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G.R. No.

L-34259

March 21, 1931

Intestate Estate of the late E. Randolph Hix.


ANNIE COUSINS HIX, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
A. W. FLUEMER, opponent-appellee.
The petitioner, Annie Cousins Hix, appeals from the order issued by the Court of First Instance of Manila in the
course of the intestate proceedings of E. Randolf Hix, the dispositive part of which reads as follows:
In view of the foregoing considerations, the court holds: (1) That the divorce decree granted by the Circuit
Court of Randolph County of the State of West Virginia awarding the deceased Hix a divorce from his wife,
Annie Cousins Hix, is valid in this jurisdiction; (2) that since the latter is legally divorced from her late
husband, she is not entitled to the pension she asks as his widow; and (3) that the motion for
reconsideration filed by her counsel on September 24, 1929 asking for an allowance for support must be
denied.
The appellant assigns the following alleged errors as committed by the court below in said order, to wit:
1. The trial court erred in assuming that E. Randolph Hix was a bona fide resident of the State of West
Virginia at the time he instituted an action for divorce against his wife in the Circuit Court of Randolf
County, West Virginia, in the year 1925.
2. The trial court erred in not finding that E. Randolph Hix was domiciled in, and resident of, the City of
Manila, Philippine Islands, he having arrived here in 1910 and died here in 1929, during which period of
time he had established his home and had engaged in business here.
3. The trial court erred in recognizing the decree of divorce secured by E. Randolph Hix from the Circuit
Court of Randolph County, West Virginia.
4. The trial court erred in refusing to apply to this case the jurisprudence laid down by this Honorable
Court in the cases of Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil., 855) and Gorayeb vs. Hashim (50 Phil., 22).
5. The trial court erred in misapplying section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure and in not construing the
same in relation with sections 309 and 312 of the same Code.
The relevant facts necessary to decide the questions raised in this appeal are the following:
E. Randolph Hix was born in the year 1866 in Union, South Carolina, where he lived with his parents until the age
of 15. They then removed to Rye, Westchester County, New York. A few years later, he was sent to the University
of Lehigh, and to the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, leaving the latter before graduating, to accept
employment with the Edison Company where he worked for about three years. After resigning from his position he
opened an office and engaged in private work as consulting engineer and contractor until the year 1895, when he
removed to Wheeling, West Virginia, to engage in the general engineering business as a member of the firm of
Hogg & Hix, surveyors.
After fifteen years of residence in Wheeling, he took an examination and received an appointment as coal expert
for the Philippine Government, arriving at Manila some time during the year 1910. While E. Randolph Hix was living
in Manila in 1912, he met the appellant and married her in Shanghai, China, on or about June 24, 1913, returning
to Manila where they established their domicile. A son was born of this union in Boston, Massachusetts, on July 1,
1915, named Preston Randolph Hix, while she was in the United States where she had gone on the month of May
of the same year to visit her family and the mother and sister of her husband. The appellant returned to Manila in
November, 1916, and continued to live with the deceased as husband and wife.
On March 16, 1919, the appellant left for Canada, where she remained with their child until February, 1921, when
she returned to Manila in a very precarious condition of health and was given medical treatment in the St. Paul's
Hospital at the expense of her husband. After she regained her health, she lived apart from her husband by mutual
consent.

On December 7, 1922, the appellant instituted an action in the Court of First Instance of Manila against her
husband, E. Randolph Hix, for the purpose of compelling him to provide adequate support for herself and her son,
Preston Randolf Hix. In that case and in open court the following stipulation was entered into between the parties:
It is stipulated and agreed that the defendant and plaintiff are both residents of the City of Manila; that
they were married on the 24th day of June, 1913, in Shanghai, China; the plaintiff is the lawful wife of
defendant; that one son named Preston R. Hix was born on July 1, 1915, of the said marriage, who is still
living; the plaintiff and defendant are now and have been, since about the middle of December, 1921,
living separate and apart from each other by mutual consent, though the greater part of the time since
December, 1921, up to November, 1922, they took their meals together; that by mutual consent they will
continue to live apart from each other; that as long as the child will remain in the Philippine Islands, the
father will have the opportunity to see him twice a week, this without prejudice of Mrs. Hix taking the child
to the States. In this case, she will keep the father informed as to the condition of the child by writing him
once a month.
The trial court adjudicated the case in her favor and ordered the defendant E. Randolph Hix to pay her the sum of
P500 in advance on or before the 5th day of each month for the maintenance of herself and her son. The case was
appealed to this court, and on February 27, 1924, the judgment of the court below was affirmed.1 During the
month of December, 1922, while the proceedings in said case were pending, the office held by E. Randolph Hix in
the Government was abolished, and he went into private practice, acting as coal expert for the Manila Electric
Company and other private concerns until March, 1924, when he left for West Virginia, leaving his wife and child in
Manila, and his business in the hands of his employee, A. W. Fluemer, the opponent and appellee, for the purpose
of residing there and suing for a divorce.
In the month of May, 1925, that is, one year after his arrival at Elkins, West Virginia, the deceased filed a
complaint for a divorce with the Circuit Court of Randolph County, West Virginia, alleging, among other things, that
he was a citizen of the United States of America, and of the State of West Virginia, and had been for more than one
year prior to the date of the institution of the suit, an actual bona fide citizen and resident of Randolph County,
West Virginia; that Annie cousins Hix was a resident of the City of Peking, China; that on December 1, 1921, his
wife had abandoned and deserted him, taking up a separate residence and declining to live or have anything to do
with him; that he, Hix, freely, voluntarily, and adequately supported his wife and child, paying her the sum of $175
per month; that he intended to reside permanently in the United States, and that it was with such intention that he
had returned to West Virginia; that he and his wife had been living apart for three years, and that she had rejected
his offer of reconciliation. As the appellant was not a resident of the State of West Virginia, she was summoned
upon the complaint for divorce by publication, and not having entered an appearance in the case, either personally
or by counsel within the term fixed, the Circuit Court of Randolph County, West Virginia, rendered judgment
against her in 1925 declaring her marriage with the plaintiff dissolved. Having procured the divorce, E. Randolph
Hix returned to Manila in 1927, where he continued to live and engaged in business up to the time of his death in
the year 1929.
The first question to decide in this appeal, raised by the first two assignments of error is, whether the Circuit Court
of Randolph County in West Virginia acquired jurisdiction to take cognizance of the complaint for divorce filed by E
.Randolph Hix and to render a valid and binding judgment against the petitioner and appellant, Annie Cousins Hix.
The pertinent part of section 306 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides as follows:
SEC. 306. Effect of Judgment. The effect of a judgment or final order in an action or special proceeding
before a court or judge of the Philippine Islands or of the United States, or of any State or Territory of the
United States, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or order, may be as follows:
1. In case of a judgment or order against a specific thing, or in respect to the probate of a will, or the
administration of the estate of a deceased person, or in respect to the personal, political, or legal condition
or relation of a particular person, the judgment or order in conclusive upon the title of the thing, the will
or administration, or the condition or relation of the person: . . . .
Section 334, No. 15, of said Code states:
SEC. 334. Disputable Presumptions. The following presumptions are satisfactory, if uncontradicted, but
they are disputable, and may be contradicted by other evidence:
xxx

xxx

xxx

15. That a court, or judge acting as such, whether in the Philippine Islands or elsewhere, was acting in the
lawful exercise of his jurisdiction.
These provisions show that in order that a judgment of a court or judge of any state of the American Union with
respect to the personal or legal condition of a particular person may be conclusive and constitute res judicata, it is
essential that the court have jurisdiction, and such jurisdiction is presumed in the absence of evidence to the
contrary.
Section 312 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 312. How Judicial Record May be Impeached. Any judicial record may be impeached by evidence
of a want of jurisdiction in the court or judicial officer, of collusion between the parties, or of fraud in the
party offering the record, in respect to the proceedings.
One of the conditions for the validity of a decree of absolute divorce is that the court granting it has acquired
jurisdiction over the subject matter, and to this end the plaintiff must be domiciled in good faith, and for the length
of time fixed by the law, in the state in which it was granted. E. Randolph Hix was domiciled in the City of Manila
where he lived apart from his wife and child, by mutual consent, and here he had his business. He removed to the
State of West Virginia leaving his aforesaid wife and child and his business behind, for the purpose of obtaining an
absolute divorce, which he did in 1925, returning in the year 1927 to reside in the City of Manila, and continuing
his business.
Although the opponent and appellee attempted to show that E. Randolph Hix went to West Virginia with the
intention of residing there permanently, as allege in the complaint for divorce, such an intention was contradicted
by the fact that before leaving the City of Manila, he did not liquidate his business but placed it under the
management of said opponent, and once having obtained his divorce, he returned to the City of Manila to take up
his residence and to continue his aforesaid business, and that his purpose in going to West Virginia was to obtain a
divorce.
In Gorayeb vs. Hashim (50 Phil., 22) this court laid down the following doctrine:
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; NULLITY OF DIVORCE. Doctrine of Ramirez vs. Gmur (42 Phil., 855) followed, to
the effect that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled and to which one or both
of them may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce has not jurisdiction to determine their
matrimonial status, and the divorce granted by such a court is not entitled to recognition here.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; PHILIPPINE RESIDENTS WHO HAVE BEEN MARRIED ABROAD. the foregoing
rule is applicable to married people who are domiciled in the Philippine Islands although they may have
contracted marriage elsewhere.
This ruling has not been weakened in the present case by the fact that E. Randolph Hix was a citizen of the United
States and of the State of West Virginia, since it is not the citizenship of the plaintiff for divorce which confers
jurisdiction upon a court, but his legal residence within the State where he applies for a divorce. That E. Randolph
Hix himself believed he had relinquished his former legal residence in West Virginia, of which he was a citizen, upon
establishing his marriage domicile in the City of Manila, Philippine Islands, is shown by the fact that he had to
reestablish his residence in said State for the length of time fixed by the law in order to be able to file his complaint
for a divorce.
Since E. Randolph Hix was not a bona fide resident of the State of West Virginia, the divorce decree he obtained
from the Circuit Court of Randolph County, is null and void, said court having failed to acquire jurisdiction over the
subject matter.
But even if his residence had been taken up in good faith, and the court had acquired jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the divorce suit, the decree issued in his favor is not binding upon the appellant; for the matrimonial
domicile of the spouses being the City of Manila, and no new domicile having been acquired in West Virginia, the
summons made by publication, she not having entered an appearance in the case, either personally or by counsel,
did not confer jurisdiction upon said court over her person.
In Haddock vs. Haddock (201 U. S., 562), the United States Supreme Court laid down the following doctrine:

The husband and wife being domiciled in New York, the husband left the wife, acquired, in good faith,
after a lapse of years, a domicile in Connecticut, and obtained in that State, and in accordance with its
laws, a judgment of divorce based on constructive, and not actual, service of process, on the wife, who
meanwhile remained domiciled in New York and never appeared in the action. The wife subsequently sued
for divorce in New York and obtained personal service in that State on the husband who pleaded the
Connecticut judgment. Held,
Without questioning the power of the State of Connecticut to enforce the decree within its own borders,
and without intimating any doubt that the State of New York might give it such a degree of efficacy that it
might be entitled to in view of the public policy of the State, that the Connecticut decree, rendered as it
was without being based on personal service of the process on, and therefore without personal jurisdiction
of the court over, the wife, was not entitled to obligatory enforcement in the State of New York by virtue
of the full faith and credit clause of the Federal Constitution.
A suit for divorce brought in a State other than that of domicile or matrimony against a wife who is still
domiciled therein is not a proceeding in rem justifying the court to enter a decree as to the res; or
marriage relation entitled to be enforced outside of the territorial jurisdiction of the court.
Without deciding whether or not clause IV of the Constitution of the United States, with reference to the full faith
and credit to be given to judgments of the courts of the States of the American Union is applicable to the Philippine
Islands, we may say that the ruling has the same force and scope as that of international comity, which must in
any case be taken into account in considering the recognition to be given in the Philippine Islands to judgments of
foreign courts. (Section 311, Act No. 190.)
The divorce decree issued by the Circuit Court of Randolph County, West Virginia, may also be impeached by
evidence of fraud, according to section 312 of the Code of Civil Procedure, quoted above.
E. Randolph Hix alleged in his complaint for a divorce filed with the aforementioned court, that on December 1,
1921 his wife had abandoned and deserted him, living separately and declining to live or have anything to do with
him; that she was a resident of the City of Peking, China; and that he freely and voluntarily provided adequately
for her and their son, paying her $175 per month. These allegations, being false, tended to deceive and did in fact
deceive the aforesaid Circuit Court of Randolph County in West Virginia into granting the decree of divorce applied
for, because, had he alleged in his complaint that his wife lived apart from him by mutual consent, as was a fact,
said court would not have granted the divorce, since in the case of Bacon vs. Bacon (68 W. Va., 747; 70 S. E.,
762), the Supreme Court of West Virginia laid down the doctrine that separation by mutual consent does not
constitute desertion or abandonment before the law. (See also Corpus Juris, vol. 19, page 64.)
For the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold: (1) That the residence acquired in a state of the
American Union by a husband, who, for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, abandons the country wherein are his
matrimonial domicile and his wife, who is living apart from him by mutual consent, and then returns to said
matrimonial domicile after obtaining a divorce, continues residing, therein and engaging in business, is not bona
fide residence, and does not confer jurisdiction upon the court even if he alleges in the complaint for divorce that
he intends to reside permanently in said state; (2) that the summons by publication in a complaint for divorce, filed
in a state by the husband who has gone to said state, abandoning his matrimonial domicile where his wife
continues to reside, does not confer jurisdiction upon the court over the person of said wife when she has not
entered an appearance in the case, and the decree issued by said court dissolving the marriage is not binding upon
her; and (3) that a decree of divorce issued by a court of any state or territory of the American Union, or of a
foreign country, may be impeached in another case for lack of jurisdiction in said court over the subject matter, or
over the person of the defendant, or for fraud in obtaining it on the part of the person procuring it.
Wherefore, the judgment appealed from is reversed, and it is held that the decree of divorce issued by the Circuit
Court of Randolph County, West Virginia, is null and void in this jurisdiction, with costs against the appellee. So
ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Street, Villamor and Romualdez, JJ., concur.
Malcolm and Ostrand, JJ., concur in the result.

G.R. No. L-32636

March 17, 1930

In the matter Estate of Edward Randolph Hix, deceased.


A.W. FLUEMER, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
ANNIE COUSHING HIX, oppositor-appellee.
The special administrator of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix appeals from a decision of Judge of First Instance
Tuason denying the probate of the document alleged to by the last will and testament of the deceased. Appellee is
not authorized to carry on this appeal. We think, however, that the appellant, who appears to have been the
moving party in these proceedings, was a "person interested in the allowance or disallowance of a will by a Court of
First Instance," and so should be permitted to appeal to the Supreme Court from the disallowance of the will (Code
of Civil Procedure, sec. 781, as amended; Villanueva vs. De Leon [1925], 42 Phil., 780).
It is theory of the petitioner that the alleged will was executed in Elkins, West Virginia, on November 3, 1925, by
Hix who had his residence in that jurisdiction, and that the laws of West Verginia Code, Annotated, by Hogg,
Charles E., vol. 2, 1914, p. 1690, and as certified to by the Director of the National Library. But this was far from a
compliance with the law. The laws of a foreign jurisdiction do not prove themselves in our courts. the courts of the
Philippine Islands are not authorized to take American Union. Such laws must be proved as facts. (In re Estate of
Johnson [1918], 39 Phil., 156.) Here the requirements of the law were not met. There was no was printed or
published under the authority of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 300 of the Code of Civil
Procedure. Nor was the extract from the law attested by the certificate of the officer having charge of the original,
under the sale of the State of West Virginia, as provided in section 301 of the Code of Civil Procedure. No evidence
was introduced to show that the extract from the laws of West Virginia was in force at the time the alleged will was
executed.
In addition, the due execution of the will was not established. The only evidence on this point is to be found in the
testimony of the petitioner. Aside from this, there was nothing to indicate that the will was acknowledged by the
testator in the presence of two competent witnesses, of that these witnesses subscribed the will in the presence of
the testator and of each other as the law of West Virginia seems to require. On the supposition that the witnesses
to the will reside without the Philippine Islands, it would then the duty of the petitioner to prove execution by some
other means (Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 633.)
It was also necessary for the petitioner to prove that the testator had his domicile in West Virginia and not
establish this fact consisted of the recitals in the CATHY will and the testimony of the petitioner. Also in beginning
administration proceedings orginally in the Philippine Islands, the petitioner violated his own theory by attempting
to have the principal administration in the Philippine Islands.
While the appeal pending submission in this court, the attorney for the appellant presented an unverified petition
asking the court to accept as part of the evidence the documents attached to the petition. One of these documents
discloses that a paper writing purporting to be the was presented for probate on June 8, 1929, to the clerk of
Randolph Country, State of West Virginia, in vacation, and was duly proven by the oaths of Dana Wamsley and
Joseph L. MAdden, the subscribing witnesses thereto , and ordered to be recorded and filed. It was shown by
another document that, in vacation, on June 8, 1929, the clerk of court of Randolph Country, West Virginia,
appointed Claude W. Maxwell as administrator, cum testamento annexo, of the estate of Edward Randolph Hix,
deceased. In this connection, it is to be noted that the application for the probate of the will in the Philippines was
filed on February 20, 1929, while the proceedings in West Virginia appear to have been initiated on June 8, 1929.
These facts are strongly indicative of an intention to make the Philippines the principal administration and West
Virginia the ancillary administration. However this may be, no attempt has been made to comply with Civil
Procedure, for no hearing on the question of the allowance of a will said to have been proved and allowed in West
Virginia has been requested. There is no showing that the deceased left any property at any place other than the
Philippine Islands and no contention that he left any in West Virginia.
Reference has been made by the parties to a divorce purported to have been awarded Edward Randolph Hix from
Annie Cousins Hix on October 8, 1925, in the State of West specific pronouncements on the validity or validity of
this alleged divorce.
For all of the foregoing, the judgment appealed from will be affirmed, with the costs of this instance against the
appellant.

ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, G.R. No. 139868


Petitioner,
Present:
PANGANIBAN, C.J. (Chairperson)
- versus - *YNARES-SANTIAGO,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR., and
CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
CANDELARIA GUERSEYDALAYGON, Promulgated:
Respondent. June 8, 2006
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:

Spouses Audrey ONeill (Audrey) and W. Richard Guersey (Richard) were American citizens who have resided in
the Philippinesfor 30 years. They have an adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill (Kyle). On July 29, 1979, Audrey
died, leaving a will. In it, she bequeathed her entire estate to Richard, who was also designated as executor.[1] The
will was admitted to probate before the Orphans Court of Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A, which named James N.
Phillips as executor due to Richards renunciation of his appointment.[2] The court also named Atty. Alonzo
Q. Ancheta (petitioner) of the Quasha Asperilla Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices as ancillary administrator.[3]

In 1981, Richard married Candelaria Guersey-Dalaygon (respondent) with whom he has two children, namely,
Kimberly and Kevin.

On October 12, 1982, Audreys will was also admitted to probate by the then Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch 25, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.[4] As administrator of Audreys
estate in the Philippines, petitioner filed an inventory and appraisal of the following properties: (1) Audreys
conjugal share in real estate with improvements located at 28 Pili Avenue, Forbes Park, Makati, Metro Manila,
valued at P764,865.00 (Makati property); (2) a current account in Audreys name with a cash balance
of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors, Inc. worth P64,444.00.[5]

On July 20, 1984, Richard died, leaving a will, wherein he bequeathed his entire estate to respondent,
save for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc. shares, which he left to Kyle.[6] The will was also
admitted to probate by the Orphans Court of Ann Arundel, Maryland, U.S.A, and James N. Phillips was likewise
appointed as executor, who in turn, designated Atty. William Quasha or any member of the Quasha Asperilla
Ancheta Pena & Nolasco Law Offices, as ancillary administrator.

Richards will was then submitted for probate before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 138,
docketed as Special Proceeding No. M-888.[7] Atty. Quasha was appointed as ancillary administrator on July 24,
1986.[8]

On October 19, 1987, petitioner filed in Special Proceeding No. 9625, a motion to declare Richard and Kyle
as heirs of Audrey.[9] Petitioner also filed on October 23, 1987, a project of partition of Audreys estate, with Richard
being apportioned the undivided interest in the Makati property, 48.333 shares in A/G Interiors, Inc.,
and P9,313.48 from the Citibank current account; and Kyle, the undivided interest in the Makati property, 16,111
shares in A/G Interiors, Inc., and P3,104.49 in cash.[10]

The motion and project of partition was granted and approved by the trial court in its Order dated February 12,
1988.[11] The trial court also issued an Order on April 7, 1988, directing the Register of Deeds of Makati to cancel
TCT No. 69792 in the name of Richard and to issue a new title in the joint names of the Estate of W. Richard
Guersey ( undivided interest) and Kyle ( undivided interest); directing the Secretary of A/G Interiors, Inc. to
transfer 48.333 shares to the Estate of W. Richard Guersey and 16.111 shares to Kyle; and directing the Citibank
to release the amount of P12,417.97 to the ancillary administrator for distribution to the heirs.[12]

Consequently, the Register of Deeds of Makati issued on June 23, 1988, TCT No. 155823 in the names of the
Estate of W. Richard Guersey and Kyle.[13]

Meanwhile, the ancillary administrator in Special Proceeding No. M-888 also filed a project of partition
wherein 2/5 of Richards undivided interest in the Makati property was allocated to respondent, while 3/5 thereof
were allocated to Richards three children. This was opposed by respondent on the ground that under the law of the
State of Maryland, a legacy passes to the legatee the entire interest of the testator in the property
subject of the legacy.[14] Since Richard left his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests
over the A/G Interiors, Inc, shares, then his entire undivided interest in the Makati property should be given to
respondent.

The trial court found merit in respondents opposition, and in its Order dated December 6, 1991,
disapproved the project of partition insofar as it affects the Makati property. The trial court also adjudicated
Richards entire undivided interest in the Makatiproperty to respondent.[15]

On October 20, 1993, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) an amended complaint for the
annulment of the trial courts Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, issued in Special Proceeding No.
9625.[16] Respondent contended that petitioner willfully breached his fiduciary duty when he disregarded the laws
of the State of Maryland on the distribution of Audreys estate in accordance with her will. Respondent argued that
since Audrey devised her entire estate to Richard, then the Makati property should be wholly adjudicated to him,
and not merely thereof, and since Richard left his entire estate, except for his rights and interests over the A/G
Interiors, Inc., to respondent, then the entire Makati property should now pertain to respondent.

Petitioner filed his Answer denying respondents allegations. Petitioner contended that he acted in good
faith in submitting the project of partition before the trial court in Special Proceeding No. 9625, as he had no
knowledge of the State of Marylands laws on testate and intestate succession. Petitioner alleged that he believed
that it is to the best interests of the surviving children that Philippine law be applied as they would receive their
just shares. Petitioner also alleged that the orders sought to be annulled are already final and executory, and
cannot be set aside.

On March 18, 1999, the CA rendered the assailed Decision annulling the trial courts Orders dated February
12, 1988 andApril 7, 1988, in Special Proceeding No. 9625.[17] The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision
provides:

WHEREFORE, the assailed Orders of February 12, 1998 and April 7, 1988 are
hereby ANNULLED and, in lieu thereof, a new one is entered ordering:
(a) The adjudication of the entire estate of Audrey ONeill Guersey in favor of the estate
of W. Richard Guersey; and
(b) The cancellation of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 15583 of the Makati City Registry
and the issuance of a new title in the name of the estate of W. Richard Guersey.
SO ORDERED.[18]

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but this was denied by the CA per Resolution dated August 27,
1999.[19]

Hence, the herein petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court alleging that the CA gravely
erred in not holding that:

A) THE ORDERS OF 12 FEBRUARY 1988 AND 07 APRIL 1988 IN SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS NO. 9625
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR PROBATE OF THE WILL OF THE DECEASED AUDREY
GUERSEY, ALONZO Q. ANCHETA, ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR, ARE VALID AND BINDING AND
HAVE LONG BECOME FINAL AND HAVE BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED AND EXECUTED AND CAN NO
LONGER BE ANNULLED.
B) THE ANCILLARY ADMINISTRATOR HAVING ACTED IN GOOD FAITH, DID NOT COMMIT FRAUD,
EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, IN THE PERFORMANCE OF HIS DUTIES AS ANCILLARY
ADMINISTRATOR OF AUDREY ONEIL GUERSEYS ESTATE IN THE PHILIPPINES, AND THAT NO
FRAUD, EITHER EXTRINSIC OR INTRINSIC, WAS EMPLOYED BY [HIM] IN PROCURING SAID
ORDERS.[20]

Petitioner reiterates his arguments before the CA that the Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7,
1988 can no longer be annulled because it is a final judgment, which is conclusive upon the administration as to all
matters involved in such judgment or order, and will determine for all time and in all courts, as far as the parties to
the proceedings are concerned, all matters therein determined, and the same has already been executed. [21]

Petitioner also contends that that he acted in good faith in performing his duties as an ancillary
administrator. He maintains that at the time of the filing of the project of partition, he was not aware of the

relevant laws of the State of Maryland, such that the partition was made in accordance with Philippine
laws. Petitioner also imputes knowledge on the part of respondent with regard to the terms of Aubreys will, stating
that as early as 1984, he already apprised respondent of the contents of the will and how the estate will be
divided.[22]

Respondent argues that petitioners breach of his fiduciary duty as ancillary administrator of Aubreys
estate amounted to extrinsic fraud. According to respondent, petitioner was duty-bound to follow the express
terms of Aubreys will, and his denial of knowledge of the laws of Maryland cannot stand because petitioner is a
senior partner in a prestigious law firm and it was his duty to know the relevant laws.

Respondent also states that she was not able to file any opposition to the project of partition because she
was not a party thereto and she learned of the provision of Aubreys will bequeathing entirely her estate to Richard
only after Atty. Ancheta filed a project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 for the settlement of Richards
estate.

A decree of distribution of the estate of a deceased person vests the title to the land of the estate in the
distributees, which, if erroneous may be corrected by a timely appeal. Once it becomes final, its binding effect is
like any other judgment in rem.[23]However, in exceptional cases, a final decree of distribution of the estate may be
set aside for lack of jurisdiction or fraud.[24]Further, in Ramon v. Ortuzar,[25] the Court ruled that a party interested
in a probate proceeding may have a final liquidation set aside when he is left out by reason of circumstances
beyond his control or through mistake or inadvertence not imputable to negligence.[26]

The petition for annulment was filed before the CA on October 20, 1993, before the issuance of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure; hence, the applicable law is Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 (B.P. 129) or the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980. An annulment of judgment filed under B.P. 129 may be based on the ground that a
judgment is void for want of jurisdiction or that the judgment was obtained by extrinsic fraud.[27] For fraud to
become a basis for annulment of judgment, it has to be extrinsic or actual,[28] and must be brought within four
years from the discovery of the fraud.[29]

In the present case, respondent alleged extrinsic fraud as basis for the annulment of the RTC Orders
dated February 12, 1988and April 7, 1988. The CA found merit in respondents cause and found that petitioners
failure to follow the terms of Audreys will, despite the latters declaration of good faith, amounted to extrinsic
fraud. The CA ruled that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, it is the national law of the decedent that is applicable,
hence, petitioner should have distributed Aubreys estate in accordance with the terms of her will. The CA also
found that petitioner was prompted to distribute Audreys estate in accordance with Philippine laws in order to
equally benefit Audrey and Richard Guerseys adopted daughter, Kyle Guersey Hill.

Petitioner contends that respondents cause of action had already prescribed because as early as 1984,
respondent was already well aware of the terms of Audreys will,[30] and the complaint was filed only in 1993.
Respondent, on the other hand, justified her lack of immediate action by saying that she had no opportunity to
question petitioners acts since she was not a party to Special Proceeding No. 9625, and it was only after
Atty. Ancheta filed the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888, reducing her inheritance in the estate
of Richard that she was prompted to seek another counsel to protect her interest.[31]

It should be pointed out that the prescriptive period for annulment of judgment based on extrinsic fraud
commences to run from the discovery of the fraud or fraudulent act/s. Respondents knowledge of the terms
of Audreys will is immaterial in this case since it is not the fraud complained of. Rather, it is petitioners failure to
introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State ofMaryland that is the fraudulent act, or in this case, omission,
alleged to have been committed against respondent, and therefore, the four-year period should be counted from
the time of respondents discovery thereof.

Records bear the fact that the filing of the project of partition of Richards estate, the opposition thereto,
and the order of the trial court disallowing the project of partition in Special Proceeding No. M-888 were all done in
1991.[32] Respondent cannot be faulted for letting the assailed orders to lapse into finality since it was only through
Special Proceeding No. M-888 that she came to comprehend the ramifications of petitioners acts. Obviously,

respondent had no other recourse under the circumstances but to file the annulment case. Since the action for
annulment was filed in 1993, clearly, the same has not yet prescribed.

Fraud takes on different shapes and faces. In Cosmic Lumber Corporation v. Court of Appeals,[33] the Court stated
that man in his ingenuity and fertile imagination will always contrive new schemes to fool the unwary.

There is extrinsic fraud within the meaning of Sec. 9 par. (2), of B.P. Blg. 129, where it
is one the effect of which prevents a party from hearing a trial, or real contest, or from
presenting all of his case to the court, or where it operates upon matters, not pertaining to the
judgment itself, but to the manner in which it was procured so that there is not a fair submission
of the controversy. In other words, extrinsic fraud refers to any fraudulent act of the prevailing
party in the litigation which is committed outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated
party has been prevented from exhibiting fully his side of the case by fraud or deception
practiced on him by his opponent. Fraud is extrinsic where the unsuccessful party has been
prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by fraud or deception practiced on him by his opponent,
as by keeping him away from court, a false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant
never had any knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or
where an attorney fraudulently or without authority connives at his defeat; these and similar
cases which show that there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are
reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the former judgment and
open the case for a new and fair hearing.[34]

The overriding consideration when extrinsic fraud is alleged is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.[35]

Petitioner is the ancillary administrator of Audreys estate. As such, he occupies a position of the highest
trust and confidence, and he is required to exercise reasonable diligence and act in entire good faith in the
performance of that trust. Although he is not a guarantor or insurer of the safety of the estate nor is he expected
to be infallible, yet the same degree of prudence, care and judgment which a person of a fair average capacity and
ability exercises in similar transactions of his own, serves as the standard by which his conduct is to be judged. [36]

Petitioners failure to proficiently manage the distribution of Audreys estate according to the terms of her
will and as dictated by the applicable law amounted to extrinsic fraud. Hence the CA Decision annulling the RTC
Orders dated February 12, 1988 andApril 7, 1988, must be upheld.

It is undisputed that Audrey Guersey was an American citizen domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A. During the
reprobate of her will in Special Proceeding No. 9625, it was shown, among others, that at the time of Audreys
death, she was residing in the Philippines but is domiciled in Maryland, U.S.A.; her Last Will and Testament dated
August 18, 1972 was executed and probated before the Orphans Court in Baltimore, Maryland, U.S.A., which was
duly authenticated and certified by the Register of Wills of Baltimore City and attested by the Chief Judge of said
court; the will was admitted by the Orphans Court of Baltimore City on September 7, 1979; and the will was
authenticated by the Secretary of State of Maryland and the Vice Consul of the Philippine Embassy.

Being a foreign national, the intrinsic validity of Audreys will, especially with regard as to who are her
heirs, is governed by her national law, i.e., the law of the State of Maryland, as provided in Article 16 of the Civil
Code, to wit:

Art. 16. Real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country
where it is situated.
However, intestate and testamentary succession, both with respect to the order of
succession and to the amount of successional rights and to the intrinsic validity of
testamentary provisions, shall be regulated by the national law of the person whose
succession is under consideration, whatever may be the nature of the property and
regardless of the country wherein said property may be found. (Emphasis supplied)

Article 1039 of the Civil Code further provides that capacity to succeed is governed by the law of the
nation of the decedent.

As a corollary rule, Section 4, Rule 77 of the Rules of Court on Allowance of Will Proved Outside the
Philippines and Administration of Estate Thereunder, states:

SEC. 4. Estate, how administered.When a will is thus allowed, the court shall grant
letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the will annexed, and such letters
testamentary or of administration, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the
Philippines.Such estate, after the payment of just debts and expenses of administration,
shall be disposed of according to such will, so far as such will may operate upon it; and
the residue, if any, shall be disposed of as is provided by law in cases of estates in the Philippines
belonging to persons who are inhabitants of another state or country. (Emphasis supplied)

While foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to take
judicial notice of them;[37] however, petitioner, as ancillary administrator of Audreys estate, was duty-bound to
introduce in evidence the pertinent law of the State of Maryland.[38]

Petitioner admitted that he failed to introduce in evidence the law of the State of Maryland on Estates and
Trusts, and merely relied on the presumption that such law is the same as the Philippine law on wills and
succession. Thus, the trial court peremptorily applied Philippine laws and totally disregarded the terms of Audreys
will. The obvious result was that there was no fair submission of the case before the trial court or a judicious
appreciation of the evidence presented.

Petitioner insists that his application of Philippine laws was made in good faith. The Court cannot accept
petitioners protestation. How can petitioner honestly presume that Philippine laws apply when as early as the
reprobate of Audreys will before the trial court in 1982, it was already brought to fore that Audrey was a U.S.
citizen, domiciled in the State of Maryland. As asserted by respondent, petitioner is a senior partner in a prestigious
law firm, with a big legal staff and a large library.[39] He had all the legal resources to determine the applicable
law. It was incumbent upon him to exercise his functions as ancillary administrator with reasonable diligence, and
to discharge the trust reposed on him faithfully. Unfortunately, petitioner failed to perform his fiduciary duties.

Moreover, whether his omission was intentional or not, the fact remains that the trial court failed to
consider said law when it issued the assailed RTC Orders dated February 12, 1988 and April 7, 1988, declaring
Richard and Kyle as Audreys heirs, and distributing Audreys estate according to the project of partition submitted
by petitioner. This eventually prejudiced respondent and deprived her of her full successional right to
the Makati property.

In GSIS v. Bengson Commercial Bldgs., Inc.,[40] the Court held that when the rule that the negligence or
mistake of counsel binds the client deserts its proper office as an aid to justice and becomes a great hindrance and
chief enemy, its rigors must be relaxed to admit exceptions thereto and to prevent a miscarriage of justice, and the

court has the power to except a particular case from the operation of the rule whenever the purposes of justice
require it.

The CA aptly noted that petitioner was remiss in his responsibilities as ancillary administrator of Audreys
estate. The CA likewise observed that the distribution made by petitioner was prompted by his concern over Kyle,
whom petitioner believed should equally benefit from the Makati property. The CA correctly stated, which the Court
adopts, thus:

In claiming good faith in the performance of his duties and responsibilities, defendant Alonzo
H. Ancheta invokes the principle which presumes the law of the forum to be the same as the
foreign law (Beam vs. Yatco, 82 Phil. 30, 38) in the absence of evidence adduced to prove the
latter law (Slade Perkins vs. Perkins, 57 Phil. 205, 210). In defending his actions in the light of
the foregoing principle, however, it appears that the defendant lost sight of the fact that his
primary responsibility as ancillary administrator was to distribute the subject estate in accordance
with the will of Audrey ONeill Guersey. Considering the principle established under Article 16 of
the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as the citizenship and the avowed domicile of the
decedent, it goes without saying that the defendant was also duty-bound to prove the pertinent
laws of Maryland on the matter.
The record reveals, however, that no clear effort was made to prove the national law of Audrey
ONeill Guersey during the proceedings before the court a quo. While there is claim of good faith
in distributing the subject estate in accordance with the Philippine laws, the defendant appears to
put his actuations in a different light as indicated in a portion of his direct examination, to wit:
xxx
It would seem, therefore, that the eventual distribution of the estate of Audrey
ONeill Guersey was prompted by defendant Alonzo H.Anchetas concern that the subject realty
equally benefit the plaintiffs adopted daughter Kyle Guersey.
Well-intentioned though it may be, defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas action appears to have
breached his duties and responsibilities as ancillary administrator of the subject estate. While
such breach of duty admittedly cannot be considered extrinsic fraud under ordinary
circumstances, the fiduciary nature of the said defendants position, as well as the
resultant frustration of the decedents last will, combine to create a circumstance that is
tantamount to extrinsic fraud. Defendant Alonzo H. Anchetas omission to prove the national
laws of the decedent and to follow the latters last will, in sum, resulted in the procurement of the
subject orders without a fair submission of the real issues involved in the case.[41] (Emphasis
supplied)

This is not a simple case of error of judgment or grave abuse of discretion, but a total disregard of the law
as a result of petitioners abject failure to discharge his fiduciary duties. It does not rest upon petitioners pleasure
as to which law should be made applicable under the circumstances. His onus is clear. Respondent was thus
excluded from enjoying full rights to the Makatiproperty through no fault or negligence of her own, as petitioners
omission was beyond her control. She was in no position to analyze the legal implications of petitioners omission

and it was belatedly that she realized the adverse consequence of the same.The end result was a miscarriage of
justice. In cases like this, the courts have the legal and moral duty to provide judicial aid to parties who are
deprived of their rights.[42]

The trial court in its Order dated December 6, 1991 in Special Proceeding No. M-888 noted the law of the
State of Marylandon Estates and Trusts, as follows:

Under Section 1-301, Title 3, Sub-Title 3 of the Annotated Code of the Public General Laws of
Maryland on Estates and Trusts, all property of a decedent shall be subject to the estate of
decedents law, and upon his death shall pass directly to the personal representative, who shall
hold the legal title for administration and distribution, while Section 4-408 expressly provides that
unless a contrary intent is expressly indicated in the will, a legacy passes to the legatee the
entire interest of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy. Section 7-101,
Title 7, Sub-Title 1, on the other hand, declares that a personal representative is a fiduciary and
as such he is under the general duty to settle and distribute the estate of the decedent in
accordance with the terms of the will and the estate of decedents law as expeditiously and with
as little sacrifice of value as is reasonable under the circumstances.[43]
In her will, Audrey devised to Richard her entire estate, consisting of the following: (1) Audreys conjugal
share in the Makatiproperty; (2) the cash amount of P12,417.97; and (3) 64,444 shares of stock in A/G Interiors,
Inc. worth P64,444.00. All these properties passed on to Richard upon Audreys death. Meanwhile, Richard, in his
will, bequeathed his entire estate to respondent, except for his rights and interests over the A/G Interiors, Inc.
shares, which he left to Kyle. When Richard subsequently died, the entire Makati property should have then passed
on to respondent. This, of course, assumes the proposition that the law of the State of Maryland which allows a
legacy to pass to the legatee the entire estate of the testator in the property which is the subject of the legacy,
was sufficiently proven in Special Proceeding No. 9625. Nevertheless, the Court may take judicial notice thereof in
view of the ruling in Bohanan v. Bohanan.[44] Therein, the Court took judicial notice of the law of Nevada despite
failure to prove the same. The Court held, viz.:

We have, however, consulted the records of the case in the court below and we have
found that during the hearing on October 4, 1954 of the motion of Magdalena C. Bohanan for
withdrawal of P20,000 as her share, the foreign law, especially Section 9905, Compiled Nevada
Laws, was introduced in evidence by appellants' (herein) counsel as Exhibit "2" (See pp. 77-79,
Vol. II, and t.s.n. pp. 24-44, Records, Court of First Instance). Again said law was presented by
the counsel for the executor and admitted by the Court as Exhibit "B" during the hearing of the
case on January 23, 1950 before Judge Rafael Amparo (see Records, Court of First Instance, Vol.
1).
In addition, the other appellants, children of the testator, do not dispute the abovequoted provision of the laws of the State ofNevada. Under all the above circumstances, we are
constrained to hold that the pertinent law of Nevada, especially Section 9905 of the Compiled

Nevada Laws of 1925, can be taken judicial notice of by us, without proof of such law having
been offered at the hearing of the project of partition.

In this case, given that the pertinent law of the State of Maryland has been brought to record before the CA, and
the trial court in Special Proceeding No. M-888 appropriately took note of the same in disapproving the proposed
project of partition of Richards estate, not to mention that petitioner or any other interested person for that matter,
does not dispute the existence or validity of said law, then Audreys and Richards estate should be distributed
according to their respective wills, and not according to the project of partition submitted by
petitioner. Consequently, the entire Makati property belongs to respondent.
Decades ago, Justice Moreland, in his dissenting opinion in Santos v. Manarang,[45] wrote:
A will is the testator speaking after death. Its provisions have substantially the same
force and effect in the probate court as if the testator stood before the court in full life making
the declarations by word of mouth as they appear in the will. That was the special purpose of the
law in the creation of the instrument known as the last will and testament. Men wished to speak
after they were dead and the law, by the creation of that instrument, permitted them to do so
x x x All doubts must be resolved in favor of the testator's having meant just what he said.

Honorable as it seems, petitioners motive in equitably distributing Audreys estate cannot prevail over
Audreys and Richards wishes. As stated in Bellis v. Bellis:[46]
x x x whatever public policy or good customs may be involved in our system of legitimes,
Congress has not intended to extend the same to the succession of foreign nationals. For it has
specifically chosen to leave, inter alia, the amount of successional rights, to the decedent's
national Law. Specific provisions must prevail over general ones.[47]

Before concluding, the Court notes the fact that Audrey and Richard Guersey were American citizens who
owned real property in the Philippines, although records do not show when and how the Guerseys acquired
the Makati property.

Under Article XIII, Sections 1 and 4 of the 1935 Constitution, the privilege to acquire and exploit lands of
the public domain, and other natural resources of the Philippines, and to operate public utilities, were reserved to
Filipinos and entities owned or controlled by them. In Republic v. Quasha,[48] the Court clarified that the Parity
Rights Amendment of 1946, which re-opened to American citizens and business enterprises the right in the

acquisition of lands of the public domain, the disposition, exploitation, development and utilization of natural
resources of the Philippines, does not include the acquisition or exploitation of private agricultural lands. The
prohibition against acquisition of private lands by aliens was carried on to the 1973 Constitution under Article XIV,
Section 14, with the exception of private lands acquired by hereditary succession and when the transfer was made
to a former natural-born citizen, as provided in Section 15, Article XIV. As it now stands, Article XII, Sections 7 and
8 of the 1986 Constitution explicitly prohibits non-Filipinos from acquiring or holding title to private lands or to
lands of the public domain, except only by way of legal succession or if the acquisition was made by a former
natural-born citizen.

In any case, the Court has also ruled that if land is invalidly transferred to an alien who subsequently
becomes a citizen or transfers it to a citizen, the flaw in the original transaction is considered cured and the title of
the transferee is rendered valid.[49] In this case, since the Makati property had already passed on to respondent
who is a Filipino, then whatever flaw, if any, that attended the acquisition by the Guerseys of the Makati property is
now inconsequential, as the objective of the constitutional provision to keep our lands in Filipino hands has been
achieved.

WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision dated March 18, 1999 and the Resolution dated August 27,
1999 of the Court of Appeals are AFFIRMED.

Petitioner is ADMONISHED to be more circumspect in the performance of his duties as an official of the court.

No pronouncement as to costs. SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-26306 April 27, 1988


TESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE GREGORIO VENTURA MARIA VENTURA, executrix- appellant, MIGUEL
VENTURA and JUANA CARDONA, heirs-appellants,
vs.
GREGORIA VENTURA and HER HUSBAND, EXEQUIEL VICTORIO, MERCEDES VENTURA and HER
HUSBAND, PEDRO D. CORPUZ, oppositors-appellees.

PARAS, J.:
This is an appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Guimba, Branch V in Special
Proceedings No. 812, Testate of the late Gregorio Venture, dated October 5, 1965, removing the appellant Maria
Ventura as executrix and administratrix of the estate of the late Gregorio Ventura, and in her place appointing the
appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura as joint administratrices of the estate. (Record on Appeal, pp.
120-131.)
Appellant Maria Ventura is the illegitimate daughter of the deceased Gregorio Ventura while Miguel Ventura and
Juana Cardona are his son and saving spouse who are also the brother and mother of Maria Ventura. On the other
hand, appellees Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the deceased's legitimate children with his former wife, the
late Paulina Simpliciano (Record on Appeal, p. 122) but the paternity of appellees was denied by the deceased in
his will (Record on Appeal, p. 4).
On December 14,1953, Gregorio Ventura filed a petition for the
appellees and the petition was docketed as Special Proceedings
will, the appellant Maria Ventura, although an illegitimate child,
executrix of his will and the administratrix of his estate (Record

probate of his will which did not include the


No. 812 (Record on Appeal, pp. 1-3). In the said
was named and appointed by the testator to be the
on Appeal, p. 7).

In due course, said will was admitted to probate on January 14,1954 (Record on Appeal, pp. 8-10). Gregorio
Ventura died on September 26,1955. On October 10, 1955, the appellant Maria Ventura filed a motion for her
appointment as executrix and for the issuance of letters testamentary in her favor (Record on Appeal, pp. 10-11).
On October 17, 1955, Maria Ventura was appointed executrix and the corresponding letters testamentary was
issued in her favor (Record on Appeal, pp. 11-12).
On or about July 26, 1956, Maria Ventura submitted an inventory of the estate of Gregorio Ventura (Record on
Appeal, pp. 12-20).
On June 17,1960, she filed her accounts of administration for the years 1955 to 1960, inclusive. (Record on
Appeal, pp. 20-27). Said account of administration was opposed by the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro
Corpuz on July 25, 1960 (Record on Appeal, pp. 27-33) and by Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura on August
5,1963 (Record on Appeal, pp. 46-50). Both oppositions assailed the veracity of the report as not reflecting the
true income of the estate and the expenses which allegedly are not administration expenses. But on January 25,
1961, Maria Ventura filed a motion to hold in abeyance the approval of the accounts of administration or to have
their approval without the opposition of the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz and Gregoria Ventura and
Exequiel Victorio on the ground that the question of the paternity of Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura is still
pending final determination before the Supreme Court and that should they be adjudged the adulterous children of
testator, as claimed, they are not entitled to inherit nor to oppose the approval of the counts of administration
(Record on Appeals, pp. 33-36). Spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz filed on February 2, 1961 their
opposition to the motion to hold in abeyance the approval of the accounts of administration on the ground that
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura had already been declared by the Court of First Instance in Civil Cases No. 1064
and 1476, which cases are supposed to be pending before the Supreme Court, as the legitimate children of
Gregorio Ventura, hence, they have reason to protect their interest (Record on Appeal, pp. 36-39). On February
9,1961, the motion to hold in abeyance the approval of the accounts was denied (Record on Appeal, pp. 39-40).
It appears that on July 12, 1963, the Court set the case for pre-trial on August 7, 1963 in connection with the
accounts of the executrix Maria Ventura dated June 17, 1960 and the Motion to Annul Provision of Will dated July
14,1962 of Mercedes Ventura (Record on Appeal, p. 45).
On October 22, 1963, four motions were filed by Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura, namely: (1) motion to
remove the executrix Maria Ventura which was supplemented on April 27, 1965; (2) motion to require her to

deposit the harvest of palay of the property under administration in a bonded warehouse; (3) motion to render an
accounting of the proceeds and expenses of Administration; and (4) motion to require her to include in the
inventory of the estate certain excluded properties (Record on Appeal, pp. 50-53; 71). An opposition to said
motions was filed by the heirs Juana Cardona and Miguel Ventura and by the executrix Maria Ventura herself
(Record on Appeal, pp. 56-61; 61-70 and 71).
On motion of counsel for Exequiel Victorio and Gregoria Ventura the joint motions to require an Up-to-date
Accounting and to Require Executrix Ventura to Include Excluded Properties in Her Inventory were ordered
withdrawn (Order dated February 2, 1965, Record on Appeal, p. 73). The other two motions were however set for
hearing.
The grounds of aforesaid joint motions to remove the executrix Maria Ventura are: (1) that she is grossly
incompetent; (2) that she has maliciously and purposely concealed certain properties of the estate in the
inventory; (3) that she is merely an illegitimate daughter who can have no harmonious relations with the
appellees; (4) that the executrix has neglected to render her accounts and failed to comply with the Order of the
Court of December 12, 1963, requiring her to file her accounts of administration for the years 1961 to 1963
(Record on Appeal, pp. 70 and 75-76) and the Order of June 11, 1964, reiterating aforesaid Order of December 12,
1963 (Record on Appeal, p. 76); and (5) that she is with permanent physical defect hindering her from efficiently
performing her duties as an executrix (Record on Appeal, pp. 50-53 and 74-79).
On May 17, 1965, the executrix Maria Ventura finally submitted her accounts of administration covering the period
1961 to 1965 (Record on Appeal, pp. 79-84) which were again opposed by the spouses Exequiel Victorio and
Gregoria Ventura on September 21, 1965 and by the spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz on September
29, 1965 (Record on Appeal, pp. 106-120). On June 2, 1965, the executrix filed her supplemental opposition to the
aforesaid four motions, and prayed that the joint supplemental motion to remove the executrix be denied or held in
abeyance until after the status of Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura as heirs of the testator is finally decided (Record
on Appeal, pp. 85-1 01). On June 3, 1965, the Court, finding that the estate taxes have not been paid, ordered the
administratrix to pay the same within thirty (30) days. On September 13, 1965, the lower court denied the
suspension of the proceedings and deferred the resolution of the joint motion to remove executrix Maria Ventura
until after the examination of the physical fitness of said executrix to undertake her duties as such. Also, it ordered
the deposit of all palay to be harvested in the next agricultural year and subsequent years to be deposited in a
bonded warehouse to be selected by the Court and the palay so deposited shall not be withdrawn without the
express permission of the Court (Record on Appeal, pp. 103-105). On September 21, 1965, spouses Exequiel
Victorio and Gregoria Ventura filed their opposition to the accounts of administration of Maria Ventura dated May
17, 1965, while that of spouses Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz was filed on September 29, 1965, both
oppositions alleging among others that said accounts do not reflect the true and actual income of the estate and
that the expenses reported thereunder are fake, exhorbitant and speculative (Record on Appeal, pp. 106-120).
On October 5, 1965, the court a quo, finding that the executrix Maria Ventura has squandered the funds of the
estate, was inefficient and incompetent, has failed to comply with the orders of the Court in the matter of
presenting up-to-date statements of accounts and neglected to pay the real estate taxes of the estate, rendered
the questioned decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, Maria Ventura is hereby removed as executrix and administratrix of the estate and
in her place Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura are hereby appointed joint a tratrices of the
estate upon filing by each of them of a bond of P 7,000.00. Let letters of administration be issued
to Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura upon their qualification.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
(Record on Appeal pp. 120-131).
Hence, this appeal.
In their brief, appellants Maria Ventura and spouses Juana Cardona and Miguel Ventura assign the following errors
allegedly committed by the probate court:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I

The lower court erred in ordering the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix and administratrix of
the will and estate of the deceased Gregorio Ventura without giving her full opportunity to be
heard and to present all her evidence.
II
The lower court erred in finding that the executrix Maria Ventura had squandered and dissipated
the funds of the estate under her administration.
III
The lower court erred in finding that the executrix Maria Ventura was inefficient and incompetent.
IV
That, considering the circumtances surrounding the case, the lower court erred in finding that the
failure of Maria Ventura to submit her periodical account had justified her removal as executrix.
V
The lower court erred in considering as an established fact that the appellees Mercedes Ventura
and Gregoria Ventura are the legitimate daughters of the deceased Gregorio Ventura.
VI
The lower court erred in finding that the devises and bequests in favor of Maria Ventura and
Miguel Ventura as specified in paragraph 8 of the last Will and Testament of the late Gregorio
Ventura have ipso facto been annulled.
VII
The lower court erred in allowing the appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura to
intervene in the hearing of the accounts of administration submitted by the executrix Maria
Ventura and/or in not suspending the hearing of the said accounts until the said appellees have
finally established their status as legitimate children of the deceased Gregorio Ventura.
VIII
The lower court erred in appointing (even without a proper petition for appointment and much
less a hearing on the appointment of) the appellees Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura who
have an adverse interest as joint administratrices of the estate of the deceased Gregorio Ventura.
IX
The lower court erred in not appointing the surviving widow, Juana Cardona, or Miguel Ventura,
as administratrix of the estate of Gregorio Ventura in case the removal of Maria Ventura as
executrix and administratrix thereof is legally justified.
X
Considering that there are in fact two (2) factions representing opposite interests in the estate,
the lower court erred in not appointing Juana Cardona, or Miguel Ventura, as one of the two (2)
administratrices.' (Joint Brief for the Appellants, pp. 1-4)
On July 19,1967, Atty. Arturo Tolentino (representing appellees Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz) and Atty.
Jose J. Francisco (representing Gregoria and Exequiel Victoria), having failed to submit their respective briefs
within the period for the purpose, which expired on July 2 and May 29,1967, respectively, the Supreme Court
Resolved to consider this case submitted for decision WITHOUT SAID APPELLEES' BRIEF (Rollo, p. 152).

The crucial issue in this case is whether or not the removal of Maria Ventura as executrix is legally justified. This
issue has, however, become moot and academic in view of the decision of this Court in related cases.
At the outset, it is worthy to note that aside from the instant special proceedings, there are two other civil cases
involving the estate of the deceased Gregoria Ventura, namely, Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476. Civil Case No.
1064 was filed on December 2, 1952 by herein appellee Gregoria Ventura in the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, Branch I, against the other appellees herein Mercedes Ventura and their father, Gregorio Ventura. Later
Mercedes Ventura joined cause with Gregoria Ventura. (Record on Appeal, p. 95). Gregoria and Mercedes Ventura
claimed that they are the legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife Paulina Simpliciano, who died in
1943, and asked that one-half of the properties described in the complaint be declared as the share of their mother
in the conjugal partnership, with them as the only forced heirs of their mother Paulina (Joint Brief for the
Appellants, pp. 53-68).
Subsequently, Civil Case No. 1476 was filed by Alipio, Eufracia and Juliana, all surnamed Simpliciano, against
Gregorio Ventura and the two sisters, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura, before the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, Branch I. They alleged that as the only children of Modesto Simpliciano, sole brother of Paulina Simpliciano,
they, instead of Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura, whom they claimed are adulterous children of Paulina with
another man, Teodoro Ventura and as such are not entitled to inherit from her, are the ones who should inherit the
share of Paulina Simpliciano in the conjugal Partnership with Gregorio Ventura (Joint Brief For The
Appealant,pp.69-79)
It appears that on November 4, 1959, after a joint hearing of Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476, the lower court
rendered its judgment, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Mercedes Ventura and Gregoria Ventura to
be the ligitimate daughters of Paulina Simpliciano and Gregorio Ventura; declaring that as such
ligitimate daughters of Paulina Simpliciano they are entitled to 1/2 of the properties described in
paragraph six of the complaint; ordering the defendant Maria Ventura, as administratrix of the
estate of Gregorio Ventura to pay to Mercedes Ventura and Gregorio Ventura the amount of P
19,074.09 which shall be divided equally between Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura declaring
Mercedes Ventura and Pedro Corpuz are the exclusive owners of the property describe in the
certificate of Title Nos. T-1102, 212, T-1213, T-1214, Exhibits 32, 33, 34 and 35, respectively;
ordering Mercedes Ventura and Pedro D. Corpuz to pay to the conjugal partnership of Gregorio
Ventura and Paulina Simpliciano the sum of P100,000.00, one-half of which shall pertain to the
estate of Gregorio Ventura and the other half to the estate of Paulina Simpliciano to whom
Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura have succeeded, to be divided between Mercedes and Gregoria in
equal parts; and dismissing Civil Case No. 1476. The parties are urged to arrive at an amicable
partition of the properties herein adjudicated within twenty days from receipt of this decision.
Upon their failure to do so, the Court shall appoint commissioners to divide the properties in
accordance with the terms of the decision. Without pronouncements as to costs. (Emphasis
supplied). (Joint Brief for the Appellants, pp. 3738.)
Thereafter, on July 14, 1962, Mercedes Ventura filed a motion to annul the provisions of the will of the deceased
Gregorio Ventura in Special Proceedings No. 812, which motion was opposed by Miguel Ventura and Juana Cardona
and later by Maria Ventura. They claimed that the decision dated November 4,1959 in Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and
1476 was not yet final.
On February 26,1964, the court annulled the institution of the heirs in the probated will of Gregorio Ventura. The
motion for reconsideration of the aforesaid order filed by executrix Maria Ventura was denied on June 11, 1964.
Accordingly, Maria Ventura appealed the February 26, 1964 and June 11, 1964 orders of the probate court in
Special Proceedings No. 812 before the Supreme Court and was docketed as G.R. No. L-23878. On May 27,1977,
this Court, through then Associate Justice Antonio P. Barredo, ruled, as follows:
And so, acting on appellees' motion to dismiss appeal, it is Our considered opinion that the
decision in Civil Cases Nos.1064 and 1476 declaring that appellees Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura are the ligimate children of the deceased Gregorio Ventura and his wife, Paulina
Simpliciano, and as such are entitled to the annulment of the institution of heirs made in the
probated will of said deceased became final and executory upon the finality of the order,
approving ther partition directed in the decision in question. We need not indulge in any
discussion as to whether or not, as of the time the orders here in question were issued by the
trial court said decision had the nature of an interlocutory order only. To be sure, in the case of
Miranda, aforementioned, the opinion of the majority of the Court may well be invoked against

appellant's pose. In any event, even if the Court were minded to modify again Miranda and go
back to Fuentebella and Zaldariaga and it is not, as of now there can be no question that
the approval by the trial court in Civil Cases Nos. 1064 and 1476 of the partition report of the
commissioners appointed for the purpose, one of whom, Emmanuel Mariano, is the husband of
appellant, put a definite end to those cases, leaving nothing else to be done in the trial court.
That order of approval is an appealable one, and inasmuch as no appeal has been taken from the
same, it is beyond dispute that the decision in controversy has already become final and
executory in all respects. Hence, the case at bar has become moot and academic. (Ventura vs.
Ventura, 77 SCRA 159, May 27,1977)
Under Article 854 of the Civil Code, "the pretention or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the
direct line, whether living at the time of the execution of the will or born after the death of the testator, shall annul
the institution of heir; but the devises and legacies shall be valid insofar as they are not inofficious," and as a
result, intestacy follows, thereby rendering the previous appointment of Maria Ventura as executrix moot and
academic. This would now necessitate the appointment of another administrator, under the following provision:
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court:
When and to whom letters of administration granted.-If no executor is named in the will, or the
executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies
intestate, a petition shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or both, in the discretion of the
court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;"
xxx xxx xxx
In the case at bar, the surviving spouse of the deceased Gregorio Ventura is Juana Cardona while the next of kin
are: Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura and Maria and Miguel Ventura. The "next of kin" has been defined as those
persons who are entitled under the statute of distribution to the decedent's property (Cooper vs. Cooper, 43 Ind. A.
620, 88 NE 341). It is generally said that "the nearest of kin, whose interest in the estate is more preponderant, is
preferred in the choice of administrator. 'Among members of a class the strongest ground for preference is the
amount or preponderance of interest. As between next of kin, the nearest of kin is to be preferred." (Cabanas, et
al. vs. Enage et al., 40 Off. Gaz. 12 Suppl. 227; citing 12 Am. Jur. Sec. 77, p. 416, cited in Francisco Vicente J.,
The Revised Rules of Court in the Philippines, Vol. V-B 1970 Ed., p. 23).
As decided by the lower court and sustained by the Supreme Court, Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura are the
legitimate children of Gregorio Ventura and his wife, the late Paulina Simpliciano. Therefore, as the nearest of kin
of Gregorio Ventura they are entitled to preference over the illegitimate children of Gregorio Ventura, namely:
Maria and Miguel Ventura. Hence, under the aforestated preference provided in Section 6 of Rule 78, the person or
persons to be appointed administrator are Juana Cardona, as the surviving spouse, or Mercedes and Gregoria
Ventura as nearest of kin, or Juana Cardona and Mercedes and Gregoria Ventura in the discretion of the Court, in
order to represent both interests.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the appeal interposed by appellants Maria Ventura, Juana Cardona and Miguel Ventura is
hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Disenting:


Consistent with my "concurrence in the result" in Acain vs. IAC, et als., G.r. No. 72706, October 27, 1987,
preterition results in total intestacy if it was mistakenly made or through inadvertence. In this case there was no
mistake nor oversight whatsoever. The testator himself sought the probate of his Will during his lifetime wherein he
not only excluded his "forced heirs" but even denied paternity.
Under the circumstances, the omission being obviously intentional, the effect is a defective disinheritance covered
by Article 918 of the Civil Code under which the institution of heir is not wholly void but only in so far as it
prejudices the ligitimes of the persons disinherited. The nullity is partial unlike in true preterition where the nullity
is total.
This conclusion further finds support in the prevailing spirit in the codal provisions, which is to make the intention
of the testator prevail (e.g., Articles 783, 790, 848, 852, 861, Civil Code).
Yap, C.J., dissent.

Separate Opinions
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., Disenting:
Consistent with my "concurrence in the result" in Acain vs. IAC, et als., G.r. No. 72706, October 27, 1987,
preterition results in total intestacy if it was mistakenly made or through inadvertence. In this case there was no
mistake nor oversight whatsoever. The testator himself sought the probate of his Will during his lifetime wherein he
not only excluded his "forced heirs" but even denied paternity.
Under the circumstances, the omission being obviously intentional, the effect is a defective disinheritance covered
by Article 918 of the Civil Code under which the institution of heir is not wholly void but only in so far as it
prejudices the ligitimes of the persons disinherited. The nullity is partial unlike in true preterition where the nullity
is total.
This conclusion further finds support in the prevailing spirit in the codal provisions, which is to make the intention
of the testator prevail (e.g., Articles 783, 790, 848, 852, 861, Civil Code).
Yap, C.J., dissent.

G.R. No. L-41508 June 27, 1988


CANDELARIO VILLAMOR, PILAR DE LA SERNA, BARTOLOME VILLAMOR, RAFAELA RETUYA, SOFRONIO
VILLAMOR, PILAR SEMBLANTE, ELEUTERIO VILLAMOR, CARIDAD GORECHO, MARCOS OR and
GUADALUPE CEDEO petitioners,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS and DANIELA CENIZA UROT, in her capacity as administratrix of the estate of
Fr. Nicanor Cortes, under Sp. Proc. No. 3062-R, respondents.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision of the Court of Appeals which
affirmed that of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch XL declaring null and void [1] the Project of
Partition in Special Proceedings Nos. 262-C and 343-C executed on December 7, 1946, [2] the "Order" of April 14,
1948 which approved said Project of Partition, [3] the "Auto" of November 25, 1953 which closed and terminated
the two (2) administration proceedings and which authorized the delivery of seven (7) parcels of land to Ireneo
Villamor and Paula Villamor, and [4] the extra-judicial settlement and partition executed by the petitioners herein
on July 28, 1969.
Spouses Victor Cortes and Maria Castaeda had eight (8) children, namely: Rufino, Barbara, Florencio, Casimira,
Brigida, Braulia, Margarita and Eugenia. Of the eight children, six died single and without issue. Barbara Cortes
begot a son by the name of Eustaquio Cortes. Rufino Cortes, who died on June 12, 1909 left two alleged legitimate
children, Ireneo Cortes Villamor and Paula Cortes Villamor. The last to die of the Cortes children was Eugenia
Cortes. She died on January 8, 1931.
Eustaquio Cortes, son of Barbara, married one Sixta Ceniza. Born to them were five children, namely: Dionisio,
Bartolome, Nicanor, Agapita and Amancia, all surnamed Cortes. All five remained unmarried and died without will
nor forced heirs. Dionisio, Amancia and Agapita predeceased their father Eustaquio. Eustaquio died on October 20,
1932, survived by his spouse and two sons, Bartolome and Nicanor. Bartolome who was a Catholic priest, died on
November 14, 1937. Nicanor Cortes, also known as Father Gabriel Maria Cortes, died as a monk of the Carthusian
Order in Barcelona, Spain on August 28, 1969. He was the last of the direct descendants of the Barbara Cortes line.
On the other hand, Paula Villamor, alleged daughter of Rufino Cortes, died single on January 29, 1967 and without
issue. Ireneo Villamor married one Bersabela Perez. Said marriage was blessed with five children, namely:
Candelario, Bartolome, Sofronio, Eleuterio and Marcos, all surnamed Villamor, the petitioners, herein. Ireneo
Villamor died on April 21, 1966.
It appears that shortly after the death of Bartolome Cortes, Special Proceedings No. 227 was instituted for the
settlement of his estate. Fr. Diosdado Camomot, a close friend of Bartolome, was named administrator.
Sometime between 1937 and 1938, Special Proceedings No. 262-C, which relates to the intestate estates of
Eugenia, Casimira Florencio, Braulia, Margarita and Barbara, all surnamed Cortes was filed. This proceeding
evidently did not include a brother, Rufino Cortes. Atty. Primitive Sato was appointed administrator.
On September 27, 1938, Paula Cortes Villamor and Ireneo Cortes Villamor, claiming to be the legitimate children of
Rufino Cortes, filed a petition for the administration of the estate of Rufino Cortes, under Special Proceedings No.
343-C, to protect their rights and counteract the effects of Special Proceedings No. 262-C. Notice of the hearing of
the petition was published in the "Nasud," a newspaper of general circulation on October 13, 20 and 27, 1938.
Appointed administrator in this proceeding was one Moises Mendoza, who thereafter submitted an inventory of the
properties allegedly belonging to the estate of Rufino Cortes. The properties enumerated in the inventory were the
very same properties subject of Special Proceedings Nos. 227 and 262-C.
A scramble over the control and possession of the, properties ensued between the heirs of Barbara Cortes,
represented by Sixta Ceniza with the help of Fr. Camomot, and the Rufino Cortes line represented by Ireneo and
Paula Cortes Villamor. On May 20, 1946, Ireneo and Paula Cortes Villamor and Father Camomot filed a joint motion
in Special Proceedings No. 262-C and Special Proceedings No. 343-C, wherein they manifested that "the heirs have
arrived at an agreement to settle the matter amicably between themselves by partitioning the estate among
them" 1 Thus, after six months of negotiation, or on December 7, 1946, a Project of Partition was executed by
Sixta Ceniza and Father Camomot, in his capacity as administrator of the Estate of Bartolome Cortes, assisted by
their counsel, Attys. Hipolito Alo and Fermin Yap, on one hand, and Ireneo and Paula Cortes Villamor, assisted by
Atty. Gaudencio Juezan, on the other. The Project of Partition was thumbmarked Sixta Ceniza at the house of a
relative, Fortunate vda. de Ceniza, where Sixta Ceniza lived at that time. In said Project of Partition, seven parcels
of land were apportioned and delivered to Ireneo and Paula Cortes Villamor. The said Project of Partition is
reproduced as follows:

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINE


COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU
IN REPUBLIC ESTATE OF BARBARA CORTES,
FLORENCIO CORTES, RUFINO CORTES,
CASIMIRA CORTES, BRIGIDA CORTES, Sp. Proc. Nos. 262 & 343
BRAULIA CORTES, MARIA CORTES
and EUGENIA CORTES,
Deceased.
-----------------------------------------PROJECT OF PARTITION
Come now Sixta Ceniza and Rev. Diosdado Camomot, the latter as administrator of the estate of
Bartolome Cortes in Sp. Proc. No. 227 of this Court assisted by their Attorneys Hipolito Alo and
Fermin Yap, to be known hereinafter as the First Party; Ireneo Cortes Villamor, assisted by their
Attorney Gaudencio R. Juezan, to be referred hereinafter as the Second Party, to this Hon. Court
respectfully state:
That Sixta Ceniza above referred to is the sole heir of Bartolome Cortes now deceased, being the
legitimate mother of the latter;
That Rev. Diosdado Camomot is the legal administrator of the estate of said Bartolome Cortes in
the Sp. Proc. No. 227 of this Court;
That Barbara, Florencio, Rufino; Casimira, Brigida, Braulia, Maria and Eugenia, all surnamed
Cortes, were brothers and sisters. They died without leaving any parent nor children except
Rufino and Barbara Cortes;
That Barbara Cortes left Bartolome Cortes as a nephew and the latter left his mother Sixta Ceniza
as his heir;
That Rufino Cortes left Ireneo and Paula Cortes as his heirs, being his legitimate children;
That Sixta Ceniza, Ireneo Cortes Villamor and Paula Cortes Villamor are all Filipinos by birth and
of legal ages and residents of Mandaue, Cebu, Philippines;
That the deceased Eugenia Cortes and Rufino Cortes, left no debt, nor will;
That the first and the second Parties hereby acknowledge that all the estate appearing in the
inventories submitted under administration Sp. Proc. Nos. 262 and 343 in this Court, belong to
the deceased Eugenia Cortes and Rufino Cortes, being the real owners thereof, of which
Eustaquio and Bartolome Cortes were extra judicial administrators;
That said Sixta Ceniza, Ireneo Cortes Villamor and Paula Cortes Villamor do hereby declare
themselves as the only heirs of said Eugenia and Rufino Cortes and adjudicate to themselves the
above-described properties and amicably partition same among themselves in the manner, form
and share hereinbelow shown;

That the First and Second Parties have agreed, as they do hereby agree, to partition, as they do
hereby partition, the properties above referred to, amicably between them, in the form, manner,
and share, to wit:
To Sixta Ceniza through Rev. Diosdado Camomot, the latter in his capacity as administrator of
the estate of Bartolome Cortes, the following parcels of land with improvements thereon, are
hereby apportioned and delivered:
1. A parcel of agricultural land with all improvements thereon located in Alang-Alang, Mandaue,
Cebu, bounded as follows:
North, Eustaquio Cortes
East, Geronimo Lambo
South, Conrado Jayme
West, Serafina Mendoza
Area, 47 Area, 37 Centares
Declared in the name of Bartolome
Cortes as per Tax Dec. No. 31520
2. A parcel of agricultural land with all improvements thereon located in Centro, Mandaue, Cebu,
bounded as follows:
North, Calle Gral, Ricarte
East, Riachuelo
South, Mariano del Castillo
West, Juana Mayol
Area, 18 Ares,
Declared in the name of Eustaquio
Cortes as per Tax Dec. No. 31531
3. A parcel of agricultural land with all improvements thereon located in Centro, Mandaue, Cebu,
bounded as follows:
North, Hrs. of Fermin Cortes
East, Riachuelo
South, Hrs. of Pio Mendoza and Juana Mendoza
West, Severino Cabajug and Ceferino Mendoza
Area, 16 Ares, and 80 Centares
Declared in the name of Eustaquio

Cortes as per Tax Dec. No. 31529


4. A parcel of agricultural land with all improvements thereon located in Centro, Mandaue, Cebu,
bounded as follows:
North, Rita Alilin and Ambrocio Cabahug
South, Rita Alilin
West, Ceferino Mendoza
Area, 13 Ares & 40 Centares
Declared in the name of Eustaquio Cortes
as per Tax Dec. No. 31628
5. A parcel of agricultural land with an improvements thereon located in Pagsubungan, Mandaue,
Cebu, bounded as follows:
North, Hrs. of Tomas Osmea and Victor Perez
East, Fernando Atamosa
South, Rio de Butuanon and Hrs. of Tomas Osmea
West, Private Ceniza and Phil. Railway Co.
Declared in the name of Eustaquio Cortes as per Tax Dec. No. 31523
6. A parcel of agricultural land with all improvements thereon located in Pagsabungan, Mandaue,
Cebu, bounded as follows:
North, Hipolito Pareja
East, Francisca Estrera
South, Enrique Diano and Catalina Pareja
West, Blas Retuerto
Area 1 Ha. 38 Area, 21 Centares
Declared in the name of Eugenia Cortes
as per Tax Dec. No. 31536
7. A parcel of agricultural land with all improvements thereon located in Kanduman Mandaue,
Cebu, bounded as follows:
North, Jacinto Mayol
East, Sergio Suyco
South, Martin Seno

West, Mariano Alivio


Area, 1 Ha. 03 Area, 24 Centares
Declared in the name of the heirs of
Casimira Cortes as per Tax Dec. No. 31514
8. A parcel of agricultural land with all improvements thereon located in Kanduman Mandaue,
Cebu, bounded as follows:
North, Jacinto Mayol and Policarpio and Josefa Cortes
East, Claudia Osmea and Camino Vecinal
South, Camino Vecinal and Hrs. of Tomas Osmea
West, Jacinto Mayol
Area, 2 Has, 45 Ares--07 Centares
Declared in the name of the heirs of
Casimira Cortes as per Tax Dec. No. 31515
9. A parcel of agricultural land with all improvements thereon located in Opao, Mandaue, Cebu,
bounded as follows:
North, Brook
East, Hrs. of Cesario Mendoza and Benito Ceniza and Juan Trox
South, Hermenegildo Alivio
West, Basilia Cabahug and Prudencia Cabahug
Area, 4 Has. 96 Area, 05 Centares
Declared in the name of heirs of
Casimira Cortes as per Tax Dec. No. 31516
10. A parcel of land [rural] with all improvements thereon located in Magikay Mandaue, Cebu,
bounded on the North by Ireneo Villamor; East, Ireneo Villamor; South, Marcelo Cortes and
Ireneo Villamor; West, Callejon, with an area of one Ha. 27 Area, and 99 Centares, covered by
Tax Dec. No. 31518;
11. A parcel of land with all improvement thereon located in Centro, Mandaue, Cebu, bounded as
follows:
North, Calle Ricarte
East, Riachuelo
South, Riachuelo

West, Mariano del Castillo


Area, 11 Ares
Declared in the name of Bartolome
Cortes as per Tax Dec. No. 31521
12. A mango tree located in the name of Apolonio Soco as per Tax Dec. No. 31527 declared in
the name of Eustaquio Cortes.
*14. A parcel of land [rural] with all improvements thereon located in Magikay Mandaue, Cebu,
bounded on the North by Florentino Perez; East, Pablo Perez; South, Ireneo Villamor; West,
Romualdo Omo, with an area of one Hectare, 39 Ares and 06 Centares, covered by Tax Dec. No.
31317; This is known as Lot No. 560-A of the plan called Hacienda de Mandaue."
15. A parcel of land [rural] with all improvements thereon located in Magikay Mandue Cebu,
bounded on the north by Susana Cortes and others; East, by Susana Cortes and others; South
Ireneo Villamor and Hermana; and West, Ireneo Villamor and Hermana; with an area of one
Hectare, 26 Ares and 99 Centares, covered by Tax Dec. No. 31519.
To Ireneo Cortes Villamor and Paula Cortes Villamor the following are hereby apportioned and
delivered:
1. A parcel of agricultural land with all improvements thereon located in Centro, Mandaue, Cebu,
bounded as follows:
North, Paula Perez
East, Car. Prov. and Pelagia Pintor
South, Rafaela Judilla and D. Mendoza
West, Riachuelo
Area, 1 Ha. 46 Ares and 30 Centares
Declared in the name of Eustaquio
Cortes as per Tax Dec. No. 31533
2. A parcel of residential land with all improvements thereon Centro, Mandaue, Cebu, bounded as
follows:
North, Calle A. del Rosario
East, Fidel Jayme
South, Bartolome Cortes and Martina Soco
West, Carr. Provincial
Area, 5,390 square meters
Declared in the name of Bartolome and

Eustaquio Cortes as per Tax Dec. No. 31522


3. A parcel of agricultural land with all improvements thereon located in Kanzaga Consolacion,
Cebu, bounded as follows:
North, Ignacio Niez
East, Saturnino Quipo y Sixto Ermac
South, Alejandro del Rosario y Doroteo Bolhot
West, Apolinario Palang
Area, 22 Ares and 36 Centares
Declared in the name of Eustaquio Cortes
as per Tax Dec. No. 17031
4. A parcel of agricultural land with all improvements thereon located in Centro, Mandaue, Cebu,
bounded as follows:
North, Camino Vecinal
East, Andres Cabahug
South, Julio Bars and Ciriaco Cortes
West, Eusebio Soco and Phil. Railway Co.
Area 53 Ares and 92 Centares
Declared in the name of Eustaquio Cortes
as per Tax Declaration No. 31534
5. A parcel of agricultural land with all improvements thereon located in Centro, Mandaue, Cebu,
bounded as follows:
North, Severina Cabajug and others
East, Simon Cortes
South, Callejon
West, Calle Gral. del Pilar
Area, 72 Ares & 96 Centares
Declared in the name of Eustaquio Cortes as per Tax Dec. No. 31532
6. A parcel of agricultural land located in Alang-Alang, Mandaue, Cebu, with all improvements
thereon, bounded as follows:
North, Callejon and Marciano Cuison

East, Calle Plaridel and Enrique Capirol


South, Calle P. Burgos and Bernardo A. Flores
West, Eusebio Soco
Area, 4 Has. 53 Ares, 47 Centares
Declared in the name of Eustaquio Cortes
as per Tax Dec. No. 31530
7. A parcel of agricultural land with all improvements thereon located in Centro, Mandaue, Cebu,
bounded as follows:
North, Benito Ceniza, Filomena Pans, Benito Ceniza
East, Emiliano Cuson
South, Calle A. del Rosario
West, Carr. Prov. Rita Alilin and others
Area, 3 Has. 08 Ares, 32 Centares
Declared in the name of Eustaquio Cortes
as per Tax Dec. No. 31524
The parties hereto do hereby give their respective conformity to the foregoing partition and do
hereby accept and receive the properties respectively apportioned to them as indicated above.
That the parties hereto shall take immediate possession and enjoyment of their respective shares
subject to the payment of the honorary fees of administrators Primitive N. Sato and Moises
Mendoza whose claims for such honorary, are still pending determination by the Court, if the
personal properties would not be sufficient to cover such fees.
That the parties hereto shall take immediate possession and enjoyment of their respective shares
subject to the payment of the honorary fees of administrators Primitive N. Sato and Moises
Mendoza whose claims for such honorary, are still pending determination by the Court, if the
personal properties would not be sufficient to cover such fees.
That the Second Party hereby assume the responsibility to pay Atty. Gaudencio R. Juezan, the
honorary fees of the latter.
City of Cebu, Philippines, December 7, 1946.
[Thumbmark]
SIXTA
CENIZA

[(SGD.) IRENEO CORTES


VILLAMOR]

Heirs of
Bartolome
Cortes

Heirs of Eugenia &


Rufino Cortes et al.

[(SGD.) PAULA CORTES VILLAMOR]


[SGD.]
GAUDENCIO R.
JUEZAN

HIPOLITO ALO & FERMIN

Atty. for Ireneo


Cortes

YAP

Villamor and
Paula Cortes

By:

Villamor

[SGD.] FERMIN YAP


Attys. for Sixta Ceniza &

[SGD.]
DIOSDADO
CAMOMOT

Administrator Diosdado
Camomot

Administrator of
the

of the estate of
Bartolome

estate of
Bartolome

Cortes in Sp. Proc. No.


227.

Cortes in Sp.
Proc. No.

PRIMITIVO N. SATO

227

In his own behalf and


that of Moises
Mendoza, as
administrators in
Sp. Proc. Nos. 262 and
343.

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES


MANDAUE, CEBU
We, Sixta Ceniza, Rev. Diosdado Camomot, Ireneo Cortes Villamor and Paula
Cortes Villamor, after being first duly sworn to, do hereby depose and say: That
we are the parties referred to in the foregoing Project of Partition, which we
have voluntarily made and that the contents thereof are true and correct.
[Thumbmark]
SIXTA
CENIZA

[SGD.] REV.
DIOSDADO
CAMOMOT

[SGD.]
PAULA
CORTES
VILLAMOR

[SGD.] IRENEO
CORTES
VILLAMOR

MOISES MENDOZA
Ad. in Sp. Proc. No. 343
Subscribed and sworn to before me this 7th day of December, 1946, at the municipality of
Mandaue, Cebu, Philippines; Affiants exhibited to me their respective Residence Certificates:
Rev. Diosdado Camomot Res Cert. No. A-1236398 issued on March 11, 1946 at San Fernando,
Cebu; Sixta Ceniza Res Cert. No. A-149873 issued on Dec. 10, 1946 at Mandaue, Cebu; Ireneo
Cortes Villamor-Res. Cert. No. A-419863 issued on Dec. 5, 1946 at Mandaue, Cebu; Paula Cortes
Villamor Res. Cert. No. A-419786 issued on Nov. 7, 1946 at Mandaue, Cebu.
[SGD.) FERMIN YAP
Notary Public
Until December 31, 1946
Doc. No. 53
Page No. 20
Book No. II
Series of 1946
APPROVED:
Cebu City, Feb. 1, 1947.
[SGD.] EDMUNDO S. PICCIO
Judge.

On April 14, 1948, Judge S. C. Moscoso approved the project of partition, and on September 30, 1948, the
administrators delivered the seven parcels of land to Ireneo and Paula Villamor. Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and
343 were ordered closed and terminated by Judge Florentino Saguin on November 25, 1953. Entry of judgment
was made on March 18, 1954.
On November 23, 1960, Ireneo and Paula Villamor sold the parcel of land described in the Project of Partition as
parcel 5 to Claudia Labos and Gregoria Suico, and on September 23, 1966, Ireneo Villamor obtained free patent
titles over parcels 1, 2, 4, 6 and 7. Only parcel no. 3 remained unregistered.
After Ireneo's death, his children, now petitioners, executed an extra-judicial partition, dividing the remaining 6
parcels of land among themselves.
Meanwhile, upon the death of Sixta Ceniza on July 28, 1948, one Cristina Ceniza, sister of respondent Daniela
Ceniza Urot instituted Special Proceedings No. 364-R for the administration of the estate of Sixta Ceniza. One
Escolastico Ceniza, brother of respondent, was appointed special administrator. The latter's appointment, however,
was revoked on February 20, 1954 upon petition of Fr. Nicanor Cortes through his counsel, Atty. Fermin Yap on
January 14, 1954, and in his stead, Victorio Perez was appointed the special administrator. In this proceedings, the
nephews and nieces of Sixta Ceniza, including herein respondent, prayed that they be declared the sole and only
forced heirs of Sixta Ceniza, although at the time, Fr. Nicanor Cortes, the only surviving child of Sixta Ceniza, was
still alive.
On October 21, 1954, Fr. Cortes executed a power of attorney before the Vice-Consul of the Republic of the
Philippines in Madrid, Spain, constituting and appointing Fr. Diosdado Camomot as his attorney-in-fact and giving
him the power to appear for me and in my behalf in Special Proceedings No. 364-R of the Court of First Instance of

Cebu, with authority to designate and employ the services of an attorney or attorneys for the protection of my
rights. 3
On January 13, 1955, Victorio Perez submitted an inventory which specifically Identified the properties which came
from the Project of Partition and the corresponding number of such property or parcel of land in said Project of
Partition.
On August 18, 1955, the court, through Judge Clementino Diez, denied the motion of the nephews and nieces of
Sixta Ceniza to be declared her heirs and declared Fr. Nicanor Cortes as the only and universal heir of Sixta Ceniza.
On May 16, 1962, Fr. Nicanor Cortes executed a Deed of Conveyance in favor of several persons wherein he
conveyed ten parcels of land which included those received by his mother under the Project of Partition.
On August 28, 1969, Fr. Nicanor Cortes died in Barcelona, Spain. Special Proceedings No. 3062-R of the Court of
First instituted for the settlement Instance of Cebu was thereafter in of his estate. Appointed administratrix was
respondent Daniela Ceniza Urot who, on June 4, 1970 filed Civil Case No. 11726 against petitioners, successors-ininterest of Ireneo Villamor of the seven parcels of land and Paula Villamor, for recovery received in the Project of
Partition, accounting and receivership.
In the complaint, respondent alleged inter alia that upon learning of the death of Fr. Nicanor Cortes, some of his
nearest of kin who are his surviving first cousins, the Cenizas [all from the side of Sixta Ceniza] initiated Special
Proceedings No. 3062-R for the settlement of the estate of the deceased monk; that prior to and in the course of
initiating said proceedings, the surviving first cousins came upon documents showing that Fr. Cortes during his
absence from the Philippines to pursue a monastic life was deprived of his inheritance by fraud, stealth and
stratagem perpetrated by Paula and Ireneo Villamor; that shortly after the last world war and after the death of Fr.
Bartolome Cortes and his sister Agapita, while Fr. Nicanor Cortes was in the monastery and his mother sick, aging,
deaf and blind, Ireneo and Paula Villamor, who were domestics and protegees in the household of the Cortes
family, initiated Special Proceedings 343-C whereby they fraudulently and falsely represented under oath, without
notice to Fr. Nicanor Cortes or his legal representative, that Rufino Cortes died leaving two legitimate children,
namely Paula Cortes Villamor and Ireneo Cortes Villamor; that Paula and Ireneo Cortes Villamor are not the
legitimate children of Rufino who remained unmarried all his life; that Moises Mendoza, the administrator in Special
Proceedings No. 343 submitted an inventory which falsely and fraudulently enumerated properties as belonging to
Rufino Cortes when the truth is that Rufino Cortes neither had any property during his lifetime nor inherited any
from his wealthy sisters, Casimira and Eugenia whom said Rufino predeceased; that said properties belonged to
Eustaquio Cortes, Casimira and Eugenia Cortes, Bartolome Cortes, Sixta Cortes and/or Nicanor Cortes; that under
the same false and fraudulent representations without notice to Fr. Cortes or his legal representative, Ireneo and
Paula Villamor prepared a Project of Partition and adjudicated to themselves the seven parcels of land whereas the
rest was apportioned to Sixta Ceniza through Fr. Camomot, as administrator of the estate of Bartolome Cortes;
that on April 14, 1948, Ireneo and Paula Villamor, in collusion with the administrators in both proceedings, had the
project of partition approved by the court; that Ireneo and Paula Villamor, without benefit of a motion for
declaration of heirs, much less a hearing thereon with proper notice to Fr. Nicanor Cortes or his legal
representative, took delivery and possession of a substantial part of the properties and had the two administration
proceedings closed on November 25, 1953; and that on July 28, 1969, defendants herein petitioners, as heirs of
Ireneo and Paula Villamor, executed an extra-judicial settlement and partition of the lands in question. It was
prayed that judgment be rendered declaring as null and void the project of partition, the orders of April 14, 1948
and November 25, 1953 and the extra-judicial settlement and partition executed on July 28, 1969; that the
defendants [petitioners herein] be ordered to reconvey the parcels of land in question to the administratrix in
Special Proceedings No. 3062-R and to render a true and correct accounting of the income and produce thereof as
far back in time as may be legally feasible and that during the pendency of the case, that the properties be placed
under receivership.
Petitioners, instead of filing an answer, filed a motion to dismiss, alleging that the cause of action is barred by prior
judgment and by the statute of limitations. On July 27, 1970, the Court denied the motion to dismiss. When
petitioners' motion for reconsideration was denied on August 19, 1970, petitioners came to this Court by means of
certiorari on August 31 1970, but the same was denied on September 15, 1970 for "being premature." On October
9, 1970, petitioners filed their answer and alleged as special defenses that aside from the fact that Special
Proceedings No. 343-C was a proceeding in rem and all the requirements to obtain jurisdiction over the person of
anybody have been complied with, Fr. Nicanor Cortes had personal knowledge of Special Proceedings No. 343-C;
that the question of legitimacy of Ireneo and Paula Villamor had been duly pleaded and raised as the principal issue
in Special Proceedings No. 343-C; that the question of declaration of heirship of the two Villamor had already been
resolved by the court in said proceedings and have long become final, entry of judgment having been made on
March 18, 1954; that with the age, respectability and social standing of Sixta Ceniza, no court could have tolerated
the alleged acts of Ireneo and Paula Sixta Ceniza Villamor committed against Sixta Ceniza; that Sixta Ceniza had
the best legal advice and ample protection from her counsels, a legal preliminary at the time and a dean of the

University of Visayas and Fr. Diosdado Camomot, then the secretary to the Archbishop of Cebu, and after the death
of Sixta Ceniza, Fr. Nicanor Cortes appeared through counsel in Special Proceedings No. 363 where Escolastico
Ceniza applied as administrator but was denied by the court in favor of Fr. Camomot upon the recommendation of
Fr. Nicanor Cortes; and that all these times, Fr. Nicanor Cortes never complained nor raised any objection to the
inventory of Special Proceedings No. 364 which was taken as a part of the inventories in Special Proceedings 262-C
and 343-C. As affirmative defenses, the petitioners alleged that the court has no jurisdiction over the nature of the
action, intrinsic fraud being the basis of the complaint; that the cause 6f action is barred by prior judgment and by
the statute of limitations; and, that the complaint states no valid cause of action.
On May 13, 1971, a receiver was appointed by the court in the person of Atty. Andres Taneo, Branch Clerk of
Court. After trial, on January 21, 1972, the court rendered judgment against the petitioners holding that Ireneo
and Paula Villamor took advantage of the helplessness of Sixta Ceniza when they had the Project of Partition
thumbmarked by her; that Ireneo and Paula Villamor resorted to false and fraudulent representations in Special
Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343 in that they misrepresented that they were the legitimate children of Rufino Cortes,
when in truth, they were merely natural children of Rufino Cortes and that the properties described in the inventory
pertained to Rufino Cortes when in fact, said properties belonged to Eugenia Cortes and after her death, the same
passed to Eustaquio Cortes; that Fr. Nicanor Cortes had no knowledge of the fraudulent proceedings as well as the
Project of Partition; that Ireneo and Paula Villamor, in collusion with the administrator Moises Mendoza and with
the support and encouragement of Fr. Camomot who enjoyed the implicit trust of Fr. Nicanor Cortes, misled the
probate court into authorizing the delivery of the parcels of land to them; that when the probate court approved
the project of partition, there was no hearing for the purpose of determining the parties lawfully entitled to the
estate nor was there an opportunity given to Fr. Nicanor Cortes to intervene or oppose; that under the
circumstances, the fraud committed by Ireneo and Paula Villamor was extrinsic or collateral; and that the fraud
was discovered for the first time by Atty. Ramon Ceniza, son of Jose Ceniza, one of the heirs at law of Fr. Cortes
only in March 1970.
On appeal, the Ninth Division of the Court of Appeals, as adverted to above, affirmed the judgment of the trial
court, hence, the present recourse.
Petitioners maintain that the Court of Appeals, like the trial court, totally ignored the letters of Fr. Nicanor Cortes
disclaiming ownership and acknowledging the fact that petitioners and/or their predecessors-in-interest are the
owners and possessors of the lands in question, which exhibits could have decided outright all the issues that Fr.
Cortes had personal knowledge of Special Proceedings Nos. 262-C and 343-C and that the predecessors-in-interest
of petitioners did not commit fraud against him. Petitioners insist that the helplessness of Sixta Ceniza could not
have vitiated the project of partition for although she had become blind and could not walk by herself at the time
she affixed her thumbmark on the project of partition, her mental faculty was very clear. It is further argued that
all the fraud alleged by private respondent were within the line of deliberation of the probate court or intrinsic fraud
and could not have been extrinsic or collateral fraud; and therefore the cause of action of private respondent had
long prescribed, considering that from September 1948 or some 22 years since petitioners' predecessors-ininterest came to possess the lands, petitioners have been in peaceful, notorious, public, actual and continuous
possession, adversely against the whole world in concepto de dueo until they were disturbed in June 1970 when
they received copies of the complaint in Civil Case No. R-11726.
On the other hand, private respondent contends that the issues raised in the petition largely dwell as challenging
the findings of fact of the trial court and/or the Court of Appeals, which cannot be done in a petition for review on
certiorari.
We find for the petitioners.
After a careful consideration of the facts and circumstances of the case, we agree that the courts below forced their
conclusions against the evidence adduced during the trial which error justifies a review of said evidence. This case
is an exception to the general rule that only questions of law may be reviewed in an appeal by certiorari and that
factual findings of the Court of Appeals are binding on this Court, if supported by substantial evidence.
Thus, while it is settled that the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in cases brought to it from the Court of Appeals
is limited to reviewing and revising the errors of law imputed to the latter, its findings of fact being conclusive 4 it is
also settled that findings of fact of the Court of Appeals may be set aside: [1] when the conclusion is a finding
grounded entirely on speculation, surmise and conjectures; [2] the inference made is manifestly mistaken; [3]
there is grave abuse of discretion; [4] the judgment is based on misapprehension of facts; [5] the Court of Appeals
went beyond the issues of the case and its findings are contrary to the admission of both appellant and appellee;
[6] the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court; [7] said findings of facts are
conclusions without citation or specific evidence on which they are based; [8] the facts set forth in the petition as

well as in the petitioner's main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents; and [9] when the finding of
fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the absence of evidence and is contradicted by evidence on record. 5
We cannot sustain the findings of the courts that Fr. Nicanor Cortes had no personal knowledge of Special
Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343 for the evidence on record is abundant to contradict such findings.
In his testimony, Fr. Diosdado Camomot declared categorically that he informed Fr. Nicanor Cortes about Special
Proceedings No. 343 6 and that he sent him a copy of the project of partition. 7 He explained that as administrator
of the estate of Fr. Bartolome Cortes, he encountered trouble with the administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 343, Moises
Mendoza, who claimed that the properties under his [Camomot's] administration belonged to Rufino Cortes; that
when informed of said problem, Sixta Ceniza advised him to write Fr. Nicanor Cortes about it, which he did; that in
reply to his letter, Fr. Nicanor Cortes recommended that he settle the case amicably; and that after a long process
of negotiation, the project of partition in question was executed and approved by the court, a copy of which he sent
to Fr. Nicanor Cortes.
Highly significant is the fact that among the witnesses who testified before the trial court, it was only Fr. Camomot
who had personal knowledge of the events leading to the execution of the project of partition. Notwithstanding, the
trial court, instead of according great weight to his testimony, summarily brushed it aside and even reached the
unwarranted conclusion that he was in collusion with Ireneo and Paula Villamor. The testimony of Fr. Diosdado
Camomot, however, is too detailed and straightforward to be a mere product of concoction or fabrication or a
device to cover-up the collusion imputed to him by the trial court. Furthermore, said testimony is corroborated by
other evidence on record that sustains its veracity. That he communicated with Fr. Nicanor Cortes was
corroborated by Roure Ceniza-Sanchez, a witness for therein plaintiff-administratrix Daniela Ceniza Urot. She
testified that being the administrator, it was Fr. Camomot who informed Fr. Nicanor Cortes about the properties of
his parents. 8 That the petition in Special Proceedings No. 343 was among the matters brought to the attention of
Fr. Nicanor Cortes by Fr. Camomot can be deduced from the letter of Fr. Nicanor Cortes dated August 20, 1948,
addressed to Pesing (Dra. Felicisima Cortes-Veloso]. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:
As for the administration of Nanay's properties, I received from Atty. Primitive Sato a letter
asking my consent to the appointment of my cousin Escolastico Ceniza as Administrator.
Apparently, a new court trouble is brewing before the old one is completely settled. I cannot
meddle on the matter for I am too far away. You discuss the matter among you [Roure Lucio,
Father Camomot and the lawyers.] You had better select your administrator, whom you could
trust implicitly, and submit his name to Father Camomot. And to avoid ill feeling among the other
cousins, make it known that Father Camomot has taken charge of Nanay's affair, with my
consent, about ten years now and I personally keep my hands off, being in the impossibility of
knowing what is going on. 9
If it were not true that Fr. Camomot had informed Fr. Nicanor Cortes about Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343
there would be no basis for Fr. Cortes to observe or comment that "apparently, a new court trouble is brewing
before the old one is completely settled. At that time, the only court proceedings in progress were Special
Proceedings Nos. 262, 343 and 227. The "old one" adverted to by Fr. Nicanor Cortes could not refer exclusively to
Special Proceedings No. 227 as surmised by Roure Ceniza-Sanchez, as the only trouble being encountered by Fr.
Camomot as administrator of the estate of Fr. Bartolome Cortes in Special Proceedings No. 227 was the claim of
Moises Mendoza as administrator in Special Proceedings No. 343 over the properties under Fr. Camomot's
administration. The trial court's conclusion that the "old one" could not refer to Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and
343 for the reason that the project of partition had been executed as early as December 7, 1946, is erroneous.
While it may be true that said project of partition had already been executed, there still remained some loose ends
that needed tieing up, so that it was not until November 25, 1953 that both proceedings were ordered closed and
terminated. 10 The phrase "before the old one is completely settled" used by Fr. Cortes is thus apropos.
The other evidence on record from which knowledge by Fr. Nicanor Cortes of both Special Proceedings Nos. 262
and 343 and the project of partition could be in erred are his letters dated April 6, 1967, May 11, 1967, November
29, 1962 and December 1, 1967, addressed to Ipyon [Concepcion Rosal], Mrs. Dulce Rallos Gitgano, Awang [Paula
Villamor] and Mr. and Mrs. Candelario Villamor, respectively, and the Deed of Conveyance dated May 9,1962.
The letter addressed to Ipyon [Concepcion Rosal] reads in part:
Great is my desire to help there. It would be my pleasure to attend to your needs, especially
about the land where you could build your house.

But now, I have nothing to do with those lands there in our place. It is those who are in
Possession of it who can decide.
Did you not try to talk with Awang and Candelario regarding your old rights and the promises of
those dead as to the place where you had built your house. It is better if you try perhaps they at
Ibabao will respect on your being an old neighbor. 11
The pertinent portion of the letter addressed to Mrs. Dulce Rallos Gitgano, on the other hand, states:
In reply to your letter of last month, I wish to say that I have no longer anything to do with any
property, including the lot on which you have built your house. As a monk, I have made the vow
of poverty and have therefore renounced to all property rights.
I regret to say that I am not in position to help you.
Have you not tried to ask Candelario to reduce the rent of the lot to an amount more
proportionate to your limited earnings? You may submit also to him your desire to buy the lot by
monthly installments.12
In his testimony, Candelario Villamor Identified the land where Concepcion Rosal wanted to build her house as
parcel "No. 1 on page five of the complaint." 13 He further Identified the land which Mrs. Dulce Rallos Gitgano
wanted to buy as "from the land which is the share of Ireneo Cortes Villamor and Paula Cortes Villamor and found
in the project of partition on page four of said project of partition and boundary number two." 14
The records show that when Fr. Nicanor Cortes left the Philippines to become a monk, he was already 44 years old.
He must have known then who the owners of the lands referred to were and certainly at that time neither Awang
[Paula Villamor] nor Candelario was in possession thereof. Yet, in his replies to the letters of Mesdames Rosal and
Gitgano, he stated by name and with certainty the persons whom the latter should approach and who could
properly exercise the right of disposition over said lands. In the absence of any showing that Awang and Candelario
were designated as representatives or administrators of Fr. Cortes' properties, the only logical conclusion reached
is that Fr. Nicanor Cortes knew the circumstances under which Awang and Candelario acquired ownership and
possession of the lands in question and that he recognized such ownership and possession, otherwise he would not
have given the advice or suggestions found in his letters.
Fr. Nicanor Cortes' letter of November 29, 1962 to Awang reads:
Regarding the land. The share of my late Mother [Nanay] Sixta was divided among those who
served her and those to whom gratitude were due, by means of documents signed on October of
1947 before Notary Fermin Yap. Those documents were sent to me by Father Camomot with a
letter where he stated that those were the true and voluntary will of my late Mother [Nanay".
Because I was unable to answer his letter he wrote me again, once or twice reiterating that those
documents were the true and voluntary will of Mother [Nanay]. 15
His letter to Mr. and Mrs. Candelario Villamor states:
I have noticed that you have now a poultry farm which must be giving you, "together with the
lands, quite an income. 16
In the Deed of Conveyance dated May 9, 1962 executed by Fr. Nicanor Cortes before the Consul General of the
Republic of the Philippines, Madrid, Spain, wherein he ceded and transferred ten [10] parcels of land in favor of
several persons for and in consideration of One Peso, Philippine currency and other valuable considerations, he
declared:
All parcels of land described above are my exclusive property having acquired the same by
succession from the previous owners, namely: Eustaquio Cortes, Casimira Cortes, Eugenia
Cortes, Bartolome Cortes, Sixta Ceniza de Cortes, as shown in the order of the Honorable Court
of First Instance of Cebu in Special Proceedings No. 364-R, dated August 18, 1955. 17
The above-quoted portions of Fr. Cortes' letters and Deed of Conveyance show beyond any iota of doubt that he
was kept posted on the developments in the Philippines. He know that his mother received some lands as "share"

and that Candelario had acquired lands. He also knew the succession of ownership of the lands to which he
succeeded as sole heir of his mother in Special Proceedings No. 364-P, From these statements, it would not be
unreasonable or far-fetched to draw the conclusion that he knew about Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343 as
well as the project of partition which were the root and origin of the "share" of his mother, the lands acquired by
Candelario, as well as the lands inherited by him.
Moreover, stress must be laid on the fact that Fr. Nicanor Cortes intervened in Special Proceedings No. 364-R, the
proceedings for the settlement of the estate of his mother, Sixta Ceniza. In the inventory submitted by the
administrator thereof, the origin of some parcels of land included in the estate of his mother were specified thus:
1 A parcel of land situated in Alang-Alang Mandaue, Cebu-Tax Declaration No. 09343 with an
area of .4737 more or less; and assessed at P70.00. Bounded on the North by Gaudencio R.
Juezan; on the East by Jacinto Engracial; on the South by Roberto Archo and Cristina Cuizon; on
the West by Filemon Pono.
In the Project of Partition in Sp. Proc. Nos. 262 & 343, the said parcel is designated as parcel No.
1.
2. A parcel of land situated in Centro, Mandaue, Cebu-Tax Declaration No. 09347 with an area
of .1347 more or less and assessed at P50.00. Bounded on the North by Rita Alilin; on the East
by Jose Mendoza; on the south by Rita Alilin and on the West by Domingo Ybasitas [Ceferino
Mendoza].
In the Project of Partition in Sp. Proc. Nos. 262 & 343, said parcel is designated as parcel No. 4.
3. A parcel of land situated in Pagsabungan, Mandaue, Cebu, Tax Declaration No. 09346 with
an area of .2246 more or less; and assessed at P70.00. Bounded on the North by Prevato Ceniza;
on the East by Fernando Hatamosa on the South by Butuanon River and Prevato Ceniza; and on
the West by Prevato Ceniza and Philippine Rail way.
In the Project of Partition in Sp. Proc. 262 & 343, said parcel is designated as parcel No. 5.
4. A parcel of land situated in Pagsabunga, Mandaue, Cebu, Tax Declaration No. 02232 with an
area of 1.0351 more or less; and assessed at P370.00. Bounded on the North by Hipolito Pareja;
on the East by Cesario Congeon; on the South by Hrs. of Remigio Judilla; on the West by Sotero
Judilla.
In the Project of Partition in Sp. Proc. Nos. 262 & 343, Id parcel is designated as parcel No. 6.
5. A parcel of land, situated in Kanduman, Mandaue, Cebu, Tax Declaration No. 09345 with an
area of 1.0324 more or less and assessed at P410.00. Bounded on the North by Jacinto Mayol; on
the East by Sergio Suyco; on the south by Martin Seno; and the West by Mariano Alivio.
In the Project of Partition in Sp. Proc. Nos. 262 & 343, said parcel is designated as parcel No. 7.
6. A parcel of land situted in Kanduman, Mandaue, Cebu, Tax Declaration No. 09344 with an
area of 2.4507 more or less; assessed at P980.00. Bounded on the North by Jacinto Mayol,
Policarpio and Josefa Cortes; on the East by Claudio Osmena and Camino Vecinal; on the South
by Camino Vecinal and Hrs. of Tomas Osmena and on the West by Jacinto Mayol;
In the Project of Partition in Sp. Proc. Nos. 262 & 343, said parcel is designated as parcel No. 8.
7. A parcel of land situated in Maguicay Mandaue, Cebu, Tax Declaration No. 09348 with an
area of .2799 more or less; assessed at P320.00. Bounded on the North by Ireneo Villamor; on
the East by Ireneo Villamor; on the South by Marcelo Cortes and Ireneo Villamor; and on the
West by Callejon.
In the Project of Partition in Sp. Proc. Nos. 262 & 343, Id parcel is designated as parcel No. 10.

8. A parcel of land situated in Maguicay Mandaue, Cebu Tax Declaration No. 09347 with an
area of 1.2996; as at P520.00. Bounded on the North by Lucas Perez and Sebastian Fajardo; on
the East by Juan Cortes; on the South by Paula Villamor; and on the West by Paula Villamor.
In the Project of Partition in Sp. Proc. Nos. 262 & 343, said parcel is designated as parcel No. 13.
9. A parcel of land situated in Maguicay Mandaue, Cebu, Tax Declaration No. 09350 with an
area of 1.2699-assessed at P320.00. Bounded on the North by Juan Cortes; on the East by
Eutiquiano Mendoza; on the South by Simon Cortes and Ambrosia Cortes; and on the West by
Juan Cortes.
In the Project of Partition in Sp. Proc. Nos. 262 & 343, said parcel is designated as parcel No. 14.
xxx xxx xxx
II. A parcel of land situated in Paknaan Mandaue, Cebu, with an area of 1.000 more or less;
assessed at P260.00. Bounded on the North by Hrs. of Roberto Ceniza and Escolastico Ceniza; on
the East by Raymundo Ceniza; on the South by Eugenia Lumapas, Constancio Ceniza and
Butuanon River; and on the West by Constancio Ceniza and Eugenia Lumapas.
This parcel is not included in the Project of Partition in Sp. Proc. Nos. 262 & 343.
[REMARKS: Parcel No. 2 in the Project of Partition in Sp. Proc. Nos. 262 & 343 Centro
Mandaue, Cebu Bounded on the North by Calle Gral. Ricarte; East Riachuelo South, Mariano
del Castillo; West, Juana Mayol is claimed by Atanasio Marababol who is said to have it
declared in his name.
Parcel No. 9 of the Project of Partition in Sp. Proc. Nos. 262 and 343 could not also be taken
possession of as according to reliable information it is under contract of lease with the Bureau of
Forestry in favor of someone.
Parcel No. 11 of the Project of Partition in Sp. Proc. Nos. 262 & 343 is the same parcel No. 2 of
said Project of Partition. 18
By reason of this circumstance, Fr. Nicanor Cortes is charged with knowledge of Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and
343 as well as the Project of Petition.
The trial court relied heavily on the certification issued by the Clerk of the Court of First Instance of Cebu
Esperanza T. Garcia, that:
... there appears to be:
1. No individual notice to one Fr. Nicanor Cortes or his legal representative nor any intervention
on his part has been recorded; 19
But, as observed by counsel for petitioners, no probative value could be assigned to said certification, in view of
another certification issued by the same Clerk of Court that "the prewar records of Sp. Proc. No. 262-C of the Court
of First Instance of Cebu were lost and/or destroyed during World War II, and that presently, the records available
in this office on said Special Proceedings only begins with a motion, dated May 22, 1946, filed by Attys. Hipolito Alo
and Fermin Yap as attorneys for Rev. D. Camomot as Administrator in Sp. Proc. No. 227, and Atty. Gaudencio
Juezan as attorney for the administrators Primitive Sato and Moises Mendoza and heirs of the deceased mentioned
in Sp. Proc. Nos. 262-C and 343-C, respectively." 20
The loss and/or destruction of the pre-war records in Special Proceedings No. 262-C renders the determination of
whether or not Fr. Nicanor Cortes was duly notified thereof an impossibility. However, the probability of his having
been notified cannot be totally discounted. On the other hand, no personal notice was due Fr. Nicanor Cortes in
Special Proceedings No. 343-C, not being the presumptive heir of Rufino Cortes. Thus, if it were true that Fr.
Nicanor Cortes had no notice of Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343, the failure to give such notice must be
attributed to whoever instituted Special Proceedings No. 262 wherein Fr. Cortes was a presumptive heir, and not to
Ireneo and Paula Villamor, the petitioners in Special Proceedings No. 343, wherein Fr. Cortes was not a

presumptive heir and where the publication of the petition as required by law was sufficient to give notice to the
whole world including Fr. Cortes.
The lower courts portrayed Sixta Ceniza as an old woman, who because of her "helplessness," became an easy
prey to unscrupulous individuals like the predecessors-in-interest of the petitioners. The petitioners, however,
contend that although it is true that Sixta Ceniza was blind and could not walk without somebody escorting her, her
helplessness only affected her physical condition for according to Roure Ceniza-Sanchez, a granddaughter with
whom said Sixta Ceniza lived at that time, Sixta Ceniza's mental faculty was "very clear". 21
We find this contention tenable. Just because a person is blind or of poor memory, it does not follow that she is of
unsound said. This Court has ruled that where the mind of the testator is in perfectly sound condition, neither old
age, nor is health nor the fact that somebody had to guide his hand in order that he might sign, is sufficient to
invalidate his will. 22
If Sixta Ceniza were really "helpless," in the sense understood by the courts, when she affixed her thumbmark in
the project of partition, on December 7, 1946, how was she able to validly donate lands to "those who served her
and those to whom gratitude were due by means of documents signed on October of 1947 before Notary Fermin
Yap" as Fr. Nicanor Cortes himself communicated to Awang"? 23
The lower courts likewise relied on the alleged absence of evidence showing that Rufino Cortes had at any time
been declared an owner of the lands in question for taxation purpose poses.
The records show, however, that before the project of partition was executed on December 7, 1946, the
contending parties in Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343 had been fighting for eight years since 1938 because
the properties listed in the inventories submitted by the administrators were Identical. To settle their differences
amicably, the parties who all claim to be the heirs of decedents, all children of Victor Cortes and Maria Castaeda,
decided to partition the properties.
Partition is defined as a division between two or more persons of real or personal property which they own as copartners, joint tenants or tenants in common, effected by the setting apart of such interests so that they may
enjoy and possess it in severalty. 24 The purpose of partition is to put an end to the common tenancy of the land or
co-ownership. It seeks a severance of the individual interest of each joint owner vesting in each a sole estate in
specific property and giving to each one the right to enjoy his estate without supervision or interference from the
other. 25 And a partition by deed is a recognized method of effectuating a separation of interest in property held in
common. 26
It is clear therefore that a partition presupposes that the thing to be divided is owned in common. It is immaterial
in whose name the properties were declared for taxation purposes for it is presumed before hand that the parties
to the partition admit the fact of co-ownership and now want to effect a separation of interest.
We do not consider as "intriguing" the observation of the lower court and concurred in by the Court of Appeals that
in both Special Proceedings in question, the administrators appointed were complete strangers to the decedents.
There is nothing repulsive in this nor is this an indicium of fraud and collusion as found by the courts. Section 642
of the Code of Civil Procedure enumerates the persons who can act as executors and administrators. It provides
that in case the persons who have the preferential right to be appointed are not competent or are unwilling to
serve, administration may be granted to such other person as the court may appoint.
What is intriguing is the fact that although Fr. Nicanor Cortes had a number of surviving first cousins, he chose and
preferred a stranger, Fr. Diosdado Camomot as his attorney-in-fact to take charge of his and his Nanay's affairs.
And even more intriguing is the fact that in the proceedings for the settlement of the estate of his mother, he took
steps to have the appointment of Escolastico Ceniza, brother of private respondent, who was appointed as Special
Administrator, revoked 27 and in which he succeeded.
Another point. Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343 lasted for about sixteen years before entry of judgment was
made on March 18, 1954, and during that period, not one but three judges had the occasion to reflect on the
propriety and merits of both proceedings as well as the project of partition. In the last page of the project of
partition appears the signature of Judge Edmundo S. Piccio approving the same on February 1, 1947. On April 14,
1948, Judge S.C. Moscoso likewise approved the project of partition. 28 On November 25, 1953, both proceedings
were ordered closed by Judge Florentino Saguin, and entry of judgment was made on March 18, 1954. Against this
factual backdrop, it is highly improbable that any irregularity have attended said proceedings could not have been
that might seasonably unravelled.

The courts also held that the fraud committed by Ireneo and Paula Cortes Villamor in collusion with Administrator
Moises Mendoza, their lawyer Gaudencio Juezan and Fr. Diosdado Camomot was extrinsic for it has been shown
that when the probate court approved the project of partition, there was no hearing or trial in the Court of First
Instance for the purpose of determining the parties lawfully entitled to the estate in the hands of the
administrators; neither was there an opportunity given to Fr. Nicanor Cortes by giving him prior notice to intervene
or oppose, much less present his evidence, nor was there a declaration of heirs.
Assuming arguendo that extrinsic fraud had been committed by Ireneo and Paula Cortes Villamor, has the action
prescribed?
The courts held that the action has not prescribed for the preponderance of evidence shows that the fraud was
discovered for the first time by Atty. Ramon B. Ceniza, son of Jose C. Ceniza, one of the heirs of Fr. Nicanor Cortes,
only in March, 1970. Since the action was commenced on June 4, 1970, it was filed well within the four year period
fixed by law.
We disagree. Prescription has set in. An action for reconveyance of real property resulting from fraud may be
barred by the statute of limitations, which requires that the action shall be filed within four [4] years from the
discovery of fraud. 29 From what time should fraud be deemed to have been discovered in the case at bar.
To ascertain what constitutes "a discovery of the facts constituting the fraud," reference must be had to the
principles of equity. In actions in equity, the rule is that the means of knowledge are equivalent to actual
knowledge; that is, that a knowledge of facts which would have put an ordinarily prudent man upon inquiry which,
if followed up, would have resulted in a discovery of the fraud, was equivalent to actual discovery. 30
In the instant case, the discovery must be deemed to have taken place, at the latest, on August 18, 1955, when
Judge Clementino Diez, in Special Proceedings No. 364-R declared Fr. Nicanor Cortes as the only and universal heir
of Sixta Ceniza and granted letters of administration to Fr. Diosdado Camomot, the person constituted by Fr.
Nicanor Cortes as his attorney-in-fact in said proceedings. From that time, the law imputes to Fr. Cortes knowledge
of Special Proceedings Nos. 262 and 343, the project of partition, and such facts and circumstances as would have
him, by the exercise of due diligence, to a knowledge of the fraud. During the time that Special Proceedings No.
364-R had been pending circumstances existed which should have aroused Fr. Nicanor Cortes' suspicion or put him
on inquiry considering that the inventory submitted therein specifically made mention of Special Proceedings Nos.
262 and 343 and the project of partition.
The period of prescription commenced to run from August 18, 1955. However, from said date up to his death on
August 28, 1969, Fr. Nicanor Cortes remained silent and failed to assert his right. He even conveyed at least three
lands which were among those apportioned to Sixta Ceniza in the Project of Partition to several persons. Her
predecessor-in-interest, Fr. Nicanor Cortes, not having filed any action for reconveyance within the prescriptive
period provided by law, neither could private respondent do so now, for her right cannot rise higher than its
source.
Finally, it is well-settled that the negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time warrants not
only a presumption that the party entitled to assert it, either had abandoned it or declined to assert it, but also
casts doubt on the validity of the claim of ownership. Such neglect to assert a right taken in conjunction with the
lapse of time, more or less great, and other circumstances causing prejudice to the adverse party, operates as a
bar in a court of equity. 31
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The judgment appealed from is set aside, and another entered
dismissing the complaint in Civil Case No. R-11726 of the then Court of First Instance of Cebu. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-21917

November 29, 1966

TESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED CARLOS GURREA Y MONASTERIO. MARCELO PIJUAN, special
administrator-appellee,
vs.
MANUELA RUIZ VDA. DE GURREA, movant-appellant.
This is an appeal, taken by Manuela Ruiz Vda. de Gurrea, from two (2) orders of the Court of First Instance of
Negros Occidental.
In 1932, appellant Manuela Ruiz hereinafter referred to as Mrs. Gurrea and Carlos Gurrea were married in
Spain, where they lived together until 1945, when he abandoned her and came, with their son Teodoro, to the
Philippines. Here he lived maritally with Rizalina Perez by whom he had two (2) children. Having been informed by
her son Teodoro, years later, that his father was residing in Pontevedra, Negros Occidental, Manuela came to the
Philippines, in June, 1960; but, Carlos Gurrea refused to admit her to his residence in said municipality. Hence, she
stayed with their son, Teodoro, in Bacolod City.
Presently, or on July 29, 1960, she instituted, against Carlos Gurrea, Civil Case No. 5820 of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, for support and the annulment of some alleged donations of conjugal property, in
favor of his common-law wife, Rizalina. In due course, said court issued an order granting Mrs. Gurrea a monthly
alimony, pendente lite, of P2,000.00 which, on May 17, 1961, was reduced by the Court of Appeals to P1,000.00.
Carlos Gurrea died on March 7, 1962, leaving a document purporting to be his last will and testament, in which he
named Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof and disinherited Mrs. Gurrea and their son, Teodoro. Soon thereafter, or
on April 24, 1962, Pijuan instituted Special Proceedings No. 6582 of the Court of First Instance of Negros
Occidental, for the probate of said will. Thereafter Pijuan was, upon his ex parte motion, appointed special
administrator of the estate, without bond. Oppositions to the probate of the will were filed by Mrs. Gurrea, her son,
Teodoro, and one Pilar Gurrea, as an alleged illegitimate daughter of the deceased.
On July 16, 1962, Mrs. Gurrea filed in said Special Proceedings No. 6582, a motion alleging that the
aforementioned alimony, pendente lite, of P1,000 a month, had been suspended upon the death of Carlos Gurrea,
and praying that the Special Administrator be ordered to continue paying it pending the final determination of the
case. This motion having been denied in an order dated February 2, 1963, Mrs. Gurrea moved for a reconsideration
thereof. Moreover, on February 27, 1963, she moved for her appointment as administratrix of the estate of the
deceased. In an order dated April 20, 1963, said motion for reconsideration was denied. The lower court, likewise,
denied, for the time being, the motion of Mrs. Gurrea for her appointment as administratrix, in view of the
provision of the will of the deceased designating another person as executor thereof. Hence this appeal from said
orders of February 2 and April 20, 1963.
Mrs. Gurrea assails as erroneous the order of the lower court denying her petition for support, as well as that
denying its reconsideration. Both were predicated upon the theory that, pursuant to Article 188 of our Civil Code
(Article 1430 of the Spanish Civil Code) the support of a surviving spouse constitutes, not an encumbrance upon
the estate of the decedent, but merely an advance from her share of said estate, and that Mrs. Gurrea is not
entitled to such advance, there being neither allegation nor proof that she had contributed any paraphernal
property to said estate or that the same includes properties forming part of the conjugal partnership between her
and the deceased. In support of this view, His Honor, the trial Judge cited the opinion of Manresa to the effect that
. . . Probado que ni en concepto de capital propio, ni como gananciales corresponde haber alguno al
conjuge sobreviviente o a los herederos del premuerto, no cabe la concesion de alimentos, pues estos, en
efecto, con arreglo el articulo 1430, son solo un anticipo del respectivo haber de cada participe.
This has, however, been misconstrued by the lower court. The foregoing view of Manresa is predicated upon the
premise that it has been proven that none of the properties under administration belongs to the surviving spouse
either as paraphernal property or as part of the conjugal partnership. Upon the other hand, the lower court denied
support to Mrs. Gurrea because of absence of proof as regards the status, nature or character of the property now
under the custody of the Special Administrator. Precisely, however, on account of such lack of proof thereon, we
are bound by law1 to assume that the estate of the deceased consists of property belonging to the conjugal
partnership,2 one-half of which belongs presumptively to Mrs. Gurrea,3 aside from such part of the share of the
deceased in said partnership as may belong to her as one of the compulsory heirs,4 if his alleged will were not
allowed to probate, or, even if probated, if the provision therein disinheriting her were nullified. Inasmuch as the
aforementioned estate is worth P205,397.64, according to the inventory submitted by the special administrator, it

is clear to us that the continuation of the monthly alimony, pendente lite, of P1,000, authorized in said Civil Case
No. 5820, is fairly justified.
It is next urged by Mrs. Gurrea that the lower court erred in denying her petition for appointment as administratrix,
for, as widow of the deceased, she claims a right of preference under Section 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of
Court. In the language of this provision, said preference exists "if no executor is named in the will or the executor
or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate." None of these
conditions obtains, however, in the case at bar. The deceased Carlos Gurrea has left a document purporting to be
his will, seemingly, is still pending probate. So, it cannot be said, as yet, that he has died intestate. Again, said
document names Marcelo Pijuan as executor thereof, and it is not claimed that he is incompetent therefor. What is
more, he has not only not refused the trust, but, has, also, expressly accepted it, by applying for his appointment
as executor, and, upon his appointment as special administrator, has assumed the duties thereof. It may not be
amiss to note that the preference accorded by the aforementioned provision of the Rules of Court to the surviving
spouse refers to the appoint of a regular administrator or administratrix, not to that of a special administrator, and
that the order appointing the latter lies within the discretion of the probate court,5and is not appealable.6
WHEREFORE, the orders appealed from are hereby modified, in the sense that Manuela Ruiz Vda. de Gurrea shall
receive from the estate of the deceased a monthly allowance of P1,000.00, by way of support, from March 7, 1962,
and that, in all other respects, said orders are hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs. It is so
ordered.

G.R. No. L-40517 January 31, 1984


LUZON SURETY COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PASTOR T. QUEBRAR and FRANCISCO KILAYKO, defendants-appellants.
This is an appeal from the judgement of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil Case No. 52790 dated
November 3, 1964 which was certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals in its resolution dated March 20, 1975.
On August 9, 1954, plaintiff-appellee issued two administrator's bond in the amount of P15,000.00 each, in behalf
of the defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, as administrator in Special Proceedings Nos. 3075 and 3076 of the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, entitled " Re Testate Estate of A. B. Chinsuy," and Re Testate Estate
of Cresenciana Lipa," respectively, (pp. 8-12, 17-21, ROA; p. 9 rec.). In consideration of the suretyship wherein
the plaintiff-appellee Luzon Surety Company, Inc. was bound jointly and severally with the defendant appellant
Pastor T. Quebrar, the latter, together with Francisco Kilayko, executed two indemnity agreements, where among
other things, they agreed jointly and severally to pay the plaintiff-appellee "the sum of Three Hundred Pesos
(P300.00) in advance as premium thereof for every 12 months or fraction thereof, this ... or any renewal or
substitution thereof is in effect" and to indemnify plaintiff-appellee against any and all damages, losses, costs,
stamps taxes, penalties, charges and expenses, whatsoever, including the 15% of the amount involved in any
litigation, for attomey's fees (pp. 12-16, 21-25. ROA; p. 9, rec.).
For the first year, from August 9, 1954 to August 9, 1955, the defendants-appellants paid P304.50 under each
indemnity agreement or a total of P609.00 for premiums and documentary stamps.
On June 6, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental approved the amended Project of Partition and
Accounts of defendant-appellant (p. 87, ROA; p. 9, rec.).
On May 8, 1962, the plaintiff-appellee demanded from the defendants-appellants the payment of the premiums
and documentary stamps from August 9,1955.
On October 17, 1962, the defendants-appellants ordered a motion for cancellation and/or reduction of executor's
bonds on the ground that "the heirs of these testate estates have already received their respective shares" (pp. 6970, ROA, p. 9, rec.).
On October 20, 1962, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental acting on the motions filed by the
defendants-appellants ordered the bonds cancelled.
Plaintiff-appellee's demand amounted to P2,436.00 in each case, hence, a total of P4,872.00 for the period of
August 9, 1955 to October 20, 1962. The defendants-appellants to pay the said amount of P4,872.00.
On January 8, 1963, the plaintiff-appellee filed the case with the Court of First Instance of Manila During the pretrial the parties presented their documentary evidences and agreed on the ultimate issue - "whether or not the
administrator's bonds were in force and effect from and after the year that they were filed and approved by the
court up to 1962, when they were cancelled." The defendants-appellants offered P1,800.00 by way of amicable
settlement which the plaintiff-appellee refused.
The lower court allowed the plaintiff to recover from the defendants-appellants, holding that:
We find for the plaintiff it is clear from the terms of the Order of the Court in which these bond
were filed, that the same were in force and effect from and after filling thereof up to and
including 20 October, 1962, when the same werecancelled. It follows that the defendants are
liable under the terms of the Indemnity Agreements, notwithstanding that they have not
expressly sought the renewal of these bonds bemuse the same were in force and effect until they
were cancelled by order of the Court. The renewal of said bonds is presumed from the fact that
the defendants did not ask for the cancellation of the same; and their liability springs from the
fact that defendant Administrator Pastor Quebrar, benefited from the bonds during their lifetime.
We find no merit in defendants' claim that the Administrator's bonds in question are not judicial
bonds but legal or conventional bonds only, since they were constituted by virtue of Rule 82, Sec.
1 of the Old Rule of Court. Neither is there merit in defendants, claim that payments of premiums

and documentary stamps were conditions precedent to the effectivity of the bonds, since it was
the defendants' duty to pay for the premiums as long as the bonds were in force and effect.
Finally, defendants' claim that they are not liable under the Indemnity Agreements is also without
merit since the under of defendants under said Indemnity Agreements; includes the payment of
yearly pre for the bonds.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the defendants,
ordering the tsn the defendant to pay the plaintiff, jointly and severally, the amount of P6,649.36
plus interest at the legal rate from 27 July 1964 until fully paid and the sum equivalent to 10% of
the total amount due as and or attorney's fees, and costs (pp. 92-94, ROA; p. 9, rec.).
Defendants-appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 20, 1975, the Court of Appeals in a resolution
certified the herein case to this Court after finding that this case involves only errors or questions of law.
1. The proper determination of the liability of the surety and of the principal on the bond must depend primarily
upon the language of the bond itself. The bonds herein were required by Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
While a bond is nonetheless a contract because it is required by statute (Midland Co. vs. Broat 52 NW 972), said
statutory bonds are construed in the light of the statute creating the obligation secured and the purposes for which
the bond is required, as expressed in the statute (Michael vs. Logan, 52 NW 972; Squires vs. Miller, 138 NW 1062).
The statute which requires the giving of a bond becomes a part of the bond and imparts into the bond any
conditions prescribed by the statute (Scott vs. United States Fidelity Co., 252 Ala 373, 41 So 2d 298; Employer's
Liability Assurance Corp. vs. Lunt, 82 Ariz 320, 313 P2d 393).
The bonds in question herein contain practically the very same conditions in Sec. 1, Rule 81 of the Rules of Court.
Pertinent provision of the administrator's bonds is as follows:
Therefore, if the said Pastor T. Quebrar faithfully prepares and presents to the Court, within three
months from the date of his appointment, a correct inventory of all the property of the deceased
which may have come into his possession or into the possession of any other person representing
him according to law, if he administers all the property of the deceased which at any time comes
into his possession or into the possession of any other person representing him; faithfully pays all
the debts, legacies, and bequests which encumber said estate, pays whatever dividends which
the Court may decide should be paid, and renders a just and true account of his administrations
to the Court within a year or at any other date that he may be required so to do, and faithfully
executes all orders and decrees of said Court, then in this case this obligation shall be void,
otherwise it shall remain full force and effect (p. 9, 18, ROA p. 9, rec.).
Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the administrator/executor to put up a bond for the purpose of
indemnifying the creditors, heirs, legatees and the estate. It is conditioned upon the faithful performance of the
administrator's trust (Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil. 134).
Having in mind the purpose and intent of the law, the surety is then liable under the administrator's bond, for as
long as the administrator has duties to do as such administrator/executor. Since the liability of the sureties is coextensive with that of the administrator and embraces the performance of every duty he is called upon to perform
in the course of administration (Deobold vs. Oppermann, 111 NY 531, 19 NE 94), it follows that the administrator
is still duty bound to respect the indemnity agreements entered into by him in consideration of the suretyship
It is shown that the defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, still had something to do as an administrator/executor
even after the approval of the amended project of partition and accounts on June 6, 1957.
The contention of the defendants-appellants that the administrator's bond ceased to be of legal force and effect
with the approval of the project of partition and statement of accounts on June 6, 1957 is without merit. The
defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar did not cease as administrator after June 6, 1957, for administration is for
the purpose of liquidation of the estate and distribution of the residue among the heirs and legatees. And
liquidation means the determination of all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and
expenses(Flores vs. Flores, 48 Phil. 982). It appears that there were still debts and expenses to be paid after June
6, 1957.
And in the case of Montemayor vs. Gutierrez (114 Phil. 95), an estate may be partitioned even before the
termination of the administration proceedings. Hence, the approval of the project of partition did not necessarily
terminate the administration proceedings. Notwithstanding the approval of the partition, the Court of First Instance

of Negros Occidental still had jurisdiction over the administration proceedings of the estate of A.B. Chinsuy and
Cresenciana Lipa.
2. The sureties of an administration bond are liable only as a rule, for matters occurring during the term covered by
the bond. And the term of a bond does not usually expire until the administration has been closed and terminated
in the manner directed by law (Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. vs. White, 115 SW 2d 249). Thus, as long as
the probate court retains jurisdiction of the estate, the bond contemplates a continuing liability (Deobold vs.
Oppermann, supra) notwithstanding the non-renewal of the bond by the defendants-appellants.
It must be remembered that the probate court possesses an all-embracing power over the administrator's bond
and over the administration proceedings and it cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond
answerable for the every purpose for which it was filed (Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil. 1-05). It is the duty of the
courts of probate jurisdiction to guard jealously the estate of the deceased persons by intervening in the
administration thereof in order to remedy or repair any injury that may be done thereto (Dariano vs. Fernandez
Fidalgo, 14 Phil. 62, 67; Sison vs. Azarraga, 30 Phil. 129, 134).
3. In cases like these where the pivotal point is the interpretation of the contracts entered into, it is essential to
scrutinize the very language used in the contracts. The two Indemnity Agreements provided that:
The undersigned, Pastor T. Quebrar and Dr. Francisco Kilayko, jointly and severally, bind
ourselves unto the Luzon Surety Co., Inc. ... in consideration of it having become SURETY upon
Civil Bond in the sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00) ... in favor of the Republic of the
Philippines in Special Proceeding ... dated August 9, 1954, a copy of which is hereto attached
and made an integral part hereof (emphasis supplied; pp. 12-13, 21, ROA p. 9, rec.),
To separately consider these two agreements would then be contrary to the intent of the parties in making them
integrated as a whole.
The contention then of the defendants-appellants that both the Administrator's Bonds and the Indemnity
Agreements ceased to have any force and effect, the former since June 6, 1957 with the approval of the project of
partition and the latter since August 9, 1955 with the non-payment of the stated premiums, is without merit. Such
construction of the said contracts entered into would render futile the purpose for which they were made.
To allow the defendants-appellants to evade their liability under the Indemnity Agreements by non-payment of the
premiums would ultimately lead to giving the administrator the power to diminish or reduce and altogether nullify
his liability under the Administrator's Bonds. As already stated, this is contrary to the intent and purpose of the law
in providing for the administrator's bonds for the protection of the creditors, heirs, legatees, and the estate.
4. Moreover, the lower court was correct in holding that there is no merit in the defendants' claim that payments of
premiums and documentary stamps are conditions precedent to the effectivity of the bonds.
It is worthy to note that there is no provision or condition in the bond to the effect that it will terminate at the end
of the first year if the premium for continuation thereafter is not paid. And there is no clause by which its obligation
is avoided or even suspended by the failure of the obligee to pay an annual premium (U.S. vs. Maryland Casualty
Co. DCMD 129 F. Supp; Dale vs. Continental Insurance Co., 31 SW 266; Equitable Insurance C. vs. Harvey, 40 SW
1092).
It was held in the case of Fourth and First Bank and Trust Co. vs. Fidelity and Deposit Co. (281 SW 785), that "at
the end of the first year, the bond went on, whether or not the premium was paid or not ... Even on a failure to
pay an annual premium, the contract ran on until affirmative action was taken to avoid it. The obligation of the
bond was therefore continuous." And in United States vs. American Surety Co. of New York (172 F2d 135), it was
held that "under a surety bond securing faithful performance of duties by postal employee, liability for default of
employee occurring in any one year would continue, whether or not a renewal premium was paid for a later year."
The payment of the annual premium is to be enforced as part of the consideration, and not as a condition Woodfin
vs. Asheville Mutual Insurance Co., 51 N.C. 558); for the payment was not made a condition to the attaching or
continuing of the contract (National Bank vs. National Surety Co., 144 A 576). The premium is the consideration for
furnishing the bonds and the obligation to pay the same subsists for as long as the liability of the surety shall exist
(Reparations Commission vs. Universal Deep-Sea Fishing Corp., L-21996, 83 SCRA 764, June 27, 1978). And in
Arranz vs. Manila Fidelity and Surety Co., Inc. (101 Phil. 272), the "premium is the consideration for furnishing the
bond or the guaranty. While the liability of the surety subsists the premium is collectible from the principal. Lastly,

in Manila Surety and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Villarama (107 Phil. 891), it was held that "the one-year period
mentioned therein refers not to the duration or lifetime of the bond, but merely to the payment of premiums, and,
consequently, does not affect at all the effectivity or efficacy of such bond. But such non- payment alone of the
premiums for the succeeding years ... does not necessarily extinguish or terminate the effectivity of the counterbond in the absence of an express stipulation in the contract making such non-payment of premiums a cause for
the extinguishment or termination of the undertaking. ...There is no necessity for an extension or renewal of the
agreement because by specific provision thereof, the duration of the counter-bond was made dependent upon the
existence of the original bond."
5. It is true that in construing the liability of sureties, the principle of strictissimi juris applies (Asiatic Petroleum Co.
vs, De Pio, 46 Phil. 167; Standard Oil Co. of N.Y. vs. Cho Siong, 53 Phil. 205); but with the advent of corporate
surety, suretyship became regarded as insurance where, usually, provisions are interpreted most favorably to the
insured and against the insurer because ordinarily the bond is prepared by the insurer who then has the
opportunity to state plainly the term of its obligation (Surety Co. vs. Pauly, 170 US 133, 18 S. Ct. 552.,42 L. Ed.
972).
This rule of construction is not applicable in the herein case because there is no ambiguity in the language of the
bond and more so when the bond is read in connection with the statutory provision referred to.
With the payment of the premium for the first year, the surety already assumed the risk involved, that is, in case
defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar defaults in his administrative duties. The surety became liable under the
bond for the faithful administration of the estate by the administrator/executor. Hence, for as long as defendantappellant Pastor T. Quebrar was administrator of the estates, the bond was held liable and inevitably, the plaintiffappellee's liability subsists since the liability of the sureties is co-extensive with that of the administrator.
WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA DATED NOVEMBER 3, 1964 IS
HEREBY AFFIRMED. WITH COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS-APPELLANTS.

[G.R. No. 118671. January 29, 1996]

THE ESTATE OF HILARIO M. RUIZ, EDMOND RUIZ, Executor, petitioner, vs. THE COURT OF APPEALS
(Former Special Sixth Division), MARIA PILAR RUIZ-MONTES, MARIA CATHRYN RUIZ, CANDICE
ALBERTINE RUIZ, MARIA ANGELINE RUIZ and THE PRESIDING JUDGE OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156, respondents.
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the decision dated November 10, 1994 and
the resolution datedJanuary 5, 1995 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045.
The facts show that on June 27, 1987, Hilario M. Ruiz1 executed a holographic will naming as his heirs his only
son, Edmond Ruiz, his adopted daughter, private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes, and his three
granddaughters, private respondents Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline, all children of Edmond
Ruiz. The testator bequeathed to his heirs substantial cash, personal and real properties and named Edmond Ruiz
executor of his estate.2
On April 12, 1988, Hilario Ruiz died. Immediately thereafter, the cash component of his estate was distributed
among Edmond Ruiz and private respondents in accordance with the decedents will. For unbeknown
reasons, Edmond, the named executor, did not take any action for the probate of his fathers holographic will.
On June 29, 1992, four years after the testators death, it was private respondent Maria Pilar Ruiz Montes who
filed before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig, a petition for the probate and approval of Hilario Ruizs will
and for the issuance of letters testamentary to Edmond Ruiz.3 Surprisingly, Edmond opposed the petition on the
ground that the will was executed under undue influence.
On November 2, 1992, one of the properties of the estate - the house and lot at No. 2 Oliva Street, Valle
Verde IV, Pasig which the testator bequeathed to Maria Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline 4 - was
leased out by Edmond Ruiz to third persons.
On January 19, 1993, the probate court ordered Edmond to deposit with the Branch Clerk of Court the rental
deposit and payments totalling P540,000.00 representing the one-year lease of the Valle Verde property. In
compliance, on January 25, 1993, Edmond turned over the amount of P348,583.56, representing the balance of
the rent after deducting P191,416.14 for repair and maintenance expenses on the estate.5
In March 1993, Edmond moved for the release of P50,000.00 to pay the real estate taxes on the real
properties of the estate. The probate court approved the release of P7,722.006
On May 14, 1993, Edmond withdrew his opposition to the probate of the will. Consequently, the probate
court, on May 18, 1993, admitted the will to probate and ordered the issuance of letters testamentary
to Edmond conditioned upon the filing of a bond in the amount of P50,000.00. The letters testamentary were
issued on June 23, 1993.
On July 28, 1993, petitioner Testate Estate of Hilario Ruiz as executor, filed an Ex-Parte Motion for Release of
Funds. It prayed for the release of the rent payments deposited with the Branch Clerk of Court. Respondent Montes
opposed the motion and concurrently filed a Motion for Release of Funds to Certain Heirs and Motion for Issuance
of Certificate of Allowance of Probate Will. Montes prayed for the release of the said rent payments to Maria
Cathryn, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeline and for the distribution of the testators properties, specifically the
Valle Verde property and the Blue Ridge apartments, in accordance with the provisions of the holographic will.
On August 26, 1993, the probate court denied petitioners motion for release of funds but granted respondent
Montes motion in view of petitioners lack of opposition. It thus ordered the release of the rent payments to the
decedents three granddaughters. It further ordered the delivery of the titleds to and possession of the properties
bequeathed to the three granddaughters and respondent Montes upon the filing of a bond of P50,000.00.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration alleging that he actually filed his opposition to respondent Montes motion
for release of rent payments which opposition the court failed to consider. Petitioner likewise reiterated his previous
motion for release of funds.
On November 23, 1993, petitioner, through counsel, manifested that he was withdrawing his motion for
release of funds in view of the fact that the lease contract over Valle Verde property had been renewed for another
year.7
Despite petitioners manifestation, the probate court, on December 22, 1993, ordered the release of the funds
to Edmond but only such amount as may be necessary to cover the espenses of administration and allowanceas for
support of the testators three granddaughters subject to collation and deductible from their share in the
inheritance. The court, however, held in abeyance the release of the titles to respondent Montes and the three

granddaughters until the lapse of six months from the date of firast publication of the notice to creditors. 8The Court
stated thus:
xxx xxx xxx
After consideration of the arguments set forth thereon by the parties, the court resolves to allow Administrator
Edmond M. Ruiz to take possession of the rental payments deposited with the Clerk of Court, Pasig Regional Trial
Court, but only such amount as may be necessary to cover the expenses of administration and allowances for
support of Maria Cathryn Veronique, Candice Albertine and Maria Angeli, which are subject to collation and
deductible from the share in the inheritance of said heirs and insofar as they exceed the fruits or rents pertaining
to them.
As to the release of the titles bequeathed to petitioner Maria Pilar Ruiz-Montes and the above-named heirs, the
same is hereby reconsidered and held in abeyance until the lapse of six (6) months from the date of first
publication of Notice to Creditors.
WHEREFORE, Administrator Edmond M. Ruiz is hereby ordered to submit an accounting of the expenses necessary
for administration including provisions for the support Of Maria Cathryn Veronique Ruiz, Candice Albertine Ruiz and
Maria Angeli Ruiz before the amount required can be withdrawn and cause the publication of the notice to
creditors with reasonable dispatch.9
Petitioner assailed this order before the Court of Appeals. Finding no grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent judge, the appellate court dismissed the petition and sustained the probate courts order in a decision
dated November 10, 199410 and a resolution dated January 5, 1995.11
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner claims that:
THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK
OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN AFFIRMING AND CONFIRMING THE ORDER OF RESPONDENT REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF PASIG, BRANCH 156, DATED DECEMBER 22, 1993, WHICH WHEN GIVEN DUE COURSE AND IS
EFFECTED WOULD: (1) DISALLOW THE EXECUTOR/ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE OF THE LATE HILARIO M.
RUIZ TO TAKE POSSESSION OF ALL THE REAL AND PERSONAL PROPERTIES OF THE ESTATE; (2) GRANT SUPPORT,
DURING THE PENDENCY OF THE SETTLEMENT OF AN ESTATE, TO CERTAIN PERSONS NOT ENTITLED THERETO;
AND (3) PREMATURELY PARTITION AND DISTRIBUTE THE ESTATE PURSUANT TO THE PROVISIONS OF THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL EVEN BEFORE ITS INTRINSIC VALIDITY HAS BEEN DETERMINED, AND DESPITE THE
EXISTENCE OF UNPAID DEBTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE ESTATE.12
The issue for resolution is whether the probate court, after admitting the will to probate but before payment
of the estates debts and obligations, has the authority: (1) to grant an allowance from the funds of the estate for
the support of the testators grandchildren; (2) to order the release of the titles to certain heirs; and (3) to grant
possession of all properties of the estate to the executor of the will.
On the matter of allowance, Section 3 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Sec. 3. Allowance to widow and family. - The widow and minor or incapacitated children of a deceased person,
during the settlement of the estate, shall receive therefrom under the direction of the court, such allowance as are
provided by law.
Petitioner alleges that this provision only gives the widow and the minor or incapacitated children of the
deceased the right to receive allowances for support during the settlement of estate proceedings. He contends that
the testators three granddaughters do not qualify for an allowance because they are not incapacitated and are no
longer minors but of legal age, married and gainfully employed. In addition, the provision expressly states children
of the deceased which excludes the latters grandchildren.
It is settled that allowances for support under Section 3 of Rule 83 should not be limited to the minor or
incapacitated children of the deceased. Article 18813 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, the substantive law in force
at the time of the testators death, provides that during the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, the deceaseds
legitimate spouse and children, regardless of their age, civil status or gainful employment, are entitled to
provisional support from the funds of the estate.14 The law is rooted on the fact that the right and duty to support,
especially the right to education, subsist even beyond the age of majority.15

Be that as it may, grandchildren are not entitled to provisional support from the funds of the decedents
estate. The law clearly limits the allowance to widow and children and does not extend it to the deceaseds
grandchildren, regardless of their minority or incapacity.16 It was error, therefore, for the appellate court to sustain
the probate courts order granting an allowance to the grandchildren of the testator pending settlement of his
estate.
Respondent courts also erred when they ordered the release of the titles of the bequeathed properties to
private respondents six months after the date of first publication of notice to creditors. An order releasing titles to
properties of the estate amounts to an advance distribution of the estate which is allowed only under the following
conditions:
Sec. 2. Advance distribution in special proceedings. - Nothwithstanding a pending controversy or appeal in
proceedings to settle the estate of a decedent, the court may, in its discretion and upon such terms as it may deem
proper and just, permit that such part of the estate as may not be affected by the controversy or appeal be
distributed among the heirs or legatees, upon compliance with the conditions set forth in Rule 90 of these Rules. 17
And Rule 90 provides that:
Sec. 1. When order for distribution of residue made. - When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax, if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with
law, have been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or administrator, or of a person interested in the
estate, and after hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the persons entitled to the same,
naming them and the proportions, or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may demand and recover
their respective shares from the executor or administrator, or any other person having the same in his possession.
If there is a controversy before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in
ordinary cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the obligations above-mentioned has been made
or provided for, unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to be fixed by the court,
conditioned for the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs. 18
In settlement of estate proceedings, the distribution of the estate properties can only be made: (1) after all the
debts, funeral charges, expenses of administration, allowance to the widow, and estate tax have been paid; or (2)
before payment of said obligations only if the distributees or any of them gives a bond in a sum fixed by the court
conditioned upon the payment of said obligations within such time as the court directs, or when provision is made
to meet those obligations.19
In the case at bar, the probate court ordered the release of the titles to the Valle Verde property and the Blue
Ridge apartments to the private respondents after the lapse of six months from the date of first publication of the
notice to creditors. The questioned order speaks of notice to creditors, not payment of debts and obligations.
Hilario Ruiz allegedly left no debts when he died but the taxes on his estate had not hitherto been paid, much less
ascertained. The estate tax is one of those obligations that must be paid before distribution of the estate.If not yet
paid, the rule requires that the distributees post a bond or make such provisions as to meet the said tax obligation
in proportion to their respective shares in the inheritance.20 Notably, at the time the order was issued the
properties of the estate had not yet been inventoried and appraised.
It was also too early in the day for the probate court to order the release of the titles six months after
admitting the will to probate. The probate of a will is conclusive as to its due execution and extrinsic validity21 and
settles only the question of whether the testator, being of sound mind, freely executed it in accordance with the
formalities prescribed by law.22 Questions as to the intrinsic validity and efficacy of the provisions of the will, the
legality of any devise or legacy may be raised even after the will has been authenticated.23
The intrinsic validity of Hilarios holographic will was controverted by petitioner before the probate court in his
Reply to Montes Opposition to his motion for release of funds24 and his motion for reconsideration of the August 26,
1993 order of the said court.25 Therein, petitioner assailed the distributive shares of the devisees and legatees
inasmuch as his fathers will included the estate of his mother and allegedly impaired his legitime as an intestate
heir of his mother. The Rules provide that if there is a controversy as to who are the lawful heirs of the decedent
and their distributive shares in his estate, the probate court shall proceed to hear and decide the same as in
ordinary cases.26
Still and all, petitioner cannot correctly claim that the assailed order deprived him of his right to take
possession of all the real and personal properties of the estate. The right of an executor or administrator to the
possession and management of the real and personal properties of the deceased is not absolute and can only be

exercised so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses of administration,27 Section 3 of
Rule 84 of the Revised Rules of Court explicitly provides:
Sec. 3. Executor or administrator to retain whole estate to pay debts, and to administer estate not willed. - An
executor or administrator shall have the right to the possession and management of the real as well as the
personal estate of the deceased so long as it is necessary for the payment of the debts and expenses for
administration.28
When petitioner moved for further release of the funds deposited with the clerk of court, he had been previously
granted by the probate court certain amounts for repair and maintenance expenses on the properties of the estate,
and payment of the real estate taxes thereon. But petitioner moved again for the release of additional funds for the
same reasons he previously cited. It was correct for the probate court to require him to submit an accounting of
the necessary expenses for administration before releasing any further money in his favor.
It was relevantly noted by the probate court that petitioner had deposited with it only a portion of the oneyear rental income from the Valle Verde property. Petitioner did not deposit its succeeding rents after renewal of
the lease.29 Neither did he render an accounting of such funds.
Petitioner must be reminded that his right of ownership over the properties of his father is merely inchoate as
long as the estate has not been fully settled and partitioned.30 As executor, he is a mere trustee of his fathers
estate. The funds of the estate in his hands are trust funds and he is held to the duties and responsibilities of a
trustee of the highest order.31 He cannot unilaterally assign to himself and possess all his parents properties and
the fruits thereof without first submitting an inventory and appraisal of all real and personal properties of the
deceased, rendering a true account of his administration, the expenses of administration, the amount of the
obligations and estate tax, all of which are subject to a determination by the court as to their veracity, propriety
and justness.32
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 33045 affirming
the order dated December 22, 1993 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 156, Pasig in SP Proc. No. 10259 are
affirmed with the modification that those portions of the order granting an allowance to the testators grandchildren
and ordering the release of the titles to the private respondents upon notice to creditors are annulled and set aside.
Respondent judge is ordered to proceed with dispatch in the proceedings below.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 74618. September 2, 1992.]


ANA LIM KALAW, Petitioner, v. THE HONORABLE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE HONORABLE
RICARDO B. DIAZ and ROSA LIM KALAW, Respondents.
Alberto R. De Joya for Petitioner.
Cheng, Martinez & Associates for Private Respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. REMEDIAL LAW; SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS; ACCOUNTABILITY OF ADMINISTRATOR, WHEN TO RENDER
ACCOUNTS; RULE AND EXCEPTION. The rendering of an accounting by an administrator of his administration
within one year from his appointment is mandatory, as shown by the use of the word "shall" in said rule. The only
exception is when the Court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims against the
estate or for paying the debts or disposing the assets of the estate, which do not exist in the case at bar.
2. ID.; ID.; REMOVAL OF ADMINISTRATOR; JUSTIFIED, FOR NEGLIGENCE TO RENDER AN ACCOUNTING OF HIS
ADMINISTRATION AS REQUIRED BY LAW. subsequent compliance in rendering an accounting report did not
purge her of her negligence in not rendering an accounting for more than six years, which justifies petitioners
removal as administratrix and the appointment of private respondent in her place as mandated by Section 2 of
Rule 82 of the Rules of Court. As correctly stated by the appellate court: "The settled rule is that the removal of an
administrator under Section 2 of Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the Court appointing him. As aptly expressed
by the Supreme Court in the case of Degala v. Ceniza and Umipig, 78 Phil. 791, the sufficiency of any ground for
removal should thus be determined by said court, whose sensibilities are, in the first place, affected by any act or
omission on the part of the administrator not comfortable to or in disregard of the rules or the orders of the court.
Consequently, appellate tribunals are disinclined to interfere with the action taken by a probate court in the matter
of the removal of an executor or administrator unless positive error or gross abuse of discretion is shown.
(Borromeo v. Borromeo, 97 Phil. 549; Matute v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 768.) In the case at bar, the removal
of petitioner as administratrix was on the ground of her failure for 6 years and 3 months from the time she was
appointed as administratrix to render an accounting of her administration as required by Section 8 of Rule 85 of the
Rules of Court."
DECISION
NOCON, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction to annul and set aside the
decision dated December 27, 1985 of the then Intermediate Appellate Court 1 affirming the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 27 in Special Proceeding No. 84520 removing petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw as
administratrix and appointing private respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw in her stead as the administratrix of the estate of
their late father Carlos Lim Kalaw.
It appears on record that Carlos Lim Kalaw died intestate on July 8, 1970.chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
On June 8, 1972, Victoria Lim Kalaw filed an amended petition for the issuance of Letters of Administration with the
then Court of First Instance of Manila in Special Proceeding No. 84520 naming Ana Lim Kalaw (63 years old),
Victoria Lim Kalaw (57 years old), Pura Lim Kalaw (53 years old) and Rosa Lim Kalaw (43 years old) as the
surviving heirs of the late Carlos Lim Kalaw.
On April 25, 1974, the trial court issued an order appointing petitioner Ana Lim Kalaw as special administratrix.
Consequently, petitioner filed a preliminary inventory of all the properties which came into her possession as
special administratrix of the estate of her late father on June 3, 1974.
On October 6, 1977, the trial court issued another order appointing petitioner as the judicial administratrix of said
estate and a Letter of Administration was issued to the petitioner after the latter took her oath of office on
November 11, 1977.
Thereafter, Jose Lim filed a motion to require petitioner to render an accounting of her administration of said estate
which was granted by respondent Judge Ricardo Diaz in an order dated December 8, 1982.chanrobles law library

On July 1, 1983, respondent judge issued another order requiring petitioner to render an accounting of her
administration with the express instruction that said order be personally served upon the petitioner since the order
dated December 8, 1982 was returned to the Court unserved. However, said order was also not received by the
petitioner.
On January 31, 1984, private respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw together with her sisters Victoria and Pura Lim Kalaw
filed a motion to remove petitioner as administratrix of their fathers estate and to appoint instead private
respondent on the ground of negligence on the part of petitioner in her duties for failing to render an accounting of
her administration since her appointment as administratrix more than six years ago in violation of Section 8 of Rule
85 of the Revised Rules of Court. The motion was set for hearing on February 10, 1984.
On February 21, 1984, respondent judge issued another order requiring petitioner to render an accounting within
30 days from receipt thereof which she did on March 22, 1984. She likewise filed on the same date, her Opposition
to the motion praying for her removal as administratrix alleging that the delay in rendering said accounting was
due to the fact that Judge Carlos Sundiam, who was the judge where the intestate proceeding was assigned, had
then been promoted to the Court of Appeals causing said sala to be vacated for a considerable length of time, while
newly-appointed Judge Joel Tiongco died of cardiac arrest soon after his appointment to said vacancy, so much so
that she did not know to whom to render an accounting report.
In their Rejoinder and Manifestation, private respondent and her co-movant alleged that the ground relied upon for
petitioners removal was not the delay but her failure or neglect to render an accounting of all the properties which
came into her possession as required under Section 1 of Rule 83 of the Revised Rules of Court.chanrobles.com :
virtual law library
On January 4, 1985, the trial court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"From the foregoing, the Court finds that Administratrix Ana Lim Kalaw violated the provisions of Section 8, Rule 85
of the Rules of Court for not rendering an account of her administration within one (1) year from date of receipt of
the letters of administration and this constitutes negligence on her part to perform her duty as Administratrix and
under Section 2, Rule 82 of the Rules of Court, neglect on the part of the administratrix to render her account is a
ground for her removal as an administratrix. Finding the instant motion to remove Administratrix to be meritorious
and well-taken, the same is, as it is hereby, GRANTED.
WHEREFORE, Administratrix Ana Lim Kalaw is hereby REMOVED as such Administratrix of the Estate of the late
Carlos Lim Kalaw." 2
On September 2, 1985, Petitioner, without waiting for the resolution of the motion for reconsideration with the trial
court, filed a Petition for Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order with the then Intermediate
Appellate Court to annul and set aside the following Orders issued by respondent Judge Diaz, as
follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a. Order dated January 4, 1985 removing the Petitioner as Administratrix of the estate of the late Carlos Lim
Kalaw;
b. Order dated April 30, 1985 denying Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of January 4, 1985;
c. Order dated May 13, 1985 appointing private Respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw, as Administratrix of said
Estate;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
d. Order dated June 19, 1985 directing the tenants and/or lessees of the Carlos Lim Kalaw building to deposit the
rentals in court and authorizing private respondent to break open the premises in said building." 3
On December 27, 1985, the appellate court rendered a decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DENIED. However, respondent Judge is directed to require private
respondent Rosa Lim Kalaw to post the appropriate administrators bond within ten (10) days from notice hereof.
With costs against petitioner." 4
On January 21, 1986, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of said decision which was however denied for
lack of merit on May 12, 1986.
Hence, this petition alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court in sustaining respondent
Judge Diaz order removing her as judicial administratrix considering that she had already submitted an accounting
report covering the period from December, 1977 to December, 1983 in compliance with respondents Judge order.

Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Revised Rules of Court provides that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph


"SEC. 8. When executor or administrator to render account. Every executor or administrator shall render an
account of his administration within one (1) year from the time of receiving letters testamentary or of
administration, unless the court otherwise directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims against, or
paying the debts of, the estate, or for disposing of the estate; and he shall render such further accounts as the
court may require until the estate is wholly settled." chanrobles law library
The rendering of an accounting by an administrator of his administration within one year from his appointment is
mandatory, as shown by the use of the word "shall" in said rule. The only exception is when the Court otherwise
directs because of extensions of time for presenting claims against the estate or for paying the debts or disposing
the assets of the estate, which do not exist in the case at bar.
Furthermore, petitioners excuse that the sala where the intestate proceeding was pending was vacant most of the
time deserves scant consideration since petitioner never attempted to file with said court an accounting report of
her administration despite the fact that at one time or another, Judge Sundiam and Judge Tiongco were presiding
over said sala during their incumbency.
Likewise, her subsequent compliance in rendering an accounting report did not purge her of her negligence in not
rendering an accounting for more than six years, which justifies petitioners removal as administratrix and the
appointment of private respondent in her place as mandated by Section 2 of Rule 82 of the Rules of Court. 5
As correctly stated by the appellate court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The settled rule is that the removal of an administrator under Section 2 of Rule 82 lies within the discretion of the
Court appointing him. As aptly expressed by the Supreme Court in the case of Degala v. Ceniza and Umipig, 78
Phil. 791, the sufficiency of any ground for removal should thus be determined by said court, whose sensibilities
are, in the first place, affected by any act or omission on the part of the administrator not comfortable to or in
disregard of the rules or the orders of the court. Consequently, appellate tribunals are disinclined to interfere with
the action taken by a probate court in the matter of the removal of an executor or administrator unless positive
error or gross abuse of discretion is shown. (Borromeo v. Borromeo, 97 Phil. 549; Matute v. Court of Appeals, 26
SCRA 768.)chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
In the case at bar, the removal of petitioner as administratrix was on the ground of her failure for 6 years and 3
months from the time she was appointed as administratrix to render an accounting of her administration as
required by Section 8 of Rule 85 of the Rules of Court." 6
As to petitioners contention that she was denied due process when she was removed as administratrix since no
hearing was held on the motion for her removal, this does not deserve serious consideration. The appellate courts
disposal of this issue is in accordance with the law and evidence. Said the Court:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Petitioners contention that her removal was without due process is certainly not borne out by the records. There
has been a hearing and, in fact, several pleadings had been filed by the parties on the issue before the order of
removal was issued. Thus, the motion to remove petitioner as administratrix was filed on January 3, 1984, which
motion was set for hearing on February 10, 1984. Petitioner filed an opposition to the motion on March 22, 1984.
This was followed by a Rejoinder and Manifestation filed on April 6, 1984 by private Respondent. The order for
petitioners removal was issued on January 4, 1985, or after almost a year from the time the motion to remove her
was filed. Not satisfied with this order, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration on January 14, 1985, to which
motion private respondent filed an opposition on January 25, 1985. Petitioner filed a rejoinder to the opposition on
February 18, 1985. Respondent Judge issued his order denying the motion for reconsideration on April 30, 1985.
This recital of events indubitably disproves petitioners allegation that she was not afforded due process." 7
WHEREFORE, finding no merit in the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with preliminary injunction,
the same is hereby DENIED. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 156403. March 31, 2005]


JOSEPHINE PAHAMOTANG and ELEANOR PAHAMOTANG-BASA, Petitioners, v. THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL
BANK (PNB) and the HEIRS OF ARTURO ARGUNA, Respondents.
Assailed and sought to be set aside in this appeal by way of a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court are the following issuances of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65290, to wit:

1. Decision dated March 20, 2002,1 granting the appeal and reversing the appealed August 7, 1998 decision of
the Regional Trial Court at Davao City; andcralawlibrary
2. Resolution dated November 20, 2002, denying herein petitioners' motion for reconsideration.2
The factual background:
On July 1, 1972, Melitona Pahamotang died. She was survived by her husband Agustin Pahamotang, and their
eight (8) children, namely: Ana, Genoveva, Isabelita, Corazon, Susana, Concepcion and herein
petitioners Josephine and Eleonor, all surnamed Pahamotang.
On September 15, 1972, Agustin filed with the then Court of First Instance of Davao City a petition for issuance of
letters administration over the estate of his deceased wife. The petition, docketed asSpecial Case No. 1792, was
raffled to Branch VI of said court, hereinafter referred to as theintestate court.
In his petition, Agustin identified petitioners Josephine and Eleonor as among the heirs of his deceased spouse. It
appears that Agustin was appointed petitioners' judicial guardian in an earlier case - Special Civil Case No. 1785 also of the CFI of Davao City, Branch VI.
On December 7, 1972, the intestate court issued an order granting Agustin's petition.
On July 6, 1973, respondent Philippine National Bank (PNB) and Agustin executed an Amendment of Real and
Chattel Mortgages with Assumption of Obligation. It appears that earlier, or on December 14, 1972, the
intestate court approved the mortgage to PNB of certain assets of the estate to secure an obligation in the amount
of P570,000.00. Agustin signed the document in behalf of (1) the estate of Melitona; (2) daughters Ana and
Corazon; and (3) a logging company named Pahamotang Logging Enterprises, Inc. (PLEI) which appeared to have
an interest in the properties of the estate. Offered as securities are twelve (12) parcels of registered land, ten (10)
of which are covered by transfer certificates of title (TCT) No. 2431, 7443, 8035, 11465, 21132, 4038, 24327,
24326, 31226 and 37786, all of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City, while the remaining two (2) parcels by TCTs
No. (3918) 1081 and (T-2947) 562 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao del Norte and Davao del Sur, respectively.
On July 16, 1973, Agustin filed with the intestate court a Petition for Authority To Increase Mortgage on the
above mentioned properties of the estate.
In an Order dated July 18, 1973, the intestate court granted said petition.
On October 5, 1974, Agustin again filed with the intestate court another petition, Petition for Declaration of
Heirs And For Authority To Increase Indebtedness, whereunder he alleged the necessity for an additional
loan from PNB to capitalize the business of the estate, the additional loan to be secured by additional collateral in
the form of a parcel of land covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-7131 registered in the name of
Heirs of Melitona Pahamotang. In the same petition, Agustin prayed the intestate court to declare him and Ana,
Genoveva, Isabelita, Corazon, Susana, Concepcion and herein petitioners Josephine and Eleonor as the only heirs
of Melitona.
In an Order of October 19, 1974, the intestate court granted Agustin authority to seek additional loan from PNB
in an amount not exceeding P5,000,000.00 to be secured by the land covered by OCT No. P-7131 of the Registry of
Deeds of Davao Oriental, but denied Agustin's prayer for declaration of heirs for being premature.
On October 22, 1974, a real estate mortgage contract for P4,500,000.00 was executed by PNB and Agustin in his
several capacities as: (1) administrator of the estate of his late wife; (2) general manager of PLEI; (3) attorney-infact of spouses Isabelita Pahamotang and Orlando Ruiz, and spouses Susana Pahamotang and Octavio Zamora;
and (4) guardian of daughters Concepcion and Genoveva and petitioners Josephine and Eleonor. Offered as
securities for the additional loan are three (3) parcels of registered land covered by TCTs No. T-21132, 37786 and
43264.
On February 19, 1980, Agustin filed with the intestate court a Petition (Request for Judicial Authority To Sell
Certain Properties of the Estate), therein praying for authority to sell to Arturo Arguna the properties of the
estate covered by TCTs No. 7443, 8035, 11465, 24326 and 31226 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao City, and also
TCT No. (T-3918) T-1081 of the Registry of Deeds of Davao del Norte.

On February 27, 1980, Agustin yet filed with the intestate court another petition, this time a Petition To Sell the
Properties of the Estate, more specifically referring to the property covered by OCT No. P-7131, in favor
of PLEI.
In separate Orders both dated February 25, 1980, the intestate court granted Agustin authority to sell estate
properties, in which orders the court also required all the heirs of Melitona to give their express conformity to the
disposal of the subject properties of the estate and to sign the deed of sale to be submitted to the same court.
Strangely, the two (2) orders were dated two (2) days earlier than February 27, 1980, the day Agustin supposedly
filed his petition.
In a motion for reconsideration, Agustin prayed the intestate court for the amendment of one of itsFebruary 25,
1980 Orders by canceling the requirement of express conformity of the heirs as a condition for the disposal of the
aforesaid properties.
In its Order of January 7, 1981, the intestate court granted Agustin's prayer.
Hence, on March 4, 1981, estate properties covered by TCTs No. 7443,11465, 24326, 31226, 8035, (T-2947) 662
and (T-3918) T-1081, were sold to respondent Arturo Arguna, while the property covered by OCT No. P-7131
was sold to PLEI. Consequent to such sales, vendees Arguna and PLEIfiled witt the intestate court a motion for the
approval of the corresponding deeds of sale in their favor. And, in an Order dated March 9, 1981, the intestate
court granted the motion.
Thereafter, three (3) daughters of Agustin, namely, Ana, Isabelita and Corazon petitioned the intestate court for
the payment of their respective shares from the sales of estate properties, which was granted by the intestate
court.
Meanwhile, the obligation secured by mortgages on the subject properties of the estate was never satisfied. Hence,
on the basis of the real estate mortgage contracts dated July 6, 1973 and October 22, 1974, mortgagor PNB
filed a petition for the extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgage.
Petitioner Josephine filed a motion with the intestate court for the issuance of an order restraining PNB from
extrajudicially foreclosing the mortgage. In its Order dated August 19, 1983, the intestate court denied Josephine's
motion. Hence, PNB was able to foreclose the mortgage in its favor.
Petitioners Josephine and Eleanor, together with their sister Susana Pahamatong-Zamora, filed motions with the
intestate court to set aside its Orders of December 14, 1972 [Note: the order dated July 18, 1973 contained
reference to an order dated December 14, 1972 approving the mortgage to PNB of certain properties of the
estate], July 18, 1973, October 19, 1974 andFebruary 25, 1980.
In an Order dated September 5, 1983, the intestate court denied the motions, explaining:
"Carefully analyzing the aforesaid motions and the grounds relied upon, as well as the opposition thereto, the Court
holds that the supposed defects and/or irregularities complained of are mainly formal or procedural and not
substantial, for which reason, the Court is not persuaded to still disturb all the orders, especially that interests of
the parties to the various contracts already authorized or approved by the Orders sought to be set aside will be
adversely affected".3
Such was the state of things when, on March 20, 1984, in the Regional Trial Court at Davao City, petitioners
Josephine and Eleanor, together with their sister Susana, filed their complaint forNullification of Mortgage
Contracts and Foreclosure Proceedings and Damages against Agustin, PNB, Arturo Arguna, PLEI, the
Provincial Sheriff of Mati, Davao Oriental, the Provincial Sheriff of Tagum, Davao del Norte and the City Sheriff of
Davao City. In their complaint, docketed asCivil Case No. 16,802 which was raffled to Branch 12 of the court, the
sisters Josephine, Eleanor and Susana prayed for the following reliefs:
"1.) The real estate mortgage contracts of July 6, 1973 and that of October 2, 1974, executed by and between
defendants PNB AND PLEI be declared null and void ab initio;
2.) Declaring the foreclosure proceedings conducted by defendants-sheriffs, insofar as they pertain to the assets of
the estate of Melitona L. Pahamotang, including the auction sales thereto, and any and all proceedings taken
thereunder, as null and void ab initio;

3.) Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Doc. No. 473; Page No.96; Book No.VIII, Series of 1981 of the Notarial
Registry of Paquito G. Balasabas of Davao City evidencing the sale/transfer of the real properties described therein
to defendant Arturo S. Arguna, as null and void ab initio;
4.) Declaring the Deed of Absolute Sale, Doc. No. 474; Page No. 96, Book No. VIII, series of 1981 of the Notarial
Registry of Paquito G. Balasabas of Davao City, evidencing the sale/transfer of real properties to PLEI as null and
void ab initio;
5.) For defendants to pay plaintiffs moral damages in such sums as may be found to be just and equitable under
the premises;
6.) For defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the expenses incurred in connection with this litigation;
7.) For defendants to pay plaintiffs, jointly and severally attorney's fees in an amount to be proven during the trial;
8.) For defendants to pay the costs of the suit".4
PNB moved to dismiss the complaint, which the trial court granted in its Order of January 11, 1985.
However, upon motion of the plaintiffs, the trial court reversed itself and ordered defendant PNB to file its answer.
Defendant PNB did file its answer with counterclaim, accompanied by a cross-claim against co-defendants Agustin
and PLEI.
During the ensuing pre-trial conference, the parties submitted the following issues for the resolution of the trial
court, to wit:
"1. Whether or not the Real Estate Mortgage contracts executed on July 6, 1973 and October 2, 1974 (sic) by and
between defendants Pahamotang Logging Enterprises, Inc. and the Philippine National Bank are null and
void?cralawlibrary
2. Whether or not the foreclosure proceedings conducted by defendants-Sheriffs, insofar as they affect the assets
of the Estate of Melitona Pahamotang, including the public auction sales thereof, are null and void?cralawlibrary
3. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of defendant Arturo Arguna entered as Doc. No. 473; Page
No. 96; Book No. VIII, series of 1981 of the Notarial Register of Notary Public Paquito Balasabas is null and
void?cralawlibrary
4. Whether or not the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of defendant Pahamotang Logging Enterprises, Inc. entered
as Doc. No. 474; Page No. 96; Book No. VIII, series of 1981 of the Notarial Register of Notary Public Paquito
Balasabas is null and void?cralawlibrary
5. On defendant PNB's cross-claim, in the event the mortgage contracts and the foreclosure proceedings are
declared null and void, whether or not defendant Pahamotang Logging Enterprises, Inc. is liable to the
PNB?cralawlibrary
6. Whether or not the defendants are liable to the plaintiffs for damages?cralawlibrary
7. Whether or not the plaintiffs are liable to the defendants for damages"?5
With defendant Arturo Arguna's death on October 31, 1990, the trial court ordered his substitution by his heirs:
Heirs of Arturo Alguna.
In a Decision dated August 7, 1998, the trial court in effect rendered judgment for the plaintiffs. We quote the
decision's dispositive portion:
"WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Declaring the Mortgage Contracts of July 6, 1973 and October 22, 1974, as well as the foreclosure proceedings,
void insofar as it affects the share, interests and property rights of the plaintiffs in the assets of the estate of
Melitona Pahamotang, but valid with respect to the other parties;
2. Declaring the deeds of sale in favor of defendants Pahamotang Logging Enterprises, Inc. and Arturo Arguna as
void insofar as it affects the shares, interests and property rights of herein plaintiffs in the assets of the estate of
Melitona Pahamotang but valid with respect to the other parties to the said deeds of sale.
3. Denying all the other claims of the parties for lack of strong, convincing and competent evidence.
No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED".6
From the aforementioned decision of the trial court, PNB, PLEI and the Heirs of Arturo Arguna went on appeal to
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 65290. While the appeal was pending, the CA granted the motion of
Susana Pahamatong-Zamora to withdraw from the case.
As stated at the threshold hereof, the Court of Appeals, in its Decision dated March 20, 2002,7reversed the
appealed decision of the trial court and dismissed the petitioners' complaint in Civil Case No. 16,802, thus:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The assailed August 07, 1998 Decision rendered by the Regional
Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 12, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one is entered DISMISSING
the complaint filed in Civil Case No. 16,802.
SO ORDERED.
The appellate court ruled that petitioners, while ostensibly questioning the validity of the contracts of
mortgage and sale entered into by their father Agustin, were essentially attacking collaterally the
validity of the four (4) orders of the intestate court in Special Case No. 1792, namely:
1. Order dated July 18, 1973, granting Agustin's Petition for Authority to Increase Mortgage;
2. Order dated October 19, 1974, denying Agustin's petition for declaration of heirs but giving him authority to
seek additional loan from PNB;
3. Order dated February 25, 1980, giving Agustin permission to sell properties of the estate to Arturo Arguna
and PLEI; andcralawlibrary
4. Order dated January 7, 1981, canceling the requirement of express conformity by the heirs as a condition for
the disposal of estate properties.
To the appellate court, petitioners committed a fatal error of mounting a collateral attack on the foregoing orders
instead of initiating a direct action to annul them. Explains the Court of Appeals:
"A null and void judgment is susceptible to direct as well as collateral attack. A direct attack against a judgment is
made through an action or proceeding the main object of which is to annul, set aside, or enjoin the enforcement of
such judgment, if not carried into effect; or if the property has been disposed of, the aggrieved party may sue for
recovery. A collateral attack is made when, in another action to obtain a different relief, an attack on the judgment
is made as an incident in said action. This is proper only when the judgment, on its fact, is null and void, as where
it is patent that the court which rendered such judgment has no jurisdiction. A judgment void on its face may also
be attacked directly.
xxx
Perusing the above arguments and comparing them with the settled ruling, the plaintiffs-appellees [now
petitioners], we believe had availed themselves of the wrong remedy before the trial court. It is clear that they are
collaterally attacking the various orders of the intestate court in an action for the nullification of the subject
mortgages, and foreclosure proceedings in favor of PNB, and the deeds of sale in favor of Arguna. Most of their

arguments stemmed from their allegations that the various orders of the intestate court were issued without a
notification given to them. An examination, however, of the July 18, 1973 order shows that the heirs of Melitona
have knowledge of the petition to increase mortgage filed by Agustin, thus:
`The petitioner testified that all his children including those who are of age have no objection to this petition and,
as matter of fact, Ana Pahamotang, one of the heirs of Melitona Pahamotang, who is the vice-president of the
logging corporation, is the one at present negotiating for the increase of mortgage with the Philippine National
Bank.'
The presumption arising from those statements of the intestate court is that the heirs were notified of the petition
for the increase of mortgage.
The same can be seen in the October 19, 1974 order:
`The records show that all the known heirs, namely Ana, Isabelita, Corazon, Susana, including the incompetent
Genoveva, and the minors Josephine, Eleanor and Concepcion all surnamed were notified of the hearing of the
petition.'
On the other hand, the February 25, 1980 order required Agustin to obtain first express conformity from the heirs
before the subject property be sold to Arguna. The fact that this was reconsidered by the intestate court in its
January 07, 1981 is of no moment. The questioned orders are valid having been issued in accordance with law and
procedure. The problem with the plaintiffs-appellees is that, in trying to nullify the subject mortgages and the
foreclosure proceedings in favor of PNB and the deeds of sale in favor of Arguna, they are assailing the aforesaid
orders of the intestate court and in attacking the said orders, they attached documents that they believe would
warrant the conclusion that the assailed orders are null and void. This is a clear collateral attack of the orders of
the intestate court which is not void on its face and which cannot be allowed in the present action. The defects
alleged by the plaintiff-appellees are not apparent on the face of the assailed orders. Their recourse is to ask for
the declaration of nullity of the said orders, not in a collateral manner, but a direct action to annul the same". 8
The same court added that petitioners' failure to assail said orders at the most opportune time constitutes laches:
"In their complaint below, plaintiffs, appellees are assailing in their present action, four orders of the intestate
court namely: July 18, 1973, October 19, 1974, February 25, 1980 and January 07, 1981 orders which were then
issued by Judge Martinez. It should be recalled that except for the January 07, 1981 order, Judge Jacinto, upon
taking over Sp. No. 1792, denied the motion of the plaintiffs-appellees to set aside the aforesaid orders. Aside from
their motion before Judge Jacinto, nothing on the records would show that the plaintiffs-appellees availed of other
remedies to set aside the questioned orders. Further, the records would not show that the plaintiffs-appellees
appealed the order of Judge Jacinto. If an interval of two years, seven months and ninety nine days were barred by
laches, with more reason should the same doctrine apply to the present case, considering that the plaintiffsappellees did not avail of the remedies provided by law in impugning the various orders of the intestate court.
Thus, the questioned orders of the intestate court, by operation of law became final. It is a fundamental principle of
public policy in every jural system that at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at
some definite time fixed by law (interest rei publicae ut finis sit litum). The very object of which the courts were
constituted was to put an end to controversies. Once a judgment or an order of a court has become final, the
issues raised therein should be laid to rest. To date, except as to the present action which we will later discuss as
improper, the plaintiff-appellees have not availed themselves of other avenues to have the orders issued by Judge
Martinez and Judge Jacinto annulled and set aside. In the present case, when Judge Jacinto denied the motion of
the plaintiffs-appellees, the latter had remedies provided by the rules to assail such order. The ruling by Judge
Jacinto denying plaintiffs-appellees motion to set aside the questioned orders of Judge Martinez has long acquired
finality. It is well embedded in our jurisprudence, that judgment properly rendered by a court vested with
jurisdiction, like the RTC, and which has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable, hence, may no
longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. Litigation must have and
always has an end. If not, judicial function will lose its relevance".
In time, petitioners moved for a reconsideration but their motion was denied by the appellate court in
its Resolution of November 20, 2002.
Hence, petitioners' present recourse, basically praying for the reversal of the CA decision and the reinstatement of
that of the trial court.
We find merit in the petition.

It is petitioners' posture that the mortgage contracts dated July 6, 1973 and October 22, 1974entered into by
Agustin with respondent PNB, as well as his subsequent sale of estate properties to PLEI and Arguna on March 4,
1981, are void because they [petitioners] never consented thereto. They assert that as heirs of their mother
Melitona, they are entitled to notice of Agustin's several petitions in the intestate court seeking authority to
mortgage and sell estate properties. Without such notice, so they maintain, the four orders of the intestate court
dated July 18, 1973, October 19, 1974, February 25, 1980 and January 7, 1981, which allowed Agustin to
mortgage and sell estate properties, are void on account of Agustin's non-compliance with the mandatory
requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court.
Prescinding from their premise that said orders are completely void and hence, could not attain finality, petitioners
maintain that the same could be attacked directly or collaterally, anytime and anywhere.
For its part, respondent PNB asserts that petitioners cannot raise as issue in this proceedings the validity of the
subject orders in their desire to invalidate the contracts of mortgage entered into by Agustin. To PNB, the validity
of the subject orders of the intestate court can only be challenged in a direct action for such purpose and not in an
action to annul contracts, as the petitioners have done. This respondent adds that the mortgage on the subject
properties is valid because the same was made with the approval of the intestate court and with the knowledge of
the heirs of Melitona, petitioners included.9
Upon the other hand, respondent Heirs of Arturo Arguna likewise claim that petitioners knew of the filing with the
intestate court by Agustin of petitions to mortgage and sell the estate properties. They reecho the CA's ruling that
petitioners are barred by laches in filing Civil Case No. 16,802.10
As we see it, the determinative question is whether or not petitioners can obtain relief from the effects of contracts
of sale and mortgage entered into by Agustin without first initiating a direct action against the orders of the
intestate court authorizing the challenged contracts.
We answer the question in the affirmative.
It bears emphasizing that the action filed by the petitioners before the trial court in Civil Case No. 16,802 is for
the annulment of several contracts entered into by Agustin for and in behalf of the estate of Melitona, namely: (a)
contract of mortgage in favor of respondent PNB, (b) contract of sale in favor of Arguna involving seven (7) parcels
of land; and (c) contract of sale of a parcel of land in favor of PLEI.
The trial court acquired jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case upon the allegations in the complaint that
said contracts were entered into despite lack of notices to the heirs of the petition for the approval of those
contracts by the intestate court.
Contrary to the view of the Court of Appeals, the action which petitioners lodged with the trial court in Civil Case
No. 16,802 is not an action to annul the orders of the intestate court, which, according to CA, cannot be done
collaterally. It is the validity of the contracts of mortgage and sale which is directly attacked in the action.
And, in the exercise of its jurisdiction, the trial court made a factual finding in its decision of August 7, 1998 that
petitioners were, in fact, not notified by their father Agustin of the filing of his petitions for permission to
mortgage/sell the estate properties. The trial court made the correct conclusion of law that the challenged orders of
the intestate court granting Agustin's petitions were null and void for lack of compliance with the mandatory
requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, particularly Sections 2, 4, 7 thereof, which respectively read:
"Sec. 2. When court may authorize sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of realty to pay debts and legacies
through personalty not exhausted. - When the personal estate of the deceased is not sufficient to pay the debts,
expenses of administration, and legacies, or where the sale of such personal estate may injure the business or
other interests of those interested in the estate, and where a testator has not otherwise made sufficient provision
for the payment of such debts, expenses, and legacies, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator and on written notice to the heirs, devisees, and legatees residing in the Philippines, may
authorize the executor or administrator to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber so much as may be necessary of
the real estate, in lieu of personal estate, for the purpose of paying such debts, expenses, and legacies, if it clearly
appears that such sale, mortgage, or encumbrance would be beneficial to the persons interested; and if a part
cannot be sold, mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered without injury to those interested in the remainder, the
authority may be for the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance of the whole of such real estate, or so much
thereof as is necessary or beneficial under the circumstances".

"Sec. 4. When court may authorize sale of estate as beneficial to interested persons. Disposal of proceeds. - When
it appears that the sale of the whole or a part of the real or personal estate, will be beneficial to the heirs,
devisees, legatees, and other interested persons, the court may, upon application of the executor or administrator
and on written notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees who are interested in the estate to be sold,
authorize the executor or administrator to sell the whole or a part of said estate, although not necessary to pay
debts, legacies, or expenses of administration; but such authority shall not be granted if inconsistent with the
provisions of a will. In case of such sale, the proceeds shall be assigned to the persons entitled to the estate in the
proper proportions".
"Sec. 7. Regulations for granting authority to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate. - The court having
jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal estate, or to
sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate; in cases provided by these rules and when it appears necessary
or beneficial, under the following regulations:
(a) The executor or administrator shall file a written petition setting forth the debts due from the deceased, the
expenses of administration, the legacies, the value of the personal estate, the situation of the estate to be sold,
mortgaged, or otherwise encumbered, and such other facts as show that the sale, mortgage, or other encumbrance
is necessary or beneficial;
(b) The court shall thereupon fix a time and place for hearing such petition, and cause notice stating the nature of
the petition, the reason for the same, and the time and place of hearing, to be given personally or by mail to the
persons interested, and may cause such further notice to be given, by publication or otherwise, as it shall deem
proper; (Emphasis supplied)".
xxx
Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction that when an order authorizing the sale or encumbrance of real property was
issued by the testate or intestate court without previous notice to the heirs, devisees and legatees as required by
the Rules, it is not only the contract itself which is null and void but also the order of the court authorizing the
same.11
Thus, in Maneclang v. Baun,12 the previous administrator of the estate filed a petition with the intestate court
seeking authority to sell portion of the estate, which the court granted despite lack of notice of hearing to the heirs
of the decedent. The new administrator of the estate filed with the Regional Trial Court an action for the annulment
of the sales made by the previous administrator. After trial, the trial court held that the order of the intestate court
granting authority to sell, as well as the deed of sale, were void. On appeal directly to this Court, We held that
without compliance with Sections 2, 4 and 7 of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, "the authority to sell, the sale itself
and the order approving it would be null and void ab initio".
In Liu v. Loy, Jr.,13 while the decedent was still living, his son and attorney-in-fact sold in behalf of the alleged
decedent certain parcels of land to Frank Liu. After the decedent died, the son sold the same properties to two
persons. Upon an ex parte motion filed by the 2nd set of buyers of estate properties, the probate court approved
the sale to them of said properties. Consequently, certificates of title covering the estate properties were cancelled
and new titles issued to the 2nd set of buyers. Frank Liu filed a complaint for reconveyance/ annulment of title with
the Regional Trial Court. The trial court dismissed the complaint and the Court of Appeals affirmed the dismissal.
When the case was appealed to us, we set aside the decision of the appellate court and declared the probate
court's approval of the sale as completely void due to the failure of the 2nd set of buyers to notify the heiradministratrix of the motion and hearing for the sale of estate property.
Clearly, the requirements of Rule 89 of the Rules of Court are mandatory and failure to give notice to the heirs
would invalidate the authority granted by the intestate/probate court to mortgage or sell estate assets.
Here, it appears that petitioners were never notified of the several petitions filed by Agustin with the intestate court
to mortgage and sell the estate properties of his wife.
According to the trial court, the "[P]etition for Authority to Increase Mortgage" and "[P]etition for
Declaration of Heirs and for Authority to Increase Indebtedness", filed by Agustin on July 16,
1973 and October 5, 1974, respectively, do not contain information that petitioners were furnished with copies of
said petitions. Also, notices of hearings of those petitions were not sent to the petitioners.14 The trial court also
found in Civil Case No. 16,802 that Agustin did not notify petitioners of the filing of his petitions for judicial
authority to sell estate properties to Arturo Arguna and PLEI.15

As it were, the appellate court offered little explanation on why it did not believe the trial court in its finding that
petitioners were ignorant of Agustin's scheme to mortgage and sell the estate properties.
Aside from merely quoting the orders of July 18, 1973 and October 19, 1974 of the intestate court, the Court
of Appeals leaves us in the dark on its reason for disbelieving the trial court. The appellate court did not publicize
its appraisal of the evidence presented by the parties before the trial court in the matter regarding the knowledge,
or absence thereof, by the petitioners of Agustin's petitions. The appellate court cannot casually set aside the
findings of the trial court without stating clearly the reasons therefor. Findings of the trial court are entitled to great
weight, and absent any indication to believe otherwise, we simply cannot adopt the conclusion reached by the
Court of Appeals.
Laches is negligence or omission to assert a right within a reasonable time, warranting the presumption that the
party entitled to assert it has either abandoned or declined the right.16 The essential elements of laches are: (1)
conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he claims, giving rise to the situation of which
complaint is made and for which the complaint seeks a remedy; (2) delay in asserting the complainant's rights, the
complainant having had knowledge or notice of the defendant's conduct and having been afforded an opportunity
to institute a suit; (3) lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the defendant that the complainant would assert
the right on which he bases his suit; and (4) injury or prejudice to the defendant in the event relief is accorded to
the complainant, or the suit is not held barred.17
In the present case, the appellate court erred in appreciating laches against petitioners. The element of delay in
questioning the subject orders of the intestate court is sorely lacking. Petitioners were totally unaware of the plan
of Agustin to mortgage and sell the estate properties. There is no indication that mortgagor PNB and vendee
Arguna had notified petitioners of the contracts they had executed with Agustin. Although petitioners finally
obtained knowledge of the subject petitions filed by their father, and eventually challenged the July 18, 1973,
October 19, 1974, February 25, 1980 and January 7, 1981 orders of the intestate court, it is not clear from the
challenged decision of the appellate court when they (petitioners) actually learned of the existence of said orders of
the intestate court. Absent any indication of the point in time when petitioners acquired knowledge of those orders,
their alleged delay in impugning the validity thereof certainly cannot be established. And the Court of Appeals
cannot simply impute laches against them.
WHEREFORE, the assailed issuances of the Court of Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the
decision dated August 7, 1998 of the trial court in its Civil Case No. 16,802 REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 129008. January 13, 2004]

TEODORA A. RIOFERIO, VERONICA O. EVANGELISTA assisted by her husband ZALDY EVANGELISTA,


ALBERTO ORFINADA, and ROWENA O. UNGOS, assisted by her husband BEDA
UNGOS, petitioners, vs.COURT OF APPEALS, ESPERANZA P. ORFINADA, LOURDES P. ORFINADA,
ALFONSO ORFINADA, NANCY P. ORFINADA, ALFONSO JAMES P. ORFINADA, CHRISTOPHER P.
ORFINADA and ANGELO P. ORFINADA, respondents.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Whether the heirs may bring suit to recover property of the estate pending the appointment of an
administrator is the issue in this case.
This Petition for Review on Certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeks to set aside the Decision[1] of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 42053 dated January 31, 1997, as well as its Resolution[2] dated March 26,
1997, denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
On May 13, 1995, Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. died without a will in Angeles City leaving several personal and real
properties located in Angeles City, Dagupan City and Kalookan City.[3] He also left a widow, respondent Esperanza
P. Orfinada, whom he married on July 11, 1960 and with whom he had seven children who are the herein
respondents, namely: Lourdes P. Orfinada, Alfonso Clyde P. Orfinada, Nancy P. Orfinada-Happenden, Alfonso
James P. Orfinada, Christopher P. Orfinada, Alfonso Mike P. Orfinada (deceased) and Angelo P. Orfinada. [4]
Apart from the respondents, the demise of the decedent left in mourning his paramour and their children.
They are petitioner Teodora Riofero, who became a part of his life when he entered into an extra-marital
relationship with her during the subsistence of his marriage to Esperanza sometime in 1965, and co-petitioners
Veronica[5], Alberto and Rowena.[6]
On November 14, 1995, respondents Alfonso James and Lourdes Orfinada discovered that on June 29, 1995,
petitioner Teodora Rioferio and her children executed an Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person
with Quitclaim involving the properties of the estate of the decedent located in Dagupan City and that accordingly,
the Registry of Deeds in Dagupan issued Certificates of Titles Nos. 63983, 63984 and 63985 in favor of petitioners
Teodora Rioferio, Veronica Orfinada-Evangelista, Alberto Orfinada and Rowena Orfinada-Ungos. Respondents also
found out that petitioners were able to obtain a loan of P700,000.00 from the Rural Bank of Mangaldan Inc. by
executing a Real Estate Mortgage over the properties subject of the extra-judicial settlement.[7]
On December 1, 1995, respondent Alfonso Clyde P. Orfinada III filed a Petition for Letters of
Administration docketed as S.P. Case No. 5118 before the Regional Trial Court of Angeles City, praying that letters
of administration encompassing the estate of Alfonso P. Orfinada, Jr. be issued to him.[8]
On December 4, 1995, respondents filed a Complaint for the Annulment/Rescission of Extra Judicial
Settlement of Estate of a Deceased Person with Quitclaim, Real Estate Mortgage and Cancellation of Transfer
Certificate of Titles with Nos. 63983, 63985 and 63984 and Other Related Documents with Damages against
petitioners, the Rural Bank of Mangaldan, Inc. and the Register of Deeds of Dagupan City before the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 42, Dagupan City.[9]
On February 5, 1996, petitioners filed their Answer to the aforesaid complaint interposing the defense that the
property subject of the contested deed of extra-judicial settlement pertained to the properties originally belonging
to the parents of Teodora Riofero[10] and that the titles thereof were delivered to her as an advance inheritance but
the decedent had managed to register them in his name.[11] Petitioners also raised the affirmative defense that
respondents are not the real parties-in-interest but rather the Estate of Alfonso O. Orfinada, Jr. in view of the
pendency of the administration proceedings.[12] On April 29, 1996, petitioners filed a Motion to Set Affirmative
Defenses for Hearing[13] on the aforesaid ground.
The lower court denied the motion in its Order[14] dated June 27, 1996, on the ground that respondents, as
heirs, are the real parties-in-interest especially in the absence of an administrator who is yet to be appointed in
S.P. Case No. 5118. Petitioners moved for its reconsideration[15] but the motion was likewise denied.[16]
This prompted petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals their Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court docketed as CA G.R. S.P. No. 42053.[17] Petitioners averred that the RTC committed grave abuse of
discretion in issuing the assailed order which denied the dismissal of the case on the ground that the proper party
to file the complaint for the annulment of the extrajudicial settlement of the estate of the deceased is the estate of
the decedent and not the respondents.[18]

The Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision[19] dated January 31, 1997, stating that it discerned no
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by the public respondent judge when he
denied petitioners motion to set affirmative defenses for hearing in view of its discretionary nature.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by petitioners but it was denied.[20] Hence, the petition before this
Court.
The issue presented by the petitioners before this Court is whether the heirs have legal standing to prosecute
the rights belonging to the deceased subsequent to the commencement of the administration proceedings. [21]
Petitioners vehemently fault the lower court for denying their motion to set the case for preliminary hearing
on their affirmative defense that the proper party to bring the action is the estate of the decedent and not the
respondents. It must be stressed that the holding of a preliminary hearing on an affirmative defense lies in the
discretion of the court. This is clear from the Rules of Court, thus:
SEC. 5. Pleadings grounds as affirmative defenses.- Any of the grounds for dismissal provided for in this rule,
except improper venue, may be pleaded as an affirmative defense, and a preliminary hearing may be had thereon
as if a motion to dismiss had been filed.[22] (Emphasis supplied.)
Certainly, the incorporation of the word may in the provision is clearly indicative of the optional character of
the preliminary hearing. The word denotes discretion and cannot be construed as having a mandatory
effect.[23] Subsequently, the electivity of the proceeding was firmed up beyond cavil by the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure with the inclusion of the phrase in the discretion of the Court, apart from the retention of the word may
in Section 6,[24] in Rule 16 thereof.
Just as no blame of abuse of discretion can be laid on the lower courts doorstep for not hearing petitioners
affirmative defense, it cannot likewise be faulted for recognizing the legal standing of the respondents as heirs to
bring the suit.
Pending the filing of administration proceedings, the heirs without doubt have legal personality to bring suit in
behalf of the estate of the decedent in accordance with the provision of Article 777 of the New Civil Code that (t)he
rights to succession are transmitted from the moment of the death of the decedent. The provision in turn is the
foundation of the principle that the property, rights and obligations to the extent and value of the inheritance of a
person are transmitted through his death to another or others by his will or by operation of law. [25]
Even if administration proceedings have already been commenced, the heirs may still bring the suit if an
administrator has not yet been appointed. This is the proper modality despite the total lack of advertence to the
heirs in the rules on party representation, namely Section 3, Rule 3[26] and Section 2, Rule 87[27] of the Rules of
Court. In fact, in the case of Gochan v. Young,[28] this Court recognized the legal standing of the heirs to represent
the rights and properties of the decedent under administration pending the appointment of an administrator. Thus:
The above-quoted rules,[29] while permitting an executor or administrator to represent or to bring suits on behalf of
the deceased, do not prohibit the heirs from representing the deceased. These rules are easily applicable to
cases in which an administrator has already been appointed. But no rule categorically addresses the
situation in which special proceedings for the settlement of an estate have already been instituted, yet
no administrator has been appointed. In such instances, the heirs cannot be expected to wait for the
appointment of an administrator; then wait further to see if the administrator appointed would care enough to file a
suit to protect the rights and the interests of the deceased; and in the meantime do nothing while the rights and
the properties of the decedent are violated or dissipated.
Even if there is an appointed administrator, jurisprudence recognizes two exceptions, viz: (1) if the executor
or administrator is unwilling or refuses to bring suit;[30] and (2) when the administrator is alleged to have
participated in the act complained of[31] and he is made a party defendant.[32] Evidently, the necessity for the heirs
to seek judicial relief to recover property of the estate is as compelling when there is no appointed administrator, if
not more, as where there is an appointed administrator but he is either disinclined to bring suit or is one of the
guilty parties himself.
All told, therefore, the rule that the heirs have no legal standing to sue for the recovery of property of the
estate during the pendency of administration proceedings has three exceptions, the third being when there is no
appointed administrator such as in this case.
As the appellate court did not commit an error of law in upholding the order of the lower court, recourse to
this Court is not warranted.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The assailed decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals
are hereby AFFIRMED.No costs.

SO ORDERED.

[G.R. NO. 149926 : February 23, 2005]


UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, v. EDMUND SANTIBAEZ and FLORENCE SANTIBAEZ
ARIOLA, Respondents.
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court which seeks the
reversal of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals dated May 30, 2001 in CA-G.R. CV No. 48831 affirming the
dismissal2 of the petitioner's complaint in Civil Case No. 18909 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City,
Branch 63.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
On May 31, 1980, the First Countryside Credit Corporation (FCCC) and Efraim M. Santibaez entered into a loan
agreement3 in the amount of P128,000.00. The amount was intended for the payment of the purchase price of one
(1) unit Ford 6600 Agricultural All-Purpose Diesel Tractor. In view thereof, Efraim and his son, Edmund, executed a
promissory note in favor of the FCCC, the principal sum payable in five equal annual amortizations of P43,745.96
due on May 31, 1981 and every May 31st thereafter up to May 31, 1985.
On December 13, 1980, the FCCC and Efraim entered into another loan agreement,4 this time in the amount
of P123,156.00. It was intended to pay the balance of the purchase price of another unit of Ford 6600 Agricultural
All-Purpose Diesel Tractor, with accessories, and one (1) unit Howard Rotamotor Model AR 60K. Again, Efraim and
his son, Edmund, executed a promissory note for the said amount in favor of the FCCC. Aside from such
promissory note, they also signed a Continuing Guaranty Agreement5 for the loan dated December 13, 1980.
Sometime in February 1981, Efraim died, leaving a holographic will.6 Subsequently in March 1981, testate
proceedings commenced before the RTC of Iloilo City, Branch 7, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 2706. On
April 9, 1981, Edmund, as one of the heirs, was appointed as the special administrator of the estate of the
decedent.7 During the pendency of the testate proceedings, the surviving heirs, Edmund and his sister Florence
Santibaez Ariola, executed a Joint Agreement8dated July 22, 1981, wherein they agreed to divide between
themselves and take possession of the three (3) tractors; that is, two (2) tractors for Edmund and one (1) tractor
for Florence. Each of them was to assume the indebtedness of their late father to FCCC, corresponding to the
tractor respectively taken by them.
On August 20, 1981, a Deed of Assignment with Assumption of Liabilities9 was executed by and between FCCC and
Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, wherein the FCCC as the assignor, among others, assigned all its assets and
liabilities to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank.
Demand letters10 for the settlement of his account were sent by petitioner Union Bank of the Philippines (UBP) to
Edmund, but the latter failed to heed the same and refused to pay. Thus, on February 5, 1988, the petitioner filed
a Complaint11 for sum of money against the heirs of Efraim Santibaez, Edmund and Florence, before the RTC of
Makati City, Branch 150, docketed as Civil Case No. 18909. Summonses were issued against both, but the one
intended for Edmund was not served since he was in the United States and there was no information on his
address or the date of his return to the Philippines.12 Accordingly, the complaint was narrowed down to respondent
Florence S. Ariola.
On December 7, 1988, respondent Florence S. Ariola filed her Answer13 and alleged that the loan documents did
not bind her since she was not a party thereto. Considering that the joint agreement signed by her and her brother
Edmund was not approved by the probate court, it was null and void; hence, she was not liable to the petitioner
under the joint agreement.
On January 29, 1990, the case was unloaded and re-raffled to the RTC of Makati City, Branch 63.14Consequently,
trial on the merits ensued and a decision was subsequently rendered by the court dismissing the complaint for lack
of merit. The decretal portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the complaint for lack of merit.15

The trial court found that the claim of the petitioner should have been filed with the probate court before which the
testate estate of the late Efraim Santibaez was pending, as the sum of money being claimed was an obligation
incurred by the said decedent. The trial court also found that the Joint Agreement apparently executed by his heirs,
Edmund and Florence, on July 22, 1981, was, in effect, a partition of the estate of the decedent. However, the said
agreement was void, considering that it had not been approved by the probate court, and that there can be no
valid partition until after the will has been probated. The trial court further declared that petitioner failed to prove
that it was the now defunct Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC had assigned its assets and
liabilities. The court also agreed to the contention of respondent Florence S. Ariola that the list of assets and
liabilities of the FCCC assigned to Union Savings and Mortgage Bank did not clearly refer to the decedent's account.
Ruling that the joint agreement executed by the heirs was null and void, the trial court held that the petitioner's
cause of action against respondent Florence S. Ariola must necessarily fail.
The petitioner appealed from the RTC decision and elevated its case to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the
following as errors of the trial court:
1. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT (EXHIBIT A) SHOULD BE APPROVED BY
THE PROBATE COURT.
2. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS UNTIL
AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.
3. THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE DEFENDANT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE
CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.16
The petitioner asserted before the CA that the obligation of the deceased had passed to his legitimate children and
heirs, in this case, Edmund and Florence; the unconditional signing of the joint agreement marked as Exhibit "A"
estopped respondent Florence S. Ariola, and that she cannot deny her liability under the said document; as the
agreement had been signed by both heirs in their personal capacity, it was no longer necessary to present the
same before the probate court for approval; the property partitioned in the agreement was not one of those
enumerated in the holographic will made by the deceased; and the active participation of the heirs, particularly
respondent Florence S. Ariola, in the present ordinary civil action was tantamount to a waiver to re-litigate the
claim in the estate proceedings.
On the other hand, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintained that the money claim of the petitioner should have
been presented before the probate court.17
The appellate court found that the appeal was not meritorious and held that the petitioner should have filed its
claim with the probate court as provided under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. It further held that
the partition made in the agreement was null and void, since no valid partition may be had until after the will has
been probated. According to the CA, page 2, paragraph (e) of the holographic will covered the subject properties
(tractors) in generic terms when the deceased referred to them as "all other properties." Moreover, the active
participation of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the case did not amount to a waiver. Thus, the CA affirmed the
RTC decision,viz.:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 63, is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.18
In the present recourse, the petitioner ascribes the following errors to the CA:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE JOINT AGREEMENT SHOULD BE APPROVED BY
THE PROBATE COURT.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THERE CAN BE NO VALID PARTITION AMONG THE HEIRS OF
THE LATE EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ UNTIL AFTER THE WILL HAS BEEN PROBATED.

III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE RESPONDENT HAD WAIVED HER RIGHT TO HAVE THE
CLAIM RE-LITIGATED IN THE ESTATE PROCEEDING.
IV.
RESPONDENTS CAN, IN FACT, BE HELD JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE PRINCIPAL DEBTOR THE LATE
EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ ON THE STRENGTH OF THE CONTINUING GUARANTY AGREEMENT EXECUTED IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER-APPELLANT UNION BANK.
V.
THE PROMISSORY NOTES DATED MAY 31, 1980 IN THE SUM OF P128,000.00 AND DECEMBER 13, 1980 IN THE
AMOUNT OF P123,000.00 CATEGORICALLY ESTABLISHED THE FACT THAT THE RESPONDENTS BOUND
THEMSELVES JOINTLY AND SEVERALLY LIABLE WITH THE LATE DEBTOR EFRAIM SANTIBAEZ IN FAVOR OF
PETITIONER UNION BANK.19
The petitioner claims that the obligations of the deceased were transmitted to the heirs as provided in Article 774
of the Civil Code; there was thus no need for the probate court to approve the joint agreement where the heirs
partitioned the tractors owned by the deceased and assumed the obligations related thereto. Since respondent
Florence S. Ariola signed the joint agreement without any condition, she is now estopped from asserting any
position contrary thereto. The petitioner also points out that the holographic will of the deceased did not include
nor mention any of the tractors subject of the complaint, and, as such was beyond the ambit of the said will. The
active participation and resistance of respondent Florence S. Ariola in the ordinary civil action against the
petitioner's claim amounts to a waiver of the right to have the claim presented in the probate proceedings, and to
allow any one of the heirs who executed the joint agreement to escape liability to pay the value of the tractors
under consideration would be equivalent to allowing the said heirs to enrich themselves to the damage and
prejudice of the petitioner.
The petitioner, likewise, avers that the decisions of both the trial and appellate courts failed to consider the fact
that respondent Florence S. Ariola and her brother Edmund executed loan documents, all establishing the vinculum
juris or the legal bond between the late Efraim Santibaez and his heirs to be in the nature of a solidary
obligation. Furthermore, the Promissory Notes dated May 31, 1980 and December 13, 1980 executed by the late
Efraim Santibaez, together with his heirs, Edmund and respondent Florence, made the obligation solidary as far
as the said heirs are concerned. The petitioner also proffers that, considering the express provisions of the
continuing guaranty agreement and the promissory notes executed by the named respondents, the latter must be
held liable jointly and severally liable thereon. Thus, there was no need for the petitioner to file its money claim
before the probate court. Finally, the petitioner stresses that both surviving heirs are being sued in their respective
personal capacities, not as heirs of the deceased.
In her comment to the petition, respondent Florence S. Ariola maintains that the petitioner is trying to recover a
sum of money from the deceased Efraim Santibaez; thus the claim should have been filed with the probate
court. She points out that at the time of the execution of the joint agreement there was already an existing probate
proceedings of which the petitioner knew about. However, to avoid a claim in the probate court which might delay
payment of the obligation, the petitioner opted to require them to execute the said agreement.rbl
r l l lbrr
According to the respondent, the trial court and the CA did not err in declaring that the agreement was null and
void. She asserts that even if the agreement was voluntarily executed by her and her brother Edmund, it should
still have been subjected to the approval of the court as it may prejudice the estate, the heirs or third parties.
Furthermore, she had not waived any rights, as she even stated in her answer in the court a quo that the claim
should be filed with the probate court. Thus, the petitioner could not invoke or claim that she is in estoppel.
Respondent Florence S. Ariola further asserts that she had not signed any continuing guaranty agreement, nor was
there any document presented as evidence to show that she had caused herself to be bound by the obligation of
her late father.
The petition is bereft of merit.

The Court is posed to resolve the following issues: a) whether or not the partition in the Agreement executed by
the heirs is valid; b) whether or not the heirs' assumption of the indebtedness of the deceased is valid; and c)
whether the petitioner can hold the heirs liable on the obligation of the deceased.rbl r l
l lbrr
At the outset, well-settled is the rule that a probate court has the jurisdiction to determine all the properties of the
deceased, to determine whether they should or should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be
administered.20 The said court is primarily concerned with the administration, liquidation and distribution of the
estate.21
In our jurisdiction, the rule is that there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been
probated:
In testate succession, there can be no valid partition among the heirs until after the will has been probated. The
law enjoins the probate of a will and the public requires it, because unless a will is probated and notice thereof
given to the whole world, the right of a person to dispose of his property by will may be rendered nugatory. The
authentication of a will decides no other question than such as touch upon the capacity of the testator and the
compliance with those requirements or solemnities which the law prescribes for the validity of a will.22
This, of course, presupposes that the properties to be partitioned are the same properties embraced in the will.23 In
the present case, the deceased, Efraim Santibaez, left a holographic will24 which contained, inter alia, the
provision which reads as follows:
(e) All other properties, real or personal, which I own and may be discovered later after my demise, shall be
distributed in the proportion indicated in the immediately preceding paragraph in favor of Edmund and Florence,
my children.
We agree with the appellate court that the above-quoted is an all-encompassing provision embracing all the
properties left by the decedent which might have escaped his mind at that time he was making his will, and other
properties he may acquire thereafter. Included therein are the three (3) subject tractors. This being so, any
partition involving the said tractors among the heirs is not valid. The joint agreement25 executed by Edmund and
Florence, partitioning the tractors among themselves, is invalid, specially so since at the time of its execution,
there was already a pending proceeding for the probate of their late father's holographic will covering the said
tractors.
It must be stressed that the probate proceeding had already acquired jurisdiction over all the properties of the
deceased, including the three (3) tractors. To dispose of them in any way without the probate court's approval is
tantamount to divesting it with jurisdiction which the Court cannot allow.26 Every act intended to put an end to
indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be a
sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction.27 Thus, in executing any joint agreement which
appears to be in the nature of an extra-judicial partition, as in the case at bar, court approval is imperative, and
the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction over that part of the estate. Moreover, it is within the
jurisdiction of the probate court to determine the identity of the heirs of the decedent.28 In the instant case, there
is no showing that the signatories in the joint agreement were the only heirs of the decedent. When it was
executed, the probate of the will was still pending before the court and the latter had yet to determine who the
heirs of the decedent were. Thus, for Edmund and respondent Florence S. Ariola to adjudicate unto themselves the
three (3) tractors was a premature act, and prejudicial to the other possible heirs and creditors who may have a
valid claim against the estate of the deceased.
The question that now comes to fore is whether the heirs' assumption of the indebtedness of the decedent is
binding. We rule in the negative. Perusing the joint agreement, it provides that the heirs as parties thereto "have
agreed to divide between themselves and take possession and use the above-described chattel and each of them
to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the chattel taken as herein after stated which is in favor of First
Countryside Credit Corp."29 The assumption of liability was conditioned upon the happening of an event, that is,
that each heir shall take possession and use of their respective share under the agreement. It was made
dependent on the validity of the partition, and that they were to assume the indebtedness corresponding to the
chattel that they were each to receive. The partition being invalid as earlier discussed, the heirs in effect did not
receive any such tractor. It follows then that the assumption of liability cannot be given any force and effect.
The Court notes that the loan was contracted by the decedent.rbl r l l lbrr

The petitioner, purportedly a creditor of the late Efraim Santibaez, should have thus filed its money claim with
the probate court in accordance with Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
Section 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed barred; exceptions. - All claims for money
against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or contingent,
all claims for funeral expenses for the last sickness of the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent,
must be filed within the time limited in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever, except that they may be set
forth as counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants. Where an
executor or administrator commences an action, or prosecutes an action already commenced by the deceased in
his lifetime, the debtor may set forth by answer the claims he has against the decedent, instead of presenting them
independently to the court as herein provided, and mutual claims may be set off against each other in such action;
and if final judgment is rendered in favor of the defendant, the amount so determined shall be considered the true
balance against the estate, as though the claim had been presented directly before the court in the administration
proceedings. Claims not yet due, or contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The filing of a money claim against the decedent's estate in the probate court is mandatory.30 As we held in the
vintage case of Py Eng Chong v. Herrera:31
'This requirement is for the purpose of protecting the estate of the deceased by informing the executor or
administrator of the claims against it, thus enabling him to examine each claim and to determine whether it is a
proper one which should be allowed. The plain and obvious design of the rule is the speedy settlement of the
affairs of the deceased and the early delivery of the property to the distributees, legatees, or heirs. `The law
strictly requires the prompt presentation and disposition of the claims against the decedent's estate in order to
settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible, pay off its debts and distribute the residue. 32
Perusing the records of the case, nothing therein could hold private respondent Florence S. Ariola accountable for
any liability incurred by her late father. The documentary evidence presented, particularly the promissory notes
and the continuing guaranty agreement, were executed and signed only by the late Efraim Santibaez and his
son Edmund. As the petitioner failed to file its money claim with the probate court, at most, it may only go after
Edmund as co-maker of the decedent under the said promissory notes and continuing guaranty, of course, subject
to any defenses Edmund may have as against the petitioner. As the court had not acquired jurisdiction over the
person of Edmund, we find it unnecessary to delve into the matter further.
We agree with the finding of the trial court that the petitioner had not sufficiently shown that it is the successor-ininterest of the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank to which the FCCC assigned its assets and liabilities. 33 The
petitioner in its complaint alleged that "by virtue of the Deed of Assignment dated August 20, 1981 executed by
and between First Countryside Credit Corporation and Union Bank of the Philippines' "34 However, the documentary
evidence35 clearly reflects that the parties in the deed of assignment with assumption of liabilities were the FCCC,
and the Union Savings and Mortgage Bank, with the conformity of Bancom Philippine Holdings, Inc. Nowhere can
the petitioner's participation therein as a party be found. Furthermore, no documentary or testimonial evidence
was presented during trial to show that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now, in fact, petitioner Union Bank of
the Philippines. As the trial court declared in its decision:
'[T]he court also finds merit to the contention of defendant that plaintiff failed to prove or did not present evidence
to prove that Union Savings and Mortgage Bank is now the Union Bank of the Philippines. Judicial notice does not
apply here. "The power to take judicial notice is to [be] exercised by the courts with caution; care must be taken
that the requisite notoriety exists; and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be promptly resolved in the
negative." (Republic v. Court of Appeals, 107 SCRA 504).36
This being the case, the petitioner's personality to file the complaint is wanting. Consequently, it failed to establish
its cause of action. Thus, the trial court did not err in dismissing the complaint, and the CA in affirming the same.
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is hereby DENIED. The assailed Court of Appeals Decision is
AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 121597. June 29, 2001.]


PHILIPPINE NATIONAL BANK, Petitioner, v. HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ALLAN M. CHUA as Special
Administrator of the Intestate Estate of the late ANTONIO M. CHUA and Mrs. ASUNCION M.
CHUA, Respondents.
DECISION
This petition assails the decision 1 of the Court of Appeals dated July 25, 1995 in CA-G.R. CV No. 36546, affirming
the decision dated September 4, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Balayan, Batangas, Branch 10 in Civil Case No.
1988.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The facts, as found by the trial court and by the Court of Appeals, are not disputed.
The spouses Antonio M. Chua and Asuncion M. Chua were the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer
Certificate of Title No. P-142 and registered in their names. Upon Antonios death, the probate court appointed his
son, private respondent Allan M. Chua, special administrator of Antonios intestate estate. The court also
authorized Allan to obtain a loan accommodation of five hundred fifty thousand (P550,000.00) pesos from
petitioner Philippine National Bank to be secured by a real estate mortgage over the above-mentioned parcel of
land.
On June 29, 1989, Allan obtained a loan of P450,000.00 from petitioner PNB evidenced by a promissory note,
payable on June 29, 1990, with interest at 18.8 percent per annum. To secure the loan, Allan executed a deed of
real estate mortgage on the aforesaid parcel of land.
On December 27, 1990, for failure to pay the loan in full, the bank extrajudicially foreclosed the real estate
mortgage, through the Ex-Officio Sheriff, who conducted a public auction of the mortgaged property pursuant to
the authority provided for in the deed of real estate mortgage. During the auction, PNB was the highest bidder with
a bid price P306,360.00. Since PNBs total claim as of the date of the auction sale was P679,185.63, the loan had a
payable balance of P372,825.63. To claim this deficiency, PNB instituted an action with the RTC, Balayan,
Batangas, Branch 10, docketed as Civil Case No. 1988, against both Mrs. Asuncion M. Chua and Allan Chua in his
capacity as special administrator of his fathers intestate estate.
Despite summons duly served, private respondents did not answer the complaint. The trial court declared them in
default and received evidence ex parte.
On September 4, 1991, the RTC rendered its decision, ordering the dismissal of PNBs complaint. 2
On appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision by dismissing PNBs appeal for lack of merit. 3
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Petitioner cites two
grounds:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
I
THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PNB CAN NO LONGER PURSUE ITS DEFICIENCY CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE OF
DECEASED ANTONIO M. CHUA, HAVING ELECTED ONE OF ITS ALTERNATIVE RIGHT PURSUANT TO SECTION 7
RULE 86 OF THE RULES OF COURT DESPITE A SPECIAL ENACTMENT (ACT. NO. 3135) COVERING EXTRAJUDICIAL
FORECLOSURE SALE ALLOWING RECOURSE FOR A DEFICIENCY CLAIM AS SUPPORTED BY CONTEMPORARY
JURISPRUDENCE.
II
THE CA ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ALLAN M. CHUA, AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATOR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF
HIS DECEASED FATHER ANTONIO M. CHUA ON ONE HAND, AND HIM AND HIS MOTHER ASUNCION CHUA AS
HEIRS ON THE OTHER HAND ARE NO LONGER LIABLE FOR THE DEBTS OF THE ESTATE. 4
The primary issue posed before us is whether or not it was error for the Court of Appeals to rule that petitioner
may no longer pursue by civil action the recovery of the balance of indebtedness after having foreclosed the
property securing the same. A resolution of this issue will also resolve the secondary issue concerning any further
liability of respondents and of the decedents estate.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
Petitioner contends that under prevailing jurisprudence, when the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the
debt, the mortgagee has the right to recover the deficiency from the debtor. 5 It also contends that Act 3135,

otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Sale of Property under Special Powers Inserted in or Annexed to Real
Estate Mortgages," is the law applicable to this case of foreclosure sale and not Section 7 of Rule 86 of the Revised
Rules of Court 6 as held by the Court of Appeals. 7
Private respondents argue that having chosen the remedy of extrajudicial foreclosure of the mortgaged property of
the deceased, petitioner is precluded from pursuing its deficiency claim against the estate of Antonio M. Chua. This
they say is pursuant to Section 7, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, which states that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 7. Rule 86. Mortgage debt due from estate. A creditor holding a claim against the deceased secured by
mortgage or other collateral security, may abandon the security and prosecute his claim in the manner provided in
this rule, and share in the general distribution of the assets of the estate; or he may foreclose his mortgage or
realize upon his security, by action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if there is
a judgment for a deficiency, after the sale of the mortgaged premises, or the property pledged, in the foreclosure
or other proceeding to realize upon the security, he may claim his deficiency judgment in the manner provided in
the preceding section; or he may rely upon his mortgage or other security alone and foreclose the same at any
time within the period of the statute of limitations, and in that event he shall not be admitted as a creditor, and
shall receive no share in the distribution of the other assets of the estate; but nothing herein contained shall
prohibit the executor or administrator from redeeming the property mortgaged or pledged by paying the debt for
which it is hold as security, under the direction of the court if the court shall adjudge it to be for the interest of the
estate that such redemption shall be made.
Pertinent to the issue at bar, according to petitioner, are our decisions he cited. 8 Prudential Bank v. Martinez, 189
SCRA 612, 615 (1990), is particularly cited by petitioner as precedent for holding that in extrajudicial foreclosure of
mortgage, when the proceeds of the sale are insufficient to pay the debt, the mortgagee has the right to recover
the deficiency from the mortgagor.
However, it must be pointed out that petitioners cited cases involve ordinary debts secured by a mortgage. The
case at bar, we must stress, involves a foreclosure of mortgage arising out of a settlement of estate, wherein the
administrator mortgaged a property belonging to the estate of the decedent, pursuant to an authority given by the
probate court. As the Court of Appeals correctly stated, the Rules of Court on Special Proceedings comes into play
decisively.
To begin with, it is clear from the text of Section 7, Rule 89, that once the deed of real estate mortgage is recorded
in the proper Registry of Deeds, together with the corresponding court order authorizing the administrator to
mortgage the property, said deed shall be valid as if it has been executed by the deceased himself. Section 7
provides in part:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
SECTION 7. Rule 89. Regulations for granting authority to sell. mortgage, or otherwise encumber estate The
court having jurisdiction of the estate of the deceased may authorize the executor or administrator to sell personal
estate, or to sell, mortgage, or otherwise encumber real estate, in cases provided by these rules when it appears
necessary or beneficial under the following regulations:chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
x

(f) There shall be recorded in the registry of deeds of the province in which the real estate thus sold, mortgaged, or
otherwise encumbered is situated, a certified copy of the order of the court, together with the deed of the executor
or administrator for such real estate, which shall be valid as if the deed had been executed by the deceased in his
lifetime.
In the present case, it is undisputed that the conditions under the aforecited rule have been complied with. It
follows that we must consider Sec. 7 of Rule 86, appropriately applicable to the controversy at hand.
Case law now holds that this rule grants to the mortgagee three distinct, independent and mutually exclusive
remedies that can be alternatively pursued by the mortgage-creditor for the satisfaction of his credit in case the
mortgagor dies, among them:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
(1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an ordinary claim;
(2) to foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and
(3) to rely on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescription without
right to file a claim for any deficiency. 9
In Perez v. Philippine National Bank, 10 reversing Pasno v. Ravina, 11 we held:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

The ruling in Pasno v. Ravina not having been reiterated in any other case, we have carefully reexamined the
same, and after mature deliberation have reached the conclusion that the dissenting opinion is more in conformity
with reason and law. Of the three alternative courses that section 7, Rule 87 (now Rule 86), offers the mortgage
creditor, to wit, (1) to waive the mortgage and claim the entire debt from the estate of the mortgagor as an
ordinary claim; (2) foreclose the mortgage judicially and prove any deficiency as an ordinary claim; and (3) to rely
on the mortgage exclusively, foreclosing the same at any time before it is barred by prescription, without right to
file a claim for any deficiency, the majority opinion in Pasno v. Ravina, in requiring a judicial foreclosure, virtually
wipes out the third alternative conceded by the Rules to the mortgage creditor, and which would precisely include
extra-judicial foreclosures by contrast with the second alternative.
The plain result of adopting the last mode of foreclosure is that the creditor waives his right to recover any
deficiency from the estate. 12 Following the Perez ruling that the third mode includes extrajudicial foreclosure
sales, the result of extrajudicial foreclosure is that the creditor waives any further deficiency claim. The dissent in
Pasno, as adopted in Perez, supports this conclusion, thus:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
When account is further taken of the fact that a creditor who elects to foreclose by extrajudicial sale waives all
right to recover against the estate of the deceased debtor for any deficiency remaining unpaid after the sale it will
be readily seen that the decision in this case (referring to the majority opinion) will impose a burden upon the
estates of deceased persons who have mortgaged real property for the security of debts, without any
compensatory advantage.
Clearly, in our view, petitioner herein has chosen the mortgage-creditors option of extrajudicially foreclosing the
mortgaged property of the Chuas. This choice now bars any subsequent deficiency claim against the estate of the
deceased, Antonio M. Chua. Petitioner may no longer avail of the complaint for the recovery of the balance of
indebtedness against said estate, after petitioner foreclosed the property securing the mortgage in its favor. It
follows that in this case no further liability remains on the part of respondents and the late Antonio M. Chuas
estate.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error committed by respondent Court of Appeals, the instant petition is hereby
DENIED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 36546 is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner. SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. L-2360. December 29, 1949.]
GAVINO ALDAMIZ, as administrator of the estate of the deceased Santiago Rementeria y
Aldamizcogeascoa, Petitioner, v. THE JUDGE OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MINDORO, THE
PROVINCIAL SHERIFF OF MINDORO and JUAN L. LUNA, Respondents.
Jose W. Diokno and Daniel Romualdez for Petitioner.
Laurel, Sabido, Almario & Laurel and Juan L. Luna for Respondents.
SYLLABUS
1. ATTORNEY AND CLIENT; ATTORNEYS FEES; ADMINISTRATION PROCEEDINGS; PROCEDURE FOR COLLECTION
OF ATTORNEYS FEES. The correct procedure for the collection of attorneys fees, is for the counsel to request
the administrator to make payment and file an action against him in his personal capacity and not as an
administrator should he fail to pay. (Palileo v. Mendoza, 2 G.R. No. 47106, 40 Off. Gaz. [8th Supp. ], 132.) If
judgment is rendered against the administrator and he pays, he may include the fees so paid in his account to the
court. (Uy Tioco v. Imperial, 53 Phil., 802.) The attorney also may, instead of bringing such an action, file a
petition in the testate or intestate proceeding "asking that the court, after notice to all persons interested, allow his
claim and direct the administrator to pay it as an allow his claim and direct the administrator to pay it as an
expense of administration."cralaw virtua1aw library
2. ID.; ID.; PAYMENT OF DEBTS AND EXPENSES OF ADMINISTRATION; EXECUTION IS AN IMPROPER REMEDY.
A writ of execution is not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of Court for the payment of debts and
expenses of administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal estate or the sale or
mortgage of real property of the deceased and all debts or expenses of administration should be paid out of the
proceeds of the sale or mortgage. The order for the sale or mortgage should be issued upon motion of the
administrator and with the written notice to all the heirs, legatees and devices residing in the Philippines, according
to Rule 89, section 3, and Rule 90, section 2. And when sale or mortgage of real estate is to be made, the
regulations contained in Rule 90, section 7, should be complied with.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; WHEN AN EXECUTION MAY LEGALLY AND VALIDLY ISSUE. Execution may issue only where the
devisees, legatees or heirs have entered into possession of their respective portions in the estate prior to
settlement and payment of the debts and expenses of administration and it is later ascertained that there are such
debts and expenses to be paid in which case "the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, by order for that

purpose, after hearing settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order how much and in what manner each
person shall contribute, and may issue execution if circumstances require."
DECISION
MORAN, C.J. :
This is a petition for certiorari filed by Gavino Aldamiz, administrator of the testate estate of the deceased Santiago
Rementeria y Aldamizcogeascoa, to set aside the order of the Court of First Instance of Mindoro issued in the said
testate estate proceedings, fixing the amount of fees for respondent Juan L. Luna, as attorney for said
administrator.
The facts material to the issues raised in the petition are as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Santiago Rementeria y Aldamizcogeascoa, the decedent, was a Spaniard and member of the commercial
partnership "Aldamiz y Rementeria." The other members were the brothers, Gavino and Jose, surnamed Aldamiz.
Santiago Rementeria died in Spain in 1937, and probate proceeding No. 705 was instituted in the same year in the
Court of First Instance of Mindoro by Gavino Aldamiz represented by Atty. Juan L. Luna. Gavino Aldamiz was
appointed administrator and as such was represented by respondent Atty. Juan Luna up to January 21, 1947, when
the order complained of was issued. In that order it is said that "said attorney is the one who instituted this testate
proceeding ten years ago and has from its incipiency to the present stage of the proceeding actively intervened in
the same."cralaw virtua1aw library
On January 15, 1947, after ten years from the date of his appointment, Gavino Aldamiz, as administrator, through
his attorney Juan L. Luna, submitted his accounts for the years 1944, 1945 and 1946 and also a project of partition
with a view to closing the proceedings. On said date, the court approved the accounts but refused to approve the
project of partition unless all debts including attorneys fees be first paid. In the project of partition, it was
expressly stated that attorneys fees, debts and incidental expenses would be proportionately paid by the
beneficiaries after the closure of the testate proceedings, but the court refused to sanction this clause of the
project. It is for this reason that right then and there, Attorney Luna, to comply with the wishes of the court,
without previously preparing and filing a written petition to have his professional fees fixed, and without previous
notice to all the interested parties, submitted evidence of his services and professional standing so that the court
might fix the amount of his compensation and the administrator may make payment thereof. This failure to file a
written claim and to notify the interested parties thereof was not due to bad faith or fraudulent purpose but to an
honest belief on the part of the respondent attorney that such requirements were not necessary under the
circumstance.
In this connection, it must be stated, in justice to Attorney Luna, that during the ten years that he served as
attorney for the administrator and during the twenty-five years as legal consultant to Santiago Rementeria, Gavino
Aldamiz and Jose Aldamiz individually and as a commercial partnership under the firm name "Aldamiz y
Rementeria," he never took the trouble of charging them for his professional services, thus showing
disinterestedness and extreme liberality on his part due to friendship and other personal considerations toward his
clients. And it is to be observed further that even after ten years of active work in the testate proceeding, when he
wanted to close the same and it was then time for him to demand payment for his services, he showed no interest
in demanding preferring to leave the matter to future negotiation or understanding with the interested parties. And
when the amount of his fees was fixed by the court and Gavino Aldamiz asked him for a substantial reduction, he
answered that it was not he who had fixed the amount but the court, and advised his client to file a motion for
reconsideration, with the assurance that he would offer no objection to any reduction in amount and to any
extension of the time for paying what might be granted by the court. And again, when Gavino Aldamiz paid him
P5,000 on account, respondent attorney told him that he would be satisfied with any additional amount that Gavino
might later desire to pay him. Only subsequent occurrences which proved distasteful to the parties, led them to
take steps which culminated in the filing of the instant civil action.
At the time respondents evidence was submitted to the court, the interested parties who were residing in the
Philippines were Gavino Aldamiz and his brother Jose Aldamiz. The others were then residing in Spain. No written
claim had ever been filed for respondents fees, and the interested parties had not been notified thereof nor of the
hearing, not even Gavino Aldamiz who did not know when he was called to testify that he would testify in
connection with respondents fees. The Court, after considering the whole evidence presented, issued its order of
January 21, 1947, awarding respondent Attorney Luna, in payment of his professional services, an aggregate sum
of P28,000 in the following manner:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. For the institution, preparation of the pleadings in the voluminous probate case, allowance of the will, project of
partition and the final closing of this proceeding, P15,000;

2. For the registration of a parcel of land of seventy-eight hectares in favor of the testate, P5,000;
3. For three naturalization cases at the rate of P1,000 each, P3,000; and
4. For services rendered in the deduction of inheritance tax from P28,000 to P433.40 P5,000.
The Court ordered payment of these amounts within thirty days. Petitioner Gavino Aldamiz received copy of this
order on February 21, 1948. Out of the total amount of P28,000, petitioner was able to pay P5,000 only, and upon
his failure to pay the balance of P23,000 after several demands made upon him by respondent attorney, the latter
on April 17, 1948, filed an ex-parte motion for execution, which was granted by the respondent Court on April 19,
1948. Pursuant to the order of execution, the respondent Sheriff levied on execution on two parcels of land
belonging, not to the testate estate of Santiago Rementeria y Aldamizcogeascoa, but to the commercial partnership
"Aldamiz y Rementeria" with a total area of three hundred fifty-seven (357) hectares, more or less, and assessed
at one hundred eighty-two thousand, three hundred and sixty pesos (P182,360), which was sold at a public auction
on July 20, 1948, in favor of respondent attorney for only twenty thousand pesos (P20,000). This sale was made
after preliminary injunction had been issued by this court in the instant case.
We believe and so hold that the order of the respondent court issued on January 21, 1948, fixing the amount of
respondent attorneys fees is null and void. The correct procedure for the collection of attorneys fees, is for the
counsel to request the administrator to make payment and file an action against him in his personal capacity and
not as an administrator should he fail to pay. (Palileo v. Mendoza, G. R. No. 47106, 40 Off. Gaz. [8th Supp. ],
132.) 1 If judgment is rendered against the administrator and he pays, he may include the fees so paid in his
account to the court. (Uy Tioco v. Imperial, 53 Phil., 802.) The attorney also may, instead of bringing such an
action, file a petition in the testate or intestate proceeding "asking that the court, after notice to all persons
interested, allow his claim and direct the administrator to pay it as an expense of administration." (Italics ours.)
Escueta v. Sy Juilliong, 5 Phil., 405.)
In the instant case, as above stated, no written petition for the payment of attorneys fees has ever been filed by
respondent attorney and the interested parties had not been previously notified thereof nor of the hearing held by
the court. Consequently, the order issued by the respondent court on January 21, 1947, and all subsequent orders
implementing it, are null and void, as having been issued in excess of jurisdiction.
We also hold that the order of execution issued on April 19, 1948, is null and void, not only because it was
intended to implement the order of January 21, 1947, which in itself was null and void, but because a writ of
execution is not the proper procedure allowed by the Rules of Court for the payment of debts and expenses of
administration. The proper procedure is for the court to order the sale of personal estate or the sale or mortgage of
real property of the deceased and all debts or expenses of administration should be paid out of the proceeds of the
sale or mortgage. The order for the sale or mortgage should be issued upon motion of the administrator and with
the written notice to all the heirs, legatees and devisees residing in the Philippines, according to Rule 89, section 3,
and Rule 90, section 2. And when sale or mortgage of real estate is to be made, the regulations contained in Rule
90, section 7, should be complied with.
Execution may issue only where the devisees, legatees or heirs have entered into possession of their respective
portions in the estate prior to settlement and payment of the debts and expenses of administration and it is later
ascertained that there are such debts and expenses to be paid, in which case "the court having jurisdiction of the
estate may, by order for that purpose, after hearing, settle the amount of their several liabilities, and order how
much and in what manner each person shall contribute, and may issue execution if circumstances require" (Rule
89, section 6; see also Rule 74, section 4; Italics ours). And this is not the instant case.
It is alleged by respondents that petitioner is guilty of laches. True that petitioner failed to appeal from the order of
January 21, 1947, within the time provided by the Rules and the instant petition forcertiorari was filed one (1)
year, four (4) months and fourteen (14) days after petitioner had received a copy of said order. And we have held
in Profeta v. David, 40 Off. Gaz., 14th Supp., p. 152, 1 that orders issued without previous notice to parties will be
deemed cured if said parties fail to appeal within the time provided by the rules and their appeal is lost due to their
own negligence. But here, aside from petitioner, there are interested parties who have never been notified of the
order complained of, and as to them, said order has not yet become final and executory. And with respect to
petitioner, he has not lost his appeal through his own negligence. When he received notice of the order of the Court
fixing respondents fees in the amount of P28,000, he immediately wrote his lawyer a letter asking for a substantial
reduction and extension of time to pay. The lawyer answered advising him to file his motion for reconsideration
within thirty days, but he received his lawyers letter after said period had expired. And petitioner had no other
attorney to advice him except respondent who was his adversary on the matter now in dispute. After receiving said
letter, he again sought equitable compromise with respondent attorney and later paid him P5,000, and respondent
then told him that he would be satisfied with whatever additional amount petitioner might desire to pay him. And
petitioner would perhaps have taken no action were it not because without previous notice to him, the respondent
attorney asked authority from the court to sell two parcels of land totalling 13 hectares, for the payment of said

professional fees and later, on July 26, 1947, respondent attorney, again without previous notice to petitioner, filed
a motion for execution for the same purpose. Both motions were, however, abandoned. But a second motion for
execution was filed by respondent without petitioners knowledge, which was granted by the Court on April 19,
1948. Respondent Sheriff levied on two parcels of land belonging to the partnership "Aldamiz y Rementeria" with a
total area of 357 hectares and assessed at P182,360 and the sale was announced by the sheriff for July 20, 1948.
Two motions for reconsideration were filed by petitioner, one on June 16, 1948, and the other on June 28, 1948,
asking that the order of January 21, 1947, and the order of execution of April 19, 1948 be set aside, but both
motions were denied and the last order of denial is dated July 1, 1948. The petition in the instant case was filed on
July 17, 1948. We hold that under the circumstances, particularly the fiduciary relation between petitioner and
respondent attorney, the former is not guilty of laches.
Respondents maintain that the case for the petitioner is one of pure technicality, premised upon a supposed failure
of the respondent attorney to follow a supposed procedure. It is said that the amount of P28,000 fixed and allowed
by respondent court as professional fees of the respondent attorney is not unconscionable or unreasonable because
the entire estate was worth P315,112 and now it is worth about half a million pesos because of many
improvements existing thereon. It appears, however, that due to lack of notice upon the interested parties
mistakes have been committed by the court which could have been avoided. For instance, the court awarded fees
for services rendered not to the testate estate but to other persons, such as the supposed services in connection
with the petitions for naturalization filed in behalf of Gavino Aldamiz and Jose Aldamiz and the application for
registration of a parcel of land of 78 hectares filed not in favor of the testate estate but of the partnership "Aldamiz
y Rementeria." These services evidently could not be charged against the estate of Santiago Rementeria. And
furthermore, due to lack of preparation on the part of respondent attorney, it appears that while he was testifying
to his professional services he was apparently not sure of being able to recite them all for at the end of his
testimony he said: "Son los servicios que me acuerdo ahora. . . . Had he been afforded ample time to recollect the
nature and details of his long and continuous services, considering his high professional standing as recited by the
respondent court in its disputed order and the increased value of the estate then, perhaps, a more reasonable
compensation would have been fixed, or, at least, the court could have rendered a decision with full knowledge of
all the facts and with justice to all the parties concerned.
For all the foregoing, the order of the respondent court of January 21, 1947, and all the subsequent orders
implementing it, particularly the order of execution issued by the court on April 19, 1948, and the sale made by the
sheriff on July 20, 1948, in favor of respondent attorney, are null and void and are hereby set aside, with costs
against respondents. It is so ordered.

SECOND DIVISION
[G.R. No. 124862. December 22, 1998.]
FE D. QUITA, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS and BLANDINA DANDAN, * respondents.
FE D. QUITA and Arturo T. Padlan, both Filipinos, were married in the Philippines on 18 May 1941. They were not
however blessed with children. Somewhere along the way their relationship soured. Eventually Fe sued Arturo for
divorce in San Francisco, California, U.S.A. She submitted in the divorce proceedings a private writing dated 19
July 1950 evidencing their agreement to live separately from each other and a settlement of their conjugal
properties. On 23 July 1954 she obtained a final judgment of divorce. Three (3) weeks thereafter she married a
certain Felix Tupaz in the same locality but their relationship also ended in a divorce. Still in the U.S.A., she
married for the third time, to a certain Wernimont.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
On 16 April 1972 Arturo died. He left no will. On 31 August 1972 Lino Javier Inciong filed a petition with the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for issuance of letters of administration concerning the estate of Arturo in favor
of the Philippine Trust Company. Respondent Blandina Dandan (also referred to as Blandina Padlan), claiming to be
the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan, and Claro, Alexis, Ricardo, Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, all surnamed
Padlan, named in the petition as surviving children of Arturo Padlan, opposed the petition and prayed for the
appointment instead of Atty. Leonardo Cabasal, which was resolved in favor of the latter. Upon motion of the
oppositors themselves, Atty. Cabasal was later replaced by Higino Castillon. On 30 April 1973 the oppositors
(Blandina and the Padlan children) submitted certified photocopies of the 19 July 1950 private writing and the final
judgment of divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Later Ruperto T. Padlan, claiming to be the sole surviving
brother of the deceased Arturo, intervened.
On 7 October 1987 petitioner moved for the immediate declaration of heirs of the decedent and the distribution of
his estate. At the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987, private respondent as well as the six (6) Padlan children
and Ruperto failed to appear despite due notice. On the same day, the trial court required the submission of the
records of birth of the Padlan children within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the
documents, the issue on the declaration of heirs would be considered submitted for resolution. The prescribed
period lapsed without the required documents being submitted.
The trial court invoking Tenchavez v. Escao 1 which held that "a foreign divorce between Filipino citizens sought
and decreed after the effectivity of the present Civil Code (Rep. Act 386) was not entitled to recognition as valid in
this jurisdiction," 2 disregarded the divorce between petitioner and Arturo. Consequently, it expressed the view
that their marriage subsisted until the death of Arturo in 1972. Neither did it consider valid their extrajudicial
settlement of conjugal properties due to lack of judicial approval. 3 On the other hand, it opined that there was no
showing that marriage existed between private respondent and Arturo, much less was it shown that the alleged
Padlan children had been acknowledged by the deceased as his children with her. As regards Ruperto, it found that
he was a brother of Arturo. On 27 November 1987 4 only petitioner and Ruperto were declared the intestate heirs
of Arturo. Accordingly, equal adjudication of the net hereditary estate was ordered in favor of the two intestate
heirs. 5
On motion for reconsideration, Blandina and the Padlan children were allowed to present proofs that the
recognition of the children by the deceased as his legitimate children, except Alexis who was recognized as his
illegitimate child, had been made in their respective records of birth. Thus on 15 February 1988 6 partial
reconsideration was granted declaring the Padlan children, with the exception of Alexis, entitled to one-half of the
estate to the exclusion of Ruperto Padlan, and petitioner to the other half. 7 Private respondent was not declared
an heir. Although it was stated in the aforementioned records of birth that she and Arturo were married on 22 April
1947, their marriage was clearly void since it was celebrated during the existence of his previous marriage to
petitioner.
In their appeal to the Court of Appeals, Blandina and her children assigned as one of the errors allegedly
committed by the trial court the circumstance that the case was decided without a hearing; in violation of Sec. 1,
Rule 90, of the Rules of Court, which provides that if there is a controversy before the court as to who are the
lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the law,
the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.
Respondent appellate court found this ground alone sufficient to sustain the appeal; hence, on 11 September 1995
it declared null and void the 27 November 1987 decision and 15 February 1988 order of the trial court, and
directed the remand of the case to the trial court for further proceedings. 8 On 18 April 1996 it denied
reconsideration. 9
Should this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings? Petitioner insists that there is no need
because, first, no legal or factual issue obtains for resolution either as to the heirship of the Padlan children or as to

their respective shares in the intestate estate of the decedent; and, second, the issue as to who between petitioner
and private respondent is the proper heir of the decedent is one of law which can be resolved in the present
petition based on established facts and admissions of the parties.
We cannot sustain petitioner. The provision relied upon by respondent courts is clear: If there is a controversy
before the court as to who are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the distributive shares to which
each person is entitled under the law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary cases.chanrobles
virtual lawlibrary
We agree with petitioner that no dispute exists either as to the right of the six (6) Padlan children to inherit from
the decedent because there are proofs that they have been duly acknowledged by him and petitioner herself even
recognizes them as heirs of Arturo Padlan; 10 nor as to their respective hereditary shares. But controversy remains
as to who is the legitimate surviving spouse of Arturo. The trial court, after the parties other than petitioner failed
to appear during the scheduled hearing on 23 October 1987 of the motion for immediate declaration of heirs and
distribution of estate, simply issued an order requiring the submission of the records of birth of the Padlan children
within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, after which, with or without the documents, the issue on declaration of
heirs would be deemed submitted for resolution.
We note that in her comment to petitioners motion private respondent raised, among others, the issue as to
whether petitioner was still entitled to inherit from the decedent considering that she had secured a divorce in the
U.S.A. and in fact had twice remarried. She also invoked the above quoted procedural rule. 11 To this, petitioner
replied that Arturo was a Filipino and as such remained legally married to her in spite of the divorce they obtained.
12 Reading between the lines, the implication is that petitioner was no longer a Filipino citizen at the time of her
divorce from Arturo. This should have prompted the trial court to conduct a hearing to establish her citizenship.
The purpose of a hearing is to ascertain the truth of the matters in issue with the aid of documentary and
testimonial evidence as well as the arguments of the parties either supporting or opposing the evidence. Instead,
the lower court perfunctorily settled her claim in her favor by merely applying the ruling in Tenchavez v. Escao.
Then in private respondents motion to set aside and/or reconsider the lower courts decision she stressed that the
citizenship of petitioner was relevant in the light of the ruling in Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. 13 that aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national
law. She prayed therefore that the case be set for hearing. 14 Petitioner opposed the motion but failed to squarely
address the issue on her citizenship. 15 The trial court did not grant private respondents prayer for a hearing but
proceeded to resolve her motion with the finding that both petitioner and Arturo were "Filipino citizens and were
married in the Philippines." 16 It maintained that their divorce obtained in 1954 in San Francisco, California,
U.S.A., was not valid in Philippine jurisdiction. We deduce that the finding on their citizenship pertained solely to
the time of their marriage as the trial court was not supplied with a basis to determine petitioners citizenship at
the time of their divorce. The doubt persisted as to whether she was still a Filipino citizen when their divorce was
decreed. The trial court must have overlooked the materiality of this aspect. Once proved that she was no longer a
Filipino citizen at the time of their divorce, Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could very well lose
her right to inherit from Arturo.
Respondent again raised in her appeal the issue on petitioners citizenship; 17 it did not merit enlightenment
however from petitioner. 18 In the present proceeding, petitioners citizenship is brought anew to the fore by
private Respondent. She even furnishes the Court with the transcript of stenographic notes taken on 5 May 1995
during the hearing for the reconstitution of the original of a certain transfer certificate title as well as the issuance
of new owners duplicate copy thereof before another trial court. When asked whether she was an American citizen
petitioner answered that she was since 1954. 19 Significantly, the decree of divorce of petitioner and Arturo was
obtained in the same year. Petitioner however did not bother to file a reply memorandum to erase the uncertainty
about her citizenship at the time of their divorce, a factual issue requiring hearings to be conducted by the trial
court. Consequently, respondent appellate court did not err in ordering the case returned to the trial court for
further proceedings.cralawnad
We emphasize however that the question to be determined by the trial court should be limited only to the right of
petitioner to inherit from Arturo as his surviving spouse. Private respondents claim to heirship was already
resolved by the trial court. She and Arturo were married on 22 April 1947 while the prior marriage of petitioner and
Arturo was subsisting thereby resulting in a bigamous marriage considered void from the beginning under Arts. 80
and 83 of the Civil Code. Consequently, she is not a surviving spouse that can inherit from him as this status
presupposes a legitimate relationship. 20
As regards the motion of private respondent for petitioner and her counsel to be declared in contempt of court and
that the present petition be dismissed for forum shopping, 21 the same lacks merit. For forum shopping to exist
the actions must involve the same transactions and same essential facts and circumstances. There must also be
identical causes of action, subject matter and issue. 22 The present petition deals with declaration of heirship while
the subsequent petitions filed before the three (3) trial courts concern the issuance of new owners duplicate copies
of titles of certain properties belonging to the estate of Arturo. Obviously, there is no reason to declare the

existence of forum shopping.


WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of respondent Court of Appeals ordering the remand of the case
to the court of origin for further proceedings and declaring null and void its decision holding petitioner Fe D. Quita
and Ruperto T. Padlan as intestate heirs is AFFIRMED. The order of the appellate court modifying its previous
decision by granting one-half () of the net hereditary estate to the Padlan children, namely, Claro, Ricardo,
Emmanuel, Zenaida and Yolanda, with the exception of Alexis, all surnamed Padlan, instead of Arturos brother
Ruperto Padlan, is likewise AFFIRMED. The Court however emphasizes that the reception of evidence by the trial
court should be limited to the hereditary rights of petitioner as the surviving spouse of Arturo Padlan.
The motion to declare petitioner and her counsel in contempt of court and to dismiss the present petition for forum
shopping is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary:red

G.R. NO. 127920 : August 9, 2005]


EMILIO B. PACIOLES, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS ADMINISTRATOR AND HEIR OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE
OF MIGUELITA CHING-PACIOLES, Petitioners, v. MIGUELA CHUATOCO-CHING, Respondent.
Oftentimes death brings peace only to the person who dies but not to the people he leaves behind. For in death, a
person's estate remains, providing a fertile ground for discords that break the familial bonds. Before us is another
case that illustrates such reality. Here, a husband and a mother of the deceased are locked in an acrimonious
dispute over the estate of their loved one.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorarifiled by Emilio B. Pacioles, Jr., herein petitioner, against Miguela ChuatocoChing, herein respondent, assailing the Court of Appeals Decision1 dated September 25, 1996 and
Resolution2 dated January 27, 1997 in CA-G.R. SP No. 41571.3 The Appellate Court affirmed the Order dated
January 17, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 99, Quezon City denying petitioner's motion for
partition and distribution of the estate of his wife, Miguelita Ching-Pacioles; and his motion for reconsideration.
The facts are undisputed.
On March 13, 1992, Miguelita died intestate, leaving real properties with an estimated value of P10.5 million, stock
investments worth P518,783.00, bank deposits amounting to P6.54 million, and interests in certain businesses.
She was survived by her husband, petitioner herein, and their two minor children.
Consequently, on August 20, 1992, petitioner filed with the RTC a verified petition4 for the settlement of Miguelita's
estate. He prayed that (a) letters of administration be issued in his name, and (b) that the net residue of the
estate be divided among the compulsory heirs.
Miguelita's mother, Miguela Chuatoco-Ching, herein respondent, filed an opposition, specifically to petitioner's
prayer for the issuance of letters of administration on the grounds that (a) petitioner is incompetent and unfit to
exercise the duties of an administrator; and (b) the bulk of Miguelita's estate is composed of
"paraphernal properties." Respondent prayed that the letters of administration be issued to her
instead.5 Afterwards, she also filed a motion for her appointment as special administratrix.6
Petitioner moved to strike out respondent's opposition, alleging that the latter has no direct and material interest in
the estate, she not being a compulsory heir, and that he, being the surviving spouse, has the preferential right to
be appointed as administrator under the law.7
Respondent countered that she has direct and material interest in the estate because she gave half of her inherited
properties to Miguelita on condition that both of them "would undertake whatever business endeavor they
decided to, in the capacity of business partners."8
In her omnibus motion9 dated April 23, 1993, respondent nominated her son Emmanuel Ching to act as special
administrator.
On April 20, 1994, the intestate court issued an order appointing petitioner and Emmanuel as joint regular
administrators of the estate.10 Both were issued letters of administration after taking their oath and posting the
requisite bond.
Consequently, Notice to Creditors was published in the issues of the Manila Standard on September 12, 19, and 26,
1994. However, no claims were filed against the estate within the period set by the Revised Rules of Court.
Thereafter, petitioner submitted to the intestate court an inventory of Miguelita's estate.11Emmanuel did not
submit an inventory.
On May 17, 1995, the intestate court declared petitioner and his two minor children as the only compulsory heirs of
Miguelita.12
On July 21, 1995, petitioner filed with the intestate court an omnibus motion13 praying, among others, that an
Order be issued directing the: 1) payment of estate taxes; 2) partition and distribution of the estate among
the declared heirs; and 3) payment of attorney's fees.

Respondent opposed petitioner's motion on the ground that the partition and distribution of the estate is
"premature and precipitate," considering that there is yet no determination "whether the properties specified in
the inventory are conjugal, paraphernal or owned in a joint venture."14Respondent claimed that she owns the
bulk of Miguelita's estate as an "heir and co-owner." Thus, she prayed that a hearing be scheduled.
On January 17, 1996, the intestate court allowed the payment of the estate taxes and attorney's fees but
denied petitioner's prayer for partition and distribution of the estate, holding that it is indeed "premature." The
intestate court ratiocinated as follows:
"On the partition and distribution of the deceased's properties, among the declared heirs, the Court finds the
prayer of petitioner in this regard to be premature. Thus, a hearing on oppositor's claim as indicated in her
opposition to the instant petition is necessary to determine 'whether the properties listed in the amended
complaint filed by petitioner are entirely conjugal or the paraphernal properties of the deceased, or a
co-ownership between the oppositor and the petitioner in their partnership venture. '"
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied in the Resolution dated May 7, 1996.
Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari seeking to annul and set aside the
intestate court's Order dated January 17, 1996 and Resolution dated May 7, 1996 which denied petitioner's prayer
for partition and distribution of the estate for being premature, indicating that it (intestate court) will first resolve
respondent's claim of ownership.
The Appellate Court dismissed the Petition for Certiorari, holding that in issuing the challenged Order and
Resolution, the intestate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion.
The Appellate Court ruled:
"Regarding the second issue raised, respondent judge did not commit grave abuse of discretion in entertaining
private respondent's unsupported claim of ownership against the estate. In fact, there is no indication that the
probate court has already made a finding of title or ownership. It is inevitable that in probate proceedings,
questions of collation or of advancement are involved for these are matters which can be passed upon in the
course of the proceedings. The probate court in exercising its prerogative to schedule a hearing, to inquire into the
propriety of private respondent's claim, is being extremely cautious in determining the composition of the estate.
This act is not tainted with an iota of grave abuse of discretion."
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration but it was likewise denied. Hence, this Petition for Review
onCertiorarianchored on the following assignments of error:
"I
RESPONDENT COURT'S DECISION WHICH AFFIRMS THE INTESTATE COURT'S ORDER IS A GRAVE ERROR FOR
BEING CONTRARY TO THE SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE AND POLICY OF THE LAW THAT ESTATE PROCEEDINGS MUST
BE SETTLED EXPEDITIOUSLY.
II
RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR IN SUSTAINING THE INTESTATE COURT'S ORDER TO CONDUCT
HEARING ON THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP CLAIM AGAINST THE ESTATE, AS SAID FUNCTION IS OUTSIDE AND
BEYOND THE JURISDICTION OF THE INTESTATE COURT.
III
RESPONDENT COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE INTESTATE COURT'S ORDER AND RESOLUTION
NOTWITHSTANDING THAT RESPONDENT CHING'S OWNERSHIP CLAIMS ARE CONFLICTING, FRIVOLOUS AND
BASELESS."
The fundamental issue for our resolution is: May a trial court, acting as an intestate court, hear and pass upon
questions of ownership involving properties claimed to be part of the decedent's estate?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

The general rule is that the jurisdiction of the trial court either as an intestate or a probate court relates only to
matters having to do with the settlement of the estate and probate of will of deceased persons but does not
extend to the determination of questions of ownership that arise during the proceedings.15 The patent
rationale for this rule is that such court exercises special and limited jurisdiction.16
A well-recognized deviation to the rule is the principle that an intestate or a probate court may hear and pass upon
questions of ownership when its purpose is to determine whether or not a property should be included in the
inventory. In such situations the adjudication is merely incidental and provisional. Thus, in Pastor, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals,17 we held:
"x x x As a rule, the question of ownership is an extraneous matter which the probate court cannot resolve with
finality. Thus, for the purpose of determining whether a certain property should or should not be
included in the inventory of estate properties, the probate court may pass upon the title thereto, but
such determination is provisional, not conclusive, and is subject to the final decision in a separate
action to resolve title."
The Court of Appeals relied heavily on the above principle in sustaining the jurisdiction of the intestate court to
conduct a hearing on respondent's claim. Such reliance is misplaced. Under the said principle, the key
consideration is that the purpose of the intestate or probate court in hearing and passing upon questions of
ownership is merely to determine whether or not a property should be included in the inventory. The
facts of this case show that such was not the purpose of the intestate court.
First, the inventory was not disputed. In fact, in her Manifestation and Opposition18 dated September 18, 1995,
respondent expressly adopted the inventory prepared by petitioner, thus:
"6. She adopts the inventory submitted by the petitioner in his Amended Compliance dated October 6,
1994, and filed only on November 4, 1994 not October 5, 1995 as erroneously asserted in Par. 12 of the Omnibus
Motion. Oppositor, however, takes exception to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties and reserves
her right to submit a more accurate and realistic pricing on each."
Respondent could have opposed petitioner's inventory and sought the exclusion of the specific properties
which she believed or considered to be hers. But instead of doing so, she expressly adopted the inventory,
taking exception only to the low valuation placed on the real estate properties.
And second, Emmanuel, respondent's son and representative in the settlement of Miguelita's estate, did not
submit his own inventory. His mandate, as co-administrator, is "to submit within three (3) months after his
appointment a true inventory and appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased which have come
into his possession or knowledge."19 He could have submitted an inventory, excluding therefrom those
properties which respondent considered to be hers. The fact that he did not endeavor to submit one
shows that he acquiesced with petitioner's inventory.
Obviously, respondent's purpose here was not to obtain from the intestate court a ruling of what properties should
or should not be included in the inventory. She wanted something else, i.e., to secure from the intestate court
a final determination of her claim of ownership over properties comprising the bulk of Miguelita's
estate. The intestate court went along with respondent on this point as evident in its Resolution20 dated May 7,
1996, thus:
"On petitioner's motion for partition and distribution of the estate of the late Miguelita Ching Pacioles, it is believed
that since oppositor had interposed a claim against the subject estate, the distribution thereof in favor of the heirs
could not possibly be implemented as there is still a need for appropriate proceedings to determine the propriety of
oppositor's claim. It must be mentioned that if it is true that oppositor owns the bulk of the properties, which she
allegedly placed/registered in the name of the deceased for convenience, Oppositor, therefore, has a material and
direct interest in the estate and hence, should be given her day in Court."
It is apparent from the foregoing Resolution that the purpose of the hearing set by the intestate court was actually
to "determine the propriety of oppositor's (respondent's) claim." According to the intestate court, "if it is
true that the oppositor (respondent) owns the bulk of (Miguelita's) properties," then it means that she
has a "material and direct interest in the estate" and, hence,"she should be given her day in court." The
intended "day in court" or hearing is geared towards resolving the propriety of respondent's contention that she is
the true owner of the bulk of Miguelita's estate.

Surely, we cannot be deluded by respondent's ingenious attempt to secure a proceeding for the purpose of
resolving her blanket claim against Miguelita's estate. Although, she made it appear that her only intent was to
determine the accuracy of petitioner's inventory, however, a close review of the facts and the pleadings reveals her
real intention.
Clearly, the RTC, acting as an intestate court, had overstepped its jurisdiction. Its proper course should have been
to maintain a hands-off stance on the matter. It is well-settled in this jurisdiction, sanctioned and reiterated in a
long line of decisions, that when a question arises as to ownership of property alleged to be a part of the estate of
the deceased person, but claimed by some other person to be his property, not by virtue of any right of inheritance
from the deceased but by title adverse to that of the deceased and his estate, such question cannot be determined
in the course of an intestate or probate proceedings. The intestate or probate court has no jurisdiction to
adjudicate such contentions, which must be submitted to the court in the exercise of its general
jurisdiction as a regional trial court.21 Jurisprudence teaches us that:
"[A] probate court or one in charge of proceedings whether testate or intestate cannot adjudicate or
determine title to properties claimed to be a part of the estate and which are claimed to belong to
outside parties. All that the said court could do as regards said properties is to determine whether they should or
should not be included in the inventory or list of properties to be administered by the administrator. If there is no
dispute, well and good, but if there is, then the parties, the administrator, and the opposing parties
have to resort to an ordinary action for a final determination of the conflicting claims of title because
the probate court cannot do so."22
Hence, respondent's recourse is to file a separate action with a court of general jurisdiction. The intestate court is
not the appropriate forum for the resolution of her adverse claim of ownership over properties ostensibly belonging
to Miguelita's estate.
Now, even assuming that the intestate court merely intended to make a provisional or prima faciedetermination of
the issue of ownership, still respondent's claim cannot prosper. It bears stressing that the bulk of Miguelita's
estate, as stated in petitioner's inventory, comprises real estates covered by the Torrens System which are
registered either in the name of Miguelita alone or with petitioner.As such, they are considered the owners of
the properties until their title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action. We find this
Court's pronouncement in Bolisay v. Alcid23 relevant, thus:
"It does not matter that respondent-administratrix has evidence purporting to support her claim of ownership, for,
on the other hand, petitioners have a Torrens title in their favor, which under the law is endowed with
incontestability until after it has been set aside in the manner indicated in the law itself, which, of course, does not
include, bringing up the matter as a mere incident in special proceedings for the settlement of the
estate of deceased persons. x x x
x x x In regard to such incident of inclusion or exclusion, We hold that if a property covered by Torrens Title is
involved, the presumptive conclusiveness of such title should be given due weight, and in the absence of strong
compelling evidence to the contrary, the holder thereof should be considered as the owner of the property
in controversy until his title is nullified or modified in an appropriate ordinary action, particularly, when
as in the case at bar, possession of the property itself is in the persons named in the title. x x x"
Corrolarily, P.D. 1529, otherwise known as, "The Property Registration Decree," proscribes collateral attack against
Torrens Title, hence:
"Section 48. Certificate not subject to collateral attack.
A certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified or cancelled
except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law."
Significantly, a perusal of the records reveals that respondent failed to present convincing evidence to bolster her
bare assertion of ownership. We quote her testimony, thus:
"Q: I now direct your attention to paragraph (5) appearing on page 1 of this sworn statement of yours which I
quote:" In accordance with the Chinese tradition and culture in the distribution of properties to the legal heirs, we
decided to give only a token to our daughter Miguelita and leave the rest to our only son Emmanuel, with the
undertaking that being the son he will take full responsibility of the rest of the family despite his marriage. Madame
witness, do you recall having stated that in your sworn statement?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A: Yes sir, but it was not carried out.


Q What was actually given to your daughter Miguelita is only a token, is that right?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: Not a token, sir, but one half of the share of the estate was given to Lita and the other half was given to
Emmanuel.
Q: What went to Emmanuel was also ', is that right?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What makes up the one half share of Lita, if you recall?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: What was given to her were all checks, sir, but I cannot remember any more the amount.
xxx
Q: Summing up your testimony, Madame, you cannot itemize the one half share of the estate of
Miguelita, is that right?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was there any document covering this partition of the estate among you, Emmanuel and Miguelita with respect
to the estate of your late husband?
A: If I only knew that this will happen'
Q: Samakatuwid po ay walang dokumento?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: Wala po."24
She further testified as follows:
"Q: Among the properties listed like the various parcels of land, stocks, investments, bank accounts
and deposits both here and abroad, interests and participation in IFS Pharmaceuticals and Medical
Supplies, Inc. and various motor vehicles, per your pleasure, Madam Witness, how should these
properties be partitioned or what should be done with these properties? According to you earlier, you
are agreeable for the partition of the said properties with Emil on a 50-50 basis, is that right?
A: Kung ano po ang sa akin, iyon ang dapat na bumalik sa akin, sir.
Q Halimbawa ay ano po iyon? Real estate properties, parcels of land located in Pag-Asa, in Silangan, in
San Lazaro, in Sta. Cruz, in San Francisco del Monte and shares of stock. Alinsunod sa inyo, paano po
ang dapat na partihan o hatian ninyo ni Emil?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: Kung ano ang sa akin'
xxx
Q Ang tanong ko po sa inyo ay ganito, ito po ba ang inyong iminungkahi kay Emil? Ito po ba ang inyong
paghahatian or hindi?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
A: Iyo akin talaga na hindi nila pinaghirapan, sir."25
Unfortunately, respondent could not even specify which of the properties listed in petitioner's inventory belong to
her. Neither could she present any document to prove her claim of ownership. The consistently changing basis of

her claim did nothing to improve her posture. Initially, she insisted that the bulk of Miguelita's estate is composed
of paraphernal properties.26 Sensing that such assertion could not strengthen her claim of ownership, she opted to
change her submission and declare that she and Miguelita were "business partners" and that she gave to the latter
most of her properties to be used in a joint business venture.27 Respondent must have realized early on that if the
properties listed in petitioner's inventory are paraphernal, then Miguelita had the absolute title and ownership over
them and upon her death, such properties would be vested to her compulsory heirs, petitioner herein and their two
minor children.28
At any rate, we must stress that our pronouncements herein cannot diminish or deprive respondent of whatever
rights or properties she believes or considers to be rightfully hers. We reiterate that the question of ownership of
properties alleged to be part of the estate must be submitted to the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its
general jurisdiction.29
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. SP No. 41571 are hereby REVERSED.
SO ORDERED.

[G.R. No. 143483. January 31, 2002.]


REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES represented by the REGISTER OF DEEDS OF PASAY CITY,Petitioner, v.
COURT OF APPEALS (SPECIAL FORMER 3RD DIVISION) AND AMADA H. SOLANO, assisted by her
husband ROMEO SOLANO, Respondents.
DECISION
This petition for certiorari seeks to nullify two (2) Resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 12 November 1998 and
4 May 2000 giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment filed by private respondent Amada H.
Solano on 3 February 1997 and denying petitioners motion for reconsideration.
For more than three (3) decades (from 1952 to 1985) private respondent Amada Solano served as the all-around
personal domestic helper of the late Elizabeth Hankins, a widow and a French national. During Ms. Hankins lifetime
and most especially during the waning years of her life, respondent Solano was her faithful girl Friday and a
constant companion since no close relative was available to tend to her needs.
In recognition of Solanos faithful and dedicated service, Ms. Hankins executed in her favor two (2) deeds of
donation involving two (2) parcels of land covered by TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808 of the Registry of Deeds. Private
respondent alleged that she misplaced the deeds of donation and were nowhere to be found.chanrob1es virtua1
1aw 1ibrary
While the deeds of donation were missing, the Republic filed a petition for the escheat of the estate of Elizabeth
Hankins before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. 1 During the proceedings, a motion for intervention was filed
by Romeo Solano, spouse of private respondent, and one Gaudencio Regosa, but on 24 June 1987 the motion was
denied by the trial court for the reason that "they miserably failed to show valid claim or right to the properties in
question." 2 Since it was established that there were no known heirs and persons entitled to the properties of
decedent Hankins, the lower court escheated the estate of the decedent in favor of petitioner Republic of the
Philippines.
By virtue of the decision of the trial court, the Registry of Deeds of Pasay City cancelled TCT Nos. 7807 and 7808
and issued new ones, TCT Nos. 129551 and 129552, both in the name of Pasay City.
In the meantime, private respondent claimed that she accidentally found the deeds of donation she had been
looking for a long time. In view of this development, respondent Amada Solano filed on 28 January 1997 a petition
before the Court of Appeals for the annulment of the lower courts decision alleging, among other, that 3
13.1. The deceased Elizabeth Hankins having donated the subject properties to the petitioner in 1983 (for TCT No.
7807) and 1984 (for TCT No. 7808), these properties did not and could not form part of her estate when she died
on September 20, 1985. Consequently, they could not validly be escheated to the Pasay City Government;
13.2. Even assuming arguendo that the properties could be subject of escheat proceedings, the decision is still
legally infirm for escheating the properties to an entity, the Pasay City Government, which is not authorized by law
to be the recipient thereof. The property should have been escheated in favor of the Republic of the Philippines
under Rule 91, Section 1 of the New Rules of Court . . .
On 17 March 1997 the Office of the Solicitor General representing public respondents RTC and the Register of
Deeds (herein petitioner) filed an answer setting forth their affirmative defenses, to wit: (a) lack of jurisdiction over
the nature of the action; and, (b) the cause of action was barred by the statute of limitations.
Finding no cogent reason to justify the dismissal of the petition for annulment, the Court of Appeals issued on 12
November 1998 the first of its assailed Resolutions giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment
and setting the date for trial on the merits. In upholding the theory of respondent Solano, the Appeals Court ruled
that
Herein petitioner invokes lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter on the part of respondent RTC to entertain the
escheat proceedings . . . because the parcels of land have been earlier donated to herein petitioner in 1983 and
1984 prior to the death of said Hankins; and therefore, respondent court could not have ordered the escheat of
said properties in favor of the Republic of the Philippines, assign them to respondent Pasay City government, order
the cancellation of the old titles in the name of Hankins and order the properties registered in the name of
respondent Pasay City. . . The 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure specifically laid down the grounds of annulment filed
before this Court, to wit: extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by
law and this jurisdiction is determined by the allegations of the complaint. It is axiomatic that the averments of the
complaint determine the nature of the action and consequently the jurisdiction of the courts. Thus whether or not
the properties in question are no longer part of the estate of the deceased Hankins at the time of her death; and,
whether or not the alleged donations are valid are issues in the present petition for annulment which can be

resolved only after a full blown trial . . .


It is for the same reason that respondents espousal of the statute of limitations against herein petition for
annulment cannot prosper at this stage of the proceedings. Indeed, Section 4, Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of
Court expressly provides that a person entitled to the estate must file his claim with the court a quo within five (5)
years from the date of said judgment. However, it is clear to this Court that herein petitioner is not claiming
anything from the estate of the deceased at the time of her death on September 20, 1985; rather she is claiming
that the subject parcels of land should not have been included as part of the estate of the said decedent as she is
the owner thereof by virtue of the deeds of donation in her favor.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
In effect, herein petitioner, who alleges to be in possession of the premises in question, is claiming ownership of
the properties in question and the consequent reconveyance thereof in her favor which cause of action prescribes
ten (10) years after the issuance of title in favor of respondent Pasay City on August 7, 1990. Herein petition was
seasonably filed on February 3, 1997 under Article 1144, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten years from the time the right of action accrues: (1)
Upon a written contract; (2) Upon an obligation created by law; (3) Upon a judgment.
And Article 1456, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Art. 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a
trustee of an implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. 4
In its Resolution of 4 May 2000 the Court of Appeals denied the motion for reconsideration filed by public
respondents Register of Deeds of Pasay City and the Presiding judge of the lower court and set the trial on the
merits for June 15 and 16, 2000.
In its effort to nullify the Resolutions herein before mentioned, petitioner points out that the Court of Appeals
committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction (a) in denying petitioners
affirmative defenses set forth in its answer and motion for reconsideration, and in setting the case for trial and
reception of evidence; and, (b) in giving due course to private respondents petition for annulment of decision
despite the palpable setting-in of the 5-year statute of limitations within which to file claims before the court a quo
set forth in Rule 91 of the Revised Rules of Court and Art. 1014 of the Civil Code.
Petitioner argues that the lower court had jurisdiction when it escheated the properties in question in favor of the
city government and the filing of a petition for annulment of judgment on the ground of subsequent discovery of
the deeds of donation did not divest the lower court of its jurisdiction on the matter. It further contends that Rule
47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure only provides for two (2) grounds for the annulment of judgment, namely:
extrinsic fraud and lack of jurisdiction. As such the discovery of the deeds of donation seven (7) years after the
finality of the escheat proceedings is an extraneous matter which is clearly not an instance of extrinsic fraud nor a
ground to oust the lower court of its jurisdiction.
Petitioner also insists that notwithstanding the execution of the deeds of donation in favor of private respondent,
the 5-year statute of limitations within which to file claims before the court a quo as set forth in Rule 91 of the
Revised Rules of Court has set in.
The present controversy revolves around the nature of the parcels of land purportedly donated to private
respondent which will ultimately determine whether the lower court had jurisdiction to declare the same escheated
in favor of the state.
We rule for the petitioner. Escheat is a proceeding, unlike that of succession or assignment, whereby the state, by
virtue of its sovereignty, steps in and claims the real or personal property of a person who dies intestate leaving no
heir. In the absence of a lawful owner, a property is claimed by the state to forestall an open "invitation to selfservice by the first comers." 5 Since escheat is one of the incidents of sovereignty, the state may, and usually
does, prescribe the conditions and limits the time within which a claim to such property may be made. The
procedure by which the escheated property may be recovered is generally prescribed by statue, and a time limit is
imposed within which such action must be brought.
In this jurisdiction, a claimant to an escheated property must file his claim "within five (5) years from the date of
such judgment, such person shall have possession of and title to the same, or if sold, the municipality or city shall
be accountable to him for the proceeds, after deducting the estate; but a claim not made shall be barred forever."
6 The 5-year period is not a device capriciously conjured by the state to defraud any claimant; on the contrary, it is
decidedly prescribed to encourage would-be claimants to be punctilious in asserting their claims, otherwise they
may lose them forever in a final judgment.
Incidentally, the question may be asked: Does herein private respondent, not being an heir but allegedly a donee,

have the personality to be a claimant within the purview of Sec. 4, Rule 91, of the Revised Rules of Court? In this
regard, we agree with the Solicitor General that the case of Municipal Council of San Pedro, Laguna v. Colegio de
San Jose, Inc., 7 is applicable at least insofar as it concerns the Courts discussion on who is an "interested party"
in an escheat proceeding
In a special proceeding for escheat under sections 750 and 751 the petitioner is not the sole and exclusive
interested party. Any person alleging to have a direct right or interest in the property sought to be escheated is
likewise an interested party and may appear and oppose the petition for escheat. In the present case, the Colegio
de San Jose, Inc. and Carlos Young appeared alleging to have a material interest in the Hacienda de San Pedro
Tunasan; the former because it claims to be the exclusive owner of the hacienda, and the latter because he claims
to be the lessee thereof under a contract legally entered with the former (Emphasis supplied).
In the instant petition, the escheat judgment was handed down by the lower court as early as 27 June 1989 but it
was only on 28 January 1997, more or less seven (7) years after, when private respondent decided to contest the
escheat judgment in the guise of a petition for annulment of judgment before the Court of Appeals. Obviously,
private respondents belated assertion of her right over the escheated properties militates against
recovery.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
A judgment in escheat proceedings when rendered by a court of competent jurisdiction is conclusive against all
persons with actual or constructive notice, but not against those who are not parties or privies thereto. As held in
Hamilton v. Brown, 8 "a judgment of escheat was held conclusive upon persons notified by advertisement to all
persons interested. Absolute lack on the part of petitioners of any dishonest intent to deprive the appellee of any
right, or in any way injure him, constitutes due process of law, proper notice having been observed." With the
lapse of the 5-year period therefore, private respondent has irretrievably lost her right to claim and the supposed
"discovery of the deeds of donation" is not enough justification to nullify the escheat judgment which has long
attained finality.
In the mind of this Court the subject properties were owned by the decedent during the time that the escheat
proceedings were being conducted and the lower court was not divested of its jurisdiction to escheat them in favor
of Pasay City notwithstanding an allegation that they had been previously donated. We recall that a motion for
intervention was earlier denied by the escheat court for failure to show "valid claim or right to the properties in
question." 9 Where a person comes into an escheat proceeding as a claimant, the burden is on such intervenor to
establish his title to the property and his right to intervene. A fortiori, the certificates of title covering the subject
properties were in the name of the decedent indicating that no transfer of ownership involving the disputed
properties was ever made by the deceased during her lifetime. In the absence therefore of any clear and
convincing proof showing that the subject lands had been conveyed by Hankins to private respondent Solano, the
same still remained, at least before the escheat, part of the estate of the decedent and the lower court was right
not to assume otherwise. The Court of Appeals therefore cannot perfunctorily presuppose that the subject
properties were no longer part of the decedents estate at the time the lower court handed down its decision on the
strength of a belated allegation that the same had previously been disposed of by the owner. It is settled that
courts decide only after a close scrutiny of every piece of evidence and analyze each case with deliberate precision
and unadulterated thoroughness, the judgment not being diluted by speculations, conjectures and unsubstantiated
assertions.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated 12 November 1998
giving due course to the petition for annulment of judgment, and its Resolution dated 4 May 2000 denying
petitioners motion for reconsideration, are SET ASIDE. The decision of the RTC-Br. 114, Pasay City, dated 27 June
1989, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

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