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FRONTLINE INTELLIGENCE IN WW2 - (III) ALLIED T FORCES

By Keith Ellison @2013

During WW2 the Allies employed specialist task forces (S Forces) in North Africa and
Italy which were used to search newly occupied cities and towns for intelligence - strategic,
tactical, technical and economic. The initial aims had been to collect military intelligence and
counter-intelligence, but with the occupation of Rome these aims had begun to evolve.

When the Allies began to consider operations in NW Europe, they realised that technical
economic and industrial intelligence would be important both for the war against Japan and for
post-war reparations. They therefore used the S Force model to create a similar type of
intelligence collection unit – the T Force, which was given the job of coordinating the collection
of a much wider type of intelligence than that collected in most S Force operations in Italy.

On 27th July 1944 SHAEF (Supreme Headquarters Allied Expeditionary Force)
Intelligence Directive No 17 instructed 6 th and 12th Army Groups to establish T Forces. The
description of T Force given by the US Military History Institute is:

“Anglo-American organization used for intelligence exploitation of scientific and
industrial targets, WWII. Its mission: seize, safeguard, and process documents,
archives, and materiel of intelligence/counterintelligence interest. Also, capture
designated enemy agents and collaborators. Established by SHAEF, G- 2, and
based in 12th Army Group HQ, G-2. Apparently modelled on S-Force of 15th
Army Group in Italy, notably in the captures of Rome and Florence.” 1

This is not a full definition, however, as it concentrates only on the US 12 th Army Group
(12 AG), while in fact there were T Forces in 6th Army Group (6 AG) and the British 21st Army
Group (21 AG) areas as well. The definition given by SHAEF was:

“a military unit for planning the seizure of, and thereafter seizing and holding
until examined and final disposition has been decided upon, individuals,
installations, documents, etc., termed targets, in captured or reoccupied enemy or
Allied cities or geographical districts.”2

BUILDING BLOCKS

The units involved in S Force work in Italy had taken on a technical intelligence
collection role as well as combat intelligence and counter-espionage as the campaign in Italy
progressed. The reason given for this was to assess the war potential of the German economy. In
this role they were guided from 21st August 1944 by the work of the Combined Intelligence
Objectives Sub-Committee (CIOS). This was formed to ensure that the intelligence derived from
captured enemy material and personnel would be available to both SHAEF and to the various
interested US and UK government departments. CIOS was responsible to the Combined Chiefs
of Staff. CIOS’ functions and responsibilities included:

“(1) To receive, approve and coordinate all requests of British and US
governmental departments for intelligence of military or political significance
which became available…exclusive of combat intelligence, normal technical
intelligence, and counter intelligence.

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(2) To assign priorities to such requests.

(3) To arrange the preparation of intelligence folders, for the preparation of
adequate plans, and for the provision of expert personnel for technical
investigations on the spot.”

The targets were placed on “Black Lists” if they were of military interest or on “Grey
Lists” if they were industrial targets. A CIOS Black List for Buildings would usually consist of 9
columns:
Priority
Target Number
Organization or Firm
Place
Zone and Map Reference
Key Personnel
Remarks
Reliability of Information
Reference of Information Source (Ministry or Department).3

CIOS had representatives from a number of US and UK intelligence and military
departments and civilian agencies and ministries, and was responsible for providing the technical
experts to investigate targets in situ. They formed seven Combined Advanced Field Teams
(CAFTs), made up of around 70 assessors. The CAFTs were attached to each Army Group, each
team specializing in the exploitation of a number of technical items. Their mission was to assess
targets rapidly and call for investigation teams when warranted. The investigation teams in turn
reported to the “T” Sub-division of G2 in SHAEF, who indexed, filed and disseminated the
reports as required.

The “T” sub-division (later changed to Intelligence Target (“T”) Sub-Division) was
created by SHAEF in July 1944 as the agency responsible for all matters concerning the
investigation and exploitation of intelligence objectives or targets. It initially consisted of five
US and three British officers, and thirteen enlisted men and women. Also, within the G2’s
Operation Intelligence Sub-division there was a Technical Intelligence Section, which acted as
the clearing house for all technical information obtained from the field; controlled the allocation
of all captured enemy war materials wanted for technical intelligence purposes; and cleared
requests for information from the various allied governments.

On 17th Feb 1945 “T” Sub-division became part of the SHAEF G2 Special Sections Sub-
division, which was principally concerned with the coordination, supervision, and facilitation of
the investigation of intelligence targets in Germany by authorised Allied agencies, and served as
the SHAEF executive agency for CIOS.4 The T Sub-division also acquired a field element, the
6800 T Force, which was about 1,700 strong by April 1945 and, with the later addition of the
GOLDCUP ministerial control parties [see below], more than 2,000 strong. During May and
June 1945, the force was able to deploy about 1,000 investigators into the field.

Planning for T Forces was eventually devolved to Army Groups, while the “T” Sub-
Division concentrated on planning T Forces for Berlin and Kiel.

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For this reason. the CIC were ordered on D Day “to locate. and prior to operations in NW Europe renamed again to 30 AU (RN) . SHAEF policy and the policy of each of the Army Groups dictated that for the duration of the period in which a T Force was operating in a specific target area. and those of organisations sympathetic to the German cause) fell normally to the US Counter Intelligence Corps (CIC) and the British Field Security Sections (FSS).Assault Unit or Advance Unit. on 27th June 1944. For instance. and place under guard all important communications centers and to take charge of civilian traffic control. however. paperwork and raw materials associated with the German nuclear weapons program. 3-20 . seize. (such as communication nodes. 30 AU had been operational since 1943 in commando-type raids on intelligence targets in North Africa and Italy. centres of civil administration and headquarters of German occupation forces. Cherbourg. Originally name the Intelligence Assault Unit. seeking nuclear scientists.”6 The British Naval Intelligence Department (NID) controlled its own collection unit. In December 1944 the unit was tasked with searching out intelligence targets in Germany. it was soon renamed 30 Commando. several other specialist intelligence collecting units operating outside of the larger target cities which later operated in the liberation of Paris under the umbrella of T Force.”5 OTHER SPECIAL UNITS There were. 8 US Division cleared Rennes as the first Alsos target. In January 1945 the main body of 30 AU was moved to the continent in readiness for operations.T FORCES IN NORTHERN EUROPE Outside of major target cities. depending upon the source.” The FSS/CIC detachments were often assisted by local French resistance groups. Alsos then moved to join T Force elements in Rambouillet on 24th August. ”Documents captured in this city were so voluminous that they were turned over to the VII Corps Order-of-Battle Team for evaluation and dissemination. preparing for D Day. which helped the detachments to advance quickly. the task of locating and searching high-priority objectives. Another specialist unit was the Alsos Mission. preparing to enter Paris. 4th Infantry Division CIC entered the first major counter-intelligence target. Their operation provided useful information on target scientists. On 4th August. unless clearance for doing so had been obtained from the T Force Commander in advance. As the OSS War Diary explains. Alsos was recalled from Italy to London to form part of an expanded group under Col Boris Pash. holding or examining targets. “T Forces were organized by the Supreme Commander to prevent independent acquisition of documents and other target objectives by uncoordinated American and British government agencies. no other Allied military or government agency concurrently would be engaged in seizing.

an interpreter where necessary. Outside of major target cities. “important items of intelligence derived from the operation included a prisoner with information on and key for an exceedingly rare cipher system. When the building targets which had been sealed under the original plan were to be unsealed. an NCO. but insufficient guard forces lead to the documents being transported by the “attacking teams”. Col Francis P Tompkins was commander and Lt Col Harold C Lyon his Executive Officer. A Civilian Interrogation Centre was initially located at the Petit Palais but later moved to 19 Ave Foch. CIC personnel. a French representative. 20 to the POW cage. According to a subsequent report.7 The organic composition of the T Force staff included eight officers and three enlisted men. 12 AG provided four additional officers as reinforcements. GSC. man a detention centre. If the attacking team was a regular Target Team. examined all documents and removed those of interest and delivered them to the garage at 19 Ave Foch. under Col T J Sands. Deputy Commander. 548 members came from various branches of 10 allied intelligence agencies. including 63 from teams sent by the Combined Intelligence Priorities Committee and 18 from Alsos.9 There were 15 numbered Target Teams consisting of a target team commander. 44 were transferred to French authorities. They entered Paris at 2200 hrs on 25th August 1944. and provide physical security for intelligence personnel.057 of whom were combat troops (including 77 from 30 AU and 80 from the French Special Service Unit). or else obtain permission from the T Force commander to operate separately. mainly using 12 AG elements.805 men in total. The Counter-Intelligence Branch (CIB). eight were evacuated to the UK and seven were released to the T Force Special Counter-Intelligence Unit (SCIU) for further exploitation. The original aim had been to handle documents in situ by sealing off target buildings. a rare set of maps of Indo-China. and so needed to be a self-contained mobile force with sufficient combat troops to guard buildings. 181 additional arrests were made. It was normal for such units to work under T Force during the occupation of large city targets. Communications Zone on 6th September and later transported to 72 Ave Foch under the custody of the SHAEF Documents Section. remove mines. the Document Section visited the buildings. and three or four enlisted men from the headquarters company. The documents were handed to CIB. These were augmented later by people from the 4-20 . It was to move into the city within a few hours of the end of fighting. booby traps and explosives. a German map disclosing the plan of mining. A Document Section was located in the HQ at Petit Palais under Lt Vandemaele of the S2 Section. documents of particular interest were kept in their custody and S2 Section notified other interested agencies. About 12% of the personality targets were detained and processed through the T Force interrogation centre. It consisted of 1. When the attacking team was composed of specialists. the documents were delivered to the Document Section. THE PARIS T FORCE The first deployment of T Force was the liberation of Paris. they would concentrate on their own missions. Action on all but 54 buildings was achieved before the T Force was withdrawn. 1. demolitions and booby trapping at Dunkerque” plus other maps and finds of technical intelligence interest. 62 of whom were target cases.8 The T Force operation covered 896 targets (382 buildings and 514 persons). Between Aug and Sep 1944 the Centre processed 243 people. G2.

and included Maj Malcolm Muggeridge. The S2’s Information Room disseminated the target information. They found the man and some of his staff wearing resistance armbands at the College de France. The main Alsos target in Paris had been Jean Frédéric Joliot-Curie and the Curie laboratories. While they went to some pains in trying to hide the reasons for their interest. Alsos also used Paris to get information on new targets not available from CIOS. He located this objective. Among his targets were known enemy agents high on the priority list for turning into double agents (the main task of SCI). a number of whom have given us valuable information for both French and German clean-up operations. billeted at 18 Rue Petrarque and attached to the T Force SCI Unit. Important members of the Abwehr and SD were picked up. After Paris. SCI has been able to make substantial contribution to short and long range military security.”11 Maj Charles Hostler. The numbered Target Teams each had their assigned geographical areas.provided support units to enable them to collect information from the factories at Olen. There were also Air Ministry. attached to SHAEF. Lt Col Lord Victor Rothschild and Sgt Tredel. commanding SCI Unit 12 AG.10 On 9th Oct 44 Maj Dana B Durand. wrote a letter to the CO T Force in which he stated: “Through the T Force operation. and spent several days debriefing him on the activities of German scientists who had made use of his laboratory. now established in Paris. Col David Strangeways - commanding R Force. 30 AU. This material is now being subjected to long range exploitation by the present staff of X2 OSS. only to find the Alsos team already there. MIS. the Sipo and SD.special intelligence agencies which organized and operated special field teams or collating agencies. 5-20 . More than one of these individuals is now working for us in penetration or deception capacities. carried out by T Force Target teams. documents seized in various headquarters of the German secret services. The information concerned uranium ore which had been sent to the Germans from Olen. “Representatives of special intelligence agencies with T Force functioned as special teams to investigate targets of particular interest to their agencies. where they were researching atomic theory. Moreover. it was soon clear that Joliot-Curie had realized why they had such an interest. a deception unit similar to A Force in Italy and North Africa . APWIU from 9 th Air Force. SCI succeeded in obtaining a large volume of important CE material. S3 Operations would issue the instructions to the teams. OSS or the US MIS. The team leader was Maj Arthur G Trevor-Wilson. through the arrest of numerous agents and informers. and the securing and safe-keeping of Madame Curie’s laboratories. Pash went with an Alsos sub-team to Brussels. and all teams were required to submit reports on their targets. Alsos. a member of 31 SCIU. CIC. was placed in command of one of the “specialist teams” covering the 5th and 6th arrondissements. was on the strength of T Force as at 3rd September. and other special agencies attached to T Force.” For example a four-man team from MI6. 28kms East of Antwerp. 12 After negotiations at a higher level the Alsos team was left in control of that target.

we were always looking for enemy plans and in particular any reaction to what ‘R’ Force had been doing. signal and intelligence units. reportedly said: “I think the great value of ‘R’ Force then was that we would rush ahead and capture all the maps and bits of intelligence. supported by Strangeways’ R Force.” (A probable reference to R Force mentioned above). who refused to even let an officer from one of the CIOS teams to have access! Strangeways also had over 400 men searching Eindhoven for intelligence targets.”16 The 2 I/C of R Force. It was decided instead in October 1944 to add the responsibilities of T Force to those of the Brigadier. The fighting troops never had a chance to do that. they were “not entirely successful. they were too busy chasing the enemy. The Eindhoven operation came under the command of British Lt Col Johnny Cave. first for ROUEN and then BRUSSELS. but also because of “a desire to try out T Force activities with existing resources designed for other purposes”. despite a SHAEF Directive of July 1944 recommending such an organisation This was partly due to a lack of manpower. Chemical Warfare. Strangeways was asked to do similar jobs in Rouen and Brussels. with a strength of 155. His staff read through the existing material on T Forces and prepared dossiers on potential targets and guides for the sub-units of 21 AG to explain their purpose. We were generally searching for German documents to find out whether we’d been doing any good or not. CIOS teams were also ordered to send representatives to Brussels to participate in the occupation of Eindhoven. whose normal occupation was deception and camouflage. within 21 AG. discussing the activities of this unit after the main deception operations had been completed. so he was well aware of the potential opportunities in intelligence collection.15 The S Force operation in Tunis and the lack of other designated forces lead to his R Force being co-opted for similar operations in NW Europe: “the operation was a success and much later on during the war. had been in charge of the first S Force operation in Tunis in 1943. In early 1945 it was realised that the T Forces of 21 AG would need to be highly mobile and capable of being split into a number of self-contained units. no special T Force was created in 21 AG during operations in France and Belgium. while Alsos was charged with securing 70 tons of uranium ore at Olen. who had participated in the liberation of Paris and had been an IO in the Rome S Force. and with the task of securing all the Intelligence Targets in the City”. including two Bomb Disposal companies. While the staff for this force undertook the T Force operations. and staff shortages within 21 AG made the creation of a separate “T” Branch impossible.”17 These units were unable to continue long-term as T Forces.13 BRITISH ARMY T FORCES (21st Army Group) According to a history of T Force activities in 21st Army Group (21 AG).14 The history goes on: “A T Force role was allotted. Commander of the R Force Deception Unit. Selected NCOs from these 6-20 . All the way to Caen and on to Brussels.” Strangeways. At this time a number of units were allocated to operate as part of T Force. Brussels itself had been an intelligence target occupied by a British “ad-hoc Intelligence Corps Battle Group. mainly due to the extreme meagreness and lateness in arrival of information on the targets. A Philips plant in the area was already under the protection of a strong detachment from R Force. Maj Philip Curtis. to certain engineer.

Kings Regiment became the lead unit of the British T Force in Belgium. In February 1945 the 5th Battalion.19 The next weekly report recorded that: 7-20 . The assessors would inform 21 AG if any further investigators were required after they had done a preliminary inspection. On 30th March 1945 the T Force was placed under the command of 2nd Army. When the targets were important. G2 would provide a dossier and maps to the Corps staff. The find was reported to T Force who immediately secured the site. at the Focke-Wulf factory in Celle “many technical documents and much equipment in this large underground plant have been seized and are under guard”. briefed. Local Military Government (Mil Gov) units would often provide T Force with additional targets of opportunity. Sean Longden’s book “T-Force” describes the activities of the Kings and other military units involved in British T Force operations. This system was similar to that used by the US T Forces. On 31 st March the main T Force moved to occupy Maasbree. The Order of Battle for the British T Forces attached to 2nd British Army and 1st Canadian Army between March and May 1945 were: 2 Br Army: 5 Kings Regt with 2 attached companies 1 Bucks Regt 805. 21 AG Documents Teams. 18 The British T Force received its first specialist assessors in the German city of Gescher. as well as the T Force doing its own reconnaissance. assessors would be dispatched to investigate the site. Once T Force had control of the target and the area was deemed safe. According to the T Force Bulletin for 21 AG. 845.companies attended safe-breaking/burglary courses back in the UK and had specialist equipment allocated to assist them in this role. while detaching companies to Hengelo in Holland under 43 Division and to 12 Corps for targets in Rheine. who would then brief the forward troops to guard the locations until T Force relieved them. The following procedure was evolved for conducting T Force operations. and Interpreters from 21 AG Interpreters Pool. near the border with the Netherlands. the G2 of 21 AG would arrange for the T Force to come under local command. hidden in a silk factory in Celle. and housed. 846 Pioneer Companies 803 Pioneer Company (1 platoon) 19 Bomb Disposal Company RE 1 Can Army: 1 Bucks Regt (minus 2 companies) 30 Royal Berkshire Regt (for ops in West Holland) 803 Pioneer Company (minus 1 platoon) 810 Pioneer Company 5 Bomb Disposal Company RE Both units also had Detachments from 30 AU. In this way the physics laboratory of Dr Wilhelm Groth (an expert on centrifuges) was located by accident. There would generally be a floating population of 40-90 British and American officers from all services to be fed. An impromptu intelligence and briefing organization was immediately set up. which was advancing on the Rhine. When a target area was about to be taken. 806.

where sixteen new U-boats and a Narvik-class destroyer were captured. 22 Walter revealed that the design of the Me 163 rocket-propelled plane had been given to the Japanese six months before. consisting of two companies of about 200 men. was confused by instructions given by higher headquarters and advanced to its target – where it was met by a garrison of 12. together with the owner. Although he had spent four days burning his documents prior to the arrival of the Allies. on behalf of the OKW [sic - German Military High Command]. and three T Force companies were dispatched to cover the 106 listed targets. Preliminary investigation found few personnel but indicated that much information on the enemy CW offensive policy would be forthcoming. a leading expert on jet propulsion. Walterwerke.”20 When the T Force HQ moved to Osnabrueck two companies were dispatched to Hannover to assist Ninth US Army (9 Army). in a laboratory in a silk factory in this town. As mentioned above. was discovered to be conducting experiments of a highly secret nature. After this the T Force was directed onto targets in Denmark. The T Force company in Celle sent out detachments to secure the Chemical Warfare Station at Raubkammer and the Ordnance Testing Station at Munster Unterluss. They secured a most valuable objective. He has subsequently been flown to UK for detailed interrogation.surrendered himself and admitted to full knowledge of German CW development and was debriefed. Both sites came under attack from SS troops hiding in nearby forests. including work on caseless ammunition for fuel-injection guns and cartridge cases made of propellant.21 On 4th-5th May the Kiel T Force. which he had previously hidden away.000 Germans. They secured the HQ of Wehrkreis XI in almost complete working order. At Munsterlager they found the central OKW CW research station which had been evacuated from Spandau Citadel in Berlin.und Munitionsfabriken (DWM) works in Lubeck. he was convinced to reveal the location of microfilm of the most important documents. evacuated from Hamburg University. This was an important intelligence target as it enabled the occupying forces to quickly take control of the civilian authorities. The laboratory remains under guard pending evacuation of the equipment. Bremen was taken by assaults from North and South. “An eminent scientist. Hamburg surrendered on 2nd May. ballistics. Col Hirsch – a senior officer from the station . The 21 AG T Force Bulletin No 7 for the period 19-30 th May 45 notes in its first paragraph: 8-20 . explosives and propellants”. Shortly afterwards. Dr Walter. Their most important target was the Deschimag U-boat assembly yard. The T Force Bulletin reported the DWM organisation was “of prime importance from the point of view of ammunition development. the force secured the cruiser Hipper and a number of U boats and maintained control of the garrison until relieved on 8 th May. One company secured the great Deutsche Waffen. which was still being investigated by Ordnance experts over a month later. with separate T Forces attached to both groups. In spite of a somewhat hostile and sceptical reception from the German staff officers in charge. 30 AU were also able to secure the intact prototype of a jet-propelled submarine capable of 25 knots under water. They were assisted in the exploitation of several intelligence targets in the area by 30 AU. Kiel was also the target for 30 AU.

25 The history of one such T Force team is recorded in the online memoirs of Jack Heslop- Harrison. Dr Östertag. They found the Station unguarded and were only able to determine its work with the help of the head of research.”24 By June 1945 it was estimated that nearly 1. and then report back from a number of set contact points.000 tons of captured equipment had been evacuated by the T Force. a Royal Electrical and Mechanical Engineer (REME) officer who commanded a T Force team immediately after the war ended in May 1945. About a dozen REME officers were assembled north of Brussels from different locations to take charge of individual teams. a Royal Artillery sergeant and five other ranks.”23 Bulletin No 8 (1-20th Jun 45) explained further that: “there has been a change of emphasis in the subjects under investigation. investigation. before proceeding north to liberate Denmark with the Canadian 1st Army. building machinery. A new list of subjects which are not concerned solely with GERMAN war potential. north of Lübeck . collaborate with such RE and other units as were in the vicinity about the earmarking and possible acquisition and transporting of potentially valuable equipment. close to the Danish border. Heslop had with him a 2nd Lieutenant. plastics. INDEPENDENT T FORCE TEAMS One of the tasks of Intelligence Targets (“T”) Sub-Division was to make arrangements with Army Groups “for further search of combat areas for items of intelligence interest after ‘T’ Forces have ceased to operate in such areas and for similar searches in areas where ‘T’ Forces are not operating”. It includes among other items metallurgy. They were briefed to - get to their individually allocated targets. textiles. The 2nd British Army had advanced to Lübeck. 9-20 . At the same time’ T’ Forces are retracing their steps in order to unearth installations and research establishments about which no information was available prior to the crossing of the RHINE. collect any information available. and one or two of his colleagues. but cover rather the secrets of GERMAN industrial and technical processes. arriving on 2nd May. “The short term investigation of targets in North West Europe is drawing to a close and the long term exploitation is now commencing.) The team’s instructions were to assess the Pelzerhaken Research Station’s facilities and functions and make a decision as to whether it would require further. A lack of electric power meant that they were unable to test any of the equipment. utilities and railway equipment. is now being covered. more expert. Their main target was the Kriegsmarine Research Station at Pelzerhaken on the Baltic coast. forestry. The previously unidentified Pelzerhaken Research Station had been discovered on the coast to the east of the main line of advance and by-passed by the frontline troops.

located east of Lubeck. A second sub-force was sent on 9 th March to Coblenz. 10-20 . research continued on infrared detection systems under Professor Dr Müller. of which 12 were found and processed. Between October and December 1944 the unit moved to Remouchamps and was reinforced with an Armoured Infantry Battalion. Col Francis P Tompkins USA was the T Force commander. The site was untouched. projects in progress covered a considerably wider span. One sub-force was dispatched to search Bonn while the main unit entered Cologne on 6th March. previously based in the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute in Berlin. so the unit withdrew to rejoin the main T Force without completing its mission. most of the attached units and personnel were withdrawn by their parent organizations. Cologne had 246 building targets. During January and February 1945. While mainly intended for naval research. and afterwards to Pelzerhaken. including methods for masking U-boat conning-towers and schnorkels.12 AG T FORCE After the completion of 12 AG’s T Force operations in Paris on 6th September. 201 personality targets were processed between 6-13th March. When his Institute had been largely destroyed he had escaped with his family and files of research results to a house in the Black Forest. Some of the new personnel assigned for future operations were not made available before the T Force HQ moved to Verdun. 12 AG T Force moved to Spa in Belgium where the rest of the assigned troops joined the HQ. Heslop reported him as someone who should be given facilities to recover his material and possibly to be taken to the UK. from where the operations against Luxembourg. The team briefly visited the aircraft factory and shipyards of Blohm and Voss. Nancy and Metz were dispatched simultaneously. and he proceeded to Luxembourg with the main HQ element. The Allied bombing campaign had meant that people and equipment had been moved to Pelzerhaken as a still-undamaged safe haven. and 30 personality targets. The Bonn T Force had 51 building targets plus 12 targets of opportunity. Col John H F Haskell replaced Tompkins on 28th December. 215 additional investigators from 24 separate intelligence agencies were processed by the T Force during the stay in Cologne. On completion of their missions both forces rejoined T Force in Cologne. The most active radar research was on anti-reflection measures. Signals Communications personnel and various intelligence units and detachments. There was nothing the team could do about this site except report what was seen and urge that guards be sent. Capt William E Johns (Assistant S-3 for the Paris T Force under Tompkins) commanded the Nancy T Force. which rejoined the main force in Luxembourg once its mission was concluded. plus 39 targets of opportunity. near Travemuende. From Luxembourg. In March the unit entered Germany and established a Command Post (CP) at Eschweiler. There was prolonged enemy resistance in Metz which prevented the Metz T Force under 2 Lt William E Bell from entering the city. with partially and fully constructed hulls standing unguarded. US ARMY T FORCES . Heslop’s team left northern Germany in mid-June at the end of their mission for a short debriefing in Holland. Allied forces were recovering from the Battle of the Bulge and T Force was preparing to enter German territory. where they were able to search 67 buildings and process 58 persons from the target lists. For example. 26 It was indicative of the thinness on the ground of Allied technical investigators in the north-western area that Heslop met no other teams with similar assignments.

after having already suffered casualties overnight from delayed action mines and German artillery on and around their Command Post in Saarbourg. A small Allied Combat Propaganda Team (CPT) landed at St Tropez. The Commanding Officer of 12 AG T Force. 6 AG established a provisional T Force using staff from its No 2 Intelligence Collection Unit (successor to S Force) on 12th October 1944. tasked to gather political intelligence for the Political Warfare Department of SHAEF. In Wiesbaden there were 73 buildings and 40 persons on the target lists. one American. The units departed Cologne on 26th March. and the T Force HQ and HQ Company moved to Wiesbaden. Col Haskell. Strasbourg was the first major city targeted by 6 AG. moved into Frankfurt on 28th March and dispatched a smaller element to operate in Wiesbaden. On 3rd May the two forces were reunited at Herten. while the other T Force was to operate with 3rd US Army in Frankfurt and Wiesbaden. Intelligence Assault Force (T Force). important signals intelligence relating to codes and ciphers was recovered. At this time the T Force was split in two. operating in the Wuppertal area from 14th April to 1st May. Their job was to report in detail on what the retreating German Army had left behind. The task given to the formation was to identify the intelligence assets of a target city and establish a plan to capture and hold its assets. and T Force Lucky moved north towards T Force Main. The T Force entered Strasbourg on 23rd November 1944. Prior to an operation.27 OPERATION DRAGOON For Operation Dragoon. Nine further building “targets of opportunity” were exploited. where they found 11 bodies in the cellar – one was the daughter of the local mayor. T Force Main operated in the Ruhr from 25th March to 1st May. All the buildings were searched and about 10% of the personality targets were arrested. the invasion of the South of France. called T Force Lucky. one French. It was not the T Force mission to analyse the captured assets. was subsequently wounded at Neuss and evacuated on 2nd April. Following SHAEF Intelligence Directive No 17. The main force was to operate with 9 th Army in the Ruhr. being replaced by Col William P Blair on 4th April. He was drafted for a “T Force” operation consisting of three officers. Operations in both cities were completed by 12th April. the T Force would therefore have an influx of intelligence specialists from various agencies to do this analysis. A signal from G2 7 th Army to G2 SHAEF dated 18th December 44 recommended the deployment of “appropriate intelligence specialists” to Strasbourg to examine and secure documents and records in the “Gauleitung” building. On 15 August 1944 the Allies landed in the South of France. seven month pregnant. The building contained “party 11-20 . the HQ of Wehrkreis Kommando XII. a number of US 7 th Army personnel with S Force experience joined with personnel from 1st French Army to form a T Force operating in the South of France. therefore. In one of the building targets. Most of the attached elements were reassigned on 6th May. Most of the Americans of the main T Force in this area were used to form the nucleus of the 6860th Headquarters Detachment. One member of this team was Capt Yurka Galitzine. They visited the Gestapo HQ in Nice. a Russian prince with an English mother. The personality targets had already been covered by CIC elements with 80 th Division. while the junior element. one British. instructing 6 th and 12th Army Groups to establish T Forces.28 a stark reminder that some T Force targets were likely to be dangerous for the hunters. Frankfurt had 171 building and 109 personality targets.

32 Alsos were also in Strasbourg. except that it automatically scrambles outgoing messages and unscrambles incoming messages”). the Allies had only obtained their first sample of this explosive in September 1944. written immediately post-war. where Air Int SHAEF arranged transport for him to Strasbourg to investigate the engine.30 The plant. official correspondence. Munich and Berchtesgarden in Phase 3. According to the Official History of the British Security Service. and an overcoat made of soft plastic explosive material resembling rubber.37 This explosive was called “nipolit”. They found working with 6 AG’s T Force so restrictive they withdrew from the T Force and got the US 7th Army to both authorise their independent entry. 36 The remaining population had been living inside their underground shelters for months. Gestapo records” and more. they also found the plans for the first jet aircraft engine as well as a prototype engine at the SA Junkers 88 plant at Matford (a fusion of the Ford and French Mathis factories in Strasbourg).33 A “truckload” of Sicherheitsdienst (SD) records was taken by Ensign Allan Oakley Hunter USNR. listed as CIOS Target 19/21. Volksturm records. with their call- signs.records. Col Pumpelly and his T Force entered Ludwigshafen around 22nd March. Samples were later obtained in many other forms. 6 AG SCIU picked up several Gestapo officials and transported them back to a gaol they had commandeered in Frankenthal. the OC of the SCIU. He then moved to Trois-Epee to see several captured men from Otto Skorzeny’s sabotage unit. Stuttgart. and took the Daimler-Benz factory on 26 th March as their HQ. when a sample disguised as a leather belt was acquired by a Turkish double agent. Karlsruhe and Wurzburg in Phase 2. Heidelburg. Capt Quirk of 6 AG SCIU had to divert to Kaiserslautern and then Vittel to deal with three captured German agents. The machine was recovered from the SD HQ. along with a diagram of the Gestapo teleprinter network throughout Germany. They moved on to operations against Frankenthal-Ludwigshafen. Mannheim. The city had been bombed once or twice daily for over four months. He and Lt Lewis Allbee USNR convinced a force of 60 SS troops armed with automatic pistols that the war was over and that they should march towards Freiburg to be taken as PoW by the Americans rather than the French. and there was “literally not a single building standing in town that was not undamaged. including underwater bombs twenty feet long and six feet in diameter!38 12-20 .) On 25th March the T Force entered Mannheim. (The Alsos mission beat the T Force to the IG Farben plant in Ludwigshafen. and Augsburg and Ulm were designated as part of the last phase (though this phase may not have been completed). on 23rd March. official documents pertaining to the execution of Allied airmen. and provide local T Force support to help guard Alsos targets in Strasbourg. 31 On 7th December 1944 it was arranged for CIOS expert Flt Lt Sproule to travel to Paris. found an operational German Hellschreiber (“an electronic device like a teletype machine.29 T Force not only captured Gestapo files. and most of them were knocked flat”. local civil service and political records. along with some items of their equipment. The SCIU spent a further 4 days searching through the HQ building. This included a cane made from plastic explosive with a time delay detonator. 34 Capt Akeley P Quirk USN. They used one of the political prisoners released from this prison as a spotter to identify Gestapo and Sicherheitsdienst in Ludwigshafen. an OSS officer with the 6AG SCIU. had a dismantled model of the engine in a secret room.35 Strasbourg was Phase 1 of a four stage operational plan for the T Force. arriving a day earlier. They contained enough explosive to destroy a ten-room house.

from which they identified the location of Goering’s hidden art treasures in the Berchtesgaden area (Goering himself had surrendered to the US Army in Berchtesgaden). T Forces were responsible for scientific and technical teams such as: CIOS Alsos Chemical Warfare Services. Strategic Bombing Survey teams (investigating the effects of the bombing on the German Economy). “The head of the War Room estimated that one such T Force operation. the Allies were in a race for technical intelligence. 39 1st Lt Raymond F Newkirk and Sgt James Utrecht of X2 OSS were assigned as an SCIU to Y Force. Much of the captured material collected here was transported back to the USA for exploitation. Munich had been entered on 30th April and the radio station.000 German intelligence personnel. the artwork was unprotected from the damp conditions and would have been ruined if they had not been found so promptly. 6 AG.established as an agency of the Joint Chiefs of Staff but transferred to the Department of Commerce in January 1946. Technical Industrial Intelligence Branch (TIIB. such as new aircraft. for evaluation and to instruct Allied personnel in its use. which had still been operating. later the TIIC. not only with the French and the Russians. The numerous British and American intelligence collecting teams under the umbrella of the T Forces were often working in competition. which was forwarded through Army Documents channels to the Counter intelligence War Room in London.located Axis equipment. etc. Together with a Major McGettigan of T Force they conducted a number of interrogations at Hermann Goering’s staff HQ. Later. ammunition. This virtually doubled the information on German intelligence personnel which had been made available through all previous Allied counterespionage operations during the war. In Heidelburg in April 1945 the T Force was able to locate important documents and personnel of Brown Bovari and Company and IG Farben. the unit was used to evaluate German industrial equipment in general. both regarded as important intelligence targets. Although very well hidden. US Army Ordnance Rocket Branch.40 According to OSS records the OSS SCI units operating with T Forces at 6 AG and 12AG “seized large quantities of counterespionage material”. but also with each other. netted identifying information on more than 20. In May the T Force helped with the liberation of Dachau Concentration Camp and went with 7th Army elements into the Nazi Redoubt region. where they uncovered tons of valuable documents hidden in caves and sunk to the bottom of lakes in special containers. and was microfilmed before being returned to the new German government. tanks. metalworking equipment. CIC and FSS. concluded in three days. Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee) . Enemy Equipment Intelligence Service (EEIS) . was seized.”41 DIVIDING THE SPOILS – FRIENDS AND FOES As the stories of 30 AU and the Alsos Mission have hinted. The loot was passed to the care of US 7th Army and the OSS X2 Art Unit was informed. Its task was to investigate 13-20 . As well as CI units like the SCIUs.

'' 44 GOLD RUSH/SAFEHAVEN teams (trying to track down Nazi treasures and funds moved abroad which were intended for rebuilding German industry port-war). Library of Congress Foreign Mission . Bureau of Mines. Navy Technical Mission. They claimed that the documents seized from these targets were never made available to the British or the Americans. Watson’s Whizzers (Operation Lusty) – tasked to collect aircraft technology. The Documents Research Center.000 pages that TIIB selected for copying.500.42 TIIB collected more than 300.a joint US_British mission to collect Sigint. 30 AU personnel reported that they had been successful in small teams searching their targets in the Paris area immediately after the occupation. in 1946. and 1.000 and 1. GOLDCUP teams from the US Group Control Council (to uncover intact parts of the German government and its archives).originally a part of the Alsos Mission. such as: TICOM.organized for the purpose of collecting and processing all captured German air documents. The organization was moved to Wright Field. and other specialists such as 30 AU and MIST (French “Mission d'Information Scientifique et Technique”).A non-military group sponsored by the U.sent to gather books and journals published in Germany (and the rest of Europe) and not available for purchase through normal channels once the war had been declared. United States Air Forces in Europe . Dayton. USAAF’s Air Technical Intelligence (ATI) teams was the active arm in the field.420 tons of documents. Before the move from Europe it was estimated that the total collection of German air documents would be between 1.S. Europe .45 Large technical libraries held by 14-20 . GOLDCUP’s collection “increased to 1. GOLDCUP teams by the end of May 1945 “collected 750 tons of documents and nearly a thousand German ministerial personnel”. there were a number of other specialist teams who had been assigned specific targets of their own. Under the auspices of CIOS the French government deployed their “Mission d'Information Scientifique et Technique” (MIST) in occupied Germany during the second half of 1945.300 Germans.500 tons.43 OTHER TEAMS Besides T Force. Special Mission V-2 Team – a US Rocket Branch mission to obtain V2 technology and personnel. A-2. tracking down atomic scientists and secret weapons on behalf of the French. assigned to investigate German advances in synthetic fuels and lubricants of interest to the Navy. Ohio. In the summer. German industries and obtain any information that might be of interest to American companies. the final screened library and collection sent to Wright Field consisted of approximately 220 tons. 46 tons of microfilm.000 pounds of German equipment and product samples as well as 200 tons of materials captured by the Army and Navy. but after several days they found several of their targets already searched and cleaned out by the French “Deuxieme Bureau”. However. The Annual Report of the Secretary of Commerce for 1946 talks about 3. made up of American and British petroleum experts and charged with investigating the industrial production of synthetic fuels and lubricants from coal using the Fischer-Tropsch method. TOM (Technical Oil Mission) .

Post-war the T Force work was continued by an American operation. documents. and aircraft. searching for information to use against Japan. Maunsell.398 separate items were chosen for technical analysis. quite often they worked alone – in part because they had agendas which did not agree with those of T Force. who was already chief of the SHAEF Special Sections Subdivision. With the aim of exploiting captured German scientific documents. much like the smaller independent T Force Teams mentioned above. One author states that as of March 1945 “in western Germany alone. namely. Since the new organization would have to remain a combined operation for as long as SHAEF existed. J. was designated head of the new organisation. integrate." in its charter. and direct the activities of the various missions and agencies" interested in scientific and technical intelligence but prohibited from collecting and exploiting such information on its own 15-20 . the ATI teams competed with 32 allied technical intelligence groups. the United States had fourteen scientific intelligence teams from the army. For example. research facilities. when they then made use of T Force/ FIAT facilities to aid their investigations. navy and air corps” operating independently and often in competition with each other as well as their allies. FIAT was authorized to "coordinate.280 items (6. Although envisioned as having exclusive "control and actual handling of operations concerning enemy personnel.200 tons) for examination. as well as online.46 Some of these specialist teams have been covered in more detail in books and articles. the Field Information Agency Technical (FIAT). the advancement of science and the improvement of production and standards of living in the United Nations by proper exploitation of German methods in these fields. which had been set up by SHAEF as a combined organization. While members of these teams might occasionally have operated under the umbrella of T Force. It was to inherit a wartime mission from the Special Sections Subdivision. and perhaps only. Many of these organisations only became operational after the war in Europe ceased. and also because they operated in areas outside the main T Force target zones. the ATI Teams and Watson’s Whizzers under Operation LUSTY swept up 16. issued at the end of May. Chief among its interests would be "the securing of the major. and equipment of scientific and industrial interest."49 FIAT's scope was extended to take in scientific and industrial processes and patents having civilian as well as military applications. which was organized so that information and equipment might be shared by the Allies equally. of which 2.47 In April 1945. but the longer-term goal was aimed toward civilian interests. the USAAF combined technical and post-hostilities intelligence objectives under the Exploitation Division as Operation LUSTY. various German aircraft manufacturers were left virtually untouched – and most of the German aircraft industry was located in the Russian occupied zone.48 FIELD INTELLIGENCE AGENCY TECHNICAL. British Brigadier R. material reward of victory. FIAT was conceived as a post-hostilities agency early in 1945 by Secretary of War Stimson.

which would be 16-20 . This was important as many of the targets provided the Allies with intelligence on the Soviet Union. It was the responsibility of FIAT investigators to screen German scientists. according to a military memo. and services to civilian investigators from the Technical Industrial Intelligence Committee (Foreign Economic Administration) who were sent to Europe in large numbers to comb German plants and laboratories for information on everything from plastics to shipbuilding and building materials to chemicals. About 1. the Joint Chiefs of Staff initiated that program in July 1945 to. Although the Russians entered Berlin first. Americans and French were busy scouring the newly liberated and occupied territories in NW Europe.000 reports. and collected 53 tons of documents. The targets included human resources. 53 FIAT continued operating until the summer of 1947. they amended the records of Nazi Party members and war criminals to allow their immigration to America.000 Germans – many scientists and technicians from Germany’s rocket and nuclear programmes – were recruited to work in the USA. By the end of the first year of the occupation. estimated the cash value of the FIAT efforts alone at ten billion dollars. The Russians appeared slower to grasp the opportunity on offer. Mobile FIAT microfilm teams were sent to major plants and industrial facilities to copy material identified by FIAT experts as valuable. The targeting of such intelligence had become more important to T Force as the British intelligence services saw the potential of places like German map depots. The French Occupation Forces maintained liaison detachments with FIAT. London. shipped 108 items of equipment (whole plants sometimes were counted as single items). supposedly to ensure that no war criminals were brought to the United States. and an exchange of information was done through joint Allied operations and trading of investigators. FIAT investigators scoured Germany looking for anything that might be suitable war compensation. FIAT had processed over 23.54 THE RUSSIAN TEAMS While the British. in asking for German reparations. Instead. but the civilian investigations increased.responsibility. "exploit chosen rare minds whose continuing intellectual productivity we wish to use.52 FIAT separated into its British and US components with the dissolution of SHAEF. FIAT provided (from its office in Frankfurt and branches in Paris. Once SHAEF ceased to exist the organisation came under the joint administration of the US Group Control Council and USFET. The Russians." Overcast evolved into Operation Paperclip. support. 51 German scientists were prime targets of FIAT investigators.50 The one new T Force operation in the FIAT period was conducted in Berlin in July and August. Also. and Berlin) the accreditation." As Simpson reported in his book "Blowback". FIAT often became the custodian of the documents and equipment collected by military units being redeployed from gathering technical intelligence. and were reported to have their own intelligence collection units working in the area. whose job included finding suitable candidates for a top-secret program called "Overcast. the Americans believed they found their prime intelligence targets untouched when they were finally given permission to enter the city. The military intelligence projects were completed and phased out in late 1945 and early 1946.

58 The Russian Mission to the US made full use of this opportunity to obtain copies of the information. and in some cases in a more digestible form. that the Soviets were much more effective in gathering up intelligence. Col Andrew J Boyle. however. We had hoped to jump into Berlin as a part of a larger operation. President Truman had established the Publications Board to review all scientific and technical information developed with government funds during the war with a view toward declassifying and publishing it.expected to have up-to-date coverage of Soviet territory. their work in the USA and the UK was more closely guarded by their new employers as the Iron Curtain fell over war-torn Europe. through the Americans than if they had obtained the information firsthand. with our agreement with the Russians [to permit them to capture Berlin] it never came off. public and general dissemination" of scientific and industrial information obtained from the enemy. It might therefore be legitimately claimed that the Soviets obtained much of the information far more cheaply and easily. We had T Forces with targets in Berlin. Obviously. Post hostilities. Several websites provide details of the Soviet search for aircraft technology.56 The work of the intelligence services on these areas as well as counter-intelligence is covered in several books and the current evidence indicates that Col Boyle grossly underestimated the efforts of the Soviets. The acquisition of the scientists and technical staff of the Third Reich proved a more precious treasure. 17-20 . described the Allied preparations to search Berlin: “We had organized a parachute operation for Berlin purely for intelligence. the President also ordered "prompt.55 It should be noted. much of the information on industrial and technological developments was released to the public and to its foreign allies at no more than the cost of copying the CIOS and FIAT reports issued by the various specialist teams. we didn’t get into Berlin for some time after the Russians had gotten in there…It was very interesting that the Russians had not organized any such intelligence effort like this at all. the officer in overall command of T Force operations in SHAEF. rocketry and atomic technology and raw materials.57 CONCLUSIONS While the Allies succeeded in sweeping up a large amount of technical information. technical information and staff than previously believed. As a consequence. All the prime targets that we wanted were still in Berlin”. of course.

provided by the US Army Military History Institute. Roll 10 of 10 rolls. Also. ENV 69. 30 The 6860th Headquarters Detachment Intelligence Assault Force (“T” Force). HQ & HQ Detachment. by Bob Steers. dated October 1944. Book II. . SHAEF Office of ACOS. 31 WO 219/818. Comments on T Force Activities in Second British Army from 31 Mar to 15 Jun 1945. 3 RG331/Box 138. OSS Accessions S91. OSS London. OSS Accessions S91. undated. 146. from US Army Military History Institute. US National Archives ref: MR/CRR/243/15W4-19-9-D. Plans and Operations Staff.” report by Maj C Brooks Peters. London. RG226/Entry 115/Box 52/Folder 3/Item 29. produced by the 5th King’s/No 2 T Force Old Comrades Association. 24 T Force Bulletin No – Period 1-20 Jun 45. 13 FSS – Field Security Section (reminiscences of W. Present Position of OSS Relative to. ETOUSA (Main). X-2 Branch. G-2. US Forces. 12 Operatives. 1977. 21 Army Group Area.1 ENDNOTES T Force/S Force – a Bibliography of MHI Sources. dated 11 January 1945. Plans and Operations Staff. by G2 30 Corps. Jan 88. 19 T Force Bulletin No 2 – Period 10-15 Apr 45. Vol 1. 8 HQ T Force 12 AG Draft “T Force Report on Target ‘PARIS’”. 20 T Force Bulletin No 3 – Period 16-24 Apr 45. Book II. Baltimore (undated). 17 Trojan Horses. 10 HQ T Force 12 AG Draft “T Force Report on Target ‘PARIS’”. England. 14 History of ‘T’ Force Activities in 21 Army Group. Sedgwick-Rough). “T Forces. The Bodley Head Ltd. 1989. 21 Army Group Area. 1996. 5 Counter Intelligence Corps History and Mission in World War II. Jun 92. Microfilm Ref M1623. by Martin Young and Robbie Stamp. 4 Report of the General Board. 225.com/genomes/jhhpdfs/orig11wartf. by Anthony Kemp. dated 31 december 1944. District T Force (UK National Archives). by Keith Ellison. RG331/Box 53. Commanding Officer. Also. US National Archives ref: MR/CRR/243/15W4-19-9-D. US National Archives ref: MR/CRR/243/15W4-19-9-D. Roll 10 of 10 rolls. RG226/Entry 115/Box 52/Folder 3/Item 29. Section 3.(II) Allies in N Africa and Italy. US National Archives ref: MR/CRR/243/15W4-19-9-D. (UK National Archives). RG331/Box 53. 26 J Heslop-Harrison Autobiography: War Service Part 7. Section 3. dated October 1944. (UK National Archives). ENV 69. England. ENV 69. London. dated 18 June 1945. RG331/Box 53.” report by Maj C Brooks Peters. 2012. USAMHI Ref Branch. by the Counter Intelligence Corps School. 21 Army Group Area. Commanding Officer. “T Force” (online at http://homepage. Microfilm Ref M1623. Jan-Mar 1945. NARA MR/CRR/331 7W4-11-16-C-D Box 137. Vol 1. on Organisation and Operation of the Theater Intelligence Services in the European Theater of Operations. 18 A Short History of T Force Operations In North West Europe During the Second World War. Section 3. from US Army Military History Institute. OSS. by Patrick K O’Donnell. 16 Trojan Horses. USMCR. 21 Army Group Area. Section 3. 1989. 38. FO 1031/49 (UK National Archives). OSS London. 9 G2 Section (Pts V-VII) 12th Army Group Report of Operations (Final After Action Report). 11 “Activities of SCI in connection with T Force Paris”. Citadel Press Books 2004. X-2 Branch. by Martin Young and Robbie Stamp. The Bodley Head Ltd. 28 The Secret Hunters. ETOUSA (Main). USMCR. by I Sayer and D Botting. European Theater. 21 T Force Bulletin No 5 – Period 2-10 May 45. 1986. Vol IV. 15 Frontline Intelligence in WW2 . by Les Hughes. 25 Activities of Intelligence Target “T” Sub-Division.ntlworld. 27 G2 Section (Pts V-VII) 12th Army Group Report of Operations (Final After Action Report). “T Forces. ENV 69. Target 8. 6 AG G2 signal to SHAEF MAIN for Strong dtd 27 Nov 1944. 7 America’s Secret Army. 22 WO 205/1049. 21 Army Group Area. 29 WO 219/818. 204-205. ENV 69.pdf). Vol IV. HQ & HQ Detachment. dated 11 January 1945. Present Position of OSS Relative to. Section 3. Target 8. 2 War Diary. 51-52. G2 7th Army signal to G2 SHAEF MAIN dtd 18 Dec 1944. US National Archives ref: MR/CRR/243/15W4-19-9-D. Fort Holabird. SCI Unit 12 AG letter dated 9 Oct 44. 23 T Force Bulletin No 7 – Period 19-30 May 45. 36-37. OSS. Oct-Dec 1944. 40. 6 War Diary. Michael O’Mara Books. Spies and Saboteurs.

' By Richard Eells. USNR (Ret).com/ed/Russian_Alsos for the race for atomic research materials and personnel. SHAEF REAR signal from Strong from Magnus SHAEF MAIN dtd 7 Dec 1944. 383. sec. Class 104-.nationalmuseum. Piram. in EUCOM.32 WO 219/818. by Jerry Dan. SHAEF.http://www. www. quoting: (1) Background and History of Field Information Agency. and http://www. 014. (UK National Archives). Vol XXVIII. Report of the Secretary of Commerce. 1946. DC: GPO. AG.1. National Museum of the US Air Force. 1946 43 History of 30 AU. for Distribution. in USFET SGS 322. Castle Books NY 2000. Center of Military History US Army 1975. By Theodore Von Karman. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944-1946.airpages. by John Curry. by Lt Col Joseph S. for Sec War. Sultana Press 1981. Vol 1. Technical. by Les Hughes. sub: Ministerial Collecting Center. 48 The Wind and Beyond. quoting: (1) Lt Col Joseph S. Loyal Comrades. for CG. for CG. Background and History of Field Information Agency. in CMH file 8-3. 7771 Document Center. Class 104. The Andrew J Boyle Papers. (ebook) 2007. 1977. 75-76. 39 The 6860th Headquarters Detachment Intelligence Assault Force (“T” Force). 2 Jun 45. Rare Books & Berry. 38 The Security Service 1908-1945. 1946. 44 The U. US Military History Institute. sub: Establishment of FIAT. Brown & Co. US Gp CC. ACofS G-2. sec. Little. 336. Library of Congress Quarterly Journal of Current Acquisitions 3 (4) Aug. Boston. 12th AGp. (3) Memo. 212. Office of the Chief Historian. 13 Jun 45. 34th. Ruthless Killers. in SHAEF G-2.russianspaceweb. (2) Memo. 47 Operation “LUSTY”. Organization and Administration of the European Theater and Its Headquarters. 51 The 6860th Headquarters Detachment Intelligence Assault Force (“T” Force). for CofS. 336. USNR (Ret). in OPD. Brown & Co (USA) 1995. (Footnotes).S. 50 (1) SHAEF. By Earl Frederick Ziemke. 54 The Army’s Technical Detectives. 34 Recollections of World War II. 8 Jul 44-30 Jun 46. by Akeley P Quirk. 12th AGp. CoS. in OPD. Sultana Press 1981. 56 See www. 40 Recollections of World War II. AG. by Vadim J Birstein. 68-69. General History. USNR (Ret). 55 Interview between Lt Gen AJ Boyle and Lt Col Frank Walton. Little. 37 Recollections of World War II. Center of Military History US Army 1975. by Akeley P Quirk. 98. in May 1948 Military Review. USNR (Ret). by Col Boris T Pash. 46 Secret Waepons of World War II. 49 Memo. SHAEF. 28 Apr 47. T 298-1/2. sub: Termination Date for FIAT. CAD. US Gp CC. (4) Memo.af. Birebeck Publishing CO London 2011. 136. 103. 8 Jul 44-30 Jun 46. 239. Washington. (2) Memo.S. 14 Jul 45. by Pavel & Anatoli Sudoplatov with J L & L P Schecter. by Les Hughes. Hqs. 121-122. in SHAEF G- 2. 27 May 45. by Akeley P Quirk. Porlock Somerset UK 2003. RG226. 1977. By Earl Frederick Ziemke. 52 FIAT continued investigations until 30 June 1947 and continued microfilming until 30 September of that year.6-4 45 'Aeronautical Science. by Guy Allan Farrin. CA 5. by Akeley P Quirk. V. in OMGUS 21-1/5. German Documents. by William B Breuer. Sultana Press 1981. by Akeley P Quirk. USNR (Ret). Sultana Press 1981. Technical. GBI/CI/CS/091. by Maj Franklin M Davis Jr. Number 2. .ru/eng/ru/troph. sub: Establishment of FIAT. 1947. Technical. Posted 2/7/2011. 42 United States Department of Commerce. Piram in EUCOM. 36 Recollections of World War II. SHAEF. 57 See SMERSH. 53 EUCOM.shtml for soviet acquisition of aircraft technology. Sultana Press 1981.mil/factsheets. Box 2 of 2.tutorgig.1-3. MA 1967. Lewis International Inc 2003. 98-100. Actg Ch. Special Tasks. Army in the Occupation of Germany: 1944-1946. 31 May 45. by Slava Katamidze.com for soviet research into German rocketry and space flight. sub: Special Detention Centers. V. 35 Recollections of World War II. in CAD. Entry 176. the Official History. sub: Establishment of a Field Information Agency. (2) OMGUS. 33 The ALSOS Mission. T 298-1 /2. 11 Jun 47. and Ultimate Deception. 41 History of US CI Vol 2. The U.

. in Federal Register. 9568 and 10960. pp.58 Executive Order 9568. vol. 28 Aug 45. 8 Jun 45. 10. and Executive Order 9604.