appeal, the spouses separated and Mrs.
Zulueta entered into a compromise agreement with
PanAm, wherein she settled for P50,000. She filed for
the dismissal of the case which was denied since a wife
Page 66 of 151
cannot bind conjugal partnership without the husbands

consent, except in cases provided by law.
ISSUE: WON the award for damages is part of the conjugal
partnership
HELD: YES. The damages arose from a breach of the
Zuluetas contract of carriage with PanAm from which they
paid their fare with funds presumable belonging to the
conjugal property. The damages therefore, fall under Art
153 CC, the right thereto having been acquired by onerous
title during the marriage. The damages do not fall under Art
148 CC as exclusive property of each spouse.
Further, that which is acquired by right of redemption or by
exchange with other property belong to only one of the
spouses and that which is purchased with exclusive money
of the wife or husband belong exclusively to such wife or
husband, it follows necessarily that what is acquired
with money of the conjugal partnership belongs
thereto or forms part thereof.
MENDOZA v REYES (1983)
124 SCRA 154
Ponciano Reyes is the husband of Julia de Reyes who
executed a deed of sale of 2 parcels of land with their
improvements in favor of (petitioners) spouses
Mendoza. The land in question was bought on
installment basis from JM Tuazon & Co. represented by
G. Araneta.
Since the spouses were always in arrears in the
payment of the said land because of lack of money,
they had to borrow from RFC (Rehabilitation Finance
Corporation). Thus, they loaned money for purposes of
completing the construction of a one-storey building
and paying balance of price of lot.
A corresponding deed of absolute sale, in which Julia
Reyes was named as vendee and her husband signed
under the phrase, with my marital consent, was
executed by Araneta on Nov 1948. From thereon, the
spouses secured another loan for the payment of
balance of lot and additional security, for the
defrayment of the expenses incurred in the repairs, etc.
As a result the transfer certificates of said lots issued by
Registry of Deeds were in the name of Julia Reyes
married to Ponciano Reyes.
The mortgage contracts executed by spouses in favor
of RFC were duly registered as well. Spouses put up a
school and a camarin in the lots. When the school was
transferred someplace else, the camarin was leased to
Mendoza spouses in 1952 for ten years. The contract of
lease was signed by Julia as lessor with marital consent
of Ponciano. Because of failure to pay their obligations
to RFC, spouses asked for extension on their obligation
and was granted such.
On March 1961, while they were separated in fact and
her husband was in Pampanga, Julia sold the lots to the
Mendoza spouses without the knowledge and consent
of Ponciano.
Thus, he filed a case for the annulment of the deed of
sale, stating that the properties were conjugal
properties and that she sold them without his
knowledge or consent.

ISSUES:
1. WON the deed of sale was null and void on grounds
that the property is conjugal property, which means
Julia is prohibited from selling such without consent of
spouse.
2. WON issue of estoppel can be raised against Ponciano.
HELD:
1. YES. Property is conjugal following the presumption
found in Art 160 CC, which states that all property of
the marriage must be presumed to belong to the
CP unless it be proved that it pertains to
exclusive property of spouses. This presumption is
strong as stated in Art 153, CC, which provides that
such presumption must be overcome by one who
contends otherwise. The only character that they could
come up with to rebut the presumption is Julias
testimony, which is contrary to Aranetas records as
well as info on mortgage contracts (which are favorable
to her husband).
Precedent states that it is sufficient to prove that the

property was acquired during the marriage in order
that the same may be deemed conjugal property.
That proof of acquisition of property in dispute during the
marriage suffices to render the statutory presumption
operative.
Thus, the property was acquired by onerous title during the
marriage. The records show that the funds used to buy the
lot and build the improvements came from loans obtained
by the spouses. Art 161 states that all debts and
obligations contracted by the husband and wife for
the benefit of the conjugal partnership are liabilities
of the partnership. Thus, the lands are conjugal
properties of both spouses.
2.
NO. The principle of estoppel rests on rule that
whenever a party has intentionally led the other to believe a
particular thing true to act upon such belief, he cannot, in
any litigation arising from his act, declaration or omission,
falsify it. It can be invoked only between persons
making the misrepresentation and person to whom
such misrepresentation is addressed. There is no
showing that Ponciano led the Mendozas to believe that the
land wasnt conjugal. It cannot be considered to have acted
in good faith because the RFC mortgages were already
registered in Registry of Deeds by the time the contract of
lease was registered. Moreover, they initially demanded
Poncianos consent when they leased the property but
dismissed it upon sale.
VILLANUEVA v TAC (1990)
192 SCRA 21
Spouses Graciano Aranas and Nicolasa Bunsa were
owners in fee simple of Lot 13. Upon their death, their
children, Modesto and Federico Aranas, adjudicated the
land to themselves under a deed of extrajudicial
partition. North portion belonged to Federico, and south
portion, described as Lot 13-C under Torrens title in
Modestos name.
Page 67 of 151
Modestos wife Victoria died in July 1971. Modesto

himself died in April 1973. They had no children.
However, it appeared that Modesto was survived by
two illegitimate children named Dorothea Aranas Ado
and Teodoro Aranas who borrowed P18,000 from
respondent Jesus Bernas.
In the loan, as security, they, as absolute co-owners,
mortgaged to Bernas Lot 13-C. Raymundo Aranas, a
relative was there as witness.
The siblings failed to pay the loan. Bernas then
acquired ownership over the land, cancelled the
siblings title and issued another in his name.
About a month later, witness Raymundo Aranas and his
spouse Consolacion Villanueva filed a complaint with
RTC of Roxas City asking that they be declared coowners of the land and title of Jesus Bernas over Lot
13-C be cancelled on the ground of their alleged
discovery of 2 wills.
Modestos will: bequeathed to his illegitimate children
all his own capital property and all interest in his
conjugal partnership with his wife Victoria .
Victorias will: bequeathed to spouses Aranas and
Villanueva, and to the illegitimate children of her
husband all of her interests, rights and properties, real
and personal, as her net share from conjugal
partnership with husband.
ISSUES:
1. WON Villanueva had right over Lot 13-C
improvements thereon by virtue of Victorias will.
2. WON improvements on said lot was conjugal.
and
HELD:
1. NO, Victoria died 2 yrs ahead of her husband. She
never inherited any part of Lot 13-C which she could
bequeath by will to anybody.
Moreover, even if
Modestos acquisition by succession of Lot 13-C took
place during the marriage, the lot would still be
regarded as his own exclusive, private property
because it was acquired during the marriage by
lucrative title.
2. NO. If improvements on Lot 13-C were conjugal,
Villanueva may have acquired a right over them by
succession. However, proof as regards when the
improvements were made on the exclusive
property and the source of funds used was not
presented. Therefore, the presumption that it belongs
exclusively to the husband stands.

c. Property Purchased by Installment

FC, Art 118 Property bought on installment paid partly
from exclusive funds of either or both spouses and partly
from conjugal funds belongs to the buyer/s if full ownership
was vested before the marriage and to the conjugal
partnership if such ownership was vested during the
marriage. In either case, any amount advanced by the
partnership or by either or both spouses shall be reimbursed
by the owner/s upon liquidation of the partnership.
SIMPLIFIED: FC does not look at the source of funds. In

cases where the property is partly paid by either the CPG or
exclusive property, the time of vesting ownership is
what matters. Though under CC, the basis was who paid
more.
* How do you reconcile this provision with Art 109 (4)
which that which includes anything purchased with the
exclusive money of the wife or the husband in the exclusive
property of the spouse?
CASTILLO v PASCO (1964)
11 SCRA 102
Marcelo Castillo Sr., a widower Macaria Pasco, a
widow who had survived 2 previous husbands.
1932 The Gonzales couple, as co-owners of the litigated
fishpond, executed a deed of sale conveying said
property to spouses Marcelo Castillo and Macaria Pasco
for P6,000 which was payable in 3 installments: P1,000
upon execution of the deed, P1,000 within 1 month
without interest and P3,000 after 1 year with 11%
interest.
1933 Marcelo died and his widow married her 4th
husband, Luis San Juan in June 1934. The petitioners,
children and grandchildren of Marcelo by his previous
marriage, a filed a complaint for partition and
accounting of the fishpond in CFI of Bulacan.
LC declared the fishpond as paraphernal property, since
even before the marriage, Macaria was a woman of
means while Marcelo had a salary of only P80 a month.
CA affirmed the CFI decision.
Installments were paid in the ff manner:
1) paid by Macaria with her exclusive money
2) paid with proceeds from a loan from Dr.
Jacinto, to whom the fishpond was mortgaged
by both spouses
3) paid from a loan secured by a mortgage on 2
parcels of land assessed in the name of
Macaria
ISSUE: WON the 2nd and 3rd installments were paid with
conjugal funds.
HELD:
Under the Spanish CC, the law applicable here, the
property acquired for onerous consideration during the
marriage was deemed conjugal or separate property
depending on the source of the funds employed for
its acquisition, irrespective of in whose name the
property was acquired.
Page 68 of 151
The initial P1000 payment was paid exclusively with

money belonging to Macaria. But the 2 other payments
were paid by conjugal funds. The deeds show that the
loans used to pay both installments were made out to
both spouses as joint borrowers. Loans thus become
obligations of CPG and money loaned is conjugal
property.
While the mortgage is on Macarias paraphernal
property, the mortgage to secure the loan is a purely
accessory obligation that the lenders could waive if they
so chose, without affecting the principal debt which was
owned by the conjugal partnership, and which the
creditors can enforce exclusively against the conjugal
property if they so desired.
Since the fishpond was purchased partly with conjugal
and partly with separate funds, justice requires that the
property be held to belong to both patrimonies in
common, in proportion to the contributions of
each to the total purchase price. An undivided 1/6
is paraphernal and the remaining 5/6 is conjugal.
Payment by the widow of the mortgage debt after
Marcelos death does not result in an increase in her
share in the property but merely creates a lien in her
favor.
Since the fishpond is undivided property of Macaria and
the conjugal partnership with Marcelo, his heirs are
entitled to ask for its partition and liquidation. The
ultimate interest of each party must be resolved after
due hearing, taking into account:
a) Macarias 1/6 direct share
b) Her half of the community property
c) Her successional rights to a part of Marcelos
share pursuant to the governing law of
succession when he died
d) Her right to reimbursement for any amount
advance by her in paying the mortgage debt.
LORENZO v NICOLAS (1952)

91 Phil 686
Magdalena Clemente Manuel Lorenzo
Manuel died in 1929 and Magdalena died five years
later. During their marriage, they had no children.
However, they had children in their previous marriages.
Plaintiffs are Manuels kids from his first marriage, while
the defendants are Magdalenas grandchildren from her
first marriage.
Subject of the petition is 2 parcels of land, the sale of
which (to respondents) the petitioner prays to be
declared null and void since they are part of CPG.
These lots were friar land which Magdalena bought on
an installment basis:
a) Lot 6: she paid P169.16 before her marriage to
Manuel. The P833.32 balance was payable in
installment P25.32 on the 1st year and P42 each
year after.
b) Lot 5: she paid P116.84 before her marriage with
Manuel. The P850.32 balance was payable by
installment of P52.32 on the 1st and P42 on each
succeeding year.
The receipts of the subsequent payment were made in
the name of Magdalena only.
CA found them to be her paraphernal property.

ISSUE: WON Lots 5 and 6 are conjugal property. NO

RATIO: They are her paraphernal property, thus petitioners
are not entitled to the land.
Lot 6 was purchased in her own name and for her own
exclusive benefit before her marriage to Manuel. She paid
the initial installment before the marriage and the balance
was paid during the marriage. All the receipts for the
installments paid, even during Manuels lifetime, were issued
in Magdalenas name and the deed of sale of Lot 6 was
made in her name despite the fact that Manuel was still
alive. The acquisition of Lot 5 was the same as Lot 6.
Under Act No. 1120 of the alienation of Friar Lands, the
certificate is only an agreement to sell and does not vest
ownership of the land.
Since the receipts for the installments paid were issued
in her name and the deed of sale in her name, this shows
that the property belonged to her; ownership had been
vested on the buyer-spouse BEFORE the marriage.
Since the installments paid during the marriage
are deemed conjugal, there being no evidence that they
were paid out of funds belonging exclusively to Magdalena,
such amounts should be reimbursed to the CPG.
Page 69 of 151
* CC has a rule for (1) ordinary improvements made by the

spouses on separate property of each of them, and another
rule if (2) the conjugal partnership constructs a building on
land belonging to either spouse. Land which is separate
property becomes CPG if conjugal funds built anything on it.
ON THE OTHER HAND

* FC provides for a uniform rule for the two circumstances.
A. cost of improvement made by CPG on separate property
+ resulting increase in the value of improved separate
property > value of the principal property at the time of the
improvement
entire property becomes CPG, CPG reimburses
spouse at liquidation
B. cost of improvement + resulting increase in value of the
improved principal property < value of the principal property
at the time of improvement
principal property and improvement belongs to
owner-spouse, subject to reimbursement
CPG accessory
If improvement i.e. the
house, is worth 2 M
* Maam Beth says that this is more correct than Castillo v

Pasco
Exclusive principal
If the land is worth 5 M
d. Rules on Improvement
FC, Art 120 The ownership of improvements, whether for
utility or adornment, made on the separate property of the
spouses at the expense of the partnership or through the
acts or efforts of either or both spouses shall pertain to
the conjugal partnership or to the original owner-spouse,
subject to the following rules:
When the cost of the improvement made by the conjugal
partnership and any resulting increase in value are more
than the value of the property at the time of the improvement,
the entire property of one of the spouses shall belong to
the conjugal partnership, subject to reimbursement of the
value of the property of the owner-spouse at the time of the
improvement; otherwise, said property shall be retained in
ownership by the owner-spouse, likewise subject to
reimbursement of the cost of the improvement.
In either case, the ownership of the entire property shall
be vested upon the reimbursement, which shall be made at
the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership.
CC, Art 158 Improvements, whether for utility or

adornment, made on the separate property of the spouses
through advancements from the partnership or through the
industry of either the husband or the wife, belong to the
conjugal partnership.
Buildings constructed, at the expense of the partnership,
during the marriage on land belonging to one of the spouses,
also pertain to the partnership, but the value of the land
shall be reimbursed to the spouse who owns the same.
Then the estimated value of house

and lot is at 10.5 M
Cost of
improvement
Resulting increase in
value of the
improved principal
property
Value of the
principal property
at the time of the
improvement
10.5 M (2 M + 5 M)
3.5 M
10.5 M
5.5 M
Principal property and improvement
belongs to owner-spouse
10.5 M
2M
* Maam Beths take on this: This is unjust (luge to use her

term), because you only get the value of the property at the
time of improvement. Plus the fact that the reimbursement
happens at the liquidation of the CPG which is roughly 2040 years later, thus because of the delay of payment, the
amount has already devaluated.
* Nevertheless, later reimbursement is pragmatic in this
case because when a person engages in any construction or
improvement in properties, the cash is usually wiped out.
CALIMLIM-CANULLAS v FORTUN (1984)
129 SCRA 675
Petitioner Mercedes Calimlim-Canullas Fernando
Canullas were married on Dec 19, 1962 and had 5 kids.
They lived in a small house on a residential land in
question located at Bacabac, Pangasinan. After

Fernandos dad died in 1965, Fernando inherited the

land.
In 1978, Fernando abandoned his family and was living
with private respondent, Corazon Daguines. During the
pendency of this appeal, they were convicted of
concubinage in a judgment rendered on Oct 21, 1981
by the then CFI of Pangasinan which judgment has
become final.
On April 15, 1980, Fernando sold the property with the
house on it to Daquines, for P2000. In the document of
sale, Fernando described the house as also inherited
by me from my deceased parents.
Unable to take possession of the lot and house,
Daguines initiated a complaint on June 18, 1980 for
quieting of title and damages against Mercedes. The
latter resisted and claimed that the house where she
and her kids lived, including the coconut trees on the
land, were built and planted with conjugal funds and
through her industry; that the sale of the land together
with the house and improvements to Daguines was null
and void because they are conjugal properties and she
had not given her consent to the sale.
ISSUE:
1. WON the construction of a conjugal house on the
exclusive property of the husband ipso facto gave the
land the character of a conjugal property - YES
2. WON the sale of the land together with the house &
improvements
thereon
was
valid under the
circumstances surrounding the transaction.
HELD:
1. Under Art 158 CC, the land and building belong to the
CPG but CPG is indebted to the husband for the value
of the land. The spouse owning the lot becomes a
creditor to the conjugal partnership for the value
of the lot, which value would be reimbursed at the
liquidation of the conjugal partnership. Conversion of
land from exclusive to conjugal property should be
deemed to retroact to the time the conjugal buildings
were first constructed thereon; thus, the land and
house are conjugal property and could not have
been sold to Daguines without Mercedes
consent.
2. The contract of sale is null and void for being contrary
to morals and public policy. Under the law, spouses are
prohibited from selling property to each other, subject
to certain exceptions. This prohibition also applies to
common-law relationships.
e. Charges upon the CPG

FC, Art 121 The conjugal partnership shall be liable for:
1.
2.
3.
support: spouse, common children, legitimate children of

either spouse; support of illegitimate children governed by the
provisions of on Support
all debts and obligations contracted during the marriage
a. by the designate administrator-spouse for the benefit
of the conjugal partnership of gains,
b. by both spouses
c. by one of them with the consent of the other
debts and obligations contracted by either spouse without the
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
Page 70 of 151
consent of the other to the extent that the family may have
been benefited
all taxes, liens, charges and expenses including major or minor
repairs upon the conjugal partnership property
all taxes and expenses for mere preservation made during the
marriage upon the separate property of either spouse
expenses to enable their spouse to commence or complete a
professional , vocational or other activity for self-improvement
ante-nuptial debts of either spouse insofar as they have
redounded to the benefit of the family
value of what is donated or promised by both spouses in favor
of their common legitimate children for the exclusive purpose
of commencing or completing a professional or vocational
course or other activity for self-improvement
expenses of litigation between spouses unless the suit is found
to be groundless
If the conjugal partnership is insufficient to cover the foregoing

liabilities, the spouse shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance
with their separate properties.
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN OBLIGATIONS OF ACP AND CPG

1.
2.
Art 94 (5) and Art 121 (5): In obligation to taxes

and expenses pertaining to preservation of separate
property, ACP provides that it should be used by the
family while CPG does not have such qualification.
The reason behind this is that CPG has interest in the
preservation of separate properties since its fruits
belong to the conjugal funds. On the other hand, a
separate property of the spouses is usually beyond the
reach of ACP hence, the express requirement.
Art 94 (9) does not have a counterpart in Art 121:
Ante-nuptial debts, liabilities and support of illegitimate
children. Spouse can only resort to a financially capable
ACP in case of absence or insufficiency of exclusive
property. CPG instead has Art 123.
FC, Art 122 The payment of personal debts contracted by
the husband or the wife before or during the marriage shall
not be charged to the conjugal partnership except insofar
as they redounded to the benefit of the family.
Neither shall the fines and indemnities imposed upon them
be charged to the partnership.
However, the payment of personal debts contracted by
either spouse before the marriage, that of fines and
indemnities imposed upon them, as well as the support of
illegitimate children of either spouse, may be enforced against
the partnership asset AFTER the responsibilities enumerated in
the preceding Article have been covered, if the spouse who is
bound should have no exclusive property or if it should be
insufficient; but at the time of the liquidation of the
partnership, such spouse shall be charged for what has been
paid for the purposes above-mentioned.
FC, Art 123 Whatever may be lost during the marriage in any
game of change, or in betting, sweepstakes or any other kind
of gambling whether permitted or prohibited by law, shall be
borne by the loser and shall not be charged to the conjugal
partnership but any winnings therefrom shall form part of the
CPG.

JAVIER v OSMEA (1916)

34 Phil 336
Florentino Collantes was married to Petrona Javier who
inherited from her parents 2 parcels of land. To perfect
her ownership, she acquired from her fathers second
wife the usufructuary right on properties for P3,000.
Florentino (husband), who succeeded Petronas father
as a commission merchant in their family business in
Manila, acquired the debt of Petronas father and
became indebted to Tomas Osmea (one of the chief
clients) in sum of P4,000-P5,000.
Unable to pay, judgment was rendered in favor of
debtor Osmena. The sheriff despite the protests of
Petrona sold off the two parcels (separate property of
Petrona) of land at an auction where Osmea was the
successful bidder.
Petrona sought to have the sale annulled and to
recover her property.
The defendant Osmea
contended that even though land was separate
property of Petrona, the usufructuary right belongs to
the CP since it was purchased using CP funds.
Defendant prayed that the revenues from both
properties, being CP, should be made liable for the
debt.
ISSUE: WON debts should be paid out of fruits and revenue
of the parcels of land which belong to wife exclusively.
HELD: Art 141 OCC says the fruits, revenues or interest
collected or accrued during the marriage relation, coming
from the conjugal properties or from that which belongs to
one of the spouses, are community property.
Art 1358 OCC states that the fruits of paraphernal properties
form part of the assets of the conjugal partnership and are
liable for the payment of the expenses of the married
couple.
The conjugal properties shall be liable for all debts and
obligations contracted during the marriage by the husband
for the support of the family. The husbands creditor may
bring his action not, as a general rule, against the
paraphernal properties, but against the fruits and income of
such property of the wife. Since the fruits of exclusive
property belong to the CP.
The debts contracted by the husband during the
marriage, for and in the exercise of an industry or
profession by which he contributes toward the support of
the family are not his personal and private debts and
the products or income from the wifes own property, which,
like those of her husbands are liable for the payment of
the marriage expenses, cannot be excepted from the
payment of such debts.
As to whether the defendants prayer for an appointment of
a receiver is to be granted, Art 1984 says that the wife has
the right to manage her paraphernal property and (Art
1412) says that the husband is the administrator of the CCP.
Thus, appointment of a receiver shall deprive the spouses of
these rights; moreover, there is no need for it.
Page 71 of 151
COBB-PEREZ v LANTIN (1968)

23 SCRA 637
Damaso Perez purchased leather materials from
Ricardo Hermoso for his shoe manufacturing business.
Unable to pay his debt to the latter, a civil case was
filed by Hermoso.
Consequently, the Sheriff of Manila levied upon the
shares of common stock in Republic Bank registered in
the name of Mr. Perez.
Mercedes Ruth Perez claims that said shares are
conjugal assets and that the debt acquired by her
husband was a personal one, not being able to benefit
the CPG.
ISSUES:
1. WON the debt of Mr. Perez is a personal debt NO.
2. WON the CPG is liable for the said obligation YES.
HELD: Fruits of the shoe manufacturing business went to
the support of the family/benefit of the CPG. The
debts incurred by the husband for and in the exercise of
industry (shoe manufacturing, in this case) or profession by
which he contributed to the welfare of the family
cannot be considered as his personal debt. As the CPG
benefited, the said shares are liable. (It was conceded that
the shares are conjugal property even if they are registered
under the name of Mr. Perez, having no evidence as to
when they were acquired.)
DBP v ADIL (1988)
161 SCRA 307
Spouses Patricio Confesor and Jovita Villafuerte
obtained an agricultural loan of P2000 from Agricultural
and Industrial Bank (AIB which is now DBP), which is
evidenced by a promissory note payable in 10 equal
yearly amortizations.
After 10 years, they were still unable to pay the loan.
Thus, Confesor, who was a member of Congress,
issued a second promissory note acknowledging the
loan and promising to pay on or before June 15, 1961.
He further agreed to the foreclosure of the mortgage if
and when he fails to pay. Another stipulation is that if
he secures a certificate of indebtedness from the
government for his back pay, he will be allowed to pay
amount out of it.
The amount remained unpaid on the specified date.
Thus DBP filed a complaint against the spouses on
Sept. 11, 1970. The City Court of Iloilo decided in favor
of DBP and ordered the spouses to pay the debt with
interest.
CFI of Iloilo reversed this decision and dismissed the
complaint against the spouses.
ISSUES:
1. WON the right of prescription may be waived or
renounced - YES
2. WON the second promissory note it binding on the
conjugal partnership - YES
HELD: Yes on both issues. Art 1112, CC right to prescription
may be tacitly renounced resulting from acts which imply
abandonment of such right. The prescription with regard to

the first promissory note had set it. However, the second
promissory note acknowledged the debt and even promised
to pay the same thus, the right to prescription was
effectively and expressly renounced.
In Villaroel v. Estrada the debt barred by prescription
cannot be enforced by the creditor. But a new contract
recognizing and assuming the prescribed debt would be
valid and enforceable.
Prescription only bars the remedy, which is the
payment of the debt, but it does not bar the debt itself.
The new promise made by Confesor constitutes a new
cause of action.
CFI claims the second promissory note is not binding
pursuant to Art 166 NCC: unless wife is spendthrift, serving
civil interdiction or confined in leprosarium, the husband
cannot alienate or encumber real property of the CP without
her consent. Thus, the CFI held that in signing the new
promissory note alone, Confesor cannot thereby bind his
wife. HOWEVER, Art 165 CC states that the husband is the
administrator of CP. Thus, all debts and obligations
which he contracts for the benefit of the CP are
chargeable to the CP. He, Confesor, signed the second
promissory note for the benefit of the CP, thus, CP is liable
for obligation.
LUZON SURETY v DE GARCIA (1969)
30 SCRA 111
Ladislao Chavez (as principal) and petitioner Luzon
Surety Co., Inc. (as surety) executed a surety bond in
favor of PNB to guaranty a crop loan granted to
Ladislao Chavez in the sum of P9,000. Vicente Garcia,
Ladislao Chavez and Ramon B. Lacson, as guarantors,
signed an indemnity agreement wherein they bound
themselves, jointly and severally, to indemnify Luzon
Surety Co., Inc. against any and all damages, losses,
costs, stamps, taxes, penalties, charges and expenses
of whatsoever kind and nature which it may incur.
PNB filed a complaint against Ladislao Chavez and
Luzon Surety to recover the amount of P4,577.95, in
interest, attorneys fees, and costs of the suit.
A third party complaint against Ladislao Chavez, Ramon
Lacson and Vicente Garcia was instituted by Luzon
Surety.
A writ of execution against Vicente Garcia for the
satisfaction of the claim of petitioner in the sum of
P8,839.97. Then a writ of garnishment was issued
levying and garnishing the sugar quedans of the Garcia
spouses, from their sugar plantation registered in their
names.
Garciasfiled a suit for injunction and the TC ruled in
their favor.
ISSUE: WON the CPG, in the absence of any showing of
benefits received, can be held liable on an indemnity
agreement executed by the husband to accommodate a 3rd
party in favor of a surety agreement. -NO
HELD: A CP under Art 161 is liable only for such debts and
obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the
CP. The husband is the administrator of the conjugal
property, however, only obligations incurred by the him that
Page 72 of 151
are chargeable against the conjugal property are

those incurred in the legitimate pursuit of his career,
profession or business with the honest belief that he
is doing right for the benefit of the family. Thus, there
must be the requisite showing then of some advantage
which clearly accrued to the welfare of the spouses. And in
this case there is none. Nor can there be, considering that
the benefit was clearly intended for a third party Ladislao
Chaves. Acting as guarantor or surety for another in an
indemnity agreement is not an act that would benefit the
While the husband, by signing the indemnity agreement
may be said to have added to his reputation or esteem and
to have earned the confidence of the business community,
such benefit even if hypothetically accepted, is too remote
and fanciful to come within the express terms of the
provision. To make a CP respond for a liability that should
appertain to the husband alone is to defeat and frustrate
the avowed objective of the NCC which is to show the
utmost concern for the solidarity and well-being of the
family as a unit.
AYALA INVESTMENT v CHING (1998)
286 SCRA 272
Philippine Blooming Mills obtained a loan of
P50,300,000 from Ayala Investment and Development
Corporation (AIDC).
Alfredo Ching, the Executive VP of PBM signed a surety
to the loan, making himself liable with PBMs
indebtedness to AIDC. Upon PBMs failure to pay the
loan, AIDC filed a case to recover the sum of money
from PBM and Ching.
A writ of execution was issued wherein the properties
of Ching were to be levied and scheduled for auction.
The 3 properties involved were conjugal properties of
Ching and his wife; thus, Ching asked that the auction
sale upon said properties be enjoined because such are
part of the CPG and could not be held liable to answer
for a loan that did not redound to the benefit of his
family.
The auction still took place and AIDC being the only
bidder acquired the properties. As such, Ching
instituted an action in the court to declare the sale null
and void.
RTC and CA ruled in his favor, giving the sale no legal
effect.
ISSUES:
1. WON the CP is liable for a surety agreement entered
into by the husband in favor of his employer. - NO
2. Was act of the husband, in securing the loan, part of
his industry, business or career from which he supports
his family? - NO
HELD:
1. The execution of the surety agreement did not redound
to the benefit of the family since it was a corporate loan
extended and used by PBM. Art 161(1), CC and Art 121
(2), FC are clear in requiring that the loan obtained
should be for the benefit of the partnership or should
redound to the benefit of the CP in order for the CPG to

be held liable. Burden of proof of showing that it does

lies in creditor-party litigant and the AIDC presented no
such proof.
Moreover, actual benefits must redound to CPG and its
not enough that the transaction be one that would
normally produce benefit for the partnership. It must
do so, in fact where such benefits directly result from
the loan; such are what is contemplated by the law.
2.
Signing as a surety is not an exercise of an industry or

profession of Ching. Neither is it an embarking in a
business or an act of administration for the benefit of
the family.
CARLOS v ABELARDO (2002)

280 SCRA 361
Oct 89: Manuel Abelardo and his wife Maria Theresa
Carlos-Abelardo approached the wifes father Honorario
Carlos and requested him to advance $25,000 for the
purchase of house and lot in Paraaque.
Petitioner issued a check in the said full amount to the
seller of the property to enable and assist the spouses
conduct their married life independently and on their
own
July 91: Carlos inquired about the status of the loan.
The spouses acknowledged their obligation but pleaded
that they were not yet ready to settle it. Respondent
expressed violent resistance to petitioners inquiries by
making various threats against the petitioner.
Aug 94: Formal demand was made by Carlos but
spouses failed yet again to comply
Oct 94: Petitioner filed a complaint for collection of the
sum and damages against spouses in Valenzuela RTC
Spouses having been separated in fact for more than a
year prior to filing of complaint, submitted separate
answers.
Wife admitted securing a loan together with husband
but claimed that loan was payable on a staggered
basis. Husband claimed that sum was not a loan but
his share of income on contracts in reviving the
petitioners construction business
RTC ruled in favor of petitioner Carlos
CA reversed decision and dismissed the complain for
insufficiency of evidence
ISSUE:
WON $25,000 or its equivalent PhP625K was in the
nature of a loan. - YES
WON loan is liability of both spouses. - YES
HELD:
1. The petitioner was able to prove it as a loan by a
preponderance of evidence in providing the check he
issued, the acknowledgement of the wife of their
accountability, and the petitioners demand letter sent
and received by respondent.
Husbands claim that it is his rightful share as income,
profit or salary is untenable because there is no
showing that he is a stockholder, an employee or an
agent of the corporation.
2.
Page 73 of 151
The acknowledgement of the loan made by the wife

binds the conjugal partnership since its proceeds
redounded to the benefit of the family because it was
used to purchase the house and lot which became their
conjugal home. Pursuant to Art 121 No. 2 & 3, even
with the alleged lack of consent of respondenthusband, defendant-husband and wife are jointly and
severally liable in the payment of the loan.
CARANDANG v HEIRS OF DE GUZMAN (2006)

508 SCRA 469
Quirino de Guzman and Arcadio and Luisa Carandang
are corporate officers of Mabuhay Broadcasting System
(MBS)
MBS increased its capital stock and was subscribed by
Arcadio and Luisa Carandang
Quirino de Guzman claims that these subscriptions were
paid by him, so he sent a demand letter to Arcadio and
Luisa
Arcadio and Luisa refused to pay claiming that they had
a pre-incorporation agreement where Quirino promised
to pay for stock subscriptions by Arcadio and Luisa
without costs in exchange for Arcadios technical
expertise, etc.
RTC and CA ruled in favor of Quirino and ordered
Arcadio and Luisa Carandang to pay Quirino
ISSUE: WON the purported liability of Arcadio and Luisa
Carandang were joint and solidary
HELD: YES, for marriages governed by CPG, an obligation
entered into by the husband and wife is chargeable
against their conjugal partnership and it is the
partnership, which is primarily bound for its
repayment. When the spouses are sued for the
enforcement if the obligation entered into by them, they are
being impleaded in their capacity as representatives of
the conjugal partnership and not as independent
debtors, such that the concept of joint and solidary liability,
as between them, does not apply. Either of them may be
sued for the whole amount, similar to that of a solidary
liability, although the amount is chargeable against their
conjugal partnership property

f. Administration of the CPG

FC, Art 124 The administration and enjoyment of the
conjugal partnership property shall belong to both
spouses jointly. In case of disagreement, the husbands
decision shall prevail, subject to recourse to the court by the
wife for proper remedy, which must be availed of within five
years from the date of the contract implementing such decision.
In the event that one spouse is incapacitated or otherwise
unable to participate in the administration of the conjugal
properties, the other spouse may assume sole powers of
administration. These powers do not include disposition or
encumbrance without authority of the court or the written
consent of the other spouse. In the absence of such authority
or consent, the disposition or encumbrance shall be void.
However, the transaction shall be construed as a continuing
offer on the part of the consenting spouse and the third person,
and may be perfected as a binding contract upon the
acceptance by the other spouse or authorization by the court
before the offer is withdrawn by either or both offerors.
FC, Art 125 Neither spouses may donate any conjugal

property without the consent of the other. However, either
spouse may without the consent of the other, make
moderate donations from the conjugal partnership property
for charity or on occasions of family rejoicing or family distress.
FELIPE v HEIRS OF MAXIMO ALDON (1983)

120 SCRA 628
Maximo Aldon Gimena Almosara. They bought several
parcels of land which were divided into 3.
Gimena, sold an unregistered 16 ha conjugal land in
San Jacinto, Masbate without the consent of her
husband, Maximo, to Eduardo and Hermogena Felipe.
Maximos heirs filed an action for annulment of the sale
in 1976, claiming they were the rightful owners of the
properties. They claim that they orally mortgaged the
lands to the spouses and an offer to redeem the
mortgage was refused by the Felipes. The Felipes
contend that they purchased the land and it was
delivered to them.
TC declared the Felipes as the lawful owners and the
complaint was dismissed for lack of merit.
CA reversed TC and declared the sale as invalid and
ordered an accounting of the produce of the land since
1951 and payment of the net monetary value of the
profits after deducting P1800.
CA ratio:
1. if transfer was through an oral contract of
mortgage: redemption allowed anytime upon
repayment of P1,800.00
2. if it was done through sale: redemption is improper
3. what really transpired: Deed of Purchase & Sale
executed by Gimena in favor of the Felipe spouses
4. sale was not forged but invalid since deed was
executed without the consent of Maximo since the
lots were conjugal (presumed as such because
were purchased during marriage). This was
properly raised in the pleading considering the fact
that complaint alleges that lands were purchased
from Gimena and Maximo.
Page 74 of 151
Felipes claim: since deed is not a forgery, it

authenticity and due execution is beyond question. This
is a question of fact that SC cannot consider. Theyre
only concerned with questions of law.
ISSUES:
1. WON the sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is valid NO
2. WON Gimena and her children can ask for an
annulment of contract - NO
3. WON petitioners have acquired the land by acquisitive
prescription - NO
4. WON the right of action of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is
barred by the statute of limitations - NO
HELD:
1) WON the sale made by Gimena to the Felipes is valid. NO
Note the following elementary rules:

1. CC, Art 165: husband is administrator of CP
2. CC, Art 166: subject to certain exceptions, husband
cannot alienate or encumber any real property of
the CP without wifes consent
3. CC, Art 172: wife cannot bind CP without
husbands consent except in cases provided by law
Since Gimena sold lands belonging to CP without

husbands consent and such sale is not covered by
instances except in cases provided by law, the sale is
defective. Not invalid, as held by the CA, because that
term is imprecise when used in relation to contracts
because the CC uses specific names in designating
defective contracts. It can either be:
1. rescissible (art. 1380) when all essential
elements are untainted (Gimenas consent was
tainted)
2. voidable (art. 1390)
3. unenforceable (art. 1403)
4. void/inexistent (art. 1409)
Deed of sale is a voidable contract. Under A1390

CC, among the voidable contracts are those where
one of the parties is incapable of giving consent to the
contract. Gimena had no capacity to give consent
to the contract of sale since the consent of both
spouses is needed.
This is further supported by CC, Art 173, which provides

that contracts entered by husband without wifes
consent when such is required, are annullable at her
instance during marriage and within 10 yrs from
questioned transaction.
The contract is not rescissible for in such a contract all

the essential elements are untainted but Gimenas
consent was tainted. Neither can the contract be
classified as unenforceable, since it does not fit any of
those described in Art 1403 CC. Finally, it cannot be
void or inexistent because it is not one of those in Art
1409 CC. Thus, it must be a voidable contract.
2. WON Gimena and her children can ask for annulment of
contract - NO
GIMENA - Its only subject to annulment of husband

during marriage because he was the victim who had
interest in contract, whereas Gimena was partly

responsible for defect. Gimena is barred from doing this

during and even after the marriage.
CHILDREN While marriage was still subsisting,
they could NOT seek for its annulment since their right
to the lands was merely inchoate or expectant. But
upon death of Maximo, they acquired the right to
question the defective contract in so far as it deprived
them of their hereditary rights in their dads share in
lands. Maximos share is and they are entitled to 2/3
of such; remaining 1/3 belongs to Gimena.
3. WON petitioners have acquired land by acquisitive

prescription - NO
They bought lands in bad faith proven by ff instances:
a. Vicente, son of the Felipe spouses, attempted to have
Gimena sign a ready-made document purporting to sell
the disputed lands to the Felipes in Dec. 1970. They
knew land did not belong to them.
b. Said document was for purpose of obtaining Gimenas
consent to the construction of irrigation pumps on the
lands. If they were the owners, why did they have to
get her consent?
c. Improvements were only being made in 1970 when
sale was in 1951.
d. Declaration of prop made only in 1974.
e. No attempt to obtain Maximos signature despite fact
that Gimena and Hermogena were close relatives.
Given that they did possess the lands, possession in bad
faith is covered by extraordinary prescription which lapses in
30 yrs. Sale was in 1951 and case filed in 1976, 30 yrs had
not yet lapsed.
4. WON the right of action of Sofia and Salvador Aldon is
barred by the statute of limitations - NO
Their right of action accrued from death of father in 1959
and they are given 30 yrs to institute it (CC Art. 1141).
Action filed in 1976, thus still within allowed time.
* CONTRACT WITHOUT CONSENT: merely voidable under
CC, but under FC it is void (Art 125 FC)
TINITIGAN v TINITIGAN (1980)
100 SCRA 619
Severino Tinitigan Sr, on Sept. 17, 1975 filed a motion
in a pending case seeking judicial approval of the sale
of a 2-storey residential house and lot which are
conjugal properties located at Pasay City.
Tinitigan contends that the proposed sale of the
property for P300,000 to Quintin Lim, was necessary to
pay outstanding conjugal obligations that were overdue
in the amount of P256,137.79 and to forestall the
foreclosure of mortgaged conjugal properties.
CFI issued an order granting Tinitigan authority to sell
the house and lot in Pasay City, in favor of Quintin Lim,
if he is a Filipino citizen, for P300,000.
CA upheld orders of respondent Judge that approves
the sale of the conjugal property.
ISSUE: WON the order to sell the conjugal property
rendered by Judge Navarro is valid.
Page 75 of 151
HELD: Petitioners Teofista Tinitigan, et al, argue that the

order authorizing Severino to sell the property is void,
because he had no authority to sell it, they being under the
administration of his wife Teofista. This has no legal basis.
Art 165 CC states: the husband is the administrator of the
CP, which is the general rule. Though Art 1658 states that
the wife may be express authority of the husband
embodied in a public instrument, administer the conjugal
partnership property. Other provisions in the Code also
speak of administration by the wife pursuant to a judicial
decree. However, such provisions are not applicable in this
case.
The judicial decree on Oct 29, 1975, appointing Teofista as
administratrix of the CP cannot be treated as an exception
because it was issued only after the CFI of Rizal granted
Severino the authority to sell the property. Besides, her
appointment was not absolute since it was subject to certain
conditions that were agreed upon.
Thus, the conclusion is that Severino did not cease being
the administrator of their conjugal properties at the time the
motion for judicial approval of the sale was granted. Being
the administrator, however, does not give him the outright
authority to alienate or encumber assets. This would require
the express or implied consent of Teofista subject to certain
exceptions. Art 166 NCC states that unless the wife has
been declared incapacitated, the husband cannot alienate or
encumber any property of the CP without her consent
wherein the court may compel her to grant it if she
unreasonably refuses to give consent. This is why Severino
sought judicial approval.
The sale was necessary to answer for a big, conjugal liability
which might endanger the familys economic standing. The
case at hand actually is one wherein the wifes consent is
not required and impliedly, no judicial intervention is
necessary.
According to Art 171 NCC, the husband may dispose of the
CP for the purposes specified in Art 161 and 162. In
general, these articles deal with the obligations of the CP.
Art 161, Par 1 provides that the CP shall be liable for all
debts and obligations contracted by the husband for
the benefit of the CP, and those contracted by the
wife, also for the same purpose, in the case where
she may legally bind the partnership.
GUIANG v CA (1998)
291 SCRA 372
Gilda Corpuz left for Manila to find a job as an Overseas
Filipino Worker in June 1989 but she fell victim to illegal
recruiters and had to stay in Manila. A year later she
successfully found a job in the Middle East. Her
husband Judie Corpuz since then rarely went home and
stayed most of the time at his workplace.
After hearing about her fathers plan to sell the
remaining half of the lot, daughter Harriet wrote to
inform her mother. Gilda expressed her disapproval but
Judie pushed through with the sale to the Guiangs.

When she returned, Gilda gathered her children who

were staying in different households and stayed in their
house in Negros. She also discovered that her now exhusband had another wife. Guiangs charged Gilda of
trespassing for staying in their house wherefore the
Corpuzes later agreed to leave the house in an
amicable settlement.
Gilda then instituted against seeking to annul the sale
of land between Judie Corpuz and the Guiang couple.
RTC ruled in Gildas favor, declaring the sale null and
void; the CA upheld this decision. Hence this appeal.
ISSUE:
1. Whether Judies execution of Deed of Transfer of Right
for the Guiangs was void or merely voidable
2. WON Gilda ratified the said contract when she entered
into the amicable settlement with the Guiangs.
HELD:
1. The deed was void. The property was acquired during
the marriage of Judie and Gilda Corpuz. When Judie
offered to sell the remaining half, Gildas consent was
totally lacking, contrary to the claim of the Guiangs
invoking Art 1390(2) CC that it was only vitiated hence
merely voidable. The case at bar falls under Art 124,
FC which states xxx the absence of such
authority or consent, the disposition or
encumbrance shall be void.
2. No, void contracts cannot be ratified. The entry into
amicable settlement would not have any effect in the
contract since it was void.
**FC applied in this case since the sale was done in 1990
RELUCIO v LOPEZ (2002)
373 SCRA 578
Imelda Relucio, the mistress of Alberto Lopez, assails
the appointment of Albertos legitimate wifes (Angelina
Mejia Lopez) as the sole administratix of conjugal
partnership of properties, forfeiture, etc.
Alberto allegedly abandoned Angela and their four
children and had maintained illicit relationship with the
petitioner, Relucio. In the course of their cohabitation,
they have amassed a fortune consisting mainly of
stockholdings
in
Lopez-owned
or
controlled
corporations, residential, agricultural, commercial lots,
houses, apartments and properties through the actual
contribution of money, property, industry of Alberto and
Relucio
Angela, the wife and the four children did not benefit
from the said properties
Alberto has also sold, disposed of, transferred assigned,
cancelled, removed, stashed away and alienated their
conjugal properties from Angela, hence the petition to
become the administratix of the said partnership
Angela prays that Alberto do the following:
o Account their conjugal partnership property
o Give support to respondent and her children
o Turn over his share in the co-ownership with
petitioner (Relucio)
o Dissolve his conjugal partnership or absolute
community property with respondent
Page 76 of 151
ISSUE: WON the petitioner has cause of action (affected in

anyway) by the respondents petition for appointment as
sole administratix of conjugal properties?
HELD: NO! The petitioner (Albertos mistress) is not an
indispensable party nor a real party-in-interest because
Alberto can fulfill the relief sought by Angela even without
the participation of Relucio. The cause of action arises
only between the husband and the wife who have
right-duty obligation between each other. The
mistress is a complete stranger to them. Any judgment
would be valid and enforceable against Alberto. The
administration of the property of marriage is entirely
between the spouses to the exclusion of other persons.
Or simply put: No need for Relucio to intervene, she has
nothing to do with the affairs of the spouse.
JADER-MANALO v CAMAISA (2002)
374 SCRA 498
Petitioner
Thelma
Jader-Manalo
came
across
respondent spouses ad in Bulletin Today selling their
10-door apartment in Makati and another property in
Taytay, Rizal.
Interested in both properties, petitioner negotiated for
its purchase through the spouses real estate broker,
Mr. Proceso Ereno.
After a visual inspection of the lots, petitioner met with
both the spouses and made a definite offer to buy the
properties.
After negotiation, Edilberto (only) and petitioner agreed
upon the purchase price of P1.5M for Taytay property
and P2.1M for Makati property.
Agreement was handwritten by petitioner and signed by
Edilberto. Purchase was on installment basis and down
payment through checks was made by petitioner.
The following day, Norma, the spouses and the real
estate broker met to incorporate notations and revise
contracts to sell.
At yet another meeting, petitioner was surprised to
learn that spouses were backing out of the agreement
because they needed spot cash for the purchase
price. Norma Camaisa refused to sign contract to sell.
ISSUES:
1. WON sale of real properties of the spouses have
already been perfected. - NO
2. WON the husband may validly dispose of a conjugal
property without his wifes written consent. - NO
3. WON Court may intervene to authorize the transaction.
- NO
HELD: According to Art 124 FC, the law requires that the
disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as
administrator in appropriate cases requires the written
consent of the wife. Otherwise, the disposition is void.
Even though Norma was aware of, even caused the
advertisement in the newspaper, and participated in the
negotiations for the sale, mere awareness of a
transaction is not consent and her written consent to
the sale is required by law for its validity.

Art 124, FC also states that court authorization is only

resorted to in cases where the spouse who does not
give consent is incapacitated. Petitioner failed to allege
and prove that respondent Norma was incapacitated to give
her consent to the contracts. In the absence of such, court
authorization cannot be sought.
g. Dissolution of the CPG

FC, Art 126 The conjugal partnership terminates:
1. upon the death of either souse
2. when there is a decree of legal separation
3. when the marriage is annulled or declared void
4. in case of judicial separation of property during the
marriage under Art 134 to 138
shall not affect the regime of CPG except that:
1. spouse who leaves the conjugal home or refuses to
live therein, without just cause, shall not have the
2. consent of one spouse to any transaction of the other
is required by law, judicial authorization shall be
obtained in a summary proceeding
3. absence or insufficient community property, the
separate property shall be solidarily liable for
the support of the family. The spouse present shall,
upon proper petition in a summary proceeding, be
given judicial authority to administer or encumber
any specific separate property of the other spouse
sand use the fruits or proceeds thereof to satisfy the
latters share
FC, Art 128 If a spouse without a just cause abandons the

other or fails to comply with his or her obligations to the family,
the aggrieved spouse may petition
1. for receivership
2. for judicial separation of property
3. for authority for sole administration of ACP
The obligations to the family mentioned in the preceding
paragraph:
1. marital
2. parental
3. property relations.
A spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he or
she has left the conjugal dwelling without any intention of
returning. The spouse who has left the conjugal dwelling for a
period of 3 months or has failed within the same period to give
any information as to his/her whereabouts shall be prima facie
presumed to have no intention of returning to the conjugal
dwelling.
Page 77 of 151
h. Liquidation of Assets and Liabilities

FC, Art 129 Upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
regime, the following procedure shall apply:
1. An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all
the properties of the conjugal partnership and the
exclusive properties of each spouse.
2. Amounts advanced by the conjugal partnership in
payment of personal debts and obligations of either
spouse shall be credited to the conjugal
partnership as an asset thereof.
3. Each spouse shall be reimbursed for the use of his
or her exclusive funds in the acquisition of property
or for the value of his or her exclusive property, the
ownership of which has been vested by law in the
4. The debts and obligations of the conjugal
partnership shall be paid out of the conjugal assets.
In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall
be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with
their separate properties, in accordance with the
provisions of paragraph (2) of Article 121.
5. Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the
spouses shall thereafter be delivered to each of them.
6. Unless the owner had been indemnified from whatever
source, the loss or deterioration of movables used for
the benefit of the family, belonging to either spouse,
even due to fortuitous event, shall be paid to said
spouse from the conjugal funds, if any.
7. The net remainder of the conjugal partnership
properties shall constitute the profits, which shall be
divided equally between husband and wife, unless a
different proportion or division was agreed upon in the
marriage settlements or unless there has been a
voluntary waiver or forfeiture of such share as provided
in this Code.
8. The presumptive legitimes of the common children
shall be delivered upon the partition in accordance with
Article 51.
9. In the partition of the properties, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall,
unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, be
adjudicated to the spouse with whom the majority
of the common children choose to remain.
Children below the age of seven years are deemed to
have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided
otherwise. In case there is no such majority, the court
shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests
of said children.
When is inventory not necessary? (Tolentino, p. 472)

1. when one of the spouses, or his heirs, should
renounce the benefits of partnership
2. when separation of property has preceded the
dissolution of the marriage
3. when partnership is dissolved by death of one of
the spouses and the deceased leaves no heir
except the surviving spouse
4. when dissolution is caused by legal separation, and
the share of the guilty spouse is forfeited to the
innocent spouse, there being no children
* Par 2 and 3 are called mutual restitution which
cannot be found in the dissolution of ACP (Art 102)

* Dissolution of CPG has 9 steps, while ACP only has 6, and

its all because of the mutual restitution part.
FC, Art 130 Upon the termination of the marriage by
death, the conjugal partnership property shall be liquidated in
the same proceeding for the settlement of the estate of the
deceased.
If no judicial settlement proceeding is instituted, the surviving
spouse shall liquidate the conjugal partnership property either
judicially or extra-judicially within six months from the death of
the deceased spouse. If upon the lapse of the six-month period
no liquidation is made, any disposition or encumbrance
involving the conjugal partnership property of the terminated
marriage shall be void.
Should the surviving spouse contract a subsequent marriage
without compliance with the foregoing requirements, a
mandatory regime of complete separation of property
shall govern the property relations of the subsequent marriage.
FC, Art 131 Whenever the liquidation of the conjugal

partnership properties of two or more marriages
contracted by the same person before the effectivity of this
Code is carried out simultaneously, the respective capital,
fruits and income of each partnership shall be determined upon
such proof as may be considered according to the rules of
evidence. In case of doubt as to which partnership the existing
properties belong, the same shall be divided between the
different partnerships in proportion to the capital and
duration of each.
FC, Art 132 The Rules of Court on the administration of

estates of deceased persons shall be observed in the appraisal
and sale of property of the conjugal partnership, and other
matters which are not expressly determined in this Chapter.
FC, Art 133 From the common mass of property support

shall be given to the surviving spouse and to the children
during the liquidation of the inventoried property and
until what belongs to them is delivered; but from this shall
be deducted that amount received for support which exceeds
the fruits or rents pertaining to them.
SANTERO v CFI OF CAVITE (1987)

153 SCRA 728
Petitioners Princesita Santero-Morales, Federico Santero
and Willy Santero are the children begotten by the late
Pablo Santero with Felixberta Pacursa while private
respondents Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina and Miguel all
surnamed Santero are four of the seven children
begotten by the same Pablo Santero with Anselma
Diaz.
Both sets of children are the natural children of the late
Pablo Santero since neither of their mothers, was
married to their father Pablo.
Even before the Court could act on the instant petition,
private respondents filed another Motion for Allowance
dated March 25, 1985 with the respondent court to
include Juanita, Estelita and Pedrito all surnamed
Santero as children of the late Pablo Santero with
Anselma Diaz praying that an order be granted
Page 78 of 151
directing the administrator Reynaldo C. Evaristo to

deliver the sum of P6,000 to each of the seven children
of Anselma Diaz as their allowance from the estate of
Pablo Santero.
ISSUE: WON the natural children Victor, Rodrigo, Anselmina
and Miguel should be granted an allowance out of the hands
of the property administrator of Pablo Santero?
HELD: YES. The fact that private respondents are of age,
gainfully employed, or married is of no moment and
should not be regarded as the determining factor of
their right to allowance under Article 188.
While the Rules of Court limit allowances to the widow
and minor or incapacitated children of the deceased,
the New Civil Code gives support to the surviving
spouse and his/her children without distinction.
Hence, the private respondents Victor, Rodrigo,
Anselmina and Miguel all surnamed Santero are entitled
to allowances as advances from their shares in the
inheritance from their father Pablo Santero.
Since the provision of the Civil Code, a substantive
law, gives the surviving spouse and to the children the
right to receive support during the liquidation of the
estate of deceased, such right cannot be impaired by
Rule 83, Sec. 3 of the Rules of Court which is a
procedural rule.
Be it noted however that with respect to spouse, the
same must be the legitimate spouse (not commonlaw spouses who are mothers of the children here).
E. Separation of Property and

Administration of Common Property
by One Spouse
1. Judicial separation of property for
sufficient cause
FC, Art 134 In the absence of an express declaration in
the marriage settlements, the separation of property between
spouses during the marriage shall not take place except by
judicial order. Such judicial separation of property may either
be voluntary or for sufficient cause.
COMPLETE SEPARATION OF PROPERTY may be had thru:

1. conventional in the marriage settlement
2. judicial decree
a. voluntary (Art 136)
b. sufficient cause (Art 135)
3. compulsory by operation of law (Art 103 and Art
130) when there is no liquidation of property
regime of first marriage

FC, Art 135 Any of the following shall be considered
sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:
(BY PRESENTATION OF FINAL JUDGMENT)

1.
2.
3.
civil interdiction
judicially declared an absentee
loss of parental authority by court decree (Art 228
and 229)
(PROOF OF CAUSE IS NEEDED)

4.
5.
6.
abandonment or failure to comply with family and

marital obligations
abuse of power of administration granted in the
marriage settlement
de facto separation for at least one year and
reconciliation is highly improbable
In the cases provided for in Number 1, 2 and 3, the

presentation of the final judgment against the guilty or
absent spouse shall be enough basis to grant of the decree of
judicial separation of property.
GARCIA v MANZANO (1958)

103 Phil 798
Gonzalo Garcia filed an action against his wife,
Consolacion Manzano, for the declaration of the
separation of their conjugal partnership property on the
ground that they have been living separately since 1948
and that all attempts at reconciliation between them
have failed.
As a result of their joint efforts, they accumulated real
and personal properties. That since their separation,
Consolacion assumed complete management and
administration of the CP.
He alleges mismanagement of the CPG since she was
exclusively enjoying the fruits of it, she refused to turn
over to Gonzalo his rightful share or allow him
participation in the partnership, she conducted fictitious
transfers and alienation of property to third persons
and that she neglected to file income tax returns.
TC dismissed complaint for failure to state a cause of
action upon motion of Consolacion
ISSUE: WON Garcia is entitled to a judicial declaration of
separation of properties. - NO
HELD: His complaint did not establish a case for separation
of properties. Consistent with its policy of discouraging a
regime of complete separation as not harmonious with the
unity of the family and the mutual affection and help
expected of the spouses, the OCC and NCC require that
separation of properties shall not prevail unless expressly
stipulated in marriage settlements before the union is
solemnized or by formal judicial decree during the existence
of the marriage; and in the latter case, it may only be
ordered by the court for the causes specified in Art 191, CC.
In the system established by the NCC, the wife does not
administer the conjugal property unless with the consent of
the husband, or by decree of the court and under its
supervision with such limitations as the court may deem
advisable. In the event of such maladministration by the
wife, the remedy of the husband does not lie in a judicial
Page 79 of 151
separation of properties but in revoking the power

granted to the wife and resuming the administration
of the communal property and the conduct of the
affairs of the CP.
He may enforce his right of possession and control of the
conjugal property against his wife, and seek such ancillary
remedies as may be required by the circumstances, even to
the extent of annulling or rescinding any unauthorized
alienations or encumbrances, upon proper action filed for
that purpose. For this reason, Art 167, 172 and 178 CC
contemplate exclusively the remedies available to the wife
against the abuses of her husband because normally, only
the latter can commit such abuses. Therefore, he cannot
claim that he should be entitled to the same remedies.
PARTOSA-JO v CA (1992)
216 SCRA 692
Jose Jo cohabitated with three women and he fathered
15 children. The petitioner in this case claims to be his
legal wife (Prima) with whom he had a daughter named
Monina Jo.
Prima claims that when she left Dumaguete City it was
their agreement that she was temporarily live with her
parents during the initial period of her pregnancy and
for Jose to visit and support her.
In 1980 Prima filed an action for judicial separation of
conjugal property and this was consolidated with her
earlier petition for support.
In the disposition of the trial court it was held that
Prima was legally married to Jose Jo and therefore
entitled to support as the lawfully wedded wife and
Jose Jo was ordered to give a monthly support of P
500. There was no definite disposition as to the judicial
separation of conjugal property.
CA upheld the TC decision but complaint for the judicial
separation of conjugal properties was dismissed for lack
of cause of action on the ground that separation by
agreement was not covered by Art 178, CC.
However, the penultimate paragraph of the decision
provides: It is, therefore, hereby ordered that all
properties in question are considered properties of Jose
Jo, the defendant in this case, subject to separation of
property under Art 178, Par 3 CC, which is subject of
separate proceedings as enunciated herein.
ISSUES:
1. WON a final judgment rendered by the LC may be
modified if the dispositive portion did not contain the
decision extensively discussed in the body of the
decision. - YES
2. WON the separation of the parties was due to their
agreement. - NO
3. WON Prima is entitled to judicial separation of property.
- YES
HELD:
1. The dispositive portion of the decision was incomplete
insofar as it carried no ruling on the complaint for
judicial separation of conjugal property although it was
extensively discussed in the body of the decision.

- The penultimate paragraph of the decision of the trial

court ruling should have been embodied in the dispositive
portion. It was based upon the findings that Prima and Jose
were legally married and the properties mentioned were
acquired during the marriage although they were registered
in the name of a dummy.
2.
The CA ruling that an agreement to live separately

without just cause was void under Art 221 of the CC
and could not sustain any claim of abandonment by the
aggrieved spouse. Thus, the only remedy available was
that of legal separation.
- However, the separation was due to abandonment.

They merely agreed that she would live with her parents
while she was pregnant, and when she returned, he refused
to accept her. This clearly demonstrates that he had no
intention of resuming their conjugal relationship;
moreover, from 1968-1988 when the court finally decided to
award support, Jose never gave financial support.
3.
On the grounds of abandonment and also failure

without just cause to comply with his obligations as
husband and father; apart from refusing to admit Prima
his lawful wife, to their conjugal home, she is entitled
to a judicial separation of property. Court held that,
abandonment is the departure by one spouse with the
avowed intent never to return, followed by a prolonged
absence without just cause, and without in the
meantime providing in the least for ones family
although able to do so. And the FC states that the
aggrieved spouse may petition for judicial
separation when there is:
Abandonment by a spouse of the other
without just cause
Failure of one spouse to comply with his or her
obligations to the family without just cause,
even if said spouse does not leave the other
spouse.
The physical separation of the parties coupled with the
refusal by Jose to give support sufficed to constitute
abandonment as a ground for the judicial separation of
their conjugal property.
FC allows judicial separation of property when the
spouses have been separated in fact for at least one
year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
Since the LC found that Jose is the real owner of the
properties, these must be divided between them on the
assumption that they were acquired during their
marriage.
DELA CRUZ v DELA CRUZ (1968)

22 SCRA 333 - SUPRA
Estrella Severino dela Cruz and blessed with six
children. They acquired seven parcels of land at
Bacolod Cadastre and three parcels at Silay Cadastre.
These are all registered in their names. They are also
engaged in various business ventures.
She filed a complaint praying for the separation of
property, monthly support and payment of attorney
fees and costs.
Page 80 of 151
In 1949, she claims that she already suspected that

Severino was sleeping around which was only
confirmed by a note she found in his shirt in 1951. She
confronted him about it and he promised her to forsake
his mistress which he failed to do
Since 1955, he never slept in conjugal dwelling, but
only paid short visits. She contends that he abandoned
her and their children to live in Manila with his mistress,
Nenita Hernandez. And that after 1955 until the time of
the trial, he had never visited the conjugal abode and
when he was in Bacolod, she was denied
communication with him.
RTC ordered separation and division of the conjugal
assets (valued at P500,000), directing the Severino to
pay to Estrella P20,000 as attorneys fees, with legal
interest form date of original complaint until fully paid
plus costs.
ISSUES:
1. WON separation of husband from his wife constitutes
abandonment in law that would justify the separation of
conjugal partnership property - NO
2. WON the husbands failure and/or refusal to inform his
wife of the state of their business is an abuse of his
powers of administration of the CP as to warrant a
division of matrimonial assets - NO
HELD:
1) There was only mere physical separation and not
real abandonment. Abandonment contemplated by the
law must be of physical estrangement, moral and
FINANCIAL desertion. Based on how abandonment was
used in Art 178, in order for desertion of one spouse to
constitute abandonment, there must be absolute
cessation of marital relations and duties and rights
with intention of perpetual separation. To abandon is
to forsake entirely. Emphasis is on its finality, hence it
means giving up absolutely and with intent never again to
resume or claim ones rights or interests.
- Here, Severino did not seem to have the intention to leave
his family permanently since he continued to give support
despite his absence which thus negates any intent not to
return and resume his marital duties and rights.
- Since separation in fact between spouses does not affect
the CP except if the husband abandons his wife without just
cause, (Art 178, CC) claims of the Estrella of concubinage
on part of Severino must be regarded as efforts at
bolstering her claim of abandonment which shall justify,
under the law, a judicial separation of conjugal assets.
There is no strong corroborated evidence that demonstrates
the existence of illicit relations between Nenita and
Severino. Neither has he been mismanaging funds since he
actually increased the value of their assets by over a million
pesos.
2) For abuse to exist, it is not enough that the husband
perform acts prejudicial to his wife or commit acts
injurious to the partnership. There must be an act
willfully performed and with utter disregard of the
partnership by the husband that would be prejudicial to the
wife, evidenced by the repetition of deliberate acts and/or
omissions. It is not condoning the husbands separation

from his wife. Instead, is that there is an insufficiency or

absence of cause of action. Remedies of Art 167 and 178
are aimed at protecting the CP. And they must exercise
restraint since they are trying to preserve union of spouses;
a judgment ordering a separation of assets where theres no
real abandonment may eradicate the possibility of
reconciliation. Alimony increased from P2000 to P3000.
Attorneys fees must also be borne by defendant since he
left the conjugal abode and has given cause for plaintiff to
seek redress in courts.
2. Voluntary separation of property

FC, Art 136 The spouses may jointly file a verified petition
with the court for the voluntary dissolution of the ACP or
CPG and for the separation of their common properties.
All creditors of the ACP or of the CPG, as well as the listed
personal creditors of the spouse shall be listed in the petition
and notified of the filing thereof. The court shall take measures
to protect the creditors and other persons with pecuniary
interests.
IN RE VOLUNTARY DISSOLUTION OF CONJUGAL

PARTNERSHIP OF SPOUSES BERNAS (1965)
14 SCRA 327
Jose and Pilar Bernas were married in Dec 1932 and
they had 2 kids. During the marriage they acquired 12
parcels of land and two buildings.
30 years later, they executed an Agreement for
Dissolution of conjugal partnership and separation of
property believing that this will redound to their
mutual advantage, benefit and gain, and preserve
peace and harmony and prevent friction, dissension and
confusion between their heirs since Jose had 2 sets of
children. After the execution of this contract, they filed
with the court the aforementioned petition.
LC denied the petition since under Art 192 CC, a CP can
only be dissolved once legal separation has been
ordered, which can only happen upon civil interdiction,
declaration of absence or abandonment (Art 191, CC).
The spouses claim that Art 191 allows voluntary judicial
separation or property during the marriage subject to
judicial approval.
ISSUE: WON voluntary separation of property during
marriage is allowed by law
HELD: YES. The CP may be dissolved by agreement of the
spouse if it has judicial approval. But even though Jose has
kids by his first marriage, their names were not included in
the agreement or approval of the petition whereas his kids
by second marriage and his second wife are. Neither were
the kids by first marriage notified of such. In fact, no notice
appears to have been given to the kids by second marriage,
although the danger of substantial injury to their rights
would seem remote.
Also, the dissolution of the CPG of the second marriage
cannot take place without first dissolving the CPG of the
first marriage wherein the kids of that marriage have an
interest. The agreement may affect the rights of the
kids by first marriage since Art 189 CC states that in
Page 81 of 151
case of doubt, the partnership property shall be divided

between the different partnerships in proportion to the
duration of each and to the prop belonging to the
respective spouses.
The kids by first marriage should be notified of the
proceedings and their names and addresses, as well as
the names and addresses of the kids by second
marriage, be furnished by them.
LACSON v SAN JOSE (1968)

24 SCRA 837
Alfonso Lacson Carmen San-Jose Lacson on Feb 14,
1953 with 4 children.
On Jan 9, 1963 Carmen left the conjugal home and
began living in Manila. She filed a complaint on March
12, 1963, in the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court
for custody of the kids and their support.
An amicable settlement was however reached between
the spouses with regard to custody of the kids (wherein
the 2 older kids go to their dad and the 2 younger ones
to their mom), support and separation of property. This
was later approved by the CFI, stating that it was
conformable to law.
Later, Carmen filed a complaint praying for the custody
of all the kids. This was granted by the CA who
declared the agreement null and void insofar as the
custody of the kids was concerned.
ISSUE: WON the compromise agreement and the judgment
of the CFI grounded on the said agreement are conformable
to law. - YES
HELD: It is valid with respect to the separation of property
between the spouses and the dissolution of the CP since this
is allowed by law provided judicial sanction is secured
beforehand. Such approval was obtained and it does not
appear that they have creditors who will be prejudiced by
the arrangements.
Further, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least
5 years and it is but proper to sever their financial and
proprietary interests. Court cannot force them to live with
each other and render conjugal rights to the other (Arroyo v
Vasquez de Arroyo).
However, in the approval of the regime and dissolution, the

court doesnt accord recognition nor legalize de facto
separation. Its abnormal and fraught with grave danger to
all concerned (Arroyo v. Vasquez de Arroyo). Spouses are
obliged to live together, observe mutual respect and fidelity
and render mutual help and support (CC, Art 109). Theres
virtue in making it as difficult as possible for married
couples to abandon each other merely due to whims and
caprices. General happiness of married life is secured by its
indissolubility. When people understand that they must live
together, they become good spouses from necessity of
remaining such. Necessity is a powerful master in teaching
duties which it imposes. (Arroyo v Vasquez de Arroyo).
With regard to the custody and support of the children: all
the children, including the Enrique and Teresa, were below
7 year old then Art 363 CC specifically commands that no

mother shall be separated from her child under 7

year old unless court finds compelling reasons for
such measure.
Ratio for Art 363: Avoid tragedy where mom has seen her
baby torn away from her. Compelling reasons must be rare
if moms heart is not to be unduly hurt. If mom has erred
such as in adultery, imprisonment and divorce will be
sufficient punishment. Her moral dereliction will not
affect the baby who has yet to understand situation.
Provision is mandatory and the compromise judgment by
separating 2 elder children who were below 7 year old from
their mom was null and void for violating the provision. No
compelling reason was given for taking away 2 children
from Carmen. CFI decision on MFR regarding compromise
judgment only presented a mere hint. Courts cannot
proceed on mere insinuations.
Enrique and Maria are now above 7 yo, thus issue regarding
awarding their custody to their mom has become moot and
academic. But, Court should still uphold their agreement
regarding custody. Art 356 CC provides that every child is
entitled to:
1. parental care
2. receive at least elementary education
3. moral and civic training by parents/guardians
4. right to live in atmosphere conducive to his
physical, moral and intellectual development
Childs welfare should not be subject to parents say-so or
mutual agreement alone. Court should ascertain in
whose custody the child can better be assured the
rights granted by law. Evidence should be presented and
court should not merely rely on compromise judgment in
determining fitness of each parent to be custodian of
children. Besides, Enrique (11), since hes now over 10,
should be given the choice of the parent he wishes to live
with.
If any child will be finally awarded to mom, P150 monthly
support is insufficient considering that prices of commodities
and services have increased and kids are now of school age.
CFI may increase such amount according to need of each
child.
MAQUILAN v MAQUILAN (2007)
524 SCRA 166
DOCTRINE: Voluntary separation of property may
take place while other cases are pending. Proceedings
for the same do not require the intervention of the Solicitor
General. Final judgment of adultery is not punished with
civil interdiction, thus it is not a ground for judicial
separation of property.
Page 82 of 151
3. Liquidation and dissolution of

property
FC, Art 137 Once the separation of property has been
decreed, the ACP or the CPG shall be liquidated in
conformity with this code (Art 102 and 129).
During the pendency of the proceedings for separation of
property, the ACP or the CPG shall pay for the support of
the spouses and their children.
FC, Art 138 After dissolution of the ACP or the CPG, the
provisions on complete separation of property shall apply.
FC, Art 139 The petition for separation of property and final
judgment granting the same shall be recorded in the proper
local civil registries and registries of property.
FC, Art 140 The separation of property shall not prejudice

the rights previously acquired by creditors.
FC, Art 141 The spouses may, in the same proceedings where
separation of property was decreed, file a motion in court for a
decree reviving the property regime that existed
between them before the separation of property in any
of the following instances:
1. civil interdiction terminates
2. absentee spouse reappears
3. when the court is satisfied that the spouse granted
the power of administration in the marriage
settlements will not again abuse that power,
authorizes the resumption of said administration
4. when the spouse who has left the conjugal home
without a decree of legal separation resumes
common life with the other
5. when parental authority is judicially restored to the
spouse previously deprived thereof
6. when the spouses who have been separated in fact
for a least one year, reconcile and resume common
life
7. when after voluntary dissolution of the ACP or CPG
has been judicially decreed upon the joint petition of
the spouses, they agree to the revival of the former
property regime. No voluntary separation of property
may thereafter be granted.
The revival of the former property regime shall be
governed by Art 67.
Art 67 Agreement to revive former regime shall specify:

1) what to contribute anew to restored property regime
2) what to retain in separate property
3) names of all the creditors

4. Sole administration of other spouses

property
FC, Art 142 The administration of all classes of exclusive
property of either spouse may be transferred by the court to
the other spouse (only acts as a trustee)
1.
2.
3.
4.
guardian of the other

judicially declared an absentee
civil interdiction
fugitive from justice or in hiding as an accused in a
criminal case
If the other spouse is not qualified by reason of

incompetence, conflict of interest, or any other just case, the
court shall appoint a suitable person to be the administrator.
In previous cases (ACP/CPG), common property

administration is given in case of incapacity. Exclusive
property may be administered by the other spouse but
court proceeding is required.
E. Regime of Separate Property

ADVANTAGES:
1. simple; no common properties hence no liquidation
2. neither spouse can be accused of being interested
in others properties
DISADVANTAGES:
1. inconsistent with the community of life and interest
which marriage is supposed to create
2. based on distrust and not favorable to the family
3. ordinarily unfavorable to the wife who usually is
unemployed and dependent on the husband for
support
4. may lead to constant disputes on sharing and
family expenses
5. against Filipino custom which is trust and sharing
in the spouses
WHEN
1.
2.
3.
MAY SEPARATION OF PROPERTY EXIST?

by agreement in marriage settlement
decree by court in proper cases
separation of property cannot be converted to any
other property regime during marriage
FC, Art 143 Should the future spouses agree in the

marriage settlements that their property relations during
marriage shall be governed by the regime of separation of
property, the provisions of this Chapter shall be of suppletory
application.
FC, Art 144 Separation of property may refer to present or

future property or both. It may be total or partial. In the
latter case, the property not agreed upon as separate shall
pertain to the ACP.
Page 83 of 151
KINDS OF SEPARATE PROPERTY

1. as to extent
a. total
b. partial
2. as to kinds of property
a. present property
b. future property
c. both present and future property
* Coexistence of CSP and ACP/CPG is possible. However, in
default of a stipulation to the regime of properties outside
the CSP, ACP shall apply.
FC, Art 145 Each spouse shall own, dispose of, possess,
administer and enjoy his or her own separate estate,
without the need of the consent of the other. To each spouse
shall belong all earnings from his or her profession, business,
industry and all fruits, natural, industrial or civil, due or received
during the marriage from his or her separate property.
FC, Art 146 Both spouses shall bear the family expenses in
proportion to their income, or in case of insufficiency or
default thereof, to the current market value of their
separate properties.
The liability of the spouses to the creditors for family expenses
shall, however, be solidary.
F. Property Regimes of Unions

Without Marriage
FC, Art 147 When a man and a woman who are capacitated to
marry each other, live exclusively with each other as husband
and wife without the benefit of marriage or under a void marriage,
their wages and salaries shall be owned by them in equal
shares and the property acquired by both of them through their
work or industry shall be governed by the rules on coownership.
In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while
they lived together shall be presumed to have been obtained
by their joint efforts, work or industry and shall be owned
by them in equal shares. (The next line was not in the CC, an
innovation of FC in favor of housewives.) For purposes of this
article, a party who did not participate in the acquisition by the
other party of any property shall be deemed to have contributed
jointly in the acquisition thereof if the formers efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family and of
the household.
(Unlike ordinary partnership) Neither party can encumber or

dispose by acts inter vivos of his or her share in the property
acquired during cohabitation and owned in common, without the

consent of the other, until after the termination of their
cohabitation.
When only one of the parties to a void marriage is in good
faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shall
be forfeited in favor of their common children. In case of default of
or waiver by any or all of the common children or their
descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the respective
surviving descendant. In the absence of descendant, such share
shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shall
take place upon the termination of the cohabitation.

* Compared with Art 98 and Art 125, this Article does not
provide for donations by reason of charity or occasion of
family rejoicing or family distress.
* Does not include fruits of their exclusive properties

This provision applies to:
1. live-in partners
a. no legal impediment to marry
b. hence, not applicable to concubinage and
adulterous relationships
c. exclusive to each other
d. real continuous cohabitation
e. the goal is to encourage future marriage
2. void marriages
a. public policy
b. absence of requisites
c. except bigamous marriages
FC, Art 148 In cases of cohabitation not falling under the
preceding Article, only the properties acquired by both of the
parties through their actual joint contribution of money,
property or industry shall be owned by them in common in
proportion to their respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and corresponding
shares are presumed to be equal. The same rule and
presumption shall apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.
If one of the parties is validly married to another, his or her
share in the co-ownership shall accrue to the absolute
community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith is not validly
married (void) to another, his or her share shall be forfeited in
the manner provided in the last paragraph of the preceding
Article.
The foregoing rules shall likewise apply even if both parties are
in bad faith.
YAPTINCHAY v TORRES (1969)

28 SCRA 489
Isidro Yaptinchay and Teresita Yaptinchay have been
living together openly and publicly as husband and wife
for 19 years
Isidros alleged legitimate wife is Josefina Yaptinchay
with whom he has a daughter named Virginia
Yaptinchay.
Isidro died intestate and upon his death, Teresita
sought her appointment as special administratrix and
then as regular administratrix of Isidros estate
A few days later, the lower court appointed Teresita as
administratrix. Josefina then registered her opposition
saying that Teresita is not a legitimate heir of Isidro
and had no right to institute the proceeding for the
settlement of Isidros estate, much less procure the
appointment as administratrix. At the same time,
Josefina and her children sought the appointment of
Virginia as special administratrix and Josefina as the
regular administratrix.
LC granted Josefina and her childrens petition and
appointed Virginia as special administratrix. Teresita
Page 84 of 151
then filed a petition seeking action for liquidation of the

partnership supposedly formed during her cohabitation
with Isidro.
LC issued a restraining order to withhold the Virginia
and Josefina from disposing any of the properties,
specifically including a house in Forbes Park
Virginia and Josefina resisted the restraining order and
posited that Teresita was not entitled to the injunction
because her right to the properties is still doubtful and
is in dispute
LC lifts the restraining order and orders Teresita not to
divest Virginia her possession of the Forbes Park
property; however it also enjoined Virginia from selling,
disposing or encumbering said property in any matter
pending resolution of the disputes
Teresita alleges that the Forbes Park property was
undertaken jointly by her and Isidro and she even
contributed using her own exclusive funds
Josefina and Virginia dispute this claim and say the
house was built with Isidros funds alone and without
Teresitas intervention. Teresita presents proof that she
obtained loans when the Forbes Park house was under
construction.
ISSUES:
1. WON the preliminary injunction could be granted in
favor of Teresita
2. WON Teresita can claim that she co-owned the house
with Isidro by the fact that they were common-law
spouses
HELD:
1. Injunction rests upon the sound discretion of the court,
in the exercise of which appellate courts will not
interfere except in a clear case of abuse. Although
Teresita presented loans that she had contracted during
the period when said house was under construction as
proof of ownership, evidence was wanting which would
correlate such loans to the construction work. Thus,
assertion that the North Forbes Park house is
petitioner's exclusive property is unsupported and may
not be permitted to override the prima facie
presumption that house, having been constructed on
Isidros lot at his instance, and during his marriage with
Josefina, is part of the estate that should be under the
control of the Virginia
2. Before a common-law spouse can claim co-ownership
of their spouses properties, there must be a clear
showing that the common-law spouse had,
during cohabitation, really contributed to the
acquisition of the property involved.
JUANIZA v JOSE (1979)
89 SCRA 306
Eugenio Jose was legally married to Socorro Ramos but
had been cohabiting with defendant-appelant Rosalia
Arroyo for 16 yrs.
Jose was the registered owner and operator of a
passenger jeepney involved in an accident of collision
with a freight train resulting in the death of 7 and
physical injuries to 5 of its passengers.

In the resulting case for damages, the CFI rendered

decision ordering Jose and Rosalia (the mistress) to
jointly and severally pay.
Rosalia filed MFR praying that she should not be liable
to pay for damages since the decision was based on the
erroneous theory that she was living together with Jose
as husband and wife without the benefit of marriage,
are co-owners of the jeepney. The motion was denied.
The court based their decision on Article 144 CC which
provides that when a man and a woman living together
as husband and wife, but they are not married, or their
marriage is void from the beginning, the property
acquired by either or both of them through their work
or industry or their wages and salaries shall be
governed by the rules on co-ownership
ISSUES:
1. WON Art 144 is applicable in a case where one of the
parties in a common-law relationship is incapacitated to
marry - NO
2. WON Rosalia, who is not a registered owner of the jeep
can be held solidarily liable for damages with the
registered owner - NO
HELD:
1. It has been consistently ruled that the co-ownership
contemplated in Art 144, requires that the man and
woman living together must not be incapacitated to
contract marriage. Since Jose is legally married to
Socorro, there is an impediment for him to contract
marriage with Rosalia. Thus, Rosalia cannot be a coowner of the jeep. The jeep belongs to the CP of Jose
and Socorro. There is therefore no basis for the liability
of Rosalia for damages arising from the death of and
physical injuries suffered by the passengers.
2. Rosalia, who is not the registered owner can neither be
liable for damages caused by its operation, because
only the registered owner is responsible.
VDA DE CONSUEGRA v GSIS (1971)
37 SCRA 315
Jose Consuguera contracted 2 marriages. 1st marriage
was with Rosario Diaz where they had 2 children. 2nd
marriage was with Basilia Berdin with 7 children. Later
he died. Both marriages were contracted in good faith.
As a member of GSIS, he was entitled to both a
retirement insurance and life insurance. The life
insurance was paid to Berdin and her children who
were the designated beneficiaries named in the policy.
The retirement policy did not designate a beneficiary.
Hence, the petition.
GSIS: to Rosario (8/16) and to Basilia (1/16
between Basilia and their seven children).
CFI: Same with GSIS.
ISSUE: WON Basilia is entitled to the proceeds of the
retirement benefits because she was just the second wife.
HELD: Yes. The marriage was contracted in good faith and
so it is just and fair for them to receive it. Not just because
the retirement does not name a beneficiary, means that it
should follow what was written in the life insurance benefits.
Page 85 of 151
It is just and fair to recognize the second wife it being that

the marriage was done in GOOD FAITH. Provisions on
retirement came when Com Act 186 was amended by RA
660 on 1951 which means that there was no intention for
the life insurance beneficiaries to automatically be the
retirement beneficiaries also. Besides, it is also required for
the member to specifically write the name of the
beneficiary.
*Maam Beth asks: When do you consider good faith in
marriages? Only with regard to belief in the authority of
the solemnizing officer.
MAXEY v CA (1984)
129 SCRA 187
Melbourne Maxey and Regina Morales started living
together in 1903 in military fashion according to their
children (which the courts did not recognize). They had
6 children: John Carlos, Lucille, Margaret, Florence,
Fred, and George. Except for the youngest son, all the
children were born before the disputed properties were
acquired. They had their church marriage in 1919, and
sometime after, Regina Morales died.
The disputed properties were acquired in 1911 and
1912 before the 1919 church marriage. Regina Morales
Maxey died in 1919 sometime after the church
wedding. The husband remarried in 1953, his second
wife Julia Pamatluan Maxey, using a power of attorney,
sold the properties to the respondent spouses, Mr. and
Mrs. Beato C. Macayra. This sale according to the
petitioners was unknown to them until in 1961.
Petitioners sought to annul the sale arguing that the
properties were common properties of their parents.
Trial court applied Art. 144 of the Civil Code stating that
When a man and a woman live together as husband
and wife, but they are not married, or their marriage is
void from the beginning, the property acquired by
either or both of them through their work or industry or
their wages and salaries shall be governed by the rules
on co-ownership.
Trial court ruled in their favor annulling the sale and
order the return of the land to them plus other costs.
Court of Appeals reversed stating that lands in question
were exclusive properties of Melbourne Maxey since
Regina Morales was in no position to be able to
contribute jointly to the acquisition of property.
ISSUES:
1. WON properties were Melbourne Maxeys exclusive
property
2. WON the phrase joint efforts was limited and
pertained only to monetary contributions
HELD:
1. NO. The said properties were products of the joint
efforts and industry of Melbourne and Regina even if
they were not legally married at the time of its
acquisition.
2. NO. SC ruled contrary to CA, stating that CA limitedly
construed the phrase joint efforts and confined them
to mean financial effort. SC recognized that even
without the benefit of marriage, Melbourne and Regina

3.
lived together and assumed the roles of husband and

wife, Regina as administrator of their domestic affairs
while Melbourne works in the colonial government.
SC recognizes womans contribution to the coownership of unmarried couples even if she is
not working outside the home. SC said that this
was the correct interpretation of the Civil Code because
the woman cannot be expected to give up her role as
homemaker and go out to earn an income.
VALDES v RTC (1998)

260 SCRA 221
Antonio Valdes and Consuelo Gomez were married on
Jan 5, 1971. In 1992, Valdez sought the declaration of
nullity of the marriage in the QC RTC, pursuant to Art
36, FC (mutual psychological incapacity to comply with
their essential marital obligations) which RTC granted.
Ex-spouses were directed to start proceedings on the
liquidation of their common properties as defined by Art
147, FC, and to comply with the provisions of Art 5052, FC, within 30 days from notice of this decision.
Consuelo Gomez sought a clarification of the direction
of compliance with Arts 50-52 asserting that the FC
contained no provisions on the procedure for the
liquidation of common property in "unions without
marriage."
RTC thus clarified that considering that Art 147
explicitly provides that the property acquired by both
parties during their union, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, are presumed to have been obtained
through the joint efforts of the parties and will be
owned by them in equal shares, ex-spouses will own
their family home and all their properties for that
matter in equal shares.
In the liquidation and partition of properties owned in
common by the ex-spouses, the provisions on
ownership found in the CC shall apply. And on the issue
of disposing the family dwelling, considering that this
Court has already declared the marriage as null and
void ab initio, pursuant to Art 147, the property regime
of petitioner and respondent shall be governed by the
rules on ownership and provisions of Arts. 102 and 129
of the FC finds no application. Petitioners MFR was
denied and in his recourse to the SC, he submits that
Art 50-52 should be controlling.
ISSUE: WON provisions Art 50-52 are controlling NO.
HELD: TC correctly applied the law. In a void marriage,
regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of the
parties during the period of cohabitation is governed either
by the provisions of Art 147 (a remake of Art 144, CC) or Art
148, FC.
The particular kind of co-ownership in Art 147 applies
when a man and a woman, suffering no illegal
impediment to marry each other, so exclusively live
together as husband and wife under a void marriage or
without the benefit of marriage. The term "capacitated"
in the provision refers to the legal capacity of a party to
contract marriage. Under this property regime, property
acquired by both spouses through their work and
Page 86 of 151
industry shall be governed by the rules on equal coownership.

Art 147 has clarified Art 144, CC and now expressly
provides that:
o
Neither party can dispose or encumber by act inter
vivos his or her share in co-ownership property,
without consent of the other, during the period of
cohabitation; and
o
In the case of a void marriage, any party in bad faith
shall forfeit his or her share in the co-ownership in
favor of their common children; in default thereof or
waiver by any or all of the common children, each
vacant share shall belong to the respective surviving
descendants, or still in default thereof, to the
innocent party. The forfeiture shall take place upon
the termination of the cohabitation (Art 147) or
declaration of nullity of the marriage (Arts 43, 50,
51, FC).
When the common-law spouses suffer from a legal
impediment to marry or when they do not live exclusively
with each other (as husband and wife), only the property
acquired by both of them through their actual joint
contribution of money, property or industry shall be
owned in common and in proportion to their respective
contributions. Such contributions and corresponding shares,
however, are prima facie presumed to be equal. The
share of any party who is married to another shall accrue to
the ACP or CPG, as the case may be, if so existing under a
valid marriage. If the party who has acted in bad faith is not
validly married to another, his or her share shall be forfeited
in the manner already heretofore expressed.
The rules set up to govern the liquidation of either
the ACP or the CPG, the property regimes recognized
for valid and voidable marriages (in the latter case until
the contract is annulled), are irrelevant to the
liquidation of the co-ownership that exists
between common-law spouses.
In all other cases, it is not to be assumed that the law
has also meant to have coincident property relations,
on the one hand, between spouses in valid and
voidable marriages (before annulment) and, on the
other, between common-law spouses or spouses of
void marriages, leaving to ordain, on the latter case,
the ordinary rules on co-ownership subject to the
provisions of the Family Code on the "family home,"
i.e., the provisions found in Title V, Chapter 2, of the
Family Code, remain in force and effect regardless of
the property regime of the spouses.
NICDAO CARINO v LEE CARINO (2001)
351 SCRA 127
Case of the Susan-loving police
1969 Santiago Carino Susan Nicdao, had 2 daughters
10 Nov 1992 Santiago Carino married Susan Yee, no
child after almost 10 years of cohabitation
23 Nov 1992 he passed away under the care of Susan
Yee who likewise spent for his medical and burial
expense
Nicdao was able to collect P146,000 from MBAI, PCCUI,
Commutation, NAPOLCOM and PAG-IBIG while Yee

received a total of P21,000 from GSIS Life and Burial as

well as burial benefit from SSS.
Yee filed a petition to order Nicdao to return to her
of the P146,000 collectively dominated as death
benefits
RTC find in favor of the petitioner based on the ground
that the deceased marriage to Nicdao is void ab initio
for wanting of a marriage license ordering the
respondent to pay P73,000 and cost of litigation
CA upheld RTC
ISSUE: WON Yee is entitled to half of the death benefits

of Carino given to Nicdao
HELD: No. Yee (second wife) is not entitled to the said
share of the death benefits given to Nicdao. Since both
marriages are void, the first marriage lacking marriage
license and the latter characterized as subsequent marriage
contracted without judicial declaration of nullity of the
previous marriage. The property regime applicable to both
marriages is governed by Art 147 and 148 FC.
Marriage to Nicdao: covered by Art 147 which covers
unions of two parties and not barred from contracting said
marriage but whose marriage is nonetheless declared void
for other reason, such in this case when the marriage of the
petitioner to the deceased is to be declared void due to lack
of marriage license. Under the said provision the properties
acquired during the subsisting cohabitation is deemed to be
obtained by the parties joint efforts, work or industry and
shall be owned by them in equal shares. THUS: half of the
disputed death benefits of the deceased shall be given to
Nicdao and the other half shall pass by intestate succession
to his legal heirs who are his children with Nicdao.
Marriage to Yee: governed by Art 148 which refers to the
property regime of unions between parties who are
cohabiting without marriage and is likewise barred to
contract marriage since a judicial declaration of nullity of his
marriage to Nicdao is not obtained before obtaining said
marriage to Yee. In this property regime the properties
acquired by the parties through their actual joint
contribution shall belong to the co-ownership, however
wages, salaries earned by each party is regarded as
his exclusive property; it follows therefore that since
these benefits were accrued by the deceased through his
contributions to these agencies while he was serving as a
policeman then these benefits exclusively belong to him
unless respondent Yee gives proof to the contrary and thus
she claim these said benefits.
RIVERA v HEIRS OF VILLANUEVA (2006)
496 SCRA 135
1913 or 1914, Romualdo Villanueva Amanda Musngi
Amanda died on April 20, 1963. While Romualdos
marriage with Amanda was still subsisting, he cohabited
with Pacita Gonzales and both lived as husband and
wife without the benefit of marriage from 1927 to 1963.
In the course of their cohabitation, Pacita and
Romualdo acquired several properties.
Page 87 of 151
ISSUE: WON the real properties acquired by Pacita and

Romualdo were equally owned by them Depends on the
date of acquisition (relative to Amandas death) and proof of
Pacitas contribution
HELD:
Because the cohabitation of Pacita and Romualdo from
1927 to 1963 was adulterous, their property relations
during those 36 years were not governed by Article 144
CC, which applies only if the couple living together is
not in any way incapacitated from getting married.
According to the doctrine laid down by Juaniza v. Jose,
no co-ownership exists between parties to an
adulterous relationship.
In Agapay v. Palang, Court expounded this doctrine by
declaring that in such a relationship, it is necessary for
each of the partners to prove his or her actual
contribution to the acquisition of property in order to be
able to lay claim to any portion of it.
Presumption of co-ownership and equal contribution do
not apply. Here, the records show only four properties
acquired by Pacita and Romualdo between 1927 and
1963 which they registered in both their names.
The records are devoid of any evidence that Pacita
contributed anything to the acquisition of these
properties. None of these four parcels should accrue to
the petitioners.
There is only one parcel of land that is registered solely
in Pacitas name. Because Romualdo never actually
challenged the validity of the registration of this land
under Pacitas name, this land should accrue entirely to
her heirs.
There is also one property acquired by both Pacita and
Romualdo after Amandas death in 1963. This must be
governed by rules on co-ownership pursuant to Article
144 CC. Hence, half of it should pertain to Pacitas heirs
and the other half, to Romualdos.
The rest of the properties registered in Romualdos
name were also acquired after Amandas death, and
therefore pursuant to Article 144 CC, half of it should
pertain to Pacitas heirs, the other half, to Romualdos.
SAGUID v CA (2003)
403 SCRA 678
Gina was then 17 years old and legally married, when
she met Jacinto. Since she was separated in fact from
her husband, she cohabited with Jacinto. They lived in
the house built on the lot of Jacintos father.
Jacinto worked as a patron of their fishing vessel. Gina
first worked as a fish dealer (in Marinduque), then as
an entertainer in Japan. After 9 years, the couple
decided to separate.
Gina asks that she be declared the sole owner of the
personal properties (appliances, furniture), which she
purchased with her income as fish dealer during their
cohabitation, and that 70,000 be reimbursed to her as
her share in the construction of their house. The latters
funding being fruits of her income as an entertainer.
Jacinto, on the other hand, claims that the petitioner
had no share in the construction of the house and that
she couldnt have bought the mentioned personal
properties as selling fish was just a pastime for her. It

was resolved that both parties contributed to their

joint account (from which the funds for acquiring said
properties came from), but there is no sufficient proof
of their respective shares.
ISSUE: WON the properties in dispute shall be adjudicated
in favor of Gina alone - NO
HELD: Gina is not legally capacitated to marry, but she
nonetheless cohabited with Jacinto. As such, Art 148 of the
FC shall apply to the properties acquired during their
cohabitation. Their share in the common property shall be
determined by the each of the parties actual contribution.
Therefore, since the receipt presented as evidence only
stated P11,413 was spent for the purchase of construction
materials, then this is amount which shall be given to Gina.
With regard to the personal properties, since there is an
absence of proof, it is presumed that Gina and Jacintos
actual contributions are of equal amount. The amount
of P111,375, said amount shall be divided equally. Thus
entitling Gina to a reimbursement of P55,687.50 as her
share.
SAN LUIS v SAN LUIS-SAGALONGOS (2007)
514 SCRA 294
Felicisimo San Luis, a former governor of Laguna,
contracted three marriages in his lifetime.
1st: Virginia Sulit with 6 children (Rodolfo, Mila Edgar,
Linda, Emilita and Manuel, petitioners).
5 years after his first wifes death, he married an
American citizen named Merry Lee who begot him an
only son. However, Lee obtained a divorce decree in
Hawaii after five years of marriage.
One year after the divorce decree was granted, he
married the respondent Felicidad Sagalongos San Luis,
they had no children.
Upon Felicisimos death, Felicidad applied for the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership asset and the
settlement of the decedents estate with her as the
administrator in Makati RTC.
The children from the first marriage opposed this
petition. Their contentions are as follows:
o Case should have been filed at Sta. Cruz, Laguna
o Marriage between them is null and void because it
is bigamous, the marriage between their father
and Merry Lee was still subsisting
In response, Felicidad adduced the decree of divorce in
order to prove Felicisimos capacity to marry. She also
invokes the Quita and Van Dorn ruling wherein divorce
by alien spouses is likewise valid to the Filipino spouse.
Notwithstanding the divorce decree she offers, the
evidentiary value as laid down in the Garcia case was
not complied with.
ISSUE: WON pending the determination of validity of the
foreign divorce, Felicidad has legal standing to apply for
letters of administration.
HELD: YES. She may request for letters of administration
because she qualifies as an interested person by virtue of
their cohabitation. If she proves the validity of Felicisimos
divorce and consequentially, his capacity to marry but fails
Page 88 of 151
to prove the validity of their own marriage, she may be

considered as a co-owner under Art 144 of CC (Art 147 FC).
Likewise, if in the case she fails to prove the validity of both
the divorce and the marriage, the applicable provision would
be Art 148 CC (regime of limited co-ownership).

XI. THE FAMILY

FAMILY may be defined as a natural and social institution
founded on the conjugal union, binding together the
individuals composing it, for the common accomplishment of
the individual and spiritual ends of life, under the authority
of the original ascendant heading it. (Tolentino, Sempio-Diy)
BASES OF THE FAMILY
1. matrimonial union
2. relationship within the degree determined by law,
whether illegitimate or legitimate
3. adoption
IMPORTANCE OF THE FAMILY
1. the family is an essential factor in the general,
social and even political life
2. constant living together of husband and wife, and
of parents and children, contributes to the
development of a strong sense of duty an aptitude
for heroic sacrifice and of the love by future
generations of the traditions and moral concepts of
those who preceded them
3. it is an indispensable element of social cohesion
and equilibrium
4. the vitality and strength of the State depends upon
the solidarity of its nucleus which is the family
A. Members of the Family

1. Nature and Scope of Family Relations
FC, Art 149 The family, being the foundation of the nation, is
a basic social institution which public policy cherishes and
protects. Consequently, family relations are governed by
law and no custom, practice or agreement destructive of the
family shall be recognized or given effect.
It is only the external aspect of family relations that is

governed by law
1. Internal aspect
- sacred to the family and inaccessible to law
- E.g. spiritual relations, sexual relations of the spouses,
career or profession that parents should choose for
their children, practice or customs in the domestic life,
distribution of childrens inheritance (although law
provides for equal legitimes of children)
- BASIS: law must respect the freedom of action of man
within his spheres
2. External aspect
- BASIS: it is only here that third persons and public
interest are concerned
- E.g. spiritual relations, sexual relations of the spouses,
career or profession that parents should choose for
their children, practice or customs in the domestic life,
Page 89 of 151
distribution of childrens inheritance (although law

provides
FC, Art 150 Family relations include:
1. Between husband and wife
2. Between parents and children
3. Among other ascendants and descendants
4. Among brothers and sisters, whether of the full or
half-blood
* Half-blood means having one common parent

CLASSES OF FAMILY RELATIONS
1. Natural by consanguinity or affinity
2. Civil created by law e.g. adoption
3. Religious created by sacraments such as baptism
and confirmation (ninong & ninang)
-
Family relations exist even when they are not living

together
Other relatives living with the family are members
of the household, but not of the family
Nephews, nieces, cousins, aunts or uncles are not
relatives inconsistent with the Filipino culture
Illegitimate children are included at least in the
family of their mother -> Sempio-Diy is wrong!
Relatives include both the husbands and the wifes
2. Support
FC, Art 194 Support = everything indispensable for
sustenance, dwelling, clothing medical attendance, education
and transportation, in keeping with the financial capacity of
the family.
The education of the person entitled to be supported referred
to in the preceding paragraph shall include his schooling or
training for some professional, trade or vocation, even beyond
age of majority. Transportation shall include expenses in going
to and from school, or to and from place of work.
* CC didnt include transportation, but FC did because it is

possible for one to save up on other expenses like food and
clothing but not on transportation expenses, especially if the
place is not reachable by walking.
* Full extent means indispensable and financial capacity.
This phrase is also seen in the two succeeding provisions for
support of family members and illegitimate brothers and
sisters.
* Even beyond age of majority

FC, Art
extent:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
195 Obligation to support each other to the whole

spouses
legitimate ascendants and descendants
parents and their legitimate children and the
legitimate and illegitimate children of the latter
(grandchildren)
parents and their illegitimate children and the
legitimate or illegitimate children of the latter
(grandchildren)
legitimate brothers and sisters, whether full or halfblood
* Rule on support is different from rule on inheritance

FC, Art 196 Brothers and sisters, not legitimately
related, whether full or half-blood, are likewise bound to
support each other to the full extent EXCEPT only when the
need for support of the brother or sister, being of age, is due to
cause imputable to the claimants fault or negligence.
* The exception does not apply to legitimate siblings so in a

nutshell, if you have a lazy and irresponsible brother, he can
lawfully ask for your support which you are obliged to give.
FC, Art 197 For the support of legitimate ascendants by:
(1) descendants, legit/illegitimate; and
(2) brothers and sisters, legit/illegitimate
-
only separate property of person obliged to give support

shall be answerable
in default of separate property, ACP and CPG will advance
support, deductible from the spouse obligeds share
upon liquidation
What properties are liable for the support of the

following relatives?
1. spouse
2. common children of
spouse
3. children of spouse by
another marriage
4. Illegitimate children
of either spouse
ACP/CPG
ACP/CPG
ACP/CPG (because they are still
legitimate!)
CPG: separate property of the
parent-spouse, but if the same is
insufficient, the CPG if financially
capable (read: all legal obligations
of the community are covered).
The support paid to the child shall
be deducted from the share of the
parent-spouse at the time of
liquidation of the partnership
FC, Art 198 Pendente lite of legal separation, annulment

or declaration of nullity: spouses and children are to be
supported from properties of ACP/CPG.
After final judgment, duty to mutual support between spouses
ceases UNLESS (exception applies in legal separation only)
court says guilty spouse should support innocent spouse,
specifying terms of such order.
Page 90 of 151
FC, Art 199 Whenever two or more persons are obliged to

give support, the liability shall devolve upon the following
persons in this order:
1. spouse
2. descendants in nearest degree
3. ascendants in nearest degree
4. brothers and sisters
FC, Art 200 When the obligation to give support falls upon two
or more persons, the payment of the same shall be divided
between them in proportion to the resources of each.
In case of urgent need and by special circumstances, judge
may order only one of them to furnish support, without
prejudice to his right to claim from the other obligors the share
due from them.
If two recipients claim support at the same time from one
obligor, follow order in Art 199 UNLESS child vs. spouse
wherein the child will be preferred.
* The spouse has better opportunity to look for other means

to support him/herself than the child.
FC, Art 201 Proportion of support stipulated in Art 195 and Art
196: resources/means of giver and necessities of recipient.
FC, Art 202 Support may be increased or reduced according to

the reduction/increase of necessities of recipient or resources of
obligor.
FC, Art 203 The obligation to give support shall be

demandable from the time the person who has a right to
receive the same needs it for maintenance, but is payable only
upon demand.
* No obligation to pay arrears in support. Support is not

retroactive. It is no longer indispensable since one has
survived even without the support (although refer to Art 206
and 208). In other words, no reimbursement can be done
with support.
* Maam Beth says: If youre a legitimate child, everything
just trickles down to you. You dont have to ask for support
or anything because you just go to the dining table and
theres food waiting for you.
FC, Art 204 The supporter have the option to fulfill the
obligation either by:
1. paying the allowance fixed
2. maintaining in the dwelling the person who has the
right to receive support UNLESS there is a moral
obstacle thereto
*Example of a moral obstacle:

a wife does not want the husband to keep an
illegitimate child with them
stepbrother and stepsister has affair

FC, Art 205 The right to receive support under this Title shall
not be levied upon on attachment or execution.
*Creditors cannot go after the support because it is

indispensable, hence essential to survival of recipient.
FC, Art 206 When, without knowledge of the person
obliged to give support, it is given by a stranger, the latter
shall have a right to claim the same from the former, unless it
appears that he gave it without any intention of being
reimbursed.
FC, Art 207 When the person obliged to support another

unjustly refuses or fails to give support when urgently
needed by the latter, any third person may furnish support to
the needy individual, with a right of reimbursement from the
person obliged to give support. This Article shall apply
particularly when the father or mother of a child under the age
of majority unjustly refuses to support or fails to give support to
the child when urgently needed.
FC, Art 208 In case of contractual support or that given by

will, the excess in amount beyond that required for legal
support shall be subject to levy on attachment or execution.
Furthermore, contractual support shall be subject to
adjustment whenever modification is necessary due to
changes in circumstances manifestly beyond the contemplation
of the parties.
SPECIAL RULES ON CONVENTIONAL SUPPORT

1. by contract (inter vivos) or by will (mortis causa)
2. subject to modifications as circumstances may
arise beyond the contemplation of the parties
LACSON v LACSON (2006)
499 SCRA 677
- Edward (petitioner) Lea Daban-Lacson (respondent)
legitimate children: Maowee and Maonaa
- Father abandons the family but mother did not badger
him for support, relying on his note in 1975 saying he
would support his daughters
- Despite being gainfully employed and owning several
pieces of valuable lands, Edward did not support the
family since 1976
- To provide for her daughters, Lea borrowed from her
brother, Noel Daman the amount of P400K-P600K
- In 1995, Lea filed an action for support and the RTC
ordered Edward to compensate plaintiffs support of
P2.496 M which is total of 18 years of support in arrears
- CA dismissed Edwards appeal
ISSUE:
1. WON the support should be computed from 1976
to 1994/WON his obligation began upon a
legitimate demand in 1995 wherein the action for
support was filed (Art 203 FC)
2. WON the amount advanced by Noel Daban should
be reimbursed
Page 91 of 151
HELD:
1. YES. As early as 1975, Lea already requested or plead for
support from her husband, which was no less a demand.
2. YES. Pursuant to Art 207 FC, Daban can rightfully exact
reimbursement. Failure on the part of the father is
established. It is also necessary to avoid unjust enrichment.
CA and RTC affirmed.
3. Funerals
CC, Art 305 Duty and right to make funeral arrangement
shall be in accordance with the order established for
support. In case of descendants of the same degree, or of
brothers and sisters, the oldest shall be preferred. In case of
ascendants, the paternal shall have better right.
CC, Art 306 Every funeral shall be in keeping with the social
position of the deceased.
* How would you reconcile CC, Art 25 (i.e. thoughtless

extravagance in expenses for leasure or display during a
period of acute public want or emergency) with CC Art
306? Maam Beth says they are in conflict but didnt explain
any further.
CC, Art 307 The funeral shall be in accordance with the
expressed wishes of the deceased. In the absence of such
expression, his religious beliefs or affiliation shall determine
the funeral rites. In case of doubt, the form of funeral shall be
decided upon by the person obliged to make
arrangements for the same after consulting the other
members of the family.
CC, Art 308 No human remains shall be retained, interred,

disposed of or exhumed without the consent of the
persons mentioned in the support provision.
CC, Art 309 Any person who shows disrespect to the dead,
or wrongfully interferes with a funeral shall be liable to the
family of the deceased for damages, material and moral.
CC, Art 310 The construction of a tombstone or

mausoleum shall be deemed part of the funeral expenses,
and shall be chargeable to the conjugal partnership
property, if the deceased is one of the spouses.
PENOBSCOT AREA HOUSING DEVELOPMENT CORP. v

CITY OF BREWER (1981)
438 A. 2D. 14
Plaintiff wants to build a house for six retarded
adults/older minors in an area zoned for a single family
residential use
The city prohibited the plaintiffs because six retarded
adults do not fall within the definition of family
According to the ordinance, the requirements for
classification as a family are:

1) does his own cooking according to Maam Beth, this is

significant because of the assumption that families have
meals together
2) domestic bond exists which means a traditional familylike structure of household authority. The staff of the nut
house cannot be considered as central figure of resident
authority because they
a. would not necessarily reside in the home
b. would serve in a rotating basis
3) quality of cohesiveness and permanence
a. the average stay of a resident would be one and
one-half years
b. they would not control the choice of who the
incoming residents would be nor when other
residents would leave
*Maam Beths obiter: A house with six nuts in it in a middle
of a peaceful suburbia would undermine the communitys
serenity.
*Applicability of definition of family in the Philippines: The
presence of a permanent figure of household authority may
be problematic in families with OFW parents. (And then she
goes on to tell stories about their family, with Dean
Pangalangan being in HK now for some professorial tasks,
she goes there almost every two weeks to visit him. That
the airplane fare costs just as much as the ticket to Davao.
Or roughly P12,000! Whoa!) And so the Congress should
craft a definition that reflects our culture and the demand of
the times.
FC, Art 151 No suit between members of the same family
shall prosper unless it should appear from the verified
complaint or petition that earnest efforts toward a
compromise have been made, but that same have failed. If
it is shown that no such efforts were in fact made, the case
must be dismissed.
This rule shall not apply to cases which may not be the
subject of compromise under CC.
*CC, Art 2035 uncompromisable matters:

a) civil status of persons (e.g. paternity and filiation)
b) validity of a marriage or legal separation
c) any ground for legal separation
d) future support
e) future legitime
f) jurisdiction of courts
because it is difficult to imagine a sadder and more

tragic spectacle than a litigation between
members of the same family.
MENDOZA v CA (1967)
19 SCRA 756
Luisa de la Rosa Mendoza (private resp) instituted the
case against her husband Cecilio (plaintiff)
When husband departed to US to further his medical
studies and profession, he did not provide his pregnant
and sickly wife with maintenance and support
Wife filed action but husband moves for its dismissal on
the grounds no efforts to compromise were made
Page 92 of 151
HELD: No valid compromise can be made with matters

regarding future support.
MENDEZ v BIONSON & EUGENIA (1977)
80 SCRA 82
- Mendez and 11 others argue that the court erred in
dismissing their complaint against the Bionsons for lack of
earnest efforts being exerted by the parties to arrive at an
amicable settlement before the action was instituted, the
parties being members of the same family.
HELD: The litigants are not family members within the
contemplation of the law. The parties are collateral
relatives who are not brothers and sisters. Only
members of the same family are required to exert efforts to
arrive at a settlement before an action is instituted.
GUERRERO v RTC & HERNANDO (1994)
229 SCRA 274
- Gaudencio Guerrero and Pedro Hernando are brothers-inlaw because their wives are half-sisters. They both claim
ownership of a lot.
- RTC ruled that the parties should have alleged in the
complaint that earnest efforts towards a compromise was
exerted since they are members of the same family.
HELD: Brothers-in-law are not members of the same
family as enumerated in Art 150. No earnest efforts
toward a compromise are needed.
HONTIVEROS v RTC (1999)
309 SCRA 340
Spouses Agusto and Maria Hontiveros filed a complaint
for damages in their land registration against Agustoss
brother Gregorio and the latters wife, Teodora Ayson.
Teodora and Gregorio denied they are married.
RTC: dismissed case because it did verify as required
by Art 151 FC and therefore it did not believe that
earnest efforts had been made to arrive at a
compromise.
HELD: Whenever a stranger is party to a case, Art 151
will not apply. Maria, a sister-in-law of Gregorio is
considered a stranger since the law does not consider inlaws as members of the same family. Teodora, is also a
stranger to Augusto. Remanded to RTC for further
proceedings.
B. The Family Home

FC, Art 152 The family home, constituted jointly by the
husband and the wife OR by an unmarried head of a
family, is the dwelling house where they and their family reside
and the land on which it is situated.
- Unmarried head can mean live-in partners, eldest

sibling/child or widow
- Cannot be a family home if you do not own the land it is
situated on

- Beneficiaries cannot constitute his own family home;

otherwise they can migrate from one place to another
and have lots of family home to the prejudice of creditors
- There should be actual occupancy. It does not matter if
a portion of the house is devoted for commercial purposes
as long as the family resides on it.
FC, Art 153 The family home is deemed constituted on a
house and lot from the time it is occupied as family
residence. From the time of its constitution and so long as
any of its beneficiaries actually resides therein, the
family home continues to be such and is exempt from
execution, forced sale or attachment except as hereinafter
provided and to the extent of the value allowed by the law.
* Difference between CC and FC rules on constitution

of family home: CC requires judicial declaration (done by
filing a petition and with the approval of the proper court)
OR extrajudicial (done recording of a public instrument in
the proper registry) for the constitution of a family home.
But no one does that, so the FC makes the constitution
of a family home automatic.
FC, Art 154 The beneficiaries of a family home:
1. husband & wife or an unmarried head of family
2. parents, ascendants, descendants, brothers and
sisters, illegitimate or legitimate, who are:
a. living in the family home
b. depend upon the head of the family for
legal support
- All three requirements (family relations, actual residence

and dependence for legal support) must be present to
become a beneficiary
- So if the wife dies, the mother-in-law becomes a stranger
to the husband and is no longer considered as beneficiary
of the family home.
FC, Art 155 The family home shall be exempt from
execution, forced sale, or attachment except:
1. non-payment of taxes
2. debts incurred prior to the constitution of the family home
3. debts secured by mortgages on the premises before or
after such constitution
4. debts due to laborers, mechanics, architects, builders,
materialmen and others who have rendered service or
furnished material for the construction of the building
* According to Tolentino, Par 4 may also apply to

repairs and improvements done to the family home
to avoid redundancy of Par 2 since construction of the home
would always be before the constitution of the family home.
FC, Art 156 Family home must be part of the ACP or CPG or of
the exclusive properties either spouse with consent. It may also
be constituted by an unmarried head of the family on his or her
own property.
Subject of conditional sale on installments: where
ownership is reserved by the vendor only to guarantee payment
of the purchase price, it may be constituted as a family home.
Page 93 of 151
FC, Art 157 The actual value of family home shall not
exceed P300,000 in urban (including chartered cities and
municipalities) and P200,000 in rural, as may fixed by law.
* Considering this price tag imposed on family homes,

realistically speaking, there is no family home in the
Philippines anymore. The law must first seek actuarial
computation to update the equivalent value in todays
economy.
FC, Art 158 It may be sold, alienated, donated, assigned or
encumbered by the owner/s with the written consent of the
person constituting the same, the latters spouse and majority
of beneficiaries of legal age.
FC, Art 159 Family home shall continue despite the death of
one or both spouses or of the unmarried head of the
family for a period of 10 years or for as long as there is a
minor beneficiary. Heirs cannot partition unless court finds a
compelling reason. Rule shall regardless of whoever owns the
property or constituted the family home.
FC, Art 160 When a creditor whose claim is not among

those mentioned in Art 155 obtains a judgment in his favor,
and has reasonable grounds to believe that the family home is
actually worth more than amount fixed in Art 157, he may
apply to court for an order directing the sale of the property
under execution. The court shall so order if it finds that the
actual value of the family home exceeds the maximum
amount allowed by law as of the time of its constitution.
If the increased actual value exceeds the maximum allowed in
Art 157 and results in subsequent voluntary improvements
introduced by the person/s constituting the family home, by the
owner/s of the property, or by any of the beneficiaries, the
same rule and procedure shall apply.
At the execution sale, no bid below the value allowed for the
family home shall be considered. The proceeds shall:
1 be applied first to the amount mentioned in Art 157
2 then to liabilities under the judgment and costs (A155)
3 delivered to the judgment debtor
* Judgment debtor is not a preferred debtor like in Art 155

* Maam Beth does not think its a wise move for creditors
to go after the family home because he puts his debtor in a
more financially precarious situation and the creditor is not
a priority.
FC, Art 161 For the purposes of availing of the benefits of
a family home as provided for in this Chapter, a person may
constitute, or be the beneficiary of only one family
home.
FC, Art 162 The provisions of this Chapter shall also govern
existing family residences insofar as said provision are
applicable.

SIARI VALLEY ESTATES v LUCASAN (1960)

109 Phil 294
Parcels of land owned by Filemon Lucasan were sold by
the sheriff at a public auction to satisfy a judgment
rendered against him.
Lucasan opposed with respect to one parcel. He
contends that the land is where he and his wife
extrajudicially constituted a family home hence the land
is exempt from execution.
ISSUE: WON the property is a family home and exempt
from execution for money judgment?
HELD: NO. A family home constituted after a debt has
been incurred is not exempt from execution. Even if
the declaration of family home predates the money
judgment, the family home may still be liable as long as it is
for payment of a debt incurred before the constitution.
Otherwise, debtors who aim to circumvent the law may
prejudice creditors.
MODEQUILLO v BREVA (1990)
185 SCRA 766
Jose Modequillo is to indemnify the relatives of Audie
Salinas who died in a vehicular accident (1976 Mar 16)
involving the former.
In 1988 January 29, CA held that the damages are to
be satisfied on his goods and chattels which include a
parcel of residential land.
Modequillo executed a motion to quash and/or set
aside since the same residential land is where the
family home is built since 1969 prior to the
commencement of this case and as such is exempt
from execution, forced sale or attachment under Art
152 and 153 of the FC except for the liabilities
enumerated in Article 155. Also, the said judgment debt
is not one of those listed in Article 155.
ISSUE: WON the said residential land has the characteristic
of a family home and thus is exempted from execution
HELD: NO.
The plaintiff misinterpreted Art 162 of the FC which
provides that all existing family residences at the time
of the effectivity of FC are considered family homes and
entitled to benefits of a family home to be retroactive.
Art 152 and Art 153 cannot be applied
retroactively.
Art. 152, which pertains to the automatic constitution of
family home by mere actual occupation, cannot be
invoked by the plaintiff.
Also, the debt or liability which was the basis of the
judgment arose or was incurred at the time of the
vehicular accident on March 16, 1976 and the money
judgment arising therefrom was rendered by the
appellate court on January 29, 1988. Both preceded
the effectivity of the FC on August 3, 1988.
Page 94 of 151
TANEO v CA (1999)
304 SCRA 308
Pablito Taneo filed an action against the conveyance of
his land to private respondent. The money judgment of
RTC was affirmed by CA.
Taneo alleges that the lands in question are exempt
from execution for being a family home (extrajudicially
constituted by his father as early as 1964).
ISSUE: WON the family home is exempt from execution
HELD: NO. Art 153 does not apply to family homes occupied
prior to the effectivity of FC and exempted from obligations
incurred prior to that same date (Aug 3, 1988). Art 162 is
not retroactive considering that the debt preceded the FC
(1964). Also, a family home should be erected on the
land owned by the members of the family (owned by
Plutarco Vacalares).
VERSOLA v MADOLARIA (2006)
497 SCRA 385
Dr. Ong Oh granted P1M loan to Dolores Ledesma
Ledesma sold her house and lot located in Tandang
Sora to spouses Eduardo and Elsa Versola for P2.5M.
Spouses paid Ledesma P1M as downpayment with
remaining balance in monthly installments
Spouses Versola applied for a 2M loan with Asiarust
Bank in order to raise the full amount that Ledesma
demanded
However, the spouses were not able to get the loan
because Asiatrust Bank discovered a notice of levy on
execution was annotated on the title in connection with
Ledesmas obligation to a certain Miladays Jewels, Inc.,
in the amount of P214,284. Because of this annotated
encumbrance, Asiatrust did not register said Real Estate
Mortgage and refused to release the P2M loan of
petitioners.
Dr. Ong Oh filed Complaint after the trial, the RTC and
CA ordered spouses Versola to pay Dr. Ong Oh 1.5M
with legal interest
Dr. Ong Oh filed a Motion for Execution and because of
this, the sheriff sold at public auction the property of
spouses Versola.
Spouses Versola failed to redeem said property, thus a
Sheriffs Final Deed of Sale was issued in favor of Dr.
Ong Oh.
Dr. Ong Oh filed and Ex Parte Motion for Issuance of
Confirmation of Judicial Sale of Real Property of
spouses
Spouses Versola opposed said motion on the ground
that the property sold is the family home of petitioners
which according to them is exempt from execution
pursuant to Art. 155 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: WON petitioners timely raised and proved that their
property is exempt from execution?
HELD: NO
Court finds that petitioners assertion for exemption is a
mere afterthought.
It was only after almost two years from the time of the
execution of sale and after the Sheriffs Final Deed of

Sale was issued did petitioners rigorously claim that the

property in question is exempt from execution.
Such claim for exemption should be set up and
proved to the Sheriff before the sale of property
at public auction. Failure to do so would estop the
party from later claiming exemption.
There was also no showing that petitioners
adduced evidence to prove that it is indeed a
family home. Instead of substantiating their claim,
petitioners languidly presupposed that the sheriff had
prior knowledge that the said property was constituted
by them as their family home.
Note: A family home is a real right which is gratuitous,

inalienable and free from attachment, constituted over the
dwelling place and the land in which it is situated and it
cannot be seized by creditors except in certain special
cases.
VENERACION v MANCILLA (2006)
495 SCRA 712
In 1995, Elizabeth Mendinueta secured a P1.2M loan
from Charlie Mancilla. She mortgaged her residential
house and lot. The title indicated that she was single
Mendinueta failed to pay upon maturity so the property
was foreclosed. She admitted her failure but claims that
she secured a loan from Banco Filipino to pay Mancilla.
All shes asking for now is the reduction of the monthly
interest.
It turns out that Elizabeth is cohabiting with a certain
Geronimo Veneracion with whom she has three kids,
one of whom is Mary Grace (petitioner).
Mary Grace seeks the nullity of judgment against the
mortgage based on the following facts:
o Geronimo paid for the monthly installments of
property since Elizabeth had no source of income
o Family home is not liable for the execution bec
Geronimo did not consent in mortgage (FC 154)
o Decision of RTC prejudiced their right to their
family home and hereditary rights
ISSUE: WON the family home may be executed with the
spouses consent wanting
HELD: NO. First there should be proof that it was indeed
a conjugal home and that their father spent for the
acquisition. They failed to append receipts of payments
made by the father. Unsubstantial claim of mothers lack of
source of income because she was able to borrow from
Banco Filipino. Mother never alleged that said property
was conjugal and was the family home, she only
wanted reduction of accrued interests.
PATRICIO v DARIO III (2006)
507 SCRA 438
Marcelino Dario died intestate. He survived his wife
Perla (petitioner) and two sons Marcelino Marc and
Marcelino III (respondent) who extrajudicially settled
the estate of their father.
Marc wants to partition the property and terminate coownership.
Page 95 of 151
RTC ordered the partition: 1/6 to Marc and Marcelino

III then 4/6 to Perla
CA family home should continue despite the death of
one or both spouses as long as there is a minor
beneficiary
Marcelino III has a minor son named Marcelino Lorenzo
Dario IV who is a grandson of Marcelino and Perla,
hence, a minor beneficiary of the family home
ISSUE:
WON a family home can be partition at the death of the
head of the household notwithstanding the presence of a
minor beneficiary (Art 154 and 159)
HELD: YES. The minor beneficiaries of a family home
contemplated in Art 159 must not only actually
reside in the home but must also be dependent on
the head of the family for legal support. Although a
grandson is included in the family relationship required of
beneficiaries stipulated in Art 154, the grandson cannot be
viewed as dependent on his grandparents for support
because his ascendants of nearest degree, the
parents are capable of providing him support. The law
imposes primary obligation of child support to parents, in
default of which the grandparents take place.
ARRIOLA v ARRIOLA (2008)
GR No. 177703
Fidel Arriola had two marriages. After his death, his
sons John Nabor Arriola (respondent son with the first
wife) and Anthony Ronald Arriola (petitioner son with
the second wife, Vilma) wanted to partition his estate
through public auction.
Petitioner refused to include in the auction the house
standing on the subject land because he says that it is
their family home.
ISSUE: WON the land on which the house stands may be
included in the public auction
HELD: NO. Although the subject house is covered by the
judgment of partition postulated by the CA, suspensive
proscription imposed by FC Art 159 shall be observed. Since
Fidel built the house out of his exclusive properties and
stayed there for 20 years, by operation of FC Art 153 the
house is automatically constituted as family home. FC
Art 152 extends the scope of family home not only to
the dwelling structure but also on the lot on which it
stands. Petitioners and respondents should not touch the
house until 10 years has lapsed (2013). All other lands
outside the family home are subject to immediate partition
through public auction.

XII. PATERNITY AND

FILIATION
A. Legitimate Children
1. Kinds of Filiation
FC, Art 163 The filiation of children may be by nature or by
adoption. Natural filiation may be legitimate or legitimate.
1.
2.
By nature
a. Legitimate
b. Illegitimate
By adoption
FC, Art 164 Children conceived or born during the marriage of

the parents are legitimate.
Children conceived as a result of artificial insemination of the
wife with the sperm of the husband or that of a donor or both
are likewise legitimate children of the husband and his wife,
provided, that both of them authorized or ratified such
insemination in a written instrument executed and signed by
them before the birth of the child. The instrument shall be
recorded in the civil registry together with the birth certificate
of the child.
Who are legitimate children? And what does

conceived OR born mean?
1. conceived before M, born during M
2. conceived during M, born during M
3. conceived during M, born after dissolution of M
a. BIOLOGICAL - NATURAL
PERIDO v PERIDO (1975)
63 SCRA 97
-
LUCIO BENITA TALORONG Felix, Ismael and

Margarita
But Benita died, so Lucio remarried
LUCIO MARCELINA BALIGUAT Eusebio, Juan,
Maria, Sofronio and Gonzalo
Lucio died in 1942 and Marcelina died in 1943
Margarita is the only living child in the first marriage.
Felix survived by his 8 children. Ismael had 5 children.
they are the petitioners in this case
Lucio Peridos heirs from both marriages executed an
extrajudicial partition of his estate
The first marriage heirs had second thoughts about the
illegitimacy and successional rights of the second
marriage heirs
Their reason was that the children of the 2nd marriage
were born out of wedlock even before the death of
Lucios first wife and that the land certificate did not
indicate that Lucio is not married to another.
Page 96 of 151
ISSUE: WON the children by the second marriage are

illegitimate
HELD: No. No cogent proof that Lucio and Marcelina were
not married, so the presumption of marriage shall prevail.
There was no legal impediment for Perido to marry at the
time of the birth of his eldest child by his second marriage.
Peridos first wife died long before.
LIYAO, Jr. v LIYAO et al (2002)
378 SCRA 563
Corazon Garcia was married to Ramon Yulo but living
separately for 10 years, but had two children
Bernadette and Enrique
William Liyao Sr was married to Juanita Tanhoti Liyao,
with two daughters Tita Rose and Linda Christina
Corazon cohabited with Liyao and begot a son, William
Liyao Jr. in White Plains
Liyao Jr. claims that he is the illegitimate child of Liyao
Sr. and asks the latters legal family for recognition as
compulsory heir
Proofs:
a. Liyao Senior paid medical and hospital expenses,
food and clothing during Juniors birth
b. Liyao Senior asked his confidential secretary to
secure a copy of Liyao Juniors birth certificate and
open a bank account for him wherein he deposited
amounts on a weekly basis
c. Liyao Senior would bring Liyao Junior to the office
and introduce him as the good looking son and
had their pictures taken together
d. Continuous possess and enjoyment of the status of
a recognized and/or acknowledge child through
direct and overt acts
e. A note saying To Cora, Love From William
f. Testimony of neighbors saying that he is the son of
Cora and William
RTC declared William as spurious illegitimate son for
preponderance of evidence
CA reversed because of presumption of legitimacy so
long as marital intimacy between the husband and the
wife was physically possible. Gave weight to the
testimonies that Corazon and Ramon Yulo were seen
together when she was supposed to be cohabiting with
Yulo.
Birth certificate and baptismal certificate saying Yulo as
the father is not sufficient to establish paternity in
absence of evidence that Yulo had direct involvement in
placing his name there. There was no signature in the
said documents even in the passbook of the bank
account he opened for Corazon and Junior.
HELD: The law favors the legitimacy rather than the
illegitimacy of the child. Liyao Jr cannot choose his own
filiation. If Corazons husband, Yulo, does not impugn the
legitimacy of the child, then the status of the child is fixed
and the child cannot choose to be the child of his
mothers alleged paramour.

SSS v AGUAS (2006)

483 SCRA 383
Pablo Aguas died so his wife Rosanna Aguas claims
death benefits from SSS, stating as minor beneficiary
their daughter Jeylnn.
Leticia Macapinlac, Pablos sister, objected to Rosannas
claim alleging that:
a. Rosanna abandoned their family 6 yrs before
b. Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna
c. Rosanna had several children with a certain Romeo
dela Pea
SSS suspended the pension benefits Rosanna and
Jeylnn were receiving
SSS, upon investigation, concluded that:
a. Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna & Jenelyn
(Jeylnn) were Rosannas children with Romeo
b. Rosanna abandoned her husband more than six
years before and lived with Romeo while pregnant
with Jenelyn (Jeylnn)
c. Pablo was not capable of having a child with
Rosanna as he was under treatment
SSS refused to resume pension benefits and ordered
refunds from Rosanna
Rosanna filed claim for restoration of pension benefits
at the Social Security Commission (SSC)
Rosanna added Janet Aguas to the petition for claims
SSC summoned several people for clarificatory
questions regarding the case. Further investigation, it
upheld the order to suspend Rosannas pension and
have her refund the paid benefits due to their
conclusion that Rosanna married Romeo during the
subsistence of her marriage with Pablo, and that Jeylnn
was her daughter with Romeo
CA reversed the SSC decision and ordered resumption
of Rosannas pension benefits
ISSUE: WON Jeylnn, Janet and Rosanna were entitled to the
SSS death benefits of Pablo as Pablos children and spouse
HELD:
YES to Jeylnn
Only Jeylnn has sufficiently established her right to a

monthly pension. As proved by the photocopy of her
birth certificate which bears the certified signature of
Pablo and was certified by the civil registrar, she was
born during Rosanna and Pablos marriage. Art 164
provides that children conceived or born during
the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
In the absence of proof to establish impossibility

of access between the spouses during the first
120 days of the 300 days which immediately
precedes the birth of the child, the presumption of
legitimacy shall subsist and is conclusive. Doctor
only treated Pablo for tuberculosis, he cannot say if he
was infertile.
Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal

right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his heirs.
NO to Janet
Janets date of birth was not substantially proven
Civil registrar did not certify the presented birth

certificate of Janet which could have proved that Janet
Page 97 of 151
was born during the subsistence of Rosannas marriage

with Pablo
NO to Rosanna
Rosanna passed the first qualifying factor for claims,

that she is the legitimate spouse
Rosanna did not pass the second qualifying factor, that

she was dependent on Pablo for support since they
were separated in fact
b. BIOLOGICAL ASSISTED REPRODUCTIVE

TECHNOLOGY
ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION is the impregnation of a female
with the semen from male without sexual intercourse.
Even without the initial consent, the child can still
be legitimated so long as the husband
subsequently gives his consent BEFORE the child is
born through AI
Can be homologous (sperm of the husband),
heterologous (sperm of a donor) or combined (a
combination of the two)
That the child was born of AI is not reflected in the
birth certificate
A child can have as much as five parents:
MOTHER
FATHER
1. Biological (source of sperm) 1. Legal/social
2. Legal/Social
2. Genetic (egg donor)
3. Gestational (not surrogate)
*Maam Beth hates the word surrogate because it is a
misnomer.
IN RE BABY M. (1988)
109 N.J. 396
Mary Beth Whitehead agreed for a fee of $10,000 to be
artificially inseminated with the semen of another
womans husband (William Stern), to carry the child so
conceived to term, and after its birth, to surrender it to
the natural father and his wife Surrogacy contract
means absolute termination of parental ties to the
gestational mother upon birth
Elizabeth Stern was not infertile, like was was stated in
the contract, rather she had multiple sclerosis which
may have serious implication on her pregnancy
After the birth of the child, the Whiteheads wished not
to go through the surrogacy contract.
The Sterns filed a complaint for possession and ultimate
custody of the child.
Lower court granted the Sterns custody and ordered
termination of Whiteheads maternal rights
Whiteheads immediately fled to different places to
evade the surrendering Baby M for custody and named
her Sara Elizabeth Whitehead
ISSUE: WON the surrogacy contract was enforceable and
valid

HELD: No. The contract was in direct conflict with existing

statutes and public policies regarding 1) involvement of
money in connection with adoption (tantamount to babyselling) 2) laws requiring proof of parental unfitness or
abandonment before termination of parental rights is
ordered or adoption is granted and 3) making surrender of
custody and consent to adoption revocable in private
placement adoptions. Secondly, although the custody was
properly granted to the father since evidence clearly proved
it to be in the best interest of the child, the termination of
maternal rights and visitation rights is contrary to law.
*M stands for Melissa. Wiki tells us that Melissa Stern
formally terminated Whitehead's parental rights and
formalized Elizabeth Stern's maternity through adoption
proceedings.
JOHNSON v CALVERT (1993)
851 P.2d 776
Mark and Crispina was a married couple. Crispina had
to undergo hysterectomy so she couldnt bear children
anymore. The couple considered surrogacy. By a
common friend, they were able to meet such person by
the name of Anna Johnson who was a nurse.
They entered into a contract wherein:
o Anna would be implanted with an embryo containing
the sperm and egg cells of the couple.
o Anna will turn over all rights over the child.
o Couple will pay 10,000 in installments.
o Couple will pay 200,000 life insurance for Anna.
o Relations deteriorated between the couple and Anna.
Blood tests show that Anna IS NOT the genetic mother.
TC ruled: Couple was the genetic, biological, and
natural parents.
CA affirmed.
ISSUE: WON Anna can claim custody of the child
HELD: NO. Since both parties gave acceptable proof of
maternity: Anna as the gestational mother. Crispina is the
genetic mother. The case will be decided on the parties
intention or from whom the mental concept of the child
emanated. In this case, the couple was considered the
prime-movers. The agreement was not inconsistent with
Public Policy. Gestational surrogacy differs from adoption:
- Child was not born.
- Anna wasnt the genetic mother.
- The payment was for the service
Judgment of CA affirmed.
IN RE ADOPTION OF ANONYMOUS (1973)
345 N.Y.S. 2d 430
During the first marriage, husband A and wife B had a
baby born of consensual AID (Artificial Insemination
Donor). Husband A and wife B were registered parents
in the birth certificate.
A and B separated and later divorced but their decree
declared the child to be legitimate. Wife B and child got
support while husband A had visitation rights. They
were not remiss on their parental duties.
Page 98 of 151
Wife B later remarried husband D. Husband D wanted

to adopt wife Bs daughter but husband a refused to
give consent.
ISSUE: WON husband As consent is required for husband

Ds petition for adoption considering that the child was
conceived through artificial insemination from an unknown
third party donor.
HELD: YES. The Domestic Relations Law requires consent of
both parents over the adoption of a child born in wedlock.
The dispensary circumstances (abandonment, divorce due
to adultery, insanity, etc.) were not present in the case. The
term father is not limited to the biological or natural father,
for what is considered is the legal relationship of father and
child and vice versa. The child cannot be considered
illegitimate since it was born during the marriage and not in
circumstances of infidelity since it was a medically-assisted
procedure where the husband and wife freely consented.
LEGAL ISSUES IN HUMAN EGG DONATION AND
GESTATIONAL SURROGACY
Is it possible to ask a woman to carry a child in her
womb for nine months without giving anything in
return? Unless you can find someone whose hobby is
to get pregnant and give birth, it is quite an
impossibility to have free surrogacy. This is
vulnerable to abuse of women in lower social
economic classes.
Maam Beth tells about the travails of pregnancy and
even asked a pregnant student in the class to share
her prenatal experiences.
What would be the relationship if a woman carries
the embryo formed by her daughter and her
daughters husband? This was an actual case in an
African country wherein the grandmother bore the
child of her daughter.
2. Impugned Legitimacy
FC, Art 166 Legitimacy of a child may be impugned only on
the following grounds:
1. physical impossibility for the husband to have sex
with wife within the first 120 days of the 300 days
which immediately preceded the birth of the child
because of:
a. physical incapacity (impotence)
b. living separately
c. serious illness
2. biological or other scientific reasons, the child could
not have been that of the husband, except in the
instance provided in Par 2 Art 164
3. conceived through artificial insemination, the written
authorization or ratification of either parent was
obtained
through
mistake,
fraud,
violence,
intimidation or undue influence
Whats so important about the first 120 days? It

refers to the first trimester when it cannot be known if a
woman is pregnant. She may not even be aware that she is

pregnant. During the second trimester, the tummy begins to

bulge and so pregnancy becomes evident.
*The presumption is based on the assumption that there is
sexual union in marriage, particularly during the period of
conception. Proof to the contrary would have to be clearly
and convincingly established.
*Serious illness of the husband in Par 1C must be of such a
nature as to exclude the possibility of his having sexual
intercourse with his wife.
*Biological reasons pertain to blood typing and DNA testing
Mothers blood type
BLOOD TYPE
Fathers
blood type
AB
O, A
A, B
O, A
O, A
O, B
O, A, B,
AB
O, B
AB
A, B
O, A, B,
AB
A, B, AB
A, B, AB
O, B
A, B, AB
A, B, AB
A, B, AB
Blood typing is conclusive only in non-paternity, wherein a

childs blood type is not a possible product of the blood
types of the mother and the alleged father. In regard to
confirming paternal ties, it can only go as far as saying that
a man is a possible father.
*Maam Beths friends from UP Med thinks that the law that
only fathers can impugn legitimacy despite scientific proof
that he is not the father, is dumb. The law should do away
with its presumptions if there is convincing proof to overturn
it! Everybody knows what happened, but law is not about
truth but what can be proven.
Why is it all about paternity and not maternity?
Because mothers are with their babies since birth. Fathers
are essentially unattached to their child, so theres a lot of
room for doubts. There is no maternity because who will
know better than the woman if a child is not hers.
ANDAL v MACARAIG (1951)
89 Phil 165
The legitimacy of Mariano Andal is assailed by his
paternal grandmother Eduvigis Macaraig. The action
was to impugn the childs ownership as legitimate heir
of the land given by defendant to the deceased father
(Emiliano) of the child as donation propter nuptias.
If the son was illegitimate, the land would revert back
to Eduvigis. If legitimate, the land remains with the
child.
The grounds for said illegitimacy is as follows:
o Emiliano was afflicted with tuberculosis such that
he could hardly move and get up from his bed.
o Wife had illicit sexual relationship with her
husbands brother, Felix when the latter came to
live with them and help Emiliano work his farm.
o Eventually, Maria Dueas eloped with Felix.
o Emiliano died without the presence of the wife who
didnt even attend the funeral.
Page 99 of 151
ISSUE: WON the son was Emilianos legitimate child and

thus entitled to inherit from his estate.
HELD: YES.
Mariano Andal was legitimate son of Emiliano, he
having been born within three hundred days following
dissolution of marriage. (January 1, 1943 June 17,
1943)
Presumption of legitimacy can only be rebutted by
proof that it was physically impossible for the husband
to have had access to his wife during the first 120 days
of the 300 next preceding the birth of the child.
According to Manresa, impossibility of access means:
o Absence during initial period of conception
o Impotence which is patent, continuing and
incurable
o Imprisonment, unless cohabitation took place
through corrupt violation of prison regulations.
Also, the fact that wife committed adultery is not
sufficient to overturn legitimacy. Husband still had
access to the wife. His sickness does not prevent carnal
intercourse. Further, cases show that tuberculous
patients are inclined to be more sexually active
(because they are bedridden).
JAO v CA (1987)
152 SCRA 359
Perico Jao (private respondent) and Arlene Salgado
(petitioner) lived together as husband and wife.
Arlene gives birth to Janice Marie and claims that Perico
is the father. Perico denies paternity of the child.
They both subjected to blood typing test which
eliminated Perico as the possible father of Janice.
However, RTC still ruled that Janice is child of Perico
and entitled to support from him.
CA reversed following the conclusive and indisputable
evidence of Pericos non-paternity and discrepancies in
the time when the two began cohabiting. What can be
inferred from the dates is the possibility of Janice being
conceived prior to cohabitation of Salgado and Jao.
Jao also previously filed a complaint to delete his name
as the father of the child.
ISSUE: WON blood grouping test is admissible and
conclusive to prove non-paternity.
HELD: Yes. Blood grouping test can establish conclusively
that a man is not a father of the child, but not necessarily
that a man is the father of a particular child. Cohabitation of
the supposed father and the mother cannot be a ground for
compulsory recognition, if such cohabitation could not have
produced the conception of the child.
FC, Art 167 The child shall be considered legitimate although
the mother may have declared against its legitimacy or may
have been sentenced an adulteress.
*Why would a woman do that? Because she just wants to

scorn or humiliate her husband.

*The rule is to protect the children and secure their status

from the passions of their parents. As long as there is
access between husband and wife, mere fact that the wife
was an adulteress or she was raped will not throw
presumption of legitimacy.
*Maam Beth quote: Why would you do that to make your
husband jealous? There must be some other way! Yes,
youll make him jealous but hell kill you too!
Congratulations!
MACADANGDANG v CA & MEJIAS (1980)
100 SCRA 73
Elizabeth Mejias is married to Crispin Anahaw. She had
an affair with Antonio Macadangdang in March 1967.
Mejias and Anahaw separated after that.
In October 1967 (or after 210 days), Mejias gave birth
to a boy named Rolando Macadangdang as reflected in
the baptismal certificate. Mejias sued Macadangdang to
recognize Rolando as his son
Page 100 of 151
FC, Art 169 The legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child born after

300 days following the termination of the marriage shall be
proved by whoever alleges such legitimacy or illegitimacy.
* State of Limbo, wherein the child is statusless

FC, Art 170 When to bring the action to impugn the legitimacy
of the child:
WITHIN:
I. NO CONCEALMENT
1 year
from knowledge of birth or recording in the civil
register - if husband, or any of his heirs reside in the
same place where the birth took place
2 years Not the same place but within the Philippines
3 years Abroad
II. CONCEALED OR UNKNOWN TO HUSBAND OR HEIRS: period
for filling of action shall be counted from discovery or
knowledge of the birth of the child OR of the fact of
registration of said birth, whichever is earlier
ISSUE:
WON Rolando is conclusively presumed the legitimate
child of Mejias and Anahaw
WON Mejias may institute an action that would
bastardize her child without giving her husband, the
legally presumed father, an opportunity to be heard
*Legitimacy of a child must be attacked in a direct action,

not collaterally.
HELD: Rolando is presumed to be the legitimate child of

Mejias and Anahaw. The child was born within 300 days
after the spouses separated. No proof was present to show
that sexual intercourse between them was impossible. In
fact, the wife continuously visits her four children in her
mothers house where her husband also stays. Only the
husband can impugn the legitimacy of the child.
*Maam Beth gave a sample situation, when to start

computing
FC, Art 168 If the marriage is terminated and the mother

contracted another marriage within 300 days after such
termination, these rules shall govern in the absence of proof to
the contrary:
1.
2.
Born before 180 days after solemnization of the

subsequent marriage is considered to have been
conceived during the former marriage, provided it be
born within 300 days after the termination of the former
marriage.
A child born after 180 days following the celebration of
the subsequent marriage is considered to have been
conceived during such marriage, even though it be born
within the 300 days after the termination of the former
marriage.
Illustration:
1st
300 days
Termination
2nd marriage
2nd
180 days
So in a nutshell, the critical point is the 180 days after the

subsequent marriage.
Why did the law impose a time limit to impugn

legitimacy of the child? Because it is in the best interest
of the child to avoid putting his/her status in a state of
uncertainty for a long time.
2 Jan 1988
3 Feb 1988
4 Feb 1989
-- This is vague to
birthday
fact of registration
discovery of birth
me. -_-
What does it mean to be unknown?

the child is registered as the child of other persons
the child is registered in other municipalities
the child is given other names
*Only the husband can contest the legitimacy of a child
born to his wife. It is only in exceptional cases that his heirs
are allowed to contest such legitimacy. If the husband
clearly didnt make use of such right or has desisted from
such intention, the heirs cannot bring the action.
FC, Art 171 When can heirs of the husband may impugn the
filiation of the child
1. if the husband should die before the expiration of the
period fixed for bringing his action
2. if he should die after the filing of the complaint, without
having desisted
3. if the child was born after the death of the husband
CABATBAT-LIM v IAC (1988)

166 SCRA 451
Dra. Esperanza Frianeza-Cabatbats estate is fought
over by her sisters and the children of her deceased

brothers and her allegedly only child with Proceso

Cabatbat, Violeta Cabatbat-Lim (petitioner)
RTC: Violeta is not the offspring and hence, not the
legal heir
Esperanzas brothers and sisters allege that Violeta was
merely a ward (ampun-ampunan), and neither a natural
child nor legally adopted so she is not a legitimate heir
entitled to own Calasiao Bihon Factory
Evidence by Respondents
1. absence of any hospital
record regarding
Esperanzas giving birth
2. absence of Violetas birth
certificate in Pangasinan
Provincial Hospital
3. certificate from the Civil
Registry of the absence
of Violetas birth record
4. certificate of Principal
that Proceso and
Esperanza are registered
only as guardians and
not parents
5. testimony of the cousin
of Violetas biological
mother
Proofs by Petitioner
1. birth record stating that
she is the legitimate child
of Proceso and Esperanza
2. testimony of Proceso that
she is his child
3. testimony of Benita
Lastimosa (alleged bio
mother) that she is not
her child
4. marriage contract where
Esperanza was the mother
5. Deed of Sale when Violeta
was still a minor and
represented by her
mother Esperanza
6. Deed of Absolute Sale
where Proceso
represented her as father
ISSUES:
1. WON TC and CA finding that Violeta is not born of
Esperanza Cabatbat is concluding on SC
2. WON complaint is an action to impugn legitimacy
and Art 263 CC (action to impugn legitimacy) can
be applied
HELD:
1.
2.
YES. The factual findings of the courts are entitled

to great respect. Moreover, the absence of a
record of birth of petitioner Violeta in the Office of
the CivReg General puts a cloud on the genuiness
of her birth record. The records of the hospital
show that only one woman by the name of Benita
Lastimosa gave birth to an illegitimate child on the
date of Violeta birth.
NO. Because this is an action to claim inheritance
of the respondents as legal heirs of their childless
deceased aunt. They do not claim that Violeta is an
illegitimate child, but that she is not a child at all.
CHUA KENG GIAP v IAC & CHUA LIAN KING (1988)

166 SCRA 451
Petitioner insists that he is the son of deceased Sy Kao.
As such, he filed a petition for the settlement of the
estate of the latter.
Private respondent moved to dismiss, due to lack of
action as well as petitioners capacity to file such a
case. It has been declared before that petitioner is not
the son of Chua Bing guan and Sy Kao.
Page 101 of 151
The latter flatly and unequivocally declared that she

was not petitioners mother. Therefore he had no lawful
interest in the estate of Sy Kao.
ISSUE: WON Sy Kao is the mother of the petitioner

HELD: No. Who better than Sy Kao herself would know if
Chua Keng Giap was really her son? More than anyone else,
it was her who could say that petitioner was not begotten of
her womb.
REPUBLIC v LABRADOR (1999)
305 SCRA 438
A childs birth certificate lists her name as Sarah Zita
Caon Erasmo, and her parents Rosemarie Caon
married to Degoberto Erasmo.
On March 1998, her aunt Gladys petitioned the RTC
Cebu to change Sarahs surname to Caon, dropping
Erasmo, and the first name of her mother to Maria
Rosario since her parents were not married.
Gladys said Sarahs mother, her sister, lived abroad
with her foreigner husband.
The RTC granted the petition based on Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. The solicitor-general appealed.
ISSUES:
1. WON a change in the record of birth in a civil
registry, which affects the civil status of the
person, may be granted in summary proceedings
2. WON Rule 108 of the Revised Rules of Court is the
proper action to impugn the legitimacy of the child,
or change filiation
HELD: No, only clerical mistakes can be made and
significant changes may only be granted in direct,
adversarial action. The change sought will result not only in
the substantial correction in the childs record of birth but
also in the childs status thereby affecting her rights which
cannot be done in a summary action. Although Maria
Rosario is the real name of the mother, Sarah will become
an illegitimate child by virtue of the change. Also,
adversarial proceedings are required in such allegations.
Rule 108 may only be used to correct or change clerical or
innocuous errors.
Also, Sarah and her purported parents should have been
parties to the proceedings. There is also no sufficient legal
explanation why the Gladys, without appointment as
guardian, was the petitioner.
Effects:
Sarahs successional and other rights may change
Illegitimacy may bring social stigma and embarrass

Sarah
Rights of her parents over her and over each other

will be affected
A change of name will affect mother and creditors

TAN v TROCIO (1990)
191 SCRA 764
School owner and directress, Felicidad Baraan Tan
filed an administrative complaint seeking disbarment of

Atty. Galileo Trcio for immorality and conduct

unbecoming of a lawyer.
She alleged that Trocio, who is the legal counsel of the
school overpowered her inside the office and against
her will, succeeded in having carnal knowledge of her.
And as a result, she begot a son whom she named
Jewel Tan. She further alleged that he used to support
Jewel but subsequently lost interest and stopped.
She claimed she filed the complaint only after 8 years
from the incident because Trocio threatened her with
the deportation of her alien husband and due to the
fact that she was married and has eight children.
Trocio files his answer stating that he was indeed a
counsel of the school as well as of Tan and her family
but denies he sexually assaulted her. He adds that the
principal was a in a revenge trip when he declined her
request to commit a breach of trust.
ISSUE: WON Trocio had sexually assaulted Tan as a

consequence of which the latter begot a child by him (and is
thus a ground for Trocios disbarment for immoral conduct)
HELD: No. Disbarment complaint dismissed for insufficiency
of basis of the allegations. The alleged threat to deport her
husband could not hold because she admitted having lost
contact with her husband when he learned of the
respondents transgression that very same evening. The
fear had thus become inexistent. She also maintained her
transactions with Tan as if nothing had happened. Such
actions can be construed as condonation of his alleged
immoral act.
Physical likeness and unusual closeness between Trocio and
Jewel is not conclusive proof of paternity, much less
violation of Tans person and honor.
Jewel was born during the wedlock of Tan and her husband
as such, the presumption of legitimacy prevails.
*Whats the big deal about naming the son Jewel? For all
we know, the name is pronounced as Joel.
*Why is there an expected reaction from sexually-abused
woman? Different people have different ways of reacting!
*If she aborts it, shes wrong. If she learns to love it, she
wasnt raped. Theres no option!!!
PEOPLE v TUMIMPAD (1994)
235 SCRA 483
Moreno L. Tumimpad and Constable Ruel C. Prieto are
charged with the crime of rape of Sandra Salcedo, a 15
years old, had a mind of a five year old child. The
accused are two of the four security men assigned to
the victims father.
Sandra first complained of constipation but after
medical aid was sought, her condition did not improve.
However, upon seeing Tumimpad coming out from the
kitchen she told her mother Mama, patayin mo yan,
bastos. The mother became suspicious so she brought
Sandra to the hospital where they found out that she
was pregnant. Nine months later, Sandra gave birtb to
a baby boy who was named Jacob.
Sandra was able to pick the pictures of Tumimpad and
Prieto and in the police line-up she pointed to the
accused.
Page 102 of 151
The accused moved that a blood test be conducted on

the offended party, her child Jacob and the two
accused. The result of the test showed that Jacob has
a type O blood, Sandra type B, Prieto type A and
Tumimpad type O.
RTC convicted Tumimpad but acquitted Prieto. The
acquittal of Prieto was on reasonable doubt stating that
he has a different type of blood with the child Jacob.
ISSUE: WON it was impossible for Tumimpad to have

committed the crime of rape because most of the time he
and his co-accused were together with Col. Salcedo.
HELD: No. It was proven that they were not always with
Col. Salcedo. There were instances that they would even
play with Sandra. Based on this it is not physically
impossible for the accused to have access to Sandra.
Tumimpad argued that his conviction was erroneously
based on the medical finding that he and the victim have
the same blood type O.
In Jao vs. Court of Appeals it was held that Paternity
Science has demonstrated that by the analysis of blood
samples of the mother, the child and the alleged father, it
can be established conclusively that the man is not the
father of a particular child. But group blood testing cannot
show only a possibility that he is.
BENITEZ-BADUA v CA (1994)
229 SCRA 468
Vicente Benitez & Isabel Chipongian owned various
properties. On April 25, 1982 Isabel died & her estate
was settled extra-judicially. ON Nov. 13, 1989 Vicente
died intestate.
Private respondents, Victoria Benitez-Lirio (Vicentes
sister) & Feodor Benitez Aguilar (Vicentes nephew)
filed a case in the RTC, praying for the issuance of
letters of administration of Vicentes estate in favor of
Aguilar. They allege that Vicente is survived by no other
heirs or relatives. That the spouses were w/o issue &
without descendants whatsoever and that Marissa
Benitez Badua who was raised and cared for by the
spouses was not related to them by blood nor legally
adopted, & therefore not an heir. On Nov. 2, 1990
Marissa opposed the petition stating that she was the
sole heir of Vicente.
If Marissa was really a biological and legitimate
daughter, there would be no need for
TC received evidence regarding the matter:
Marissa tried to prove she was the legitimate child

of the spouses, presenting documentary evidence:
o Her certificate of live birth
o Baptismal certificate
o Income tax returns & information sheet
for membership w/ GSIS of Vicente,
naming her his daughter
o School records
o She also testified that they raised her as
their legit daughter
Private respondents presented testimonial evidence

that the spouses failed to have a child & that
Isabel was referred to Dr. Manahan (an ob-gyne)
for treatment

TC ruled in favor of Marissa, relying on Art 166 and Art 170

FC. CA however reversed their decision stating that Marissa
is not the biological child of the spouses and therefore not a
legal heir. The CA also held that the TC erred in applying Art
166 and Art 170 FC
ISSUES:
1. WON Art 164, 166, 170 & 171 FC is applicable to
the case, as the petitioner contends.
2. WON Marissa is the biological child of the spouses
and therefore a legal heir.
HELD: No. The following DO NOT contemplate a situation
like the instant case, where a child is alleged not to be the
biological child of a certain couple. These articles govern a
situation where a husband (or his heirs) denies as his own a
child of his wife. The CA correctly refused to apply these
articles to the case. Since this case doesnt contend that
Marissa is not the child of Vicente by Isabel; but that she
wasnt born to the spouses. Cabatbat-Lim v IAC is
appropriate to the case. The totality of contrary evidence
presented by the respondents sufficiently rebutted the truth
of the content of petitioners birth certificate.
LUMAIN DE APARICHO v PARAGUYA (1987)
150 SCRA 279
Trinidad Montilde had a love affair with Reverend
Father Felipe Lumain, a priest, and in the process she
conceived. When she was 4 months pregnant, in order
to conceal her disgrace from the public, she decided to
marry one Anastacio Mamburao.
Father Lumain himself solemnized their marriage in
March 1924. However, the couple never lived together
as husband and wife. Trinidad gave birth to daughter
Consolacion Lumain in Sept, 192 days or 6 mos after
the marriage.
Father Lumain eventually died but he left a last will &
testament wherein he acknowledged Consolacion as his
daughter and instituted her as the sole and universal
heir of all his property rights and interests. This was
duly probated in CFI and on appeal was affirmed by the
CA.
After reaching age of majority, daughter Consolacion
filed an action in CFI against one Hipolito Paraguya for
the recovery of certain parcels of land she claims to
have inherited from her father, the priest.
Hipolito Paraguya was declared owner of portions A, B,
H, F and G and all its improvements. The land in
question is portion G. Hipolito assails also that
Consolacion is not a natural child of the late Fr Lumain.
TC: Bearing in mind the date of the birth of the
plaintiff, it is evident that her mother Trinidad was still
single at the time she was conceived. It is a legal
presumption that plaintiff is the daughter of the
spouses Anastacio and Trinidad. However, this was
disputable and Trinidad successfully overcame it.
Consolacion is therefore the natural child of Father
Lumain and she is entitled to claim the disputed
property, she having been instituted in the will as
universal heir.
Page 103 of 151
ISSUE: WON Consolacion is the natural child of Lumain and

if so, WON she is entitled to the possession of Portion G
HELD: SC finds it unnecessary to determine the paternity of

appellee Consolacion. As Father Lumain, who died w/o any
compulsory heir, Consolacion is therefore his lawful heir as
duly instituted in his will. One who has no compulsory heirs
may dispose by will all of his estate or any part of it in favor
of any person having capacity to succeed. Portion G and its
improvement declared to be owned by Consolacion. No
award of moral damages to be given to Hipolito for
Consolacion was acting in her belief that she was legal heir
of the land. Judgment affirmed.
B. Proof of Filiation
1. How to prove filiation
FC, Art 172 The filiation of legitimate children is established by
any of the following:
(PRIMARY EVIDENCE FOR VOLUNTARY RECOGNITION)

1.
The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a

final judgment
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document
or a private handwritten instrument and signed by the
parent concerned
In the absence of which:
(SECONDARY EVIDENCE FOR INVOLUNTARY RECOG)

1.
2.
The open and continuous possession of the status of a

legitimate child
Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and
special laws
* Defense against Art 166 (grounds for impugning)

It is the husband or his heirs who must present proofs to
overcome the presumption of legitimacy.
* Necessary for Art 169 (statusless) The Family Code
gives children their status from the moment of their birth.
But such status may be questioned or in the case of a child
born after 300 days following the termination of the
marriage of the mother, the law does not give him any
status so that the child or someone in his behalf will have to
prove his status for him.
* Secondary evidence not admissible if primary exists!
My question: In this case, can a man voluntarily recognize
the child to be his illegitimate child at the opposition of the
biological mother?
RECORD OF BIRTH
The books making up the civil register and all the
documents relating thereto shall be considered public
documents and shall be prima facie evidence of the
truth of the facts therein
If the alleged father did not intervene in the making of
the birth certificate, the putting of his name by the

mother or doctor or registrar is void. The fathers

signature is necessary.
*Maam Beth says that the rule requiring fathers signature
on the birth certificate to prove participation is ridiculous
since there is no blank or provided space for the father to
sign. The only chance a father can sign on the birth
certificate is if he is the informant.
ADMISSION IN A DOCUMENT
A public document is one which is 1) issued by a public
office and 2) private document that is notarized
A typewritten document containing an admission of the
legitimate filiation is not admissible, as the signature
therein may be super-imposed and may not be the true
signature of the parent
Also, for handwritten documents, the intent to
recognize the child must be sufficiently apparent.
OPEN AND CONTINUOUS POSSESSION OF THE STATUS OF
A LEGITIMATE CHILD
E.g. bearing the fathers surname, treatment by the
parents and of the family of the child as legitimate,
constant attendance to the childs support and
education and giving the child the reputation of being
the child of his parents
BASIS: the admission of the parents themselves and
the concurrence therein of the family and of the society
Continuous = uninterrupted and consistent
o Tolentino: idea of possesory status of some
duration
o Sempio-Diy: no required particular length of time
o Pangalangan: distinguished from continually
which allows for interruption as long as it is in a
regular basis, continuously may be translated to
walang humpay
Maybe enjoyed by a child conceived but not yet born
OTHER MEANS ALLOWED BY THE RULES OF COURT AND
SPECIAL LAWS
A. Baptismal certificate: is a presumptive evidence
only, especially when people often have different
names in their birth certificate and baptismal
B. Judicial admission
C. Family bible where childs name is entered: As
explained by Maam Beth, this is given importance
because a Bible is presumed to have been there for
generations and is handed down to children. As the
family grows, the names of the children are added
in the list. This is biased to Catholics though.
D. Common reputation respecting pedigree.
E. Admission by silence
F. Testimonies of witnesses
G. Other kinds of proofs admissible under Rule 130 of
RRC
Page 104 of 151
RRC, Rule 130

Declaration against interest
Act or declaration about pedigree
Family reputation or tradition regarding pedigree
Common reputation
Entries in official records
Testimony or deposition at a former proceeding
Opinion of expert witness
Opinion of ordinary witnesses
CC, Art 220 In case of doubt, all presumptions favor the
solidarity of the family. Thus, every intendment of law or facts
leans toward the validity of marriage, the indissolubility of the
marriage bonds, the legitimacy of children, the community of
property during marriage, the authority of parents over their
children, and the validity of defense for any member of the
family in case of unlawful aggression.
****For cases under Proof of Filiation, focus on the pieces

of evidence established in each case
CONSTANTINO v MENDEZ (1992)
209 SCRA 18
Amelia Constantino filed an action for acknowledgment,
support of her child Michael, and damages against Ivan
Mendez, a married man. Mendez denied having sexual
intercourse with Constantino.
HELD: Filiation was not proven by clear and convincing
evidence. The burden of proof to establish the allegation is
on Constantino. Constantinos testimony as to when she had
intercourse with Mendez is contradicted by evidence. The
date was crucial to determine whether Michael was
conceived during the time Amelia and Ivan were having
sexual relations. There was also no clear and convincing
proof that Amelia did not have any sexual encounter with
other men.
MENDOZA v MELIA (1966)
17 SCRA 788
Father versus sons common law wife and her son
Paciano Pareja owned lot No. 3390-B in Sorsogon. He
donated it to his son Gavino in 1939. Gavino during
that time had been living with his common-law spouse
Catalina Mendoza, and their only son Rodolfo who was
born in 1935.
Gavino disappeared in 1943 and had not been heard of
since. Paciano Pareja sold the disputed property to
Temistocles Mella in 1948 who then told herein
petitioners to vacate the said land in 1952.
With the notice remaining unheeded, Mella filed and
action in 1955. Petitioners claim ownership of said land,
claiming Rodolfo as the rightful successor being the son
of Gavino, and for having adverse possession of the
land for 10 years. Trial and appellate courts ruled for
Mella, hence this challenge by Catalina and Rodolfo.
As to the issue of possession, petitioners invoke Art.
390 of Civil Code but the respondent argued that this
was never raised in the trial court nor the appellate
court thus could not be considered at the SC.
With the issue of Rodolfo as successor, he showed a
coy of his birth certificate.

ISSUE: WON Rodolfo can be considered acknowledged

natural child by virtue of his birth certificate as evidence.
HELD: No. The appellate court deemed the birth certificate
insufficient because it did not have the signatures of the
parents, it being only a certified copy of the registry. The
court ruled that in the absence of such signatures, there
was no clear proof that the parent recognizes the child.
LIM v CA (1975)
65 SCRA 160
- In 1962, Felisa Lim brought suit against Francisco Miguel
Romualdez Uy Chen Hong for the declaration of nullity of
the affidavit Uy executed in which he adjudicated to
himself (120 square meters located in Tayabas), as the
only son and heir of Susana Lim.
- Uy and Lim fights over the inheritance of Susana Lims
property, to the exclusion of each other
- Lim claims that she is the natural daughter of Susana. Her
evidence are as follows:
o baptismal certificate which stated the her mother
was Susana
o marriage contract wherein Susana gave consent to
the marriage of Felisa
- On the other hand, Uy claims that he is the only son and
heir of Susana. His evidence:
o application form for alien registration which stated
that his mother was Susana
o order of the BOI cancelling his alien registration, by
derivation from his Filipina mother
o his identification certificate which describes him as
the son of Susana.
- RTC: In 1967, Felisa Lim was held as the daughter and
only heir of Susana Lim to which Uy filed a motion for
reconsideration and new trial but the court denied it.
- CA: Upon Uys appeal, CA ruled that neither Felisa Lim nor
Uy is entitled to the inheritance because:
o neither of them been recognized by Susana Lim as
her child by any means provided for by law
o neither of them been declared in a judicial
proceeding to be the child of Susana Lim
- They both assailed the decision of the CA
- Lim says that Susanas consent to her marriage
constitutes recognition as natural daughter and was even
executed in a public document in the form of her
marriage contract (Sec 131 of CC of 1889 says that be
made in the record of birth, in a will or some other public
document
- Guadalupe Uy contended that her husband purchased the

property in question with his own money prior to his
mothers death and took conveyance and title. There was
an existence of implied trust. His mother gave him a little
money to complete the purchase price.
ISSUES & HELD:
1. WON Felisa Lim is entitled to the inheritance. NO
- Felisa Lim alleges that she was recognized by Susana Lim
during 1943 which means that it was during the effectivity
of the Civil Code of 1889. Sec. 131 of CC of 1889
requires that the recognition of a natural child be made in
Page 105 of 151
the record of birth, in a will, or in some other public

document.
- Public documents are those authenticated by a notary or
by a competent public official, with formalities required by
law. The two classes of public documents are:
o Executed by private individuals which must be
authenticated by notaries (MARRIAGE CONTRACTS
WOULD FALL UNDER THIS CATEGORY)
o Those issued by competent public officials by
reason of their office
- Marriage contract presented by Felisa does not satisfy the
requirements of solemnity prescribed by article 131 of the
CC of 1889. There was no intervention of a notary.
- The marriage contract is a mere declaration by the
contracting parties, in the presence of the person
solemnizing the marriage and of two witnesses of legal
age, that they take each other as husband and wife,
signed by signature or mark by the said contracting
parties and the said witnesses, and attested by the
person solemnizing the marriage.
2. WON Uy is entitled to the inheritance. NO
- The title is in the name of Susana Lim, and oral testimony
cannot overcome the fact that the sale was made to
Susana Lim and title issued in her favor
- Implied trust arises where a person purchases land with
his own money and takes conveyance thereof in the name
of another. The property is held on a resulting trust in
favor of the one furnishing the consideration for the
transfer unless a different intention or understanding
appears.
- Uy raised the theory of implied trust in favor of her
husband for the first time in her motion for
reconsideration filed with the appellate court and
evidence regarding the purchase by her husband is
altogether unconvincing.
HEIRS OF RAYMUNDO BAAS v HEIRS OF BIBIANO
BAAS (1985)
134 SCRA 260
Raymundo was the child of Dolores Castillo and an
unknown father. Upon Raymundos death, his heirs
filed for partition of recovery of hereditary share
against the heirs of Bibiano, claiming that Raymundo
was a recognized natural son of Bibiano.
Faustina
Bibiano
Pedro
Trinidad, niece of Faustina
PETITIONERS
EVIDENCE
Handwritten note
alledgedly written by
Bibiano to the 18 yo
Raymundo with a
complimentary ending
Dolores
Raymundo
CC 278 provides for authentic

handwriting which is a private
document thus acknowledgement of the
child in such instrument should not be
incidental but explicit. The

su padre
School records, report

cards, school receipts for
matriculation all signed
and paid by Bibiano
Typewritten letters to
Atty. Faustino alleging
his personal
circumstance; as well as
typewritten
autobiography asserting
that his father is a
surgeon Bibiano Baas
complimentary ending might be due to

the close relations Raymundo enjoyed
with his uncle/guardian Bibiano; there
is no clear expression of
acknowledgement of filiation. Paternal
solicitude paternity
Bibiano signed these documents as
guardian of Raymundo while he is
growing up since the latter spent for his
education because Pedro (the real
father) is unable to support him; thus it
is natural that Bibiano signs as the
guardian even more so that Raymundo
spent most his lifetime in Bibiano and
Fautinas care
WON prescription barred private respondents right to

demand partition of Lupos estate.
2. WON the private respondents, who belatedly filed the
action for recognition, were able to prove their
successional rights of over the estate.
What is the nature of the complaint filed by the private
respondents.
This typewritten evidence taken into

account the contradicting testimony of
Raymundos wife Trinidad casts doubt
to the authenticity of these personal
accounts of Raymundo
1) WON prescription barred private respondents right to

demand partition of Lupos estate.
Since they are legit kids and heirs of Lupo, the time
limitation prescribed in Art 258 for filing an action for
recognition is inapplicable. Prescription doesnt run against
private respondents w/ respect to the filing of the action for
partition so long as the heirs for whose benefit prescription
is invoked, havent expressly or impliedly repudiated the coownership. Prescription of an action for partition doesnt lie
except when the co-ownership is properly repudiated by the
co-owner.
A co-owner cant acquire by prescription the share of
the other co-owner absent a clear repudiation of coownership duly communicated to the other co-owners.
Also, an action to demand partition is imprescriptible &
cant be barred by laches. It is at once an action for
declaration of co-ownership & for segregation & conveyance
of a certain property.
No valid repudiation was made by the petitioners.
Assuming the petitioners registration of the subject lot was
an act of repudiation of co-ownership, prescription hasnt
set in when private respondents filed in 1973 the present
action for partition. The registration didnt operate as a
valid repudiation of the co-ownership.
SC stated that prescription, as a mode of terminating a
relation of co-ownership, must have been preceded by
repudiation w/c subject to certain conditions:
1) a co-owner repudiates the co-ownership
2) such an act of repudiation is clearly made known
to the other co-owners
3) the evidence thereon is clear & conclusive
4) he has been in possession thru open,
continuous, exclusive & notorious possession of
the prop for a period required by law
Inasmuch as petitioners registered the prop in their
names in fraud of their co-heirs, prescription can only be
deemed to have commenced from the time private
respondents discovered the petitioners act of defraudation.
And this action was commenced 2 months after learning
petitioners had registered in their names the lots involved to
the prejudice of private respondents.
RESPONDENTS EVIDENCE
C O U R T
S A Y S
A sworn affidavit duly notarized

and executed by Bibiano Banas
declaring that Raymundo Banas
is his brother, Pedros son
A public instrument explicitly

stating Pedro is the father of
Raymundo is strong evidence
that he does not acknowledge
or have the intention thereof
that the latter is his son
A sworn JOINT affidavit duly

notarized and executed by
Raymundo and Pedro Banas
correcting an error made on the
marriage certificate of the
former changing the father of
Raymundo from Bibiano to
Pedro
If Raymundo really believed that

he is indeed the son of Bibiano
he could not have consented to
executing such declaration;
Trinidads contention of the
document was contradictory
and therefore set aside.
*Maam Beth does not buy the interpretation of Your

Father as a reference term for an uncle.
UYGUANGCO v CA See Illegitimate Filiation
MARIATEGUI v CA (1992)
205 SCRA 675
Lupo Mariategui during his lifetime contracted three
marriages with three different women and sired three sets
of children.
First: with Eusebia Montellano, 4 kids
Baldomera: died, survived by kids surnamed Espina
Maria del Rosario
Urbana
Ireneo: died, left a son, Ruperto
Second: with Flaviana Montellano, one daughter, Cresciana
Third: with Felipa Velasco, 3 kids: Jacinto, Julian, Paulina
He died intestate and the children from his 1st and 2nd
marriages excluded the children from the 3rd marriage in the
extra-judicial partition of Lupos properties.
ISSUES:
Page 106 of 151
1.
HELD: The children from the third marriage continuously

possessed the status of legitimate children. Filiation of
legitimate children may be established by the record of birth
appearing in the civil registrar, a final judgment or by the
open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate
child.
2) WON the private respondents, were

successional rights over the estate. YES
FC has to apply since it is effective
Art 172, filiation of legit kids may be
record of birth appearing in the civil
able to prove their

already. And under
established by the
register or a final

judgment or by the open & continuous possession of the

status of a legit kid.
Evidence proves the private respondents legit filiation.
Jacintos birth cert was presented. Though Julian and
Paulina didnt present evidence required by Art 172, they
continuously enjoyed the status as kids of Lupo in the same
manner as Jacinto. And for a considerable length of time &
despite the death of their mom, they lived with Lupo until
his death.
ACEBEDO v ARQUERO (2003)
399 SCRA 10
Edwin Acebedo charged Eddie Arquero for immorality in
an administrative complaint. He alleged that his wife,
Dedje Irader Acebedo and respondent unlawfully
cohabited as husband and wife as a result of which a
girl, Desiree May Irader Arquero, was born to the two.
Attached was the birth certificate of the girl indicating
her parents to be Arquero and Dedjoe. He also
presented a copy of their marriage contract.
Arquero vehemently denied the charge of immorality,
claiming that it is just a mere harassment and a
product of complainants hatred and extreme jealousy
to his wife. He presented a sworn statement wherein
Edwin Acebedo (complainant) acknowledged paternity
of a child born out of wedlock, which documents,
respondent claims, support his contention that the
complaint filed against him is but a malicious scheme
concocted by complainant to harass him. He also said
that the complainant was cohabiting with another
woman.
MTC recommended that the complaint be dismissed for
failure to adduce adequate evidence to show that
respondent is guilty of the charge
Memorandum by the Office of the Court Administrator
disagreeing with the recommendation of the
Investigating Judge that the case should be dismissed,
recommends that respondent be held guilty of
immorality and that he be suspended from office for a
period of one (1) year without pay.
ISSUE: WON Arquero can be suspended due to immorality.
RATIO: Yes.
The entry of respondents name as father in the
baptismal certificate of Desiree May I. Arquero cannot
be used to prove her filiation and, therefore, cannot be
availed of to imply that respondent maintained illicit
relations with Dedje Irader Acebedo.
A baptismal certificate merely attests to the fact which
gave rise to its issue, and the date thereof, to wit, the
fact of the administration of the sacrament on the date
stated, but not the truth of the statements therein as to
the parentage of the child baptized.
Arquero admitted that he had an illicit relationship with
the wife of the complainant
Arquero justified his pursuing a relationship with
complainants wife with the spouses having previously
entered into a settlement with respect to their marriage
which was embodied in a Kasunduan.
This justification fails because Arquero, being an
employee of the judiciary, knows that the Kasunduan
Page 107 of 151
has no force and effect because Article 1 of the FC

provides: marriage is an inviolable social institution
whose nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation. It is an
institution of public order or policy, governed by rules
established by law which cannot be made inoperative
by the stipulation of the parties.
RA 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees,
enunciates the States policy of promoting a high
standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the
public service
Although every office in the government service is a
public trust, no position exacts a greater demand for
moral righteousness and uprightness from an individual
than in the judiciary.
Argueros act of having illicit relations with the
complainants wife is a disgraceful and immoral
conduct.
Under Rule IV, Section 52A (15) of the Revised Uniform
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service, an
immoral conduct is classified as a grave offense which
calls for a penalty of suspension for six (6) months and
one (1) day to one (1) year for the first offense, and
dismissal is imposed for the second offense. Since it is
his first offense, his suspension for six (6) months and
one (1) day is in order.
HERRERA v ALBA (2005)

460 SCRA 197
Armi Alba instituted an action for support, damages and
compulsory recognition against Rosendo Herrera on
behalf of her 13 year old son Rosendo Alba.
Respondent requested for DNA testing to determine her
sons paternal relation to Herrera, which RTC granted.
Herrera appealed assailing that compulsory DNA testing
violates his constitutional right against self-incrimination
CA: right against self-incrimination applies only to
testimonial compulsion and affirmed the order to DNA
ISSUE: WON DNA testing is a valid test for paternity in this
jurisdiction
HELD: Yes. DNA testing has probative value in this
jurisdiction owing to its growing accuracy in establishing
matches between a parent and an offspring. However, it
should take not of the following things:
1. how the samples were collected and handled
2. the possibility of contamination of samples
3. the procedure followed in analyzing the samples
4. whether the proper standards and procedures were
followed in conducting the tests
5. qualification of the analysts who conducted the test
The policy of the FC to liberalize the rule on the
investigation of the paternity and filiation of children,
especially legitimate children is without prejudice to the
right of the putative parent to claim his or her own
defenses.

FOUR SIGNIFICANT PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF A

TRADITIONAL PATERNITY
1. prima facie case that the woman had sexual
relation with the putative father
2. affirmative defense show physical incapability or
sexual relations OR sexual relation with other men
at the time of conception
3. presumption of legitimacy
4. physical resemblance between father and child
2. Action to claim legitimacy
FC, Art 173 The action to claim legitimacy may be

brought by the child during his or her lifetime and shall
be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
the minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the
heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
institute action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive

notwithstanding the death of either or both of the
parties.
The right of a child to claim legitimacy may only be
transferred to the heirs under two cases and within 5 years:
1. if the child dies during minority
2. if the child dies in a state of insanity
*The effect of legitimacy claim extends the successional
rights
3. Rights of legitimate children

FC, Art 174 Legitimate children shall have the right:
1. to bear the surnames of the father and the
mother, in conformity with the provisions of the
CC on surname
2. to receive support from their parents, their
ascendants, and in proper cases, their brothers
and sisters, in conformity with the provisions of
this Code on Support
3. to be entitled to the legitimate and other
successional rights granted to them by the CC
*Maam Beths mnemonics: 3s - support, surname,
succession
*The childs use of his/her father surname indicates the
family to which he/she belongs. Hence, it is mandatory for
the child to do so.
REPUBLIC v CA & VICENCIO (1998)
300 SCRA 138
Cynthia Vicencio was born on 19 January 1971 at the
Capitol Medical Center, Quezon City to spouses Pablo
Castro Vicencio and Fe Esperanza de Vega Leabres.
Page 108 of 151
They lived in Meycauayan, Bulacan and Pablo left the

said abode on 10 January 1972 after a quarrel with Fe
and from then on was never seen or heard from.
Neither was any support for his family ever received
from him.
29 June 1976, Fe Esperanza petitioned for the
dissolution of their conjugal partnership which was
granted. On 11 July 1977 Fe petitioned to drop the
surname of her estranged husband, it was approved.
On 26 April 1986, Pablo was judicially declared as an
absentee.
Fe married Ernesto Yu on 15 April 1986, with then
Mandaluyong City Mayor Benjamin Abalos Sr.
solemnizing the ceremony.
Cynthia grew up treating Yu as her father and Yu
treated her as his own daughter. Confusion and
embarrassment was caused by her use of the surname
Vicencio when his stepfather is surnamed Yu.
She was made to use the surname Yu when she joined
two beauty pageants, where the use was with the
consent of her stepfather. When Cynthia petitioned
for a change in surname, the stepfather openly
declared his consent. The Trial Court decided in her
favor and Appellate Court upheld, both saying that
granting her request would be for the best interest of
Cynthia
SG opposed saying that even if it would improve her
personality, there was no valid, proper, and reasonable
cause to grant her request. It would generate
complicated problems especially with regards to
problems of inheritance since her status will be
affected. They say, Ernesto could have adopted her
instead of Cynthia coming to court with this petition.
ISSUE: WON appellate court erred in affirming trial courts

decision allowing the change of private respondents
surname with that of her stepfather.
HELD: Yes. A change of name is a privilege, not a matter of
right, addressed to the sound discretion of the court, which
has the duty to consider carefully the consequences of a
change of name and to deny the same unless weighty
reasons are shown. Confusion might arise with regard to
private
respondents
parentage
because
of
her
surname. But even more confusion with grave legal
consequences could arise if we allow private respondent to
bear her step-fathers surname, even if she is not legally
adopted by him. A legitimate child must use the surname of
his/her father.

DE ASIS v CA (1999)
303 SCRA 176
Vircel Andres, mother and legal guardian of her son
Glen Camil Andres de Asis, brought an action for
support and maintenance against the alleged father
Manuel de Asis. Manueld denied filiation. Vircel agreed
to compromise that she would not pursue the case if
Manuel will withdraw his counterclaim. After six years,
Vircel filed an action for support and maintenance of
her son.
HELD: The right to support cannot be the subject of
compromise. The action for support cannot be barred by res
judicata. The ratio behind the prohibition against waving the
right to future support is the need to maintain ones
existence. Paternity and filiation (or lack of it) must be
judicially established and it is for the court to declare its
existence or absence. It cannot be left to the will or
agreement of the parties. The agreement entered into by
the petitioner and respondents mother for the dismissal of
the complaint for maintenance and support, which is in the
nature of a compromise, cannot be countenanced. The right
to receive support can neither be renounced nor transmitted
to a third person as per Art 301 CC. Also, future support
cannot be the subject of a compromise as in Art 2035.
** Legitime of a legitimate child: half of the parents estate
divided by the number of legitimate children.
C. Illegitimate Children
Generally, illegitimate children are those born of parents
who are not united by a valid marriage.
Under the CC, there were three main groups of illegitimate
children:
1. Natural children
2. Natural children by legal fiction
3. Spurious children
o adulterous
o incestuous
o sacrilegious born of persons who are
disqualified to marry by reason of religious
profession
o manceres those born of prostitutes
Under our law, there is no disqualification to marry on the
ground of religious profession. And we also have no law
which automatically classifies children of prostitutes as
illegitimate.
FC abolished all distinctions between illegitimate children
such that there are only two categories of children today:
legitimate and illegitimate.
However, an informal distinction between two groups of
illegitimate children was established:
Page 109 of 151
1.
2.
those conceived of parents who have no legal

impediment to marry at the time of the conception
may be legitimated
all other illegitimate children
1. Proof of filiation
FC, Art 175 Illegitimate children may establish their
illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children. (Art 172)
The action must be brought within the same period
specified in Art 173 (lifetime of the child, will not be
extinguished by death of either parties), except when
the action is based on the second paragraph of Art 172,
in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent.
Why must the action be brought during the lifetime
of the putative parent in Par 2? Since there might still
be a question as to whether the child is really the
illegitimate child of the alleged parent or not, the latter must
be given an opportunity to contest the action, and this he or
she can only do if the action is filed during his or her
lifetime.
Maam Beth asks: How would illegitimate children know
they are illegitimate if they have always been living with the
family? The only time theyd learn they do are not entitled
to their parents estate is when they die. Only Sempio-Diy
knows that rule, mortals dont!
COMPARED WITH THE CC PROVISION ON PROVING
ILLEGITIMATE FILIATION: Art 285 provided for exceptions
in the prescription for recognition of natural children, FC
removed this provision in Par 2, Art 175. (Uyguangco v CA)
1. If the father or the mother died during the minority
of the child, in which case the latter may file the
action before the expiration of four years from the
attainment of his majority.
2. If after the death of the father or of the mother a
document should appear of which nothing had
been heard and in which either or both parents
recognize the child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within 4 years
from the finding of the document.
HOW TO BRING ACTION TO CLAIM FILIATION
1. File a separate action
2. Intervene in the settlement of estate of his/her
alleged parent
LEUTERIO v CA (1991)
197 SCRA 369
Ma. Alicia Leuterio claims that she is the natural
daughter of Pablo Leuterio and Ana Maglangque, who
was the servant of the former.
Alicia claims that she was conceived at the time when
her parents were not disqualified to marry each other

and that she was legitimated by the marriage of her

parents nine years after her birth.
Around four months after Pablos marriage to Ana,
Pablo died so she took possession of Pablos estate and
its administration,
Pablos siblings objected and prayed for the
administration and succession rights be transferred to
them alleging that Pablo died a widower and that the
allegation that Alicia was a legitimated daughter is
without foundation in fact and law.
The lower court affirmed this conclusion and said that
Alicias evidences are insufficient, being forged and
incompetent
There was no document to show that petitioner had
been supported by the deceased in his lifetime. There
were neither receipts of payment of school fees in the
name of Pablo nor signatures in school cards and
letters to relatives or friends naming Maria Alicia as
daughter.
The baptismal certificate and birth certificate do not
bear express acknowledgment of petitioner as a child of
the deceased.
As proof of filiation, petitioner claimed that she was in
the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural
child of the decedent and her mother.
CA affirmed the lower courts findings ratiocinating that
it is not unusual if Pablo looked upon Maria as if she
were his own daughter because he had no child in his
previous marriage.
ISSUE: WON Alicia is the legitimated daughter of Pablo and

Ana
HELD: No. CA decision was affirmed. The relief of petitioner
is that of involuntary recognition which may be given if
there is incontrovertible paper written by the parent
expressly recognizing his paternity. The recognition must be
precise, express and solemn. The photographs she
presented likewise did not bear the decedents signature.
She was also not a legitimated daughter.
UYGUANGCO v CA (1989)
178 SCRA 684
Graciano Uyguangco claims that he is the illegitimate
son of the late Apolinario Uyguangco who died
intestate. Graciano admits having no documents to
prove his filiation but claims to be in continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
He moved to Misamis Oriental where Apolinario
supported his education and even hired him as a
storekeeper in their store without objection of the
family. He was allowed to use the surname and shared
in the profits of the copra business.
ISSUE: WON he should be allowed to prove that he is an
illegitimate child of his claimed father, who is already dead,
in the absence of the documentary evidence required by the
CC.
HELD: The action to prove illegitimate filiation is barred.
Since Graciano seeks to prove filiation based on Par 2 of Art
172 FC, it should take place during the lifetime of the
Page 110 of 151
parent. His action is barred because of the death of his

father. Art 283 CC which gives weight to continuous
possession of the status of a child of his alleged father by
the direct acts of the latter or his family has been
superseded by Art 175 FC.
RODRIGUEZ v CA (1995)
245 SCRA 150
On Oct. 15, 1986, Clarito Agbulos filed a case against
Bienvenido Rodriguez. He presented his mother as
witness to reveal the identity of his father.
Counsel for Rodriguez objected and the Trial Court
sustained.
Clarito filed a petition in the SC and the SC referred the
case to the CA. That decision is assailed in this case.
Petitioner: Felicitas shouldnt be allowed to reveal the
name of the father as stated in Art. 280 of the Civil
Code:
When the father or the mother makes the
recognition separately, he or she shall not
reveal the name of the person with whom
he or she had the child; neither shall she
state any circumstance whereby the other
party may be identified.
-
Respondent: Fecilitas should be allowed by :

1. Art 283(4) CC: The father is obliged to recognize
the child as his natural child when the child has in
his favor any evidence or proof that the defendant
is his father
2. Sec 30, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court: A
witness can testify only to those facts which he
knows of his own knowledge, that is, which are
derived from his own perception, except as
otherwise provided in these rules
ISSUE: WON the testimony of the mother is admissible for

compulsory recognition.
HELD: Yes. Prohibition in A280, against the identification of
the father or mother of a child apply only in voluntary & not
in compulsory recognition. The said laws were repealed by
the FC. Art 172 FC states that filiation may be proved by
any evidence and proof that the defendant is his father.
ARUEGO v CA (1996)
254 SCRA 711
Jose Aruego while married had an extra-marital
relationship with Luz Fabian in 1959 until his death in
March 1982. Allegedly born to this amorous relationship
were Antonia and Evelyn, both surnamed Aruego.
In 1983, Luz Fabian filed a complaint for the compelled
recognition of her children as compulsory heirs of the
deceased on the grounds of open and continuous
possession of the status of illegitimate children.
RTC declared only Antonia as the illegitimate daughter
of Jose Aruego and entitled to her share in the estate
ISSUE:
1. WON Family Code provisions apply in instant case

2.
3.
WON application of Family Code in this case prejudice

or impair vested right of respondent should FC be
given retroactive effect
WON trial court lost jurisdiction when FC took effect.
HELD:
1. No. The suit was filed prior to the effectivity of FC,
thus CC provisions still apply. Art 285 CC governs the
case and not Art 175 Par 2 FC.
2. YES. If FC prevails over CC in the choice of which
should govern, it would prejudice Antonias right
which was vested upon her by virtue of Art. 285,
through the above-mentioned suit for recognition.
3. NO. Since CC still governs the case, trial court never
lost its original jurisdiction.
What is your understanding of a vested right? It is not
defined in Art 256 FC because it should be on a case to case
basis, taking into account all the circumstances and facts.
Subsequent change of law should not affect the available
cause of action.
JISON v CA (1998)
286 SCRA 495
Monina Jison alleged that she is the illegitimate
daughter of Francisco Jison. Francisco denied paternity.
While married to Lilia Jison, Francisco impregnated the
nanny of his eldest daughter, Esperanza Amolar. The
child was born and enjoyed the continuous and implied
recognition as an illegitimate child.
Francisco spent for her education until she became a
CPA and eventually worked as Central Bank examiner.
It was her father who paid for the burial expenses for
her mothers death. And it was through filiation with
her father that she previously was able to seek
employment at Miller & Cruz in Bacolod City.
She was able to name the members of the Jison
household as well as the staff in her fathers office.
She also claimed knowing the 3 children of Francisco
and Lilia. The last time she saw her father was when
she sought his blessings to get married.
In sum, Moninas evidence and testimonies showed that
a. she was close with Franciscos relatives
b. she received P15 as monthly allowance from her
father coursed through accountants of his office
c. her filiation was known in the Jison office &
household
d. her allowance was not recorded in the books but in
a separate cash book because it had to be hidden
from Mrs Jison and children
e. that she even asked for a Christmas gift from her
godfather, Don Vicente, father of Mrs Jison
When Monina wanted to go to Spain, her father
negotiated that in exchange for the expenses, she
would sign a document that denies her being a
daughter.
HELD: Monina proved her filiation. She has open and
continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
Her witnesses (she had 11) established her claims.
However, Monina cannot rely on her birth certificate in the
Local Registrar where Francisco is named as her father.
Page 111 of 151
Neither can she rely on her baptismal certificate naming

Francisco as her father. There was no showing that
Francisco had anything to do with the filing of said
certificates. Moreover, Art 172 provides the various forms of
evidence w/c may be presented. Monina was able to
present a high standard of proof which was coherent,
logical and natural as compared to Franciscos evidence
which was barren and mostly denials.
As regards the issue that there was opportunity for Moninas
mother to have slept with other men during the time she
conceived Monina, Francisco had the burden of proof which
he failed to deliver. The issue of whether sexual intercourse
actually occurred inevitably redounds to the victims or
mothers word, as against the protestation of the accused or
putatives father. Although Pansay unfortunately passed
away and therefore cannot testify, this does not mean that
Monina could no longer prove her filiation. Since it was
established that Pansay was still employed under Francisco
at the time Monina was conceived, sexual contact between
Pansay and him was not at all impossible, especially in the
light of the overwhelming evidence. Francisco is Moninas
father and she was conceived at the time Pansay worked for
him. He recognized Monina as his child through his overt
acts and conduct as was found by CA and such recognition
has been consistently shown and manifested throughout the
years publicly, spontaneously, continuously and in an
uninterrupted manner. Moreover, if Monina were not his
illegitimate daughter, it would have been unnecessary for
Francisco to have gone to such great lengths in order that
Monina denounce her filiation. Monina filed her action well
within the period granted her by a positive provision of law.
A denial of her action on ground of laches would clearly be
inequitable and unjust. Petition denied. Challenged CA
decision affirmed.
ALBERTO v CA (1994)
232 SCRA 745
Ma. Theresa Alberto claims that she has been in continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child of the late
Juan Alberto and is entitled to a share in his estate. The
following are the proofs used:
1. Juan & Aurora were sweethearts prior to Juans
marriage to Yolanda
2. Juan gave money to Aurora thru Fr. Arcilla, Juans
first cousin
3. Juan gave Theresa money for her schooling
4. Juan made known to his friends & relatives that
she was his daughter
5. He made known to personnel of International
School where Theresa was enrolled that she was
his daughter
6. Juans younger sister, Mrs. Aurita Solidum, asked
Theresa to be sent to her house to meet her dad
for the first time when Theresa was 9.
7. Fr. Arcilla brought Theresa to Juans bedside in the
hospital when he was shot & asked guards to give
way to her as she was a member of the family.
8. Juans step mom, Saturnina Alberto, introduced
Theresa to one of Juans daughter (her half-sister).
She was introduced as an elder sister.

9.
Aurora testified that her giving birth to Theresa

was due to an indiscretion and that Mrs. Solidum
did arrange mtg bet Theresa & Juan
10. Theresa testified that:
a. her dad gave her P500.00 on their first
meeting along with two phone numbers where
he could be reached.
b. She met him several times after the first
meeting and he gave him money during those
times too
c. Dad visited her in IS twice. IS is very strict
when it comes to visitors & by allowing Juan
to see Theresa, this shows that he was
identified by the school personnel as Theresas
dad.
d. Dad promised to see her in school during her
14th birthday which didnt happen because he
was gunned down.
e. Her uncles and aunts (bros and sis) of her dad
regarded her as their niece & she was
introduced as Juans eldest daughter. The
children of Juans bros and sis likewise
recognized her as their cousin.
11. Jose Tablizo testified that there was a strong
physical resemblance bet Juan & Theresa & they
wrote similarly too. He further stated that it was
known among Juans friends (the Breeze Gang)
that Theresa was Juans daughter and that Juan
proudly showed him Theresas report card w/high
grades.
12. Atty. Martiniano Vivo testified that Juans lawyer,
Immigrations Commissioner Edmundo Reyes
discussed w/him Juans letter saying that he was
not denying that he was Theresas dad and due to
his marital status & since he was a public official,
he wanted to avoid public scandal thus support will
be given quietly thru Fr. Arcilla.
CA reversed decision. It was not satisfied that Theresa
was in continuous possession of status of natural child
of deceased. Bases:
1. Case wherein 2 nurses took care of kids at the
expense of alleged dad, that he kissed kids, called
them sons, gave money for their necessities, they
called him dad & was publicly regarded as dad of
the children but Court held that they were
insufficient basis for a declaration of paternity. CA
finds Theresas evidence weaker than this. Dad
may have been convinced of his paternity but they
dont show his intent to place kids in possession of
status of natural children.
2. Theresas letter to Jose Tablizo wherein she wrote
of how proud she is of her dad & how she only
knew him as a big man & that his friends like
Tablizo who knew him well & she envied them for
having that privilege. (see p. 751). CA claims that
the letter gave the impression that Juan distanced
himself from Theresa.
Yolanda denied that Juan ever recognized Theresa as
his daughter. She presented letters sent by Aurora to
Juan & Fr. Arcilla as proof that Juan refused to
recognize Theresa. In one letter Aurora complained that
Juan didnt give a damn to Theresa & she mentioned
Page 112 of 151
that the child was graduating from Prep School. Letter

likewise stated that she waited for the money for
support & that she was grateful for the P300 he sent.
HELD: Theresa was able to prove her open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child.
1. Letters from Aurora: did not prove that Juan refused to
recognize Theresa, it only proved that Aurora was
having a hard time raising child on her own and she
asked for Juans assistance.
2. Juan never stopped Theresa from using his last name.
3. Report card story: being discredited for hearsay but
according to SC this is w/in the exception of the
hearsay rule (Sec. 38, Rule 130, ROC).
4. Relatives of Juan recognized Theresa too. Yolanda
could have presented any of these relatives to negate
Theresas claims but she failed to do so.
5. Re Theresas letter to Tablizo: What a poignant novel
she can now author as she seeks to establish her
parental links with her dad. There must be questions as
to why his dad didnt marry her mom when there were
no legal impediments at the time of her conception.
Note that under the different categories of illegitimate
children under the CC, the natural child occupies the
highest position since her parents were not disqualified
to marry during her conception. Child is often the fruit
of first love & is entrenched firmly in her parents
hearts. Juan couldve not resisted manifesting signs of
concern & care in so far as his first born is concerned
especially since child has much talent & great promise.
Its expected that dad would proudly step forward to
claim his paternity. Discreetness is understandable
considering the straight-laced mores of the times & the
social & political stature of Juan. But despite that, he
openly visited his daughter in school and met with her
in several occasions. Though letter may imply lack of
association, its understood because their relationship
was far from normal. Theres sufficient proof that Juan
acted in such manner as to show his intent to recognize
Theresa as his own & not that he distanced himself
from her.
6. CC Art. 285: Action for recognition of natural children
may be brought only during the lifetime of presumed
parents except (1) if dad/mom died during childs
minority, in w/c case, child may file action before the
expiration of 4 yrs from attainment of his majority.
Theresa falls w/in this exception since she was only 14
when her dad died. So can file an action before she
reaches 25 (4 years after age of majority w/c was 21
then). So she had until Sept. 18, 1978 to file the action.
And she filed the present action on Sept. 15, 1978, 3
days before the expiration of the 4-year period.
GUY v CA (2006)
502 SCRA 151
Sima Wei died intestate in Makati City on October 1992,
leaving 10M worth of real and personal properties
His known heirs are his surviving spouse and Shirley
Guy and children
Private respondents (minors Karen and Kamille Wei),
represented by their mother Remedios filed a petition
and prayed for the appointment of a regular

administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Weis

estate.
Petitioners prayed for the dismissal of the petition of
Remedios on the following grounds:
1. That Sima Lei left no debts and there is therefore
no need to secure letters of administration
2. That private respondents should have established
their status as illegitimate children during the
lifetime of Sima Wei
3. That private respondents claim had been paid,
waived and abandoned or otherwise extinguished
by reason of Remedios RELEASE AND WAIVER
CLAIM stating that in exchange for the financial
educational assistance received from petitioner,
Remedios and her minor children discharge the
estate of Sima Wei from any and all liabitilities
ISSUES:
1. WON the Release and Waiver of Claim precludes
private respondents from claiming their
successional rights
2. WON private respondents are barred by
prescription from proving their filiation
HELD:
1. No. A waiver may not be attributed to a person when its
terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to
abandon a right. The document does not state with clarity
the purpose for its execution. Parents and guardians may
not also repudiate the inheritance of their wards without
judicial approval. Not having been judicially authorized, the
Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and
will not bar private respondents from asserting their rights
as heirs of the deceased. It must also be emphasized that
waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Private respondents could not have possible waived their
successional rights because they are yet to prove their
status as acknowledged illegitimate children of the
deceased.
2. A ruling in the same would be premature considering
respondents have yet to present evidences to prove their
filiation. It is the duty of the trial court.
AGUSTIN v CA (2005)
460 SCRA 315
Arnel Agustin had an extramarital affair with Fe
Prollamante which produced the child named Martin.
Arnel suggested to have the pregnancy aborted which
Fe refused.
Arnel allegedly took care of all the medical bills in
Martins birth and even signed his birth certificate as
the father. However, in the long run, Arnel failed to
give sustenance despite his adequate financial capacity.
Fe, afflicted with leukemia, sues Arnel for support. They
also moved for DNA testing to prove their cause of
action.
ISSUES:
1. WON complaint for support can be converted to a
petition for recognition
2. WON DNA paternity testing can be ordered in a
proceeding
for
support
without
violating
Page 113 of 151
petitioners constitutional right to privacy and right

against self-incrimination
HELD:
1.
2.
The action does not amount to conversion. Rather,

the DNA was necessity to establish the
respondents cause of action. Also, even if the
order would effect the establishment of filiation,
the integration of the two actions is still lawful
because the resolution of one issue necessary in
the determination of the other issue.
No. Right to self-incrimination is considered only in
written and verbal compulsion.
IN RE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATES OF

DECEASED JOSEFA DELGADO AND GUILLERMO
RUSTIA (2006)
480 SCRA 334
Lucio Campo
Guillermo
Josefa
Guillermina & Nanie

Guillerma (illegitimate
child with Amparo
Sagarbarria)
Felisa
Ramon Osorio
Nazario
Edilberta
Jose
Jacoba
Gorgonio
Luis
This case involves the partition of the estate of decedent

Guillermo and Josefa Delgado. The two groups contending
the right of inheritance are the heirs of Josefa Delgado (her
half and full-blood siblings and their descendants) and the
heirs of Guillermo Delgado (his siblings and their
descendants, his illegitimate child and de facto adopted
child). Josefa died before Guillermo, both intestate. The
existence of their marriage is also under question.
1. HEIRS OF JOSEFA DELGADO. Felisa had seven children
fathered by two men, all the births were out of wedlock. In
effect the children belong to the illegitimate line.
2. HEIRS OF GUILLERMO RUSTIA. He had an illegitimate
child named Guillerma with Amparo Sagarbarria. However,
in his petition for adoption of his ampun-ampunan
Guillermina, he declared that he had no legitimate,
legitimated or acknowledge natural child.
ISSUES:
1. WON Guillermo and Josefa were validly married
2. Who the legal heirs of the decedents are
1.
2.
Their cohabitation of 50 years cannot be doubted.

By presumption of law, there existed valid marriage
between them. Marriage contract is not the only
proof of marriage. The baptismal certificate
wherein Josefa was referred to as seorita has
no legal bearing.
Because of the declaration of Luis as the natural
child of Felisa, it was established that no marriage
took place between Ramon Osorio and her. Given
that, illegitimate siblings, whether half or full blood

3.
can reciprocally inherit from each other. Only the

collateral relatives (and their heirs by their right of
representation) of Josefa who are alive at the time
of her death are entitled to a share in her estate.
Guilllermas right to compulsory recognition
prescribed upon the death of her putative father
because her open and continuous possession of
the status of an illegitimate child is only a ground
for compelling acknowledgement. The obituary
written by Guillermo for Josefa which includes her
as his child does not pass as genuine writing. Same
goes for the ampun-ampunan Guillermina. As a
result, Guillermos compulsory heirs are his
collateral relatives.
ESTATE OF ROGELIO ONG v DIAZ (2007)

540 SCRA 480
Jinky sued for the determination of her minor child
Joannes filiation via DNA testing for claim of support.
Despite her marriage with Hasegawa Katsuo, she
maintained illicit affair with Rogelio Ong. She got
impregnated, and Rogelio Ong covered all the medical
bills and baptismal expenses until he cut off the support
and said that the child was not his.
During the pendency of the case, Rogelio died.
ISSUES:
1. WON the court erred in not declaring Joanne as
the legitimate child of Hasegawa and Jinky
2. WON DNA analysis is still feasible notwithstanding
the death of Rogelio Ong
HELD:
1. No. The presumption of legitimacy of the child is not
conclusive and may be overthrown by evidence to the
contrary. Further, the resolution of the second issue will
render the issue moot.
2. Yes. Rogelios death does not ipso facto negate the
application of DNA testing for as long as there exist
appropriate biological samples of his DNA. Biological
samples means any organic material originating from a
persons body, even if found in inanimate objects.
*This was decided differently, deviated from the rule that
only the husband can raise or impugn the childs legitimacy.
Mam is in favor of this ruling.
Page 114 of 151
2. Rights of illegitimate children

FC, Art 176 Illegitimate children shall use the surname
and shall be under the parental authority of their
mother, and shall be entitled to support in conformity
with this Code. However, illegitimate children may use
the surname of their father if their filiation has been
expressly recognized by their father through the record
of birth appearing in the civil register, or when an
admission in a public document or private handwritten
instrument is made by the father. PROVIDED, the father
has the right to institute an action before the regular
courts to prove non-filiation during his lifetime. The
legitime of each illegitimate child shall consist one-half of
the legitimate child. *As amended by RA 9255 in 2004
IN CC: recognition of the father was required before

illegitimate child can use his surname.
IN FC: regardless of recognition, illegitimate child shall use
mothers surname.
RA 9255: reverts to the CC rule which allows illegitimate
children to use fathers surname subject to the fathers
recognition.
* RA 9255 was authored by Sen. Ramon Revilla who is
known for having at least 85 children of legal age. (Read:
the number does not include minor children.)
* The problem with this law is that it takes out of the
picture the role of women.
DAVID v CA (1995)
250 SCRA 82
Ramon villar, a married man, had three children with his
secretary Daisie David. Ramon recognized the children as
his. Ramon refused to return Christopher then 6 years old
and his youngest child after a trip to Boracay. He also
enrolled him in a school. Daisy filed a petition for habeas
corpus on behalf of Christopher.
HELD: Christopher, as an illegitimate child, is under the
parental authority of his mother. That the husband can
provide the needs of the son better is not an argument
against the mothers custody. The fact that Ramon
recognized the child may be a ground for him to give
support but not for giving him custody of the child.
PEOPLE v NAMAYAN (1995)
246 SCRA 646
The accused Tortillano Namayan raped Margie
Pagaygay, 21 years old but is slightly retarded with a
mental age of 3-7 years old.
The bulging stomach indicating pregnancy became
evident. Margie says that Namayan raped her on
several occasions while she was fetching water from
the artesian well.
Namayan denied all allegations purporting that at the
time specified, he was serving time in jail. However, the
jail warden admitted that he cannot confirm WON

Namayan was indeed in jail because it was not his

responsibility to look after the prisoners. In fact, some
of the detainees are allowed to go out at the discretion
of the guard.
ISSUES & RULING:
1. WON it was physically impossible for Namayan to be the
father of the child. NO
On July 30, 1991 Margie was found to be 4-5 months
pregnant therefore sexual intercourse might have
happened during the period between March 15, 1991 to
April 15, 1991. It was proven that Namayan was seen
outside the Municipal Jail during the town fiesta (March
19, 1991). Namayan was detained in a minimum
security prison and it was also stated that some
prisoners were able to go out depending on the
discretion of the guard. These facts disprove the claim
of Namayan that it could not have physically possible
for him to commit the act. Also, even if he was released
only on April 12, 1991 it would have still been possible
for him to impregnate Margie.
2) WON compulsory acknowledgement and support for the
child is a proper remedy in this case. YES
No legal impediment
The crime of rape committed by Namayan carries with
it among others the obligation to acknowledge the
offspring if the character of its origin doe not prevent it
and to support the same.
MOSSESGELD v CA (1998)
300 SCRA 464
Eleazar Calasan, a married man, signed the birth certificate
of his illegitimate son, Jonathan Mossesgeld CAlsan. The
local civil registrar refused to register the birth certificate of
Jonathan using the surname Calasan.
HELD: Illegitimate children must use the surname of their
mother regardless of whether or not they had been
acknowledged by their fathers in the record of birth. The
father may however choose to legally adopt the child. Once
adopted, the child may use the fathers surname.
REPUBLIC v ABADILLA (1999)
302 SCRA 358
Gerson Abadilla and Luzviminda Celestino begot two
children during their common law relationship. The
childrens birth certificate indicated their surnames as
Abadilla. They filed a petition for correction/cancellation
of entries to rectify Herson to Gerson and delete the
entry in the parents marriage date and place. RTC
granted the petition.
OSG interposed the RTC decisions reversible error in
not ordering the change of minors surname from
Abadilla to Celestino, as effect of the deletion of the
entry on marriage.
HELD: Illegitimate children shall use the surname of their
mother. The surname of the children in the birth certificates
should be changed to Celestino.
Page 115 of 151
** Under RA 9255 (2004) illegitimate children may use their

fathers surname if he consents to it.
GONZALES v CA (1998)
298 SCRA 322
Ricardo Abad died intestate. The sisters and brothers of
Ricardo alleged that they are the only heirs of the
deceased. Honoria Empaynado (partner for 27 years),
Cecilia Abad Empaynado and Marian Abad Empaynado
filed a motion alleging that they are the acknowledged
natural children of Ricardo. There was also another
illegitimate child with Dolores Sancho named Rosemarie
Abad.
The collateral relatives adduced the following proofs:
o Mapua Institute of Technology enrollment forms
which did not state Jose as dead.
o Affidavits of Quiambao & Ramos claiming that
they know Jose died in 1971 & that he was
buried at the Loyola Memorial Park.
o A doctor who said Ricardo had gonorrhea so he
was sterile.
HELD: The Best evidence is Joses death certificate which
was not presented. Loyola Memorial Park showed a certain
JOSE BAUTISTA LIBUNAO married to a JOSEFA REYES and
not JOSE SANTOS LIBUNAO married to HONORIA
EMPAYNADO. Also, Dr. Arenas affidavit is inadmissible for
tending to blacken Ricardos reputation. The privilege of
secrecy is not abolished because of death. Respondents
presented his ITR where he declared Honoria as his
legitimate wife & the 3 as his legitimate dependents. He
also opened bank accounts for them and paid insurance
premiums. The evidence presented proved that the three
sisters are the illegitimate children of Ricardo. Hence, they
are entitled to inherit Ricardos estate. Art 988 CC provides
that in the absence of legitimate descendants and
ascendants, illegitimate children succeed to the entire estate
of the deceased.
REPUBLIC v VICENCIO (1998)
300 SCRA 138 - SUPRA
GAN v REYES (2002)
382 SCRA 357
Bernadette Pondevida wrote Augustus Caezar Gan
demanding for support for the their love child, 3 year old
Francheska Joy Pondevida, in order that she may send the
child to school. Gan denied paternity of the chld, prompting
Bernadette to institute in behalf of her daughter a complaint
for support.
HELD: In all cases involving a child, his interest and welfare
are always the paramount concerns. There may be
instances where, in view of the poverty of the child, it would
be a travesty of justice to refuse him support until the
decision of the trial court attains finality. Cases involving
child support are final and immediately executory, even
more so, cannot be stayed by an appeal.

TONOG v CA (2002)
376 SCRA 523
Petitioner Dinah Tonog, a nursing student begot a child
with a physician Edgar Daguimol. The child named
Gardin Faith Tonog and the mother resided with the
Daguimols parents. Then, Dina left for the US to work
and the child was left in the care of paternal
grandparents and her father.
Daguimol applied for legal guardianship of the child,
which was subsequently granted.
Dina instituted action for remand of custody
ISSUE: WON Dina can claim custody of the child on TYP and
Art 176 FC
HELD: The custody case is not yet concluded, meaning the
court can only rule on temporary custody. The CA did not
err in allowing Edgar to retain in the meantime parental
custody over Gardin. A child should not be wrenched from
her familiar surroundings and thrust into a strange
environment away from the people and places to which she
had apparently formed an attachment. Gardin Faith is
already 12 years old, her choice should also be given
weight. However, the decision should not be taken against
the fitness of the mother or the preference or the father.
DE GUZMAN v PEREZ (2006)
496 SCRA 474
Petitioner Roberto and private respondent Shirley
became sweethearts while STUDYING LAW in UST.
Their studies were interrupted when Shirley became
pregnant and gave birth to Robby. The two,
nonetheless, never got married.
Roberto married another woman later on. He never
provided any financial support for Robby except in two
instances (1992 & 1993) when he sent money for the
schooling and when he gave P7000.00 for the kids
hospitalization expenses.
Shirley, at one instance, demanded support for Robbys
education since she was suffering some financial
problems. Roberto did not give anything despite his
fabulous wealth. He managed the De Guzman
corporations, has five luxurious cars, owns a house in
Ayala Heights Quezon City and regularly travels abroad
with his family.
Shirley then filed criminal complaint for abandonment
against Roberto.
Respondents evidence: Notarized copy of the Gen Info
Sheet of RNCD Development Corporation showed that
Roberto owned P750,000 worth of paid-up corporate
shares.
The city prosecutor of Lipa found probable cause to
charge petitioner with neglect of child under Art 59(4)
of PD 603 in relation to Sec 10(a) of RA 7610
Roberto filed a petition for review with the Sec of
Justice who then affirmed City Prosecutors resolution
Petitioners claims: (1) He is financially incapable as all
the alleged properties belong to his father. His share
was also in reality his dads; (2) Robby is not a
neglected child since his education was provided by
Shirley and her relatives
Page 116 of 151
ISSUE: WON a parent who fails/refuses to do his part in

providing his child the education his financial station in life
and condition may permit, be charged criminally for neglect
of child under Art 59(4) of PD 603 in relation to RA 7610
HELD: Petitioner acknowledged Robby as his son. He had
not denied that he never contributed for his education
except in two instances. He admitted that the boys
education was being financed by Shirley and her relatives.
There is also a prima facie evidence that he is financially
capable as shown by the notarized GIS.
Robertos argument that "neglect attaches only if BOTH
parents are guilty of neglect does not hold. The law is
clear. The crime may be committed by ANY parent. The
law intends to punish the neglect of any parent. The
irresponsible parent cannot exculpate himself from the
consequences of his neglect by invoking the other
parents faithful compliance with his/her own parental
duties.
Petitioner, however, cannot be indicted for violation of
PD 603 in relation to RA 7610 as the latter covers only
those cases of neglect under the former which are not
covered by the RPC. Neglect of child under PD 603 is
also a crime under Art 277 of the RPC. Hence, it is
excluded from the coverage of 7610
Presumption of innocence is his favor still stands. What
has been ascertained is simply the existence of
probable cause for petitioners indictment for the
charge against him. Petitioners guilt should still be
proven beyond reasonable doubt in a criminal case.
ZEPEDA v ZEPEDA (1963)
41 Ill App 2d 240
Plaintiff Joseph Dennis Zepeda sued his father for causing
him to be an adulterine bastard. The father induced the
mother to have sexual relations with him with the promise
of marriage despite his full knowledge of its impossibility
because he is already married. As a result, the plaintiff
suffers the consequences of being an illegitimate child like
social stigma, inability to inherit from paternal ancestors and
deprived of the right to have a normal home. An illegitimate
very birth placed him under a disability.
ISSUE: WON the plaintiff has cause of action
HELD: Recognition of the plaintiffs claim means creation of
a new tort: a cause of action for a wrongful life. Courts
must take into consideration the consequences of opening
the doors of litigation wider. Lawmaking, though inherent in
the judicial process, should not be indulged in where the
result could be as sweeping as here. The interest of the
society is so involved, the action needed to redress the tort
could be so far-reaching, that the policy of the State should
be declared by the representatives of the people.
ALBA v CA (2005)
465 SCRA 495 (same parties as in 460 SCRA 197)
Rosendo Herrera seeks to delete his name as a father
and his surname from the birth certificate of Armi Albas
son Rosendo Alba, Jr. RTC granted the petition and
duly notified Armi of the said decision. However, the
decision notice was sent to the wrong address.

Armi now avers that Rosendo deliberately provided the

wrong address to prevent her from appealing in the
case. That he is well aware of her present address
because they used to live there as common law
spouses. As a result, extrinsic fraud and lack of
jurisdiction was committed by the court.
ISSUE: WON the RTC grant to correct the entries in

Rosendo Albas birth certificate should be annulled
HELD: No. The petition for correction of birth certificate is in
rem so it does not require the presence of Armi. Also, no
extrinsic fraud occured because although Armi claims that
the address in the birth certificate was erroneously entered
by her sister, her signature signifies her approval in the
entries provided. Rosendo Herreras payment of the
condominium unit only proves his previous ownership and
fails to establish any intimate relations between them. The
photocopied love notes also do not have any probative
value and never proven to be the respondents authentic
writing. Finally, even if the court annuls the decision,
Rosendo Herrera Jr is still not eligible to retain his surname
because RA 9255 provides that an illegitimate child shall
only use his fathers surname if the latter acknowledges his
filitiation, which is not the circumstance in this case.
Therefore, Rosendo Herrera must use his mothers surname.
REPUBLIC v CAPOTE (2007)
514 SCRA 76
Trinidad Capote filed a petition for the change of name
of one Giovanni N. Gallamaso to Giovanni Nadores, a
minor under her guardianship being that the mother is
in abroad.
The minor was the illegitimate child of Corazon Nadores
and Diosdado Gallamaso, born July 9, 1982, prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code and as such used the
name of his father despite the absence of marriage
between them
The father never gave any support and failed to take up
his responsibilities towards the said minor from his
birth. The minor is now fully aware of his position and
likewise prays for the same, since his mother would like
to petition him to join her in abroad, and having a
different surname without a father would cause and
inconvenience in the processing of document.
RTC granted petition and CA affirm
ISSUE: WON the guardian may rightfully change the minors
name
HELD: Yes. Since private respondent has complied with the
requirements of Rule 103. Art 366 CC states that he should
take the surname of the recognizing parent, who in the
present case is the mother. Art 176 FC mandates that
illegitimate children shall use the surname of the mother.
Being that the name established filial relations it is of
importance that he change his name to affirm his status. It
will erase the impression that he was recognized by his
father. The SOG has likewise misapplied Rule 108 RC,
because such action is separate and distinct from the action
at hand. This is for the best interest of the child since it will
Page 117 of 151
facilitate the reunion between him and his mother, once she
successfully petitions him.
Petitioners Contention: Is should be tried as an adversarial
proceeding and not a summary proceeding. *To this the
respondent has already complied with such requirement by
posting it in a newspaper of general circulation, no opposing
petitions were put forward.
D. Legitimated Children
FC, Art 177 Only when conceived and born outside of
the wedlock of parents who, at the time of the
conception of the former, were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other may be legitimated.
LEGITIMATION remedy by means of which illegitimate
children are considered legitimate, it being supposed that
they were born in lawful wedlock.
LEGITIMATED CHILDREN illegitimate children who are
considered legitimate because of the subsequent marriage
of their parents
In legitimation, the law makes legal what exists by nature,
while in adoption, the law creates by fiction a relation that
did not in fact exist by nature.
REQUISITES FOR LEGITIMATION
1. child was conceived AND born out of wedlock
2. the parents were not disqualified by any
impediment to marry each other at the time of
conception
CHILDREN WHO CANNOT BE LEGITIMATED
1. adulterous
2. incestuous
3. of marriages against public policy
4. of bigamous marriages but can be ADOPTED to
elevate their status
Why cant children of adulterous relationships
cannot be legitimated?
1. rational of legitimation would be destroyed
2. unfair to legitimate children in terms of
successional rights
3. problem of public scandal
4. will destroy the sanctity of marriage
5. very scandalous, especially if the parents marry
years after the birth of the child
6. it is tantamount to tolerating what would have
been a wrong act, it would seem to be more
beneficial to the erring spouse
FC, Art 178 Legitimation shall take place by subsequent
valid marriage between parents. The annulment of a
voidable marriage shall not affect the legitimation.

CC: legitimation takes place through subsequent marriage

(Art 270) provided that the parents have acknowledge the
child before or after the marriage
FC: legitimation takes place through subsequent marriage
as long as the requisites of Art 177 are met. The length of
time between childs birth and the parents marriage does
not matter.
* The status of legitimated children in void ab initio
marriages are likewise affected because no marriage exists
at all.
FC, Art 179 Legitimated children shall enjoy the same rights as
legitimate children.
claims that she is entitled to inherit from the estate of

Antonio by virtue of her being the legitimate daughter
of Tomasa, who is a legitimated sister of Antonio
ISSUE: WON Maria Luciano is entitled to inherit from
Antonio
HELD: YES. A child that enjoys continuous possession of the
status of a natural child is considered legitimated by the
subsequent marriage of the parents. Maria Lucianos mother
Tomasa was legitimated by the Maria of her parents hence
a legitimate sister of Antonio. A legitimate daughter of a
legitimated sister is entitled to inherit from her mothers
legitimate daughter - Maria may inherit from Antonio.
RAMIREZ v GMUR (1919)
42 Phil 855
FC, Art 180 The effects of legitimation shall retroact to the

time of the childs birth.
Doa Ana Ramirez
* To protect not only the child but also the childs

descendants because it can happen that at the time of the
marriage of the childs parents, the child already had
married and died is survived by children who should benefit
from the legitimation of their deceased parent.
DE LOS SANTOS v LUCIANO (1934)

60 Phil 328
Tomasa Escobar was born to Leon Escobar and Josefa
Esguerra before they were married. After her parents
got married, they begot two more children: Antonio and
Fortunato Escobar.
All the while, Tomasa lived with the spouses and their
two legitimate children. The children called the spouses
Tatay and Nanay. The other children called Tomasa
Manang, which is an appellation given to elder sisters.
Tomasa grew up and lived under the care of the
spouses until she married. The spouses supported her,
treated and presented her as their daughter, and was
publicly known as such.
Tomasa married and had a daughter, Maria Luciano.
When she was widowed, she took her daughter with
her and lived in the house that Leon Escobar built for
them. Leon visited them almost everyday.
He sent his sons Antonio and Fortunato to keep them
company at night. When Tomasa died, Leon took Maria
into his home until she married and was taken by her
husband to the province. Leon Escobar died, then
Fortunato became ill. Antonio wrote to Maria to return
to Manila to nurse Fortunato, even sending money for
passage.
When Fortunato died, Antonio took Maria into his
home, where she lived until Antonios death. Maria
Samuel Bischoff
Wertmuller
Felisa Castro
Leona Castro
FC, Art 181 The legitimation of children who died before the
celebration of the marriage shall benefit their descendants.
FC, Art 182 Legitimation may be impugned only by those who

are prejudiced in their rights, within five years from the time
their cause of action accrues.
Page 118 of 151
Frederick von
Kauffman
Dr. Ernest Emil

Mory
Elena
Federico
Ernesto
Leontina Elizabeth
Carmen Maria
Esther
Samuel, a Swiss, is married to Ana Ramirez without

children. He died in 1913 and left a will which declares
that he has no forced heir. He bequeaths all his
properties to his wife, to the exclusion of properties in
Switzerland which are adjudicated to his brothers and
sisters.
His declaration of absence of force heirs ignores the
possibility of his descendants from Leona.
Leona is born to Felisa Castro and an unknown father.
However, on the margin of her original baptismal
certificate was an annotation by Fr. Ferrero that Samuel
recognized her as his natural daughter.
Leona grew up in Samuels family and brought up as a
family member, which effected a tacit admission of
paternity.
1895 Leona Frederick, a Brit born in HK with whom
she had three children.
1899 Leona goes to Switzerland to recuperate in a
sanatorium (did not specify illness). After sometime,
she told Fred that she does not want to be his wife
anymore. So in 1904 Fred went to France and obtained
a decree of divorce which was granted in 1905.
Leona fell for her doctor Emil. They begot a child in
1900 and married after Leona got divorced from Fred.
Two more daughters issued in the married.
1910 Leona died
The heirs of Leona seeks participation in the estate of
their alleged grandfather Samuel.
Otto Gmur (respondent) appeared as guardian of 3
Mory children while Fred appeared for his own children.
Ana insists that Samuel did not recognized Leona.

ISSUES:
1. WON Leona is a recognized natural child of Samuel
2. WON the divorce between Fred and Leona is valid
3. WON Leontina should be considered as a legitimate
daughter of Fred and Leona (being born before the
divorce decree, hence while their marriage is
subsisting)
4. WON the Mory and the Kaufmann children are entitled
to their share in the estate.
5. WON the probate of a will affects the rights of forced
heirs who dont appear to contest the probate.
HELD:
1. Yes. Prior to her first marriage, she was in an
uninterrupted enjoyment of de facto status of natural
child & treated as such by Samuel.
Document presented by Fr. Ferrero admissible since
hes the custodian of church records. Original document
not needed since they have shown that diligent search
was made to find it, to no avail. Thus, secondary
evidence presented by the priest is sufficient.
Applicable provision: Law 11 of Toro which became Law
1, Title 5, Book 10 of the Novisima Recopilacion which
provides that recognition could be established by proof
of acts on part of the parent unequivocally recognizing
the status of his child. This is different from CC Art 131
provision which provides that acknowledgment must be
made in the record of birth, by will or in other public
instrument. Regardless of what provision is applied, its
sufficiently shown that Leona was recognized.
Anas contention that only kids born of persons free to
marry may possess status of recognized natural child.
There being no evidence to show Felisa Castros status
at the time Leona was born, she will be presumed
single or widow. Court cannot entertain contrary
presumption that Felisas guilty of adultery.
As a recognized natural daughter, had she survived her
dad, she would have been his forced heir (CC Art 807
(3) & 939) and entitled to 1/3 of the inheritance (CC Art
842).
2.
No. French tribunal has no jurisdiction to entertain an

action for dissolution of marriage contracted in the Phil
by persons domiciled here especially since such
marriage is indissoluble under Philippine laws. Although
the spouses (first marriage) have traveled to different
places, all those stays were limited & thus we cant say
that they have established their domicile elsewhere. It
has been established that court of a country in w/c
neither spouse is domiciled & w/c one/both spouses
may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining divorce
has no jurisdiction to determine their matrimonial status
& a divorce granted by such court is not entitled to
recognition anywhere. Going to one place for the sole
purpose of obtaining divorce w/o intention to remain in
that place is not sufficient to confer jurisdiction on
courts of that state especially if cause of divorce is not
recognized by the laws of the state of that persons
own domicile. During the time they obtained divorce
decree, the Phil law provided that a valid marriage can
only be dissolved by death of one of the parties. The
Page 119 of 151
law invoked in obtaining the divorce allowed divorce

where wife has been guilty of adultery/husband guilty
of concubinage. Evidently, this should not be upheld
since it is repugnant to the moral sensibilities of our
people & its contrary to law.
3.
Leontinas status: The first marriage was still subsisting

when she was born thus shes an offspring of an
adulterous intercourse w/c is not capable of legitimation
(CC Art 119).
4.
WON the Mory and the Kaufman children are entitled to

inherit. Fredericks children are legitimate & entitled to
inherit, thus no need to discuss. The divorce being
invalid, the claims of the Mory children should then be
rejected. The right to inherit is limited to legitimate,
legitimated & acknowledged natural children, excluding
kids of adulterous relations. Descendants under CC
Art. 941 cant include illegitimates born of adulterous
relations.
5.
No. Rights of forced heirs to their legitime are not

divested by decree admitting a will to probate,
regardless of fact that no provision has been made for
them in the will. Decree of probate is conclusive only as
regards due execution of will. Code of Civil Procedure
Sec. 753: forced heirs cant be prejudiced by failure of
testator to provide for them in his will. And even if
testator intended to leave everything to his wife, will is
intrinsically invalid if it would cut off the rights of his
forced heirs.
IN RE JULIAN WANG (2005)

454 SCRA 155
The mother, Anna Lisa Wang, wants to change her
minor childs name from Julian Lin Carulasan Wang to
Julian Lin Wang, in effect dropping his middle name.
The mother explains that the family will be migrating to
Singapore where middle names or the maiden surname
of the mother are not carried in a persons name. She
fears that this will cause discrimination and
embarrassment to her son as Carulasan sounds funny
in Mandarin (they pronounce R as L).
There will also be difference in Julian and her sisters
(Wang Mei Jasmine) name. They might be confused
because they have different surnames.
RTC: denied, the reason they purported does not fall
within the grounds provided by law
OSG: No proof that change of name is in the best
interest of the child; Mere convenience is not a valid
reason for petition for change of name; Singaporean
law does not prohibit the use of middle name; There
will be no confusion to parentage because they both
use their fathers surname
ISSUE: WON the change of the minors name should be
allowed
HELD: No. SC adopts the same reason as OSG and added
that such change of name would make his integration into
the Singaporean society is not sufficiently establish. Also,

petitioner is only a minor. The matter of change of name

should be left to his judgment and discretion when he
reaches the age of majority.
Cute trivia: Did you know that Pepe is the nickname for Jose
because Joseph is the padre putative (putative/foster father) of
Jesus, shorted to P.P. which is pronounced pe-pe in Spanish?
Page 120 of 151

XIII. ADOPTION
ADOPTION is a juridical act which creates between two
persons a relationship similar to that which results from
legitimate paternity and filiation.
PURPOSE OF ADOPTION
Originally: mainly for the benefit of the adopter,
who are usually people who had no children, so
that they may experience the joys of parenthood
Modern view: for the benefit of the children to be
adopted
o It has both social and moral purpose: to
extend to the orphan or to the child of the
indigent, the incapacitated or the sick, the
protection of society in the person of the
adopter
o The adopted child remains an heir of his
parents by nature
CONSTRUCTION OF ADOPTION LAW: construed so as to
encourage the adoption of unfortunate children by persons
who can properly read and educate them
CHILD WELFARE PARAMOUNT: In determining whether
adoption shall be allowed, the welfare of the child is the
primary consideration.
NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS: Petition for adoption is done
through proceeding in rem. No court may entertain such a
petition unless it has jurisdiction over:
the subject matter of the case and over the parties
the res, which is the personal status of the person
to be adopted as well as that of the petitioners
ADOPTION AND LEGITIMATION similar in the sense that in
both of them the child is given the status of the child born
in lawful wedlock of the parents adopting or legitimizing it
Persons affected
Procedure
Carried out by
whom
Benefits
LEGITIMATION
Only natural
children
May take place by
extrajudicial act of
parents (marriage)
Only by both
parents of the
child
Child receives the
same status and
rights as a
legitimate child,
not only in relation
to the legitimizing
parents, but also
in relation to other
relatives of the
latter
ADOPTION
Strangers
(generally)
Always by judicial
decree
May be made by
one parent
Creates a
relationship only
between the child
and the adopting
parent, but not
with the relatives
of the latter
Page 121 of 151
WHAT DOES ONLY BY A JUDICIAL DECREE MEAN?

Only an adoption made through the court is valid.
The fact of adoption is never presumed, but must
be affirmatively proved by the person claiming its
existence
Proof required: judicial decree of adoption
o Absence of proof of order of adoption by court
cannot by substituted by oral evidence
o Secondary evidence admissible where the
records of adoption were actually lost or
destroyed
o Pedigree testimony is not admissible
Mere agreement of adoption between the adopters
and the biological parents of the child is not valid
Mere fact that the child has lived with the alleged
adopter who had treated him like his own child is
not sufficient to establish a valid adoption (Lazatin
v Campos)
Neither is the mere registration of the child in his
or her birth certificate as the child of the supposed
adopters a valid adoption (simulated birth)
A. Pre-adoption and Adoption

Procedure
There are no provisions on pre-adoption procedures in FC, it
is only introduced in RA 8552 (Domestic Adoption Act of
1998).
FC, Art 184 The following persons may not adopt:
1. The guardian with respect to the ward prior to the
approval of the final account rendered upon the
termination of their guardianship relations;
2. Any person who has been convicted of a crime involving
moral turpitude;
3. An alien, except:
a. a former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative by consanguinity
b. One who seeks to adopt the legitimate child of his
or her Filipino spouse
c. One who is married to a Filipino citizen and seeks
to adopt jointly with his or her spouse a relative by
consanguinity of the latter
GUARDIAN: To prevent a guardian who has misused or

misappropriated the funds or properties of his ward to
resort to adopting his ward to avoid an accounting of such
funds or properties and possible criminal prosecution.
Guardianship must be terminated first in accordance with
the Rules of Court and the final accounts of the guardian
approved, before said guardian can be allowed to adopt his
or her ward.
MORAL TURPITUDE: Adoption demands that the adopter be
morally qualified to do so, and a conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude shows lack of good moral
character on the part of the person convicted. The
disqualification is not removed by a pardon given to the
offender, since the lack of necessary moral qualification
remains even if criminal liability has been removed.

*The fact that adopter has legitimate or illegitimate children

is no longer a barrier to adopting. This was prohibited by CC
and removed in PD 603, FC and RA 8552.
FC, Art 187 The following persons may not be adopted
1. A person of legal age, UNLESS, he or she is
A child by nature of the adopter or his or her
spouse
Prior to the adoption, said person had been
consistently considered and treated by the
adopter as his or her own child during minority
2. An alien with whose government the Republic of the
Philippines has no diplomatic relations
3. A person who has already been adopted unless such
adoption has been previously revoked or rescinded
ADOPTION OF ADULTS
1. No need to adopt adults because they are old
enough to take care of themselves.
2. If the only reason someone wishes to adopt and
adult is to share his material advantages with
another, he can do so by simply giving the latter
financial assistance and leaving him something in
his will.
3. Rational of adoption: to give poor, orphaned,
abandoned little children the advantages of having
parents who would love, support, protect, rear and
educate them until they are old enough to take
care of themselves.
4. EXCEPTIONS
a. If the adult is the parent in nature
because this would raise the status of the
illegitimate child
b. If in the custody since childhood/minority,
there is the presumption that adopter
really wants to adopt the child but only
neglected to do so before the latter
reached majority.
PROCEDURE FOR ADOPTION ACCORDING TO RA 8552
(Maam Beth tabulated the procedure during lecture)
CHILD
1. Biological parent goes to
DSWD for:
a. counseling (Sec 4)
- importance of providing
relevant info on the child,
medical history and family
background
- possibility of child to be
placed for adoption
b. signs a Deed of Voluntary
Commitment or DVC**
c. give the parent 6 months
to reconsider
**but if no DVC was signed (in
cases where the child was
abandoned or left to strangers)
i. locate unknown parents
through trimedia (TV, radio or
newspaper) (Sec 5)
PROSPECTIVE ADOPTIVE
PARENTS
1.
2.
3.
4.
Inquiry
Attend adoption forum
Application
DSWD makes a case study
report home study report
(Sec 14)
5. Matching
6. Placement issuance of preadoption placement authority
(PAPA)
7. Supervised trial custody for 6
months or less adjustment
period (Sec 12)
8. Recommendation and
consent of DSWD
9. File a petition for adoption
Lawyers only come in at this
point (dahil pampagulo lang
sila)
10. Decree of adoption (Sec 13)
ii. after 3 months of no

claiming, petition for
Declaration of Abandonment
(DA) now becomes a ward
of the government
Page 122 of 151

11. Issuance of Travel Authority
if foreign adoption
2. Declare the child legally

available for adoption
*Preparation of Home Study Report
1. Visit to adopters home

2. Will include documents of adopter (locals)
a. authenticated birth certificate
b. Marriage contract
c. Written consent of children
d. Physical and mental evaluations
e. NBI/Police clearances
f.
financial proofs
g. character references
h. pictures
i.
Certificate of attendance to pre-adoption fora
3. For foreigners (on top of item 2)
a. certification of legal capacity to adopt
b. certificate that country will allow entry of and permanent
residence of adoptee into the country
c. Certificate of Philippine residents from BID
d. Two character references from non-relatives from home
country
e. Police clearances from all places where adopter lived
BIOLOGICAL PARENT: Does not provide exception for age.

This means that a minor mother does not need the consent
of her parents to give up her child for adoption. Even if the
parents are against the adoption of their grandchild, they
cannot prevent the biological parent from doing so.
GRACE PERIOD: This is an innovation of RA 8552. The
biological parent is given the right to reconsider his/her
decision to relinquish his/her child within six months from
signing the Deed of Voluntary Commitment
- This grace period is what makes it impossible to adopt a
newly born infant. However, if adoptive parents insist, they
can be given risk placement wherein the adopters get
custody of the child, subject to the biological parents
change of mind within 6 months.
MATCHING: The adoptive parents are allowed for certain
preference, for instance, they could specify sex.
Females are generally more adoptible because they
are easier to take care of. The notion is adopting a
boy is like bringing in a male stranger.
The peak season for adoption is during Christmas.
Parents prefer younger children because they have
no values yet. They are relatively more convenient
to shape and rear in a way the adoptive parents
want to. Not much mannerisms or habits yet.
Regarding physical attributes, Maam Beth noticed
that the adoptive parents want the child to have a
resemblance with the husband.

B. Who may adopt/be adopted

FC, Art 183 A person of age, and in possession of full civil
capacity and legal rights may adopt, provided he is in a position
to support and care for his children, legitimate or illegitimate in
keeping with means of the family.
Only minors may be adopted, except in the cases when the
adoption of a person of majority age is allowed in this Title.
In addition, the adopter must be at least sixteen years older
than the person to be adopted unless the adopter is the parent
by nature of the adopted or is the spouse of the legitimate
parent of the person to be adopted.
*The age gap ensures that the relationship between the

adopter and the adoptee will be a parent child relationship
(approximate natural filiation) and that the adopter has
sufficient maturity to fulfill the role of a parent to the
adopted child. (Think Daddy Long Legs)
ADOPTION OF SEVERAL CHILDREN: A person may legally
adopt two or more children.
FC, Art 185 Husband and wife must jointly adopt, except in
the following cases:
1. When one spouse seeks to adopt his own illegitimate
child
2. When one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate child
of the other
* Under CC and PD 603, spouses can adopt solely.

* But what if one spouse seeks to adopt the illegitimate
child of the other?
FC, Art 186 In case husband and wife jointly adopt or one
spouse adopts legitimate child of the other, joint parental
authority shall be exercised by the spouses in accordance with
this Code.
* Consent not required in case of legal separation because it

terminates the common life between the spouses and the
reason for requiring the consent of one spouse for the
adoption made by the other no longer exists this was
made explicit in RA 8552
Page 123 of 151
Art 183 (who may adopt), Art 184 (who may not
adopt), Art 185 (joint adoption of spouses) and
Art 186 (parental authority) have been amended
by Art III Sec 7, RA 8552
WHO MAY ADOPT
I. For Filipino citizens
1. of legal age
2. full capacity and legal rights
3. good moral character, no conviction for crime
involving moral turpitude
4. emotionally and psychologically capable of caring for
children
5. at least 16 years older than the adoptee UNLESS
biological parent of the adoptee or the spouses of the
adoptees parent
II. For aliens
1. qualifications for Filipino citizens
2. the country has diplomatic relations with the
Philippines
3. has been living in the Philippines for at least 3 years
prior to the filing of application
4. certified by his/her diplomatic or consular office or
any appropriate government agency that he/she has
the legal capacity to adopt in his/her country
5. his/her government allows the adoptee to enter the
country as his/her adopted son/daughter
6. requirements for residency and certification of
qualification is waived for the following
a. former Filipino citizen who seeks to adopt a
relative within the 4th civil degree of
consanguinity OR affinity
b. seeks to adopt the legitimate son/daughter of
his/her Filipino spouse
c. married to a Filipino citizen and seeks to adopt
jointly with his/her spouse a relative within the
4th degree of consanguinity OR affinity of the
Filipino spouse
III. Guardian with respect to the ward after the termination of
the guardianship and clearance of his/her financial
accountabilities
IV. Husband and wife shall jointly adopt, except in the following
cases:
a. if one spouse seeks to adopt the legitimate
son/daughter of the other
b. if one spouse seeks to adopt his/her own illegitimate
son/daughter PROVIDED that the other spouse has
signified his/her consent thereto
c. if the spouses are legally separated from each other
If spouses jointly adopted or one spouse adopted the
illegitimate child of the other, Joint parental authority shall be
exercised by parents.
* Qualifications for exemption in residency requirements of

RA 8552 (Number 6 in box above) is the exemption to the
general rules for adoption by aliens in Art 184 Par 3. One
difference is that RA 8552 allowed for adoption of relatives
by affinity

Art III Sec 8, RA 8662

WHO MAY BE ADOPTED
Any person:
1. below 18 years of age who has been administratively
or judicially declared available for adoption
2. legitimate son/daughter of one spouse by the other
spouse
3. illegitimate son/daughter by a qualified adopter to
improve his/her status to that of legitimacy
4. a person of legal age IF prior to the adoption said
person has been consistently considered and treated
by the adopter(s) as his/her own child since minority
5. a child whose adoption has been previously rescinded
6. a child whose biological or adoptive parent(s) has
died PROVIDED that no proceedings shall be initiated
within 6 months from the time of death of said parent
IN RE ADOPTION OF EDWIN VILLA (1967)

aka SANTOS Jr. v REPUBLIC
21 SCRA 299
Spouses Luis Santos Jr a lawyer and Edipola Villa a nurse,
having no child of their own, filed a petition praying that the
minor Edwin Villa, a younger brother of Edipola, be declared
their son by adoption. Due to the childs sickness, he was
entrusted to the petitioners since birth. The natural parents
of the minor voluntarily gave their consent and written
conformity to the adoption. The SG opposed the petition on
the ground that relatives by blood or by affinity are
prohibited from adopting one another bec of the
incongruous dual relationship that will result. TC dismissed
the petition, hence this appeal.
ISSUE: WON an elder sister may adopt her younger brother
HELD: Yes. There is no provision in the law prohibiting
relatives by blood from adopting one another. A. 335 NCC
enumerates those persons who may not adopt, and it has
been shown that petitioners arent among those prohibited
from adopting. A. 339 NCC names those who cant be
adopted and the minor Edwin isnt one of those excluded by
law. A. 338 NCC on the other hand allows the adoption of a
natural child by the natural father or mother, of other
illegitimate kids by their father or mother, and a stepchild by
the stepdad or stepmom.
To say that adoption shouldnt be allowed when the
adopter and the adopted are related to each other, except
in those cases enumerated Art 338 CC is to preclude
adoption among relatives no mater how removed or in
whatever degree that relationship might be, w/c isnt the
policy of the law. Adoption statutes, being humane and
salutary, and designed to provide homes, care and
education for unfortunate kids, should be construed so as to
encourage the adoption of such kids by persons who can
properly rear and educate them.
The fact that adoption in this case will result in a dual
relationship between the parties, that the adopted brother
will also be the son of the adopting sister, shouldnt prevent
the adoption. One is by nature, while the other is by fiction
of law. The relationship established by adoption is limited to
the adopting parents and doesnt extend to their other
Page 124 of 151
relatives, except as expressly provided by law. Petition for

adoption granted.
REPUBLIC v CA and BOBILES (1992)
205 SCRA 356
Private respondent Zenaida Bobiles filed a petition to
adopt Jason Condat, then 6 yo and who had been living
with her family since he was 4 mos old.
The court a quo, finding the petition to be sufficient in
form and substance, issued and order setting the
petition for hearing. The order was duly published and
posted with copies seasonably served to interested
parties. Nobody appeared to oppose the petition.
Subsequently, the RTC granted the petition which was
affirmed by the CA.
During the pendency of her petition, the FC took effect
which makes mandatory the joint adoption of spouses.
Petitioner now contends that the petition for adoption
should have been dismissed outright as it was filed
solely by private respondent without joining her
husband Dioscoro Bobiles, in violation of Art 185 FC. It
argues that FC must be applied retroactively to the
petition of Mrs. Bobiles. And that even if the FC is not
applied, the court still erred by granting adoption to
both the spouses instead of Zenaida alone.
ISSUE: WON the FC provision regarding joint adoption of
spouses should apply
HELD: No. Art 256 FC provides for the retroactive effect of
appropriate relevant provisions thereof subject to the
qualification that such retroactive application will not
prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights. Zenaida had
rightfully commenced the petition prior to the effectivity of
the FC. Her right to that action is not subject to subsequent
modification of the law.
Art 185 FC is remedial in nature. Technical rules should not
be stringently applied to adoption proceedings because it
involves the future condition and paramount welfare of the
adoptee. Petition for adoption granted.
REPUBLIC v TOLEDANO and SPS. CLOUSE (1994)
233 SCRA 9
Spouses Alvin and Evelyn Clouse filed a petition to adopt
Solomon, Evelyns 12 yo brother. Alvin is a natural born
American citizen while Evelyn was a former Filipno who
became naturalized American citizen in Guam. Solomon
Joseph Alcala and his mother, Nery Alcala consented to the
adoption due to her inability to support the boys education.
HELD: The Clouse may not adopt Filipino children. Alvin is
not qualified to adopt under FC because he is not a former
Filipino citizen and Solomon is not his relative by
consanguinity nor the legitimate child of his spouse. Evelyn,
as a former Filipino citizen, is qualified to adopt but the FC
requires spouses to jointly adopt. Hence, the spouses may
not adopt Solomon.
** Under RA 8552 qualified resident aliens may adopt
Filipino citizens

REPUBLIC v MILLER (1999)

306 SCRA 183
Claude Miller, formerly a member of the US Air Force
assigned at Clark Air Base, and his wife, Jumrus Miller,
both US citizens but residing in Angeles City, filed
before RTC a verified petition to adopt minor Michael
Magno Madayag.
Poverty and deep concern for his future prompted
Michaels natural parents to give their irrevocable
consent to the adoption.
RTC granted petition for adoption finding petitioners to
possess all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications for adoption. Michael was freed from
all obligations of obedience and support with respect to
natural parents. He was then declared child of the
Millers by adoption. His surname was to be changed
from Madayag to Miller.
a legacy of support to Rodolfo Gallardo, a son

of her late sister
o a legacy of education to Ramon Sta. Clara
(petitioners son)
During Margarita de Asis lifetime, she kept a safety
deposit box at the Peoples Bank and Trust Company,
which either she or Nora could open.
Five days after Margaritas death, Nora opened the said
box and removed its contents (shares of stock,
adoption papers of hers and her sisters, jewelry
belonging to her and to her mother)
Her sole reason for opening the box was to get the
stock certificates and other small items. A bank
personnel informed her that she needed an authority
from the court to open the box in view of her mothers
death. So, she decided to remove everything from it
On June 3, 1974, the private respondents filed a
petition to probate the will of Margarita
Days after learning that Nora opened the box, Ramon
Sta. Clara filed a motion in the probate court, claiming:
o that Margarita had executed a will subsequent
to that submitted for probate
o demanded its production
o prayed for the opening of the box
Of course, when the court ordered its opening, the box
was already empty.
o
ISSUE: WON the Court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino

child despite the prohibition under FC, effective on Aug 3,
1988, when the petition for adoption was filed before FC, on
July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code, which allowed aliens to adopt.
HELD: Yes. The enactment of FC will not impair the right of

alien respondents to adopt a Filipino child because the right
has become vested at the time of filing of the petition for
adoption and shall be governed by the law then in force. A
vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent
does not depend upon events foreign to the will of the
holder. The jurisdiction of the court is determined by the
statute in force at the time of the commencement of the
action. Adoption statues, being humane and salutary, hold
the interests and welfare of the child to be of paramount
consideration. Every reasonable intendment should be
sustained to promote and fulfill the compassionate and
noble objectives of the law.
C. Nature of adoption proceedings

LAZATIN v CAMPOS (1979)
92 SCRA 250
Dr. Mariano M. Lazatin died intestate and was survived
by his wife, Margarita de Asis, and his adopted twin
daughters Nora L. De Leon (married to Bernardo de
Leon) and Irma Lazatin (married to Francisco Veloso)
A month after Mariano Lazatins death, Margarita de
Asis commenced an intestate proceeding before the CFI
of Pasay. To the said proceeding, Mariano, Oscar,
Virgilio and Yvonne intervened since they claimed to be
admitted illegitimate (not natural) children of Mariano
with a woman named Helen Muoz. Subsequently, one
Lily Lazatin also intervened, claiming to be another
illegitimate (not natural) child
2 months after the intestate proceeding, Margarita de
Asis died but left a holographic will (a will written
entirely in the testators hand), which provided, among
others, for:
o a legacy of cash, jewelry and stocks to Arlene
De Leon, a granddaughter
Page 125 of 151
Seven months after Margaritas death, Renato Lazatin

intervened for the first time as an admitted illegitimate
child. Then he also filed a motion to intervene in the
estate of Margarita de Asis, this time as an adopted
child on the basis of an affidavit executed by Benjamin
Lazatin, brother of Mariano, stating that Renato was an
illegitimate child of Mariano who has later adopted by
him. The affidavit was later modified to state that
Renato was adopted by both Mariano and Margarita
Renatos motion to intervene in the settlement of the
estate of Margarita was denied by the lower court on
the ground that the evidence presented tend to prove
that he was a recognized natural child of Mariano, but
not a legally adopted child of Margarita. He never
presented a decree of adoption in his favor.
Likewise, Renatos motion for reconsideration was
denied by the court unless he presented some
documentary evidence to prove his adoption
Renato Lazatin filed a motion for intervention in the
probate proceedings of the estate of Margarita de Asis
as an adopted child.
ISSUE: WON Renato is an adopted child

HELD: Renato has not established his status as an adopted
child. Secondary evidence is not admissible unless the
existence of the records are proven along with the contents
of the records and its loss. Adoption is a juridical act and
the statutory requirements must be strictly carried out
otherwise it is a nullity. The fact of adoption is never
presumed, but must be affirmatively proven by the person
claiming its existence.

SANTOS v ARANZANSO (1966)

16 SCRA 344
Paulina, 17 and Aurora, 8 were adopted by spouses
Simplicio Santos and Juliana Reyes. The two minors
were in the custody of the couple since infancy and the
whereabouts of their biological parents are unknown
since the outbreak of the war.
Crisanto de Mesa, the guardian ad litem gave his
written consent to the adoption. Paulina who was over
14 years old then also put in writing her assent to the
proceeding. An adoption decree was eventually granted
8 years later, Juliana died and Simplicio commenced
the settlement of her estate declaring that he and the
two adopted daughters, are the surviving heirs
Gregoria Aranzanso, an alleged first cousin of Juliana
opposed the settlement estate saying that the marriage
between Juliana and Simplicio is void ab initio for being
bigamous. Likewise, the adoption is also null for want
of written consent of their parents.
Demetria Ventura, who claims to be another cousin of
Juliana and mother of Paulina filed her opposition in the
same tenor as Gregorias.
ISSUE: WON the adoption decree is valid.
HELD: Yes. Consent by the parents to the adoption is not an
absolute requisite. If the natural parents have abandoned
their kids, consent by the guardian ad litem suffices. In
adoption proceedings, abandonment imports any conduct
on the part of the parent w/c evinces a settled purpose to
forgo all parental duties & relinquish all parental claims to
the child. It means neglect or refusal to perform the
natural & legal obligations of care & support which parents
owe to their kids. Although the adoption court did not use
the term abandonment the reasons propounded bear the
essential elements of abandonment. Granting arguendo that
the marriage between Juliana and Simplicio is void, the
adopted children are deemed to be adopted by Juliana as a
single person. The philosophy behind adoption statutes is to
promote welfare of the child, every reasonable intendment
should be sustained to promote that objective.
Page 126 of 151
recommendation. Adoption is a legal advice by which a

better future may be accorded an unfortunate child. Judge
censured and social worker reprimanded.
D. Consent necessary for adoption

FC, Art 188 The written consent of the following to the
adoption shall be necessary:
1. The person to be adopted, if 10 years or older
2. The parents by nature of the child, the legal
guardian,
or
the
proper
government
instrumentality
3. The legitimate and adopted children, 10 years
or older, of the adopting parent/s
4. The illegitimate children, 10 years or older, of
the adopting parent, IF living with said parent
and the latters spouse, if any
5. The spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to
be adopted
Art III Sec 9, RA 8662
WHOSE CONSENT IS NECESSARY
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
The adoptee if 10 years of age or over

the biological parent(s) of the child, if known, or the
legal guardian, or the proper government
instrumentality which has legal custody of the child
the legitimate and adopted sons/daughters, 10 years
of age or over
the illegitimate sons/daughters, 10 years of age or
over of the adopter IF living with said adopter and
the latters spouse
the spouse, if any, of the person adopting or to be
adopted
* PD 603 and CC: The consent of the adoptee was required

only if 14 years of age or over.
DSWD v BELEN (1997)

275 SCRA 645
Spouses Desiderio Soriano and Aurora Bernardo,
naturalized US citizens, filed a petition to adopt their
niece, the minor Zhedell Bernardo Ibea.
Respondent Judge Antonio Belen granted the petition
based on the findings and recommendations of the
DSWD that the adopting parents and the adoptee have
developed emotional attachment.
When travel clearance was being sought from DSWD so
that the child may join her adopters in the States, it
was discovered that DSWD was not informed about the
commencement of the adoption proceedings nor was it
given notice of the petition being granted.
DUNCAN v CFI (1976)

69 SCRA 298
A 3-day old baby named Colin Berry Christensen
Duncan was given by his unwed mother to Atty.
Corazon Velasquez. She also instructed him to look for
a suitable couple to adopt the child.
Atty. Velasquez then gave consent for the Duncan
spouses (Robin Francis Radley and Maria Lucy
Christensen) to adopt the child.
Husband: British national residing in the country for
the last 17 years and wife: American citizen born in
and a resident of the Philippines
No child of their own but previously adopted another
child
ISSUE: WON Atty. Velasquez is the proper party required by
law to give consent the adoption
HELD: The DSWD has to be notified of the adoption

proceedings. A Home and Child Study Report is mandatory
before adoption is to be finalized. The DSWD is undoubtedly
has the necessary competence, more than that possessed
by the court social welfare officer, to make the proper
HELD: Yes. She can rightfully give consent to the adoption.

The fathers consent is not necessary because the child is
illegitimate. The mothers consent is not necessary either
because she is deemed to have abandoned the child and
has given the child to Atty. Velasquez for guardianship.

CANG v CLAVANO (1998)

296 SCRA 128
Spouses Herbert Cang and Anna Marie Clavano
(employee at the Philippine Consulate in LA) were
legally separated because the husbands extramarital
affairs. Herbert became naturalized US citizen and
secured a divorce decree there.
Clavanos brother (Ronald Clavano, a wealthy
businessman) and his wife Maria Clara (a flight
stewardess) wanted to adopt the three children (Keith,
Charmaine and Joseph Anthony) of the spouses Cang
and Clavano. The 14 yo son signed the petition of
adoption along with Clavano.
The mother justified the adoption with the following
statements:
o The brother had been her in taking care of the
children
o She will be going to the US and the children
would hamper her job-seeking venture abroad
o Husband had long forfeited his parental rights
Herbert immediately returned home upon learning
about the adoption proceeding, which he opposes.
RTC and CA granted the decree of adoption
ISSUE: WON the consent of the father to the adoption must
be sought, given that he expresses desire to retain parental
authority and that he did not abandon his children
HELD: The adoption may not be granted. Cangs consent as
the father is necessary. Petitioners conduct did not manifest
relinquishment of parental duties. Despite the fact that Cang
abandoned his children, it was proven that he continued to
send support for the family from the US. It was mere
physical estrangement that existed. Cang did not manifest a
settled purpose to forego all parental duties and relinquish
all parental claims over his children as to constitute
abandonment.
LANDINGIN v REPUBLIC (2006)
493 SCRA 415
Maria Taruc
Ramos
Diwata
Landingin
Ann, Errol,
Dennis and Ricfel
Branitley
Manuel
Ramos
Amelia Ramos
Elaine
Elma
Eugene
Diwata Landingin wants to adopt the legitimate children

of her deceased brother Manuel. Since his death, the
children have been in the care of their paternal
grandmother Maria as their biological mother left for
Italy to work. Since then, it has been the paternal
relatives who give support to the children. The mother
also rarely communicates with the children and already
has a second family in Italy.
Petitioner is a 57 year old widow, naturalized US citizen
in Guam with four grown-up children of her own who
have their own respective families and gainfully
employed also in Guam. She lives alone in her house
Page 127 of 151
and works as a part-time waitress. Petitioners children

executed an affidavit of consent for the adoption
proceeding in the US. Elaine, the eldest of the three
adoptees likewise testified regarding their consent to be
adopted by their aunt.
The DSWD social worker was able to interview Amelia
when she went home to the Philippines. According to
the mother, she is willing to let go of her parental ties
with the children since its her in-laws who have been
rearing them.
RTC granted but CA reversed for absence of consent of
the petitioners children and the adoptees biological
mother.
ISSUES:
1. WON the adoption may proceed absent the
mothers written consent
2. WON the affidavit of consent executed by the
petitioners children in Guam not in the presence of
a Philippine consular office is admissible
3. WON the petitioner is financially capable of
supporting the adoptees
HELD:
1.
2.
3.
No. The petitioner failed to present actual evidence

regarding the mothers consent. It cannot be said
that she intends to abandon them because she
continually gives them financial support no matter
how minimal. Also, the eldest daughter admitted
that she consults her regarding serious issues.
No. The authenticity of her childrens affidavit was
also not clearly established.
No. Her advanced age and instable source of
income puts doubt on her financial capacity to
raise the three kids in the US. That her own
children are willing the back her up is untenable
because the ability to support must be personal to
the adopter.
ADOPTION AND THE RIGHTS OF PUTATIVE FATHERS

A Review of New York Law
Unmarried fathers should be given legal rights to their
involvement in the lives of their illegitimate children. The
New York legislature has adopted specific statutory
guidelines for identifying unwed fathers who have a
constitutionally protected parental right which must be
surrendered or terminated before their child can be
adopted.
1. Fathers with full substantive rights Unwed fathers who
maintained substantial and continuous or repeated contact
with the child have the same rights as unmarried mothers
with respect to their children, and must execute a voluntary
surrender before the child can be adopted. The father has
to have a substantial relationship with the child, the
standards of which vary according to the age of the child.
A. For children under six months old
i. openly lived with the child or the childs mother for a
continuous period of six months prior to the
placement of the child for adoption

ii.
iii.
openly held himself out to be the father of the child

for six months prior to the placement of the child for
adoption
paid or offered to pay a fair and reasonable sum
according to his means toward the medical expenses
in connection with the mothers pregnancy or the
birth of the child
B. For children over six months old

i. pays a reasonable sum according to his means
toward the support of the child
ii. visit the child monthly or maintain regular
communication with the child or agency that has
custody of the child
2. Fathers with due process rights For those who do not
meet the statutory criteria which would require their
consent to adoption, they can still be entitled to special
notice which gives due process rights with respect to
voluntary surrenders and termination of parental right. This
do not include men convicted of first degree rape when the
child who is the subject of the termination was conceived as
the result of the rape.
i.
ii.
iii.
iv.
v.
vi.
vii.
viii.
any person adjudicated to be the father of the child

by any NY court
any person adjudicated to be the father of the child
by another state court when a certified copy of the
order has been filed with the NY putative father
registry
any person who has filed a timely and unrevoked
notice of intent to claim paternity
any person who is recorded on the childs birth
certificate as the childs father
any person who is openly lived with the child or the
childs mother for a continuous period of six months
prior to the placement of the child for adoption
any person who has been identified as the childs
father by the mother in a written, sworn statement
any person who was married to the childs mother
within six months subsequent to the birth of the child
and prior to the execution of a surrender or the
initiation of a termination proceeding
any person who has filed an instrument with the
putative father registry acknowledging the paternity
of the child
3. Fathers without rights Those who have not made

efforts to establish a relationship with a non-marital child do
not have a right to be included in a court decision to
approve a mothers surrender, to terminate the mothers
rights or to approve the adoption of the child
4. Fathers unable to meet the criteria
prevented from visiting or contacting the child because
of a court order or other actions taken to protect the
mother from domestic violence
incarceration
drug addiction
father unaware of the child
relatives action
Page 128 of 151
E. Effects of Adoption
FC, Art 189 Adoption shall have the following effects:
1. For civil purposes, the adopted shall be deemed to be
a legitimate child of the adopters and both shall
acquire the reciprocal rights and obligations arising
from the relationship of parent and child including the
right of the adopted to use the surname of the
adopters;
2. The parental authority of the parents by nature over
the adopted shall terminate and be vested in the
adopters, except that if the adopter is the spouse of
the parent by nature of the adopted, parental
authority over the adopted shall be exercised jointly
by both spouses
3. The adopted shall remain an intestate heir of his
parents and other blood relatives
CC, Art 365 An adopted child shall bear the surname of the
adopter.
* RA 8552 allows the adopters to give their adopted child a

name of their choice. This was previously not available in
PD603 and FC (Republic v Hernandez). The rationale for this
rule is that the given name will be the only emotional tie the
adoptive parents can have with their adoptee.
FC, Art 190 Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the
adopted shall be governed by the following rules:
(1) Legitimate and illegitimate children and descendants and
the surviving spouse of the adopted shall inherit from the
adopted, in accordance with the ordinary rules of legal or
intestate succession;
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the
legitimate ascendants of the adopted concur with the adopter,
they shall divide the entire estate, one-half to be inherited by
the parents or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
(3) When the surviving spouse or the illegitimate children of the
adopted concur with the adopters, they shall divide the entire
estate in equal shares, one-half to be inherited by the spouse
or the illegitimate children of the adopted and the other half, by
the adopters.
(4) When the adopters concur with the illegitimate children and
the surviving spouse of the adopted, they shall divide the entire
estate in equal shares, one-third to be inherited by the
illegitimate children, one-third by the surviving spouse, and
one-third by the adopters;
(5) When only the adopters survive, they shall inherit the entire
estate; and
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive,
then the ordinary rules of legal or intestate succession shall
apply.

PARENTAL AUTHORITY (Sec. 16)
All legal ties bet. biological parents and adoptee are severed,
and the same shall be vested on the adopter, except if the
biological parent is the spouse of the adopter.
LEGITIMACY (Sec. 17)
The adoptee shall be considered legitimate son/daughter of
the adopter for all intents and purposes, and entitled to all
rights and obligations provided by law to legitimate children
born to them without discrimination of any kind. Adoptee is
entitled to love, guidance, and support.
SUCCESSION (Sec.18)
Adopter and adoptee shall have reciprocal rights of
succession without distinction from legitimate filiation, in
legal and intestate succession. If adoptee and his/her
biological parents had left a will, the law on testamentary
succession shall govern.
TAMARGO v CA (1992)
209 SCRA 518
Spouses Sabas and Felisa Rapisura filed a petition to adopt
the 10 yo minor Adelberto Bundoc. Before the petition was
granted, Adelberto shot and killed Jennifer Tamargo using
an air rifle. The parents of Tamargo sued Adelbertos natural
parents for damages. The child though was acquitted for
acting without discernment. The Bundocs claim that the
Rapisuras should be the proper parties in this suit since
parental authority shifted to the adopting parent from the
moment the petition for adoption was filed.
ISSUE: Who between the adoptive parents and the
biological parents should be held liable for the damages
incurred by the child?
HELD: Adelbertos natural parents are liable for the
damages. The tortuous act of the minor occurred prior to
the adoption. Adelberto was in his natural parents actual
custody at the time of the accident. The effects of adoption
on parental authority cannot be given retroactive effect.
SAYSON v CA (1992)
205 SCRA 321
Rafaela Eleno
Mauricio
Rosario
Basilisa
Remedios
Teodoro
Teodoro Isabel
Delia (adopted)
Edmundo (adopted)
Doribel (legitimate)
The surviving brother, sisters and mother-in-law of

Teodoro filed a complaint for partition and accounting of
the intestate estate of the deceased spouses Teodoro and
Isabel, but this was resisted by Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel Sayson, alleging successional rights to the
disputed estate as the decedents lawful descendants
Delia, Edmundo and Doribel filed another complaint for
the accounting and partition of the estate of their
grandparents (Eleno and Rafaela) against the 4 surviving
Page 129 of 151
children, alleging that Delia and Edmundo were the

adopted children of Teodoro and Isabel, and that Doribel
was a legitimate child as such, they were entitled to
inherit Teodoros share in his parents estate by right of
representation
The lower court decided both cases in favor of herein
respondents
Both decisions were based on findings evidenced by the
decree of adoption of Delia and Edmundo, and the birth
certificate of Doribel
In the first case, it was held that the respondents, being
legitimate heirs of Teodoro and Isabel, the herein
petitioners were excluded from sharing in the estate of
the spouses
In the second case, it was held that Delia, Edmundo and
Doribel were entitled to inherit from Eleno and Rafaela by
right of representation (of their father Teodoro)
The CA, however, held that Delia and Edmundo are NOT
entitled to inherit from the estate of Eleno and Rafaela,
but affirmed the lower courts decision in all other
respects
Petitioners contend that:
Delia and Edmundo were not legally adopted because
Doribel had already been born when the decree of
adoption was issued. Doribels birth disqualified her
parents from adopting based on Art 335 CC, which
names among those who cannot adopt those who
have legitimate, legitimated, acknowledged natural
children, or natural children by legal fiction.
Doribel is not a natural child of Teodoro and Isabel,
but of Edita Abila who manifested in a petition for
guardianship of the child that she was the mother of
Doribel
1. WON Delia and Edmundo were legally adopted children of

Teodoro and Isabel - YES
It is too late to challenge the decree of adoption. It was
issued way back in 1967, and therefore has become final
and executory
Assuming that the petitioners were the proper parties,
they should have seasonably appealed or assailed the
decree of adoption on the basis of Doribels birth before
or seasonably after the decree was issued, but they did
not
Mauricio also claims to have no personal knowledge of
Doribels birth
A challenge to the validity of the adoption cannot be
made collaterally, as in petitioners action for partition,
but in a direct proceeding frontally addressing the issue
A presumption arises in such cases where the validity of
the judgment is thus attacked that the necessary
jurisdictional facts were proven
Santos v Aranzanso An adoption order implies the
finding of the necessary facts, and the burden of proof is
on the party attacking it
2. WON Doribel is a legitimate child - YES
Doribels birth certificate is one of the prescribed means
of recognition under both Art 265 CC and Art 172 FC.
Although it is only prima facie evidence of filiation, which
may be refuted by evidence, such evidence is lacking in
this case

Mauricios testimony that he was present when Doribel

was born to Edita Abila is suspect as it comes from an
interested party
Abilas affidavit denying her earlier statement in the
petition for the guardianship of Doribel is hearsay. It was
also never offered in evidence in the lower courts.
Even without Abilas affidavit, the birth certificate must be
upheld.
It was held in Legaspi v CA that the evidentiary nature of
public documents must be sustained in the absence of
strong, complete, and conclusive proof of its falsity or
nullity
Doribels legitimacy cannot be questioned in a complaint
for partition and accounting. It should be questioned in a
direct action seasonably filed by the proper party
It cannot be questioned by way of defense or as a
collateral issue in another action for a different purpose
3. WON Delia, Edmundo and Doribel are entitled to inherit

from Teodoro and Isabel - YES
Doribel, as the legitimate daughter, and Delia and
Edmundo, as their adopted children, are exclusive heirs to
the intestate estate of the deceased couple, in conformity
with Art 979, which states that legitimate children, which
includes adopted children, succeed their parents
The underlying philosophy of the article is that a persons
love descends first to his children, and grandchildren
before it ascends to his parents and thereafter spreads
among his collateral relatives
It is also supposed that one of a persons purposes in
acquiring property is to leave them eventually his children
as a token of his love for them and as a provision for their
continued care after his death
4. WON Delia and Edmundo are entitled to inherit from Eleno
and Rafaela - NO
The grandparents were total strangers to Delia and
Edmundo, as adopted children
An adopted child is deemed to be a legitimate child, and
thus has the same rights as legitimate child. HOWEVER,
these rights do not include the right of representation.
The relationship created by the adoption is between only
the adopting parents and the adopted child, and does not
extend to the blood relatives of either party.
* The adopted children are entitled to Teodoros estate.
Legally adopted children have the right to inherit from the
adoptive parents. However, the adopted children may not
represent their adoptive parent. Adoption creates a
relationship only between the adoptive parents and the
adopted. It does not extend to the blood relatives of either
party.
JOHNSTON v REPUBLIC (1963)
7 SCRA 1040
Isabel Johnston filed a petition to adopt a 2 yo minornamed
Ana Isabel Henriette Antonio Concepcion Georgiana from
Hospicio de San Jose as she is in a childless marriage with
Raymond Arthur Johnston. The petition was granted and
the child was given Isabels maiden surname, Valdez. Isabel
filed a motion to change the childs surname to ValdezJohnston, Isabels married name.
Page 130 of 151
HELD: Isabels husband did not concur in the adoption.

Hence, the child should use Isabels maiden name or it may
lead to confusion.
REPUBLIC v WONG (1992)
209 SCRA 189
Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala Sr
and Segundina Alcala. When they were 2 and 9 yo
respectively, he and his sister were legally adopted by
Hoon Wong and Concepcion Ty Wong (naturalized
Filipinos who are childless after 15 yrs of marriage.
When he turned 22, Maximo wants to revert to his
natural parents real name saying that the Chinese
surname of his adoptive parents embarrassed and
isolate him in his Muslim community. Likewise, it
hampers the progress of his business (furniture store).
The adoptive mom does not mind his action and even
assured that he will still be entitled to inherit from them
despite the name change.
RTC granted the petition for change of name
SG resists because change of name is an act of
ingratitude to his adoptive parents who cared for him.
ISSUE: WON the reasons submitted by Maximo are valid,
sufficient & proper to warrant the granting of the petition.
HELD: Yes. It was proven that the surname was detrimental
to Maximos business. Likewise, the change of Maximos
surname was not done to defraud anyone. Use of the
adoptive parents surname is not the main objective of
adoption but merely one of its effects.
FC echoes the same statutory right of an adopted child to
use the surname of the adopter. Thus, the use of the
surname of the adopter by the adopted child is both an
obligation and a right. SC said that the State has an interest
in the names borne by individuals & entities for the purpose
of identification & a change of name is not a matter of right
but of sound judicial discretion, to be exercised in the light
of reasons adduced & the consequences that will likely
follow; it is a privilege w/c may be granted upon showing of
a proper or reasonable cause or compelling reason. While it
is true under the law that an adopted child must bear the
name of the adopter, the change of the surname of the
adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of
adoption proceedings.
REPUBLIC v CA and CARANTO ( )
255 SCRA 99
Midael had been living with Jaime since he was 7 years
old. When Jaime married Zenaida on 19 January 1986,
Midael stayed under their care and custody.
Spouses Jaime and Zenaida Caranto filed for the
adoption of 15 yo minor Midael C. Mazon on 2
September 1988. Aside from the decree of adoption,
they also prayed for the change in the given name birth
certificate entry from Midael to Michael.
OSG opposed the petition insofar as it also sought to
change Midael to Michael in an adoption proceeding.
RTC dismissed OSG and rendered judgment on 30 May
1989 granting Caranto spouses petition.

Page 131 of 151
OSG appealed to CA, CA upheld RTC on 23 January

1992; hence, this petition.
ISSUES:
WON RTC acquired jurisdiction on petition for adoption
WON RTC and CA erred in granting change of given
name from Midael to Michael
HELD:
YES. Petitioner contends that since the name appearing
in the requisite notice by publication did not state the
true name of the child. Court ruled that the case at bar
was an obvious clerical error in the given name of the
child, and does not confuse any identities.
NO. The change of given name is without force and
effect. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court does not only
refer to errors concerning civil status, but even to
names as well as enumerated in item (o) of 2 of Rule
108. The local civil registrar must have been made
party to the proceeding. The notice by publication also
failed to include the matter on the change of name,
depriving the local civil registrar of notice and
opportunity to be heard.
REPUBLIC v HERNANDEZ (1996)
253 SCRA 509
Spouses Van and Regina Munson adopted an infant
who bears the name Kevin Earl Bartolome Moran in his
birth certificate. When they had him baptized, they
gave him the name Aaron Joseph, the name by which
the child is known to the family, relatives and friends.
The spouses then instituted a joinder of the petition for
adoption and the petition for a change of name.
The petitioner opposed the said action saying that there
is no legal basis for the change of the adoptees given
name.
RTC ruled in favor changing the name of the child
ratiocinating that as adoptive parents, petitioner like
other parents may feely select the first name given to
his/her child as it is only the surname to which the child
is entitled that is fixed by law.
Further, the respondents submit that change of name
may be given liberal construction since the object of
strict implementation is to prevent fraudulent acts,
while an infant has not exercised any of its rights.
ISSUES:
1. WON joinder of petition for adoption and petition
for a change of name is allowed by the law
2. WON there is lawful ground for the adoptees
change of name
HELD:
1. No. In order for two petitions may be joined in one
proceeding, the causes of action must: (a) not violate
the rules on jurisdiction, venue and joinder of parties
and (b) arise out of the same contract, transaction or
relation between the parties, or are for demands for
money or are of the same nature and character.
There is no conceptual unity between petition for
adoption and petition for change of name. The two
actions are different and unrelated from each
other, and therefore, two special proceedings

which cannot be joined as having one cause of
action. They must be instituted separately.
2.
No. The change of surname of the adoptee as a result

of the adoption and to follow that of the adopter does
not lawfully extend to or include the proper or given
name. The birth certificate, as it appears in the civil
register, contains the official name. It does not matter
if the mother, with all intention to abandon it later,
named the child for the sake of naming it.
If they really want to change the name, they
institute another action under Rule 103 of the
Rules of Court.
F. Rescission
FC, Art 191 If the adopted is a minor or otherwise
incapacitated, the adoption may be judicially rescinded upon
petition of any person authorized by the court or proper
government instrumentality acting on his behalf, on the same
grounds prescribed for loss or suspension of parental authority.
If the adopted is at least 18 years of age, he may petition for
judicial rescission of the adoption on the same grounds
prescribed for disinheriting an ascendant.
FC, Art 192 The adopters may petition the court for the
judicial rescission of the adoption in any of the following cases:
1. If the adopted has committed any act constituting a
ground for disinheriting a descendant
2. When the adopted has abandoned the home of the
adopters during minority for at least one year, or by
some other acts has definitely repudiated the adoption
** Under CC, PD 603 and FC, both the adopted child and
the adopter can ask for the judicial rescission. However, RA
8552 only allows rescission by the adoptee.
Art VI Sec 19, RA 8662
GROUNDS FOR RESCISSION OF ADOPTION
1.
2.
3.
4.
Repeated physical and verbal maltreatment by the

adopter(s)
attempt on the life of the adoptee
sexual assault or violence
abandonment and failure to comply with parental
obligations
The only remedy available to the adopter is Art 919 CC which is

disinheritance.
*Art 919 CC causes for disinheritance

1. conviction of an attempt against the life of the
testator, his or her spouses, descendants or
ascendants
2. having accused the testator of a crime punishable
by imprisonment for six years or more, if the
accusation has been found groundless
3. conviction of adultery or concubinage with the
spouse of the testator

4.
having induced the testator to make a will or to

change one already made, by fraud, violence,
intimidation or undue influence
refusal without justifiable cause to support the
testator
maltreatment of the testator by word or deed
living a dishonorable or disgraceful life
conviction of a crime which carrier the penalty of
civil interdiction
5.
6.
7.
8.
EFFECTS OF RESCISSION
FC, Art 193 If the adopted minor has not reached the age of
majority at the time of the judicial rescission of the adoption,
the court in the same proceeding shall reinstate the parental
authority of the parents by nature, unless the latter are
disqualified or incapacitated, in which case the court shall
appoint a guardian over the person and property of the minor.
If the adopted person is physically or mentally handicapped,
the court shall appoint in the same proceeding a guardian over
his person or property or both.
Judicial rescission of the adoption shall extinguish all reciprocal
rights and obligations between the adopters and the adopted
arising from the relationship of parent and child. The adopted
shall likewise lose the right to use the surnames of the adopters
and shall resume his surname prior to the adoption.
The court shall accordingly order the amendment of the records
in the proper registries.
Art VI Sec 20, RA 8662

1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
Restoration of parental authority to original

Reciprocal rights and obligation between adoptee and
adopter extinguished
Cancellation of amended birth certificate
Successional right back to before as of date of
rescission
Vested rights acquired prior to judicial rescission shall
be respected
G. Rectification of Simulated Birth

CRIME OF SIMULATION OF BIRTH
(Art VII Sec 21, RA 8522)
intended to curb or prevent such acts done by
people who want to avoid trouble and expenses of
judicial adoption o simply register adopted child in
heir names
any person who causes fictitious registration of
birth of child under name/s of person/s not his/her
biological parent/s
punishable by prison mayor medium plus P50k fine
includes physician/nurse/hospital personnel who
cooperated in execution of crime, similar penalties
apply plus permanent disqualification
Maam Beth says: The cost of adoption decree is
just as much as normal delivery! Well, at least,
thats my rate.
Page 132 of 151
RECTIFICATION OF SIMULATION OF BIRTH

(Art VII Sec 22, RA 8522)
Three-in-one procedure
1. Correction of Entries in Birth certificate
2. Declaration of Abandonment
3. Adoption Decree
Application for correction of the birth registration shall
be filed within 5 years from the effectivity of this Act
and completed thereafter
H. Adoption decree
REYES v SOTERO (2006)
482 SCRA 520
Elena Lising died intestate. Corazon Chichioco filed a
petition for issuance of letter and administration and
settlement and estate as the niece of the decedent with
the collateral relatives of the decedent.
Chichioco alleged that the properties of the decedent is
with the petitioner Ana Joyce Reyes, her grand niede
and that she be appointed as the administrator of these
properties instead.
Reyes filed an opposition to the petition, claiming that
she is in fact the adopted child of the decedent and her
husband Serafin delos Santos and that the appointment
of administration is unnecessary since she is the sole
heir of Lising. As evidence, she provided the following:
o Certification from the Municipal Registrar of
Paniqui, Tralac that on the Record of Court
Decrees, Reyes was adopted by Elena Lising and
Serafin delos Santos.
o Certification of the Clerk of Court of the RTCTarlac City that judgment was rendered on Dec
21, 1968 decreeing her adoption by the spouses
o Judicial form no. 43: the adoption decree which
declares her adoption
o Decree of final distribution issued by PVAO:
benefits paid to her as daughter of Serafin
delos Santos.
Chichioco filed an annulment of the adoption decree
stating that documents presented are false and
fraudulent; and that petitioner and her mother
collaborated to make it appear that petitioner is
adopted by Elena and Serafin.
ISSUE: WON the petitioner herein should prove the validity
of her adoption due to irregularities raised by private
respondent.
HELD: No. The Court ruled that the documents presented
by the petitioner sufficiently proved that she is legally
adopted by Elena and Serafin. It is presumed that these
documents are regularly issued as they are issued under the
seal of the issuing offices and signed by the proper officers.
The adoption decree is a public document that is required
by law to be properly registered in the official repository i.e.
local civreg as well as the court that rendered such
judgment. Thus these documents are prima facie evidence
of the facts therein unless proven contrary with proof of
such alleged irregularity be brought in a separate
proceeding for the purpose of nullifying the adoption decree

as in Santos v Aranzanso. The private respondents cannot

assail such decree to defeat the petitioners claim that she is
the sole heir of the decedent. Therefore, the petitioner
whose adoption is presumed to be valid is the sole heir of
the decedent.
I. Inter-country Adoption
* Governed by RA 8043 or the Inter-country Adoption Act
WHO MAY BE ADOPTED Any child:
1. has been voluntarily or involuntarily committed to the
Department as dependent, abandoned, or neglected
pursuant to the provisions of the Child and Youth
Welfare Code may be the subject of Inter-Country
Adoption;
2. Povided that in case of a child who is voluntarily
committed, the physical transfer of said child shall be
made not earlier than six (6) months from the date
the Deed of Voluntary Commitment was executed by
the childs biological parent/s. The prohibition against
physical transfer shall not apply to adoption by a
relative or children with special medical conditions.
WHO MAY ADOPT
Any foreign national or a Filipino citizen permanently
residing abroad who has the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications under the Act may file an application if
he/she:
(a) is at least twenty-seven (27) years of age;
(b) is at least sixteen (16) years older than the child to
be adopted at the time of the filing of the
application, unless the applicant is the parent by
nature of the child to be adopted or is the spouse
of such parent by nature;
(c) has the capacity to act and assume all the rights
and responsibilities incident to parental authority
under his/her national law;
(d) has undergone appropriate counseling form an
accredited counselor in his/her country
(e) has not been convicted of a crime involving moral
turpitude;
(f) is eligible to adopt under his/her national law
(g) can provide the proper care and support and give
the necessary moral values and example to the
child and, in the proper case, to all his/her other
children;
(h) comes from a country:
a. with whom the Philippines has diplomatic
relations;
b. whose government maintains a foreign
adoption agency; and
c. whose laws allow adoption; and
(i) files jointly with his/her spouse, if any, who shall
have the same qualifications and none of the
disqualifications to adopt as prescribed above.
Page 133 of 151
J. Adoption issues
THE PROS AND CONS OF INTER-COUNTRY
ADOPTION ACT1
Nationalistic reasons against IA
1. International pride political pressure to upgrade
internal system of social welfare
2. An unacceptable form of international charity
3. Belief that country and heritage is special and children
would be deprived of something valuable if removed
from it
4. Waste of human resources and exploitation by Western
neighbors
Best interest of the child
1. Remain in their biological families, or at least in their
home countries
a. Deprivation of cultural identity
b. Racial discrimination
c. Unnecessary separation from family
2. IA acts as an escape valve for LDCs and a
conscience-saving mechanism for developed
countries, it works to the disadvantage of all children in
these nations
a. limited response to the needs of children by
benefiting only a few, leaving millions of
homeless children in need of assistance
b. IA reduces pressure on the nations to improve
their child and family welfare programs
3. IA is dictated by the demands of would-be parents in
developed countries, rather than the needs of the
children involved
a. incentives for child trafficking and trading
likewise increase
b. will result to increase in number of abandoned
children, it will even encourage more mothers
who want better life for their children
c. western people are adopting for their own
selfish needs, then it is not an altruistic activity
4. IA facilitates child trafficking
*Too lazy to include the rebuttals which is the second part.
Its nice though. You might want to check it out yourself.
Summary by Karichi Santos

XIV. PARENTS AND

CHILDREN
PARENTAL AUTHORITY (patria potestas) is defined by
Manresa as the mass of rights and obligations which
parents have in relation to the person and property of their
children until their emancipation and even after this under
certain circumstances.
A. Parental Authority General

Provisions
FC, Art 209 Pursuant to the natural right and duty of parents
over the person and property of their unemancipated children,
parental authority and responsibility shall include caring for and
rearing of such children for civic consciousness and efficiency
and the development of their moral, mental and physical
character and well-being.
FC, Art 210 Parental authority and responsibility may not be

renounced or transferred except in the cases authorized by law.
Parental authority is a purely personal right. It cannot be

renounced except for the following waiver permitted by law:
1. adoption
2. guardianship
3. surrender to an orphanage or asylum (Art 223-224)
Minority does not divest a parent of parental authority. In
fact, there are two kinds of parental authority:
1. parental authority over the person of the child
2. parental authority over the property of the child
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
OVER THE PERSON
PARENTAL AUTHORITY
OVER THE PROPERTY
When does a parent have parental authority over

the person but not the property?
1. when the parent is a minor
2. when the parent is disinherited by an ascendant
(Grandparent Parent Child)
FC, Art 211 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
parental authority over the persons of their common children.
In case of disagreement, the fathers decision shall prevail,
unless there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Children shall always observe respect and reverence towards
their parents and are obliged to obey them as long as they
children are under parental authority.
Page 134 of 151
* The preferential right of fathers is for cases that require

immediate decision and are essentially temporary until
decided by the court.
CHILDRENS DUTY
1. observe respect and reverence permanent,
lifetime of parent and child
2. obey them temporary, only as long as they are
under parental authority
*But in the Philippines, the best way to show respect and
reverence is to obey!
FC, Art 212 In case of absence or death of either parent, the
parent present shall continue exercising parental authority. The
remarriage of the surviving parent shall not affect the parental
authority over the children, UNLESS the court appoints another
person to be the guardian of the person or property of the
children.
FC, Art 213 In case of separation of parents, parental

authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the
Court. The Court shall take into account all relevant
considerations, especially the choice of the child over seven
years of age, unless the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under 7 yo shall be separated from the mother unless
the Court finds compelling reasons to order otherwise. (Tender
Years Presumption)
FC, Art 214 In case of

1. death
2. absence
3. unsuitability of the parents
Substitute parental authority shall be exercised by the surviving
grandparent. In case several survive, the one designated by the
court, taking into account the same consideration mentioned in
the preceding article, shall exercise the authority.
PD 603, Art 58 Damages by child are answered by parents
CC, Art 2180 The father and, in case of his death or

incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages
caused by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors
or incapacitated persons who are under their authority
and live in their company.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and
trades shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils
and students or apprentices, so long as they remain in
their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease
when the persons herein mentioned prove that they
observed all the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage.

1. Custody
A. Determining the best interest of the child
i. GENDER AND TENDER YEARS PRESUMPTION
EX PARTE DEVINE (1981)
398 So. 2d 686
Alice Beth, an employee at the US Army at Fort
McMClellan Christoper, a school teacher Matthew
Patrick and Timothy Clark
Mr and Mrs Devine were divorced, the court awarded
the children to Mrs Devine, according to the tender
years presumption (if both parents are fit, and children
are at their tender years, under 7 years, mother will
take care of them, based on instinctive role of the
mother).
Mr Devine now challenges the constitutionality of the
tender years presumption and claiming that it is
violative of the14th amendment (equal protection)
ISSUE: WON the trial courts reliance on tender years
presumption deprived the father of his constitutional
entitlement to the equal protection of the law
HELD: Yes. The tender years presumption represents an
unconstitutional
gender-based
classification
which
discriminates between fathers and mothers in child custody
proceedings solely on the basis of sex. It creates a
presumption of fitness and suitability of one parent without
consideration of the actual capabilities of both parties. It
also imposes unnecessary legal burden on the father. (Note:
The burden of proof that the mother is unfit. Thus, the male
can only gain custody IF the female is unfit even if the
father is fit. This violates the equal protection clause.)
* Remember Moe v Dinkins, a case about the requirement
of parental consent
TEST
PROXY
MOE v DINKINS
Maturity
Age
DEVINE
Fitness
Sex/Gender
Is there a fit between the test and the proxy? No, because
even if mothers are closer than fathers during infancy, it is
not sufficient ground because as the child matures, the
difference between the parental skills of the father and the
mother decreases.
CERVANTES v FAJARDO (1989)
169 SCRA 575
Angelie Anne Cervantes is the product of common-law
relationship between Conrado Fajardo and Gina
Carreon. They offered Angelie for adoption to her sister
and brother in law, Zenaida Carreon Cervantes and
Nelson Cervantes, the petitioners in this case.
Gina executed an affidavit of consent and an
appropriate petition for adoption was filed by herein
petitioners. The petition was granted.
Petitioners received a letter from the respondents
demanding to be paid 150,000, or else, they would get
back their child. The petitioners refused.
Page 135 of 151
Gina took the child from their yaya at the petitioners

residence. Petitioners asked for the child but
respondent refused, saying that she had no desire to
give up the child in the first place and the affidavit that
she executed wasnt explained fully to her. The
petitioners herein filed a writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE: WON Gina has rights to the child

HELD: No. The provision that no mother shall be separated
from a child under 7 yo will not apply when the court finds
compelling reasons to do otherwise. In this case, Ginas
situation is not economic and moral conducing for the child.
Conrado is married to another woman, and also, Gina has
another child by another married man. Having a sibling with
a different surname will cause confusion to the child.
Angelie Anne was also legally adopted and it dissolves the
authority of the natural parents to the child.
Maam Beth does not agree with the decision, she says that
3 yo kids will be happy for the playmate. It would not ask
Sino tatay mo?
Moral of the story: Dont use different surnames, even if the
father acknowledges the child. UNLESS he gives support,
otherwise, its useless!
Would it favor an adulterous mother if the child was
younger or older? Younger, because the child does not
have any opinions yet. All it wants is milk, diaper and burp.
ESPIRITU v CA (1995)
246 SCRA 362
Reynaldo Espiritu and Teresita Masauding first met at
Iligan City in 1976. In 1984, they again met in
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania and began to maintain a
common law relationship as husband and wife.
2 years later, Rosalind was born. They then got married
in 1987 and later had a son, Reginald. Their
relationship deteriorated and they separated in 1990.
Teresita then left the children and Reynaldo and went
back to California. Reynaldo brought the children to the
Philippines and left them to her sister.
Teresita then filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
against the petitioners. The trial court denied the writ,
but the CA granted the petition, applying Art 363 CC
which states that a child below 7 yrs old shall not be
separated from the mother.
ISSUE: WON Teresita is fit to be granted custody of the
children
HELD: No. The prime consideration is the childs best
interest. TYP provides that if the child is under seven years
of age, the mother is the best custodian. However, the
presumption is not absolute and may be overcome by
compelling reasons. When a child is over seven, his or her
choice of parent is paramount.
The testimonies of the psychologist and social worker
showed that the children disliked their mother, even loves
her yaya more. Their testimonies were given weight by the

court since the interview and the examination were done for
foreign travel and school purposes respectively, not for the
advancement of the litigation case. Also, she refuses to talk
to her in the phone and when they saw each other in court,
daughter ignored her mother and did not show any longing.
The mothers illicit affair with Reynaldos coworker seemed
to have caused emotional disturbances to Rosalind. There
is also nothing in the records which show that Reynaldo was
unfit. His assignment in the states is just temporary, and he
will be coming back home to the Philippines permanently.
CELIS v CAFUIR (1950)
86 Phil 554
When Ileana Celis gave birth to a boy, Joel, she
entrusted him to Soledad Cafuir because of her fathers
displeasure of the disgrace Ileana brought to the family
for having illicit relations with a man whom she is not
married with and because of her fathers objection of
having her son stay in the paternal home.
Ileana made two documents: 1) entrusting Soledad her
child and only Soledad can adopt the child. 2)
appointment of Soledad as the childs guardian.
Ileana only came to visit the boy every Saturday and
provided some milk, food and a little money.
She eventually married co petitioner Agustin Rivera and
then decided to get the boy back, but Soledad refused.
Ileana then filed for a writ of habeas corpus. Soledad,
in her defense, claims that the two documents enacted
by Ileana renounced her custody of and patria potestas
over her child.
ISSUE: WON Ileana had renounced her custody of the child
in favor of Soledad.
HELD: No. The first document merely entrusted her son to
soledad. Entrusted cannot convey the idea of permanent
renunciation. Also, the clause that says No one has the
right to claim for adoption except Soledad merely provides
an option for Soledad, which she didnt take. The second
document, on the other hand, merely designated Soledad as
the guardian of the child. The designation of one as the
guardian does not mean that the guardian will always
assume and discharge the duties of the office or position.
GAMBOA-HIRSCH v CA (2007)
527 SCRA 380
Agnes Gamboa-Hirsh Franklin Harvey Hirsch and a
daughter was born to them named Simon Noelle
They were married in Bacolod but the couple cannot
agree on where they would establish their conjugal
home, whether in Boracay or in Makati.
They settled in Boracay but Agnes insisted on going to
Makati. She did, and took with her Noelle with no
intention of coming back.
Husband petitions for writ of habeas corpus which CA
granted and they were given joint custody
ISSUE: WON the CA erred in giving custody to both the
parents
Page 136 of 151
HELD: Yes. Art 213 applies because the child is under 7

years old and the mother did not have the disqualification
for possessing custody.
SY v CA (2007)
GR No. 124518
Mercedes filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus for
her two minor children Vanessa and Jeremiah.
Her husband Wilson alleges that she is unfit for custody
because she has 1) abandoned their family, 2) mentally
unstable and 3) cannot provide for their children
ISSUE: WON Mercedes can have custody of her children
HELD: Yes. Because all of Wilsons arguments, aside from
being unsubstantiated, had been refuted by Mercedes. She
left the conjugal home to work in Taiwan and earn money
to reclaim her children. Her act of praying in the rain is a
mere expression of her faith, which is the same reason for
the couples separation (religious differences).
ii. PARENTAL UNFITNESS
FELDMAN v FELDMAN (1974)
358 NYS 2d 507
Mady Feldman filed for divorce against her husband,
Philip, based upon cruel and inhuman treatment.
Pursuant to their separation agreement, she was
awarded the custody of their 2 children.
After the divorce, the former wife began dating a
married man. In one visit of the former husband at her
former wifes house, he found a copy of Screw
Magazine and some letters with explicit photographs on
the dining room and kitchen tables. The letters were in
response to the ads placed by the former wife and her
male companion regarding fun and games with other
couples or groups.
The former husband then filed a petition for the
custody of the two children. The trial court found that
the wife was living sexually liberated lifestyle. Based on
this, the trial court granted the custody of the two
children to the former husband.
ISSUE: WON the mothers unusual sexual activities makes
her unsuitable for custody because of immorality
HELD: No. Her peculiar sexual practices do not ipso facto
constitute unfitness for custody. It was found that she had
supported her children well and has given them a great
atmosphere at home. The unusual practices by the mother
did not, in any way, affect the children. There is no
evidence also, that the publications or pictures were ever
seen by the children. (Note: the right of a divorced woman
to engage in private sexual activities, which no way affect
her minor children, is within the penumbra of privacy
mandated by the Bill of Rights) Also, the children were wellprovided for both emotionally and physically (doing good at
school, even elected as class officers) and that the mothers
home had a cheerful and happy atmosphere (which to
Maam Beths mind was maaliwalas.

SANTOS v CA (1995)
242 SCRA 407
Leouel and Julia had placed their child into the care of
the latters parents ever since the child was born. The
grandparents were the ones who provided support for
the child, since Leouel cannot afford to do so. Julia then
left for the States to work. The grandparents claim that
Julia has been sending financial support to her son.
On September 1990, Leouel abducted the child from his
grandparents. The grandparents then filed for custody
of the boy, which the trial court granted.
Leouel appealed, stating that the respondents have
failed to show the he is unfit to be the father and that
the substitute parental authority granted to the boys
grandparents was inappropriate.
The respondents claim that they are financially well-off
to take care of the son, while Leouel is not. They can
provide the child with an air-conditioned room since he
is asthmatic.
Also, Julia has entrusted the boy to them. Leouels use
of trickery to abduct the child also is a sign of his
unfitness. They likewise claim that they are in the best
position to take care of the child, and this should be the
primary consideration of the court.
ISSUE: WON Leouel should be awarded proper custody
HELD: Yes. The father, Leouel was not shown to be an unfit
parent. The fact that he kidnapped his son from the latters
maternal grandparents does not render him unfit. Also,
disqualifying him as custodian because of the nature of his
work would mean depriving all soldiers of their childs
company. Only in cases of death, absence or unsuitability of
parents may substitute parental authority be exercised by
the surviving grandparents.
B. Role of the childs preference

PIZARRO v CA & VASQUEZ (1937)
36 OG 449
Maria and Mariano were wed in 1928 and lived together
until 1922. they have two children. Because of
Marianos infidelity and cruelty, spouses agreed to live
separately. They executed a contract of separation
stating that the custody of the children will be with
Maria.
One year late, Maria gave birth to Lorenzo. Mariano
sues and wins a case for adultery. However, since both
parties had committed adultery after such separation,
the court gave custody to the paternal grandparents.
ISSUE: WON a wife accused of adultery was entitled to
separate maintenance.
HELD: In absence of proof of guilt, yes she is entitled to
support. The contention here is between the wifes
affirmation against the husbands denial of the short-lived
marital reunion. Maria said she had briefly reconciled with
her husband during a fiesta in Cavite. He promised to
behave so she was persuaded to live with him again.
Page 137 of 151
The presumption of legitimacy continues even if the

husband and wife voluntarily separate and live apart. This
presumption is one of the strongest known in law and
cannot be overthrown except by stronger evidence to the
contrary.
Considering that the reunion with the wife is not impossible
nor improbable. Mariano also asserted the unchastity of his
wife after the birth of Lorenzo, contradicting his earlier
statements and actions. He had found out about Marias
affair as early as March 1934 but gave her money in
September and October 1934.
Maria is entitled to prima facie presumption of innocence of
the crime of adultery. A declaration of adultery in this case
affects her standing, as well as her child. Since alleged
adultery of Maria has not been sufficiently established,
Lorenzo is presumed to be legitimate because he was born
in lawful wedlock, there having been no divorce relative or
absolute.
Maria swore that she had left her husband and the conjugal
abode because he had kept a mistress there, and had
repeatedly done her bodily harm. These assertions were not
contradicted. Consequently, the defense of unworthiness
having failed, the innocent wife must be given separate
maintenance. She would also be given the custody of her
three children, because 1) the contract of separation
stipulated that Gloria and Julita stay with her and 2) it was
for the best interest of the children.
GOLDSTEIN v GOLDSTEIN (1975)
115 R.I. 152
Edward Goldstein was awarded custody of a child, Ann
Robin, after a decree by the court. As such, the child
and her father lived in Israel, while the mother, Claire,
stayed in the States.
The wife then initiated a series of proceedings to
reclaim rights over the child and she finally succeeded
in part, when her husband and child returned to the
States and appeared in court. The trial judge found it
advisable to place the child under the mothers custody
pending the hearing. At the hearing, both were found
to be fit.
Ann was found to be very intelligent and suffers no
emotional damage. The wife requested for the judge to
take notice of the threat of war in Israel, while the
husband argued that the states had more violence and
engaged in much more wars.
The judge and Ann Robin then talked, and from their
conversation, Ann said that she loved her father more
than her mother and that she had no desire to visit with
her mother but agreed if she was allowed to live with
her father if she visited her mother for 4 weeks during
the summer.
The judge, taking into consideration the childs best
interests, granted custody to the father. The wife
argued that the judge failed to consider all
circumstances and allowed the childs choice to control
his decision.

ISSUE: WON the judges reliance on the childs preference

was justifiable
HELD: Yes. The factors in awarding custody to one or the
other of the parents were equally balanced as to make it
difficult for the judge to decide between them. That being
so, it does not seem that he abused his discretion when he
gave great weight to the childs preference.
LAXAMANA v LAXAMANA (2002)
388 SCRA 296
Lourdes (a degree holder in banking and finance)
Raymond (graduate of LLB, buy and sell, resto owner
and fishpond) Michael and twins Joseph & Vincent
The family was well off until the father became drug
dependent and violent. This led the wife and her
children to abandon the petitioner
After going in and out of the rehab and finally being
declared drug-free, Reymond then filed a petition for
habeas corpus for the custody of the 3 children
Lourdes opposed the petition, citing the drug
dependence of the petitioner and then filed for an
annulment of their marriage
Reymond filed in the habeas corpus case a motion
seeking visitation rights over his children. After the
parties reached an agreement, the court granted the
visitation rights and ordered the parties to undergo
psychiatric and psychological examination.
The results of the psychiatric evaluation were presented
to the court. The exam states that the children were
affected psychologically by the fathers drug-related
behavior, and also the psychiatrist found that Reymond
is still not completely cured of the drug addiction.
However, the psychiatrist did not detect any evidence
that the paternal visits would be harmful to the
children. Based on this, the court granted custody to
Lourdes and visitation rights to Reymond.
ISSUE: WON the court properly resolved the issue of
custody
HELD: No. The fundamental policy of the State to promote
and protect the welfare of the children shall not be
disregarded by mere technicality in resolving disputes which
involve the family and the youth. While Reymond may have
a history of drug dependence, the records are inadequate as
to his moral, financial and social well-being. Although he is
not completely cured of his drug dependence, there is no
evidence showing that he is unfit to provide the children
with adequate support, education and moral and intellectual
training and development. Moreover, the children in this
case were 14 and 15 years old at the time of the
promulgation of the decision, yet the court did not ascertain
their choice as to which parent they wanted to live.
* Maam Beth does not like this decision. Why would you
risk the children staying with someone who has propensity
for drug addiction? Its only saving grace is that the lower
court would only receive evidence.
Page 138 of 151
C. Presumption for primary caretaker

This rule is not followed in the Philippines. Its just included
here so that well know that we have other alternatives to:
1. tender years presumption
2. best interest of the child
3. childs preference
GARSKA v MCCOY (1981)
278 S.E. 2d 357
Michael Garska, the appellee and Gwendolyn McCoy, the
appellant, met at North Carolina. Michael got Gwen
pregnant and thus, Gwen moved back to her grandparents.
During her pregnancy, she received no support from
Michael, but after she gave birth, Michael sent a package of
food and diapers. In the subsequent months, the baby had
many complications, and to pay for the medical bills, Gwens
grandfather attempted to use his medical insurance
provided by the united mine workers. But he has been
informed that they would have to adopt the baby so they
can avail of the said insurance. Gwen then signed a consent
in which she agreed that her baby will be adopted by her
grandparents. Michael, upon learning this, visited the baby
for the 1st time and sent money weekly. Gwens grandfather
then filed a petition for adoption. Consequently, Michael
filed a petition for write of habeas corpus to secure custody
of his son. The court denied the petition for adoption, since
the baby had not resided with them for the requisite 6
months. The court also awarded custody to Michael for
reasons that he: is natural father, was better educated,
more intelligent, able to provide better financial support,
among others.
ISSUE: WON Michael should be awarded custody
HELD: No. the court set forth the rule regarding the
presumption of primary caretaker. The court held that the
primary caretaker is one who performs the following caring
and nurturing duties of the parent: 1. preparing and
planning of meals 2. Bathing and grooming and dressing, 3.
purchasing, cleaning and care of clothes, 4. medical care, 5.
arranging for social interaction among peers after school, 6.
arranging alternative care, 7. putting child to bed at night,
attending to child in the middle of the night, waking child in
the morning, 8. disciplining, 9. educating, and, 10. teaching
elementary skills. Once the primary caretaker is identified,
all that need to be determined is whether the parent is unfit
or not. In this case, it is obvious that Gwen is the primary
caretaker. There is no finding which points that Gwen is
unfit. In fact, all of the evidence indicates that she mobilized
all of the resources at her command, namely the solicitous
regard of her grandparents, in the interest of this child and
that she went to extraordinary lengths to provide for him
adequate medical attention and financial support.

D. Flip of the coin 2

(Mnookin article)
CRITICISMS AGAINST ALTERNATIVES
TYP results to protracted litigation. However, if we do
way with no presumptions, there is the disadvantage of
moving into the facts, and what should be the hierarchy
of the facts? Each and every case will be litigated, and
we end up spending money and destroying families
when we could have done it by being civil.
How much weight should be given to the childs choice?
When and where should we ask the child? Any place
where there are neither parents nor lawyers like the
chambers of the judge.
When do you ask? Not during the trial of course, when
the child would be fearful of hurting the parents.
What is the advantage of flipping the coin? It is
perfectly random, like the way they pick people in the
draft, who will fight the war.
BUT we cannot flip the coin because application to the
governments capacity to decide on the childs best
interest. It symbolically ignores the difference between
the parties. Also, people lose the opportunity or forum
to vent, to flame which is good for the soul.
Conclusion: accept the flaws of whatever presumption
we have.
2. Other rights and duties in exercise of

parental authority
FC, Art 220 The parents and those exercising parental
authority shall have with respect to their unemancipated
children or wards the following rights and duties:
1. To keep them in their company, to support, educate and
instruct them by right precept and good example, and to
provide for their upbringing in keeping with their means;
2. To give them love and affection, advice and counsel,
companionship and understanding;
3. To provide them with moral and spiritual guidance,
inculcate in them honesty, integrity, self-discipline, selfreliance, industry and thrift, stimulate their interest in civic
affairs, and inspire in them compliance with the duties of
citizenship;
4. To furnish them with good and wholesome educational
materials, supervise their activities, recreation and
association with others, protect them from bad company,
and prevent them from acquiring habits detrimental to
their health, studies and morals;
5. To represent them in all matters affecting their interests;
6. To demand from them respect and obedience;
7. To impose discipline on them as may be required under
the circumstances; and
8. To perform such other duties as are imposed by law upon
parents and guardians.
Summary by Krissy Conti
Page 139 of 151
RIGHTS OF PARENTS
1. To keep them in their
company
2. To demand from them
respect and obedience
DUTIES OF PARENTS
All others! So in effect, parents
have more duties than rights
FC, Art 221 Parents and other persons exercising parental

authority shall be civilly liable for the injuries and damages
caused by the acts or omissions of their unemancipated
children living in their company and under their parental
authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
FC, Art 222 The courts may appoint a guardian of the child's
property or a guardian ad litem when the best interests of the
child so requires
FC, Art 223 The parents or, in their absence or incapacity, the
individual, entity or institution exercising parental authority,
may petition the proper court of the place where the child
resides, for an order providing for disciplinary measures over
the child. The child shall be entitled to the assistance of
counsel, either of his choice or appointed by the court, and a
summary hearing shall be conducted wherein the petitioner and
the child shall be heard.
However, if in the same proceeding the court finds the
petitioner at fault, irrespective of the merits of the petition, or
when the circumstances so warrant, the court may also order
the deprivation or suspension of parental authority or adopt
such other measures as it may deem just and proper.
FC, Art 224 The measures referred to in the preceding article

may include the commitment of the child for not more than 30
days in entities or institutions engaged in child care or in
children's homes duly accredited by the proper government
agency.
The parent exercising parental authority shall not interfere with
the care of the child whenever committed but shall provide for
his support. Upon proper petition or at its own instance, the
court may terminate the commitment of the child whenever just
and proper.

FC, Art 225 The father and the mother shall jointly exercise
legal guardianship over the property of the unemancipated
common child without the necessity of a court appointment. In
case of disagreement, the father's decision shall prevail, unless
there is a judicial order to the contrary.
Where the market value of the property or the annual income
of the child exceeds P50,000, the parent concerned shall be
required to furnish a bond in such amount as the court may
determine, but not less than ten per centum (10%) of the value
of the property or annual income, to guarantee the
performance of the obligations prescribed for general
guardians.
A verified petition for approval of the bond shall be filed in the
proper court of the place where the child resides, or, if the child
resides in a foreign country, in the proper court of the place
where the property or any part thereof is situated.
The petition shall be docketed as a summary special proceeding
in which all incidents and issues regarding the performance of
the obligations referred to in the second paragraph of this
Article shall be heard and resolved.
The ordinary rules on guardianship shall be merely suppletory
except when the child is under substitute parental authority, or
the guardian is a stranger, or a parent has remarried, in which
case the ordinary rules on guardianship shall apply.
FC, Art 226 The property of the unemancipated child earned

or acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or
gratuitous title shall belong to the child in ownership and shall
be devoted exclusively to the latter's support and education,
unless the title or transfer provides otherwise.
Page 140 of 151
Administration and usufruct are two distinct

things. There may be administration without
usufruct or vice versa.
FC, Art 227 If the parents entrust the management or
administration of any of their properties to an unemancipated
child, the net proceeds of such property shall belong to the
owner. The child shall be given a reasonable monthly allowance
in an amount not less than that which the owner would have
paid if the administrator were a stranger, unless the owner,
grants the entire proceeds to the child. In any case, the
proceeds thus give in whole or in part shall not be charged to
the child's legitime.
Who has authority over the childs property?

1. parents unless minor or disinherited by ascendant
2. parental authority
SALIENTES v ABANILLA (2006)
500 SCRA 128
Marie Antonette Loran Lorenzo Emmanuel
The family lives with the wifes parents. However, Loran
cannot get along with his in-laws so he urges his wife
to leave and transfer to their own place. Marie refuses
so Loran leaves alone.
Loran was prevented from seeing his childn. So he filed
a petition for writ of habeas corpus for his 2 yo child.
CA dismissed his case because WHC is resorted to in
cases where rightful custody is withheld from a person
entitled thereto.
ISSUE: WON a father may be deprived to see his son
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the
child's property shall be limited primarily to the child's support
and secondarily to the collective daily needs of the family.
HELD: No. Since they have de facto separation, the custody

is yet to be settled so father retains his parental authority
over the child.
PROPERTY OF THE CHILD

1. childs earning through his labor, work or industry
2. property acquired by the child by gratuitous title
donated or inherited
3. property acquired by the child through onerous
title
4. fruits of all the properties of the child whether
acquired by lucrative or onerous title
5. insurance proceeds accruing to the child
CABANAS v PILAPIL (1974)

58 SCRA 94
- Florentino Pilapil had a child (Millian Pilipil) with the
plaintiff, Melchora Cabanas, married to another man.
- The deceased insured himself assigning the child as the
beneficiary and his brother, respondent herein, Francisco
Pilapil as the trustee during her minority. Upon his deaths,
the proceeds were given to the brother.
- Mother prays for appointment as the administrator in her
capacity as the natural parent. Uncle resists invoking the
terms of the insurance policy.
PURPOSES WHICH THE PARENTS MAY USE THE FRUITS

AND INCOME OF THE CHILD
1. childs support and education
2. collective daily needs of the family as a social unit
EXTINGUISHMENT OF PARENTS USUFRUCT
1. emancipation of child
2. death of the child
3. loss of parental authority through judicial decree
4. consent of the parent to the childs living
independently
5. disinheritance and incapacity to succeed by reason
of unworthiness
ISSUE: Who between the mother and the uncle has the
right to administer the childs property?
HELD: The mother. Art 320 and 321 of CC says that the
father, in his absence, the mother is the legal administrator
of the property of the child. There is no ambiguity in the
law, so apply it if the facts are not disputed.
LIBI v IAC (1992)
214 SCRA 816
Julie Ann Gotiong (18 yo, 1st year Commerce student at
University of San Carlos, Cebu) and Wendell Libi (1819) were sweethearts.

Julie broke up with Wendell because he was sadistic

and irresponsible. Wendell attempts to reconcile with
her but to no avail. So he resorts to threatening Julie
who in turn, sought the help of her best friend Malou
Alfonso in whose house she stayed to avoid her ex-bf.
Julie and Wendell died from a single gunshot inflicted
by a revolver licensed in the name of Wendells father,
Cresencio Libi (the petitioner).
No eyewitness account so the parents of the two
parties presented their own theories.
GOTIONG VERSION OF THE STORY: Wendell killed
their daughter, the committed suicide.
LIBI VERSION OF THE STORY: Wendell was an
informer of the Constabulary Anti-Narcotics Unit
(CANU), so an unknown and antagonized third party
killed him and included Julie to eliminate any witnesses.
The Gotiongs filed a civil case against the Libis to
recover damages for their daughters death
ISSUE: WON the parents of the Wendell are liable for the
damages
HELD: Yes. Parents are primary liable for damages caused
by minor children from quasi-delicts and criminal offenses
except when they exercised due diligence. In this case,
parents did not exercise due diligence since the son gained
access to the key of the safety deposit box where gun was
(mother just kept it in her bag, to the knowledge of the son)
and their ignorance to the nature of his job as evidence by
the picture of him with a gun given to Julie Ann. Also, the
Libis theory is untenable because they did not file a case
against the alleged malefactor of their son, there were only
two bullets used and no paraffin test was conducted
because of the hasty interment.
* Maam Beth recognizes the impulse of teen-agers to have
a life unknown from their parents. Mahirap talagang maging
magulang, if you dont know what your child is doing, youre
a bad parent and if something goes wrong youre liable for
it. If you get involved too much, youre being too intrusive
and stunts your childs growth.
LINDAIN v CA (1992)
212 SCRA 725
Dolores Luluquisin, acting as a guardian of her minor
children, sold a land registered in the name of her
children to the private respondents Apolonia Valiente
and Federico Ila for P2000.
They assert that the value can be validly sold without
written court approval because the property was less
than P2000.
Even if the sale was invalid, the petitioners right to
redeem has already prescribed because it is only
allowed until four years after reaching age of majority
ISSUE: WON judicial approval was necessary for the sale of
minors property by the mother
HELD: Yes. Sale of minor children's property executed by
the mother is void. Judicial approval is necessary because
the powers and duties as legal administrator are only
powers of possession and management; no power to
Page 141 of 151
mortgage, encumber or dispose. Also, the action for

reconveyance of immovable prescribe only after 30 years.
PEOPLE v SILVANO (1999)
309 SCRA 362
It is not for the humans to ravish what they produced.
Sheryl Silvano, a beautiful and tall mestiza, 16 yo was
raped by her father as a punishment for her coming
home late. She has been raped since she was 13 yo
old. And only told her mother and grandmother about it
when she was being compelled to return to their home
(she left their home and stayed at her lolas house).
Father submits many arguments like: he couldnt have
possibly raped the child because the room was
cramped, that his wife just wants to severe marital ties
with him, that if he did rape her it would have woke up
her two brothers who are sleeping in the same room.
He was merely teaching her sex education.
ISSUE: WON raping is justified form of punishment
HELD: No! Sex with one's own child is per se abhorrent and
can never be justified as a form of parental punishment. It
is detrimental to the childs moral development and wellbeing. His arguments are likewise untenable because any
noise that they would have produced is disguised as a form
of parental reproach. DEATH ROLL!
SHIELDS v GROSS (1983)
58 NY 2d 338
- Brooke Shields wants to revoke a contract entered into by
her mother when she was just 10 years old. The contract
was for a modeling session wherein she was made to pose
nude in a bath tub.
ISSUE: WON a child upon reaching age of majority may
disaffirm a contract entered into by her parent
HELD: No. Neither was judicial approval of the contract was
necessary because this was only required of child
performers which by statutory definition excludes child
models.
The decision balanced two interests, that of:
1. the child: not pornographic (????)
2. stability of commercial transactions
SILVA v CA & GONZALES (1997)
275 SCRA 60
Carlitos Silva (a married businessman) cohabited with
Suzanne Gonzales (an actress) and begot two children,
Ramon Carlos and Rica Natalia
Because the wife resumed her acting career (though
wife contends that she did not stop) they separated
Mother refuses to allow father the childrens company
on weekends and says that he is into gambling and
womanizing which she fears might affect the values of
the children
RTC gave visitation rights to the father
Mother remarries a Dutch national and goes to Holland
with kids.

CA denies custodial rights to father and asks for selfsacrifice, saying that rotational custody is harmful to
the children, especially if they see that the father has
another family. If he really loves his children, he will
give them what is best for them, even if it means he
will not see them. Besides, illegitimate children should
be under the parental authority of the mother.
ISSUE: WON the father may be deprived of visitation rights

HELD: No. Provisions on inherent and natural right is
regardless of legitimacy. Besides, Art 49 FC may be applied
here (visitation rights of void ab initio marriages). The
consequences are merely the product of the unfounded
imagination of the judge. Besides, the RTC gave safeguards
to the visitation rights: cannot take out children without the
mothers consent.
B. Substitute and Special Parental

Authority
FC, Art 216 In default of parents or a judicially appointed
guardian, the following persons shall exercise substitute
parental authority over the child in the order indicated.:
1. surviving grandparent, as provided in Art 214
2. oldest brother or sister, over 21 yo, unless unfit or
disqualified
3. childs actual custodian, over 21 yo, unless unfit or
disqualified
whenever the appointment of a judicial guardian over the
property of the child becomes necessary, the same order of
preference shall be observed.
SUBSTITUTE PARENTAL
AUTHORITY
Grandparents, oldest
sibling or court appoint
guardian
Exercised in case of death,
absence or unsuitability of
parents
Subsidiarily liable for if
damages caused by act or
omission under the
supervision of people with
special parental authority
Law is silent about
prohibition of corporal
punishment
SPECIAL PARENTAL
AUTHORITY
School, administrators and
teachers
Exercised concurrently with
the exercise of parental
authority
Principally and solidarily
liable for damages caused
by act or omission of minor
under their custody,
supervision or instruction
Cannot inflict corporal
punishment on the minor
FC, Art 217 In case of foundlings, abandoned, neglected or

abused children and other children similarly situated, parental
authority shall be entrusted in summary judicial proceedings to
heads of childrens homes, orphanages and similar institutions
duly accredited by the proper government agency.
Page 142 of 151
ABANDONED CHILD is one who has no parental care of

guardianship or whose parents or guardian have deserted
him for at least six months
FC, Art 218 The school, its administrators and teachers, or the
individual, entity or institution engaged in child care shall have
special parental authority and responsibility over the minor child
while under their supervision, instruction or custody.
Authority and responsibility shall apply to all authorized
activities whether inside or outside the premises of the school,
entity or institution.
FC, Art 219 Those given the authority and responsibility under
the preceding Article shall be principally and solidarily liable for
damages caused by the acts or omissions of the unemancipated
minor. The parents, judicial guardians or the persons exercising
substitute parental authority over said minor shall be
subsidiarily liable.
The respective liabilities of those referred to in the preceding
paragraph shall not apply if it is proved that they exercised the
proper diligence required under the particular circumstances.
All other cases not covered by this and the preceding articles
shall be governed by the provisions of the Civil Code on quasidelicts.
CC, Art 2180 The father and, in case of his death or

incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused
by the minor children who live in their company.
Guardians are liable for damages caused by the minors or
incapacitated persons who are under their authority and live in
their company.
Lastly, teachers or heads of establishments of arts and trades
shall be liable for damages caused by their pupils and students
or apprentices, so long as they remain in their custody.
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
PALISOC v BRILLANTES (1971)

41 SCRA 548
While inside the laboratory room of Manila Technological
Institute, Dominador Palisoc and Virgilio Daffon engaged in
a brawl which killed the former. Parents of Dominador
claims damages from the school, the teacher and Daffon
(who is already of legal age).
ISSUE: WON the school, its administrators, the teacher and
Daffon are liable for damages
HELD: President and instructor are jointly and severally
liable since incident could have been prevented if they gave
proper supervision. It is not necessary that the student
board in the school for Art 2180 to apply. As long as
students are in their custody, they stand in loco parentis
and must exercise reasonable supervision over the conduct
of the child.

AMADORA v CA (1988)
160 SCRA 315
Just before their highschool graduation, Pablito Daffon
shot Alfredo Amadora which resulted to his death. It
was proven that they were only at the school
auditorium to finish their project in Physics. Amadoras
parents claim for damages which RTC and CA
dismissed.
ISSUE: Who may be held liable for the damages?
HELD:
1) Not the school nor the administrators: Art 2180 only
holds school administrators of trade and art school liable,
but not academic institutions.
2) Not the teacher in charge because it was not show that
he was not required to be there at the time of the incident.
3) Not the school prefect because it was not proven that the
gun used by Daffon was the same gun he had confiscated
and did not report to authorities.
However, it was established that Art 2180 applies to all
schools, academic or non-academic. In academic schools,
teacher in charge is liable for student's misconduct. In nonacademic schools, the head is liable. Custody is not
coterminous with semester. As long as student is under the
control and influence of school and within its premises in
pursuance of legitimate right, obligation or privilege, he is
considered under school custody.
* Maam Beth thinks Amadora was incorrectly decided
DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PALISOC AND AMADORA
PALISOC
during school hours, school
liable if impleaded
AMADORA
not during classhours, what
mattered was the purpose
ST. MARYS ACADEMY v CARPITANOS (2002)

376 SCRA 473
On 13 to 20 February 1995, St. Marys Academy
Dipolog conducted enrolment drive for the school year
1995-1996. This included visiting schools where
prospective enrollees are. Among the volunteer
students are Sherwin Carpitanos and James Daniel II.
On one day of the campaign, James Daniel II who was
then 15 took the wheel from the grandson of Vivencio
Villanueva, the owner of the Mitsubishi jeep, and by
reckless driving caused the overturning of the said
vehicle which caused injuries to its passengers and led
to the death of Sherwin.
Sherwins parents sued James Daniel II and his parents,
Vivencio Villanueva, and the school. JD II and
Villanueva were absolved while SMA was held to pay
primary liability while James Daniel Sr. and Guada
Daniel were to pay subsidiarily.
SMA appealed and on 29 February 2000, got reduced
damages to pay. They moved to reconsider on the
same date, but got denied on 22 May 2000. Hence they
filed this appeal.
ISSUE: WON SMA is liable under Art 218 and 219 FC
Page 143 of 151
HELD: NO. Even if under the aforementioned articles, the

school, its administrators and teachers, have special
parental authority over minor children (Art 218) and that
they will be solidarily liable for any damages (Art 219), it
was erroneously established that their alleged negligence of
not sending a teacher to serve as guardian was the
proximate cause of the accident that caused the death of
Sherwin. Rather, it was the reckless driving of James II and
the mechanical failure of the jeep when its steering wheel
guide got detached that caused the jeep to lose control and
turn turtle, injuring its passengers and causing the death of
herein petitioners minor child. The ones liable should be the
parents of James Daniel II (JD II being in their care and
custody) and Vivencio Villanueva for his negligence
regarding the condition of his jeep and his grandsons
allowing of James to drive the said vehicle.
VANCIL v BELMES (2001)
358 SCRA 707
Reeder Vancil died as a US Navy Serviceman in 1986.
He is survived by his common-law wife Helen Belmes
(herein respondent) and two minor children Valerie and
Vincent. The kids were 6 and 2 years old respectively in
1987.
Bonifacia, Reeders mother and a naturalized American
citizen, is the petitioner in this case. She seeks
guardianship over the persons and properties of the
two minors. RTC appointed her as legal and judicial in
1987.
Helen appealed to the in 1988 CA and won. CA said
that parents are the ipso facto guardian of their minor
children without the need of the court appointment.
The grandmother did not present any reason to contest
Helens fitness to hold parental authority.
Ten years later or in 1998, Bonifacia brought the case
to SC saying that Helen is morally unfit as guardian
because her live-in partner raped Valerie several times
and that her status as an expatriate is not a statutory
requirement for guardianship.
ISSUE: WON the grandmother may be granted guardianship
of the two children instead of the mother.
HELD: OF COURSE NOT. As the Court held in Santos, Sr. v
CA, parents have the preferential right to the custody of
their children especially if there is continuous parental
authority. Grandparents are only resorted to in case the
parent is absent, dead or proved to be unsuitable. Bonifacia
did not present convincing evidence showing that Helen is
unfit to be Vincents guardian (Valerie already turned 18 by
1998, ergo guardianship for her is moot). Also her
expatriate status disqualifies as a substitute guardian
because 1) she resides in the US (plus the fact that her libel
case here in the Philippines would give her second thoughts
on coming back) and 2) her old age, she will merely
delegate guardianship duties to someone else who may not
qualify as a guardian. Besides, Vincent only has 2 years
before emancipation. CA DECISION AFFIRMED.

C. Suspension or Termination of
Parental Authority
FC, Art 228 Parental authority terminates permanently:
1. Upon the death of the parents;
2. Upon the death of the child; or
3. Upon emancipation of the child
FC, Art
parental
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
229 Unless subsequently revived by a final judgment,

authority also terminates:
adoption
guardianship
abandonment
final judgment divesting parental authority
absence or incapacity
FC, Art 230 Parental authority is suspended upon conviction of

the parent or the person exercising the same of a crime which
carries with it the penalty of civil interdiction. The authority is
automatically reinstated upon service of the penalty or upon
pardon or amnesty of the offender.
FC, Art 231 The court in an action filed for the purpose in a
related case may also suspend parental authority if the parent
or the person exercising the same:
1.
2.
3.
4.
Treats the child with excessive harshness or cruelty;

Gives the child corrupting orders, counsel or
example;
Compels the child to beg; or
Subjects the child or allows him to be subjected to
acts of lasciviousness.
The grounds enumerated above are deemed to include cases

which have resulted from culpable negligence of the parent or
the person exercising parental authority.
If the degree of seriousness so warrants, or the welfare of the
child so demands, the court shall deprive the guilty party of
parental authority or adopt such other measures as may be
proper under the circumstances.
The suspension or deprivation may be revoked and the parental
authority revived in a case filed for the purpose or in the same
proceeding if the court finds that the cause therefor has ceased
and will not be repeated.
FC, Art 232 If the person exercising parental authority has

subjected the child or allowed him to be subjected to sexual
abuse, such person shall be permanently deprived by the court
of such authority.
FC, Art 233 The person exercising substitute parental

authority shall have the same authority over the person of the
child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher of individual
engaged in child care exercising special parental authority inflict
corporal punishment upon the child.
TERMINATION permanent
Page 144 of 151
SUSPENSION temporary
a. ipso facto if with civil interdiction (reclusion
temporal, perpetua or death)
terminated by:
i. service of penalty
ii. amnesty or pardon
b. judicial decree
CHUA v CABANGBANG (1969)
27 SCRA 791
CFI dismisses Pacitas claim for her daughter. She was
a prostitute who had three children by three men whom
she lived with successively (Chua Ben, Sy Sia Lay and
Victor Tan Villareal).
Betty Chua, 11 yo at the time of the trial, was one of
her children and is in the custody of Flora Cabangbang.
Cabangbang and Chua had different stories as to how
Bettys custody was acquired.
FLORA: she found the child wrapped in a bundle in
their front door
PACITA: Villareal gave Betty to Flora as a payment for
his debts. She now claims custody of her child after five
years allegedly because she did not know where to look
for the child.
ISSUE: WON Pacita may regain her child
HELD: No. There was constructive abandonment and hence
she may be deprived of parental authority. She only wants
the child back so her biological fathers support would
resume (take not that this is still uncertain) and she was
even willing to withdraw her suit if the Cabangbangs would
pay her 150 K. She attests no genuine motherly longing. In
the best interest of the child, Flora Cabangbang should
retain custody.
COMPARED WITH CELIS v CAFUIR, Celis did not lose
communication with her child during the time that Cafuir
had custody of her child.
ABIERA v ORIN (1907)
8 Phil 193
Parents
Miguel
Vicenta
Mario
Petra
Juan
Sebastian
Vicenta, Mario and Petra were brothers and sisters. Vicenta

was married to Miguel; Petra to Juan. When Vicenta died,
Miguel, Mario and Juan entered into an agreement covering
the disposition of the properties left by Vicenta; Mario and
Juan were representing their children, who are the heirs of
Vicenta.
Sebastian, son of Petra and Juan filed a complaint as special
administrator of his deceased father, alleging that Miguel
has not complied with the said contract/agreement.

ISSUE: WON Sebastian, being the son of the deceased Juan

Abiera has the right to ask for the compliance with the said
obligation
HELD: No. The true interested parties in the obligation
contracted by Miguel Orin are the children of Juan Abiera,
and not the latter, for the simple reason that the obligation
was executed in their favor and not in favor of said Abiera.
This being the fact, it is evident that the plaintiff in his office
as administrator of the deceased Juan Abiera has no right to
ask for the compliance with the said obligation. As such
administrator, he has only the right to institute such actions
as correspond and pertain to the estate which he is
administering, and no other action dealing with contracts
and obligations contracted in favor of 3rd persons or others
from whom he does not derive such right, can be brought
as such administrator. The right of Juan Abiera to represent
his children as father or guardian of the same, and that he
has not transferred nor could he transfer to the
administrator of his estate such right from the mere fact
that he was such administrator. The said right attached to
parental authority or guardianship was extinguished when
Juan Abiera died.
CORTES v CASTILLO (1921)
41 Phil 466
Maria Cortes Alejandro Herrera Acardio and
Bernardo
Maria committed adultery and was convicted but
Alejandro pardoned her and they reconciled. However,
Maria again committed adultery so Alejandro filed
annulment of their wedding and brought his children to
his mother.
During the pendency of the annulment proceeding,
Alejandro died as a policeman.
ISSUE: WON Maria Cortes may have custody of her
children?
HELD: No. she had insufficient means to support the
children and the fact that she had been found guilty of
adultery, she has corrupt moral values harmful to the
welfare of the minors. Grandmother retains custody.
*Cortes is a very old case and would not be the same if
decided today. In the olden days, females are judged by her
womb, all these laws reflect that shes just a wife and
mother, not a person.
Page 145 of 151
D. Rights and Duties of Children

Rights of
the child
Duties of
the child
Rights of the
parents
Duties of the
parents
CC, Art 356 Every child:

1. is entitled to parental care
2. shall receive at least elementary education
3. shall be given moral and civil training by the guardians
4. has a right to live in an atmosphere conducive to
physical, moral and intellectual development
* Rights of the child

* Compare with Art 3 of PD 603
CC, Art 357 Every child shall:
1. obey and honor parents or guardian
2. respect grandparents, old relatives and persons holding
substitute parental authority
3. exert utmost for education and training
4. cooperate with the family in all matters that make for
the good of the same
* Duties of the child

* Compare with Art 4 of PD 603
CC, Art 358 Every parent and every person holding substitute
parental authority shall see to it that the rights of the child are
respected and his duties complied with, and shall particularly, by
precept and example, imbue the child with high-mindedness, love
of country, veneration for the national heroes, fidelity to
democracy as a way of life and attachment to the ideal of
permanent world peace.
CC, Art 359 The government promotes the full growth of the
faculties of every child. For this purpose, the government will
establish, whenever possible:
1. schools in every barrio, municipality and city where the
optional religious instruction shall be taught as a part of
the curriculum at the option the parent or guardian
2. puericulture and similar centers
3. Council for the Protection of Children
4. juvenile courts
CC, Art 360 The Council for the Protection of Children shall look
after the welfare of children in the municipality. It shall, among
other functions:
1. foster the education of every child in the municipality
2. encourage the cultivation of the duties of parents
3. protect and assist abandoned or mistreated children and
orphans
4. take steps to prevent juvenile delinquency
5. adopt measures for the health of children
6. promote the opening and maintenance of playgrounds

CC, Art 361 Juvenile courts will be established, as far as
practicable, in every chartered city or large municipality.
CC, Art 362 Whenever a child is found delinquent by any court,

the father, mother or guardian may in a proper case be judicially
admonished.
CC, Art 363 In all questions on the care, custody, education and
property of children, the latters welfare shall be paramount. No
mother shall be separated from her child under seven years of
age, unless the court finds compelling reasons for such measure.
CC, Art 375 In case of identity of names and surnames between

ascendants and descendants, the word Junior can be used only
by a son. Grandsons and other direct male descendants shall
either:
1. Add a middle name or the mothers surname
2. Add the Roman numerals II, III and so on
CC, Art 376 No person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority.
* Repealed by RA No. 9048 Correction of clerical or
typographical error without need of judicial order
Not allowed if it will sow confusion on paternity and

successional rights
When father changes his name, there are no effects on
children. However, children may elect to change their
names on a separate petition upon emancipation. The
father can also include their minor children in his
petition.
Change of name shall have no effect on: family
relations, family rights and duties, legal capacity like
civil status or citizenship.
Change of name is done in a proceeding in rem.
FC, Art 129
(8) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be
delivered upon partition in accordance with Art 51.
FC, Art 211 Par 2 Children shall always observe respect and
reverence towards their parents and are obliged to obey them as
long as the children are under parental authority. (17a, PD 603)
FC, Art 213 In case of separation of the parents, parental

authority shall be exercised by the parent designated by the Court.
The Court shall take into account all relevant considerations,
especially the choice of the child over seven years of age, unless
the parent chosen is unfit.
No child under seven years of age shall be separated from the
mother unless the court finds compelling reasons to order
otherwise.
* Separation in this article applies both to de facto and

legal separation
Page 146 of 151
FC Art 226 The property of unemancipated child earned or

acquired with his work or industry or by onerous or gratuitous title
shall belong to the child in ownership and shall be devoted
exclusively to the latters support and education, unless the title or
transfer provides otherwise.
The right of the parents over the fruits and income of the childs
property shall be limited:
1. primarily, childs support
2. secondarily, collective daily needs of the family

PD 603 Art 3 Rights of the Child. - All children shall be

entitled to the rights herein set forth without distinction as to
legitimacy or illegitimacy, sex, social status, religion, political
antecedents, and other factors. Every child has the right to:
(1) is endowed with the dignity and worth of a human
being from the moment of his conception, as generally
accepted in medical parlance, and has, therefore, the
right to be born well.
(2) a wholesome family life that will provide him with love,
care and understanding, guidance and counseling, and
moral and material security.
Dependent or abandoned child: shall be
provided with the nearest substitute for a home.
(3) a well-rounded development of his personality to the
end that he may become a happy, useful and active
member of society.
Gifted child shall be given opportunity and
encouragement to develop his special talents.
Emotionally disturbed or socially maladjusted
child shall be treated with sympathy and
understanding, and shall be entitled to
treatment and competent care.
Physically or mentally handicapped child shall be
given the treatment, education and care
required by his particular condition.
(4) a balanced diet, adequate clothing, sufficient shelter,
proper medical attention, and all the basic physical
requirements of a healthy and vigorous life.
(5) be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and
rectitude for the enrichment and the strengthening of
his character.
(6) an education commensurate with his abilities and to
the development of his skills for the improvement of his
capacity for service to himself and to his fellowmen.
(7) full opportunities for safe and wholesome recreation
and activities, individual as well as social, for the
wholesome use of his leisure hours.
(8) protection against exploitation, improper influences,
hazards, and other conditions or circumstances
prejudicial to his physical, mental, emotional, social and
moral development.
(9) live in a community and a society that can offer him an
environment free from pernicious influences and
conducive to the promotion of his health and the
cultivation of his desirable traits and attributes.
(10) the care, assistance, and protection of the State,
particularly when his parents or guardians fail or are
unable to provide him with his fundamental needs for
growth, development, and improvement.
(11) an efficient and honest government that will deepen his
faith in democracy and inspire him with the morality of
the constituted authorities both in their public and
private lives.
(12) grow up as a free individual, in an atmosphere of
peace, understanding, tolerance, and universal
brotherhood, and with the determination to contribute
his share in the building of a better world.
Page 147 of 151
PD 603 Art 4 Responsibilities of the Child. - Every child,

regardless of the circumstances of his birth, sex, religion, social
status, political antecedents and other factors shall:
(1) Strive to lead an upright and virtuous life in accordance
with the tenets of his religion, the teachings of his elders
and mentors, and the biddings of a clean conscience;
(2) Love, respect and obey his parents, and cooperate with
them in the strengthening of the family;
(3) Extend to his brothers and sisters his love, thoughtfulness,
and helpfulness, and endeavor with them to keep the
family harmonious and united;
(4) Exert his utmost to develop his potentialities for service,
particularly by undergoing a formal education suited to his
abilities, in order that he may become an asset to himself
and to society;
(5) Respect not only his elders but also the customs and
traditions of our people, the memory of our heroes, the
duly constituted authorities, the laws of our country, and
the principles and institutions of democracy;
(6) Participate actively in civic affairs and in the promotion of
the general welfare, always bearing in mind that it is the
youth who will eventually be called upon to discharge the
responsibility of leadership in shaping the nation's future;
and
(7) Help in the observance of individual human rights, the
strengthening of freedom everywhere, the fostering of
cooperation among nations in the pursuit of their common
aspirations for programs and prosperity, and the
furtherance of world peace.
Conventions on the Rights of the Child
Art 1
Definition of a child A child is recognized as a person
under 18, unless national laws recognize age of majority
earlier.
Art 2
Non-discrimination All rights apply to all children without
exception. It is the States obligation to protect children
from any form of discrimination and to take positive action
to promote their rights.
Art 3
Best interest of the child All actions concerning the child
should take full account of his or her best interest. The
State shall provide the child with adequate care when
parents, or others charged with the responsibility, fail to
do so.
Art 4
Implementation of rights The State must do all it can to
implement the rights contained in the Convention.
Art 5
Parental guidance and the childs evolving capacities The
State must respect the rights and responsibilities of
parents and the extended family to provide guidance for
the child which is appropriate to her or his evolving
capacities.
Art 6
Survival and development Every child has the inherent
right to life and the State has an obligation to ensure the
childs survival and development.
Art 7
Name and nationality The child has the right to a name
at birth. The child also has the right to acquire a
nationality and, as far as possible, to know his or her
parents and be cared for by them.
Art 8
Preservation of identity The State has an obligation to
protect and if necessary, re-establish basic aspects of the
childs identity. This includes name, nationality and family
ties.
Art 9
Separation from parents The child has a right to live with
his or her parents unless this is deemed to be incompatible
with the childs best interest. The child also hast the right
to maintain contact with both parents if separated from
one or both.
Art 10 Family unification Children and their parents have the
right to leave any country and to enter their own for

Art 11
Art 12
Art 13
Art 14
Art 15
Art 16
Art 17
Art 18
Art 19
Art 20
Art 21
Art 22
Art 23
Art 24
Art 25
Art 26
Art 27
purposes of reunion or the maintenance of the childparent relationship.

Illicit transfer and non-return The State has an obligation
to prevent and remedy the kidnapping or retention of
children abroad by a parent or third party.
The childs opinion The child has the right to express his
or her opinion freely and to have that opinion taken into
account in any matter or procedure affecting the child.
Freedom of expression The child has the right to express
his or her views, obtain information, make ideas or
information known, regardless of frontiers.
Freedom of thought, conscience and religion The State
shall respect the childs right to freedom of thought,
conscience and religion, subject to appropriate parental
guidance.
Freedom of association Children have a right to meet
with others, and to join or form association.
Protection of privacy Children have the right to
protection from interference with privacy, family, home
and correspondence and from libel or slander.
Access to appropriate information The State shall ensure
the accessibility to children of information and material
from a diversity of sources, and it shall encourage the
mass media to disseminate information which is of social
and cultural benefit to the child, and take steps to protect
him or her from harmful materials.
Parental responsibilities Parents have joint primary
responsibility for raising the child, and the State shall
support them in this. The State shall provide appropriate
assistance to parents in child-raising.
Protection from abuse and neglect The State shall
protect the child from forms of maltreatment by parents
others responsible for the care of child and establish
appropriate social programs for the prevention of abuse
and the treatment of victims.
Protection of a child without family The State is obliged
to provide special protection for a child deprived of family
environment and to ensure that appropriate alternative
family care or institutional placement is available in such
causes. Efforts to meet this obligation shall pay due regard
to the childs cultural background.
Adoption In countries where adoption is recognized
and/or allowed, it shall only carried out in the interests of
child, and then only with the authorization of competent
authorities and safeguards for the child.
Refugee children Special protection shall be granted to a
refugee child or to a child seeking refugee status. It is the
States obligation to co-operate with competent
organizations which provide such protection and
assistance.
Disabled children A disabled child has the right to special
care, education and training to help him or her enjoy a full
and decent life in dignity and achieve the greatest degree
of self-reliance and social integration possible.
Health and health services The child has a right to the
highest standard of health and medical care attainable.
States shall place special emphasis on the provision of
primary and preventive health care, public health
education and the reduction of infant mortality. They shall
encourage international co-operation in this regard and
strive to see that no child is deprived access to effective
health services.
Periodic review of placement A child who is placed by
the State by reasons of care, protection or treatment is
entitled to have that placement evaluated regularly.
Social security The child has the right to benefit from
social security including social insurance.
Standard of living Every child has the right to a standard
living adequate for his or her physical, mental, moral,
Art 28
Art 29
Art 30
Art 31
Art 32
Art 33
Art 34
Art 35
Art 36
Art 37
Art 38
Art 39
Art 40
Page 148 of 151

spiritual, and social development. Parents have the
primary responsibility to ensure that the child has an
adequate standard of living. The States duty is to ensure
that this responsibility can be fulfilled and is. State
responsibility can include material assistance to parents
and their children.
Education The child has a right to education and the
States duty is to ensure that primary education is free and
compulsory to encourage different forms of secondary
education accessible to every child and to make higher
education available to all on the bases of capacity. School
discipline shall be consisted with the childs rights and
dignity. The State shall engage in international cooperation to implement this right.
Aims of education Education shall aim at developing the
childs personality, talents and mental and physical abilities
to the fullest extent. Education shall prepare the child for
an active adult life in a free society and foster respect for
the childs parents, his or her own cultural identity,
language and values, and for the cultural background and
values of others.
Children of minorities or indigenous populations Children
of minority communities and indigenous populations have
the right to enjoy their own culture and to practice their
own religion and language.
Leisure, recreation and cultural activities. The child has
the right to leisure, play and participation in cultural and
artistic activities.
Child labor The child has the right to be protected from
work that threatens his or her health, education or
development. The State shall set minimum ages for
employment and regulate working conditions.
Drug abuse Children have the right to protection from
the use of narcotic and psychotropic drugs and from being
involved in the production or distribution.
Sexual exploitation The State shall protect children from
sexual exploitation and abuse, including prostitution and
involvement in pornography.
Sale, trafficking and abduction It is the States obligation
to make every effort to prevent the sale, trafficking and
abduction of children.
Other forms of exploitation the child has the right to
protection from all forms of exploitation prejudicial to any
aspects of the childs welfare covered in Articles 32, 33, 34
and 35.
Torture and deprivation of liberty No child shall be
subjected to torture, cruel treatment or punishment,
unlawful arrest or deprivation of liberty. Both capital
punishment and life imprisonment without the possibility
of release are prohibited for offenses committed by
persons below 18 years. Any child deprived of liberty shall
be separated from adults unless it is considered in the
childs best interests not to do so. A child who is detained
shall have legal and other assistance as well as contact
with the family.
Armed conflicts State parties shall take all feasible
measures to ensure that children under 15 years of age
have no direct part in hostilities. No child below 15 shall be
recruited into the armed forces. States shall also ensure
the protection and care of children who are affected by
armed conflict as described in relevant international law.
Rehabilitative care The State has an obligation to ensure
that child victims of armed conflicts, torture, neglect,
maltreatment or exploitation receive appropriate treatment
for their recovery and social reintegration.
Administration of juvenile justice A child in conflict with
the law has the right to treatment which promotes the
childs sense of dignity and worth, takes the childs age
into account and aims at his or her reintegration into

Art 41
Art 42
society. The child is entitled to basic guarantees as well as

legal or other assistance for his or her defense. Judicial
proceedings and institutional placements shall be avoided
wherever possible.
Respect for higher standards Wherever standards set in
applicable national and international law relevant to the
rights of the child that are higher than those in this
Convention, the higher standard shall always apply.
The States obligation to make the rights contained in this
Convention widely known to both adults and children.
The Child is Not a Person: Family Law and other

Legal Cultures (Caroline Sawyer)3
Paradigms of the Child
1. Family Law
2. Property Law
3. Childrens Obligation Tort and Contract
Confusion between the capacity of a person to be the
subject of rights and obligations (legal personality) and the
capacity of that person to take action which produces legal
effects (legal capacity)
E. Parents versus Children When

rights clash
STRUNK v STRUNK (1969)
445 S. W. 2d 145 | CA of Kentucky
Tommy (28) and Jerry (27) Strunk are brothers. Tom is
suffering from chronic glomerulus nephritis, a fatal kidney
disease, and requires a kidney transplant. Jerry, an
incompetent with the mind of a 6 year old and a speech
defect (severely retarded with IQ of 35), is the only viable
donor for the operation. The mother as a committee secures
court consent for the operation. Both the Department of
Mental Health and psychiatrist find Jerry is emotionally
dependent on Tom such that his death would be more
detrimental and traumatic for him than the loss of one
kidney. Guardian ad litem questions authority of the State to
approve the procedure.
ISSUE: WON a court of equity may approve the operation
for the incompetent.
HELD: YES! The doctrine of substituted judgment applies
which means that where the legal disability of the individual
is shown, the jurisdiction of the court is plenary and potent
to afford whatever relief may be necessary to protect his
interests and preserve his estates. Such rule has not only
been extended to cover matters of property but also of
personal affairs of the incompetent.
Page 149 of 151
living sibling Jerry has. For Jerry only those who are able to
communicate intimately with him can help in his mental
treatment, and in most cases these are members of his
family. Tom is important to him in that he can identify
himself with him. Tom is his model, his tie with his family
thus his life is vital to his improvement at the asylum.
Considering that their parents are in their fifties, it would be
in the best interest of Jerrys welfare if Tommy were to
survive.
CONSERVATORSHIP OF VALERIE N.
aka Mildred G. v Valerie N. (1985)
707 P. 2d 760 | SC of California
Valerie N (29), is inflicted with Down Syndrome and has an
IQ of 30. She lives with her mother and her stepfather. The
mother instituted a court proceeding for appointment as
conservators and requested for additional powers to sterilize
Valerie through tubal ligation (salpingectomy).
According to the mother, sterilization was necessary
because Valerie is sexually aggressive at the sight of men
(kiss, hug, climb and sit on their laps). Though she is not
sexually active for being under close watch, she
masturbates excessively. Her mother fears the day when
she will no longer be able to look after her daughter. She
also went through unsuccessful behavior modification, tried
to ingest contraceptive pills but rejected it eventually and
would not cooperate in pelvic examination for intra-uterine
device.
Lower court granted conservatorship but not authority to
sterilize the incompetent.
ISSUE: WON conservators can give consent to sterilization
on behalf of their incompetent wards
HELD: No. Although the repeal of the statutes regarding
asexualization of mentally challenged individuals have been
declared unconstitutional for violating their due process and
equal protection rights, conservators still may not be
authorize to conduct the procedure unless all means have
been exhausted. The mother also did not provide clear and
convincing evidence as to the necessity of irreversible
sterilization. That Valerie is capable of pregnancy, that other
brands of pills were administered and that other means of
administering contraceptive pill were attempted.
JOHNSON v CALVERT (1993)
851 P. 2d 776 - SUPRA
It is also important to note here the questioned ruling of the

circuit court. Therein the operation was approved because it
was held to be for the best interest of the incompetent.
The testimony of the psychiatrist held that Tommy was
indispensable for the welfare of Jerry because he is the only
GILLICK v WEST NORFOLK & WISBECH AREA

HEALTH AUTHORITY (1985)
3 All E. R. 402
Victoria Gillick wrote to area health authority asking for
assurance that her daughters aged 13, 12, 10 and 5 will not
be given contraceptive advice and treatment without her
consent. The reply to the letter stated that they cannot give
such assurance because the final decision must be for the
doctors clinical judgment.
Gillick again asked for a declaration from the office that it

will not provide minors under 16 years old with
Summary by Krissy Conti

contraceptive advice and treatment without informing the

parents but the health authority was steadfast. They argued
for the patient-doctor confidentiality and that if this principle
is abandoned, minors might not seek professional advice at
all. This will lead to consequences such as unwanted
pregnancies, STD and high risk abortions.
She contends that permitting minors to disregard their
parents consent undermines parental responsibility and
family stability.
ISSUE: WON doctors can lawfully give contraceptive advice
and treatment to minors without parental consent (the
extent of a parents right and duties with respect to the
medical treatment of a girl under 16 years old)
HELD: NO. Girls under 16 can give no valid consent to
anything in the areas under consideration which apart from
consent would constitute an assault, whether civil or
criminal, and can impose no valid prohibition on a doctor
against seeking parental consent.
CURTIS v SCHOOL COMMITTEE (1995)
652 N. E. 2d 580 | SC of Massachussetts
Parents contend the condom availability program in a public
school where senior and junior high school students may
obtain condoms for free in the nurses office and for 75
cents in the vending machine in their CR. Condoms are
given away with counseling from nurse and pamphlet about
HIV/AIDS and STD, with authorities stressing the
importance of abstinence as the best method to avoid STD.
The program did not provide for an opt out nor parental
notification wherein parents would be notified of their
childrens request for condoms.
ISSUE:
1. WON the program violates the parents
constitutionally protected right to familial privacy
and parental liability
2. WON the program infringes into the free exercise
clause
HELD:
1.
2.
3.
No. The plaintiff failed to demonstrate how

condom availability constitutes unconstitutional
interference by the state. There was no coercive
burden upon the students:
a. Students are free to decline
b. Parents are free to instruct their children
not to participate
No. They were unable to demonstrate sufficient
facts to support any substantial burden to religious
exercise. They merely alleged that the program
contravenes parental teaching on premarital sex:
the not only is it permissible but can be made safe.
Parents have no right to tailor public school policy
to meet their individual religious and moral
preferences.
Page 150 of 151
ROE v DOE (1971)

29 NY 2d 188 | CA of New York
Daughter was cut off from support by her father by not
obeying his instructions that she live in a college dormitory
while studying in college and instead took up residence with
a female classmate in an off-campus apartment. Her father
requested she come home but instead, the daughter sold
her car [a gift from her father] and finished the school year
using the proceeds thereof. Upon returning to New York for
the summer, she further disobeyed her father by choosing
to stay with the parents of her female classmate in Long
Island. Daughter in general fares poorly in school and has
experimented with drugs. Furthermore she has had a spotty
childhood, her mother died when she was three and her
father has repeatedly married and remarried since then his
most recent remarriage in 1970. With the help of a guardian
ad litem, she initiated this action for support.
ISSUE: WON daughter is entitled for support in light of her
transgressions against her father.
HELD: While delinquent behavior of a child even if
unexplained or persistent does not merit the termination of
the duty of the parent to support, voluntary abandonment
by the child of the parents home is tantamount to forfeiture
of the claim to support. A father in return for maintenance
and support may establish and impose reasonable
regulations on his child. Courts as much as possible do not
interfere with the parents prerogative in caring, controlling
and protecting the child except only when there is a clear
and obvious display of abuse or neglect on the part of the
parent. The parent was concerned about the temptations
that abound outside of campus hence his insistence that she
live in the campus dorm. While the daughter may be free
disagree and choose to not comply, she puts herself at risk
of incurring her fathers wrath and consequently, by
abandoning her home she forfeits her right to support.
IN RE EDWARD C. (1981)
178 Cal. Rptr. 694 | CA of California
The appeal instituted by spouses Edmond and Deborah to
regain custody of their two sons Edward and Eric who were
previously declared dependent children.
Edward and Eric were removed from their parents home
because they were maltreated and subjected to cruel and
inhuman corporal punishment by their father. The father,
supported by the mother, argues that he is vested with
divine and Biblical authority to inflict discipline on his
children. Their daughter, Marlee, was given to her maternal
grandmother for adoption after suffering physical abuse in
the hands of her father.
ISSUE: WON the dependency of children is a violation of
constitutional right of privacy of the family
HELD: NO. The parental doctrine and childs best interest
are usually compatible but when they clash, the latter is
protected by the legal system. The finding on Marlees case
is admissible to Eric and Edward. The fact that the sons
witnessed the vicious beatings as command of the Lord may
inhibit their healthy emotional development. Until the

parents cooperate to counseling program, reunification of

the family will be detrimental to the welfare of the minors.
PRINCE v MASSACHUSSETTS (1944)
321 US 158 | SC of Massachusetts
Sarah Prince, a member of the Jehovahs Witness is a
mother to two sons and the guardian of minor Betty
Simmons
One night she went one to distribute Watchtower and
Consolation, fulfilling one of her religious obligations
She used to bring along her kids but upon reprimand by
Peskins because it violates the statute law against child
labor and employment, she ceased to take her children
with her. However, Betty Simmons insisted to come
that particular night.
ISSUE:
1. WON the religious act of selling their magazines
violate the statute
2. WON the presence of parent will exempt them
from punishment
HELD:
1.
2.
3.
Yes. It does not infringe on the free exercise clause

because the burden on the religious activity was
merely incidental. The prohibition applies to all
children.
No. There was clear and present danger even
though in the company of adults. The States
authority over children is broader than adults
especially in public activities and employment
which has crippling effects on the child. They
reserve the Parents can make martyrs out of
themselves but not of their children.
Check out the dissent. Parents reserve the right to
train their children religiously.
F. Summary Procedure
REYES-TABUJARA v CA (2006)
495 SCRA 844
Ivy Joan Ernesto Carlos Iigo
The separated and custody battle ensued. Dad initially
won. Mother files a consolidated petition for writ of
habeas corpus and Anti-VAWC.
However, the presiding judge went on leave effect June
1. But the new presiding judge issued decision in favor
of the mother on May 31.
ISSUE: WON the RTC has jurisdiction over habeas corpus
petitions.
HELD: Yes. RA 8369 did not divest RTC jurisdiction over
such cases.
MADRINAN v MADRINAN (2007)
527 SCRA 487
Felipe Francisca three sons and a daughter
Romnick, Phillip, Francis Angelo and Krizia Ann
Page 151 of 151
The couple had a quarrel so he took the sons with him

to Ligao, Albay and then to Sta. Rosa, Laguna. Wife
sought the help of the parents and the parents in law,
and even the Lupong Tagapagpamayapa to make
peace with the husband, but to no avail.
She alleges that the travel disrupted the education of
the children and deprived them of maternal care.
They accused each other that their respective parents
always meddle with their family affairs.
Mother is unfit because she is always drunk and would
come home late at night from the beerhouse. She
neglected her duties as a mother.
Father, a tricycle driver, drove mother out, and a
gambler, drug addict and alcoholic himself.
ISSUE: WON CA has jurisdiction regarding writ of habeas

corpus under Sec 5 (b) of RA 8369
HELD: Yes. Concurrent jurisdictions of Family Court, SC and
CA so that the decision will be enforceable anywhere in the
Philippines. Note that he had moved to two different
provinces.

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PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y.

Karichi Santos |UP Law B2012

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009

Beware of false knowledge;

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009

Sec 14, Art II

Sec 1, Art III

Overview of Due Process and Equal

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009

available for use in premarital sexual relations and its scope

Is there a compelling state interest in regulating

*In both Griswold and Eisenstadt cases, there was no fit

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009

CHARACTERISTICS OF FETAL PERSONALITY

But it can enjoy rights like inherit from will or intestacy

A. Concept and Classes of Persons

CC, Art 41 For civil purposes, the fetus is considered born if it

CC, Art 37 Juridical capacity, which is fitness to be the

If intrauterine life < 7 months, then the fetus must live

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009

ISSUE: WON husband can claim damages for the death of

Death means natural or physical death, as there no

PEOPLE v TIROL (1981)

CC, Art 43 If there is a doubt, as between two or more

Rule 123 of Sec 60 of Revised Rules of Court resorted to

Applicable only when (1) calamity & (2) involves

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009

CC, Art 47 Dissolution of No 2 - in pursuance of law or the

B. Capacity to Act and Restrictions

not necessarily imply that the person is incapable of

still civilly liable although criminally not liable

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009

Art 1403 (3) if both is incapable UNENFORCEABLE unless

They did not disclose the age of the sons so the

ISSUES: WON non-disclosure of a minors age may render

Art 35 (1), FC void ab initio

Art 12, RPC

C. State of being deaf-mute

deaf-mute who are no read, no write cannot

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009

wanton waste of ones estate; without

MARTINEZ v MARTINEZ (1902)

Any male of the age of sixteen years

Art 123, CC For the validity of marriage settlements

Justifying circ: in defense of family

HELD: Since prodigality is not defined in our law, it may be

Art 390, CC after 7 years a person is presumed dead for all

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009

BASIS FOR HEARTBALM STATUTE

assured returning soon. But he never returned and

Why is there no success in claiming damages for breach of

HELD: No. In Art 21, the essential feature is seduction, that

DE JESUS v SYQUIA (1933)

Breach of promise to marry is a quasi-delict

WASSMER v VELEZ (1964)

ISSUE: WON Antonia is entitled to damages for breach of

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009

HELD: Promise to marry not satisfactorily proved so the trial

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009

IV. DEFINITION &

HELD: Unconstitutional for many reasons. As for the state

PERSONS AND FAMILY RELATIONS | Prof. E. A. Pangalangan, A.Y. 2008-2009

The agreement was that the wife asked husband to quit

ISSUE: WON the agreement compels the wife to continue