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Jorge Montecillo was accused by Francisco Gica of slander. Atty. Quirico del Mar
represented Montecillo and he successfully defended Monteceillo in the lower court.
Del Mar was even able to win their counterclaim thus the lower court ordered Gica
to pay Montecillo the adjudged moral damages.
Gica appealed the award of damages to the Court of Appeals where the latter court
reversed the same. Atty. Del Mar then filed a motion for reconsideration where he
made a veiled threat against the Court of Appeals judges intimating that he thinks
the CA justices knowingly rendered an unjust decision and judgment has been
rendered through negligence and that the CA allowed itself to be deceived.
The CA denied the MFR and it admonished Atty. Del Mar from using such tone with
the court. Del Mar then filed a second MFR where he again made threats. The CA
then ordered del Mar to show cause as to why he should not be punished for
Thereafter, del Mar sent the three CA justices a copy of a letter which he sent to the
President of the Philippines asking the said justices to consider the CA judgment.
But the CA did not reverse its judgment. Del Mar then filed a civil case against the
three justices of the CA before a Cebu lower court but the civil case was eventually
dismissed by reason of a compromise agreement where del Mar agreed to pay
damages to the justices. Eventually, the CA suspended Atty. Del Mar from practice.
The issue reached the Supreme Court. Del Mar asked the SC to reverse his
suspension as well as the CA decision as to the Montecillo case. The SC denied both
and this earned the ire of del Mar as he demanded from the Clerk of the Supreme
Court as to who were the judges who voted against him.
The Supreme Court then directed del Mar to submit an explanation as to why he
should not be disciplined. Del Mar in his explanation instead tried to justify his
actions even stating that had he not been convinced that human efforts in
[pursuing the case] will be fruitless he would have continued with the civil case
against the CA justices. In his explanation, del Mar also intimated that even the
Supreme Court is part among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly
committing injustice.
Del Mar even filed a civil case against some Supreme Court justices but the judge
who handled the case dismissed the same.
ISSUE: Whether or not Atty. Del Mar should be suspended.
HELD: Yes. Atty. Del Mar, by his contemptuous acts is in violation of his duties to the
courts. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not
destroy unnecessarily the high esteem and regard towards the court so essential to
the proper administration of justice.
It is manifest that del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Courts of the land
when on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to

challenge the integrity of both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered
unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that they acted with intent and malice, if
not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of his client.
Del Mar was then suspended indefinitely.

Clarita J. Samala (complainant) filed a complaint against Atty. Luciano D. Valencia
(respondent) for Disbarment on the following grounds:

serving on two separate occasions as counsel for contending parties;


knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence;


initiating numerous cases in exchange for non-payment of rental fees; and


having a reputation of being immoral by siring illegitimate children.

After respondent filed his Comment, the Court referred the case to the IBP for
investigation, report, and recommendation.
After a series of hearings, the parties filed their respective memoranda and the case
was deemed submitted for resolution.
The Commissioner found respondent guilty of violating Canons 15 and 21 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for
six months.
The IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation
of Commissioner Reyes but increased the penalty of suspension from six months to
one year.
Whether or not the respondent violated Canons 15 and 21 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.
This Court adopts the report of the IBP Board of Governors except as to the issue on
immorality and as to the recommended penalty.
(a) On serving as counsel for contending parties.
Respondent, while being the counsel for defendant Valdez, also acted as counsel for
the tenants Lagmay, Valencia, Bustamante and Bayuga by filing an Explanation and
Compliance before the RTC.
The Presiding Judge warned respondent to refrain from repeating the act of being
counsel of record of both parties in Civil Case No. 95-105-MK.

Rule 15.03, Canon 15 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides that a

lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all
concerned given after a full disclosure of the facts.
A lawyer may not, without being guilty of professional misconduct, act as counsel
for a person whose interest conflicts with that of his present or former client. He
may not also undertake to discharge conflicting duties any more than he may
represent antagonistic interests. This stern rule is founded on the principles of
public policy and good taste. It springs from the relation of attorney and client
which is one of trust and confidence. Lawyers are expected not only to keep
inviolate the client's confidence, but also to avoid the appearance of treachery and
double-dealing for only then can litigants be encouraged to entrust their secrets to
their lawyers, which is of paramount importance in the administration of justice.
One of the tests of inconsistency of interests is whether the acceptance of a new
relation would prevent the full discharge of the lawyer's duty of undivided fidelity
and loyalty to the client or invite suspicion of unfaithfulness or double-dealing in the
performance of that duty.
(b) On knowingly misleading the court by submitting false documentary evidence.
Complainant alleges that in Civil Case No. 00-7137 filed before MTC, Branch 75 for
ejectment, respondent submitted TCT No. 273020 as evidence of Valdez's ownership
despite the fact that a new TCT No. 275500 was already issued in the name of Alba
on February 2, 1995.
During the hearing before Commissioner Raval, respondent avers that when the
Answer was filed in the said case, that was the time that he came to know that the
title was already in the name of Alba; so that when the court dismissed the
complaint, he did not do anything anymore. Respondent further avers that Valdez
did not tell him the truth and things were revealed to him only when the case for
rescission was filed in 2002.
Respondent failed to comply with Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which provides that a lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent
to the doing of any in court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be mislead
by any artifice. It matters not that the trial court was not misled by respondent's
submission of TCT No. 273020 in the name of Valdez, as shown by its decision dated
January 8, 2002 dismissing the complaint for ejectment. What is decisive in this
case is respondent's intent in trying to mislead the court by presenting TCT No.
273020 despite the fact that said title was already cancelled and a new one, TCT
No. 275500, was already issued in the name of Alba.
(c) On initiating numerous cases in exchange for nonpayment of rental fees.
Complainant alleged that respondent filed the following cases: (a) Civil Case No.
2000-657-MK at the RTC, Branch 272; (b) Civil Case No. 00-7137 at the MTC, Branch
75; and (c) I.S. Nos. 00-4439 and 01-036162 both entitled "Valencia v. Samala" for
estafa and grave coercion, respectively, before the Marikina City Prosecutor.
Complainant claims that the two criminal cases were filed in retaliation for the cases

she filed against Lagmay docketed as I.S. No. 00-4306 for estafa and I.S. No. 004318 against Alvin Valencia (son of respondent) for trespass to dwelling.
As culled from the records, Valdez entered into a retainer agreement with
respondent. As payment for his services, he was allowed to occupy the property for
free and utilize the same as his office pursuant to their retainer agreement.
The Court finds the charge to be without sufficient basis. The act of respondent of
filing the aforecited cases to protect the interest of his client, on one hand, and his
own interest, on the other, cannot be made the basis of an administrative charge
unless it can be clearly shown that the same was being done to abuse judicial
processes to commit injustice.
The filing of an administrative case against respondent for protecting the interest of
his client and his own right would be putting a burden on a practicing lawyer who is
obligated to defend and prosecute the right of his client.
(d) On having a reputation for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
The Court finds respondent liable for being immoral by siring illegitimate children.
During the hearing, respondent admitted that he sired three children by Teresita
Lagmay who are all over 20 years of age, while his first wife was still alive. He also
admitted that he has eight children by his first wife, the youngest of whom is over
20 years of age, and after his wife died in 1997, he married Lagmay in 1998.
Respondent further admitted that Lagmay was staying in one of the apartments
being claimed by complainant. However, he does not consider his affair with
Lagmay as a relationship and does not consider the latter as his second family. He
reasoned that he was not staying with Lagmay because he has two houses, one in
Muntinlupa and another in Marikina.
Under Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, a lawyer shall
not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct. It may be difficult
to specify the degree of moral delinquency that may qualify an act as immoral, yet,
for purposes of disciplining a lawyer, immoral conduct has been defined as that
"conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows a moral
indifference to the opinion of respectable members of the community.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondent Atty. Luciano D. Valencia GUILTY of
misconduct and violation of Canons 21, 10 and 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for three (3) years,
effective immediately upon receipt of herein Resolution.

Facts: Complainant, Manuel L. Lee, charged respondent, Atty. Regino B. Tambago,
with violation of Notarial Law and the Ethics of the legal profession for notarizing a
will that is alleged to be spurious in nature in containing forged signatures of his
father, the decedent, Vicente Lee Sr. and two other witnesses, which were also
questioned for the unnotated Residence Certificates that are known to be a copy of

their respective voter's affidavit. In addition to such, the contested will was
executed and acknowledged before respondent on June 30, 1965 but bears a
Residence Certificate by the Testator dated January 5, 1962, which was never
submitted for filing to the Archives Division of the Records Management and
Archives Office of the National Commission for Culture and Arts (NCAA).
Respondent, on the other hand, claimed that all allegations are falsely given
because he allegedly exercised his duties as Notary Public with due care and with
due regards to the provision of existing law and had complied with elementary
formalities in the performance of his duties and that the complaint was filed simply
to harass him based on the result of a criminal case against him in the Ombudsman
that did not prosper. However, he did not deny the contention of non-filing a copy to
the Archives Division of NCAA. In resolution, the court referred the case to the IBP
and the decision of which was affirmed with modification against the respondent
and in favor of the complainant.

Issue: Did Atty. Regino B. Tambago committed a violation in Notarial Law and the
Ethics of Legal Profession for notarizing a spurious last will and testament?

Held: Yes. As per Supreme Court, Atty. Regino B. Tambago is guilty of professional
misconduct as he violated the Lawyer's Oath, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, Canon
1 and Rule 1.01nof the Code of Professional Responsibility, Article 806 of the Civil
Code and provision of the Notarial Law. Thus, Atty. Tambago is suspended from the
practice of law for one year and his Notarial commission revoked. In addition,
because he has not lived up to the trustworthiness expected of him as a notary
public and as an officer of the court, he is perpetually disqualified from
reappointments as a Notary Public.

In re Gutierrez
Attorney Gutierrez was convicted for the murder of one Filemon Samaco in 1956. He
was sentenced to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. In 1958, after serving a portion
of the penalty, he was granted a conditional pardon by the President. He was
released on the condition that he shall not commit any crime. Subsequently, the
widow of Samaco filed a disbarment case against Gutierrez by reason of the latters
conviction of a crime involving moral turpitude. Murder, is without a doubt, such a
ISSUE: Whether or not Gutierrez may be disbarred considering the fact that he was
granted pardon.
HELD: Yes. The pardon granted to Gutierrez is not absolute but conditional. It merely
remitted his sentence. It does not reach the offense itself. Gutierrez must be judged
upon the fact of his conviction for murder without regard to the pardon (which he
invoked in defense). The crime was actually qualified by treachery and aggravated
by its having been committed in hand, by taking advantage of his official position

(Gutierrez being municipal mayor at the time) and with the use of motor vehicle.
The degree of moral turpitude involved is such as to justify his being purged from
the profession.

Facts: During a dispute over land, Flaminiano illegally took possession of the
property in litigation using abusive methods. She was aided by her husband, a
lawyer. The illegal entry took place while the case was pending in the CA & while a
writ of preliminary injunction was in force.
Held: Atty. Flaminianos acts of entering the property without the consent of its
occupants & in contravention of the existing writ or preliminary injunction &making
utterances showing disrespect for the law & this Court, are unbecoming of a
member of the Bar. Although he says that they peacefully took over the property,
such peaceful take-over cannot justify defiance of the writ of preliminary
injunction that he knew was still in force. Through his acts, he has flouted his duties
as a member of the legal profession. Under the Code of Professional Responsibility,
he is prohibited from counseling or abetting activities aimed at defiance of the law
or at lessening confidence in the legal system.

Jon De Ysasi and Jon De Ysasi III are father and sons respectively. The elder Ysasi
owns a hacienda in Negros Occidental. De Ysasi III is employed in the hacienda as
the farm administrator. In November 1982, De Ysasi III underwent surgery and so he
missed work. He was confined and while hes nursing from his infections he was
terminated, without due process, by his father. De Ysasi III filed against his father for
illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission. His father invoked
that his son actually abandoned his work.
ISSUE: Whether or not De Ysasi III abandoned his work.
HELD: No. His absence from work does not constitute abandonment. To constitute
abandonment, there must be a.) failure to report for work or absence without valid
or justifiable reason, and b.) a clear intention to sever the employer-employee
relationship, with the second element as the more determinative factor and being
manifested by some overt acts. No such intent was proven in this case.
The Supreme Court, in making its decision, noted that the lawyers for both camps
failed to exert all reasonable efforts to smooth over legal conflicts, preferably out of
court and especially in consideration of the direct and immediate consanguineous
ties between their clients especially considering that the parties involved are father
and son. This case may have never reached the courts had there been an earnest
effort by the lawyers to have both parties find an off court settlement but records
show that no such effort was made. The useful function of a lawyer is not only to
conduct litigation but to avoid it whenever possible by advising settlement or

withholding suit. He is often called upon less for dramatic forensic exploits than for
wise counsel in every phase of life. He should be a mediator for concord and a
conciliator for compromise, rather than a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
Rule 1.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility explicitly provides that (a)
lawyer shall encourage his client to avoid, end or settle the controversy if it will
admit of a fair settlement. Both counsel fell short of what was expected of them,
despite their avowed duties as officers of the court. In the same manner, the labor
arbiter who handled this regrettable case has been less than faithful to the letter
and spirit of the Labor Code mandating that a labor arbiter shall exert all efforts
towards the amicable settlement of a labor dispute within his jurisdiction. If he
ever did so, or at least entertained the thought, the copious records of the
proceedings in this controversy are barren of any reflection of the same.


Appellant Pajares was engaged in the business of buying and selling merchandise at
her stall and appelle Udharam Bazar & Co. was one of her creditors from whom she
used to buy on credit ready-made goods for resale.
Consequently, the company sued Pajares for the recovery of a certain sum of
money for the goods delivered to her in good condition (the same having been
sold), but did not make the full payment. Pajares, however, moved for a bill of
particulars, alleging that without which she would not be able to meet the issues
raised in the complaint. Such having been denied, appellant moved for a motion for
reconsideration. The same was also denied and clogged the court for seven years.
Whether or not there has been a faithful adherence (on the part of Pajares lawyer)
to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court.
No, there was no faithful adhererence.
Clearly, there must be faithful adherence to Rule 7, section 5 of the Rules of Court
which provides that the signature of an attorney constitutes a certificate by him
that he has read the pleading and that to the best of his knowledge, information
and belief, there is good ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay
and expressly admonishes that for a willful violation of this rule an attorney may be
subjected to disciplinary action.
Had appellant been but prudently advised by her counsel to confess judgment and
ask from her creditor the reasonable time she needed to discharge her lawful
indebtedness, the expenses of litigation that she has incurred would have been
more than sufficient to pay off her just debt to appelle.


(Per Curiam) Atty. Fred Gutierrez asked for a cash loan of P30,000.00 from Manuel
Yuhico. Gutierrez then claimed that he needed money to pay for the medical
expenses of his mother who was seriously ill. Yuhico immediately handed the
money. In turn, Gutierrez promised to pay the loan very soon, since he was
expecting to collect his attorney's fees from a Japanese client. Gutierrez again asked
Yuhico for a loan, in the amount of P60,000.00, allegedly to pay the medical
expenses of his wife who was also hospitalized. Again, Yuhico readily issued to
Gutierrez a check amounting to P60,000.00. Again, Gutierrez promised to pay his
two loans totalling to P90,000.00 "within a short time." Yuhico asked Gutierrez to
pay his loans. Gutierrez failed to pay and in a text message he asked for an
extension of time to pay. Later, thru a text message, Gutierrez attempted to borrow
money from Yuhico again. Gutierrez claimed that his daughter needed P70,000.00
to pay the fees required to take the licensure examination in the U.S. Medical Board.
Gutierrez assured him that he will pay all his debts within a month. However, this
time, Yuhico refused to lend Gutierrez any amount of money. Instead, he demanded
from Gutierrez the payment of his debts. Gutierrez then sent another text message
to Yuhico and requested him to give him another week to pay his debts. Gutierrez
failed to make the payment. Yuhico's counsel sent a demand letter to Gutierrez to
pay his debts, but to no avail. Thus, Yuhico filed the instant complaint against
Gutierrez before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline
(IBP-CBD).On January 12, 2006, the IBP-CBD directed Gutierrez to submit his Answer
on the complaint against him. In a Resolution, IBP-CBD found Gutierrez guilty of nonpayment of just debts and ordered him to return the amount of P90,000.00 to
Yuhico, with interest until full payment.
Whether or not Gutierrez guilty of non-payment of just debts and likewise guilty of
gross misconduct
HELD: Lawyers must, at all times, faithfully perform their duties to society, to the
bar, the courts and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial
Deliberate failure to pay just debts constitutes gross misconduct, for which a lawyer
may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are
instruments for the administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system.
They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency, but also a high standard of
morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the peoples faith and
confidence in the judicial system is ensured. They must, at all times, faithfully
perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts and to their clients, which
include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a
manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in
the Code of Professional Responsibility. In the instant case, there is no question as to
Gutierrez's guilt. His admission of the loan he contracted and his failure to pay the
same leaves no room for interpretation. Neither can he justify his act of nonpayment of debt by his dire financial condition. Gutierrez should not have

contracted loans which are beyond his financial capacity to pay. Likewise, it cannot
be overlooked Gutierrez's propensity of employing deceit and misrepresentations
for the purpose of obtaining debts without the intention of paying them. Records
show Gutierrez's pattern of habitually making promises of paying his debts, yet
repeatedly failing to deliver. The series of text messages he sent to Yuhico
promising to pay his loans, while simultaneously giving excuses without actually
making good of his promises, is clearly reprehensible. Undoubtedly, his acts
demonstrate lack of moral character to satisfy the responsibilities and duties
imposed on lawyers as professionals and as officers of the court. Supreme Court
also noted that in Huyssen v. Atty. Gutierrez, the Court had already disbarred
Gutierrez from the practice of law for gross misconduct due to non-payment of just
debts and issuance of bouncing checks. In view of the foregoing, while the court
agrees with the findings of the IBP, it cannot, however, adopt its recommendation to
disbar Gutierrez for the second time, considering that Gutierrez had already been
previously disbarred. Indeed, as the IBP pointed out, the court does not have double
or multiple disbarments in its laws or jurisprudence. Neither do it have a law
mandating a minimum 5-yearrequirement for readmission, as cited by the IBP. Thus,
while Gutierrez's infraction calls for the penalty of disbarment, court cannot disbar
him anew.


Atty. Lumasag was authorized by Nelia to sell two adjacent lots of 400 square
meters each in QC
Nelia's allegation : Atty. Lumasag must pay PHP1,120,000
Atty. Lumasag's contention: The two lots were sold at PHP563960
Written in the deed of sale:PHP560000
He violated Canon 1 Rule 1.01 stating that a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful,
dishonest and immoral or deceitful conduct.
As to the falsification, burden of proof lies on the complainant.Mere photocopy of
passport is not enough to prove the allegation made by complainant.
Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or
upon demand. However, he shall have a lien over the funds and may apply so much
thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving
notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent
on all judgements and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the
Rules of Court.
Atty. Jaime Lumasag Jr.
Atty. Lumasag was 72 years old at the time. The court suspended him for six
months from the practice of law.
Nelia Chavez Blanco and Mario Blanco sought the help of Atty. Lumasag, Mario
Blanco's first cousin
One lot was sold in 1995 for PHP320000 and Atty. Lumasag deducted 38130 for
taxes and commissions. The remaining were remitted to a certain Belen

Johnnes.The second lot remains unsold because it was occupied by squatters (Atty
Lumasag's version)
one lot sold
In 1998, Nelia discovered that two lots were actually sold to Celso and Consolacion
Martinez and a special power of attorney was also issued signed by Nelia and Mario
but Nelia said that their signatures were forged as they are in USA when it was
W/N Atty. Lumasag is guilty of deceit and gross misconduct
W/N Atty. Lumasag falsified the SPA
Atty. Jaime Lumasag JR.
Family Name: LUMASAG
First Name: JAIME
Middle Initial: B.
Suffix Name: JR.
Hometown: Oroquieta, Misamis Occ.
Date admitted to the Philippine Bar: March 10, 1964
Roll Number: 19559
Yes. He deceived the couple that he was only able to sell one lot when in fact, he
was able to sell both. He even reasoned out that Nelia was not the proper
complainant as her husband is the true owner and she is not the right party to file
for a case.He took advantage of the situation when the couple was in another
He also said that the deed of absolute sale presented was fake but failed to show
otherwise.The SC held that the exchanges regarding the sale of one lot proves that
Nelia was able to get the money but the respondent saying that the money for the
other lot was given to him was hard to believe at.