Should Rawlss Law of Peoples be regarded as developing an account of global justice?

When A Theory of Justice was published, it attracted so much the attention of cosmopolitans that
they started building up expectations about Rawlss next work. They imagined he would extrapolate
his domestic theory of justice to a global level and Beitz (1979) even developed a Rawlsian liberal
cosmopolitanism based on that domestic theory of justice. However, while Rawlss constructivist
method does have the potential to support an account of global justice of great scope (Kaufman,
2013), the Law of Peoples did not live up to that potential. Rawls describes the Law of Peoples
as being a particular political conception of right and justice that applies to the principles and
norms of international law and practice (1999, p.3). Essential for the purpose of this essay is the
emphasis on how the use of the word international in this definition reveals the authors intention
regarding the reach of the concept. This essay argues that Rawlss Law of Peoples should not be
regarded as developing an account of global justice, but as providing a stable and peaceful setting
for nations to interact. The first part of this essay will develop a parallel between cosmopolitan
critique deployed on the assumption that the Law of Peoples attempts to give an account of global
justice and the responses supporters of Rawls use to defend his work. In the second part, these
points will build up towards the main argument stated above, which is based on Freemans
interpretation of the Law of Peoples.

When the Law of Peoples was published, the disappointed cosmopolitans started criticising it in
relation to their falsely-built expectations about how it should have looked like. For example,
whereas cosmopolitans would have aimed for a single global original position, Rawls argues in
favour of differentiating the domestic one from the international one. Kaufman (2013) highlights
how the goal of the parties in the first original position is to secure satisfactory shares of primary
social goods for the individual persons that they represent (p. 624), while the parties in the second
original position aim to secure satisfactory protections for a set of fundamental interests of peoples
that include: political independence, free culture and civil liberties, security and territory, the wellbeing of their citizens, and proper respect of their status as equals in a society of well-ordered
peoples (p. 624). Furthermore, he emphasises how the set of interests accounted for in the second
original position is both narrower and broader than the one accounted for in the first original
position. Narrower because it does not aim to account for all the desires rational individuals
could have, but rather for their needs. Broader because it accounts for interests that are of
fundamental importance from the collective point of view of a people, rather than that of an
individual (Kaufman, 2013).

An important part of the critique is held by the fact that Rawls does not apply the principles of
difference and of fair equality of opportunity developed in A Theory of Justice to the global level.
Pogge (2001), argues that since the governments elected by citizens of liberal democratic countries
impose an unfair global economic order that disadvantages the poor countries, those citizens have
the duty to remedy the harm they have caused. The remedy he suggests is a Global Resources Tax,
which is something that Rawls vehemently opposes. Rawls (1999) does acknowledge how
something like a global difference principle could seem as an appealing solution for the current
injustices. However, while he recognises an inherent duty that well-ordered peoples have towards

burdened societies, he believes this duty should be fulfilled by helping burdened societies to be
able to manage their own affairs reasonably and rationally and eventually to become members of
the society of well-ordered peoples. This defines the target of assistance. After it is achieved, further
assistance is not required, even though the now well-ordered society may still be relatively
poor (Rawls, 1999, p. 111). He is promoting self-sustaining institutions and societies that take
responsibility for their citizens well-being (Brock, 2010). I believe that the causes of the wealth of
a people and the forms it takes lie in their political culture and in the religious, philosophical, and
moral traditions that support the basic structure of their political and social institutions, as well as in
the industriousness and cooperative talents of its members, all supported by their political
virtues (Rawls, 1999, p. 108).

What is more, Rawls argues that any principle of global redistribution needs a target and a cutoff
point (Brock, 2010, p. 88) that could only be ensured by institutions. Without them, global
redistribution would never cease, given that the main concern of cosmopolitans is for the well-being
of individuals. Short of a global government, the principles of [] a stable global order will be
inescapably statist (Wenar, 2006, p. 110). In defence of Rawls, Freeman (2007) emphasises that
principles of distributive justice can only be appropriate in a domestic context, where relations are
characterised by reciprocity and cooperation. Furthermore, he highlights how the global institutions
are different than the domestic ones on which the principle of redistribution is based. Martin (2006,
p. 237) suggests that Freemans arguments demonstrate how this type of objections can emerge
directly from elements embedded in Rawlss thinking.

Another key point of criticism for cosmopolitans is Rawlss position on human rights. Nickel
(2006) believes the set of rights presented in the Law of Peoples is ultraminimalist. Pogge
(1994) points out that, on the one hand, Rawls offers a quite poor account of why decent societies

would agree with even the minimal set of rights he proposes; on the other hand, he highlights that
liberal societies should want to add more rights, such as freedom of speech and democratic rights.
Kuper (2000) also argues that leaving out democratic rights is a mistake. Sen (1999) agrees with
Kuper; he advances and supports the claim that non-democratic regimes have a great negative
impact upon the well-being and human rights of their citizens. As an argument for the inclusion of
democratic rights, Sen emphasises that these are not simply Western values, but ideas that can be
encountered in various major cultures and religions.

One possible response to Pogges comment relies on Rawlss argument about the rationality and
reasonability of the parties involved. He clearly states that the rational representatives of liberal
peoples are to specify the Law of Peoples (Rawls, 1999, p. 32) and that the parties representing
these decent hierarchical peoples are [also] fairly situated, rational and moved by appropriate
reasons (Rawls 1999, p. 63). In fact, the entire Law of Peoples depends upon the claims that (i)
choosers in a suitably described choice position would all accept the principles of the law of peoples
to govern their mutual relations, and (ii) this joint acceptance of a single set of principles is
sufficiently morally significant to justify the claim that all (liberal or decent) peoples should accept
those principles to regulate relations among them (Kaufman, 2013, p. 625). This could not happen
without a criterion that all parties recognise as authoritative, and that criterion is rationality.
Furthermore, after these rational parties reflect on the advantages of these principles without
seeing any reason to depart from them or to propose alternatives (Rawls, 1999, p. 41), just like it
happens in A Theory of Justice, they would choose them because they would see little reason for
trying to do better that the satisfactory minimum (Rawls, 1971, p. 135), recognises Kaufman
(2013).

Another point of defence addresses the critique regarding the set of human rights being
ultraminimalist and lacking democratic rights. Rawls connects human rights with the political
notion of intervention, meaning that they specify limits to a regimes internal autonomy and by
fulfilling them it is sufficient to exclude justified and forceful intervention by other
peoples (Rawls, 1999, p. 79). Therefore, he justifies the minimisation of the set of human rights as
an insurance that forceful intervention is not abused or undermined (Nickel, 2006). Freeman makes
a valid point that the right to vote and the right to run for office, however central to democratic
societies, are not necessary for social cooperation. Historically, most people in most societies have
not enjoyed democratic rights, and even in societies where they do, these rights often willingly go
unexercised (2006, p. 37).

As it has been emphasised in the beginning, the Law of Peoples has been regarded as addressing
the nature of global justice since before it was even published. Along the lines of Rawlss choice of
constructivism as a method of work, this essay argues that the perception of Law of Peoples as a
failed account of global justice was constructed through discourse by cosmopolitans and eventually
became a self-fulfilling prophecy. On the same note, Freeman (2006) brings about a new perception
of Rawlss work. He claims that the scope attributed to it was too ambitious and that the true
questions addressed by the Law of Peoples relate to the appropriate foreign policy of liberal
peoples, including aspects such as tolerance towards non-liberal societies and its limits. Heath
(2005, p. 212) comes in support of this argument, by emphasising that

given the stature that A Theory of Justice has achieved, it is easy to forget that Rawls's
primary ambition, in writing that book, was to displace utilitarianism from its position as the
dominant public philosophy. [] One can see similar practical ambitions at work in The
Law of Peoples. First of all, it is worth noting that Rawls is not primarily concerned with the

question of how international relations should be structured, he is concerned to develop a set

of principles to guide the foreign policy of liberal states []. Second, in the same way that
he was concerned to defeat utilitarianism in A Theory of Justice, his primary ambition in The
Law of Peoples is to dislodge realism - the idea that states should pursue their rational
interests, while disregarding normative constraints entirely - as the dominant view in foreign
policy thinking.

This essay has tried to highlight that the critique of the Law of Peoples has mostly stemmed
from its noncompliance with preconceived assumptions. Instead of being perceived as a failed
account of global justice, it should be perceived as what Rawls meant it, which is a realistic
utopia aiming to offer a framework of ideal conditions onto which a peaceful and stable world
order can be established (Audard, 2006). As Wenar concludes, cosmopolitanism is not only
incomplete as it stands, it cannot become a complete theory of a legitimate and stable world (2006,
p. 111) as long as it does not acknowledge the need for peace as a precondition of justice. Rawlss
law of peoples, though often surprising and perhaps in places flawed, represents a liberal statism
that is the only realized approach to global political morality that we have (Wenar, 2006, p. 111).

References:

Audard, C. 2006, Cultural Imperialism and Democratic Peace, in Martin, R. and Reidy, D. (ed.s),
Rawlss Law of Peoples: A Realistic Utopia?, Blackwell, Oxford, pp. 5975;

Beitz, C. R. 1979, Political Theory and International Relations, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, N.J.;

Brock, G. 2010, Recent Work on Rawls's Law of Peoples: Critics versus Defenders, American
Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 47, No. 1, pp. 85-101;

Freeman, S. 2006, The Law of Peoples, Social Cooperation, Human Rights, and Distributive
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Freeman, S. 2007, Justice and the Social Contract, Oxford University Press, Oxford;

Heath, J. 2005, Rawls on Global Distributive Justice: A Defence, Canadian Journal of Philosophy,
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Kuper, A. 2010, Rawlsian Global Justice: Beyond the Law of Peoples to a Cosmopolitan Law of
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