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CASE DIGEST

HOMEWORK FOR
LEGAL TECHNIQUE AND LOGIC

By:
NEIL BRYAN N. MONINIO

ATTY. JOE EMPACES


Instructor

S.Y. 2015- 2016

TABLE OF CONTENTS
CASE

PAGE

1. Lagon vs. Hoovan Comalco Industries, Inc.,


349 SCRA 363

1-2

2. Atienza vs. Board of Medicine


642 SCRA 523

3-4

3. SCC Chemicals Corporation vs. CA


353 SCRA 20

5-6

4. People vs. Calumpang


454 SCRA 719

7-9

5. Ubales vs. People


570 SCRA 251

10-12

6. Tating vs. Marcela


519 SCRA 79

13

7. PNOC Shipping and Transport Corp. vs. CA


297 SCRA 402
8. Calamba Steel Center, Inc. vs. Commissioner of Internal Revenue
457 SCRA 482
9. People vs. Baraoil
676 SCRA 24
10. Heirs of Lourdes Saez Sabanpan vs. Cormoposa
408 SCRA 692

14-15
16
17-18
19-23

JOSE LAGON v. HOOVEN COMALCO INDUSTRIES, INC.


G.R. No. 135657 January 17, 2001
FACTS:
Petitioner Jose V. Lagon is a businessman and owner of a commercial building in
Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. Respondent HOOVEN on the other is a domestic corporation known
to be the biggest manufacturer and installer of aluminum materials in the country with branch
office at E. Quirino Avenue, Davao City..Sometime in April 1981 Lagon and HOOVEN entered
into two (2) contracts, both denominated Proposal, whereby for a total consideration of
P104,870.00 HOOVEN agreed to sell and install various aluminum materials in Lagons
commercial building in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat. Upon execution of the contracts, Lagon paid
HOOVEN P48,000.00 in advance.
Lagon, in his answer, denied liability and averred that HOOVEN was the party guilty of
breach of contract by failing to deliver and install some of the materials specified in the
proposals; that as a consequence he was compelled to procure the undelivered materials from
other sources; that as regards the materials duly delivered and installed by HOOVEN, they were
fully paid. He counterclaimed for actual, moral, exemplary, temperate and nominal damages, as
well as for attorneys fees and expenses of litigation.
ISSUE:
Whether or not all the materials specified in the contracts had been delivered and
installed by respondent in petitioners commercial building in Tacurong, Sultan Kudarat.
RULING:
Firstly, the quantity of materials and the amounts sated in the delivery receipts do not
tally with those in the invoices covering them, notwithstanding that, according to HOOVEN OIC
Alberto Villanueva, the invoices were based merely on the delivery receipts.
Secondly, the total value of the materials as reflected in all the invoices is P117,329.0 while
under the delivery receipts it is only P112, 870.50, or a difference of P4,458.00.
Even more strange is the fact that HOOVEN instituted the present action for collection of sum of
money against Lagon only on 24 February 1987, or more than five (5) years after the supposed
completion of the project. Indeed, it is contrary to common experience that a creditor would take
its own sweet time in collecting its credit, more so in this case when the amount involved is not
miniscule but substantial.
All the delivery receipts did not appear to have been signed by petitioner or his duly
authorized representative acknowledging receipt of the materials listed therein. A closer
examination of the receipts clearly showed that the deliveries were made to a certain Jose Rubin,
claimed to be petitioners driver, Armando Lagon, and a certain bookkeeper. Unfortunately for
HOOVEN, the identities of these persons were never been established, and there is no way of
determining now whether they were indeed authorized representatives of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 28 April 1997 is

MODIFIED. Petitioner Jose V. Lagon is ordered to pay respondent Hooven Comalco Industries,
Inc., P6,377.66 representing the value of the unpaid materials admittedly delivered to him. On
the other hand, respondent is ordered to pay petitioner P50,000.00 as moral damages, P30,000.00
as attorneys fees and P46,554.50 as actual damages and litigation expenses.

RICO ROMMEL ATIENZA v. BOARD OF MEDICINE and EDITHA


SIOSON G.R. No. 177407 February 9. 2011
FACTS:
Private respondent went to Rizal Medical Center to submit for a check up due to her lumbar
pains. Her diagnostic laboratory test results revealed that her right kidney was normal while her
left kidney was non-functioning and non-visualizing. Hence, she underwent kidney operation
under the care of the four physicians namely: Dr. Judd dela Vega, Dr. Pedro Lantin III, Dr.
Gerardo Antonio and petitioner Dr. Rico Rommel Atienza.
The said physicians removed her fully functioning right kidney instead of the left nonfunctioning and non-visualizing kidney. Due to their gross negligence and incompetence, private
respondent filed a complaint against the four doctors before the Board of Medicine. Private
respondent therein offered four certified photocopies as her documentary evidence to prove that
her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at the time that she was operated.
The Board of Medicine admitted the formal offer despite the objection of herein petitioner.
Petitioner contends that the documentary evidence offered were inadmissible as it were
incompetent. Further, he alleged that the same documents were not properly identified and
authenticated, violate the best evidence rule and his substantive rights, and are completely
hearsay.
ISSUES:
1.
Whether the exhibits are inadmissible evidence on the ground that it violates the best
evidence rule.
2.
Whether the exhibits are inadmissible evidence on the ground that they have not been
properly identified and authenticated.
3.
Whether the exhibits are inadmissible evidence on the ground that it is completely hearsay.
4.
Whether the admission of the documents violated the substantive rights of the petitioner.

RULING:
1.
No. The subject of the inquiry in this case is whether the doctors are liable for gross
negligence in removing the right functioning kidney of Editha instead of the left non-functioning
kidney, not the proper anatomical locations of Edithas kidneys. The proper anatomical locations
of Edithas kidneys at the time of her operation at the RMC may be established not only through
the exhibits offered in evidence.

In fact, the introduction of secondary evidence is allowed. Section 3, Rule 130 provides that
when the subject of the inquiry is the contents of the document, no evidence shall be admissible
other than the original document itself, except when the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court without bad faith on the offeror. Since the original documents cannot
be produced based on the testimony of Dr. Aquino BOM properly admitted Edithas formal offer
of evidence, and thereafter, the BOM shall determine the probative value thereof when it decides
the case.
2.
No, the documentary evidence were properly identified and authenticated. The records
show that the exhibits offered by private respondent were the same evidence attached in Doctor
Lantin's counter-affidavit filed before the Office of the City Prosecutor in answer to the criminal
complaint of the respondent. To lay the predicate for her case, private respondent offered the
exhibits in evidence to prove that her kidneys were both in their proper anatomical locations at
the time of her operation.
3.
No, these exhibits do not constitute hearsay evidence. The anatomical positions whether
left or right, of Edithas kidneys, and the removal of one or both, may still be established through
a belated ultrasound or x-ray of her abdominal area.
4.
No, petitioners substantive rights were not violated when the documentary evidence were
admitted. The fact sought to be proved by the exhibits that the two kidneys of Editha were in
their proper anatomical locations at the time she was operated on is presumed under Section 3 of
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court which provides that things have happened according to the
ordinary course of nature and the ordinary habits of life.
The fact sought to be established by the admission of the respondents exhibit need not be proved
as it is covered by mandatory judicial notice. Laws of nature involving the physical science,
specifically biology include the structural make-up and composition of living things such as
human beings in which the court may take judicial notice.

G.R. No. 128538


February 28, 2001
SCC CHEMICALS CORPORATION v. CA
FACTS:
SCC Chemicals Corporation through its chairman, private respondent DaniloArrieta and
vice president, Pablo (Pablito) Bermundo, obtained a loan from State Investment House Inc
(hereinafter SIHI) in the amount of P129,824.48. The loan carried an annual interest rate of 30%
plus penalty charges of 2% per month on the remaining balance of the principal upon nonpayment on the due date-January 12, 1984. To secure the payment of the loan, DaniloArrieta and
private respondent LeopoldoHalili executed a Comprehensive Surety Agreement binding
themselves jointly and severally to pay the obligation on the maturity date.
SCC failed to pay the loan when it matured. SIHI then sent demand letters to SCC,
Arrieta and Halili, but notwithstanding receipt thereof, no payment was made.
SIHI filed Civil Case for a sum of money with a prayer for preliminary attachment
against SCC, Arrieta, and Halili with the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
In its answer, SCC asserted SIHI's lack of cause of action. Petitioner contended that the
promissory note upon which SIHI anchored its cause of action was null, void, and of no binding
effect for lack or failure of consideration.
The case was then set for pre-trial. The parties were allowed to meet out-of-court in an
effort to settle the dispute amicably. No settlement was reached, but the following stipulation of
facts was agreed upon:
1. Parties agree that this Court has jurisdiction over the plaintiff and the defendant and
that it has jurisdiction to try and decide this case on its merits and that plaintiff and the defendant
have each the capacity to sue and to be sued in this present action;
2. Parties agree that plaintiff sent a demand letter to the defendant SCC Chemical
Corporation dated April 4, 1984 together with a statement of account of even date which were
both received by the herein defendant; and
3. Parties finally agree that the plaintiff and the defendant SCC
Chemical
Corporation the latter acting through defendants Danilo E. Arrieta and
Pablito
Bermundo executed a promissory note last December 13, 1983 for the amount
of
P129,824.48 with maturity date on January 12, 1984.
The case then proceeded to trial on the sole issue of whether or not the defendants were
liable to the plaintiff and to what extent was the liability.
SIHI presented one witness to prove its claim. The cross-examination of said witness was
postponed several times due to one reason or another at the instance of either party. The case was
calendared several times for hearing but each time, SCC or its counsel failed to appear despite
notice. SCC was finally declared by the trial court to have waived its right to cross-examine the
witness of SIHI and the case was deemed submitted for decision.
On March 22, 1993, the lower court promulgated its decision in favor of SIHI.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the testimony of private respondents witness is hearsay.
2. Whether the promissory note was genuine and genuinely executed as
required
by law.
3. Whether the best evidence rule should be applied.
RULING:
1. The Court of Appeals correctly found that the witness of SIHI was a competent witness
as he testified to facts, which he knew of his personal knowledge. Thus, the requirements of
Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court as to the admissibility of his testimony were satisfied.
Rule 130, Section 36 reads:
SEC. 36. Testimony generally confined to personal knowledge; hearsay excluded. A
witness can testify only to those facts which he knows of his personal knowledge; that is, which
are derived from his own perception, except as otherwise provided in these rules.
Petitioner's reliance on Section 36, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court is misplaced. As a rule,
hearsay evidence is excluded and carries no probative value. However, the rule does admit of an
exception. Where a party failed to object to hearsay evidence, then the same is admissible.The
rationale for this exception is to be found in the right of a litigant to cross-examine. It is settled
that it is the opportunity to cross-examine which negates the claim that the matters testified to by
a witness are hearsay.However, the right to cross-examine may be waived. The repeated failure
of a party to cross-examine the witness is an implied waiver of such right. Petitioner was
afforded several opportunities by the trial court to cross-examine the other party's witness.
Petitioner repeatedly failed to take advantage of these opportunities. No error was thus
committed by the respondent court when it sustained the trial court's finding that petitioner had
waived its right to cross-examine the opposing party's witness. It is now too late for petitioner to
be raising this matter of hearsay evidence.
2. Petitioner's admission as to the execution of the promissory note by it through private
respondent Arrieta and Bermundo at pre-trial sufficed to settle the question of the genuineness of
signatures. The admission having been made in a stipulation of facts at pre-trial by the parties, it
must be treated as a judicial admission. Under Section, 4 Rule 129 of the Rules of Court, a
judicial admission requires no proof.
3. Respondent SIHI had no need to present the original of the documents as there was
already a judicial admission by petitioner at pre-trial of the execution of the promissory note and
receipt of the demand letter. It is now too late for petitioner to be questioning their authenticity.
Its admission of the existence of these documents was sufficient to establish its obligation.
Petitioner failed to submit any evidence to the contrary or proof of payment or other forms of
extinguishment of said obligation. No reversible error was thus committed by the appellate court
when it held petitioner liable on its obligation

ANGEL UBALES y VELEZ v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES


G.R. No. 175692 October 29, 2008
FACTS:
APPELLEE VERSION

Laila Cherry Cruz, the sister of Mark Santos, testified that on 16 October 2001, at
about 8 p.m., petitioner Ubales and the deceased Mark Santos (Mark) were drinking liquor in
front of the victims house at 4334 Interior 5 Albina Street, Sta. Mesa, Manila. They were with a
group which included a certain Jon-Jon, Solo Perez, and Jojo Santos. In the course of their
carousal, Ubales and Mark engaged in an argument about the former calling the latters cousin a
homosexual. Mark told Ubales not to meddle because he (Ubales) did not know what was
happening within his (Marks) family. The argument was soon apparently resolved, with Ubales
patting the shoulders of Mark.
The carousal ended at 1 a.m. the following day. Mark and Ubales went inside the
house. Ubales asked permission from Laila Cruz to use their comfort room. Before Ubales went
inside the comfort room, Laila Cruz saw Ubales place his gun with black stripes on top of the
dining table. Mark asked permission from his mother to bring Ubales to his house in J.P. Laurel
Street and also asked for money so that they could eat lugaw on their way there. Mark and
Ubales then left.
Eduardo Galvan (Galvan), a 65-year old balut vendor and the best friend of the deceased
Mark Santos, testified that at 3 a.m. in the morning of 17 October 2001, while he was
selling balut near the Malacaang area, he saw Mark and Ubales quarreling around a meter away
from him. The argument lasted for about three minutes, culminating with Ubales taking out his
gun and shooting Mark on the head. Galvan is certain about this, as he was still only one meter
away from Mark and Ubales when the former shot the latter, and the place was wellilluminated. When Mark fell, Ubales ran towards Atienza Street. Galvan also testified that he
was an acquaintance of Ubales for about five months prior to the incident.

APPELLANT VERSION
Ubales testified that on 16 October 2001, at around 6 or 7 p.m., he went to the home of
his friend Guido Almosera on Uli-Uli Street, where he saw Joseph Karunungan, Rico Sison, Eric
Marquez and Henry Ponce.
The group was initially engaged in light conversation until Guido Almosera brought out
some liquor while they were playing the guitar. Ubales stayed with the group until 10 p.m., when
he left for Sta. Mesa to go to the house of a certain Alex to meet a man named Boy. He arrived at
Alexs house at around 11 p.m., but left immediately when he learned that Boy was already
asleep. Along the way, he saw Mark who had been having a drinking spree with other
persons. He decided to join the group for a while before returning home.
At around 12 midnight, Ubales bade leave to go home. Mark went along with him to the
place where he could get a ride home. They parted ways and Ubales got on a jeep which he rode
to J.P. Laurel Street. He stopped by a 7-Eleven convenience store and bought something to eat
before proceeding home.
On the way home, Ubales saw the group of Guido Almosera still having drinks. He
decided to join them again until around 1 a.m. of 17 October 2001.
Ubales testified that although he is a former policeman, he no longer had a gun and that
his sidearm is in the custody of the WPD. He stated further that he was arrested without a
warrant.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence for the prosecution proves that petitioner committed
the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:
No. the Decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and set aside. Petitioner Angel
Ubales y Velez is hereby acquitted of the crime of homicide on account of reasonable doubt. In
both versions of the facts, Mark had been gracious enough to accompany Ubales after their
carousal, clearly showing that whatever misunderstanding they had during their drinking spree
was already resolved. If Galvans version of the facts is to be believed, Ubales and Mark had even
been together for a several hours more before Mark was killed. We have ruled that though the
general rule is that motive is not essential to a conviction especially where the identity of the
assailant is duly established by other competent evidence or is not disputed, the absence of such
motive is important in ascertaining the truth as between two antagonistic theories or versions of
the killing.
Proof as to motive is essential when the evidence on the commission of the crime is
purely circumstantial or inconclusive. Verily, the dominating rule is that, with respect to the
credibility of witnesses, this Court has always accorded the highest degree of respect to the
findings of the trial court, unless there is proof of misappreciation of evidence which is precisely
the situation in the case at bar.
We also take note of petitioner Ubales stance when he was confronted by Laila Cruz and
SPO2 Fernandez. Ubales told SPO2 Fernandez that he would voluntarily join him to prove to
him that he was not in hiding. Ubales then cooperated fully with SPO2 Fernandez, allowing
himself to undergo a medical examination, which apparently yielded nothing as the findings
thereof was not presented as evidence, and going with the SPO2 Fernandez to the PNP
Malacaang Field Force. Flight evidences guilt and guilty conscience: the wicked flee, even when
no man pursues, but the righteous stand fast as bold as a lion. In all, we find it hard to lend
credence to the testimony of the lone alleged eyewitness.
We have said that it is better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent
person. Every circumstance against guilt and in favor of innocence must be considered. Where
the evidence admits of two interpretations, one of which is consistent with guilt, and the other
with innocence, the accused must be given the benefit of doubt and should be acquitted. n the
instant case, while it is possible that the accused has committed the crime, there is also the
possibility, based on the evidence presented, that he has not. He should be deemed to have not
for failure to meet the test of moral certainty. Finally, an accused should not be convicted by
reason of the weakness of his alibi. It is fundamental that the prosecution must prove its case
beyond reasonable doubt and must not rely on the weakness of the evidence of the defense.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. RICO CALUMPANG and JOVENAL OMATANG


G.R. No. 158203. March 31, 2005
FACTS:
APPELLEE VERSION
Magno Gomez testified that around 6:30 p.m. of July 14, 1991, he was at Talay, Pamplona,
Negros Oriental, walking home to Sitio Makapa, Mangoto, Pamplona. He was with his
neighbors, the spouses Santiago and Alicia Catipay. On their way, they stopped at the store of
Ana Andagan, located near the Pamplona Coconut Plantation, and decided to have some beer.
Magno added that Santiago saw appellants drinking tuba inside Anas store, and offered them a
glass of beer, but appellants refused. Santiago just drank the glass of beer he was offering. After
that, Magno and the spouses left the store and took a shortcut through the coconut plantation.
Magno saw appellants follow them. He suspected that appellants were planning something
sinister because they followed too closely and were concealing something at their backs. Magno
cautioned Santiago, but the latter just told him not to worry about appellants. Magno and the
spouses simply continued walking for another half-kilometer until they reached the narrow
waterway that let water from the river into the plantation. Magno removed his slippers and
started to cross ahead of the spouses. Santiago and Alicia stayed slightly behind because
Santiago had to remove his shoes.
When Magno had crossed five feet of the waterway, Magno turned around to wait for his
companions and saw appellants attacking the spouses. With a bolo, appellant Calumpang hacked
Santiago on the head and stabbed his abdomen. At the same time, appellant Omatang attacked
Alicia.
Scared that appellants would also attack him, Magno ran away. After 50 meters, he reached
Alexander Ebiass house. He asked Alexander for a torch then continued walking towards Sitio
Makapa, Mangoto, Pamplona. After a kilometer, however, he saw the house of his cousin
Rolando Retada. He decided to spend the night there.
Rolando confirmed that Magno spent the night at his house on July 14, 1991, and left very
early the next morning without drinking coffee. Visitacion Rabor, on the other hand, testified
that she overheard Santiago berating Magno when they passed her store around 6:30 p.m. on July
14, 1991. Santiago was mad at Magno because Magno did not want to help Santiago clean the
dam at Mangoto, Pamplona, as Magno was supposed to. She added that Santiago continued
calling Magno useless at Anas store until Alicia prevailed upon Santiago to go home. When
Santiago and Alicia left, Magno followed them.

APPELLANT VERSION

Analyn Andagan testified that on July 14, 1991, she was tending the store of her mother, Ana
Andagan, at Talay, Pamplona, Negros Oriental. Around 3:00 p.m. appellants Calumpang and
Omatang arrived with one Conchito Nilas. The three ordered a gallon of tuba and started
drinking. Around 6:30 p.m., Magno and the spouses arrived. They each had one bottle of beer
and immediately left after finishing their beers. Analyn further testified that appellants did not
follow Magno, Santiago and Alicia when the three left her mothers store. Appellant Omatang
stayed until 7:00 p.m. and continued talking with his two companions, appellant Calumpang and
Conchito Nilas. He left when his 12-year-old nephew, defense witness Joseph Rabor, came to
fetch him for supper. Appellant Calumpang, for his part, stayed until 8:00 p.m. and helped her
close the store. He walked home with her and Conchito Nilas.
Joseph Rabor corroborated Analyns testimony that he fetched his uncle, appellant Omatang,
from the store around 7:00 p.m. upon the order of his mother. He added that he and appellant
Omatang slept in the same room that night.
Appellant Omatang likewise corroborated Analyns testimony that he left around 7:00 p.m.
with Joseph. He also claimed he had nothing to do with the killing of the spouses and averred
that he was at home in the same room with Joseph, sleeping, when the spouses were murdered.
He claimed that he learned of the murders only upon his arrest the next day.
Appellant Calumpang vehemently denied killing the spouses. He declared that Santiago and
Alicia had no known enemies and were good people. He corroborated all of Analyns testimony,
and added that Magno and Santiago were arguing when the two came into the store. Appellant
Calumpang likewise averred that after helping Analyn close the store, he went home, ate supper,
and went to bed.

The trial court gave credence to the testimony of Magno Gomez and accepted his account of
the murders.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the evidence for the prosecution proves that petitioner committed
the crime charged of double murder beyond reasonable doubt.

RULING:
No. The decision in the Regional Trial Court is reversed. Appellants Rico Calumpang and
Jovenal Omatang are acquitted on reasonable doubt. No convincing proof could show that
appellants had any reason to kill Santiago and Alicia in cold blood. As the OSG points out, the
supposed grudge, which Magno claimed could have motivated appellants to kill the spouses, is
too flimsy to be believed. It is highly improbable that appellants would murder the spouses
because Santiago had offered appellants a glass of beer and they refused him. If anybody should
harbor a grudge from such an incident, it should have been Santiago whose offer appellants
refused. But there is no evidence of any grudge between Santiago and the appellants, and as
Magno testified, Santiago simply drank the glass of beer himself.
Appellants defense of alibi was indeed weak, since their alibis were corroborated only by
their relatives and friends, and it was not shown that it was impossible for them to be at the place
of the incident. However, the rule that an accused must satisfactorily prove his alibi was never
intended to change or shift the burden of proof in criminal cases. It is basic that the prosecution
evidence must stand or fall on its own weight and cannot draw strength from the weakness of the
defense. Unless the prosecution overturns the constitutional presumption of innocence of an
accused by competent and credible evidence proving his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the
presumption remains. There being no sufficient evidence beyond reasonable doubt pointing to
appellants as the perpetrators of the crime, appellants presumed innocence stands.

TATING v. MARCELLA, TATING and COURT OF APPEALS


G.R. No. 155208 | 2007-03-27
FACTS:
On October 14, 1969, Daniela sold the subject property to her granddaughter, herein
petitioner Nena Lazalita Tating. The contract of sale was embodied in a duly notarized Deed of
Absolute Sale executed by Daniela in favor of Nena. Subsequently, title over the subject property
was transferred in the name of Nena. She declared the property in her name for tax purposes and
paid the real estate taxes due thereon for the years 1972, 1973, 1975 to 1986 and 1988.However,
the land remained in possession Daniela. On December 28, 1977, Daniela executed a sworn
statement claiming that she had actually no intention of selling the property; the true agreement
between her and Nena was simply to transfer title over the subject property in favor of the latter
to enable her to obtain a loan by mortgaging the subject property for the purpose of helping her
defray her business expenses; she later discovered that Nena did not secure any loan nor
mortgage the property; she wants the title in the name of Nena cancelled and the subject property
reconveyed to her. Daniela died on July 29, 1988 leaving her children as her heirs. In a letter
dated March 1, 1989, Carlos informed Nena that when Daniela died they discovered the sworn
statement she executed on December 28, 1977 and, as a consequence, they are demanding from
Nena the return of their rightful shares over the subject property as heirs of Daniela. Nena did not
reply. Efforts to settle the case amicably proved futile. Hence, her son filed a complaint with the
RTC praying for the nullification of the Deed of Absolute Sale. RTC decide in favour or the
plaintiff and was affirmed by the CA.
ISSUE:
Whether the Sworn Statement should have been rejected outright by the lower courts.
RULING:

The Court finds that both the trial court and the CA committed error in giving the sworn
statement probative weight. Since Daniela is no longer available to take the witness stand as she
is already dead, the RTC and the CA should not have given probative value on Daniela's sworn
statement for purposes of proving that the contract of sale between her and petitioner was
simulated and that, as a consequence, a trust relationship was created between them. Considering
that the Court finds the subject contract of sale between petitioner and Daniela to be valid and
not fictitious or simulated, there is no more necessity to discuss the issue as to whether or not a
trust relationship was created between them. WHEREFORE, the assailed Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals, affirming the Decision of the Regional Trial Court, are
REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The complaint of the private respondents is DISMISSED.

PNOC SHIPPING AND TRANSPORT CORPORATION v. HONORABLE COURT OF


APPEALS and MARIA EFIGENIA FISHING CORPORATION
G.R. No. 107518. October 8, 1998
FACTS:
On the morning of September 21, 1977, M/V Maria Efigenia XV (of the private
respondent) was navigating the waters near Fortune Island in Nasugbu, Batangas on its way to
Navotas, Metro Manila when it collided with the vessel Petroparcel, owned at that time by
Luzon Stevedoring Corporation (LSC).The Board of Marine Inquiry found the Petroparcel at
fault for the collision and based on this and after unsuccessful demands on petitioner, private
respondent sued LSC and Petroparcel captain Edgardo Doruelo for actual and compensatory
damages.
During the pendency of the proceedings, PNOC Shipping Transport Corporation acquired
ownership of Petroparcel and replaced LSC in the trial. CFI Caloocan ruled in favor of private
respondent, awarding it: the sum of P6,438,048.00 representing the value of the fishing boat with
interest of 6% per annum; P50,000 attorneys fees and the cost of suit. The basis of said amount
was the testimony of the general manager of Maria Efigenia Fishin Corporation, Edilberto del
Rosario and several documentary evidence that included: ownership certificate, price quotations,
and invoices issued at the request of Del Rosario. CFI ruled that PNOC-STC was unable to
contest such evidence with only the testimony of its senior estimator Lorenzo Lazaro as sole
witness and without any documentary evidence.
On appeal, petitioner questioned the admissibility and competency of private
respondents documents as basis for damages. The Court of Appeals affirmed the CFI decision
ruling that where a lower court is confronted with evidence which appears to be of doubtful
admissibility, the judge should declare in favorof admissibility rather than of non-admissibility.

On appeal to the SC, petitioner argued, among other things, that the documents were not
sufficient evidence to support the extent and actual damages incurred by private respondent. The
price quotationswere not duly authenticated and that the witness (Del Rosario) did not have
personal knowledge on the contents of the writings and neither was he an expert on the subjects
thereof. CA argued that the documents were sufficient and exempt from the hearsay rule as they
are part of commercial lists defined in sec.45 Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence in so
far as they fall under the or other published compilation phrase of the rule.
Section 45. Commercial lists and the like. Evidence of statements of matters of interest
to persons engaged in an occupation contained in a list, register, periodical, or other published
compilation is admissible as tending to prove the truth of any relevant matter so stated if that
compilation is published for use by persons engaged in that occupation and is generally used
and relied upon by them therein.

ISSUE:
WON the documents fall under the exception to the hearsay evidence rule under sec. 45 rule 130
of the Revised Rules on Evidence and would therefore be competent enough to establish the
amount of actual and compensatory damages.
RULING:
With respect to the documentary evidence, the SC ruled in favor of the petitioner PNOCSTC. For actual and compensatory damages, the injured party is required to prove the actual
amount of loss with reasonable degree of certainty premised upon competent proof and on the
best evidence available. Damages may not be awarded on the basis of on the basis of hearsay
evidence. The documents presented by private respondent were regarded as hearsay evidence.
Del Rosario could not have testified on the veracity of the documents as he was not the author of
them. He can only testify as to facts of his personal knowledge. As such, the price quotations
were considered ordinary private writings which under the Revised Rules of Court should be
preferred along with the testimony of the writers thereof. One of the exemptions to the hearsay
evidence rule under Sec.37-47 of Rule 130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence is commercial
lists.
However, the quotations do not fall under other published compilation mentioned in the
said exemptionas they are not published in any list, register, periodical, or other compilation.
They are also not standard handbooks or periodicals containing data of everyday professionals
need and relied upon in the work of occupation. They are merely letters responding to the queries
of Del Rosario.
Under the principle of ejusdem generis, where general words follow an enumeration of
persons or things, by words of a particular and specific meaning, such general words are not to
be construed in their widest extent but are to be held as applying only to persons or things of the

same kind or class as those specifically mentioned. Because of the absence of competent proof of
the actual damage suffered, SC modified the CA decision and awarded the private respondent
nominal damages amounting to P2,000,000.00.

Calamba Steel Center Inc. v. CIR


GR 151857, April 28, 2005
FACTS:
Petitioner is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacture of steel blanks for use by
manufacturers of automotive, electrical, electronics in industrial and household appliances. In it's
amended Corporate Annual Income Tax Return on June 4, 1996 it declared a net taxable income
of P9,461,597.00, tax credits of P6,471,246.00 and tax due in the amount of P3,311,559.00. It
also reported uarterly payments for the second and third quarters of 1995 in the amounts of
P2,328,747.26 and P1,082,108.00, respectively. It is the contention of the petitioner in this case
filed in 1997, that it is entitled to a refund. The refund was purportedly due to income taxes
witheld from it, and remitted in its behalf, by the witholding agents. Such witheld tax, as per
petitioners 1997 return, were not utilised in 1996 since due to its income/loss positions for the
three quarters of 1996.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a tax refund may be claimed even beyong the taxable year following that
in which the tax credit arises.
RULING:
Yes, however; it is still incumbent upon the claimant to prove that it is entitled to such
refund. Tax refunds being in the nature of tax exemptions such must be construed strictissimi
juris against the taypayer-claimant. Under the NIRC, the only limitation as regards the claiming
of tax refunds is that such must be made within two years. The claim for refund made by
Calamba steel was well within the 2 year period.As regards the procedure taken by counsel of

Calamba Steel in submitting thefinal adjustment returns (1996) after trial has been conducted, the
Court said that although the ordinary rules of procedure from upon this jurisprudence mandates
that the proceedings before the tax court's shall not be governed bystrictly technical rules of
evidence. Moreoover, as regards evidence, the court further said that Judicial notice could have
been taken by the cA and theCTA of the 1996 final adjustment return made by petitioner in
another case then pending with the CTA

PEOPLE OF THE PIIILIPPINES, v. ANTONIO BARAOIL


G.R. No. 194608
July 9, 2012
FACTS:
The accused-appellant is a neighbor of the victim's (AAA) family whom they consider and
respect like an uncle.
According to the evidence of the prosecution, on August 8, 2004, at about 2:00 p.m., five (5)
year old AAA was walking near the house of the accused-appellant when the latter saw her. He
asked where she was going then he invited her to take a ride with him on his bicycle. AAA
acceded because accused-appellant is a friend of her parents. The accused-appellant and AAA
biked together towards the town rice mill. BBB, the elder sister of AAA, saw them. Worried
about AAAs safety, BBB sought the help of CCC, her other sister, and their cousin DDD to look
for AAA.
Upon arriving at the rice mill, the accused-appellant parked his bicycle against the wall, and
pulled AAA inside the mill's comfort room. He pulled AAA's shorts as she was not wearing
underwear. The accused-appellant then sat on a toilet bowl and unzipped his pants. He lifted
AAA, seated her on his lap, and inserted his penis into AAA's vagina. AAA did not shout despite
feeling pain.
The accused-appellant threatened AAA not to tell his mother or father about what happened or
else he will repeat the act. He then inserted his right forefinger in AAA's vagina. AAA saw his
finger that was thrust into her. AAA did not shout although she was about to cry. The accusedappellant removed his finger then pulled up his pants.

At that moment, BBB, CCC, and DDD arrived at the rice mill and saw the accused-appellant's
bicycle. They entered and heard thumping sounds coming from the comfort room. The accusedappellant then suddenly opened its door and walked out. AAA followed him after a while
towards his bicycle looking visibly sweating and walking with difficulty.
CCC approached the accused-appellant and told him that they will take AAA home. The
accused-appellant refused and told them that he will take AAA home after buying a new pair of
slippers he needed for himself. He bought the pair of slippers and a chocolate-filled biscuit for
AAA.
After half an hour, the accused-appellant took AAA back to the comfort room of the same rice
mill. There, he undressed her and sucked her vagina. While doing this, AAA begged the accusedappellant to take her home. The accused-appellant stopped and boarded her to his bicycle and
brought her home.
The next day, DDD asked AAA what happened when she was with the accused-appellant. AAA
did not say anything but she started to cry until she told her mother EEE all that transpired. On
August 10, 2004, EEE brought AAA to the police station where they reported the incident.
For the defense, the accused-appellant denied the charges and proferred an alibi by stating that he
was with his friend Renato at the fish pond at the time when the alleged rape took place. He
claimed that they were fishing from 7:30 to 10:00 in the morning. They also drank gin at around
3:00 p.m. and went home at 4:00 p.m. He, moreover, claimed that AAA was nice to him before
the alleged rape. However, AAA's family got mad at him after he disconnected their jumper
connection from the power source. They even threatened that they will hack him to death. Thus,
the accusation of AAA's family was a means of revenge.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the accused-appellants guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt
vis-a-vis his main defense that the rape charges were merely concocted to get back at him as
leverage against his act of disconnecting the jumper owned by AAA's family.

RULING:
This Court sustains accused-appellants conviction. This Court finds no cogent reason to
disturb the trial court's appreciation of the credibility of the prosecution witnesses'
testimony.1wphi1 Findings of trial court relative to the credibility of the rape victim are
normally respected and not disturbed on appeal, more so, if affirmed by the appellate court. This
rule may be brushed aside in exceptional circumstances, such as when the courts evaluation was
reached arbitrarily, or when the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied certain facts
or circumstances of weight and substance which could affect the result of the case. The
assessment of the credibility of witnesses is a domain best left to the trial court judge because of
his unique opportunity to observe their deportment and demeanor on the witness stand; a vantage

point denied appellate courts - and when his findings have been affirmed by the CA, these are
generally binding and conclusive upon this Court.
AAA testified in a spontaneous and straightforward manner and never wavered in
positively identifying appellant as her rapist despite grueling cross-examination. The trial court
thus found the testimony of AAA to have been amply corroborated... who bravely, unabashedly,
straightforwardly and consistently narrated in court her harrowing ordeal, vexation and pain in
the hands of the accused.

HEIRS OF LOURDES SAEZ SABANPAN v. COMORPOSA


G.R. No. 152807. August 12, 2003

FACTS:
The CA summarized the factual antecedents of the case as follows:
A Complaint for unlawful detainer with damages was filed by [petitioners] against
[respondents] before the Santa Cruz, Davao del Sur Municipal Trial Court.
The Complaint alleged that Marcos Saez was the lawful and actual possessor of Lot No.
845, Land 275 located at Darong, Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur with an area of 1.2 hectares. In 1960,
he died leaving all his heirs, his children and grandchildren.
In 1965, Francisco Comorposa who was working in the land of Oboza was terminated
from his job. The termination of his employment caused a problem in relocating his house. Being
a close family friend of [Marcos] Saez, Francisco Comorposa approached the late Marcos Saezs
son, [Adolfo] Saez, the husband of Gloria Leano Saez, about his problem. Out of pity and for
humanitarian consideration, Adolfo allowed Francisco Comorposa to occupy the land of Marcos
Saez. Hence, his nipa hut was carried by his neighbors and transferred to a portion of the land
subject matter of this case. Such transfer was witnessed by several people, among them, Gloria
Leano and Noel Oboza. Francisco Comorposa occupied a portion of Marcos Saez property
without paying any rental.
Francisco Comorposa left for Hawaii, U.S.A. He was succeeded in his possession by the
respondents who likewise did not pay any rental and are occupying the premises through
petitioners tolerance.
On 7 May 1998, a formal demand was made upon the respondents to vacate the premises
but the latter refused to vacate the same and claimed that they [were] the legitimate claimants
and the actual and lawful possessor[s] of the premises. A [C]omplaint was filed with the

barangay office of Sta. Cruz[,] Davao del Sur, but the parties failed to arrive at an amicable
settlement. Thus, the corresponding Certificate to File Action was issued by the said barangay
and an action for unlawful detainer was filed by petitioners against respondents.
Respondents, in their Answer, denied the material allegations of the [C]omplaint and
alleged that they entered and occupied the premises in their own right as true, valid and lawful
claimants, possessors and owners of the said lot way back in 1960 and up to the present time;
that they have acquired just and valid ownership and possession of the premises by ordinary or
extraordinary prescription, and that the Regional Director of the DENR, Region XI has already
upheld their possession over the land in question when it ruled that they [were] the rightful
claimants and possessors and [were], therefore, entitled to the issuance of a title.
The Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Cruz, Davao del Sur rendered judgment in favor of
petitioners but the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, on appeal, reversed and set
aside the said decision. x x x[6]

Ruling of the Court of Appeals


Affirming the Regional Trial Court (RTC), the CA upheld the right of respondents as
claimants and possessors. The appellate court held that -- although not yet final -- the Order
issued by the regional executive director of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) remained in full force and effect, unless declared null and void. The CA
added that the Certification issued by the DENRs community environment and natural resources
(CENR) officer was proof that when the cadastral survey was conducted, the land was still
alienable and was not yet allocated to any person.
According to the CA, respondents had the better right to possess alienable and disposable
land of the public domain, because they have suffiently proven their actual, physical, open,
notorious, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted possession thereof since 1960. The appellate
court deemed as self-serving, and therefore incredible, the Affidavits executed by Gloria Leano
Saez, Noel Oboza and Paulina Paran.
Hence, this Petition.

ISSUES:
In their Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for the Courts consideration:
I

Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and [err] in sustaining the ruling of the
Regional Trial Court giving credence to the Order dated 2 April 1998 issued by the regional
executive director?
II
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in sustaining the Regional Trial
Courts ruling giving weight to the CENR Officers Certification, which only bears the facsimile
of the alleged signature of a certain Jose F. Tagorda and, [worse], it is a new matter raised for the
first time on appeal?
III
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion and err in holding that the land subject
matter of this case has been acquired by means of adverse possession and prescription?
IV
Did the Court of Appeals gravely abuse its discretion, and err in declaring that, neither is there
error on the part of the Regional Trial Court, when it did not give importance to the affidavits by
Gloria Leano Saez, Noel [Oboza], and Paulina Paran for allegedly being self serving?[
To facilitate the discussion, the fourth and the third issues shall be discussed in reverse
sequence.
RULING:
The Petition has no merit.
First Issue:
The DENR Order of April 2, 1998
Petitioners claim that the reliance of the CA upon the April 2, 1998 Order issued by the
regional director of the DENR was erroneous. The reason was that the Order, which had upheld
the claim of respondents, was supposedly not yet final and executory. Another Order dated
August 23, 1999, issued later by the DENR regional director, allegedly held in abeyance the
effectivity of the earlier one.
Under the Public Land Act, the management and the disposition of public land is under the
primary control of the director of lands (now the director of the Lands Management Bureau or
LMB), subject to review by the DENR secretary. As a rule, then, courts have no jurisdiction to
intrude upon matters properly falling within the powers of the LMB.

The powers given to the LMB and the DENR to alienate and dispose of public land does
not, however, divest regular courts of jurisdiction over possessory actions instituted by occupants
or applicants to protect their respective possessions and occupations. The power to determine
who has actual physical possession or occupation of public land and who has the better right of
possession over it remains with the courts. But once the DENR has decided, particularly through
the grant of a homestead patent and the issuance of a certificate of title, its decision on these
points will normally prevail.
Therefore, while the issue as to who among the parties are entitled to a piece of public land
remains pending with the DENR, the question of recovery of possession of the disputed property
is a matter that may be addressed to the courts.

Second Issue:
CENR Officers Certification
Petitioners contend that the CENR Certification dated July 22, 1997 is a sham document,
because the signature of the CENR officer is a mere facsimile. In support of their argument, they
cite Garvida v. Sales Jr. and argue that the Certification is a new matter being raised by
respondents for the first time on appeal.
We are not persuaded.
In Garvida, the Court held:
A facsimile or fax transmission is a process involving the transmission and reproduction of
printed and graphic matter by scanning an original copy, one elemental area at a time, and
representing the shade or tone of each area by a specified amount of electric current. x x x
Pleadings filed via fax machines are not considered originals and are at best exact copies. As
such, they are not admissible in evidence, as there is no way of determining whether they are
genuine or authentic.
The Certification, on the other hand, is being contested for bearing a facsimile of the
signature of CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda. The facsimile referred to is not the same as that
which is alluded to in Garvida. The one mentioned here refers to a facsimile signature, which is
defined as a signature produced by mechanical means but recognized as valid in banking,
financial, and business transactions.
Note that the CENR officer has not disclaimed the Certification. In fact, the DENR regional
director has acknowledged and used it as reference in his Order dated April 2, 1998:

x x x. CENR Officer Jose F. Tagorda, in a CERTIFICATION dated 22 July 1997, certified among others,
that: x x x per records available in his Office, x x x the controverted lot x x x was not allocated to
any person x x x.
If the Certification were a sham as petitioner claims, then the regional director would not
have used it as reference in his Order. Instead, he would have either verified it or directed the
CENR officer to take the appropriate action, as the latter was under the formers direct control
and supervision.

Petitioners claim that the Certification was raised for the first time on appeal is incorrect. As
early as the pretrial conference at the Municipal Trial Court (MTC), the CENR Certification had
already been marked as evidence for respondents as stated in the Pre-trial Order. The
Certification was not formally offered, however, because respondents had not been able to file
their position paper.
Neither the rules of procedurenor jurisprudencewould sanction the admission of evidence
that has not been formally offered during the trial. But this evidentiary rule is applicable only to
ordinary trials, not to cases covered by the rule on summary procedure -- cases in which no fullblown trial is held.
Third Issue:
Affidavit of Petitioners Witnesses
Petitioners assert that the CA erred in disregarding the Affidavits of their witnesses, insisting
that the Rule on Summary Procedure authorizes the use of affidavits. They also claim that the
failure of respondents to file their position paper and counter-affidavits before the MTC amounts
to an admission by silence.
The admissibility of evidence should not be confused with its probative value. Admissibility
refers to the question of whether certain pieces of evidence are to be considered at all, while
probative value refers to the question of whether the admitted evidence proves an issue. Thus, a
particular item of evidence may be admissible, but its evidentiary weight depends on judicial
evaluation within the guidelines provided by the rules of evidence.
While in summary proceedings affidavits are admissible as the witnesses respective
testimonies, the failure of the adverse party to reply does not ipso facto render the facts, set forth
therein, duly proven. Petitioners still bear the burden of proving their cause of action, because
they are the ones asserting an affirmative relief.
Fourth Issue:
Defense of Prescription

Petitioners claim that the court a quo erred in upholding the defense of prescription
proffered by respondents. It is the formers contention that since the latters possession of the land
was merely being tolerated, there was no basis for the claim of prescription. We disagree.
For the Court to uphold the contention of petitioners, they have first to prove that the
possession of respondents was by mere tolerance. The only pieces of evidence submitted by the
former to support their claim were a technical description and a vicinity map drawn in
accordance with the survey dated May 22, 1936. Both of these were discredited by the CENR
Certification, which indicated that the contested lot had not yet been allocated to any person
when the survey was conducted. The testimony of petitioners witnesses alone cannot prevail over
respondents continued and uninterrupted possession of the subject lot for a considerable length
of time.
humanitarian
Saez.
Hence,
his
consideration,
nipa
hut
was
Adolfo
carried
allowed
by
his
neighbors
Francisco
Comorposa
and
transferred
to
occupy
to
aato
portion
land
of
the
of
Marcos
land
subject
Gloria
Leano
matter
and
of
this
case.
Oboza.
Such
Francisco
transfer
was
Comorposa
witnessed
occupied
by
several
aof
portion
people,
of
among
Marcos
them,
Saez'
property
"Francisco
without
Comorposa
paying
left
any
for
rental.
Hawaii,
U.S.A.
He
was
succeeded
in
his
possession
by
the
respondents
petitioners'
tolerance.
who
likewise
did
not
pay
any
rental
and
are
occupying
the
premises
through
"On
latter
7and
May
refused
1998,
to
aNoel
formal
vacate
the
demand
same
was
and
made
claimed
upon
that
the
they
respondents
[were]
to
legitimate
vacate
claimants
premises
but
barangay
the
actual
office
and
of
lawful
Sta.
Cruz[,]
possessor[s]
Davao
del
of
the
Sur,
premises.
but
the
parties
A
[C]omplaint
failed
to
was
arrive
filed
atthe
an
with
amicable
the
settlement.
an
action
Thus,
for
unlawful
the
corresponding
detainer
Certificate
filed
by
to
petitioners
File
Action
against
was
issued
respondents.
by
the
said
barangay
"Respondents,
entered
inuninterrupted
and
their
occupied
Answer,
the
denied
premises
the
material
in
their
allegations
own
right
as
of
true,
the
[C]omplaint
valid
and
lawful
and
alleged
claimants,
that
they
have
possessors
acquired
and
just
owners
and
valid
of
the
ownership
said
lot
way
back
possession
in
1960
and
the
up
premises
the
present
by
ordinary
time;
or
extraordinary
upheld
their
possession
prescription,
over
and
the
that
land
the
in
Regional
question
Director
when
it
ruled
of
the
that
DENR,
they
[were]
Region
the
XI
rightful
has
already
claimants
Ruling
of
the
and
Court
possessors
of
Appeals
and
[were],
therefore,
entitled
to
the
issuance
of
title
and
regional
in
full
force
DENR's
community
effect,
unless
environment
declared
null
and
and
natural
void.
resources
The
CA
added
(CENR)
that
officer
the
Certification
was
proof
that
issued
when
by
the
the
person.
the
exclusive,
continuous
and
possession
thereof
since
1960.
The
appellate
court
deemed
as
selfParan.
7Paulina
Hence,
this
Petition.
humanitarian
Saez.
his
consideration,
hut
was
Adolfo
carried
allowed
by
his
neighbors
Francisco
Comorposa
and
transferred
to
occupy
to
a filed
portion
land
of
the
of
land
subject
Gloria
Leano
matter
and
ofofnipa
this
case.
Oboza.
Such
Francisco
transfer
was
Comorposa
witnessed
occupied
by
several
a portion
people,
of
among
Marcos
them,
Saez'
property
"Francisco
without
Comorposa
paying
left
any
for
rental.
Hawaii,
He
was
succeeded
in
his
possession
by
theMarcos
respondents
petitioners'
tolerance.
who
likewise
did
not
pay
any
rental
and
are
occupying
the
premises
through
"On
the
latter
7Hence,
May
refused
1998,
to
aNoel
formal
vacate
the
demand
same
was
and
made
claimed
upon
that
the
they
respondents
[were]
the
to
legitimate
vacate
claimants
premises
but
barangay
the
actual
office
and
lawful
Sta.
Cruz[,]
possessor[s]
Davao
del
ofU.S.A.
the
Sur,
premises.
but
the
parties
A
[C]omplaint
failed
to
was
arrive
atthe
an
with
amicable
the
settlement.
and
an
action
Thus,
for
unlawful
the
corresponding
detainer
Certificate
filed
by
topetitioners
File
Action
against
was
issued
respondents.
by
the
said
barangay