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Nuclear Command, Control


The views expressed in CDI publications are those of the authors.

Center for Defense Information
1779 Massachusetts Avenue, NW
Washington, D.C. 20036-2109

Washington, D.C.
May 2003

© 2003 Center for Defense Information


About the Author

Valery Yarynich was born in 1937 to a family of a Soviet Naval officer. He graduated
from the Military Academy of Communications, Leningrad in 1959, and began his
career in the Strategic Rocket Forces, serving in the very first Soviet ICBM division,
near the city of Kirov. From 1966 to 1992, Yarynich was stationed in Moscow, serving
in the central command of the SRF until 1986, and spent the last six years of his military career in the General Staff.
His area of specialization is nuclear weapons command and control, and he participated in the design, testing and deployment of the main C 3 systems for silo-based as
well as mobile strategic missiles. Most of these systems are in use to this day.
After retiring from the Army, Yarynich worked at the Moscow Institute for World
Economy and International Relations, as well as in the Russian State Duma as assistant
to Deputy Alexei Arbatov. Since June 2001, Yarynich has been a Visiting Associate
Professor at the California State University, San Bernardino.
Yarynich is the author of Evaluation of A Guarantee (Moscow State University of
International Relations, 1994) and many articles on the issues of arms control and strategic stability in Russian and foreign periodicals.


"To all those who worked hard to create nuclear command and control systems"

The publication of this book would have been impossible without the support and
encouragement of Dr. Bruce G. Blair. The author is profoundly grateful to Dr. Blair
and to the Center for Defense Information for their efforts in its publishing. Many of
Bruce Blair's ideas have been put into the foundation of this book.
The author would also like to express his gratitude to the Hon. Thomas C. Reed,
Dr. William C. Green, Dr. Frank von Rippel, Dr. Richard L. Garwin, Dr. Nikolai
Sokov, Dr. Debbie Ball, Dr. Dean Wilkening and Dr. David Holloway for their valuable ideas.
The author is also grateful to Elena Tsypkin for her translation of the book, to Luba
Schwartzman for translating a section of Chapter 4, to Theresa Hitchens, Dan Rothem
and Anthony Keats for overseeing the preparation of the book for publication, and to
Rachel Freedman for her work on the design.
Support for this project was made available by the John D. and Catherine T.
MacArthur Foundation.

Table of Contents

Board of Advisors:
Dr. Bruce G. Blair- President, CDI

Preface by Bruce G. Blair
Doris Z. Bato-Santa Fe, N.M.
Bruce and Barbara Berger-Aspen, Colo.
Arthur D. Berliss, Jr.-Captain, U.S. Naval
Reserve (Ret.); former Vice President,
Allen-Hollander Co., New York, N.Y.
Edward H.R. Blitzer-Former Chairman,
Lightolier Inc., New York, N.Y.
Dick Brukenfeld-Dobbs Ferry, N.Y.
Ben Cohen-Co-founder, Ben & Jerry's
Homemade, Inc., South Burlington, Vt.
James R. Compton-Chair Emeritus, Fund
for Peace Board; Chair Emeritus, The
Compton Foundation, Menlo Park, Calif.
Joseph N. Deblinger-President, Deblinger
Sales & Marketing Corp., Manhasset, N.Y.
Gay Dillingham-eNS Communications,
Santa Fe, N.M.
James A. Donovan-Colonel, U.S. Marine
Corps (Ret.); Author, former Publisher Journal of the Armed Forces, Atlanta, Ga.
Raymond Frankel-Los Angeles, Calif.
Robert L. Frome-Senior Partner, Olshan,
Grundman and Frome, Attorneys, New
York, N.Y.
Seth M. Glickenhaus-lnvestment Banker,
New York, N.Y.
Eva Haller-Santa Barbara, Calif.
Yoel Haller, M.D.-Santa Barbara, Calif.
James D. Head, Ph.D.-President, Strategy
Development Company, Freeland, Mich.,
Chairman of the Board, CDI.
David H. Horowitz-New York, N.Y.
Robert G. James-Rear Admiral, U.S. Naval
Reserve (Ret.); President, Enterprise Development Associates, New York, N.Y.
Alan F. Kay, Ph.D.-Businessman,
St. Augustine, Fla.
Gene R. La Rocque-Rear Admiral, U.S.
Navy (Ret.); President Emeritus, CDI,
Washington, D.C.

Eugene M. Lang-Founder/ Chairman Emeritus, REFAC Technology Development Corp.
and "I Have A Dream" Foundation, New
York, N.Y.

Ch. 1

Ellie Meyers-Deerfield, Ill.
Robert M. Meyers, M.D.-Deerfield, Ill.
David E. Moore-Rye, N.Y.
Paul Newman-Motion Pictures, Los Angeles, Calif.
Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Pulitzer IV-8t. Louis, Mo.
Rudolph S. Rasin-President, The Rasin
Corporation, Chicago, Ill.
John M. Rockwood-Publisher, Chicago, Ill.

Ch. 2

Martha S. Schauss-Redmond, Wash.
Julie Schecter, Ph.D.-Director, Peaked Hill
Trust, Wayland, Mass.

Why Should C 3 be Taken into Account? Potential Dangers and Problems
What is C 3 ?
The "Black Box" of Negative Control
Should We Trust the Display?
The Hair Trigger
The Illusion ofWeakness
The Third Countries
1. 7
Reducing Strategic Arms Blindfolded
The State of Scholarship
General Review
Bruce G. Blair
Daniel F. Ford
Theoretical Approaches








Gloria Scher-New York, N.Y.
John J. Shanahan-Vice Admiral, U.S. Navy
(Ret.), Ormond Beach, Fla.
Adele E. Starr-Mamaroneck, N.Y.
Philip A. Straus-Partner, Neuberger and
Berman, Members, New York Stock Exchange, New York, N.Y.
Philip A. Straus, Jr.-Photographer,
Philadelphia, Pa.
Andrew Ungerleider-Earthstone International Ltd., Santa Fe, N.M.
Albert B. Wells-President, The Abelard
Foundation, Inc.; Kingsley, Schreck, Wells
& Reichling, Private Investments, San Francisco, Calif.
Barbara Slaner Winslow, Ph.D.-Schaal of
Education and Women's Studies Program,
Brooklyn College/City University of NeW
York, N.Y.
Joanne Woodward-Actress-Director,
Westport, Conn.

Ch. 3

The Methodology: The Estimate of Nuclear Deterrence Using C 3
How Does Deterrence Work?
How Random is the Final Result?
The Essence of Approach
The Object of Study
Factors of Influence
The Model
Presentation of Final Results
The Command and Control System's Influence Upon the Final Result
Practical Aspects of the Method
lnfluence of ertai_n Factors U pon Final istrib1.1tion
n he istributive F unction and Mathematical Expeetati n
Reduction of Strategic I uclear Forces and 'ufficiency
i ·
' ufficiency and the riterion of ost Effectiveness
Possibility of an A ymetrical Decision
The Area of St ability
Transformation of the '( ) Function ulto an F '(W ) F unciton 100
Rationalizing t he E nemy 's trategy
ft;ldependence of Analysis of the Command and ontrol ystem 104
3.5.10 fi'orming Requitement.'! for the ommand and ontrol . 'ystem 104
3.5.11 MU;c llaneous

Summary: Principles and Advantages of the Suggested Approach
Implementation Problems
3. 7.1
Accuracy of the Risk Estimate
Towards Confidence Through Joint Research
The Mechanism for Applying the Method
The Problem of Choice: How Much is Needed for Deterrence?


C 3 in Russia and the United States: A Comparative Analysis
Russian C 3 : History of Establishment and Development
The Beginning Stage (1959-1964)
The Transition to the Automation of Command and Control
4 .1. 3
Main Development Stages of the Soviet SNF Automated
Command and Control System
Russian Strategic C 3 Today
The Highest Level ofSNF C 3
SRF C 3 System
Command and Control of the Sea-based and Airborne SNF
Scientists, Designers, Testing Ranges and Industry
Prospects for Development
C 3 in the United States
Command Posts and Centers
Communication and Control Systems
The General Algorithm of American C 3
Some Personal Observations



Ch. 4

Ch. 5

Ch. 6


The Stage of Theory
Initial Practical Steps
Prospective Trends in Mutual Control
IfWe Do Nothing ...


Appendix 1

by Dr. Bruce G. Blair,

President, Center lor Defense Information


Problems with Russian and U.S. C 3
Negative Control
Lower Levels of Russian C 3 : Below the Top Leadership
American PALs
The National Command Authority
C 3 Survivability: Is There a Solution?
American 0
Russian C 3
Detargeting, Combat Readiness and Strategic Postures
5. 5
Uncertainty: Deterrence or Provocation?







ost Western observers of Russia's system of nuclear control and early warning warn
that its deterioration poses a danger to the world. Of particular concern is its questionable effectiveness in preventing the theft of nuclear weapons in storage. That concern animates the West's efforts to assist Russia in securing its vast storehouse of nuclear
weapons and raw fissile materials. Other concerns range from the susceptibility of the
early warning network to false alarms - increasing the risk of a mistaken launch - to a
breakdown of safeguards against unauthorized actions that could lead to an unsanctioned
launch of nuclear missiles.
Although Col. (ret.) Valery Yarynich, the author of this volume, shares my view that
these are legitimate and reasonable concerns, his assessment diverges considerably on
many of the particular points of concern. And his judgment counts a great deal more
than mine, and, for that matter, the typical Western observer. Col. Yarynich brings to
the discourse some unusual credentials, not the least of which is a 30-year career in the
Soviet Strategic Rocket Forces and the Soviet General Staff, where his primary responsibilities lay in streamlining the Russian strategic nuclear command and control system. He is one of a small group of true specialists in this esoteric realm, a person who
WCil'ked with all the key designers, testers, and implementers of the system.
Having worked closely with Valery and a considerable number of his colleagues in
this field for more than a decade, I can attest to his tremendous store of knowledge of
the system. From him, and a handful of his colleagues in the military and specialized
military industrial design bureaus assigned to build coherent nuclear command-control sy~te:ms that could carry out orders to execute a large-scale nuclear war and at the
same tune prevent any accidental or unauthorized use of the Soviet arsenal, I learned a
great deal about the Soviet and Russian system that deserves only admiration and con fidence.
. . earned that the nuclear control system of the Soviet Union and its successor Russta IS bett cl ' d
tr es•gne than the nuclear control system of the United States, about which
I a)so have om fmt- hand
. k now ledge, havmg
. devoted decades of
, as we11 as acad em1c,
~ to the operation and study of U. . nuclear weapons. In the adrenalin rush
. _1 g
estern ~y ts brought on by the fear of a meltdown of Russian nuclear con...~a coo1analytical Wl.der tandi
f h
Th 18
ng o t e wor mgs of the Russian system is often miss• anb •mpr ssive side to these workings that has been lost on Western oblllal Y ecause they· hav
e no rea Y grasped the Russ1an system's architecture.


I fJi: Nuc/Bal' Command, Conll'ol, CODPBI'ation

Whenever I meet with South Asian and other nuclear specialists interested in refining the design of their nascent nuclear command system, I strongly recommend that
they examine the Russian system and emulate it if they wish to achieve the ~ighest
level of top-down control. The Russian architecture compares favorably wtth the
American because of the extraordinary attention paid to ensuring strict centralized
control over Russian (Soviet) nuclear operations. This concentration reflects the core
value of Russian political and military culture going back for centuries. From the days
of the czars through the dawn of the nuclear age under Stalin and beyond, "control"
was the watchword. "Control" is the hallmark of the system, and its pervasive priority
is embodied in the most elaborate centralized network the world has ever seen. By
comparison, the U.S. system started out as a highly decentralized system that operated
on the basis of a great deal of trust between the U.S. civilian leadership and the military.
Although the U.S. system evolved toward greater centralization with more stringent
technical and organizational safeguards against unauthorized use of nuclear weapons,
it remains today far less centralized and "tight" than its Russian counterpart. Alas, the
maintenance of the Russian system- human, organizational, and technical - has fallen
down, preventing it from realizing its design potential.
Col. Yarynich documents the development of the Soviet and Russian system in finegrained detail. He provides an authoritative account of the system designers, and the
technical and organizational arrangements that evolved from the system's inception
after World War II until the present day. His descriptions are based on material that
exists in the public domain in Russia, the United States, and elsewhere, but material
that called for a true expert to integrate into a coherent picture.
The picture that emerges is often fascinating. The stodgy Soviet bureaucracy created, against all odds it would seem, some of the most innovative systems of nuclear
control imaginable. To cite one example, the Soviet "Dead Hand," or Perimetr system
designed by the Impuls bureau in St. Petersburg, under the guidance of Lt. Gen.
Varfolomey V. Korobushin, embodies bold concepts of control for dealing with circumstances involving a sudden U.S. missile attack that decapitated the top political
and military leadership in the Moscow metropolis. Reminiscent of the "doomsday
machine" in the famous Stanley Kubrick movie Dr. Strangelove, this Soviet innovation
was placed into operation in the early- to mid-1980s during the nuclear confrontation
of the Reagan era.
Col. Yarynich describes the project's history and rationale, and, in fact, he describes
all of the significant systems of nuclear control and early warning that evolved during
the past one-half century. This encyclopedic account is by far the definitive work on
the subject, not only in terms of the various technical projects but also in terms of their
function and performance in the overall system. He provides rigorous assessments of
the survivability and capabilities of the separate parts and overall system. He provides
the factual and analytical basis for informed judgments on the Russian (Soviet) capability to maintain effective control in various stressful environments ranging from large-

Pl'elacs 111

scale enemy nuclear assault, to illicit acts on the inside to misuse Russian nuclear forces,
to spoofing or cyber-attack by terrorists.
This work is thus required reading of anyone who wishes to grasp the actual inner
workings of the Russian nuclear control system before commenting on its strengths
and weaknesses. It is also essential reading for those of us who aspire to move beyond
the conventional wisdom that the system is riddled with deficiencies. The gloom and
doom may be partially justified but often its misinformed and misguided. And a mastery of the subject generates a fair amount of optimism about the inherent strength of
the system as well as an understanding of its potential weaknesses.
Col. Yarynich rightly calls for a searching look at both the U.S. and Russian systems
by a group of governmental and non-governmental experts. Such a body of experts
sharing information about each system could help allay unjustified fears as well as identify genuine deficiencies requiring fixes. American and Russian experts could learn a
great deal from each other, and cooperate in addressing vulnerabilities to deliberate
exploitation by terrorists, misguided insiders, or other parties. They could cooperate
in finding new ways to reduce the risk of mistaken launch on false warning. They
could cooperate in figuring out ways to reduce the danger of mistaken or unauthorized
launch by Pakistan, India, or other countries. They could cooperate in numerous ways
for noble purposes. This book is a terrific first step in this direction of sharing knowledge and advice.


his book discusses command and control of strategic nuclear weapons. Its goal is to
facilitate cooperation in this field between official and independent experts in Russia, the United States and other countries, and to make these matters a subject of public


Today we are facing an obvious absurdity. On the one hand, as far as nuclear weapons themselves are concerned, the United States and Russia have become
unprecedentedly open with each other, exchanging information that used to be completely secret during the Cold War. Now publicly accessible computer databases include information about various types of American and Russian ballistic missiles and
nuclear warheads, their numbers, characteristics, location, design bureaus and production facilities. Experts on nuclear weapons from various countries hold regular meetings, and special organizations and departments within the power structures of both
Russia and the United States have already been established in order to implement
signed agreements on cooperation in this area. Regular mutual inspections of military
lases, testing ranges and industrial enterprises are being conducted. The result of such
steps is evident: the process of nuclear arms reduction has started and is succ ssfully continuing.
By the end of the 20th century, the American strategic forces had about 6,400 nuclear
warheads; 54 percent of these warheads were submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLB is) (on board the Ohio-class nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines- or
.· B - armed with Trident-1 and Trident-2 SLBMs), 33 percent were on silo-based
mtercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) (Minuteman-3 and the Peacekeeper), and
13 percen on board B-52 strategic bombers armed with air-launched cruise missiles .
At thesa:me time, Russia had about 6,600 strategic warheads counted under the terms
of • TART I (5,800 of them were in operational status); 33 percent of these warheads
were bas~ on SSBNs, 55 percent on silo-based and mobile ICBMs, and 12 percent
wer earned by strategic bombers.l
t the sam titne ho
. comes to command and
• wever, ab so1ute secrecy retgns
when tt
l of nuclear weapans (' A
. .
m mencan termmology, C 3I- command, control, commu-


bona and

mtelbgen ) T ·
ha been
ce · wo tssues are of greatest importance here. First, what meave

taken by the nuclear powers against accidental or unauthorized use of

· h . and how reliable are these measures (known as negative
control)? SecIS

t e tdeology for h

ypothet'teal auth onzed
employment of nuclear weapons?


I C': Nuc/eal' Command, Contl'ol, coopel'ation

Since these weapons exist, and are likely to continue to exist for the foreseeable future, there must also be a clear system of action for national command authorities (NCA)
and combat duty crews at all levels in crisis situations. This is called positive control,
the effectiveness of which should be estimated not only from the standpoint of providing robust deterrence against a potential attacker, but should also be viewed through
the prism of negative control, which is dominant today.
Unfortunately, cooperation in this field between Russia, the United States and other
nuclear powers is practically nonexistent. Data on command and control systems and
concepts of use continue to be secret. Experts in C 3 I do not meet, and urgent problems
are not discussed. This is surprising. Nuclear weapons are not the only problem, and
reduction of nuclear arsenals is not the only goal. Establishing global security and preventing any accidents with the nuclear monster are much broader and more important
tasks on the long road of reductions. But while the level of nuclear potential is gradually
declining, the level of danger is staying relatively the same. This is because to the common citizen, the end result is the same whether a nuclear conflict involves thousands of
warheads or "only" dozens. Such an outcome must be prevented in principle, and this
can be done only through the command, control and communication (C 3 ) system. In
peacetime, nuclear weapons themselves only become deadly through a mistake in, or
intentional misuse of, their command and control system.
Of course, one cannot assume a priori that dangers in this field already threaten the
world. Perhaps problems do not exist, or that finding their solution can be postponed.
However, ignorance and lack of information concerning these dangers weaken mutual
trust and may result in considerable problems in the near future. Logic itself suggests
the necessity of increased attention to the influence of command and control factors on
strategic stability. There is no reason to wait. "Simple intuition suggests that omitting
command parameters from consideration invites miscalculation. " 2 Nevertheless, Russia
and the United States have taken practically no steps in this direction. Why?
Perhaps it is because the subject of nuclear command and control is justifiably considered one of the most complex and delicate. One cannot blame the leaders of the
nuclear powers for not understanding all the nuances of the command and control systems. After all, it is the business of technical experts. But at the same time, those in
power, who are fully aware of the exceptional importance of command and control, are
concerned about irreversible consequences for their national security in case these particular "cards" in their defense " hand" are played . Thus, it is the combination of twO
circumstances- fear of making an irreversible mistake, and the realization of their relative incompetence in this technologically complex field - that creates the "blockage at
the top ." This prevents C 3 I experts of various countries from sitting around the sa
table and coming up with practical proposals to make these systems more secure and
This book proposes one of the possible approaches to initiating international coop·
eration on nuclear command and control. The main emphasis is not so much oo a

tntl'oduction 115

traditional description of C 3 systems and the concepts of their employment, but rather
on a logical and mathematical substantiation of the admissibility and necessity f~r open
dialogue in the field of C 3I, within reasonable limits. Openness is the key to solvmg the
numerous problems that stand in the way of strengthening civilian control over nuclear
forces. It can be achieved without any risk to national security, and in fact, it may even
be advantageous both for global security and economics.
Chapter 1 considers the general principles of nuclear command and control systems
and their place and role in nuclear forces. It points to a number of the problems and
potential dangers inherent to the operation of these systems, and demonstrates the
undesirable consequences of complete secrecy. It proposes one possible approach to
overcoming this absurdity, namely conducting combined theoretical studies on the ef.c tiveness and permissibility (from the standpoint of national security) of reasonable
mutual openness in nuclear command and control; then, if such effectiveness IS pro:en,
taking concrete mutual steps for strengthening strategic stability and global se:unty:
Chapter 2 analyzes the major scholarly works on strategic C 3I. These works mves.tlgate practically all the major aspects of nuclear co~m~nd and co~trol, ~n.d em~hasize
the necessity of command and control when considenng strategic stability, disarmament and global security. However, substantiating the necessity and possibility for
international cooperation in C 3I needs more attention.
This is addressed'in Chapter 3, which describes a logical, mathematical method for
solving the problem of cooperation. This method was developed and tested on numerous occasions during the 1990s by the Russian military and academic research institutes, to substantiate the required composition and characteristics of strategic nuclear
fiDrces (SNF) and their command and control systems. The main conclusion is that a
nuclear power can, theoretically, be reliably guaranteed to retaliate against an attacker
und r any conditions, irrespective of the size of prior preparations by the attacker to
a oid r taliation (e.g. improvement of the offensive forces and methods for their employment, strengthening of ballistic missile defense - or BMD - increased survivability under conditions of nuclear war, etc.). The method allows analysts, with an accu racy a ceptabl for practical purposes, to find a quantitative measure for the probability that the required level of retaliation will be implemented, and to correlate the required values of this index on the effectiveness of SNF (including their command and
control sy tern) with necessary expenditures.
.Thi approa his practical only under conditions of mutual openness regarding certain
of the C 3 systems. Given the theoretically proven assured retaliation, it is
sbl to move toward this kind of openness while maintaining national security.
. ~h~pt r 4 describe the Russian and U .S. nuclear command and control systems ,
ancluding ~h~ir history, organization and operational principles. Despite the fact that
top• 1• practically closed in Russia, in recent years a considerable number of
IOI:Ie)xrkdent and official experts described elements of strategic nuclear C 3 system
their real nam es, ffilSS!ons
· ·
. .
an some charactenstlcs. Unfortunately, these



1 fJl: Nuc/eal' Command, Contl'ot Coopel'ation

disparate data, presented by Russian authors, do not provide an objective picture of
the system as a whole. It is also unfortunate that some of these data, and especially a
number ofWestern publications about the Russian strategic C 3 , distort the real picture. Thus, I have undertaken in this book to give the previously published data on the
Russian C 3 a certain logical structure. In other words, the readers will find here not
only the list and brief description of the C 3 elements, but, more importantly, an explanation as to why these elements have been created, what their roles are in the general C 3
system, and what their impact is on strengthening nuclear deterrence. Some information on the systems' designers and manufacturers is also provided, and future prospects are analyzed. This will help maintain strategic stability and counter uninformed
speculation on this crucial subject. These issues are discussed primarily in relationship
to the first three components of C 3l: command, control and communications. Considerable attention is paid to the Russian strategic rocket forces (SRF) CJ. Information
about C 3 systems for the sea-based and air legs of the nuclear triad, as well as for the
SNF as a whole, is less detailed.
There is also a brief description of the U.S. nuclear command and control system.
Chapter 5 contains a comparative analysis of some problems in Russian and U.S. C 3 .
Using examples of negative control, delegation of authority, "dead hand" -type systems,
concepts of nuclear weapons use, etc., the chapter demonstrates that these problems
are largely similar for both systems, and that it is better to solve them cooperatively.
Chapter 6 proposes some concrete measures for cooperation between Russian and
U.S. C 3 experts. It contains a list of questions in the field of nuclear command and
control where unclassified publications, as well as discussions by official and independent experts, should be permitted. Questions regarding areas where such openness is
impossible are listed as well.
Analysis of the problems listed above is accompanied by references to opinions, conclusions and proposals contained in works by prominent specialists on the subject,
mostly Americans. In general, the author's views, based for the most part on those of
Russian scholars, largely support the opinions of non-Russian experts, a fact which
suggests considerable potential for cooperation. At the same time, the author proposes several alternatives to the American specialists' views, which can also be een,
positively, as material for beginning a discussion on the development of mutually acceptable recommendations.
As noted above, the abbreviation C 3 means "command, control, communications."
This retains its meaning throughout the book. The author, however, has decided to
change this meaning slightly in the title ("command, control, cooperation"), in order to
immediately draw the reader's attention to the book's foremost concern.

Cha ter 1
WhY Should C3 be Taken into Account? Potential Dangers and Problems


What IS C3 ?

The general principles for building and operating a C 3 system (we use this term to
describe only CJ - command, control and communications) are the same for all nuclear
To use the standard definition, a C 3 system lS the totality of organs, pomts and means
of command and control. When speaking about "organs," we imply, in addition, that
they have executive officials, procedures and doctrines of comm~nd ~nd ~o~trol. . .
The American literature on C 3 frequently employs the followmg Slmphfied defmltion of command and control: "The ability to send order requires only one-way links
from higher authority to the forces; this is command. The ability to receive feedback
on an information channel is necessary for control." 3
The C 3 system for strategic nuclear forces (SNF) is designed to provide the top political leaders with complete command of strategic nuclear weapons and, if necessary,
with a monopoly on their use. This is true for nuclear force components - land- based,
ea-based and/or air -based nuclear missile systems (their composition differs from
one nuclear power to another) - as well as for the infrastructure necessary for their
The main functions of a nuclear C 3 system are:
Control of the technical conditions and combat readiness of nuclear missiles;
Protection of nuclear weapons, at all levels, from unauthorized or accidental use;
Providing for the routine operations of subordinated forces and staffs;
Coordination with other services, organs and structures (early warning system,
ballistic missile defense, strategic reconnaissance, anti-aircraft defense, ground
forces groups, etc.) in carrying out the missions of the nuclear forces;
Preparation and correction of plans for combat employment of nuclear forces;
If necessary, combat use of nuclear weapons including decision -making proce~ures, pr paration of launch orders, and their transmission to the implementatlonlevel.
elusive right to authorize use of nuclear weapons belongs to the head of state

•-:tent, tc.).
' mam
· requirements
. The 0 systems
are trustworth'mess, speed an d
OJ)eratton, and combat stability. All levels of the system, from the top leader-


Why Should f1l be Taken into Account?l19

I IJI: Nuc/eal' Command, Conll'o~ Coopel'alion

ship down to the implementation level, have groupings of different types of command
facilities (highly protected stationary types, mobile land-based, air-based, etc.). These
command facilities have round-the-clock combat watch. They are all systematically
linked into an integrated network by the common user algorithm, and technologically
linked by communication channels based on different physical principles. Command
facilities for the top leadership are equipped to receive signals of a nuclear missile attack. All levels of the C 3 system are equipped with devices to block accidental or intentiona! actions within the system that can result in an unauthorized missile launch.
In the course of combat watch at high command facilities (General Staff and service
commanders in chief of the nuclear triad), the condition of nuclear missiles and troops
is constantly monitored, and reports about incidents are received at the level required
by the circumstances. All means necessary for preparing and transmitting the order to
unblock and launch the missiles are kept in constant readiness . The working algorithm
of the high command of C 3 for nuclear retaliation is, in principle, the same for every
nuclear power and is as follows :
Warning of a missile attack is sent to the head of state and is simultaneously received
at the highest-level command posts. Political leaders are then informed of the attack's
nature once it is identified. On the basis of this and previous information, the head of
state calls an urgent meeting (using teleconference) with the persons who had been
given authority in advance to make decisions about use of nuclear weapons. If a joint
decision to use nuclear weapons is made, the head of state uses special technology (the
"nuclear briefcase") to prepare the authorization and transmits it to the top military
command facilities .
If the early warning system (EWS) fails to inform the nation's leadership about a
missile attack in time, the sanction for retaliatory strikes is prepared in response to
detonations of enemy nuclear charges.
Once authorization is received, the high-level command facilities prepare launch
orders. This important procedure includes a number of sequential operations that are
performed together by several members of the combat watch. It is impossible for one
person to perform this procedure. Once the launch commands package is prepared, it
is transmitted to the troops simultaneously by all communication channels.
This operation takes a certain technologically determined minimum amount of time,
which can vary depending on the limit of time "granted" to the defender by the attacker. This question of time granted will be discussed later, within the context of
various nuclear retaliation options .
The main peculiarity of the nuclear 0 system is that it must simultaneously have
negative and positive controls, which are diametrically opposed to each other. In other
words, it must, on the one hand, guarantee protection against an accidental or unauthorized launch of even a single missile, and, on the other hand, it should be constantly
ready to transmit an order to launch, if necessary, all nuclear delivery systems.
The inner contradiction of this dual requirement is quite obvious when we take as

an example the following two extremes. First, positive control will be most effective if
all blocking devices are removed from missiles and the C 3 system. But then there is no
protection from accidents. Whereas, on the other extreme the ideal situation for negative control is a complete absence of missiles and nuclear warheads.
The first extreme is impermissible on principle, while we are yet to see the day when
the latter is possible. Therefore, we need a golden mean between the two opposite
requirements, a compromise, with all its ensuing complexities.
To sum up, one has to emphasize the rigidly centralized nature of nuclear C 3 systems. Unless the military command facility produces the guarded unblocking code
value (sometimes referred to by the abbreviation goschislo - "state number") and the
launch order itself, not a single missile with a nuclear warhead can be launched.
This means that the role of C 3 systems in nuclear force operations, and in nuclear
deterrence as a whole, is to determine the final response to an attack. The probability
of the national command authority (NCA) issuing release authority and launch orders
determines whether even a single missile from the entire arsenal will be launched. Furthermore, the characteristics of the C 3 system also influence the magnitude of retaliatory strike. Even if the NCA issues an order, it may not reach some of the missiles
because of damage to separate segments of the C 3 system as a result of a possible attack.
While 0 plays a decisive role in nuclear deterrence (a role equal to that of the nuclear
weapons themselves), there is the other side of the coin. Operation of strategic C 3 can
result in a number of problems for global security, which can lead, under certain conditions, to incidents with nuclear weapons and even to a threat of nuclear war. It is necessary to analyze these problems and possible actions to reduce potential threats.
Why is it necessary to take C 3 into account in estimates of strategic stability and
ways to strengthen that stability? There are six major problems that suggest the necessity of such an approach:
1. Absence of mutual accurate controls over the reliability of national systems for protection against accidental or intentional misuse of nuclear weapons. Numerous statements by national leaders about an "absolute guaran·
tee" against unauthorized launches of ballistic missiles are hardly satisfactory;

2. Simultaneous existence of several concepts for authorized use of nuclear
· 1 confl'1ct; the danger of a launch on warning (LOW)
forces in a hypothebca
pos.ture, which both Russia and the United States consider to be central to
thetr nuclear strategy;
3 · The hair· trigger st t f
· of the nuclear forces wh1ch
a eo a cons1'd erable portiOn
exacerbates the dangers of a LOW posture;

· b'l'
ros,on of confidence·m the surviva
llty of the C 3 systems under com-


I CJ: Nuc/eal' Command, Contl'ol, Coopel'ation
plicated combat conditions. This lack of confidence is gradually growing as
modern countermeasures against C 3 I are improving (e.g. precision conventional weapons and weapons based on new physical principles), and as aresult of economic, political and social factors;
5. Growing concern regarding the adequacy of nuclear C 3 systems in Pakistan, India and Israel, as well as the threshold nuclear powers;
6. Impossibility of further and deeper reductions in SNF without taking 0
into account, absence of acceptable methods for determining a reasonable
balance for nuclear forces and their C 3 systems, and, consequently, excessive expenditures by nuclear powers. Taking into account only the quantity
and characteristics of nuclear weapons in order to estimate the level of nuclear
deterrence is becoming, with further reductions in strategic arms, more and
more na1ve.
Let us have a more detailed look at the problems mentioned.


WhY Should CJ be Taken into Account? 121

As noted, until now the United States and Russia have taken no significant practical
steps toward cooperation in nuclear C 3 . To be fair, though, one should mention that
the United States has made some attempts concerning the issue of negative control.
Many experts believe, without official confirmation, that in the early 1960s the United
States offered to equip Soviet missiles with American protections against accidental or
unauthorized launch. Moscow turned down the offer from fear of losing face, and the
decades since have confirmed the reliability of Soviet analogues of PALs.
In 1991. working groups of experts from the United States and the Soviet Union,
headed respectively by Assistant Secretary of State for International Security Richard
Bartholomew and Deputy Foreign Minster A.A. Obukhov, met for consultation about
the problems of nuclear weapons.
Other participants in the meetings were V.G. Komplektov, the Soviet ambassador to
the United States, Lt. Gen. F. Ladygin, the chief of the Treaty and Legal Department
of the General Staff, as well as other officials. From the United States were Assistant
Secretary of Defense S. Hadley, and representatives from the National Security Council, the CIA, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (Gen. J. Shalikashvili) and other agencies. Representatives of Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan were also present. Cited below are
some previously unpublished excerpts from the records of these meetings. 4

The "Black Box" of Negative Control

Technical protections against accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear missiles (in American terminology they are called PALs - permissive action links) that are
integrated within C 3 systems, as well as the whole organizational system of such protections, have always been the most secret topic in the entire range of issues related to
nuclear weapons. At least, this has been the case in Russia. As for the United States,
some data about American PALs have been published and discussed in the mass media but the issue remains largely undisclosed. (See more on this in Chapter 2.)
Cooperation and openness in this area between the nuclear powers would obviously
be useful. Of course, public disclosure of all technical details is impossible, but a system of mutual verification between official experts and government agencies is necessary. Such a system of verification would allow national leaders to speak about a "100
percent" (or some other) guarantee, based on mutually agreeable, reliable international
standards, verified in place and in action.
In principle, it is not so difficult to implement such a system as long as there is the
political will to do so. There is no risk here for national security. The problems arise
when it comes to national sensitivities: each side has reasons to be concerned that in the
course of technical information exchange some shortcomings in its system would be
revealed. Such revelations, however, are inevitable, because each system, when con~­
pared to another, has its advantages and disadvantages. But these negative consequences
of openness would be more than compensated by the great benefit for both sides, and
the world as a whole, that are obtained from the introduction and exchange of the be t

Bartholomew: "It has appeared to us that President Gorbachev's statement did not
contain a response to one of President Bush's initiatives, that is our proposal to begin dialogue about command and control of strategic nuclear weapons."

Obukhov: "In his TV statement, M.S. Gorbachev said that we 'are ready to enter into
a substantive dialogue with the United States on developing safe and environmentally responsible technologies for storing and transporting nuclear warheads, methods for utilizing nuclear charges, and improvement of nuclear security.' The statement also said that 'in order to strengthen the reliability of control over nuclear
weapons we are unifying under a single operational directorate all [SNF] and are
including strategic defensive forces 5 in the same service of the armed forces.' . . .
Thus, I think that the Soviet side gave an exhaustive response to the U.S. initiatives.
At the same time, since the American side specially emphasizes the issues of nuclear
0, we would like to hear additional ideas from your side about concrete proposals."

~~rtholomew: "The statement by President Bush mentioned, in this relation, possililemeasures to tmprove
the command and control system, which could preclude
au onze use of nuclear weapons."
Shalihruhvili· "I
t. 1
. .
· n par tcu ar, we would hke to dtscuss the followmg tssues : techmcal
measures within th
· ·
e extstmg system of command and control of strategic nuclear
weapons. preventing unau th onze
. d use of these weapons; procedures whtch
. are an


Why Should fJl be Taken into Account? 123

I fJl: Nuc/BBI' Commanll, Conll'ol, Coopel'allon
element in the strategic command and control system, preventing the possibility of
an accidental or intentional launch of strategic offensive systems of different types
.. · I would also like to stress that the American side is not offering a detailed exchange on this subject that could touch upon subjects related to state secrets and
national security interests."
Bartholomew: "In this context I would like to note that the very top of the chain of
command of strategic forces in the United States is occupied by civilians, and not
by the military."

Further on, Shalikashvili briefly presented the main principles of command and
control of the U.S. strategic forces . Among other things, he said:
" ... Earlier the [Soviet Union] and the United States did not discuss these rather
sensitive problems. But under the present improvement in Soviet-American relations, it is important that both sides have an idea of how the other side's nuclear C 3
system is organized .. .. Of special importance in the organizational structure of the
U.S. nuclear command and control system is civilian control of the armed forces as
a whole and of nuclear forces in particular."

Obukhov: "The Soviet Union has a system of command and control of [SNF] that

ensures reliable operation of nuclear weapons and guarantees against their unauthorized use. Just as in the United States, in our country it is a civilian- the president of the Soviet Union - who is the commander in chief ... We have listened with
great attention to Gen. Shalikashvili's ideas regarding possible discussions about
the system of strategic C 3 . It is becoming clear to us that it is the issue of developing
procedures providing for even more reliable guarantees against unauthorized use of
nuclear weapons, but without going into the area related to the interests of national
security.. .. We will recommend to our leadership that these questions are reflected
in the course of the future contacts with the American side. In particular, they
could be touched upon during the forthcoming meeting with [Soviet] Defense
Minster Ye. I. Shaposhnikov."
Bartholomew: "We will certainly follow your advice."

From the dialogue quoted above it is apparent that the Soviet side offered, diplomatically, to further clarify the matter because Moscow was not yet ready, at the political level, to agree in principle to begin concrete discussion about C 3 • It is also apparent
that the American side was primarily interested in negative control.
A month and a half later, the sides resumed the conversation: 6
Bartholomew: "The next important issue on our agenda is the system of command

and control of nuclear forces .... Naturally, control of nuclear weapons is in the competence of the Soviet authorities themselves. At the same time, in view of the changes
unfolding in the [Soviet Union] today, the United States has an objective interest in
the reliability of the Soviet nuclear arsenal's controls. The United States is in favor of
keeping the nuclear weapons in the [Soviet Union] under unified collective command and control without any prejudice to the relations between the sovereign republics . ... We will inform you about the system of command and control of U.S.
nuclear forces . This will be the first exchange of information of this kind."

Within the framework of this initiative, the American side presented its partner with
a working document entitled "The System of Nuclear Command and Control," with
the expectation that after getting acquainted with it, the Soviet side would reciprocate
with its own materials.
The General Staff of the Soviet Armed Forces tasked its Center for Operational and
Strategic Research to draft the reciprocal materials. At that time, I worked at the center as the deputy chief of the division studying the problems of command and control
for the Armed Forces, and directly participated in this work. When we were given the
materials provided by Bartholomew's group, we could only smile. They contained only
the most general, well-known principles of American nuclear C 3 . It was clear that our
partner also realized this and was just making the first small step forward, wary of
scaring off its counterpart. The main emphasis in the U.S. materials was on the necessity of mutual exchange of information about protection against an unauthorized launch.
Our leaders could do nothing else but order us to prepare similar material, which we
did, emphasizing the primary importance of protection against unauthorized actions
within the C 3 system. Both the Soviet and U.S . materials were of no value to the opposite side, but their exchange at a high official level created some hope for a breakthrough.
In the course of the meeting cited above, the following exchange took place:
Bartholomew: "l propose establishing a working group to discuss the issue of the
nuclear forces command and control system .. .. We would like to receive information about the Soviet system of nuclear forces C3 • For instance, we would like to
know who in the [Soviet Union] is authorized to order the use of nuclear weapons;
how ~oes this system operate in view of the emergence of the sovereign republics;
how 18 the collective and simultaneously centralized control implemented, etc."

Obukh01.1·· "The Issue
of nuclear C 3 really is extremely important for our nations, as
as for the wh0 1e war ld . We understand U .S. concerns about these matters in
VIew of lhe change h
. .
s appemng m our country. I would like to direct your attention
as!lurances given b Y the [S ov1et
. ] pres1dent
during his meeting with George Bush


I IJl: Nuc/ea,. Command, Conll'o~ Coope,.alion
in Madrid, that command and control of nuclear weapons in the [Soviet Union] is 100
percent reliable. There is no possibility of unauthorized use. In his interview with the
American magazine U.S. News & World Report, the president of the [Soviet Union]
stressed that there is no danger of weakening in nuclear command and control. He
said: 'If there are any discussions, they concern only the structure of the Armed Forces
and the degree of change in the role of the republics, so that they could have a greater
say in the formation and command of the Armed Forces.' . . . We have already discussed these questions during consultations in Moscow in October of this year, and
asked the American side for a number of clarifications. The comments that we've
heard today do clarify what aspects the U.S. side would like to discuss. Subsequent
discussions will help to make things even clearer .... Our side will be represented in
the experts' working group by F.I. Ladygin and S.A. Zelentsov."

When Gorbachev spoke about "1 00 percent" reliability of command and control
systems ,this absolute (maximum) value, while not a clear-cut technical parameter ,was
supposed to reassure Americans. They could expect that the Russians would share
such a brilliant achievement with them, especially since the decision was actually made
to report to the leaders of both naticms on the need to begin work Involving C 3 experts.
But as far as I know, these exchanges had no sequel. Even if something has been
done In this area, there have been no official announcements about t. It would be
surpn;nng if the public were not informed about bilateral efforts to prevent accidents
With nuclear weapons . If such contacts are taking place at all, they should be announced.
Today there are no direct indications of any immediate threat to protection of nuclear
C against unauthorized actions. I worked for many years on Soviet and Russian C 3 ,
and can confirm that the reliability of the blocking devices IS sufficiently high. Ameri can experts generally are also certain about the protection of their C 3 system. Thus,
Gen. Bernnie Davis at Strategic Air Command 'sheadquarters said: "As far as the United
States IS concerned, it IS impossible to accidentally launch anuclear weapon. Impossible. Just not humanly possible - or not machine possible - for an accidental launch .
And for the Soviets ,I'm very confident they have similar safeguards. ' 7
However sincere, this IS only the personal opinion of an expert, and not a r alit)'
verified and confirmed by both sides . There are continuing doubts about the ro bust·
ness of negative control.
For Instance, there IS the recurnng ssue ofU S. SSBNs, which carry on board all the
necessary documents and means for autonomous launches of SLBMs without N CA
authorization. In particular during the consultations described earlier ,Sergei Rogov.
director of the Institute for the Study of the USA and Canada, asked, among othet
questions, 'if there are any plans to install blocking devices onUS .SSBNs. " American sources have noted some incidents with blocking devices In the United tates:
" .. (T]he upgrade of safeguards on the weapons will not solve the problem of safe·
guarding the codes themselves , ap01nt driven home by a December 1994 incident in

Why Should C' bB Taksn into Account? 125

which the extant unlock codes for strategic forces were compromised aboard a U.S.
Strategic Command airborne command center." 8
Another problem of the same kind is the technical possibility of delegating missile
launch authority down from the NCA to lower levels. It is impossible, in principle, to
avoid such a scenario within the C 3 systems of the nuclear powers, but how and under
what circumstances it could be implemented is a very complicated question. The absence of an agreed-upon approach can also result in losing control over nuclear weapons. Until now it has not been said openly, at least not in Russia, who really can give
the order to launch strategic missiles - the president, minister of defense, General Staff
or someone else? How many options are there and which one is the primary option?
This is not idle curiosity given the political events in Russia during the last 10 to 1 5
years. It is the heart of negative control and the public should be completely aware of it.
The same applies to other nuclear powers.
For five years (1994-1999), Russian and American SNF took part in a successful
program named Shadow. Under this program, Russian and American missile officers
learned about the conditions of service of their opposite numbers, and sometimes even
played their opposite numbers' roles. Regarding this, Col. Gen. Vladimir Yakovlev,
then the SRF commander in chief, said:

"The greatest fear in the United States regarding the Russian strategic forces is that
our systems might not be reliable enough, which might lead to an unauthorized
launch. The Shadow program proved the opposite ... Gen. [Eugene] Habiger even
told me we are resolving these issues even better that the United States. I visited the
launch control centers of a regiment and a brigade and looked into these issues in
the United States, and I can state responsibly that our systems providing for safety
and transmission of combat commands are not any worse, and in some cases are
even better than the American ones." 9

Apparentir, the former commander In chief was right . Still ,this IS only an interview,
not anofficial document of aJOint U.S .Russian expert evaluation. One of the main

~sonsfor Western concern about the reliability of Russ1im negative control 1s the
Wtdely-heldoplnlon that many elements of the Russian C 3 system are physically obsolete. Russian officials do not deny this :"The maJonty of stationary command posts
and 60 to70 percent of the C 3 eqmpment of the troops and weapons of the strategic
· service
· 1·I1e
· ·· IS· not any better m· the Space De fiweapons
T arepast th eir
. ...T h e situatwn
ense roops, where more than 60percent of the information systems are past their
\Varranted serviceli£e "lo


. fltfe

t eRuss1an c3
system contmues to be very safe, one cannot completely ex certa.tnvulnerab'l'
· safety due to aging .
I Ity to ts

0 0

elude a


thhereas~urances of the SRF sformer commander In chief that the negative


I f11: NucleBP Commllllll, Conii'OI, Coopet'atlon

It is difficult without detailed knowledge of the real situation to speak about complete protection against unauthorized actions in all the nuclear powers today, and more
so in the future under different domestic and international situations. The growth of
terrorism and improvements in technologies available to terrorists are a legitimate source
of concern. At the very least, there is no alternative to an exchange of the best experience in this field, and mutual help among the members of the nuclear club that is not
limited to consu ltations, but could perhaps include technical and financial aid.
Probably, protection against accidental or unauthorized launches of nuclear missiles
is not only a national problem, but more of an international one. The danger is in the
complete lack of knowledge of the situation amongst the nuclear powers.


Should we Trust the Display?

Information on PALs is classified, but it is easy to prove that cooperation is necessary. On the other hand, quite a lot has been published about other aspects of C 3 •
Thus, for instance, much has been said and written about the use of nuclear weapons.
(See Chapter 2 and elsewhere.) Some explanations are in order, however, for readers
who are not experts in this subject.
The official operational scenarios of pre-emptive strikes against a potential enemy
are distant history now. In the 1960s, for instance, the list of commands for the Soviet
C 3 system included an order to "launch at designated time ... ." In essence, it was an
order for a pre-emptive strike. But as Soviet-American contacts developed, some time
in the early 1970s, this directive gradually disappeared from combat orders at command facilities, and then from screens of command and control equipment altogether.
Of course, it is impossible to completely exclude the capability for a first nuclear strike
either theoretically or practically. But the Russian General Staff's current operational
plans do not have such an order. Nuclear weapons can be used only in response.
But in response precisely to what? NATO's expansion to the East, the 1999 war
against Yugoslavia, and the weakening of Russia's conventional forces have all raised
discussions in Moscow of revising the official position in this matter. The first revision
had been made in the new military doctrine adopted in November 1993, in which Russia renounced its earlier pledge of no first use of nuclear weapons. The Concept of
Russian National Security adopted in December 1997, stated that nuclear weapons
could be used "if there is a threat to the existence itself of the Russian Federation as a
sovereign state.' Once Vladimir Putin came to power in Moscow, more precise formu·
lations were urgently added. In the Concept of National Security of the Russian Fed·
eration, signed by the acting president in his executive order No. 24 of Jan. 10, 2000.
Russia declares the principle of using "all the weapons at her disposal, including nuclear
weapons, in order to repel an armed aggression, if all other means for resolving tb
crisis situation have been exhausted or have proved to be not effective." 11
It is apparent that the nuclear threshold has been lowered even further. Two factors,
however, are worth mentioning. First, from the technical point of view, all of

Why Should fJ1 be Taken into Account? 127

changes nothing in the C 3 operational capabilities of the Russian SNF. No one will
reintroduce into it the "launch at designated time" as an anachronism. The new concept could be implemented through the existing system simply by transmitting a launch
order at the appropriate moment. Second, one should take into consideration the psychological aspect of this problem. Even when the Soviet Union and Russia pledged no
first use, no potential aggressor could count firmly on this pledge. No matter what, a
would-be attacker had to take into account that in a critical situation Russia, or the
Soviet Union, would use the means of last resort to protect itself. So, such declarations
are not worth much in the military sense.
Ideas on the possibility of a limited, "regulated" nuclear war, occasionally revived in
the West, are also not viable. Long ago, Georgi Arbatov wrote: "The idea itself of
introducing 'rules of the game' and of artificial limitations 'by agreement' is based on
an illusion and is without foundation. It is hard to imagine that nuclear war, iflaunched,
could be held within the framework of the 'rules' and not grow into general war." 12
Daniel Ford writes: "The gap between the strategy of controlled escalation and the
command and control system's present capability is [in the words of Paul Bracken] as
far as from here to the planet Uranus." 13
These statements continue to be true today.
Today, however, ideas criticized by Arbatov and Ford appear not only in U.S. sources,
but in Russian military literature as well. Thus, two Strategic Rocket Forces (SRF)
generals, N. Ye. Solovtsov and V.T. Nosov, stated in November 1994: "The mission of
deterrence advances an additional requirement to the [SNF] - an ability to deliver
selective, even single, nuclear strikes to a wide range of distances, with minimal environmental consequences." 14
It is difficult to determine whether this opinion was a reflection of Russian official
positions. In any case, it may be explained by the fact that Russian (as well as any
other) C3 has the technical capability to launch a strike, including single launches, against
any number of targets . The authors cited above, as specialists, were most probably
talking about the development of this "technical capability" in a command and control
system in order to increase its flexibility under complicated circumstances of a retaliatory strike. Using such a capability, however, for advanced planning of a limited nuclear
war would be a completely different matter. It is a prerogative of politicians. Unfortunately, under the cover of the new military doctrine, the support is growing in Moscow
for allowing
· response to an attac k , an d t h'1s support 1s
· m
· d'1rect
. · limited nuc1ear stn'kes m
proporti(:> Oto outside pressure against Russia. However, it is always stressed that the
~thofSosu~h strikes is not "complete destruction of the aggressor" (as they used to say
mbvie vtet days) • but rather stoppmg
· the war before 1t
· becomes a global catastrophe.
· d" nuc1ear war 1s
ously,Othis "reassurance " d oes not Improve
matters, as a "1'1m1te
'.-Qatller-. h ne can only hope that this Russian position is only a warning to a potential
, t e means to preserve peace.
a long period
t' 1
• un 1 recently, Russia and the United States have generally be-


Why Should CI be Taken into Account? 129

I CI: Nucteal' Command, Contl'ol, Coopel'ation

lieved that reliable mutual deterrence could be provided by developing nuclear weapons
and C 3 systems based on a strike in response to early warning, called launch on warning
(LOW), as well as in response to an actually delivered strike (launch under attack, or
LUA). Combining these two approaches could have been possible if it did not create a
number of serious problems in technology, economy and strategy. For now, let us look
at strategy.
The strategic aspect of the problem asks which responsive action should be the dominant one, i.e., how should the NCA act at the moment of nuclear crisis? Also, can
LOW and LUA exist separately, i.e., can they exclude one another?
From the standpoint of strategic stability, it is unacceptable to follow only a LOW
concept. One cannot drive the leaders of a nuclear power into a corner by making them
react impulsively and immediately to early warning information without the right to
make a mistake, without the insurance of the LUA concept, which provides for retaliation under any circumstances.
Alexei Arbatov writes: "The function of making the most important of all imaginable decisions by political leaders actually becomes a fiction, a monkey's conditional
reflex: the light turns on- the monkey pulls a handle - a banana appears. " 15 Further,
he makes a very sharp and bold - but absolutely correct- conclusion:
"There is no doubt that after the end of the Cold War, even under conditions of
possible future great international tensions, risk of a nuclear disaster because of an
accident is much higher and more terrible than the risk that in case of a hypothetical
attack against Russia her retaliatory strike would be delayed, less destructive or even
won't take place at all. Since the danger of war has been reduced, the last word
should belong to politicians: the strategy of delayed second strike appears to be the
only reasonable approach." 16

The subsequent logical question is: if 0 within the framework of LUA guarantees
retaliation against an attacker reliably enough, why incur additional expense for L W?
Such questions are numerous, and they will be considered in the following chapters.
For now, let us note that today there is no satisfactory explanation for an NCA's actions
in a unique crisis situation, which one hopes will never occur.
Russia lacks an official unclassified document regulating the actions of political leaders in case of a nuclear conflict. A good example of this shortcoming is the notorious
case in which the Russian EWS "detected" in early 1995, the launch of a Norwegian
meteorological rocket. Leaving aside Russian leaders' political use of this action (detection), let us ask a simple question: how should then President Boris Yeltsin and the
General Staff have acted if that rocket had been flying {even by mistake) toward Rus·
sian territory?
As Yeltsin confessed, he "used the nuclear briefcase for the first time" on that

sion. The whole episode smacked of a poor joke and made many specialists in the
Ministry of Defense and the defense industry wince. The president demonstrated very
vague knowledge of the subject. This came as no surprise, because Russian political
leaders Uust as their Soviet predecessors) never conducted any serious training for such
a case. Under such circumstances, it makes no sense whatsoever to speak about use of
nuclear weapons, since it is the president who is supposed to be one of the main actors
in such a case.
For the sake of comparative analysis, let us refer to some examples from the American experience:
"[A]s Richard DeLauer, the under Secretary of defense for research and engineering, has noted, the civilian officials' preparation for their roles is less than impressive. 'One of the things we have discussed over the years is the difficulty of getting
the president even to sit down to practice,' he said. 'I guess President Carter was the
first president ever to visit the National Command Post and sit down where he was
supposed to sit and at least be briefed on what it all means. President Nixon never
did, Johnson never did, and some of the security advisers, like Kissinger, never went
down there.' ... A former Pentagon official said that Richard Nixon was 'the great
neglector' of this subject while Jimmy Carter 'had an almost morbid' interest in it
and spent considerable time trying to master the intricacies of the [Single Integrated
Operational Plan]. Carter volunteered to sit down with his successor to discuss the
subject, but his offer was rebuffed by President Reagan." 17

Under LOW, the NCA has very little time for decision-making. Under the best
circumstances, in Russia it would be not more than two or three minutes. This is if the
Russian EWS, the capabilities of which have been considerably reduced, functions
normally. Theoretically, a nuclear response will take place if the NCA has such authority frem the Russian people and an agreement from the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States .18 And, of course, if the president will take upon himself
~ ultimate responsibility for action in a complicated, confusing situation, having as
his only justification the information on EWS screens about the (possible) beginning
of a (possible) nuclear attack against (perhaps) Russia. (But, as President John F.
Kenn~d~ once said, "later there will be no one left to judge.")
This 18 • approximately, the argument of LOW opponents in Moscow. The sup po~rs of L W answer as follows: If one has to wait for a nuclear strike against one's
to actually take place, it may turn out that there is nothing left to launch, that
~ er cannot be transmitted because the communication system is wrecked, and
A will be unable to make a decision because it has perished by that time.
· t h etr
· scenano
· any retahatory
· w1ll
· be wea k an d
Pl'obabT L . W stress that m
1 tty WtU be low.



I IJl: Nucleap Command, Contl'ol, CoopePation

Such arguments may seem a bit academic, but theoretical concepts on the use of
nuclear weapons are backed up by concrete and expensive C 3 systems. In the case of
LOW, the system is not highly survivable, but rather a fast and all-seeing effective
EWS with a mostly stationary system of command posts linked together by cable and
satellite communication channels . Add to this a "decisive" president. The concept of
LUA, on the contrary, presupposes a relatively slow C 3 system that is highly survivable under the most adverse conditions. This is the network of mobile and super-hardened command posts linked together by special highly survivable channels of command and control. (Literature about one of these command posts is available.) 19 Add
to this a cautious NCA, which has, thanks to a system like this, the right to make a
mistake (i.e., the right not to be in a hurry).
Until the disintegration of the Soviet Union, its C 3 system was built on the principle
of LOW; as Arbatov said, " ... the one-sided Soviet strategy ... relied excessively on the
launch-on-warning principle." 20
Now this system looks less impressive. As for LUA, today technical support for its
implementation is insufficient in both the United States and Russia. In which direction will nuclear postures, now subject to reductions, develop? Supporters of LOW
maintain that the drastic cuts in nuclear arsenals require a reliance only on LOW, since
after the years 2007 -2008, according to their calculations, there will be no missiles left
for a retaliatory strike after absorbing an enemy attack. Supporters of the delayed second strike (DSS) are pointing out that today negative control is much more important
than positive control, and that the notions of "few" and "many" regarding nuclear retaliation are quite relative.
The arguments continue, but in practice both sides manage to obtain funding for
their main technical programs. A good deal of money is being spent while there is till
no strategic clarity. Combat documents at the nuclear command facilities continue to
reflect both types of scenarios, and they are periodically gamed at command and staff
exercises. Notably, this confrontation has been somewhat muted in recent years. Vari·
ous scenarios of limited nuclear conflicts with an abstract potential enemy have comple·
mented the two existing scenarios. (See more in Chapter 2.) However, these scenarios
are not likely to have a significant impact on the main direction of military-technical
policy in Russia and the United States regarding nuclear 0 . In Russia, with its current
economic problems, not only the political opposition but also clear-sighted members
of parliament are raising the issue of logical, open substantiation of strategic concepts.
to allow for more optimal defense planning.


The Hair Trigger

Strategic stability is seriously threatened by the exceptionally high technical
ness of nuclear forces, and of their C 3 system, for immediate action. The time froll1
decision to the launch is now only several minutes.
It sounds like a paradox. For three decades, both nuclear superpowers have


Why Should IJl/JB Taken into Account? 31

sized the combat readiness of their nuclear forces above anything else, squeezing minutes and seconds out of technology. In the Soviet SRF, combat readiness was absolutely above all other requirements, and was supposed to be perfected constantly. I
have also taken an active part in this effort. Now, however, combat readiness has become an obstacle.
The paradox, nonetheless, only seems to be true. Everything depends on one's vantage point. From the military point of view, high combat readiness of any weapon is
necessary. Along with the destructive potential of nuclear charges, it determines effectiveness of deterrence. A different picture emerges from a political vantage point, which
takes global security into account.
It is politics and ideology that determine the characteristics of nuclear C 3 systems.
Because the United States and the Soviet Union relied for a long time on mutual deterrence, today we have the technical capability to respond immediately and transmit the
launch order to the missiles within 10 to 15 seconds. However, if it is officially acknowledged that global security has the top priority, that presidents have the right to
make a mistake, that they have no right to authorize a retaliatory strike only on the
basis of information from an EWS (even the most reliable one), then a different posture
becomes possible, which no longer emphasizes speed of response above all else.
Combat readiness, understood broadly, involves not only the capacity to notice a
threat in time, evaluate it and rapidly transmit the order to respond. It has another
IISPect: survivability of nuclear forces and their C 3 system under the most adverse conditions. To develop such a capability is tantamount to relying on the LUA concept,
using technology to provide for the right to make a mistake.
The idea of lowering the readiness of nuclear forces is becoming increasingly popular.
Alang with studying the possibility of a transition, through changes in the C 3 systems,
from LOW to a less dangerous concept of DSS, some direct measures such as delaying
the preparation and launch of missiles in case of unexpected accidents are either being
studied or implemented. In the United States and Russia, some missile launchers and
elements of the C 3 systems are being taken off combat watch, nuclear warheads have
been remov d from the missiles, etc. The idea of deep reductions, down to days, weeks
and months, of the readiness of all nuclear force components (weapons, C 3 , etc.) - "zero
alert" - is described in detail by Dr. Bruce G . Blair.21 In the following chapters, I will
analyz t~is aspect of his work. The idea of zero alert is worthy of a most attentive study.
ven lf.nuclear readiness is reduced to a very low level , in the case of a political
~~:ta~:~o, the two sides may begin to upgrade readiness. This process of upgradIng th' ~ 18 dangerous by itself: one side can find itself ahead of the other and try to
ts advantag " I
n sue h c1rcumstances,
one needs something beyond political
(W:htch we do not
· a conflict
· from
•nu:·lD •
cons1 er m t 1s stu y capable of preventmg
'lllllllnmt:~: a l.ic:at_astrophe. At the conceptual level, it is the LUA strategy which can
ta atton. At the level of technology we may think of some measures within
systems themse lVes. (S ee more m
. Chapter
' 6. )


Why Should IJi liB Taken into Account? 133

I CJ: Nuc/ea,. Command, Contl'ol, Coope,.allon

Today, in any case, it makes no sense to keep the still huge nuclear forces and their C
systems in a dangerous hair-trigger state.



The Illusion of Weakness

Concerns over the possible weakening of nuclear C 3 systems can result from, first,
the continuing development of different means of attack, and, second, because of internal problems in nuclear states.
The effectiveness of intelligence collection against operation and modernization of
nuclear C 3 systems is increasing. Means for disrupting C 3 systems are being improved.
Primarily, these are munitions with deep underground impact, strike anti-satellite systems, Stealth aircraft, electronic warfare systems, and promising weapons based on new
physical principles, especially super-electro-magnetic pulse (EMP) weapons. In Global
Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, Blair speaks about "the bane of Russian planning":
"The Trident D- 5 force alone, representing only 18 percent of the active U.S. strategic nuclear stockpile (1,344 of our 7, 700 warheads), poses a qualitatively new threat
to Russia. The missile's pinpoint accuracy means that practically any target in Russia except a handful of underground command bunkers is vulnerable to destruction
by U.S. SLBMs, even though most D-Ss carry warheads with relatively low explosive power. If directly targeted, critical facilities in the nuclear command system
in the Moscow area would stand little chance of surviving." 22

It is difficult to judge a priori how small the chances are for command facilities to
survive accurate strikes by Trident D-5 SLBMs, but it is obvious that they present a
serious threat to the Russian C 3 system. They, as well as other means of attack, threaten
the military C 3 systems of other countries, such as China, at least as seriously. And thl
is disturbing.
A Russian expert, stressing the continuous improvement of counter-C 3 measures,
writes (with reference to a U.S. source): 23 " ... It is no accident that American expert
believe that under conditions of deep reductions and given the qualitative composition
of strategic nuclear forces, 'resistance to the temptation for a first strike in relations
between Russia and the United States will be the weakest since the early 1970s."' 24
It is self-evident that a strong, highly survivable system of nuclear C 3 is a stabilizing
factor, and can never become destabilizing. Indeed, the attacker in a nuclear conflict
can have a weak C 3 system, since a highly survivable one is not necessary for a firSt
strike. But a weak C 3 system may, under certain circumstances in a difficult ituation.
provoke the opposing side to carry out a first strike to decapitate the opponent's
forces and thus prevent his retaliation or his first strike. Of course, such scenarios
not in the spirit of today's relations between nuclear powers, but the very nature of
nuclear world makes it necessary to take all possible scenarios into account.

The disintegration of the Soviet Union has awakened serious concerns over the state
of its nuclear C 3 system. The breakup resulted in serious, although not decisive, changes
in the Russian nuclear C 3 , as well as in control over nuclear weapons located in Ukraine,
Kazakhstan and Belarus. The first, and most important, factor was that Russia had to
exclude those nuclear forces not deployed on its territory from the combat organization
of its SNF. This was done because Russia actually lost not only administrative, but also
operational, control over these forces. The second important factor was the destruction
of the single EWS. The majority of the early warning radars being operated, modernized or brought on line by the Soviet Union turned out to be outside of Russia: Skrunda
in Latvia, Nikolaev (Sevastopol) and Beregovo (Mukachevo) in Ukraine, Mingechaur
(Lyaki) in Azerbaijan, Balkhash in Kazakhstan and Gantsevichi (Baranovichi) in Belarus.
Thus, out of nine deployed Soviet EWS radar regions, only three have remained in
Russia: Olenegorsk (Murmansk), Mishelevka (Irkutsk), and Pechora. 25 Although the
Russian government has concluded agreements with some of the former republics about
their operation, the Russian military leadership cannot fully rely on these radars in its
strategic planning. A good example is the elimination of the radar in Skrunda. The
significance of this loss is clear: without reliable "eyes" in the SNF C 3 system, it is difficult to argue in favor of a LOW posture, with all the logical consequences.
Furthermore, the disintegration of the Soviet Union resulted in the collapse of the
l!iuge research-industrial cooperative network, which produced not only strategic rocketa, but also 0 equipment (Chapter 4 will list the design bureaus and factories that
:Russia lost). Although Russia has rebuilt this cooperative network using its own reaou.rces, it will have difficulties in developing its C 3 system for years to come. Significant cuts in the defense budget will have a similar effect.
The former chief of the Main Operational Directorate of the General Staff, Col.
en. V.M. Baryn'kin, said in 1996:

"The disintegration of the [Soviet Union] has considerably complicated working
canditions for the military command and control system. The best elements of this
system, with some exceptions, have been left outside of Russia, while what remains
in Russia, naturally, cannot fully provide for the needs of command and control.
l3esides this, in recent years, because of the general economic decline in the country
and disruptio n of th e sc1ent1
· 'f'1c and productwn
· links between the [Commonwealth
of Independen t Stat es ] countnes,
the tempo of development of the command and
control system . l d'
. . system, has been sharply reduced
' me u mg t e commumcatwn
hanges m the count ry 's econom1c
. s1tuat10n
. have resulted m
. a fa1lure
to fmance
Wor k for the mai t
n enance of readmess and further development of the command
d control system t
resui b
a any more than 40 to 50 percent below the required level. As a
t, y U1e year 2000 th
tnent will be
' e eye e to mtroduce new command and control equipIl'lore than 60 years, and the whole process will no longer be realistic. " 26







"In the spring of 1998, the planned defense expenditures were first cut by the Sergei
Kiriyenko Cabinet from 82 down to 61 billion rubles, and after the Aug. 17 crisis
the financing of defense was reduced even further, and as a result by the end of that
year the actual defense expenditures were only SO percent of the planned level. By
the end of 1998 the military personnel was reduced by 25 percent, while the military budget - by 50 percent. Since it was impossible to reduce proportionally the
expenditures for operation and maintenance as well as for investment, the deepest
cuts were made in the budget for [research and development] and design, weapons
and equipment acquisition, and capital construction. They were financed only at
the level of 14 percent from the plan (4 billion rubles instead of the planned 28.5
billion rubles)." 27
Given the poor condition of the Russian economy in general, and the defense industry in particular, the programs for C 3 development were practically frozen between
1996 and 1998. If during the Soviet era the share of spending for the improvement of
strategic C 3 constituted from 10 percent to 15 percent, or even 20 percent, of the total
SNF spending, between 1996 and 1998 it fell down to 1 percent or 2 percent. However, in 1999 the C 3 share in the SRF returned back to 10 percent, mostly because
research and development work on the Toppol-M ICBM was over and its mass production began; therefore, some redistribution of research and development funding
became possible. Yakovlev, then the SRF commander in chief, said in this regard,
"When working on the program for the future SRF ... a certain redistribution of re·
sources has occurred between the development of informational and command and
control systems and the strike elements of the SRF." 28 It is also possible that the Rus·
sian leaders have realized at last that C 3 could no longer be neglected and started mak·
ing some steps to reverse the situation. But despite all of this, with the economy in
decline and low defense budgets in absolute terms, this 10 percent will hardly be uffi•
cient for the development of Russian C 3 •
All the factors listed above may create an impression of Russia's nuclear im
among less knowledgeable observers, or at least of a gradual deterioration in its ability
control its nuclear forces. This would be a dangerous illusion. Subsequent chapters
explain why. At this point, it is sufficient to say that neither the continuing detrrai:JaiJ""j
of Russian strategic C 3 , nor the problems of its modernization, nor an increase of all
of negative external factors affecting it can exclude, in principle, some probability that
will work when necessary. The result will be catastrophic for anyone trying to test



Why Should C' be Taken into Account? 135

I f1: Nuclelll' Command, Conii'OI, Coopel'ation

Of course, it is too early to talk about a 60-year-long cycle of developing new command and control systems for the SNF, but the situation has not improved since 1996.
The Russian defense industry was particularly hard hit by the budget crisis of spring
1998 and by the subsequent financial crash of Aug. 17, 1998. According to Arbatov,

- -·· -

system. The main task is not to cast doubts upon the deterring role of strategic C 3 , but to
study how this role evolves and to prevent dangerous uninformed speculation on the subject.
Last, from command and control's point of view, the disintegration of the Soviet
Union not only created difficulties within Russia, but also raised some new questions
at the global level. Much had been recently said about the Ukraine's technical ability to
take operational control of "its" ICBMs within several weeks, using the remaining C 3
elements in Vinnitsa, Khmelnitsk and Pervomaysk, as well as the research and production capabilities of the design bureaus and factories in Kharkiv, Kiev and
Dniepropetrovsk. Now Ukraine has been proclaimed to be nuclear-free, but it is not
ICBM-free. If this independent country, or Kazakhstan or Belarus for that matter,
would plan to use its remaining missile technology, specialists and rich experience from
the Soviet period, we should take into consideration that they have considerable experience in the field of command and control.


The Third Countries

There is a concern over nuclear command and control in threshold states that actually
have nuclear weapons, but do not have official status as nuclear powers: Pakistan, India,
Israel, and some others. In the course of the Soviet-American consultations in 1991
mentioned earlier, one of the American participants said, "the United States is concerned
over the unreliability of ballistic missile C 3 systems in the threshold states
A Russian expert, with reference to an American source, writes:
0 0

0 "

"Some American scholars propose that their government should help create reliable systems for 'positive' and 'negative' control of nuclear weapons in the new
nuclear states in order to prevent any unauthorized or accidental use. These experts
refer to an example of cooperation in this field in the past: in the early 1960s the
United States supposedly informed both the United Kingdom and the USSR about
the design of their novelty - 'electronic locks ' on nuclear warheads." 31

It is very difficult to come up with anything definitive on this subject. Any attempts
at control over the C 3 I activities of third parties are going to run into their lack of official
status as nuclear powers. Still, some things can be seen without their cooperation:
"Although little is p bl' 1 k
u ICY nown about some of Its
elements , especially
e Specific line of th ·
au onty an other more procedural aspects the physical elements are quite a
e constructwn of underground command-and-cono c~ters takes at lea t
tellit .
. s a year an Is easily noted by photographic reconnaissance
es, commun!catio £ T .
. .
by a va .
ns aci Ities, navigatwn stations, and radar sites are mapped
nety of s1gnal intelli
· launches and orgence (SIGI NT) systems; and satelhte


Why Should fJl be Taken into Account? 137

I fJl: Nuc/eal' Command, Contl'ot Coopel'ation
bits are continuously monitored, although the precise mission must necessarily often
be inferred." 32

Such information is not reassuring enough of the safety of these C 3 systems. Therefore, positive results are likely to be achieved only if an international solution to the
main problem is found: elimination of nuclear weapons in the countries that are not
officially recognized as nuclear powers.
If some of these countries strengthen their positions as nuclear powers, it will become necessary to include them in negotiations on cooperation on C 3 I issues (although
the word "cooperation" is perhaps not the best term to describe the situation). It is
probably better to be aware of the situation in unofficial nuclear powers, and perhaps
even give them aid in order to increase the security of their command and control, than
completely ignore the issue and thus create the potential danger of nuclear accidents.
Such is the paradoxical nature of strategic C 3 •
According to experts, up to 20 nations could have nuclear weapons by the years
2008-2010, and the relations between some of them will certainly not be as stable as
they are between the members of the official nuclear club. Regions suffering from
long-standing conflicts will then become a reason for particular concern. Although
India and Pakistan, after openly testing their nuclear weapons, assert that the situation
in their region has now stabilized, there is no guarantee that under certain circwn·
stances they would not resort to these powerful weapons. The situation could be made
even worse by their weak, undeveloped systems of nuclear C 3 : it may be tempting ta
suppress the enemy C 3 , and these systems may be accident-prone. A nuclear conflict
between these two nations could have negative impact on other troubled regions. The
Middle East comes to mind first, where Israel already has nuclear weapons, and some
of its perennial Arab enemies could acquire such weapons within the next few years.
One may add that such nuclear nations as India, Pakistan and Israel, as well as Egypt.
Libya, Iran and some other states, can develop and build ballistic missiles.
The issue of third countries has another aspect as well. They may present a threat to
the command and control systems of nuclear powers. As Blair notes,
"A related function, which is an increasingly important priority, is to monitor the
launch activities of threshold states that are developing or deploying ballistic missiles. This proliferation has a growing potential to directly threaten the nuclear superpowers as well as to strain their early warning systems. It might increase the
risks of false alarms and thus aggravate the problem of nuclear inadvertence. "


Reducing Strategic Arms Blindfolded

This section deals with accounting for command and control in estimates of
gic stability, deterrence, etc. While all the issues dealt with earlier belonged to

dangers related to operating nuclear C 3 systems, this particular question can be described as a problem.
Mutual nuclear deterrence has been, and will continue to be, the cornerstone of strategic stability as long as nuclear weapons exist. One may only agree with the school of
thought maintaining that nuclear deterrence is much more reliable than a conventional one. Of course, this is no reason for celebration, and the preservation of the
nuclear monster cannot be a goal for its own sake. Still, it would be reasonable to view
reliable mutual nuclear deterrence as the natural inevitable result of nuclear weapons'
In the course of their nuclear confrontation, the Soviet Union and the United States
strove for parity, which they understood as, simply put, an approximate equality of
general quantitative levels of nuclear arsenals. This is so: both sides had 10,000 to
12,000 strategic warheads and 15,000 to 20,000 tactical nuclear warheads. The same
principle has been adhered to since the beginning of arms reduction process: according
to START I, each side is to keep 6,000 strategic nuclear warheads, while the never-tobe-implemented START II allows each side 3,000 to 3,500 warheads. This rather
simplistic approach was justified by the huge absolute size of the strategic arsenals,
which guaranteed destruction of the enemy and of world civilization many times over.
The process of U.S.- Russian strategic arms reductions is continuing, despite some
anags, and it is becoming clear that in the near future we will have to determine why we
requir the level of strategic forces that we have now, as opposed to a higher or a lower
one. If the level is higher than reasonable, this means excessive expenditures; if it is
l0wer, national security is threatened. Also, why should we cling to the outdated con~ept ~f parity? Given the weakness of Russia's economy, it cannot pursue nuclear parIty wtth the United States. Here is one of the most pessimistic scenarios, presented by

''B~ the year 2008 ... Russia's SNF would have 600 to 700 warheads, mostly on
deltvery vehicles no longer adequate for reliable deterrence. Even if the United
·~t~s go down to 3,500 warheads within the START II framework, they will 'unWtllmgly' have a five - t o S1x-1o
· r ld supenonty
· · over Russ1a,
· and 1f
· one counts nuclear
, e supenonty w1 e seven- to e1ght-fold,
the same

at was during the Cuban missile crisis."34

u .

b e~erts have proposed vanous
plans to prevent a large strategic nuclear ine
oth b
e mte tates, but all these plans would result in hurter HU)ches
th. SN of th e mlltar_y,
the economy, the government's social programs,

· pnonty
· · m
· R ussta
· ,s defense policy, and
necesc: .e kF must
. rem am th e mam
·@! y to eep 1t that
· a fact: an asymme~~UC:I~r potea ial b
way. Wl e ta en, but 1t remams
etween Russ1a and the United States is inevitable in the im-


I CI: Nuc/eal' Command, Conll'ot Coopel'alion

mediate future. What else could be expected if Russia's defense budget is not more than
6 to 7 percent of the U.S. military budget?
When the formula of strategic balance no longer has the equality in which Russia's
military analysts seek their salvation, we will have to think about new ways of estimating effectiveness of deterrence. I believe that the simple comparison of strategic arsenals is dead, and that we have to estimate the forecast final result of nuclear retaliatory
strikes. The estimates of such forecasts should be performed not only by experts, but
also involve a broad public participation. The C 3 factor in nuclear deterrence will play
an important role in this new approach.
The command and control factor has a direct impact on the stabilizing, or destabilizing, character of different types of nuclear weapons. The dependence of a weapon's
effectiveness upon the reliability of C 3 must be taken into consideration when concluding and implementing treaties on the reduction of strategic weapons.
This can be best demonstrated by the example of sea- based components of the nuclear
triad. According to START II, this component could have become very important in
the Russian SNF after 2003, but it is no secret that today the survivability of the SSBNs'
C 3 system is low. Land-based extremely low frequency (ELF) transmitters, which are
practically the only means for communicating orders to deeply submerged submarines,
are relatively vulnerable not only to nuclear, but to conventional, weapons as well. This
situation is a result of the Soviet Union's (and Russia's) one-sided preference for th.eLOW concept. Had START II been implemented, it would have been necessary to
undertake drastic measures to strengthen the reliability of SSBN C 3 systems, in coor·
dination with the tempo of reductions in strategic weapons. If this is not done, the
other side would acquire an opportunity to "disconnect" the main Russian means for a
retaliatory strike, and this would become a powerful destabilizing factor. By compa:rison, the United States has a sufficiently powerful and reliable C 3 system for its seabased nuclear forces, which includes a global network of land-based transmitters, a
group of Take Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) airborne relay transmitters,
communication satellites. Such a degree of attention to C 3 for SSBN s adequately
fleets American ideas about the importance ofSSBNs as the main means of
The mutual relationship between weapons and command and control can be
in other components of the triad. Thus, the destabilizing character of silo-based I
with multiple, independently targeted re-entry vehicles (MIRVs) is further
by the fact that in Russia these weapon systems have the best and fastest 0
An order from the center can be transmitted to such missiles in less than a rnintite.
the same time, the C 3 system for the mobile ICBMs of the SRF has quite a few
lems although it is more reliable than that of the SSBNs. Since land-based
ICBMs will play an important role in providing for a retaliatory strike, their C
should also be improved.
As for strategic bombers, the task of reliably transmitting orders to them
quite complicated, especially when they are far away from land-based UHF

Why Should CI be Taken into Account? 139

ters and under conditions of high interference. Given Russia's current economic difficulties, one cannot expect radical improvements in this respect. Therefore, precisely
because of C 3 problems, the airborne component of the triad has a rather destabilizing
character, and it would be quite logical to eliminate it, changing the posture to a nuclear
In general, the stabilizing influence of a C 3 system is manifested in the following
way: The more reliable a 0 system is, the more weight it carries of the total nuclear
potential that survives a first-strike attack, and thus can be used for a retaliatory strike.
There is an economically rational prospect of developing the 0 system in such a way
as to allow the surviving strategic forces to approach 100 percent reliability, and thus
create conditions for deep reductions in SNF. In this regard, it is worthwhile to pay
attention to the idea of mutual limitations on further development and production of
the means for disrupting C 3 systems.
The Russian and American experiences show that expenditures for C 3 l and nuclear
:weapons as such are in the same category. This becomes quite evident if one takes into
consideration the needs for research and development financing, testing, mass production and multi-year operation and maintenance of all elements of a C 3 system: a
groupofland-based (stationary and mobile) command facilities, and airborne and other
(rail-based, sea-based) types of command facilities at all levels; automated command
and control systems; networks of cable, radio, satellite, radio-relay, tropospheric and
Ciltht::rtypes of communications, etc.; not to mention the expenditures for the staff of
these facilities . During some periods of the Cold War, the United States and Soviet
Union spent about 15 to 20 percent of all their nuclear forces' budgets on C 3 systems.
~ e more in Chapter 4.) So, the economic aspect of the C 3 I problem is also quite
tmpor ant.

Two questions are in order here. First, if two concepts- LOW and LUA - coexist
~y, at:~d complement each other strategically, is it possible to save money through an
opttmalredistribution of expenditures between them within the framework of or as a
whole? S.econd , IS· It· possi'b le to reduce general expenditures on nuclear deterrence by a
more ratlol1 a1 d Istn
· ·b UtiOn
· of allocatiOnS
to the weapons themselves and their C 3 sys? Yakevlev, then SRF's commander in chief, addressed this issue in 1998 :

"8ut dee [Russia] n d h
· the members of the nuclear
ee sue a num b er of warheads If

c u • U0tcounting th U ·t d s
e m e tates, and Russia ] have about 1 ,000 warheads beeen ltem) Can th
e government provide such funding today? And what would
th e 1undm
· ·
'b . g pnonty: the warheads or C 3 system s? What would make greater
utton to combat effectiveness?" 3s

until now most t. t
f fr .
es Irna es o e 1ect1veness have been performed sepa an or C3I b h . h
- ot m t e Soviet Union and Russia, and, to the best of



I fJ1: Nucteal' Command, Conll'ol, Coope/'alion

my knowledge, in the United States. Moreover, estimates of C 3 systems proper are
performed either within the framework of LOW without any reference to LUA, or
conversely, for LUA without any reference to LOW. This results in excessively high
expenditures. Today, there are generally accepted indices and criteria taking into account the respective contributions of weapons and C 3 elements to the deterrence factor
in various scenarios of nuclear conflict. If such a common denominator can be found,
a better economy of resources for operation and development of C 3 I and nuclear forces
as a whole can be achieved.
I believe that the absence of open, convincing proof of the sufficient level of nuclear
deterrence and of the corresponding structure of the nuclear forces and their C 3 system
were the main reasons for Russia's multi-year procrastination over the ratification of
START II. The supporters of START II during all those years had no effective instrument that could help them overcome the resistance of pseudo-patriots, who simply used START II for their opportunistic political goals.
This problem is mentioned in an interesting book about Russian nuclear weapons,
but its author's logic seems to be a bit strange: "When signing all the international agreements on limitations and reductions of strategic offensive weapons, the C 3 systems always remained outside the framework of these agreements. Arms reductions do not
involve C 3 systems. The C 3 system is the cornerstone of combat ability of Russia's SNF." 36
According to this logic, since the C 3 system is the cornerstone of the SNF combat
ability, it should not be taken into consideration when estimating this same combat
ability for the purpose of arms reductions . But the opposite should be true. Until now,
C 3 was not taken into consideration because of the monstrously high levels of nuclear
arsenals and a lack of methodology for such estimates. The sides to the arms reductions process have not yet learned how to estimate together nuclear parity not on the
basis of a primitive equality of initial arsenals, but by forecasting results of a hypothetical conflict. One cannot leave the C 3 factor out when estimating the final outcome of a
nuclear exchange.
There is no doubt that the problems listed above, as well as other potential problems
related to nuclear C 3 , are serious. The issue is: how to reduce their negative impact on
strategic stability? The special character of this problem, resulting from the
nature of the nuclear threat, is that it can be solved only through the combined
of different nations, first of all the nuclear powers. It is necessary to agree on the
principles of conduct in this area, and establish certain rules to the game.
This requires a certain degree of openness on the issues of nuclear C 3 • Here is
key to solving all those problems listed earlier. During the Cold War one could
even think about such mutual confidence.
In 1968, Lev Mendelevich, a prominent Soviet diplomat, said:
"We know so much about how you make decisions. Americans are talking about
this and writing about this all the time. It is more than we can swallow. But you

Why Should fJ1 be Taken into Account? 141

know little of how we make decisions and we are not going to tell you. Because we
do know, we have some chance of influencing your decisions. Because you don't
know, your chances of influencing ours are limited and we intend to keep it that
way., 37

This is a classic example of the Soviet official thinking of the time. But it is no longer
1968, and the nuclear powers have made a number of significant steps toward each
other. The next important step should be in C 3 .
In order to have a degree of openness in this field, one needs firm guarantees that no
irreversible damage to national security will be done. Official and unofficial experts
should focus all their efforts on the search for such guarantees.
It appears rational to begin with combined preparatory research whose goals will be
(a) to prove whether cooperation in C 3 is beneficial to the nuclear powers, and (b) to
prove, theoretically, that national security can be guaranteed with a certain level of openness in the area of strategic C 3 .
Before describing a possible methodological approach to the analysis of these two
problems it makes sense to consider the achievement of experts from different countries in solving this problem during the nuclear era.

Cha ter 2
The State of Scholarhsip


General Review

Ever since the dawn of the nuclear confrontation, many experts have been intrigued
by: the influence of command and control on the assessment of the effectiveness of
nuclear forces, mutual deterrence, strategic stability, etc. The bulk of non-classified
work on the matter has been published in the West, predominantly in the United States.
Issues discussed in this book have been dealt with in the works of Raymond L.
Garth0ff, Scott D. Sagan, Richard L. Garwin, Desmond Ball, Peter Douglas Feaver
and Riciliard Ned Lebow, Paul Bracken, Frank von Hippel, Harold Feiveson, Daniel F.
Ford, Thomas C. Reed, Peter V. Pry, John Erickson, Daniel Goure, Sherman Frankel
and G. Jacabs. Scholars from the Brookings Institution- Bruce G. Blair, John D .
· bruner, Charles A Zraket, Ashton B. Carter and Richard K. Betts- have made a
major c0ntribution to the theory of nuclear command and control within the framework of global secur"1ty.
ue to weU -known reasons, there were no unclassified publications on C 3 in the
· Union during the Cold War. All the research was classified and only for "inter." i.e. only within the framework of the specialized institutions inside the miliindustrial complex. The Soviet C 3 community, however, showed great interest in
~lnldatior1s ef some popular Western sources. Two of the works that were transussian are worth mentioning here: Analysis for Military Decisions- a collecl:..ll!l~ur""' delivered by the leading experts of the RAND Corporation for the
of the US. Defense Department and American private industry, edited
published in the Soviet Union in 1969 and Ford's book The Button the
eanSJatt'oI[\ 0f which was published in the l;te 1970s.
or another • problems related to nuclear command and control were menunclassified writings of Soviet and Russian scholars but no research
on _the sp.ecific topic discussed here. Unclassified publications on
So~let Uruon only in the late 1980s. For example, it is worth men~I:Dal:erials published by the Kometa, a central research and production
under the leade ~sh'1P ofA nato 1'1 I. Savm,
. and a senes
. of articles
qsc::ow· lnshtute of the World Economics and International
Academ.y of S .
Al .
Clence exe1 G. Arbatov, G. D . Lednev and
Wrote, Otsenka G
· · (A
arantn ssessment of the Guarantee) pubtate Institute of 1n t ernatwna
· 1 Relatwns,
may be recomJ



The State of Schotal'ship 145

I 17: Nucteal' command, Contl'ol, coopel'ation

. source dedicated totally to the impact of command and
mended as another Russlan .
1 £ es Russian experts have examh f£ tlveness o nuc ear ore .
control syste~s upon t e e ec
d d control in a number of publications. *(See
ined severallssues of nuclear comman an
Appendix 1).
thers emphasize that the correct
d wor s as we as o
. .
f h
The maJonty o t e men wnef
1 ,f
l·s practically impossible without conf h f£ t'
ess 0 nuc ear orces
assessment o t e e ec. lVen
f th most definitive studies of the subject,
'd . C3 Thus Blatr the aut oro one o
s1 enng. C·
•d d ' Control· Redefining the Nuc 1ear Th rea t , says.·
Strateg1c amman an
. ..
tions that underlie much strategic enumeration, particu"The ~ey hmttm:. ass::weapons system characteristics are the key determinants
larly t e assump wn
n a cursor examination and footnote ... Comof strategic strength, reqmre more tha .
t t factor but the key determand performance is quite possibly not JUSt an tmpor an
minant of real strategic capab t'l'tty. " ·38



l . . mmand and control considered by Ameri-

Th array of quest.J.ons regafrdmg nuc ealal ~do ologl·cal often philosophical, aspects of

b ·oad - TOm gener L e . . '
. .
can experts 1s very 1
t d tailed descriptions of pecthc tecb.nuclear confrontation and mutualh eter~enlce oth:ds of assessing the impact of CJ to
. 1 systen
x ax~d
• means·· from t eoret.tca me
practical proposals for its further__ d:ve!~;,~m~,~~off,~o Goure.~t ] . Hemsley,"2 t phen
American authors, uch as Euc so '
. t s · vely on the ovie (later Rus·
4:l J
bs H Blair4s and others have wntten ex en l

Zal oga, aco •
· ·

sian) 3 system and as a whole have a high opmwn o . Jts po e
. h W
kes some contenhous judgments about
, 'The conventional wtsdom m t e est rna
. .. .
It h lds that effecthe institutional structure and style o~ Soviet ~eapondabcqmsttw~. 1 c:ntralized pro. h S . U . n ts handtcappe y excesstve y
hve procurement m t e ovtet . m~. . b
It holds that the Soviet apcedures implemented by an ummagt~atlve ureaucracy.
. s stems (by U S
proach to weapons design' ts conserv~tlve and ~~uces low~:u~:~e?s are ill advised
standards) These are dubious assertwn~ an . e~tern p~ Sy ui ment. Where it
to accept them. Most Soviet systems are not mfenor to
eq p
11 as and
matters- on the battlefield-- they can be expecte~ to perform a: le1ast al~twe w~uld

t 1 ot techmca qua 1 Y· ...
h'l ?" 46
better than U S. hardware.. .. Th IS ts tac tea n
pro bably
t b worthw I e.
more respectful attenbon to the Soviet system andt ts sty e no e


Ball state$' 'it would probably not be possible to is~la:e the_Sovietfl w 11 47
· the Sov1et mtelhgence 0 ·
from the strateglc forces or comp1etely tmpalr
with such assessments' m mind, former secretary of the~ aV)I J .magine~ •48
stated,' 'the Soviets have the best command-and- contro one can 1

There are also opposite op'm'w ns of Russian C 3. Some American experts emphasize
inferior1ty of certam technical aspects, insufficient development of satellite communicatwn system~ conceptual inflexibility and the highest degree of centralization. The
latter may be viewed as both an asset and a fault; and it will be discussed later.
As for American C 3, it '1s described in sufficient detail in the work of Blair, Bracken,
Ford Pry, Lebow and Sagan.49 The works by Ball and Reed can be recommended for
their familiarization w·1th the princ1ples and practices of U.S. C 3 planning (the single
integrated operational plan). 5° For learning about American means of negative control
(PAL} studies by Peter Feaver, Peter Stein, Donald Cotter and Dan Caldwell are helpful Y As a whole, the mentioned experts favorably estimate the capability of U.S. C 3 for
reliable nuclear deterrence They emphasize its flexibility in a great variety of potential
scenaiw& '1ts high technical level- primarily in computer technology and satellite commuri1cation systems- and sufficient civilian control of its operation and modernization.
Along vi1th pos'16ve assessments of American C 3, certain doubts of its effectiveness
and reliability are voiced. A number of experts criticize it for higher-than-necessary
decentralization. Others express serious concerns about its vulnerability. In 1982,
James P Wade, the pr'mc'1ple deputy under secretary of defense for research and engineering and the individual most responsible for planning U.S. strategic command moderni2ation during the early 1980s said, "A very key uncertainty in the deterrent equation is the ability of our C 3 (command, control, and communication) system to survive
a Soviet first strike, and thereafter be able to get the necessary messages out to our
forces to respond, to retaliate. That is an imponderable, but it is something we are very
worried about." 52 Generally speaking, the gap between the opinions of American experts regarding national 0 is considerable - from very high to clearly pessimistic ones.
Indirectly, this gap points to the fact that, as of this point in time, the United States (as
Uas Russia) does not possess a clearly-defined, widely-recognized tool for assessing
effectiveness of nuclear command and control.
In the United States, a lot of attention is paid to discussion of various concepts of
aazclear weapons employment, which, in reality, means principles of command and
Comm.on criticism by many experts of the Russian and U.S. LOW strategy,
"hair trigger," should be noted: "Serious study of various options for lowthe readiness of nuclear forces and creating an international taboo against hairnuclear postures should be undertaken." 53 The majority of experts are in favor
LUA., or "delayed retaliation," concept as the officially recognized one.
• Blair, Betts and Garwin made the most important contributions in anaproblem. s4

C:Onceming purely theoretical work in this area, American and other Western
a number of approaches to objective assessment of strategic stabilerrence and analysis of the impact of C 3. Of note are the works of Elisabeth
tn ~n~P. S. Fishbeck, Steinbruner, Carter, Lebow, Bracken, Betts, Blair
a TJ published in the collections edited by Quade. 55 The approaches


1 IJI: Nuclear Command, ContPo/, CoopePation
The State or ScholaPship 147

they suggest are based on game theory, on the Bayesian updating of the probability of
nuclear attack, and even on common sense:

"Yet another alternative was to assume the emerging situation to be wholly novel,
forget the past, return to first principles and attempt to build up a new theory appropriate to the new age .... The exemplary formal strategist was Thomas Schelling,
with Morton Kaplan, Glenn Snyder, Daniel Ellsberg, Malcolm Hoag and Oskar
Morgenstern also having a right to inclusion. The ·exemplar methodology for the
formal strategies was provided by game theory ... One alternative was to rely on
common sense - the sum of personal understanding of human nature and more
immediate political circumstances - to develop judgments on how reasonably sensible and responsible national leaders might act under various scenarios. " 56

It is probab~~ not an accide~t that in 1983, U.S. Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger
observed that although survivable and enduring command cont 1 d

ro an commumcations systems are decisive for deterrence and would be a critical force capab 'l't h ld
.c '1
. .
1 I y s ou
deterrence 1ai , c~rtena used in analysis have nonetheless been blind to command and
control systems. 59
It seems that as a whole the research activity on nuclear deterrence strat · t b'l
egiC s a 1 etc., mclu
g problems of nuclear command and control, has somewhat decreased
in tb .last sevet:~ years both in Ru sia and the United States. The Russian expert K.E. note : Th et of arguments .o n both sides has practically not changed in all
this time; th conceptual level of the discussions remained the same , and th eo b'~ect'rvity of some experts defending absolut advantages ofiCBMs and SSBN
s causes more
and mor doubts. 60
And then:



All those approaches are subjects for discussion as research tools for finding simple,
reliable and truthful methods. However, the attitude of U.S. and other Western experts to the attempts of a purely theoretical resolution of the "nuclear puzzle" has until
now remained skeptical.
Thus, Lawrence Freedman points out major difficulties in theory development in
this field. He notes that the different indexes for assessment of nuclear balance which
were used (delivery vehicles and warheads, 'equivalent megatonage' and lethality, etc.)
and also the theory's problems (it is necessary to take into account a lot of factorstarget structure, defects, reliability, tactics, accuracy, yield, as well as 'the lack of evi·
dence,' or market research) used to justify the stress on perception. He adds:

"Little could be known about the likely responses of human beings to any of the
situations that they were liable to find themselves in during nuclear war - either in
deciding whether to launch a nuclear attack, or in implementing this decision, or in
anticipating and suffering the results . .. . There were unavoidable uncertainties over
whether it was reasonable to expect a nuclear war to have its own conventions and
ground rules of the sort evident in the warfare of the past. One possibility mooted
was the mutual avoidance of cities. On the other hand a nuclear exchange might be
unremitting and indiscriminate. With each side able to choose from a variety of
strategies there were many possible scenarios and this added further compl ications
to military planning." 57

Freedman also quotes Sir Solly Zuckerman from Omar Bradley's This Way Lies
(1949): "It is based upon assumptions about human behavior which seem .
real. It neither constitutes scientific analysis not scientific theorizing, but 5 .
science of untestable speculations about Western and Soviet block behavior ..


"At first glance such stagnation is observed not only in our country. Thus, American research publications practically do not contain any of the nuclear sophisticated
research that showed up regularly in the 1970-80s. But there is a crucial difference.
If ~ere we argue about important but not the major issues, abroad they have been to ca~efully search for a nuclear algorithm of a new multipolar, post-confrontatiOnal penod, to analyze - for now only in the first approximation_ those characteristics that may radically change both separate components of a traditional nuclear
b~lance .and the nuclear equation as a whole. Is it not possible that early in the next
millenmum we will be confronted not only with a dated and worn out nuclear arse~ .but also with a major delay in our understanding of the basics of the changed
military nuclear situation?" 61

Even if the conclu ·

· d
sron a out a certam ecrease m nuclear research is correct it does
"-A mean t at the ·
f h
• nucl
Impor ance 0 t e problems IS any less or that the dangers associated
ear command d
t 1h
• ditec~ .
. an con ro ave Isappeared. Therefore, initiating a search in
·~on Is crucial.
nfertuoately in
by tw R , . so~e cases the results of certain analyses take us too far. An ar62
ussran officers, published in Military Thought in 199 5, serves as a good
we can only w 1
d .
hard! ace
. e come e au acity of therr approach and broad knowledge
f~rst tl y ept their proposed scheme of the "world order."
' 1e authors note
' quite correctly, the challenges in quantitative assessment
and n 1
uc ear deterrence Yi t th
provided b
. . e . ey rna e a met odologrcal error: "sufficiency
"It is n t Y.a certam quantity. What is this quantity equal to?" And on the
o quite clear how t 0 l l
~ed on th
. .
ca cu ate t e nee ed number of strategic nuclear
e Pnncrple f d £
ff' ·
•ICIVe for a
o e ense su rcrency. How many attack weapons
successful defense?"63





The State ol Scholal'shfp 148

1 C': Nucleal' Command, ContJtol, Coopel'afion

The error is that they are looking for a quantity of weapons, not for the probability of
succesful retaliation. Without this, it is, indeed, "unclear how to calculate ..." Further:
"[The SNF's] only sensible role is in deterrence. The possession by a state of a certain
number of strategic nuclear weapons should make the aggression against it inadmissible as such." 64
The "only role" concept is true. But what does "certain" stand for? How and by
whom are those numbers established? It is not important for the authors, since in their
concept the aggression against a nuclear state is "inadmissible as such." In reality, this
is a rejection of objective bases for reasonable minimums of nuclear weapons and a
verdict against the methodologies for assessment of unacceptable damage. "With all
seeming attractiveness of assessing stability based on the inevitability of the aggressor
receiving unacceptable damage in a retaliatory strike, the impossibility to formalize
this unacceptable damage makes the use of this method difficult."
After such a conclusion, the authors go down the slippery slope idea of a world order
supported by a group of elite nuclear states - to be more precise, Russia and the United
States - also known as elitist utilitarianism. They say, "Aurelio Peccei, the founder of
the Club of Rome, noticed that 'the well-being of all the world is a necessary condition
for the well-being of its separate parts while the reverse is not at all obvious and should
be checked in each specific case.' This statement seems reasonable and fair and proves
the superiority of the utilitarian approach. " 66
True, the authors recognize "inefficiency" of a dictatorship, quoting from Pierre
Corneille: "He who can do everything he wishes for - wishes for more than he hould
wish." Therefore, they name a system "with one subject or a group of subjects with
similar goals," a dictatorial system. The authors do not explain what "goals" mean but
assume that ''power potential should correspond to the level of societal maturity.
the imbalance between technical and social development may be quickly removed
speeding up societal development." 67
We may leave the moral and political aspect of such a scheme for the ''world
and the idea of quick ''leveling'' of social development inside the "elite'' to th~
science of the authors. In the context of this chapter, we are only interested tn
absence of any approach to quantitative assessment of nuclear deterrence. lnstea~.
article recommends a well-known "qualitative" prescription: " ... preserving equalaty
Russian and American potential at the levels providing for the possibility of a
eral decision on the fate of civilization; inclusion of other nuclear states in the
tion process on strategic weapons of other nuclear states; developing the measures

preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons."

This is, certainly, a personal opinion of two officers. Yet it was published lU an
cial military journal and is probably shared by some Russian experts. As is we~l
a number of major political and military leaders of various countries also think•
. that powerful nuclear arsena1s WI'11 h ave to b e prese rved. fereda
without any basis,
time yet. N onetheless, the search for reasonable minimums would be contanu

All of the above was only a list of authors and a summary of their main works. Hopefully, it will facilitate, especially for the Russian readers, the search for sources required
for in-depth work in this field. We will later come back to the works of mentioned and
other experts. In this chapter, however, it would be useful to review in greater detail
those sources that, in the author's opinion, are most valid for understanding his own
conclusions and suggestions .


Bruce G. Blair

One of the major studies of the influence of C 3 on strategic stability is Blair's The

Logic of Accidental Nuclear War. 69
The author's conclusions and recommendations are based on a significant amount
of material collected and analyzed by a large group of American experts over several
years. Considerable attention is paid to the historical analysis of nuclear security, including the alarming days of the Cuban missile crisis and the attempted coup in the
Soviet Union in August 1991. The American nuclear command and control system is
compared to its Soviet counterpart, and the book provides a large amount of information about these systems including dynamics of their development, principles of plansing, composition and structure, exercises with nuclear weapons, and other data. A
suggestion is made regarding a possible model for assessing the impact of early warning upon strategic stability. Many practical suggestions regarding the resolution of
existing problems are reviewed.
The main thrust of the book studies accidental nuclear war. As in all analyses performed through the prism of command and control system, problems of positive and
negative control are closely interrelated in this discussion. The author emphasizes the
necessity of strengthening negative control:
"The proposals require a sharp reorientation of the axes of security policies, with
the emphasis tilting further away from the traditional preoccupation with calcula~d aggression and closer to the strengthening of safeguards against major sources
ofmadvertent conflict. Such rotation acknowledges that the deterrence of premeditated attack has been firmly established and that the primary threat of war arises
&om lapses of strict operational control over nuclear weapons." 70

~t ran~ of organizational and technical suggestions for improving negative conound In the b oo k . 0 ne can practica
. 11y agree with all of them. At a minimum
.a profound study, Here we enumerate only a few of them since they wili
In .g~eater detail in following chapters.
· msta
ll atwn
. of rehable
all Plnton
' the top reqmrement
and easily-operated
....-.... . .
e part1es need to exchange information on the status
--....cttve Invento nes
. an d esta bl IS
' h ed standards with
. wh1ch
. to evaluate the


I fJI: /Vue/ear Command, Control, Cooperation
The State or Scholarship 151

d Weapons that do fail to meet their requieffectiveness of existing techmcal sa eguar sb .
diately inactivated (taken off alert)
site standards would, by mutual agree_ment, e rmme
and slated for eventual destru~twn. f d 1 . t . uclear responsibili6es from poliircal
Blair 'rs skeptical about the rdea ~ ~ Nega mg n mr'lr'tary nodes possess all the au.
leadershp to executive mr 1 ary undr d.
. 1 ment nuclear war plans ... " n He also
. ·
bling codes nee e to rmp e
1 vestigial -inconsrstency etween t e
t f rl to notice a un amen a~
. h.
nef canno
t'JOn al political context 'm whrc rt operh U S a tern and t h e mterna
autonomy oh t e
sysy be less .clOr t h e Russran
. system because of'rts high degree of
ates.... . Sue. concern
b ut the Soviet command. and
' •n Th author; however; JO es a o
h control
centrahzatwn .
d h d £ e minister have the ng t to order
h the presrdent an t e e ens
system .. . a oug R . mrhtary
1ead ers h ave the technical abllrty to carry t em
nuclear launche& top ussran
Bl . th'
chanism dates back to the Cold War
rding to arr; IS me
b h ·d
out." '" On ot sr e& acco
d modified as appropirate' •;s
b ' t d t 0 presrdentra scru my an
and should eb su
of Rus·
operatiOn to Improve

The author e reves 0m co
A th idea 'rs to install a certam combinano er
t f, r earl y warnmg
srarr Amencan. cen
1 . f
d nd vrsua1 sensors Ire
fron of
m rare a
to ensure mutual confidence that
can simultaneousy send signals to warnmg cen ers,


' 11

"Retaliation after rid -out wa an abstract idea in th theory of stabiuty but not a
viabl option in the real world. As a practical matter, the susceptibility of command
systems to disruption, th mutua l vulnerability of each sid ' si lo-based force , and
the commitment to strategic weapons targeting created a strong bias on both sides
for ·tremely rapid reaction to evidence of impending attack - in effect a faun han -warning posture for both sid s."'9





the missiles remam·m their silos.
. t now·" The political revolutionin
. . f
re openness m
t an exrs s
Blair rs m avor
· U ·
h create senous pro
b. t · to the public domain for
the former Sovret mo~ as
it has also brought prevrously ta oo su Jec s m
natiOn. •v6
t e control as a wholeis discussed .
If the goal ofmcreasmg effectiveness o nega rvt dare qu'rte specifrc, the problem
. . th b k and the measures sugges e
great clanty m 1. e oo , ted as a camp l'reate d an d ambivalent one. Concepts o
posrtrve contro rs presen
f military actronl) the concept
s possr e scenanos o
weapon , the composrtron and characteristics of the
ployment of nuc
all of thesE; according to the book, are
age and .related
and therr
c d
h . 1 but also philosophical significance
only with orgamzational an tee mea oth sides adhere'm general to LOW ''~on"""'
The author notes that as of toda)l b .
. bl
d thus to be the lesser of
t . t seems to be mevrta e, an
the flaws oft rs concep , I
. t th acute disadvantages o
, 'Launch on warrimg owed 'rts de fa.cto a optron ho et
es of preemptiOn and
natrves. It represente a co
d echnical drawback& " 77


afron after ride-aut that skirted therr ~ohtrcal an t t efforts to rev'rve it) 'rs a .
Indeed a pre-emptive
st n'ke (desprte some curren'l'
. t of vrew: " ... the
. 'ble
anachronism; nor does rt rna e an
ld have had a negligs
. d th at su ccessful preemption
ets surely recogmze
. wou . 'm response to .
should the United States have launc~ed on tacticahl wahrnmdg Blair considers
. '1 e sa1vo " tR On
dicatwns of a Soviet mrssr
. .the ot er an ,
aftern'd e-ou t , or LUA • to be also unreahstrc:

The absence of definite conclusion regarding the employment of nuclear weapon
constitut san asset, and not a flaw of Blair's book. The author demon trated the true
essence of thi problem. He cannot bring himself to wholeheartedly embrace either of
the concepts - L W or L A. It seem that the main rea on for thi uncertainty is that
the bipolar (or if yotl want tri-polar, i:f we include the pre-emptive strike) theory i a
dead eJld. Blair's book is a vivid illustration of this fact. H pre ents a very convincing
argument that the three types of strikes follow one another in quick succession: " ... the
difference in releas timing among all tlu-ee was measur din minutes." 80 'eparating
these tJu·ee types of trikes and controlling these choices is a challenging task. The
command and conh'ol sy tern functioning according to L W may unnoticeably slip
into pre-emptive trike without provocation, or from LOW to LUA, etc.

The attthor is very awa re of the dang rs of "hair triggers'' and suggests as ries of
measures to help mutual reduction of day-to-day nuclear combat readines , including
commaAd and control systems. He continue along the ame lines in his sub equ nt
rks, including Global Ze1·o Alert for Nttclea?· Forces .
I generally agree with this trend since it will allow for the creation of a time barrier
the way to nuclear accidents. houJd relation between Russia and th nited States
~ftm again after de-alerting m asures are introduced, th considerable tim interval
allew "hot heads" to cool off. till, the em asures ar only able to slow down, not
ll'll11PieteJy exclude the return to a "hair trigger." And if this happens, the problem of
nuclear weapons would return. Tl1u , the path suggested by Blair should
be supplem nted by reliable and comprehensible proof, a theoretical confirin case of deterioration of the relati.onship , getting back "to the barrier"

"'''"""'~':;es a · heoretical vacuum in thi

area that exi t at present time: "What
catastrophic failu,e of nucl...,- command and control particularly c{; turbing is
estunate of the risk exists. Little more than the rough ou clines of th
A whole new kit bag of theories, tool of anaJy is, and data base


of nuclear dete ·
nenc ss a gener foundation of all the approaches to the
stability. Blai,, how ver, while defend; ng the idea of" zero ale,t,"

rat~~~al'd dete~rence perspective i

more a hindrance than a help bean negative control is its main concern."Hz One hopes that Blair
mg the asses ment of positive control, but ra her is wary that it



1 f!: Nucls8J' Command, Control, Coopsl'ation

would shadow the more important problem of negative control. I feel that this i confirmed by Blair's words in the beginning of the book: " uclear deterrence remains a
precept of both sides' security." 53
As of now, a considerable level of trust has been achieved in relation to nuclear weapons themselves. How ver, the situation with command and control systems is, according to lair, very different: ''The 'oviet system wa particularly shrouded in secrecy. Although the successor system i now more acce sible to examination it still
remains opaque to outside view." 84 The goaL of overcoming this barrier is a logical step
on the way to well-justified nuclear sufficiency. Blair's work will play a major role in
the resolution of th.i problem. ne may even describe it as a breakthrough.
Indeed, the volume of information on the Russian ( oviet) command and control
system contained in Blair's book and the degree of its openness are without precedent.
There are many facts regarding the main subsystems of command and control of the
political leadership General taff, · F's commanders in chief, Air Force and avy:
real names of systems maio functions and principles of mployment, advantages and
disadvantages. The location of central command posts, including deep und rground
bunkers of the supreme high command, is researcl1ed thoroughly. Unique procedures
for obtaining sanction , decision-making, developing and transmitting launch orders
are revealed. afety systems against unsanctioned use of weapons at aU levels of command and control are also analyzed. For obviou reasons, the mentioned data are not
complete and sometimes contradictory so that the book cannot be used as an "official
reference book" on Russian command and control. Ievertheless, as of this moment,
this work is almost the only open source on many issues of ussian nuclear command
and control that so far have remained officially classified.
I believe that this degree of opennes i necessary and sometimes even unavoidable
for any serious study on nuclear security. Together with his colleagues, the author used
interviews with hundreds of experts ranging from marshals, members of the Russian
Academy of ciences, and general designers, to rank-ru1d -file people, active duty and
retired military officers of missi.le forces, submarine units and strategic bombers. It is
impossible, and makes no sense, to try and keep "the genie in the bottle," for tl1en no
·esearch will be possible.
Having studied thi book in depth, the reader overcome the shock of surprise and
becomes thoroughly convinced that opening this richness of "super secret" data d
not diminish security guarantee for both parties. In spite of the fact that the data is
now openly published (and for the United tates tl1is had been done a long time ago~
there is no damage done. 1any variable parameters of the command and control
terns cannot be revealed in principle; these are current locat-ion of mobile
working rad io frequencies, times of communication sessions, etc., since they a1·e
lated by the opponent only with the heJp of probabilities, which in itself
adherence to mutual deterrence.
Blair refers to tbi fact often: " ... (t}he United tates did not project a prompt

The State ot SC/tolaPship / 58
threat to the d
eepest So · b
.. VIet unkers;"ss "[']t
cations from
a survivmg b k
I was unlik 1 h
additiOnal redund
un er would have b
e y, owever, that all
ancy establi h d
een Perman 1
communicon I ence in the effe t'
s e dunng a crisis
ent y suppressed. "86 "
ma~d system;"87 "[b]~:~e~ess ofstrikes against the ~o~ld certainly have h;ered vhe

details as plans for delegat:~des hahve ~lso kept each ot~:: leade~ship and military co~~·
As a wh 1 .
g aut onty t
guessmg ab
terns, the h~~·e:\~ppears. that the greaterot~~~loy nuclear weapons, "B~~!csuch critical
tive d
e confidence in .
penness of com
Its effectiveness from th
mand and control sysan negative control Th
problems of negative co t. 1 us, only after encount .
e standpoint of both p .
n ro h
enng m
OSIems, t e author states w'th av~ .een resolved in So .
any examples of how th
I conviction:
VIet command and
control sys"In my estimation

' eregime f . .
system's adaptive capacit
o e~Istmg safeguards, combi
dure acute domestic tur:· .;hould Inspire confidence in th ned With the command
to date and to conta· h OI probably on a scale far
~system's ability to enIn t e effe t
command and through
h c. s o aberrant behavior . h. anyt mg witnessed
out t e life of the nuclear w
Wit m the nuclear chain of
eapons. " 89
Blair's book is a b0 ld



an .fear. This is its greate mpt to ~reak through the



eratiOn among C3
st contnbution to th
g ~Illte wall of misund
experts S dl
e establish
'VIet/Russian system b
a . y, such an effort Was d ment of international c
a source of certain g~psyan;encan experts and not by~~ ~r~ken.' in relation to theo~;_­
meal1~ detract from the b k~mall errors. These have ei~ ~S.Sian colleagues. Thi .
Blair's Work is cl
.oo s general value.
no Significant impact a d b sIS
can and R .
ear evidence to the
n y no
USSian C3 ex
necessity of in


:;;g~::~esearch. I thi~~r:~a~:~h:n ;fficiallevels a~~e::~~:~~ta~ts between Amerim strengthening nuclear


Daniel f. fo

u s.uch cooperation it will b eh ramework of indesecunty a d
e ard to h ·
n strategic stab .1.
ac Ieve more
I I ty.

Ford' b
• rlf
s ook 7h
an exam 1 ' e Button . The P.
llld co p e of the openness. wi
e~tagon Strategic Comm
Tb. ntrol system.
th which one is allowed t t lkand and Control System 90 .
lS Work
o a about a
' Is
of the G
Was of great int
national command
enera] St ff
erest to Soviet '1·
"'..itegic St . a ' Gen. Makhmo
mi Itary leaders. In 19
~ation o~~~esbof the General Sta~; ~arey~v, asked the Center!~' ~he de~uty chief
"""~ter, Ill d
e ook - mad fc
o review this book Wi
. peratJonal and
a e a lot f
e or a very sm 11
e studied th R
caJled th ·b o notes in the t t
a number of offici 1 h
e ussian
of the be oak "very intere t ~x ' wrote a brief review and a s ~ t at arrived in the
ook again.
s mg, worth studying carefull g~ve It back to Gareyev.
y, but I never saw th'Is



I fJ1: Nuclesl' Commsnd.' Control, Coopel'atlon

. e~ p rts. f We
. on aU of fthe
de a strong impresston
10 the te
the unprecedented volume o ess of information. We
ere impressed not only wl.'tb but al o by th degree .of opennll' ce 'tssue and
" 1 d" ear 1er,
th rea - w
that had been c ose ·h book - informal, de· mg w1 d aw this conclusion rom .
f, und the style oft e
aJ '
We were able to r
1 tern because tlley
a"' o
very appe mg.
d and conb·o sys
ized by gentle humfor:d to talk about their commauf'd nt that the Soviets would neks"
. una ra1
. t h ey at. con 1 e
gth That IS,
ber of sy tem "b ttlenec
·ts tren
. a great num
are totaJiy sure o f lk.
'ts reliability,
take a risk of chec ~~~ ~- d by the author.
that were severely cnbCJze

Jndeed, Ford,s work ma .


. tes ' it would
'sown esttma
. and the Pentagon
all's analysiS
. . U command an d con .
)Ons to dlsa e
th targets o f suco1.
fiftv SovJet w al
d tl Pentagon,
takd wenaan ' '
Wh 't Hou,. an ><
d enter, an
ddition to the
I Military omman
d th Alternate ! atiOna
. b t s venty-five miles
trol system. fnl a
d .II1clu e: eR 'tchie 'tviaryland ' wh'ch
IS a ou
an attack wou
maha lebra ka,.
£ 'lity at •ort I
d uarters near
. Air ommand Hea q
k d le Air · orceBa em
. trategtc
t s at Bar s a
om Washmgton,
nd) Headquar er
r the Atlantic
· A .r c omma
. the 1leadquarter
the alternate [ trategtc
es in aliforma;
. th k y[Or
AT&T swltchf ch Air ,•ore
. Hawrur e e
Louisiana and I ar . .
d r . th Pacific Fle t, m
. .'
r. nsas; Hillsboro,
c lk v ·rgmla an LOI
b. k . FatrVtew, J' a
Fleet m ono . I
Lyons, le ras a, . .
il 't y commurucah as the ones m
. cnttcal m t ar


. to

esmon .

~peel t~at a~rd::,:~ese

Amenca~ · 2 ~0


C::i~~~:~ ~:



Theoretical 8111Jroaches

It is useful to compare opinions of certain American authors presented in the collection edited by QuadeW and in Bracken's book" regarding the theoretical explanation of
the role and place of a comfuand and control system in strengthening strategic 'tabil.
ity, with the opinions of Soviet experts in the 19 70s to 1990s.
The correlation between concepts, such as ,ufficiency of nuclear forces and prob.
ability of their employment, is an important idea in Quade's collection. In the United
State., at the time, the prevailing theory was massive retaliation, whose apologists ins;sted that the more horrible the threat, the more effective the deterrence. The critics
of this theory argued that effectiveness of deterrence depended on the probability of
the threat be;ng carried out. An interesting thought was introduced, Sometimes, the
l!Caie of the threat may dec;sively reduce the probability of it being carried out

nuclea~ ~


weighed by more t
mmand (
RA ); the
uch satellite systems as t R)
Aerospace efense . o
mmand posts at allleve s.. . s stem (MIL TA '·ono
. rules of successlOn; co R I 'atellite ommumcation y llite ommumcatJ
') Air Force ate
. Tactical and e ay
tary trategtc,
. tions ystem (
t I through the 1J .
ro transrrusSion
. . stat>ons,
fense ate "ute ommumca bmarine command and con
(Af AT! 0 I);
and ultra low frequency
d Wave Emergency
I .
inks (l ALs), th Groun
d ost(Looking
d love ut(TA
Permissive Achon L
d's airborne comrnan p
d misslle&,
Air Cornman
re erve syst m, the cket
ystem (ER ) system of comman
the Emergency Ro


Despite all the problems with the Russian C' system, the same is true for it as well.
The merit here belongs not just to both system, but also to the objects that they control
-· the national nuclear arsenals. Besides, "people have not yet learned how to deal with
" 92
the possible
fragility and ambiguities of these systems when they are under 'tress or


d bt the reliabil·t'ticism it wou b e possible to hou
doubts are ou
and other
North American
pages of detailed
dealing with


global military communication, network and many other things. The mechanism of
the system's operation is described for hypothetical seenarios. With such a broad and
technkally detailed analytical picture, the system's various faolt,, although quite seri.
ous, do not seem to have a decisive impact. The general impression is that the existing
has a stable "reliability zone" that needs to be periodically improved but cannot

Ford provides a very good comparison in his book "Without a command and control system to do all this, a nuclear arsenal would be no more useful than a fortune
locked away in a safety deposit box to which one had lost the

;ug centers - sue
alma do - that handle c<rtam . s· the very low frequency
I lissouri; and Lamar,.
c key U . . defen e satellite 'W -L=ngton, and on the
d stations ror
d J'
reek, a~u
(tions; the groun .
. C utler Mame, an un
U submanne ): and a
mtters tn
d rs to · ·
VLF) radlo trans!
al'. ( hich broadcast or e
To increase t e
· Austr 1a w
T d locabons.
1h orthwest ap m
me of wb;ch " ' in cia"" •e
. ,;tes used to detect
andful of other targets, so f .
the thirteen early warnmg
d con USIOn,
t • ?I
elemenl of surpns. a~l
ld also be obviou targe s.
. SOV!e
· t m1 ·s1le wou

ne would
ity of the

The State ot SC/Jolal'sh/p 155

Albert Wohlstetter, an American expert, is quoted in the mentioned book discussing
the Prospect that it w;jj be impo,,.ible, due to limited resources, to provide for a high
Probability of preserving all nuclear forces in case of an enemy's surprise attack. The
author's arguments ring true at first sight, yet they are self-contradictory and therefore
inttresting for the problem we are discussing. They deserve a more detailed comment

"Let us say, then, that we would Hke to presecve our strik;ng force. with very high
Conf;dence (at lea.t 90 chances out of 100). He [the enemy) would like to have a
ltigh Confidence (ot least 90 out of 100) of destroying all of our fStrategk Air Com·
-d) not f<rtain to be handled by his defen,.s. Now, suppose, we hove such a
ltigh·eonfid,nce mea.ure for a certa;n fraction of /Strategk Air Command]. and
then th;nk up another mea.u,. which gives us a so. 50 chance of preserving a ron.
"d"able addit;onaJ froct;on. It is clear that th;s adilit;onal measure does not fulfill


The State of Scholal'ship 57

56 \ t?: Nuclear command, control, cooperation

our fond•" dosi<"'· n the oth« hand, it should bo ob"rvod that it do<' preVoot
tho enemy fwm having a better than S0-50 chono< of "alizing his fondost d.,Uos.
lt makos a surprise attack a gamble and thmfor< "'" ar a d<tm<nt '"
o far it is logical' we would hke to have more. butthere i no such possibihty; how·
ever , "'"" a "fifty-fifty" deters the opponent A notable observation follows "O ne of
the ways we might decrease his [enemY s] confidence with respect to the success of
some particular attack strategy might be to increase the variability l emphasis added] ol
his result, even if we d o not affect the average outcoroe. T his would increase the risk
... "" of th e possible results for the risk
for Th hirn
th function
e dispersion
is is
taker, the lower his confidence T he author, however, tries to insure himself, and the
next part of his argument b rings up a numb ·of questions " ... but it also roeans that
since we have increased the variability, we hav also reduced our own confidence ...
Th relore our fondest desires ru:e not .atisfied. T hat is one rea on why we continue to
seek high -confidence measures for crucial goals where we do not already have them.
T hey cannot be replaced by low-confidence measures""'
The following questions arise> ){ow did he come to this conclusion? What is more
crucial here - our confid"" or the opponent's lack of confidence? What deters and
whom does it deter? And wbat pair of values - "our success versus hi' suceess" - is
,ufficient for reliable deterrence? 90o\O, 70o30 or 40>60? T he author does not provide
an ansWer to all these questions. Yet, not wishing to leave thern totally open, he fwishes
by saying that 'it is important to study systematically this less ambitious class of mea·
so res, especially where we are not able to find rneans of satisfying our roo« ambitious
W e...cannot
help but agree ln the earlY stages of the nuclear confrontation (this lee·
t ure had been presented in the I 950s) both sides adhered to th e principle of "the rn.or<,
the bett.,·.' ' Today, we are talking about the ,earch for r<£1SOTI<'blY sufficient !,.Is of
Or, to paraphra'" it, about forgetting the "more ambitious goals" and ,..


evaluating the significance of " low-conf idence measures."
T he book, justifiably, argues that
"This m'"n' that we have to do systems research forth< enemYas well as for our·
solves. To anticipate his strategy and choice of weapons we haVe to look at the prob·
\em from his poin of view. And while there are nato rally differenc" in the derail
with which we study hi' problem and our own, the logic of systems research w

quires ns to play both sides of the game." '

T hese statements should have led. inevitably, to the condu, ion about the

of joint
· research by the "due1"In " "d
feratwn.. Back then, h owevec gth' SI · es,
· taking the mtere,ts
ofb h
. ot parhes into comidrontabonal chamcter of 1' '. lS JOlllt <eseareh w" im
In his book B k
po Itlcal relations
' rae en studies h

vie:"' of the attacked side's
situatiOn and mak" fl . C

possible because of th

e con-

3 ow re~l~stic a protracted nu
capabilities ·101 H e JU'tly
mg e1nbl
a clear war IS from the pomt
the drastic changes in the 1
would be very
that evaluating the
ea ers tp' s structure after th Icuh t m th"ts case because of
e exc ange of st n"kes:



"I· argue that wartime condt"t"wns w"ll ·
1 1erent m£
gtme on the victim's com mand sy t1 Impose a radically d"f:c
s em. Because of th d
ormatiOn reweapons and vu1ne b"1"
e estruct"
ra 1 1ty of
tered mto separated . 1 d commumcation 1inkag
tveness of nuclear
IS an s of d"
es, a comm d .
nuclear attack E h
tsconnected fore
an wtll be shatb"
. ac sepa t d .
es once It .
rae lSiand then willfacettsownmd"
." ru
to heav y
ua1 assessment

The1author uses a cl ear matnx
f nuc
o d to demonstrate
t he IsolattOn
. of the ". 1 d ,
ear forces
for from their command
a protracted
· econclud h .
IS an s
war without havin
est _at makes no sense to
oo":'mand and control ro
avrulable in this
Only through
prehmmary amwcr to the
nuclear.exchanges be had .• envtronment can a reali,tic
as;essment information
The mterest in theoret" 1
o the controllability of


~al ~eans





the. Soviet
· Union/Russia Ica
th resea
. rch on protracted nuclea
subject concentrates onan m the United States. The
appears to be lower in
'"ue an order for the glo:;tenhal survival of at least oneJonty of Soviet ""arch on
of command anda retahatory strike and pre"rv
pr"t authorized



: : t can deliver thir
the minimal tech.
of : ;s considered sufficient
rotracted "controlled"
1 Ia e nuclear deterrence A
e remaming forces.
. ins noted
systeorne other approaches ofnucear
Am . war h ave been criticized
. earrter, the ideas
S ms should b
er>ean experts t
e menhoned here
. n assessment of com
..J h'er e problem of LOW was rev.. Thus,
e 'ources dmand
t' band control
tor wa e,
notably, the ue . 1CWe . The deci,ive role of ' a mg ack to the
of quantitative a"essment:f:s clmly emphatially h I aggressor to dete h" , ch a system could prod
e deterrence facr 1m. fro m attackmg.
uce enough uncertamty
"'-- . ave th"IS effect th
' e potenhal victi
ce any probabilit
ence on th unsuccessful retaliat
. m may allow, for exam I £ y may potenWe h e aggressor.
ory stnke and still preserv
p e, or a 20 percent
s ould h
e a strong d t .
tlted ab
' owever
t h
e ernng influ.II tti I ove never atte • no e t at w h en talking ab
h the con 'd
_mpts to evaluate the d t
out a possible LOW th
" erahon of both LO Wand eLUA
' way
e author
N factor in a more broad
th t
. evertheless , h.IS next conclu• stan


pote~;::enboned. Theoreti~l~b~~

~""" of


I CJ: Nuc/eal' Command, Contl'o~ CoopepatJon

on the role of C 3- is welcome: The vulnerability of the strategi command and control
system presents a much more important problem than the vulnerability of individual
types of weapons. He then tates that these questions deserve much more attention
than they have ever J:eceived.
Tn the oviet Union/Russia, con iderable attention has always been paid to assessing the effectiveness of weapon systems and scientific basi for their performance characteristics. At the same time, rational inter-relation between command and control
systems and nuclear arsenal has re eived little direct attention, although a number of
problems leading to a resolution of this larger problem have been studied rather well.
Th is problem has received more attention in Russia in recent years.
Unfortunately, there are very few open sources on the work of oviet experts in this
area. Even though purely theoretical approaches were not (and could not) be considered classified information, they were, as a rule, presented in classified materials of
military research institutions. Hence the lack of references to open sources.
Regarding the meth ds of selecting the indicators for the effectiveness of military
automated command ystems, as early as the 1970 it wa noted that despite the complexity of considering all aspects of the system, a method of selecting one dominant
generalized effectiveness indicator and tuming all other indicators into Limiters proved
to be the most usefu l. Usually, mathematical expectation, or an average value of the
damage to the nemy in a reta liatory strike, is used as a generalized effectivenes indicator for nuclear C 3 sy tems. Various characteristics of the damage - for example, the
percent of destruction of th military economical potential - have been used for this
Even though such indicators seem specific, it appears that they do not provid full
characteristics of the predi ted result. Indeed, most recommendation of the oviet
research. military institutions in this area sounded like this: "ln a retaliatory strike, the
nuclear forces should have the capability to damage the enemy's military economical
potential at the level of so and so percent." A reasonable question arises: What does
"should hav a capability" mean? With what probability? It is obvious that we cannot
as ume that this probability equals 1.0. Nothing absolut is possible. Also, such a
requirement does not provide a predicted dispersion of the results. What you have
here is no more, no less than a "point."
Further, requirements for command and control systems have been projected separately for L Wand LUA. It wa verbalized in this way: In case of LOW, the CJ
should provide ... In case of LUA, then it should ... What does "in case of ... " mean?
1 othing was ever said about the correlation between the two "arms" of the command
and control system, about their contribution to the generalized indicator of the effec·
tiveness of retaliatory actions with consid ration to any potential cenario. uch a generalized indicator did not even exist.
In most research work as well as all of the official statements of oviet (from the
1970s onward), and now Russian, political and military leaders, it has been al


The SIJite ot Scholal'shtp 59

emphasized that th
e purpose of the strate · £
deter a
potential aggressor Th.
. . gic orces Is not to d t
Is political principle sh ld h es roy the enemy but to
porated in the actu 1
ff .
a structure f
ave b
een, It seems, incoro lCia] substantiation of th . o nuc ear forces and their C3
hardly, if at all, reflects their rea~o~able sufficiency. Yet th system as well as in an
damage from a retaliatory t:ansihon from the earlier a~ses:::ethodology even now
For now, most of the talk h nke to the new concept of as
ent of the size of the
about the probability of retatst?een a~out the potentialle::~sm;nt of its probability.
works mention the re .
Ia Ion agamst the attacker A d "fs o nuclear strikes, not
qUirement £ th "
. n I som
earners," this indicator st "ll .
or e probability of the 1
h e ill! Itary research
. ~ Is regarded as a second
aunc orders reaching th
tion of the dam a
ary one, the
ge remamm th
g e pnmary one. Such r
mat ematJcal expectacommand and cant 1
ro system t
are still widely used
11 o carry out the retaliator
. s as t e ability of the
Y actions a LOW
, as we as th
command post" d "
e concept of "th
and LUA"
. .
' an guarante d
e potential sur . 1
mdJcators are quali"tat· .
e preparation and tran . .
VIva of at least one
lVe In nat
SmJSSIOn" f d
calculating the levels of suffici ure and may never be used for the o or .ers: All these
It seems that th
quantitative basis of
d. d
e experts from th K
1 the most advanced h.
. . e ometa scientific res
mid-1980s. They u d t mkmg m the methodology of earc~ center headed by Savin
assessmg th
heads, no lower th se as effect·
!Veness mdicator th
b b" .
e roe of CJ in the
1ue, reaching their tar
dIcator was applied on]
o a number of warmaud and control syst:ntot~ss~smg the effectiveness of j~e:s. Unfortunately, this intheir command and
' e WS, and not the wh 1 s one element of the comcontrol B "d
o e system f
wbere the EWS
. esJ es, only the cond"t·
o nuc1ear forces and
1 IOns of LOW
parameters 1
Arbatov one of R . ' p ay an Important role
were considered
ussJa s lead'
tate Duma of the R .
mg experts in strategi·c
uss1an Fed
weapons d
eratiOn, refers to the imp t
an a member of the
not only the size of the d
amage, but also the probabilit f or a~c~ of taking into account
Yo retahat100 in S
ecurzty: Russia s



"As far as d t ·
e ernng a hypotheti
First, what level of d
cal nuclear attack the SNF [;
are sufficient fo d amage and what probability' of th " d aces a double dilemma.
r eterrence?
Is amage a t 11
cnteria of the Cold W.
. . .. s far as this first dilemma
.c _ua y occurring
Percent of the
_ar era (destruction of up to 70
goes, ~~Is dear that the
times over E populatwn) are obsolete and could b percent of mdustry and 30
· ven und
d' .
e reduced · h
ture, a 50
er con lhons of 'cold
In t e future many
percent p b b. .
peace som th ·
ro a Ihty of destroying 10
~ mg possible in the fun appears to be m
percent of mdustr
ore than sufficient. "l04
Y and 5 percent of

question is· wh
States) finds

. . y a SO percent probabilit ~
this probability sufficient? Rega~i;n~ _which side (Russia or the
g t Is Arbatov says: "As dem-

BO 1 fl: tvucleBI' Command, ConiPol, Coopel'atlon

onstrated by years and years of r search and debates, it's difficult to calculate these
criteria 'objectively' and prove them rationally. The solution is that political leadership, on the basi of common sense, should come up with a qualitative defioition." 105
f course, even in this case deterrence should be estimated on the basis of common
sense, but if any concrete probability value would be mentioned, it should be calcu lated and justified. Especially since, as Arbatov conclude , the qualitative definition,
accepted by political leaders on tbis basi , " .. . will determine many things: the number
of warheads that mu t survive en my attack, get through the enemy's BM (pos ible
in the future), and reach assigned target , and therefore determine the general number
and composition of strategic nuclear forces for the corresponding period of 6me. " 106
The ideas of arter in a 19 7 collection published by the Brookings Institution deerve a special consideration. 107 They coincide, to a considerable degree, with th ideas
developed in the following chapter and represent a broader theoretical context for the
method of assessing the C 3 ontribution to nuclear deterrence.
In his work, Carter considers all widely -dispersed results of a nuclear operation, or
as he refers to it, error and uncertainty - that is the a pect which most analysts are
reluctant to study: "From the beginning one must face the fact that the specific instances of error and LLncertainty almost always look improbable and absurd, which
threatens to discredit them as subjects for serious study." 108
The author says that it would be preferable to know not only the most probable
value of the final result but also its range of possibilities as well as th relative probability of all outcomes: 109 "Dramatically different outcomes might not b downright unlikely, but only Je s than the expected outcome. The expected outcome, though the
most likely, might nonetheless be unlikely ... Most sinister of all, but almost surely
present, are the 'unknown unknowns' of which operational planners are not even
aware." 110
Let us remember that we are talking about a potential outcome of a nuclear war.
It is also noted that the range of possibilities of a large number of independent events
is usually not great. Here Carter i discussing a range of possibilities, between percent and 5 percent in the example of launches of combat missiles in the course of a
hypothetical nuclear strike. Doing this, he considers previously obtained data from
experience, including data from missile tests.
Later, however, he suggests also that there are factors that have much more influence on tbi range of possibilities: EMP weapons, EW , C 3 and others. In some cases,
it is possible to isolate one of these factors and study its influence on the final outcome.
This type of research, however, is not to the liking of some customers from the militarY
and political leadership:
"Frank eli cussion of uncertainty can also be mistaken for tupidity or political circumspection on the part of the analyst. In the words of General Estes. 'Any analyst
who told a general or a Congressional comm'ttee, that a weapon ystem would have


The State of Sebolal'ship 81

a survival probability of bet
out of the analyst '
ween 10 percent and 100
s corps and hi .
percent would b d
the mfection'."III
s VIewgraphs would be b
e rummed
urned to avoid spreading

(This sounds like the Middl A
Nevertheless this a
e ges! Try to analyze and
sbuggest anything after this )
nuclear war and th P~roach appears to be the right
h. h
e pnce to be 'd
one ecause
Ig . The method de 'b d . pai for its "least prob bl "
we are talking about
sen e In th
a e out
possi le outcomes of
e next chapter is ba d
. comes Is extremely
unacceptable because ;;hear. retaliation. Estimation :; t:rec;sely on researching all
account the C3 factor h e SIZe of the damage) outcom . eshe ess probable (but still
w en pr 'd ·
es Is t e
essence of taking into
et them be unlikely- b t h OVI mg a quantitative asses
u t ey ar
sment of n 1
camp1etely ruled out th
e sti unacceptable If
uc ear deterrence
, en any att
sue apr0 b b'l·
abl e zn princinle Wh
empt to test this a
a 1 Ity cannot be
r .
at could b .
ssessment 10
as been practically ignored b e ;;~pler? But unfortunately u ~ractice Is unaccepty .o lCial studies.
' nti now this approach
Carter feels that
not everyth
can appear to th
Ing Is lost yet· "C
ose w o mana
oncern about
t e deterrent 'system.' Assi .ge.nudear operations as im lie e~~o~ and uncertainty
cal leaders than for 'e
~Ilatmg error and uncertaint ~ d cnticism or distrust of
and reality." 112
~perts. Politicians know how wide ~his probably easier for politiTo sum up the s
e gap can be between plans
ources rev
t e United States have paid ce::~e ere. allow one to conclude t
systems on strategic st b '1'
am attention to the influe
f hat both Russia and
a IIty A
nee o co
ese problems Neverth 1 . mencan experts have pl d
mman and control
odology for a q~antitativ e es~, ev~n today we lack a dear a ace a greater emphasis on
a methodology could r ~l~stimatiOn of the C3 contribut' nd well-substantiated methth . fi
LaCI Itate
Ion to nucl
1 .
eir urther reduct'
more ratiOnal plannin f fi
earp annmg. Such
g o uture
nuc ear arsenals and

The Methodology: The Estimate ol Nuclear Deterrence Using C3


his chapter describes one possible method for assessing the effectiveness of nuclear
deterrence. Notably, it takes into account the effect of all aspects of a nuclear C 3
system under attack - its structure, reliability and principles of operation - upon the
final result of any retaliation.
The proposed logical and mathematical approach was developed from 1987 to 1990
at the Soviet Center for Operational and Strategic Research of the General Staff. Using
this approach, the author, together with experts from the General Staff, SRF, research
institutes of the Ministry of Defense and defense industry design bureaus, carried out a
number of official research projects dealing with nuclear deterrence, strategic stability,
defense sufficiency, etc.
This methodology was described in detail in the book, The Assessment of Guarantee ,
written on my own initiative in 1991, while I still worked at the Center for Operational
and Strategic Research. Three years later, it was published in Russian by the Moscow
Institute oflnternational Relations 113 with the only changes the substitution of the word
"Russian" for "Soviet."
I had two reasons for changing so little. First, I wanted to preserve the style of the
original manuscript, which reflected, to a certain degree, the spirit of military research
during that complicated historical period and of hope for the success of perestroika in
the Soviet society. Second, I wanted to demonstrate that the method offered in 1991
still applied not only in 1993, but for the foreseeable future as well .
Here, I have decided to use the same decade-old style to introduce an international
readership to the essence of this method, as it appeared in the full text of The Assessment
of Guarantee. As a result, Chapter 3 is more difficult to read than other chapters in this
book, and there may be some repetition. In my opinion, however, these shortcomings
should be compensated for by the integrity and simplicity of the material.


How Does Deterrence Work?

Obviously, strategic stability, safety, balance, parity, etc., rest on the foundation of

n~clear deterrence. Over the last 40 years, deterrence has considerably helped main-

~ peace on Earth.

The very character of nuclear weapons predetermines a primary
rode for deterrence; this will remain so in the future even after deep reductions in U ..
ill\ R
th u Sian nuclear arsenals. The further the process of disarmament goes, however,
e more important will the quantitative aspect of deterrence become.

The Methodology: The Esllmate or Nucleal' Detel'l'ence Using ca

I 85

84 \ f?: /Vucrear command, contl'ol, Cooperauon

This rev .JeWWl'l'l only
. include
· fl the nature of nucl.._.._..
Let us review bne y
war? T o
the military aspect of
revents nuclear antagol11S
h alt following statements and c_
t ntial agP
even t oug
b " lmagme a po e
only discuss ~o sl e ,
embers of the ''nuclear c1u .
himself and by
principle, appbcable_to most; his goal with the smallest damage to
gressor who would hke to ac teve
dden nuclear attack.
way of a su
. ;>
u1 d These arseo, what does dete:;::~s of rmclear weapo~s hav~ b een. a:~:ut:g ~hem without
fl ;ct
his logic is
As of today, hug th t their owners consider tt posstble to~
i.m.mense a
h t' l nuc1ear con • ·
.ected results of a hypot e tea .
. the other side JS so
nals are so
having compared t~1e p~toh.J . correct: if the level of potenttal bat t~ . k The cuts are
. '· t any maJOr ns ·
d t begm w1 , ts
sunple, an , o
ing arsenals w1tMU
high it is possible to start ecre~
h rsenals: you have 6 000 nuc1ear w
lanned based on companng t e a
. '
largely p
ff . t for plannmg an
d o do we.
a\ would not be SU !Cle O
w· h
an s
. 1 panty of arsen s
. . . b h' d the arsenals . It
of the capab1hhes e ln
But what then? sunp
h · 00 measure
attack and re ponse - t ere l

det~r~:~~::~:~~"i:~ a 11ud~ar





ue methods tor estimating reliability of deterrence.

Fig. 1: Alternatl •



this kind of "methodology," there is a chance that one side, or maybe both, may cross
over a dangerous line in reducing the number of weapons - that is, beneath a minimal
deterrent parameter.
Fig. 1 demonstrates possible ways of evaluating the degree of nuclear deterrence.
Considering all of the above, it is necessary to stop simply comparing potentials. There
is an alternative: studying the expected result of retaliatory actions on each side if it
were attacked with nuclear weapons . If the risk from such retaliatory action for the
potential aggressor would be such that it would provide reliable deterrence from an
attack, strategic balance, parity, safety and stability would follow. The size of nuclear
arsenals thus becomes a secondary factor, even though it is still desirable that they are
as low as possible.
What is the nature of a nuclear conflict's projected result? And how should it be
assessed by a potential aggressor considering a surprise attack?
First, the aggressor would need to use an integrated approach toward such an evaluation. He should include in his calculations not only the potential damage from the
opponent's retaliatory actions, but also self-inflicted damage from his own attack (such
as environmental, etc. ). The trend in nuclear development, however, is now toward
high precision and relatively low-power weapons, which will serve to reduce environmental damage, especially within the framework of general arms reductions. Therefore, the main emphasis should be placed on evaluating the damage from an opponent's
Second, the potential aggressor should consider that, in retaliating, an opponent
would use the major part of his nuclear arsenal; that is, would attempt to deliver a massive nuclear strike. The targets of such a strike would include not just military targets
on the aggressor's territory but also administrative centers, industry and so on. Thus,
the response would by all means have the character of retaliation . A great deal is being
written now about "reasonable" or "acceptable" levels of damage in a nuclear attack.
This is a complicated question, and the assessment of what is "reasonable" or "acceptable" fluctuates widely. Nevertheless, independent of the assessment method, these
levels have to be fixed at a certain value. Otherwise, it would be impossible to carry out
any quantitative calculations. Considering this, we will later review the concept of
"unacceptable d amage."
Third, when assessing the degree of risk, we by all means have to include one circumstance of key importance for clarifying the approach described in this book. Until
now, we have been talking abou t the magnitude of the damage of any retaliation. But
this does not include all aspects of danger or risk. The potential aggressor would very
li~ely be interested in another, equally important, aspect of the danger of retaliation
Wlth major consequences: how probable is it? In other words, what is the probability of
suffering unacceptable damage as a result of one's own aggression?
. As of today, unfortunately, probability has been ignored as a variable in nuclear plannlng. The magnitude of damage is sometimes expressed by a statistical median value

Ths Mslhodo/ogy: Ths Est/mats of Nuc/881' Ostsi'I'Bncs Using C' 1 87

I C': Nuclear command, conrrot, cooperation

t change much, becau e it still is uncleart

or ma~:rn::~:~:::~;c:;~:~h
~e~:;:,d:~' ~~ th~:.;:,:7, ~~~:0:~=~~•;:~:~,

; a~ a.:~~;!~ ;~::~~~t~l of retaliatio~
that the P~\::yt~~:~::
The higher tx1e
the retahatory capa 1
bTt of 0 7 costs 4
of money.
hieve the more expensive
of aggression is tryl~g~~i~c of o:s costs 2 billion rubles. while ~1 ro~a ~e~e. w~ will just
~~~i~:~~:s~ ~~~~his ~o~relationtwfil~~~g:a~:e~~~ ~:::~eg~~ (deterrence) and eco1ot


. ll' ht' " th1s aspec o
note that "hlg 1 1g mg
· 1
ld be
nomic (cost) impo~tf~n~~· of this method of evaluating deterrenc~· ~~ ~ns:::~etail.
For further clan lCa lOll
f the result we want to pre 1
dom character o
helpful to constder t e ran

. . the outcome of the victim' ret~iale to addces randomness lD
mine with any certamty
lt is ~ot at ~1.:~~. the potential aggressor carthmot p;e:~e:ictimdeterminewhether
tory actlOns. r
t lia tion, nor can e po en
ill ot be su bJede to re a
that (>.e w n
h £ of a nuclear
'11 be able to retabate.
tainty - simply on t e ear
h e Wl
. b
d on complete unce,r
Today everythm,g ts ase
d bts
. . f ctor i.n it elf. Jo one ou .. t that this vagueness is a powerful d terh·nng a o should we just stop here
lear arsenals are so uge.
ome msts .
iall today w en nuc
thts, espec . Y
P I' t' ally people have
and do n~tbmg?b ble to 'Technical progress is relentless. . ~n::~his ~eneral trend.
We will not ea.
. . 1S and it i hard to argue agal
bei.n condared to start reducm.g ~uclear: ~eans for attacking nuclear CU:senalsr~:al anJ techIn tnilitary and techmc~ .area~, ved Put together, these two factors - po l~ay not work.
. to a point beyond which deterrenc
tinuously developed an
. al
·u gradually bnng us
What i its nature.
{r ted by two dang rous
nologlc - Wl. { tal point without an.y exaggera.tton.
We can caU tlus a a
f . ·hi point we wtll be con on
· to search or t s
If we d o no t ry
1 ar arms reduct10ns.
· 'st that
d'ff lt path o nuc e
try may tnSI
extremes on the. I ~~~"risk-takers" in the potential aggressor co~~s with a surprise
. h
d "expect" to resolve all pro
T~ . trend is
ne extreme lS tha~
the risk of retaliation lS no . ~g ' an erious damage to their own co:m~· n~'\oria af-


How Random is the Anal Result?

nuclear attack wi.thou: enaltal~~:p:~s sbecome more powerful. ehspelclallyh~P;:!ss would
s conveotton
lfWar T e t1oug
mcreasmg a
nfli t . 1ch as the Pers1an u
" Tl ·e i no nee 0
ter victories in local co
c s S"L • k othing terrible wilt happen!
be somethmg I .
b thinking.
. . "is it real y.
explain th consequences o~ sue
tious ensible people will object.. ?" J3ut let
The other extreme is bemg ove~·cau . ~ith regard to a nuclear confhct.
f such
essary cauttOn
·y nature o
possible to talk about unnec b are 0f being overcaunous. ~ever .f rninirnUI'll
· d
t vVe must ewe
. 1·
trivmg not or
us reserve JU gmen .
't and sufficiency ltnP tes s
concepts as d !Sarro

levels of nuclear deterrence, but rather for "reasonably" minimal levels. And "reason"
implies, first and foremost, a quantitative assessment. It is hard not to quote Lord
Calvin: "If we are not able to measure a phenomenon quantitatively, we know nothing
about it." That is, we have to learn to measure the deterrence factor. Otherwise, we
will spend huge amounts of money in a hare brained manner, and our resources are
Possibly, the above arguments are enough to convince ourselves that we can no longer
live in an atmosphere of complete uncertainty. That is why this path is crossed out in
Fig. 1. Let us now try to establish to what degree we may be able to use quantitative
measurement in this case.
Initially, we must ask whether the desired result of retaliation is predetermined,
whether it has a fixed value under certain specific conditions. Or, is it at least possible
to express it by a relatively stable median value, with a small range of spread? In order
to answer this question, it is necessary to turn directly to the object of research, that is,
the nuclear capability of the "potential victim" and the factors that affect this capability in case of retaliatory actions. Consideration of this data should emphasize their
influence on the spread of the values of the final result. If the spread is not too great,
we may use the median value (so-called "determined" evaluation). If the spread is
great, this method cannot be applied.
It is interesting that the United States considered the spread of the potential retaliation values as important even in the beginning of the nuclear standoff. Here, and later,
we will be referring to Analysis for Military Decisions, edited by E.S. Quade, translated and published in Russia in 1969. 114 The book contains a series of lectures delivered by leading experts from RAND Corp. for high-level Defense Department and
industry employees in the United States. Even though some of the ideas are clearly
dated, others are still relevant.
On the issue of the spread of results, the book says that the greater the spread, the
better for deterrence. The use of the words "to increase" in relation to the spread of
results, however, implies that the authors desired to increase this range artificially. In
reality, we will show that it is achieved "by itself," under the influence of certain objective factors.
There are many factors affecting the range of final results, and there is no need to
name all of them here. It is more important to divide them according to the character
of the effect they have. Here are the major ones.
Factors of the first type are those that do not have a major influence on the spread of
the summary final result, but rather establish its absolute value. These include the
s~rvivability of specific nuclear weapons platforms such as missile launchers, submar~e~ and strategic bombers under attack by conventional and nuclear weapons. The
~ llity of missiles and warheads to overcome the opponent's BMD is also included
ere. Also, among these factors is the coefficient of combat readiness of each delivery
IYstem, which integrates the equipment's technical reliability with the morale of the


I f1l: Nucleal' Command, Co/III'DI, Coopel'alion
The Methodology,· The Esti

launch crew, etc. These factors all share one characteristic: each one is manifested
individually for each
F element (missile launchers, submarines, plane , etc.), or
even for each warhead. The sum total of the state of these elements (survival or de truction) is repre ented a the sum total of a large number of independent variables. In other
words these variable are weakly con-elated. An integrated assessment of the sum
totals of uch variables is successfully carried out using median values (mathematical
1ost of the factors that influence the final result belong to this fir t group. Their
combined effect should lead to some kind of a median final result. For example, we
may assume that initially the attacked side had 1,000 delivery vehicles with 6,000 warheads. Let us assume that the loss of delivery vehicle in the conventional conflict was
20 percent; in the nuclear conflict - 30 percent; the coefficient of combat readiness \Vas
0.9, and the opponent's BM had 0 percent effectivene s. Through a simplified calculation we may presuppo e that about 2 000 warheads will reach thei1· targets in the
retaliation phase. Even when considering that the mentioned factors and the calculations are much more complicated than presented here, it i still possible to express the
final result by a "point value" - about 2,000 warheads - without a major error. Let us
repeat that thi result would be possible only if the state of various NF elements had
been consi ered independently from one another. In reality, tlu is far from being so, makes the character of the final result quit different.
A second type of factor is different in principle in as far as the influence it has on the
final outcome. As a result of thi factor's impact, the spread of pas ible values for
warheads that reached their targets becomes very large, from zero to a certain maximal
value (based on specific initial data). This factor is called the command and control
Th question of what influence command and control systems have on the final
outcome of retaliation that we want to forecast is the main th si of this book. At this
point, we are only assuming the impossibility of describing the final result with a fixed
deterministic value. Although this conclusion is obvious, we will try to clarify it in d1e
next few paragraph .
Thus, we cross out another method - deterministic evaluation - in Fig. 1. nJy the
third, intennediate version i left - the probabilistic evaluation approach.
In his day, when Albert Einstein became familiar with Heisenberg's indeterminacy
principle, he told his friends that he could never accept it. He could not believe that
God based everything He created on a probability principle; that od "played dice."
The question we are considering is somewhat simiJar. We are trying to assess deterrence by way of probability. You might answer: 'probability belongs with jndicaters
characterizing a proces that can be repeated many time , while nuclear war can hap·
pen (God forbid! ) only once. " How to deal with this contradiction?
There is no contradiction here since we are dealing with simulation. You can pia}'
war as many times as you want using a model, and thus obtain any distribution of ran·


mare ot Nucleap Detel'l'ence Using ca



dom results de

. .
· d·
pen mg on Initial d t
In Nicator you are searching for.
a a. You may obtain the values of th
evertheless the q
e probability
o~ly one "try., How can we remams - how is it in reality? We
With this one try th
evaluate the danger on th b .
would have one and
• e resu t ma b
e asis of 1
only try is unpredictable
d yh e,anythmg - from zero to th
.on y one try? Even
So, how do w
: an t at s a fact.
e maximum. Our one and
e reconcile multi 1 .
The answer is simple. Th
p e ~Imulations with only one t ?
resul.ts of simulation. Thi ~ pot~nti~l aggressor considerin t ~Y· .
requned color out f b s SituatiOn Is reminiscent of
g his try Is evaluating the
an attempt t
o a ag S th
where white is life bl k . ay ere are seven white and th
b o get a ball of the
':hite balls and on~ btck ~eans death: The probability is 0 7re~ lack balls in the bag,
like trying to get a b llac . ~ there a difference? Yes th
. . . nother scenario: nine
, ere IS But
a even 111 th
personal, but threate
e second scenario espe . 11.
, you sti11 do not feel
ns our wh 1 · .1.
Cia y whe th · k ·
dollars are behind th
o e CIVI IZation. On the th h
n e ns Is not just
ese numb
o er and b ·ll·
numbers and this ap
h . ers. o, no matter what w h
' I IOns of rubles or
, If only b
, e ave to learn t
L et us make sam proac
o accept these
ecause there is noth.
e Intermediate con 1 .
mg e se.
c USIOns here:

D~~errence is determined not .
ability as well.
JUst by the magnitude of retaliat. b
IOn ut by Its prob2 The
magnitude of retaliation .
zero to a certain maximum Is a random value with a considerab
. The factor "to blame"£ thi
~e spread- from
and control sy t
s em.
or s spread Is th
3. As of toda
y, we o not know the
~agnlitude of retaliation. Deterrennat~reb(or law) of distribution forth
Simp y on fear
ce Is ased on co 1
e ran om
mp ete uncertainty, th at IS· 1.

4. If we want to search for a reaso
away from this uncertaint
nable lev~l of nuclear sufficienc
y. If we do this we w·ll .
y, we have to move
evaluate app
ropnate costs even with th
I gam a chance to camp
e most approximate
. .
are an
quantitative indicators
These are only . . . 1
general sha
Iniha conclusions yet on h .
pe ofthe suggested a
t elf basis we can be .
tct using cl
. 1
pproach. The problem . . d
gm to discern the
research in this assica probability theory and math t • . escnbe a hypothetical nuclear
question Th area also attempts to solv th.
ematical statistics. Notabl
e "o 1 "d'
e Is probl
y, most
n y Ifference in the
ere is nothin
ap l
of command and
suggested approach will b h
g new to the
of~/ any results. From th. con~rol systems on this process d ~ ow to evaluate the
Is pomt, we will concentr t
' an . ow to describe and
e Problem.
a e our attention on th
ese aspects

70 1 C': NuCIBII' comiTIIIId, Contl'o/, Coopsi'Btlon


Ths Mslhodology: T/t, Eo
• ., rllm•ts ot NuciBBI' DBIBI'I'Bncs Using C'

The Enence or Approach

1hB Ob}BCt Dl Study
Since we are evaluating one side's ability to respond to an attack by another side, the
object of our study will be the complex of systems used for such a response. We will
view the defending side as the object of study, and the attacking side as a set of impacting factors using the appropriate initial data.
Let us assume that Russia is the defending side, while the U nited States is an attacker. Now we have to estimate the level of deterrence required to keep the United
States from attacking Russia by analyzing the degree of likelihood of an unacceptable
(or given) retaliation. Iatura.lly, this approach implies an estimate of the reverse: deterring Russia from an attack against the United States, conducted in the same fashion.
The indices obtained as a result may be different, but together they determine the balance of mutual deterrence.
What is included in the object of study, i.e. the complex of retaliatory systems on
the defending side?
First of all are the components of the nuclear arsenal, ready for use: RF silo-based
and mobile launchers; BNs, which are the naval component of the NF ( CS F);
and strategic bombers ( Bs) carrying nuclear weapons.
These nuclear weapon delivery systems ( NW) are armed, depending on their
type, with various numbers of warheads (WH) each. When calculating the generalized
final result, we will use the total number of warheads delivered in a strike ( WI1) . Below
we shall investigate the separate question of deriving the magnitude of damage from
the number of warheads. The Iwh value will be used in a general demonstration of our
approach for reasons of simplicity. Thus, the first element of study is the delivery
systems deployed to different areas (zones).
The second element is the ' F C 3 system. ince the C system will be described in
some detail later, here 1 will provide only its general contours. C includes all those
subsystems that provide for the following: delivery of information about rocket attack
and nuclear attack (RA and A) from global information systems (GI ) to the ICA;
NCA decision-making to use nuclear weapons, and transmission of the corresponding
authorization to the highest level military command posts (HL 1CP). These are the
command posts that have the mandate to prepare and release execution orders, either
with authorization from CA or autonomously, under a certain set of conditions s.ig·
nifying nuclear attack. And finally, communication channels for transmitting orders
from HLMCP to the nuclear weapons delivery systems.
The third element of study is the global information system (GIS), which provides
strategic nuclear C3 sy terns with data about missile and nuclear attack. The data con·
cerning rocket attack come from the missile attack EW , while data concerning nuclear
attack come from a system that identifies numerous nuclear detonations on Russian

The simplest graph Ic
· VIew
· of th



e o ~ect of our study will be:



System a



Commend System
of Strategic
Nuclear Forces




Fig, 2: The ObJect of study,


hctoPa ot lnfluBncs

Generally speaking infl
uencmg factors can be divided i
external. Internal £ ,
ever it ism
act~rs are technical reliability read' ntfo two groups: internal and
mess o launch c
ore convement for
paring initial data for the 1 us to ta e these influences into con 'd re~s, etc. HowI

influencing factors are

tho:ee:;::l;:~l~:e~~d~h Thus, we shall :~s~::~~~a;:~ ::~

e attacker. These factors are·
the physical impact of various t
all ~~e.ments of the object of stu ype~ of conventional (non-nuclear) wea
facihttes, relay faciliti~s
dy, Le.l upon nuclear delivery s t
pons upon
massive nuclear strike a~:a::hof observation and intelligenc/s ems, command
electronic suppression of. .c s same elements;
th 1
mwrmat10n and
command and control channels between
e e ements of the object of study.

This could be

grap Ically presented as follows:

use ot

nuclear strike



obJect of study
(NDSs + CS SNF + GISs)

Fig, 3: Factors of Influence.

In Prin Clp
· 1
el one ma t k .
e lc Pulse (EMp
y a e Into consideration other [;
llot irnportant
), beam weapons, etc. From th ~ , ac.tors, such as electro-mag,
e VIewpomt of methodology th, .


lS lS


72 1 fJl: Nucteat' Command, Control, CoopePation


The Methodology: The EstiJ
mate OJ Nuc/eap DetePPence Using ca

The Model

The final result of each computer-simulated "test" will be the total number of warheads delivered on target Nwh' The final result of k tests will be the probabilistic distribution of the value N wh' Thus, this model should take into consideration the dynamics
of conflict.
Despite the considerable complexity of taking into account all factors , such models
exist and are successfully used in research. Because of a number of simplifications and
conditionalities, they have an aggregate character.
Our model has all the elements under study presented as a so-called cohesion graph.
that is, a net of nodes with arcs connecting them. The node producing initial information should be called the initiator. In our case, it is a single, abstract node, imitating the
attacker's missile launch. The final nodes are the information addressees - the nuoleat'


delivery systems Th
ere are many of th
strategic nuclear forces. All th .
eJ~, reflectmg the character of th . .
ces es of preparation and t.rans:~:e:~n:~~.ate nodes and arcs serve to in:t;::~~~ng. of
An attacker's missile launcl ,
mtermediate (secondary) ,· _.c
pw ab
) generates". £
. out a nuclear strike; this inform .
. ~ ormationaboutamissile attack
stan, and action by HLMCP . atJon, m ~ts turn, i transformed in
, and lat .r.
they reach nude .
crews. rders JS ued by HLl f
to an NCA deciTl
ar deL, very ystem determi
. P and the degree to which
. ne t e resuitmg value
. 1 attacker conducts a suicid 1
a experiment: he start tJ
him, or may t I
to have an im~a~t :porde~lto~educe the probability of hiss d1:o:ect~nism that may kill
initiator node). 11us ion a t e nodes and arcs of the graph (na't -~jattacker attempts
as well as through elec~~:! may[:be through use of conventional ~~d :· ~xcept for the
;re. ur should determineu~=ar weaphons,
potential attacker can reduce
The mechan·
e egree of n k.
w muc the
Ism wr such a SIM · . ·
node and arc is assigned
probable-time functioning indices,
y at each one of them WI'11 fiunc-

In reality, this will be a complex of models linked by a common concept and algorithm. The general idea of modeling here is to "play" war a certain number of times
and attempt to determine, with an acceptable degree of accuracy, a distribution of the
possible magnitudes of retaliation against the aggressor. In other words, it is an attempt to determine the value of the degree of risk.
The best means for solving this problem is a statistical imitation model ( IM), which
does not require high accuracy. From the standpoint of risk estimate, it is not necessary to compare such probabilities as 0.72 and 0.74, or 0.50 and 0.53. For practical
purposes, it is sufficient to compare such probabilities as, for instance, 0.4 and 0.7.
Thus, the required accuracy can be achieved in SIM by a reasonable number of "tests."
The accuracy of the initial data in SIM is another matter to be dealt with later.
Application of SIM has the clear advantage of a conditional analog of the process
under investigation, which takes into consideration all major factors and allows us to
obtain a probabilistic distribution of the random resulting value, rather than an "abstract" point estimate. We must model the following main stages of nuclear conflict:
a nuclear missile attack (possibly following a conventional war);
information the Russian NCA has about the missile attack (mostly on the basis of data from the early warning system);
the NCA's decision to use nuclear weapons, and transmission of this decision
to the HLMCPs;
receipt by surviving HLMCPs of information about the nuclear attack directly
from the system that observes nuclear detonations on Russian territory;
preparation by HLMCPs of orders to unblock and use nuclear weapons ( W),
and transmission of these orders to C 3 system channels;
transmission of orders directly to nuclear delivery systems by the C 3 system
while under enemy attack;
launch of missiles, and warhead impact on the aggressor's territory.









of NDSs

of survival



Initial data


--- - - - --


K simulations on
combining block of




Probabilities of
survival of
channels of

Analysis of
cohesion graph of

Probabilities of
bringing order to
places where
NDSs are located

i--analysis of results



74 1 11: Nuc/BBI' Command, ContPOI, CoopePstlon

Ths Msthodology: Ths ElllmstB 01

tioo properly duciog the time period 6t 1, 6t2, ilt , etc. The values of thes indices
depend upon the char-c1cteristics of the node (or curve) and the degree of the attacker's
impact upon it. The result of such an impact is to slow information down in the net, to
a different degree in different tests. There is also an impact on the addressees themselves, the nuclear delivery systems. For each delivery system, the model analyzes one
situation: did the delivery system receive an order and launch before it was destroyed?
For each war simulation, the number of such delivery systems is calculated, and o is
the total number of their warheads; the losse from enemy B f are taken into account, and finally the value "'" is determined. In each simulation, as we have said
earlier, this value is different. After h. simulations, we obtain a probable di tribution,
i.e. a certain (for the given set of initial data) statistical series.
The final result i totally dependent on the values of probable-time indices of nodes
and arcs. The latter, in their tum, depend upon the attacker's impact. It is only natural
that the attacker would design his impact strategy in a way allowing him to allocat his
realistically limited arsenal optimally - in order to get the "best" outcome. We shall
discuss this outcome that later. Let us conclude that the attacker would attempt to opti mize his strategy based on an expected final result. aturally, we must fore ee this, and
base our calculations on the optimal (for the given set of basic data) strategy of impact.



After k computer simulation with one set of basic data, we obtain a mass of random
values of the final result ash values of wh. This is the so-called statistical series.
Let us take a imple example with a small number of computer simulations, for instance, h=l 0. Assume that aft r 10 simulations the following values of wh are obtained:






Table 1: Results of ten simulations.

How to analyze these results?
As noted earlier, there are two aspects of risk for a potential attacker: the magnitude

NuciBBI' DBIII'I'Bncs Ullng C'


Fig, 5: Maq of reeulta

of retaliation and its prob b '1'
a I Ity. herefore th
N ~~~nttude of unacceptable retaliation If e aggressor should initially determine
we assume that unacceptabl d
udwarheads, then all N>so '11 b .
e amage
Addressing the prob b . . - Wl e unacceptable
a I1Ity of the · k h
. ·
r~quently N~SO could occur. (This ~~e' t e po~~ntial attacker will want to know h
ehngl) Our results show that out f 1 quenc~, naturally, is applicable onl
0 cases, SIX were N~SO
y to modAs the number of . 1 .
b .
Slmu atwns m SIM .
egms to approach its
b ..
Increases, the frequenc f
probability. Thus in th~ro a~lhty. We will therefore speak not yfof the given event

I~Nud ~ 20, the~ P(N~;~~~I~~~~:~~s;(ne may say that P(N~S~) ==r~~~ency, but of
Nud Is qUite uncertain, it is more convenien~~OPO) =0.2h, etc. Taking into account that
. table:
resent t e resultsma


P(N>NUd )
Tab le2: Probab












llltles of different levels of retaliation.

, ~warning is due here· the rob b . .

~~~:t~~ fields o~ results! . Th!, fa: i~~:a~:~~~ ~e?ect not pain~ ~inal results, but proba _
80 100 Y mdagl11tude no less than 60 warheads . I s the probability that the strike may
· n our case the
an 11 0 warh d I
a strike of 60
ea s. t would be absolute] wr
se are stn es of 60, 74,
warheads equals 0 5
y ong to say that the probabil't f
.1. ne table doe
h .
distribu . . s not s ow a strike with a ma ,
imiLar!:l~~~ ~ccurs twice. Why? Because itg;~~~se 0 (zero), although in the final
ously al~ays ea es no sense to search for the value p
sen~e to s~eak about Nud 0.
Probability i q~als. 1. Here we are dealing with a ( -:- /,~mce t~Is probability obvi l>( ::o):::: 0 ~quite Important for us, and we must b:pa:~:
~rderlme" point zero. Its
Now w .h.
e of It. In our case we obtain.
e s auld dd
tion of the above- a ~ess the distribution function F(N)
mentioned table.
· It is a graphic representa-




The Methodology: ThB Estimate or Nuc/8111' DeiBI'I'Bnce Using C8
.. confl'ol coopel'arton
78 ' C': NuciBIII' commanu,




misunderstandings while considering the practical aspects of the proposed approach.
This is the mathematical foundation of our approach.
We will be using more graphs further on, where theY axis shows the values not of
F'(N), but ofP(N2N req ), and "req" is "requested." In some cases, it will be more convenient to substitute for the graph of distributive function the corresponding graph of distribution density f(N). Since we will have few simulations, this will be a discrete statistical series. In practice, when the number of simulations is large(> 100), it is more convenient to use a continuous graph of distribution density instead of discrete series. If applied to our study with a large number of simulations, this graph might look as follows:






















Fig. 7: The density of distribution of modeling results.

• Distribution of modelling results.
F1 g.6.

Ventsel' a going downd monstrated by Ye. ·
cerns a
One may object that th~s cur~eaweas
the classical distributive fulnctltoh:~::signed.
d asmour c . .
d. d mage no ess
ward, and not upwar If
t while we are intereste m a
the substance of
e than" type o even
hich does not c ange .
no mord 1' with reverse functlon f ( ), w
perties as the classtcal one.
We are ea mg
. function has all the same pro
the matter' because thts





=1 - F(N)

'(N) denotes
For instance, F
' ) . the value of the
Letters F and p ~a~e st~m 1
ion. F' (N 20) or simply~ (2_0 lS But isn't 0.8 a
simply the who~e dtstnb~t~~ ~~~~ This value in the given po~nt;s ~~~~r words, F and
function F' (N) m ~h: pam b bility of N being no less than 2 . n
T 1 y, 1t 1s the pro a
probabl_t lktyd. byes~he following dependence:
pare m e

. 'f cantly different meamng.



=20) =P(N220)

. t N = 20 is nothing but the
. F'
at the pam
. the value of the functton
to avoid
Thabt lbs:l.ty that N will be no less t~~n 20.
d they are given here onlY
pro a 1 1
f probabthty theory, an
These are the bastes o

The distributive function, or density of distribution, characterizes most completely
a random value. But using them in practice is not altogether convenient. It is necessary to use the corresponding simpler and more demonstrative index P(N2Nreq) . This
one is most convenient because it responds to the question of deterrence: what is the
probability of unacceptable damage? We will refer to this index as the degree of risk or
deterrence index.
At the same time, the distributive function obtained can provide us with other indices. Two of them, together with the one mentioned above, are most well known: mathematical expectation (average from all results), and the index of value N when P2P,.q·
This last is unlikely to be convenient for frequent use, since today most studies rely
upon the concept of unacceptable damage, although its value has not been determined
Yet. Nevertheless, the converse problem to find the value under conditions of a probability not lower than that assigned ("requested '), may be viewed as only subsidiary.
Mathematical expectation is a different matter. This index is the most usable now,
~\though it has a number of shortcomings. Later, we will investigate these shortcomtngs and demonstrate why the proposed deterrence index P(N2N ) is more prefer~
e for analyzing the problem of sufficient deterrence.

18·6 Application

\V~ have considered the process of estimating one concrete data variable.

The result of

ThB Msthodo/ogy: ThB EBIImsts of Nuc/BBI' DstBI'I'Bncs Using cs 1 78

78 \ C': tvucltJBI' Command, control, coopBrBtlon


F'( ) of a specific type corre.
. .
ressed by the distributive f~nctlon..
according to the assigned
this estnnatlOD lS ~xp
: t f basic data. Tlus functton~
l e of deterrence
th g1ven van an o
to flnd t e va u
spending to e
t ble to the attacker, h ps ~IS
t . of a series of alternalevel of damage unaccep a
roach is to provlde estnna es
( > ). The task ofthis app
·mal one.
mdex r - ""
. d t · order to select the optl .
onents and charac.
upmg o camp
. bl of baste a a l 11
tiVe vana es
· t~ It is a partlCU1at grO ·
r - nuclear delrvWhat i a baste data vandan . tudy We have described the~n e~r le(rC")· global infor·

f 1 1 nents un er s
teristlcs o t :tehe ~~system of command, control CU:. com d characteristics, contributes
ery systems; t err Each element, i.e., its composl~on; r that direction. Concretely,
mati.on systems.
lt changing its value ln t lS o



fixe~ v:~u~;~~

something to
with a
of changes in the
it changes the va ~e o 1 of tl::tis study is to determme t eh . th contribution made
·h naJo· goaLS
ult W at ts e
One of t e t
on the total ftna 1res .
l roent is the most
d elements up
nent o an e e
above-mentlonf\ ? Which dement, or which comp~
enditures for introduced
by each one o t em. . It neously estinmte ·especttve exp . ..
'? If we slm\.1 a

ess enter ton.
import:1.nt one .. U arrive at the well-known c~st.e -~ct ~~~~the aspect of sufficiency to the
chat:tges, we Wl
rtant pecuhanty · 1 a
roach has a very lmpo
1 t the optimal vanant.
. f. d
al . . order to se ec
h baslS o m ex
classical cost-benefit an y~::~ analyzed a number of variables3on ~e: change, while
Let us assume that we
. . and characteristics of the . sys
t The result
( ~50), ~n which the compos\~:1 information systems retnam constan .
lear weapons and g
d ata for n Uc
is below:.


Deterrence IndeX

ca variables

(conditional units)









Table 3: Alternatives of deterre

nee effectiveness ·

e the

ken that the rnor . ,,
. . was believed ' but unspo . , .
The ''truth
. h variable to select? Earher tt
l taken in to consideratwn.
Money was a so
ffectlVeness goes .

better , as f ar as e
categones ·
reallY P0
was sought in the balance of th~se t';'o the effectiveness of our acuons tn a tble. 'fhe

Indeed' when it comes to es:~:~~gof victory should be as greathas ~~1:tica1 tOQ11d
sible (acceptable) war, thedp~o a ey (or resources in general) . A. ypled il'l the01d.
only limiting factor waul ~· ~::nt story' and should not be approac 1
nuclear war is an altogether 1

traditional ways. It is recognized that there can be no winners in such a war, and this is
our assumption.
Is not our mission to guarantee the destruction of the opponent? And if we are to
guarantee this, what exactly does it mean? A guarantee may be viewed in terms of the
magnitude of damage. For instance, it is a well-founded belief that 50 warheads delivered on target constitute unacceptable damage. But what about the second component
of the degree of risk- the probability of retaliation?
It seems that if this component should guarantee destruction as well, then its value
should also be infinitely approaching 1, as it would be in the above-mentioned case of
conventional war. Then, even variant 4 in our example might not be sufficient, while
the difficulty of achieving this index at the level of 0.999, under conditions of enemy
counteractions, would be extreme. One could spend unimaginable amounts of resources
without achieving these "nines."
Is this a dead-end? Yes, if our mission is retaliation guaranteed to destroy the opponent. But there is no dead-end if the mission instead is guaranteed deterrence. By the
way, the latter goal is logically derived from the universally recognized general concept
of strategic security and stability.
Still, skeptics may object: are we taking a conscious risk not to be able to retaliate in
the case of an attack? To a certain degree this is so, but it is more useful to say that we
are proposing to take account of reality. Moreover, we are not defining this borderline
in quantitative terms, but only proposing a method to open up the real picture.
An approach taking into account the deterrent effect of risk allows us to hope for the
establishment of realistic, and at the same time robust, levels of weapons, C 3 systems
and information systems. For instance, according to our table, the potential attacker is
not likely to start a war even in variant 1, because the 0.4 probability of unacceptable
damage is quite impressive.
There may be great potential for lowering the reasonable threshold of deterrence.
After all, the theoretical probability of an unacceptable event should equal zero! This is
worth thinking about. However, we are not going to determine the value of this probability yet, especially since it is linked to the value Nud- that is, to unacceptable damage. We are still addressing the issue of methodology.
Thus, reasonable sufficiency is added to traditional cost-effectiveness when estimating alternative variables. Here is an opportunity to make a quantitative estimate of
this criterion according not to weapons potential, but to the forecast result. The abstract concept of probability becomes quite substantial, and can be evaluated by concteteexpenditures. With the help of this concept, we can broaden our interpretation of
the~ost-effectiveness criterion , which might now be referred to more accurately as the
· ·
·~· ency-cost cntenon.
analysis may run in the following way.. Variant 2 provides for deterrence, i.e., it
~ Vesthe final problem, and requires expenditures of 1.2 conditional units. However,
We want to increase the margin of reliability for deterrence, and have the resources to



I CB: NucleBI' Command, ConiPo~ Coopet'at/on

do so, we can implement variants 3 and even 4. t the same time, even with a shortage
of resources, it would be considered risky to use variant 1 with expenditures smaller
than in variant 2.
It is obvious that the variables should include several combination among the components and characteristics not only of 3 systems, but also of global information sy terns and nuclear weapons themselves. T his would allow for a better balancin g of costeffectiveness between them. This in turn is quite important for developing a better
substantiated, more sober policy for reducing strategic nuclear forces.
To urn this section up, the statistical imitation model investigates the ability of
nuclear delivery systems, C 3 systems and global information ystems as a whole to r taliate in response to a m.1dear attack. After k wars, we obtain a d istributive function
for the random result of retaliation, and determine the value of a deterrence index for
the given variant P( T~ T"0) . This index is useful for comparing a number of variables
embodying different components and characteristics for the whole object of study.
election of the optimal variable is carried out according to a sufficiency-cost analysis.


The Methodology: The Estimate or Nuctea,. Det111'1'ence ,. .





~ ~

--- --- --Decision-making
and authorization
(issue of sanction)

--- --- --- -----

The Command and Control System's Influence Upon the Anal Result

We have already noted that the 3 system has a decisive influence on the probabilistic distribution of the final re ult . We wi!J examine the mechanism of this influence
and attempt to fin d out why the C 3 system create such a large point dispersal.
Le us look in some detail at the 3 sy tern as one element of our study, considering
only those aspects that ar important for answ ring our que tion . Fig. 8 is a diagram of
the o~ system within the framework of our research as a whole.
T he eparate components can be understood as follows:
E arly Wamjng System (E WS) - the missile attack warning system, including communications channels to decision-makers, a well as the connected systems that produe information on the enemy's missile attack.

Identification of missile
and nuclear attack and

Forming and issuing
of launch orders

--- --- - -- --Transmission ot
launch orders


---- --- - ---Missiles launch

final recipients
(nuclear weapons)

National Command Author ity (NCA) - the organs and command post of those
military and po.litical leaders authorized to make decisions on the use of nucl ar weapons under specific conditions. This component also includes a special communication
system for t he leadership, and the system for communicating decisions to the com·
mand posts of the eneral Staff.
Command Posts of the General Staff and NCA (HLMCP) - The system of headquarters command posts that are authorized to is ue ord rs to use nuclear weapons.


SINA - the system for identifying a nuclear attack, including sensors for registerin_g
nuclear explosions on hom territory summarizing thi information, and commUJll·
eating it to ICA and HL 1 P.

Fig. 8: l aunch function of


MC3 and RC3 th
colllrnunicati . - e mam and back-up command a d
to thee
.ons centers, translators and the c
. n _ control systems including
xecutmg r k T
ommumcat10 1·
etnpha .
m s. he fact that the MCJ d RC
ns mes etween them and
IZe that th
. .
3 are p
llnder-attack b hey are ah:ays used together for both la ~sente as _one component
y t e strategic nuclear forces.
unc -on-warnmg and launch-

Pinal recipients
· .

e nuclear weapon delivery systems.

1 a1

The Methodology: The Estimate of Nuc/eal' Oetel'l'ence Using C8

82 ' C': Nuctssr commsndI


I 83

nrrol coopsrarion

f the conunand and
th parameters o
can further broad en e
'I ) This is frequentLy
Generally speakn"lg, w_e
1 b \ information system (G .
b indudmg the go a
control system y
ill ncentrate on the pewill not broaden our view, bu~ ~ co_. w aspect. We will
and justifiably done.
In this case, howevedr, wde control systems in a more spect~tc, nan~ith command and
. . . f comman an
f ·'- Gf ' coeXlstence
cuhanttes o
. the question o to.e
h GI system be preEmit ourselves by dlscussmgf
"auld the initial data from t e
f U · what arm s.1.1.
control: ftrst 0 a ' 10
d d control system?
t . the cornman an
ifications for the flow-chart a ave. stem hasize the command
sented as tt en ers
Here are some dar bl
of nuclear deterrence, we mud
p the nuclear weapons
· the pro em
h or ers to
ln ana yzmg
. "' fui'Ction: to deliver aunc
tt ugh this very func's pnmar J


• d out .1.1r0
and contra1system.
. t ·g'tc nuclear retabahon lS carne d t' ating its cost, other
t s slnce stra e
tero an es tro
t\ at while designmg t e sys
d and control systems
dehvery sys em '
t ion. This does not meban )nsidered in evaluating the comma~ points.
h ld not e co
e as startmg
functions s ou
. """0 statements shou serv
il' d . n the course of the
T l1e followmg "......
y be ut tze l
th . ly those functtons t at ma
.d. c r massive retaha,
sume at on
. b' t' e - provl mg I'0
Flrst, we as .
f lfilling its mam o JeC lV
. cl d
ll the functions that
system's operation, up to ~should be considered. These tn u _e ~egree of war readition with nuclear weapons
"uch as providing for the necessaxfy . es as a whole, durf
· nuclear me
support ef e 1Ve d d control system , and strategtc
t rs· primarily, stabJhty
. l
nman an
. d
t n parame e .
ness tn t:l.e cm
. t 'n the estabhshe sys eJ
. tl e system's pennaing peacetime ..They l'l_l~l.:r at actions, with the goal ~f suppornng st:m's ability to produring convent~onal ~~\.lt yrimary task. They also mclude.the sy d finally, the most
t readiness to fulfl\llts p
. 1' 't d nuclear conflict. An ,
. .
trikes dunng um e
f assive retahatlCD·
vide selective n~cle~r s Ifill if need be, the mam go~l o. x:n those funcimportant functlOn IS to ~u k ~ore critically at the advlsabiht{ ~f p outside the frame·
The time has come to oto· land nuclear forces as a whole, t :ta area one believes anY
d and con ro
t 'kes etc.
h . conducting subsequent s n
'd. ,
of a global nuclear
tions of cornmal'l.
con 1t1ons
work o e en
' .
would be possible un er
. deterrence.
'II talk only about those functlons p
. g a retaliatory
longer that such actions
n we WI
conflict. For t :tl~ reaso ' u· te on just one main functlo~ . t of the commanlll
Second, we Will concen a
m tion that all studted vanan ~
entation of
strike. We will work. under lth~ at~:~ le~els of their effectivenessbforf~mpdle~e will cer·
dtffer on Y10 l
e to e 1xe ·
and eontrol system
f th functions we WI assum
pay speC!
this main function; the rest o h eworking out cost estimates, bu~ we Wlhanges to the
'nly evaluate all of them w en
the variants resulting rom c
differences between
attention to the cost .
. 's 1nechan\s11l
effectiveness of the mam fu.nctlo:view the command and :ontro~ sy~~~~en't we going
bnefly r
1 may be justified m askmg. A b fraid evetl
N ow it is necessary to
Some peop e
1 ed to e a
fox realizing this functton. h "h ly of holies," that which pe?P e us
ect of the questlon.
far?" This is, after all, t e o.
ld help to clanfy t IS asp
to mention\ It wou


It is true that the command and control of strategic nuclear forces has remained for
a long time one of the most classified topics. Even after practically all secrets about the
weapons themselves (numbers, types, locations, etc.) had been revealed, command and
control was hardly mentioned. The explanation is simple: there was no need, no "demand." But once the specific question of nuclear forces reduction arose, the parties
were able to agree to open their most "holy of holies." The question became what to
reveal. We will talk about this issue in more detail when discussing the problem of
initial data. Here we will just mention one thing: it is ridiculous to conceal what is
already known to everyone - the general design principles of command and control
systems, for example, which are the same everywhere. Nobody, on the other hand, is
going to reveal what is harder for the opposing side to learn: the location of mobile
units, working frequencies, number of communication channels, unblocking codes for
nuclear forces, etc. More detail on that further. Here, let us discuss the fulfillment of
the command and control system's main function; that is, the launching of missiles.
This is no secret at all.
A country's military and political leadership (the "leadership") [see Fig. 8] is a strictly
defined group of people authorized by law to decide on the retaliatory use of nuclear
weapons under extreme conditions. They are an integral component of the command
and control system. No matter where these people are at the moment of a nuclear
attack, they have to communicate with each other by "teleconferencing," and make a
joint decision. A special communication system serves this purpose. After the decision is made, the leadership's authorization, numerically encoded, is passed along to
those high level command posts (HLMCP) that can produce launch orders for nuclear
weapons delivery vehicles. The HLMCP's crews would not be able to produce those
orders without the presence of at least one of two conditions: receipt of the leadership's
authorization, or the presence of a definite aggregate of factors confirming an enemy's
nuclear attack.
We already discussed how that authorization is achieved. The second condition
arises independently from the actions of the leadership, and is the command and control system's fallback "insurance" in case the leadership pathway does not work, for
whatever reason. What are the factors fulfilling that second condition? They are a
!!Ombination of data from the SINA, the complete disappearance of any communication channels with the leadership, and initial permission received from the leadership
authorizing independent actions in such a situation (preauthorization) . The presence
of this combination of factors at a surviving HLMCP would allow the command post
COmputations to produce and deliver a launch order to the delivery vehicles.
. In any case, no nuclear weapons unit would be able to carry out its task of launching
~~~issiles without receiving an order with the code for unblocking the weapons. This
~entralization of the command and control system, and the potential for its being
apltated, are the main reasons why retaliation could have zero results.
1io\v can this be?



I C': Nuclelll' Comm8f111, Contro~ Coopef'Btion

Don't panic yet. Instead, ask yourselves two questions: is it possible to exclude this
outcome completely, and do we need to exclude it? The answers will follow. Remain
patient and we will continue.
More "exotic" variations in the design of command and control systems exist in
theory. The so-called "dead hand" variant is an example. In this case, each nuclear
weapons carrier is able to launch on its own upon " positive" identification of a nuclear
attack. The word " positive" is not set in quotes for nothing. The question of removing
the "nuclear monster" from human control is a special problem. Even if both sides
reach an agreement that permits both of them to have such technology, allegedly for
more "reliable deterrence," it does not change the essence of the approach we are considering. The initial data change, but the character of the results will not change significantly. The route defined by authorization (the first arm) remains intact under this
variant, and "zero" results may almost disappear. But is this worth such a risk? Hardly.
As of today, the two-branch system with authorization arriving from above remains a
"classical'' realistic variant. This will be the object of our further analysis.
Designing nuclear weapons command and control systems according to the "twobranch" variant has a deep strategic meaning. If we keep only the authorization route,
we make our leadership hostage in a way. A[) results of this decision, unique in the
history of humankind, will fall entirely on their heads. And they will be making this
choice under extreme conditions, with severely limited time, and base it, in reality,
only on technologically produced data from a warning system. The question of whether
EWS data may be trusted is directly related to the problem of limiting nuclear retaliation. Such a situation will always tempt the aggressor to "take a risk," to try to over ·
come the only barrier wholly dependent on the human element. This situation is, obviously, hugely destabilizing.
This is why it is logical to have something like a second deterrence barrier that does
not depend quite so much on human beings, because it is hard not to "notice" a nuclear
war! If the first branch reacts to a warning, the second one reacts to the fact.
Sometimes, that part of the command and control system that initiates a reaction
according to the C3 warning is called the main system - MC3 , and the second part
(second branch) - reserve system ( RC3 ). This separation is strictly abstract since both
systems always operate together. RC3 components are simply much more stable relevant to nuclear war, unlike the MC 3 , whose main purpose is to authorize orders before
any nuclear explosions take place. We will here speak of the system as a whole and will
use the terms MC3 / RC3 only as necessary, for convenient presentation of the material.
Thus, the presence of two branches within the system makes it more stable from the
viewpoint of deterring a potential aggressor. Those two branches, however, differ .a~­
cording to the magnitude of retaliation they provide. The first bra11ch allows partJCl·
pation of more nuclear weapons units in a nuclear strike than the second, since the
latter's response is delayed until after nuclear strikes have begun.
At this point we can directly examine the influence command and control systelJ15

The MBthodo/ogy: 1h8 &lima
te or Nllcielll' D8t81'1'ellee lklng f:3

h~ve. on the types of final distribu

non. Broadly speakin



distribution are al d
Th f
rea y obviOus.
g, ree characteristics of thi
e trst are of retaliation I
the command and control
evels.- namely tbe Nwto values - is the.
lized. In this
.system, Ill which the autbo . .
tdeal performance of
case, e maJo ·ty f
nzatton route (f
mg the missiles even b t4 n o nuclear weapon units will fi lfJI th ~~st ranch) IS utialready know LOW Teh ore the enemy's weapons hit S hu 1 • task of Jaundl .
e value f
· uc a stnke
11 d
will be affected by
s o r are highest in tht·s
IS ca e , as we
prevtous loss d .
case; or the
of the enemy's BMD Le
es unng a conventional war
most part, they
Let us analyze a .
.t u~ note that this area has a rathe , as wile as the effectiveness
quanbtat1ve e
r sma range of d.
at all units on the de£ d.
. xamp1e. Assume that the inif I
destroyed in the cour::o~ng Slde w~ 6,000. Assume also that ~aO~~er of warheads
of nuclear attack '' I
a conventional conflict and 4 000
, . o them had been
· we are assu ·
were mtact t h
system was able to em 1
mmg t at during the LOW th
a t e moment
sess SO
P oy aU 4,000 of them And r
' e command and control
T.-•·= .Percent effectiveness. Thus ab .
, mally, let the enemy's BMD
aJUng mto account a certai
, out 2,000 warheads will
pasabout 1, 900 to 2 100
n number of random values we
reach theJr targets.
• ·
can say our ar 0 f al
The second probabl
ea v ues is
work b
e area of values N

. y the authorization pathw
b ,.., aHses when the system didn't I
explosiOns on home territ
ay, ut was only able to react t h
1ave bme to
values ofN here ar 1 ory. Such a nuclear strike is called LUAo t e. fact of nuclear
e ower than for LOW
. It 1s de th
actor: how fast the command d
. But by how much~ it de
d ar at the
number of nuclear w .
.an control system reacts on . . pen son the time
one Side, and how fast the
It is worth
. eapon Uotts will "vanish, und
notmg that the timing of
er enemy nuclear attacks
may be somewhat protr ed
an enemy's nuclear hits a
. ·r a~t . According to the most
I , s part of a mass strike
laund1 of aU t. t
popu ar mod 1
s nusst es IS
warheads from its
. most preferable for the
e' a sunuJtaneous
the last - from tb sNuibmhannes might reach home terriagtogres~ohr: 1n that case, the first
e ort Am ·
ry Wit tn 12 t 13 ·
we can talk ab t
encan continent say - onl
mmutes, and
working interv~ubyan ha~chproximately 20 tninu~e span fo~ a:fiaterd30 to 35 minutes. Thus,
w 1 the
nu ear attack Thi ·
t ·
o Its second "branch ,
reactiOn of the com.mand and
s IS the
ties of command d. should be analyzed. F urther Ot1
~ollnltrol system, according
an control rfc
• we Wl ook at
01 ~•.
~e note of a m h
pe ormance within this · t al
some peculiari.
uc greater
m erv . For
· .
'lild the third ar .
range o values for N: 500-1 500 t4
now, we will JUst
system has
ea IS that of null outcomes 1 th.
or our example.
not performed th
· n ts case the
eaP<>ns has bee .
rough either of its "branch , ,
command and control
nario in which thn ISsued, and no nuclear warhead ha ~s, no order to unblock nuclear
It used to be th e enemy succeeds in "beheading" ths een launched. This is the seefrorn t hern A . dat everybodY kept qu1et
e command d
about th
an control system
. £ U1 1et th •
OSe nulls "

tL . f. we combine all thrls area occupy its legitimate post·t·
, . yet, we cannot get away
..~e f•ft 1
ee area
1on m our ge al ·
....a result sh
. . s, we Will get a pictu. f tb
ner Picture.
, own m Ftg. 9:
e probable distribution for

The Methodology: The Estimate of Nucleat' Detet't'ence Using ca

88 \ C': Nuc/e81' command,

I 87

control, Cooperation















Fig. 9: Combined picture of aJI possible results of modelling.


All three areas discussed are quite probable. The only realistic "sample" (th:rt is, a
nuclear conflict) may produce any •' value from th discussed areas. Which onel
NobodY will ever say, nor is able to say. Th campi te lack of certainty is ad terring
factor here. A · the same time this probabilistic picture contains another type of crucial
information - costs. It is from the relationship between he opponents' forces - that is,
relative costs - on whicb the pecific type of distribution depends. The number of null
outcomes, high volume strikes, or mediocre results depends on relative costs. I now·
ing the value of unacceptable damage "' we may then establisl"> the value of the deter·




- P(speaking.
r ~ "). the rnecl">anism by which the command and control sys·
i , generally
tem influences the final distribution. Now we can go farther and look at this influence's
variants of the command and control ystem. "Command
Fig. 10 illu in
and control system operability" can b s parated into two componentso the actual time
it takes to deliver an order fwm the ceo ter to theexecuti ve units ( t), and the delay before
transmitting the order begins, that is, the ystern's "reaction time" (t, ), where del is

will stand for ommand ystem .
Let us assume that in the C -I and C -2 variants the a<:tual delivery time is rouGh
less than the ]ength of tbe enemy's nuclear attacko the system pe ·forms immediatelYBut in the C · \ variant, the response of the system is higher than in S-2. for ex·
ample, in S-1 the order was delivered prior to the enemy's nuclear attack- ln that



cas , the character of the final distribution is determined mostly by the prelimjpatl'
impact of conventional weapons and the effectiveness of the enemy's M . At
the distribution law is close to normal, and the final indicator )'( > ) - \ ·
ln th
-2 variant the order is deliv red only during the
nuclear attack;
con equently, a portion of the missiles is not launched and gets destroyed. The disU''
bution moves to the left by the value of the delay. Yet the distribution type (ei03


normal, because the 1i i low. The final result is



d) < 1.0.

Fig. 10: lhfluence of CS type on form of distribution densrty of results.

rea1"tty, however it i
work inst~nta: extremely_ difficult to design a command

the speeds "th h" eously whtle under attack b
and control system
nuclear war th . fl
ey ewer mformation
d .
. . s eu b syeteme vary
in a dietributio:
of these factors is,
r m the>: vulnerabilities . In a
ftnal result ie hi ;at" stretched to the left.
outcomes r
.g er, when It IS less efficient t"t. 1
ystem Is Improved (CS-3) the
emarnapo "bT
• " ower (CS-4) A
y the level of . .d "' rtty. The probability of th
. ' noted earlier null
From Fig. \
in nuclear
when low) is deter,;ined
characteristic th' 1 Is obvwusly important to consid an hcontrol systems.
' e so-called " .
er anot er com
. ' shown in the d
regrme of saturation."
man and control


~ u~nce


;•g~ _centr~lization


comm;;~ e~en

. result
the left ' st rengthenmg
. s trnherealit
on\. ytoup
. rs,
to a certarn point. "Sthe
t command
. " and control system

"""•de th


y, a coheston graph Th
e system of command and


a uratron appears in thi
determi_ned bys ::c:r;
D effectiveness. In the


1 IJI: Nucleal' Command, Contl'ol, Coopel'ation
The Methodology: The Estimate of Nuc/eap Detel'l'ence Using ca






< N;n2


< Nin3









strengthening C 3

Fig. 11: Saturation of C3 systems.






above drawing on the right, we see the most saturated C 3 system possible under various
N . and with fixed BMD effectiveness . In previous drawings, the CS-1 and CS-2
variants implied a "saturated" command and control system; in CS-3 and 4, a nonsaturated one.
A study of the command and control system' effectiveness in executing its main
pw-pose - launching nuclear weapons (that is, with the u e of the distributive function
F'( 1) - suggests a possible interesting direction in streamlining the structure of the
system as regards necessary sufficiency. In Fig. 12, we can see a simplified command
and control structure. MC is a major, or general, channel from the ource (center) to
the "distributor." IC is an accounting, or individual, channel from the "distributor" to
each receiver (nudear weapons carrier). The study questioned the interdependence
between the character of the final distribution and probabilistic - temporary characteristics of the M and l channels. imulation showed that the final distribution
depends on them significantly.
Fig. 13 demonstrates the distributive function for the three variant of the 3 structw-e. Variant 1 presupposes high (close to maximally achievable) characteristics for
both 1C and IC. The final result is close to 1 over all the considered stretch of ·
Curve 2 describes the variant where the MC remain on the arne level, but the IC
characteri tics are much lower. Variant 3 is the opposite of variant 2. Which is better?
lflevel F'( J) 3 is sufficient for nuclear deterrence, then all variants are the same Uild~
low 1ud (i.e. N ud 1) , even though the first one is more expensiv . If ur1 is increaseb
t e
variant 2 may be found unacceptable. A comparison between variants 1 and favors
latter, since it costs less with the same acceptable result. This conclusion is dernott~



cha~ 1 ----;-di~du~






an system.




, ~~~------~--~3~


---- - ,--


--------, ___ _






I 11': Nucleal' Command, ,onti'Dl, coopet'ation

The Methodology: The Estimate Of Nuc/eap Detel'l'ence Using ca

. 11
the flow charts of the distribution density
· :b(N) correlating to the
strated v1sua Y on .
(See Fig. 14)
COOS!'d ere d distributive functwns.


It ;s important to '<member that this correlation ;s not carr;ed out exclusively on
the highest level - issuing o' not ;ssuU,g the launch n,d,,. Subsystems that a'< Patel nf
the general configuration and deal whh la,ge g,-oups of carriers of va'ious types, also
make a difference. Therefore, ll any such subsystem fails, the 6nal value of retal;ation
is changed. As a =ult of th;s, the statistical dist,ibution may have a multimode chatcacter. For example, let us demonstrate a few such pmbable types of d;str;bution h
the d;fferent Vatciants of the command and contm] system (F;g. 15).






Fig. 14: orstributlon densities for same cs structures which are shown in Fig. 13.

iuce the immediate "source"
tiono what i preferable - a

1 we may pose this quesfor

is~::.:::;:;: or :::~twork

d~ta ;:;;~~:


~r. ~:tof sufficieocy, the channel~ ap::'a~m:er of units

In the search
( paraJ'l,'l·
S for a reas?na h . dividual channels mo tly defme I d
. 1 peakmg, t e m
f h
leve an
portant. Imp y s
'k ( 'thin the framework o t
in al d f'
the probabJhty
. . · · the stn e WI
1 · gener e m
. all
parbcipatmg m
ts and major channe s In .
. h ve a minun y
pas (the " Iuster effect") . It ts
· better to ba b 'lity of in uf.
erers), wht·1e t be cumman
of them reaching thetr targets .. d damage level than a higher pro a I ral con,;idcceptable probability of the r.e~uue h ld certainly be considered, yet gene
'f conditions s au
tc d
may be of pr<Ctical value.
trongly influ·
f h ommand and control system s
·ation of the noted depen e~c~
h · ctensttcs o t e c
• 1
Thes parttcu arc a; are crucial for further analy ts.
re that the conun•".
ence the
result, .anbin eli cussed here, it is important to no other factor.
ummanztng ever yt g
t on the final ce ult than any
and contJ·ol ysten:
groupings of nuclear weapons
is becau e of the ngld corre a o



~a gt·~a~r ~L~~::een


the C' system. The system guides the carriers the way a conductor conducts a choi,.
to include everyone, single out the basses and tenors, or make everyone s;.
at once.


. ch




Fig. 15: Possible types of distribution density for variants of CS structure.

Such chatcts a'e not at all ;n conflict w;th the earn, , statements on the three atceas of
theN values. The atceas of LOW and "0" 'ema;n ;ntact, while the LUA atcea may
COnsist of several sepatcate "f'>gments." All those details atce determined statistically,
according to the results of repeated simulations.


Pracucal Aspects or the Method

In this Part, we atce goU,g to '<view various aspects nf the suggested method that chatc·
''let:tze its P'>ctical value. We will try to d'aw some conclusions with ;ts help, and clatc;fy
of methodo!og;cal questions. The fmal goal of this 'eview ;, to decide whether
lllethod has a futu,., and is wo,thwh;Je to continue developing and ;mplementing.



1 C': NucleaP Command, COntJtol, COOIHH'ation

Fac: .

rem~mo: ~:;'.nical

'I'S Upon Rna/ 0/stl'/but/on
d control sy tern's char- · of CePII/n
nfluence of the command an that tho'*' characterLet us
parameters and
• We saw intl1
cteristic on e t'lpe
· systems ts.
., . o 10 f two factors - the

a. S.l




a tics consist, in thw turn, o£ ton the sy tern's componend. on two more important
degree of the enemy's ef
the final pictme depen
nuclear warheads ( ,J
t I . ow useful to look at
h ;..,;tial general number
. al and nuclear att IS n
. . . l data _ t e ""
, convenban
s in reducmg
. the oum er o
of the . tmtta ber is reduce d bY the enemy
. ess of the enemy s
the amount thts num
. and the effecbven
. 17).


nuclear warheads that reac
tacks (Ftg. 16),




When the levels of C' and the eneruy's BMD are constant, the greater inhial poten ·
tial of the strategic nuclear forces, the higher the final result, i.e. effectivene,. of deterrence. Let us note that, at a high initial N, it is easier to create a conunand and control
system that is needed for achieving the required results .
The more effective the enemy's BMD, the lower (when N. and C' are constant) is
the probability of achieving the desired result of nuclear forces retaliatory actions. It is
also clear that if the N,. is higher in the figure above, the curves will go higher.

On /he llisll'flnnlve fllm:lltm 8IRf Malhem8tic6{ ~lltm


Many works in this area have used mathematical expectation (m) as the main indicator of effectiveness. It is, however, well known from the probability theory that the
distributive function provides a fuller description of a random value than mathematical expectation.
demonstrated very clearly that this is especially true while

I of c3and enem Y's BMO
Leve s are constant


0t ut t
0 Lmll! tt





Fig, 16: Influence of N• on distribution function.









k -Nwh(ln)


0llnJJ /,11_ _ll_ _ __


a_--- ._.~NWh(lo)




Levels of Nln and C
are constant


' 2,ooo






Fig. 17: Influence of BMO systems on lstr~lbutlon function.

i.:=::•~o~11rnscm be!Woen rnolhernelloaleKpecfallon

(m)eOd del..,.noa ln<fe•

..... ,, ''"'ly .....,....,........,.,.,•••,, .. '"'""•lion.



1 f!: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation
Tho MethodoJ.
'Ogy: The Estimate ot Nucleap o.
'IJiePPenco Using ca

Let us compare the conclusions that may be drawn on the basis of conditional initial
data by applying m and F'(N). To make it more graphic, we will review discrete distributions for only 10 realizations on a statistical model. Equivalents of those distributions with the use of real initial data and the required number of simulations do exist.
(Fig. 18)

fl ~2,oo;-o~~~N

0 .______









m is much greater than Nuct· But
that is quite below 1.0.





With m close to NUd, probability of P(N~) may be
below Q_5, the distribution law difters from the norm.





m Is already lower than the required level Nud(~ 1 ,000),




P(N ~ Nud)

is only 0.6,





6, 000

while probability P(N<?:Nud) remains unchanged at 0.4.

m is substantially smaller than Nuct' while the value of

Fig. 19:

Extreme cases

P(Nuct) can be considered sufficient for deterrence.

From the table it i clear that using '( J) provides more information than m. For
xample, even when m is considerably higher than ud' the probability of unacceptable
damage is still far from 1. Also, while m changes over a wide range (from 1,250 to 830)
the value of f'(Nud) remains unchanged (0.4). peaking of sufficiency, the table demonstrates the following: when using m, the allowable reduction in the initial number of
nuclear units is 50 percent; further reduction is impossible ince m is less than ud ' The
conclu ion is somewhat different when applying the distributive function: the 33 per·
cent l vel also proves acceptable; a for the 17 percent level. everything depends on our
attitude to the value of P( ~ •• ) = 0_2 . If this is a sufficient deten-ing factor (this is,
after all, the probability of unacceptable damage!) then such a level of reduction i also
acceptable. This cannot be seen when using only m.
The difference in the amount of ioforrnatioo between using m or F' J) i even more
obviou, when considering extreme ituations. (Fig. 19)
In the top drawing, the result is zero in eight out of 10 simulation , while in the two
other cases it equals 5,000 warhead . Mathematical expectation = 1,000. Jn the lower
drawing, with a clifferent control and command system, zero result appears only in o!\t
simulation, while in nine cases 1,000 o 1,100 warheads reached their targ ts.
ematical xpectation is still about 1,000. But there is a huge difference in tbe
indicator: 0.2 in th first scenario and about 0.9 in the econd one. The physical
teristic of th two compared command and control ystems are very concrete;
the study of the di tributive function is crucial.
Of course, mathematical expectation can certainly be used as an_additional i

for general orientation It
ho:vever, that "m::::: 1,2~0 "may be noted along with dis


thi:~:I~~l::c;. a. z~viint~
va ues, that th
. Is much

~w precise is uch an .
e probability of unacceptcounttn ) f
sttmate> E
g o transition points . . - v:rything depend
range of value . Bo
m discrete distributi
on the correct tally;... (
r example fc
on . t would b
..., .g acand ror
Variant 4
. ' or van aut 1 .
useful to
pend on th
~ ~(1 ;:::900-7-1,000):::: 0 2 , we may ay that P( >950-=- provJde hat
. . A awhole,a u ual - . - 1,050)=:0.6,
Let us al o rem b .
data when using e-th
, precise estimates d
area. F'( )
em ' that ,[ m signif1
., .
er m or '( T).
eu<J means the
. b b. .
a Pomt" (
~alur example for variant 1prtol· a llJty of all numbers hig~veralge PoJnt), then F'( ) is an
Ues ar
, lOse valu
•ter t 1an
· P
ar 1500 600
ud ' I.e_ ( r;;:;l
) I
able to che unacceptable rwr tI1e enem e A
' • , an 6 000
ut1 ·
~ I .aracterize all th "Jefi
~; . t lbe sam time, witl• ·b war eads. AJJ these
P( ; ~· ~~ that very same varia~:~· . t. e_, for the val u
T~ t help ofF'( ) \V ar
sufficie, ) - 0.1. This j of no s
'.t follows that P( r;;:; 00) =: utl down to z ro_ For
ley Problem.
maH Importance for an all
0. 9 and, a cordingly
-ptupo e
I .
eva uat,on of tbe
Reduction ot s,

Let us tr
'tPateg;c Nuc/eap fl
lined ab Y to review this c
'OI'Ces and Sll/liciencu
ove and .
ornp ex and
1 ·r
Fig. 20 , .. With the under
. rnu tliaceted proble


:;clear for:~a~~~=t the ~ssence 0~t~:d::t~:~ t~is is. only one :p~~~/;~;P~oach outenelb.y Rt..1D

s wh,le guarant .
o estimating the d . . oa problem.
and the cornrn ;emg effective deterrence \M a missible reduction of
an and control system a
e assume that the level
re constant. In th.
Is case, when




I £!: Nuclear Command, Contl'ol' Cooperation

lear forces
in ) • the probabi1. nu~turaUy,
initial potential of strategtc
f~r both
consistently <educmJ thege to the enemy iS<educedB 1 etc. should be taken m conity of unacc ptable am~ al and nuclear weapons,
"d to develop conventt~n
st es
whenever posstble.

""'-..,., " " ' - . , - - - ...... I BJ
levels is necessary; in this case, the concept of a detwing factor acquires a fuller, differamounts
of money.
ent meaning.
This is even truce because each increase in probability costs substantia]


Subiciency and the Ci'itel'ion ot Cost Ehecuveness

The greatest significance of the economic aspect of deterrence lies in the huge investments put into strategic nuclear forces. A. crucial question arises: what is the relationship between the savings from strategic force reductions and the cost of maintaining a deterrence potential even at the minimum necessary level?




initial potential
of SNF
(warheads number)

Here, too, we should mention the important contribution of the command and control system. First of all, the defensive character of our military doctrine requires the
speedy creation of a command and control system that can Pmvide effective deterrence even if our strategic nuclear forces have to catty out a delayed retaliatoty strike.
Secondly, on top of those "initial" expenses, the command and control system demands
long term investments in order for it to compensate for any reduction in deterrence as
a result of genera[ strategic force reductions. Costs for developing conunand and control systems are quite comparable with savings through general nuclear force reductions, since they will be, for the most part, costs for operating existing weapons only.
The following Fig. 21 shows one of the possible relationships between savings and
expenditures, and should clarify certain peculiarities:
/::, c (billion rubles)

expenses on C ~
providing requested
level of F'(Nud)
e for opponent
unacceptable damaJI that reach target)
(number of warhea s

savings due to
SNF reduction

Fig. 2ll: Influence of nuclear arms red uction on value of deterrence Inde x P(NzNw ).

~~ :~nb<aeing



Down to what p<obab;.


10 f damage should w e reduce.? This
lue and what leve
olitical, and
· ·
all aspects:
disarmament ;o



we_cl_a n:~

a very compli"":ted
levels is a key
trate that
cal. The question o_ d Tl1e goal of this chapter IS o : for the probabtltY
ly stud1e. · n1 damage eve 1s. Accountmg
being mtense
ourselves to researchmg o y


SNF reduction


Fig. >1' ConelotJon be'-n expenses on C' and sov;ngs due lo SNF <educf;on.


the X •xis We can see the degree of reduction in present day levels of strategic
ear forces; on theY axis, we find costs or savings. With a 75 percent nuclear force


1 IJI: NucleBI' Command, Contl'ol, Coopel'ation
The MelhodoJogy; The Estimate
of Nuc/eal' Detel'l'ence Using

reduction and an established value for the main effectiveness indicator F'(N), we reach
the limit beyond which any increase in spending for the command and control system
does not result in an increased F'(N) (the saturation/regime ofC 3). If we reduce nuclear
forces down to 50 percent, 3 expenses may be lower than the savings on the nuclear
strategic forces themselves. This is the favorable ar a from the point of view of savings.
In the area between 50 percent and 75 percent fore reduction, 3 expenses exceed
savings; the deeper the reduction, the faster this difference grows. The optimal parameter should be located in this latter area - the boundary beyond which additional
expenses will not be justified by strategic force reductions.
It is clear from previous chapters that if a different, lower value of F'(Nud) is established, or the value of Nud itself is reduced, then the savings will allow deeper reductions in nuclear forces (more than 75 percent) .


~tack against C3:


The Al'ea of Stability

ince the command and control system plays such a crucial part in nuclear de~er­
rence, i would be interesting to consider how the strength of counterm asures ag
it would be reflected in the final result. Is it pos ible to totally uppre s the system,
that the probability of the aggres or's side receiving exces ive damage will not be
than acceptable? alculations have d monstrated that thi is a challenging task.
The graphs (Fig. 22) show the possible changes in the valu ofF'( ud) under
influence of increased ratio of expenses for an attack against the command and
system ( ..), and xpenses for protecting it ( ,J Thu , on the X axis the ratio is

With both conventional
and nuclear Weapons


Possibility ot an Asymmetl'lcal Decision

Analyzing the problem of ufficiency with the use of the F'( ) indicator allows a
new approach to the que tion of asymmetry. As is known, this problem is caused by
differences in conditions, primarily geographical, for the nuclear forces of the nited
tates and Russia. In the .n ited tates, those conditions are more favorable, especially
for both weapons and command and control systems.
When estimating equivalent initial nuclear potentials, it seems that the final result,
i.e. the damage, may be different. To phrase it more correctly, the differences will not
be in the damage itself, but in the probabi lities of the same damage lev ls for both
ides. For example if ud is the same, for one side P(N> ud) 0.6, while for t he other
side it is only 0.4.
But such degrees of risk may be as una ceptable for both sides as may be 0.5, and
0. , etc. Everything depend on the established deterrence parameter. Thus, it ap·
pears that up to a certain level of equal reduction, asymmetry need not be considered at
all. And this minimal level of equivalent redu tion may be lower than wh n ori nting
ouTselve only to the damage level.
Later, either asymmetrical reductions in strategic forces or reductions in the levels
of ud and P( ~ uJ) a agreed by the parties will, of course, become necessary.








with more eft .
based on new hect!ve means,
P YSical principles








~ P~mtbed1arts_i_t-.----.----------~~==::~~~~~~~::::::~~
Slll~elationship C



1numbers" • .

~bvtous that the depend

nee of .


a non-linear on 0
the fmal result on th
itland and co
marufests itself, whi h
. n the lower level ofF'( )
~'value of
dian _£i·oJn 0. 7~:~~6 ysTtelt~·. it is much ~ar~:~~ thdat, using I:1easures agai~:·: t:effect of
ting eli
· 11s 1s
re uc the f a1
comr . able syste
fi eqUJval l1t to the weJJ k
.111 . result fiom 0.2 to 0 1
Way, It is hard fo7 th~~1lfi uff!cient number o;~\:: ~rlii'nbcJJple of the possibility ~f

e endmg s'd

· Je a e camp
e to mamtain F'( I)
onents. In the
on a very high level: for

cs I



1 IJI: Nuc/eal' Command, Contl'ol, Coopel'atton
The Methodology; The Estimate

example, to maintain it within the parameters 0.90-0.95, the defender has to invest
more in maintaining the system than the aggressor in its suppressjon.
Yet, as noted earlier. the whole pojnt is that very high levels of '(N ) are not needed
to maintain reliable deterrence. And under lower lev l of this indicator, the correlaion of expenses becomes favorable for th defender; the lower this lev I the higher the
differ nee in those expen es.
Summing it all up, we should mention the potential preSe.t1 e of a certain stability (a
reserve of reliabjlity) when asymmetrical (lesser) efforts by the defender will, for practical purposes, neutralize the aggres or's much higher expenses, tbu maintaining the
threat of a final result tha would be unacceptable for th aggressor.
Adjusting the upper limit of the stability area is made possible by establishing a
corresponding value for the initial potential of strategic nuclear forces (Nu). The higher
the in' the higher the level at which it is po sible to achieve this upper boundary.
The upper chart in Fig. 22 shows interde endencie under condition when tne adversaries use both conventional and nuclear weapon . The lower chart shows a situation in which the opponents us m.or effective weapons ba ed on new physical principles. recise estimated value are only achievable wi h sufficiently reliable initial
data; it seem , however, that the essence of existing interdependencies will remain.
If those areas of stability are realistically achievable (considering the economic potential of each side), this factor may be of consid rable practical impo1tance. In this
case, allocating sufficient means for complete suppression of the command and control
system make,-; no sense; this may lead, in its turn, to changes in strategy in wruch most
resources are used to destroy weapon systems themselves, primarily nuclear weapons.
The goal of such a strategy would be to achieve th same resul without attacking the
con·unand and control system, but cone ntrating instead on reducing the enemy's weapons' potential below the lev-el of LU)acceptable dan1age. It is approximately the same as
the transition from curve 3 to curve 2 in the drawing illustrating the rational structure
of the command and control system (Fig. 23). Curve 3 favors the defender; curve 2 is
more favorable for the aggressor.
Today a significant portion of resources is intended for suppressing command and
control systems. This, and the fact that the strategies and levels of weapons on both
sides are now subject to negotiations, make the above considerations quite important.
Further studies on this question would serve a good purpose.

3.5.7 Tl'anslol'mation of the F'(NJ Function into an F'(WJ Function
Up to this point we have been using the F(N) type distributive function, where ~
the number of warheads reaching their targets on the aggressor nation's territory. 'fhl5
parameter is widely used in most studies and we will continue using it. Sometimes, ho~ ."
ever, it is useful to introduce another concept - the damage to the enemy. We will cod~ Jt
as the letter W. Since W is also a random value, we will be talking about the distributl
function ofF'(W). One needs to know how to change from one function to another·

of NucJeap Oetel'l'ence Using ca




1 • initial ("avera e"
2 - means of des~u~ ~trategy of attack;
towards strength:n~~ are ~edlstrlbuted
the warheads the
9 the•r attack against
the attack agalnst~elves, thus reducing
3 • (reverse lnterdependen
!rates on c3whife d
cy~: attack concancarriers.
ecreasmg against the




Fig. 23: Influence of atta k

c strategy on the form of F'llJrtfi
, ••' tinction.

Among various · t
In erpretations of "d
to se1e t
..c a general indicator W
. amag
e, " th e one most useful £
conditwnal integrated p·ot . 1, which Is expressed in the
or our purposes is
entia Th
percentage f th
. .
en t e process of sw 't h'
e enemy's
appears to be rather u
lation of nuclear w ncomplicated. It consists of the£ 111 c .mg from F'(N) to F'(W)
Each of these warheaard, a .grou? of warheads that have fioulf~wllmdg hst~ps. For each simu 1 e
t en . .
s Is assigned . d
usmg strategic nuclear £
In a vance to a specific t
mission appears.
orces. J?uring each simulation . .arget 1? the battle plan for
magnitude of dama
gets). Then sum ~e by analyzmg the "successful"
'~t Js possible to establish the

mmg up all simulatio
war eads (that reach d h .
Is method is applic bl 'f h
ns, we can arrive at F'(W)
e t elf tarage of th · · ·
a e 1 t e dama W ·
e Initial potenti 1 B
IS expressed b
. .
tors that include 't
~ . ut the damage may also b
y one Indicator: a percentThere is a method! v~nous aspe~ts - military, indust:i~~pres~nted b~ several indica tlJe rnodeJ, the su
;l~~ble for this situation also Wh ' socJa.l, environmental, etc
type of answer. Umo: succes~ful" warheads (de~tro e~ntanalyzmg each simulation i~
We use a P(W>W p
completmg our simulatio
argets), provides a 'yes-n ,
of damage ac - d :eq) type point evaluation W n~, !?stead of the distributive funct' o
cor mgt 11 h .
Is mterp t d
''Or the sak f
o a t e Indicators.
re e as an integral esti·m t
F'(:~. r
e o con
!~)and F'(W)
vemence, we will be . b

usmg oth t
f ·
' pen mg on the material
ypes o distributive functJ.

. 1t is not
rng the Enemy's Stl'ategy
lb... I
necessary t
-•ttl atin
o go Into a d '1
g, to select th
eta! ed explanation f h
~ear w
e enemy s m
o ow 1mpo t
· .
eapons carriers th
ost ratJOnal strategy of atta k
. r ant Jt ls, when
, e command and control
c agamst the opponent's
system, and the GIS .
'm order to



102 1 IJI: Nucleal' Command, Contl'ol, Coopel'ation
The Methodology: 1h

reach a reliable estimate of the final outcome.
We start with the initial assumption that a potential aggressor who is planning a
nuclear strike will address the problem of distributing all his military potential (conventional, nuclear, radio-electronic warfare) between existing targets. In any case, we
know that his means of attack are limited (especially his nuclear weapons) .
The approach presented here allows for rather flexible prognoses of potential solutions to the aggressor's problem. Since we have selected P(N:::::Nud) or P(W:::::Wud) as
common indicators for all nuclear retaliatory actions, it would be logical to use the same
indicators to select rational strategies for the opponent's planned attack.
To simplify our argument, let us assume that all the elements of the GIS are part of
the command and control system. (See Fig. 23) Thus we will be able to view the
opponent's problem as the need to distribute his means of destruction between two
types of targets - nuclear weapons carriers and the command and control system.
Curve 1 is the initial ("average") strategy of attack. Curve 2 reflects the changes
when the means of destruction are redistributed towards strengthening their attack
against the warheads themselves, thus weakening the attack against the command and
control system. Here the level of potential damage is reduced but its probability increases (the curve moves upwards to the left). Curve 3 is the reverse interdependency,
in which the brunt of attack is against the command and control system while fewer
weapons are targeted against the carriers. In this case, the curve moves down to the
right, that is, the level of potential damage increases, but its probability decreases.
The goal of each side's strategies may be to "maintain" the curve of the forecasted
final outcome in that area favorable for it. (Fig. 24)




costly victory"

strategy "with the risk of
guaranteed annihilation"
















1 I J
- - - - -L
2 I -; - - - I


I 3




----+-2 I ;- - - - I


Fig. 24: Goals of strategies of sides.

ca I


~h.e point where two per end.
sufficient for achievin th p
Icular lmes cross is the value of th . .
areas. Area 2. th
g e goal of deterrence. Th b
~mdzcator P(W~W )
Is e most accept bl £
e a ove rnentzo d 1'
gic goal is to keep th
a e or the opponent ifh . h
ne IDes form four
e entire curv f h .
e IS t e aggr
The arrow signifies th
e o t e distributive fiunct' F'( essor. Is stratee enemy's f£
W) · h '
zero. Our strategy'
e ort to reduce the ef£ t'
Wit In this area.
s goa Is to s th
ec zveness of
exceeds the deterr
ee at the curve F'(W)
our retaliation to
. ence parameter.
goes through area 3 th .
D unng
' at zs '

con firontat'
pos~Ible. !hose are shown in Fi;~4vanants in which neither goal is ach. d
Fig. 25 Illustrates a
.. .
Ieve are also
case In whzch th
2 o~ y,. plans the distribution of h . e en~my, unable to keep the curv ,
mams In areas 1 and 2 If h
Is offenszve assets in s h
e F (W) In area
t e en
· ·
uc a way th t th
case may be metaph . 11
erny Is still going to rz'sk
e curve reonca y c 11 d h
an attack h'
opponent deliberatel
a e t e strategy of "costl
, zs strategy in this
Y se ects a h' h
Y VIctory " Th'
than unacceptable.
zg probabzlity of darn
IS means the
age, ut at so
The opponent rn
rne eve11ower
ay c oose a d f£
nght section of Fi . 25
~ e~ent strategy, if he has . .
F'(W) goes throu gh
shows a distnbution of offens.
hmzte~ capabzlities. The
g areas 2 and 4 I h'
IVe weapons In wh' h
ues that are greater th
. n t Is case It is impo 'bl
Ic the curve
all h. "
an unacceptabl b
SSI e to exclud d
c t Is a strategy with th . k
e,. ut the probability is 1 . 1 e amage valre atJVe y low. We may
e ns of annihilation.,

strategy of "


'8 Estimate 0/ Nuc/eap Detel'/'ence Using

104 1 CS: Nuc/eBl' command,


The Methodology: Th E .
. " slimate o/ Nucleal' Detel'l'ence Using CB

The lower the levels ofW and Pare, the higher the temptation to start nuclear aggression under he two latter strategies. We are unable to predict which of the two
extremes the enemy would select if he risks an attack. From our point of view, therefore, it is not desirable to allow the use of either of the "unstable balance" versions
discussed above. The only variant with a guarantee should be the one in which the
curveF'(W ) goes tlu·ough three areas- 1. 3, and 4, with an expected damage level greater
than unacceptable and a high probability. Let us remember that establisrung a suffi cient value for P(W ;;::W ud) is a special que tion which is not considered in this work.
This method for rationalizing the enemy's trategies allows us to realistically evaluate in advance the current relationship between the different sides forces during peacetime. It may be that we are already in a state of unstable balance because the temptation is sufficiently high for a potential aggressor (if, for example, the distributive function is only in area 2 or goes through 1-2, 2-4). This is hardly a situat ion with which
anyone can be satisfied, and something hould be done. ...urve F '(W ) hould be
"forced" into area 3. liow do we achieve that? There are many ways: reduce the enemy's
impact· do not rush with the reduction of in. or perhap review together the value of
the deterrence indicator. That should be done both for lud and for the probability
values. In any ca e something should be done and the method . ugg sted here may be
of aid.

3.5.9 Independence ot Analysis ot the Command and Conll'ol System
When analyzing nuclear deterrence, purely military questions should be considered
in close connection with all aspects of the threat, including the moral, social, ecological,
and other indicators. This is an unavoidable condition, without which calculations
make no sense.
It is important to note, however, that this condition is only relevant for establishing
the value of unacceptable damage. In any case, once all threat factors have been gathered under this concept, in the end we ought to have a certain number of warheads,
with certain characteristics and with an optimal plan for their use. This indicator is
necessary in order to establish subsequently the required probability of delivering to
their targets no fewer than that number of warheads. And this probability, as we saw
before, is for the most part defined by the command and control system.
As for the command and control system itself, it may be analyzed separately from
the combination of factors mentioned above, since they are going to be taken into ac·
count in the assigned level of unacceptable damage. This is what we understand as the
independence of research on command and control system's sufficiency.
3.5.10 fol'ming Requil'ements lol' the Command and Contl'ol System
One of the most important practical aspects of the suggested approach is that it helps
to define the contribution of one or another command and control subsystem (or a
separate component) to the overall outcome. On this basis, it is then possible to assign



correspond·mg requirement
t h e syst ' h
s wr
are some general considerations fl d em .s ~ aracteristics. With that in . d h
trol systems
or etermmmg requireme t
min ' ere
n s to com
As we ha
man and conb
ve come to see, a command d
~anched cohesion graph. It incJ
a~ control system is quite a co
With various transm . .
udes a senes of ubsystems ( bl
mplex and
reache the caniers :;~o:thpe~d~· stability under enemy atta~: ~space, radio, etc.)
weapons carriers th t 1
er m Jcators. At the "end" of th ' egrees to which it
heads, etc.
a a so vary considerably in their sur . :~~ systems are nuclear
VIVa I Ity, numbers of war
I .
t Is clear that no matter how h d
ing the command and
ar we try, we will not succeed .
at least not from the po~ont trfol ~ystem and the weapons into twoi~ cotmpletely separatIn o VIew f
1 ·
au onomou "
In principle, it is possible to s o ana ysis .and estimating results.
s parts,
here are the ·
eparate them In this w . h
here is
. SIX command and control channels
~Y· ere Is a specific missile and
a different carrier - an SSBN It h
?f vanous types connected to 't ' B

::::~:;i!~i~: ~:::a~nels of a ddiffer~nt ty::. a;~~e;;:tn~~7:e;;;f wa~bheads a~d, f:

one stan ard.
y are we even talking about se

:~: wpi:atpuoren~?


possi e to bnng all


Unfortunately, attempis~:a:g otl~:nc~mnn1and and control systems from
Is presented ·
u ue even tod
Q ·
warheads, from which a~: an3 unaccept~bly pr-imitive way: Her:~~ Uite frequently,
command and c tt· J
ut ,000 sutv JVe by the time tal ' .
a ~oup of 6, 000
on o system that
re IC\tlon begins H
ons carriers with
gucuantees the delivery of d
. ere IS a
that the f ' a1 . anl ~verage" probability of 0 8 S th r or ers to the nuclear weapm resu tw 11 b
• ·
o, e 1ans ofth'
fs th .
e on tHe I vel of 2 400 w h d
Is approach reason
IS correct? Absolute!
ea s.
ological approa h
Y not.
e have already seen th t . h
not a point
c even the character of the final result is d'~ Wit t~e .correct methodSuch c . 1
1 erent- It Is a distribution
amp ete averaging .
exam 1 . . .
Is certamly absurd S .
Rock~ ~olt IS Im~oss~ble to say that the probabilito Is a more detailed averaging. For
ties are o/~:::mts .differs from the probability of Itso~:~h~rder reaching the Strategic
probabilities w'sthe,. different between the legs of the Strat .mNgSSlBNs . The probabili1
· are also d '£T egtc uc ear Rorces tna
ty Pe of ca . . In each leg of th e tnad
1 1erent )'(
' but
rner 1ts 1 t'
ment area et '
oca wn, the degree of the enemy'
. . o~ ave to consider the
s potential Impact in th d 1
' c.
But even
th' .
e ep oyIs IS not all w· h'
Probability of del' .
It In a specific subsystem f c3
One must not fl Ivenng orders in just one geographi 1 o
' one must discuss the
Problem with t~rg~t about the concepts of circularit ca darea with the greatest caution.
Let us ass
e aid of a simple abstract example y an ensemble. Let us review this
ave a space command and cant
n order fro
(space app m Earth (HMLCP) is passed ala th rol ~ystem as presented in Fig. 26
aratus SA) d
ng e maJor h
1 (M
an from it, along individual chan 1c ann~
C) to a satellite
ne s (IC) In a circular fashion.


I IJI: Nuclear Command, Conll'ol, Cooperation
The Methodology; The Estimate Of Nucleal' DBIBI'I'ence Using ca

HLMCP- high level military command post
SA - satellite apparatus
MC _ major channel
IC- Individual channel



them. We should not forget that in a real command and control system there will be
many such interconnected "brooms." Such a network is hard to describe in an analytical
way. The best result is the calculations provided by the statistical simulation model (SIM)
So, what is the correct approach to formulating requirements for the command and
control system under these conditions?
It appears that the most correct way would be to estimate its effectiveness according
to the final indicator P(N<-Nreq ). This Ls a so-called "external" indicator of the effectiveness. This author thinks that only external indicators should be used for the command and control system as a whole.
Naturally, they should be applied with a concrete grouping of nuclear strategic weapons in mind . C' and nuclear weapom are organically inseparable, and the indicator
P(N~Nreq ) is common for both of them.


0 0


o ____ o


nuclear carriers (-0.70 each)

Flg.26: "Circularity" and "ensemble."

. ch anne1(MC) to a satellite
d long the maJor
An order from Earth (HMLCP? ts pass~ d~ .dual channels (IC) in a circula~ fas?ton to
(space apparatus - SA) and from rt,_along '~ '~'which has 10 warheads. Consrdermgt~
100 identical nuclear weapons earners, eac o nts functioning is: HLMCP 0.9; M my
's attack, the probability of these eleme
th probability for IC to be about 1.0.
e we have a broom wtt
· h a h andle
0 8· SA= 0. ; carriers = 0.7 eac .
1 . ll ? Imagine
. How do we evaluate this result ana ytlca y.


(HLMCP, MC, SA) and a brush or ~wee~er (I~)~me delivery vehicles will have been
First of all, by the time the order .ts del:ve:e10~ multiplied by 0.7 =70. Altogether
ltiply probabilities for all parts ~f tl~e
estroyed. About 70 will still functtohn, stnc
we the
muprobability of the handl
they will have only 700 war h eads
_· 0T58enSo
. 's sur vtva
'ble to
broom's handle: 0.9 x 0.8 x 0.8 - .. h. b~en correct. But from here, tt ts posst
. tely 0 6 So far everythmg as
· ·
= . o,


ld supTh a nght or a wrong way. l . l the handle by the sweeper; 700 by 0. 6 h 420
e wrong chmce ts to mu ttp y
t' ate· about 400 warheads s ou
. d t the already £amt·1·tar pomt es tm ·
we've arnve o
. eithot
posedly reach their
t proach gives a totally different answder.(prob. t h oug h • us mg the correc
. 6) none o
In reality,
. t arg ets (t e pro b ab 1'lt'ty of this event ts 0 · or
700 warheads reac h t h etr
. d boUt
1 mentary factors, but we have to b e remtnde a
ability is 0.4). And t h at 's 1.t .
These are the simplest, most e e


Now, what to do with separate command and control subsystems, including newly
developed ones? For instance, for the SRF. We may, of course, form our requirements
for their contribution to the effectiveness of the SRF's retaliatory actions. It would be
to review this contribution with the whole SNF in mind, that is, using
the general
And, finally, how do we eMablish requirements for separate components (routes)
within a subsystem? Here we are talking about "internal" effectiveness indicators; that
is, the characteristics of the subsystem's components. In the example above, this means
performance probabilities of the HLMCP, MC, SA, and !C. Requirements for them
should be developed by breaking down the external indicator of the subsystem's effectiveness, and with consideration for each component's contribution and cost. And only
after that, on the basis of the established requirements for the probability of performance, we can develop strictly technical requirements for each component. These requirements will be checked during the subsystem's testing. After they are specified
and agreed
upon .during the tests, the final overall result may be elaborated with the
of the model
This is how we see the "ideal" way to develop and establish requirements for the
would allow for a more justified selection of priorities
and and


From all of the above, it follows that it is theoretically incorrect to talk about the
of delivering an order to the "ensemble" (SNF, SRF, etc.). Such a prubabil rty can be assigned only in relation to one addressee. And this can only be checked
durir>g testing. As for the command and control system as a whole, its effectiveness
he estimated
). only according to an external indicator. We suggest using the indicareq

li 11 Miscellaneous
Let approach.
Us introduce here some additional thoughts on the characteristics of the sug.

The Methodology: The Estimate of Nuc/eal' Oetel'l'ence Using ca

168 \ fJl: Nuclear command, contl'ol, cooperauon

This method permits us to appwach an understanding of such a novel category as
the minimal level of deterrence. It is important to emphasize that this will not be a
fixed value. On the way to deep nuclear arms reductions, the use of the suggested
generalized indicator P( " J,.) appears to be very convenient. Dudng each new step
toward reducing the deterrence threshold , each side may, by mutual consent, re-estimate both co[)lponents of the indicator; that is, the values of unacceptable damage as

;:~e~:~i:~ ~~::~:b:ity

a problem
in which no !ewer
than 500
d 0. 9 for

tainly guarante a certain damage value in aclvance, axceeding the unacceptable damage level with a considerable margin of safety. But the probability of such unacceptable damage in retaliatory strikes being equal to 1. 0 is theoretically unachievable. If
this value approaches\.0, itexcludes any opportunities for a strategic nuclear weapons
reduction and requires additional astronomic expenditures for the command and control system. The princi pie of "the more the better," that was applied until recent! y, has
no place if we are to resolve the problems of defense sufficiency. At the same time,
"guatanteed deterrence" may be achieved by establisOing rational values for the probability
It is of
too early to damage.
establish those acceptable levels of deterrence. It is necessary

Erst to study all possible probable outcomes of a nuclear war, taking into account fu ture weapons develop1nent and their costs.

It is interesting that unlike manY ideas proposed today, this approach does not bave
any costs. This is becau e all we are talking about i an improvement in the evaluation
system, making it more natural. Who said that the evaluation systems used before are
perfect and that there are no other ways? If we change our approach, maybe the whole
picture of strategic balance will look different. And savings, if there are any, could
reach billions. It i.s probably worth trying.

It is also important to note that this method of evaluation i most applicable exactly
to strategic nuclear weapons when the final result can be expressed using specific numerical values for damage, or for the number of warheads reaching their targets. for
conventional weapons, the task of estimating a level of reasonable sufficiency is more
challenging because of their widely varying uses, and the difficulty in electing a gen·
eralized indicator of their effectiveness. It is possible that using the approach suggested here for conventional weapons might turn out to be useful as well
This method has been considered from the standpoint of a "duel" between two sides,8
Russia and the United tates. 1f necessary, however, it can be extrapolated to much
broader group, including all current and potential members of the nuclear club. Aftot
all, everything will be determined by the degree of risk to a potential aggcessor
One more consideration is very important for the problem of sufficienCY· This
method assumes an iotegrated approach to estimating the deterrence factor, for b0$h
LUA and LOW strikes by, F. U estimates are done separately for L Wand L\JJ\,
a correspondingly high level of deterrence factor should be maintained. for· .,.amPle,


z~:a:dh;~e ;0~ ~e;;~ t~~r targets should be

~e, m order to receive the general I . ;e do rt m an intele':~~~o ~ave the p,jN ~500) = 0. 7 an~a;e ;;_.;~N~ 5~0) = 0. 9 it

is, simply speaking
costs considerably

And one last thing· th
s t e margm of sufficiency is qu't lula - 00)- 0.7. Thts
· e very cha t
1 e arge
way. Indeed , w h en we rae
c er o deterrence moves us t awards
us . · ·
dmannes, planes warh d
mg tt m a
o en 1a s h
ea s and · .

thmg only the milit
as ofisits
a good
time to clarif; the concept of "guaranteed retaliation." We cancer-






ow many sub-

when the threat is ary can understand, not ordinary pe 1s quBtte
like some'f'
ut 1t 1s
expressed by
wtth.a.certain prob abT
ea s over your h d1 lerent
1 tty o such an

specrfrc values of P(N>N )

event actually happenin

the expenses that

Th. .

ea ' and

- fud are accompanied by real numb g . .c lS lS true especially if
come rom th t
ers wr exp
the scale and cost ofh' /h
e axpayer's pocket. Here a
d' ens:s.
ese are
lS er own£
nor mary t'
tary. On the basis
the b usmess
. cr rzen
. of th e suggestedear.
meth "d cannot
. . remain
of thcan see
rna e y the entrre soC1ety,
o 'itrt d" obvrous. th. at such decisions should
e m"represented by
3 8d b
s emocrahc mstitutions.


Summary: Principles and Advan

We have reviewed the essenc f h tages ol the Suggested Approach
characteristics, and m thod
e ~ t e proposed approach to CJ
this field there . t e
. s for tts application. Altho h
assessment, tts main
ex1s s practicall
ug research i

~al audience. What follow


. y no summanzed description of the
crples and advantages th ts a summary of the method includ'
and implementation. ' a s ould serve as a
This method f
f . .
o assessment can b
su ftctency for CJ and strategic force:


s con ucted m
for a genprinr rmprovernent

motivatio~ its'~!!h: ~ethod's

levels of reasonable
. .
. lS ase on the fall .

. mutual deterr

. h
owmg pnnC1ples:
ence lS t e b . f
a potential aggress . dasts o strategic stability;
or lS eterred b th .
h tation;
y e nsk of unacce P t able d amage th


t e magnitude of the retaliatory da
. maximal values·
mage 1s rand om an d lS
· greatly dispersed- from
the t to




: of the retali
ype o artltstnbution and t h e d'tsperswn
forces bput y
ltlhe characteristics of the potent'a
.damage random value
espeC1a y
th h
1a vtctim's

and global . D
. 0 n e c aracteristics of the t
nuc ear weapons
arget s command and control
the risk rn ormahon systems;
to a potential a ggressor lS
· best expressed by th d
e eterrence indicator

level N[" )·'

o reasonablesufficiency for the


. .


on that the risk to h
potential vtctim is establ' h
acceptabl ( .
t e potential aggressor is t 1
ls ed by the cone asstgned), that is P(N2: N ) > P . no ower than what he considers



The Methodology·. The Estimate of Nuclear Deterrence Using CS


I 111

l C': Nuclear command, conll'ol, cooperation
tal committees, within parliaments
' etc. The nuclear threat is a seri ous rea1'rty costmg
. .of dollars.
when using this indicator, we may substitute for the traditional criterion of "costeffectiveness" the criterion of "cost-sufficiency." In this case, all spending above
the level of "reasonable sufficiency" will increase the safety margin of robustness
sufficiency of C' and strategic nuclear forces as a whole is a stable concept, in
that no matter how much the enemY spends on his SNF, the potential victim can
always maintain the effectiveness of his SNF at a level suffccient for deterrence

owmg lS a list of practical ta k
s s that can be accomplished using th'1s new approach to force assessment··
1) assess existing

c3systems according t o m. d.lCators of effectiveness and suff'rcrency·

ana yze the contribution
introduced into use) to




with the help of less expensive, asymmetrical measures.
The main advantage of this approach is that it may allow us to determine a quantitative substantiation for the concept of reasonable sufficiency. This refers not just to C' ,
but to the whole complex of strategic nuclear forces, including groups of nuclear weap·
ons carrier, global information systems and C'. This approach to assessment can also
point the way to a rational balance between all these p - of strategic nuclear forces,
thus providing the required deterrence level with the minimum expenses.
Three areas in which reserves of sufficiency can be opened up with the use of this
method should be pointed out:


co:baa~ye:fe:~:~~n::;o;~;:;system (being developed or

3) evaluate. the sufficiency of a program of

c3 development, and prioritize subsystems·

for newl d
4) d etermmereqmrements

level of a final outcome indicate; (r:~:r:~:~s;;;subsystems, based on an assigned

5) ?etermine the most rational allotment
m order to provide a required final re~~~:~sources among various C3 components,

te~lC ~uclear forces,

and of the C3 S r a senslbl~ rat.lO between the levels of stracntenon and various plans for SNF ::~:~i~:~pmg m mind "cost-effectiveness"

6) de~elop practical recommendations fo

1) An integrated assessment of the risks of both LOW and L UA. It is possible to

obtain a required value for the deterrence indicator with relatively smaller indica·
tors for LOW and LUA, which means reduction of general expenditures.
2) Limiting the missions of C' and accordingly, SNF as a whole, to deterrence of a
potential aggressor.
3) Establishing the value of the deterrence indicator at a reasonably minimal level,
by accepting, for example, F(N2: 1000.,) 0.8 as a sufficient probability, rather
than demanding the probability of 0.99. The 0.99 probability is unachievable
from a technical and economic point of view, and is not even necessarY for deterrence. (These numbers, however, are used merely as an example; we are not go·


ing to select them now.)
Even if these reserves do not result in big savings, and the calculated indicator of
deterrence turns out to be "on the edge" or dangerously low, obtaining this kind of
information can still be important for taking appropriate measures to prevent a nucleal
war. It can point out some answers to broader questions, such as, what are the valu•
and price of fear? And what is the real potential for a conflict?
This type of assessment may help bring about new thinking, and a better understanding of the concept of nuclear threat - that is, not only the scale of damage, but alSO:
its probability. In that case, the question of capabilities of nuclear weapons, GIS and C
needed for deterrence could be determined democratically by appropriate govern.,..-

. This approacl·
l t o assessment al
. so has a number f m th d I .
indicator P( >comp"': d to assessment by mathematical,: o. og>.cal advantage , param I 'f
- 1 ud) ts much easier to use tl
ctatlOn. Fmt of aU the
p e,' we want to
'an mat ex
warheads whil
or an unacceptable (required) le I fd pectatlOn. For ex'
e usmg math em t' al
ve o amag at a
a tc . expectation
we will rlave to ,force" the
roun . 1,000
. of the NF and t h e J syste
rs because any
m m or er· to we reach thi " . " .
composr ·
between actual and assi ned
pornt many ca e. That
'above" or "b 1
that point bec::w th.e requirement. Thus, there
would be consid red
Tl . di
es carved m stone.
t lty tn the assessm n -





i~ no~=~~:;.

~ac~~~ ~.cture.

1e ill cator propo d h
level (1
se ere, howeve ·,complete[ ch
ability) as a
7head ) can be. established
The cequired
econd it i
.·bI h range of vanability is broad fr
0 g he value of {probegy . '
posst etogetafullrand
d . ' om to1.0.
u mg th dist ·'b .
more etarled asses .
offunction (l'k
ubonfunction F'(r ). Ea h t e f . smento theenemy'sstratand the sam ' e fmgerprrn ts). Mathematical ex YP to . tt ategy corr sponds to a type
Third as e result with various strategic i e ; : c anon, however, may obtain one
ing the , n~ted before, the P( >
) : ;;:· a .method rs "not input ensitive"
of both L W ;;;,d
the threat, ackoowl dgtca expectation; simple averaging \~illuc mtegratiOn is not possible using
not work here.



"i'.~~ rcatorh~tegrates

The Methodology: The Estimate ot Nuclear Oetsrrencs Using C'


I t:': Nuclear command, Confl'OI' Cooperation

d The answer to the question of
ver thing cannot forever be aver~g~ . " es " The stimuli are strong
And fmally, e Y
h t tus quo is dehmtely Y ·
h d' · plementawhether we should challenge t e st~ ractical steps of this new met o s 1ffi
h Before thinking through e p
f the challenges ahead.
e~ougth.e following chapter will look at some o


Implementation ProblemS

t .mplementing the discussed method.
t mind·
oblems on the way 0 1
There are numerous pr r icture three major problems come ~ k estimate without
For the sake of the broade ~tee the acceptable accuracy of the ns ts of this problem
First, how can we gu~ra l security? At first glance, the twoh~ar pect Obviously,
·d 's natwna
t t on t 1s as
hurtmg e1t er s~ e h ther which is why we concen rae . d
valid by the conseem to contradiCt ea~ o l ' d the method will be recogmze as bl'
d' .
s reso ve
t the pu 1C.
if this contra 1Ctl0n ~l't
and political leadership, par 1amen. • for implementing it
sumer; that is, the ffi1 1 ary
seen as valid, a mechamsm
te ic offensive weapons .
d if the method comes to b~ .
'll lways remain. That 1S,
Secon '
d . 'tially for negotlatwns on stra ~


sho;~ ~~i~~e::~ fi~~l problte~ ~~~et~:o~:;a%~~ ~~: ~;~seahas ~ee;:tseqa~:~t:~::

'f h
thad 1S accep e
l' bl deterrence.
even·l· t e me
ld be applied as sufficient for r~ ~a e dhow will this deterrence
speC1f1c value shou - he value and the probab1hty. An. . ? What trends will apfor both component~ ~h eneral picture of strateg1c stab1hty . . d here besides the
indicator integrate w1th ?e ~hat are the other aspects .t~ c~ns1 ~r It is 'certainly not
pear as its value cha~ges. - moral , philosophical, pohtlC~' etc.:th'n the framework
t all those quest1ons wr 1
'litary and economlC ones . .
.d dects1ve answers o
f h
w to provr e
'th me o t em.
posst e ~o
We will try to deal JUSt w~ s.o
hole series of derivat1Ve
of this thtrd pro~lemh.
blems in detail, we w1ll d1scover awl 'f . g of initial data,
1 zmg t e pro
. . f
the c assl y1n
When ana y
atural difficulties ansmg rom . . .tial data in probab1hty
f trust towards the
questions: overcommg ~ technical problem of representmg ~m
that is, secrecy; t~e pu~~ y human factor into account; the 1SSlue o
of other prob·
formulas, includtng ~a .mg a d his behavior; as well as a who e group
artner in the negottatwns, an
l of ob·
.is difficult and seems to
ferns . We will
Though gettmg starte on
that as we have become conv f l e Apf
t the advantages
ower u on .
We have a motivation, and a very p 1 then established
stacles, let us not org~ .
gested approa~h m~Y nng~ matic way, we first tried to.see thehgoa' best sense, the
proaching the tssue m a sys e 1 k at ways of reaching lt. In t e v~ry the rnost chal·
its attractiveness, and now we {; this idea support us while ~alyz~~~ strong m.otiva·
goal here justifies the means. d l t us say even in advance t at, Wl
nd doubtful aspects, an e
lengmg a
they can all be overcome.

t~y addr~ss


ACCUI'BCY of the


~sk Estlm~e

The reliability of estlrnates un er s

cons~::~:. ~he su~·

hthePreirnulation, as we know, depends on bot

1 113

ci ion of the model itself and on the precision of initial data. L et us establish at once that
it is po sible to create such a IM, whose precision will sati fy the requirements for
estimating degrees of risk. Remember that to estimate the degree of risk from the standpoint of deterrence, it is quite sufficient to go to one decimal: the probability of unacceptable damage at level 0.5 or 0. (not 0.73 or 0.76). In an extreme ca e, arriving at the
second decimal present no problem either.
The initial data are a different story. Whatever you enter into the system will determine t he outcome. Errors in initial data may b much wor e than the impreci ion of
the model itself. Therefore, we will pay all our further attention to the question of
reliable initial data.
Remember that, in our case, the set of initial data includes, for each variant, a combination of nuclear weapon delivery sy terns, their C3 system , and the I , all of which,
in a model, represent a graph of cohesion. The component of this combination are the
graph nodes while the communication channels between them are the curves of the
Let us now break the whole set of initial data into two groups.
The first group includes the data that determine the initial graph structure and its
characteristics in peacetime. Assigning this type of data presents no great challenge
for each specific variant. W take the required number of various types of delivery
vehicles, establish their~ Jocations, then a sign probability cha1·acteristics to all parts
and curves between them for functioning in peacetime. The characteristics are determined by operational documentation and confirmed by experience; prospective systems use the system characteristics that are stated in the technical specifications.
The second group of initial data is the data that determine the probable performance
characteristics of tho e same components during military action, taking into consideration an enemy assault with all availabl means. uring a statistical simulation on the
computer, each component and curve is randomly assigned, based on established probability, to a tate of "yes" or "no." A summary result is then e tablished from each
simulation. These general principle of simulation have been discussed earlier, and we
will not go over t hem here. Let us only emphasize that as a result of the enemy's attack,
all probabilistic and temporal characteristics for all of the graph's elements will be worse
than in peacetime. And the more optimal the enemy's strategy - that is, the distribution of his assault means between all the graph 's components and curves - the better
the result for the enemy and the worse for us. That is why, for each studied variant, we
should try to establish th most rational strategies for the enemy.
How do we do that?
. First, let us note that, for each separate type of conlponent or curve (missile, ubma~lne, command post, communications channel, etc.), the probability of its performanc
epends on the intensity of the enemy's assault. or xamp.le, it is known that in order
:destroy a mobile missile launcher of n-type with a probability of 0.7 the enemy
Ould use no fewer than 10 warheads of such and such power. H we need to increase

114 1 fJI: Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation

The Methodology; The Estimate O/ Nucteap Deterl'ence Using ca

the probability, for example, up to 0.8, then we should increase the strength of attack
up to 15 warheads. And so on (the numbers are relative). Each side has approved nomograms and schedules, which may be periodically reviewed and refined, but can be
used in a concrete study as fixed initial data. This is true for all components and curves.
But all this applies to separately analyzed elements. "For the enemy," however, we
have to distribute all resources for the entire graph. This is also not a new problem, and
has been solved in many studies. We will pay attention only to two crucial aspects.
First of all, we have to determine which strategy is better for the enemy. Often it is
thought that this criterion is the least number of our warheads launched. But we are
already convinced that point estimates provide too little information. It is easy to demonstrate that we can arrive at the same minimal number Nwh under a whole series of
very different offensive strategies. It would, therefore, seem more correct to use the
entire curve of the distributive function F(N) (see 3.5.8) as the criterion. Here each
strategy means a curve, so there is no ambiguity. Which curve is better? Let us leave
this question to the consumer's taste. We will express some of our thoughts at the end
of this chapter. For now, let us decide that we do have a fixed criterion.
Even that is not enough. To resolve the distribution problem, we have a criterion, an
apparatus for each component, and data on the enemy's resources (approximated)! Now
we have to go to the object of suppression -that is, our cohesion graph.
An attentive reader would ask: "But we do have our own cohesion graph; what's the
But the trick is that the graph in our possession is not sufficient. The enemy should
have the above-mentioned data, too. Let us think - the solution for this distribution
problem is a strictly bilateral process. It is as if we are thinking for the enemy, suggesting the strategies rational for him. How can he distribute his weapons rationally without any knowledge of the object to be suppressed? Thus, we have to consider the highest possible degree of knowledge on his part.
Here, it seems, we have arrived at our first really serious difficulty. The enemy knows
his resources; we can reach agreement with him on the final criteria and nomograms
for each component, but how do we take into consideration his knowledge of us? What
does he know about the components, structure, and properties of our cohesion graph?
Realistically, he needs to know about our SNF groupings, command and control system, and the GIS. But no side will completely reveal such data "off hand" because of
concerns about its national security interests. Without those data, we will not be able
to obtain results for the minimal deterrence levels. What are we to do?
We've come to one of the most important questions in this whole discussion - the
question of availability of data, the question of secrecy. This is an obstacle on the way
to our final goal, and as such, it should be resolved.
A few years ago, even posing this question made no sense. Today, there is a cer~~
hope that it may be positively resolved, based on the experience each side has acqwr
in reducing nuclear weapons themselves.



Indeed it has b
come poss1bl t d 1 ·
sue l formerly super s
o c a. stfy th fil· t part f
- Jcjr t areas as the number and ty
fo our cohesion graph,
delivery vehicles
as we as th · d 1
pes o nude
over reducing them W
etr ep oyment ar as and t .
. ar war1leads and
hy shouJdn t we b able to d, ·h o e tablish mutual control
the graph the
command a d
o t e same fi · tl
interests of botll sid ?
n control system and the I
. 1 or le second part of
, WH' lOut h . ·
Unfortunately, our tb ' k'
aunmg security
m mg has b
prevads that even if dedas if' .
een c anging too lowly E
come possible, command dlcatton of information about the.
ven now the opinion


This is certainly a mist: cottr~ an_d information system:~~~o~s proper has beaccess to command and contr . n t e ftrst place, without reso/vi u ~ever be.
I _ol systems data, we cannot ev
lk ng tlus question of
minimal deterr nc
command and conti:o1 na yzmg only the weapons themsel en ta . ~Lbout .the problem of
systems and th
vesl WltJIOut 1 1 d'
econd, we ought at least to tt
e ' .' WllJ not allow this probl
nc u mg their
the perspective of whi I
a mpt to look at the command d em to be resolved.
l part are "d 1
an control
nattonaJ security p ·l
ec a sifiab/ " witll t h
syst m trom
. et lap Oltr fc . .
ou at:n111lg th .
even tned to analyz tl . L eazs rue omewhat exaggerat d ? U
e Interests of
Let us break all th us.. et us try to do it now at least e 1·. p to now, no one has
e mam dat
on t le mo t
thre groups.
a on t e command and con 1
s general level.
tro system and the 1 .
TLle f1r
t group of d· t .
a a mclude tl t ·-c
ea other, which make n
la lw.ormatlon both side
dude, for example th 1 o _ense to conceal. Tlus will b
know very well about
' e ocat.10n
d b .e[
e ea y to agr .
mand posts and commu . . an c I . characteristics of th
. e on.
ley 111and communjcation sy t DlcatJon_ facilities; the presence of gl ~~~am tationary comnications technolocr . h ems; maJor cable routes; the par
. o. a command, control
ecaJ princi.ple of tobhy, t nomenclature of the main com ameters of standard conunu.
e command d
ponents ofth . 1 .
rnents, tlus Ji will
. I
. ao control systems and I
.e gtap and genThe s cond . camp .ment our cohesion graph
. After additional agree.
group cons1sts of th d
cu:cumstances ~rh·
e ata that shou ld
Js group t Lf .c
not e d 1 '£·
are of no importance fo .
~ se . !ails into two parts. On s
ec assi_ led under any
~e Potentia/ opponeotr :olvmg our problem. For xample t~b~group ~~ th data that
State lumbe ") .
now the codes for blocki
1• Jete nev.e r Js a need to 1 t
r , or the valu fi
ng nuc ear wea
e other sub.gro
es or the encryption ke s fi
po~ts t11 so-caHed
ll1auce tabilit
up mdud the data that have. . y or commurucation charnlel
b declassified.
.e over the graph's perfor-·
~o fteguencies in~ mo J!e nuclear weapons carriers and, .or example, the schedule of
at determine ;h ormbati?n transmission times and tl command posts, working ra are c .
e pro ab11i ti h
o 1ers. Tho
. h
onsldered in th
c aracter of th ~graph
e a.~:e t e very data
~lllPle, the enem e~bove mentioned tandard initial components' performance, and
ln Ows th approx/ . ows t!1at such and such ty of no:ograms and schedules. For
ow the frequ 11c;:; (o~ ~t may b declassifie~ by :~~ ~~~ c)olmnu~nd post exists, he
posJtron change A
ocatJOn but does
· n approp t
na e nomograms ill
w an wer the


~~sition chan~sb~t tha~~hould


Ths Mslhodotogy: The Estimate oti'Jucteal' DetBI'I'ence Using C3 1 117
118 \ fJI: Nucleal' command, contl'ol, coopel'atlon

. .
ere uired probability. Coordi.
means are needed to destroy 1t W1th th ~is a complicated business,
questwn of what
.th every component of the grap.
. . 1 it is technically
nating these nomogram~ Wl d t '1 and a lot of time, but m pr~nop e

1 t f attentwn to e al
· 1secunty.
requmng a o o
h' . not a direct threat to nat10na . h
.d is sure they know
. those about which nelt er Sl. e
One exfeasible. In any case, t 1S lS




the inforFinally, the third
f mobile elements of vanous type . t' tes We will call
everything, and wh1c
· d
the num er o
d ct our es 1ma ·
ample lS ata on
. . . 1d ta and allow us to con u
d "fully" with a
ld fll ut the m1t1a a
, d ing the wor
mat10n wou 1 o
f. 't'al data "fully revealed, en ow
netration into our
1 ted set o llll 1
t the enemy s pe
such a comp e
are fully protected agams
. . .
mation remains invery specific meamng: wt'e keys etc. This area of classlhed mfothr degree of stability
h upon e
b " ncryp wn
"state num er, e th t this "full revelation" only touc es
the probabilistic characl
t 's performance. Even so,
tact. But let us note a
d and contro sys ern
in the comman
. d
·t would allow
f much data has remame .
ld be highly desirable smce 1
ter o
the third group wou
'tin a hurry. The reason
Reveahng data .from lt but neither side is gomg to reveallh "looked into it" yet.
us to start estim~tmg r:~a:·the final result wou~d be. No o:e s::uation, the unknown
is clear: no one nows
b k from that pomt. In sue a
A d there would be no way ac
. to anyone.
"insurance" stage or
would be fnghtenmg h ld be a logical intermediate ste~, an.
to the third group,
This is why there s .ou . conditional initial data be on~mg
rantees that
mutual theoretical studieS u~l:; goal of such studies is to obtam so~:{:e:s of further
taken from a broad range.
1 tely convinced as to the purpose
t become comp e
would allow us o.
ual research. It is
work along those hnes.
ht us to the idea of such mut
ts have roug
All previous argumen
absolutely necessary.

Jol~t ~esearchrch on the deterrence problem? First
ts in favor of JOlnt resea
What are the argurnen
nfidence and guarantees.
"not wanting lS not eno
Earth wants a nuclear war. Yet,
from the vagueness
is the lssue.of co
No senslble person on .
. stability. We have to get away
above roaY
one would like to have c?nhdence lhnwith the use of the approach ofudthtnedence indica. · J01nt researc1theoretical picture, an .. or d er" 0 e bl
of today's sttuatwn.
everyone to
help establish, first of all, a g~e~:. 1 data. In other words, it ~~ul~ e~; e uld provide
measuring fear . Thls m ltse wo
tors across the broad range ~ mt 1~
d1menswn h lS
. d' tor to a
ce m lea
some ground for c~n 1 e~~e.
ld benefit from reducing the .eterren the risk of wal'•
The fact that nelther sl e woub'l' the overall situation and mcrease
h to desta 1 lZe

level dangerous enoug
f uarantee.
ee if it is aol'l
would itself serve as a meas.u~e o g
ept may also serve as a guarant ,
The stability of the sufftclency cone

"' 7

ilol •


Towards Confidence Through

firmed by joint research ( ee .5.6). By that we understand that in peacetime, no side
would be able to achieve such economic superiority over another that the degree of risk
would make aggression acceptable.
Thus we can expect a "double guarantee' situation, in which neither side wants or
can afford nuclear aggr s ion. While everyone now accepts thi intuitively, we will be
abl to prove this quantitatively.
There is reason to hope for confirmation of a stability area within the concept of
ufficiency. Thi is betokened by the properties of the cohesion graph as a network.
When the network reaches a certain size, the expense of expanding it becomes lower
than the expen e required to maintain its suppression at the previous leveL To make
this clear, let us review a simplified example.
Let us talk about a group of mobil command posts of the highe t level. We are
interested in the probability of at least one of them urviving. First variant - in the
group there are four command posts. In order to eliminate one with a probability of
0.3, the enemy needs to allocate 10 warheads. The cost of one command post is one
conditional unit. The cost of a strike by one warhead is 0.1 conditional unit. In this
case, th probability of at least one command post surviving is 1-(1 -0.3)4 = 0.75, and
the relation hip of the costs ''group of command posts: attack" is 1:1. econd variant we increase the number of command posts to six. With the same relationship between
costs, the probability of on post surviving wilJ increase to 1-(1 -0.3)6 = 0.87. Therefore, the enemy will need more attack assets to maintain th same probability 0.75. For
the attacker, the probability of urvival of ach command post should not be higher
than 0.2 . To achieve this re ult, the attacker need to aU ocate not 10 but 15 warheads
per command post, o that the relationship of costs will get worse for the aggressor,
1:1.5 instead of the formerl: 1.
Obviously, to reduce the probability of survival of at least one po t to, for example,
0.5 or 0. , the aggressor will have to allocate substantially more offensive weapons for
this task. At that, the de~ nding side is able to maintain this probability at higher levels
with the help of lower, asymmetrical efforts.
This example illustrates only in principle a concept of sufficiency that is stable. If
we consider not only a group of mobile command po ts but instead the entire cohesion
graph, everything will certainly become much more complicated. But the general trend,
of cost ratio changing in favor of the d fending side as the deterrence indicator decreases, should remain the same. To completely exclude (or adliev very high proba~ility for excl uding) an unacceptable retaliatory damage would probably be irnpos~ble. It is hardly possible to overestimat the sigrllficance of such a conclusion if it can
e proved quantitatively. As noted earlier, this could solve a lot of problems.
It could demonstrate, for example, that no matter how great the potentia l aggressor's
efforts are dLlring peacetime, no matter how much he spends, and even with an optimal
att~~k trategy, he will not be able to reduce the probability of receiving a retaliatory
st(ike of at least 800 warheads to a value lower than 0.2 to 0 . . Is this a little or a lot?

The Methodology:• The E.stimate
of Nuclear Deterl'ence Using cs

1 f?: Nuclear command, conrrol, Cooperation


data; all of this is possible using conditional initial data.
If we attempt to illustrate this idea it would look like this:



__________ Lp stable

~I ~:~~:..,.,.

-- -~ ----



favora~:d ~ l~vels tha~

:~:~ ~:::;~o~rect,


' -0'-~


h aslZlng
.. tl · d
n e
I t ts( worth
ee Fig mp
2 ) F
1e m ependence of the results und
'b" b less th:.U P or example, can the value of pwbabili per :anoue attack strate(r cud) under strategy "a"? Th' .
ty (N_600) under strategy
1s rs true for our example: P(N> 00) _
. an cud = 0· 5, wh ere , ud" is " 1 l ·
04 dP
_and ''"Y
" It
o earners, C3 and GIS, as our alreadY 1amr
'1'rar broome.·"Let



tempts by the enemy to improve th ex
a;'~'."ed stability levels. We will call t : ct~d resdult. lo e their meaning. Th se are th
o JOmt research will co nsrs
. t then f em
. blioun. anes P"' and l · Tl1e who! p
-· "- esta slung these bound • .
. . urpose
ues, so that later th
ey may be compared with the p
ane as numencal valdeterre
It lSI
natural that the most
ar sufficient for
roug 1 JOmt research.
so utron to thts problem ca b

Right now we are not making that e,timate. The Unpodant point hcre is whethe< such
an area of 'tability exists, while locating and confinning it would be the pmpooc of
joint '"'ea<ch. Let us ,emembcr that we will not have to completely <eveal all initial










Fig. 27: The "Springs" principle with strengthening of opponent's attack.


Cmve' "a" and "b" a<e boundary cmve' cone,ponding with two extreme potential
'''ategie' fo< the enemy. St<ategy "a" car<ie' the <i'k of perishing - we will call it the
adventmei' ,trntegy; "b" b<ing' a ve<y co,tly (Pynhic) victory. Recall that with ,trateg;; "a" the enemy "'sentially "abandoM" theN value and concentrate' all hi' effods
on maximum po,.ible ,eduction of the probability level P. To achieve that, when planning a nuclear st<ike he will have to allocate his main offensive as>;cls again't the cohesion graph's "b<nom handle" and the GIS. On the contrary, using strategy "b," he will
have to "abandon" wo<rying about P, and concentrate mo't of hi' effods and a,et' on
the "sweeping" pad of the bwom, that is, the ca<riers of nudea< weapon' themoclvesln other word,, he will try to reduce the N value to as low a level as poS'ible
The influence of the principle of stability is demonst<ated in the fact that the lower
are the value' ofP and N a<e, the harde< it is fo< the enemY to reduce them fmthcr (the
law of diminishing retmns). This i' like a ,pring working in two directions. In peace·
time, the enemy trie' to pre" the springs down and to the left, Unp<nving hi' means of
atw:k. In reality, he t<ies to bring the curves of the distributive function F'(N) as close
to zero as possible. The more he presses them down (that is, spends more resources),
howeve<, the le" advantage he achieves, since the 'P'ings resi't pressure. For the
fendcr, though, the more the sp<ings are pre,ed the more favo<able is the relationsh•P
between the costs of <esisting the enemy and the enemy', expenditw-<'· As noted..,.
lie<, at cedain leveh of P and N, this relationship becomes such that anY furthe< at·




~ :::0~:=~~~: ::;~e~~amp'~em' thi;,houl~


ucud ....
clearly unacceptable d amage


--------=+--=- --= ===~------






Fig. 28: lndependenee of results under "a" and " b" i mpact strategies.

g the
"h anthe
dle,",a "thus
. ' th
. e the
n my
allocates the
· part of h>S
. asset for
. maJor
And wl ' that out of 100 sunulation , the "b .
of rts performance down to 0. 5.
1at rs the srtuation with th •·
' loom remams undamaged in '" 0
h "
e weeper here? ·
. ::J case .
on t e handle" th ..
, .
. mce e enemy's att k
uons, then
e swe p r ' better off I
ac wa conhigh a d umber of delwery vehicles and tl .
. n almost all computer simula.
n may b
1.err warhead t k'
10 the "broom"e consr ered ufficient for unacce tabled
a >ng pad m the attack i
If w
altogether is: p ~ 0. 5.
amage. That i , what we have


e change 0 the "b"
swe per," w
·u .
trategy and concentrate th
even mme Ie wr achieve the effect en in Fig 1 11
s mam attack on the
in the "sw re
fashion :say, the probability
t . ," handle" will perform in an
eeper the situation will wo.rsen, sot hoatm
~. s per
wiiJ go up to 0 7 vu
o t
o n Iyormance
a b out, for xampl '60..





I IJ: Nuclellt' Command, Conll'ol, Coopel'ation
The Methodology: The Estimate of Nucleal' Detei'Pence Using CS




Majority of nu~le~r
carriers survrve,

Probability of performance of
"handle" P=O.S

Majority of nuclear
carriers and
communications channels
to them are destroyed

Probability of performance of
"handle" P::0.7



Flg. 2S: "Broom's'' condition under "a" Impact strategy.
Fig. 31: "Broom's" condition under "b" Impact strategy.
· ture will look like this:
If we present the same picture through the densl'tY of the final result distributiOn,
t hepic

simulations will the number of warheads taking part in the strike be more than 600. We
are interested in the general result for the whole "broom." Multiplying the probabilities of successive events, we will obtain:


P(N~600) = 0.7 X 0.6 = 0.42

(Fig. 31)

So, even if the means of attack ace 'edistdbuted fwm the same pool"' stmtegies
change, the final 'esults may be conside,ed to be independent of them. Results are
determined by the structu,e and characte,isti" of the "handle" and the "sweepec" It
to have such a poo' "sweepe," that, using the "b" strategy, not one compute,
simulation will 'esult in the numbe, of wacheads being mo,e than 600. Then, the
general 'esult is P(N;>600) 0, even though the "handle" may be an ideal one in this
Situation. Each part of the "b,oom" plays its part and makes its own contdbution.
l'he cons1deratJon :possibility ofjoint 'eseacch is influenced by the following simple






usef~lness_ and

Fig. 30: The density of distribution (to Fig. 29).

First of all, the ve,y idea of mutual detenence implies a mandatmy exchange of in-

1 121

The Methodology·. The &limate
ol Nuc/BBI' Detei'Pence Using cs

I 123

l C': Nucteal' command, Contl'ol, coopel'alion
Under what cond'Itlons
is it acce t bl
the potential of the opponents? p a e not to consider any existing asymmetry in

formation. Each sid , after determining for itself a uf!icient level of defensive paten·
tial, is obligated to demonsttate this to the opposite side. It i further required to prove
that with uch a potential, the pmbability of unacceptable damage for the aggressor
would be of an appropriate value. Each side is most interested in seeing that the other
side has this knowledge, or the deterrence factor simply will not work. uch a nece.sity
is not felt very sttongly right now because the current strategic nuclear force are very
large. Yet, when searching for minimally acceptable defensi v levels, such mutual pmofs
will become
cond, this
can be financial ly beneficial !or both sides. The pr ence of full rand
more reliable initial data made available during joint research will allow the parties to
come do e to truly sufficient minimuros and avoid unnecess"')l expenses. If the existence of the above described areas of stability is confirmed, both sides may avoid conducting expensive but pointless programs.
Third, there is no risk involved for either side. Each of the parties has the right to
stop at the level that it deems sufficient for itself. And after conducting joint reeearch,
it will be able to obtain more solid support for its decision. How much initial data will
be revealed depends, just as at the present time, on the specific situation.
Such joint research could have as its main goal fuller accounting of all major factors
in the process of nuclear arms reductions, not only the initial levels of strategic forces
such as composition, characteristics, deployment a<eas. etc., but also the possible final
outcome of a nude>< exchange. It is, after all, not the potential itself, but the expected
result of its uee, that acts as a deterrent. And the latter, as we have ,een, is most fully
characterized by the pwbabilistic distribution value. joint design and study of such
distributions by both sides, and then using those studies to make recommendations to
relevant agencies, is a viable way to speed up nuclear disarmament.
It seems that a logical fi<et step in such work would be to agree upon the msin methodological principles for evaluating the potential final outcome, and then selecting an
appropriate model. With the help of these tools, still on a theoretical level and with the
use of a broad range of conditional initial data, it would be helpful to elaborate on a feW
questions before going on to the practical steps:

For h w long, and down to what values, is the pmbahility of inflicting unaccept·
able damage (or any assigned damage level) in retaliation on the aggressor sustained whe11 reducing strategic weapon levels and deploying BM systems?
What are the boundaries of the existing areas of stability when. under an given
spending I vels, the defending side can, with relatively less effort than the aggres·
sor, maintain a degree of risk unacceptable to the aggres or?
What is the influence of realistically achi vable and economically reasonable co!W
mand and control systems on the character of probabilistic distribution of th•
final outcome, and what are the best ways to consider this factor during negotia·
tions to reduce strategic nuclear forces?

?nee the~e and similar questions are ans
status for practica l use d unng
':ered, thiS. methodological
"tool" cou ld b e
assigned offiCial
en Iscussing the p t' l .
Wh "d
rae ICa Implem t ·
so-ca ed human factor" .
en ahon of this method the
It graph
Is possible to establish probabie ch aractenstlcs
.of the
all technical
. . aspects of the co eswn
channels, relay stations, etc.
information systems ' co;r
mg e _mal result. Can we formalize or" 'a urn~~ ~emg also takes part in pre arvery ""?us _consideration make the ,;h I program, hiS activities? And
Impact of th h
o e method doubtful?
f h
e uman factor on th
h .
comes with the actions
r~mg ystem. If we take all t h . 1 . !On on a nuclear attack from
sue as arrangmg the meetin
ec mea considerations out of th
. .
ormation throu hthe
d' authorization
, etc . , t eh




~~;m~and post~,


~: ;a~~';;,7 polit~alleadership




ecision, will remain . It IS
. no b etter th g 'd. Iscussmg the situati.on, an d makm
. thn
the probability of the leadership's
can rea mg your fate in tea leaves to try t g e
of m 1
penormance wh· h d
o guess
A ora' psyc ologlcal and other conditions. wh IC epends on virtually thousands
rather simple way to
at should we do'?
. f,
reso ve t IS can be deri d f
look :t
eature ." to consider the degree of
£ r;;.m the
of the method,






eJ:~:~;l ~!essor

the aggress?r should m:e
Let us
hticalleadership would
for a SituatiOn in which the def,pd. for the worst.
. .
per orm Ideall t th
en mg country'
hme trammg, that is, would b
y a e cruCial moment, just as durin
s poMathematically speaking the able to respond within the "technical" wigd the peaceth t h" " · ·
• e aggressor (a d
n ow.
d a. " VIctim" will act with automatic ef£ n_ we are playing for him) has to assume
u~n; ":erc!Ses) with probability of 1.0. ectlveness and speed (repeatedly confirmed
eemg onfortheei value .of this " technological
. window" should
of a gproblem
b. ther side. It cannot and sho ld
not present too much
should b
u not e too m h f
e esta hshed d ·
ccisis by NCA
unng peacetime exercises R
uc o a secret, but
leadership ha:ere
some time ago on.
on actions in a
to .ave the fmal wocd. This will be
. o the_ocean . Now, these
We l quantitative measurement of the l l f their contnbution toward the
a so have to mention th
eve o deterrence.
uman factor Th
e crews at the command ost h
sanctioned .
ese crews enter and issue the ord p .s;: en dlScussmg the purely
is no need a response or autonomously under th ers,
er after the leadership has
for the 1 dto
our study for the command e confditlons described above. There
ea ership E
posts a ter we h
llliLtary crews . . veryt mg applies, except for the fac h ave
yzed It m detail
The d . exercise on a regular basi's
t t at dunng peacetime the









we used above is one of t h e assumptions that are used ins·Imu1atwn,


1 IJI: Nucleal' Command, ContJtol, CDopet'lltion
The Methodology: The Esllmar,
'B Of Nucteal' DBiel'l'ence Using

seems to be the most logical one. So far, at least, there has been no sensible alternative.
If one is presented, it will not change the whole method but will only influence the
initial data.
ow let us present an intermediate summary.
A priori, we have already overcome some methodological challenges. We have decided that our first priority i to establish theoretically a range of assumed val ues for
the degree of risk, and to convince ourselves of the stability of the concept of sufficiency. This would be best done through joint research. If the safety margin of reli ability is proved, the way will be open for the next practical steps. Then the two parties
may cooperate on initial data that is lacking on a third group without any major risk to
themselves. This process will be, it seems of iterative character, with a gradual approach to the "truth. " The path goes from redundant reliability towards a minimum
rea onable reliability.
The transition from theoretical re earch to practical applications of the work will be
a sophisticated business requiring patience, mutual understanding, and initiative on
both sides. The results obtained will not be "points" but will be located within a certain range. At this stage, each side could justifiably rely on the following principle: any
re ult obtained jointly, based on some accepted level of declassification for initial data,
will be considered the "true" one . .As the initial data become clearer and influence the
precision of the final result, this will approach the "real" truth.
All this, however, will come at a later date. Today's agenda is to organize joint research between Russia and the United tates, along with other partners, in this area.
The purpose of this book i to establish the necessity of such research. All the following steps mu t be considered without losing sight of this final goal, or the motivation to
achieve it. We also do not consider as closed the discussion of how to guarantee acceptable truthfulness in the final results, ince thi major question will be crucial for the
two other problems in implementing our method: creating the mechanism for using it,
and making choices.

3.7.3 The Mechanism tol' Applying 1/Je Mei/Jod
Let us assume that a methodological apparatus for "measuring fear" has been developed through the efforts of both sides. A unified model has been created, and the
existence of an area of deterrence indicator stability is proven theoretically. Now, the
participants have started to discuss coordinating their initial data. This last step is, in
reality, already a part of the negotiating process on strategic nuclear forces, since implementing it would get us closer to specific quantitative indicators for the command and
control systems, GIS, and nuclear weapons delivery vehicles groups. Naturally, each
side will check those results "at home" before coordinating any part of the initial data
with its partner. Each side's behavior during negotiations will be based on those preparatory results.
Fig. 32 provides a schematic illustration of using the method during the negotiating:

ca I



r - - - - _---r----.--1

I nuclear potential



command and
control system
(C 3)

distribution function

1- : - - - - _ j



~tlons o!_Eefending side


l r----1


deterrence factor _
degree of risk for


Minimization of NP and c3.
balanced with regard to
economic considerations
~nd reliability guarantee
(Independently by defending side)

Suggestions at

Predicted result

.01 NP realization _

Minimization of (P(W>
to level ot minimal d ~~eqJ)
y agreement between sides)


w- damage for attacker_a_s_a-re

with the defending side
suit of reciprocal actions
req. - requested (agreed) value
unacceptable for the attac~~~amage, which is

Fig. 32: The method for minimization of
nuclear potential and C3f

Ig. 32 demonstrates that th f
comes from the realization
_e mal result of retaliatory actions b
tees the unblo k'
of Its nuclear potential (NP) th
y the defendmg side
(C3) h ·
c 10g and us f
1 weapons. Since bothrough
~y the aggressor's attacks ;ho nucleahr
NP and c'3 w I~hflguaran­
Is used as a
' e resu t as a random ch
are 10 uenced
~ndicatordu~i:~t::~:i:~terrence i~dicator in the illus:::t~~:.· ;~~ba~ility P(W~Wreq)
Is a possibility of f1 g 'bl ons t~ review questions of risk det
h Sid~ ~auld use this
We m
exi y mampulating its p and W '
errence, stability, etc. There
ay assume that it is
tisk accord·
possi le to establish "th
however t~:; to ~e .participants' mutual agreement r;shold" values for the degree of
and mai~tai'n eacfi Side has the right to keep its "ow. .. ron: the chart it becomes clear
n estimate f th d
a sa ety m · T .
Weapons, C3 and
a~giO, his means that each art
o e egree of risk,
siderations 0 1 t~e GIS Independently, based on ec p ~er may reduce his nuclear
balanced s~ n ~a ter many independent and joint ~?omic p~tential and other conNo matt gghestwns at. the negotiations.
es Imates wdl each side present
er owtempt
h' .
Q\Jite doubtful
. 10~ t IS picture ofjoint pro 'ects . . .
that it will not d~ t? Its highly unusual character~ wh •: Its Implementation may seem
dl!ring negotia:a e I~ own errors or be deceived? Ever~~~ar~ntee does any side have
ns. et us try to analyze a few pot t . 1 10g .ep.ends on the behavior
en Ia negohatmg strategies.




1 f7: Nuc/eal' Command, ContJtot Coopel'ation
The Methodology.· Th E: .
• 'II Stimate Of Nuc/eal' Detel'l'ence Using ca

The idea that the participants are interested in preventing a nuclear conflict as well
as minimizing the cost of guaranteeing deterrence should be at the core of this analysis.
The goal of analyzing potential behavior strategies at the negotiations is to try to minimize the level of distrust, both toward the other participant(s) and toward the potential
results; in other words, to obtain certain guarantees.
Let us consider a possible Russian approach to the assumed strategies of the United
States during such negotiations. This is just an example. It is logical to assume that the
U.S. side is entitled to similar evaluation of the Russian strategy, taking into account
their own peculiarities and interests. Can such an analysis, based on simple logical
conclusions, help us find, in a preliminary fashion, some guarantees?
The following considerations should have priority:
The participants have worked out a joint methodological apparatus together, which
gives them a model for estimating results they would like to predict. They have also
agreed on maximum (critical) levels of indicator P(W;:::Wreq ) according to which they
evaluate the results obtained in the course of research.
Russia evaluates the consequences of U.S. strategy according to three main criteria:
does it change the degree of risk of nuclear war; does it reduce or create obstacles to the
process of strategic nuclear force reduction, assuming this to be one of the main goals
of world politics; and what extra expenditures will Russia incur, when purposeful outlays are separated from wasteful ones?
Our research indicates that those three factors are interrelated, so that, as a final
result, improvements of SNF C 3 increase the value of the indicator P(W;:::Wreq ), while
reduction of the SNF themselves decreases it. It is possible to regulate the indicator
through balanced changes in the components and characteristics of SNF and SNF C 3 •
When estimating possible U.S. strategies in the course of research, we assume the
following attitudes of the United States toward the risk of unacceptable damage as a
result of Russia's retaliation in response to a U.S. attack. For the majority of the public,
the very possibility of unacceptable damage, regardless of its magnitude expressed
quantitatively, is enough of a deterrent. For a minor segment (aggressive military/
political circles, members of the military industrial complex, etc.- the so-called "hawks")
just acknowledging such a possibility is not a sufficient deterrent. Additional quantitative estimates of the degree of risk P(W;:::Wreq ) will be necessary. This factor ma:y
play a deterring role only if it is officially and openly declared.
Let us demonstrate, considering all of the above, one possible Russian assessment
of projected U.S. negotiating strategies.
Three lines of U.S. behavior might be used during joint research with Russia to obtain final calculations for the value of P(W;:::Wreq ). (See Table 4).
Strategy A: the "honorable" one, with the most reliable initial data possible. Two
results are possible here: one, when the value of calculated indicator P(W;:::Wreq) is high,
i.e. higher than the mutually established critical level; and two, when it is lower than
the critical level.


Strategy "A " ("h onorable")
results of calculations are:


P(W>W )>P

Risk of
nuclear war


Additional expenses of
Russia for C3 system





Continuation of STAAT
process (reducing nuclear
arsenals of both sides)
Attitude to the given
U.S. strategy from
U.S. side Russian side Conclusion and
expedient measures

P(W?.Wtnq )<Pcrlt.


most acceptable
most acceptable


favorable situation:
possible to conside
next steps towards
nuclear arms

necessary to
agree on joint
measures for


Strategy "8"
aims to
increase the value



(but it increases
the risk of war)

for both:
U.S.: refuse "8"
Russia: for
insurance, to
redundance: +llP

goal is to
decrease the value

P(W>Wreq, )



U.S.: partly
Russia: unaccep!able
due to extra expenses
U.S.: can use, maybe
.Russia: to try to
rncrease P due to not
only own additional
expenses, but also
with U.S . help.


· one con ciousl a. 1
. . . gy B·. h1is
artrflaal changes in some initial
bso:~ UA1 ·ea .mg the va lue ofP(W? W ) through
trategy . same a b
rnencan and Ru ian
sa ove ut 'th • L
P(W~ W )
WI onsciou goal of 1
\M '""
oweung t 1e value of
. e have to work under th as
·inme jf tl · · ·
sumpttOn that 1t w Jd b ·
th .
le trutial data was distorted by tl . .
e lOlpo sib1e to fu JJy d ter~
. ~lr strategies and our responses we 1e
ruted States. Th refore, while evaluatin.



. ur ideas of how,the
to consider :he possibility of
to posstble results should b f I
e evaluates Its own strategies wit!
P1esented in Tabl 4
va ue to us her
e .
e assumptions are also
n1a s ~ result of estimating pos ible U
. .
y draw the following preLiminary co. .clt:I~tegJes m the course of a joint resear h .. ,
n us1ons:
' "
Strategy A
a) If hi h
ioio.t g values for P(W~W ) are obt . .
tel:lce ~a~~lations possible, we ~~y consid:~n:: m t~e course of the most "honorable"
IDe nuc~ Ie~ed. In this case, we may consider the mam ;oal of effective nuclear deter ear lOrces.
e ways lOr further reductions of strate-



Strategy "C"

Table 4· Evaluar
mg t e possible strategies of the United St t
a es srde durrng joint research .



128 1 fJl: Nuc/eal' Command,


The Methodology: The EsOmate of Nuc/eap DeiBI'I'ence Using ca

b) If low values for the rune indicators P(W~ W rcq ) are obtained, the situation should
be perceived as dangerous, mainly because the "hawks" will be trongly tempted to
declare that aggression would not result in retaliation. hould such results be declared
officially, the ensuing situation would have to be regarded as unacceptable for both
sides, especially because the goal of further reducing strategic nuclear force becomes
more difficult. Under these conditions, both sides together wi ll have to look for ways
to increase the value of P(W~W ) to a required level. There are several possible ways
to do this: improve 3 of Russia's
F, or reduce the effectiveness of a U. . conventional and nuclear attack agains the RussianS F command and control system, as
well a against the delivery vehicles themselves. This cou ld be done, for example, by
redeploying S B s to the areas further removed from Russia, limiting theater and space
armaments, etc. aturally, further Russian steps for reducing strategic nuclear forces
wiJl have to take into account such considerations.



the c3 SNF, We would have to slow the process of red .
"b .
ucmg nuclear strategic forces
For the United States strateg C .
I ·
Y Is poss1 le f t ·d al
t Is tr~e that the risk of war would be small , 1 no. 1 e , under certain conditions.
a~d mi~ht be further reduced. Russia
would mcur additional expenses. Th
be slowing down the process of st teo? y nelgative pomt (for the United States) would
t t
ra egic nuc ear force red t.
evertheless, this
s ra egy eaves room for maneuver.
uc IOns.

t L'\1

Strategy B
If strategy B is pursued by the United tates, the calculated value of indicator
P(W?.W ) is higher than the "true" one obtained as a re ult of "strategy A. ''
(Russian) side may not have this information available.
This situation .is al o dangerous and unacceptable for both sides. The nited tates
would stiJl be tempted to commit aggression, because within the United tates, those
involved with the issue would know the true degree of risk, while society in general
wouJd not. On the surface, moreover, it would look as if it were possible to further
reduce strategic nuclear forces. uch a measure, however, would actually increase the
danger of war, since the value of the indicator P(W~W ""~)would become even lower.
Also, Russia would not feel a need to increase expense for improving the 3 NF. For
all these reasons, it is very improbable that the United States would use strategy B for
joint research.
"'or Russia, such aU. . strategy is also dangerous because of potential di information. Because establishing for a fact that information provided by the United tates is
or is not really disioformation is very difficult, we would hav to take out an insurance
policy creating a safety margin in the value of indicator P(W~Wrcq) . The ways to do
that are described under strategy A.
Strategy C
Due to intentional distortions by the United tates, the value of P(W?.Wrcq) is lower
than the 'true" one. It is clear that in reality the risk of war is small. This i all the rno~e
so since as in the ca e of strategy A (b) measures to incl-eas the value of the matn
indicate~ would be taken. The implications ofthi situation are different for the United
States and Russia.
. hi
It is not beneficial for Russia because we would have to incur additional (and JL1. t ~
case unnecessary) expense for improving 3 NF. r, due to the seeming weakness 0

General Conclusion
When arranging £
· ·
or a JOmt research usin th
the merican to be "honorable" . r
1 g. e su~gested approach, we may expect
m wrmu atmg the · '( 1d
f. d.
Ir Im Ia
ata, With a certain trend
toward lowering the calculated val
ues o m 1cator P(W>W ) I
- req . n this case, we should
act Wit the maximum openness d
an accuracy of · "( 1 d
sures to create additional safety m . r
1111 Ia ata, takmg subsequent meah ld b
argm wr t e value of P(W>W )
s ou
e taken not only by us but b
t .h
- req • Those measures
e me Wit counterm
b h
ea~ures ~ t e United States.
. us t e conclusions obtained throu h anal .
mahon as some kind of a guarantee Wgh"l h~Sls may be .VIewed m the first approxi"bl
1 e t 1s exampl
possi e ways to choose and is b
e Is JUst an 111 ustration of the
y no means mal or co 1 t
ous. F Irst of all, the conclusion th t 1"t . .
. mp e e, two advantages are obvid
IS Impossible to t t ll
amage wr the aggressor may serve
b . r
o a y exc u e unacceptable
h .
n ees wr eac side. If such a
coneIuswn Is confirmed by testing th . . . I d
I" .
e 111Itla ata across b d
ranges, It may become a serious det
roa ' rea Ishcally achievable
· · .
errence 1actor S
mg Jomt research by the participants
. . I. econ '.sue a result, achieved durth
. .
, may 111Itse f serve to
mcrease mutual trust during
e negotiatiOns process and contrib t t .
useful to consider an open excha
ub e o Its success. Based on this, it would seem
h h ,
nge etween the two sid
f h ·
eac ot er s possible strategies. After all the
e~ ~ . t eir own estimates of
expenses while maintaining a reliable le~el ofoa of such activities-:- to avoid additional
mutual deterrence- Is very attractive.



Pl'obtem ot Choice: How Much Is Needed top
ow, et us assume that the intermediate ste .
. . .
pleted. Areas of stability have been th
. lpl s m our J0111t work have been com eoretica y pro
b d ·
oun anes of these areas - that .
ven o exist. The quantitative
rat d Th
Is, va ues o
and N ( t
bl )
e .
e next point on the a
d .
st s · sta e - have been elabov .
gen a Is an analysis f th
f . .
anants of the totality of nuclear weap
d I"
o . e cost-su ficiency of alternative
tern, and GIS components in order t ons e IVery vehicles, command and control systee reliable deterrence wid~ minim 1 o select the mos~ rational one that would guaransake of simplicity.
a expenses. We will call this totality "SNF" for the
What con ·d
Sl erahons should we use for this h . ?
of all
c 01ce.
of st
. , we ave to consider the possibilit of h
, y t e aggressor employmg any type
. rategy 111 his attack - from th " d
VIctory (b)
e a venturers strate " ( )
in h.
. The aggressor can make this ch . .
~y a to t e strategy of Pyrrhic
. Olhce !~mediately before the attack by alterg Is choice of weapons to be u d
se agamst t e given targets Th t . h
a Is w Your evalua-

The Methodology: The Estimate at Nuclear Deterrence Using IJI 1 131


l 17: Nuclear command, conwot, cooperation

'll have a dual character that logically follows from the dual nature of

tion of the resu t w~
d N)
· ht evaluate
the deterrence indtcator (P. an
.. d t' n how a potential aggressor mtg
£ . t
Second, we should take tnt? ehra to
e of our calculations. Let us n~t or~~
d N obtamed m t e cour
.· " that 1s at tne
the values of p st an
daries for "coropressmg the s~ung, .
gh to
those are the maxtmum oun
p and r are Lmpresstve nou
possible peaks of arms race.
a tiny bit more at the expldense bof
h "compress

? It wou pro h
be a deterrent, t en w y
. on't do any good anyway.





dream~~g :~:~~

huge financial outlays,
intense competition;,
bl make sense not to plan or
but to follow the natura p .
a y natural and incredibly expenstve we.aponsW, should rather continue developmg
· · f the ttme.
d GIS development tha: is characte~ts~;ac~r against strategic nuclear weapons,
.an of bilatns that during the subsequent senes
weapons, includmg means o ~
This m turn mea
· t for the extreme
but at an ordmary pace.
N chosen as the reference pam s
eral estimates, the values of P andt , than the established values of P st and Nl st'
k hould be grea er
ith the rea pace o
strategies of attac ' s
'th less effort, correspon mg w
" . gs" would be pressed down Wl
· p· 33·
ns and countermeasures
P nd N
as seen m tg.
weap O
. l £ nee potnts
We will call these practtca re ere






f-----+I -----

- --- 1

1 __

- - -- ~-


L - - - -I


N stable. N pract.

· gs" contraction.
. 33' Limit and practicallevels of spnn
F19· ·

· ·

1' .t for the probabthty

r, consideri-ng th real situation, we have moved rea 3 of our picture up and to the
right. We will do further work with this area.
What i our goal as a defending ide? We need to have an
F comp ition (includ3
and the I ) that would be able to provide for th curve of the distributive
function '( I) through Area. under any type of enemy attack. trategy, from trategy
"a'' (adv nturer's strategy) to strategy "b' (Pyrrhic victory) _
principle, we have to consid r different variants of composition of
F while
modifying both maximum cm-ve ; that i , under nemy attack strategi s fTom "a" to
"b." Let us, how ver note the foUowing circum tance. p to th.e pres nt moment as
we have already mentioned everal times in this chap er, no one has addr ssed the probability of damage (P), yet there .i much lebate about the magnitude of damage {W ),
and the concept of unacceptable damage remain quite varrue. lt wiJI r main this way
for a long time, and, quite possibly, over larg r ranges.
Therefore, to simplify our further argum nts, let us introduc the foUowing device:
we will analyze the variants of the S fF campo itions while m difying only the "b"
curv , leaving the 'a" curve at a given fixed level. hi device is j ustified because the
"a" curved monstrates th probability f normous, known to b unacceptable damage (up to 1,200 Ol' 2,000 warheads for example), and fluctuation within the 0.3 to 0.5
range < re not very significant for this kind of probability. We have not yet learned to
operate with such oncepts. Let us rem mb r al o that the expenses for thi curve go
mostly for the I and the "brooms handl ." ' o, we will assum hat in all the variants
of ·omposition f Tf we will be r vi wing, the e expenses will remain constant and
their jze will be such that they will deter the enemy if h decides to u. the "a" strategy.
The "b' curv is a very di{feren story. ince the concept of unacceptabl damage is
so vague, it makes sen e precisely h r to review the alternative variants whil taking
i11to account th differeuc sin co ts forth other part of the cohesion graph - the nuclear
deljvery vehi les themselves and thos lement of the command and control y tern
that we have called ''the broom.'' W will, naturally, consid r g neral expen es when
using the "sufficiency-cost" criteria while taking into account both curves 'a" and "b."
ne other consideration ha to do with the time fa t r. 1 ot on ly money andresources bu also time are crucial to change any weapon development plan . For xample, if th potential aggr sor uddenly decid d to change the exp cted picture, catch
us unawares and g below the deterrence thresholds in order to later create the conditions for an attack, he could not ucceed. Yi ars are needed for developing and intro~ucing into production and ervice new types of weapons, artd to cone al them today is
Lmpossible. In thi , cas the pot 1tial victim would have time to take countermeasures.
Such measures cost less than the enemy' (as we have demonstrated earlier). will comP~nsate for th aggressor's efforts, and the hresh ld values of Lhe deterrence indicator
wl]~ remain at the a me level. With a unified model and joint research, this fact will be
eastly demonstTable to the other side, and make i reconsid r any abrupt changes in
si:J)ategic tability.


.. 0 5 Accord·
e case of arms race, the lower tml
For example, m an _extrem . .
"normal" pace of development tt ts . . late tne
unacceptable damage ts 0:3, ':"htle m a
in an "ideal'' situation, we ~an calcu
ingly, applying the Pyrrhtc vt~to.ry strategy 300 warheads, while realistically toda:eads.
. .
magnitude of retahatwn at, sa~,
here at the level of 600 war
. .mum wtll be somew
in the foreseeable future t ts mtm

The Methodology: The Estimate of Nucteal' De*"""
. ca
.....Bnce Usmg

I 133

132 \ Cl: Nuclear command, Contl'ol, Cooperation
P(Nc.Nud) under value of Nud

Based on the above considerations, let us now consider as examples a series of results that could be obtained by analyzing alternative variants of the SNF composition




for a specific period of time. All numbers are conditional.
Let us assume that there are four such variants altogether. First is the existing combination of weapon delivery vehicles, the GIS, and the command and control system.
All other variants involve increasing certain components of this combination. We are
not going into the details of what components are increased (according to their content
and characteristics) right now. It is important, it should be done, and it should be done
with expenses in mind. But this is "internal" work, while here we are limiting ourselves to an analysis of the general picture. Therefore, we will designate the expenses



under "b" impact































(costsas distributive
for The
function F'(N) for the given variants are shown in
Fig. 34:
. lia~le 5. Evaluatmg SNF alternatives from the point of view of the deterrence effectiveness.


. this out is what da mage va1ue the a
glven time (ud). Let ~s assume that th. h :gressor p~rceives as unacceptable at a
lS as een estabhshed at the level of 500 warheads..
. .


ls useful to see practical ' maxlmum
noted ltby*):
reference points N pr an d p pr (.1n our



PP,= 0.5 and N pr = 600
No": .for pthe analysis
of the table itself (Let us remember the the t. 1b
of stab1hty
" 0 · an d N "~ 300) ,
ore rca oundanes
the user look
. . sof
t h e potential
. The probablllty
wh result1 of.the
" ene my ,s " adventurer's strategy"
ceptable dam
ose va ue ls guaranteed" b .
age tot e aggressods, in this first
to nng clearly unac·
cae practtcal boundary of the area of stability he:":· att elevel of 0 .5 . It is located on
it. But is this a lot or a little &:m ';h me:ns that as of now the aggressm
is highly respected in the Uni e pomt of v>ew of deterrence/
Luck, meanmg that if something bad
t : States - hece we call it the "Law
In our case, "something bad" can aptn it will, and on the first and
de a tty of 0.5 . This is no Mur h ' L
~eanst e end of the world, and with a
thr~~ent? It seems to be. At leas;, ~:thi~w ~n ~~tty; this is a S0/50 chance. Is it a










Fig. 34: Distribution function of final result for alternative variants.

These graphs provide the most detailed and complete characteristics of the given
variants, and thus should serve as a basis for detailed analysis. Wben the variants are
reviewed by a broad circle of mers, however, it is more useful and convenient to""
tables correlated with these graphs, such as Table 5.
"Clear!y unacceptable damage" (CUD) - that which is maximally possible to achi "
with the selected initial data.
How should a lay user view this table? The most important thing to consider wh"'

~t re~uce


Prov:~d ~p to 0. 6 as in the. table, or even hfgh: i~ ~ ~e potenbal victim to rai>< this
IJ .

a1>~e counter questwn' how much

e "':enough money. (Let us ask
fmished with the "adventurer's
hke for. "full" confidence?)
. ow tempted would the aggressor be to us!yh t, e use~ Wl.ll regard the other ext e Pyrrhlc vlctory" strategy? How


s~:~;d ~?~


I 17: Nucteal' Command, Conrrol, CoopBI'alion
Would the damage be that unacceptable even if

"Pyrrhic" is this victory in reality?
.d th t 600 warheads is close to the lower boundretaliation is highly probable?
Let us look at the table. If we consl ~~· had . the beginning that Nud = 500), then
ary of unacceptable damage (we esta ~ Oe 4 l~e can say that our "sweeper" is not
variant 1 seems weak since P(N2':610d0d) -1 . ~hat these conditions are enough of a de.f h nemy shou
ec are
complete. Even l t e e
. ht to chose variants 2 or 3.
terrent for him, we neve~theless.~ave the :~:le" at the level of 800, not 500 warheads,
If the damage is constdered unaVcc~p t 3 r 4 seem most likely. If Nud = 1,000
h ld we choose? anan s o
which vanant s ou
. .
. ll more expensive vanants, etc., e .
warheads, we may have ~o revtew potent:t :nd resent as concisely and graphically as
What is left now is to mtegrate th.e ~e.s
di~ons state the lower boundary of unac'bl What have we got? If our mtttal con
posst e.
h d we recommend:
ceptable damage as 500 war ea s,
ntees P(N2':600) = 0.6-0.7.
I . 1 t penstve an guara
6 08
Choose variant 2. t ts eas ex
. . d' t will be higher: P(N2':600) = 0. - . .
sive variant 3, thts m tea or
select the more expen
. I "0
roducts are guarantee .
Dear users, make your chotce.
ur p d l
of the probability we are seekmg
f presente va ues
Let us note here that t e ran~e o
. P(N>600). Therefore, for genera use,
. 1 "£ k"·06tsP and0.8ts
f the deterrence indtcator:
is not JUSt a stmp e or . . . f
we may suggest the followmg ormu a or


p (oo






. .
1 of com letely unacceptable damage.
The infinity sign here mdtcates thh~ lkevef
ore fnteresting and elegant formula, but
'll be able tot m 0 am
h ld be able to understand tt.
Perhaps someone Wl
the important point is that everyone s ou
1 by way of example. But even
b ld ot
of course con 1 wna '
All figures presente ere are, . .
' h
commendations stills ou n
lt f mt researc ' our re
d t
if they were obtained as a resu o JO no ri bt to - recomm.end a specific \~vel o e er-_
be taken up because we cannot - have
~h h uld be solved democratJcally. Wh~t
renee. This is a task for everyone, at1~ onhi
e 't tat ~ oR commendations presented in thdlS
· t 1 a method rot t
as ·
1 ·
accor is presented here ts a o~ '
. T
order of choices, no cone uswns
chapter should be percetved as suggest mg an
ing to specific values.

C3 in Russia and the United States: AComparative Analysis


Russian C3: History ol Establishment and Development


The Beginning Stage (1959·18841

The formation of the SNF C 3 began and has improved together with the formation
and development of the forces themselves. With the appearance of the first nuclear
weapons delivery vehicles (long-range bombers, short-range and medium-range ballistic missiles), they were taken under the strict and centralized control of the supreme
level of the Soviet military-political leadership. The main functions of nuclear command and control - blocking unauthorized use, development of operational use plans
and perfecting procedures for direct management of nuclear strikes - were the exclusive prerogatives of the General Staff.
The lower level c8mmand and control organs of the Ground Forces, Air Force
and the Navy had the tasks of routine command and control over the weapons' condition and maintenance.
Initially, engineering brigades for nuclear ballistic missiles were included in the composition of the Supreme High Command's reserves. The 1959 appearance of a new
military service- the SRF -was a huge step in regulating command and control of the
rapidly developing nuclear weapons, and was used to create better conditions to develop the doctrinal and technical foundations for using this fundamentally new means
- as they thought then - of warfare.
Today, everyone officially recognizes that nuclear armaments must not be used, and
that they may be regarded only as a peculiar means of deterrence. However, this perspective assumes the necessity of a more-or-less logical theory of their use.
The nuclear doctrine of the early 1950s freely accepted the possibility of nuclear
war. On Sept. 14, 1954, in the Soviet Union's southern Urals village ofTotskoe, a 20kiloton bomb exploded at an altitude of 350 meters. Thirty-seven minutes after the
explosion, "attack" troops wearing protective clothing passed through the explosion's
epicenter. The fact that nothing immediately happened to them gave the Soviet establishment a basis for developing a broad campaign to disperse the fears associated with
nuclear weapons. For some time this succeeded. In spite of the widely known longterm consequences associated with Hiroshima and Nagasaki, many in the Soviet Union,
especially the military, began to think that "there was nothing to fear in it." Unfortunately, the inertia of this impulse proved quite strong and, for many years, defined the
character of military-ideological goals.

136 1 Cl: Nuc/eal' Command, Contl'ol, Coopel'ation

CS in Russia and the Unhe.d ,,.. .
Quiles. ACompapatfve Analysis

During a revi w of the Totsko exercises, ikolai Bulganin, then minister of defen e,
drew attention to the 11ecessity of developing troop operations in a nuclear contaminated
ikita Khrushchev further used these "results" in the political truggle with
Malenkov, accusing the latter of ignoring r at experimental data which, according to the
general secretary of the Communi t party, confirmed the admissibility of nuclear war.
fGcially, this position was embodied in the so-called " okolovsky's trategy. ' Its
appearance is connected with the publication of Milita·ry t-rategy, edited by Marshal V.
D. Sokolovsky. ln the book, basic elements of conducting a nuclear war were formu lated, and they defined the main trend in the subsequent development of oviet military
theory, incl uding the operational and teclu1ical aspects of nuclear command and control.
The main question then was the ab.ility to maintain command and control of troops
under nuclear warfare conditions. fficial assurance that this wa the case in the aviet military were pure bluff, and wer actually refuted in the eneraJ taff and the
scientific research institutes' classified materials. Everyone understood that at that
time there was no technical basis for command and control of nuclear war.
At first, in the proces of establishing nuclear forces, command and control was accomplished using the existing communications network ofthe military districts, other
services and civilian administrations. The overall technical level of military and civilian communication wa quite low. Here, antiquated types oft lephone and tel graph
equipment wer in use, as well as radio stations n1any of which w re pre-World War II
design. ecure communications wer practically nonexistent, and therefore the sole
means for transmitting important information was ciph red communications, with all
of its complications and low efficiency. pecial difficulti arose in orgaruzmg command and control of the new RF sites due to their isolated location.
Additionally, from the first day of the nuclear forces life, demands fo.r reliability,
efficiency and ecrecy in th ir command and control became rigid. All existing methods had to be inve tigated in order to mitigate the sharp contradiction betwe .n big
wishes and very limited capabilities. For that, the scanty xesources of the local civil
networks of the. 1inistry of omm.un.ications were exploited to their limit in the interests of the new users. The best mainline channels of cabl communications with Moscow were relinqui bed to RF on an around-the-clock lease.
But even this wa not enough, especially for the proposed period of military operations. Therefore, ba ed on a special government decree an operational system was~­
traduced, allowing nuclear forces in extraordinary circumstances a significant add t·
tiona! number of the Ministry of Communications' able and radio channels. ll .of
these channels were pre-assigned to specific ites, and their transfer to the
was regularly practiced during exercises and training. Besides, urgent subscriber coP·
nection by any ofthe other civilian channels, in case all available military channels went
out of order, was often used. In this case, by transmitting down the line the set pa~s·
. f tl), the extstmg
. . regwna
. l and district
word Vozdukh! (Air attack!) or Samolet! (Au-era

commumca.tJ.ons centers, wtbtm one to two mmutes, ena e commuru'cation between



nuclear sites separated £
The absence of
of kilometers.
ns of command and control which
would correspond to the hi'gh
reqUirements fo d th

made substitutes. During the c
, rce.
e creatiOn of temporary, home. h.
se lOrmatiVe years m
. ..
wit m SRF, naval and airborne SNF .
. ' nova IVe activities were prevalent
· 1
umts. Different ty
an Isp ays, crew training simulators d
p~s ~ command post panels
crypto-stability level were created b an ~el~ure c~m.mumcatwns equipment with set
Y spec1a Ists Withm th
automated systems did not pla
d . .
. .
ese umts. Of course these
contraI. Still, Independent in t'
. . 10 . rovmg nuc1ear command and
ven IOns were distmgUished b
. . .
ways, such Initiatives by young officers hel ed
y ongi?ahty and, in several
of a new standard of work.
p to speed the creatwn and introduction


. As a whole, the old technological base created lar
lmg nuclear forces. The Min. t
. ~e problems m managing the fledgIs ry o ommumcatwn ' bl
command and control system operated
k d.
. s ca e network, on which the
· ·
• wor
· long breaks
m commumcatwns with sites Th
f e . mtermittentl y, Oil.c.ten h avmg
because of secrecy considerations S t ll't
. U~Icatwns was severely limited
d 'd
Command and control deficienci· . b a e I e commumc
a ~ons I not exist in practice.
es ecame especially t
bl .
. .
trammg exercises, where it was clear th t th
I n~ Icea e m command and staff
· 1 command meth d Th a ey .were
.c. h
. s owmg d own llirt
er refmement
o s.
e transmissiOn of ord
. .
were earned out, as a ·rule by t I h
ers an receivmg of reports
e ep one, Wit a large n b
I' d d
urn er o correctiOns and clarificatwns. The documentation of
genera 12e ata wa
rom the staff assigned to follow the
f s carne on manually, with officers
d d' · ·
opera IOns o each co
seIected officers who took note fd t
. .
rps an IVIswn, and specially£ .
o a a on missile launch
t F
o entire exercises was to try to 1 'f h
. .es, e c. requently, the purpose
c an y ow many miss 1
. .
an ow many were destroyed by the "enem " I
I es accomp Ished their mission,
new weaponry required a fundamentall d
t became clear that the fundamentally
y I erent command and control system.
4. 1.2 The li'ans/Uon to lh A
. . e .'lltomatlon ot Command and Conll'ol rt985·1970J
growmg sophisticatiOn of nuclear . '1
brought to light the question of t
. . missi e weaponry and methods of its use
a ransition to aut
t d
ex~enence of the first several years f
oma e command and control. The
latlOn of the basic requirements fo o ;~mbat duty allowed a sufficiently clear formu trol (avtomatizirovannaja systema ~a ulur~ automated system of command and conreliable, fast and secure transmis . pra~ enzdya) . It ha~ ~o support, first of all, highly
Of the thre
. d
. Sions o or ers for missile launch.
e mentwne reqUirements s e d b
c II
a. YaU scenarios "gamed" d .
. ' p e . ecame the mam one, in that practi strik
unng exercises envisag d th
es, after which the Soviets ste
e. e exc ange of massive nuclear
(he\vever, in th
. .
f ~ m was, JUstly, considered to be completely d t
the .t\ ·
e opmwn o Soviet and Amencan
es roye
tnencan system) Alth
h h
perts, the same outcome applied to


:~:~:~::·atthee a peopl~
insid:ut~e ~;1i1~;;;_J:~~:t::~:~~;~:~:~bt:umttahkeegivehn
~ircommand a d
a c Oice·
n contra system so survivable that it would be undam ~


1 fJl: Nucleal' Command, Conll'ol, Coopel'ation
cstn Russ/a and the Unned States: A Comparatille Analysis

aged in nuclear war, or to make one so fast that it would succeed in launching all missiles in the intervening time from the warning signal of an attack to the arrival of the
enemy's first nuclear warheads.
The emphasis was placed on the so-called response-encounter strike (OVU - otvetnovstrechnyy udar) - the American terminology, launch on warning (LOW). In reality,
such a concept did not in the least disturb simultaneously gamed follow-on operations
after exchange of strikes, i.e., to re-establish the command and control system, to retarget the remaining missiles and to conduct repeat launches for the "final'' victory. This
was the concept of response strike (OU - otvetnyy udar), or launch under attack (LUA).
War gaming on military maps had to be supported by actual development of appropriate command and control means by industry. It was decided to finance both concepts, although, notably, less financing was allotted for the second one. At the early
1970s successes in space technology predetermined the selection of LOW with the
strengthening of the ground missile strike EWS by satellites. The SNF's command
and control system now had "improved eyesight."
Besides the struggle to gain seconds, necessitated by essence of LOW, high reliability would be required from the future automated command and control system, both
in peacetime and in limited conventional warfare. This requirement was not easy to
accomplish, if one keeps in mind the deficiencies of the existing communications network on which the automated system had to rely. And, of course, besides the major
function of bringing the launch orders, the new system had to support day -to-day
management of troops and remote monitoring of the missiles' technical condition.
By the beginning of the 1960s, there were two main directions for developing such a
command and control system. The first was characterized by the idea of using special
integrated circuits in the automated system. This, according to the designers' intent,
was supposed to provide relatively flexible logic for using nuclear weapons, i.e., to
change, if necessary, the automated system's working algorithm by re-programming.
This direction was promoted by the Moscow Research Institute of Automatic Equipment, led by Vladimir Semenikhin (subsequently, member of the Academy of Sciences).
The other proposed direction for an automated system used elements with rigidlyfixed ("hard-wired") logic, produced on ferrite-cores (Ferrit-ferritovye yacheyki) . Taras
Sokolov is rightfully regarded as the father of this direction. At the end of the 19 50s,
while working as an instructor at the Leningrad Polytechnic Institute - LPI, Sokolov
had already worked out and successfully put into practice the ferrite-cores idea. In
1961 he established a research design bureau attached to the LPI (presently the Scientific Production Corporation - the Impuls Corp.) and invited his most capable students to come there. These were, basically, young graduates of LPI who challenged
the recognized authorities from Moscow. By 1964, the LPI Design Bureau compl ted
the development of a highly reliable ferrite logic board sealed in a special compound.
Based on it, the first experimental pieces of SRF command and control eq uipment
were built by the end of 1965. 115



. In the history of the oviet military-industrial co
mstances of real competition
mplex, there have not been many
OJ a uge order More oft tl
.d d
C l e on a monopoly basis ac
en lan not, matters wer deuld
cor mg to an edtct from b
b constdered an xc ption and th
. a ave.
le story just discussed
undoubted u efulness of uch £,
f elsu .sequent course of events onfinn d the
p 11 I
a orm o se ectLOn
ara. e r s ~ch and developm nt ended with. com
• pettt:Jve prototype testmg,
on ducted m the first half of 1966 . If
JQ 'LOscow and Leruna. d 1 'h
. ·
tammg the 'R " automated .
,ra · · e truggle was for ob·
f un d amental efforts in tllosecomman and control sys tem ord r, Slnce
the co untry's
years were concentrated 0
rnent of thts s rvrce. fficers of th ,r· .
n upportmg raprd establish Itru try of Defense ·e
h· ·
tlle troop (ma.mly
from the SR )
1 searc mstltutes and from
· a1 .
wer asstgned to th M
dL .
tlon tnals. I was among tl1 m.
oscow an
enmgrad opera-


. The comp titive trials, which lasted for ev .
viCtory."6 Tt turn d out that
eral month ' wer capped by 'okolov's
equtpment ased on th r· 'd r . ·
excee ed m r bability th an·l
d .
tgr ~ernte-core -!ogre notably
a ogous evJces based on s~;JJ .
Cutts. t the same time a reJ t.1 e1
"' u:npenect mtegrated cir.

a v Y rna set of c
mt~ the automated system developed by the LPI omn~an ~1 r ·1 ort ' "hard -wiud"
fictent for RF command and co tr I f h
. p ctal destgn bureau, was fully sufn o o t at penod Forth
k f b' ..
note at later the Leningrad gro al
. ·. e sa eo o ~ectJvtty, we will
up so rna the trm1Sltlon . d all
e computer logic, but with greater . 1. bil'
• gra u y, to more flex I
. .
re ta tty.
n sptte of_ the d ftmte re istance of several h.i hi
. . .
the tll n mmtster of defense 1 1 a)
g . y placed mdtvtduals, m particul<u·
, ars 1
rrutry U tmov tl
mated sy tern wa entrusted to k I
T .
, le crea ton o an RF auto Design Bureau and based on o ~lovtl. n VIew of the limited resource of the U 1
ever a o ler factors c d . .
m nt for Naval and Air F
• oor tnatwn of system developwa entruste to e
'kb ' H
eveloper of tlle authorization system£ .
1 .?leJU m. e was designated as the
era[ designer of t11 command d
o~ lnuc ear orce use, and afterward as the gend' · .
an contra syst·em forth
· A
IVJston of influence between d 1
e entire . rm d I~orces. This
.111 . .
eve opers o . the automated
pnnople, until this very mom t 't d h
sys ·em as been maintained,
v.(ard combining future work unden . nif~ ~yd, I owever: there are definite tendencie. to~
era u Je eadersh1p n '
'll d
a dress this below. 111
. • WI WJ
4 18
Main Development Stages 1 tb.
(A) The Highest Level or Co. '0 lid'Ortlet SIIJF Automated Command and ContPol System
Tl 1 ·
omman and Control
1e ughe t level of the oviet nuclear
end of the 1 50s with the creation of th c~mmand and control was establi hed at the
Defense Council, head ed by the su . uclear fore s themselves. ft included the
•la~nokomanduyushchiy); in the 'ovi -t U~re~· commander in chief (Verkhovnyy
n1UOJst Party of the o . t
on, IS was the general ecretary ofth Comtarat
ruon an the eneral t ff ·th ·
. es.and system f command o ts.
. .
. a. wt . tt corresponding direclllamtaJned un ...:l th
. p
practJce, tlus stru ture has b n invar' bl
th 0
e present tun . e c t th h
Ia y
· ....
e L\.Ussim1 president.
' x ep
at t e supreme commander in chief is now

140 1 fJI: Nuc/eal' Command, Conti'O~ Coopet'ation

cain Russ/a and the IJJ ~
'll ted States: ACompal'ative Analysis

The functions of the highest level of nuclear command and control, the most important of which is making decision together with the political leadership on use of nuclear
weapons, have not changed much since then . At the same time, the technical foundation of command and control - the system of command posts and corresponding means
of automated command and control - have evolved quite substantially.
Until the early 1970s, work in the highest levels of SNF command and control had
mostly not been automated. Information from the troop was collected by telephone
and telegraph. The necessary calculations and generalized data input to the display in
the General Staff's Central Command Post were petf ormed by hand. The same can be
said about the work of the NCA. During a period of threat, they were supposed to
gather in one of the heavily protected underground bunker , which could, in principle,
survive nuclear strikes, but which were not equipped with effective means of automated command and control.
The General Staff's Central Command Post transmitted nuclear employment orders to the troops primarily via the Monolit system. The Monolit simultaneously transmitted via cable and radio coded signals to be decoded at reception points by opening
special packages, which were kept under strict control in the safes of the troops' command posts. These packets had been prepared beforehand in the General Staff, then
circulated to the troops, and were periodically updated.
The Monolit system had existed even before the establishment of the Soviet nuclear
forces. One must give credit to the military signals specialists who ensured for many
years that Monolit improved troops' command and control. Many crews were virtuosos
when it came to receiving Monolit's radio transmissions under powerful jamming by the
"enemy. ' Individuals, designated Champions of the U.S.S.R. and Europe in ham radio
operation, frequently served on duty at the most crucial elements of the command posts.
However, the new weapons' stringent requirements for command and control pinpointed the main shortcomings of traditional types of communications, including the
Monolit system. After the order was received through that system, the missile launch
operations could be carried out (or not) only by the crews at the lowest levels of the
nuclear forces. Remote launches or their urgent cancellation, originating from Moscow, were impossible. The old system's speed was also no longer satisfactory.
Members of inspection teams, which frequently visited the troops during exercises,
time and again witnessed how outdated Monolit had become even from the psychological point of view. In a decisive moment, a duty officer of the combat crew might
fail, sometimes for several minutes, to cut open the packets with scissors because his
hands were shaking so badly. One does not know what frightened the officers more an imaginary nuclear war or the real inspector from Moscow, calmly observing this
unique procedure. In any case, minutes - crucial for evaluating the combat readiness
of a regiment or a division - were wasted.
The problem of using scissors was recognized as so serious that troop inventors were
entrusted to find the solution. The packet was constructed with a pull-string, on wwch



an operator could tug to i
combat readiness
mt_ned1ate1y open the packet. In o e .
was thus Increased by 18
p ratiOnal documents th
1 e y, greater.
seconds, although in realit "t
, e
Th .
y 1 was, most
e sttuatton changed in man
effortds of the C00p erative heade~ ~ey peecmts d~kr:~~g the 1970s. Under the guidance and
eru n1n a se ·
was eveJo d d ·
the qual·typef an mtroduced at the highest level of .n e od automation techniques
o nuclear
coinman and
lay d b h
. command and con trol. Imp t
. con tro, Improving
Y t e d s 1gn
M "k! .
or ant roles m th ·
. were
1 1a1l Log inov v·
e.u creation
Lesh c h enko and t1 · e. rs
l" onash
.d '
. 1e mJ 1ltary customers; far hal f
. ev, gor MJzin, Yuri
e. ov an
en . Vladimir ruzbi . E
o ommumcation Troo s And . .
i1khavlenko Vladimir
· ·h t 1: nm, ugeny Evs6gneev Anatoli z· kp
u ov .r 0 t t · T .
m1en ov v· t _
la tter wer tragically kill d . ,
~san m rof1mov and Yur i Ryab · . Tlu . tc o.r
e m 198 7 m
fi ·
· mm.
·ee of th
co~cerrung equipping th e troop ofWa;s::c; t tdJsas Hungary, during a missio:
an control systems.
. ac countne with automat d
Th b ·
e command
e asic automation systems for
~he authorizing system Kazbek, the n~~~:~nd and control at the highest level included
at command and control KSBU (k
wn system Krokus, and the system fc
th t
or coma ' at t e Central Command Post of the G ya ststema boevogo upravleniya). Beside
mand and control system was installed T . eneral Staff, the Signal automated comgroup of Sokolov. With the hel of KS. his system was developed by the Leni


~hntrol of t~e airborne and sea-b;sed SN~U, ~~.:e~eral Staff exercised comman~g::~

ro~gh ?tgnal, SRF command and co~;n 1 ewise of the Armed Forces as a whole
descnbed In more detail . th
rol was accomplished Th
m e next section
ese systems are
A1 kb k
1 . oo ac at the history of creation and
?wr~g. In contrast to the Kazbek and Krok development of KSBU will show the fol tJon In a rather short period of time b t
us, developed and introduced into op
trodu t'
e ween 1978 d 19
eraIts d c rtn Into operation of this large, multi-lev 1 an
83, the development and ine system dragged out for man
eve opment had begun in the

~::; ~erahtionSal sys.tem during sta~:r:~s~~~~e~~~ it was officially accepted as~ ~::s~



ars a erge1 Akhromee
e command of the chief of G
se~ar~e elements of the system :e::~:~t on ~ombat watch only in 1985. Untilet~::1
a uc a long gestation period was d
fc xpehnmenta1 use by the military.
PProach b th
ue, or t e most p t t
ing on intery d~ customer. Instead of introducing one K~B;l ~ not altogether successful
Inents h.
Iate versions of the system the mlt
e ement at a time and relynew re~ur·c resulted in significant additi~nal wo~~
const~tly advanced new requireA '-'o
1rements were advanced etc Th.
. .n expenmental sections, after wh1"ch
·~ llleev t k h
Is VIc1ou · 1
l< BD d ~o c arge of the program Akh
s .C1rc e was broken only when
an ell]
romeev pard c
·d b
consider bi . aye a good relationship with its
1 d . onst era le attention to the
f~rrcn \V ka e Influence upon the Soviet h. h genera esrgner, Semenikhin, who had
ea ened o 1 .
rg command Th
ll}terest i
n y m the last years of his life (h d. d . .
e prestrge of Semenikhin 's
n command and control and because f:h 1e In 1990), mostly because of reduced
o e general problems in the Soviet Union.



142 1 1}1: Nuc/eal' Command, Contl'o~ Coopel'alion

cain Russ/a and IIJe United States: A Compal'atlve Analysts
During the last decade, a high-level command and control system has been developed within the framework of the Armed Forces global command and control project,
named Tsentr (Center). 11 8 The highest level in that system is called Vershina (Summit).
The projects are intended to enhance reliability and speed for preparing authorization,
to automate collection of information and analysis of the operational-strategic environment, and to introduce some new means of C 3 • However, the political turbulence
of the 1990s has somewhat slowed down the implementation of these projects.

(B) The SRF Command and Control System
The SRF moved toward automation of command and control independently. Despite Semenikhin's closeness to the powers that be, and his sharp competition with the
Leningrad group, all the command and control issues for the main service of the Soviet
Armed Forces were decided by SRF officers and the LPI Design Bureau. The General
Staff was involved in the details only when it came to protection against unauthorized
use, plans of combat employment and integration of the SRF automated system with
the highest level of command and control.
The history of how the creative collaboration between SRF specialists and civilian
scientists grew and developed is interesting in itself. It shows that even under the bureaucracy it was possible- in a relatively short time - to create from scratch the basis of
a theory of nuclear command and control, to develop and manufacture the necessary
technical means, and to equip the troops with them.
It is a striking historical fact that the basic concepts of nuclear command and control,
such as protection from unauthorized actions, remote monitoring of weaponry, retargeting, the degree of automation oflaunching processes, efficiency, reliability, etc., originated and obtained real maturity in the minds of the General Staff and SRF Research
Institute specialists, but also, to a similar degree, in the purely civilian team of the LPI
Design Bureau. More than that, not bound by the narrow confines of military tradition, Sokolov and his young colleagues, Vladimir Petukhov, Boris Mikhailov, Leonid
Vasil'ev, Anatoliy Greshnevikov, Vitaliy Mel'nik and others, provided many new ideas
precisely for the command and control doctrine. These and other designers of SRF 0
systems are the subject of published memoirs by their SRF colleagues and veterans. 119
Their ideas were immediately discussed with the military in Leningrad, in Moscow, at
the SRF Research Institute in the Moscow suburb of Bolshevo and then implemented
at the design bureaus and factories of the Leningrad research, development and production network. Nobody, in essence, hindered the Leningrad team's work, moneY
was regularly disbursed from above, and the appropriate results appeared soon nough.
Already in 1967-1968, the first serially produced levels of the Signal automated system had begun to enter service with SRF formations. Equipping the troops went froOl
the bottom up. First, they created the equipment for the command posts of mediwn·
range missile battalions and regiments, and ofiCBM regiments (levels 6 and 5). At tbe
same time, in the Design Bureau all the other levels of the Signal system were devel·



oped- for the missile division (level 4) ar
and 2). These types of equipment
, .my evel3), and the SRF main staff (levels 1
were given to the troop 1 t
years each. For the training oft
s a er, Wit elays of several
roop o leers, courses wer
· L ·
oscow, and at the strategic missile sites.
e se up m enmgrad and
The Signal automated system belongin t th .
1960s through the mid-1970 )
d g o. ~first stage of automation (the late.
s ' a owe transmission of 13 f d
mgt e establishment of watch
Ixe commands concern.
or com at wor modes for th
o troops to vanous readiness lev 1 th
e system, the transitiOn
e s, e num er of the co b t 1
ord er concerning the start and c n 11 t'
. .
m a p an to use, and the
h .
a ce a wn o a missile lau h Th
lOr gat enng up to 20 confirm t'
nc .
ere was a provision
a Ions an reports m respo
nse o prevwusly prepared
questwns concerning the stat f . '1
e o miSS! e and troop read.
d 1
mess, e ays, and mission


Durin~ that stage, missile launch installations th
emselves were equipped with an other device, not included in th S.
e zgna automated system Th .
remote command and control d
. .
Is wast e so-called
. .
an monrtonng system (SDUK
upravlenzya t kontrolya ) 120 D .
- szstema zstantswnnogo
esigners w o worked o 1
. .
n aunc positiOns developed its
several variants. The SDUK
' on one SI e was Jomed t th
- by an underground cable - to th
o e roc et, and from the other
a d
t I
1owest 1eve! of command post A de au1 hornateh command
n con ro system at the
. n ' a t oug a vanant I t . 11 . . .
e ec nca y JOinmg the automated system and the SDUK d . tl
Irec y was envisaged the .
tern use was assumed to be rna
1 h
' . pnmary mo e of Signal sys.
dIVIswnal or regimental command
t fi
. .
ou aunc operatwns at the
pos s a ter receiVmg the 0 d f
fiore, t h e first-stage
automated sy t
11 d
r er rom a ove. Theret 1b
s em was ca e a system oft
ro , ut not yet of weaponry.
roop command and con Equipment of the first generation was uit I
ql d e. ~rge .and required considerable power,
especially at the division level It
. I
. sex erna efiCtencies co b' d . h 1' .
capabilities evoked c 't ' .
, m me Wit lmited opera rom competmg d .
d d'
tec hmeal solutions to be us d . Icism
th .
esigners an
Id not allow the
e In e mterests of the entire A
th SR .
e F Itself, the benefit ofth f ' t
rme l'Orces. However, in
e Irs mo est step wa
d. 1 c
bona! experience not only revealed t h . I d f' . s .Imme late y lelt. Actual opera .
ec n1ca e lCienCie b t
questiOns of operational nuclear
d d
s, u gave a powerful surge to
comman an control Not . I SRF
ow performed without the use f th
a smg e
exercise was
posts, as well as operation and o . e automated system. Duty crews at the command
mamtenance personnel l't 11
ncernmg the system 's refinement
' I era y poured suggestions
The second stage of the SRF auto.mated c
Msystem (mid-1970s through m'd-1980 ommand and control system - the Signalacteristics. A mode f t
s).- already possessed noticeably better char! I
o au omatic connectwn
k d
eve and subsequently at t . .
was wor e out m detail at the lowest
Were, as a rule, conducted~;~~~ rang~·and lf·n troop exercises. Actual missile launches
P<:>sts of ad ' . .
e pus mg 0 a button at higher levels the
!VISion arm
t h C
taff. Thi's b
y or a t e entral Command Post of the SRF and G
ecame a type f ·t 1
o n ua' crownrng many major activities of the military-

C8 /n Russ/a and the United States: ACompal'ative Analysts 1 145

144 \ Cl: Nucleal' command, contl'ol, coopel'alion

. l ded the higher leadership of the
1 The main designers willingly me u
11 nches. These leadindustnal camp ex.
. such remote-contra au
d of the Ministry of Defense m
w· th this goal in mmd, regu ar

~~~~~~::elves, more than once, pus~edn~=o~~r~~:~uip~ent was specially installed at

. l M automated comman a
level4 Stgna. . t the Central Command Post.
. .·
channels of
and control system, comroumcauons . - that
the General Staff to. lmlta e
Simultaneously, m the commabnd d - cab! 'radio, radio -relay and s~tclhteff' th
h ical t pes began to e use
At theSRF mam sta m e
vanout~alply~:ight:Ued the stability of its work m peacteatgllens\or each missile division was
essen 1
t d system ou
1970s a daily accounting of automa e
due to the measures underta en, was
' t d The combined monthly outage .lmde,
t command and control system
cond uc e .
d dlze remo e
'1 b
to a few minutes. A new stan ar
e new third-generatlon Sl os y
r(eSdDuUceKd) code-named Pauk. (Spider), was created folrytphrotected against unauthorized
. B
It was extreme
the LPI Special Deslgn ureau.
5 ubsystem was devel
. s· nal-M system., the yuga
w·thin the framework of the 1g . 97 6 1978 and was u ed to create supp
lt was introduced to the troop m 1 ~ o ·t~ at all levels via broadcast-o~ly
ope .
ths for delivering orders to conunan pl s - SRF leveL the V'yuga eqUlpmentary pa
. .
els At a ower
. '1 l
radio and satellite coromumcatla~s:s ~n l- .1 in order to allow a remote rru Sl e aun 1
ment was electrically interfaced wlt tgna
to be conducted by radio from the. cen~er. d technical characteristics of the V'yug~ su In view of the acceptable operatlOna an . Bureau was accepted in 1982 fort e o-


~=~o~~~ ~:~:::~~~:~~e~;~~o~~o~=~~u~;:e: ~i::"'::~!o';,:i

Additionally, Signal-M.~a~ inter;:s ~ade it possible to accelerate the pro~es~:
SRF rocket armies and dLvtslons.
ea ons and to solve a number o o
e:ational re-planning for the use of nucbl~swoft~e LPl esign Bureau developed ~e
L t · on mern er
· to a unlutational problems. . a er :
11 b . SRF computatiOnal centers m
tymg a aslC
. formation-calculatlOn ystem,
F command and contra
fied network.
k in the development of SR
. .
Before it,
p · t ystem

reglhas been the creation of the en~e.; s . a a ~ommand post of a lower leve ·;·ef, a the
all orders were passed to the ~lSSl es Vltem reception of launch comman s rom
In the Penmetr sys

ment or batta1lOU.
dio directly at the launc er.
1 ed by
center could be accomplished by ra from a simple listing of the systems de~~:foUI1d
Here, it is pertinent to ste.p awayf
tl working with the troops, qUlC
s i.n
His engmeers, requen y
d d control system
the Sokolov group.
f 1' ble function of comman an
d by the
the key to solving the;a was the communication channels use alit ln



complex cOombat
terminal equipment
ne cou
t but all this would come to naug
super hardened comman pos s,
sion channels were vulnerable.

The experience of using the first generation of automated systems had shown that
traditional cables, radio and even satellite communications channels could not support
reliable command and control in nuclear warfare or in warfare with massive use of precision-guided weapons. Other means would have to be found. Thus an idea grew for
the creation of an independent system of channels for combat command and control,
specially intended for extraordinary conditions. Naturally, this could only be radio channels, and hence the system received the designation of radio-combat command and control (radio-boevoe upravlenie - RBU). At the installation stage for the Signal-M system,
several types of such channels appeared, the most important of which became Perimetr .
The Perimetr system was accepted into service and, since 1985, has been on combat watch. It will be described in the next section. Some types of radio -combat command and control have been described in an authoritative Russian publication. 123 The
Gorn system mentioned there is a group of Perimetr command missiles, based on the
SS-20 ballistic missiles. The Gorn was on active duty for some time, but then it was
retired because the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to destroy ballistic missiles of this class. Several publications provide additional information on the channels
of radio-combat command and control. 124
Finally, the smaller size, weight, and power requirements of this second-generation
automated system allowed its accommodation into all command posts of the then new
types of missiles . The standardized regimental command posts for remote launch
(otdel'nye starty) type missile regiments - that is, without any launch crews in the immediate vicinity of the launchers - as well as the mobile command posts of the mobile
Pioner missiles (SS-20, in NATO terminology), were equipped with the Signal-M,
Perimetr and V'yuga equipment. This period demonstrated that, in the nuclear forces,
it is impossible to separate the missiles themselves from their command and control
system; these, in principle, constitute a unified whole. Hence, the transition from command and control of troops to command and control of nuclear weapons began in the
1970s. This transition was actually completed with the creation of the third -generation automated system - the Signal-A.
Signal-A began to reach the troops in 1985-1986. The lowest level of this system (seventh link) - was installed directly at the launchers, and was an important integral
part of them. Without them, not a single new missile could have been put on combat
duty. This made the SRF leadership still more attentive to the question of command
and control. It is not surprising that in this period the deputies of the SRF commander
in chief, and at times he himself, were frequent visitors at the Impuls Corp. Design
Bureau, other design bureaus and production plants carefully considering the timetables for testing and production of the automated systems.
The introduction of the Signal-A system began also from below, from equipment in
tqe missile complexes (levels 7 and 5) up to the division level and higher. This process
has continued even to the present time. The interfacing of the Signal-M and the Signal-A resources is accomplished at a functional level.

I? in Russia and the IIi'lilted States: AComparative Analysis 1 147


l IJI: Nuclear command, Conrrol, cooperation

:~:,real£reason is different, but the 7::tn;:;::~:~:d;~erent scrviw. Again, perhaps
I emU ~r.naval "."d aviation SNF progressed more a 1 e~elopm~t of the automated
the command an d control systems d .

Signal-A allows retaxgeting of missiles remotely from the General Staff or from the
SRF main staff. Several sets of the flight plans (poletnye zadaniya) are stored in the
equipment of the seventh level (launchers). For retaxgeting missiles, it is sufficient to
indicate in the launch order the number of the corresponding combat plan. Upon receiving the plan number, the automated sy tem gives the command to the missile for
the selection of the required fligh path, which is carried out automatically within 10 to
I 5 seconds, after which the nrissi le is launched. Recently, much has been written about

The Signal-A system comprehensively uses all existing types of "traditional" communications channels and the high-reliability channels of the radio-combat command
and control system. It has its own highly secure encryption equipment developed by
lmpuls Corp., has an improved design and is easy to use thanks to the special minicomputers used by the operators. The extension of this system is being accomplished
according to plans, and designers and customers are already looking to the future, where
it is proposed to have a Signal-A\ system. (If, of course, by that time peopl will not
have decided to throw nuclear weapons and all of their exc Uent infrastructure onto the
rubbish heap.)
(C) IJevelopmmt of c.,..,.,..,a and Control oJS..rB=<l and A'""""' SNF Componen'-'
In contrast to the SRF, where creation of an automated command and control system was from the very beginning almost entirely turned over to the military and its
research, development and industrial network, command and control of the sea-based
and airborne SNF was within the sphere of the general designer of the system for the
entire Soviet Armed Forces - Semenikhin (Moscow Research Institute of Automatic
Equipment) and once again. of a "general" customer - the General Staff. In the author's
opinion, this circumstance had a major influence on the character and tempo of system

development for nuclear submarines and strategic bombers.
It is likely that an invisible division of responsibility came about between the General Staff and the main staffs of the Navy and Air Force. But it is even more probable
that responsibility was shuffled between them: the General Staff wanted the two services to be concerned with their own systems, while the sailors and airmen figured that
since the SNF command and control was strictly centralized in the hands of the Gen·
eral Staff, heirs also were the responsibility of the General Staff. One should keeP in
mind that the SRF was a brand new service, while the airmen and sailo" had their
long-standing "attachments" to traditional weapon systems. Therefore, in the Air orce
and the Navy, basic efforts in command and control continued to be focused on the
non-nuclear portion of the forces, while the concept of the nuclear triad took a geeond
seat. As for the general designer of the Armed Forces automated system, he was, in
large measure, preoccupied with such important questions as authorization, prole¢'
tion from unauthorized actions and command and control at the highest level. H.enoe.
he was unable to monitor with sufficient effectiveness the work of his subcontrartofS-

n a airness, It must be noted that . dd' .
s ow y than m the SRF
the ind'>rated organizational
b d d . lCS m solvmg the problem of reliabl
reaase an . airborne SNF were caused al b
e ~ommand and control for the seadeploy~d m rigidly fixed areas and were ;i~e y techm~al complexities. SRF sites were
a. techmcal point of view• th e1r
. command a rally
d dug lmto the ground · Therewre
e country Even r d'
e commumca
a 10 an satellite communicati'ons were es-ta· Ished more easily along w e11.-d eve1oped
nnes and strategic aviation as a b .
d permanent routes. Conversely s b
asic mo e of d t
' u rnacenb er.
oreover, a constant maJor
. ob stacle f, u 1'y, bl
patro regions remote f rom t h e
su merged boats was the th' k
or re Ia e delivery of orde t d
only by VLF transmissions." ness o the water, which, as is known, can


Sea-Based SNF
When the first missile-ca. .
in the earl~ 1960s, their coa:::g ~n~n:~~~e (SSBs or S~BNs) joined the Soviet Na
of con_venbonal submarine . The main dif£ ol was not Mferent in principle from
erencebwas dthe General
Staff's mo nopo1y on
. the use of strategic nuc1ear weapons
o~abon•. The rest of the routine control o;- oabr 'and.Implementation of launch
o t e Navy staffs.
an com at duties were the responsibility


Under the leadership of th M
the Desig~ Bureau Mars in t~e c~:~o; ~~~earch Institute of Automatic Equipment,
Alekseychik, carried out developme t f yanovsk, headed for many years by V V
sea-based SNF Th
n ° automated com
d d
- ·
ductio A
: . e mam enterprise for serial produ (man an control systems for
Knmintern, in Leningrad."'
c ton was the Research and Pro-


ng the Initial period of SSB/SS
mand and control was based
BN operatwn by the Soviet Nav
y, therr comcontr l E
on the same "packet" . . l
pnncip e as the SRF command and
. .o . mergency orders to change th 1
were transmitted from the General Staff san d to carry out the assigned
and operational radio networks Thor
mam naval staff using the
/SSBNs by means of powerful ~t /or ers were delivered to the subing
SovlCt Union. Six known transmi;t:;,na;y VLF
(At/ant) Fwere most often used: Krasnodar (Gh klw) ItGhm the VICimty of the follow )
orky (G l' .1\ A
, runze (P
'?metey • Khabarovsk (Glwrkul")
o '"" • rkhange\,k
Arctic ice d.
. Jdnotmterferewiththe d
. Molodechno (Antey). "'
e Arctic Oc
un erwater reception of o d
ducted H . ean, a senes of exercises re 1 b 11' .
. r ers m the VLF range.
of up t· avm g received
the order the s b
. a a 1shc mlSSl'1e 1aunches was con
o tw
u manne surf d b k
PGshment to
tluck, and conducted a \au h
• ro e through an ice crust
ter reportmg mission accomo t e center by a short-wave broad net :
cas ' It submerged.









1 f?: Nucleal' Command, Conll'ol, Coopel'ation
cain Russia and tile United States: A Compal'ative Analysts

The transition to automatic command and control of the sea-based r F happened
at the sam time that, as described above, the Armed Forces introduced its automated
system a a whole in the econd half of the 1960s. The fundamental problem at this
stage weFe strengthening protection against unauthorized actions by a submarine crew
member; the expansion of operational capabilities of command and control; and im provement of survivability and of radio channel capacity, which was supposed toreduce the submarines' time on the surface.
The communications channels gradually improved. From the end of the 1970s, a
satellite communications system, which has a greater noise- immunity and capacity than
old HF communications, began to be used for two-way communications sessions with
surfaced ubmarines. The radio lines were fully secure. Antennas were improved for
reception in the VLF and ELF ranges while submarines were in submerged movement. 1l1e tethered-type antennas, several kilometer long and towed behind a moving submarine, produced satisfactory results as a whole. Antennas towed by modern
submarines enable them to receive communications while at working depth. In addition to radio communications, submarines can u e acoustic communications; its main
advantage is that submarines do not need to surface and use retractable and towed
antennas. However since the range of underwater acoustic communications is short
(not more than 10- 0 km), it can be used only in some case·, for instance, when surface
escorts accompany submarines. 128
With the delivery of the first KSBU models to the Armed Forces, their prototypes
began to be installed and checked at fleet and B division command posts. However, the beginning of their official combat use should be considered 1985 - the year
K BU was accepted for combat duty.
In spite of orne achievements in improving the sea-based NF command an control system in the 1970s and 19 0 , the rather high vuln rability of its ground elements,
i.e., the command posts and shore communication facilities (beregovye obyekty svyazi) of
the fleets, and also the relaying radio transmitter center , remained a major deficiency.
To remedy these shortfalls, several measures were undertaken. everal mobile command posts and truck-mounted HF transponders, and also a group of VLF-range Oreltype relay aircraft based on the TU-142mr, were introduced into the sea-based
command and control system. 129 However, the mentioned steps, in the opinion of a
number of experts, gave only an insignificant increase in command and control reliability. The Orel capabilities for long-range operations proved to be significantly lower than
those of the American TACAM system, and the mobile command posts were bulkY
and not particularly mobile. Mor decisive actions for improving submarine command
and control were not taken because of a oviet tendency to underestimate the sea-based
component of the nuclear forces.
When the Ru sian 1 adership, according to START II, agreed to a sharp reduction
ofland-based I B 1s, questions con eming the command and control of the sea-based
IF took on a different meaning. According to that agreement, by 2003- 2005 more

I 149

than half of the Russian strategic nuclear
~~e::~ore,. the issue of strengthening relia~l:~::~ds ~auld. be carried by submarines.
su mannes command and
en mto account in Russia d .
unng the process of START II t"f· . contr_ol
considering subsequent d .
. .
re uctiOns of str t . f£ .
ra I rcation and m
a egrc o ensrve weapons A th
escnptiOn of command d

book, and in its bibli:~ra~~~!r:a~~r~a~~~!an sea-based SNF c~n b:afo:~;~:~l::~

Airborne SNF

The creation and development of a
SNF also encountered several compl command and control system for the airb
able co
· ·
ex problems m tl · h
The~mu~rcatiOns with strategic bombers patrollin o~ y m t e area o~ providing relieve opment of a command and
g ar away from therr ground bas
system for strategic bomb
es .
seen for many years by th R
e esearc In ft
ers was over
th r;t~ra); the chief designer was Rober: ~~~~ao iat~ematical Machines in Yereva~
~ . : l~ron assembly plant, also in Yerevan
n. enes production was organized at
mtr~ y, combat orders were transmitted .
HF radw channels which h
k . to the strategic bombers onl b
ave wea nor ·
Y Y means of
~IOns, close t? the territory of the potenti ~e Immunrty especially in the northern rehon was equrpped with t 11"
a opponent. In the 1970s 1
sa e rte commun· t"
• ong-range av1a
rts command and control Work . b .
rca IOn stations, which somewhat im
b b
IS emg conduct d t
. om ers wrt Perimetr receivers wh· h . .
e o equrp the TU-9SM and TU-160
Improve command and control ~f airi~or~ev~e;;;_~J~s a sufficiently effective measure to



Russian Strategic ca Today

42 1
The Highest Level ot SNF ca
Th e R ussran
· president has th . h

:::/~~:ifof C~ i~cludes, in addit:~~o tt~: :~:~~~~:t u:~ of ~u~lear weapons. The high '. an_ t e commanders in chiefs of the SRF, N e mmrster of defense, the Genrgamzatron of the developme t
d .
, avy and Air Force.
Warheads of t
n ' pro uctwn storag
hs rategrc weapons is entrusted to a s; . 1 e an mamtenance of nuclear
.. se - t e 12th Chief Directorate Th" d" ecra st~ucture within the Ministry of
nunrster of d fi
Is Irectorate IS b d ·
the nu 1
e ense, and has its own storage fac Tt"
su or mated directly the
Chief Dc ~ar triad. These subunits' specialized~I Iest~ as well as special subunits within
unc IOns are sub d"
rrectorate h"l
lllandCL· f h
, w I e operationally and ad . .
or mate to the 12th
11 o t e respective SRF, Navy or A" R mmrst.ratrvely they are under the com1
rr orce unrt.
o ensure that all th
Work together .
ree egs of the nuclear triad function
In order to wrth_ the other elements and structures of th ~or~ally, they constantly
~d especiaU ~;ovide for continuous command and contr:1 ussian Arme~ Forces.
IS operationaf T~he ~uclear forces, a system of command
o~the troops m general ,
e highest level command post . 1 d posts as been deployed and



s Inc u e:

C' in Russia and the anited
- States: ACompal'ative Analysts

I 151

150 \ 1?: Nucleal' Command, Contl'ol, Coopel'allon

undergrou11d , super hardened comma11d posts in the city of Moscow, and the
Moscow region (Chekhov);
airborne comma11d and control posts for the General Staff, the SRF, the Navy and



the Air Force, based pear Moscow;
railroad and mobile ground (truck-mounted) command posts.









These command posts are connected by two-way communications channels, and
are equipped to receive an EWS signal of a nuclear attack. There is also a system for
Special Communications S st
y em


one post to take over from another.
Individuals and agencies included in the higher level of SNF C' are continuously
connected to each other by a special communications system, Kazbek. (Fig. 35) This

(cable, radio, radio relay, satellite)


system includes:



portable equipment ( Cheget) used by the president to prepare and issue authori.
zation for the use of nuclear weapons (the "nudear briefcase" );
terminal equipment (Boh>an) installed at command posts of the General taff,
RF. Air Force and avy to receive the president's authorization;
the special communications system Kavkaz (radio, radio relay and satellite communication channels). This system connects tbe "nuclear briefcase" to the Kazbek
network from wherever the president happens to be, and del ivers133information to
all Bahsan devices with necessary reliability, security and speed.
The 'nuclear briefcase" outward\y does not differ from a typical hard -shell briefcase.
The designers manufactured several samples, but how rnany "briefcases" were re.Uy
used in the viet Sr F command and control is unknown. Some believe that three were
used for preparation and release of nuclear authorization• one belonged to the general
secretary of the Communist Party's Central ommittee, one to the minister of defense.
and one to the chief of the enecal taff. A clear, official description of this complex and
crucially important process does not exist. The situation is similar in the United States.
The widely held opinion that Cheget is the same "nuclear button" with which th•
president can launch strategic missiles is erroneous. The launch of a missile is impossible
without the m ilitary, starting with the crews at the conunand posts of the en ral tafl.
The authorization of the president is no more than the perroission and order to launch·
The special communications system of the national leadership, Kavhaz. ha> a high
survivability in crisis conditions thanks to being based on a wide, mutu.Uy-connect<d
network of cable, satellite, radio and radio relay two-way secure channeh of cornrnu"'d
cation. Wherever Cheget's operator might be, be can connect it to this network an
transmit authorization to the eneral Staff's entral Corrunand Post. The Kavlla<
system simultaneously supports communication between senior government officials
while they are making the decision whether to use nuclear weapons, without requiring
thero to be gathered in one place.



ON DUTY . , _




~B l








H lI







Force I~



From EWS




Flg,35: "Kazbe!~k~""s:y~s~te:m:.------------~---------~

equ.Ipment h as been installed
ch:l authorization has been received b
B General Staff command posts. Once
bee . els, the General Staff crew muort : .
aksan eqmpment and verified via other
n .Installed at all of the SRF A. F
egm to carry out the order. Baksan h
e Sltuati
• " orceand Nav co
as a so
tor expediting preparatory
posts m order to monitor



display th Ig -. evel technical resource for SNF
attr.iving' teKtermmal receiving equipment £or th c~~ml and and control is the Krokus
a rok ·
e miSSI e att k
us IS venfied through a

ac warnmg system Data
specia procedure and expedites those prepara

caIn Russia and the Uniterl States: AComparative Analysis



1 153

CS: Nuclear commanrl, conll'ol, Coopel'atlon


t .H

he receipt of authonzatwo.
be conducted up tot
d Forces command
f pecial cOlnputers installed at rrne d
nifi.ed algotory operatiOns .
l( BU is a co.rnbmatJOn o . .
cted by various channels an ~ u rf d 'th
th SRF) mterconne
d · mte ace wt
mis ion of orders
duty watch at
nt m .
· t system · ere tS
. d t h e tgna
itor the condition
computer centers,:
K B consoles.
d sts contmuou ly mon
. w at th highest level com~an po
b t accidents on a level appropnnd recewe reports a ou
. hin the comuty ere
of nuclear missiles and troops, ~d
Attempted unauthorized actiOns wtt d tl . h
ate to the importance of the ace~ ~nt. I
weapons are automatically rep.orte ;ou~
mand and control system or wt nuc ear t fthe eneral taff. Everythmg an everyall levels up to the Centra~ Comma~d :~: ;d issue orders to the troops to unblock and
body are in constant readmess to prep
. .
and and contro
launch the mtssiles.
F's highest level o comm
The work algorithm of th~ ~usstan ~ s stems architecture as desc~i~ed m hapte~
. . onds to the general pnnciple of~ y . d 1d its source iden.tlfted at the com

~.ohsts (o~:~!:~rane


1~n e:e the warning of a m.isaffsile atdta;~e~:~~:i~;sear:ed with strategi~ nuclear\ wea~o~~~
f h
eneral St an
epending on t 1e un o
tnand posts o t e
'd t and the mimster of defense.
\. . by the
t to the prest en
t of reta tatwn
a report lS sen
.th tile current concep
t to the
m'ltted via the Cheget equtpmen
. g sl'tuation and in. accordance Wl .

ons 1s trans
. ·epare
thorization to use nuclear wea~
d d control. Launch or ers are pr
ah~ h t level of the Armed Forces comman ~tt d to the troop simultaneously usmg
1g es
d th
·e transau e
t these command posts, an
en ar . ! A Vyuga Perimetr and ot ers.
a available technical means -:- K BU •. 1gna- , oviet ~xpert on negative control durprotection of the Soviet
all According to the
enate hearings m . epte.m ~dr al,
oau·thorized actions was base on
mg . .
. t Cl ent or u
mand and control system agams ac

infor~attOn pr~ld;~~{ t~u

following principles:

nude~r co:~

1 ar weapons
. h t level over the d eclsLOn
rigid centralization at the hlg es troo s·
. ll the
P. ' gainst unauthorized actwns m a
and issue execution orders to the
1 d sufficient protectwn a
essentially equa an
three legs of the nuclear _tnad; 1
t the higher levels of command and c
. 1 1 f otectlOn from ower o
. increasmg eve 0 pr
and comP
tinues to function along the same mes,
. ' SNF C3 system con
Russla s
. ..
unch erformed by one perso .
uclear triae s
excludes any posslblhty o~ ~ laff's co~mand post directly co~m~ds t~e nording to the
The crew at the Genera. ta d t 1 launching of the mlsslles.
cc t ol can be
h e aratlon an ac ua
nd and con r
troops ln launc pr p
h h le process of combat comma
mentioned Soviet C3 expert, t e w o
. hief sen.d the
divided into four stages. 1St ff nd the corresponding commander m c
The chief of the Genera a a

preliminary command to the troops after the first information about an attack comes from
the EWS. This order automatically switches the command and control equipment at all
levels from watch duty to combat duty, and allows the crews at command posts access to
launch equipment and operational documents. However, at that time the crews arecapable only to carry out some preparatory steps, but not to launch the missiles.
The permission command is issued upon final confirmation of a missile attack against
Russia. The president, minister of defense and chief of the General Staff together prepare the authorization for use of nuclear weapons. It is sent to the three commanders in
chief, and delegates launch authority to them.
The direct command is prepared by the chief of the General Staff and by the commanders in chief and is sent to the action levels as an order to launch the missiles. (We
are talking not about actions by an individual, but by appropriate combat crews at the
command posts ofthe General Staff and main staffs of the services 137 .) The crews at the
action level verify it with the help of special organizational and technical methods. After receiving this command, which also contains the unblocking code value and the number of the operational plan, the crews at the lowest level of the C 3 system are physically
enabled to launch the missiles. Each launcher automatically receives concrete targeting
data depending on the number of the operational plan contained in the direct command.
The action crews issue the launch command directly to the weapons themselves after
the direct command i& verified. This operation is limited to a very short period of time,
after which the channel for transmitting the command is switched off.
Finally, the last barrier to launch is an automatic verification of the command in the
launcher itself. If the result is positive, the missile is launched. 138
The description provided by the Soviet expert in 1991 should also include the capability to launch missiles without participation of intermediate and low levels in the chain
of command, using Signal-A and V'yuga (order transmitted electrically via regimental
command posts), as well as via Perimetr (by radio signal directly to launchers). 139
One should emphasize once again the rigidly centralized character of the SNF 0.
Not a single missile with a nuclear warhead can launch until the highest level Command Post releases a specially guarded unblocking code value, nicknamed goschislo
(gosudarstevennoe chislo - state number).

SRF C8 System
(A) The Technical Means For Command and Control From the Center
. The main technical means for command and control of the SRF is Signal-A, which
Includes the subsystem V'yuga. (See Fig. 36)
ignal-A routinely monitors the condition of nuclear missiles and troops, changes in
~heir state of alert and preparation for missile launches. This system's equipment is
:stalled at all command posts and directly in the launchers, from the General Staff
awn to the stationary and mobile ICBMs.


1 C': Nuclear Command, Contl'ol, Cooperation
C'ln Russia and the United States: A Co.

The system has several modes of operation. The main operational mode is the automatic electronic .interface of all levels of command and control into an integrated network, by which mi siles can be launched di1·ectly from the command posts of the General Staff. exclusive of the intermediate level command crews. In thi cas , the launch
command follows all the descending teps of the hierarchical ladder, but the intermediate level acts only as an automatie relay station, while the combat crews are observers. There is also a manual interface mode, which allows one level to law1ch its "own"
missiles. This operational mode can be introduced only by special command from th
General Staff, upon receipt of which the ignal-A console at a given level' command
post is unblocked. There is also a mixed mode of operational interface.
'ignal -A is very fast. A command from the leneral Staff reaches the ICB 1launchers
not more than 30 econds after it was given. According to Yakovlev, the former RF
commander in chief, "the RF officers still remember how the then Minister of Defense Army en. Pavel rachev, when visiting th Central ommand Post of RF,
attempted to give them a dressing down for 'brazen bluffing' - the computer monitors
at the Central Command Post automatically provided new information on the combat
readiness of each missiJe il'l the RF units." HO The collection of reports from all subordinate levels and the appearance of this generalized data on the displays at the Central
Command Posts takes no more several minutes.
The highest levels of ignal-A interface with computer centers are capable of largescale calculations, such as the correction of operational plans for SNF combat use or
calculations of new flight tnission for individual ICBMs.
The reliability of the system is guaranteed by the use of several independent, widely
dispersed (physically) communication tracks for each pair of levels. Each communication track may have several channels of a different physical nature - cable, radio, satellite, tropospheric, etc. The switch from a damaged channel to a backup one is done
automatically within several seconds. All the channel are highly secure.
ince the ignal-A system is characterized by redundancy, it is highly reliable and
combat-ready on an evel'yday basis. ver many years of operation, there has not been
a single, even minimally serious case of disruption in communications between the
command posts of the eneral taff, the RF ommander in chief and the I BM
launchers. The system' improvement is ongoing in order to strengthen it tability
and expand its combat potential. HI
As noted earlier, V'yuga is a part of Signal -A. This redundant system, using flF,
VL and satellite communication channels, serves for one-way radio transmission of
launch orders and other commands to the troops. All command posts, including regimental ones, are equipped with V yuga receivers. Working HF frequencies are selected
individually for each area of reception, based on optimal conditions for the propag~­
tion of radio waves in that given area. Therefore, the system has a number of territon·
ally dispersed radio transmitters, which are controlled in synchronism from one high
Level command post operational at that given moment.


General Staff







'RIPBI'ative Analysis

------ - ----- ---1

Strategic Rocket Forces


Main Staff
Central Command Posts


Rocket Army
Command Post








ICBM Division
(silo and mobile)
command posts






L_________ _

---- - - -


rocket regiment
command posts


(silo and mobile)



Fig. 36: "Signal-A,, system.

Signal-A and V'
yuga are mterfaced electrically and algorithmically and
D .

are use
esp1te the hi h
g everyday reliability of the system d
and other experts believe that it
escn ed, the Russian military
CendT~~rantee reliable delivery of launch :~::s ~osup?l~mented by some means that
to devel ns of nuclear war. Hence, from the late 1970 missiles under the extraordinary
came t op a backup SRF command and cont 1 s onward, the Soviet Union began
ro system . At the same time, Signal-A
o be referred to as the main SRF CJ



cs In Russia and the United States: ACompaPative Analysis

1 157

l £8: NuciBBI' command, ConiJ'ol, coopePaflon

d and control was specifically designed and
This backup system of the SRF comma~ll .t
des and channels are especially sur1 s no'tt1'ng launch orders under extreme
developed for conditions of nuclear war~
tern 1 or transm1
. .
ivable. Its mam element 1S a sys
mmand m1sslles.
d H d"
. p ·
conditions usmg enmetr co
tt t' n to Perimetr (nicknamed Dea
The world mass media began to pa~ a en 10 .
t that has been written on the
d smce that tlme mas
s, an
d'1 torted on purpose. There have a so
in the West) in the ear1y 1
1 t and sometlmes s
· ff' · 11
subJ'ect is erroneous, mcomp e e . .
t42 I
nly in 1999 that Russ1a o 1C1a y
bl catwns
twas 0
O~e of the most important documents m t. 1S
been some relativ~ly senous pu. 1
recognized the ex1stence of P~rtme~r.. C
lexes edited by members of the Russ1an
d G A Yefremov.t43 The foreect
U k' y S Solomonov an
· ·
Academy of Sciences, V.~. t m, ~~ VA Subbotin, chief of the SRF Rocket and

booktsw~h:~:~::~:g ~ a~ e~ce.rpt form the book:

word tAo the
Space rmamen .

"P . t "("Perimetr-RTs") with the missile JSAll.
"The Missile complex JSPOll
enme r
d 'ssile of the Perimetr sysd f d . of the comman mt
The development of the rat estgn
'ttee of the CPSU and the
th decision of the Centra ommt
f '1'
tern was ordere y e
th d of combat command o mt 1. .
30 1974.
e me o
Council ofMmtsters o ug. '
.. .
d missiles was proposed
conditions utlhzmg comman
tary facilities under extreme
'th th r experts. In December 1975,
V F Utk' . conJunctlOn Wl o e
by Chief Destgner . .
d· h
. alized equipment was devel.
f h
was complete ' t e spect
the draft destgn o t e sys em
f th LPl] In December 1977' the
· 1D
n Bureau o e
oped by the OKB LPI [specta estg
one 15B99. In December
d missile 15A11 wtt nose c
draft destgn of the comman
. '1 15A11 were conducted in order to test spe. .
mands for missiles launch
1978, the first launches of the mtsst e
rove the system for tssumg com
cialized eqmpment an tmp
f the command missile 15A 11 was
· d The fhght testmg o
. .
during the specta1 peno .
1 of the command mtsst1es
. M h 1982. In January 1985, t e comp ex
completed m arc
t n combat watc .
of the Perimetr system was pu o
The designer -Design Bureau "Yiuz hnoe. "
General Designer- V. F. Utkin.
. '
nyy zavod.
Manufacturer- Yiuz nyy
bl d ICBM in a launch con. t START I- assem e
Classification accor d mg 0
tainer (Class A).
. '1 . the silo of remote launch type,
The type of the complex - strategtc I_m~st e m
t' command mtsstle.
. D
with a thtr genera ton
1985 passed acceptance tests tn eStatus - on combat watch smce January
cember 1990. 144
Missile - 15A 11
Nose cone - 15B99

The history of development and introduction to combat duty of the Perimetr system
is described in sufficient detail in the Military Encyclopedic Dictionary of the SRF, in
"The hronology of the Main Events in the History of RF." H6 Information on the
mobil version of the command missiles of the Perimetr system, based on the Topol I BM,
has also been published. 147 RF experts consider Col. Gen. Varfolomey l orobu hin to
be the father of Perimetr; he led a large group of military officers and ci:vilian specialists
throughout the system's development, testing and introduction to combat duty.
The crucial characteristic of Perimetr is it ability to transmit an order from the General taff directly to the ICBr 1 launchers, physically bypassing (in contra t to igna.lA) all intermediate command posts of the RF.
The prin iple of the sy tern's operation is a follows. uring the threat period, fac ing a possible enemy attack, several previously elected officials (at the level of deputy
minister of defen e, or equivalent) move into asp cial, super hardened underground
facility in the vicinity of the main command post. Thi facility, referred to as the radio
command and control center, is equipped with a powerful LF and 1F transmitter, as
well as with an underground antenna, as uper hardened as the facility itself.
Imagine the following, purely hypothetical , scenario, The EW display at the Central Command Post of the General taff shows information warning of an enemy missile attack. This is a unique situation, without anything analogous in the history of
humankind. T he people at the command post b it the president or duty crews, are
facing Hamlet's choice: to be, or not to b ? - To issue an order for a retaliatory nuclear
strike, or not? lt is ea y to imagine that ami take, i.e., a positive response to fal e initial
information, would have much more horrible consequences than in the case of the Prince
of Denmark.
For many years both the oviet Union and the United tates came with surprising
ease, to the sam certainty: a warning of a missile attack by the EW should initiate an
immediate retaliatory nuclear strike, or it might be too late. perational documents say
this even today, and such an approach governed all the concepts for building C 3 systems
and the strategic offensive forces themselves (with corre ponding huge expenditures).
The spirit of the old War itself could explain, to a certain degree, this conclusion.
But today it is becoming increasingly obvious that such a concept drives into a dead
end the people whose duty it i to be supremely cautious and ultimately responsible in
critical moments; that it denies them their right to make a mi take.
The sup r haTdened element of the Perimetr system, described above, mitigates th ·
critical nature of that choice. pon receiving a warning of a missile attack (a warning
which, in th ory, can be false) the r CA has an opportunity to temporarily switch the
responsibility for thi unique decision over to authorized individuals who may stay
~live after the leadership itself has perished. It is critically important that this survivU)g crew can carry out its combat order only after receiving confirmation of actual
~llclear detonations on Russian territory and if the leadership bas perished or cannot,
er technical reasons, carry ou its duties at the main command post.

C8 in Russia and the United States: A Compal'atlve Analysts

I 159

I (JI: Nucteal' command, Contl'ol, Coopel'atlon


(B) The Division OJ Silo-Based ICBMs
The architecture of 0 for a division with silo-based ICBM regiment i seen in Fig. 8.






National Command Authority

the nose cones of these command missiles, which are equipped with special radio transmitt rs instead of nuclear warheads. The missiles are then launched along pr - elected
trajectorie over ussian territory and, during the entir e flight, transmit th launch
order to armed missiles, as well as to command post at every level.
To put it briefly Perimetr ha ·two crucial advantage :it reduces the probability of a
tragic mistake and it increases the probability of retaliation. Its hortcomings include a
relatively slow speed of operation since it takes 35 to 40 minutes o transmit the launch
order to those armed missiles located at the greatest distances from the center. Thi
means that while a Russian retaliatory strike would be highly probable, its size (th
number of missiles launched) may turn out to be comparatively small. But th relativ ity of the concept "comparatively mall ' in any given case will be addressed below, in
an analy is of variou concepts of r F retaliation. 148

CCM - Complex of Command Missiles
LF _ Low Frequency
PA - Preliminary Authonzatlon
RCC - Radio Command Center
OM _ Decimeter Range
ACP - Airborne Command Post

Fig. 37: "Perlmetr" system.

h NCA transmits a special code for premmand and control center. The
Technically, this is made possible when tde d'
hardene ra 10 co
l.t the launch order to the troop
liminary authorizatwn to t e super
h · ~
pare an ransm
crew working at the center c~n pre
t· the release of preliminary aut ~nza
only if three conditions are slm~lta~eousl~t::~~ NCA, and reception of rel.iab~e mfo\tion, a complete loss of comm~mcatlOnS "':
es of sensors (visual, seismic, etc ..
mation about nuclear detonatwns from d.lfferenlt tnycph order automatically without par-f
T f
repanng a au
'd eo
The system has no capab 1 lty or p .
. d f time there is no evl enc
. . .
' crew. If, Wlth a certam peno o
tlclpatwn of the cent~r s
stem returns to its initial status.
d and
d antenna in the radio comman
actual nuclear exploswns, the sy
. .
of the un ergroun
Since the transmission range
l the launch order vla co
. . . d th P rimetr system can re ay
. h. ange o
control center. lS hmlte , e 'le launchers for these missiles are loc~ted Wlt ln ~ed iJ;ItO
missiles . Statwnary and mobl e
the order is automatically recor
the centers radio channel. Upon receptwn,

An ICBM division's command has two stationary hardened command posts, the
main one and are erve, as well as a mobile, automobile-based reserve command post,
and a helicopter-based airborne po t. There is a procedure for passing the command
and control from one post to another, as necessary.
The stationary and reserve command po ts of the division are connected with one
another by several branche of underground communication cables, ach one encompassing from one to three highly-protected, underground standardized command posts
for missile regiments. The e cable channel are used for round -the-clock operation of
the igna/-A system, a well as for routine administrative telephone and loudspeaker
Direct cable ljnes connect a missile regiment's standardized command post to each
of its silo-based launchers. The cables are designated for continuous detailed monitoring of the mis iles' teclmical condition at the regimental post (and more generally, at
divisional and even higher command po t ). These same cables are to be used to tran mit combat launch orders to the missiles. Silo-ba ed launch r have no crew , and only
external guard team are located near them. All launch quipment and the I BM its If
are remote-controlled from the standardized command post of the mis ile regiment.
. The command and control system of the missile division is hardened against the
tmpact of nuclear and conventional weapons, as well as electronic jamming. The cable
Line are backed up, in case of damage, by radio relay and radio communication chan nels. Some launchers of neighboring regiments are connected with cables in a way that
forms a common network for divisional command and control. In an extreme ituation
(and, obviously, only after receiving pecial order from above), this permits launching
alL of the division's ICBMs from any one standardized command post of ami sile regi;e?~· ln other word , each regimental standardized command po t can b used as the
IV~slon commander's command post. Tbis is a substantial advantage because of the


1 IJI: Nuc/eal' Command, Contro~ Coopel'alion
cain Russia and the United States: ACa

Airborne CP
of division

'RIPBI'IIt/ve Analysis



A number of other measures to str
control under extreme conditions ha~n~ en .the reliability of divisional command
As one can see the mis '1 d. . . e een Implemented.
. .
SI e IVIS10n's C3 S S
t hat give It considerable flexibility in both y ternb as a Wide range of technical mea
T ese tech · 1
corn at com
d d
the SRF mea mea~s are operated in a manner det
. mdanb an routine activities.
ermme y the General Staff and
commander m chief.

(C) Command A d c
ontrol of Mobile ICB"~~~
The C 3 system f SS
. .
o an -25 (Topol) mobile I
. .. .
The pnnciple of mobile missile CJ . 1
~B~ diVIsiOn Is shown in Fig. 39
Is argely Similar to that of ad' . .
IVISion of statiOnary

main CP
of division


Airborn CP
of division

Residential Area

Mobile CP of Division
Mobile CP

Fi(J. 38: Silo-based ICBM division.

possibility that a considerable portion of divisional and regimental command posts
would be destroyed by a nuclear or massive conventional strike.
The reliability of combat order transmissions is further guaranteed by the flexible
technical capabilities of the division commander's regular command posts: the main
post, the reserve post, the mobile reserve post and the airborne post. All of them have
independent channels for receiving information from the higher levels (including V'yuga
and Perimetr receivers), as well as independent direct radio channels for the transmission of launch orders to the silo-based launchers.
Finally, the most important measure to increase the survivability of the command
and control system of an ICBM division is not only its hierarchical architecture, but
also the capability to transmit orders from above directly to the regimental commaod
posts and to the launchers, bypassing the division command. This is achieved by equip·
ping all missile regiment command posts with V'yuga and Perimetr receivers, and launch·
ers with Perimetr receivers.

Division CP

Residential Area

ICBM Topol

Regiment CP

Stationary position
of ICBM regiment


1 C': NucleBI' Command, Confl'ol, Coopel'atlon
cstn Russ/a and tho United States: A CompaPatli

ICBMs. It also combines a hierarchical structure with direct channels from the highest levels of command and control down to the launchers. The division command has
approximately the same set of command posts. The channels of combat command and
control are also sufficiently redundant. At the same time, there are a number of differences, determined by the special character of the mobile ICBMs' operation.
The regimental command posts are mobile, like the ICBMs themselves. Unlike
silo-based launchers, mobile ICBMs require service crews, which include, in addition
to the guards and drivers, personnel that are able, under certain condition and with
authorization, to launch the missiles. When these regiments are deployed in the field
or are in motion, their C 3 depends almost entirely on radio. able communication can
be used to a limited degree only if there is a communication center in the vicinity of the
field position.
Under combat conditions the autonomous launchers on the march use UHF channels to maintain continuous operational telephone communication with their regimental command posts. They are also constantly ready to receive launch orders via the
Signal-A system, and directly from the highest levels of command and control via the
V'yuga and Perimetr systems. Once the launch order is recl6ved, the mobile 1 BM
command deploys in the field and executes the order. The flight mission is entered
without the participation of the crew, i.e., automatically in the course of the launch
procedure, in accordance with the information contained in the launch order.
Since it is necessary to save the ICBM transporters from excessive use, the mobile
SS-25 regiments spend much of the time in the areas of their permanent bases. They
deploy to their field positions according to training plans or in a period of real threat.
However, the long-existing concept of a surprise nuclear war predetermined a variant
of combat watch for the mobile ICBMs at their stationary positions.
At their permanent regimental base, mobile SS-25 ICBMs are stationed in special,
unprotected structures with Krona retractable roofs. The mobile regimental command
post is located nearby in a similar structure. There is also an unprotected stationary
building for the regimental command post, fitted with C:' equipment. All these tructures have the necessary antennas and are hierarchically connected with cab! lines to
the higher levels.
Constant combat watch is carried out either in the stationary command post building, or directly in the mobile command post' vehicles, parked in their facility. Upon
receiving of combat orders, ICBMs are launched from the Krona facilities automatically. The launch can be implemented by remote control from the center or by the
crew at the regimental command post once they receive authorization. This variant in
the launch control is determined by the duty established in the Signal-A system based
on the directive by the General Staff or the SRF commander in chief. 149
The SRF commanders in chief and their deputies paid constant attention to coxn·
mand and control, and made considerable contributions to the improvement in sRF


ve Anatms 1 1118

SRF ommanders in Chief
Mitrofan IvanovJ'ch
- 1959-1960

Y. ·


Deputy Ministers ofDefense

ed eI'm chief
mars 1a1 of arttllery, Hero of the ovt'et

emenovich Mo kal · k
' oviet Union - 1960-1962en o, mru·shal of the oviet Unio

... .



n, ~,vice . ero of the

ergei ernenovich Biryuzov
Un.ion - 1962-1963
'mar hal ofthe oviet U .
roof the oviet
l.ikolai Ivanovich Kr 1
U .
Y ov, marshal ofth
· U .
111on - 1963 -1972
e OVJet nton, twice Hero of tl
VI d · ·
1e oviet
a unu· .Pedorovich Tolubk
- 1972-1985
o, chief marshal of artiU ry, Hero of
Yury p
ocialist Labor
av.1OVIc Maksimov, Arm
Igor mitrievich
y gene, al, Hero of the oviet
11ion - 1985-1992
Vladimir ikolaevic~g~vk, Alnny general, 1992-1997
{a ov ev Army g
I 1 olai Yevgen'evich olov
ener ' 1997-2001
tsov, colonel o-eneral 2001


Vladimir Fedorovlch 11 I bk 0
lvlikba:i l Grig , .
- 1960- 1968
o~· evlc1l Grigor'ev - 1968-1981
y Alek eevJch Yashin - 1981 -198
Alek andr p h· • h
..... OVJc Volkov - 1988- 1994
1kolcu Yevge • · h
n evlc olovtsov - 1995 1997
Anato j1y
fikola · h p
evlc ennmov - 1997-2000


In 1999 ' vako
· ·.
1.; ·
v 1ev uutJated

. ·
RF local area networ~ c~hatlOn of a unified information and reference
llom combat di
e system embrace all
syseq . .
rea ness to finances and lo . ti
aspects of life of the RF
01o:;.m~nt the RF entral ommat~: pcs.t hslllg his personal computer and th~
ent receJve aU th . £
os , t e comma d . ch'
a fir~1g p 'f
em ormation he needs b it th d l n er m -tef can at any
Patie t . osi 1011, tb availability of fuel md j b . e .ep oyment of a Topol I 13 to
n s JU the RF
u ncants Ul are ·
tuniziug di tribu~o e;I~ral. Hospital. This sy tem proved tog~ment, or the number of
Plan of re .
no lmited re ources and org . .
Veiy useful when op. Patr work b tl · d
<U1lZing th ope ti 1
collect .
Y le m ustry and by th
· .
ra ona and finmcial
, Ploces aud tr . . h
e mtssJ 1e depots
om staffs d
ansnut uge amounts of data h
.. .
cour e, the need to
allo\ved d an. ombat ·ew of commMd po t Bas requne~ a lot of additional work
~he Ve~ hi~:'lte all the difficulties, to maintain ti .udt accor~mg to Yakovlev, this ba
, evel ofO 95 1so f
· le m ex ofSRF 0 b t
111g eye£ T
· ·
n add1t10n _ md thi .
. .
m a readmess at
the Weapon act~ltate prevention of unauthorized a tis I q~~~ tmportant - uch an all em elves.
ons Wit n the CJ ystem and witll

~~n of the



1 fJi: Nuclear Command,



cain Russia and the United States: A c,
. omparattve Analysis

Command and Contl'ol ot the Sea-based and Ail'bol'ne SIUF

The main technical means for transmitting General Staff's orders to SSBNs is KSBU,
the system of combat command artd control. The organizational and operational principles of this system are largely similar to Signal-A, which is used by the SRF. All
levels of the sea-based 1 F command and control have KSBU equipment, including
the General Staff, the main naval staff, and subordinate staffs. SSBNs themselves are
equipped with special devices interfaced with KSBU at the higher levels.
The survivability requirements for the sea-based SNF under conditions of nuclear
and conventional war have determined that their main combat use is patrolling the
oceans and seas at considerable depths (hundreds of meters), which makes reliable communication with the SSBNs more difficult. The SSBN C3 system allow SLBM launch
both from submerged submarines and from the submarines on combat watch at their
SSBNs patrolling submerged in peacetime are continuously on duty for VLF recep tion. Under combat conditions, the General Staff's order to launch missiles would be
transmitted to the submarines by KSBU via the ground-based VLF transmitters and
shore-based communication facilities. Once the launch order is received, the SSBNs
should execute it without surfacing or conducting any two-way communications.
Communications between SSBNs and the center are possible only when the submarines surface. In this case, a session of two-way communication is conducted via HF
and satellite channels. Submarines on combat d uty in the oceans and seas surface in
turns according to a special schedule, which is periodically changed. In an emergency,
the center can use the VLF network to transmit a command to surface to one of the
submarines, and then conduct a two-way communication session with it. Beginning in
the early 1980s, urgent orders to surface have been transmitted by the ELF radio center Zevs (near the city of Severomorsk on the Kola peninsula), equipped with a transmitting antenna several dozen kilometers long. 151
The Northern and Pacific fleets have shore communications facilities to support
SSBN command and control. These facilities are connected via cable, satellite, radio
relay, and radio channels with the command posts of the General Staff, of the main
naval staff, and of the fleets, and also with the mentioned powerful VLF and ELF radio
centers. If necessary, the Ministry of Communications' transmitters could be enlisted
for SSBN command and control.
Russian SSBN are equipped with safety devices blocking accidental or unauthorized launches of SLBMs. Their nuclear weapons can be unblocked only after a special
code is received from the chain of command. From the very beginning, and until now.
the crews of Soviet (Russian) SSBNs have not had a real ability to launch SLBMs with·
out authorization by the chain of command.
The semi-automatic Dalnost' system has been installed at the main naval staff an
fleet command posts, and at shore communication centers. This system increases

sc (satellite communtcations)












~, 66~ )



. BN CJsystem. (SCF- Shore


. ---- "



Communrcation Facility.)

speed of 1 .
re ayJUg com
rtnes themselves have man s fr?rn the center to ubrnarines sev .
~khnicheslu'klt sredstv· bee~ equipped with the Rotatm· and I eral fold. The. ubmaIO~ of incoming di . .. Jon oard technical d vices), as well n.~gr~l (bortovye kompleksy
offt~er and th
gzta data from radio channels
d . a . evzces for logic proce sWork i b .e weapons sy tem of th
BN , an lts delzvery to the command ing
eJng cond
d ·
o ·BNs Under e .. ucte to ~mprove the reliabilit of tr . . .
lllai Il'lode with xtreme condztions. It ha been j ;y
.ansnuttmgorders by Pen'metr
the sea-based Tf b
mpossrble to use Perim t"1 . .
ecause tts workin d .
.e In 1ts norg ecrmetnc range rad.
zo waves



188 1 fJI: NucteaP Command, Contl'ol, Coopepation

cannot penetrate deep water. Pe-rimetr-type logic receivers are in tailed on SSBNs, but
they receiv orders fron1 the command missile by relay: initially, the orders are received by the ground-based elements of the sea-based .NF ", and are then transmitted to submerged submarines by LF channels.
ln the overall plan, a solution for this problem is foreseen within the framework of
the mentioned Tsentr system, in which the planned subsystem More would serve the
sea-based SNF.
The role of the Russian SNF's airborne component is currently reduced, and this
study does not address its C 3 system in detail. Fig. 42 shows several crucial details.
Communication with strategic bombers in flight is maintained via HF, VLF and
satellite channels transmitted from ground bases. When the bombers are far away from
their ground bases and under powerful jamming, transmitting the launch orders becomes quite complicated.
Command and control of that part of the airborne SNF which is located at airfields
when the General Staff combat order is received, is more reliable. The crew, receiving
all necessary data on the ground, i.e., the target destination and the code for unblocking the nuclear weapons, can in principle then take off, go to the target, and accomplish
the mission independently.
Here a very serious ''but" comes into play, although connected only indirectly with
command and control: The most critical factor is to ensure that the airborne SNF take
off from the ground before any surprise strike against them. The C 3 system itself can
rapidly deliver an urgent takeoff order to the airfields. But starting the engines and
launching all the aircraft takes much more time. The bombers cannot start their patrolling beforehand and continue it for a long time, both because of technical limitations and because of strategic considerations. Such an action in a crisis situation could
be provocative. All of this imposes certain limitations on the participation of the airborne SNF in a nuclear retaliatory strike.
In order to win several minutes and reduce losses to the airborne SNF, the following
scenario was assessed during exercises in the 1970s and 1980s. A proposal was made to
insert an order into the operational documents for urgent strategic bomber takeoff upon
receiving the preliminary signal of an opponent's missile launch, even before the 'EW ·
comes up with a "missile attack" signal. But this proposed variant was recognized as
unacceptable, since the takeoff of all forces upon an erroneous signal might provoke a
strike against Russia.
Planned within the framework of the Tsentr project, the command and control sys·
tem Krylo for the airborne SNF is now at the experimental design stage.

4.2.4 Scientists, DesignePs, Testing Ranges and lndusiPy
From the very start until recently, the quality of Russian nuclear 0 and the speed 0
its development and introduction to the troops were largely determined by the power·
ful support rendered by the country's political leadership to the strengthening of the

caIn Russia and the United St.
'Btes: ACompaPative Analysts


em of air component ot SNF.

nuclear forces as a wh 0 1
natur f
e. The technical com 1 ·
Ill andes~r thetr use in combat demanded a clo~ee;~t ?f nu~lear weapons and the unique
bureaus uc!u:es an~ military/civilian research an~I~nship betwee? the military comcal t ' an mdustnal enterprises Th'
. evelopment Institutions de .
Is cooperat
, Sign
s age f t h .
the rnilita~y. ec meal development and testing, buti:~o ~~~tio~d not only at the tactiOver th 1
oug out subsequent use by
e ast several d d
Vely stable
eca es, each leg of the nucle
factories spec~el~~ork. of cooperation between researchar. tnt~d developed its own, relaIa IZing In th d
IDS Itutes d '
nuclear w
e evelopment and m d
. .
' estgn urea us and
0 ermzat!On of c3
eapons T: bi
The tnain d .t . a ~ 6 shows the genera! principles of th.
syste~s for strategic
oc nna1 Ideas for the d 1
Is cooperatwn.
eve opment of c3 d h
an t e strengthening of its



cain Russ/a and the U.'lined
. States: A compal'ative Analysis




I 189

Nuclear command, conll'ol, cooperation


combat potential are born in the central staff of the various services, mo t prominent! y
in the main staffs' operations directorates. Thes cor ideas are directly formulated in



the directorates' departments of troop control automation.
ub equently, these initial r quirements ar forward d to the military research. institution for detailed study. Each of the nuclear triad's militarY services bas its own
lead cesearch in titute, plus several other military research organizations (institutes,

academies, centers and testing facilities) subordinate to it.
The lead researcl1 institute in charge of all aspects of RF development, including
C', is the Central Res arch Institute o. 4 of the Ministry of efense, located in tbe
loscow suburb of Bo\shevo. Togethe< with !nstitu te l o. 4, th Peter the reat Mil itary Academy in !oscow, the Mozhaisky Military Academy in t. Pewsburg, and a
number of high r
' officer schools do work on ' on a project-by-project basis.
The entral Research Institute o. · 0 of the Ministry of efense in oscow studies
for the airborne 'I F, while entral Research Institute o. 24 in t. Petersburg per3
forms similar work for B ls. Thes research institutes of th nuclear triad cooperate
with on · another, as well as with entral Research Institute I o. 27 in Moscow, the lead
institute studying command and control for the Russian Arm d "orces as a whole.
The military res arcl1 institutes for each leg of the
F triad analyze aU aspects of
new missions and develop the technical specifications [or new technology, or for the
mod rnization of an eJ<isting system.
draft of these requirement is presented to the
customer - the main staff of the respective service.
After this. the main staff. together with th directorate of the ervice in charge of
acquisitions, drafts an agreement with the manufacturer. The purpose of such an agreement is to ensure that the rojectcan be indeed im p\emen ted according to the cu tamer's
specifications and within the estimated budg t. Within the network of design organi>.atinns working fo.r a given military service, the lead organization is the chief designer
of the C' systern for that leg of the nuclear triad. This group organizes a mor detailetl
study of the given requU-ements, with the participation of all the civilian reseacch. insti-

tutes and design bureaus that are part of the network.
The lead organization for the
' is the !mpul orp. in t. Petersburg (director
- B.G . !ikhailov, cb ief system d signer - V. Ye. Petokhov). It cooperates on different
aspects of ' with the entral Design Bureau of Heavy lachine- Building in Mo oow;
the Moscow Institute of Thermal Technology; the Moscow Research Institute of Radio Communications; the Voronezh Research Institute of Communications; .the
Krasnoyarsk Television Factory; the !<rasnodar Jns<rument-Building Factory; etc.
After several iterative stages in negotiations, the service comroander in chief and tb•
chief designer approve the technical speciflcations. for a major projec , th


taff ew
also approves the pecifications.
systems and equipment are d veloped and designed in design bureaus under
military oversight by those research institutes that formulated the requirements- 11>•
customer also constantly monitors th process of design and development through "'

staff of Research
overside Series Testing
service Institutes designer in indus tr~ factories Ranges

Main doctrinal Ideas


Project of technical
specifications (TS)



Agreement of TS



Approval ofTS





Laboratory and
factory tests





Testing ranges













Tests on military'sites


Series production
Introduction to
military installations


Introduction to
combat duty



Operation by troops
and Industry's oversight



Removal from use


TableS·. RUSSian















ca Acquisition

permanent representatives
to the des'

~~~:;ed;:stitution of military acc~~an~:ea;,:;, Thes~ rep~esentatives constitute the

out th .
e mam customer in Moscow win'
Expee:fmprovtall of the lead military

mon or t e whole Russian Armed
any design -team project with-


the desi n ben a sampl es of t he new command and· c
militacygfieldureaus then undergo a series of tests· s::trol
developed by
conducted b
e>ther of whole systems or
. d tests, mteragency tests and
latives r y t e 'tate commissions which are
m~Jor components. State tests are
ing to ~hesearch institutes, design b~reaus fact c~mpnsed ~f the customer's represene result th
ones and mtl't
. .
Ofteturn d
'• e expenmental samples are 'th I
' ary spec>al>sts. AccordDepend' to the designers for improvement el er aunched into series production




mg on the ch aracter and scale of tests
· , th ey may reqmre
. various facilities:

170 1 IJI: Nuc/eaf' Command, Cont/'ol, Coopef'alion

caIn Russ/a and the United States.· A "'0.""

. "' niPal'ative Analysis

laboratories, experimental prod uction shops in design bureaus, factory stands, mili tary insta llations or testing ranges. In the 1970s and 1980s, RF 0 1 equipment was
prod uced in the Russian, Belarussian, Armenian, Kazakh, Baltic and Ukrainian Union
Republic . The major factories in Russia weJ; the Kalinin machine-build ing factory
and the Bolshevik factory in Leningrad. the Ba-rrihady factory i.n Volgograd, and the
factories in 1 rasnoyarsk and I rasnodar.
ince the di integration of the oviet Union. relations with the majority of 3 enterpris s outside ussia hav broken off or have become complicated, including such major
enterprises as the [insk Electrical- iechanical Factory, the Monolit and Kommunar
factories i.n Kharkiv, and the rad io factory in } iev. ertain st ps have been taken to
recreate the necessary network of factories within Russia it elf. 154
The new C 3 systems and eq uipment are tested at the same cientific and t sting
center as the mis iles themselves. The RF usually use th well -known testing ranges
Mirny, near the city of Arkhangel sk, Kapustin Yar near Volgograd, and (now, to a lesser
degree) Tyuratam in Kazakstan.
T he special nature of nuclear C 3 systems require compulsory testing of their components with the respectiv I l3 1 sy tems. Tests of 3 systems are usuall y completed
by live missile launches at the testing ranges or at military installations. If 3 tests are
on a small scale, they are included a an element in the general program of testing new
missiles. When large components of 3 yst ms are tested, missiles and other necessary equjpment may b allocated for live launches at the final t sting tage.
ln tbi respect, the testing of Perimetr in t.he early 1980s wa quite typical. A brief
description oftest procedure i useful . From the lmpuls orp.'s test stand ( till the
LPT esign Bureau in Leningrad at the time), which simulated the enlnl Command
Post of the eneral taff, a signal was tran, mitted by a regular communications channel to a LF transmitt r near foscow. Then, its signal wa received at Kapu tin Yar by
the special mobile launcher of a command mis ile (based on the -20 Pioner). The
command missile took off on a trajectory to Lake Balkhash (the impact it ) and, for
the entire duration of the flight , transmitted the launch order. This ord ·was received
in a silo launcher at the Tyuratam test range, playing, in this case, the role of a combat
launcher. The I B 1also launched and precis ly hit the target at a testing range in the
vicinity of the Kliuchi settlement in F amchatka. At the same tim , many command
and control post - deployed for this test throughout the oviet nion - received the
order transmitted from the nose cone of the command missile.
As in the United ' tates, the average term for developing Russian 3 components is
about five to seven years. But in some cases, developing new equipment takes longer.
After testing, new 3 equipment is put into series prod uc6on and introduced to
military in tal lation . s mentioned, at this point contacts between the military and
th manufacturer continue. Moreover, one may say that this cooperation broadens
because it includes a large number of military specialists from th troops.
The RussianSNF, especially theSRF. have developed regt1larcooperation with weaP·



on_s designers and manufacturers that

!h:~~;;~~,~~~s :~:~&:Y~;!:' i~h:::~::tf:o:'::t;;,n;: ~~ ~~:~::io~~:~n:his

t e mdustr '
e arrangement de 'b d
y s guaranteed oversight , E
. 11
sen e above has been called
:::rs are obli.g~ted for the duration. of t~:e:tia. y, the ,de~ign bureaus and manufac'1 ~Uipment s hfe to conduct the difficult
k at the. mihtary installations that th
~rgent repairs following accident
. e m~ Itary cannot conduct. Among th
Istry of D fi
s or major failures t k
ese are
e ~n~e, prolonging service life analy . ,fa eov~r of equipment by the MinfD
Sis o operati
et c. The M m t
. Is ry o efense annually all t
on on a service-wide scale
t eed oversight.
oca es resources for th · d
e m ustry s guaranven today, factory teams, representative
tary research institutes maintain a
s of design bureaus and officers fr
proven its effectiveness in general,p::~e:~t~a~~~e SRF.installations. This appr::~:~
tary requests them, the industr ,
. .
m particular. As a rule when
one or two d
. y s specialists arrive at an
. '
the mihth
ays an perform necessary repairs Th k y mi Itary Installation within
e weapons and CJ systems are maintain . .
an s to such rapid and skilled aid
Western experts hav h
ed m a state of high combat
e s own consistent l'nt
rea mess.
rna kmg and
erest m the
·1 h
. 1
. cooperatwn among those Ru .
.specia c aracter of decisionmhv~l ved m the development and introdu:~Ian mfiitary-mdustrial structures that are
w I e to comment .,
. .
on o new weapon
upon certam Ideas stated b St \M
sys ems. It Is worthy an oods, an American expert in
regar mg Russian CJ.
_\Voods stresses the tendency of the
lutwns, which allow effective implemen~~;;~a:f:~quisiti~n agencies to favor simple soe requirements without any "ex t ras " :
"Soviet de igns are often simple m
tailored to a ingle rol - d fi - earung rugged, lacking detailed fini I .
them .
an requently they are able to
s ltng, an
. and no more. From the fact that
per for rn th task required of
desc ti
many ut by
np on, It cannot be inferred that th
no means all, y tems fit this
re~l operational b nefits result fron1
. y adl e. ~ny less ffe tive, however. In fact
tar ·
· ·
ov1et es1gn · · eli
' ·
. ntng a mmunum of exotic material or so .' . er pr erence for weapons conIng the most advanced technology o 1 'f. ~hr~tlcated subsystems and for employn y I tlrs VItal to su ces fu l performance of the
combat mission. "Is s

· Is
· generall
. This co nc1uswn
Simple but effective
y correct. The Russian c3 system Jar 1
modules, whose sum total
ge y consists of such
provi es for the
. d
( and co t 1 w·
tntroduced .
n ~o .
Ith few exceptions, all th.
require reliability of
"'ex:oti. " mto service on schedule. Today
hls eqmpment was developed and
more t an ev R .
c tech 1 .
and shar
.no _ogles because of simultaneous dr t'
d er, . uss~a cannot afford any
One c~npf~lcde I~cr.eases for all parts and materia~ss lc re uctwns m defense spending
m simil
1 ·
ar cone Uslons about the tendenc f R .
y o ussian designers to stick to

172 1 IJI: Nuclear Command, Contl'ot, Cooperation

caIn Russia and the United States· A c,
. omparatJve Anatys/s

an evolutionary development of military technology: 'As for evolutionary change (or
exploitation of design inheritance), there is an apparent oviet preference for cautious
step-by-step modification of hardware rather than radical design innovation." 156
There are quite a few such examples in the Russian C 3 acquisition process, an example being the history of gradual modernization for the SRF C 3 's main system Signal,
described in section 4 .1.
Woods notes with approval the practice of speedy introduction of new systems into
service: "The Soviets attempt to deploy new yst ms as quickly as possible ... The Soviet practice of prototyping enables a weapon in every ca e - to reach operational status
very quickly." 157
This is generally true, although when it comes to 3 equipment there is a difference.
The approach de cribed above cannot be applied to the process that the designers and
manufacturers use to perfect the reliability of negative control in new type of C3 systems. Until all the requirements for protection against unauthorized actions are fu lfilled and confirmed during tests, prototypes are not launched into series production.
As for any new operational capabilities in 3 technology, sometimes permission can b
obtained to improve them to the level already being introduced into service, or even
during the early stage of combat ervice. This would be within the framework of the
industry's guaranteed oversight, a described earlier. This principle is applied also to
the introduction of the n ewest missile systems, which include as integral parts C 3 elements at the lowest level.
Woods' study also criticizes the belief that Russian design bureaus completely depend
upon research institutes, a mass of reference manuals, instructions and various requirements, which are said to practically paralyze the initiative of the new weapon designers:
"The relationship between research institutes and design bureaus profoundly influences the Soviet [research and development] process ... Their [different restrictions'] existence is a reflection of the institutes' monopoly of research and test facilities. It is said that this style of [research and development] inhibits designers from
exploiting new technologies that could lead to important weapons development.
But to argue this is to ignore the military effectiveness of many Soviet weapons and
rely on assertions about their low technological content." 158
Obviously, there are some formal restrictions on what the designers can do, but it is
erroneous to say the designers are completely helpless in the face of the customers. As
noted earlier, the Russian C 3 designers play a role equal to, and sometimes even more
important than, that of the military in the research and development process. A go~d
example of this can be found the history of the Impuls Corp., published in Russian 10
1995. There, in a memoir about Taras Sokolov, the general designer of the SRF 0 system, V. I. Lazutkin, one of his closest aides and a winner of Lenin and State prizes, writes:



"[Taras Sokolov] used to say that th
e customer's te h · 1
ve1opment of complex systems is t th K
c mea requzrements for the de·
no e oran but 0 1
su ltmg movie depends on those k' .
n y a movie script. The rerna
tbe composers. It depends up h
or, e actors, the cameramen
on ow eeply the
y un erstand their mission how
umfied their team is and f
o course, upon the custome h.
quality and success of th
r Imse · As a result the
e movie are determmed b h
standing of its creators· and
y t e talent and mutual under'
' mos Importantly the m
one that the customer initially wanted b
ost successful movie is not the
' ut the one that he really needs. "Js9
. The military customers in Russia, just like their
Soviet predecessors, have not obJected to such a cooperative appr h
1 1
oac as a ru e and h
VIews of highly-qualified civilian speci'al' t '
d'ave arge y trusted the innovative
Is s regar mg th
nuc ear command and control. St'll th
e comp1Icated problems of
· ·
I • ere ave been
restnctwns on new development
. 11
many arguments. If there are any
funding, a already mentioned. s, especia y now, they are the result of insufficient
In his conclusion Woods com

panng t e pra t'
c Ices o weapons acquisition in Russia
and the United States considers th R
e ussran approach
. 1 b
an more rehable - quite sensible:
- Simp er, ut less expensive

"This is why oviet weapons are often simple in com ..
cated U.S. quipment And 't.1 I
pauson With overly sophistib
I w 1y ov1et hardwa · ·
Y We tern standard . In the trade-off betwe
te IS ~otonously poorly finished
capability, Soviet de igners tend to ·d h li en product:tOn costs and high weapon
wat t e ormer wh
'bJ L
costs permit the procurement of l
en posst e. ow production
£ .
arge num ers of sturd el' bl
ecttve systems. n the oth - h d
y, r ta .e, and militarily ef. ..
et an • the quest for high w
mextremelyexpensive, unreliablee ui m
eapon capabJIJty can result
q p ent, whtchmay perform poorly in battle.'''6o
Naturally, one should not idealize "sim 1' . "
should not be artificially slowed do
. p rlcidt~. Techmcal progress is inevitable and
Inent H
wn, me u mg the area f
sh . owever, in such a special area as nu 1

• .o new weapons develop~ld ~e the guiding principles. Apparent~ ea~ C ' su~phcit~ and reliability, perhaps,
t Ussia owes its CJ system to rna t 1 ~ t e Russians stick to these principles. 161
,ary ~nd civilian. In section 4 1 I ~y ~ ente and outstanding individuals, both mili-

~;;~:~~~et:o~rine and s~;p~

~g~::e~~~e S~;e~~l ~~a!f'; ge~~ral ~hho

0 ; :::
dee avy and Air Force, the direction ofCJ
' oge er wrt spe•L
r orne legs of the triad As fi th
development for the sea -based
••le rn
or e command d
Alexalo~t prominent roles have been played b th a~ llco~trol ofland-based missiles,
&et 1 erSapozhnikov, IvanD ukarev
. y ~ o owmg SRF customers: Gens.
geev, Yuri Yashin, Victor Esi~, Alex;~:I~y G~I ~~~hv, Varfolomey Korobushin, Igor
yaz s I ' Igor Kovalev, Victor Khalin

and ai b


cain Russia and the United States: AComparative Analysis

I 175

1 C': Nuclear Command, control, Cooperation

Victor P.etrankov, uri Pikin, E ugeny Volkov, L ev Volkov, Vladimi · Dvorkin, Victor
olgov, Anatoli Kutibaba, Mikhail Pokushko, Valery Rudakov, Valery ubbotin; Cols.
Yuri Mosalov, Boris Uchenik, Grigo.ry Ioffe, Yuri Kasatkin, Pavel Z olotarev, Alexei
efedov, Vladimir Kolganov, \lri Ksenofontov, Vitaly Zhikin, Alexander Larin and
Boris Fedotov, and many other general officers and specialists of the RF.
ln addition to the chief industrial designers and experts named in section 4.1, who
played a pcominent wle in the development of
F ' . one should mention Anato\i
Aleksandrov, tan islav am tskiy, Eugeny Kamushkin, ennady Valentik, Vadim
Kondrash.ov Vitaly Teterev (all from t he Impuls Corp.), nton Bilenko, foscow Institute of Radio ommunications), Boris O sipov and Vladimir orisov (Vo.ronezh Research Institute of ommunications), Valery Romanovskiy (Moscow Institute ofThermal Technology), Boris Aksyutin, Alexander L eontenkov G leb Vasil'ev ( 1oscow ent ral Design Bmeau of Heavy Machine, Leonid Pokrovskiy (Kra noyarsk
Television actory), Yuriy I horoshkin (Ktasnodar Instrument-Building Factory) and
Yuri Zagorovskiy (the Monolit factory in 1G1arkiv); among others.
esr ite the natural differences of characfer and career between these mil.itary and
civilian specialists, they have always been united by enthusiasm for and lifelong attach ment to their work. Probably, th majority of them - being highly-educated, int llectual people - never seriously believed in the acceptability of nuclear war, and did not
consider the danger of aggressive "world imperialism" to be t he main stimulus of their
activity. Also, the modest salary paid in the Soviet · tl.ion, and oow in Russia, to the
chief designers of the mighty C 3 systems and thei · associates wa not their motivation.
lany of them have advanced degrees, are professors and members of the Academy of
ciences, and winners of state prizes and other awards.
Most probably, when thinking through and i.mpl menting new ideas for nuclear commaud and control, thes people have been motivated by purely professional interest in
such an esoteric field, as exciting as space exploration. l ndeed , in ma ny cases, components of military C 3 systems are used for space programs, whi te the research and deve13
opment and industrial organ izations involved with C also receive direct orders for specialized, non-military systems and equipment for space exploration programs. T he
majority of enterprises involved in 3 also have substantial achievements in other cutting-edge areas of Russian science and technology.
good example is the !ropuls Corp, which, since !995, has been openly describ.d
as Russia' lead design organization for SRF ' . Established in 19 61 at one of the lead·
ing science and technology centers in l ussia (the LPI. now the St. Petersburg
Polytechnic U niversity), lropuls orp. has to its credit, in addition to its main work.
the development of one of the first oviet digital cmnpu ters (Kvarts Temp· 1, T
participation in launches of the frrs earth satellites and the first manned space flights,
beginning with Yury agarin's pioneering flight; contributions to the theory andprac{
tice of magndic rnicroel ctronics; dynamics of nuclear power stations;
exp runents m balhstlcs; computatronal technology; and medrcme. Beguuung


en~v· ~


1990s, ~s part of a defense industry conversion I
producmgmodems, information securit
. , mp~ls Corp. has been designing and
~ifunctional credit payment systems anJ ~~~~nt, mformation utility networks, mullS cooperating with a number ofU S G
/IMI computers. The lmpuls Corp.
S f
· ., erman French Jap
o ar, o course, this cooperation d
. '1
. '
anese an other companies
0 h
oes not me ude 1
t er Russian enterprises involved 'th th d ssues o command and control.
1 C3
e evelopm t d
nuc ear
systems also have sufficientl b d .
en an manufacturing of
In this network of people . 1 d . ~ roa .mterests and connections.
mvo ve m mte.restmg pra t' 1
mi Itary research mstitutes pl
c Ica matters, offiCers from the
. .
ay an Important role. The
1 d bl .
. y are not a stract theonsts but
rat er practiCal specialists as k
now e gea em th d '1 f
e etm so new C3 systems as the
designers themselves. For instance th ff
Research Institute No. 4 are regula 1, . eo1 dlcder.s at the Ministry of Defense's Central
r Ydme u e m the commiSSIOn
· · !Or
Sl'1es an d their c3 systems Th
testing new mis.
ey spen months t f

try representatives at testing ranges d T a . a Ime war mg together with indusThe development and t t'
an mi Itary mstallations.
I ..
es mg process for C3 system
mg. mtially, a rational and con t 'd . r
components IS quite interest. several, sometimes very
'ff' 1 d'
ere e 1 ea Is wrmulated d unng
1 ICU t, Iscussions between th
e customer and the co t t . M
ters mg. Then this idea is tested b
n rae or m oscow and St. Pey representatives from b th 'd .
esque p ace, such as the steppe of K
. v
o Sl es m some pictur, l 11
apustm Iar or the S'b .
There ' these
recent mte ectual opponents live an d war k together
' as f 1 'enan
1 d taiga.
o creature comforts. These p
1 k
a ami y, espite a frequent lack
eop e now not only h t
k b
time too: hunting, fishing and co
ow o war , ut how to have a good
h .
nversatwns around
t eir common hard work is crowned t th t .
a camp Ire at night. And finally
table sight of an ICBM launch db :.b e
range with the fantastic,
e Y a utton the h
d ·
atlons and compliments no one
y ave esigned. Among congratu1h

even remembe th "
t e next day will see fierce arguments about idrs De potential aggressor." And again,
Unfortunately this style of
eas or new work.
th'mgs are different.
' Change . wor
. . of the recent past. Today
R IS. more ch ~rae t enstic
s m ussian mental t th 1' , .
an a number of other factors have n t' 1 If[' e Imitatwns in defense spending
0£ the c3 research, development and ega ~ve ~ a ected the cohesion and effectiveness
~loyee on a regular basis and so hpro uctwn net~ork. In order to pay their emtial , th e 1ead ers of the design
, bureaus
me owdpreserve their
. , mtellectual
. . compames
poten~nr~lated to their real expertise. Desp:: t~:::: ms~tutes have to l~ok for conttacts from the Russian C3 commun't M
arts, owever, there IS a serious brain
ruzation for better-paying jobs f 1 y. la~y young, capable people leave these orgaThere
' requent Y m trade.
· producing strate ic c3
ary 1997 were even stnkes at ent erpnses
.' workem and enginecrs of thelm uls C
eqmpment. In Febcuthimkandmg that they be paid salary o :th
~~St. Petersburg took to the street
em wr eight month Th' · ·
n able 1
Du .
on y several years earlier re . d
IS mCident, un~' SSta b t l .
' ceiVe attentiOn f
:?at hbelped
orma wn a out similar incidents.




P~ti:,s;h~~et~:~::~ ::~:;icity

.so~v:~~e ;;:~l:~~~:e~t ;~~l~

cs In Russ/a and the United States: AComparative Analysis I 1n

I Cl: Nuclear Command, Control, cooperation

'd t As noted in previous chap1 ments 1S evt en .
The negative impact of sue eve op .
t bilizing factor. A weak CJ system ts a
in any country lS a s a
will make everybo y a oser.
ters, a strong C sys e~
R ssta's present pro ems
provocat~ve one.f hu I uls Corp. cited earlier, says:
The htstory o t e mp

.r oun years participating in great deeds for the
"Lucky are those who spent thet y . g b
.d b t us the authors of this book
d Th' an certamly e sat a ou
t blished unique creative teams.
glory of the Father an . . dts c f space sctence,
we es a
Working at the cuttmg e ge o
t h pect'alists on research met .. ·
f'deas the top-no c s
. · ·
Among us were the generators o 1 . , 1
bl 'directors' who staged sctentlftc
1 sts the trrep acea e
. t
ods, the unique system ana y '
. 1 'ft f introducing new technology m o
'th the speoa gt or
f h
ld h
b n achieved without all o t em ....
experiments, and t h ose wt .
thmg wou
ave ee
h .
production and servtce- no
.thout fear finding strengt m our
't without fatigue, Wt
We worked wtthout respt e,
t fa grandiose proJeCt, one
ledge that we were a par o
optimism and conft ent now . .
ambition- both personal an pad excttlng ever. ... ur
f f lt
. ·
of the most prestlg10US an
when each one o us e
oluntary coopera ton,
triotic- found its manuestat10n m v
W were young, daring and inqutsl'b . t the common cause.
A d
his direct contn utton o
new unforgettable.
n we
tive then .
were really luckY ...

ese excellent traditions, great
. k b t ways to preserve th
"" rell said We should t m a ou
d strengthen strategic sta 1 tty.

der to provt e an
d high professtona tsm m or
expenence an

ppospects toP DBIIBIOpment
f strategic arms reductions, sci.
l · t'
the tempo o
· R ·
nd political situation m usst.a
d the economtc a
entific and technologtcal progress, an
1 r command and control syste •
t of the Russtan nuc ea
stntcinfluence the deve opmen
'11 b determined, fust of all, y any
. SNF c3 system Wl e
Changes in the Russtan
t k place in these very forces.
tural and qualitative changes that 7:~e ~:ld War and the disintegration o_f the ~v~y
t f US -Russian relatwns an
The first decade after the end
· d b mprovemen o
· ·
h. ro·
Union was generally charactenze ~ 1 ' trategic nuclear arms. In Russia, t ts·p;n.
f the two nattons s
. .
d thetr .. .
rogress in reductwns o
. onditions: the mtss11es an
· d by the economtc c
. .
d desP'""
cess was pnmanly determme
d 1980s were past their servtce hfe, an '
.... is·

d decOlnr. ...
d · th 197 san
frastructure, prod uce 1~ e
ll removed from combat duty an
QOO to
all the effort to extend tt, were g~adua lJ no longer maintain the old arsenal of 6,
sioned, that is - destroyed. Russta cou
h ads
d rnove a
6 500 nuclear strategtc war ~ . . f td t d concepts of deterrence an a
1S10n 0 ou a e
. .
The logical resu twas a rev
hods ofits reliability and sufftctency. . nding
from the old, mistaken assessment m~l~ t'
he has demonstrated an unde[Sta
pay respeCt


the reality and moved against the calculation and forecasts of official military exp rts.
A primitive approach based on numerical parity of missiles and warheads, as well as
the erroneous method relying on average magnitudes of retaliatory strikes, turned out
to be useless when the Bush administration took the course toward national missile
defense (NMD). It has become clear that the old approaches to nuclear deterrence reel
only into a dead end, at least because standard instruments are of no use for analyzing
such a unique phenomenon as global nuclear catastrophe. And the Russian pre ident,
who initially responded with threats of MII Ving S -27 Topol -M I BMs in respons
, has quickly found his way around the issues of strategic nuclear· poli<::y, and
has offered a reasonable deaJ. In exchange for allowing U. . work on NMD, ussia has
obtained a .. pledge to cut deeply its offensive strategic ar enal, as well as other political dividend . Ru sia's choice i.n the sphere of nuclear weapons ha become especially important since it has been undertaken within the context of another crucial decision by Putin, the one to support the United States in its fight against international
terrorism, which can become dangerous to Russian nuclear-tipped missiles and their
0 system .
While the process of Russian nuclear arms reduction in the last 10 to 12 years has
followed the path of logic, the structural changes of the SNF and military reform as a
whole hardly followed the same road. Two ministers of defense, Gen. Pavel Grachev
(1992 -1996 ), and G~n. Igor Rodionov (1996-1997) widely advertised their plans for
military reform, but nothing has been accomplished during their terms on office. To
be more precise, a spontaneous "military reform ' amounted to disintegration of the
Armed Forces. The SNF also experienced difficulties, but continued to be the backbone of the Armed Forces, the main means of deterrence.
The first real steps toward reforming the SNF were made in 1997 -1998, when Marshal Igor Sergeyev, the minister of defense, merged the SRF with the space troops and
BMD troops. This was the beginning of a serious plan for the integration of SNF command and control. Next, plans were announced for the creation of a joint command of
Russia's SNF, along the lines of U.S. Strategic Command (STRATCOM). But Russia's
financial collapse in August 1998, as well as the unprecedented open conflict between
the chief of the General Staff, Army Gen. Anatoly K vashnin, and Sergeyev, which ended
with the latter's resignation, resulted in a drastic change in the Russian leadership's
approach to SNF reform in 2001. The space troops and BMD troops were removed
from the SRF command and subordinated directly to the General Staff. The SRF have
lost their status as the most important service of the Armed Forces, and are supposed
to be subordinated to the Air Force by 2005-2006. The SNF have started to emphasize
SB ls, while the emphasis in the Armed Forces as a whole has shifted from nuclear
Weapons to conventional ones.
. These unpredictable zigzags in th process of NF reform could not but have an
;Pact on their 3 system. uring these years of uncertainty there has been no real
ao for development of the Russian trategic C 3 system. Furthermore the situation

178 1 IJ: Nuc/eBI' Command, Conll'ol, Coopepafion

cs in Russia and the United States: A Com
has been complicated by meager funding of the defense budget, and a fundamental
restructuring of the defense industry begun in 2001. At the same time, throughout
this whole period the Russian military and political leadership have understood, or at
least have declared that they understand, the role of C 3 in robust nuclear deterrence.
Many statements have been made to the effect that further nuclear arms reductions
should be accompanied by strengthening the C 3 system. For instance, Sergeyev, while
still SRF's commander in chief, said in 1995: "The command and control system has
always played a special role in ensuring combat readiness of the SRF. Today, when
SNF undergo significant reductions, the important of command and control is growing, since the quantity of weapons is going down, and their guaranteed employment
requires absolutely reliable and survivable C 3 systems." 163
The former chief of the Main Operations Directorate of the General Staff, Col. Gen.
V.M. Baryn'kin wrote: "One should emphasize that when troops (forces) are being
reduced, their effective employments becomes one of the main tasks, and their command and control system become the main factors providing for deterrence." 164
Today, all information regarding the directions of the SNF 0 modernization is classified, and therefore one can make only some conjectures derived from the general
character of Armed Forces reform.
Although Sergeyev's plan for a joint strategic command has been abandoned for now,
the integration of SNF C 3 will not fade away, and the issue requires a solution for a
number of complex organizational and technical problems. This is a result of increased
general requirements to modernize C 3 systems, as well as of the ongoing structural
changes in the Armed Forces. First, turning space troops into a separate branch subordinated to the General Staff presumes improved coordination of satellite communications channels, navigation data and EWS information, providing support to all the components of the nuclear triad, as well as to the conventional forces. Second, the planned
inclusion of SRF into the Air Force as a service branch will require a substantial reorganization of the command posts and lines of communication, and a change of combat
planning documents in cooperation of different formations for accomplishing a joint
SNF mission. With the Main Command of the Ground Forces restored, there must be
new tasks to organize command and control of tactical nuclear weapons, and to coordinate their C 3 with the common principles of command and control of nuclear weapons
as a whole. Finally, the growing threat of international terrorism requires a more ener·
getic effort to strengthen the reliability of negative control over 0 in all formations armed
with nuclear weapons. Today, all such problems are the prerogative of the General tafT.
Will it be able to resolve all of them as their number and importance continue to growl
Perhaps it will be necessary to create a special body responsible for a complete solution.
In addition to integration, Russia's strategic 0 development will include:
The deep SRF reductions, and the character of recent agreements regarding
tegic arms reductions, will cause intensified work on increasing the reliability


'fJal'aUve Alla/ysts J

command and control of SSBN
In order to provide for r 1' bl ~and land-based mobile ICBMs.
this concept becoming tl~ei~a~n eterrence.wit~in th LUA framework a



p~sts. is likely to continueot~\:u:~~~vab~lity of the ~stem of centr~ldc:t~~

develo~mg Its mobile (ground and ail'b

. J1gthened. This can be achi Ved b
orne) elem nts, as well as b .
. y
the statiOnary command
. .
. .
Y unprovmg
e e~Istmg multiplicity of types of C3
recognrzed to be a serious short
systems m the various SNF elem t .
commg Th
en s Is
. e research, development and rodu . . e expen.ence and available designs of

~:~:~~~ .somebt1echno1ogica1 solu::ons a~t~~~a:~:e~~r~~~wC~rking for SRF, which

Is pro em.
as a whole can h 1
Information t
. .
ransmisswn priority will a
dw channels for combat co
pparently see development of
mman and c t 1
specia ramet ~ds of digital information proc . on ro , satellite communication systems
~en~Ies and state-owned civilian ne:::~· :se ~f communication lines of othe;
. aXImum use of computers will con .
s or t e needs of SNF.
Improvement of SNF c3
tmue to be one of the main requi'r
ements wr
If the assessment of the r 1' b '1'
e Ia I Ity of nu 1 d
attentiOn to the c3 f.'a t
c ear eterrence one that
I< c or, ecame
ff . 1
to clearly de:;:r::
s e appropnate for LUA and have th £ r nu~ ear wrces. Such an optimal
e ollowmg characteristics.
. A group of central command posts that e
ord;r ~o l~unch a retaliatory strike will be ~sur~With sufficient probability that an
. Issue . after an enemy attack has alre
ma e Its Impact. The required s
pos~ group can be achieved by usi:gstemibc'lsurvivability of the central comm:dy
statwnar :£ '1' .
mo I e comm d
y aci Itles or an optimal combination fb an mo ules, super-hardened
command posts existed in a . . .
o oth. If such a system ofh' h
Ct!SIS It Would
. h
Ig c3 ons t~ e made without dangero~s ha t :~rmit t e decision to use nuclear
s e.
sence of such an element in the
. A system Is a destabilizing factor
system of d'
m d
Irect communications cha
syatn post group, linking these comm ndne s, as s~rviVable as the central cornan posts With
s ems Cl 1 . .
means of ret e~r ~· It ~s necessary to have such reliable nuc ear ';ea~ons delivery
a ~tJ.on (m Ru sia, these are SSB
c~mmunicatwns with the
Pact ;:~nn::qurreme~1 for these channels is t~saa~~ mobile SS~25 ICBMs Topol).
EMp A~c~ear and higll-precision convention 1 bihty to functwn despite the imAn ac.c t . e same time, the speed of the lau ahwedapons, electronic jamming and
Ul'ate gl b 1
nc or er tr
· · ·
tack w'tJ
o a sy t m for identifying a
ansmisswn Is not crucial
' ' 1 sens . .J:
nuc ear or
transmit . . Ol ~ustnb u ted all over the nati ,
. massive conventional atbng lOformation from tho
on s terntory, and with channels tl
se sensors to the central comm d
an post group.

:~:t=~~at;obnal structu~e

char::t:ri;~i~s ~~3



I fJl: Nuclear Command, Conll'o~ Cooperation
cain Russ/a and the United States: A Compal'ative AnaiYBiB

. . ore accurate estimate of curr nt daJ~age to
I t . . nation of what constltutes a
uch a system would provide for a m
d in. a sub equent c e euru
the friendly st e, to e us
I . h . b mes possible to use nuclear weapons
threshold l vel of damage after w uc tt ecalo l th cleterrnination of thi thre h. .J
1 atur y,
in the ourse of a conventiOna ~va~.
S ·u .
ld b better to understand the
drff1cult tl , 1t wou
. l
. f Ia t re ort - massiVe emold in the course o war ls very
omplex si uation b fore deciding to use t le means o
1 .c • the forces and means used to
and an contro LOt
. .
reliable subsystem o comm.
terns (for instance, surface ups
auar d an d d •fien d nucl ar weapon de1rvet y sys
in the areas of B patrols) .


A line of succession for command of the nuclear forces and of the country as a whole
in emergencies has been developed and officially approved. The U.S. pr.,ident's 12
successors in order of preemption are: the vice president, the speaker of the House of
Representatives, the president pro tern of the Senate, and nine members of the Cabinet. This list is published in the Federal Register. Most departments and agencies
have also determined and published lines of succession.
(http:/ /



Command Posts and Centel's - Succession ot command


11 tl
goals This section addresses only
rev nt excessive spending.
d 'ff' It t cht ve a lese < •
d d
Jaturally, it will be 1 ·tcu o a
t of the nuclear comman an
. .
cts for th eve opmen
some possible po tttve
. .. Jt to sa how Rus ia will resolve the e pro
control sy t. m, and so far tt JS dtfft u .
the other nuclear powers has ratsed
R ·
the nited , tates nor
f h
ntil now, neither ussta nor
d th. 'ssu is urgent in light o t ese s .
on J standards. But to ay 1 l
th tssue
. nsuring strategic stabihty.
exco ptionaltmportance

ca In the .United States· 1
Various questtons concern on~ I 'b

d and control ystem are dis·

S nu lear comman
Chapter 2 presents the opinions of




cuss d in hapters 2 and oft JS oo . stem developed in the1970sand 1980s, .Jiauthors on th general valuation o: the syR . CJ of sp cific problems like th.e.r
usstanof the syst-m under battle cond oons.
hapt r 5 analyzes a companson
al the
. bTt'es
ability of negative control. the survt:' capa .1 1 I
and questions of delegating ~uthon.ty. ·e of the American
Tlus section seeks to provtde a plc~w


in the la e 20th-earlY 2

information on
d impart some additional mformattOn.
It is pointless
to attempt to d escn'b e I1el·e all of the open-source



U.S. nu leru· ommand and ontrol system, fi•·st of all, because of the large volume and
continuous updating, and Se<:ondly be<:au e it i' quite difficult to isolate this system
from th background of the extensive national military and civilian networks of administration and communication thal are well -integrated at various levels. The objectives
here are somewhat different, To show how openly Americans discuss their C' and to
help the general reader to find information that is of interest to him or her on this topic
on the Internet and in various publicatinns. At the same time, even separate fragments
of the system provide a relatively thorough understanding about its extensivene<S, flexibility and security, the histocy of its development, its co't and its perspectives. It is
possible that coverage of such infocmation on the U.S. C' will allow the continuing
secrecy of this sphere in Russia to be surmounted faster.

Ployment of nuclear weapons.

fi 0 f
lear weapons can be nh anced b y ext rna!. control
CJ over
t its
Worldwtde a.. ty
ower·' nat1onal
sy ems
to Link the Jve nuc ear p
d cooperation. uch a system
C3 syst m . It would rna e sense
d t . ted system of contro1 an
together into a um te au oma
mutual control over rea mess
pabiltty for contmuous
must give all parttCJpants 1 ca
d any attempts to penetrate comd. .
f nuclear weapons, recor
f .
and technjcal con 1tton o
t' eel and accidentallaunc 1es o mtsd pr vent unsanc JOn
h ld
n'land and control systems an. .
. cl
tern of control and cooperations
uf1ed automate sys
siles. At the same tJme, 'leur
f tl ose weapons. uch a sy tern IS te f
· . ·dmg t use o 1
· ·
not limit freedom o actton regat
Id . .
'o. its implementatlot1 are mtsstng .
. t oJitica ectSIODS L' l •
nical ly feasibl 'but appropna e p .
ld allow us to determine the most rahon
bviously, international cooperatiOn wou . .
,d d elop a standard fOJ: them.
character of nuclear comman
.. ment vo each sy tern, an d wo uld
This would mak it much easier to formu ate requu .

I - SupPeme command
The supreme organ of command of the U.S. Armed Forces (including the stmtegic
nucleac fore_,) is the National Command Authocity (NCA), which includes the pcesident and the seccetacy of defense, and their alternates and successors from the White
llouse, the Pentagon, Congress, the State Department and other official administrations, the duties and rights of which ace established in advance. Below the East Wing of
White House lies the President's Emergency Opecations Center (PEOC), which
""''"to handle nuclear contingencies. The PEOC is differentiated from the White Hou«e
' itt.ation Room, which is located in the basement of the West Wing of the White House.



4.a.1.a- IVucJeap ''loot/Jail"

~ The Pcesident'

nucleac bciefca<e - nicknamed the "Football" - contains nuclear
codesth(Gold 'd
Codes) and theh President's Decision
Book. The military officer


s e Prest ent wherever e goes, carrymg the Football, must be knowledgeabout all aspects of the overall Single Integrated Operational Plan (Sl OP), as


cs in Russia and the United States: ACompal'ative Analysis


182 \ 11: NUcleal' command, contl'ol, coopel'allon
~an remain there for two weeks under a full
mg System, also known as th "
y autonomous regime The P .

well as the v..-ious options availabl to the p<esiden for implementing th war plan.
The offic t comes from one of the four military branches - ranked lieutenant colonel
naval commander, or marine major - and must undergo the nation's mot rigorous
security background chack. "Yankee White." The criteria for this cl arance include
. . citizenship, unquestionable loyalty. and an absolute absence of any foreign influence over the individual, his family, or" pmons to wbom the individual i closely I inked."
Accotding to 2000 data, the I P involves font stmtegic targeting groups: Russian
Nuclear Forces, onventional Military Forces, Military .nd Politi al Leadership, Economi and Industrial targets. Th "Black Book" contains 75 pages of sc narios for actinn:
options of gen ral attacks as well as selected at limited strike•- Nuclear forces cru> also be
used against enemy forces leading a conventional attack against the U . . or its alii s.
The ational ecurity Agency ( l A) has jurisdiction over all questions concerning
the FootbalL It is also in charge of distributing the daily old odes to the White
House, Pentagon, STRATCOM and the TACAMO aircraft.

(http: I ( nuke/_guid I u a/ 3i/ nuclear -footbalL httn) - National Military Command Center
The National Military Command Center ( MC ) is located in the Joint hiefs of
Staff (JCS) area of the Pentagon. TheN lC is responsible for providing the JC
with information about the curtent state of the strategic forces as well as mis ile warnings. About 300 people ..-e employed at NM . It is funded by the Air •orce. The
Center has the following facilities: the Current Actions Center (CAC), the Emergency
Conference Room (ECR), .nd the JCS Confetence Room, or "The Tank."
(http:/ / USTIIATCOM
.S. Strategic Command (USSTRATCOM), located on Offutt Air Force Base.
in Omaha, Neb. is ditectly r<'ponsible for comrn.nd of the nuclear triad.
The USSTRATCOM Command Center is located in the Underground ornmand
Complex. Also located within this complex are the Intelligence Opemtions Center,
the Weather Support Centet, .nd the Alternate Processing and Correlation Center
(APCC). The APCC conveys missile warning information from the Cheyenne ]Y!oun·
tain Air Station (CMAS) for U.S. Space Command (USSPACECOM) cornpl<' Ul
Springs, Co.
Comm.nd Center is a two-level, high-altitude electrordag-

netic pulse (HEMP) protected facility that lies at a depth of 15 mete<s and bas an,..
of about
The main
of the
Command Center has monitoring screens with a total

of about 80 metetS. One thousand people work at the Conttol Center, and 800 of


to speak directly to






~~~:: ~~ter~ntinental ballistic mi;sil~O(~~~;:;~f locatmns throughout the wodd,

Irect hnes to the president th J . C . aunch control centers (LCC )
ommand C en t er m
· Washington' De Comt hiefs of 'taff• an d the National MT
s _·

The Command enter IS equipped 'th ll
ca e, very low frequency (VLF) 1 WI a channels of communication . 1 .
and high frequency (HF) .
, ow frequency (LF), ultra-high f requency
, me(UHF),



' ··


( nuke/ guid I
(http:/ /www.stratcom m'l!f
\ usa/C3i/cmdctr.htm)
actss eets/crndctr.htm l) The Cheyenne Mountain Complex
. tlThe heyenne
. Camp Iex (
C) l t d
1e mam correlation center of tl I
• oca e out ide olorado p .·
ment (ITW I AA) system. The \e otegrated Ta tical Warning and Atta::gs, . o.,
Aerospace dense Command (
coordmate and controls the orth
(U SPACEC r1) mis ions Th
) and the United tates Space
with the words" - '1 , .
e pnmary functions of th b'
moss\ e - atmosph re - 'pace" w - _e o_ je<t can be described
The Ch


eyenne Mountain Co


ammg actlvJhes.
mp1ex ou es the following operation centers:

The Air
. 0 peratwns
Center (AOC)
. .
uspaceto prevent overflight
b h 'l canst
. an t surveillance
of North
ton atrcraft annually·
y ashe aucraft. It tracks

TheM' '1


over .5 mll-

. lSSl e \Yarning
enter (MW
whh ther they are a threat to rJorth A~ d~te~ts launches globally and determines
e pace
ontro enter (
etects, Identifies and track 11
Jects in space. lt c . l

bodies and debtis· unent y tracks over 8,000 objects

includi~; p:~n-;;ade ob-

Y oa s, wcket

e hub for all activity within th
k me Command Center (CCC) serv

rom th


~~. t tdoSrwards critical information

e wor cente

fter of Ce at der centers to the president of the
ana a The ce t

I £


es as

tates and th



(NCA), the uSsT
net a so reports to the National Co
e pnme m'_nisThe Combi d I Ri\TCOM and other organsmmand Authonbes
ne ntelhgence Watch Center (CW
for ":'~rldwide thteats from spac:('~;:~ves as the indications .nd



s geopolJtrcal unr"'t that could f£


SLle, and stcategic air activ-

ests abroad;
a ect orth America and U S f,
e lati I , "
· . mces/
attack ' th e center would
ng aC1
Ity isthe
US ~~:r
· ·1 dt~f,e~s~ :Warning center. In case of
e civihan alerting circuits of the


I fJI: Nucteal' Command, Contl'ot Coopel'ation
CS In Russ/a and the United States: ACompa/'ative Analysis

· s t (NAWAS);
Natwnal Warmng
ys em
(SWSC) is responstble for the mamtew
terns enter
The Space and armng ys
The SWSC currently mam1 .
f ission-cnttcal so tware.
tains in excess of 12 mtlhon hnes o co e on
ten in 27 languages;
The Weather Support Center.


s Each crew consists of approximate~y 40 people, and,
d ty cor an eight-hour shtft.
Ftve crews man the center .
1 d. .
ach crew ts on u l'
N b k
d t Offutt Air Force Base m e ras a.
under norma con ttlons, e
. .1 W · Center ts
locate a
An Alternate Mtsst e arnmg
tain Complex m 1987 were
d for the Cheyenne oun
. h
the modernization took etght
Five upgrade programs P anne
cost $968 million. In practtce, owever,
to than expected ' an d ran $ 792 million over budget.

1 185

times more functional space than the earlier EC-135 command post. The main deck is
divided into six functional areas: a National Command Authorities' work area, a conference
room, a briefing room, an operations team work area, and communications and
The E-4B crew may include up to 114 people. Its communication systems and terminals have electromagnetic pulse protection. The total weight of the EB-4 is 360 tons, its
ceiling is 9 kilometers, its endurance is 12 hours unrefueled, and its cost is $258 million.
At .least one E-4B is always on alert at one of many selected bases throughout the
The first B model was delivered to the Air Force in January 1980, and, by 1985, all
four aircraft were converted to B models.
(.!:mp:// guide/usa/ 3i/e-4bnaoc.htm)

. I nu kel!ruide/usa/C3i/cmn.htm)
(http:/ /www.las.ot.g
,.. Ail'bOPne STRATCOM Command Centel' (E-88} Mobile Consolidated Comman~ Centers d (USSTRATCOM) and the U.S. Space
Two commands, the U.S. Strategtc ~~mmanb'l
lt'dated command center, called
aJomtmo 1 econso
Command (USSPAC .
Mobile Alternate Headquarters (CMAH), or
the Cheyenne Mountam and C


Mobile Consolidated ~ommand Center ('al semi-~railers. There are sev_eral types of
The mobile center ts mounted on shpe.ctf t' ns· war planning, intelhgence, comd
modules (trat'1 ers ) t h at correspond tot etr unc tot' . tc) Several mo b'l
1 e comman
munications, support systems (fuel, water, recrea ton, e ..
d f om these modules.
centers are con tgure r
'd the internal communicatwns. omm An RF cable distributi~n system pro~Fe/sUHF radio and satellite (AFSATCOM,
nications systems, includmg H~ and V. 't of command capabilities. The commu.
d MILSTAR) terminals, provtde contmlil y
1 ctromagnetic pulse protectton.
. 1 h
nication termma s ave e e
rt of these command centers.
The U.S. Air Force is responstbkle :o~ ~upp~ control centers at various levels of comThe United States has a networ o atr ~rn
mand. Two of them deserve special attentwn.

. /nuke/gujde/usa/ 3i/cmah.htm)
(http://www. f a .org

4 a. 18- National Alrbol'ne Opel'ations Centel' (E-48 NAOCJ
the airborne control cenaft. · ·

Center serves as

~~sand the JCS).

The E-4B National Alfborne pem
ter at the highest command level (the~ N b


b~sed th~O!~u~eA~!i~:al ~i~~a:~


There are fom E-4B
The NAOC is also the worldw

em:;~~ tbi<'

and they are
Command System
survivable, en unng no e h b . fth commercial Boeing 747 -2 00, an
The E -4B is designed on t e asts o e

The special EC-135 aircraft (nicknamed "Looking Glass" because its mission mirrored ground-based command, control, and communications) served as the airborne
STRATCOM command center from Feb. 3, 1961 until Oct. 1, 1998. There were several such aircraft, and one of them was always in the air throughout all of this time. The
crews accumulated m;re than 281,000 accident-free flying hours. On July 24, 1990,
Looking Glass ceased continuous airborne alert, but remained on ground or airborne
alert 24 hours a day.
The EC-135s have been replaced with the E -6 aircraft. An innovative decision was
made to combine in one aircraft both Airborne Command Post (ABNCP) and Take
Charge and Move Out (TACAMO) functions. The E -6A TACAMO aircraft was
modified to a dual-mission aircraft, the E -6B. The USSTRATCOM is thus able to use
all!6 dual-mission aircraft, with two aircraft at its disposal on alert 'latus at Offut AFB.
The main modification for STRATCOM has been the installation of the Airborne
Launch Control Center (ALCC), which is capable of determining missile ,latus in
silos, changing missile as'ignments, and, if necessary, launching missiles. The ALCC
Operates through the UHF range within the line of sight of the launch silo. The ALCC
term· oal ;, installed into a specially designated place as the given E -6 B aircraft i,
equipped especially for STRATCOM once at Offut AFB.
The airborne command center relays orders to submerged submarines through the
For additional tasks, the
-6B" equipped with three 1,000-watt UHF radio stations, which have 45 full-du ·
PI"< channel' each, SATCOM (satellite communications) and MILSTAR (Military,
Tactical And Relay) terminal, and othec means of communication.

;A AMO system that comes 'tandard in the aircraft model.


cs in RuBS/a and the IIi'llaed States: ACompal'ative Analysis

I 187

188 \ f1l: NuciBBI' command, Contl'ol, Coopel'ation

'b appropriate forth e d'rverse needs f th WW
possr ~e the Desert Shield and Desert St: e
.MCCS sites. In particular it made
costs of the system and its failur rm operabons. However' in view of,the hi h
wGals offrcrally deactivated in August 1996e fmatch growing demands, the
• m avor of a new g1ob a1control system - the
Th Comma
_nd an d C ontrol System (GCCS)

operall?~ ICBM Launch control center (LCCJ

The website cited below describes the importance of the control system' "Survivable communications are an integral part of U.S. deterrence strategy because potential
adversaries must be convinced that launch orders could actually be transmitted to, and
received by, the Launch Control Centers (LCC) when required."
There are 100 LCCs for Minuteman and MX missiles, interconnected within each
ICBM wing by an underground communication cable network. Each LCC controls
and maintains in permanent readiness a flight of 10 silo-based ICBMs. At the squadron level (50 silos) any two LCCs working together are capable of launching all 50
missiles. LCCs are hardened to 2,000 psi.
In addition to regular cable connections, since 1990, the LCCs have been equipped
with terminals for batch satellite connections through the Defense Satellite Command
System (DSCS). When the DSCS ends its term of service in 2003, the LCCs will be
integrated into the MEECN communications system, which will allow them to receive
commands and relay them to missiles through the satellite channels of the MILSTAR
system in EHF and VLF /LF ranges. New EHF terminals will replace the existing Super High Frequency Satellite (!SST) terminals and the AFSATCO M system equipment
of the, while new VLF /LF terminals will replace the Survivable Low Frequency Command System (SLFCS) terminals. Existing and new terminals are HEMP protected



. . e C~S lS an automated informaf
cnsrs planrung with the use of an inte r~~n system desrgned to support deliberate and
g ed set of analytic tools and the fl 'bl d
transfer capabilities. GCCS w'll b
f, h
' ecomethe · 1 cr
exr e ata
.romt. ox ole to command post. The C4I forsrtnhgeW I ~ystem4 to support the warfighter
mac. ron today, Is
· commrtted
to the challeng ef arnor
. (C l FTW ) concept, already
to achieve victory for any
the warrior's quest for infor.
a Command and Control S t
y time, and at any place
the Department of Def:s em (GCCS) involves all of the
dresses questrons of pl
nse, the JCS and the STRATCOM y
e 1
. annmg and conductio 0
. .
. It admp
n e 1gence Th

t I
e organs
t ro are mtegrated into the GCCS .cror carrym
. .and channels of nu c1ear con-,
o many general questions .
g ou speoftc tasks as well as M 'th ~ud





(http:/ / uide
(http://www.fa .org/nuke/ 'd /usa/C3~/wwmccs.htm)
fllll e/usa/ 3J/gccs.htm)
4.3~h2 -

The National Communications System

e U.S . nuclear control s stem .
trons System (NCS). The 23 y b rs also mtegrated into the Nation 1 C
mem ers of the
· ·
a ommumcae e leral
e necessary
. .
surmg t hat


communication and contl'ol Systems - Global Contl'ol System: from WWMCCS to BCCS

In the early 19 60s, the United States set out to create a single global system for com·
mand and control of its widely dispersed forces (Worldwide Military Command and
Control System - WWMCCS). The goal of the system was to allow the transfer of
information to any location and at any level of command within minutes. By the !at<
1960s, about 160 different computer systems with 30 different general-purpose soft·
ware systems were used at 81locations.
Due to technological problems and financial limitations, however, the WW !C
was never realized to the full potential envisioned for the system. Its hortcomin!l'
brought about several serious fiascos. In June of 1967, for example, during the Arab·
Israeli conflict the USS Liberty a naval reconnaissance ship, was ordered by the JC to
move further away from the coastlines of the belligerents. Five high-priority messages
to that effect were sent to the Liberty, but none arrived for more than 13 hours. By thai
time the ship had become the victim of an apparently mistaken attack by Israeli aircraft
and patrol boats that killed 34 Americans.
The system was gradually upgraded, and, on the whole, provided a range of caP'"

:~c;:;:~~;:;:,~n:;,:;;!::~:::~:~:~~~:~~r~:e;;;~ ::;,::;~~s:::

den. necessary, authorized teams f
ell epartment of Defense and the JCS
lion es rgnat.'d _and arranged ahead ofrom
timea memb ers o f t h e system meet in loca~ f~r the hqurdation of the consequ
;"d prep~re coordinated recommend I urmg these emergendes the NC
o the cnsiS.
n particular
d h
S provrdes necessary
. .
radio res
'un er t e Shared Resources Hi h Fre
com_murucallons resources.


avai!able~u;:: ~~onging to 53 federal and federal~u:~i;a~:: Progr~ (SHARES),
nited States

d ARES network consists of 1,040 HF d . rganiZatwns are made
an abroad and over 250 HF f
ra ro stations located in th

4. (lill.p: II \VWW .f:as.oq~/nuke/guid /usa/C
- l·t ncs. btm)
8.2.8 - .....
The U.S.
nu 1 EssenliaI flmepgency Communications Netwol'k
rnunications Network
c ear control
system Th
relies on. th e M'mrmum
Essential Emergency C
e mam goal of the MEECN IS
. to ensure thatomthe

188 1 C': Nucleal' Command, Conll'ol, Coopet'ation
cain RUll8ia and the United States: ACom
'PBI'Biive Ana/Jrlll." J

president can send Emergency Action Messages (EAMs) to the National Command
Authorities and the Strategic Nuclear Forces.
Several outdated programs remain in the MEECN at the "sustainment" stage and
should be deactivated. In particular, this is the Ground Wave Emergency Network
(GWEN), which does not match current operational and survivability demands. The
American C 3 network is increasingly relying on satellite forms of communication.
The MEECN is upgraded through three basic projects:
DIRECT (Defense IEMATS Replacement Command and Control Terminal):
switching from the AUTODIN system (see, which had served out its
term of over 30 years to the Defense Message System (DMS);
ILES (ICBM LCC EHF) or simply EHF: equipping ground missile LCC terminals with terminals for two-way communication with country's highest authorities;
Modified Miniature Receive Terminals (MMRTs): installation of MMRTs operating at very low frequencies onto B-1 and B- 52 fighter planes, LCCs, and airborne command centers to allow for communication with the NCA. Along with
the miniaturization and unification for the various consumers mentioned, these
receivers are better protected in emergencies. - Stl'ategic Automated Command ContPol System - (SACCSJ
The main purpose of the SACCS is to provide command and control of the nuclear
missile forces. Through the system, the STRATCOM receives Emergency Action
Messages (EAMs) and Force Direction Messages (FDMs) from the supreme commander and relays them to its subordinates. The system also provides situation monitoring, warning, strategic planning and retargeting, and damage/strike assessments.
SACCS terminals are located at STRATCOM command centers and all subordinated command centers down to the LCS, launch control facilities and strategic aircraft sites. This system also provides SlOP messages to Air Combat Command, Air
Mobility Command, Air National Guard and Air Force Reserve for the deployment of
strategic fighter planes, mobilized aircraft and refueling aircraft.
The SACCS network also serves six external interfaces: Data Processing Subsystem
(DPS), Air Force Global Weather Center (AFGWC), Command Center Processing
and Display System (CCPDS), AUTODIN, Air Force Satellite Communication
(AFSATCOM), and 616A (a survivable Low Frequency Communications System).
The system was first procured by the Strategic Air Command (SAC) in 1963. In
1988, it was upgraded and renamed the 46SL SACDIN (SAC Digital Network). The
SACDIN was able to maintain an end-to-end message delivery time of not more than
15 seconds for an Emergency Action Messages. Total system cost for SACDIN (S C
Digital Network), including a later modification, was nearly $1 billion. After formal
acceptance, the system became known as SACCS. (The systems used to provt'de con1mand over U.S. nuclear submarines include ELF, VLF, and TACAMO. flepy Low FPequency (fiLFJ
Ten powerful VLF /LF trans . .
mtsswn center lo t d th
cast command from the r CA . h
ca e
roughout the world b . d. tnt eVery Low Fre
(14.-6o. kHz). Each center imultaneousl
br d quency an Low Frequency ranges
Until recent times, the centers used o ytd ~a casts through four SObps channels.
ployed vacuum tube Rt"ght .
d u a ed (40-ye.aJ:-old) technology which em
now, un er th
state technology is underway.
PJOgraJn, the transition to solidThe website cited below provides d t fi
a a rom some of these facilities:
NPM Lualualei, Hawaii
NAA Culter, Maine
NLK JimCreek, Wash.
NAU Aguada, Puerto Rico

21,4 kHz
24,0 kHz
24,8 kHz
40,75 kHz

750!1000 kW
192 kW

43 2 7
· · · - TACAMO System
1heTak h
arge and 1ove u t (TA AM
;~ nlerged submarines through special]
. ) sy~te~ provtdes communication with
r ass squadron - the "Ironmen" "'·1.d tl y"eqhudtppe rurcraft. Two E-6A "Mercury"
ttorn y · k
a ows'' - d 1
tn er Atr Force Base Okla Th
ep oy more than 20 a.ll·crews
;Force received the first E-6A A~ :sarrc;aft replaced the aging EC-130Qs. The
he current 200-kilow·
. g t 1 ~89.
replaced . .
att transmtt sets on radio rela . . .
.Wlth the new, more powerful Higl p
. ~[ y a~craft are currently being
uencres Th
1 ower ransmtt t
1. h
e antenna is a dual traili·
e s, w 11c use very low
gt 1. in · ·
ng wu·e assembly ty
ce tt t. more effective th
. . .
pe, a out kllometers in
more vertrcaltt 1 10 flight wo k t £'
' r o me-tune th1s


CS In Russia and the United Slates: A Com",JBI'atJve
. Analysis



190 \ IJI: Nuclear Command, control, Cooperation

MILSTAR2 is a constellation o[ four
late 1990s. The group was slated to be re ~at~llrtes. The first one was launched in th
undOer the plan, nine such satellite we.-e
n 2006 and 2009. Therefo,:
n Apnl30 1999 th rr·t
. .
e purcna ed by 2011.
' e I an au 11 that w l
or It that was lower than planned A
1 as aunc mg the third satellite entered
bd l d
I e went mto
a wrong orbit, and
. ec are a complete loss on Ma 4 199 t , the satell"t
contmued. According to official s'
_9. Nonetheless, MILSTAR2 launches we
MILSTAR program between 1994
about $12 billion w" spent on

~o·: ~etwe

O'pect of the pwject is underway. The E-6, based on the Boeing-707 comme<eial airplane, h"' a e<ew of \4, a total weight of 154 tons, a ceiling of 13 kilometers, a maximum speed of 960 kph, a range of 12,000 kilometers and costs 141.7 million dollars.


(ht - Mllttai'Y, Sll'ateglc, Tacllcal and Relay (MILSTARJ Satellite communication System
MIL 'T R is cllrrently the .most technologicalty advanced military communications system. MILSTAR terminals are installed on almost ali com.mand posts and
nuclear missile can:iers. It is a large and very expensive system that ha several stages
of development, inc\ uding the three basic one" MIL T AR1 , MJLST AR2 and

The MILSTAR program was first developed in the early 1980s to provide secure
command over U.S. strategic and tactical nuclear missile forces in case of nuclear
war. The original plan included the creation of a group of nine satellites: four active
and one reserve ,.tellit"' in geosynchronous equatorial orbit, and three active and
one reserve in geosynchronous polar orbit. The total cost of the program, including
ground equipment was estimated at $22 billion, with each spacecraft costing about
the end of the Cold War, however, in 1991, the Congress seriously limited
financing for the program. The progmm was changed to consist of six satellites in a
mixture of\ow- and high-inclination orbits. The first MILSTAR 1 satellite was launched
in early 1994 with the other satellites launched at a mte of one a ye.r. Each satellite
weighs about 4.5 tons has a design life of 10 years and solar panels that generate 8,000
watts of power. MILSTAR terminals were first installed for the nuclear forces, and


( ilit ary/program/com/mi1star2.btm)

The new
. tage of th program, the dvanced Ext.
I H"
program, IS a1 0 a constellation of fo

reme y . lgh Frequency (AEHF)
north to 65 degree south T~
ur sat~ Ite Lhat cover the globe from 65 d
. ,. system will now hav
f 1, or advanced extr mel I . h f
e a ~~re general name - AEHF
bon, although this is probabJ Y mru"nl y aytechmc
llg . requency
(mihtary satellite commumcaassomanycommruldandcomm umcatJ.ons
. .
systea name.
·t · Apparently
' the US
· · mil"t
I ary
e capabilities o+ he n .
ms, I Is easier to use "technical"
b Th
~ ew generat>on of !ILSTA .
ut, at the same tim the cost of th
R will be significantly high
· The total value
3 IS estimated at "on ly" $2 5 b"ll"
creased agam.
fmt s~tellite of the series is expected to
11 Ion (mcluding ground equipment). The
In hght of the "multilayered" natur
e a.unched by December 2004.
cans pay a lot of attention to the opt~;:~ ~!h ~ost.ofthe ~ILSTAR system, Ameri~ the cunent plan, MILSTAR! and M~;:;;~on of tt~ stages, preemption, etc.
. TA 2 constellation will not be re
.A~2 will be continued, but the
sa~~lbhtes will not be built as lanned). In~:~~s~ed :"'It~ Its own satellites (accordingly,
w e deployed in full. Ho wevel'. deb ate about
's artmg
th e opm
l transitiOn
. period continue
syst em


(bttQ)/ itary! program/ com/ mJJstar3.htm)

then for other purposes.
(htt :1/www.fas.or

With the end of the Cold War, the satellite communication system was expected to


4•8·2·9 - Concept fj
This concept isliP th~ddedv~lopment of satellite communication
m . .
provi e m the U.S D
m~~cattons A"hitecture." Under th. epartment of Defense program, "Space Com llitary satellite communication must: IS program, the future (2010 -2025) system of


reorient fwm serving strategic nuclear to ,.rving conventional (tactical) fore£s.
were also increasing demands to reduce system costs. In parallel with the MILSTAR
program, a new program, MILSTAR2 was introduced, to fulfill these demands.
The classified payload was removed from MILSTAR2 satellites; spending on the
"Heroic" survivability was reduced; the <educed functions of nuclear fore"
we« replaced by functions of tactical forces command; the cost of ground tetlfll1l '


was cut by 35 percent.

. ect connections
to any re "pi nt at an .
· ·
Y tune and at any place·
ully mtegrated into th
have mmimal"footprints"
e eXLstwg .network
f of mt·u tary ·ll1LOrmation

Ext .
mm s, an ennas, etc.
enslVe internatwnal
for the
cooperation is considered one of the mai n cond"Ihons

caIn Russia and theiJnlted States: ACompal'ative Analysis 1 198
192 \ (}1: Nucleal' command, control, Coopel'arion

1) http:/ / is the website of the Federation of American Scientists

creation of such a syst~m. b 1 s stem will consist of the EHF, X/Ka band, UHF, and
Technologically, thls glo a y
el capac1ty to
Polar System sub systems.
MILSTAR, improvmg c ann
F Satellite System Wlll replace
d which should improve mterferThe EH
abytes a secon ,
. ht nd later 10 and more, meg
s1x to e1g ' a
. ·
S ce Commumcat10ns
ence protectlOn.
1 the current Defense pa
f h'
t lS
The X/
1Broad cast System
th e
System (DS
f the· commumca lons
. ll'k
·u b the increased vo ume o
will use commerCla - 1 e
system Wl ~ .
1 This project, hke many ot ers,
number of reClplent c anne s.
. .
mumcat10ns w1t
he roblem of secure com
Th UHF Satellite System wlll address t p t mmercial developments are not
. e
b'l ob)' ects. It is believed that curren co
vanous mo 1 e
sufficient, but they will be used ~s we . d for communications with ob)~cts .loc~te
e Polar Satellite System wlll be use
'ty EHF system into a hlgh-mclmaTh
h of a low-capacl
will require two such sate ltes.
bove 65 degrees north. T e aunc
:ion orbit is being considere~. 24-hour co.~;:.~: a maximal unification of ground terOverall, the architecture hsted a~ove Wl
1 etwork for the satellites.
. l and an integrated observatlOn and contra n
m1na s,

organization ( Space Policy Projects (SPP) section.
2) The SPP section includes a "military" projects section along with civilian
U.S. projects and international projects. http:/ /
3) The military section includes a guidebook of the Department of Defense on military technology; a report of the Commission to Assess United States National
Security Space Management and Organization; facilities; doctrine, exercises and
operations; budgets; materials of congressional hearings; reports from the General Accounting Office; space agencies; and finally the "Programs" section: http:/
/www.fa .org/srm/m ilitary/program.
4) The "Programs" section includes navigation, meteorology, etc., including a subsection on communications: ht p://
5) Here one can find information on any operational satellite communications system or a project under development in the given area. If the name of the desired
project is known, it can be found directly- for example: http:/ /
ruw/mi litary/prograrn/com/milstar3.

(http:! /


ave references to other sources .. Thr~ug
Almost all of the afore:nentlOned Sltes ~ensive information about speciftc proJects.

~;:: :.::~';~::d::;:;e,:;~:~:::~~;:~ti;,~ :::~:,~::':~:;,~;,::~:
~ractical not~~~~:.~~~: force~

als::~~:t~~~s~ ~!~


found it
it commands . It
information about ST
. C4 (command, control, com
. .
f the commanders, mcludmg
. B '11 The main pubhcatlOns o
raph 1es o
B . Gen Em1le ata1 e.
D ctor ng.
'd d
computer systems) lre . .'
d links to other sites are provl e .
be found
organization, various statlstlcs an
and of American nuclear forces can. . ·ou h
A lot of information related to comm f D fense. One can easily acces. tt th[ 'tges
U S D partment o e
f o mary s1 •
on the web sites oft.h e . . . e . eb a e provides the addresses o 3 pn . t Chiefs

~.defenselink.mlll sltes.

Thls:N p :the Department of Defense, theJ~n t 1 oOO
including the Air Force, Army ~D ::JNATO; and the U.S. Congress .. ~ ;uaffairs.
of Staff and the Pentagon; NO . f
ation on almost all spheres of mlhta / nd p\ilf·
other sites are listed that ~~ve mb:~et new technologies, and developmen a
g '
. f the
. l d' ng data from the mlhtary
me u 1
h ebslte o
atellite communicatlOns from t e w
chasing of vanous ar~ament s~l.
. f
tlon on ml ltary s
Below, the m orma
. . .
vided as an example.
f American SClenttsts lS pro
Fed erat10n o

The General Algorithm of American cs

There is not a lot of general information about the algoritht"l1S of the U. . nuclear
command system in the sources reviewed. ~01is may be because th yare different in
every case and depend on the specific task: either the command system functions in
emergencies bringing forces into a certain level of battle-readiness; or it i the day -today operations of headquarters and forces; or the C 3 elements that survive an enemy
attack secure a retaliation attack, etc. The most interesting ituation is the way the
system is supposed to work after re eiving information about the start of a missile attack against the nited tates from the Early Warning (EW ) system. In other words,
the algorithm of the launching function of . . 3 .
Based on information from open sources, including tho e listed above, the following
Picture is created:
A signal from th
heyenne Mountain Complex is ent to the .S. president, t he
secretary of defense, th STRAT
1 command center , and other joint command
center . Nter a short teleconference, if a decision to retaliate is made, the ationaJ
O~n:mand Authority uses the "football " to give a battle action order to the nuclear
~llsstle forces (an E M signal with launch codes). t the same time, the U . . popula~on is informed through theE system. Reserve command posts, including the airoru.e command posts of the
(E-4B A
) and STRATC M (E-6B) and
mobile consolidated command center of TRAT
M and :PA E
1 1 (M CCs)

C8 In Russia and the United States: ACompat'ative Analysts

I 185

194 \ (11: Nuclear command, confl'ol, Cooperarion



C' sytems Internet citations cont.
Survivable Low Frequency Communication System

National Military Communication System

'delusa[C3ilautodin .htm
b.tlp:/lwww.tas org/nuke/gw ~
\aced alter serving for over 30 ye
AUTODIN System now bemg rep

http:l/www.fas orglouke/quide/usa/C3ilnmcs.htm

Satellite Communication System for Submarines
htlp:f!W\'1\V fas.orglnukelguide{Usa!C3i/ssixs.htm

· 1 a/C3ildcwcs.l11m
J:illp:lfwww.tas orgtou\sefautde us Management Agency (FEMA).
System tor lhe Federal Emergency
·ct 1 sa!C3lldms.htm
IJllp:!/www·fas.oro/Oukel_qul; e u
tem that is replac'log AUTO
OMS commuotcaltons sys
The new
·ctelusa/C3i/dlrect h\m
Jllli2;{1Www.fas org/nuke/QUl AUTODIN with the new OMS.
DIRECT program to replace
National Emergen? ~/e~;~=:~;a/C3\/eas.htm.

f an emergency through AM/FM radio
b.\lp:I!Www.ias.orq au. e
. to the populatton tn the case o
Pr~ides emergency tolormatton
and television broadcasts.
/oukelauide/usa/C3jfcombal cidersr\~he AUTOVON system.
d' broadcasts. and elemen o
Subsystem of \he BBC ra to

Combat Ciders

ll1lQ;!Iw.~.tas orq

HF Buoys
k /gujde/usa!C3i/ao-bst-1 him
Trident submarine. Renewed in 1988.
blltrl/Www·Jas.orgl nu e
lor urgent reports to shore from a
HF transmitter on two buoys
Voice Command I ke/gujde{Usa/C3ilercs.htm
d missiles from 1961 until the early 1990s. p u
ads to LCCs through com man
The system tor votce comma
I kelaulde(Usa!C3llfsbs h\ffi
d t ubmarines in the Low Frequency range
ht!p:l/www.fas org au
m lor transmitting comman s o s
Modernization of the sy~l~ umber of shore stations.
through the reductton o t e n

Low Frequency


nc transmission stations tor
bl\p://www.tas ora/ouke/gutN twork {GWEN) system of low frequ.e y The service is ending.
Ground Wave Emergency e t roo of emergency commuotcattons.
improving the loterterence pro ec I
d Implementation
Joint Plannmg an I ke/guide/usa[C3jljopes.htm .

h. h includes the STRATCOM.
ad implementation, w tc ~u.
National system ol JOIOt plaomng a

Reserve Air Force System\d I sa/C3ilmystlc star.htm
bt1Q:I/wwW·las.orgtouke/9U e u . .
'th Air Force bases throughout the war .
Reserve system of radio communication WI
· ation Center
Alternate Commumc k I uldelusa!C3il raven rock btm
Jl1ip;~ww las.Qrg/mJ


Cable Mililary Communication Network

Digital Very Low Frequency Information Network

are activated . The reserve command centers are authorized to act if the primary com mand centers are disabled. The TACAMO E-6A aircraft system is activated and deployed. The crews of submarines are informed through this system and other long
wave (ELF and VLF) radio communication systems.
Commands from the NCA and STRATCOM, including missile launch commands,
are transmitted to the ICBM launch control centers (LCCs), strategic fighter planes,
shore and air transmission stations simultaneously through all available communica tion systems (GCCS, SACCS, SLFCS and others) using cable (TCS), short wave (HF,
UHF), long wave (VLF) and satellite (MILSTAR, AFSATCOM and other) channels.
The end-to-end message delivery time to missile launch does not exceed one minute.
Minutemen-M and M -X missiles are launched by LCCs; however, if the LCCs are
disabled, remaining missiles can be launched by E -6B aircraft through the ALCC terminals described in section 4. 3.1.9. Submerged submarines receive orders through
ground (ELF, VLF) and air (TACAMO) transmission centers. Fighter jets in the air
(and on the ground) are controlled through short-wave and satellite channels. The
algorithm provided can vary depending on the initial state at the time the signal about
the beginning of a missile attack against the United States is received. If the signal is
preceded by a crisis situation, the C 3 system will be better deployed and more combat
ready than in case of a sudden large-scale attack. However, most experts consider the
~cond scenario even more unlikely than the first.
It is known that significant changes were made in the structure of the high military
command of the United States after Oct. 1, 2002. A new joint command center
(NORTH COM) has begun functioning under Air Force Gen. Ralph E. Eberhart, who
\Vas Previously the head ofSPACECOM. This has, to some extent, affected the nuclear
lllissile command system. However, this fact does not change the essence of the infor~ation provided or the goal of the given work: to show the extent and character of open
Information on the U.S. C 3 •

C' in Russia and the United States: ACompal'ative Analysis 1 187

188 \ C': Nuclear Command, contl'ol, cooperation

p, oblems
nclassified analysis of nuclear
r. 1 p1anmng
. . the most difficult area or u
. .
ik lans WI'th a 1'ts t of targets·' such
Operat~~a This does not refer to spec_rfic st~ -~ pt itwould be useful to be ab_le to
_ poses of this boo · u
ific situat10ns.
weapons ·
fort e pur
d the different systems m spec
'bl t
d ata is unnecessary
. ..
pons use an
· ·
ly poss1 e o
. highly classified, however, ~t 1~ on l f m some
assess the flex1b1hty o. wea
B cause this informatlon re~ams d R .an C3 capabilities md1rect y ro
kinds of Amencan an
evaluate these
c3 s stem are greatly
American sources.
. th t the type and funct1ons of a
t emphas1ze a
t' onal plans:
Amencan exper s
dependent on the content o opera 1


. ed safety, flowed from
ld h ve compromts
" These actions, all of which wou
ad troy a huge number of Soviet tar...
.rements to be ready and able to es
d 16 000 individual Soviet
t h e reqUl
1 SlOP forces were ass1gne
gets. In 1986, for examp e,

"1 65

t 'h Soviet CJ was centralized
. .
l h. h degree to wmc
They further note that the e~tr_e~ y Lgl\owiog the country's leaders to _part1Clpate
at strategic flextbllity, by a
h .
plan established m advance.
.guarant~e greb t decisions rather than just to aut onze a t made it more difficult
. . view of some of these exper s,
directly tn com a
n the other band, tlus system, m . l .
1 rapidly and effect1ve y.
to carry out pans

eared to empha.
t l ballistic operatwns app
f r mtercontmen a
d t conform
nd and control system was expecte o
''Soviet targetmg po 1CY o
size flexibility. The nuclear co~ma
d which might demand a menu of op
e h1gh comman •
1 r exerto the wishes of the supre~
. . 1 fficials often participated m nuc ~a .
tions. High-ranking Sovtet poht1ca o
t d to manage nuclear operatwns m a
In a real conflict, they were expec e l
f r all-out attack. In short, the
· t'ngp
ans o
. 1 t
dorse preexts
f actton,
detailed way, not stmp y o en
. 'db t flexible in developing a course o
t m was not ng1 u
1 By contras '
Soviet comman sys e
d us 1.n carrying out the p an.
. · · d d pon ero
bl' h d p an
though it appeared qUtte ngt an. .
. out an intricate pre-esta ts e
. "t66
was agtle m carrymg
the U.S. command system
novel course of actwn.
but appeared quite inflexible m supportmg a
. t




. . · bySov1e
F uent part1c1pat1on
r den this assessment. req .
ometimes atten -'
It is hard to confirm o . ~
bably an exaggeratlon. They s
titutes re<tJ
ers in nuclear force _ex~rc1ses 1S ~:~ed a launch button, but this hardly -~=y eJCerciseJ
field tests of new m1SS1les an~ p
mentioned earlier, never took part 1f the highest
involvement. The S~viet le~. er~;:he quotation above is cer~ainly true t~:n.
'th the "nuclear bnefcase. B
d w the Russ1an Federa
h U s s R an no military leadership of both t e . . . .

at the level of three Jf legs commanders. These leaders knew and til] do know virtually all the operational "fine print" of 3 use, and ar able to advise political leaders of
various options in a timely and clear fashion.
But what about the apparent trade-off between flexibility in planning versus rigidity in execution that is described as characteristic of oviet/Russian C3? The system is
technically capabl of toring and quickly electing among a number of action plans
sufficient to allow for all reasonable conflict scenarios. How many plan there are, and
what they consist of at any given time, is another question . This is, so to speak, "variable" information. Th description of Russian 3 in a previou chapter makes it clear
tha a specific missile launch plan takes only minutes to execute, and (technically) may
be done in as igned time interval . Thus, it is not clear what the American writer quoted
above had in mind. n the other hand, the supposed rigidity of th merican system
in "supporting a novel course of action" may b equally questionable.16;
In a time of crisis, besides the "minimal" MEE 1 network, all American peacetime communications would be brought into play, primarily u ing rented cabl channels and parts of the national public communications systems. n the whole, such a
sy tem provide for stable management ofU. . nuclear forces. A number of American
experts, however, have expressed doubts about reliability of the system's separate parts.
They note its vulnerability to a high-precision conventional or tactical nuclear strike,
much less a hit by a po\~erful Russian I B 1. The radio channel on which all airborne
command posts rely ar sensitive to inte1ference and ionospheric disturbances caused
by ground and e p cially high-altitude nucl ar explosion . Great attention is also paid
by Americans to th dangers of electromagnetic pulse (E tlP ) weapons.
American source de cribe previous mi takes of missile early warning system:
"It should also be noted that U. . early warning system have a credibi lity problem
that bears on t heir utility for warning of a oviet attack. cca ional false reporting by
the U.. early warning sy tern has resulted in unn cessary nuclear alerts, as in the incidents of Ju11e 3 and 6, 19 0, when erroneous warning of incoming oviet LBMs and
LCBMs re ulted in the scrambling of AC strategic bombers." 168
Pry describes some other d sign faults: am 'ssile cannot be launched u ing the crews
ef only one LC ; two crews working together are needed for a uccessfullaunch. If
·during ombat, four of five LC "'s in a quadran become inop rable, none of the SO
rnissiles will be launched. There is no technical capability for a neighboring squadron
to take over the launch of those SO mis iles. ALC are described as no more than 'a
temporary means of con rolling I BMs." 169
"ALC can launch missiles only when flying within sight of the wing. ALCCs
C~)not remain airborne forever, but must land periodically for maintenanc and refu·
~lng. ALCC can be maintained on station most days if tan ker support is available,
ut only for hours if there are no or too few tankers for continuous refueling." Ho
U.~la~ draw ome ~omparison~ b~tween the airborne elements. o~ the Russian and
· C systems for direct transnuss10n of a launch order to the ffilSSlle .

cs in Russia and the United States: ACompal'atlve Analysis 1 199
188 \ IJI: Nuclear command, contl'ol, cooperation

. .
their airborne command posts could remotel~
"Soviet SRF officers mdtcated that
S . '1 which in turn could transmtt
200 iles) an ERC mtsst e,
fire (at a range of about
d ICBM launchers. One such source urthe firing signals directly to the unmanne
able to transmit fire signals
mmand posts were
. l .
stances but that the procedure
ther indicated that the atr orne co
. specta Clrcum
directly to the ICBM launc ers m
d only when coordinated wtth t e
was extremely complex and could be per orme
. 't'tes of other launch centers.
· ary backups to
h control centers were t h e pnm
For the United States, atrborne launc
. . . borne launch control centers
t 1centers In a cnsts, atr
the underground launc con ro
f .h .
gt'ons of Minuteman deployments
h 0 t e s1x re
would have initiated patro1s m eac
11 f these SAC aircraft possessed a
to back up the ground crews. ~
h d s to the ground crews, replete wtt
abd launc or er
the codes necessary to tssue v
d th ground crews and sent tre stgunlock codes. They could also have bfypassh~ h a~ert was declared. Safeguards on
ed silos a ter a tg
t for that portion of the atr orne
nals directly to the unmann
l ely procedura , excep
h' h
board the aircraf t were arg
. .
launch message from tg er
fleet that acquired unlock co es


mmunication aircraft are hardened against
In theory, the major co~mand a~? co tection will actually work when put to the
t f the total expenditures for a proEMP , but no one can predtct howt t lStopro
20 percen
. tEMP can run about $100
test. Such
NEACP a1rcra t agams
tected aircraft, so that protectmg one
3 .
t desi ned to win a protracted ~~clear
Some experts believe that A~en~an C ts n:nents ~i.e., computers) are sufftctentl_Y
war. Even though the systems lo~Kalfcomp h a war the physical components (pn. 1 optwns or sue
y surfl 'ble to provide operatwna
. .
l ) do not have the necessar
d commumcatton c anne s
marily command posts an
. other such defects.m
s of
vivability. Various sources descnbe. A
. an C3 are important to the purpos~
ts and functions are similar to t ose
T wo points in particular. concernmg
t 's componen
h h one
this paper. First, the Amencan sys em t however to try to determine w et. e~l ·i.
t Any attemp •
d d t · 1stml at
of its Russtan counterpar .
intless. Techmcal an oc nna
side "borrowed" from the other would be ponature of nuclear weapons themselv~s : .


ties between the systems ~rise fro:e~:::.r:ach country arrived at its pr~sen~ :r~ces
the ideas that govern thetr p~~po .t bl .' There are, nevertheless, certam ~iff~iliW of
figuration independently an mevt a. y C3 One example is the way survtva ents in U.S. and Russian approach~s to uhsmg chosen to emphasize mobile com~dongreater
d Amencans ave
d' .
lly pat
. h
b t'des those tra ttwna
t he system lS ensure .
h'l Russta as, es
land-based and airborne d- w 1 e d command posts.
· to h ar d ened un ergroun

The second point lies in the relative nature of such concepts as "strong" and "weak"
when applied to U. . c:~ by American experts. Such qualitative evaluations lie very
much in the eye of the beholder. It is po sible to keep investing huge sums of mon yin
C 3 and achieve nothing. It is more important at the present time to evaluate cientifically how C 3 systems contribute to the general goal of strengthening strategic stability.
hort ofthis, it remain clear that Russian and merican 3 systems are reliable enough
to avoid starting a nuclear war.
As for probl m of U. . 3 development, American expetts cited earlier the enduring indifference to C 3l problems among those respon ible for allocating defense funds.
Everyone paid lip-service to the sy tem's importance, but the reality was qujte the opposite. Even when 0 development was declared to be an official goal, actual changes
remained insignificant. Blair describe how the Reagan administration declared de velopment of C 3 the main goal for updating nuclear forces: "According to Reagan, mod ernization of the control system was crucial to the success of the overall plan;' without
dependable C 3 I, new weapons cannot be transformed into ef£ ctive power. upport
for this thesis continue to run deep and wide. The cowcroft ommi ion expres ed
a representative opinion: " ur first defense priority should be to ensure that there is
continuing, constitutionally legitimate, and full control of our strategic force under
conditions of stress or actual attack .... Th Commis ion urges that this program con tinue to have the highe t priority." 174
In reality, however, legitimate doubts were voiced about at lea t three aspects of C 3 L
goal ; technical feasibility; and funding. The lack of dear goals arose from undefined
priorities in the strategic concepts of nuclear weapon use. cott . agan, a leading
American expert in this field ex plaine the title of his book on nuclear strategy: "Moving
Targets does not refer only to mobile missiles ... It i also an allusion to the central topic
.. . Indeed, a anyone who ha written about this exceedingly complex subject understands, U. . nuclear strategy, in many ways, is itself a moving target." 175
oubts about the possibility of developing a C 3 sy tem that would atisfy serious
prospective requirements arose from a major tedmological challenge facu1g scientist
and engineer . It was impossible to predict behavior of the oppo ite side, for decades
in the future: 'Defense officials seem keenly aware that a technological challenge of
daunting dimensions accompanies the goals laid out by th Reagan admini tration." 17 ~
A number of well-known Western experts did not believe in an "idea]" system: "Among
other who do not share the administration' sanguine view are Desmond Ball and John
D. teinbruner. Bail concludes that 'the capability to exercise trict control and coordination would inevitably be lost relatively early in a nuclear exchange .. .' In this
same vein teinbruner contends that a dependable technical olution to C 3 I endurance
Probably cannot be achieved at feasible cost." li7 t experts agreed only on the need to increase the survivability of C 3 in the initial
~ge of a nuclear exchange, and supported funding requests for the e improvements.
hat funding the administration did end up allocating for 3 went mostly to R&D,


1 IJI: Nucleal' Command, Contrrol, Coopel'atlon
cain Ru88/a and the United States: ACompal'ative Analysis

not to manufacturing and deployment. Blair noted that some promising C I developments found a temporary refuge in R&D, but it was not clear whether the results of
such research would ever be implemented.
Time has shown these fears to be well founded. By the mid-1980s, production was
assured only for some of the system's components. Even the most successful developments remained underfunded, and the dramatic increase in funding promised by the
administration never materialized. Blair complains that as in the past, 0 received only
1. 5 percent of the defense budget, or about 10 to 12 percent of the total strategic nuclear
forces budget. He points out that, from 1970 to 1985, the United States annually invested an average of $1.5 billion for development of command, control, communication and tactical early warning. 178
Unfortunately, the data on funding for command and control varies widely among
U.S. publications. For example, a different source claims: "Between 1977 and 1986,
funding for CZ equipment jumped nearly 150 percent, from less than $10 billion annually to nearly $25 billion a year, as computers, communications systems, and surveillance systems acquired status comparable to the most advanced bombers and submarines."179 These differences in data may be a result of the many rather free interpretations of what constitutes command and control: C 2 , C 3 , C 3 I, or C 4 I?
In comparison to the problems of Russian C 3 , such a budget share (10 to 12 percent), is not so small (especially if one takes into consideration the absolute size of
defense spending in the United States). In the 1970s, the Strategic Rocket Forces were
well ahead of the other nuclear triad forces in command and control. During this period
the Strategic Rocket Forces command earmarked up to 15 to 20 percent of incoming
revenue for the development, manufacture and deployment of the Signal, Vyuga,
Perimetr, and other systems. At the same time, missile development continued apace,
and even showed some increase.
In both the United States and Russia, however, there has been a clear trend toward
redistributing funds officially allocated for C 3 into weapons systems. Even though 0 is
an integral part of these weapons, it still does not receive adequate support. "That weapons systems are the main beneficiaries of the administration's defense largesse is further
suggested by the fact that key OI programs such as the E-4B airborne command post
and ECX TACAMO were scaled down or stretched out during Reagan's first term.''' 60
Low funding levels for C 3 (C 4 I) may also be due to the fact that the nuclear triad is
the "cheapest" part of the armed forces, and that defense spending levels in general
have been decreasing. In 1995, the then Strategic Rocket Forces Commander in Chief
Col. Gen. Igor Sergeyev noted: "The spending for developing and maintaining NF is
only 10-15percent of the total military budget; as for the Strategic Rocket Forces - the
main component ofSNF - it's no more than 5 to 6 percent." 181
It would be logical to increase spending gradually on C 3 for strategic nuclear forces
as force levels themselves decrease. This notion seems slowly to be taking hold in the
United States, as recent C I programs are given high priority and financing.



In his book "W
eapons Acquisition i th S ·
mteres~~ng comparison between weapon: R~D o.viet Unio~,, Stan Woods makes an
Sta~es: T~~ee groups play a major role in the m the Sov~e~ .Union and the United
et~. the military (with their doctrin h.
weapons acquisition process in any s .

(":I~h ~11 of its pr~orities, values and e:~pi~:~~~y ~nd ~a~itions), the political leaders~~~
Wit t .e defense mdustry as a whole. The r ns , a~ t e R&D community combined
~fa ~~wnal progression of events but is th~ :~uctiO~ of new weapons is not the result
tlons .Ips among these groups."tsz
u put o a complex web of iterative relaThis describes ' £or th e most part th ·
~tates. ~ar chief designers of we~ o~ssituatwn today both in Russia and the United
m ~onvmcmg. the powers that be t:at th::; ~oredsucc~~sful than their C3I colleagues
natiOnal secunty. This 't . .
pro ucts are the most "
. 1"
. d
SI uatwn Is partially d
essentia for
mze authoritative methods r
. . ue tot e absence of commonl
wr su stantiat
Y recognuc ear forces into the general result (d t
mg) e contnbution of each element of
There are th
d. .
e errence
ree Istmctive types of probl
over t~e futur~ development of American CJ;~. m ~he ongoing, often political, fight
~~~ wdl functron reliably during the first fe . . Irst Is the need to ensure that the sysItlons of launch-on-warning b r
w mmutes of a nuclear conflict und
ewre t e enemy's w h
er con.e~e pro lems have been given sufficient .
. ar eads reach their targets. While
~Itl~al aspect that remains not addressed. ~ma~c.Ial and technical attention, there is a


\t Issue·:t whether a responsible, ~:s. ~ot ~o~prehensive and slides past

~~ossi e w~en t~ere are only a few minutes toc~sio~dis"ts~manly and organization-

ecr e.
e second Issue Is how th
e command and cont 1
.ours o an enemy attack. The network f . b ro system functions in the first few
bon centers is the anchor of th.
o ai~ orne command posts and comm .
partiall fi d d
rs system and Its further d 1
unrcaeve opment continues to be
t'll y . un e . Despite financial and techn. 1 h 11
sfr consrdered viable as "insurance" £ th rcla c a. enges, the "airborne concept" is
0 c3.
or e ess reliable ground-ba d
se components
he third group of problems deals .
have been .explored thoroughly, and th::th a protrac~ed war. !hese problems never
are exceptiOns to this rule such
st~dy remams essentrally unfunded Th

as e proJe t £
Op ·
nuc~:::ronal ~uclear Detection System - IO~D~) ~~atmg a sys:em (the Integrated
Potent' ~xplosrons from space, both in the United St tat would drscover and analyze
a es and other regions. I ONDS
. ra y would be able to assess th d
e am age to
h ·d ·
forces ~matron to change plans for subsequent e ea~ sr e m a conflict, and then use
tonot~y he system is projected to have up to 18m~ ~[.ment ~f the remaining nuclear
(no ground support) and th b'l'
sa e Ites, wrth high operational au
0 ther CJI
e a I rty to deliver in£
· d'
programs with high potential are to:
ormatwn rrectly to the user.
Increase th
. b.
d 1
e survrva Ility of EWS satell't .
eve op mobile r
I es,
g oun -based termmals for the EWS·,

202 1 IJI: Nuc/BBI' Command,


CS in Russ/a and the Unhed States: A Cf'
· o~mpspatfve Analysis

upgrade BMEWS radars;
improve the survivability of airborne command posts against the effects of nuclear
increase the survivability and operational capability of stationary command posts;
develop alternative satellite communications systems alongside MILSTAR;
expand ELF submarine communications.
All of the above measures are well known from the theory and practice of military
and civilian communications. These ideas have been researched and developed at the
institutes, laboratories, and testing ranges of Russia, France, China and elsewhere. The
choice of specific technologies depends on each nation's technical and financial means.
Blair rightly points out, "Strategic analysis has long suffered from a methodological
affliction known as the law of the instrument, which states that problems must be tailored to the tools at one's disposal." 184 At the same time, however, he notes the lack of
a clear methodology for assessing the contribution of C 3 systems to strategic stability.
This lack is directly responsible for the already mentioned financial emphasis on weapons systems alone.
"Because available tools are generally honed for problems that can be readily quantified, rigorous assessment has steadily advanced, but in narrowly circumscribed areas
of interest: the size, technical composition, and economics of nuclear weapons. Progress
toward assessing the central question - command system performance - has not been
commensurate. Standard calculations, in fact, have obscured the problem of force
management, a subject that generally defies meaningful quantification." 185
The situation is the same in Russia today. The "law of the instrument" is hardly a
useful way to approach serious problems with any hope of success. In the case of C 3I,
it prevents researchers from discerning true priorities and concentrating resources on
solving them.


Some Pel'sonal 0/Jsel'vatlons

A lot of interesting information was kindly given to me during a visit to Offutt AFB,
to which I was invited as an independent expert on Sept. 11 -12, 1996. With the help
and cooperation of Alfred A. Buckles, principal deputy J-6 (C 4I systems), I was fortu·
nate to see things I had been able only to imagine when I served in the Soviet Rocket
Forces and at the General Staff. At Offutt, I listened to a presentation on the underground command post while sitting in a commander in chiefSTRATCOM chair, froill
where American nuclear forces would be directed in a crisis. I talked with enlisted
personnel and officers on duty in a Looking Glass plane. I saw the president's Airborne Command Post, the TACAMO plane and many other interesting things. My
hosts naturally were not able to inform me about everything I was interested in, but
what I did learn was enough to form a general picture and draw some conclusions.
The USSTRATCOM in Omaha is, on the one hand, a well-tuned, smoothly func-

tioning mechanism staffed by hi h1
moment to work at any comm ~ y skilled professionals who are ready at

1 203

are~ team of intellectuat~ri:n~t ~n the other hand,

Jar to Russians. Sometimes I celt I y, . ppy people who seemed surprisingly Sl·m·
a . th
was In a So . t . 'I . .
1gam, e atmosphere was
£ '1'
VIe mtssi e division in S'b .
so ami Iar Wh
I ena once
WIS that we never would have a
en saymg ~~~dbye, we all expressed the

Omaha and Perkhushkovo to the test.

put the capabilities of our command posts at

Cha ter 5
Problems with Russian and U.S. C



his chapter deals with certain. comparative problems in. the structure and operation
of Russian and U. . nuclear C 3 systems. It provides a brief analysis of some problems common for both sides. Thi analysis is organized around the author's comments
on published views of American specialists.
uclear C 3 systems are essentially inertial: substantial hanges in these systems take
place relativ ly slowly, over many years. The main trends in their development are longterm in character, and their fundamental characteristics have been p ·actically immutable since the invention of nuclear weapons. Therefore, I will refer in this chapter to
sources dating from the 1970s and 1980s to most recent ones. From the point of view of
this book, which makes an argument for international cooperation of C 3 experts, such a
time frame is quite appropriate.


Negative Control

Russia's nuclear 0 system i viewed by the majority of foreign and domestic experts
as one of the most protected again t unauthorized action : "Although unforeseen loopholes lurk in any system, a long-standing and deep-seated obsession with controlling
nuclear weapons led the Soviets to go to extraordinary lengths to ensure tight central
control on nuclear weapons. Their afeguards were more stringen than those of any
9ther nuclear power, including the United tates." 18"
All organizational and technical measures of negative control were unified in the
Soviet/Russian 3 system under a program known as "Zashchita" (Protection). The
· eneral Staff ba the exclusive prerogative for the implementation and improvement
of this system. The main staffs of the nuclear triad components are responsible for the
implementation of concrete orders from the General Staff in their subordinate forces.

6.1.1 towel' Levels ol Russian CS: Below the Top Leadel'sh/p
Blair describe this complex sy tem in the following way:
The main safeguards:
1. the division of the command and control tructure into two distinct types of organizations with separate chains of command, one responsible for managing the
technical state of nuclear forces and one for providing mi litary direction to the
cotnbat units;

Problems with RUBB/an and U.S. fJI 1 207
208 \ 1?: Nuclear command, control, cooperation

their delivery units;
ee in nuclear warheads apart rom
2 the standard pracnce of k p g .
3·. the application of two-person r~~~ck loops that enable subordinate umts to be
4. the utilization of elabo.rate fee
closely monitored by hlgher. echelons, th tenable higher echelons to dtsable mtsf el t ·omc systems a
t .
5 the extensive use o ec l
lower level comman pas s,
. sile launchers quickly an~ to ~eu~ah~:signed physically to impede the unauthoextens·ive use ofblockmg evlces
6 · the
. d use of weapons.
ctive numeriA brief commentary wtt respe
is description is correct.
I n genera,l th
cal reference is in order.

d' . . n of comman.d and contra uncu
. n
J is characterized by a clear
tv tsto
u·ve organizational branches.
1. ~,uss1a
f ch ctioo by respec
h' h facilitates control o ea se
ll d by staffs using vanous tra Jtwns, w tc '
\ f .
are contra e
t f
Thus, everyday activ ities.of ~:te otces lly equipped with encrypting equJp~e~ o
tional means of communtcl~abtl~~:· .l~:~:phon 'telegraph, encrypted comromucauons,
uaranteed or temporary re 1 l I y.
nitored with peaal sys1d employment of nuclear weapons ~re mo
ignal in SRF), which
couners, etdc: .
The con Jtton al
d d control (for mstance,
tems and means of combat comt~~. ;:ans of command and control. There are so
b ve absolute p.riority over al~ o~1e
.. mmand and control systel~ .
~visions of responsibilities wttlun the ~~::c~~ condition is carried o~t vta eparat~
Routine control f nuclear weapons\
tem all the way down the chatn of cow~an
f th automated combat contra sys
1 l f the command and centro .sys: fr m the lower eve s o
. .
d mamtetrac ks o.
;" directorates for opetatwn an
posts · Teclmtcalln[ormatlOn
1 ed by e rna......
d . eaponsate
tem is generahzed an ana y~l problems and accidents inv.olvmgbnu eat ~ecl1nologinance of nuclear weapons.
d . lt;,., g in the appropnate su sequen
d analyze ' resu u. •
immediately so ve an
lear weapons
cal improvements.
. . . for combat employment o nuc
t crews
. ally the main re ponslblhty
. t'onal personnel: combat du y
f h uclear forces opera~
·tments an
within the competencedo tffe nt all levels particularly the operatwns edp~ ceJ'ving re·
. ·
ands an re
t an sta s a
of command pass
l The track for transmlttmg com.m
11 other funccommunications personne .d . . separated by technical means fron:b:t a f , ,·sonnel
ti n of or ers JS
lf Th num er o P""
ports about execu o
ilbat control system ttse :
~ . d d these limits
...;ons within the automate con
d d control is stnctly hm.tte an
b t comman an
with dire t access to com a
·t ·ed and enforced·
are rigorously moru or
. (·om the!I
·heads apart r
ctice of keeping nuc lear war
. ractice 15
2 Blair's claim that "standard prad
a It is sufficient to say that thls p

. . , · . t directly relate to
delJVery uruts, lS no
f R ·an nuclear missiles.
. d
t tyoes o ussl
not apphe to mOS

3. The "two-person rule" is indeed implemented at Russia's nuclear command posts.
For instance, launch operations in an SRF regiment can be conducted only by two
members of the duty crew simultaneously. The control tools (buttons, keys, etc.) are
located on the equipment and designed in such a way as to preclude their use by one
person. They are at such a distance from one another and are synchronized in such a
way that, for instance, if one person attempts to activate sequentially two "separated"
control tools, the whole system automatically turns itself off. This rule also applies,
although somewhat differently, to all higher level command posts, including the General Staff. But at this level, not only two operators but also a larger number of people
must simultaneously "want" and be "able" to give launch orders to the forces.
One may add that all technical command and control assemblies and combat documents required for launching the missiles are kept at the command posts in specially
controlled, reliable safes, equipped with alarms.
4-5. The higher command posts exercise continuous technical control over possible
unauthorized actions in the subordinate sections of C 3 • For instance, the SRF's Signal
system (Signal-M and A) provides for an immediate, automatic, top-priority report,
"NSD!" (nesanktsionirovannye deystviya- unauthorized action!), from the command
post "at fault" up the whole chain of command, including the Central Command Post
of SRF and the Central Command Post of the General Staff.
On several occasions during my service in the SRF Main Staff, I took part in emergency investigations conducted in SRF divisions to find the causes of such automatic
reports, which happened infrequently from time to time. All of them were caused by
technical problems in the equipment or by operators mistakes. All these incidents were
thoroughly analyzed, with consequent improvements in technology and manuals to prevent repeated mistakes. In this way, the command and control system was debugged.
These illustrations of the Russian command and control system's ability to provide
automatic reports on unauthorized actions testify to its robustness. During the entire
period of the SRF automated combat control system's operation, there has not been a
single case of intentional unauthorized action, to find out the codes, etc. At least, I
know nothing of such incidents, and it is impossible to hide information about such
extraordinary events within the nuclear forces. I believe that there truly have been no
such incidents because of the extremely "respectful" attitude toward nuclear weapons
on the part of everybody who knows anything about them.
. Technology can malfunction; there is nothing surprising about it. It is much more
~portant to know what may result from these malfunctions. There are two important
lSSltes involved: first, how can such malfunctions be neutralized within the system itself, and, second, how do people behave in such a situation?
Malfunctions that took place within the Soviet/Russian C 3 were neutralized by the
s:stem's design principles. Their undesirable consequences were blocked by the algo fl.thrn of pre-launch operations, which requires that each command receives a response,

208 1 1!: Nuc/Bal' Command, Contl'ol, CoopBI'ation
PI'Ob/ems With Russian and u.s. I!

and all subsequent operations also require a response from "below." The malfunctions
I know about were in the initial stages of the whole process.
As for people (first, duty crews in command posts), in peacetime they operate on the
basis of common sense. In the mid-1970s, there was a case of technical malfunctioning
in the SRF C 3 system from top-to-bottom. Because of a technical mistake, the troops
received an automatically transmitted preliminary order to put the C 3 system on combat alert. All the duty officers in the command posts realized, up the chain of command (in SRF armies and the SRF Central Command Post), what was going on, except
for one duty officer in a division command post, who started to implement the order
and put his unit on alert. This level of alert is part of very preliminary procedures, and
could not have any serious consequences leading to an unauthorized missile launch.
How should we evaluate the actions of duty officers? Of course, from purely military standpoint, the only "disciplined" lieutenant colonel was right. And, from this
formal standpoint, he was rewarded. But from the human standpoint, everybody supported the remaining majority of duty officers: the international situation was quiet,
everything was peaceful, and one could not act blindly.
It was different in times of international tension. During the Cuban missile crisis, I
was on temporary duty at a rocket division located near the city of Nizhny Tagil, and I
was present at the command posts when authentic orders were transmitted from Moscow to put all SRF on the highest combat alert. Orders were carried out quickly and
skillfully at the command posts, but it was strangely quiet. I cannot forget the mixture
of nervousness, surprise and pain on the faces of each operator, without exceptionofficers, enlisted men, and women telephone operators. This should never happen again.
For the sea-based nuclear forces, the questions of controlling unauthorized actions
are a bit more complicated than for the SRF. Since SSBN s cannot give continuous
feedback to the center, it is impossible for them to report any incidents immediately.
There is no evidence of attempted unauthorized actions on board Russian SSBNs.
Most experts in Russia and in the United States are convinced that Russian SSBNs
still have no capability to launch SLBMs autonomously, without sanction from the

To b £ ·
. e air, one must mention that some
particular, references have been
sources express doubt in this matt
St.aff, Marshal Akhromeev, and :::n::::1~ements. by the former chief of the G::era~
fairs, Gen. Geliy Batenin, made in privat ary advi~or to the Ministry of Foreign Afe conversatwns with the US
· . miitary:
"Akhromeev indeed told Wi
estern VISitors in a .
were not equipped with bl k'
d .
pnvate meetmg that Soviet SSBN
auth onty prior to launch G
eqUire coded input from h. h
M' .
. en. atenm a militar d .
Ig er
Inistry, also claimed that SSBN h d h .
y a VIser to the Russian Foreign
s a P ysical a t
ave Ired without authorization." 189
u onomy and could technically

I~ is dif~icult to determine what the actual sit

. .
mation, Without knowing the context and eire uatiOn Is on the basis of unofficial inforthe combat manuals used by the R . A umstances of these conversations Tod
t~nomous SLBM launches. Accor~si:an rmed Forces have nothing to say about
smce the early 1970s t9o N
th 1
g to a recent study, this has been th .
ever e ess the ver £
e SituatiOn
sugg:sts that this issue is worth studyi~g withi~ bact t at t~ere are doubts in this matter
discussions about C3 pro blems
. SNF also have pro bl ems With
una~thonzed actions trom a plane that is at contmu.ous feedback to the center abou~
partially resolved by strict limi'tat·
a great distance. Here, the problem
IOns on peac t · fl' h
can e
e problem is solved when the strat . b e Imbe Ig ts With nuclear weapons aboard
egic om ers are on the ground t th .
nent bases.
etr permaa


6. Regarding technical blockin d

all levels of Russia's C3 system as g


ef~Icesldlet us note again that they are installed

con trme by US
· . sources:

"Most Russian nuclear forces - all strat .
must receive unlock codes from h' h
egic ~eapons and most tactical weapons .
Ig er authonty 'th
~ot p y~rcally be dispatched or detonated The wr ~ut which the weapons canI

"There is definite evidence that external input information from outside the vessel
was needed to enable the crew to fire its missiles. Perhaps the strongest evidence
came from a former Delta- II and Delta-III class SSBN crew member, whoseversion of the launch procedure alleged the existence of electronic blocking systems
that needed to be lifted prior to launch. Special unlock codes had to be received
from higher authority and punched into the on- board weapon system computer to
deactivate the blocking system that prevented unauthorized launch ... Another Soviet military source familiar with SSBN launch procedures confirmed this account
but added that the procedures varied with circumstances." 188

I 208

rs especrally sophisticated in th t I .
unblockmg system for their ICBMs
a on y those w
d .
aunc need be unlocked and a.c.t
. eapons esrgnated for immediate
a . 'f
II er a s ort penod th
gam I for any reason they had n t b
ey are automatically locked up
s t
o een aunched a 1
ys em lacks this sophistication. "191
s p anne . The U.S. unblocking

The values for block'
Periodic 11
mg codes are prepared and s
la Y~ the General Staff using the
tore only m the General Staff
appropnate de t
nuc ea t . d
are set . dr. na renews these codes among th t
. par me~ts m the main staffs of
of exchan .Inspected in Moscow and then delive:e;~op~ . . Spect~l b!ocking assemblies
angmg old assemblies for the ne
o ~ etr destmatiOn. In the process
w ones, not a smgle participant knows (or can



210 1 C': NucleBI' Command, Contl'ol, Coopel'alion
Pl'oblems With Russian and u.s. C'

learn) the real values for the combat codes. It is impossible to copy information from
the assemblies, and if such an attempt is made, the code values are automatically erased.
There is also a system for rapid replacement of compromised codes.

6.1.2 American PALs
A brief history of the creation and evolution of American blocking devices, known
as PALs:
Once nuclear forces appeared in the United States, the issue of separating the control
of nuclear weapons from their possession arose: " ... to achieve use control by decoupling
control of the weapon from possession of the weapon." 192
In 1958, Fred Ikle (at that time with RAND Corp.) was the first to propose the idea of
combination locks for nuclear weapons. Then, John Foster at Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Harold Agnew at Los Alamos National Laboratory refined the
idea. Prototypes of electromechanical, remote-controlled combination locks were developed. Their first models were installed on gravity bombs and missiles based in Europe.
Initially, the military resisted the new concept, fearing that it would reduce the weapons' combat readiness. Some even thought that the Kennedy administration, unen thusiastic about tactical nuclear weapons (TNW), simply "locked'' them. But after
National Security Action Memorandum 160 in 1962, PALs began to develop. It was
necessary to strengthen control and protection with a minimum negative impact on
combat readiness and the ability of the operators to function. These requirements resulted in the "secure container concept."
PALs of categories A, B, D and F were used in TNW: Pershing-2 , Lance and cruise
missiles. These PALs used the two -man rule, by which launch required the combined
actions of two operators inputting a dual code to the weapon. These locks were protected against "picking." A "limited try" rule (a limited number of attempts to break
the code) was also implemented.
Nevertheless, all blocking devices of these types can, at least in theory, be penetrated,
although with considerable difficulty. To avoid this, the bypass prevention method
was invented. Processing of electronic information, based on cryptographic technology, was introduced into the control switches and control circuits of the nuclear weapons. In addition, other (active) protection systems included:
sensor membranes for detection of penetration or attempted penetration;
a long-life power supply for such sensor membranes;
a series of changing penalty responses, which disable critical components 0 f
nuclear warheads or destroy them in case of penetration by unauthorized
a choice of any type of penalty response.
Initially, it was a matter of protecting the nuclear warheads and missiles.

I 211

the two-man rule resulted i h
n t e development of launch control meth d r I
and SLBMs:
0 s 10c CBMs
"By the end of the 1970s a1
' most a and- and . b
~tr- ased U.S. tactical nuclear weapons were equipped with PALs. and all st
rdate~rc bombers and missiles assigned to
the Strategi Air ommand wel· eq .
· .
Utppe wrth PAL
both Th
h .
e Air orce rejected the u e of PAL . [; s or co ed swltch systems, or
: e B-1 bomber in order to save mon
h s m avor of coded switch devices for
tmpo ·t'
ey, w ereas the U S N
st wn o any such device. "193
· ·
avy has resisted the

The two-man r 1
u e required that two
bihty earned out every sens. t'
p~opl~ of equal teaming and level of
zones " h
I IVe operatwn mvolvi
responsi' w ere a smgle person co ld
ng nuclear weapons. "N 1
u not e present, were delineated
d o one
aroun nuclear
e best solution for problems of
terns. Emergency message materials,::~~~::control was found for the Minuteman sys such a way as to provide both for prot t'
d.launch keys were located in the LCC .
At the same time, introduction of ;~~n agams.t accidents and high launch readin:s~n
was necessary to decide which of th
s comphcated the operation of C3 system I.
for control and blocking d .
I e weapon systems' elements should
hs. t
. 1 .
evices. t was n
serve as orne
tive y Widely-circulated codes b .
ecessary to consider the possibi'li'ty f 1
h ·
emg compr · d K
o rea::;~rt, p ysically, from one another could re~mise h. eepmg different codes widely
uce t e weapons survivability. Nevere ess, the experts at the Department of
capable of acceptably flexible code tr D~fe~se succeeded in developing a C3 syste
~ary, adt the peak of a crisis or at the m:mnsemntissfi~n as well as recall capability if necesm
tng co es as we11 as one real code all
o Its. resol
Th'Is system WI'th
. u IOn.
t .
St t · b
• owed for tr

ram bo ~a egi~ ambers received devices that bl Without loss of control.
~c miss.Ile launch and release of gravit
c m s u~ttl the aircraft commandin offi
~:ed SWitc~ system. These device: sol~=~ Inputs his personal code to the bomber'~
P. Vent, for Instance the bomb
k fi
_other problems as well: "Such
. . '
rae s rom dis
h .
sys ems
It ng o a missile's terminal countdown t 1 penhsmg t eir stores or prevent the beWas also difficult to exclude th
. .o. aunc . " 194

~f~~neJs for receiving codes are disa~fe~ss~~~ty of unauthorized use if communication

ProbJ:gressor d~cided that he could d~stro e;~:nce could lo~e s~me of its robustness
b y
se communicatwns channels Th.
D . Was particularly difficult £
nttl 1997 the US N
or sea- ased nuclear forces
ll)ented a
. . avy refused to have PAL
. ..
s and similar devices and . 1
concept of its own·
Imp e"There are no PALs or
coded swrtch devices on th
or for h
t at matter on most other naval
e su manne ballistic missile force
nuc ear weapons C
. ertam naval weapons such

Pl'oblems with Russian and u.s.


1 213

l f1l: Nuclear command, control, cooperation
. .
d all antisubmarine warfare weapons
as the submarine-launched crUise mtsshtle an tection is removed when the vessels
· b "PAL-s butt e pro
· PALs
have been equipped wtt
. .' N v olicy evidently calls for restonng
carrying them go to sea on mtsstO~· .. ::ei~ missions, return to port, and transport
hen the vessels cornp ete
protectiOn w
d " 195
storage depots on Ian .
weapon to
d . U S submarines in the
h . d actions was addresse m . .
Protection against unaut onze

following way, until1997:

. 1
h d ballistic missile forces (whose
. th submanne- aunc e
"The procedures in use m e
h . d through theN avy nuc ear weaph
d . )areaut onze
d .gned to prevent unauthorized launc .
warheads have no PAL-type evtces
dures are est
ons surety program. T h ose proce
fthe submarine in a launch ts ensure y
· 1
'th reThe necessity to mvo ve mos
The launch control process begms Wl
rocedures in the launch check hsts. b
need to the entire crew. The radw
h t
st e annou
ceipt of a launch message t a mu f fficers (not including the comman o.three of whom have separate funct.wns m
message is verified by two te~ms o
ficer weapons officers, or nav1gat~r,
then issued to those respons1ble for
'b'l' ) Spec1al keys are
the chain of respons1 1 tty .
d f the keys is assigned to personne
certain specific functions (pre-launch cu~to yf .~ ermission" switches can be closed
d h
) ' so that a senes
f the crew is kept informe t roug
E h mem er o
. t'f
in the prescribed sequence. ac
1 h
dt' alogue. These procedures JUS 1 y
t and te ep one
public address announce~en s
d authorities in the integrity of t e
.dence of the natwnal comman
t he conf 1
n19 6
launch control system.
d l
h procedure
ually comphcate aunc
The description above indicatles tha\~h;:c~;~:n of a launch command frornh ab:~
h le SSBN crew a ong Wl
M' temen under t e s
mvolves thew o
l two operators launch mu
ld launeh
At the same time, hov:ever, on? yM
sources suggest that U.S. SSB s cou
Why the d1fference.
. .
cond 1t1ons.
. al hearings in 1991:
SLBMs without authonzat10n.
d t n congress1on
This situation was re!erre o 1
. . .
. to U. . forces, at least those at sea, . . .
Bruce Blair: "This situatwn lS m cont~astl\ .
able oflaunching their forces ,vtth
I know are notphystca y mcap
1thmk most peop
bl "
d s They are phystcally capa e ...
'fi d infor·
out sue c e ·
d thi is no class• te
. . " • xam \e, as I understand tt, an
.s .
en. Joseplt B~.den. For_e
. blic \iteratur , there tS on th . . . .
om a
mation, I am just speakmgfrord'l1 the pu en launches without authonzatton frpeca·
. I afeguar to prev
h d the coo
system no teel'111lca s .
·ne commander who a
·ds the su man
higher authonty. In ot 'leT wot '


tion of certain memb rs of his crew could launch nu lear weapons at his or her own
discretion. lnd ed, if he were a commander of a Trident submarine, theoretically he
could launch up to 200 warheads, each of them with 10 times the destructive power
of what was dropped on Hiro hima ." 1 ~'
The main reason for this peculiarity was the grea probability of loss of communication between the SSBN and the center under comba onditions. This system, however, aggravated the problem of negative control in the sea-based component of the
U.S. strategic forces.
In 1997, according to Blair, the U.S. Navy yielded to pressure from defen e civil ians to equip Trident submarines with technical seafeguards that would prevent t.he
unauthorized launch of missiles. A special safe was installed in each boat for this purpose. Each safe has an inner safe whose unlock combination would normally be provided in a wartime launch order from higher authority.
pening the inner safe with
the combination give access to a special key to be inserted into the main fire-control
console of the boat's command post. Without easy access to the key, no missiles could
be fired .
This does not represent a true PAL, and this new physical barrier is not ironclad
protection against unauthorized efforts to gain access to the critical launch key. But, it
represents a further centralization of technical control outside the boat and a shift of
priority further away from positive control and toward negative control.


The National Command Authol'ity

One needs to address the i ue of protection again t unauthorized actions at the
CA level.
n mistake there can lead to a global catastrophe.
Tf lower-! vel olutions to the problem of negative control ar for lhe most part
technical in nature, at the TCA, uch problems requi.r solutions of an organizational
nature, with con iderable attention to the psychological and philosophical aspect .
Theoretically, a command and conb:ol system cannot be completely protected agajnst
mistake by tho e who are in charge of a nation at a critical. moment. Why? First,
''absolute negativ control" makes impo sible, as seen from the term itself, any use of
nuclear weapons whatsoever. econd, even national leaders are only human. In the
final analysis at the J A level, everything depend on the integrity of the main actors.
Blair describes the actions of Russian strategic CJ during th 1991 attempted coup:
"The established teclmical and organizational procedures had not been able to cope
with such upheaval at the apex of command and could not by t hemselves re ist the
designs of the coup leader ." 198
Blair notes, correctly, that whatever the protective measures undertaken in advance,
the effectiveness of negative control .is reduced at moments of social or international
~Pheaval: " ocio-political factor motivated th se remedial actions. By the sam coin,
eviations from e tablished procedures could undermine the negative function. The

214 1 IJI: Nuc/eBI' Command, Conll'ol, CooptJI'ation

Pl'obtems With Russ/a.

effects of socio-political factors on control can cut either way. They may be beneficial
or harmful, depending on the circumstances." 199
Blair believes that the Russian command and control system, as a whole, successfully survived this trial. The main factor was the people who actually controlled the
launch capability (high-ranking military officers), who did everything necessary to protect against an accidental launch.
According to Blair, the Russian system is based on the division of competence, responsibilities and rights when it comes to the preparation of three main launch orders launch authorization, unlock codes and targeting instructions. Indications of an enemy attack would be the basis for issuing those orders. This information is, in general,
similar to that quoted from another source in Chapter 4.
According to numerous assessments by American experts, Russian C 3 adjusted to
the situation during the coup attempt and successfully blocked any possibility of accidental or intentional actions with nuclear weapons on behalf of the conspirators, even
though there is no evidence of such attempts. The major barrier in the command and
control system against mistakes and their undesirable consequences during the days of
the coup attempt were the actions of the commanders in chief of the main components
of the nuclear triad- SRF, Navy and Air Force. Those commanders decided, between
themselves, not to carry out the conspirators' orders; to refuse assigning them therequired experts, equipment and documentation; to maintain the command and control
systems in manual, rather than automated, mode; to carry out a number of pre-emptive
measures in their troops, which was done immediately; and also to maintain a constant
exchange of information regarding the developing situation.
One can agree with this positive evaluation of the commanders in chief's actions by
American sources. By no means were their actions in violation of procedure or an act of
insubordination. The top generals demonstrated high responsibility and considerable
political maturity by excluding opportunities for employing nuclear weapons as a dangerous ace card in a messy political game. It only remains to add that this pattern of
behavior was demonstrated not only by high-ranking generals but also by all the nuclear
staff and troops who carried out the pre-emptive measures in a clear and conscious way.
The U.S. military have demonstrated a similar behavior pattern during acute moments in the country's domestic political life: "During the final days of the Nixon administration, the kind of implicit veto that can occur was applied when Secretary of
Defense James Schlesinger instructed the commanders of U .S. forces not to obey any
unusual order from the White House without confirmation from the Pentagon. "
Blair describes alternative opportunities to exercise negative control beyond what
the Russian C 3 system demonstrated during the coup attempt.201 Most of them actu·
ally exist.
Thus, Gorbachev's "nuclear briefcase" could not be used, even though the conspifcl·
tors confiscated it and sent it to Moscow. On board the plane, the officer respon ible
for its safekeeping allegedly erased all the information contained in it. There is also

'II and

u.s. C" I


theory that the suitcase had b
een ren ered
h ouse when it had b
unusa e even earlier - at th 1:'
een Isconnected £
l' oros
the same time, after the president'
1romba. external communication ch"'l colltntry
s nuc ear nefc
"d '
._ ne s At
ors o a special control system in
. ase ISappe.,1l·ed from view " .
to an established algorithm Th Mosco~ deactivated two other briefcases ' op~ra­
th d fi
ose were m th
e e ense mmister, and Chief f th G
e possession of I 1arshal mit11.. y

:~t:;~cip-~te1 in the conspira~y; t~e 1:~:::l:::f~i~~~~k~ail ~loiseev (th


£0 : ::,:

ecJ e not to allow Gennad Yan
s a ow ). Just in case the
. .
ayev, pretender to the J'ob of h d f '
access to the special co
1 d'
mmumcatwn syste K b k
ea o state
h m . az e mentioned in hapter 4 th
c u mg him from the "game " S
Th' ·
orne ot er sim'l
us exIs picture may or may not b
I ar measures are mentioned
1 th
e qUite correct d t
c ear at such measures should and do . . an ~~e In specific details, but it is
however, that nothing is known for sure ~XIst In Russia s c3 system. It is very bad
we cannot correctly assess their reliabilit a .o~t. those saf:ty measures. This means tlla~
gerous flaws and improve the syst
r. yh,Initiate effective efforts for elimina•:~g d
. .
em 1llrt er Th 1 k f
con ro Is Its main problem
us, ac o knowledge about
. . e second controversial aspect that A
bJhty that the military might act inde end:encan ~uthors pa~ attention to is the possi ~any aspects of the R~ssian negativepcontr::ly, Without presidential authorization. If
t e ~ommand and control chain betwee
sy~t.em are unclear, this factual break in
obvwus fact: "If com
. .
. n the pohbcalleadership and th
mumcatwns With b th h
e rni Itary Is an
severed, the Chief of the General Staff act _o ~ e president and defense minister are
ous means, including the Dead H d
mg a one could authorize retaliation b
y vanG
an system "202
enerally speaking, the situation is the sam. .
Gen. Igor Sergeyev, the SRF comm d .
: m the U.S. strategic forces When C 1
ak dd
an ermchJef .. d h
s e_ utyoff~cersatSTRATCOMwheth
, VIsite t eUmtedStatesin1993and
denbal _authonzation, they, after some ember they could launch missiles without presi Is this good or bad? With all the challen arrassme~t, . responded positively.

::1~~~ that this general principle is rather g;:~! prov~d~g a straightforward answer, it

w a e to tak~ the key from the monster's cav

goo .t a_n bad. It is probably more

an~o are techmcally sophisticated, understand e anf give It to a large group of people
d control, and endowed with the high t

nuc ear weapons, and their command

:ib~: ~fa nucl:ar catastrophe's conseque::e:en~ of responsibility due to their know1 -

Ihent ~t certamly less competent technologi~all ne person, p~obably not less responcert . o stress (or with evil intent in some e
~-may commit a tragic error in a mo ;c~p Ion~l case). This conclusion is to a
th am degree, confirmed by the beh .
avwr o t e Soviet C3 system during th d '
e coup attempt.
e ays o
Th e th Ird"
· aspe t f
. control" . . .
comm d
c o negative
of the:~ . and control. American sources state th~: ngid cent~alization of the Russian
it and w -~n. ahny order from above will be considered' 1fo~ ~11 mid-level and lower units
w at purpose 20J Th
h .
egitlmate - no matter who .
1 1
ey emp asize that the 1
ower eve s of c3 are practically

Problems with Russian


1 fll: /Vucteal' command, conll'ol, coopel'ation

unable to do anything. According to American experts, the U.S. 0 system is less centralized and therefore better. My argument is that in both cases only the degree of
centralization - that is, what level has the right to issue launch orders- is different. In
the long run, executing units are in more or less the same position in both countries.
In the next section, we will discuss in greater detail the question of delegating nuclear
responsibilities. Here, it is necessary only to state that, from the point of view of negative control, it is better to have a more rigidly centralized chain where the very top of
the chain is reliably protected. A case in which lack of confidence in the leaders is
compensated by delegating responsibilities to a whole series of command levels, one of
which may prove unreliable, seems to be a less sound one.
A general problem for any nuclear state is that at the very top echelons of C organizational, not technical, measures prevail. And even though such a situation cannot be
completely changed, there should be an effort to introduce greater implementation of
reliable technical systems and safety measures at the very top of the system.
Summarizing the discussion on negative control, it is evident that there is considerable similarity between both sides regarding the problems that exist in all the areas of
ideology, organization and technology. This is not surprising since the final goal of all
measures is identical for all parties. Those problems will not be resolved in any normal
way without a mutual exchange of information between nuclear states. Not only inforI

mation but also cooperation and mutual aid are crucial.
During Senate hearings in 1991, Biden expressed a wish to change to practical cooperation by suggesting the formation of a special commission consisting of Soviet and
American C3 experts. This met with the approval of everyone present:
"The commission would consist of civilian and military experts from each side. Experts such as our witnesses today, who should begin meeting with each other as you
two have, first to share information that would lead to stronger protections on each
side against unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons. And second, to share
ideas and develop joint recommendations as to how the two sides can achieve early
and massive reductions in their nuclear arsenals through simultaneous measures."

ca Survivability:

and u.s. f1J



Is There a Solution'

~ong :"ith.~egative control, one of in problems for . .
therr survwability
under comb a t cond 1t10n
' .
. b. . C3 system s 1s
1 otabl
arecsattsfied, the goal of expected positive
Ihty r:quirements
onunand and control surv'tva b"]'lty ts
. t·h e character· f asf een· achteved.
,as the most influence on its effe ti
If .
ts LC o posJttve control that
c veness.
mdeed we tak
. d'
speed of operation - its te ch mea
. I a bil'.tty to perform
e as
an m· Jcator the
t ·
gtven speed (first and foremost l
h ·. .
cer am act10ns with a
' aunc mg t e rrusstles) tl
ems m this area at the present t'
M d
- .l ere are no senous probtme.
o ern coutmand d
l .
t ts problem as a whole by
1 .
an contra means resolve
h· .
emp oymg computer tech 1
d h' h
mcatwn channels.
no ogy an tg -speed commu-

CO~trol reJia~iljtySU~"VlVba

. Another indicator, secrecy, is al o not crucial F'
mformation with guaranteed s cu .t . ·.del . J_rst, the methods for encrypting
n Yate WI y used m co
d d
m peacetime. eco.nd with th b . .
mman an control systems
e egmrung o combat
longer important - especially l·n th f'
, secrecy canst erations are no
e trst stage of th
£1' (·f
will even be subsequent stages) I
l . .
e con tct 1 we assume that there
which happens in some scenarios n rnera ' ltdlS possible to issue a launch order openly
0 comman and controls t
'b' .
the command and controlyssyems
t emp
h ·oyment.
pans an scenarios and the b'l 't
s em avmg necessary
a 1 1 Y to c ange the m qlllc
· kl Y - IS
· also present, as was
earlier. ' .,

Lastly, one more important requirement 1. 1' b 1'1'
portunities for distorting inform ti
~ re ta tty (accuracy) of mformation.
Opand control (preliminary a d a on. pa lse along the channels of military command
n executive aunch ord
ers, reports up t e chain of command, etc.) are not great even d
un er an enemy's counte
Th' .
Wlt the help of reliable modern meth d £ .
. rmeasures.
ts IS achieved
0 s or mcreasmg the reli bTt
tons - mterference-hardened c d"
a 11 yo communicaonl 1 bal
o mg, numerous repetltwns reversed ch k
y go
problem remaining in the eli b'l'
ec s, etc. The
c nfd
. .
r a I tty o command and
t 1
o J ence m mformation from the t d . 1EW
con ro systems IS
of scienti ts and engineers in this e mica
S. :Vith all due respect to the efforts
ability may be considered theoret:~~· even ht~e acbhltevement of "perfect" EWS relih
Y unac teva e The anal · f h'
owever, IS out id the scope of thi work.
ysts o t IS problem,
Thu 'survivability of command and controls st
lem directly related to the effect'
. _Y ems remams the most serious probtveness o posttlve control:

But such a commission was never created.
Avoidance of unauthorized actions with nuclear weapons should become the main
point on the agenda of all nuclear states, not just as a figure of speech but as an existing
practice. The limit of such efforts is in reality impossible to define. Negative control
requires much less financial expense than positive control, and is much more meaningful today. Blair note" "The Soviet command and control system was deeply fearful of
a breakdown that could lead to the illicit use of nuclear weapons. Its obsession led to

the imposition of tight central control and elaborate safeguards."
It is possible that such "obsession" could be useful now on both sides.

"D espite
. considerable progress made in hard .
command and cont 1
f h
. . enmg and addmg redundancy to U.S.
ro , one o t e most sigmfic t d
the possibility that I.
. .
an angers o nuclear war remains
n a eep cnsis or con t'
tation' strike perhaps b S . I l
ven IOna war a precursor nuclear ,decapi'
. central U.S. command and c t 1 t
su marmes,
on ro argets, might appe t b h 1
available to the Soviet leadership."206 ar o e t e east disastrous military option

Pl'obtems with Russian and u.s. C' 1 218

I C': NucleBI' command, Contl'ol, coopePation

h h " robable
d. American expert, speaking about t e t en. p
3 .
Expressed m 1989 by a lea mg
l . the planning of Amencan C ' m
" h'
· remains a vahd argumen m
opponent, t 1 o.ncern.
. l . b t"•een the two nuclear superpowers.
n th relations 11p e w

Efr t
. l 1.
d . his or that form, in Russla.
IOr s are
spite of cruc!a cnanges I
·allel argument IS also use ' m t
course '
. b'l'
the survlva
11ty of C .
. b'l'
made by both sldes to Improve .
f U S nd Russian 0 survlva 1 tty:
Let us briefly review American assessments o . . a




th t to American command and control
1 · the nuc ear rea
One of the sources ana yzmg
. l h f ll ing potential goals of attac mg
t d by Pry 201 In C3J Survwa t e o ow
systems 1s a s u Y
the systems are listed:
bility to retaliate;
d h'
degradmg the mencan a
d h . . 1 t' n from the mihtary lea ers tp;
. .
fU S
lear forces an t etr ISO a 10
. '1
decapltatwn o . . nuc
facilitate bombers and crUlse mlsst es
. efrectiveness
of alr defenses, to

re ducmg
entering Amencan alr s?. ,
d t a protracted nuclear war;
degrading American abthty to con uhc NCA d the strategic forces (that1could
t' 'ty between t e
"severance of connec lVl
l its forces, or to employ t emma
ited States the capablhty to emp oy
d eny th e Un
"Soviet side" with
will substitute what Pry call s th e
For convemence s sake, we
ble of conducting a limited nuclear attack several
In Pry's opinion, the opp~nent IS capa 'k The goals of such an attack would be to
minutes prior to a massive r:ucle~r. stn e. teet the subsequent main strike or conduct
deprive the United States of tts ablhty to d~ .
period of conventional war to
enano 1s to use a
a retaliatory strike. An a terna ~~e sc d'
to resist a sudden attack. Accordmg to
d fenses and lts rea mess
. .
weaken A mencan e . .
have different charactenstlcs:
the author, those prehmmary attac s may
striking the EWS;
attack em~loying EMPdweaJ~:~trol posts and against LCCs;
attack agamst comman an
d h' .
ntry's lea ers 1p,
f th
physical destructiOn 0
~ cou .
in elements of c3.
. of sabotage operatwns agamst t e ma
- a senes
S d
· ·1 EW an
1 es for ballistic mtssl es
Destruction of radars and ~round su~~::~o~xr::Y Warning System sate~lites ~a~:
Precision Acquisition ~fVehlcle Ent~~ental United States) will leave the 'l!n~ted a.rrned
of the last six are outside of th~ contl
ble of doing this with cruise mlsstles
blind. The opponent's submannes are capa

with conventional or tactical nuclear warheads. Timely detection of such an attack is a
very difficult task.
Almost all parts of the American EWS are located on ocean shores, and submarines
may commit acts of sabotage against them. This is also true for other C 3 elements:
"The bombers in the J'Ctic rely on the reen Pine system to relay the [Emergency
Action Messagel to them by UHF after receiving it from Looking Glass or [Emergency Rocket ommunications ystem]. As noted, Looking Glass has access to
the stations through a imple node at Elkhorn, Nebraska, which could easily be
destroyed. Even if [the Emergency Rocket Communications System] survived to
deliver the [Emergency Action Message] to the Green Pine network, the network
itself could be directly attacked." 209

American expert evaluate various types of super-ElviP weapons as a seriou threat
to the Armed Forces in general and especially to their command and control systems.
According to many exp rts, an EMP attack i capabl of"pinning" i 1inutemen in their
silos, destroying bombers and launched missiles en route, and s communications with the nuclear forces completely. It is thought that the entire American East
Coast can be "covered';'by the explosion of an EMP charge at an altitude of 500 kilometers, three minutes after launching it from a submarine in the Atlantic. There are
also alternative, equally effective scenarios of EMP attack.
Americans are involved in thorough research and, wherever possible, implementation of weapons and command and control system E1 lP-hardening. Three main methods of such hardening have been discu sed:
computers, telephones and oth r communication equipment are shielded by special steel boxes known as Faraday's cages or are located deep underground;
cable lines and antennas are isolated from electronic equipment with the help of
surge arresters, i.e. devices similar to those used against lightning. (In Russia
they are called "lightning arresters." Regular lightning arresters cannot be used
against EMP weapons, so special ones are built with a very low level of inertnes ,
comparable with the exceptionaUy short duration and ste p 1 ading edge of EMP);
wide use of fiber optic technology, which i practically invulnerable to EMP weapons. In the last 10 to 15 years, a numb r of projects were under way in the nited
tates u ing fiber optic technology in command and control of MX missiles and
B-1 bomber .
h' lmplem .nting EMF-hardening is, however, very challenging. Together with the
gh cost (up to 20 percent of the hardened site's general cost), there are doubts about
th:e general effectiveness of those measures. Full-scale experiments simulating combat

220 1 IJI: Nucleal' Command,


PPoblems With Russian and u.s. IJI

conditions as closely as possible can only be carried out dur ing nuclear weapons tests,
which are currently not being undertaken by the United tates. AvaiJable simulations
are not reliable enough. (This is a true paradox of our times - banning nuclear weapons
testing prevents developing defense mechan.isms! And the most effective solution to
this problem can only be elimination of the topic itself - nuclear arms.)
Pry thinks that it is also possible to carry out a strike against th L C s of silo-based
U . ICBMs prior to the main nuclear attack. H e sees a flaw in the fact that a large
number of Minutemen and M mis iles (with even more warheads on the latter) are
t::ontrolled by a relatively small number of L C Cs. These command po ts are vulnerable to submarine attacks with conventional and low-yield nuclear charges. Sabotage
is also pas ible. ALC s may prove unreliable. There is only one ALCC per each wing
of AC. They may be incapacitated whil still on the ground or in the air by EMP
weapons. ommunical"ions betwe n AL Cs and the missiles may be disrupted due to
high altitude nuclear explosions upsetting the ionosphere, etc. ALCCs cannot stay
within the SAC wings' line of sight for a long time; they have to land periodically at
their own bases which may th mselves be destroyed .
The author also does not exclude the possibility of decapitation of the U.S. nuclear
forces as a result of the assassination of political and military leaders, along wi th wideranging sabotage against crucial elements of the command and control system s. Here
h cites a an argument the considerable attention paid in the oviet Union to perfecting t he petsnaz forces. Accordjng to his data, there were between 12,000 and 30,000
petsnaz troops as of 1990. He also mentions the "formidable experience in theU. . .R." of jamming Western radio stations (Voice of America and other ). T his experience and still existing equipment may, as mentioned in the book, be effectively used,
especially prior to a nuclear attack.
There is no need to recount all the dramatic scenarios of timely penetration into U.S.
territory by Russian saboteurs with atomic demolition munitions. Even more "dramatic" things were gamed during nuclear exercises on both sides over the last 30 odd
years . Today, nothing seems unrealistic in a world shaken by acts of international ter·
rorism. Here, we are, of course, talking not about plans by Moscow or Washington,
but about the existing potential of serious provocations from "third parties." T here·
fore, Pry's concern about timely prevention of such actions against C 3l is easily under·
standable today.
There are other sources worth mentioning here that consider potential threats to
American command and control systems. Let's quote from one of them:

"Conventional conflict also threatens the following U.S. strategic control elements
deployed abroad: low -frequency and very low -frequency radio towers for SB .
communications, SAC high-frequency radio towers for sb·ategic aircraft communi cations, overseas bomber recovery bases, bomber str.ike assessment relay stations,



t ~





por IaCl1ttte and tenders
strategic and non-strategic units: me~~;r:loan·y olther ~ate~lite constellations support
gJca , nav1gatwnal · 1 .
and communi ·
canons. Electronic and I . J
Signa s, Intelligence
war would degrade 0
trat .
-p l YS Jca attack on them during conv tl'
b. . .
. . ' eg!c nuclear ca ab T .
en wna
III ties . .. . Major command d
. P_ 1 ttles as well as conventional
an communtcatw
d . .
capaan vulnerable. The lack of
n no es m atr are also largely fix d
tions is 'd l
mo ern, protected command
WI e y seen as the greatest d f' .
posts and communicae ICtency m th th
e eater nuclear area."210

Blair also points out the relatively lows
even collateral damage to C3 1
urvtvabthty of American C3 H
t h
e ements from tt k
· e noes t at
Isrupt command and control:
a ac son nuclear forces themselves can
· attack designed to i fi.
n Ict maxunum dama
posst 1 tty that underlies the . . 1
ge on . . nuclear forces th
· .
pnnctpa perceived w k
comcJdentaliy produce extensive d
ea ness of U.S. deterrence - would
C3J l
amage to the U S
e ements would come under direct tt k b
. . command structure. Many
b b
a ac ecause f h . 1
om er, tanker, and Mt'nut
o p ysica proximity to SAC
eman ases."211

Further on, the author lists direct thre
those mentioned earlier.
ats to command and control coinciding with
. .
I would like to end this rather gloom
quote from a "salty admiral " I
1 y descnptwn on a more cheerful note H
' a sore evant t th
· ere Is a
not~ earher that each submarine tows I o e pro Iem of C3J survivability (it was
a ong antenna): "I have looked th
penscope on the USS l\li'll R
ogers and have b
h . .
roug my
mg on the doggoned wire back here " 212 een ornfted to find there are birds roostAs£
.. .
or my comment on the material d.
aii those threats to command and c t I:cussed In this section, I have only one· Tr

~~actical implementation does not ~:e: t~:tems are theoreti~ally possible. Y~t th~~;
e. Nor does the American C3 seem £
h easy whe~ lookmg at it from the other
rom t at other side to be so vulnerable.


Russian ca

Arnerican experts .
f .
on the b ·
. , vtews 0 Russian 3 survivabilit
of BJarr work ·wht. h aJ
y ptoblems are cousidered h
Ievels· 1 ·asis

c an yzes 1ts h
1 .
BJ ·. l_lg -level trategic command and low 1 ypot letlcal combat stability on two
a,lr lS somewhat harsh with the R
. c- eve! ~ommand posts.
bot') eve] H
USSl<U1 J havmg d 'd d
cause of ,;h e describes the highest level of
eel e that it is vulnerable on
cow and
uge labyrinth of underground bunke:ss~s~n a ~uclear ~ etherlands b .
tection f s suburb alone there are about 75 d
. d ccordmg to his data, in Mos o no less than several thous<Uld psi.
eep un er·ground structure with pro-



I'I'Oblems With Russian and u.s. f!



222 \ IJI: Nucleal' command, Contl'ol, Coopel'afion

Despite the existence of a well developed network of highly protected stationary
structures all over the country - according to some estimates there are 2,000 to 2,500 of
them - and permanent representation of the central authority on the periphery, the old
Russian habit of "maximal centralization" makes sure that all the command and control in the armed, and especially nuclear, forces are concentrated in a few key bunkers
in the Moscow area. The most important ones are mentioned in Blair's book, being
discussed here. The author believes that the biggest one is a structure in Ramenki that
can house up to 10,000 people and is 650 to 1,000 feet deep .
The CIA's 1978 study of protection for the Soviet high-level strategic command's
underground command posts concluded that "all fixed leadership shelters which have
been identified are vulnerable to direct attack."
But already in the 1980s, using new calculation formulas, American experts concluded that more effective weapons were required to guarantee complete destruction
of these bunkers. One cannot but be impressed by the thoroughness of these calculations, which take into account the peculiarities of the structures themselves, characteristics of missiles, nuclear charges, the soils, etc. If according to the old calculations the
diameter of the crater from a 1-megaton charge would be 651 feet, according to the
new formula it would be "only" 394 feet. This was not enough for destruction of the
bunkers, according to the Pentagon experts. In the most typical locations of Soviet
command posts - wet soft rock - only structures no deeper than 344 feet could be
destroyed. Ultimately, the United States arrived at the conclusion that it would be
difficult to incapacitate the top level of the opponent's nuclear command and control.
At the same time, Moscow continued using old formulas - on purpose, according to
Blair. According to the formulas, the threat to the central strategic command posts
was a "lethal" one. Soviet experts did not even exclude the possibility of employment
of gcavity bombs with very high explosive yields against the bunke". They assumed
that in the course of conventional war, American bombers could unexpectedly fly from
Europe to Russia and strike with these bombs. Such warheads could. according to
their calculations, destroy structures down to 1,889 feet deep.
This discrepancy between the 'esults of calculations by the two sides is typical hall
estimates of C' component smvivability. And this is no small "fmk" between optimis·
tic and pessimistic assessments. This is quite natmal because, fi'5t, the basic data is
fully classified, and, second, the price of an eno' is exceedingly high. And, as Blair
justly notes, "No model had been ve,ified expedmentally and p,oved accurate."'"
Blair then notes that the cable communication channels and antennas coming !i:ol1l
the command post stmctures axe much mo'e vulne,able than the structures theroselv"·
He lists the al,.ady familia' facto" influencing C' components - dll:ect physical de·
struction, active jamming, disturbance of the ionosphere due to nudeai
EMP, etc. Most of the cadio and satellite communication lines, including theJr lac>
tions, can be detected by foreign intelligence even in peacetime. This argument, b;.;
ever, contains a small technical inaccuracy. Blair believes that antennae transiT>l


fields do not provide accurate informatio
both the fields and th
non the location of co
able distance a
fe ra Iho transmitters are, for the sake of se mmand posts because
way rom t e p t
crecy m
cables. This is only partially tr::: an
con trolled
not just in Russia, is to avoid jamm:ause t' e mam purpose of such a ste::v "g>cound

ar~ rem~te

tluc~u:~e ~consider.

~1:~~ :::~~~~::~eD;~~i:ea:~~o~~~?Iet::~~i:yol~ki:l;;~~i~:~toa; ::i:oc::::denri;wcost~se~~

was un I e y h
a Ions
. .
rom a. survivmg bunker would h ave b een perm • tlowever, t at all commu mcahons
. . '
air also analyzes the c t , b k
anen y suppressed ."2ls
. Bl
en er s ac up a d
mcluding mobile command posts wi'th
. n auxi Iary command and control po t
vanous types ofb ·
s s,
air orne command posts Th
.. .
e key role b l
. "
e aut or cnbctzes the h hl
e ongs to
I ernatwn routme in peacetime .
ff' .
m ars y for their outdated fleet
, Insu IC1ent crew t · ·

rammg, use fof regular civilian
airports, etc.: As a rule, virtually all them ob'l
I e b ac kup com
comman an control system were kept on a low level f l ponents o the Soviet nucl ear
d d
to get ready. In consequence they were 1
o a ert and required many hours
vu nera e to dest t' ·
aws m these elements of R . •
rue Ion m a surprise attack "216
ussia s command d
consi erable degree of their equival t . h U ~n contra system, also typical to a
en s m t e mted St t
e wrong to conclude that th
a es, cannot be denied· yet it
ey are tota ly 1
• '
ld b
enever possible, they are bein .
d vu nera e an lack combat readiness
g Improve crews
b .
rna e a certam contribution to the 1' bT
are emg tramed, and they do
Blair, along with his ow
.re Ia IIty of the whole system.
n negative assessment £
. .
~ mencan experts on the survivabilit of th , r~ ers to t h e ~pmwn
of the majority
ties were a source of major Soviet disco~fort e ~: e~els .ofSovie: C3: "The uncertainalso b~ ac~nowledged, however. In 1990 US e flip side of this uncertainty should
could mflict decisive damage to S . t f' ' d . . planners had reasonable doubts they
ovie Ixe or relo t bl
ower levels ofSRF c
d d
ca a e command targets "21 7
amman an control
t mks that in 1990 if a £ d
are a so severely criticized by Blair h
ew ozen Amen
. '1 l
'w o
h .
~gmn,t the standard command post' f t~an·~':' es aunched an attack 'pecifically
ave ~een able to neutralize the main oart ef s~o~ as~d ICBM regiments, they would
With considerable knowl d
h p o t. e oviet ICBMs.
and control at this level - m:b~le, t e audthor hsts. all the additional types of command
d d •
I e groun and heh
t d. . .
un ant cable networks with' d 1
cop er IVISIOn command posts , "resyste
m ep oyment areas e 1
ms o other services and institutions t H d , mp oyment of communication
11e syst
h owever that
. em as a whole is vulnerable H ' •'de c. . he raws the cone1uswn,
at th s 1eve are the regimental UKP· ( ISifiI .ea Is t at the b asis
· of command and control
um ttstrovannyy ko
Pt _. post ' the equivalent of Amcrican LCC . "If hmo~ nyy punkt - 'tandru-d com.
va:~ected ~potent threat to the Soviet ICBM£ s. b t at" _so, then the United States
of the laun_ch control centers
't could have desttoyed the




hi ghdlevel of ~KP p~otectwn
. - about 6 000 psi - two
D- 5despite
A three-stage
. f
ea s could mcapaCitate each of them
scenano o nu c1ear war IS
. d escnbed
as optimal.

Pl'oblems With Russ/an and u.s. CS


I 225

1 C': Nucleal' command, control, Coopel'afion

Stage One- an attack on all of the UKPs (L s). It would take only 222 nuclear
warheads to deprive up to 80 percent of oviet missiles of their main communications
with the center through the UKPs. If the effectivenes of the strike is calculated, as it is
often done, according to the proportion of used (friendly) and neutralized (th
opponents) warheads, it is a very alluring 1-to-23 (1).
Stage Two - an almost immediate attack again t the silos themselves. Here this pro·
portion is in favor of the United States. Put together, the proportion becomes
even more dramatic for both stages: 1-28- since some of the surviving UKPs will no
longer have most of their missiles.
tage Three - "finishing off" the surviving UKPs and missiles with strategic bombers within 10 hours after the first two stages. It is thought that their command and
control cannot be restored during that time.
One tends to be too overwhelmed by such a scenario to argue against it, but here I
try. unlike the American LCCs, the crew of one UKP can launch (by radio) all the
missiles in a division. This is always checked during exercises. Second, the author
mentions Perimetr only in passing. Yet, within 40 minutes at the most, it will be abl,e to
launch all the remaining ICBMs. Third, the system of autonomous launches performed
by special crews directly from the ICBM silos will be 3Ctivated. Any surviving missile
division mobile command posts will also be used. There are other launching alternatives; it makes no sense to list all of them here. And, finally, Blair reviews only the
LUA ecenario, even though it probably will not take place, and we will have to deal

the Soviets consciously maintained th'
the name of negative control:
lS patrollmg system, sacrificing surv1Vab1hty
.. m

"Soviet com men t ators f requently voiced th .
virtue of dispensing with unlock devices o err concern that the United States b

:~~~~~: t~eapon'


babnce too f"' in the di<ection of po,itive
at"""· h•d tip,.,d
Sovlets took the opposite tack and lmpose
d stnct
. c et expense
of safeguards . The
approach that created add't'
SSBN s, an
1 lOna ur ens on theirsystem of posltlve
. . over
. .
. described
. system of regul ar commumcatw
oca wns oes mcrease th e1r
. vu l nerab1ht
· n sesswns that reveal su b mannes'
l t
ers from above, which ' accord'mg to Bl<Ur
Y: create
usslan boats. cannot launch w'th
' out or·
p. oyment.
In particular , the m11
'l'tary 1ead ershl
' .
s a .senes of problems in th e1r
. em.
Issumg an order to a submarine .c .c
f ~ may m some cases consciously del
, wr lear o mlstak
en a.ctwns by the submarine after
commumcatwns disappear. But such a del
theI order
ay can result m the submarine not r ecervmg
. .
r when the time co mes.
n lght of such a cautious approach U S
. .
~nd control as reasonably hi h ,Bl ... speclahsts
Vlew the stability ofSSBN comtlon with submarines is also mai:taine;lro~ates that near native shores, communica-


through buoys, acoustical devices surf , h' top of al.l by the methods listed above
s lps, escortmg non-missile submarines a d'
even underwater cables. From th,
th elr
. srlghtly detectable antennae and
r .
~h eIf, t h e submarines periodically raise
ment by the former Navy commander :~e~~:e~r ~~s. He me.ntions the following state,
m. Sergei Gorshkov:

with a LOW scenario.
Thus, it is impossible to consider the case of Russian ICBM command and control
as so
drawn his conclusion about the unreliability of the Soviet stationary mis·
siles' command and control systems, Blair analyses the potential of communications
with mobile ICBMs. He notes their important role tl they are deployed to the field in
good time, and justly points to certain difficulties in communicating with them when
they are deployed. Further, he stresses the high launch readiness of these I CBMs when
at their permanent basee using the Krona systems. Blair also describes possible meth·
ods of command and control for rail-mobile ICBMs.
A few words regarding the American evaluation of the Soviet SSBN command anO
control systems: Blair thinks that a low degree of SSBN readiness - few boats are OP
combat patrol in peacetime - can be explained by the desire to maintain stable commu·
nications with them as well as rigid centralized control from Moscow. When submerged
on patrol in the remote waters of the Northern Atlantic and by Greenland's shores.
they continuously receive ELF control signals from the Kola Peninsula. When• el
this signal disappears, as well as when reception is good, SSBNs surface twice a daY•
every day, for two-way communication with the center, mostly by short-wave
satellite channels. American experts feel that even though this compromises ta '


"Th'IS very Important
moment of sub manne
. control
measures and actions aimed at im rovin
. ..
can reqmre many complex
ated launch of additional com p. . g rebabrbty of the signal's passage: accelermumcatlOn sat ll't . d 1
troland relay devices at sea bene th th
e I es, . ep oyment of additional cond h'
e water and m th . d
' .
e alr; eployment of comman s lps; mvolvement of cr'vl'l d'
t'rme mtervals
10 commun
for submarine t .
rca Ions centers; and reduction of
o nse near the surface f,or rad'IO communications. "220

that:~~ ~tty fo~



concludes that severa1' 1'f not any smgle
f h
the command and control
o t ose
can provide
ls actor lS a powerful deterrent l'nfl
s m case of a dtrect attack . He feels
enou h
uence upon U S d . .
reassure Soviet expe t
. . eclSlon-makers, while it is
notTh 1g to
e atter opm'
. b
r s.
concerned a solutely correct. Moscow's milit
. .
about the rnsufficient reliabilit f
ary leadershtp " seriously
of SNF, which considerably l::t a;mmand .and control for the sea-based
alr s general conclusion regarding th
s .1
e survlva lhty of U.S. and Sov1e
. t nuc1ear com _





I C': Nuclear Command, Control, Cooperation
Pl'obtems with RUBS/an and U.S. CU / 227

. . . " om mand and control
d f 1990 i pessunlshc:
mand and control systems ~t the e~ ~
investments to protect them. In the U. .
remained vulnerable despite lUge
I di rupted by the effects of a
. -functions coul.d have been severe y .
and ems_
ovtet cases t h eu
few hundred weapons at most. " 221
th gbt of my American colleague - t hat t h.lS
This is tru to some degree. Th next . o~ L W postUl·e - is also correct. But, of
b ·d t mbrace t11e
1 ·
circumstance pushes bot Sl es .o e d naturalJy the author arrives at the cone u ton
an readmess
essary _ global:tero alert.
cours e, this j not the
. best. solutiOn,
IS nee
that a major r ductlOn of nu ear . . at resolve the who! problem.
This is a good measure but It does n .
. ments of both Russian and U. . C
. h
t d Amencan a se s
· t
Let us review agam t e quo e
.:roe trying to decapitate t em I oo
k , b tt at . e same u

sys ems. They are both wea
. 1 , L ·! e · assessments are logical
. · I only remams lO
. k With all their amblva ence, t 1es
-· b te to nuclear deterrence.
ns y.
d 'd control systems contrr u
. th ·'
erious danger threatenmg e
determine how mucll comman .at
tl · ·(datively new, u very
" " t · 41·
I'll also menttOn
ano 'ler r
" _ that gives the fourt 'l
" omputer warrare
h ' 0l
systems of nuclear
. £ rm of hidden m 'litary competlttOn, w JC 1
Tbis is a very speoalized, co~plex o
Russian military computer Clen'bl t
·tam counte.rmea ur es.
ertheless is su ceptl e o cer
. l . thi ru·ea behind the West:
. l1ave pru'd altention to a certam ag m

p~w~rs -


. d he dangerTof the
"The 1 adino- nations have long ago recogmze
d and control sy 'tems. n
war in thei.r automated comman
l , ft are for the armed fo.rces. ln
op so
w in d velopmenl sm
1986 .
Pentagon ordere t 1e .
TR- . ha
b en
- bl e soft w ar proFranee, t 1e progr·ammmg languag L . ·r· d b obtaining re Ja
c • h workareJuStl 1e
. c
Substant ial allocations JOT Sll
. b
b etc. .. . Because new m~orinst
tection for military systems aga .
d d . to the work of com man and
b ·
dly m.tro uc· m
mation technologies are mg rap~ .
ecial agency (Th Defense Infor. .
. th
tmil tary, a new sp <
control organtzatmns Ill e . .
development an con )
. ated· it supervises so
mation System Agen y was Cle
t'ty has functioned in the Pentafi . omputei ' ecur
puter acquisitions. The enter_ Ot
d' . . variou aspects of using non-let 1a
1981 filitary theonsts ar Jscussillg
gon smce . ..c . ation weapons .m ml'I'ltary
- conflicts.":m
. t1u·s directio.n
. ts
. t akin g nee ssary steps m
... ld think that Russian leadership
ne snou


as well .
. .
f thi,ection' u rv iva brrty
T 0 fCJ . 1•5 abil·
Let us get back to tlle que~tlon JJllt~" ~: strive fortotal, 100 p r ents uM•Ievd
P 'bl tl'lere ~s no so uwon
. . a1 antltatlve
a solution? - ossi y, . 'f
ble to come up with a mm1m qu
'th cJQse
. ty But there is a solutwn t we are a
Th . ha to be done WI

6or reliable m utual deterr nee. ·
necessary to pwvrde . .
I . wea ons themselves.
. C' is .,.rl
reference to the capabilt_tles of nuc ear CJ ~ of such a nature that protectmg
As shown in this sectlon, threats to

difficult and very co tly. Limiting d velopment and teeting of new types of anti-C' capabilities is n ce sary but Catmot b a panacea, because attempting to stop or even slow
technical progress is impossible. This competition between offense and defense cm continue ir1definitely, with fll1iu,tified spending and periodic cris., in strategic 'tability.
Evidendy, the re,olution to this problem lies in a different area. We need to prove
the xistence of a limit that cannot be overcome by any technical advantage of one side
without the risk of punishment for the attempt to use such an advantage. It is a mechanism similar to th idea of" prings" presented in Chapter 3. If this goalie achieved,
ind ud ing development of new means of attack, will continue at a
natural pace without artificial acceleration, which would no longer make any sense.
That should provide solid strategic stability.



Detargeting, Combat Readiness and Strategic Postures

The agreement between former presidents Bill Clinton and Boris Yeltsin about
detargeting of strategic missiles was one of the first attempts to strengthen nuclear
security by means of commmd and control. Without diminishing the political significance of this initiative, we should note its particular internal contradictions.
On the one hand, detargeting of missile attempts to reduce the danger of accidental
or unauthorized launc4; that is, to increase the effectiveness of negative control. This
is the main aspect of detargeting.
Th econd goal of t hi initiative is to reduce mutual fear of an enemy's surprise
attack. Implemen tation of this or that detargeting scenario hould in principle, increase the time for bringing mi sil s to full launch readin ss. Today, this time is
about two to three minutes even for ICB Is; depending on the detargeting scenario
it will increase to dozen, of minutes, hour or even day . Yet, without diminishing
the positive 'ignificance of th i tirn buffe,-, one has to consider the potential temptation
crisis.for one side to beat its opponent by w·gently regen rating combat readiness in a
The paraclox is that becau,. of thi, peculiarity of detargeting, today', "hair trigger"
situation looks the most logical and reliable. The deeper the reductions in combat readiness (from the point of view of the time it would take to get back to it), the harder it
becom s to provide for the requirements of positive control.
The problem of reducing the combat readiness of strategic forces is directly related
to the concept' of their hypothetical use. Today·, official sources and academic studie,
"' the following classification of potential response 'cenarios by the attacked sid"'
L Wand LUA, a' well DSS (delayed eecond etrike). The difference between LUA
•nd Dss is that, in the first case, the retaliatory strike i, conducted as soon as po,.ible,
"en While the opponent's attack is continuing, while in DSS the retaliation takee place
after the enemy's attack is over and analysis of the situation has been conducted .
ater, We will be able to see how detargeting and other mea,ures for reducing combat
l'eadine s are correlated to the postures of strategic forces' employment.


Problems with Russian and U.S. C' 1 229
228 \ t?: Nuclear command, contl'ol, coopel'afjon

doubt the roost
. 1 situation, W1thout any
' .
A we h ave see n '
sures· t a 1S,
aid to negative contra mea
' .
wever also evident t at
attention should be p .d nts with nuclear weapons. It 1S, ho h ld be implemented
h measures s au
t revent any accl e
su.reh~ ot~e broad context of strategic stabb1 1ty sue the diametrically opposite requuew1t m
ble balance etween
ithout upsettmg a reasona
d ositive control.
he substance of ro1htary
official unclassified on t
U .t d States. Only
roents of negatlve an p
Unfortunately, there are n~
. l roented in Russ1a and the me
t' g vanants 1rop e
and technical d etarge m
e available, such as:
. f and general statements ar
very b ne
k t p ces stated on
. hief of the StrategK Roc e or '
"Col Gen. Igor Sergeev, commander m.c f th Jan 14 1994 agreement to detarget
· 1
tatton o e
· '
May 30' 1994 (completed l~P e~e~
·n not lift off in case of accidentallaunc '"~2-3
. '1 )· 'Russtan mtsstles Wl
d from the missiles' gUl ance com
all strategic mtss1 es .
cause target coordinates have been remove

made sirrdar statements.
olitical and military leaders have
. d 'tn the last several year (pnAmencan P
. th t h ve appeare
d · h.
bl'1shed in 199 5) were use 1J1 t 15
cations on detargetmg a a
ome pu
1 ar Forces, pu

aril Blair's Global Zero Alert Jo.r ttC ~
d below are taken frmn tlus sourc ' ea
. ll all the scenanos revtewe
" for the most part hypom .y
sectwn. Practlca y
h "Russian side's commentary,
mmand and
'ed by t e
· 1 f Russ1an co
them lS accompam t forget that Blair analyzes the p~ten~1a o open information about
thetical. Let us no
roes to detargeting, base on yon
ver are probably
. that· "The two systems, howe . : . .
control systems, when 1t ~o
3 in the United States, fauly assummg
'll .strate the detargeting poss1b1htles on
h U S system can 1 u
similar enough that t e · ·
· 'l d targetmg .
. d "224
1 . t of strateg1c m1SS1 e e
s1 es .
1 t tial techmca vanan s
e severa po en
f h
"fii ht mission is one o t em.
ented for its strategtc
ere ar . "
bat watch W1th zlero d t~ t this variant has actually been 1mplde~ t the official stateR ia has dec are
. l
ent Accor mg 0
. ~ts in accordance with the presidentd1a agr~:~"ze~o" flight mission since May '
ffilSSl e
. ICBMs have been on uty Wl
ment all Russlan
. everal
d mobile ontams
. l BMs both ilo.-basedan
,,' '·ilealltherest
Each computer ab oar·d Russtan
'd . d' "technological." or " zero ' wo . ICBNls
f them 1s cons1 ere
t ll Russ1an
flight missio~s. . ne o eforeimpleroenting the m~nt~oned agre~~1e~ ,' ~i ht mission ~~~as
are com bat mlSSlons. B f th "contbat" fligb nusslons. The zer~ l t~ combat flight
were on dul-y with o~e o. e .cal i.n: ectiOJ1S. When on duty W1t 1 e ntrol chaO'
only used during penodic tech~l ·d ~om General taff command an~l ~~ed for it bY
""';ssion. receiving a reallaunc 1 OI her . ile toward a specific target esta lhS fa rnissilt
• I
ch of eac l1.1lSS
. l· unc o
nels meant auto.matlC aun
nt plan. This automatic a .
. )
mnbat erop oyme
b t ad1lless e
the main (acttve
c b
l t to the highest stage of com a re
was possible if it had been roug 1

In case it became necessary to launch a missile toward a different target, established
by a flight mission also stored in the on-board computer, the number of the new combat
plan would have to be included in the launch order. Any of those alternatives required
no longer than 10 to 15 seconds for reverse (combat) retargeting of all the missiles.
Now, with the "zero" flight mission scenario implemented, all listed technical possibilities for retargeting have been preserved. Thus, the level of positive control - or, in
other words, combat readiness of the Russian SRF -has not in fact been reduced.
Detargeting is a very small addition to the existing reliable system of negative control. Due to such powerful protection, the probability of any accidental launch is very
small. The chance of giving a false launch order with a combat flight mission to an
I BM i also extremely small and comparable to the probability of a false signal that
could switch the missile from a zero to a combat flight mission.
During the Cold War, both the Soviet Union and the United States chose LOW to
be the main posture for ICBM employment. Within this framework, both sides were
waging a virtual war for seconds trying to beat each other "to the punch" in a future
It is, however, doubtful that these few seconds could play a major role in providing
for LOW. At least, it did not work for the Soviet Union when American Pershings
were deployed in Ger111.any. This fact may have influenced the Soviet leadership's decision to eliminate the newest SS- 20 missiles .
It is clear that detargeting with a "zero" flight mission has more of a political rather
than a military/strategic meaning. Today, mutual targeting still exists for all practical
purposes. Neither side can check what combat flight missions are - or are not - stored
in the opposing side's ICBM computers. Retargeting to combat flight missions from
the "zero" missions may be performed extremely quickly, upon one order from the
General Staff. The American side probably has the same or equivalent retargeting
ability. Thus, at least from the technological and operational points of view, both nuclear
superpowers are able to keep their command and control systems at the "hair trigger"
level. A number of sources confirm the symbolic character of detargeting. 225
Should an accidental or unauthorized launch happen despite all the reliable safety
measures, the missile will start toward one of the planned targets (identified as the
"main" one in each list of targets aboard a missile). Switching from a "zero" to a "combat" flight mission will occur automatically when the launch begins, because the mis sile cannot fly "nowhere." The probability of such a launch order appearing by error
will not depend upon keeping the missile on duty with a "zero' flight .
To avoid an accidental strike against the "programmed," or any other, target, a different scenario of detargeting - the so-called "oceanic lightning rod" - may be used . In
t?is case every missile should be targeted in peacetime at a non-American/non-Rus Stan main target that can be purely nominal, such as a point in the ocean. STRATCOM
ill:\d the Russian General Staff may easily and responsibly carry out this main targets
rept·o grammmg.

230 1 IJI: Nuclear Command,


PI'Dblem8 With

Two questions need to be addressed. First, what is the difference between the Russian and the U.S. on-board ICBM computers regarding the technical (computer) time
needed to switch from a nominal flight mission to combat one, especially when there is
a considerable distance between the two, such as one target being in an ocean and the
other on a continent? And second, which levels of command and control will participate, during a crisis, in issuing orders to reverse the mission back to a combat target?
This question is important because of the contribution that higher and intermediate
level command posts make to the overall time period for retargeting.
There is no official data on the first question, either for Russian or for American
missiles. It is possible that retargeting Russian missiles from "oceanic" targets to "combat" ones will take just as much time as in the 'zero" flight mission scenario. As for the
second question, it is not crucial: the time required to transmit the order (no more than
one minute) is much shorter than the time period for retargeting. For both sides, general retargeting time will be mostly defined by the missiles' computer time.
If one side's response time differs from that of the other even by a few minutes, then
the side which is "late" will find itself, for all practical purposes, in a state of a DSS.
Therefore, it is important to know how the command and control system will be able to
provide for retargeting and launching of missiles under such conditions.
The probability that an order will be transmitted from the top depends on the availability of invulnerable reserve elements in the command and control system, such as the
Emergency Rocket Communications System Perimetr. As mentioned, an advantage of
the Russian version of the system is its ability to transmit the order "aim and launch"
(as a single order) from the General Staff to the ICBM launchers immediately, bypassing all intermediate and lower command centers. If the Russian missiles, surviving an
enemy strike, receive such an order, they will be automatically targeted and launched.
In the Minuteman system, orders for retargeting and launching are transmitted not
directly to the missile launcher, but via LCCs. This would have a negative effect on the
massiveness of the American retaliatory strike since a part of the total number ofLCCs
may be destroyed in a Russian attack. This is why, in certain proposed American
detargeting variants, the timely issuing by LCCs of an order to the missiles for combat
retargeting is not excluded in a crisis situation. Such a proposal, however seems q uestionable because of its somewhat provocative character.
The main conclusion regarding the "oceanic lightning rod' is that when it is used.
the danger of destruction is reduced for real targets in case of an accidental launch ..At
the same time, the sides will be a step closer to a posture of LUA, since the alterna:ove
becomes more and more problematic due to increased time needed for retargeting.
Apparently, there is no need to fear abandoning the LOW posture, if, of course, opportunities for retaliation after an attack have been preserved. The "pure" LOW~;~
ture is not stable and is dangerous because the national leadership. ca~ ~ever be eal
percent sure that their decision to start a nuclear counterattack is JUStified by a r
nuclear attack, and not by an error or a breakdown of the warning systems.

RU88/IIIIIIIItl 11.8. (JI I 281
Other, more radical changes I·n th
e command d
erasmg all fhght missions }rom com uter
. an control system
makes ICBMs incapable of a th ~ d memon~s, except nominal, o ~~y Provide for
e1s of command and c t 1 u ouze automatic retargeting and ceamc ones. This
on ro must p ti ·
now th h· h
process. Depending on the levels o ar Cipate m. the technical chain of the . lg er l~vtrol- a regiment in R
. ( U S f those posts m the structure of c
retarg tu'lg
ussia, or
d. . . .
ommand d
an army in Ru sia (wi . h
. .'
'or a IVIswn In Russia (aU
an conness changes which mng m tthe Unhited.States)- the depth of reduction;~· quabdron), or
eans at t e time (h
'"''com at r d'
readiness can chal1ge too
ours, ays) needed tog t ba k t
ea J ·
o c0.mbat
There are two crucial questions here· the s
ness, ~nd the survivability of participa~ing 1i:::~ of~estonng complete combat readiThe difference between R
n t e command and con ....01
ussian an Am ·
m t~e "zero" flight mission scenario ma:;:c:;;. poten.tials here, which is gr ater tha~
versial. This is explained by h' t . ' l
. I~ ~ersiOn of detargeting mor cont
IS onca pecuhant
. h
tob 'ld I~ m t e pnnciples of the systems'
arc It~cture; it is practically impossible t
essentially similar.
ore UI t ese systems anew and make them

The differences between the ti'mes co b . .
. 'I es b ack to combat
d 1< r nngmg th e l11ISSI
ness WI'11 be measured b h
Y ours an days de
rea Ib b,l 1pe~ mg on the degree of reduction in
combat readiness. In this case it l·s
pro a y ess Im
retargetmg time periods for both si'd th
por ant to etermine the concrete
es an to analyz ·
· ·
quences of the unavoidable dif£
. e, m pnnCip1e, the possible conseF'
erences measured m
Irst of all, as mentioned the
sue arge absolute values.
1 d
very1acto agr t d'ffi
.ea s to a growing temptation to get ah d f h ea er I erence m the response time
ea o t e opp
t ·
mg a cnsis. Besides, the survivabilit f
. . . onen m regenerating forces durtrol systems is very important he
YI od pdartiCipatmg elements in command and con1' h h
re. n ee a lo
. d f .
Is t e SNF combat readiness (ho
d '
ng peno o time needed to re-estab.
urs or ays) rna
certam conditions, to conduct a quick strike b co y p~ovo e one of the parties, under
~ey. command and control points, where they nventi,ona1 or ~uclear weapons against
Ity Is stored. When all flight path h
b opponent s techmcal retargeting capabil IC
r .
s ave een rem
egimental and divisional command
ove rom BMs and are stored at
subs.tantially smaller than in the cases o~~s~s, the. nu~ber of such key points becomes
ers (I.e., "zero" flight path or "o
. " fle. ahrgetmg Implemented directly in a111aunch In this co
. ,
ceamc Ig t path).
p· .
ntext, Russia s security will be 1
bIrst, In the American system, the remote int::~ ro . ust than that of the United States.
y the launch command posts is done more . ~~twn scenarios for the missiles
;and P~sts are less vulnerable to conventio qUic y than In Russ~a. Second, U.S. cornan terntory. Third, the "insurance" 1 nfahl wReapo~s than their equivalents on Rusnegat d ·
ro e o t e u
p, .
o d e In this case, in as much as this
ssian enmetr subsystem would be
o; t~:t~ target and launch, not to install as~;t:;;:~st~;l:t c~able of trans~itting the short
CBM on-board computer F' ll
g P grampropermtothememory
.. and Russian nuclear forces basi~na ~:ne must remember the asymmetry of the
ere are many more land-based ICBMs in

232 1 C': Nucteal' Command, Conll'ol, Coopel'atlon
Pl'oblems With

the Russian strategic forces than in the United States, where SSBNs play the major role.
Some analysts suggest that the effectiveness of the latter variant be increased by
organizing permanent, ongoing, mutual on-site inspections to check for fulfillment of a
detargeting agreement. This idea has the right to exist, even though it is quite evident
that, from purely technical point of view, detargeting control is extremely difficult.
But in the long term, technical details are not that important; the whole issue can, morally and ethically, be seen in light of the well-known problem of hostage taking. These
inspections cannot become a reliable tool to protect against the inspected side urgently
retargeting its missiles for combat missions. Nevertheless, the goal of monitoring and
control is crucial in any detargeting scenario.
In this regard, it makes sense to study the proposal for cooperative development of a
unified automated system of operation and control for Russian and American nuclear
weapons. Certain preliminary sketches for this system have already been worked out
by the Impuls Corp. Those preliminary studies substantiate the need and the potential
for creating such a unified technical complex that would provide permanent and reliable control over the state and degree of combat readiness of the "opponent's" nuclear
weapons, but at the same time would not limit freedom of action for either side. According to Russian experts, this system would make a major difference in preventing
nuclear accidents.
It is clear that scenarios in which the missiles themselves are stripped of their ability
to retarget, and this ability is transferred to command posts, take both sides further
away from the LOW posture. One can also propose a variant whereby parts of the
targeting devices themselves are removed from the missiles and stored at the command posts of regiments, divisions, etc. In this case, missiles cannot launch at all, so
protection from accidental launch is total. The important problems would be: Where
will the removed devices be stored? How to combine protection and survivability of
those storage structures? And how much time it will take to physically install the devices back aboard all the missiles?
In general, this approach is equivalent to other methods involving removal of any
command and control device from a missile (a receiver, for example) or even a part of a
missile itself (part of an engine, etc.). In this connection, the unilateral suggestion by
President George H . W . Bush in October 1991 is worth mentioning: Minutemen cre\~S
enter each silo and insert a special safety pin into the engines' mechanisms. This physically prevents the missiles from launching. To reverse, crews re- enter the silos and
remove the safety pins.
Such scenarios for detargeting strategic missiles are not fundamentally different ~ ~
analogous measures with the weapons themselves (removing warheads, etc. ) And tt
. .
. h. b k niakes. ga
not accrdental that Blarr, w en revrewmg all these alternatives m rs oo ,
seamless transition from the detargeting problem to the essential proble~ of
the weapons' combat readiness. Detargetlng and other means of reducmg rea I ~itll
cannot be seen as effective measures for improving strategic stability without re a


Russian and u.s. C'



them to. the aspects of the hypothetical em
In this c~nnectwn, we need to review again
dp!oyment of strategic forces
posture, which is implemented th
. , an m greater detail, th SNF .
Embracing a LOW
. roug vanous aspects of C3J.
strategy IS dangerous
I' .
pulsive response to EWS . fi
an unre rabrle, with its u
immediate "lau h
~~ormatiOn, the response that can be
navor ably imnc on warnmg " A m .
expressed onl
remember the rigid time limit Uust a f::::nc:rtamty is present here, especial{y ;; :n
regarding the feasibility of this postu
mfu es to make a decision) and skept ' . e
Th ·
re, even rom a
h .
Is study deals exclusively with C3
pure y tee meal point of view
lplro ems: so the fourth part of nuclear c .
mand and control - "intelligence"
' as we as the frfth
om'd f.
sr eo rts framework and are barely discussed It d one - computers," remain outf .
oes not, however, mean that th
have less significance for the cant 'b t'
b 'I·
n u wn o comm d d
grc sta I Ity. These two parts require seriou .
an an control systems to stratethe context of this study's c 1 .
s mdependent research. Still they fr't . t
one uswns and
suggestiOns, mcluding its methodological
Under "intelligence" in C4I we
r ·
mean, rrst the EWS I · f1
efIectrveness of the command and
t 1
. ts m uence in assessing the
con ro system as
h 1 ·
of rts re1rability when making at' 1
a w o e Is reflected in expectation
Ime y report to the N CA f
attac underway. Without analyzing thi.
o an enemy's nuclear missile
s pro em m de th 1
proach toth Is assessment 22 6 In A M del
p ' et us note just one ap
such a characteristic of EWS a B o. of the f!JJects of Warning on Stability Blair useb ..
s ayesran updatm f t k
pro abrhty of detection. After a stat' t ' 1 . lg ~ a tac model expectations i e the
rs rca simu at
f d 'ffi
' . .
at a general conclusion regarding the co 1 .
ron o . I erent scenarios, he arrives
mp exrty and ambrvalence of EWS
"The main i l' ·
mp rcatwn that emerges from lhe B : .
drawn in a perfectly logical ma
. ayeslclll model IS that conclusions
nner rom Jncommg tacti l . r
even when the warning s t
ca tn,orma tlOn may be wrong
ys em perwrm to htgh stand d
posrtrve control failure (du t . ff' .
ar s. ... 1 result may be a
e o msu rctent conftdence th
at an attack IS under way)
or a negative control failure (d t
ue o overco tdenc )." -!7

An analysis of the EWS £
dent! · ·
actor may be conducted t
y, Without coordinating it wr'th th
o a consrderable degree indepen control
e assessment f th

mentioned. One way r's t . t d
o o er aspects of command and
ab I.l.tty systems
om ro uce forth
k f ·
1 0 To·
working positively into the
I ,
e sa eo srmplrcrty, the prob. · his
assessment 0 f C3J (C4J)
. corresponds better with th " genera
· · .
as a value of
e pessimistic" ap
h f
intr d t e attack. But if we want to a d ff' . I proac o a potential attacker to
o uce th
' n su rcrent y tru t EWS
e estimated probability of I'd t'f .
assessment, we can
-·~ete r ·
en I ymg t e att k ·
Into the general connectiv:lty graph Th
h ac
as any other mput pain ut even with such a Io . 1
. .
e met od remams the same.
g 1.0, and more than that,g~:h :~:us~pt~~n as the probab~lity of EWS functioning bermu aneous assumption that the leadership would


Problems With Russ111n 8lld u.s. C'

I 235

234 \ C': NuciBBI' Command, Confl'ol, Cooperarton

It seems at first that each posture bas both st bil' .
on the
of mng and destabilizing elements
notice, though, that he
whatever is cheap"'. I;

a out a smaU sc 1 f
. belong 1~o d 1'f'
r of
on targets), for L W the
(for example, a
not that unportant (tt is super redundant). Th dest b'li .t magmtud f the strike is
n:ore ~b tract one - it is the unpredictability of h
a t zm~ moment here is a much
sttuattOn. In the first ca we may discuss the "reu~an rea~hon to a uniquely re sful
of deterrence, tability, etc.)· in the s cond . . . al meanmg of some value (ind i.cator
I .
. .
case 1t t very hard t
l l .
e cone uston that lt l S easier to "calc I t " th L
o ca cu ate. Thts leads to
L W Tl . . .
postur q
ti .
. . us ts unportant considering the go l· f d'
' uan tattvely, than the
a. m mg a reasonable minimum of strateglc offen ive forces.

~"; t~e choice should be really mad

by all means, make a decision within the established time period, the problem in supporting the LOW posture does not get easier- the tim allocated for all operational
elements is too short. It seems that after all these arguments, the LOW posture should
be cast off, especially if alternative LUA and DSS postures are able to provide reliable

~::r ~otto


deterrence by themselves.
It is not, however, so simple. It is impossible to exclude the LOW posture physically. If all technical elements of the EWS remain in place (satellites, radars, computer centere, etc.), the poseibility oheporting to the center also remains in place. To
remove reporting altogether will be equal to depriving a human being of his eyes. If he
gets hit, he will not even know who is hitting him. The goal of identifying the aggressor remains crucial.
The only solution for this situation is using the mentioned dual approach - that is,
depending on which side is making a forecast. The potential victim will not conduct a
"real" LOW due to the presence of reliable insurance (potential for LUA or DSS).
But the potential aggressor will never believe it, because he knows that the opponent
possesses an EWS. Quantitative assessment of the effectiveness of deterrence (in one
specifically reviewed direction) will vary- the potential aggressor will make it higher
and more redundant.
So, all the potential postures of nuclear weapons employment remain. A reasonably
balanced way of spending is needed to provide for them.
Analyzing both LOW and LUA (DSS) postures on the basis of their stabilizing or
destabilizing influence, we cannot help noting advantages and disadvantages in both
of them. Some experts and officials prefer LOW because it realizes a much greater
part of the nude'"' potential, wd therefore allows for certain reserves in the course of
reductions in initial levels of strategic offensive forces. The supporters of this posture
also add that there is no need to spend a lot of resources to increase the survivability of
forces and command and control systems.
But significant expense in this case will be required to improve the warning sy terns.
We saw that more than half of the former Soviet land-based EWS radars are locatec:l
outside Russia. Some experts express general doubts about the possibility of creating a
reliable EWS that can detect the beginning of an attack from all potential nuclear weap·
ons locations -"" Still this is notthe main disadvwtage of the LOW posture. The main
destabilizing factor in this posture is the necessity for the leadership to make a unique,
highly-unusual decision to use nuclear weapons on the basis of data coming from tech·
nical sources and under the most severe time shortage - virtually a few minutes.
As for a LUA postore, the decision to condoct retaliation after establishing the 0




of a specific attack is highly justified. Herein lies the permanently stabilizing
the LUA postore. The opponents of LUA argue, though, that mother
element is present here: low retaliatory power or even its complete failure in 0case
commwd and control system's decapitation. Accordingly, reliance on this P '"-'' " ' '
slow down the pace of reductions of strategic offensive forces.



disadvantages~~~ ~s

::a~ retah~tion

If it is impossible to exclude one of the post
concrete and practical goal We
f. d ul re a tog.ether , how to plan their use is a
. .
can m a c ear stra1ghtft
mam act1vtty, planned for im l
_ . .
orwal· sol utwn h ere: the
P ementat10n 111 case of a · · h 1
acttons m the form ofL
or DS . Tl11s
. s h auld b thcns ts, ·s ou
· d become
. retaliatOP'
combat plans of the strategic force '
e mam tntent.lon wntten in the
s comman posts Th t f
tam groupmg of the nuclear triad top
"d £ ef£ . . a ' o course, requtres a cerwork ofL A (
rovt e or ecttve detenence within the frame . h as y t mad a
either the nited tates noi· ussta
0 ff" · l
gen raJ adherenc to LUA (
) I l k .
rcta statements about
· t oo s )j ke both nu I
consider L W their mainstay Th'
c ear superpowers continue to
1s may certamly bee 1 · d b
· · ·
t10ns of the performance of the'.

xp rune Y pessumsbc estimau own nuc1ear forces and 3 d ..
Tl .
11S approach, however, dates back t th
ld \)
uttng retaliatory actions.
day. As of today negative cor1trol . ob ~ ol
ar and IS not relevant forth present
lS 0 VIOUS y a p . .' t
d h
rever ed . The proposed sch me, L
an t e emphasts shou ld b
(where th potential in principle for L W . (
~·.or launch only when a real attack
cal at the time. Its guarantee agai t1 t -. lS. an addJtw~al deterrent) seems more logis enor IS more r habl . t 1

serves a sufficient level of d t
e, a t 1.e same ttme it pre

e e ·renee.
I t t.S neces ary to remember tl1at tlle
process of develo .
. .
and control sy tems takes man
reorgaruzmg th comha. Thu 'if d cisions on prospecb'vey ~eladr an? IS charactenzed by considerable ineroctnne are not tak · J
·t lf r
en 111 t 1e near future, it is
pos ibl e .for Russia to find
. 1 se ' ror techmcaJ reasons a . .
tategy m the years 2007-2008 I
ff' .
. ' pnsoner o a dated nuclear
· nsu lCtent numbe ts
·. 0 f tlle components needed to
rov1"d e for LUA (D · ) ·
m command and control
tmmedtat reaction t EWS d t h
systems will contmue to make an
a a eon y useful co
t h ' 1. •
· anged character of nuclear ·£ .
b h .
ncep ' w tcn will conflict with the
mces on ot stdes.
it mam
, . emphasts
. on th sea-ba ed leg ofthe triad
and sp cial TACA 1 -ty ' with
d hs
pe an ot er command d
. 1
Acerta.n degree with the LUA and D
. an contra systems, corre ponds to
mencan command and c ntrol el
~ostut ~s. ut the Lugh d velopn•ent of all
ements, mcludmg EW 'guarantees reliable retalia -




Pl'obfems With Russ/aa aad u.s. CJ 1 237

238 ' IJI: NuCIBBI' Command, Conii'OI, COOPBI'BtiOR

. 1 d' LOW It seems that as of today conditions
u mg.c
tory actwns un er an
ff' ·. 1 . plementation of t h e concept ua1
favorable wr o ICla liD
in the United States are more
. T
t 1 over the Armed Forces and conplan, LUA-DSS (LOW). Effective ClVdllandcon rounderstanding of the nature of the
. .c C3I have allowe a eeper
. h'
Thi's means that the U. · nuc ear
siderable spend mg wr
. £ fl 'bl trategy m t 1s area.
t ly the ability to execute LOW, but also
problem, and provide or exl elsh
d and contra ave no on
k .
tential after the enemy s attac ' m
forces and comman
f h
tain part o t e nuc ear po
the ability to preserve a cer
purposeful manner. Amencan
order to analyze t h e sltua wn ~
1' .
ft the reliable identification of the
· mediate reta Iatwn a er
experts see
, Le., Im
DSS is perceived as a separate potentia1
enemy's nuclear attack, as preferable, w ereas
t d with the main emphasis on LOW.
d ntrol system was crea e
Russia's command an co
d . l
t LUA or DSS. At the present
. 1
1.n reahty create to Imp emen
No techn1ca means were,
d the hypothetical situation of ta mg
t ongly pushe towar
. . b ·
time, Russia IS emg s r
. d t nuclear attack. Thls process lS
. th
urse of an alrea y carne ou
retaliatory actwns m e co
h M
dership but is developing a most
bl' hed pohcy oft e oscow 1ea
d .
d xternal factors: degra atwn o
not a conscious1yes t a lS
h . fl
ce of the mentwne e
. .
'gl'd ti'me limit for deClsWn-makautomatlcally under t em uen
f h S . tEWS amuc moren
the land-based part o t e ovie
. t btain additional agreements from
ing than in the United States, and the ne~esslty o aments mentioned in Chapter 1.
. d Belaruslan govern
the Ukraiman, Kaza stam an
. h C
nwealth of Independent States;
eement m t e ommo
. R · tried to coordinate his actwns
(Nobody has cance. 11ed t. lS'1 agr. ode no one m
If . the course of future reductions o
yet in the Norwegian mlsSI e epis
with the leaders of these independe.nt statesl.) , bm
the basis of Russia's nuclear
l SSBN and mobile comp exes ecame
d ) ushin into retaliation dunng the enemy s
strategic arsena s,
forces (by the general number of war~ea s ' r
. d
attack would rna e roue
establishment is gradually bemg rawn
Subjectively, a part of th~ R~ssian ml It~~{be conditions for LUA but LOW could
to the LUA (LOW) scenano (Le., tere ~~W Objective reality, though, makes the
possibly be conducted), and ~w~y rom fr: . . DSS part of the agenda. The time,
f providmg for an e tectlve
d ay
more challengmg goa1o
. '
d hi to ad' ust its strategic nuclear plans an p

it seems, has arrived for Russ~a sbl~; e:s f~nctio~ under the real conditions of a nuclear
more attention to the country s a 1 Ity ~
attack not only at the moment of warmng. .
of how well, in reality,
LUA d DSS raises t e ques wns
This forced transition to
d t the conditions of ou ea~
the Russian command and control system correspon ~ o t m Two factors are o
what is the level of retaliation produced by this sys e . .d under unique
war, and
t that can prov1 e,
e1 f
importance here: ~~rst, t~e presence o com::;:~:ssian missiles with a ~igh lev . o_
conditions, the abihty to Issue an order to la
. rder to the maximum nul'll


sy~tem'shabil:::~ :;l~~:rr~~:tory


probability; and
strike (the
ber of missiles, which determmes t e p
1 d
'tively the strategic Sl
f these questions are not reso ve posl
launched warh ead s) · I

tion may be as essed as unstable, including factor that would unavoidably lure Russia
to use LOW.
Today's Ru sian command and control system ah·eady possesse some elements for
functioning under conditions of nuclear war, such as the Perimetr subsystem. These
elements, containing components of increased survivability, reach out, so to sp ak, to the
silo-ba ed and mobile tnis ile , but they are not meant for tt·ansmitting ord rs to ubmar.ines.
ne can state with high confidence that until deep reduction of RF are
implemented, the expected level of Russian retaliation will continue to be sufficient to
provide a reliable deterrent. tiU, in the nearest future, the problem of command and
ontrol for submarines must be resolved, and performance within the fran1ework of
LUA and DS should be provided for in a more reliable way. The only alt mative is a
cardinal change to the minimal required level of retaliation that would erve as a sufficient deterrent.
The general principles of employment of strategic forces are discussed in a funda mental tudy by a group of u sian scholar , edited by Pavel Podvig. While the information in th book is valuable, and its publication in ussia is significant by itself,
some comments regarding the concepts of
employment are called for. 229
The authors of the tudy say that "latmch on warning ... may appear to be a justified
strategy under certain "'conditions." This pltrase may be understood literally by some
not-very -well informed readers. Unfortunately, the subsequent xplanations fail to
d monstrate that this option is absolutely inadmissible.
One cannot ompletely agree with the tatement that " ... in case of launch-underattack, unlike in case of launch -on -war:ni ng, the decision to use nuclear forces would be
based on the real fact of the beginning of a nuclear attack, record d by the warning
system ... " 230 A we have noted earlier, information obtained by the EWS should never
be enough to immediately trigger a massive retaliatory nuclear strike. It is another
matter that the possibility, in principle, of such an uncontrolled , random reaction of the
opposite side ha to be taken into consideration by a potential aggressor, thus strengthening deterrence.
Finally, under the L W posture the NCA hav "no more than eight to 10 minutes, '
as maintained by the authors of the study cited above, but only two to three minutes.
Thi opinion is shared by th absolute majority of Russian and non-Russian experts.
Despite some inaccuracies noted above, the ideas regarding the principles of employment of SNF found in th study edit d by Podvig, are interesting.
The question of a retaliation threshold or, as it is sometimes called, the level of unacceptable damage, is as old as it is complicated. All the criticism of LUA and
always been, and still is, based on the idea of allegedly "low" level and probability of
retaliation. In ord r to justify LU and
, and thu significantly increase trategic
stability, the military mentality on both sides of the Atlantic should undergo consider~ble changes. or ordinary people, an unacceptable damage level is not hundreds or
ozens of nuclear explosions, but probably even a ingle digit number of these - all the

238 1 IJI: /Vucteal' Command, Conll'ol, Coopel'ation
PPOblema With IIi

more so since the targets that will be struck are not known in advance (everyone is a
With the planned arms reductions, we are very far from such low numbers for hypothetical retaliation. At least, it is clear so far that according to calculations a retaliatory
strike would involve these same hundreds of warheads. It is evident that the key to the
problem of nuclear disarmament i in coordinating a gradual reduction in the level of
"acceptable" nuclear retaliation for ach ide.
A practical step toward olving tlus problem of nuclear empl.oyment postures would
be for Russia to recognize L
and DSS, not L W, a its mainstay postures, and
official confirmation that Russia does have certain reserve systems for command and
control under conditions of nuclear war. It would serve a good purpose to make this
announcement publicly but without stating the specific numbers and locations of the
mentioned components . Even a demonstration of some parts of these components
would be possible Gust as it is done now for many types of missiles) .
At the same time, it would be desirable for the United States to also confirm its
reliance on LUA and DSS, and exclude from its combat plans an immediate nuclear
reaction to EWS information. Some American experts already see such a transition as
a positive step: "Most important, the threat of a surprise nuclear attack, which was the
touchstone of traditional arms control theory, can no longer be considered even a viable planning scenario ." 231
As of now, Russia possesses certain technical capabilities for modernizing its C 3 I
system in a direction well designed to fit the context of nuclear disarmament. Based on
this conceptual foundation, those scenarios reviewed above, for detargeting as well as
undocking warheads from missiles, will seem much more logical and purposeful, since
the unavoidable reduction in readiness will be balanced by a guaranteed capability to
operate in extraordinary circumstances. From a national security standpoint, such measures as a ban on removal of Russian rail -based ICBMs from their garrisons, bombers'
watch without nuclear weapons, reduction in OPTEMPO ofSSBNs by increasing the
time spent in port, or watch of air-based command and control posts spent on the ground
will look much more justified. It is possible that a mutual official transition to the LUADSS (LOW) posture would allow for more rapid methods of nuclear disarmament without the considerable expense of proportionate decommissioning of delivery vehicles.
Blair suggests that strategic stability can be strengthened only (or mostly) by reducing
the combat readiness of nuclear forces within the framework of zero alert. He is quite
skeptical regarding measures to strengthen the system of command and control because
they serve, in the final analysis, the goals of strengthening not safety, but deterrence:
"But in the final analysis all the command and control arrangements discussed here
sustain alert practices and emergency launch procedures whose main purpose is to
service deterrence, not safety ... The operational posture would have to eliminate its
dependence on strategic and tactical warning, and launch under attack ... Strategic

UBIIhln 11111111.8. /}1

I 288

forces would be taken off alert and the h . t .
mand system. " 232
air ngger removed from the
nuclear com-

One cannot fully agree with th.
tions of readiness th
Is approach. Whal if, ven after


T~::~:~ ~~t~: ~~t~:;~·onta6on?

p:~::l ~:1:~r~~duc-

R iabJe
mtroduce additional instability or n t If s whether th measures of positive
0 ·
a measur of
rt~l~ tde pFomt of view of negative control, then it codntroi is atisfactory
u 1 IZe . or exam 1 th n .
e Vl e w . · a ,
a goo one, and
p e, e rerzmetr sy tern's existe.n
~e~s of negative control, but definitely strength . ce do~s not damage the effectiv s~twn from. a ."hair trigger" posture to the more ; : strateglc stability. Therefore, tranCiently reahstic. (Of course, if one views the l'd
f onall LUA or
postures is suffi H owever, tak'mg Into
· account the r t th ea o nuc .ear
. d terrence Jtself
as rational )
. t1
Iac at one cannot d
emp oyment m general, Blair views as ace t bl .
. ~ WI . l.Out concep ts of nuclea r
~~ a em pnnCiple the posture of "del d
retaliation" or the so-called d
en -state stability:
"End-state stability has one basic
component. Havmg
h d
mum combat readiness th
reac e a state of m axi.,
' e Cornman systems should b bl
egy of delayed retaliation Th'
e a e to support a strat.
Is means t at the establ' h d
nuclear forces could be accom 1' h d . h
Is e wartime mission of the
P IS e Wlt out resort t 1
under attack ... The US t t .
o aunc on warning or launch
· · s ra eg1c nuclear fore h
es ave never been able to meet this
requirement. "233

. The .suggested official reorientation of


!~possible without a preliminary m t lnuc ear weapon use postures is most certainly

u ua agreement bet
IOn o natwnal security at the expense of reliable (
ween t e parties on preservaterrence. So far, no steps have bee
d . h . un.fortunately, for now) mutual de sa
· .
n rna e m t e d1rectwn f
me time, It Is quite probable th t
o sue an agreement. At the
1 1 ·
a as soon as Ru ·
d U
ca cu atiOns together in a cooperatives irit t
ss~a~ .an
.S. experts begin their
could arise. After that w
p , . he possibility of relying on LUA (DSS)
I 1
' e cou try to predict th f
eve of deterrence with implementation of
e uture ~ coordinating a balanced
As becomes clear from th'
new deep reductwns.
Is sectwn, detargetin
d .
orces and employment postures are tight! I' kg:~ ucmg combat readiness of nuclear
c~ntrol systems. For example deta
. y ~n e m one knot through command and
directly related to the questio~ of rgettmg, WOith the resulting reduction in readiness is
lle s t
pas ures. r LOW d
. o achieve fast reaction while to
eman s a high level of readi survlvability, is emphasized, etc A supt port UA (DSS) another aspect of readiness
• · ny s rong tre d t
tvely reflected by other r
n owar one of the postures will be
Th .
ere IS no sense in
(Orces ( .
argumg agamst mutual reductio f
as Is bemg partially done now) and their
n o com at readmess for nuclear
command and control systems. Blair


I fJd: Nucteal' Command, Confl'ot Coopet'ation
Pl'oblems With Russian and u.s. C'

f this approach notes that introduction of the zero
one of the most active suppor ers o
f' .' 1 . fl ence on the problems of C3:
1 £
alert regime for nuc ear orces may have a ene. ICla
f m u that it reduces, in t h e f'rrst
f zero alert IS o course
"One of the Important eatures o
. , losing control over its nuclear weapd
equences o ussla s
instance, the chances an cons
. that pose far greater anger
Z 0 alert serves as a buffer agamst contmgenoes
ons. er
d l t "234
k ton launch-rea Y a er ·
when nuclear orces are ep
h ld be organized to exdude an uncon1
terns themse ves s ou
Under zero a ert,
ld .
. ·s periods and to make t e tran.
d and contro unng cnsl
. " h'
trollable d1ffuswn o comman .
t've of national leadership: T IS
h . h 1 1 f readmess a rea preroga I
1 . "23s
sition to rg er eve s o
d . h'bl' ts spontaneous esca abon.
the process an m I
strengthens top-leve contra over 1 .
b t een various aspects of nuclear weap· close corre atwns e w
h d.
Blair, w en rscussmg
fully how to avoid creatmg any
ity to thmk t roug care
ons control, notes t e necess . .
h h ' h degrees of nuclear forces readrdangerous superiority for one srde m case w en rg
ness must urgently be restored:
1 t
edure must pass a teSt of peacetime and crisis stability. The
"Any zero-a er proc
. · 1 . does the plan remove th e abi1ity of potential adversarfirst par of the test lS Slmp e.
. ? The second par is more comd ..
dden attack m peacetime.
ies to mount a eclslve su
. . 1 t bility during the regeneratwn
t provide for trans1t10na s a
plex. The cpostures
mus ergency an d ensure th at the process bringing forces to
of nuclear wrces m an em
peak readiness culminates in a stable balance between t em.
n believes that in the process of regenera. t
h ther but on the contrary,
Evidently, it is not the easrest task. Blair eve
t not race agams eac o
h 'd
tion of higher readmess t e SI es mus
t' of strategic capability could well be
. "But the regenera ron
help each other I necessary .
t 1 convulses under interna pres1d
If Russran nuc ear con ro
an inappropnate response.
. 't' 11 be to provide reassurance an even
sures, the Western responses hould ' at east
. h m1
. 1a y, the nuclear threat to the ",
west . "237
h h · t' mrg t mcrease
assistance, even thoug t e srtua Ionld like to have something else in reserv~. One too
It is a good proposal, bu.t .one wou
us fluctuations in forces' readmess wo~d
or providing strategic stabihty under conti~uo
. . varr'ous regeneration cenariOS
be the prognosis of results of miTIt~ry contmgencres
d ' m 'fi get ahead of the enemy Ill
for strategrc
. £orces. For example: wrll I have an a vantage 1
regenerating nuclear forces, or not?
1 ( h t . 'th additional insurance), thel
d th. type of zero a ert t a rs WI
To P"'aphrase, un er ts
less reliable posdwe c ch
sides could have reliable negative cont:l : r~a ~: ~n T~~s posture option seems mu
on paper (in a model jointly developed y ot Sl es .
more preferable than the one we have today.

1 241

certain circumstances from a political leader to lower levels in the com <nand hierarchy is
an important problem for any C' system. This can be seen most clearly by the unity of
opposites in the "negative control- positive control" bipolar sy tem: With total cen tralization, the level of negative control is the /Ughe t ( "super PAL" according to
but the danger of the system's decapitation is great. And atthe opposite end,
the lower the delegation of authority can go down a command and control system, the
higher the system's survivability, i.e. positive control; but accordingly, protection from
unauthorized actions is lower.


American experts and officials pay considerable attention to finding solutions for
this problem. Feaver discusses this question in great detail. 239 He reviews two methods of delegating authority down the chain: devolution of command- delegating command and control; and predelegation of authority- delegating authority in advance. In
both cases, according to this author, command and control is transferred from civilians
to the military.
In principle, delegation of command and control is perceived as a legal, widely used
practice. The president, as commander in chief, has the right to delegate his functions
to his subordinates. Devolution of command also includes those cases when, if the higher
commander is incapacitated, the lower level of command accepts his responsibilities.
In the United States, the devolution of command is under constant careful civilian
control. In peacetime, the secretary of defense is only the sixth in the constitutional
chain of command for the president's successors. But during crisis periods, there is a
strong motivation to "sneak around" the constitutional chain and devolve command to
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and strategic commanders in chief, who, according to Feaver,
have much more competence in questions of nuclear conflict than the secretary of the
Nevertheless, the dubious legality of such plans is noted. The author cites a number
of historical examples when parts of the presidential command functions were, without public knowledge, devolved to commanders of strategic forces, and lower level
commanders 240
were ready to use nuclear weapons at their discretion "under certain circumstances. "
The author is hopeful that today the U.S. government does not have
such plans because they are both unconstitutional, politically undesirable and could
possibly begin a slide into nuclear war:

"The decision to use nuclear weapons, and by extension the determination of the
circumstances under which nuclear weapons will be used, is considered to be
quintessentially political in form and substance. In a democracy, the military simply do not have the right to make such a decision, regardless of whether those who
do have the right decide to cede it to the military." 241

ea ons can be delegate d~~
The possibility that authority for usmg nuclear w p


The exclusive prerogative of the national leadership to authorize the use of nuclear

242 1 C': Nucleal' CommantJ, Conll'ol, Coopet'allon
PPoblems With Russian and u.s.

weapons is seen as a suppLemental measure to increase civilian control over nuclear
weapons. In this case, predelegation - prior delegatjon of nuclear release authority to
milita1y commanders - is permitted. The author feels that this constitutional right of
th president is strategically justified and increases deterrence. Opinions of the military on t llis issue are cited: "In light of this vulnerability of portions of the strategic
arsenals, en. athan Twining former chairman of the JCS, defended predelegation
as 'the only solution to military fire control'. " 242
At the same time, Feaver addresses the dark side of this function. He notes, with
good reason, that implementing predelegation introduces great "automatism" into the
subsequent actions of lower command levels. Quoting Paul Bracken, he expresses his
concerns that the delegation of nuclear responsibilities may occur at such a moment in
the crisis when the political leadership .is ready to compromise. And at this moment,
th military, its decision on the basis of an unfavorable military situation, may
use predelegated nuclea~r release authority to avoid the damag that politicians may
find acceptable. w ln this regard, he reminds us that World War I began because the
civilian leadership of opposing countries lost control over the situation.
Another potential danger is the fact that, after certain levels of th militaty command
receive authorization codes, it would be practically impossible to distingui h between
"legitimate," i.e. authorized by national lead rship, and "illegitimate" lau n h orders.
Reversing the codes back to the leadership level in. case of peaceful resolution of a
crisis will also be extremely difficult, includ ing purely technical difficultie . lt is necessary to exclude even the slightest possibility of compromi ing these codes at1d any
opportunity for their unauthorized use in the future. This is probably solvable only
through a total replacement of the old codes with new ones, which brings certain organizational difficulties.
Feaver also notes that since predelegation plans (if they even exist) are known only
to a very narrow circle of high officials, the level of the command and control chain at
which a legitimate order could be distinguishable from an unauthorized one would
remain very high. (One can assume that the author probably means the level of commanders in chief, where there are many various sources of sufficiently reliable information. ) He mentions widely spread public speculation about this delicate subject,
namely the U.S. government's reluctance to describe the "space of predelegation" more
or less specifically.
It is thought in the United States that the first most significant step toward delegating nuclear authority to the commanders in chief was made by President Dwight
Eisenhower. This decision was maintained by his successors. Feaver cites anotber
American expert:
"Daniel Ellsberg asserted that Presidents Eisenhower, Kennedy, and Johnson
predelegated authority to six or seven three and four star generals, that is, the unified and specified commanders. Ellsberg's claim appears to be supported by a un-


I 243

classified memo written b M G
Y c eorge Bundy [. p ·d
warned about policies that enabled
.o.r resJ ent Kennedy in which he
a semor mJhtary
weapons m the absence of a presi'de t" 1 d
comman eer to use nuclear
n 1a or er. "244

Blair says "I
' n pursumg a rapid reaction
launch authority to military commande :o~ture, the Umted States delegated nuclear
The majority of experts beli ve 'I
hrs _unn~ the entire Cold War era. "24s
there is
ff ·
t at t e sJtuatwn has not h
d ·
. .
no o ICJal confmnation of this polic . "
~ng smce, even though
6ttrugbtforw~d, would actually be extreme!
P;edelegatw_n, whi l conceptually
ound questwns about how far d
y . tcu t to operatlOnalize. [t rai es .
delegat d 1
own t 1· cham of comn d h
pro. _e_ . lOW wtd dJ cretion should be ra
1an t authonty should be
g nted, and how authorit-.:• \vould ~
the CiV rll atll.eadersh ip " 2t6
• ••·
r vert to
A mention d tJ
, 1e range of delegation and th
secr~t. Sagan comments on the same sub· . "every ex_Istence of such plans is ke t
pr stdents hav chos n to b I
h ~ect. The precise details of how su
a ance t ose co
governments most highly"ed
mpetmg reqUirements is among th

· .
secrets " 247
. ...
lrst, It Is understandab! .
-r .
mg a out the prediction of n t'
tro1efIectlveness. Let u h
.s, owever note that th I
ega 1Ve conany time dep~~ing on 'hece sity, 'ven thou h _e eve! of del~gati~g may be changed at
ond the posstbJiity to delegate
1 .
g . m only one d~rectwn: down. And
· bil'
nuc eat authont
secVIva lty of command and control "II .
y may ma e one hopeful that the su
auy tisis, which in tum increa es ~I ~:~:~~: dramatically in the crucial moment ~~
~otaHy sensele to one al. this. In this . :e factor. ~t s rves no purpose and i
unprudent for Sovi t I ader t·
vem, agan contmu : "lt would b ildl
· ··
o a sume ho
w y
lnttia1 nuclear attack would
wever, t 11at de troying Wast-:
en ure that retal" ·
LUngton m an
tatton would be elinli nat -d (It wo ld b
equally unpudent for
. I aI
· ,
· ·
ers to as
mgTtattack would liminate the ri k of re~~;~:t~~a )~2~:troying £ foscow in a 'decapitatse ms that ·1
. a WJt 1 many other a pect of such
a strange subject as nuclear deter.' on that I unusual for standard
assessments - a lot he . b d
I .
re lS ase on lack of
the :~s ext~e~ely important that the possibilit of
p pohticalleadership to th
delegatmg nuclear authori"ty £
e m1 1tary co
sureexecutw? level, cannot be totally exclude~man at any_Iev~l, all the way down to
cant;· le~·n I: eve:ybody wants to execute this y ~ny org:mza~wnal or technical meashoul~ t ls Sit.uatwn is very bad. But this is a ;eal rom t ~ po10t of view of negative
ever pobe.bcol nsldered not only in the qualitative but atac~ ~hlch ca~no: be ignored, and
I . SSI e.
so 10 Its quantitative aspect, whent ls not ver ha d
estimates of y r to take 10to account the potential of
. .
ered in Ch deterrence. Predelegation simply h
hpredelegatwn 10 quantitative
dealing . ahpter 3. If under a rigidly centralizecd anges t edconnectivity graph considwrt a "
·a "
comman and
t I
con ro system we are
pyramt , predelegation "break " .
s It. Let us assume that the potential


PPob/ems w·lur
... nUSStan

and u.s. f:l


I 245

1 f?: Nuclear Command, Conrrol, cooperation

aggreS'OC, when evaluating the ri'k' of a nuclear attack again't the United States,
should consider as a fact the launching potential of commande<s in chief as well as that
of all SSBNs. His strike would be planned with these considerations in mind. With a
more cautious "pessimistic" pwgnosis, he should count on the wmst-case scenario for
himself- that this potential would be delegated all the way down to LCCs at the last
moment. Thus, the plan of the attack has to be changed again, etc.
Some optimal level of delegation, which does not undermine negative control too
much and preserves the reliability of a launch order ceaching the missiles sufficient for
deterrence, pwbably exists. For peacetime and crisis conditions, this level should cer.
tainly vary. Should this level be proved scientifically, it could be officially published.
All the more so since, as we have noted before, the "rational" opponent should base his
estimates on the much more radical predelegation scenario for the oppo ing side - that
i,, the worst possible scenario for himself. What we have in thi case is a well-known
situation fwm game theory with two sides differently evaluating the same prognosis
At this point it would make sense to look at some American experts' evaluations of
nuclear delegation in Russia (Soviet Union).
It was emphasized in preceding chapters that Russian C' is mostly viewed as being
very centralized. Since we cannot completely rule out delegation as a hypothetical op·
tion, we reach the same conclusion that we were able to reach regarding the U.S. C':
there is no guarantee for a potential attacker that the opposing side will not carry out
such a predelegation at some point. We do not mean here specific intent of the at·
tacked side (Russia, in this ca,e): the important part is that the potential aggressor has
to think
are no
technical problems with predelegation in the Russian
system. AU it
tak.. is transmitting tbe authorizing codes (encryptions) in the usual way, with the
addresses of corresponding levels in tb command and control system. Th pr blems,
just like in the U. . ' sy tern, are rooted in the oppo ite requirement of negative an<l
contr.ol .of predelegation is most complicat<d when it comes to command and
The dilemma
control ofTNW. By the end of 1990s, the United 'tates had several hundred tactical
nuclear woapons (T W) in Europe (B-61 gravity bmnb 1 and about I, 000 T I W in the
United tates, including 350 nuclear-armed ubmarine-launch d cruise missiles. By the
same time. Russia had an arsenal ofT Win the range of 3,000 to 4 000: nuclear gravity
bombs, nuclear artillery •hells, warheads of anti-aircraft missiles and mi$o;iles of different
types. All Tt W owned by both countries are kept during peacetime in special storage
facilitie , but during a threat period they are suppo ed to b depk>yad with appropriat<
military units in theatef' of military action. Each T W h>' a blocking deVice again:'
accidental use or unauthorized actions, and it can be used in comba only aftet an apptopn·
ate sanction from above, with appropriate codes permitting their employment. I .,;U ..,<
attempt to evaluate the reliability of uch a safety system, although one maY taise
questions regarding the difficulty of guarding and servicingTNW at the bases of convorntiO


forces. I would like to consider here onl t
The character of combat
y he operatwnal aspect of th
concepts of SNF em lo m
TNW is substantial! e TNW problem.
principle of SNF
pl y ent,. d1scussed m sufficient deta'l .
d1fferent from the
emp oyment
. .d
1 m t 1S b k T
multaneous release of th l
"ngr :'ntralization of command d oo . he main
sanctwn to all involved SNF an control, and si
the sanction by the
would make 'uc
natwn s ch<rf executive. The operational
based on
h an approach senseless !nd d
requi<ements for TNW
~~ aster. and better how and when to u;e T~~: ha c~mmander in the field would find
ls supenors, and is
1 b
, e lS more aware f h .
would dif£ .
. vasty etter aware of it than the NCA N o t e srtuatron than
theater parts of military action both: . aturally •. the situation
m It extremely difficult, perhaps even.'
trme and m space. The
line bet
ween the two extremes: Avoid TNW
n_nposs1ble, to determine the th'
b:nal war, or, while still capable of condo t
and nska decisive defeat in a conve::'
t e us~ of weapons of last resort, and thus ~ mg conventlOnal warfare, hurry to order
escalatw~ of ~uclear conflict up to the globa;~se ~nOade~uate response with inevitable
ness to. glVe field commanders , m
. a s1tuat1
. £evef . bvwusly, it would be sheer madaccor mg to their judgment.
on ar rom clear, the authority to use TNW
One may say, of course that NCA
use, if forced by cimumst,ances SNF would hav.e a similar problem deciding wh
to all combined arms
ml principle it is possible to
~1 no anger be a selective use of the mor em~ oyment of TNW. This, of course

empl~yment ~f




woo~~~~ ~~wus






a tactical goal, but in fac:
of a theate;
us, 1t would be sim 1
dd' .
m a strategic op _
to the already ruinous pl:::.:ryanur;wn of a series of less powerful
o 1magm~ a. war employing only TNW. Does coear catastrophe, since it is impossible
Today It 1S often said that Russ'
ne really need such a second hel . ...
1a nee s to pre
· T
as an addition to Russia'
etc.) m
forces. This
TNWof the C .factor (leaving all other strate ic a we vr"": tlus rssue only through the



pr:s~"ense o~ly

~ussia ~ell





it is d·fi"
as all other nations,
asr:e), :"e. must conclude that
t to
for their negative control h etter e elrmrnated both because
, se ~ts o~eratlOnal command and control
w en m .storage and in the field, and
1 he S1tuatwn with SNF . d. f-C
are not flex1ble enough
tem the R .
lerent. Working on i
diff~ f USSian military 1Sand1research
and de I mprovmg their predelegation syscent "','t ~om the Americans. It, main id
ve opment specialists chose a method
man~alrzatron, while at the same time prov::;i;a;, to keep the highest possible degree nf
sile .
that has the authority and
survivability of the com.
Bl . ". rdea was rmplemented in Perim t d
. potentral for launching the misdet a1r pa1d a lot of attention to a 1 . e hr, escnbed m Chapter 4.
1 of t h'rs system in nuclear
he errence
. H e b nefly
describes itsnaidea
andt ite role and. pace
esses the system positively i d' t' s operat.wnal significance.Z49 In general
' n Ica mg that 1t allows for realization of th~


~. o~gan




l'l'ob/ems QIUI
...... RUBBIB/1111111 u.s.

t CS: Nuclear command, control, Cooperation

I 247

In any case, the Perimetr does exi t and
~osse se the technical c· ...
above. It is not necessary to know th
the system is on dut
e preciSe variant of its 0
circumstances E y, a11. t
more so since it can alwa s p rat ton that is used when


leadership's right to err:


i, o~ ;~~n':d
valua~ ~ot

anything. Its
the system .off, taking
according to
different way under the cliff lcte
aggressor to
ICU con 1t1ons of h
h .
e uss1an a ·
. nd..,d, when the p.,imetr system is taken . ; ypot
nuclear conflict.
g mo e ecomes very different. With t . ' 1 connectivity graph

"from the standpoint of sa ety it would be n1ot·e prudent for the Russians to withhold
a launch deci,sion, activate the ead Hand in response to tactical warning, and
predicate a final launch order on eviden e of nuclear explosions ... In sum, launch
under att-ack using the Dead Hand permits an initial mistake (false alarm or misinterpretation of warning sensor data) to be corrected by the absence of nuclear




It would be useful to mention here the two articles published in The New York Times.
In ctober 1993, Blair described briefly and, as a whole, conectly, th Perimetr system. Yet, he express d his cone rn that the system increases the ri k for unauthorized
25 1
By the time his article was
use of nuclear weapons especially during crisis periods.
published, the existence of the system in Russia and various evaluations of its signifi252
canc had b en already men cioned in American writings. To prevent erroneous specu253
lation on this subject I responded to Blair in The New York Times on Feb. 1, 1994.
The i.d ea of my commentary on Blair's article was that Perimetr not only does not weaken
negative control. but, on the contrary, is built to improve its reliability during very
acute mom nts of crisi and therefor it play an exclusively stabilizing role.
Ha ing this system at their disposal. .o cow's political and military leaders now
have more freedom not to rush into action upon receiving signals of an attack from the
As wa shown in. hapter 4, they roa:y, at this critical moment of uncertainty,

~ WS.

delegate th launching function to special highly survivable nodes of the command and
control system without sacrificing the reliability of direct measure to protect against
unauthorized actions. In reality, negative conu·ol is trengthened because this type of
"insurance" relieves authorized officials from the difficult dilemma of making a choice
in a stressed, changing and totally unique situation.
In one of his later works, Blair essentially recognized the rationality of 254
the idea at the
core of Perimetr: "The rationale for this Dead Hand system is evident."
After corning to this conclusion, Blair attempts to analyze some operational aspects
of the system's employment, relying here on information received from four knowledgeable, high-ranking Russian experts from the Main Operational Directorate of the
General Staff and industrial ministries.255 All four confirmed the existence of the system. Two of them stated that it provides two technically-possible scenarios of operation
when on duty' the first is to include sensor information registering occurrence of nucl..,
detonations into Perimetr' main algorithm; the second bypasses the sensors, relying'""ply on transmitting, at the nece"ary moment, authorization codes from Central eommand Posts to the system's command missiles. Two other experts denied that the sen0
sor scenario is operated while on duty, though they confirmed that the system
this capability. They mentioned Marshal Sergei Akhromeev. the former cluef _
General Staff, who allegedly rejected operational use of sensors for safety considerattO





.only through the command post' of';;: •t .. aU orders arrive at the
when Penmetr lS operating the ord
e miSSile regim nts (Urrp)
d . .
ers, as a ready e h . d
bypassing all intermediate level'
asoze 'arriv dicectly from
em.h n other words, alternative ways make total
command and control sysmuc harder. If we remember that the comm
su~p~essJOn of Lh connectivity gra h
groups of highly survivable launchers th d and
are launched from disper!d
comm~nd and control system is stren~thee ;~ee to whi~h the reliability of Russia's
Besides Perimetr there
. ecomes evident.
are o er possiblhtles t d 1
own the system at a critical moment .
o e egate nuclear release authority
m or er to expand th
. .
maxlmum. These do not characterize onl R
e connectivity graph to its
yb"l" ~ssian command and control. The C3
systems of all nuclear states have such
· · ·
capa I 1hes and th
examp e, It IS Impossible to exclud
"t . .
ey cannot e ehminated For
. .
e a SI uatwn m wh · h
o com at actwns, the commander f
. "1
. IC 'at t e most difficult moment
. nuclear authorI"ty d e1egated from above would d o"d a missi
d 1 e umt alr ead y possessmg
. d
eCl e to e egat th
lS, own to the launchers themselv
h e em to t e very bottom level - that
wr t e s k f "
t IS example belongs rather to th
a .e o greater reliability." In truth
e area o evolutl
ower evel than to the area of delegat·
.on o. command and control at the
Ion, ut wr simpl .t
lCI y, we are gomg to treat it as
an example for predelegation.

~om~an moss~es.




· t U mon,
· this
· concept was implemented h
T In theS ovie
hese were constantly practiced d .
t rough autonomous launches"

unng miitary e
com at actions with conventional w
. xerClses.
t a certain moment in
of a division of silo· based ICBM eapons, or dunng the threat period, the commander
otdel' nyy start - separate launch) as sent. toll each. lau nc h er Wit
. h out a crew (a so-called

avtonomnogo puska - autonomous lasupeClha y tramed unit headed by an officer (raschet

nc crew) Th"
roun unker that had b
IS umt was statwned at an und
een prepared I d
erg . db
umt did not deliver any codes in ord n a van·~ m the. vicinity of the launcher. The
cont.rol. The unit did, howev~r h
er .toh ~VOl reducmg the reliability of negative
recelV k
ave Wit 1t an ultra-sh t
er, eys and passwords to enter th "1
or wave ra 10 transmitter lUg the missile (PAP - pul't t
e Sl o, and a special miniature device for launchan
av onomnogo puska) Wh
h h"
appropnate order this unit
. .
en t e Igher command sent down
:"''code that in ordinary circu:~~anc:c:ve 1~~ lau~ching code on the radio (that
?und cable from the regiment's c
ave een transmitted via an undernutt ed to them from any of th
post) . Th"IS cod e could have been trans. .
e survivmg command posts of th e d"IVIsion,
. .
. the


PI'Oblflllll WIJJt RuaiiDIIIIJ U.l. ,

I f:l: Nucteat' Command, contt'OI, coopel'ation

mmand post of the missile army, if the
1 or even from an a1r d'orne
regtmenta1 1eve,
.. ~ d t a distance allowmg permanen
latter found itself in the area of the 1V1S1·. an a
th ltra short wave radto.
. ·
commumcatton on ~ u
. . for this scenario several times dunng exerh . two cars and consisted of three
I had the opportumty to obs:r.v~ tram1hngl

. I d
. d. h
tty oft e aunc er m
cises. The unit arnve m t .e ~tcm b radio - th authorization code (with tmu ate
to four people. After recetvmg- y
d l 'I 'ntroduc d h · code into the spe·
. ,
) th unit enter t1e St o, I
. .
"jammmg by the enemy ' e . d 1 l
hing order to the ml S1le. Then t urut
. .
m1tte tle aunc
cial mtmature devtce an rans
.c d' t
as· oon as posstbl . It too sever
to a s are IS anc
d t th missile until it would leave the
left the silo rapidly, an rove av.:a~
transmtttmg t e or er o e
. h
dozens of secon s rom
h 1
't 1 ft the launching area m t e secon
b k d
and thew o e um e
silo. Once, one car ro e ~V.:n
f h
the autonomous launch crew had to
According to the cond1ttons o t e exerctses,
£ t measures were also use .
d other methods of delegation
have two cars. Other necessary sa e ~
In difficult conditions of com~at sttuatt?ns, ;~~:na command and control syst ·m
. mprove the effectiveness of retahatory ac tto.ns:l
. ach ar a of deployment, includ1
· · mt s1 es me
"milks" the highest number o survtvt~g .
dging by the des ription above, nega100 · u
. the genera1b a1an ce of retahat
ing them m
.t d s not decrease any U1or t 11an ·.
f£ d amattcally
t ea t 1
tive control does not su er r
.. .
t 1 acquires the most importance.
b t t'ons when pos1ttve con ro
. h
d to separate two questtons. trst,
necessary m com a ac 1 ,
To conclude this sect~on, ~e~. us note :;~12o~c e,~e: means it po ses es, an ability that
the ability of the potenttal VlCttm to us 'd .
h analyzing its plans. Asses ments
the potential aggressor c~nnot help canst ::~; ~:o: ;his point of view.
nd, econd,
ofl evel of mutual detercence hould b
'al lt . ev ident tha th latter can be
f th d 1 gation potent• . I
practical implementatton
e ee ..
clear crisis itself. The mo l iroportan
t f the reaht1es o a nu
viewed only in t e ~onte~ o
f d le ation potential with emphasis on malOpart of the second tssue ts assess~ent o . e g
. . relt'able negative control m peacettme.




Uncertainty: Deterrence or ProvocatiOn.
. h
aspects of nuclear

d h
closely kmt t e vanous

The prev{ous secttons demons~ra~e
ow . . f C3 problems and makes analysJ.S
Thts 1s charactenstlc 0
command an d contra are.
h 1 k of any clear answers to
This difficulty 1S also mcreasdedl~y t e.thac1.S t.n fact uncertainty. We can
q uite difficult.
Wh t we are ea mg Wt

questwns at the present ttme.
hole series of such questions:
~a W
, b
req u 1ren'l
. 1
t the "golden mean etween
" ?zs~
How do we estabhsh and 1mp emen .
th " sability paradox ill
1 th t
overcome e u

of ositive and negattve contra - a 1S ~
an dangerous .
. bTt h ld C3 have m order to overcome y
How much survtva 1 1 y s o~
d h ld e be thinking about
s{on of {ts weakness? And, m th1s regar , s ou ;
apons in a first str o; ~'justifying'' conditions for the emplo~~ent of nuc ear ~e o1nt of mutuallY e e
Is the goal of mutual detargeting reahsttc from the stan p


I fAll

ti've veri fication, or is it purely a pohical bluff? A
able" et hies of targ ting? That is, what sho~ld ~d w ;abl:vould beth "accep ·
'k . h
k ·'
. .
e es a lshed as targets f0r a
retahato 1y str.t e. t attac er emRy mtsstle sil
. . .
os or somel mg e)se? How does
1t ftt mto the concept of deterrence?
Can we rely on information from the EWS about a mlssil atta k ·
c m progress so
much that we retahate wtth. an tmmedtate nuclear s tnke ( boice of p0stures )'r
How much could the readmess of nuclear forces and their command and control
systems be reduced without permanent damage to nationa l security and what
guarantees are possible here?
How do we conduct quantitative analyses of the contribution of c3 to the balance
of deterrence and strategic stability, considering the prospects of deeper reductions in strategic offensive forces and the desire to minimize expenses for nuclear
forces in general? Does a consistent theory of the part and place of C3 in all these
matters exist?
Are openness and international cooperation between C 3 experts in this area useful?
We could continue this series of questions, most of which do not have any convincing answers so far. This work also does not give answers, but it attempts to attract
attention to the nec~ssity of starting a serious study by Russian and U.S. experts, and
finding solutions to these problems.
Lack of certainty in nuclear command and control issues has always been damaging
for strategic stability. During the Cold War, uncertainties justified new spirals in the
arms race and increased international tensions. At the present time, it is a hindrance to
reduction of nuclear arsenals, and prevents a decisive transition to mutual deep reduction in readiness for the remaining nuclear forces. Due to the lack of certainty in command and control issues, both sides continue to cling to the outdated posture of LOW,
and at the same time admit that this is not the best choice at all.
Unfortunately, these are not all the disadvantages of uncertainty. Lack of certainty in
C and related doctrines of nuclear weapons use results in certain over-insurance on
both sides and reconsideration of arms control agreements achieved earlier. The actions
of both the U.S. and Russian political leadership are not always in harmony with the
goals of disarmament and global stability, thereby provoking criticism from the experts
and the public. Blair's report, The Effects of U.S. Policy on Russian Nuclear Contro/,2 57 is
a typical reaction of C 3 experts to current political activity in both countries.
Blair's general conclusion is that the U.S. policy toward Russia was wrong, forcing
the latter to take responsive rr :Casures that made the situation worse in general, and
reg~rding reliability of negatiVe control in particular: "Although U.S. security depends
on u·onclad Russian control CXrer nuclear weapons and materials, our security policy
~oward Rus ia does not promqe the strengthening of that control. In fact virtually all
acets of our policy, xcept forthe Nunn-Lugar program, work against it." 258
Blair not s that the RussianC 3 system is going through hard times even without the

250 1 fJI: Nuc/eal' Command, Contl'ol, Coopel'ation

influence of any extemaJ fa tors. The fa] I of the Soviet Union and economic instability in Russia, reduced coh sian of the Russian military and politicians at the top levels
of 3 as well as some other factor , have caused ser.ious problems for both positive and
negative controL He states that R ussia continue to adhere to the posture of LOW
and that " ... risk of a breakdown of control has been steadily rising in several dimenswns.
According to Blair, however, this situation is made worse by such current U.S. policies as:


maintaining the same level of high combat readiness for nuclear forces which,
according to experts, will provide serious superiority over Russian nuclear forces
in case of a nuclear conflict;
continuing r lian.ce on the unnecessary long-term concept of nuclear hedging;
persistently pushing for the expansion of potential missile defense for North
America, and in th possible theaters of military operations;
encouraging NATO's expansion eastward;
taking a rigid position at the START negotiations;
continuing activities in such areas as preparation for strategic anti-submarine
Naturally, says Blair, such and similar actions by the United States result in corresponding measures by Russia. In particular, he noted the increase in number of SNF
exercises, including deployment of mobile ICBMs into the field, SLBM launches, and
training elements of the nuclear forces under LOW conditions. These actions increase
the danger of a breakdown in negative control. He also notes that Moscow is afraid
that, under the cover of the BMD program, the United States will create a shield which
will bring down to zero the effectiveness of Russian retaliatory strikes. In his opinion,
it can even bring back the concept of a pre-emptive nuclear strike. As for the START
negotiations, by forcing Russia to switch to mobile components of nuclear forces, the
United States made the situation worse regarding protection from unauthorized actions, which is less reliable for Russian Topol (SS-25) and SSBNs than for silo-based
ICBMs. NATO's expansion eastward can stimulate an increase in Russia's TNW,
where the issues of negative control are even more challenging.
In the conclusion of his report, the American expert stressed the same idea that is
central to the previous chapters of this book - the necessity of developing a more clear
and definitive theoretical basis for the problems of nuclear weapons:
"The various policies, operational practices, and real or imagined threats discussed
above may seem academic in this post-Cold War era. They dose m to embody Lhe
tired old concepts of a previous era in US - Russian relation . Th sort of calculations
presented above seem rarefied indeed. But the fact remains that n it her governrnent
has replaced the classical formulation of security based on strategic balance and de-

terrence, and therefore these principle
plan .
s contmue t d .
nmg, t e operatronal postures, and all th
~ orninate the 1 .
e other Issues d
ogxc of nudtu
un er d'lSCUSSIOn.
· "259

Today, one may say that the Am .
encan expert
Sian reactiOn to the actions by the United St t
was nghl. at least rega d'
Russian relations since th
d h
a es. Of course. much b
r ~ng the Rusas chang d · U
en, an t e 1eaders of th
tions m relations But th
1 . .
e two nation st.·
e ~n .S..
e ana ysis cited ab
nve to avo'd
ove WI contmue to be
fi 1 aggravamust avOid actions that could
some of which may b . d rna e nuclear powers take dangero use ul: poli ticians
. .
e ma equate.
u counterme
Contmumg lack of certainty about man

::~t~::~~!:i:~i:~ P~licy of th~ U~ited S~a:;:;~:a~~ n:~!e: ~:;mand and control

a ows certam Circles in Mosc
ussed above create
years, about the possibility of Ru .
ow to talk, like they have ti
tryling t? justify the necessary co~~~i~:~~o~utchl~ar weapons first, and, much :::s:ve~~
n this re d
gar , we can refer to an article b M .
tary Thought, tellingly called "Conditio [. y aJ . G.e~. VItaly Ryaboshapko in MiliWeapons."26o The author now ret' d fns or a !ransitiOn to Potential Use ofNucl

Ire rom act
d t
nance of strategic offensive systems in the SRF IVe ~ y, was an expert in the mainteand, I~ the years just before his retirement, worked forth~ Center of Operational
I worked side by side with him for a Jon .and Strategic Research of the General Staff.
ve.r~ far from underestimating the conseg time, and must say that he had always been
cntical of the "hawks " N
h 1
.quences of nuclear war, and had been h ' hl
Ig y
evert e ess m the cit d
e article he talks straightforwardly
about the need for Russia to establ ' h , d' .
Is con Itions u d
h' h .
use nuclear weapons as a response to an t
n er w. IC It would be the first to
There is no need to repeat h
ex ernal threat to Its national security.
ere e contents of h.
tions, developed unilaterally (not J. ust b R . bis artie e. It Is clear that such condi h
Y USS!a Ut by
~ve any mternatiOna11ega1 powe b t h
any nuc ear state), would not
strll be catastrophic for the whol rl, u t Se consequences of their application would
e P anet. uch co d't'
mu ated m Russia. But the very fact 0 f th
. 1 n I IOns WI probably never be forp b!' ·
e artie e's a
u ICation demonstrates that som . R .
ppearance m an official military
e m ussia are look· [.
8 't
mg or a potential way out of the
I uatiOn, which is already compl' t d d
future. The "way out" suggested ~at~e t~· ay ~nd can become dangerous in the near
look for another one. The latter c b a; Icl~ Is, of course, unacceptable; they have to
tw~e? the United States, Russia a:~
oun tnly throu~h friendly cooperation beoffzczal and independent experts in th er nucf ear states, Including a broad range of
and co t 1 A
e area o nuclear wea
d h .
n ro. n assessment of"' t'f' d'
pons an t ezr command
can b
JUs I Ie conditions [. f
th' eon y performed multilaterally Of
. .
or Irst use of nuclear weapons
hIs dead end, and the Russian expe~t . c·o~rs~, It I~ necessary to look for a way out of
s oSuld be sought together by the nati IS ng t zn thdis regard. This way out, however,
ome A
ons concerne .
mencan sources cite differences of o inion
ary and civilians over th
. p
or even conflzcts between the
e positive-negative control dilemma:


252 1 fl: Nuc/eal' Command, Conll'ol, Coopel'atlon
Pi'Oblem11 IN/tit

"There are inherent trade-offs between positive and negative control, between ensuring that weapons will always work when one wants them to, and will never work
when one does not ... The general trade-off is simply stated: the greater the assurance of 'always,' the lesser the assurance of 'never,' and vice-versa. The proper
balance between the two is a subject of dispute between civilians and the
military." 261

I would like, however, to elaborate on this formula. Not very long ago, some people
may have sincerely believed nuclear war and victory were possible. Now the situation
is different. The majority in the militaries, including the heads of the SNF of Russia,
the United States and other nuclear states, are not planning to really use these horrible
weapons. Even if they continue parting the line of duty to improve positive control, it
only means that they have to promote the policy of preserving mutual deterrence conducted by their civilian leadership.
The militaries are also involved in negative control of nuclear weapons, in all institu tional and technical measures of protecting them against accidents and sabotage. They
are much more involved in these aspects than the politicians. At the present time, the
militaries face additional work in this area: implementing the agreements on strategic
offensive forces reduction. Experience shows that these activities now take up no less
time in the schedule of strategic commanders, their staff, command posts and services
than their traditional military activity.
If cooperative research in C 3l (C 41, C 5l, etc.) issues and their contribution to strategic stability finally begins among nuclear states, the military experts will again play a
considerable role. Therefore, the military and civilians should not oppose each other.
After all, it was a civilian who issued the order to bomb Hiroshima and Nagasaki. And
should nuclear weapons some day disappear from the face of the Earth, the military
will experience as much relief as civilians.
Uncertainty in the area of nuclear command and control has a twofold role: it both
deters and provokes. The deterrents are the unknown results, fear of the worst. The
provocation is the secret hope for a "Maybe!" The latter seems less dangerous when
nuclear potentials are huge and, as such, make people reluctant to experiment. But the
deeper the reduction of strategic offensive forces, the more this provoking aspect of
uncertainty will come to the forefront. If the sides seriously intend to move further
toward nuclear disarmament, they should inevitably arrive at certain agreements and
mutual assessments in that area of C 3l.
Sharp debates among experts and political struggle at the highest level - both inside
the United States and Russia as well as between the two - accompanied the work 0~
NMD in the United States and the American decision to withdraw from the 1972 Ant~
Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM). Until it became clear that the United States woul
withdraw from the treaty, Russia was adamantly against any concessions, fearing tl~at
NMD would eliminate Russia's retaliatory potential, especially when deep cuts of Jts

;~cl~ar arsenal occur either as a result of arms

RIIB8/111J 111111

u.a. , I 263

e ormer SRF commander in chief, Yakovlev co~dtrol agreements or
, sa1 :
"All the tal~ about 'modification' of the AB f ·.
ment of anti-ballistic missiles constitutes d . Treaty .I S misleading. The
allow protecting 70
en.~al of the treaty's ,
d ploynext st
percent o the U.S. territory. And we 1:
es ence, since it will
ber of ·e~ will not be five or six more similar deployment Ja~e n~ guarantees that the
m erceptors becomes a purely technical
' smce lncreasing the n
created. This will completely ruin the existiJ~a ter once ~e information syste~~~
force co-relationship when NMD.
. g U. .- Russian nuclear b I
15-t 1 . {;
JS taken mto account w"IJ b
a ance: the
o-m avoroftheUnitedStates d
, 1 ecome10-to-lor
' epen mg on the configuration ofth N

e MD."262
Yakovlev is absolutely ri'ght .
'11 b
m saymg th t .
WI e a purely technical matter A d th
~ 1~1creasmg the numb rs of int .
e pnnclple, laid in the foundation of t~ceptors
Treaty, is also correct: Mutual t n



fundamen:a~~;:cc~~~~vt~l i:ab~ity


believe that this
to escape retaliation.e
The crux of the matter is our
or as well under conditions of an
Indeed, rf we select, out of thousands of
as ~ss~ent ofB
characteristic, average results .
modehng simulations of retaliation th
stud ·
' rgnonng the probabil' t ·
' e most
BMJ;I)ng, w~ can determine the critical level ofSNF (~s Ic a~pect of the process we are
at ~hich an aggressor goes un unish
or a grven level of the opponent's
along the hnes described in Chapter:
~ldl . I~, however, we use a different approach
' we WI arnve at an 0
system · Al k
~~ as a or anywhere else, can, in . .
pposrte conclusion: no BMD
did Preside~t Ronald Reagan's Strate ic rJ~ncrple, against retaliation. Why
erage Amen can voter did not
g b .e ense ImtiatiVe fail? Simply becaus
ffi ·
want to ehev th t
e an av.
e a sue a shreld could be 100
e ective, and rejected the h

uge expendrture
· d .
Iet here were other reasons as well butt~· regurre In favor of other budget prioriet us look at the problem from t ' d "f£ Is one appea_rs to be the main one.
prevent. a nation (be it the United S~~esr ~ren~ perspectives. First, it is impossible to
rotect Itself against various eventualities' EUSSia, or an~ o~her nation) from trying to
aps somewhat reduce the damage£
. vena very limited BMD system can perwhat" and "perhaps" - th
brom an external attack. Note the wo d "
ere Is no a solute
r s some:~ It requires _reasonable expenditures, will ;o~~antee even here. But the hope, as long
s ehsame nation will never give its leaders th ~rht anyone. Second, at the same time
uc a shield h
e ng t to take a r · k
hi h
, owever ighly reliable it is believe
IS , un er t e cover of
er than at any casino (although the meth d d to be. !he stakes will be too high,
onte Carlo method).
o , sued for nsk assessment, is called the
True, it is und . bl 1
risk £ .
ema e t 1at the StTonger the BMD f
.o~ Jl. And herein lies the real ne . .
o one of the srdes, the lower the
~:~v~dmg an absolute guarantee, it pu;::Jvt:Impa~t ofbstrengthe~ing BMD: Without
or a potential aggressor i provocatively~ nuc ear alance to Instability, where the



I (11: Nucteal' Command, ConiPol, coopel'aflon

f nuclear warheads per side) turned out not ~o
The START II level (3,000 to 3,50~ o In Ma 2002, the United States and Russ~a
be the lower Limit of acceptable redu~twn.
hy' h ·u bring the level of strategtc
. d t on treaty w tc wt
.gn d a new strategtc arms te uc t
'ble that in reality reasona e
1 700 to 2 200 t ts posst
nuclea r warheads down to '
h d There is a feeling, however,
even fewer war ea s.
redundancy exists aroun d '
ts and the realistic redun ancy
" b tween today s agreemen
h d
that there is a "dead zone e
d R . cannot overcome with old met o s
U .t d States an
minimum, a gap that t h e me
'11 ot let this happen and it wtll be neces.
~h . l't' 1opposttlon WI n
(that is. blmdly). 1 e ~o ttca: . .
'bl t reserve national secunty and take sue
sary to prove to the natlons tha.t tt ts ~o~sl et o research of command and control sys~
come thts barnet' mu ua
t' way to disarmament.
radical steps. 0 over .
. d There ts no a1terna tve
terns IS reqmre ·




ter 8

eveloping international cooperation between nuclear C 3 experts may be implemented
in several stages.
The first stage is a theoretical one. It has two main goals: first, to confirm that a
common solution for C 3 problems is not just useful but necessary. Second, to convince
participants, in the course of joint research using the same models, that stable guarantees of national security for all sides, with a reasonable degree of openness regarding
initial data, do indeed exist.
The second stage is to formulate and resolve the most important practical tasks for
strengthening negative control of nuclear arms, while simultaneously preserving each
party's interest in th~ area of positive control.
The third stage includes developing joint proposals for a comprehensive consideration of the 0 factor in the reduction of strategic offensive forces, and in the general
process of arms control.
From an organizational point of view, carrying out these stages could result in the
creation of an international consultative body for 0. This body would encourage and
monitor nuclear states in the conduct of more rational policies toward command and
control, policies that would coincide with the interests of the entire world.
The major characteristic of cooperation between C 3 experts is the inability to develop independently without consideration for the weapons themselves, and without
the participation of specialists in operations and general strategy.
It is evident, as noted above, that we cannot evaluate the effectiveness of C 3 without
assessing its influence on and contributions to the forecasted outcomes of nuclear operations. In the same way, "pure operators"- that is, experts on weapons and their use
-are not able to forecast anything concerning deterrence reliability without a quantitative consideration of the command and control factor.
Therefore, we are talking about the necessity for broader mutual cooperation among
experts in various areas of nuclear deterrence, where solutions to C 3 problems would
also develop.
At the present time, some international contacts have started developing around
separate aspect· of global strategic stability, including some between American and
Russian military exp rts. We can mention here the so-called military-to-military contacts program, which includes regular meetings between higher leadership and experts
from TRATC M and the Russian SRF.

258 1 fJI: Nucleal' Command, ContJtol, Coopepal/on
CS In Russia and the United St.

Btea: A BhoJtt Ca

The visit of a delegation of Russian experts on strategic missiles, headed by Col.
Gen. Sergeyev, to the United States at the end of 1993, was the first such contact. The
delegation visited Washington, Offut Air Force Base and Vandenberg Air Force Base.
A return visit to Russia by American missile specialists, headed by Adm. Hemy G .
Chiles, occurred in August-September 1994. Since then, exchange of expert delegations at various levels have occurred and are continuing now.
It is hard to overestimate the significance of contacts between the missile officers of
the two nuclear superpowers for strengthening mutual trust. (At least, American colleagues told ergeyev in December 1993, in Omaha that "all of them feel very calm
while he and hi delegation are vi iting them.")
Even if we ignore specific serious questions solved in the course of those meetings,
the very fact tha those people are getting acquainted is extremely important. Further
development of the militaJ.y-to-military program will build the found ation for a subsequent transition to real cooperation between former potential opponents over strengthening strategic stability. till, joint work has not yet started in many important areas,
including topics of command and control. Even when C 3 experts came as members of
a delegation, they had nothing concrete to do. Nothing is known about any attempts to
conduct joint simulation of nuclear conflicts, even though the necessity for a transition
to such cooperation is quite clear.
The first ever visit to the United States by a group of Russian C experts , which took
place in August 1997 in California, was a cause for hopes for a breakthrough for U.S.Russian cooperation in this field. This 10-day visit was informal, although Russian
official bodies approved it. This visit was the result of an initiative by Thomas C. Reed,
former secretary of the Air Force, and a national security assistant to U .S. President
Ronald Reagan, as well as by the author of this book.
The Russian delegation included Maj. Gen. Vladimir Dvorkin, director of the Central Research Institute No.4 of the Ministry of Defense; his deputy Col. Boris Uchenik;
Boris Mikhailov, general director of the Impuls Corp. (St. Petersburg); his deputy, Chief
Designer of C 3 systems for the SRF Vladimir Petukhov; General Director of the Central Design Bureau of Heavy Machine Building (Moscow) Aleksandr Leontenkov; his
deputy Gleb Vasiliev; and Col. (Ret.) Valery Yarynich. The American institutions represented at the meetings included the Brookings Institution, the Draper Laboratory,
the Naval Postgraduate School, TRW and others.
Although these meetings were informal, there was some substantive discussion of
common problems of C 3 and of the necessity of cooperation in this field. Two joint
proposals resulted from the meetings: one regarding exchange of information concernjog
organization of negative control in national C systems; the other about establishing a
joint monitoring center for control of nuclear proliferation using existing elements ~f
C 3 systems. Although there was no negative official reaction to these meetings one~.ther side, no practical steps have followed.
It appears that the lack of practical results from that first visit originated not 001Y

~ 2II1
the uniqueness of the subiect of d.
Iscusswns, bu t also .
in R .
ussia, where the government h b
. tn the administ .
r~form and social conditions of the ~r::; ~verwhelrned by the Pro~~tJve diffi':~lties
VIewed as a precedent for future d 1
orces. Nevettheless such rn,s of military
Joint analysis of command d eve opmen of coopera6on.
meetings were
t - '1'
an control problems withj h
o mi Itary programs Is hampered by the Jack f nif' d n t e framework of rnili
:~lei of C3 systems in nuclear forces, and the a~s~ncel:f !h~ory regarding the p1ac::~
. o ogy for the quantitative assessment of its
. . ear and unclassified meth
d ' contnbutlOn to deterrence Th
Important obstacle here is lack ofcl 't
k' . .
an y regar mg gu
· · e most
wor mg J.o mtly in such a sensitive area. It seems th ar~ ees ~ ~latlonal security when
the questwn of guarantees a discu .
. at Wlthout JOmt theoretical wo"·k
sswn o practicaL a1
... on
gm. And without that, serious talks about as e . go s con. er?~ng CJ will never berenee or perspectives for reducing nuclear r . I smg ~he reh~bthty of mutual detera,sena s are llnpossJble.
Notably, the difficulty with "
guarantees pred t
overcommg it successfully· first thi's
b e ermmes two main conditions for
wor Is to e d
· · 1 b
sian experts on a unified theoretical b.
one Jomt Y y Amencan and Rus d
asJs, an second th
' ~ openness of such work is
man atory. The fu t condition proceed I . 11 f
been said abou t openness but 't .
'alogica y rom prevwus conclusions. A lot has

1 JS cruc1 to add th t
:VI11 bnng, it should not remain hidd £
h a no matter what results such work
mternal affair for the political and 'el?t roml t e world community. This is not an
mi I ary eaders .
. .
th eir natwns, as well as other nations.
, smce It mvolves the interests of
To stop fearing the unknown, to prevent oin
come out with reasonable estimates f h g ~to extremes because of these fears to
world a guarante against nuclear w.: ~wan ~~ w~at level to disarm, to give ~he
conducted. . ne hundred thousand t' ' o y .one t I~g. Is needed: This war needs to be
First, the sid s will
h Jmes, usmg a umfied model.
. ·.
convmce t emse/ves and each h
portant) that lt l. impossible to reduc th . k
ot er (the latter Is even more imThi 'JJ
e e n (to the a ·
ggres or to zero 111 principle.
s WI serve as JOint theoretical proof of the
econd, veryone will
. sensele sness of nuclear war.
see, I even tentatively th
. · ·
' rom here various scenarios are p 'bl fi [i ' e quantJtatJve levels of deterrence
If the results show serious .. ~ ~. e . or urther activities.
. supenonty and not
. 1 1
? the stde ' it is bad for everyone. In thi . partlcu at: y ro~ust deterrence for one
Increase stability: either to stop arm d ~ case, something wtll have to be done to
s re uchons, or urge t1 d 1
rces, or even provide help to the "d fi
d" 'd
n y eve op some elements of
no on wiil be able to blame th
ake eate Sl e from the "victorious" one. At that
WiJ1 be clear that they are in eveerywoe ,er. (or "less strong") side for its activities since i;
ft ·
ne mterests
1S not, however, impos ibl that the r
. .
scholars and military experts will b
esul~~ obtamed m the course of joint work by
Wot:ld stability. There are no guaranteaccepta e t~ the. public, for both sides and for
~tUted ' tates and Russia are not
at this ?omt nuclear professionals in the
c ange of hundred or thou ands o;
I on v:ry high levels of deterrence - the exnuc ,ear stnkes. (Many experts I'ncl d' A
u mg men-




cs in Russia and the United stares: AShol't

l C': Nuclear command, conrPot, cooperation

1 groupings of the victim's nuc1ear fo
~re ad~~st completely declassified by both si~es)(those are the weap ...L_.
con Itlonal" command an d contraI ystems £es ;
ons Uiat
concepts of retaliatory actions by tl1e v1ctun
. . (Lor W
these groupulg s,.

can experts, think that nuclear deterrents of France or China are quite sufficient.)
Bri fly speaking, an optimistic a sessment will allow to plan and implement measures for a graduol reduction of nuclear arsenols and their readiness, transition to safer
concepts for peacetime, and doing it all in the most conscious and open way. Consequently, no one in the nuclear states will be able to blame their leaderships for "lack of
patriotism" and prevent important, reasonable steps for strengthening strategic stability. Today, such reasonable behavior in the nited States and Russia sounds \ike Utopia. And yet, we hould strlve to achieve such a level of publlc consciousness. It is no
longer possible for the two teams to play with fire on a huge barrel of gun powder
without any rules while the cover of the barrel is gradually rotting. It is better to work
out those rules. ll is pos ible to do that in stages.
Suggested stages of cooperation follow.


The Stage ol Theory

Even now, it is possible to get together a small group of independent American and
Russian C experts and "pure operators," and ask them to develop a theoretical foun3
dation for further cooperation in two main directions: negative and positive control.
No special theoretical proofs regarding the usefulness of cooperation over negative
control are required. The only important goal here would be proving that uring th
exchange of technologi" for protecting nuclear w apons and 'from accidental and
unauthorized use the sides would not, "along th way,' touch upon those other patts of
the C structure that are relevant not for prot · ction from unsanctioned action but rather
belong to the sphere of positive control. for which it is much harder to reach mutuol
understanding. till. thls is not a serious obstacle, and it is rather simple to cr ate and
agree on a pmt ctlv barri -e againort an initially undesimble mixing ofthe two issues.
Theoretical tasks would be more challenging for positive control. We can recom3
mend the following schedule for contacts between C experts in this area:
a) Develop or choose, from those available, a statistical simulation model and meth-.
odology lor researching the influence of command and control systems on the
assessment of mutual nuclear deterrence; for example, the scenario described in
Chapter 3;
b) Agree on a set of conditional initial data for the C' of both countries. Those will
include already known (unclassified) information on the structure of the systems.
their fixed components, the standard physical pammeters of comrnunication chan•
nels, etc. Each side would be able to include any number of conditional elements
and characteristics in this set for insurance;
c) To study, by simulating a hypothetical nuclear conflict, changes in the parameter
of a retaliation strike under different scenarios with the following initial data:


means an d strategies of th e aggressor' att k (
' D ' )·
able degree at this time).
ac also d classified t'0 a cons:tder
d) Draw,
I' . based on th e ab ave, conclusiOns
mg two mam questions: f
a lmit for reducing the risk to the
the aggressor's initial military and
aggressor exist und r any
to approximately which quanft f ec me supenonty over the victim> rease m


tude of the strike and its


proba~~i:~~ ~~~eles ~~ISpli~ra~eters
for (t~~~n~~

. sta e f ..
. other words
' the goa1.cwr the first
to fi~d a scientific foundation forth
~ o JOmtrese~rch on positive contTol sho ld b
e gucu an tee of a natlO ' .
cond t'
.. .
n s strategtc ecurity und
MI lons, an to. prove
. . the sensei essness 0 f.mtbabn
cl .
r any
f l'g nu eat war agamst It, in princip'
ost people mtmtlvely feel the exist
· ·
ence o so rd gu
vtew of its special chru-acter. [two ld b arantees agamst initiation of a
~e tea y such guarantees. But in a situ f
e possrble to avoid proving theoeveloped, it is desirable to know the I a l~n : er~ ·ome arm are reduced and other
The level of. minimal" . k f, h eve an pnce of those guarantees
1 . :
· d eed ' seem ns
or tlarge
e aggressor
work might ' .m
not too
in abs Jobtained as a resu t of Jomt


:mple, t~at Jt would be about P( ?o50) ~ 0.~-~t~term~. Let us assu~e, just for exessor s .very lugh preparatory efforts h h
This means that m spite of the
nsk looks like this: the potential victim 'is abl:s no g~arantee retaliation. The
warheads on the territory of the ag
t~ dehver the mimmum of 50 nude
targets (any can be hit) are not k
state with a probability of 0.3-0.4 And thar
'I k h
nown m advance
a e t e example of another "lowest" . k
experts should not give an answer to t~~s : P(~2':2~) .= 0.6-0.8. Is this high or low?
Ju t ~how what they have as a result of mo~u~.stiOn: lt JSJ10t their business. They will
makmg a sessments and taking de . .
mg. But everyone should take part .
abl d
CISlOUS on th
ff ·
;.het.errence. The decision should be mad . sud JCJency the guarantee for relj e 1dca of this approach . th .
em a emocrat1c way.
even t he 1east probable - but nev
ts rth
at, mstead
of some ab tract, average values of risk
e ess catastrophi
. 1
e r_evealed and asse sed. It i un
c ~ resu ts of nuclear simulations
es~ts of stmulation (the way it is usually a;:ept~bl t? tgnore even the mo t extteme
. o achieve an accurate e
ne m statlsttcal research).
. a ratherlacge stasamp mg tscequi red - that is a lot of . of ext
I reme seenanos,
iJ;;'.I I;" for modern computers. At fir t
:ons per
seenario. This is not
node a:,a
the pmbability characteristics of, :e most diffrcult task is agreeing on
' re lability of communication chann I
lnsy. t~ms, uch as survivability of
e s, etc.
reality, bowever, there lS
. no need









280 1 C': Nuclear Command, Contl'ol, Cooperation
c~ In Russ/a and the u,

to look for anything new here: this approach uses the same initial data as all other
methods now used by military and research institutions of various countries. The
difference lies only in the choice of presenting the simulation output's final results.
As for the concepts of "a Little" and "a lot" as related to nuclear deterrence, this was
already discussed in previous chapters. We can quote some more from American civilian and m ilitary experts: " ... because Robert Jervis believes that Soviet leaders are aware
of the extremely high costs of nuclear war, he judges that even a small probability of
such a war is sufficient to deter Soviet leaders." This underlies his response that "the
argument that the American threat to use nuclear weapons is not very credible glosses
over the point that only a little credibility be required." 16.1
Bernard Brodie presents a similar position: " lt is a curiosity of our limes that one of
the foremost factors making deten·ence really work and work well is the lurking fear
that in some massive confrontation crisis might fall. Under tl1ese circumstances one
does not tempt fate." 21H
Harold Brown argues that " ... Even when the probability of an event seems low, it
may (depend ing o n how costly the effort) be worth reducing sti ll further when tl1e
consequences of its occurrence are so great." 165
ln 1992, Frank von 1:-Iippel, a well -known American expert, was familiarized in Moscow with the assessment method described here, and was asked what level of risk he
considers (conditionally) acceptable even to consider a surprise attack against Russia.
Without any hesitation, he wrote: P(N~ l ) = 0.00 ... 1(!) Many would fjnd this kind of
risk a bit low but this answer is symbolic in many respects.
In the spring of the same year, I was going home by train in the same compartment
with a Russian nuclear physicist who had worked with Andrei Sakharov. He was trying to convince me that, from a purely scientific point of view, 200 to 300 nuclear
detonations on ilie territory of a country such as Russia or the United States would not
bring devastating consequences to those countries, and even less to the whole planel.
He found any comparisons with C hernobyl "inappropriate" since "this is a totally
different matter." I could not argue with this highly skilled professional in his terms. 1
did say, though, that even if he was theoretically correct, he would never be able to
convince the majority of civilians, simply because they will not want to believe him.
My opponent could not argue against such a "non-scientific" argument.
The prospect of nuclear war is almost unacceptable for a human being. This is a
solid guarantee, and a basis for the " workab.ility" of the suggested approach for assessing sufficient levels of deterrence.
Assessment of results obtained by a group of C 3 experts in the course of suggested
research may bring about various subsequent activities. If they conclude iliat calcu·
lated values of "minimal risk level" do not satisfy requirements of reliable deterrence,
each side will have the right not to declassify in full their coLmectivity graphs. Both
partners can also leave the situation in the same uncertainty that they have today, st~t­
ing they have a number of additional real C 3 elements that they did not include earher

'11/ted States: A Sh

. l



m t le considered J.OJ.nt ,
d' .
con 1t1onal" ·
There is hope t11ough that the . Sim
i ulatton model.
m b f• '
resu ts of sucl • •
ore ene Ictal results.
1 JOtnt theoreti I
In 1990- 1992, some assessments .
ca research wiU bring
for Operational and Strategic Resear~~mg t IS me~hod were carried o
reported to the Ministry of Defi
A lor the Russian General Staff ;~at the Center
are no indications that its result:~~:d
t :ough ~he work was formaliy a e results were
f th any Impa.ct on the work of th
.,.PProve.d, there
cor.n plex. Nonetheless s
, orne o ose cone! ·
e mt ttary · d
F•trst, the w1classified .
. d
USions are worth m.ent' .
m ustnal
that there is, indeed, a b~:~:t tl e~lt Wtth the~retical issues, and in~~~~~~·
. ~eshold for nsk reduction to the t . a suggestion
although the potential
unilateral (no US
:uantJ~a~tve level was not established si
cl ntJal aggressor,
d h
nee l1e research
. . expel ts parttctpated) S
1990s, gJven tl'le existiJ1g weapons on b~th e~~n , t e repon concluded that in the e~~~s
nuclear CJ, the probabili
fR .
. . SJ. es and real. characteristics f h . . Y
than 800 to 900
1 ty o ussm retallatmg against the U 't d S o t _e Russ.tan
nuc ear warheads was 0 6-0 8
nJ e tates WJth no less
even WJlh a considerable increase in the . ·< . ~nother conclusion suggested that
data used in modeling) and w·th
s nuclear forces (compared 'th ·]< ,
1 tlle mostaggr~ssor
unJ 1k 1 A
WI t 1e
.am age, the value of the indicator of det . .
ePyN mencan perceptions of acceptable
ctent to
eit ence ( W
Jd b
"'- wou e more than suffiprevent a nuclear attack again t R .
At the
s ussla
same tune the work demonstrated
forces on one side and developing offensi 6that should the process of reducing nuclear
to the aggressor would decrease If . ve orces by the other continue, the level of risk
contr 1
no measures are tak t ·
o systems, by 2003 the foJlowin in .
en o U11prove command and
~(~~1 00) 0.5 or P(N~SO) 0.6
dtc~tors may ~e expected: P(N~200) = 0.3 or
tndtcator should be maintained to .ach_questlOn was ratsed: At what level a deterrence
~eve guaranteed deterrence, and how t ch.
that level? The report th L' d
en 1ste vanous sc
.· £
. .
o a teve
pr~xtmatc fmanciaJ estimates.
enauos or adHevmg this goal, with apfhat work was one of th f'
e 1rst attempts to a
h h
a new pom t of view R . b ·
< pproac t e problem of dete .

0 1 o v1ous reasons it
nen.ce n·om
considered as the beginning ofjoint the . 't. alwas unt ateral and, therefore, may not be
could bee 1 d · .
Ole lC research 13ut tl1
mp oye JO JOint research.
e me 'lod that was used
If the theoretical stage of cooperation c . .
d_ant g uarantees for both sides alo
. Jonfums the extstence of reliable and redun gJve a "green light" to the sub~equ:~t Wpl:a:~ualtual deterrc~ce, official institutions can
stage ofJOtnt work.






Initial PracucaJ Steps

The pa t'
r tes, sa eguarded by a mutually
\v~lvleblop and implement tile most importantmroevec gtJ~rantee of security, may start to
e strength ·
asures m the CJ ar L L
ne .
enmg strategic stability Tb
ea, uJe goal of which
gabve contr ] lv1
e mam emphasts sl 1 1 b
etaphorically speakin th .
lou c e on mcreasing
and and control systems from accident~· de sebcunty of. nuclear weapons and corn.
s an sa otage wdl be increased ;..
u• pract1ce,


282 1 (}1: Nucteal' Commaml,



caIn Russia and lhe United
while the ability of each side to punish the aggressor (that is, positive control) will be
gradually transferred from everyday life to the domain of paper and modeling. With
that, there would not be even tbe slightest reduction in the real effectiveness of nuclear
deter ·ence, proved during joint theoretical work for all alternatives. The ability to retaliate will be "locked .in a box" (or a fist hidden in a pocket, if some prefer this comparison). Th danger of a tragic slide toward nuclear war is reduced.
It wo\,lld be useful to start the organizational stage of the second step with each side's
official confirmation of a data list for national 3 systems in the areas where unclassified publications and joint research are allowed. The bilateral expert group may prepare such a list on the basi of the theoretical stage of the work.
Here is an example of a list:
Issues of Nuclear Command and Control for which Joint Research and
Unclassified Publications are Allowed or Banned
Open Constant Group
These are topics on which cooperation may be allowed even prior to conducting the
joint theoretical research. They are questions that are relatively permanent:
composition of C 3 system, and real names of its main structural elements that are
in operation;
general principles and elements of the system's architecture and operation;
locations of stationary command posts, operational large transmitting centers and
satellite communications centers;
design bureaus and research institutes of the Ministry of Defense, and industries,
enterprises and institutions involved in development and mass production for C 3
as a whole and its components. This includes names, locations, names of com·
manders, history of creation and development, main responsibilities in C 3 ;
design operating principles and reliability of C 3 protection systems against accidental or unauthorized launch of nuclear missiles; the same for components of the
system and blocking code devices at all levels of command and control (this would
be open only to the experts, while only their conclusions would be published);
concepts for combat use of C 3 in hypothetical nuclear conflict scenarios, instructions on actions of nationalleaderships and duty crews at command posts of all
levels in a critical situation, the system of predelegation from the commander in
chief down to the lowest levels; available scenarios of autonomous missile launches;
methods used for evaluating C 3 according to the cost-effectiveness criteria under
general SNF evaluation; corresponding models.
Open Extra Group
This includes additional information to be released after conducting theoretical resear

States: A 8hfll't Co,__•
..._-...,... An6/ylll8

and creating a joint assessment method £,
the c3 standpoint:
or the effectiveness of m

r 2sa

utual deterrence from

the actual current number of element .
be useful t ·
s 111 command and
. _o give t e parties the right to decla if
control systems. It would
;~n sufficient for achieving the calculated goal on~ th~t part of the informae rest of the data would be better off clas ifi d on Jr~n?' mutuaJ deteu·ence.
e 'tomatntam '.. 1-1a bil'
· 1ty
Ban Probable Grou12
This_in~ludes banned questions of variable natur
actenstics for the opposing side:
e that might serve as probability char-


real values of launching codes bl k.
, oc tng codes, key data for the encrypti'n
g eqUipwor~mg radw frequencies, passwords and c
. .
locatwns of field positions for mobile land-bommumcation session schedules;
dant (concealed) airports for a· b
ased elements of the system, redunt (ACP
Ir orne command
mentiOned CJ elements moving into th
), schedules for the
pment 0 new, prospective systems of c3 ( .
plans for combat employment f
. . pn~r to startmg their operation)·
o nuc ear missiles With a list of th . t
eir argets.
A similar list will be elaborated and
work's first stage; that is, theoretical I s~p~ emebnted according to the results of the
ca cu atwns ased on a unified simulating model
Upon agreeing on the list of open data for
. cfommand and control systems Russia
and the United States might conduct
a senes o expa d d
per s to Iscuss some initial practical t
n e wor meetmgs among exseminar in order to formulate spec'£' stepks. r t would be helpful to first hold a special
. .
I IC as s wr work
reso ve orgamzatwnal and financ· I
groups, create those groups and
I 1 ·
Ia questiOns
. nc udmg specialists with different areas o .
Is an important condition for success:
f expertise related to CJ in such work groups

"It's crucial, therefore that the small
r grou~ making up the 'C3 community' today
be expanded to includ~ more th
an a !eW engmeers b h . 1 . .
catwns specialists defe
' e avwra SCientists, communi'
nse contractors and militar
though, can lead to narrow th' k'
d' 3 .
y people .... Limited inputs,
lO mg, an C ISSUes are t
ew self-designated experts. " 266
oo Important to be left to a

. From expenence
we know that th
Ing such meetings:
ose experts understand each other very well dur-

284 1 (}1: Nucleal' Command, Contl'ol, Coopel'ation
cain Russia and the United State. .
s. A Shol't CompaiWtlve Aml/y818

"Fundamental to understanding C 3 l ... is to know who you're talking to. If he is a
technocrat you can talk to him in terms of a 'C 3 system.' If, on the other hand,
you're talking to a manager ... you'd best talk about C 3 I, because you're talking about
a program - a chunk of the Department of Defense Budget. If you're talking to an
operator ... then you're talking about a process, a command and control process,
which is facilitated by a program .... They have a differing perspective on what it is
you're talking about when you say command and control." 267

I 285

d) Confirming, using joint simulation w'tb
1' bl
rea ( u l · ·
re Ja e mutual deterrence within L
(D )· nc ass.Jfted) initia l data act a) d
agreemg on the s ff .'
u an.
deterrence indicator's calculat d 1
va ues, taking int
u uctency of the
a.rms ~eductwns, prognose for military and techl . oaJconslderation prosp cts for
tions m levels of nuclear readiness.
uc progres ' and deep reduc I

e) Implementing
upon t ose agreements the f,0 ll .
· official rejection of LOW th
owmg measures:
as e pnmary concept·
man posts mstructions on conducting .
, r~movmg from the comt · r
1mme 1ate retahato
t 'k .
rys n esinresponse
o mwrmatwn from the EWS 0 f
a nuc ear attack·
ta I~g more de~isive steps to decrease combat re~di
cludmg undockmg warheads fr
. '1
ness of nuclear forces, in'b d
om missi es Here mo t 0 f th
sen e by Blair and other A
h ·
e suggestions demencan aut ors with. th f
may be used;
m e ramework of zero alert

The work described here may be done both on the official level under the auspices
of the governments, or independently, with the cooperation of international organizations and funds. In any case, the Russian and American official structures should simultaneously prepare corresponding agencies that would receive any recommend ations from these expert groups and implement them.
During their initial meetings, C 3 experts, while getting acquainted, might review
possible ways to resolve the following tasks:


agreeing on acceptable measures for increasin t
g he readmess of command and
s n e I necessary· dev 1 .
externa1signs that would d. t .
e opmg c ear, accurate
· ·
IS mgms etween thos
ties m preparation for a first (p
. ) .
e measures and the activi _
re-emptive stnke·
mvolvmg observers from other countries in staf
f exercises of command and
control systems· practical d

emonstratwn ofCJ capabTt' :D h
I I Ies or t ose observers
me1uding the functions of
the LUA (DSS) posture· separate e ements providing for the effectiveness of
control systems for a retaliatory t 'k 'f

a) Agreeing on one standard for keeping nuclear weapons safe from accidents and
unsanctioned activities. The parties should use their best achievements in this
area, develop the best organizational system from top to bottom, make efforts to
eliminate weaknesses and implement modern technological methods, etc.
Should standards be agreed upon, it would be possible to check national weapons and C 3systems for satisfying these requirements. Systems found lacking would
then be improved. Systems found not worth improving should be removed from
combat duty and be the first ones eliminated. Mutual assistance, including ideas,
funds, technology and specialists, would not be out of the question at this point.
After close cooperation is established in this area, it would be useful to attempt
spreading positive experience to other nuclear states, including China. The ability to secure nuclear weapons and command and control systems of undeclared
nuclear states may be achieved with the same approach.
b) Jointly developing special technical systems able to react quickly during potential
terrorist seizures of nuclear weapons. Such systems should provide immediate
information on seizures to leadership, as well as potentially transmit orders by
radio and satellite directly to technical devices that would automatically block the
weapon(s) or eliminate it in an ecologically acceptable manner. These systems
should be capable of being used exclusively by the country possessing the seized
nuclear weapons.
c) Eliminating the traditional peacetime predelegation of nuclear responsibilities from
the national command to lower levels (including the elimination and changing of
encrypting codes given out earlier). introducti~n into nationalle islatio
. . .
han and acquisition of potent' 1
n of hmitatwns on producIa countermeasures to nuclear command and control systems.
.T_h~re is no doubt that positive achiev
,. .
th1s 1mtiallist.
ements of the experts Jomt work will expand
Let us emphasize again that implementin th
g e measures for strengthening negative
control (points a b c and s· '1
Imi ar measures)
· d
' ' '
steps for maintaining positive cont 1 t h may. e carne out mdependently of any
ro a t e reqmred l ·1 ( ·
I 1
mp ementmg some of the sugge t'
. ve. pomts ' e, and Similar).
s Ions WI only requ
. ,
Ire. e parties agreements and
correspondmg directives while oth
ers WI require the d 1
Ion o corresponding technolog· 1
eve opment and ImplementaIca eqmpment.


Prospective Trends in Mutual Control

Successful work on the second sta e of coo
g . . peratwn will bnng us to creation of a
Permanent international C3 expe t

r orgamzatwn the existe
f h· h
Irst, common internationally lega1I'zed " l , f h
nee o w Ic seems crucial.
com man d and control as they d .
· m
. nuclear
. rues
. o t e game" sh ou ld exist
0 m commumcat
enrng character of potential violations of CJ " 1 ~; navrgation, ecology, etc. The threatru es makes permanent control over their


1 C': Nuc/eal' Command, Conll'ot CoopePation

implementation, particularly by the nuclear states, absolutely neces cu-y.
Second, an international C agency could become one of the main sources of scientifically proven recommendations for choosing the mo t rational development for nuclear
command and control systems. Its pcuticipation in analyzing the potentials, volumes
and pace for deep nuclear arms reductions would also be a valid a pect of it work.
Third, a broader structure in charge of controlling the EW (C I), military computers sphere (C1I), etc. may be created later on the basis of such a C3 body.
Finally, the international character of such an institution would allow for provision
of the financial means necessary to implement major, l01~g-term and costly programs
in the cu·ea. Those programs may incl.ude:

reation of accurate, stcu1dardized systems for detecting nuclear attack, with the
goal of providing those systems to all nuclear states.

b) Developing and implementing technology to r -d uce the consequence of accidental or unau thorized launcbe of nuclear mi siles; jmproving weapons and command and control systems already in xistence; in this respect, herman Frankel's
ideas may be used. 2ft3

reating a ·pecial unified automated communication and control ystem for
n uclear weapons, in addition to the telephone and telex "hot lines" already op r ating between the heads of the nuclear states, as well as between the national c nters for reducing nuclear danger.

d) Ongoing refinement of methods for calculating the C3 factor into agreements on
deep reductions of nuclear weapons.
n this basis, minimization of general expenses for maintaining a reasonably uffici nt level of mutual deterrence.
e) Regular publication of bilat ral White Book on the problems of nuclear command
and control.

f) Developing a theoretical basi for the p lace and role of nucl ar C3 within broader
stt·ategic stability, and subsequent creation of a minimal tandard for national
systems, providing for their stabilizing character.


eveloping control over the C3 activ iti s of the "unofficial" nuclear states, ancl
rendering help, if neces ary, to improving their command and control systems to
the required standard level.

At this point it is impossible to predict how actively, md in precisely what directions, cooperation may develop. But i is clear that this would encoUJ·age the strength~

cstn Russia and the a
'lilted Bllltea.· A

. 8/totrt ~l'lr . . .


enmg of global strategic stability C
retical stage, without which a


tra~sit~:~~:a~~~~~:~ C3 has to start with the f
measures w


UWe Do Nothing...

What would happ 'f
would ha e . . en l _ not a mgle proposal listed above

i;:ru~~;v~o~~n;~:~t' ig~ore




Ltst, theobe most dcrficult.



the. potential
Any t d I . .
JVe an negative control?
ear command and
. u y c amung to be objective assumes
J .
~n~ludm~ the wo~t and the least probable ones. ~:;: :sls. of al~ possible alternatives
his reqUirement J especially relevant .
h £
~~'lg Wtth nuclear det .
~ve to study all possible outcomes ~f n:~~ ~e~=- of ctvJ~ation is at stake, t~~r:~~c~
p easant they could be. They must see th
. . renee, owever fantastic and u
real life we could make th . h
. ese rughhTlare scenarios to the end
tl ~L
eng t conclus10n and take these
. .
· so 1at Ill
et u con tder only some of the hypothetical .
- scenanos mto consid ration.
future, and try to fore ast the cow·
_sttuatwns that w might face in th
eo events F1rst let
tve contra1: is it strong enough to preve d .
us con t er the issue of posi of strength?
nt eterrence from detetioratiog into a
rea test
The w~rld has changed significant! since tl:
. .
that Russta and the United States
yld .
le Cold War. It IS dtfficul.t to imagine
. .
wou r turn to th 1 I f
susptcwn that charaeterized their r I t'
1. .
e eve o mutual ignorance and
even today there ar many potentiale : IOns6u:~n tl~e 19.50 to 1. 970s.
In an imaginative scenario all
ufisesl ot . tenoratJOn of relations.

peace u means £
een exhausted, Cll1d the \M stand R .
or reso vmg a political crisis have
while the relations wer good both 'duss.:a cul·e on the brin..k of war. Prior to the crisjs
Sl es unp emented d
ness. But, unfortunately the tim b ffi
eep re ucttOns of nuclear read ith 1 d b
e u er provtded by tl
d ..
no e pe oth sides to reach an ag
le re uctJOn of readine s has
o b . .
reement an now the h
us au- tngg r PO ture in wh 1'ch · .
Y ave returned to a danger'
m1sst1e.s are ready to 1

ecau e of the complete lack f :_c
aunc m a . ew nunutes.
. .
o lillOrmatiOn ab t
a ence of JOmt U. . -Russian as essme t f
o.u comm~d and control, and the
staffs of tile Unjted tates AT
d. Rn o . a posstbJe confltct's results, the military
now rea d y to unp!ement
u ta hav prep · d ·li·
them Th 1 .
rue mt tary opttons and ar
th 1
e ess mformed about 0
et us assume that th Pent
ne ano 1 r, the crazier ar
e p ans.
Russian 3, think tl1at they can swift! agon, .Ignorant about the reaJ capabilities of
:em. This could be attempted fo-. t y d~capi~ate and suppress the Ru sian CJ sysU1 the EW against the k
' d onsfance, y a simultaneous strike through the ''h 1 "
ey no es o the CJ
o es
~er-E~ weapons, ma ive radio interfer sys em, several htgh altitude blasts of suSJ~n terntory, possibly with seizure of enc~ across all wave bands, sabotage on Rustails of uch a plan are not that .
severa command posts, etc. The concrete deand b .
tmportant; rather it is d
angerous t at such a plan exists
y Itself promotes it xec t'
observation about theater· 1'f
u ~on.
ne ~ay remember here Anton Checkhov's
· a gun IS s en han
gmg on t e wall m Act One, by the end of
e play it must shoot.)


1 IJi: Nuc/eal' Command, Contl'ol, Coopel'ation

Military operations, including those using conventional weapons, have not started
yet, but the sides are in a state of unstable balance and uncertainty, wb.ich we remember from the Cuban missile crisis. Each side fear the other' preemption. In thi situation Russia, aware of the West's fears and of its operational plans, may take various
courses of action . First, it can wait without ups tting the fragile balance; but this choi e
appears dangerous because Russia lack a reliable assessment of its capability to retaliate if attacked first. If the Russian leader hip has such an asses ment, it is not particu larly dependable because it is unilateral, and most importantly, the potential aggressor
is not aware of this assessment. The second possible course of action for Russia is to
carry out a pre-emptive strike, now coordinated with the official military doctrine; but
even selective strikes by T r W will inevitably lead to a gJobaJ escalation and catastro phe. Finally, the third optioA would be to delegate, at the last possible mom nt, nuclear
release authority to various lower levels of the command and control system. This,
however, increases the danger of war because of an accidental (or unauthorized) a tion
by at lea tone of the command posts that receive nuclear releas authority and all necessary codes. As noted earlier, it is technically impossible to remove the potential for
predelegation, and it should not be done: with this potential built into the system, any
attempt to decapitate it would be tan.tamount to putting out fire with gasoline.
The conclusion from nightmare number 1 is obvious: all operational plans of attack
against opponent's C 3 systems should be removed from all command po ts, declared
unr alistic and dangerou . nee joint assessments of possible outcomes of such attempts are conducted, we will obtain rea ons not to mak such attempt : retaliation is
possible, global ecological consequences are catastrophic etc.
Nightmare number 2: fmmediate launch of missiles in .response to false information
from the EW . This "classical" mi take has been well investigated and is widely described in many unclassified studies. Tllis book has al o addressed the issue, so I will
only mention some conclusions. First, it would be useful to organize a constant presence at all C 3 facilities of l'epresentative of other members of the nuclear dub, probably as weU as of international organization . These representatives should be present
not only at EW' centers, as is aheady being done to a certain extent by th
tates and Russia, but also directly at the central command posts of nuclear forces. f
course, this cannot completely exclude the possibility of unpredictable action by one
of the sides in a critical moment. Therefore. it will be very important fo · the nited
'tates and Russia to reject L W as the maio posture, and to replac it with LUA.
Thus, as I said earlier, operational documents at command post. should contain references to LUA rather han to LOW. This more than 40-year-old delusion must be
corrected at last, if for no other reason than because n.o one really know how humans
will behave in such a super-uruque situation, at a threshold of war. The ubao nussil
crisis teaches us little in this respect, since EW did not exist then. n should not
stake everything on a completely unpredictable phenomenon without any re ults of
real life experiments, without any concrete knowledg - which cannot be obtained·

]Oint research and as

cain Russia and the IJnited


J 288

sessment will h 1
Now I would like to address
e p ex~lain why LOA
of devel
orne po stbl (
can be
e. although hi
carne the main posture.
opment. o events in the field
tected from accident
of negattve c
ghly undesirabl )
s an unauthorized
antral: ar CJ
e scenanos
nternatwnal crises test negative
systems relialfuly proas a result of an EWS
control as Well a
. .
error Is a complet [; .
POSitive co t
~~ntrol dismtegrates after predelegatio: o~ 1rure of negative cont~~o1.. A .missile launch
y of command and control: even if the c . ~u~Iear relea:3e authori. Snnilaxly, negative
be, for some time until th
nsis rs over th
ty down the hierarT' d
ey are completely
' e compromis d CJ
l o ay the greatest probl
. h
rep aced, used fo
codes may
em Is t e poss'b'l'
r unauth · d
1 1 Ity of seriou
t ro1m
peacetime Th ·
. .
. onze actions.
f 1d
e Situatwn m the w ld d
s Weakenmg f
~e and is deteriorating. Ther
oes not favor reliab1 o ne~ative contwna1 and domestic t
e are more than enough rea
r e protection in this
erronsm· smart
sons wr c
ested in more than pra t' 1 . ,k
. computer hackers, some f h oncern: internao w om ma b .
d . .
c Ica Jo es; drscont t
en among personnel . h
y e mterems; efiCiencies of cert .
bility of a menta11 '11 am s~stems, as well as their obsoles
Wit access to CJ sys··
cence· a d f
y 1 person
It would be wrong t
1 m a po.sition of considerable pow , n mally, a possio ana yze herem det '1
sueh an analysis could serve
ai vanous scenarios of such
as a textbook for terrorists (0
h potential threats;
designers of negat'
tions by an intrud~:~ c;ntr~1 systems should model all thinka~; s ~uld sa~ here that
e a~ unthmkahle ac. or Instance, here are some gene 1h
ra ypothetical scenarios
I~ (for instance) France, a grou of A
fmd out (either while already p b drab te.rronsts has seized an SSBN Th
on oar or m d
s. he terrorists begin to blackm~il the a vance the secret of launching
. usness, they launch one SLBM h' h d
world, and, to confirm theirs .
, w rc eta t
en~~ e ocean. If, however, they do not
na es Wit a warhead(s) somewhere
still bluff that .they can launch their s{;~ess ;~e secret of negative control, they
s. mally, when an attempt to eliminate the terronsts is mounted, the bl
co~s~quences. Or even worse: th: m~: up the whole SSBN, with all attendant
this time against land-based
1 y
age to launch one or more SLBM b
, rea targets.
- ut
A teenage hack
er anyw ere m the world t .
. s udies the structure and operations f
Important element of the US t
· . s rateg1c C3 t
o an
we connected with wider computer net sys em. . ~nee th~s system is relatively
least, there have already been intrusions i work~ .. this Is possible in principle. At
hacker announces via the Internet th t h nto military networks.) Then, the young
a e has created a virus capable of bl k'
the work of theseUS CJ 1
· · e ements In d
oc mg
m the subject, the hacker explains.
or e~to. emonstrate how well versed he is
derstand. He says that he can laun;~7: te~ nica1 details that
experts can LIDalso mentions how 1
e VIrus before he is caught Th t
ong It would take to eli .
e eenager
system. This will serve as food fo th
h mmate the vnus and unblock the CJ
r oug t to other countries as well.


270 1 IJl: Nucleal' Command, Contl'ol, Coopel'atlon

cain Russ/a BOd th
In one of the Russian ICBM regiments, a captain from the duty crew, driven to
distraction by lack of housing, miserly pay (which also is sometimes delayed),
family problems and lack of confidence in his and his family's future, has gone
completely mad: he informs the mass media that during his time in underground
command posts he has discovered the code blocking the combat launch equipment. Further, he says that he has shared the information with several of his
colleagues in other military units (the code is common), and that they can, in principle, launch the ICBMs on thei.r own, although only at targets already in their
computer memory. (The captain knows very well that today's detargeting is noth ing more than a show.) Of course, this is only a bluff the captain never shared
any information with anybody, because h could not possibly break the code. But
only Russian experts understand this. In view of world reaction to this episode,
th Russian military command has to completely replace the code throughout the
entire nuclear forces - an extremely problematic act.
One of the old Russian regimental command posts, which controls 10 remote
autonomous ICBM silos, loses all communications with the outside world- and
with its own launchers - for several hours, because of a breakdown of the wornout equipment. The regiment, which always kept live communication links, completely disappears from the sphere of negative control. ne can imagine the feelings of the higher command , which does no know why the regiment has "disappeared," and is justifiably concerned over the fate of the regiment's people and
missiles. This would be bad enough if the episode takes place in peacetime; but
what if it happens during an international crisis?
In Pakistan and India, less than responsible politicians have come to power, another crisis over Kashmir has flared up, there is fighting - so far - without nuclear
weapons . Unfortunately, because of a failure in the maintaining system of the
command and control system, a nuclear explosion occurs. This is confus d with
an attack, with an "adequate" retaliation following and subsequen t e calation.
This turn of events has negative consequences not only for the two nations, but
also lowers the nuclear threshold in other troubled regions.
The number of such hypothetical situations is large enough, and is growing. It would
be wrong to limit our concerns over negative control only to Russia. Russia has its
problems, but so do other nuclear nations.
The problem of negative control is objective for all nuclear nations, and it can be
solved only at the global level with the cooperation of all interested parties. Unilateral
actions in this area, even if they are 100 percent effective, cannot prevent attempts t~
test the strength of command and control safety systems. The problem is the degree
trust in unilateral declarations . A terrorist may believe declarations by one nation that



e Unned Bta~~~r.


1. s

.A,_,'>os,.._. I m

system is completely secure h
nty fC3
or e rna
. o
systems coming simultane 1
Y not believe i B
Impressive and more likely to d. ouds Y from .S. and Ru"~. ut affJ.rmation of aecuIssua e an
""tan off' 'al .
mted States nor Russia would .
~One rorn testing th
lCI sIS mucn more
. .
gam anyth 1 f
e syst
N ·
crencies, smce it is in the interest of b th th ng rom covering up th em.
etther the
in order. In such case the p bl'
at the other 's negativ
e other side's defi'
u rc wr e much
e control m.
t h at the terrorists th h k
JUOre 1ikely to t _
ec: 1laJ:Usl'tl cis
, e ac ers or the unfortuna
rust t le expert
r:e 'dUSstan captain are only ~~;~o say
As for an Insane leader at the top of a
pen, that the leaders of all nuclear
~y rn.t ' one hopes that thi .
cooperate in C3 As f'
states wrll be rational at least
. WIU not hap.
a rrst step th u · d S
, ratJon I
other the 1·
' e mte tates and Rus ·
a enough to
Atlantic w~:~ ~ p~ssr.ble Intrusion scenarios that are mod:;:dcoul~ shar~ with each
on oth Sides of the
eve opmg systems of negative command d
an control.




t is probably true that the main outcome of the Cold War was not only the "victery"
of the United States over the Soviet Union, and of the West over the East. In the final
analysis, all nations have benefited from the disintegration of the oviet empire ancd th
Socialist camp. An equally important outcome is that the 40-year long global political
and military confrontation ended peacefully without a nuclear catastrophe.
Nuclear weapons should not be viewed as a political instrument. evertbeless, Margaret Thatcher, the "iron lady," was right: nuclear weapon have kept peace on earth
for decades. A hypothetical aggressor is deterred from the temptation to use th nuclear
trump card not so much by fantastic scenarios of nuclear war and retaliatory strikes
developed by the opponent (the potential aggressor could only guess about the content
of such plans), but by the mere existence of the opponent's nuclear arsenal. The politicalleaders and military officers who have access to the nuclear "button" naturally fear
unpredictable global consequences. This fear is the most reliahle guarantee of peace.
It is insufficient, however, to pay attention only to the obvious qualitative aspect of
nuclear deterrence. It is equally useful to view the quantitative aspect of this question
and tra~k the changing positions of politicians and military commanders regarding the
uffic.i. ncy of nuclear deterrence. The evolution of these views during the Cold War
demonstrated that the invisible nuclear threshold is a very relative thing. Without going into detail, let us take note of two extreme points: in the 1970s and 1980s, both the
United States and the Soviet Union believed that 10,000 to 12,000 strategic nuclear
warheads for each side were barely enough to preserve strategic balance, even under the
limitations on BMD imposed by the 1972 ABM Treaty. And now, Russia and the
United States are ready to reduce their nuclear arsenals down to 1, 700 to 2,200 strategic
warheads, while work on NMD is unfolding in the United States. Why such a drastic
It appears that the intuition of the two nuclear superpowers' leaders has turned out
to be better than the complicated calculations of their military strategists. George W.
Bush and Vladimir Putin have actually shifted to a new kind of logic, and th General
Staff and Pentagon must be dra tically reviewing their operational plans to correspond
to new, more rational political attitudes. It is becoming increasingly clear that the old
scenarios of nuclear war and th respective requirements to the structure and composition of nuclear forces were developed using erroneous methodologies. Initially, both
sides relied on the simp! principl of approximate equality of arsenals, which is by

274 1 fJ: Nucteal' Command, Contl'ol, Coopet'ation

no means a scientific approach. Then the approach was correctly complemented by
assessments of the possible magnitude of retaliation; but these assessments were based
on the most probable (average) outcomes of war simulations, which is a serious methodological error. Even if retaliation by a victim of aggression is not highly probable, it
may still have catastrophic consequences for an attacker, something that a "rational
potential aggressor" cannot discount. Since catastrophic consequences of retaliation
are possible in principle, as demonstrated by numerous simulations of a hypothetical
conflict, deterrence would be reliable even when nuclear arsenals are rather small and a
BMD system is deployed.
Nuclear planners ignored this obvious fact for many years, and their delusion exacted a huge price from both the Americans and Soviets. After wasting vast resources,
both sides are now rapidly moving toward reasonable, sufficient levels of nuclear arsenals. The politicians have taken a correct and courageous decision, but now we are
facing a certain methodological vacuum: it appears that neither side can convincingly
substantiate this decision. If appropriate substantiations exist they should be revealed,
and the public in both countries will be reassured. So far this has not been done.
Common sense is good, but sometimes it's not enough. Russia's calm official reaction to the U.S. decision to abandon the ABM Treaty was immediately followed by the
Moscow Treaty of May 2002 on radical reductions of nuclear weapons . Until recently,
the combination of such two actions would have been viewed as complete nonsense.
Why has it turned out, after all, to make sense?
As long as there is no clear answer to this question, which is hardly rhetorical, there
will be stubborn resistance from the opposition to this sensible course of action, which
is approved by the majority of people both in Russian and the United States. This
resistance may grow in response to further advances in arms reductions. It will have a
negative impact on the domestic politics of both nations, and even drag us back to the
thinking and actions of the Cold War era, with resulting challenges, conflicts and expenditures.
This book proposes a possible approach to the joint U.S.- Russian substantiation of
sufficient level of nuclear deterrence. This approach employs the system of command
and control. Without reasonable openness in this area and correct accounting for the
C 3 factor, it is hardly possible to begin to rely upon such an informative indicator of
deterrence as "probability of retaliation not lower than required ." And without this
indicator, it is practically impossible to evaluate the "unlikely" but catastrophic outcomes of retaliation, which are the real deterring factor. Tbe approach propo ed in tlus
book fits the logic of common sense, with the new thinking of polit icians who have cut
the Gordian knot of offensive strategic weapons and BMD. This approach can serve as
a basis for developing a theoretical foundation for current and future political decisions
in this area.
The theoretical aspect of our approach is quite simple, and most probably will n~t
provoke serious objections. Practical implementation of this approach, however,

m uch more complicated E
- · iif271
have to
1. .
. xperts working on .
exp am Its advantages to the' 1
sa t
1r eaders (
ton ef thi
. ry o overcome the barrier of mutual distru users - a difficult task
a~proach wjjJ
gm to coope.ra.t~ in the secret field of C3. ]o' st between the recent
Itw~ be mecesproblem of Initial data becaus f
mt U.S.- ussian rnod 1i versatles and bel
e o secrecy But
e ng will
, as t 11s book d
r un mta the
em cou d be resolved F' ll a:£i
a1ways face the problem of L . . h
~ o JOmt modeling
be .s, s prob0
caoJce. ow much
are o tatned


hope':~;~;';:,:;e~:~b~~::~ll:s~:;r:.::::~t::;';:~~~ ;~~':~~::.~:.,~:7~: wll
ogy, but rather from its novelty Aft . l y
tcommgs of the proposed
abstract fear of retaliation to a ~uanti~~:~· we are proposing a qualitativ~ sh;~thodol­
tude. Initially this m
e measurem nt of its probab T
rom an
easurement will be appr .
lrty and magn .
more precise and detailed 0
h OXlmate, ut subsequently it w'1J b
ur approac also p
'd r
wr eac scenario Th
rovi es lOt estimates f
billions of dollars.- as ~~l~:;rp~VI~gd the system ~or assessment of det:re~:~e;~UJtures
· t work by US d R .OVI e more certamty·
1 save
I om
. .
. . an
ussian experts can l b .
vmcmg each side that its national securit will a so nng.other benefits, such as con1 .
not suffer m the process of exch
data on nuclear C3 This
ld 11
cone uswn and exchange f f
. o ltm guarantees of d . terrence
wou a ow both sides to cooperate . th
md e cru.c~al protection of nuclear J syste
from unauthorized actions T, d
f 1b
. .
. o ay, un er conditio
Is misswn is paramount.
ns o g o al war against terrorism
. The book proposes cooperation in the area of 3
S ff C.' Where to begin? Much has been
dlscusslOn of the approach proposed here.. tuh Ifc'e It to. say that an open wide-ranging
· alternative 1 d'
Is e Itst pnority. p erh aps someone would
. a mo re attractive
sufficient levels of nuclear deterre::emg ~o:he same goal: substantiation of minimum
over nuclear C3
evelopment of U.S.- Russian cooper t'
If .
a 1on
this happens, this book has fulfilled 't
. .
1 S ffilSSIOn.

S~Jd on. this subject throughout the book

AIIPindlx 1


Yarynich V.E. "Military Thought" (Voennaya Misl'), Moscow, N 12-1990 and N 9-1991.


Yarynich V.E. "Ways to Security," Peace Research Institute, N 319, 1992, Moscow, pp.39-52.



'"~ m•
Uoi~ f~ A~i<knoltTmdY-< U~ nfW~po"" M~,
hcynlch V. E. "B~;"' "'M~cte.?" "TnwMdH N0<Jc,· W~poo. Free Wodd," ln<e<o<~loml C<>nf~-, "Sw.;.
Yoomich V. E.
of <>mm•""
( 31)
Stt<><egic S>•biihy b<im•ho,.." "lmp1Jc,,; ,
Ol=in<lon of <he S,;,,
D'"''"'"lon, • lnre=<lo""'
Conference, Piarnu, Estonia, April 23-25, 1992. Publi hed in Tallinn, pp. 213-221.


ofNnd~e Pmiif~•hno Rieb md New Nndeoc 1bc~"•" Slockhoim, Noe. 19. 21,

ieh Published
foc<be PreYmlion
in Stockholm, 1993, pp. 155-159.

Yarynich V.E. "New Times" (Novae Vremja) NN 10 and 33, 1992.


Gen. Maksimov Y.P., ed. Raketnye voyska strategicheskogo naznachenija, Moscow, 1992, pp. 81-83, 123-


Yarynich V.E. Allgemeine Schweizerische Militarzeitschrift, Nr.4, April1993, p. 153-155.


V.E. 1993,
system's role and place" (in Russian). "START-2 and national security of Russia,"
pp 24-34.


Sutyagin Igor. The Use of Force, Nuclear Weapons, and Civil- Military Relations in the Soviet Union and Russia.
"Civil- iilitary
June Relations
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138. Weapons." Center for International Security and Arms Control, Stanford

10. Security,"
Podvig P.L.,
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Khronika osnovnykh sobytiy istorii RVSN (k 35-letiyu RVSN), Moscow, 1994.


Veterany-raketchiki vspominayut (k 35-letiyu RVSN), Moscow, 1994.


Yarynich V.E. "Yadernye strategii i faktor upravleniya," Segodnya, March 30, 1994.

14. Yarynich V.E. "The Doomsday Machine's Safety Catch." The New York Times, Feb. 1, 1994, p. A 17.
15. Yarynich V.E. Otsenka garantii, MGIMO, Moscow, 1994.

Tarasov, V.S. ed., Stremitel'nyy vzlyot, St. Petersburg Technical University, 1995.


Sorokin K.E. "Yadernoe oruzhie v epokhu geopolticheskoy mnogopolyarnosti," Polis, no. 4, 1995.


Gen. Yesin
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Maslyukov Y.S. "U dogovora SNV-2 poyavilsya shans," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, no. 21, June 5-18,


M.a.j. Gen.
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no. 4, July -August

21. July
' kin, V.M., "Problemy razvitiya sistemy upravleniya na sovremennom etape," Voennaya mysl',

Yarynich V.E. "The role of command system of nuclear weapons in the strengthening of strategic stability." "Russia: in sear h ofs trategy of security. The problems of security, arms limitations and peacekeepers." I MEMO RAN,
C MP, (in Russian). 1996, pp. 45-55.


Ne7.avisimoye voyt,mnoye obozreniye, Oct. 30, 1998.

24, 309.J
l'odeigJI.P.L, .J..


YOOm!bmie R"'"'i,


l!dA1; 1938, pp. 37·54, 128. 135, 215· 237

kom leksy, St. Petersburg,
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A V Utkin A.F., Popov . .,
25. Karpenko · .. ,
19-33 207.
National Press lnstiNevskiy Bastion, 1999' PP·
t . heskogo naznachemya. Moscow,
. R k t kh voys stra eg!C
M A Raketnoe oruzhle a e ny
26. Pervov · ·
234 .
tute, 1999 • Pp ·
Yadernyy kontrol'' November 1999.
17 1999.
28. Izvestiya, Nov. 12,1999.
. . moye voyennoye obozremye, Dec. '
29 .
0 1999.
. .
e voyennoye obozremye, Aug. 2 '
30. Nezav1snnoy
Arbatov, AJeksei, Bezopasnosr'. Rossiyshiy vybor,

loscow' EPltsentr, 1999, p. 51.

Blair. Bruce G ., Str11teg1c Command.(Urd Control. Redefining th Nuclear17trelll, Washington, D.C.: Brookings lnsti·
t\ltion, 19, S, p. 3.
Carter t\ ., tei.nbruner J. and Zraket
1987. p. 117 . .

., Managing Nuclear Operations, \.Vashlngton. D.C .: Brookings In titution.

lapis' OSI\Oimogu soderzlu1niya konsul 'ratsiy, A. A.



bukhova with
kov for providing me wlth this documenL

R. Bartholomew,

ct. 7. 1991 , 1 would like to

At that time, Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev was planning to establish strategic defensive forces, embracing
the 'NF, B ill and space troops..

lapis' osnovnogo soderzl1an iya kor15ul'tatsiy, A. t\.

bukhova with R. Bartbolom w, Nov. 25-27, 1991

Ball, Desmond, oviet Strategic Commmrd, Control, Communicat·ions and fntelligencd ( .31) System, Canberra; The
trategic and Defense tudies Centre, Australian 1ational University, 1985, p. 119.
Blair, Bruce G., Globlll Zero Alert for ludear Forces, \i ashington, D .C .: Brookings Jnstilulion , 1995, p. 60.

Yademy lwntrol ',

ovember 1999.

Ne:wvisimoye voyenu/Jye obozreniye, no. 49, Dec. 17, 1999.
"Kontseptsiya natsional' noy bezopasnosti Rossiyskoy Fcderatsii,"

e:wvisimoyc voy 'III!O)'C obo~mtiyc, no. 00 I. Jan.

14. 2000.

~orgy A. Arbatov, "The American trategic ebate: i\ Sovi t View,". urvival val. 16 (May·June 1974), pp. 133·
134, cited in Ball, Desmond, "Soviet trategic Planning and the ontrol of udear War," 171e ouiel Calculus of
uclear War, Ed. Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen P. 1 l ickiewio., 1986. (pp. 49- 67).


Ford, Daniel F., 17tc Bullon : 17re Pentago•1's Strategic Comm(Uid aitd Control ysldm,
Schuster, 19 5, p . 102.
Lt. Gen.

. Y . Solovtsov Rnd Mi\i .

en. V.T. Nosov, Voencl.)'a mysl' no. 9 (November/December 1994), p. 75.


A. Arba1ov, 81!Zopasnost' Rossiyskiy vybor, pp. 34 · 344 .


lbid.• pp. 44-345.


'ew York, IY: Simon and

Ford, 17ta Buttort : 11te Pimtagon 's tmtcgic ommand aud Control ~ltlm, p. 91 .
ln 1992, when the
F were located throughout Ru sia, Ukrnine, Kazakhstan and 13clarus, an agreement waJ;rcached
within the IS on consultations prior to the use of strategic forces. It has not been canccll·d yet.


Pavel Podvig, Ed., trategidteskoe yudemoe woruzl.euie Rossii. Moscow: lzdAT. 1998, pp. 53, 57.
Blair, Global Zero Alert for


uclear Forces, p. 43.

Ibid .. pp. 30-31.
Ibid., pp. 61-62.

Project Air ForceAuuuc1/ f{eport, Fiscal Year 1992. AR- 800-af. The RAND orporation, p. 2 '.

K.E. Sorokin, "Yademoe oruzhi v epokhu geopolticheskoy mnogopolyarnosti," Po/i$ no. -1 (1995), p. 22.
Podvig. Ed., trategiclre~koe yadcrnoc vooruzheuiu Rossii, pp. 6 -36 .
Col. en. V. M.Uaryn'kin, "Problemy razvitiyasistemy upravleniya na sovr mennoiTI ctape," Voennayu mysl' Oulyl
August 1996).
J\. Arbatov, pp. 437-438.

Nezavisimoye lltljoermoye obuzreuiye no. 49 ( ec. 17, 1999).


A. A. Obukhova with R. Bartholomew, Zapis' osnovnogo soderzhaniya konsul'tatsiy, Oct. 7, 1991.


Peter Feaver, "Command and Control in Emerging Nuclear Nations," International Security vol. 17, no. 3, (19921993), pp. 183-185.



Sorokin, "Yadernoe oruzhie v epokhu geopolticheskoy mnogopolyarnosti," p. 27.


Ball, Desmond, "Soviet Strategic Planning and the Control of Nuclear War," The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War,
pp. 49-67.


Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, p. 275.

Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nu l

c ear rorces p. 107


Johu D. tcinbruner '"' .
• wnmc under

Sergei Sokut, "Effektivnost', stoimost' realizuemost' ," Nezavisimoye voyennoye obozreniye, Oct. 30, 1998.
Mikhail Pervov, Raketnoe oruzhie raketnykh Voysk Strategicheskogo Naznach eniya, Moscow: National Press Institute, 1999, p. 173.


{;~~g. ~e TiffibecL~ a~l·~aming

Blair, Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat, p. 3.


John Erickson, "Soviet Command and Control," Military Review vol. 52, no. 1 (January 1972), pp. 41-50.



011 Strategi?
:{NucCIem· Attach,
., le Y ametrc DleOT)•ofD .
a nglon, .C.: .Brooko
.. ruee .. andSte· b
Slly Press, 1974· Carter A
t . bUCISion. uw Dm!Cizsion of Political An I . mpg~ Tnstrtutiort, 199!· St ~nbruner,
Br k· 1 · '
' ·• em runcr J and
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a ysrs, nncet
J: Princeton
· ern •·uner
oo mgs nstJtution 1987· Lebo 8 . .
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mar~d and Comrol Qj' • uclea.~ Fi. '~· etween Pl!(lceand \liar: The Nature of In ~ar perations, Wash in ton 11i~er:
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M ol'
mman an Co
anac· nla ' n
• " oml ttary Decisions, Santa I lonica,
A: The RAJ~tro : edejin~ng tl.e uc/ear nlr
lrQ, II! Logi~ of Accidental
Freedman, Lawrence Th E l .
orpordhon, 1964.
. uade, E.S., Aualysi< .for
• e vo utwn of N 1 S
' J•
Ibzd., p. 180
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Gottemoeller, Rose E., "Soviet Arms Control Decision Making Since Brezhnev," The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear
War, Ed. Roman Kolkowicz and Ellen Propper Mickiewicz, Massachusetts/ Toronto: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath
and Company/Lexington, 1984. (pp. 85-113.)


·R~~~~dc;~al1~~:~c;:fc~~ ~~:7:; g:~~ ~::· 7!•c LA,gic




~lltijic Amerie<rn vol. 250

lnsLJtutron, 1987; Richard L Gan . 2..~etts, uclear Blac/(Jnail and Nucll , Les~IIIISfor DefctiSt ~~grc ~ommand and
ecurity vol. 4 (Winter 1979~ 0) Vln, Launch under Attack to Redr ~r_BIIlance, Washin • munng, WashingP: C
, p, 117.
'eSs Mrnute111 an V 1 Ston, D.Co: .BrookingJ
at~- o.rnell, Elisabeth M., and Fischbeck Paul
u 11embility?" lnt,'1'11aticmal
mversrty, Center fodnternational
S.,/3ayestall : Updating of the Pr

A. Arbatov, Bezopasnost', p. 358.

tt k .. Sci

entnl Nuclear \Var; Targeting and Deter::,,~. ,


at; Ed


Garthoff, Raymond L., The Soviet High Command and General Staff, Santa Monica, CA: The RAND Corporation,
1955, p. 684.


Ibid., p. 181


n s ress, 1983, p lBl.



Daniel Goure, "C3 and the New Soviet Nuclear Forces," Signal vol. 41, no. 4 (December 1986), pp. 86-89.

J , Hemsley, "Command Technology: Voennaya Sistemotekhnika. An Algorithmic Approach to Decision-making,"
RUSI Journal vol. 125, no. 3 (September 1980), pp. 58-64.



Steven]. Zaloga, "Former Soviet ABM Chief Mocks USSR's Ballistic Missile Defense," Armed Forces Journal International (October 1990), p. 29.
G. Jacobs, "Soviet Strategic Command and Control and the Tu-142 'Bear J' ,"Jane's Soviet Intelligence Review vol. 3
(April 1991).


Blair, Bruce G . , The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993; Blair, Global


Woods, Stan, "Weapons Acquisition in the Soviet Union," The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War, Eds. R. Kolkowicz
and E.P. Mickiewicz, 1986. (pp. 236-237).



Ball, Desmond. "Soviet Strategic Planning and the Control ofNuclear War," The Soviet Calculus of Nuclear War, Eds.
R. Kolkowicz and E.P. Mickiewicz, p. 63.


Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War; Targeting ami Detemmce, London: Ll S, 1992; Dlair, Global ZeroAlertfor
Nuclear Forces; Blair, Bruce G. Strategic Command and Contrpl: Redefining the Nuclear TI1reat, Washington, D.C.:
Brookings Institution, 1985; Bracken, Paul, The Command and Control of uclear Forces, Yale University Press,
1983; Ford, Daniel F. , The Button: The Pentagon's Strategic Command and Control System. ew York, Y: Simon
and Schuster, 1985; Pry, Peter V. The Strategic Nuclear Balance - Volume I : Anti \Vhy it Matt.en. ew York, Y:
Taylor & Francis, 1990; Pry, Peter V. The Strategic Nuclear Balance - Volume 2: Nuclear Wars Exchanges and Out·
comes, New York, NY: Taylor & Francis, 1990; Lebow, Richard led, Between Peare and War: 'J1,e Nature of Inter·
national Crisis, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1981 ; 'agan, Scott ., Moving Target~: Nuclear Strategy and No·
tiona/ Security, Princeton University Press, 1989.




Ibid., p. 61.

Ball, Desmond, Politics and Force Levels: The Strategic Missile Program o.f tlu1 Kennedy Administmtion, niversity of
California, 1980; Targeting for Strategic Deterrence, London: US , ummer 1983; "U. . trategic Forces: How Woul~
They Be Used?" International Security vol.7 (Winter 1982-8 ); Ball, Desmond and Richelson. Jeffrey, lroJegt•
Nuclear Targeting, Cornell University, 1986; Reed, Thomas .. "The Role of uderu: Weapons in the ew World
Order," Briefing for the Joint Strategic Target Planning taff/St.m tegic Advisory Group, trategic . eterrencc' tudy
Group, Oct. 10, 1991.
Stein, Peterand f'eaver, Peter, Assuri11g Co11trol ofl uclear Wen pons: 71te Evolution of Permissiwi\Gtion Links ..La;a::
MD: University Press of Ameri01, 1987; Cotter, Donald R .. ""Peace Time perations: Safety and S~cunty, D C.:
Ashton B. ilrter, Johll D . 'te.illbruner, and C harles A . Zraket, Managing Nuclear Operations, Washington,
Brookings Institution, 1987. (pp. 17-74): Dan aldwe/J, "Permissive Action Links: A Deso:iption and Propos '
Survival vol.29 (May-June 1987), pp. 224-38.


Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, p. 316.

Ibid., p. 39.
Ibid., p. 41.
Ibid., p. 41.
Blair The L · 0>/A .
cC!dental Nuclear w,
Ibid., p. 20.

Ibid., p. 280.
Ibid., p. 285.
Ibid., pp. 284-285.
uc ear rorces, p. 19.
BlaJr, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War
Ibid., p. 284.
Blair, Global Zero Alert for N




Ibid., p . 170.
Ibid., p. 173.
Ibid., p. 274.



Ibid., p. 170.
Ibid., p. 16.
Ibid., p. 3.
Ibid., p. 18.

;u ..


o zs no. 4 (1995), p 18.
Lt. Col G A K
. uznetsov and Maj S P Strel a "
mysl no. 3 (May-June 1~95)
. .
y ev, Mnogopolyarnyy miri voprosy dostatochn
Ibzd., p 38.
oshSNV, Voennaya


Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces.


Blair, Strategic Command and C t I R
on ro : edefining th N 1
K. E. Sorokin "Y, d
e uc ear Threat, p. 5.
a ernoe oruzhJe v epokhu
I .
geopo hcheskoy mnogopolyarnosti "p I'

Ibid., p. 138.

Ibid., p. 140.

Ibid., p. 143 .


Ibid., p. 118.


Ibid., P· 259.
. C
nd and Control System.
Ford, The Button: The Pentagon's Strategtc omma



Karpenko, Utkin, Popov, Otechestvennye strategicheksie Raketnye kompleksy, p. 31.


Igor u yagin, "The seofPorce, 1 udearWeapons, and Civil-Military Relation. in the Soviet Union and Russia:
ivii -Military Relations and uclear Weapons," Center for International Secu rity and Arms Control, Stanford
U niversity, june 1994, pp. 111 - 138, 145; Blair, Global ZeYo Alert for Nuclear Forces, Tarasov, Ed., Stremitel 'nyy
vzlj'l)t; Pervov, Rakttnoe omzhie raketnykh Voysk rralegiclrtiSk<>go Naznacll eniya, p. 173.


Podvig, Ed., trmegiche.o;koc yadenroewon•zl•cnie Rossii, p. 235; Blair, Tire logic of Accidental uclear \Var, P- 157;
Karpenko, tkin, Popov, Otcchestvenn ·e strategiclleskie naketnye kompleshy; Pervov, Ral<etnoe oruzl1ie r11ketuyhl•
Voysk Strategiche.o;ko Naznacllcniya, !ini try of Defense, Peter the Great iilitary Acad my, 1999; \loermyy
entsiklopedicheskiy slovar' raketnyl<h Voysk lrategiclreskogo Naznaclreniya , • linistry of Defense, Peter the Great Mi litary Academy, 1999.


Tarasov, Ed., Stremitel'nyy vzlyot.

Ibid.' p. 40.
k by Charles Zraket of the MITRE Corporation.
87-88. The author quotes the 198 remar s
Ib t ., PP·


Ibid., p . 24.


Ed Analysis for Military Decisions.
l ..-Nuclear Forces.
Bracken The Command and Contra O;
" A
l is jior Military DeciSions, Ed. Qua e, PP·
D ·
f Conflict Systems,
t "Analysis and estgn o
Wohlstetter, Alb er •

,...,, d


~ua e,



Ibid., p. 136.



Bh .
b t Enemy e avtor,
T. C. Schelling, "Assumptions a ou
ommand and Control of Nuclear Forces.
Braeken, The C



Ibid., p. 99.


Ibid, p. 128.

Ed Quade p. 199.
"Analysisfior Military Deetswns, .


Podvig, Ed., Strategicheskoe yadernoe vooruzhenie Rossii, p. 235; Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, p. 157.


Podvig, Ed., Strategicheskoe yadernoe vooruzhenie Rossii, p. 235.


Podvig, Ed., Strategicheskoe yadernoe vooruzhenie Rossii, p. 235; Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, Index.


Podvig, Ed., Strategicheskoeyadernoe vooruzhenie Rossii, p. 215,230-237.


fnformation about the designers of command and control systems for the airborne strategic nuclear forces can be
found in Tarasov, V.S. Ed., Stremitel'nyy vzlyot; Podvig, Ed., Strategicheskoe yadernoe vooruzhenie Rossii, pp. 3093 I 1; 131air. Tilt Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, pp. 76, 165.
Information about the command posts of the top echelons of th command of the Armed forces of Russian ~ deralion c:m be found in Yesin, Ed. Sozdateli -rakelntJ·yademogo oruzlriy11 i veterony·mhctchiki rassiMzyvayut, pp. 28-39;
Voemryy entsik/opediclwskiy s/owr' raketny/~/1 Vo.)•sk !Tategicl1eslwgo Naznaclrerri)vl; Podvig, Ed., trarcgicl1esk0a
yadernoe Wc1ruzl1enis Rossii, pp. 45, 5'2-54; .,utyagin. "The Use of Force, ' uclear \.Veapons, and ivil - lilitary
Relations in the Soviet Union and Russia: Civil-Military Relations and 1 uc.lear Weapons," pp. Ill · I 38; Blair, Jl1e
Logic of 1\ccidentttl Nuclear \Var, pp. 78, 141-1 SO, 16 -1(iS.

. .
A. Arbatov, Bezopasnost'. Rosstyshty vybor, p.



Ib t.d·


1987 pp 611-639.
· Nuclear Operatwns,
• ·


Carter, A., Steinbruner, J. and Zraket, C.,


Ibid., p. 612.


Ibid., p. 619.


Ibid., p. 620.


Ibid., p. 624.


Ibid., p. 639.
. GlMO 1994.
. h VE Otsenkagaranttt, Moscow. M







Podvig. trategiclteskoe :yadernoe 1Xl0ntzf.enid Ros ii, pp. 50, 378; Igor ut}•a_gin, ''0 diskussi po povodu planov
KSSS: ne vsyo takodnoznachno," Moscow: Center for 'tudy of t\rm' ontrol, Energy and Ecology,
Moscow Physical Technical Tnstitute. M.arch I 5, 1999; Sutyagin, "Th Use oJ Force, luclcar \Venpons, nnd ivi iMilitary Relations in the Soviet Union and Russia: Civil-Military Relation and ' udearWeapons," p. 127; IJiair,
Global Zero Alert for uclear Forces, Index.

Quade Ed.' Analysis for Mihtary Dectswns.
d 0 portunities Arising from the August Revol:"C m'atld and Control of Soviet Nuclear Weapons. Dafnfgersoafnthe ~ommittee on Foretgn Relations, US. Sena e,
European a atrs
, " Hearing before the subcommittee on
t1t0o~~d Congress, first session, Sept. 24, 1991.
. lU .
'ty 1995· Mikhail Pervov, Raketnoe oruzhie
bur Techmca ntverst ,

• · ., .,
heniya Moscow,
1 or· A ·
k tnykh Voysk Strategichesuogo aznac
, Tarasov Ed., Stremite uyy 1.!Z y '
ra e
d th competition between t em, see
. h
t p tersburg, vs ty
On Nll AA, LPl D~sign:~\e;up:~v ~rcchust'llellll)'8 strategicheksie Ral!el~l~8 ~ompl~.;;,a~hru~i)·a, PP· \72-173.
. .
11;1/108 oruzhie raketnyhh Voysk Strategtc 18S logo
. and Russia:
Karpenko, A.F. Utktn an
d ivil-Military Relations in the Sovtet UCmon l Stanford
Bastion, 1999, PP· 22_-23; Pervov, Ra
luch:ar Weapons, an
d Arms antra ,
Igor Sutyagin, "The ~se o o~e, I
Weapon~." Center or Intcmational Secun~ a~Blair Global Zero Alert for
Civil-Military RelatiOns and uc ea~l . TI I ogic of )\ccicfe-nlttl l uclear War, In ex,
University, June 1994, PP· I I 'I · I 38; a•r, te •


\ 35

utyagin, ,;The Use of Force, fuclcarWeapons, and Civil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union and Russia: CivilMilitary Relations and ludear Weapons," pp. 111-138; Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, Index; Sutyagin,
''0 diskussi po povodu planov sozdaniya OGK SSS: ne vsyo tak odnoznachno."


"Command and Control of viet 1uclear Weapons: Dangers and Opportunities Arising from the August Revolution," Hearing before the ubcommitt eon European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,
102nd congress, first session, pt. 24, 1991.



. h hogo Naznac
Nuclear Forces, In dex.
M k.
Ed Raketnye Vyska Strategtc es 'k'
Gen Yu
a stmov,
ketcht r
Tarasov, Ed., Stremitel'nyyvz yot; . rid So~da;eli raRetno-yadernogo oruzhiya i veterany-ra
M oscow,
Moscow:TSIPK. 1996.






ji Nuclear rv• •
h .
81·Blair,G1oba1ZeroA1ert or
V. k St t gicheskogo Naznac emya, p. '
Maksimov, Ed., Raketnye .oy~ a r~ e
88-97, 104, 148-151.
R ketnoe on•ihi~t
Index; Tarasov, Ed., Stremttel nyy vz yot, PP·
. h k . Raketnye Kompleksy, p. 24; Pervov, a
. P
Otechestvennye Strategtc e ste
Karpenko, Utkm, opov,
Nuclear forcq$.
Raketnykh voysk strategicheskogo naznachemya, p.
, h .
1 56· Blair, Global Zero Alert for
· h kogo naznac emya, P·
Ed Raketnye voyska strategtc es
M akSlmOV, .,
Index; Tarasov, Ed., Stremitel'nyy vzlyot, p.

Much has been published recently about tJ1e KCtZbeh. it was even. the subject f newspaper articles and TV programs. See Podvig, Ed.,, lrategicheskoe yodernve voomzlum ie Rossii, pp. SO. 378; utyagin, "The Use of force.
Nuclear Weapons, and ivil-Military Relations in the Soviet Union and Russia; ivil -Military Relations and 'uclear
Weapons," pp. 111- 13 ; Blair. Tiw Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, In lex; Blair, Global Zero Al~rt for 1 nclear
Forces, Index.




RF, Air Force, and N•wy.

" ommand and Control ofSoviet Nuclear Weapons: Dangers and Opportunities Arising from the August Revolution," Hearing before the ubcommittce on European Affairs of the Committee on Foreign Relations, U.S. Senate,
102nd congress, first session, Sept. 24, 1991, p. 5.
The algorithm ofla.u nch operations in the Russian C' system is also described in Podvig, ed., Strategicheskoe yadernoe

vooruz/1enie Rossii, pp. 50-54.

Izvestiya, Nov. 12, 1999.


/\bout the .' ignal s stem, sec 'Nlaksimov, ·d., Ral1elnyc Voyska ' trcrtegich()Shogo Naz naclleniya , pp. 83. 12 -126:
Hemsley,] .. "Command Technology: Voennaya istemotekhnika: /\n Algorithmic Approach to Decision-making," pp. 58-M. Index; Taras0 v, Ed .. lremitel'nyy vzlyot: .ol 3Cn. ViktorYcsin, Eel., ozdt•teli ralle/JIO· ·ademdgo
oruzl1iyC1 / vererany-raketchihi 'l'liSskazyvayut, lvloscow: TSI PI<, 1996, p. I ~2 ; Yuri Mas!yukov, "U dogovorn N\12 poyavilsya shans," ezavisimoye VO.)'ennoye obo~eniye no. 21 (Jun 5-18, 1996); Bh1ir, The l...ogic of 1\ccid~n tal
uclear \Var, pp. 76. 100, 145, Index.


For the latter type of publications, see "Command and Control of Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Dangers and Opportu-

nities Arising from the August Revolution," Hearing before the ubcommiltee on European AlTairs of the Com~
mit tee on l"oreign Relations, U.S. nate, I02nd ongress, first session, Sept. 24, 1991 ; Maksimov, Ed., IWetnye
lfo.)oslw t-ralegiclteskogo 't1Z1wcl1eniya, p. 156; !31air, 17Je Logic of Accidelllal Nuclear \.lh1r, lndex; Blair, Bnu:e G.,
"Russia's Doomsday 1 Iachine,'' Tit~ New Yorl: Tim<JS, Oct. 8, 1993, p. 17; Sutyagin, ''The Use of Force, udear
Weapon~. and Civi l· liJitary Relat ions in th Soviet Union and Russia: ivi i-M ilitary Relations and luclearWeap·
ons," pp. 11 '1-1.38: 13!air, Globt1l ZeroAiertfor Nuclear Forces, Index: Yuri Maslyukov. "U dogovoraS V-2 poyavilsya
6hans," Ne;z;avisimoy<~ooyennoye obozreniye no. 21 (June 5-1 , 1996): Podvig, Ed., tralegiclwskoe ytldtrtloeVOI)ruzhenie
Rossii, pp. 52·53.



Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear W,

Karpenko, Utkin, Popov, Otechestvennye strategicheksie Raketnye kompleksy.
Frequently, strategic systems were put on combat watch before passing formal acceptance tests because of the arms
race pressure.



Karpenko, Utkin, Popov, Otechestvennye strategicheksie Raketnye kompleksy, p. 207.




Voennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar' Raketnykh Voysk Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya (Moscow: Ministry of Defense,
Peter the Great Military Academy, 1999, pp. 626·629.


Podvig, Ed., Strategicheskoe yademoe vooruzhenie Rossii, p. 57.


Conditions for combat actions by the crews of radio command and control centers, as well as the information about
command missiles, can be found in Podvig, Ed., Strategicheskoe yadernoe vooruzhenie Rossii, pp. 52·53.




Izvestiya, Nov. 12, 1999.


Podvig, Ed., Strategicheskoe yadernoe vooruzhenie Rossii, p. 234; Blair, The Logic ofAccidental Nuclear \Var, pp. 129, 157.



Podvig, Ed., Strategicheskoe yadernoe vooruzhenie Rossii, pp. 128·130, 221-227; Maksimov, Ed., "Raketnye Voyska
Strategicheskogo Naznacheniya;" Tarasov, Ed., Stremitel'nyy vzlyot; Yes in, Ed., Sozdateli raketno·yadernogo oruzhiya


I veterany·raketchiki rasskazyvayut.

About military representatives (voenpredy), see Podvig, Ed., Strategicheskoe yadernoe vooruzhenie Rossii, p. 37.


On some of Lh former nnd currently operati11g lcfense industrial enterprises that have conLributed to building a
strntegic C systeltl, see Maksimov, Ed .. "Raketnye \/! }'Ska Strntcgicheskogo 1 azna heniya," pp. 82, 157; Tarasov,
Ed., Stremital'nyy vzlyot, pp. 8~97; Yesin, Ed., ozdnteli rahetno-yadernogo OTuzl1iya I v~t,mmy-ralletclriki
rassl1azyvayut, pp. 28-39, 134, 142-147; Karpen ko. Utkin, Popov. Otedrest1!emryestmtegiclre/1Sie Ralletnyehompleksy.
pp. 24, 31; Pcrvov, Rahetnoe oruz/1 ie RallelrrJ•Illt Voysk lrategicheskogo N aznacheniya.



Ibid., p. 222.
Ibid., p. 225.



Ibid., p. 218


Tarasov, Stremitel'nyy vzlyot, p. 136.


Woods, \Veapons Acquisition in the Soviet Union; R. Kolkowicz and E.P. Mickiewicz, Eds., "The Soviet Calculus of
Nuclear War," p. 232.


For a sufficiently detailed description of the system of weapons R&D and production in the USSR and Russia, see
Podvig, Ed., Strategicheskoe yadernoe vooruzhenie Rossii, pp. 37·40, 135-150.



Tarasov, Ed., Stremitel'nyy vzlyot, p. 5.


Col. Gen. I. D. Sergeyev, "Sovershenstvovanie bocvoy gotovnosti Raketnykh voysk strategich skogo naznacheniya
v usloviyakh realizatsii dogovoro po SNV," Vocnnaya mysl' no.6 (November-December 1995), P· 19.


Col. Gen. V. M. Baryn'kin, "Problemy razvitiya sistemy upravleniya na sovremennom etape,'' \locnna)'a mysl' GulyAugust 1996), p. 31.


Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, p. 73.


Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear \Var, p. 112.


Some information on operational planning of Russia's SNF can be found in Podvig, Ed., Strategicheslloe yadtn'riO<!
vooruzhenie Rossii, pp. 45·47.


NJ· p .

· nnceton Un·1vers1'ty,

Ibid., pp. 243·244.
Ibid., pp. 7, 246.
Coakley, Thomas P., "Command and C
Press, 1991, p. 43.
ontrolforWarand Peace,"Washington DC. N .
B .
' . . . atJOnal Defense Universit
lair, Strategtc Command and Control, p . 243.
Sergeev, Col Gen r D "S
. . .' overs enstvovanie b
v uslovJakh realizatsii dogovorov po SNV" Vi oevOJ gotovnostz Raketnikh Voisk Strategichesk
Wood "
. .
oennaya Mysl' no. 6 (November-D
ova aznacheniya
s, Weapons AcqUJsJtion in the Soviet U . " Th S .
ecember 1995), Moscow.
· S
e ovtet Calcul 0ifN 1
Bl a1r,
trategic Command and C
uc ear War p 207
ontro, p. 279.
' ·
Ibid., p. 281.

Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, p. 107.
Ibzd., p. 90.

Ibid., pp. 98·99
Ibid., p. 97




cunty, Pnnceton

an ontrol, p. 243.


Woods, Stan, Weapons Acquisition in the Soviet Union, Eds. R . Kolkowicz and E.P. Mickiewicz, "The Soviet Calcu·
Ius of Nuclear War," 1986, p. 222.

Bl a1r,
· S trategic Command


n com mand and comrol of divisions ofsi lo·based a nd mobile JCB fs, se Karp¢nko, tkin. Popov, Oteclrestuenny
st.-rarugiclreksic l~aketnye hompleksy, pp. 19-33; Podvig, Ed., trategiclreskoe yadcmoe vooruzlwnie Ros.cii, pp. 131 ,
150-154; Maksimov, Ed. Ralretnye Voyskll tralegicileskogo aznaclwniya; Yesin,Ed. o~doteli ral!etno-yadernog11
oruzltiya 1 vetertJny-raketc/!il1i rasskazyooyut; Blair, Tire Logic of Accidental uclear \Var; .BI;~ir, Globa l Zero Alert for
Nucle1rr Forces; Pervov, Ral•etnos o:ruzlric Ral1etrryhb Voysk, trategicheskogo azrwcl1erriya, pp. 173,227,234.

I >I


ar,pp. 328-329.

ry, The Strategic Nuclear Balan
Vi I
ce. o ume 2: Nuclear 1-\~rs· E
ee, for mstance, Blair "St t . C
· xchanges and O
Wars· E h
ra egJc ommand and Control·" P •
utcome;:, p. 26
· xc anges and Outcomes· Ford "Th B
• ry, 71re LYa.tegi N
Babbit, Albert E. "Command Centers'" Me ~tton: Th Pentagon's Strat~i ':;lear Balance. Volume 2: Nuclear
anagmg Nuclear Operatiolls Croak~ ommand and Control System·"
L., Strategic Nuclear War: What th S'
e uperpowers Target and \VI1 G '
rngs lnstztuti
Bl a1r, Strategic Command and C t l
Y· reellwOO(j Press N von, 98 7; Savage, Paul
on ro , p. 241.
• ew wrk, 1986.
Sagan, Scott D., "Mavin 'I
1989, p. 9.
g argets: Nuclear Strategy and National Se . " .








Pry, The Strategic Nuclear Bal
ance. Volume 2:
Ibid., p. 27.
Nuclear Wars · E
• xchanges and Outcomes, p. 23.
Ibid., p. 29.




Podvig, Ed., Strategicheskoe yadernoe vooruzhen. R ..
B ·
1e ossn, p. 237.
laJr, The Logrc of Accidental Nuclear War, p. 278.
Carter, A., Steinbruner,]. and Zraket C Ed



' ·· s., anagmg Nucl
The Logic of Accidental N I
ear peratwns, p. 46.
uc ear war, p . 279
Ibid., p. 279

Carter, A., Steinbruner, J.. and Zraket C Ed M
"Command and Control fSo . N ' .,
s., anagmg Nuclear Operations, p . 53.
t' " H .
VIet ucle<)r Weapons· 0
eanngs before the ubcommittee on Euro~~1Arl~~rs an f Ohpportunities Arising from the August Revolu
Sentate. 102nd Con
..-~ ·
umrs o t e Committ
F ·
gress, 1st ses ron , Sept. 24, 199 1; pp. 10, 22.
ee on oreJgn Relations of the U.S.
Blair, The Logzc of Accidental Nuclear War, p. 82.
Ibid., p. 82.
Ball • "So v1et
· Strategic Command C t I C
. .
' on ro , ommumcatJ
Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nu l
ons an nte11•gence (C'f) System," p. 143
c ear war, pp. 84·86
:la~r, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, p. 49.

"la.~r, The Logzc of Accidental Nuclear War, p. 85.
_Co~mand and Control of . viet uclear Wea ns· Da


~~~~d Heanng before the _'ubcommitteeon Eu:pe~n A~f!~;: =~!O~portu~ItJes Arisin~ from the August Revolu.

congress, fJrst Se8SIOil, Pl. 24 199'
B! ·

'· P· .
aJr, The Logtc of Accidental Nuclear War, p. 112.

e ommJttee on ForeJgn Relations U S S
• · . enate,


Sagan, "Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security," p. 118.



Pry, "The Strategic Nuclear Balance," Exchanges and Outcomes, Volume 2: Nuclear Wars.



Ibid., p. 17.



Speed, Roger D., Strategic Deterrence in the 1980s, Stanford, CA: Hoover Institution, 1979, p . 69.




Blair, Bruce G., "Alerting in Crisis and Conventional War," Managing Nuclear Operations, Eds. Carter, Ashton B.,
Steinbruner, John D., Zraket, Charles A., Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1987, pp. 107-108.

Ibid., p . 271.


Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, p. 136.


Ibid., p. 137.


Ibid., p. 140.

Ibid., p. 49.
Ibid., p. 52.


Blair, Bruce, G., Strategic Command and Control: Redefining the Nuclear Threat, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985, p. 226.


Ibid., p. 47.
Ibid., p. 48.

Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear Wt
eaver, Guarding the Guardians. C' ·t· C

. lVI lan ontro/ of N



Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and N t. I uc ear Weapons in the Unit d S
Ibid., p.142.
a wna Security,p.t _
e tates,p.S..,




2 16

Ibid., p. 143.


Ibid., p. 145.


Ibid., p. 150.



Ibid., p. 163.



Ibid., p. 163.


Ibid., p. 166.



Samokhvalov, Plotnikov, "Problemy ispol'zovaniya novykh informatsionnykh tekhnologiy v upravlenii voyskami,"
Voennaya mysl' no. 4 (July-August 1996), p. 41.


"U.S.-Russian Strategic Missiles Detargeting Complete," Arms Control Today (July-August 1994), p. 26.



Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, p. 79.


Podvig, Ed., Strategicheskae yadernoe vaoruzhenie Rossii, p. 152.



Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, pp. 219-254.


Ibid., pp. 251-252.


Paul Podvig, "The Operational Status of the Russian Space-Based Early Warning System," Science and Global
Security vol. 4 (1994) pp. 370-371.
See Podvig, Ed., Strategicheskoe yadernoe vooruzhenie Rassii, pp. 42-44.


There i~ an intt•r·esting dis~repancy in the American and Russian terminology. Tn the Ame;ricnn terminology. we
usually refer to two different postures: launch-on-warning and launch-under-attack. Russians frequently hav
three distinci terms to describe n1rclear postures. Vst'l'eclwyy udar (a meeting str:ike, like meeting engagement in
conventional military terminology) is a strik delivered only in response to data obtained by the EW · ,and thus is an
equivalent of th American l:tunch-on-warning. Otvel71o-vstrecln1)')' udar {a retaliatory/meeting strike) is lmmched.
as soon as sensors record the first nu lear detonations on friendly territory. before. an assessment of the enemy strike
can be. performed. Otwhryy udar (a retaliatory strike) is launched only after a post-attack assessment is completed;
it's most precise Engl ish equivalent is delayed second strike. For the sake of convenience, we refer to the econd and
third sce.11arios as lau nch-under-attack, unless it is necessary to specifically refer todclayed second strike.

23 1

Kartchner, Kerry M., "The Objectives of Arms Control," Arms Control: Toward the 21st Century, Eds. Larsen,
Jeffrey A., Rattray, Gregory J., Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1996, p. 20.


Blair, Global Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, p . 56.


Ibid., p. 105.


Ibid., p. 103.


Ibid., p. 104.


Ibid., p. 100.


Ibid., p. 103.


Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strategy and National Security, p. 141.


Feaver, Peter D., Guarding the Guardians: Civilian Control of Nuclear Weapons in the United States, Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 1992.

Ibid., p. 46.

Sagan, Moving Targets: Nuclear Strate
Bl . B
gy and Natwnal Security p 4
air, ruceG., "TheEffectsOfUS P 1'
' ..
U.S. Security Interests The As
.o Icy On Russian Nuclear Control " Th p l'"
pen nstJtute Workshop, Aug. 10-15, 1996.·
e ro !Jeration Threat ofWMD and




Blair, The Logic of Accidental Nuclear War, pp. 78-80
Blair, Global Zero Alert for N I

uc ear 1·orces, p. 54
Bla1r Bruce G "R · ,
uss!a s Doomsday Machine " Th N
~lair, The Logic of Accidental uclettr War pp' 78 ;0 ew Y~rk Times, Oct. 8, 1993, p . 17
' . - ' 208; 'Command d
angers and pportunities A .. . fi
;•sr~g rom t~e August Revolution. " He.a . anb Control of Soviet Nucl Wi
Affairs of the Committe
e. on orergn RelatiOns, U.S. Senate I 02 d Co rrng efore the ubcommi
ear eapons:
arymc 'V.E., "The Doom d M ch' '
ogress first. .
BJ . G! b
s ay a me s Safety Catch," TheN y,
. ' . scssron, Sept. 24, 1991
alf, o al Zero Alert for Nuclear Forces, p. 53.
ew ark Times, Feb. 1, 1994, p. A17
Ib!d., pp. 55-56.

Ryaboshapko, Maj. Gen. V.A r






· ( et.), Uslov1ya perekhod k
mys no.4(July-August1996) PP 1014
a vozmozhnomuprimeneniyuyad
Feaver, Guarding the Guardians. c· 'I' , C . - .
ernogo oruzh,ya,"
. lVI ran antral of N I Wt
lzvestiya, Nov. 12, 1999.
uc ear eapons in the United States, pp. 20-21.



Lynn Eden and Steven E M'lJ
· 1 er,
s Nuclear A
antra Debates, Ithaca, NY: Cornell
p rguments. Understanding the Strategic N l A
nlvers!ty ress 1989 p 122
uc ear rms and Arms
lb I ., p. 122.
' ·

u'. .

Ibid., p. 121.



Coakley, Command and Control for War and p




ee Paschall, C3I and the National Milita
. .
Ed. Thomas P. Coakley, Washington,
1980, cited in C3I: Issues of Command and Con
Sherman Frankel. "Abortin U
efense Unrverslty Press, 1991, p. 118.
struction," Sci
g nauthonzed Launches ofNuclear-A
. .
. .
ence and Global Security vol. 2 (1990), pp. 1-20.
rme Balhshc Missiles through PostlaunchDe-

D.C~ ~::::~d;ystem,




Anti-Ballistic Missile
automobile-based reserve command post
automated command and control system
airborne command post
Armed Forces

Air Force Satellite Communications
airborne launch control center
Ballistic Missile Defense




C-cube (command, control, communications)
C-cube-I (command, control, communications, and intelligence)
complex of command missiles
Central Intelligence Agency
Commonwealth of Independent States
command post
Communist Party of the Soviet Union
command system
clearly unacceptable damage
decimeter range
Department of Defense
Defense Satellite Communications System
delayed second strike
Emergency Action Message
extremely low frequency
electro-magnetic pulse
Emergency Rocket Command System
Early Warning System
global information system
General Staff

CUD (cud)
helicopter-based airborne command post
high frequency
high-level military command post
individual channel
intercontinental ballistic missile

290 1 (}1: Nucteal' Command, Conll'ol, Coopel'alion




Joint Chiefs of Staff
kcomandnaya sistema boevogo upravleniya (combat command system)
launch control center
low frequency
launch on warning
Leningrad Polytechnic Institute
launch under attack
mathematical expectation
major channel
middle frequency
Military, Strategic, Tactical and Relay
multiple independently targeted reentry vehicle
National Command Authority
nuclear delivery system
National Missile Defense
North American Air Defense Command
nuclear potential
nuclear weapons
preliminary authorization
permissive action links
pul't avtonomnogo puska (device for launching a missile)
Research and Development
radio-boevoe upravlenie (RBCC; radio battle command channels)
radio command center
Russian Federation
satellite apparatus
Strategic Air Command
strategic bomber
satellite communications
shore communications facility
standardized command post
Strategic Defense Initiative
statistical imitation model
system for identification of nuclear attack
submarine-launched ballistic missile
Strategic Nuclear Forces
Strategic Rocket Forces
nuclear submarine armed with ballistic missiles
Strategic Arms Reduction Talks

...., I m

T~k· Ctrhategic Command
argeAnd M
ove Out
UD (ud)
nuclear weapons
unacce~table damage
ult.ra-~Igh frequency
unifitsnovanny kom d
ultra-l~w frequenc;n nyy punkt (standard colllrnand ost
very high frequency
p )
very low frequency
weapons of mass destruction