You are on page 1of 90

GARCIA VS RECIO G.R.

138322 Oct 2 2001

Rederick Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson an Australian citizen, on March 1, 1987. On
May 18, 1989 a decree of divorce dissolving the marriage was issued by the Australian Family Court. On
June 26, 1992, Recio became an Australian citizen. Subsequently, Recio entered into marriage with Grace
Garcia, a Filipina, on January 12, 1994. Starting October 22, 1995, Recio and Garcia lived separately
without prior judicial dissolution of their marriage. On March 3, 1998, Garcia filed a complaint for
Declaration of Nullity of Marriage on the ground of bigamy. Recio contended that his prior marriage had
been validly dissolved by a decree of divorce obtained in Australia thus he is legally capacitated to marry
Garcia. The trial court rendered the decision declaring the marriage between Garcia and Recio dissolved
and both parties can now remarry. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Recio in Australia ipso facto capacitated him to remarry.
HELD: The SC remanded the case to the court a quo to receive evidence. Based on the records, the court
cannot conclude that Recio who was then a naturalized Australian citizen was legally capacitated to marry
Garcia. Neither can the court grant Garcias prayer to declare her marriage null and void on the ground of
bigamy. After all it may turn out that under Australian law he was really capacitated to marry Garcia as
result of the divorce decree. The SC laid down the following basic legal principles; a marriage between
two Filipino cannot be dissolved even by a divorce decree obtained abroad because of Articles 15 and 17
of the Civil Code.

CANG VS CA Case Digest: G. R. No. 105308. September 25, 1998


Herbert Cang, petitioner, vs. Court of Appeals and Spouses Ronald V. Clavano and Maria Clara Clavano,
respondents.
Facts: Petitioner and Ana Marie Clavano were married and begot three children. Ana Marie upon learning
of her husband's illicit liaison file a petition for legal separation with alimony pendente lite which was
approved. Petitioner then left for the United States where he sought a divorce from Ana Marie. He was
issued a divorce decree and granted sole custody of the children to Ana Marie, reserving rights of
visitation at all reasonable times and places to petitioner. Private respondents who were the brother and
sister-in-law of Ana Marie filed a petition for adoption of the three minor Cang children. The trial court
granted the petition for adoption. Ana Marie was the only parent who gives consent to the adoption of
their children. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court's decision.
Issue: Whether petitioner has abandoned his children, thereby making his consent to the adoption
necessary.
Ruling: The law is clear that either parent may lose parental authority over the child only for a valid
reason. No such reason was established in the legal separation case. Deprivation of parental authority is
one of the effects of a decree of adoption. But there cannot be a valid decree of adoption in this case
precisely because the findings of the lower courts on the issue of abandonment of facts on record. The
petition for adoption must be denied as it was filed without the required consent of their father who, by
law and under the facts of the case at bar, has not abandoned them.

Tenchavez vs Escano 15 Scra 256

Torts and Damages When Liability for Quasi Delict Arises Unfounded Suit
In February 1948, Tenchavez and Escao secretly married each other and of course without the
knowledge of Escaos parents who were of prominent social status. The marriage was celebrated by a
military chaplain. When Escaos parents learned of this, they insisted a church wedding to be held but
Escao withdrew from having a recelebration because she heard that Tenchavez was having an affair with
another woman. Eventually, their relationship went sour; 2 years later, Escao went to the US where she
acquired a decree of absolute divorce and she subsequently became an American citizen and also married
an American.
In 1955, Tenchavez initiated a case for legal separation and further alleged that Escaos parents
dissuaded their daughter to go abroad and causing her to be estranged from him hence hes asking for
damages in the amount of P1,000,000.00. The lower court did not grant the legal separation being sought
for and at the same time awarded a P45,000.00 worth of counter-claim by the Escaos.
ISSUE: Whether or not damages should be awarded to either party in the case at bar
HELD: Yes.
On the part of Tenchavez:
His marriage with Escao was a secret one and the failure of said marriage did not result to public
humiliation; that they never lived together and he even consented to annulling the marriage earlier
(because Escao filed for annulment before she left for the US but the same was dismissed due to her
non-appearance in court); that he failed to prove that Escaos parents dissuaded their daughter to leave
Tenchavez and as such his P1,000,000.00 claim cannot be awarded. HOWEVER, by reason of the fact
that Escao left without the knowledge of Tenchavez and being able to acquire a divorce decree; and
Tenchavez being unable to remarry, the SC awarded P25,000.00 only by way of moral damages and
attorneys fees to be paid by Escao and not her parents.
On the part of Escaos parents:

It is true that the P1,000,000.00 for damages suit by Tenchavez against the Escaos is unfounded and the
same must have wounded their feelings and caused them anxiety, the same could in no way have
seriously injured their reputation, or otherwise prejudiced them, lawsuits having become a common
occurrence in present society. What is important, and has been correctly established in the decision of the
lower court, is that they were not guilty of any improper conduct in the whole deplorable affair. The SC
reduced the damages awarded from P45,000.00 to P5,000.00 only.

RECTO vs Harden
[G.R. No. L-22174. July 21, 1967.]
ESPERANZA P. DE HARDEN, Plaintiff, v. FRED M. HARDEN, ET AL., Defendants. AURORA R.
DE RECTO, Administratrix of the Estate of Claro M. Recto, claimant-appellee, v. JOSE
SALUMBIDES, Oppositor-Appellant.
Rogelio M . Jalandoni for Oppositor-Appellant.
Recto Law Offices for Claimant-Appellee.

SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEY-AT-LAW; COMPENSATION; ATTORNEYS LIEN; BAR BY PRIOR JUDGMENT;
CASE AT BAR. The defense of bar by prior judgment which rests upon the lower courts orders of
December 7, 1953 and January 24, 1956 cannot prosper where said court orders were subsequently
expressly declared erroneous and already superseded and reversed by the later court orders of December
14, 1955, July 1, 1957 and February 21, 1958.
2. ID.; ID.; ID; PRESCRIPTION; LACHES; CASE AT BAR. Even if the period for bringing the
action be five years as appellant suggests, still the same has not yet lapsed. The dividends being litigated
were declared from April 15, 1950 to July 2, 1955. But the receivers letter of May 9, 1953 asking for the
dividends and claimants motions of November 4, 1953, December 15, 1955, April 4, 1957, February 10,
1958 and November 27, 1961, to the same effect, seasonably interrupted the prescriptive period. These
extrajudicial and judicial demands also negative laches on claimants part.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ACQUISITIVE PRESCRIPTION; CASE AT BAR. Salumbides could not acquire the
dividends in question by prescription since he possessed them, not in concept of owner, adverse to the
Hardens, but rather as attorney-in-fact of Mr. Harden.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; WAIVER, CASE AT BAR. Rectos demand for the P20,531.00 cash dividends which
were declared from December 14, 1955 to December 14, 1956, is not a waiver of the previous dividends.
He merely wanted to satisfy his judgment credit from among any of the Harden assets available. Since the
later dividends failed to fully satisfy the judgment, Recto could still enforce his valid claims against the
previous dividends. As to the cash dividend of October 3, 1955, the order of December 14, 1955 is very
clear that it "shall not constitute a precedent with respect to the disposition of all dividends whether
already declared or to be hereinafter declared." The defense of waiver, therefore, fails.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; EFFECT OF DEATH OF A PARTY DURING PENDENCY OF CLAIM; CASE AT
BAR. Rectos claim, not being a money claim under the Rules, need not be made in the administration
proceedings of Mr. Hardens estate, notwithstanding the latters death during the pendency of these
proceedings. Rectos claim is neither a claim nor a judgment for money directed against the decedent, Mr.
Harden, but is founded on a personal obligation of Mrs. Harden. But granting that Rectos claim is a
money claim, this Court has already ruled that a charging lien established on the property in litigation to
secure payment of attorneys fees partakes of the nature of a collateral security or of a lien on real
property, the enforcement of which need not be made in the administration proceedings.
DECISION
BENGZON, J.P., J.:
Fred Harden, an American citizen, and Esperanza Perez were married in the Philippines on December 14,
1917. They lived together, acquiring considerable conjugal properties, until 1938 when they separated. In
July 1941, Mrs. Harden hired the late Claro M. Recto as her counsel in the suit she was contemplating to
file against her husband. In their contract, she agreed, inter alia, to pay Recto 20% of her share in the
conjugal partnership. On July 12, 1941, Mrs. Harden, thru Recto, filed her complaint for administration
and/or accounting of the conjugal properties against Mr. Harden, and Jose Salumbides, herein oppositorappellant, as his attorney-in-fact. The war suspended the proceedings. After liberation, the records of the

case were reconstituted and on November 20, 1946, the conjugal properties of the Harden spouses were
placed under receivership. On October 31, 1949, the lower court rendered judgment for Mrs. Harden. Mr.
Harden appealed to this Court 1 and then left the Philippines. Mrs. Harden must have followed her
husband for in January 29, 1952, an amicable settlement was effected between them in Canada. As a
consequence thereof, Recto was instructed by Mrs. Harden to discontinue the proceedings.
On February 20, 1952, Recto filed a motion in the Supreme Court to establish his attorneys charging lien.
The Hardens opposed. This Court, by resolution dated July 22, 1952, remanded the case to the trial court
to determine the amount of Rectos attorneys fees. But all the ancillary writs and processes issued in the
case were dissolved except the receivership on the conjugal properties, which was maintained.
Subsequently, the lower court, after hearing, held that Recto was entitled to P384,110.97 as counsel fees.
Mrs. Harden appealed to this Court 2 which upheld Recto but modified the amount to P304,110.97 only.
On January 22, 1957, Recto moved for execution of the judgment. The lower court having granted the
motion, the Hardens went on certiorari 3 to this Court. We dismissed the petition on August 2, 1957 for
lack of merit. Recto was then able to secure an alias writ of execution. Again this was questioned
on certiorari 4 by the Hardens in this Court. On February 10, 1958, We upheld Recto once more. This
finally enabled the latter to levy upon the stocks and other properties of the Hardens, the public sales of
which realized P100,805.00. A balance of P203,305.97 thus remained in Rectos favor.
On July 2, 1958, Recto moved ex parte to levy on other shares of stock owned by the Hardens but
registered in the name of Salumbides, including the 410,638 shares in the Surigao Consolidated Mining
Co. Upon being notified that the 410,638 Surigao shares, inter alia, were to be sold at public auction,
Salumbides filed an opposition claiming that he owned said shares, the same being registered in his name.
This was denied. His motion to reconsider the denial also met the same fate, the lower court holding that
Salumbides did not own the said Surigao shares of stock. Whereupon, Salumbides appealed to this Court.
5 We dismissed the same on December 22, 1958 for being frivolous. The motion to reconsider
subsequently filed failed to save the appeal. On April 21, 1959, the said 410,638 shares were sold at
public auction for P147,679.97 [sic] leaving an unsatisfied judgment balance of P55,624.00 in Rectos
favor.
The next incident concerns the return to the receiver of the P20,531.90 cash dividends from December 14,
1955 to December 14, 1956, received by Salumbides on the same 410,638 Surigao shares. As early as
April 4, 1957, Recto had already moved that Salumbides be ordered to deliver to the receiver all the
dividends on the said shares which were under receivership. On July 1, 1957, the lower court issued an
order requiring Salumbides to "turn over to the receiver . . . all the dividends he has already received from
the Surigao Mining Company, Inc." Salumbides motion to reconsider this order was denied.
On February 10, 1958, Recto moved for a writ of execution to implement the order of July 1, 1957. This
was approved on February 21, 1958. Salumbides filed a motion to reconsider, claiming that he owned the
dividends pertaining to the 410,638 shares. On July 30, 1959, the lower court ordered Salumbides to
comply with the order of July 1, 1957 by depositing P20,531.90 in the Commercial Bank & Trust Co. The
latter moved for reconsideration alleging, inter alia, that he had spent P45,900.99 as expenses for the
Hardens from 1955 to 1957 and for which he must be reimbursed. When this was denied, a second motion
to reconsider was filed, Salumbides claiming that the P20,531.90 cash dividends had already been
disbursed for the benefit of the Harden family. On August 29, 1961, the lower court, after hearing and
presentation of evidence, denied the second motion to reconsider, holding that the alleged incurring of
expenses by Salumbides was a mere afterthought concocted by him.
Preliminary steps were taken by Salumbides to appeal this order. Meanwhile, on October 2, 1960, Recto
died and his wife, as his administratrix, was substituted as claimant. On October 7, 1961, the lower court

required Salumbides to submit a P25,000.00 supersedeas bond to prevent execution pending appeal. This
compelled Salumbides to abandon the intended appeal. On October 23, 1961, he deposited P20,531.90 in
the bank in compliance with the order of August 29, 1961. On November 21, 1961, Mrs. Recto, with
court approval, withdrew P25,000.00 from the Harden funds under receivership in the bank, thus reducing
the judgment balance to P30,624.00.
On November 27, 1961, Mrs. Recto moved for full compliance with the order of July 1, 1957 to satisfy
the remaining judgment balance, relying upon a statement 6 issued by the Surigao Consolidated that from
April 15, 1950 to July 2, 1955, Salumbides had received all the cash dividends on the 410,638 shares,
amounting to P60,797.29. Resolving the motion and opposition interposed by Salumbides, the lower court
on December 11, 1962 ordered Salumbides to deposit P30,624.00 in the Commercial Bank and Trust
Company for final satisfaction of the judgment balance in Rectos favor. This is the incident under the
present appeal, first taken to the Court of Appeals but subsequently certified to Us.
Appellant Salumbides first submits that the order of July 1, 1957 which is sought to be fully enforced did
not include the cash dividends received by him before December 14, 1955 since Rectos motion of April
4, 1957 was limited to those dividends received after said date. This is without merit. The dispositive
portion of the order of July, 1957, which reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Finding the said petition to be well founded this Court hereby orders Jose Salumbides to turn over to the
Receiver, Atty. Juan S. Ong all the dividends that he has already received from the Surigao Consolidated
Mining Company, Inc."cralaw virtua1aw library
clearly includes all dividends received as of then by Salumbides. The Surigao Consolidated statement
dated April 5, 1957 shows that the cash dividends on the 410,638 shares from April 15, 1950 to July 1955
had also been delivered to and already received by Salumbides. And the lower court found, in its order of
August 29, 1961, that Salumbides never appealed the order of July 1, 1957. Hence the same can no longer
be questioned now.
Salumbides would also argue that those dividends had already been disbursed by him for the benefit of
the Harden family. This question, however, had already been raised and argued twice before the lower
court which tried and decided it adversely in the order of August 29, 1961. Although Salumbides filed his
notice of appeal and appeal bond, the appeal was never really pursued. In fact, on October 23, 1961, he
manifested to the lower court that he had already complied with the order of August 29, 1961, thus
making the same final and conclusive as against him.
The defenses of (a) bar by prior judgments, (b) prescription, extinctive and acquisitive, (c) laches, and (d)
waiver, set up by Salumbides, are without merit. For the first, he would rely upon the lower courts orders
of December 7, 1953 and January 24, 1956, which declared that the receivership did not include future
dividends on the shares of stock. But the more recent order of August 29, 1961 expressly declared these
orders erroneous and already superseded and reversed by the later court orders of December 14, 1955,
July 1, 1957 and February 21, 1958.
There could be no prescription, extinctive or acquisitive. Even if the period for bringing the action be five
years as appellant suggests, still the same has not yet lapsed. The dividends being litigated were declared
from April 15, 1950 to July 2, 1955. But the receivers letter of May 9, 1953 7 asking for the dividends
and claimants motions of November 4, 1953, December 15, 1955, April 4, 1957, February 10, 1958 and
November 27, 1961, to the same effect, seasonably interrupted the prescriptive period. These extrajudicial
and judicial demands also negative laches on claimants part.
Salumbides could not acquire the dividends in question by prescription since he possessed them, not in

concept of owner, adverse to the Hardens, but rather as attorney-in-fact of Mr. Harden. He first claimed
ownership only in his omnibus opposition dated July 1, 1957. But two years later, or on August 24, 1959,
in his motion to reconsider, Salumbides admitted that these dividends belonged to the Hardens.
Neither is Rectos demand for the P20,531.00 cash dividends which were declared from December 14,
1955 to December 14, 1956, a waiver of the previous dividends. He merely wanted to satisfy his
judgment credit from among any of the Harden assets available. Since the later dividends failed to fully
satisfy the judgment, Recto could still enforce his valid claim against the previous dividends. As to the
cash dividend of October 3, 1955, the order of December 14, 1955 is very clear that it "shall not constitute
a precedent with respect to the disposition of all dividends whether already declared or to be hereinafter
declared." The defense of waiver, therefore, fails.
Lastly, appellant would insist that upon the death of Mr. Harden in Canada on May 1, 1959, or during the
pendency of the proceedings, Rectos claim should have been forthwith dismissed and filed in the
administration proceedings of Mr. Hardens estate. But appellant erroneously assumes that Rectos claim
is a "money claim" under the Rules 8 when it is neither a claim nor a judgment for money directed against
the decedent, Mr. Harden. Rectos claim is founded on a personal obligation of Mrs. Harden. But granting
that Rectos claim is a money claim against Mr. Harden, that would not help appellant any. We have
already ruled 9 that a charging lien established on the property in litigation to secure payment of
attorneys fees partakes of the nature of a collateral security or of a lien on real or personal property, the
enforcement of which need not be made in the administration proceedings.
Wherefore, the order appealed from is hereby affirmed. Costs against oppositor-appellant. So ordered.
Reyes, J .B.L., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J. and Dizon, J., are on official leave.

Van Dorn vs Romillo 139 SCRA 139

FACTS:
Petitioner Alice Reyes (Filipino) and private respondent Richard Upton (American) were married in Hong
Kong. After they divorced in Nevada USA, private respondent filed a suit against petitioner stating that
petitioners business in Ermita, Manila is conjugal property and the he be declared to have management
over the conjugal partnership.
Petitioner moved for the dismissal because the cause of action is barred by a previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged that he and
petitioner had no community property.Respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada
Court cannot prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy.
ISSUE:
Is respondent estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal property because of the representation
he made in the divorce proceedings that they had no community property.
HELD:
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standard of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would have no
standing to use in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets.
As he is bound by the Decision of his own countrys Court, which validly exercises jurisdiction over him,
and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court
from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still married
to private respondent and still subject to a wifes obligation under Article 109 of the Civil Code cannot be
justified. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render
support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to
conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to
be served.

PILAPIL vs. HON IBAY-SOMERA, VICTOR AND GEILING et al


G.R. No. 80116
June 30, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Imelda Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private respondent Erich Geiling, a German
national, were married in Germany. After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial
disharmony eventuated in Geiling initiating a divorce proceeding against Pilapil in Germany. The Local
Court, Federal Republic of Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of
marriage of the spouses.
More than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree, Geiling filed two complaints for adultery
before the City Fiscal of Manila alleging in one that, while still married to said Geiling, Pilapil had an
affair with a certain William Chia. The Assistant Fiscal, after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of evidence. However, upon
review, the respondent city fiscal Victor approved a resolution directing the filing of 2 complaint for
adultery against the petitioner. The case entitled PP Philippines vs. Pilapil and Chia was assigned to the
court presided by the respondent judge Ibay-Somera.
A motion to quash was filed in the same case which was denied by the respondent. Pilapil filed this
special civil action for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for a TRO, seeking the annulment of the
order of the lower court denying her motion to quash.
As cogently argued by Pilapil, Article 344 of the RPC thus presupposes that the marital relationship is still
subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal action for adultery.
ISSUE: Did Geiling have legal capacity at the time of the filing of the complaint for adultery, considering
that it was done after obtaining a divorce decree?
HELD: WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioners MTQ is SET ASIDE and another one
entered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. The TRO issued in this case is hereby
made permanent.
NO
Under Article 344 of the RPC, the crime of adultery cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written
complaint filed by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency,
that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal, requirement.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it necessarily
follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal representation to do so at the time of the
filing of the criminal action. This is a logical consequence since the raison detre of said provision of law
would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse of the alleged offender at
the time of the filing of the criminal case.
Stated differently, the inquiry would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a criminal action
for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the accused be unsevered and existing at
the time of the institution of the action by the former against the latter.

In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his country, the Federal
Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines
insofar as private respondent is concerned in view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the
matter of status of persons Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no
longer the husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
San luis G.R. 133743 2/6/07
Bigamy Void Marriage
During his lifetime, Felicisimo (Rodolfos dad) contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with
Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six children. On August 11, 1963, Virginia
predeceased Felicisimo.
Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias.
However, on October 15, 1971, Merry Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the
Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and
Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973. On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married Felicidad San
Luis, then surnamed Sagalongos. He had no children with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from
the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992. Upon death of his dad Rodolfo sought
the dissolution of their conjugal partnership assets and the settlement of Felicisimos estate. On December
17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City.
Rodolfo claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a
mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.
Felicidad presented the decree of absolute divorce issued by the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of
Hawaii to prove that the marriage of Felicisimo to Merry Lee had already been dissolved. Thus, she
claimed that Felicisimo had the legal capacity to marry her by virtue of paragraph 2 Article 26 of the
Family Code.
Rodolfo asserted that paragraph 2, Article 26 of the Family Code cannot be given retroactive effect to
validate respondents bigamous marriage with Felicisimo because this would impair vested rights in
derogation of Article 256.
ISSUE: Whether or not Felicidads marriage to Felicisimo is bigamous.
HELD: The divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to
remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimos
surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the validity of
the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of
the U.S.A. InGarcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign
law and divorce judgments. It held that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that
proof of its authenticity and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a
writing or document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If
the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the

proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
With regard to respondents marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged
and proved.
The case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on the divorce decree
obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.

QUITA vs Ca 300 S 406

Liorenie Vs CA GR 124371 11/23/00


Nationality Principle
Lorenzo and petitioner Paula Llorente was married before a parish priest. Before the outbreak of war,
Lorenzo departed for the United States and Paula was left at the conjugal home. Lorenzo was naturalized
by the United State. After the liberation of the Philippines he went home and visited his wife to which he
discovered that his wife was pregnant and was having an adulterous relationship. Lorenzo returned to the
US and filed for divorce. Lorenzo married Alicia LLorente; they lived together for 25 years and begot 3
children. Lorenzo on his last will and testament bequeathed all his property to Alicia and their 3 children.
Paula filed a petition for letters administration over Lorenzos estate. The RTC ruled in favor of Paula. On
appeal, the decision was modified declaring Alicia as co-owner of whatever properties they have
acquired. Hence, this petition to the Supreme Court.
ISSUES: Whether or not the divorce obtained by Lorenzo capacitated him to remarry. Who are entitled to
inherit from the late Lorenzo Llorente?
HELD: In Van Dorn vs Ramillo Jr. the Supreme Court held that owing to the nationality principle
embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
absolute divorce. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorce abroad provided that
they are valid according to their national law. The Supreme Court held that divorce obtained by Lorenzo
from his first wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity.
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the court of origin for the determination of the intrinsic validity
of Lorenzos will and determine the successional rights allowing proof of foreign law. The deceased is not
covered by our laws on family rights and duties, status, condition and legal capacity since he was a
foreigner.

Bayot Vs CA G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

FACTS:
On April 20, 1979, Vicente, a Filipino, and Rebecca, an American, were married in Muntinlupa. They
had a child name Alix, born in November 27, 1982 in California.

In February 22, 1996, Rebecca initiated divorce proceedings in Dominican Republic, which was docketed
as Civil Decree No. 362/96 ordering the dissolution of the marriage. The same court also issued Civil
Decree No. 406/97 settling the couple's conjugal property in Muntinlupa in March 4, 1997.

She then filed a declaration of absolute nullity of marriage on the ground of Vicente's alleged
psychological incapacity,

docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094. She sought dissolution of the conjugal partnerships of gains with
application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. She also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a
permanent monthly support for their daughter Alix in the amount of P 220,000.00.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds of lack of cause of action and that the
petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce.

RTC denied Vicente's motion to dismiss. CA dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094 and set aside RTC's
incidental orders. According the the CA, RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss, since the
marriage between the spouses is already dissolved when the divorce decree was granted since Rebecca
was an American citizen when she applied for the decree.

Issue:
Whether or not the divorce decree obtained by Rebecca in Dominican Republic is valid.

Ruling:

Yes. Civil Decrees No. 362/96 and 406/97 are valid.

Rebecca at that time she applied and obtained her divorce was an American citizen and remains to be one,
being born to American parents in Guam, an American territory which follows the principle of jus soli
granting American citizenship to those who are born there. She was, and still may be, a holder of
American passport.

She had consistently professed, asserted and represented herself as an American citizen, as shown in her
marriage certificate, in Alix's birth certificate, when she secured divorce in Dominican Republic.

Being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of America, a
country which allows divorce.

The Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued by the Dominican Republic court properly adjudicated the excouple's property relations.

The Court said, in order that a foreign divorce can be recognized here, the divorce decree must be proven
as a fact and as valid under the national law of the alien spouse.

The fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce
decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient.

Thus the foreign decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid, and
consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.
The fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognised as a Filipino citizen by force of the June 8, 2000
affirmation by the DOJ Secretary of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of Recognition will not, stand
alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen in
1996. In determining whether or not a divorce is secured abroad would come within the pale of the
country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a
valid divorce is obtained.
Categories: Judicial Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Marriage, Persons and Family Relations
RP vs dayot GR 175581 3/28/08
Article 39 Prescription
Jose was introduced to Felisa in 1986. He later came to live as a boarder in Felisas house, the latter
being his landlady. Later, Felisa requested him to accompany her to the Pasay City Hall, so she could
claim a package sent to her by her brother from Saudi. At the PCH, upon a pre-arranged signal from
Felisa, a man bearing three folded pieces of paper approached them. They were told that Jose needed to
sign the papers so that the package could be released to Felisa. He initially refused to do so. However,
Felisa cajoled him, and told him that his refusal could get both of them killed by her brother who had
learned about their relationship. Reluctantly, he signed the pieces of paper, and gave them to the man
who immediately left. It was in February 1987 when he discovered that he had contracted marriage with
Felisa. He alleged that he saw a piece of paper lying on top of the table at the sala of Felisas house.
When he perused the same, he discovered that it was a copy of his marriage contract with Felisa. When
he confronted Felisa, she said she does not know of such. Felisa denied Joses allegations and defended
the validity of their marriage. She declared that they had maintained their relationship as man and wife
absent the legality of marriage in the early part of 1980, but that she had deferred contracting marriage
with him on account of their age difference. In her pre-trial brief, Felisa expounded that while her
marriage to Jose was subsisting, the latter contracted marriage with a certain Rufina Pascual (Rufina) on
31 August 1990. On 3 June 1993, Felisa filed an action for bigamy against Jose. Subsequently, she filed
an administrative complaint against Jose with the Office of the Ombudsman, since Jose and Rufina were
both employees of the National Statistics and Coordinating Board. The Ombudsman found Jose
administratively liable for disgraceful and immoral conduct, and meted out to him the penalty of
suspension from service for one year without emolument. The RTC ruled against Jose claiming that his
story is impossible and that his action of fraud has already prescribed. It cited Article 87 of the New Civil
Code which requires that the action for annulment of marriage must be commenced by the injured party
within four years after the discovery of the fraud.

ISSUE: Whether or not the action to file an action to nullify a marriage due to fraud is subject to
prescription.
HELD: The OSG avers that Jose is deemed estopped from assailing the legality of his marriage for lack
of a marriage license. It is claimed that Jose and Felisa had lived together from 1986 to 1990,
notwithstanding Joses subsequent marriage to Rufina Pascual on 31 August 1990, and that it took Jose
seven years before he sought the declaration of nullity; hence, estoppel had set in. This is erroneous. An
action for nullity of marriage is imprescriptible. Jose and Felisas marriage was celebrated sans a
marriage license. No other conclusion can be reached except that it is void ab initio. In this case, the right
to impugn a void marriage does not prescribe, and may be raised any time
De Castro vs Assidao GR 160172 2/13/08
Void ab initio marriages
Reinel and Annabelle met and became sweethearts in 1991. They applied for a marriage license in Pasig
City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly
engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage
license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license,
they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date. Nevertheless, after the ceremony,
petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and
wife. On 13 Nov 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the
childs birth, the mother has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and
from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City . In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the
latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna
Tricia as his child. Reinel denied his marriage with Annabelle claiming that the marriage is void ab initio
because the affidavit they jointly executed is a fake. And that he was only forced by Annabelle to marry
her to avoid the humiliation that the pregnancy sans marriage may bring her. The trial court ruled that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage
license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her
support. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to
be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the
child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as
well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying
that petitioners forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward
him of his being irresponsible. Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April
1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial
court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There
was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no
collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a

marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter
that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.
HELD: The SC holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In
the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a
marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that
they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the
falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be
considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the
marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication
of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous
cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere
scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and
present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

Mallion vs alcantara Gr 141528 10/31/06


OSCAR P. MALLION, petitioner, v. EDITHA ALCANTARA, respondent.
G.R. No. 141528.

October 31, 2006.

Facts:
On October 24, 1995, petitioner Oscar Mallion filed with the regional trial court seeking a declaration of
nullity of his marriage to respondent Editha Alcantara on the ground of psychological incapacity.
The trial court denied the petition. Likewise, it was dismissed in the Court of Appeals.
After such decision, petitioner filed another petition for declaration of nullity of marriage with the
regional trial court alleging that his marriage with respondent was null and void due to the fact that it was
celebrated without a valid marriage license.
Respondent filed an answer with motion to dismiss on the ground of res judicata and forum shopping.
The trial court grated her petition.
Issue:

Is the action of the husband tenable?


Ruling:
No. Section 47(b) of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court pertains as bar by prior judgment or estoppels by
verdict, which is the effect of a judgment as a bar to the prosecution of the second action upon the same
claim, demand or cause of action. In Section 47(c) of the same rule, it pertains to res judicata in its
concept as conclusiveness of judgment or the rule of auter action pendant which ordains that issues
actually and directly resolved in a former suit cannot again be raised in any future case between the same
parties involving a different cause of action. Therefore, having expressly and impliedly concealed the
validity of their marriage celebration, petitioner is now deemed to have waived any defects therein. The
Court finds then that the present action for declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground of lack of
marriage license is barred. The petition is denied for lack of merit.

Chi Ming Tsoi Vs CA 266 scra 324


FACTS:
Private respondent Gina Loi and petitioner Chi Ming Tsoi were married at the Manila Cathedral on May
22, 1988. Contrary to Ginas expectations that the newlyweds were to enjoy making love or having sexual
intercourse with each other, the defendant just went to bed, slept on one side thereof, then turned his back
and went to sleep. No sexual intercourse occurred during their first night, second, third and fourth night.
From May 22, 1988 until March 15, 1989, they slept together in the same room and on the same bed but
during this period, there was no attempt of sexual intercourse between them. A case was then filed to
declare the annulment of the marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity. Gina alleged that Chi
Ming was impotent, a closet homosexual as he did not show him his penis (clinically found to be only 3
inches and 1 cm. when erect). Defendant admitted that no sexual contact was ever made and according to
him everytime he wanted to have sexual intercourse with his wife, she always avoided him and whenever
he caressed her private parts she always removed his hands.
ISSUE:
Is the refusal of private respondent to have sexual communion with petitioner a psychological
incapacity ?[i]
HELD:
If a spouse, although physically capable but simply refuses to perform his or her essential marriage
obligations, and the refusal is senseless and constant, Catholic marriage tribunals attribute the causes to
psychological incapacity than to stubborn refusal. Senseless and protracted refusal is equivalent to

psychological incapacity. Thus, the prolonged refusal of a spouse to have sexual intercourse with his or
her spouse is considered a sign of psychological incapacity.
Evidently, one of the essential marital obligations under the Family Code is To procreate children based
on the universal principle that procreation of children through sexual cooperation is the basic end of
marriage. Constant non-fulfillment of this obligation will finally destroy the integrity or wholeness of the
marriage. In the case at bar, the senseless and protracted refusal of one of the parties to fulfill the above
marital obligation is equivalent to psychological incapacity.
While the law provides that the husband and the wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love,
respect and fidelity. (Art. 68, Family Code), the sanction therefor is actually the spontaneous, mutual
affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or court order. Love is useless unless it is
shared with another. Indeed, no man is an island, the cruelest act of a partner in marriage is to say I could
not have cared less. This is so because an ungiven self is an unfulfilled self. The egoist has nothing but
himself. In the natural order, it is sexual intimacy which brings spouses wholeness and oneness. Sexual
intimacy is a gift and a participation in the mystery of creation. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family relations.

Valdes vs RTC 260 scra 221


FACTS:
Antonio Valdez and Consuelo Gomez were married in 1971 and begotten 5 children. Valdez filed a
petition in 1992 for a declaration of nullity of their marriage pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code,
which was granted hence, marriage is null and void on the ground of their mutual psychological
incapacity. Stella and Joaquin are placed under the custody of their mother while the other 3 siblings are
free to choose which they prefer.
Gomez sought a clarification of that portion in the decision regarding the procedure for the liquidation of
common property in unions without marriage. During the hearing on the motion, the children filed a
joint affidavit expressing desire to stay with their father.
ISSUE: Whether or not the property regime should be based on co-ownership.
HELD:

The Supreme Court ruled that in a void marriage, regardless of the cause thereof, the property relations of
the parties are governed by the rules on co-ownership. Any property acquired during the union is prima
facie presumed to have been obtained through their joint efforts. A party who did not participate in the
acquisition of the property shall be considered as having contributed thereto jointly if said partys efforts
consisted in the care and maintenance of the family.

DOMINGO v. CA
September 17, 1993 (G.R. No. 104818) PARTIES: Petitioner: Robert Domingo
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Delia Soledad Avera represented by her Attorney-in-Fact MOISES R.
AVERA
FACTS:

April 25, 1969, Robert Domingo married Emerlina dela Paz on which marriage is valid and still
existing

November 29, 1976, he married Delia Soledad

January 23 1979 up to the present, Soledad has been working in Saudi Arabia

1983, Emerlina sued for bigamy, respondent found out about the prior marriage

May 29, 1991, private respondent Delia Soledad A. Domingo filed a petition before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasig entitled Declaration of Nullity of Marriage and Separation of Property against
petitioner Roberto Domingo

1989, respondent found out that they are cohabiting and Robert was spending and disposing of
some of her properties without her knowledge or consent
ISSUE:
Whether or not a petition for judicial declaration of a void marriage is necessary. If in the
affirmative, whether the same should be filed only for purposes of remarriage.

HELD: Yes. A declaration of the absolute nullity of a marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause
of action or a ground for defense. Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected
marriage be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void

Constitution as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family; as such, it shall be
protected by the State. As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification of a marriage for the purpose of
contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one
that their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render
it void ipso jure and with no legal effect

Ninal vs Bayadog

Ninal vs. Bayadog


328 SCRA 122

FACTS:

Pepito Ninal was married with Teodulfa Bellones on September 26, 1974. They had 3 children namely
Babyline, Ingrid and Archie, petitioners. Due to the shot inflicted by Pepito to Teodulfa, the latter died on

April 24, 1985 leaving the children under the guardianship of Engrace Ninal. 1 year and 8 months later,
Pepito and Norma Badayog got married without any marriage license. They instituted an affidavit stating
that they had lived together for at least 5 years exempting from securing the marriage license. Pepito died
in a car accident on February 19, 1977. After his death, petitioners filed a petition for declaration of
nullity of the marriage of Pepito and Norma alleging that said marriage was void for lack of marriage
license.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not the second marriage of Pepito was void?
2. Whether or not the heirs of the deceased may file for the declaration of the nullity of Pepitos marriage
after his death?

HELD:

The marriage of Pepito and Norma is void for absence of the marriage license. They cannot be exempted
even though they instituted an affidavit and claimed that they cohabit for at least 5 years because from the
time of Pepitos first marriage was dissolved to the time of his marriage with Norma, only about 20
months had elapsed. Albeit, Pepito and his first wife had separated in fact, and thereafter both Pepito and
Norma had started living with each other that has already lasted for five years, the fact remains that their
five-year period cohabitation was not the cohabitation contemplated by law. Hence, his marriage to
Norma is still void.

Void marriages are deemed to have not taken place and cannot be the source of rights. It can be
questioned even after the death of one of the parties and any proper interested party may attack a void
marriage.
Perez- Ferris vs ferris GR 162368 7/17/06
Article 36: Psychological Incapacity
Armida and Brix are a showbiz couple. The couples relationship before the marriage and even during
their brief union (for well about a year or so) was not all bad. During that relatively short period of time,
Armida was happy and contented with her life in the company of Brix. Armida even admits that Brix was
a responsible and loving husband. Their problems began when Armida started doubting Brix fidelity. It
was only when they started fighting about the calls from women that Brix began to withdraw into his
shell and corner, and failed to perform his so-called marital obligations. Brix could not understand
Armidas lack of trust in him and her constant naggings. He thought her suspicions irrational. Brix could
not relate to her anger, temper and jealousy. Armida presented a psychological expert (Dr. Dayan) who
finds Brix to be a schizoid and a dependent and avoidant type. This is evidenced by Brixs
leaving-the-house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the
sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his
band mates than his family.

ISSUE: Whether or not PI is attendant in the case at bar.


HELD: The SC upheld the decision of the lower courts. The alleged mixed personality disorder, the
leaving-the-house attitude whenever they quarreled, the violent tendencies during epileptic attacks, the
sexual infidelity, the abandonment and lack of support, and his preference to spend more time with his
band mates than his family, are not rooted on some debilitating psychological condition but a mere refusal
or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and these do not constitute PI. Further,
the expert was not able to prove her findings. Notably, when asked as to the root cause of respondents
alleged psychological incapacity, Dr. Dayans answer was vague, evasive and inconclusive. She replied
that such disorder can be part of his family upbringing She stated that there was a history of Brixs
parents having difficulties in their relationship- this is of course inconclusive for such has no direct
bearing to the case at bar.
What is psychological incapacity?
The term psychological incapacity to be a ground for the nullity of marriage under Article 36 of the
Family Code, refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting a party even before the celebration of the
marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and
responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume. As all people may have certain quirks
and idiosyncrasies, or isolated characteristics associated with certain personality disorders, there is hardly
any doubt that the intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to
the most serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability
to give meaning and significance to the marriage. It is for this reason that the Courts rely heavily on
psychological experts for its understanding of the human personality. However, the root cause must be
identified as a psychological illness and its incapacitating nature must be fully explained in court.

TONGOLO VS TONGOL GR 157610 10/19/07

Santos vs CA
GR No. 112019, January 4, 1995

FACTS:
Leouel, a First Lieutenant in the Philippine Army, met Julia in Iloilo. The two got married in 1986 before
a municipal trial court followed shortly thereafter, by a church wedding. The couple lived with Julias
parents at the J. Bedia Compound. Julia gave birth to a baby boy in 1987 and was named as Leouel
Santos Jr. Occasionally, the couple will quarrel over a number of things aside from the interference of
Julias parents into their family affairs.
Julia left in 1988 to work in US as a nurse despite Leouels pleas to dissuade her. Seven months after her
departure, she called her husband and promised to return home upon the expiration of her contract in July
1989 but she never did. Leouel got a chance to visit US where he underwent a training program under
AFP, he desperately tried to locate or somehow get in touch with Julia but all his efforts were of no avail.
Leouel filed a complaint to have their marriage declared void under Article 36 of the Family Code. He
argued that failure of Julia to return home or to communicate with him for more than 5 years are
circumstances that show her being psychologically incapacitated to enter into married life.
ISSUE: Whether their marriage can be considered void under Article 36 of the Family Code.
HELD:
The intendment of the law has been to confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most
serious cases of personal disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give
meaning and significance to the marriage. This condition must exist at the time the marriage is
celebrated.

Undeniably and understandably, Leouel stands aggrieved, even desperate, in his present situation.
Regrettably, neither law nor society itself can always provide all the specific answers to every individual
problem. Wherefore, his petition was denied.

Antonio vs Reyes
Antonio vs. Reyes
GR No. 155800, March 10, 2006
FACTS:
Leonilo Antonio, 26 years of age, and Marie Ivonne Reyes, 36 years of age met in 1989. Barely a year
after their first meeting, they got married at Manila City Hall and then a subsequent church wedding at
Pasig in December 1990. A child was born but died 5 months later. Reyes persistently lied about herself,
the people around her, her occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. She
even did not conceal bearing an illegitimate child, which she represented to her husband as adopted child
of their family. They were separated in August 1991 and after attempt for reconciliation, he finally left
her for good in November 1991. Petitioner then filed in 1993 a petition to have his marriage with Reyes
declared null and void anchored in Article 36 of the Family Code.
ISSUE: Whether Antonio can impose Article 36 of the Family Code as basis for declaring their marriage
null and void.
HELD:
Psychological incapacity pertains to the inability to understand the obligations of marriage as opposed to
a mere inability to comply with them. The petitioner, aside from his own testimony presented a
psychiatrist and clinical psychologist who attested that constant lying and extreme jealousy of Reyes is
abnormal and pathological and corroborated his allegations on his wifes behavior, which amounts to
psychological incapacity. Respondents fantastic ability to invent, fabricate stories and letters of fictitious
characters enabled her to live in a world of make-believe that made her psychologically incapacitated as it
rendered her incapable of giving meaning and significance to her marriage. The root causes of Reyes
psychological incapacity have been medically or clinically identified that was sufficiently proven by
experts. The gravity of respondents psychological incapacity was considered so grave that a restrictive
clause was appended to the sentence of nullity prohibited by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal
from contracting marriage without their consent. It would be difficult for an inveterate pathological liar
to commit the basic tenets of relationship between spouses based on love, trust and respect. Furthermore,
Reyes case is incurable considering that petitioner tried to reconcile with her but her behavior remain
unchanged.

Republic vs Quintero-Hamano
Republic vs. Quintero-Hamano
GR No. 149498, May 20, 2004

FACTS:

Lolita Quintero-Hamano filed a complaint in 1996 for declaration of nullity of her marriage with Toshio
Hamano, a Japanese national, on the ground of psychological incapacity. She and Toshio started a
common-law relationship in Japan and lived in the Philippines for a month. Thereafter, Toshio went back
to Japan and stayed there for half of 1987. Lolita then gave birth on November 16, 1987.

In 1988, Lolita and Toshio got married in MTC-Bacoor, Cavite. After a month of their marriage, Toshio
returned to Japan and promised to return by Christmas to celebrate the holidays with his family. Toshio
sent money for two months and after that he stopped giving financial support. She wrote him several
times but never respondent. In 1991, she learned from her friend that Toshio visited the country but did
not bother to see her nor their child.

Toshio was no longer residing at his given address thus summons issued to him remained unserved.
Consequently, in 1996, Lolita filed an ex parte motion for leave to effect service of summons by
publication. The motion was granted and the summons, accompanied by a copy of the petition, was
published in a newspaper of general circulation giving Toshio 15 days to file his answer. Toshio filed to
respond after the lapse of 60 days from publication, thus, Lolita filed a motion to refer the case to the
prosecutor for investigation.
ISSUE: Whether Toshio was psychologically incapacitated to perform his marital obligation.
HELD:

The Court is mindful of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as basic autonomous
social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in
favor of the validity of the marriage.
Toshios act of abandonment was doubtlessly irresponsible but it was never alleged nor proven to be due
to some kind of psychological illness. Although as rule, actual medical examinations are not needed, it
would have greatly helped Lolita had she presented evidence that medically or clinically identified
Toshios illness. This could have been done through an expert witness. It is essential that a person show
incapability of doing marital obligation due to some psychological, not physical illness. Hence, Toshio
was not considered as psychologically incapacitated.
BIER VS BIER GR no 173294 2/27/08

NAVALES vs NAVALES GR 167523 6/27/08


Article 36: Psychological Incapacity
In 1986, Nilda and Reynaldo met in a local bar where Nilda was a waitress. Because of his fear that Nilda
may be wed to an American, Reynaldo proposed to Nilda and they got married in 1988. Reynaldo is
aware that Nilda has an illegitimate child out of wedlock. The 1st year of their marriage went well until
Nilda began to work when she neglected some of her duties as a wife. She later worked as a gym
instructor and according to Reynaldos allegations; her job makes her flirt with her male clients. She also
drives home with other guys even though Reynaldo would be there to fetch her. She also projected herself
as single. And she refused to have a child with Reynaldo because that would only destroy her figure.
Reynaldo then filed a petition to have their marriage be annulled. He presented her cousin as a witness
that attested that Nilda was flirting with other guys even with Reynaldos presence. Reynaldo also
presented the findings of a psychologist who concluded that based on Nildas acts, Nilda is a
nymphomaniac, who has a borderline personality, a social deviant, an alcoholic, and suffering from antisocial personality disorder, among others, which illnesses are incurable and are the causes of Nildas
psychological incapacity to perform her marital role as wife to Reynaldo. Nilda on her part attacked
Reynaldos allegations. She said that it is actually Reynaldo who is a womanizer and that in fact she has
filed a case of concubinage against him which was still pending. She also said that she only needs the job
in order to support herself because Reynaldo is not supporting her. She also showed proof that she
projected herself as a married woman and that she handles an aerobics class which is exclusive to females
only. The RTC and the CA ruled in favor of Reynaldo.
ISSUE: Whether the marriage between Reynaldo and Nilda is null and void on the ground of Nildas
psychological incapacity.
HELD: The petition must be granted because the States participation in this case is wanting. There were
no other pleadings, motions, or position papers filed by the Public Prosecutor or OSG; and no
controverting evidence presented by them before the judgment was rendered. And even if the SC would
consider the case based on the merits, the petition would still be granted. The acts presented by Reynaldo
by themselves are insufficient to establish a psychological or mental defect that is serious, incurable or
grave as contemplated by Article 36 of the Family Code. Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or
inability to take cognizance of and to assume basic marital obligations. Mere difficulty, refusal or

neglect in the performance of marital obligations or ill will on the part of the spouse is different from
incapacity rooted on some debilitating psychological condition or illness. Indeed, irreconcilable
differences, sexual infidelity or perversion, emotional immaturity and irresponsibility, and the like, do not
by themselves warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under Article 36, as the same may only be
due to a persons refusal or unwillingness to assume the essential obligations of marriage and not due to
some psychological illness that is contemplated by said rule. The SC also finds the finding of the
psychological expert to be insufficient to prove the PI of Nilda. The testimonies presented by people the
expert interviewed were not concretely established as the fact as to how those people came up with their
respective information was not as well shown. There is no proof as well that Nilda had had sex with
different guys a condition for nymphomia. There being doubt as to Nildas PI the SC ruled that this case
be resolved in favor of the validity of marriage.

ASPILLAGA v. ASPILLAGA
G.R. No. 170925 October 26, 2009
Quisumbing, J.
Doctrine:
The fact that certain psychological conditions will hamper their performance of their marital obligations
does not mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity as contemplated under Article 36 of the
Family Code. Psychological disorders do not manifest that both parties are truly incapacitated to
perform the basic marital covenants. Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity. Psychological
incapacity is reserved to the most serious cases of personality disorder.
Facts:
Rodolfo Aspillaga filed a petition for annulment of marriage on the ground of psychological incapacity on
the part of Aurora Aspillaga. Aurora alleged upon her return to Manila, she discovered that while she was
in Japan, Rodolfo brought into their conjugal home her cousin, Lecita Rose A. Besina, as his concubine.
Aurora alleged that Rodolfos cohabitation with her cousin led to the disintegration of their marriage and
their eventual separation.
During trial, expert witness Dr. Eduardo Maaba explained that both parties are psychologically
incapacitated. The RTC found the parties psychologically incapacitated to enter into marriage.
The CA reversed the RTC decision and declared the marriage of Rodolfo and Aurora Aspillaga valid.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the motion was also denied. Hence this petition.

Issue:
Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of the parties psychological incapacity
Held:
No. As early as 1995, in Santos v. Court of Appeals (G.R. No. 112019, January 4, 1995), it has been
categorically ruled that:
Psychological incapacity required by Art. 36 must be characterized by (a) gravity, (b) juridical
antecedence, and (c) incurability. The incapacity must be grave or serious such that the party would be
incapable of carrying out the ordinary duties required in marriage; it must be rooted in the history of the
party antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
it must be incurable or, even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the means of the party
involved.
In the instant case, Dr. Maaba failed to reveal that the psychological conditions were grave or serious
enough to bring about an incapacity to assume the essential obligations of marriage. Indeed, Dr. Maaba
was able to establish the parties personality disorder; however, he failed to link the parties psychological
disorders to his conclusion that they are psychologically incapacitated to perform their obligations as
husband and wife. The fact that these psychological conditions will hamper their performance of their
marital obligations does not mean that they suffer from psychological incapacity as contemplated under
Article 36 of the Family Code. Mere difficulty is not synonymous to incapacity.
It must be stressed that psychological incapacity must be more than just a difficulty, refusal or
neglect in the performance of some marital obligations (Republic v. CA). The intention of the law is to
confine the meaning of psychological incapacity to the most serious cases of personality disorders
clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and significance to the
marriage (Tongol v. Tongol, G.R. No. 157610, October 19, 2007).
Psychological disorders do not manifest that both parties are truly incapacitated to perform the basic
marital covenants. Moreover, there is nothing that shows incurability of these disorders. Incompatibility
and irreconcilable differences cannot be equated with psychological incapacity as understood juristically.
As to Rodolfos allegation that Aurora was a spendthrift, the same likewise fails to convince. While
disagreements on money matters would, no doubt, affect the other aspects of ones marriage as to make
the wedlock unsatisfactory, this is not a ground to declare a marriage null and void. In fact, the Court
takes judicial notice of the fact that disagreements regarding money matters are a common, and even
normal, occurrence between husbands and wives.

Te vs Te
Te vs. Te
GR No. 161793, February 13, 2009

FACTS:

Petitioner Edward Te first met respondent Rowena Te in a gathering organized by the Filipino-Chinese
association in their college. Initially, he was attracted to Rowenas close friend but, as the latter already
had a boyfriend, the young man decided to court Rowena, which happened in January 1996. It was
Rowena who asked that they elope but Edward refused bickering that he was young and jobless. Her
persistence, however, made him relent. They left Manila and sailed to Cebu that month; he, providing
their travel money of P80,000 and she, purchasing the boat ticket.

They decided to go back to Manila in April 1996. Rowena proceeded to her uncles house and Edward to
his parents home. Eventually they got married but without a marriage license. Edward was prohibited
from getting out of the house unaccompanied and was threatened by Rowena and her uncle. After a
month, Edward escaped from the house, and stayed with his parents. Edwards parents wanted them to
stay at their house but Rowena refused and demanded that they have a separate abode. In June 1996, she
said that it was better for them to live separate lives and they then parted ways.

After four years in January 2000, Edward filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage to Rowena on
the basis of the latters psychological incapacity.

ISSUE: Whether the marriage contracted is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.

HELD:

The parties whirlwind relationship lasted more or less six months. They met in January 1996, eloped in
March, exchanged marital vows in May, and parted ways in June. The psychologist who provided expert
testimony found both parties psychologically incapacitated. Petitioners behavioral pattern falls under the
classification of dependent personality disorder, and respondents, that of the narcissistic and antisocial
personality disorder

There is no requirement that the person to be declared psychologically incapacitated be personally


examined by a physician, if the totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of
psychological incapacity. Verily, the evidence must show a link, medical or the like, between the acts that
manifest psychological incapacity and the psychological disorder itself.

The presentation of expert proof presupposes a thorough and in-depth assessment of the parties by the
psychologist or expert, for a conclusive diagnosis of a grave, severe and incurable presence of
psychological incapacity.

Indeed, petitioner, afflicted with dependent personality disorder, cannot assume the essential marital
obligations of living together, observing love, respect and fidelity and rendering help and support, for he
is unable to make everyday decisions without advice from others, and allows others to make most of his
important decisions (such as where to live). As clearly shown in this case, petitioner followed everything
dictated to him by the persons around him. He is insecure, weak and gullible, has no sense of his identity
as a person, has no cohesive self to speak of, and has no goals and clear direction in life.

As for the respondent, her being afflicted with antisocial personality disorder makes her unable to assume
the essential marital obligations on account for her disregard in the rights of others, her abuse,
mistreatment and control of others without remorse, and her tendency to blame others. Moreover, as
shown in this case, respondent is impulsive and domineering; she had no qualms in manipulating
petitioner with her threats of blackmail and of committing suicide.

Both parties being afflicted with grave, severe and incurable psychological incapacity, the precipitous
marriage that they contracted on April 23, 1996 is thus, declared null and void.

Lester Halili vs Chona Halili (G.R. No. 165424)


FACTS: This resolves the motion for reconsideration of the April 16, 2008 resolution of this Court
denying petitioners petition for review on certiorari (under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court). The petition
sought to set aside the January 26, 2004 decision and September 24, 2004 resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 60010.

Petitioner Lester Benjamin S. Halili filed a petition to declare his marriage to respondent Chona M.
Santos-Halili null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity to perform the essential
obligations of marriage in the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 158.

He alleged that he wed respondent in civil rites thinking that it was a joke. After the ceremonies, they
never lived together as husband and wife, but maintained the relationship. However, they started fighting
constantly a year later, at which point petitioner decided to stop seeing respondent and started dating other
women. Immediately thereafter, he received prank calls telling him to stop dating other women as he was
already a married man. It was only upon making an inquiry that he found out that the marriage was not
fake.

Eventually, the RTC found petitioner to be suffering from a mixed personality disorder, particularly
dependent and self-defeating personality disorder, as diagnosed by his expert witness, Dr. Natividad
Dayan. The court a quo held that petitioners personality disorder was serious and incurable and directly
affected his capacity to comply with his essential marital obligations to respondent. It thus declared the
marriage null and void.

On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the decision of the trial court on the ground that the totality of
the evidence presented failed to establish petitioners psychological incapacity. Petitioner moved for
reconsideration. It was denied.

The case was elevated to the Supreme Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. We affirmed the CAs
decision and resolution upholding the validity of the marriage.

Petitioner then filed this motion for reconsideration reiterating his argument that his marriage to
respondent ought to be declared null and void on the basis of his psychological incapacity. He stressed
that the evidence he presented, especially the testimony of his expert witness, was more than enough to
sustain the findings and conclusions of the trial court that he was and still is psychologically incapable of
complying with the essential obligations of marriage.

ISSUE: Whether or not, psychological incapacity of the petitioner is a sufficient ground for the nullity of
marriage. Whether or not decision of the Regional Trial Court should be reinstated.

HELD: Court reiterated that courts should interpret the provision on psychological incapacity (as a
ground for the declaration of nullity of a marriage) on a case-to-case basis guided by experience, the
findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines and by decisions of church tribunals.

In Te, this Court defined dependent personality disorder as:

a personality disorder characterized by a pattern of dependent and submissive behavior. Such individuals
usually lack self-esteem and frequently belittle their capabilities; they fear criticism and are easily hurt by
others comments. At times they actually bring about dominance by others through a quest for
overprotection.

In her psychological report, Dr. Dayan stated that petitioners dependent personality disorder was evident
in the fact that petitioner was very much attached to his parents and depended on them for decisions.
Petitioners mother even had to be the one to tell him to seek legal help when he felt confused on what
action to take upon learning that his marriage to respondent was for real.
Ultimately, Dr. Dayan concluded that petitioners personality disorder was grave and incurable and already
existent at the time of the celebration of his marriage to respondent

From the foregoing, it has been shown that petitioner is indeed suffering from psychological incapacity
that effectively renders him unable to perform the essential obligations of marriage. Accordingly, the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is declared null and void

The decision of the Regional Trial Court, Pasig City, Branch 158 dated April 17, 1998 is REINSTATED.

Matias Matias G.R. No. 109975. February 9, 2001


Republic of the Philippines, petitioner, vs. Erlinda Matias Dagdag, respondent.
_______________________________________________________________________
Facts: Erlinda Matias married Avelino Parangan Dagdag and begot two children. Avelino would
disappear for months without explanation and attend to drinking sprees with friends and return home
drunk when with the family; forced his wife to have sexual intercourse and if she resisted, would inflict
injure to the latter. He left his family again and never heard of him. Erlinda was constrained to look for a
job to fend for themselves. Erlinda then learned that Avelino was imprisoned for some crime, and that he
escaped from jail who remains at-large at date.Erlinda filed for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage
on the ground of psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The trial court rendered a
decision declaring the marriage void under Artcile 36 of the Family Code. The Solicitor General appealed
to the Court of Appeals raising that the lower court erred in declaring the apellee's marriage to Avelino
Dagdag null and void on the ground of psychological incapacity of the latter, pursuant to Article 36 of the
Family Code, the psychological incapacity of the nature contemplated by the law not having been proven
to exist. However, the Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court
Issue: Whether or not immaturity and irresponsibility, habitual alcoholic, and a fugitive from justice
constitutes psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code to declare the marriage null and
void.
Ruling: No. The ruling in Republic v. Court of Appeals and Molina case is reiterated herein in which the
Court laid down the following GUIDELINES in the interpretation and application of Article 36 of the
Family Code:
(1) The burden of proof to show the nullity of the marriage belongs to the plaintiff.
(2) The root cause of the psychological incapacity must be: (a) medically or clinically identified, (b)
alleged in the complaint, (c) sufficiently proven by experts and (d) clearly explained in the decision.
Article 36 of the Family Code requires that the incapacity must be psychological - not physical, although
its manifestations and/or symptoms may be physical.
(3) The incapacity must be proven to be existing at the time of the celebration of the marriage.
(4) Such incapacity must also be shown to be medically or clinically permanent or incurable. Such
incurability may be absolute or even relative only in regard to the other spouse, not necessarily absolutely
against everyone of the same sex.
(5) Such illness must be grave enough to bring about the disability of the party to assume the essential
obligations of marriage.
(6) The essential marital obligations must be those embraced by Articles 68 up to 71 of the Family Codeas
regards the husband and wife as well as Articles 220, 221 and 225 of the same Code in regard to parents
and their children
(7) Interpretations given by the National Appellate Matrimonial Tribunal of the Catholic Church in the
Philippines, while not controlling or decisive, should be given great respect by our courts.

(8) The trial court must order the prosecuting attorney or fiscal and the Solicitor General to appear as
counsel for the state.

MARCOS V. MARCOS
Facts
Plaintiff Brenda B. Marcos married Wilson Marcos in 1982 and they had five children.
Alleging that the husband failed to provide material support to the family and have
resorted to physical abuse and abandonment, Brenda filed a case for the nullity of
the marriage for psychological incapacity. The RTC declared the marriage null and
void under Art. 36 which was however reversed by CA.
Issues
Whether personal medical or psychological examination of the respondent by a
physician is a requirement for a declaration of psychological incapacity.
Whether the totality of evidence presented in this case show psychological
incapacity.
Held
Psychological incapacity as a ground for declaring the nullity of a marriage, may be
established by the totality of evidence presented. There is no requirement, however
that the respondent be examined by a physician or a psychologist as a condition
sine qua non for such declaration. Although this Court is sufficiently convinced that
respondent failed to provide material support to the family and may have resorted
to physical abuse and abandonment, the totality of his acts does not lead to a
conclusion of psychological incapacity on his part. There is absolutely no showing
that his defects were already present at the inception of the marriage or that they
are incurable. Verily, the behavior of respondent can be attributed to the fact that
he had lost his job and was not gainfully employed for a period of more than six
years. It was during this period that he became intermittently drunk, failed to give
material and moral support, and even left the family home. Thus, his alleged
psychological illness was traced only to said period and not to the inception of the
marriage. Equally important, there is no evidence showing that his condition is
incurable, especially now that he is gainfully employed as a taxi driver. In sum, this
Court cannot declare the dissolution of the marriage for failure of the petitioner to
show that the alleged psychological incapacity is characterized by gravity, juridical

antecedence and incurabilty and for her failure to observe the guidelines as outline
in Republic v. CA and Molina.

Paras Vs PAras GR 147824

Antonio vs Reyes GR no 155880

Art 45 (3) distinguished from Psychological Incapacity


In 1990, Leo married Marie, the latter being ten years his senior. In 1993, Leo filed to annul the marriage
due to Maries PI. Leo claimed that Marie persistently lied about herself, the people around her, her
occupation, income, educational attainment and other events or things. She would claim that she is a
psychologist but she is not. Shed claim she is a singer with the company Blackgold and that she is the
latters number 1 money maker but shes not. Shed also spend lavishly as opposed to her monthly
income. She fabricates things and people only to serve her make believe world. Leo presented an expert
that proved Maries PI. Marie denied all Leos allegations and also presented an expert to prove her case.
The RTC ruled against Marie and annulled the marriage. The Matrimonial Tribunal of the church also
annulled the marriage and was affirmed by the Vaticans Roman Rata. The CA reversed the decision
hence the appeal.
ISSUE: Whether or not PI is attendant to the case.
HELD: Yes, PI is attendant. The guidelines established in the Molina case is properly established in the
case at bar.
The SC also emphasized what fraud means as contemplated in Art 45 (3) of the FC vis a vis Art 46 of the
FC. In PI, the misrepresentation done by Marie points to her inadequacy to cope with her marital
obligations, kindred to psychological incapacity. In Art 45 (3), marriage may be annulled if the consent of
either party was obtained by fraud, and Article 46 which enumerates the circumstances constituting fraud
under the previous article, clarifies that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to character, health, rank,
fortune or chastity shall constitute such fraud as will give grounds for action for the annulment of
marriage. These provisions of Art 45 (3) and Art 46 cannot be applied in the case at bar because the
misrepresentations done by Marie is not considered as fraud but rather such misrepresentations constitute
her aberrant behaviour which further constitutes PI. Her misrepresentations are not lies sought to vitiate
Leos consent to marry her. Her misrepresentations are evidence that Marie cannot simply distinguish
fiction/fantasy from reality which is so grave and it falls under the fourth guideline laid down in
the Molina Case.

Republic vs CA and Molina


Republic vs. CA and Molina
G.R. No. 108763 February 13, 1997
FACTS:
The case at bar challenges the decision of CA affirming the marriage of the respondent Roridel Molina to
Reynaldo Molina void in the ground of psychological incapacity. The couple got married in 1985, after a
year, Reynaldo manifested signs of immaturity and irresponsibility both as husband and a father
preferring to spend more time with friends whom he squandered his money, depends on his parents for aid

and assistance and was never honest with his wife in regard to their finances. In 1986, the couple had an
intense quarrel and as a result their relationship was estranged. Roridel quit her work and went to live
with her parents in Baguio City in 1987 and a few weeks later, Reynaldo left her and their child. Since
then he abandoned them.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage is void on the ground of psychological incapacity.
HELD:
The marriage between Roridel and Reynaldo subsists and remains valid. What constitutes psychological
incapacity is not mere showing of irreconcilable differences and confliction personalities. It is
indispensable that the parties must exhibit inclinations which would not meet the essential marital
responsibilites and duties due to some psychological illness. Reynaldos action at the time of the
marriage did not manifest such characteristics that would comprise grounds for psychological incapacity.
The evidence shown by Roridel merely showed that she and her husband cannot get along with each other
and had not shown gravity of the problem neither its juridical antecedence nor its incurability. In
addition, the expert testimony by Dr Sison showed no incurable psychiatric disorder but only
incompatibility which is not considered as psychological incapacity.

The following are the guidelines as to the grounds of psychological incapacity laid set forth in this case:
burden of proof to show nullity belongs to the plaintiff
root causes of the incapacity must be medically and clinically inclined
such incapacity should be in existence at the time of the marriage
such incapacity must be grave so as to disable the person in complying with the essentials of
marital obligations of marriage
such incapacity must be embraced in Art. 68-71 as well as Art 220, 221 and 225 of the Family
Code
decision of the National Matrimonial Appellate Court or the Catholic Church must be respected
court shall order the prosecuting attorney and the fiscal assigned to it to act on behalf of the state.

CO- OWNERSHIP
Buenaventura VS. CA
G.R. Nos. 127358 and G.R. Nos. 127449
March 31, 2005
Facts: Noel Buenaventura filed a position for the declaration of nullity of marriage on the ground that
both he and his wife were psychologically incapacitated.
The RTC in its decision, declared the marriage entered into between petitioner and respondent null and
violation ordered the liquidation of the assets of the conjugal partnership property; ordered petitioner a
regular support in favor of his son in the amount of 15,000 monthly, subject to modification as the
necessity arises, and awarded the care and custody of the minor to his mother.

Petitioner appealed before the CA. While the appeal was pending, the CA, upon respondents motion
issued a resolution increasing the support pendants like to P20, 000.
The CA dismissal petitioner appeal for lack of merit and affirmed in to the RTC decision. Petitioner
motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.
Issue: Whether or not co-ownership is applicable to valid marriage.
Held: Since the present case does not involve the annulment of a bigamous marriage, the provisions of
article 50 in relation to articles 41, 42 and 43 of the Family Code, providing for the dissolution of the
absolute community or conjugal partnership of gains, as the case maybe, do not apply. Rather the general
rule applies, which is in case a marriage is declared void ab initio, the property regime applicable to be
liquidated, partitioned and distributed is that of equal co-ownership.
Since the properties ordered to be distributed by the court a quo were found, both by the RTC and the CA,
to have been acquired during the union of the parties, the same would be covered by the co-ownership.
No fruits of a separate property of one of the parties appear to have been included or involved in said
distribution.

Enrico vs Heirs if Medinaceli GR 173614 9/28/07

Republic vs CA
Republic vs. CA
GR No. 159614, December 9, 2005
FACTS:

Alan Alegro, the petitioner, was married with Lea in January 1995. Lea arrived home late in February
1995 and Alan told her that if she enjoys life of a single person, it will be better for her to go back to her
parents. Lea left after that fight. Allan checked if she went to her parents house but was not there and
even inquired to her friends. He went back to the parents-in-laws house and learned that Lea had been to
their house but left without notice. He then sought help from the Barangay Captain. For sometime, Alan
decided to work as part-time taxi driver and during his free time he would look for Lea in the malls. In
June 2001, Alan reported Leas disappearance to the local police station and an alarm notice was issued.
He also reported the disappearance in NBI on July 2001. Alan filed a petition in March 2001 for the
declaration of presumptive death of his wife.

ISSUE: Whether Alan has a well-founded belief that his wife is already dead.

HELD:

The court ruled that Alan failed to prove that he has a well-founded belief, before he filed his petition
with RTC, that his spouse was dead. He failed to present a witness other than the Barangay Captain. He
even failed to present those friends of Lea which he inquired to corroborate his testimony. He also failed
to make inquiries from his parents-in-law regarding Leas whereabouts before filing his petition in the
RTC. It could have enhanced his credibility had he made inquiries from his parents-in-law about Lea's
whereabouts considering that Lea's father was the owner of Radio DYMS. He did report and seek help of
the local police authorities and NBI to locate Lea but he did so only after the OSG filed its notice to
dismiss his petition in RTC.

SSS vs Jarque De bailon 3/24/06


Article 41-42
In 1955 Clemente Bailon and Alice Diaz married in Barcelona, Sorsogon. 15+ years later, Clemente filed
an action to declare the presumptive death of Alice she being an absentee. The petition was granted in
1970. In 1983, Clemente married Jarque. The two live together untile Clementes death in 1998. Jarque
then sought to claim her husbands SSS benefits and the same were granted her. On the other hand, a
certain Cecilia Baion-Yap who claimed that she is the daughter of Bailon to a certain Elisa Jayona
petitioned before the SSS that they be given the reimbursement for the funeral spending for it was
actually them who shouldered the burial expenses of Clemente. They further claim that Clemente
contracted three marriages; one with Alice, another with Elisa and the other with Jarque. Cecilia also
averred that Alice is alive and kicking and Alice subsequently emerged; Cecilia claimed that Clemente
obtained the declaration of Alices presumptive death in bad faith for he was aware of the whereabouts of
Alice or if not he could have easily located her in her parents place. She was in Sorsogon all along in her
parents place. She went there upon learning that Clemente had been having extra-marital affairs. SSS
then ruled that Jarque should reimburse what had been granted her and to return the same to Cecilia since
she shouldered the burial expenses and that the benefits should go to Alice because her reappearance had
terminated Clementes marriage with Harque. Further, SSS ruled that the RTCs decision in declaring
Alice to be presumptively death is erroneous. Teresita appealed the decision of the SSS before the Social
Security Comission and the SSC affirmed SSS. The CA however ruled the contrary.
ISSUE: Whether or not the mere appearance of the absent spouse declared presumptively dead
automatically terminates the subsequent marriage.
HELD: There is no previous marriage to restore for it is terminated upon Clementes death. Likewise
there is no subsequent marriage to terminate for the same is terminated upon Clementes death. SSS is
correct in ruling that it is futile for Alice to pursue the recording of her reappearance before the local civil
registrar through an affidavit or a court action. But it is not correct for the SSS to rule upon the
declaration made by the RTC. The SSC or the SSS has no judicial power to review the decision of the
RTC. SSS is indeed empowered to determine as to who should be the rightful beneficiary of the benefits
obtained by a deceased member in case of disputes but such power does not include the appellate power
to review a court decision or declaration. In the case at bar, the RTC ruling is binding and Jarques
marriage to Clemente is still valid because no affidavit was filed by Alice to make known her
reappearance legally. Alice reappeared only after Clementes death and in this case she can no longer file
such an affidavit; in this case the bad faith [or good faith] of Clemente can no longer be raised the
marriage herein is considered voidable and must be attacked directly not collaterally it is however
impossible for a direct attack since there is no longer a marriage to be attacked for the same has been
terminated upon Clementes death.

Villanueva vs Ca GR no 132955 10/27/06


Article 45
In April 1988, Orly married Lilia before a trial court judge in Puerto Princesa. In November 1992, Orly
filed to annul the marriage. He claimed that threats of violence and duress forced him to marry Lilia. He
said that he had been receiving phone calls threatening him and that Lilia even hired the service of a
certain Ka Celso, a member of the NPA, to threaten him. Orly also said he was defrauded by Lilia by
claiming that she was pregnant hence he married her but he now raises that he never impregnated Lilia
prior to the marriage. Lilia on the other hand denied Orlys allegations and she said that Orly freely
cohabited with her after the marriage and she showed 14 letters that shows Orlys affection and care
towards her.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is duress and fraud attendant in the case at bar.
HELD: The SC ruled that Orlys allegation of fraud and intimidation is untenable. On its face, it is
obvious that Orly is only seeking to annul his marriage with Lilia so as to have the pending appealed
bigamy case [filed against him by Lilia] to be dismissed. On the merits of the case, Orlys allegation of
fear was not concretely established. He was not able to prove that there was a reasonable and well
grounded reason for fear to be created in his mind by the alleged intimidation being done against him by
Lilia and her party. Orly is a security guard who is well abreast with self-defense and that the threat he so
described done against him is not sufficient enough to vitiate him from freely marrying Lilia. Fraud
cannot be raised as a ground as well. His allegation that he never had an erection during their sexual
intercourse is incredible and is an outright lie. Also, there is a prolonged inaction on the part of Orly to
attack the marriage. It took him 4 and a half years to file an action which brings merit to Lilias contention
that Orly freely cohabited with her after the marriage.

Anaya vs Palaroan
Anaya vs. Palaroan
36 SCRA 97

FACTS:

Aurora Anaya and Fernando Palaroan were married in 1953. Palaroan filed an action for annulment of
the marriage in 1954 on the ground that his consent was obtained through force and intimidation. The
complaint was dismissed and upheld the validity of the marriage and granting Auroras counterclaim.
While the amount of counterclaim was being negotiated, Fernando divulged to her that several months
prior to their marriage, he had pre-marital relationship with a close relative of his. According to her, the
non-divulgement to her of such pre-marital secret constituted fraud in obtaining her consent. She prayed
for the annulment of her marriage with Fernando on such ground.

ISSUE: Whether or not the concealment to a wife by her husband of his pre-marital relationship with
another woman is a ground for annulment of marriage.

HELD:
The concealment of a husbands pre-marital relationship with another woman was not one of those
enumerated that would constitute fraud as ground for annulment and it is further excluded by the last
paragraph providing that no other misrepresentation or deceit as to.. chastity shall give ground for an
action to annul a marriage. Hence, the case at bar does not constitute fraud and therefore would not
warrant an annulment of marriage.

Amelor vs RTC GR no 179620 8/26/08


Article 45
Manuel married Leonida in 1989. They are both medical practitioners. They begot 3 children. 11 years
later, Leonida sought to annul her marriage with Manuel claiming that Manuel is psychologically
incapacitated to perform the essential marital obligations. Leonida testified that Manuel is a harsh
disciplinarian and that his policy towards their children are often unconventional and was the cause of
their frequent fight. Manuel has an unreasonable way of imposing discipline towards their children but is
remarkably so gentle towards his mom. He is more affectionate towards his mom and this is a factor
which is unreasonable for Leonida. Further, Leonida also testified that Manuel is a homosexual as
evidenced by his unusual closeness to his male companions and that he concealed his homosexuality from
Leonida prior to their marriage. She once caught Manuel talking to a man affectionately over the phone
and she confirmed all her fear when she saw Manuel kiss a man. The RTC ruled that their marriage is null
and void not because of PI but rather due to fraud by reason of Manuels concealment of his
homosexuality (Art 45 of the FC). The CA affirmed the RTCs decision.
ISSUE: Whether or not the marriage between the two can be declared as null and void due to fraud by
reason of Manuels concealment of his homosexuality.
HELD: The SC emphasized that homosexuality per se is not a ground to nullify a marriage. It is the
concealment of homosexuality that would. In the case at bar however, it is not proven that Manuel is a
homosexual. The lower court should not have taken the publics perception against Manuels sexuality.
His peculiarities must not be ruled by the lower court as an indication of his homosexuality for those are
not conclusive and are not sufficient enough to prove so. Even granting that Manuel is indeed a
homosexual, there was nothing in the complaint or anywhere in the case was it alleged and proven that
Manuel hid such sexuality from Leonida and that Leonidas consent had been vitiated by such.

RARRAY vs CHAE KYUNG LEE

Article 45
Rayray married Lee in 1952 in Pusan, Korea. Before the marriage, Lee was able to secure a marriage
license which is a requirement in Korea prior to marrying. They lived together until 1955. Rayray
however later found out that Lee had previously lived with 2 Americans and a Korean. Lee answered by
saying that it is not unusual in Korea for a woman to have more than one partner and that it is legally
permissive for them to do so and that there is no legal impediment to her marriage with Rayray.
Eventually they pursued their separate ways. Rayray later filed before lower court of Manila for an action
to annul his marriage with Lee because Lees whereabouts cannot be determined and that his consent in
marrying Lee would have not been for the marriage had he known prior that Lee had been living with
other men. His action for annulment had been duly published and summons were made known to Lee but
due to her absence Rayray moved to have Lee be declared in default. The lower court denied Rayrays
action stating that since the marriage was celebrated in Korea the court cannot take cognizance of the case
and that the facts presented by Rayray is not sufficient to debunk his marriage with Lee.
ISSUE: Whether or not Rayrays marriage with Lee is null and void.
HELD: The lower court erred in ruling that Philippine courts do not have jurisdiction over the case. As
far as marriage status is concerned, the nationality principle is controlling NOT lex loci celebracionis. The
lower court is however correct in ruling that Rayrays evidence is not sufficient to render his marriage
with Lee null and void. Rayray said that the police clearance secured by Lee is meant to allow her to
marry after her subsequent cohabitation/s with the other men which is considered bigamous in
Philippine law. The SC ruled that the police clearance is wanting for it lacks the signature of the person
who prepared it and there is no competent document to establish the identity of the same. Also, through
Rayray himself, Lee averred that it is ok in Korea for a person who cohabited with other men before to
marry another man. This is an indication that Lee herself is aware that if it were a previous marriage that
is concerned then that could be a legal impediment to any subsequent marriage. Rayray cannot be given
credence in claiming that his consent could have been otherwise altered had he known all these facts prior
to the marriage because he would lie to every opportunity given him by the Court so as to suit his case.

De Ocampo vs Florenciano
De Ocampo vs. Florenciano

107 Phil 35

FACTS:

Jose de Ocampo and Serafina Florenciano were married in 1938. They begot several children who are not
living with plaintiff. In March 1951, latter discovered on several occasions that his wife was betraying
his trust by maintaining illicit relations with Jose Arcalas. Having found out, he sent the wife to Manila in
June 1951 to study beauty culture where she stayed for one year. Again plaintiff discovered that the wife
was going out with several other man other than Arcalas. In 1952, when the wife finished her studies, she
left plaintiff and since then they had lived separately. In June 1955, plaintiff surprised his wife in the act
of having illicit relations with Nelson Orzame. He signified his intention of filing a petition for legal
separation to which defendant manifested conformity provided she is not charged with adultery in a
criminal action. Accordingly, Ocampo filed a petition for legal separation in 1955.

ISSUE: Whether the confession made by Florenciano constitutes the confession of judgment disallowed
by the Family Code.

HELD:

Florencianos admission to the investigating fiscal that she committed adultery, in the existence of
evidence of adultery other than such confession, is not the confession of judgment disallowed by Article
48 of the Family Code. What is prohibited is a confession of judgment, a confession done in court or
through a pleading. Where there is evidence of the adultery independent of the defendants statement
agreeing to the legal separation, the decree of separation should be granted since it would not be based on
the confession but upon the evidence presented by the plaintiff. What the law prohibits is a judgment
based exclusively on defendants confession. The petition should be granted based on the second
adultery, which has not yet prescribed.

enchavez vs Escano
TITLE: Tenchavez vs. Escano
CITATION: 15 SCRA 355

FACTS:
27 years old Vicenta Escano who belong to a prominent Filipino Family of Spanish ancestry got married
on Feburary 24, 1948 with Pastor Tenchavez, 32 years old engineer, and ex-army officer before Catholic
chaplain Lt. Moises Lavares. The marriage was a culmination of the love affair of the couple and was
duly registered in the local civil registry. A certain Pacita Noel came to be their match-maker and gobetween who had an amorous relationship with Tenchavez as written by a San Carlos college student
where she and Vicenta are studying. Vicenta and Pastor are supposed to renew their vows/ marriage in a
church as suggested by Vicentas parents. However after translating the said letter to Vicentas dad , he
disagreed for a new marriage. Vicenta continued leaving with her parents in Cebu while Pastor went back
to work in Manila.

Vicenta applied for a passport indicating that she was single and when it was approved she left for the
United States and filed a complaint for divorce against Pastor which was later on approved and issued by
the Second Judicial Court of the State of Nevada. She then sought for the annulment of her marriage to
the Archbishop of Cebu. Vicenta married Russell Leo Moran, an American, in Nevada and has begotten
children. She acquired citizenship on August 8, 1958. Petitioner filed a complaint against Vicenta and
her parents whom he alleged to have dissuaded Vicenta from joining her husband.

ISSUE: Whether the divorce sought by Vicenta Escano is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.

HELD:
Civil Code of the Philippines does not admit divorce. Philippine courts cannot give recognition on
foreign decrees of absolute divorce between Filipino citizens because it would be a violation of the Civil
Code. Such grant would arise to discrimination in favor of rich citizens who can afford divorce in foreign
countries. The adulterous relationship of Escano with her American husband is enough grounds for the
legal separation prayed by Tenchavez. In the eyes of Philippine laws, Tenchavez and Escano are still
married. A foreign divorce between Filipinos sought and decreed is not entitled to recognition neither is
the marriage of the divorcee entitled to validity in the Philippines. Thus, the desertion and securing of an
invalid divorce decree by one spouse entitled the other for damages.

WHEREFORE, the decision under appeal is hereby modified as follows;


(1) Adjudging plaintiff-appellant Pastor Tenchavez entitled to a decree of legal separation from defendant
Vicenta F. Escao;
(2) Sentencing defendant-appellee Vicenta Escao to pay plaintiff-appellant Tenchavez the amount of
P25,000 for damages and attorneys' fees;
(3) Sentencing appellant Pastor Tenchavez to pay the appellee, Mamerto Escao and the estate of his
wife, the deceased Mena Escao, P5,000 by way of damages and attorneys' fees.

Lapuz-Sy vs Eufemio
Lapuz-Sy vs. Eufemio
43 SCRA 177

FACTS:

Carmen Lapuz-Sy filed a petition for legal separation against Eufemio Eufemio on August 1953. They
were married civilly on September 21, 1934 and canonically after nine days. They had lived together as
husband and wife continuously without any children until 1943 when her husband abandoned her. They
acquired properties during their marriage. Petitioner then discovered that her husband cohabited with a
Chinese woman named Go Hiok on or about 1949. She prayed for the issuance of a decree of legal
separation, which among others, would order that the defendant Eufemio should be deprived of his share
of the conjugal partnership profits.

Eufemio counterclaimed for the declaration of nullity of his marriage with Lapuz-Sy on the ground of his
prior and subsisting marriage with Go Hiok. Trial proceeded and the parties adduced their respective
evidence. However, before the trial could be completed, respondent already scheduled to present
surrebuttal evidence, petitioner died in a vehicular accident on May 1969. Her counsel duly notified the
court of her death. Eufemio moved to dismiss the petition for legal separation on June 1969 on the
grounds that the said petition was filed beyond the one-year period provided in Article 102 of the Civil
Code and that the death of Carmen abated the action for legal separation. Petitioners counsel moved to
substitute the deceased Carmen by her father, Macario Lapuz.

ISSUE: Whether the death of the plaintiff, before final decree in an action for legal separation, abate the
action and will it also apply if the action involved property rights.

HELD:

An action for legal separation is abated by the death of the plaintiff, even if property rights are involved.
These rights are mere effects of decree of separation, their source being the decree itself; without the
decree such rights do not come into existence, so that before the finality of a decree, these claims are
merely rights in expectation. If death supervenes during the pendency of the action, no decree can be
forthcoming, death producing a more radical and definitive separation; and the expected consequential
rights and claims would necessarily remain unborn.
The petition of Eufemio for declaration of nullity is moot and academic and there could be no further
interest in continuing the same after her demise, that automatically dissolved the questioned union. Any
property rights acquired by either party as a result of Article 144 of the Civil Code of the Philippines 6
could be resolved and determined in a proper action for partition by either the appellee or by the heirs of
the appellant.

Potenciano vs CA
Potenciano vs. CA
GR No. 139789, 139808, July 19, 2001

FACTS:

In March 1999, Erlinda Illusorio, the wife of herein petitioner, Potenciano, petitioned for habeas corpus
which was dismissed on May 2000 for lack of merit and granted the petition to nullify the CA ruling

giving visitation rights to Erlinda. This case before SC is Erlindas motion to reconsider the decision
made. A conference was set on September 2000 to determine the propriety and relevance of a physical
and medical examination of Potenciano and how it will be conducted. Erlindas motion to have
Potenciano be medically examined by a team of medical experts appointed by the Court was denied with
finality in March 2001.

ISSUE: Whether a court can validly issue an order compelling the husband to live together and observe
mutual love, respect and fidelity.

HELD:

Erlinda claimed that she was not compelling Potenciano to live with her in consortium but clearly she
wanted the latter to live with her and is the root cause of her petition. What the law provides is that
husband and wife are obliged to live together, observe mutual love, respect and fidelity. The sanction
thereof is the spontaneous, mutual affection between husband and wife and not any legal mandate or
court order to enforce consortium.

Evidently, there was absence of empathy between Erlinda and Potenciano having separated from bed and
board since 1972. Empathy as defined by SC is a shared feeling between husband and wife experienced
not only by having spontaneous sexual intimacy but a deep sense of spiritual communion. Marital union
is a two-way process. It is for two loving adults who view the relationship with respect, sacrifice and a
continuing commitment to togetherness, conscious of its value as a sublime social institution.

Ty vs CA GR no 127406 11/27/00
Article 40 Exception to the Rule
In 1977, Reyes married Anna Maria Villanueva in a civil ceremony. They had a church wedding in the
same year as well. In 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of QC declared their marriage as
null and void; the civil one for lack of marriage license and the subsequent church wedding due to the
lack of consent of the parties. In 1979, prior to the JDRC decision, Reyes married Ofelia. Then in 1991,
Reyes filed for an action for declaration of nullity of his marriage with Ofelia. He averred that they lack a
marriage license at the time of the celebration and that there was no judicial declaration yet as to the
nullity of his previous marriage with Anna. Ofelia presented evidence proving the existence of a valid
marriage license including the specific license number designated. The lower court however ruled that
Ofelias marriage with Reyes is null and void. The same was affirmed by the CA applying the provisions
of the Art 40 of the FC.

ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of the previous of marriage of Reyes can be invoked in the
case at bar.
HELD: Art. 40 of the FC provides that, The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
This means that before one can enter into a second marriage he must first acquire a judicial declaration of
the nullity of the previous marriage and such declaration may be invoked on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring the previous marriage as void. For purposes other than remarriage, other evidences
may be presented and the declaration can be passed upon by the courts. In the case at bar, the lower court
and the CA cannot apply the provision of the FC. Both marriages entered by Reyes were solemnized prior
to the FC. The old CC did not have any provision that states that there must be such a declaration before
remarriage can be done hence Ofelias marriage with Reyes is valid. The provisions of the FC (took effect
in 87) cannot be applied retroactively especially because they would impair the vested rights of Ofelia
under the CC which was operational during her marriage with Reyes.

ANGELES VS. MAGLAYA


Angeles vs. Maglaya GR no 153798 9/2/05
Facts:
Petitioner is the wife of the deceased while the respondent is the child of the deceased in his first wife.
Respondent seeks administration of the estate of the deceased but opposed by the surviving wife (2nd
wife) alleging that the respondent is an illegitimate child of the deceased.

Issue:
Whether or not the respondent is illegitimate precluding her to become the administratrix.

Ruling:
No, respondent is not illegitimate.

Article 164 of the Family Code cannot be more emphatic on the matter: Children conceived or
born during the marriage of the parents are legitimate.
The issue of legitimacy cannot be attacked collaterally.

Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
1. The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgments; or
2. An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument and
signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
1. The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
2. Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.

Concepcion vs CA
Concepcion vs. CA CONOPUIN
GR No. 123450, August 31, 2005

FACTS:

Gerardo Concepcion, the petitioner, and Ma. Theresa Almonte, private respondent, were married in
December 1989, and begotten a child named Jose Gerardo in December 1990. The husband filed on
December 1991, a petition to have his marriage annulled on the ground of bigamy since the wife married
a certain Mario Gopiao sometime in December 1980, whom according to the husband was still alive and
living in Loyola Heights, QC. Trial court ruled that the son was an illegitimate child and the custody was
awarded to the wife while Gerardo was granted visitation rights. Theresa argued that there was nothing in
the law granting visitation rights in favor of the putative father of an illegitimate child. She further
wanted to have the surname of the son changed from Concepcion to Almonte, her maiden name, since
an illegitimate child should use his mothers surname. After the requested oral argument, trial court
reversed its ruling and held the son to be not the son of Gerardo but of Mario. Hence, the child was a
legitimate child of Theresa and Mario.

HELD:

Considering that Theresas marriage with Gerardo was void ab initio, the latter never became the formers
husband and never acquired any right to impugn the legitimacy of the child. Theresas contention was to
have his son be declared as not the legitimate child of her and Mario but her illegitimate child with
Gerardo. In this case, the mother has no right to disavow a child because maternity is never uncertain.
Hence, she is not permitted by law to question the sons legitimacy. Under Article 167 of the Family
Code, the child shall be considered legitimate although the mother may have declared against its
legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. Having the best interest of the child in mind,
the presumption of his legitimacy was upheld by the Court. As a legitimate child, the son shall have the
right to bear the surnames of Mario and Theresa, in conformity with the provisions of Civil Code on
surnames. Gerardo cannot then impose his surname to be used by the child, since in the eyes of the law,
the child is not related to him in any way

Benitez-Badua vs CA
Benitez-Badua vs. CA
GR No. 105625, January 24, 1994

FACTS:

Spouses Vicente Benitez and Isabel Chipongian were owners of various properties located in Laguna.
Isabel died in 1982 while his husband died in 1989. Vicentes sister and nephew filed a complaint for the
issuance of letters of administration of Vicentes estate in favor of the nephew, herein private respondent.
The petitioner, Marissa Benitez-Badua, was raised and cared by the deceased spouses since childhood,
though not related to them by blood, nor legally adopted. The latter to prove that she is the only
legitimate child of the spouses submitted documents such as her certificate of live birth where the spouses
name were reflected as her parents. She even testified that said spouses continuously treated her as their
legitimate daughter. On the other hand, the relatives of Vicente declared that said spouses were unable to
physically procreate hence the petitioner cannot be the biological child. Trial court decided in favor of
the petitioner as the legitimate daughter and sole heir of the spouses.

ISSUE: WON petitioners certificate of live birth will suffice to establish her legitimacy.

HELD:

The Court dismissed the case for lack of merit. The mere registration of a child in his or her birth
certificate as the child of the supposed parents is not a valid adoption. It does not confer upon the child
the status of an adopted child and her legal rights. Such act amounts to simulation of the child's birth or
falsification of his or her birth certificate, which is a public document.

It is worthy to note that Vicente and brother of the deceased wife executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial
Settlement of the Estate of the latter. In the notarized document, they stated that they were the sole heirs
of the deceased because she died without descendants and ascendants. In executing such deed, Vicente
effectively repudiated the Certificate of Live Birth of the petitioner where it appeared thathe was the
petitioners father.

SS v. AGUAS
G.R. No. 165546 February 27, 2006.
CALLEJO, SR., J.

FACTS:
Pablo Aguas, a member and pensioner of the SSS died.
Pablos surviving spouse, Rosanna H. Aguas, filed a claim with the SSS for death benefits on indicating in
herclaim that Pablo was survived by his minor child, Jeylnn
Her claim for monthly pension was settled.
SSS received a sworn from Leticia Aguas-Macapinlac, Pablos sister, contesting Rosannas claim for
deathbenefits. She alleged that Rosanna abandoned the family abode approximately more than 6 years
before, and lived with another man on whom she has been dependent for support. She further averred that
Pablo had no legal children with Rosanna.
The SSC ruled that Rosanna was no longer qualified as primary beneficiary.
CA reversed the SSC deicision and favored the respondents.

ISSUE:
W/N Rosanna, Jeylnn and Janet are entitled to the SSS death benefits accruing from the death of Pablo
HELD: Petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED.

It bears stressing that under Article 164 of the Family Code, children conceived or born during the
marriage of the parents are legitimate.
Jeylnns claim is justified by the photocopy of her birth certificate which bears the signature of Pablo.
Petitioner was able to authenticate the certification from the Civil Registry showing that she was born on
October 29, 1991. The records also show that Rosanna and Pablo were married on December 4, 1977 and
the marriage subsisted until the latters death on December 8, 1996. It is therefore evident that Jeylnn was
born during Rosanna and Pablos marriage.
Impugning the legitimacy of a child is a strictly personal right of the husband or, in exceptional cases, his
heirs. In this case, there is no showing that Pablo challenged the legitimacy of Jeylnn during his lifetime.
The presumption that Jeylnn is a legitimate child is buttressed by her birth certificate bearing Pablos
signature, which was verified from his specimen signature on file with petitioner. A birth
certificate signed by the father is a competent evidence of paternity.
For Rosanna, to qualify as a primary beneficiary, she must establish 2 qualifying factors: (1) that she is
the legitimate spouse, and (2) that she is dependent upon the member for support.
A wife who is already separated de facto from her husband cannot be said to be "dependent for support"
upon the husband, absent any showing to the contrary. If it is proved that the were till living together at
the time of his death, it is presumed that she was dependent on the husband for support, unless it is shown
that she is capable of providing for herself.
Only Jeylnn is entitled to the SSS death benefits as it was established that she is his legitimate child.
Records show that Janet was merely "adopted" by the spouses, but there are no legal papers to prove it.
Rosanna was the legitimate wife of Pablo, she is likewise not qualified as a primary beneficiary since she
failed to present any proof to show that at the time of his death, she was still dependent on him for
support even if they were already living separately. NOTE: Legitimacy cannot be extended to other
siblings.

TEOFISTA BABIERA VS PRESENTACION CATOTAL


Posted by kaye lee on 11:33 PM
G.R. No. 138493 June 15 2000

FACTS:
Presentacion questioned the authenticity of the entry of birth of Teofista. She asserted that the birth
certificate is void ab initio, as it was totally a simulated birth, the signature of informant forged, and
contained false entries, to wit:

That Teofista is the legitimate child of the late spouses Eugenio Babiera and Hermogena
Cariosa;
Signature of the mother, Hermogena, is falsified;
Teofista's correct family name is GUINTO, not Babiera;
Her real mother was Flora Guinto, and her status is an illegitimate child;
It was clinically and medically impossible for Hermogena to bore a child at 54 years of age; her
last child birth was when Presentacion was born.
Presentacion ask the court to declare Teofista's certificate of birth void and ineffective, and to order the
City Civil Registrar to cancel the same as it affect the hereditary rights of Presentacion who inherited the
estate.

Teofista countered that she and Presentacion are full-blooded sisters, as showed therein her certificate of
birth, Certificate of Baptism, and her School Report Card. She also filed a motion on the grounds that:
the petition states no cause of action, being an attack on her legitimacy as the child of Hermogena and
Eugenio; that Presentacion has no legal capacity to file the petition pursuant to Art. 171 of the Family
Code;
and that the petition was barred from prescription in accordance with Art. 170 of the Family Code.

The trial court ruled in favor of Presentacion. CA affirmed the decision of the trial court.

ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Presentacion has legal capacity to file the special proceedings pursuant to Art. 171;
2. Whether or not the special proceedings is improper and barred by the statute of limitation;
3. Whether or not the public record of Teofista's birth is superior to the oral testimony of Presentacion.

RULING:
Petition is not meritorious.

1. Article 171 is not applicable in this case. Article 171 of the Family Code shows that it applies to
instances which the father impugns the legitimacy of his wife's child. The provision, however,
presupposes that the child was the undisputed child of the mother. Present case alleges and shows that
Hermogena did not give birth to Teofista. The present action does not impugn Teofista's filiation to
Eugenio and Hermogeno, be there is no blood relation to impugn in the first place. The reason why
Presentacion took interest on Teofista's status is to protect the former's successional rights.

2. Article 170 of the FC does not apply. The provision provides a prescriptive period for action to impugn
the legitimacy of the child. The present action involves the cancellation of Teofista's Birth Certificate, it
does not impugn her legitimacy. The action to nullify the birth certificate does not prescribe because it
was allegedly declared void ab initio.

3. The specific attendant in the case at bar and the totality of the evidence presented during trial,
sufficiently negates the presumption of regularity in the issuance of birth certificate.

First, the birth certificate was not signed by the local civil registrar, and the mother's signature was
different from other signatures. Second, no medical records or doctor's prescription that provide as
evidence of Hermogena's pregnancy. It was impossible for her to have given birth at 54 years of age.
Third, the disposition of Hermogena which states that she did not give brith to Teofista and that the latter
was not hers of Eugenio.

TIJING VS CA
Posted by kaye lee on 1:45 PM
G.R. No. 125901, March 8, 2001 [Habeas Corpus]
FACTS:
Edgardo and Bienvenida Tijing filed a petition for habeas corpus in order to recover their youngest child,
Edgardo Jr., whom they did not see for 4 years. Trial court granted the petition and ordered Angelita
Diamante to immediately release the child, now named John Thomas D. Lopez, and turn him over to his
parents. CA reversed and set aside the decision rendered by the lower court. It questioned the propriety of
the habeas corpus in this case.

ISSUE:Whether or not habeas corpus is the proper remedy to regain custody of the minor.
RULING:
Yes. SC upheld the decision of the trial court.
The writ of habeas corpus extends to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is
deprived of his liberty, or by the rightful custody of any person withheld from the persons entitled thereto.
The writ of habeas corpus is the proper legal remedy to enable parents to regain the custody of a minor
child even if the latter be in the custody of a third person of his own free will. It must be stressed out that
in habeas corpus proceeding, the question of identity is relevant and material, subject to the usual
presumption, including those as identity of the person.
The trial court was correct in its judgment based on the evidence established by the parents and by the
witness who is the brother of the late common-law husband of Angelita. Furthermore, there are no clinical
records, log book or discharge from the clinic where John Thomas was allegedly born were presented.
Strong evidence directly proves that Thomas Lopez, Angela's "husband", was not capable of siring a
child. Moreover, his first marriage produced no offspring even after almost 15 years of living together
with his legal wife. His 14 year affair with Angelita also bore no offspring.
The birth certificate of John Thomas Lopez were attended by irregularities. It was filed by Thomas Lopez,
the alleged father. Under Sec. 4, Act No. 3753 (Civil Register Law), the attending physician or midwife in
attendance of the birth should cause the registration of such birth. Only in default of the physician or
midwife, can the parent register the birth of his child. Certificate must be filed with the LCR within 30
days after the birth. The status of Thomas and Angelita on the birth certificate were typed in as legally
married, which is false because Angelita herself had admitted that she is a "common-law wife."
Trial court also observed several times that when the child and Bienvenida were both in court, the two had
strong similarities in their faces. Resemblance between a minor and his alleged parent is competent and
material evidence to establish parentage. Lastly, the spouses presented clinical records and testimony of
the midwife who attended Bienvenida's childbirth.
Categories: Habeas Corpus, Persons and Family Relations, Philippine Civil Code

Jison vs CA
Jison vs. CA
GR No. 124853, February 24, 1998

FACTS:

Private respondent, Monina Jison, instituted a complaint against petitioner, Francisco Jison, for
recognition as illegitimate child of the latter. The case was filed 20 years after her mothers death and
when she was already 39 years of age.

Petitioner was married to Lilia Lopez Jison since 1940 and sometime in 1945, he impregnated Esperanza
Amolar, Moninas mother. Monina alleged that since childhood, she had enjoyed the continuous, implied
recognition as the illegitimate child of petitioner by his acts and that of his family. It was likewise alleged
that petitioner supported her and spent for her education such that she became a CPA and eventually a
Central Bank Examiner. Monina was able to present total of 11 witnesses.

ISSUE: WON Monina should be declared as illegitimate child of Francisco Jison.

HELD:

Under Article 175 of the Family Code, illegitimate filiation may be established in the same way and on
the same evidence as that of legitimate children. Article 172 thereof provides the various forms of
evidence by which legitimate filiation is established.

To prove open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child, there must be evidence of
the manifestation of the permanent intention of the supposed father to consider the child as his, by
continuous and clear manifestations of parental affection and care, which cannot be attributed to pure
charity. Such acts must be of such a nature that they reveal not only the conviction of paternity, but also
the apparent desire to have and treat the child as such in all relations in society and in life, not
accidentally, but continuously.

The following facts was established based on the testimonial evidences offered by Monina:
1.
2.

That Francisco was her father and she was conceived at the time when her mother was employed by the
former;
That Francisco recognized Monina as his child through his overt acts and conduct.

SC ruled that a certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the putative father is not competence
evidence as to the issue of paternity. Franciscos lack of participation in the preparation of baptismal
certificates and school records render the documents showed as incompetent to prove paternity. With
regard to the affidavit signed by Monina when she was 25 years of age attesting that Francisco was not
her father, SC was in the position that if Monina were truly not Franciscos illegitimate child, it would be
unnecessary for him to have gone to such great lengths in order that Monina denounce her filiation.
Moninas evidence hurdles the high standard of proof required for the success of an action to establish
ones illegitimate filiation in relying upon the provision on open and continuous possession. Hence,
Monina proved her filiation by more than mere preponderance of evidence.

Since the instant case involves paternity and filiation, even if illegitimate, Monina filed her action well
within the period granted her by a positive provision of law. A denial then of her action on ground of
laches would clearly be inequitable and unjust. Petition was denied.

Case Digest: G.R. No. 174689. October 22, 2007

Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio, petitioner, vs. Republic of the Philippines, respondent.
_______________________________________________________________________

Facts: Petitioner was born and registered as male. He admitted that he is a male transsexual, that is,
anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female and that he had always identified himself with
girls since childhood. He underwent psychological examination, hormone treatment, breast augmentation
and sex reassignment surgery. From then on, petitioner lived as female and was in fact engaged to be
married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed from Rommel Jacinto to Mely,
and his sex from male to female. The trial court rendered a decision in favor of the petitioner. Republic of
the Philippines thru the OSG filed a petition for certiorari in the Court of Appeals. CA rendered a decision
in favor of the Republic.

Issue: Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked for.

Ruling: Article 376 of the Civil Code provides that no person can change his name or surname without
judicial authority which was amended by RA 9048 Clerical Error Law which does not sanction a change
of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Before a person can legally change his given name, he

must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In addition,
he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to
show, or even allege, any prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.
Article 412 of the Civil Code provides that no entry in the civil register shall be changed or corrected
without a judicial order. The birth certificate of petitioner contained no error. All entries therein, including
those corresponding to his first name and sex, were all correct. Hence, no correction is necessary. Article
413 of the Civil Code provides that all other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be
governed by special laws. However, there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex
reassignment and its effects. Under the Civil Register Law, a birth certificate is a historical record of the
facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex of a person is determined at birth, visually done by
the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering that
there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a persons sex made at the time
of his or her birth, if not attended by error is immutable

For these reasons, while petitioner may have succeeded in altering his body and appearance through the
intervention of modern surgery, no law authorizes the change of entry as to sex in the civil registry for
that reason. Thus, there is no legal basis for his petition for the correction or change of the entries in his
birth certificate. The remedies petitioner seeks involve questions of public policy to be addressed solely
by the legislature, not by the courts. Hence, petition is denied.

Republic vs. Cagandahan, GR No. 166676


Posted: October 5, 2011 in Case Digests
0
FACTS: Jennifer Cagandahan filed before the Regional Trial Court Branch 33 of Siniloan, Laguna a
Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate of her name from Jennifer B. Cagandahan to Jeff
Cagandahan and her gender from female to male. It appearing that Jennifer Cagandahan is suffering from
Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which is a rare medical condition where afflicted persons possess both
male and female characteristics. Jennifer Cagandahan grew up with secondary male characteristics. To
further her petition, Cagandahan presented in court the medical certificate evidencing that she is suffering
from Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia which certificate is issued by Dr. Michael Sionzon of the
Department of Psychiatry, University of the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital, who, in addition,

explained that Cagandahan genetically is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her
female organs did not develop normally, thus has organs of both male and female. The lower court
decided in her favor but the Office of the Solicitor General appealed before the Supreme Court invoking
that the same was a violation of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court because the said petition did not
implead the local civil registrar.
ISSUE: The issue in this case is the validity of the change of sex or gender and name of respondent as
ruled by the lower court.
HELD: The contention of the Office of the Solicitor General that the petition is fatally defective because
it failed to implead the local civil registrar as well as all persons who have or claim any interest therein is
not without merit. However, it must be stressed that private respondent furnished the local civil registrar a
copy of the petition, the order to publish on December 16, 2003 and all pleadings, orders or processes in
the course of the proceedings. In which case, the Supreme Court ruled that there is substantial compliance
of the provisions of Rules 103 and 108 of the Rules of Court. Furthermore, the Supreme Court held that
the determination of a persons sex appearing in his birth certificate is a legal issue which in this case
should be dealt with utmost care in view of the delicate facts present in this case.
In deciding the case, the Supreme Court brings forth the need to elaborate the term intersexuality which
is the condition or let us say a disorder that respondent is undergoing. INTERSEXUALITY applies to
human beings who cannot be classified as either male or female. It is the state of a living thing of a
gonochoristic species whose sex chromosomes, genitalia, and/or secondary sex characteristics are
determined to be neither exclusively male nor female. It is said that an organism with intersex may have
biological characteristics of both male and female sexes. In view of the foregoing, the highest tribunal of
the land consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations
which should not be subject to outright denial.
The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or
as a female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally
negates such rigid classification. That is, Philippine courts must render judgment based on law and the
evidence presented. In the instant case, there is no denying that evidence points that respondent is male.

In determining respondent to be a female, there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for
gender. The Supreme Court held that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the
determining factor in his gender classification would be what the individual, like respondent, having
reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Sexual development in cases of
intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender of
such persons, like respondent, is fixed. The Court will not consider respondent as having erred in not
choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force
respondent to undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society
commonly currently knows this gender of the human species. Respondent is the one who has to live with
his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of health. Thus, to
him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual
development and maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the
absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male will harm other members of society
who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Supreme Court affirmed as valid and justified the
respondents position and his personal judgment of being a male.

Alcantara vs alcantara GR no 167746 august 8 2007


Marriage Valid Marriage Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio
Restituto filed a petition for annulment of marriage against Rosita alleging that on 8 Dec 1982 he and
Rosita, without securing the required marriage license, went to the Manila City Hall for the purpose of
looking for a fixer who could arrange a marriage for them before a certain Rev. Navarro. They got

married on the same day. Restituto and Rosita went through another marriage ceremony in Tondo,
Manila, on 26 March 1983. The marriage was again celebrated without the parties securing a marriage
license. The alleged marriage license, procured in Carmona, Cavite, appearing on the marriage contract,
is a sham, as neither party was a resident of Carmona, and they never went to Carmona to apply for a
license with the local civil registrar of the said place. In 1988, they parted ways and lived separate lives.
Petitioner prayed that after due hearing, judgment be issued declaring their marriage void and ordering
the Civil Registrar to cancel the corresponding marriage contract and its entry on file. Rosita however
asserts the validity of their marriage and maintains that there was a marriage license issued as evidenced
by a certification from the Office of the Civil Registry of Carmona, Cavite. Restituto has a mistress with
whom he has three children. Restituto only filed the annulment of their marriage to evade prosecution for
concubinage. Rosita, in fact, has filed a case for concubinage against Restituto.
ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.
HELD: The requirement and issuance of a marriage license is the States demonstration of its
involvement and participation in every marriage, in the maintenance of which the general public is
interested. Petitioner cannot insist on the absence of a marriage license to impugn the validity of his
marriage. The cases where the court considered the absence of a marriage license as a ground for
considering the marriage void are clear-cut. In this case, the marriage contract between the petitioner and
respondent reflects a marriage license number. A certification to this effect was also issued by the local
civil registrar of Carmona, Cavite. The certification moreover is precise in that it specifically identified
the parties to whom the marriage license was issued, namely Restituto Alcantara and Rosita Almario,
further validating the fact that a license was in fact issued to the parties herein. Petitioner, in a faint
attempt to demolish the probative value of the marriage license, claims that neither he nor respondent is a
resident of Carmona, Cavite. Even then, we still hold that there is no sufficient basis to annul petitioner
and respondents marriage. Issuance of a marriage license in a city or municipality, not the residence of
either of the contracting parties, and issuance of a marriage license despite the absence of publication or
prior to the completion of the 10-day period for publication are considered mere irregularities that do not
affect the validity of the marriage. An irregularity in any of the formal requisites of marriage does not
affect its validity but the party or parties responsible for the irregularity are civilly, criminally and
administratively liable. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. The presumption is always in favor of the
validity of the marriage. Every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage
bonds. The Courts look upon this presumption with great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the
contrary, the presumption is of great weight.

Republic vs CA and Castro


Republic vs. CA and Castro
GR No. 103047, September 12, 1994

FACTS:

Angelina Castro, with her parents unaware, contracted a civil marriage with Edwin Cardenas. They did
not immediately live together and it was only upon Castro found out that she was pregnant that they
decided to live together wherein the said cohabitation lasted for only 4 months. Thereafter, they parted
ways and Castro gave birth that was adopted by her brother with the consent of Cardenas.

The baby was brought in the US and in Castros earnest desire to follow her daughter wanted to put in
order her marital status before leaving for US. She filed a petition seeking a declaration for the nullity of
her marriage. Her lawyer then found out that there was no marriage license issued prior to the celebration
of their marriage proven by the certification issued by the Civil Registrar of Pasig.

ISSUE: Whether or not the documentary and testimonial evidence resorted to by Castro is sufficient to
establish that no marriage license was issued to the parties prior to the solemnization of their marriage.

HELD:

The court affirmed the decision of CA that the certification issued by the Civil Registrar unaccompanied
by any circumstances of suspicion sufficiently prove that the office did not issue a marriage license to the
contracting parties. Albeit the fact that the testimony of Castro is not supported by any other witnesses is
not a ground to deny her petition because of the peculiar circumstances of her case. Furthermore,
Cardenas was duly served with notice of the proceedings, which he chose to ignore.

Under the circumstances of the case, the documentary and testimonial evidence presented by private
respondent Castro sufficiently established the absence of the subject marriage license.

CARINO VS CARINO GR NO 132529 2 FEBRAURY 2001


Article 40
In 1969 SPO4 Santiago Carino married Susan Nicdao Carino. He had 2 children with her. In 1992, SPO4
contracted a second marriage, this time with Susan Yee Carino. In 1988, prior to his second marriage,
SPO4 is already bedridden and he was under the care of Yee. In 1992, he died 13 days after his marriage

with Yee. Thereafter, the spouses went on to claim the benefits of SPO4. Nicdao was able to claim a total
of P140,000.00 while Yee was able to collect a total of P21,000.00. In 1993, Yee filed an action for
collection of sum of money against Nicdao. She wanted to have half of the P140k. Yee admitted that her
marriage with SPO4 was solemnized during the subsistence of the marriage b/n SPO4 and Nicdao but the
said marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due to the absence of a valid marriage license as
certified by the local civil registrar. Yee also claimed that she only found out about the previous marriage
on SPO4s funeral.
ISSUE: Whether or not the absolute nullity of marriage may be invoked to claim presumptive legitimes.
HELD: The marriage between Nicdao and SPO4 is null and void due the absence of a valid marriage
license. The marriage between Yee and SPO4 is likewise null and void for the same has been solemnized
without the judicial declaration of the nullity of the marriage between Nicdao and SPO4. Under Article 40
of the FC, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the
sole basis acceptable in law, for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity, is a final judgment
declaring the previous marriage void. However, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is
necessary to declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to the
determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of
property regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even
after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit not directly instituted to question the validity of
said marriage, so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. In such instances, evidence must
be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous
marriage an absolute nullity. These need not be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court
declaring such previous marriage void.
The SC ruled that Yee has no right to the benefits earned by SPO4 as a policeman for their marriage is
void due to bigamy; she is only entitled to properties, money etc owned by them in common in proportion
to their respective contributions. Wages and salaries earned by each party shall belong to him or her
exclusively (Art. 148 of FC). Nicdao is entitled to the full benefits earned by SPO4 as a cop even if their
marriage is likewise void. This is because the two were capacitated to marry each other for there were no
impediments but their marriage was void due to the lack of a marriage license; in their situation, their
property relations is governed by Art 147 of the FC which provides that everything they earned during
their cohabitation is presumed to have been equally contributed by each party this includes salaries and
wages earned by each party notwithstanding the fact that the other may not have contributed at all.

Morigo vs People
Morigo vs. People
GR No. 145226, February 6, 2004

FACTS:

Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates in Bohol. They lost contacts for a while but after
receiving a card from Barrete and various exchanges of letters, they became sweethearts. They got
married in 1990. Barrete went back to Canada for work and in 1991 she filed petition for divorce in
Ontario Canada, which was granted. In 1992, Morigo married Lumbago. He subsequently filed a
complaint for judicial declaration of nullity on the ground that there was no marriage ceremony. Morigo
was then charged with bigamy and moved for a suspension of arraignment since the civil case pending
posed a prejudicial question in the bigamy case. Morigo pleaded not guilty claiming that his marriage
with Barrete was void ab initio. Petitioner contented he contracted second marriage in good faith.

ISSUE: Whether Morigo must have filed declaration for the nullity of his marriage with Barrete before
his second marriage in order to be free from the bigamy case.

HELD:

Morigos marriage with Barrete is void ab initio considering that there was no actual marriage ceremony
performed between them by a solemnizing officer instead they just merely signed a marriage contract.
The petitioner does not need to file declaration of the nullity of his marriage when he contracted his
second marriage with Lumbago. Hence, he did not commit bigamy and is acquitted in the case filed.

Balogbog vs CA
Balogbog vs. CA
GR No. 83598, March 7, 1997

FACTS:

Ramonito and Generoso Balogbog filed an action for partition and accounting against their Aunt Leoncia
and Uncle Gaudioso for partition and accounting of their grandparents estate at the Court of First
Instance of Cebu City which was granted by the latter. Leoncia and Gaudioso appealed to the Court of
Appeals but the latter affirmed the lower courts decision.

Basilio Balogbog and Genoveva Arnibal died intestate in 1951 and 1961 respectively. They have three
children, Leoncia, Gaudioso and Gavino, their older brother who died in 1935. Ramoncito and Generoso
was claiming that they were the legitimate children of Gavino by Catalina Ubas and that, as such they
were entitled to the one-third share in the estate of their grandparents. However, Leoncia and Gaudioso
claimed they are not aware that their brother has 2 sons and that he was married. They started to question
the validity of the marriage between their brother Gavino and Catalina despite how Gaudioso himself
admitted during a police investigation proceeding that indeed Ramonito is his nephew as the latter is the
son of his elder brother Gavino.

In the efforts of Ramoncito and Generoso to prove the validity of their parents marriage, they presented
Priscilo Trazo, 81 years old then mayor of Asturias from 1928 to 1934 and Matias Pogoy who both
testified that he knew Gavino and Catalina to be husband and wife and that they have three children.
Catalina herself testified that she was handed a receipt presumably the marriage certificate by Fr.
Jomao-as but it was burned during the war.

On the other hand,Leoncia claimed that her brother Gavino died single at the family residence in Asturias.
She obtained a certificate from the local Civil Registrar of Asturias to the effect that the office did not
have a record of the names of Gavino and Catalina which was prepared by Assistant Municipal Treasurer
Juan Maranga who testified in the hearing as well.

Leoncia and Gaudioso contended that the marriage of Gavino and Catalina should have been proven in
accordance with Arts. 53 and 54 of the Civil Code of 1889 because this was the law in force at the time of
the alleged marriage was celebrated.

Art. 53 provides that marriages celebrated under the Civil Code of 1889 should be proven only by a
certified copy of the memorandum in the Civil Registry, unless the books thereof have not been kept or
have been lost, or unless they are questioned in the courts, in which case any other proof, such as that of
the continuous possession by parents of the status of husband and wife, may be considered, provided that
the registration of the birth of their children as their legitimate children is also submitted in evidence.

ISSUE: Whether or not Gavino and Catalinas marriage is valid.

HELD:

Supreme Court affirmed the decisions of the trial court and Court of Appeals in rendering Gavino and
Catalinas marriage as valid and thus entitle Ramonito and Generoso one third of their grandparents
estate.

The court further states that Arts. 42 to 107 of the Civil Code of 889 of Spain did not take effect, having
been suspended by the Governor General of the Philippines shortly after the extension of that code of this
country. Therefore, Arts. 53 and 54 never came into force. Since this case was brought in the lower court
in 1968, the existence of the marriage must be determined in accordance with the present Civil Code,
which repealed the provisions of the former Civil Code, except as they related to vested rights, and the
rules of evidence. Under the Rules of Court, the presumption is that a man and a woman conducting
themselves as husband and wife are legally married.

Albeit, a marriage contract is considered primary evidence of marriage, failure to present it would not
mean that marriage did not take place. Other evidence may be presented where in this case evidence
consisting of the testimonies of witnesses was held competent to prove the marriage of Gavino and
Catalina in 1929, that they have three children, one of whom, Petronilo, died at the age of six and that
they are recognized by Gavinos family and by the public as the legitimate children of Gavino

G.R. No. L-19671 (November 29, 1965)


Tenchavez vs. Escao
FACTS:
Vicenta Escao, 27, exchanged marriage vows with Pastor Tenchavez, 32, on February 24, 1948, before
a Catholic chaplain. The marriage was duly registered with the local civil registrar. However, the two
were unable to live together after the marriage and as of June 1948, they were already estranged. Vicenta
left for the United Stated in 1950. On the same year she filed a verified complaint for divorce against
Tenchavez in the State of Nevada on the ground of Extreme cruelty, entirely mental in character.
A decree of divorce, final and absolute was issued in open court by the said tribunal. She married an
American, lived with him in California, had several children with him and, on 1958, acquired American
Citizenship.
On 30 July 1955, Tenchavez filed a complaint in the Court of First Instance of Cebu, and amended on 31
May 1956, against Vicenta F. Escao, her parents, Mamerto and Mena Escao whom he charged with
having dissuaded and discouraged Vicenta from joining her husband, and alienating her affections, and
against the Roman Catholic Church, for having, through its Diocesan Tribunal, decreed the annulment of
the marriage, and asked for legal separation and one million pesos in damages. Vicentas parents denied
that they had in any way influenced their daughters acts, and counterclaimed for moral damages.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not the divorce sought by Vicenta Escao is valid and binding upon courts of the
Philippines.

2. Whether or not the charges against Vicenta Escaos parents were sufficient in form.
RULING:
1. No. Vicenta Escao and Pastor Tenchavez marriage remain existent and undissolved under the
Philippine Law. Escaos divorce and second marriage cannot be deemed valid under the Philippine Law
to which Escao was bound since in the time the divorce decree was issued, Escao, like her husband,
was still a Filipino citizen. The acts of the wife in not complying with her wifely duties, deserting her
husband without any justifiable cause, leaving for the United States in order to secure a decree of absolute
divorce, and finally getting married again are acts which constitute a willful infliction of injury upon the
husbands feelings in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy, thus entitling
Tenchavez to a decree of legal separation under our law on the basis of adultery.
2. No. Tenchavez charge against Vicentas parents are not supported by credible evidence. The
testimony of Tenchavez about the Escaos animosity toward him strikes the court to be merely
conjecture and exaggeration, and were belied by Tenchavez own letters written before the suit had
begun. An action for alienation of affections against the parents of one consort does not lie in the absence
of proof of malice or unworthy motives on their part.
Plaintiff Tenchavez, in falsely charging Vicenta's aged parents with racial or social discrimination and
with having exerted efforts and pressured her to seek annulment and divorce, unquestionably caused them
unrest and anxiety, entitling them to recover damages.

Republic vs Iyoy (G.R. No. 152577)


Facts:
The case is a petition for review by the RP represented by the Office of the Solicitor General on certiorari
praying for thereversal of the decision of the CA dated July 30, 2001 affirming the judgment of the RTC
declaring the marriage of Crasus L. Iyoy(respondent) and Ada Rosal-Iyoy null and void based on Article
36.
On December 16, 1961 Crasus Iyoy and Ada Rosal-Iyoy married each other, they had 5 children. In 1984,
Fely went to the US, inthe same year she sent letters to Crasus asking him to sign divorce papers. In 1985,
Crasus learned that Fely married an Americanand had a child. Fely went back to the Philippines on
several occasions, during one she attended the marriage of one of her children inwhich she used her
husbands last name as hers in the invitation.
March 25, 1997, Crasus filed a complaint for declaration of nullity alleging that Felys acts brought
danger and dishonor to the family and were manifestations of her psychological incapacity. Crasus

submitted his testimony, the certification of the recording of their marriage contract, and the invitation
where Fely used her newhusbands last name as evidences.
Fely denied the claims and asserted that Crasus was a drunkard, womanizer, had no job, and thatsince
1988 she was already an American citizen and not covered by our laws. The RTC found the evidences
sufficient and granted thedecree; it was affirmed in the CA.
Issue:
Does abandonment and sexual infidelity per se constitute psychological incapacity?
Held:
The evidences presented by the respondent fail to establish psychological incapacity.
Furthermore, Article 36 contemplates downright incapacity or inability to take cognizance of and to
assume the basic marital obligations; not a mere refusal, neglect or difficulty, much less, ill will, on the
part of the errant spouse. Irreconcilable differences, conflicting personalities, emotional immaturity and
irresponsibility, physical abuse, habitual alcoholism, sexual infidelity or perversion, and abandonment, by
themselves, also do not warrant a finding of psychological incapacity under the said Article.
Finally, Article 36 is not to be confused with a divorce law thatcuts the marital bond at the time the
causes therefore manifest themselves. It refers to a serious psychological illness afflicting aparty even
before the celebration of marriage. It is a malady so grave and so permanent as to deprive one of
awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond one is about to assume.

Van dorn vs Romillo GR no L-68470 october 8 1985


139 scra 139
Nationality Principle Divorce
Petitioner Alice Reyes is a citizen of the Philippines while private respondent is a citizen of the United
States; they were married in Hongkong. Thereafter, they established their residence in the Philippines and
begot two children. Subsequently, they were divorced in Nevada, United States, and that petitioner has remarried also in Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.

Private respondent filed suit against petitioner, stating that petitioners business in Manila is their conjugal
property; that petitioner he ordered to render accounting of the business and that private respondent be
declared to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to dismiss the case contending that the cause
of action is barred by the judgment in the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court. The denial now
is the subject of the certiorari proceeding.
ISSUE: Whether or not the divorce obtained by the parties is binding only to the alien spouse.
HELD: Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only
Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case,
the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American
Law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage.
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband petitioner. He would have
no standing to sue in the case below as petitioners husband entitled to exercise control over conjugal
assets. As he is bound by the decision of his own countrys court, which validly exercised jurisdiction
over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is stopped by his own representation before said
court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

De castro vs de castro Gr no 160172 feb 13 2008


Void ab initio marriages
Reinel and Annabelle met and became sweethearts in 1991. They applied for a marriage license in Pasig
City in September 1994. They had their first sexual relation sometime in October 1994, and had regularly
engaged in sex thereafter. When the couple went back to the Office of the Civil Registrar, the marriage
license had already expired. Thus, in order to push through with the plan, in lieu of a marriage license,
they executed an affidavit dated 13 March 1995 stating that they had been living together as husband and
wife for at least five years. The couple got married on the same date. Nevertheless, after the ceremony,
petitioner and respondent went back to their respective homes and did not live together as husband and
wife. On 13 Nov 1995, Annabelle gave birth to a child named Reinna Tricia A. De Castro. Since the
childs birth, the mother has been the one supporting her out of her income as a government dentist and
from her private practice.
On 4 June 1998, respondent filed a complaint for support against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court of Pasig City . In her complaint, respondent alleged that she is married to petitioner and that the
latter has reneged on his responsibility/obligation to financially support her as his wife and Reinna
Tricia as his child. Reinel denied his marriage with Annabelle claiming that the marriage is void ab initio
because the affidavit they jointly executed is a fake. And that he was only forced by Annabelle to marry
her to avoid the humiliation that the pregnancy sans marriage may bring her. The trial court ruled that the
marriage between petitioner and respondent is not valid because it was solemnized without a marriage
license. However, it declared petitioner as the natural father of the child, and thus obliged to give her
support. The Court of Appeals denied the appeal. Prompted by the rule that a marriage is presumed to
be subsisting until a judicial declaration of nullity has been made, the appellate court declared that the
child was born during the subsistence and validity of the parties marriage. In addition, the Court of
Appeals frowned upon petitioners refusal to undergo DNA testing to prove the paternity and filiation, as

well as his refusal to state with certainty the last time he had carnal knowledge with respondent, saying
that petitioners forgetfulness should not be used as a vehicle to relieve him of his obligation and reward
him of his being irresponsible. Moreover, the Court of Appeals noted the affidavit dated 7 April
1998 executed by petitioner, wherein he voluntarily admitted that he is the legitimate father of the child.
The appellate court also ruled that since this case is an action for support, it was improper for the trial
court to declare the marriage of petitioner and respondent as null and void in the very same case. There
was no participation of the State, through the prosecuting attorney or fiscal, to see to it that there is no
collusion between the parties, as required by the Family Code in actions for declaration of nullity of a
marriage. The burden of proof to show that the marriage is void rests upon petitioner, but it is a matter
that can be raised in an action for declaration of nullity, and not in the instant proceedings.
ISSUE: Whether or not their marriage is valid.
HELD: The SC holds that the trial court had jurisdiction to determine the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent. The validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked.
Under the Family Code, the absence of any of the essential or formal requisites shall render the marriage
void ab initio, whereas a defect in any of the essential requisites shall render the marriage voidable. In
the instant case, it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner and respondent did not have a
marriage license when they contracted their marriage. Instead, they presented an affidavit stating that
they had been living together for more than five years. However, respondent herself in effect admitted the
falsity of the affidavit when she was asked during cross-examination. The falsity of the affidavit cannot be
considered as a mere irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage. The law dispenses with the
marriage license requirement for a man and a woman who have lived together and exclusively with each
other as husband and wife for a continuous and unbroken period of at least five years before the marriage.
The aim of this provision is to avoid exposing the parties to humiliation, shame and embarrassment
concomitant with the scandalous cohabitation of persons outside a valid marriage due to the publication
of every applicants name for a marriage license. In the instant case, there was no scandalous
cohabitation to protect; in fact, there was no cohabitation at all. The false affidavit which petitioner and
respondent executed so they could push through with the marriage has no value whatsoever; it is a mere
scrap of paper. They were not exempt from the marriage license requirement. Their failure to obtain and
present a marriage license renders their marriage void ab initio.

Republic of the Philippines


SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. 108854 June 14, 1994


MA. PAZ FERNANDEZ KROHN, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and EDGAR KROHN, JR., respondents.

Cruz, Durian, Agabin, Atienza, Alday and Tuason for petitioner.


Oscar F. Martinez for private respondent.

BELLOSILLO, J.:
A confidential psychiatric evaluation report is being presented in evidence before the trial court in a
petition for annulment of marriage grounded on psychological incapacity. The witness testifying on the
report is the husband who initiated the annulment proceedings, not the physician who prepared the report.
The subject of the evaluation report, Ma. Paz Fernandez Krohn, invoking the rule on privileged
communication between physician and patient, seeks to enjoin her husband from disclosing the contents
of the report. After failing to convince the trial court and the appellate court, she is now before us on a
petition for review on certiorari.
On 14 June 1964, Edgar Krohn, Jr., and Ma. Paz Fernandez were married at the Saint Vincent de Paul
Church in San Marcelino, Manila. The union produced three children, Edgar Johannes, Karl Wilhelm and
Alexandra. Their blessings notwithstanding, the relationship between the couple developed into a stormy
one. In 1971, Ma. Paz underwent psychological testing purportedly in an effort to ease the marital strain.
The effort however proved futile. In 1973, they finally separated in fact.
In 1975, Edgar was able to secure a copy of the confidential psychiatric report on Ma. Paz prepared and
signed by Drs. Cornelio Banaag, Jr., and Baltazar Reyes. On 2 November 1978, presenting the report
among others, he obtained a decree ("Conclusion") from the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale in
Manila nullifying his church marriage with Ma. Paz on the ground of "incapacitas assumendi onera
conjugalia due to lack of due discretion existent at the time of the wedding and thereafter." 1 On 10 July
1979, the decree was confirmed and pronounced "Final and Definite." 2
Meanwhile, on 30 July 1982, the then Court of First Instance (now Regional Trial Court) of Pasig, Br. II,
issued an order granting the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership.
On 23 October 1990, Edgar filed a petition for the annulment of his marriage with Ma. Paz before the trial
court. 3In his petition, he cited the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report which Ma. Paz merely
denied in her Answer as "either unfounded or irrelevant." 4
At the hearing on 8 May 1991, Edgar took the witness stand and tried to testify on the contents of the
Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report. This was objected to on the ground that it violated the rule on
privileged communication between physician and patient. Subsequently, Ma. Paz filed a Manifestation
expressing her "continuing objection" to any evidence, oral or documentary, "that would thwart the
physician-patient privileged communication rule," 5 and thereafter submitted a Statement for the Record
asserting among others that "there is no factual or legal basis whatsoever for petitioner (Edgar) to claim
'psychological incapacity' to annul their marriage, such ground being completely false, fabricated and
merely an afterthought." 6 Before leaving for Spain where she has since resided after their separation, Ma.
Paz also authorized and instructed her counsel to oppose the suit and pursue her counterclaim even during
her absence.
On 29 May 1991, Edgar opposed Ma. Paz' motion to disallow the introduction of the confidential
psychiatric report as evidence, 7 and afterwards moved to strike out Ma. Paz' Statement for the Record. 8

On 4 June 1991, the trial court issued an Order admitting the Confidential Psychiatric Evaluation Report
in evidence and ruling that
. . . the Court resolves to overrule the objection and to sustain the Opposition to the
respondent's Motion; first, because the very issue in this case is whether or not the
respondent had been suffering from psychological incapacity; and secondly, when the
said psychiatric report was referred to in the complaint, the respondent did not object
thereto on the ground of the supposed privileged communication between patient and
physician. What was raised by the respondent was that the said psychiatric report was
irrelevant. So, the Court feels that in the interest of justice and for the purpose of
determining whether the respondent as alleged in the petition was suffering from
psychological incapacity, the said psychiatric report is very material and may be testified
to by petitioner (Edgar Krohn, Jr.) without prejudice on the part of the respondent to
dispute the said report or to cross-examination first the petitioner and later the
psychiatrist who prepared the same if the latter will be presented. 9
On 27 November 1991, the trial court denied the Motion to Reconsider Order dated June 4, 1991, and
directed that the Statement for the Record filed by Ma. Paz be stricken off the record. A subsequent
motion for reconsideration filed by her counsel was likewise denied.
Counsel of Ma. Paz then elevated the issue to respondent Court of Appeals. In a Decision promulgated 30
October 1992, the appellate court dismissed the petition for certiorari. 10 On 5 February 1993, the motion
to reconsider the dismissal was likewise denied. Hence, the instant petition for review.
Petitioner now seeks to enjoin the presentation and disclosure of the contents of the psychiatric report and
prays for the admission of her Statement for the Record to form part of the records of the case. She argues
that since
Sec. 24, par. (c), Rule 130, of the Rules of Court 11 prohibits a physician from testifying on matters which
he may have acquired in attending to a patient in a professional capacity, "WITH MORE REASON
should be third person (like respondent-husband in this particular instance) be PROHIBITED from
testifying on privileged matters between a physician and patient or from submitting any medical report,
findings or evaluation prepared by a physician which the latter has acquired as a result of his confidential
and privileged relation with a patient." 12 She says that the reason behind the prohibition is
. . . to facilitate and make safe, full and confidential disclosure by a patient to his
physician of all facts, circumstances and symptoms, untrammeled by apprehension of
their subsequent and enforced disclosure and publication on the witness stand, to the end
that the physician may form a correct opinion, and be enabled safely and efficaciously to
treat his patient. 13
She further argues that to allow her husband to testify on the contents of the psychiatric evaluation report
"will set a very bad and dangerous precedent because it abets circumvention of the rule's intent in
preserving the sanctity, security and confidence to the relation of physician and his patient." 14 Her thesis
is that what cannot be done directly should not be allowed to be done indirectly.
Petitioner submits that her Statement for the Record simply reiterates under oath what she asserted in her
Answer, which she failed to verify as she had already left for Spain when her Answer was filed. She
maintains that her "Statement for the Record is a plain and simple pleading and is not as it has never been
intended to take the place of her testimony;" 15 hence, there is no factual and legal basis whatsoever to
expunge it from the records.

Private respondent Edgar Krohn, Jr., however contends that "the rules are very explicit: the prohibition
applies only to a physician. Thus . . . the legal prohibition to testify is not applicable to the case at bar
where the person sought to be barred from testifying on the privileged communication is the husband and
not the physician of the petitioner." 16 In fact, according to him, the Rules sanction his testimony
considering that a husband may testify against his wife in a civil case filed by one against the other.
Besides, private respondent submits that privileged communication may be waived by the person entitled
thereto, and this petitioner expressly did when she gave her unconditional consent to the use of the
psychiatric evaluation report when it was presented to the Tribunal Metropolitanum Matrimoniale which
took it into account among others in deciding the case and declaring their marriage null and void. Private
respondent further argues that petitioner also gave her implied consent when she failed to specifically
object to the admissibility of the report in her Answer where she merely described the evaluation report as
"either unfounded or irrelevant." At any rate, failure to interpose a timely objection at the earliest
opportunity to the evidence presented on privileged matters may be construed as an implied waiver.
With regard to the Statement for the Record filed by petitioner, private respondent posits that this in
reality is an amendment of her Answer and thus should comply with pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court, hence, its exclusion from the records for failure to comply with the Rules is proper.
The treatise presented by petitioner on the privileged nature of the communication between physician and
patient, as well as the reasons therefor, is not doubted. Indeed, statutes making communications between
physician and patient privileged are intended to inspire confidence in the patient and encourage him to
make a full disclosure to his physician of his symptoms and condition. 17 Consequently, this prevents the
physician from making public information that will result in humiliation, embarrassment, or disgrace to
the patient. 18 For, the patient should rest assured with the knowledge that the law recognizes the
communication as confidential, and guards against the possibility of his feelings being shocked or his
reputation tarnished by their subsequent disclosure. 19 The physician-patient privilege creates a zone of
privacy, intended to preclude the humiliation of the patient that may follow the disclosure of his ailments.
Indeed, certain types of information communicated in the context of the physician-patient relationship fall
within the constitutionally protected zone of privacy, 20 including a patient's interest in keeping his mental
health records confidential. 21 Thus, it has been observed that the psychotherapist-patient privilege is
founded upon the notion that certain forms of antisocial behavior may be prevented by encouraging those
in need of treatment for emotional problems to secure the services of a psychotherapist.
Petitioner's discourse while exhaustive is however misplaced. Lim v. Court of Appeals 22 clearly lays
down the requisites in order that the privilege may be successfully invoked: (a) the privilege is claimed in
a civil case; (b) the person against whom the privilege is claimed is one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics; (c) such person acquired the information while he was attending to the
patient in his professional capacity; (d) the information was necessary to enable him to act in that
capacity; and, (e) the information was confidential and, if disclosed, would blacken the reputation
(formerly character) of the patient.
In the instant case, the person against whom the privilege is claimed is not one duly authorized to practice
medicine, surgery or obstetrics. He is simply the patient's husband who wishes to testify on a document
executed by medical practitioners. Plainly and clearly, this does not fall within the claimed prohibition.
Neither can his testimony be considered a circumvention of the prohibition because his testimony cannot
have the force and effect of the testimony of the physician who examined the patient and executed the
report.

Counsel for petitioner indulged heavily in objecting to the testimony of private respondent on the ground
that it was privileged. In his Manifestation before the trial court dated 10 May 1991, he invoked the rule
on privileged communications but never questioned the testimony as hearsay. It was a fatal mistake. For,
in failing to object to the testimony on the ground that it was hearsay, counsel waived his right to make
such objection and, consequently, the evidence offered may be admitted.
The other issue raised by petitioner is too trivial to merit the full attention of this Court. The allegations
contained in the Statement for the Records are but refutations of private respondent's declarations which
may be denied or disproved during the trial.
The instant appeal has taken its toll on the petition for annulment. Three years have already lapsed and
private respondent herein, as petitioner before the trial court, has yet to conclude his testimony thereat.
We thus enjoin the trial judge and the parties' respective counsel to act with deliberate speed in resolving
the main action, and avoid any and all stratagems that may further delay this case. If all lawyers are
allowed to appeal every perceived indiscretion of a judge in the course of trial and include in their appeals
depthless issues, there will be no end to litigations, and the docket of appellate courts will forever be
clogged with inconsequential cases. Hence, counsel should exercise prudence in appealing lower court
rulings and raise only legitimate issues so as not to retard the resolution of cases. Indeed, there is no point
in unreasonably delaying the resolution of the petition and prolonging the agony of the wedded couple
who after coming out from a storm still have the right to a renewed blissful life either alone or in the
company of each other. 23
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision of
respondent Court of Appeals promulgated on 30 October 1992 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Davide, Jr., Quiason and Kapunan, JJ., concur.

Lacson vs san jose lacson 24 S 827


KULANG

Cabataniw vs CA GR 124814 10/21/04


DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
March 15, 1996 decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. 36708 which in turn affirmed the decision
of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Branch 60 in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C which compelled petitioner
Camelo Cabatania to acknowledge private respondent Camelo Regodos as his illegitimate son and to give
support to the latter in the amount of P 500 per month.
This controversy stemmed from a petition for recognition and support filed by Florencia Regodos in
behalf of her minor son, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
During the trial, Florencia testified that she was the mother of private respondent who was born on
September 9, 1982 and that she was the one supporting the child. She recounted that after her husband left
her in the early part of 1981, she went to Escalante, Negros Occidental to look for work and was
eventually hired as petitioners household help. It was while working there as a maid that, on January 2,
1982, petitioner brought her to Bacolod City where they checked in at the Visayan Motel and had sexual
intercourse. Petitioner promised to support her if she got pregnant.
Florencia claimed she discovered she was carrying petitioners child 27 days after their sexual
encounter. The sexual intercourse was repeated in March 1982 in San Carlos City. Later, on suspicion that
Florencia was pregnant, petitioners wife sent her home. But petitioner instead brought her to Singcang,
Bacolod City where he rented a house for her. On September 9, 1982, assisted by a hilot in her aunts
house in Tiglawigan, Cadiz City, she gave birth to her child, private respondent Camelo Regodos.
Petitioner Camelo Cabatanias version was different. He testified that he was a sugar planter and a
businessman. Sometime in December, 1981, he hired Florencia as a servant at home. During the course of
her employment, she would often go home to her husband in the afternoon and return to work the
following morning. This displeased petitioners wife, hence she was told to look for another job.
In the meantime, Florencia asked permission from petitioner to go home and spend New Years Eve
in Cadiz City. Petitioner met her on board the Ceres bus bound for San Carlos City and invited her to
dinner. While they were eating, she confided that she was hard up and petitioner offered to lend her save
money. Later, they spent the night in San Carlos City and had sexual intercourse. While doing it, he felt
something jerking and when he asked her about it, she told him she was pregnant with the child of her
husband. They went home the following day.
In March 1982, Florencia, then already working in another household, went to petitioners house
hoping to be re-employed as a servant there. Since petitioners wife was in need of one, she was re-hired.
However petitioners wife noticed that her stomach was bulging and inquired about the father of the
unborn child. She told petitioners wife that the baby was by her husband. Because of her condition, she
was again told to go home and they did not see each other anymore.

Petitioner was therefore surprised when summons was served on him by Florencias counsel. She
was demanding support for private respondent Camelo Regodos. Petitioner refused, denying the alleged
paternity. He insisted she was already pregnant when they had sex. He denied going to Bacolod City with
her and checking in at the Visayan Motel. He vehemently denied having sex with her on January 2, 1982
and renting a house for her in Singcang, Bacolod City.
After trial, the court a quo gave more probative weight to the testimony of Florencia despite its
discovery that she misrepresented herself as a widow when, in reality, her husband was alive. Deciding in
favor of private respondent, the trial court declared:
The child was presented before the Court, and if the Court is to decide this case, based on the personal
appearance of the child then there can never be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child of the
defendant with plaintiff-minors mother, Florencia Regodos.
xxx

xxx

xxx

In view of the evidence presented by the plaintiff, the Court finds the evidence of the plaintiff in support
of the claim to be meritorious; defendant admitted having a sexual intercourse with the plaintiffs
mother, Florencia Regodos, but denied paternity to the child. The child was presented before the Court,
and if the Court is to decide this case, based on the personal appearance of the child, then there can never
be a doubt that the plaintiff-minor is the child of the defendant with plaintiff-minors mother, Florencia
Regodos.[2]
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC:
The misrepresentation made by Florencia in the petition that she was a widow should not prejudice the
right of petitioner-appellee. As held by the Supreme Court, even where a witness has been found to have
deliberately falsified the truth in some particulars, it is not required that the whole of her testimony be
rejected (People vs. Bohol, 170 SCRA 585). It is perfectly reasonable to believe the testimony of a
witness with respect to some facts and disbelieve it with respect to other facts (People vs. Delas, 199
SCRA 574, 575). There is therefore no reason to disbelieve Florencia that her first intercourse with
appellant occurred on January 2, 1982 and nine (9) months later or on September 9, 1982, she gave birth
to appellee (TSN, Hearing of June 10, 1991 and Exhibit A).
In the absence of arbitrariness in the evaluation of the evidence adduced before the trial court and there
being no evidence that the latter had overlooked or misappreciated, we find no cogent reason to disturb
the trial courts findings.
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED.[3]
Hence this petition which assigns the following errors:
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 283 OF THE
CIVIL CODE ON THE COMPULSORY RECOGNITION AND AWARD OF SUPPORT IN
FAVOR OF RESPONDENT-APPELLEE CAMELO REGODOS;

B. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN ITS DECISION BASED ON THE EVIDENCE


ADDUCED BY RESPONDENT CAMELO REGODOS BEFORE THE TRIAL COURT.[4]
Clearly, this petition calls for a review of the factual findings of the two lower courts. As a general
rule, factual issues are not within the province of this Court. Factual findings of the trial court, when
adopted and confirmed by the Court of Appeals, become final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on
appeal except (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (2) when there is
a grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the finding is grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (4) when the judgment of the Court of Appeals is based on misapprehension of facts; (5)
when the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the Court of Appeals, in making its findings, goes
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(7) when the findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; (8) when the findings
of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (9) when the Court
of Appeals manifestly overlooks certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and which, if properly
considered, justifies a different conclusion, and (10) when the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are
premised on the absence of evidence and are contradicted by the evidence on record. The Court is
convinced that this case falls within one of the exceptions. [5]
The trial courts finding of a paternal relationship between petitioner and private respondent was
based on the testimony of the childs mother and the personal appearance of the child.
Time and again, this Court has ruled that a high standard of proof is required to establish paternity
and filiation.[6] An order for recognition and support may create an unwholesome situation or may be an
irritant to the family or the lives of the parties so that it must be issued only if paternity or filiation is
established by clear and convincing evidence. [7]
The applicable provisions of the law are Articles 172 and 175 of the Civil Code:
Art. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten
instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
Art. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the same
evidence as legitimate children.
xxx

xxx

xxx

Private respondent presented a copy of his birth and baptismal certificates, the preparation of which
was without the knowledge or consent of petitioner. A certificate of live birth purportedly identifying the
putative father is not competent evidence of paternity when there is no showing that the putative father
had a hand in the preparation of said certificate. The local civil registrar has no authority to record the
paternity of an illegitimate child on the information of a third person. [8]
In the same vein, we have ruled that, while a baptismal certificate may be considered a public
document, it can only serve as evidence of the administration of the sacrament on the date specified but
not the veracity of the entries with respect to the childs paternity. [9] Thus, certificates issued by the local
civil registrar and baptismal certificates are per se inadmissible in evidence as proof of filiation and they
cannot be admitted indirectly as circumstantial evidence to prove the same. [10]
Aside from Florencias self-serving testimony that petitioner rented a house for her in Singcang,
Bacolod City, private respondent failed to present sufficient proof of voluntary recognition.
We now proceed to the credibility of Florencias testimony. Both the trial court and the appellate
court brushed aside the misrepresentation of Florencia in the petition for recognition that she was a
widow. Both courts dismissed the lie as minor which did not affect the rest of her testimony. We disagree.
The fact that Florencias husband is living and there is a valid subsisting marriage between them gives
rise to the presumption that a child born within that marriage is legitimate even though the mother may
have declared against its legitimacy or may have been sentenced as an adulteress. [11] The presumption of
legitimacy does not only flow out of a declaration in the statute but is based on the broad principles of
natural justice and the supposed virtue of the mother. The presumption is grounded on the policy to
protect innocent offspring from the odium of illegitimacy.[12]
In this age of genetic profiling and deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) analysis, the extremely subjective
test of physical resemblance or similarity of features will not suffice as evidence to prove paternity and
filiation before the courts of law.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. 36708 dated March 15, 1996, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City,
Branch 60, in Spec. Proc. No. 88-C isREVERSED and SET ASIDE. Private respondents petition for
recognition and support is dismissed.
SO ORDERED.

De la camqra vs rueda GR no 11263 Novembner 2, 1916