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identifying gaps/shortcomings  inspection technologies and applications  commercially


1. Purpose
1.1. General
Users  basic elements  RBI Programdeveloping, Implementing, maintaining
owners, operators, designers of pressure-containing equipment developing, implementing 
inspection program
understanding the design premise
planning the RBI assessment
data and information collection
identifying damage mechanisms and failure modes
assessing POF
assessing COF
risk determination, assessment, and management
risk management with inspection activities and process control
other risk mitigation activities
reassessment and updating
roles, responsibilities, training, and qualifications
documentation and recordkeeping
RBI process generating:
relative risk ranking
detailed description of the inspection plan
extent of application
timing (interval/due date)
risk management
Risk mitigation activities description
expected risk levels after implementation
risk drivers

RBI Benefits and Limitations
RBI primary work products  manage risks  equipment level.
highlight risks safety/health/environmenteconomic standpoint
projected risk mitigation cost-effective


RBI plan provide:
overall reduction in risk
acceptance/understanding current risk

inspection and maintenancefocused, cost effective identify equipment with acceptable
level riskdoes not require inspection/ mitigation
reduction inspection data smaller set of data-> more accurate information

if inspection technology not adequately and/or cost-effectively mitigate risks, with RBI
guide the direction of inspection technology development
deployment of emerging inspection technologies that underutilized

RBI provide:
inspection and maintenance plans action to provide reliable and safe operation
input into an organization’s annual planning and budgeting
RBI integrated  management system  managing and controlling damage
mechanisms in fixed equipmentdefining and maintaining IOWs, robust MOC process

2.1. Industry Scope
Hydrocarbon and chemical process industry
2.2. Flexibility in Application
diversity in organizations’size, culture, federal and/or local regulatory requirements
RBI is intended to promote consistency and quality in the identification, assessment, and
management of risks pertaining to material deterioration, which could lead to loss of containment.
2.3. Mechanical Integrity Focused
Focused on maintaining the mechanical integrity of pressure equipment, minimizing the
risk of loss of containment due to deterioration
RBInot a substitute for a PHA or HAZOP
RBI complements:
PHA: the mechanical integrity related damage mechanisms and risk management through
RCM: understanding failure modes, addressing the modes and therefore improving the
reliability of equipment and process facilities
PHA focus on the process unit design, operating, unit’s current/anticipated operating conditions

RBI plans may result cost reductions, risk reductions and process safety improvements

RBI will not compensate:
inaccurate or missing information,
inadequate designs or faulty equipment installation,
operating outside the acceptable IOWs,
not effectively executing the plans,
lack of qualified personnel or teamwork,
lack of sound engineering or operational judgment


Using RBI as a Continuous Improvement Tool
RBIcontinuously improving the inspection reassessment  new data, changes occur
refreshed view of the risks

RBI as an Integrated Management Tool
Integration of these risk management efforts is key to the success of a risk management
program: RBI with RCM, PHA, IOWs

Equipment Covered
Pressure Vessels (Pressurized)
Process Piping (Pipe and piping components)
Storage Tanks (Atmospheric and pressurized)
Rotating Equipment (Pressurized)
Boilers and Heaters (Pressurized)
Heat exchangers (shells, floating heads, channels, and bundles).
Pressure-relief devices
pump and compressor casings

Equipment Not Covered
May be covered by other types of RBI/risk assessment work processes such as RCM
instrument and control systems,
electrical systems,
structural systems,
machinery components

loss of containment). electrical power failures. Examples include pressure vessels. trains. 4.failure mode: The manner of failure.Hazard: A physical condition or a release of a hazardous material that could result from component failure and result in human injury or death. relief devices. Rating.23.9. A Comparison of Criteria For Acceptance of Risk. and heaters. testing. crack. acts of God.19. or onstream assessment (or any combination of the three) of the condition of pressure equipment 4. Absolute risk: An ideal and accurate description and quantification of risk 4. Piping Inspection Code: Inspection. For example. 4. cost-effective: An activity that is both effective in resolving an issue and is a financially sound use of resources 4.1. may range from positive to negative. such as aircraft.1. a slow leak under insulation may not be detected until a pool of fluid forms on the ground or someone notices a drip or wisp of vapor. or events such as neighboring fires or explosions.13.25.1. conform to applicable code. Consequence: An outcome from an event.1.15. stress corrosion cracking.1.1. sabotage. The basic objectives of the techniques are: to produce a full description of the facility or process. 1994 ASME PVRC Project 99-IP-01. internal. Components that are used to transport. etc. Fitness-For-Service API 581. and their impact on pressure equipment 4. which were originally developed for the process industry.external event: Events resulting from forces of nature. External events are usually beyond the direct or indirect control of persons employed at or by the facility. Risk-Based Inspection Technology API 653.6. and rupture.3.7. and thermal aging 4. neighboring hazardous material releases.8.2. but always negative for safety aspects.1. can be singular or multiple. Damage Mechanisms Affecting Fixed Equipment in the Refining Industry API 579-1/ASME FFS-1. forces of nature. design premise: Assumptions made during the design (e. corrosion monitoring techniques.g. damage (or deterioration) mode: The physical manifestation of damage 4.Event tree: An analytical tool that organizes and characterizes potential occurrences in a logical and graphical manner. and Reconstruction API 752. Damage or degradation may be used in place of deterioration 4.22. Normative References API 510.Fitness-For-Fervice assessment: A methodology whereby damage or flaws/imperfections contained within a component or equipment item are assessed in order to determine acceptability for continued service 4. maintenance and operations 3. Repair. use systematic techniques to identify hazards and operability issues throughout an entire facility. piping.g. erosion.1. terrorism.deterioration: The reduction in the ability of a component to provide its intended purpose of containment of fluids. structure. damage (or deterioration) mechanism: A process that induces micro and/or macro material changes over time that are harmful to the material condition or mechanical An individual item that is part of a system.2.likelihood: probability 4.g.1. 4. Human error and external events may also create a hazard 4. cumulative. Acceptable risk: A level of risk that is acceptable to the owner-user. fatigue. and. It is particularly useful in identifying unforeseen hazards designed into facilities due to lack of information.12.1. 2000 EPA 58 FR 54190 (40 CFR Part 68). unrecoverable.1. equipment or piping systems prior to implementation of the change . e. engineering. The external.1. or automobiles. including the intended design conditions to systematically review every part of the facility or process to discover how deviations from the intention of the design can occur to decide whether these deviations can lead to hazards or operability issues to assess effectiveness of safeguards.Event: Occurrence of a particular set of circumstances. or they may be announced and detected by any number of methods at the instance of occurrence (announced failure). Hazard is the source of harm. Repair. The event tree begins with the identification of potential initiating events.Failure: Termination of the ability of a system. corrosion degradation mechanisms. and/or owner’s written procedure requirements.18. corrosion mitigation methods.4.1.6. of change (MOC): A documented management system for review and approval of changes in process.24. It includes the planning.1.26. and intrusions of external transportation vehicles. February 16. Target Audience primary audience  inspection and engineering personnel  mechanical integrity and operability of equipment the primary audience  inspection and materials engineering personnel RBI initiative Champion inspection/materials engineering group requires the involvement engineering. Acronyms and Abbreviations 4. materials selection.1. and Alteration API 570. rupture of a pipe in a process plant or sudden decrease in pressure in the system 4.119. store. A small leak may not be noticed until the next inspection (unannounced failure). Repair. or process a hazardous material can be a source of hazard. Risk Management Vocabulary OSHA 29 CFR 1910. Pressure Vessel Inspection Code: Inspection. Failures may be unannounced and undetected at the instant of occurrence (unannounced failure). the failure of concern is loss of containment of pressurized equipment items. erection.damage tolerance: The amount of deterioration that a component can withstand without failing 4.1.1. Common damage mechanisms include corrosion. Damage mechanisms are usually incremental. equipment or component to perform its required function of containment of fluid (i. Risk Management Plan (RMP) Regulations ISO Guide 73. As low as reasonably practical (ALARP): A concept of minimization that postulates that attributes (such as risk) can only be reduced to a certain minimum under current technology and with reasonable cost 4. HAZOP studies. or environmental degradation. Terms and Definitions 4. Subsequent possible events (including activation of safety functions) resulting from the initiating events are then displayed as the second level of the event tree. slow leakage from buried piping or small leak in a heat exchanger tube. Steels for Hydrogen Service at Elevated Temperatures and Pressures in Petroleum Refineries and Petrochemical Plants AICHE . may be certain or uncertain. and Rerating of In-service Piping Systems API 571. implementation. or introduced into existing facilities due to changes in process conditions or operating procedures.1.17.Facility: Any location containing equipment and/or components to be addressed under this RP 4. Dow’s Fire and Explosion Index Hazard Classification Guide.21.1. examinations.20..1. corrosion specialist: A person who is knowledgeable and experienced in the specific process chemistries.Inspection: Activities performed to verify that materials. Examples of failure modes are small hole.14. fabrication. fracture.1.10.16. ships. Terms. trucks. and evaluation of the results of inspection activities. 4.1. e. Process Safety Management of Highly Hazardous Chemical 4.11. repairs. design life and corrosion allowance needed) 4. Alteration.1. Components: Parts that make up a piece of equipment or equipment item 4.HAZOP (hazard and operability) study: A HAZOP study is a form of failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA).e.1. in some instances.1. Tank Inspection. This process is continued to develop pathways or scenarios from the initiating events to potential outcomes 4. loss or damage. For RBI. Alteration. creep. boilers. 4. may be expressed qualitatively or quantitatively 4.1. The probability of an event occurring within a given period of time can be estimated Management of Hazards Associated With Location of Process Plant Buildings API 941.integrity operating window (IOW): Established limits for process variables that can affect the integrity of the equipment if the process operation deviates from the established limits for a predetermined amount of time 4.

stakeholder concerns. severity. death. risk mitigation. The results of qualitative risk analyses are dependent on the background and expertise of the analysts and the objectives of the analysis. the probability is near one (1). may lead to a severe event or any other undesired consequence. informed opinions.27. 4. negative consequences. Risk identification may also identify stakeholder concerns. These chemicals (when ingested. Source in a safety context is a hazard 4.relative risk: The comparative risk of a facility.1. event. Risk management typically includes risk assessment. risk is the product 4. nature. human actions. and ethylene production 4.1. equipment items.source: Thing or activity with a potential for consequence.risk assessment: Overall process of risk analysis and risk evaluation 4.55. 4. Examples of processes include power generation. and other variables. FMEA and HAZOPs are examples of qualitative risk analysis techniques that become QRA methods when consequence and failure probability values are estimated along with the respective descriptive input 4.33. Methods that use primarily engineering judgment and experience as the basis for the determination of probabilities and consequences of failure.1. consequence.” Probability can be related to a long-run relative frequency of occurrence or to a degree of belief that an event will occur. Risk evaluation may be used to assist in the acceptance or mitigation decision 4. the physical progression of incidents. legal and statutory requirements.stakeholder: Any individual.1. fuel oil production. group or organization that may affect.risk reduction: Actions taken to lessen the probability.28.risk driver: An item affecting either the probability. acid production. 4.1.40. due to material deterioration. Information can include historical data. system.risk mitigation: Process of selection and implementation of measures to modify risk. Risk analysis provides a basis for risk evaluation. Acronyms and Abbreviations ACC American Chemistry Council AIChE American Institute of Chemical Engineers ALARP as low as reasonably practical ANSI American National Standards Institute ASME American Society of Mechanical Engineers ASNT American Society of Nondestructive Testing ASTM American Society of Testing and Materials BLEVE boiling liquid expanding vapor explosion CCPS Center for Chemical Process Safety COF consequence of failure EPA Environmental Protection Agency FMEA failure modes and effects analysis HAZOP hazard and operability assessment IOW integrity operating window ISO International Organization for Standardization LOPA layers of protection analysis MOC management of change MSD material selection diagrams NACE National Association of Corrosion Engineers NDE nondestructive examination .31.1.1. risk is a deviation from the expected. or absorbed through the skin) can cause damage to living tissue.35.32.risk communication: Exchange or sharing of information about risk between the decision maker and other stakeholders.unmitigated risk: The risk prior to mitigation activities - 4. For a high degree of belief. if they occur.Probability: Extent to which an event is likely to occur within the time frame under consideration. These risks are managed primarily through equipment inspection 4. and separation systems.1.1.1. These chemicals may also result in adverse effects to the environment (measured as ecotoxicity and related to persistence and bioaccumulation potential) 4.52.risk management: Coordinated activities to direct and control an organization with regard to risk. benefits. or action to withdraw from a risk situation.49.51. or both such that it constitutes a significant portion of the risk 4. as appropriate for risk evaluation 4. socio-economic and environmental aspects. Risk criteria may include associated cost and benefits.41.semi-quantitative analysis: A semi-quantitative analysis includes aspects of both qualitative and quantitative analyses 4.1. estimates the probability of occurrence for each combination estimates the consequences QRA generally: integrates information about facility design. A collection of equipment assembled for a specific function within a process unit. probability.risk analysis: Systematic use of information to identify sources and to estimate the risk. process units.1.residual risk: The risk remaining after risk mitigation 4.risk: Combination of the probability of an event and its consequence.risk acceptance: A decision to accept a risk. or modifications and prepare process equipment for the next operating cycle 4.1.48. Examples of systems include service water system. or perceive itself to be affected by the risk 4.46. Elements may include: source. theoretical analysis. 4. and concerns of stakeholders. mitigation.risk criteria: Terms of reference by which the significance of risk is assessed. list. or components. or in extreme cases.” 4.risk identification: Process to find. Degrees of belief about probability can be chosen as classes or ranks like “rare/unlikely/moderate/likely/almost certain” or “incredible/ improbable/remote/occasional/probable/frequent. impairment of the central nervous system. The term risk mitigation is sometimes used for measures themselves.45.1.reassessment: The process of integrating inspection data or other changes into the risk analysis. acceptability. operating practices.toxic chemical: Any chemical that presents a physical or health hazard or an environmental hazard according to the appropriate material safety datasheet.38.quantitative risk analysis (QRA): An analysis that quantifies the probabilities and consequences of the probable damage mechanisms and that: identifies and delineates the combinations of events that.2.29. The information may relate to the existence.1. form. Risk acceptance depends on risk criteria. The decision may be taken based onthe result of risk evaluation 4. maintenance.39. probability.56.1.process unit: A group of systems arranged in a specific fashion to produce a product or service. distillation systems.risk-based inspection (RBI): A risk assessment and management process that is focused on loss of containment of pressurized equipment in processing facilities.1. priorities and other inputs to the assessment.1.qualitative risk analysis: An analysis that uses broad categorizations for probabilities and consequences of failure.risk evaluation: Process used to compare the estimated risk against given risk criteria to determine the significance of the risk.47.44. Risk estimation may consider cost.1.Mitigation: Limitation of any negative consequence or reduction in probability of a particular event 4. consequence. operating history.1. or other aspects of risk.1.1. In some situations.1.37.risk estimation: Process used to assign values to the probability and consequence of a risk. component reliability. risk mitigation and risk acceptance.risk avoidance: Decision not to become involved in.Turnaround: A period of down time to perform inspection. 4. or both associated with a particular risk 4. When probability and consequence are expressed numerically.1. severe illness. The mathematical definition of probability is “a real number in the scale 0 to 1 attached to a random event.1. 4.34. 4.1. inhaled. be affected by. and characterize elements of risk.1. 4. and potential environmental and health effects Uses logic and probabilistic models depicting combinations of events and the progression of incidents to provide both qualitative and quantitative insights into the level of risks analysis logic models consisting of event trees and fault trees to estimate the frequency of each incident sequence 4.54.30. concerns of stakeholders. risk acceptance. and risk communication.36.42. respectively process unit. Frequency rather than probability may be used in describing risk. equipment item or component to other facilities.

and review risk analysis results for consistency/reasonableness Risk Management and Risk Reduction risk is known.g. pitting) Section 9: determine damage susceptibility and rates Section 10: determine the POF over a defined time frame for each damage mechanism Section 10 determine credible failure mode(s) [e. Overview of Risk Analysis Many methods available to assess risknumber of factor risk analysis complexity strictly relative ranking or rigorous calculation The Evolution of Inspection Intervals/Due Dates established inspection.4. testing programs. covering a variety of equipment don’t fix it unless its broken or complete inspection of all equipment items on a frequent basis Setting the intervals/due dates time-based/calendar-based condition-based inspection philosophy API 510.5. and implementing an RBI program effectiveness of inspection programs varies widely reactive programs. local metal loss. general metal loss. optimizing. more acceptable level of risk with some form of risk reduction activity risk reduction part of risk management 5. optionally. lack of data. low-quality data. analysis results may not be realistic Effective risk assessmentrational. risk reduction: act of mitigating a known risk that is deemed to be too high to a lower. Risk is the combination of the probability of some event occurring during a time period of interest and the consequences (generally negative) associated with the event Risk = Probability X Consequence 5. API 570.NFPA National Fire Protection Association OSHA Occupational Safety and Health Administration PHA process hazards analysis PMI positive material identification POF probability of failure PSM process safety management PTASCC polythionic acid stress corrosion cracking PVRC Pressure Vessel Research Council QA/QC quality assurance/quality control QRA quantitative risk assessment RBI risk-based inspection RCM reliability centered maintenance RMP risk management plan SIL safety integrity level TEMA Tubular Exchangers Manufacturers Association TNO The Netherlands Organization for Applied Scientific Research UT ultrasonic testing 5. rupture Section 11: identify credible consequence scenarios that will result from the failure mode(s) Section 11: determine the probability of each consequence scenario. determine whether the risk is acceptable logical progression for a risk analysis: Section 8: collect and validate the necessary data and information Section 9: identify damage mechanisms and. interval/due date setting with ultimate goal is the safety and reliability of operating facilities showing risk reduction expected when degree and frequency of inspection increased y-axis no inspectionhigher level of risk initial investment inspection activities risk significantly reduced . and API 653: inspection intervals/due dates based on some percentage of equipment life (such as half life) on-stream inspection in lieu of internal inspection based on low deterioration rates internal inspection requirements for damage mechanisms related to process environment induced cracking consequence based inspection intervals/due dates RBI represent next generation inspection approaches. determine the damage mode(s) for each mechanism (e. develop plan to maintain risks at an acceptable level damage modegeneral measurementsrequirement acceptance criteria Basic Risk Assessment Concepts 5. including a sensitivity analysis. logical.1. metal losson-stream wall thickness shut down/repair on-streamFitness-For-Service Inspection Optimization risk determined inspection techniques. process monitoring effectiveness reducing risk estimated or quantified adequate information available for planning.2. determine risk reduction required. structured processdetermine how big the risk. approach not adequately differentiate risksthe results may not yield usable. process monitoring to detect and evaluate deterioration due to the effects of in-service operation 5. concentrate on known areas of concern proactive programs. small leak. What is Risk? People are constantly making decisions based on risk. magnitude of the risk is established  risk management risk analysisdevelop inspection planif necessary other mitigation actionsevaluate residual risk Risk management: process to assess risks.g. considering the POF and the probability that a specific consequence scenario will result from the failure Section 12: determine the risk. large leak.3. failure is defined as loss of containment Rbirisk-based approachFocuses attentionequipment and damage mechanisms risk to the facility focusing on risks and their mitigation better linkage mechanisms lead to failure (loss of containment)and the inspectioneffectively reduce the associated risks 5.

semi-quantitatively Each approach provides screen for risk.deliberate acts (e. process control and other mitigation activities 6. environmental. Introduction to Risk-Based Inspection 6. number of facilities and equipment items to study. economic impacts failurespotentially serious consequencesprobability is low the risk may not warrant immediate or extensive action riskhigh (unacceptable)mitigation action to reduce the probability and/or the consequence of the event is appropriate Excessive inspection  invasive inspections may cause additional deterioration level of risk may go up RBI program  consistent methodologyoptimum combination of methods and frequencies of inspection available inspection method estimate relative effectiveness reducing failure probability cost each proceduredevelop optimization program Traditionallyfocused COF or POFno tying the two together effective risk-based decision making considering COF & POF The key to developingassess the risk associated equipmentdetermine most appropriate inspection techniques for equipment risk acceptability criteria defined: not every failure lead to incident with consequence (e. documented method for COF determination. consistency of the program and analysis updates documented method for POF determination. available resources.g. systems. or componentsrelative risk rank focus high risks quantitative rigorously and properlyfair approximation actual risk of loss of containment due to deterioration evaluate risk acceptance sensitivity analysis qualitative and semi-quantitative assessments numeric relative risk values 6. assessment time frame. result in a spill and cause environmental damage.1. Relative Risk vs Absolute Risk Calculating absolute risk time and cost consuming many uncertaintiescan not high degree accuracy determination absolute risknot even possible. Consequence and Probability for RBI objective RBIdetermine what incident could occur (consequence) in the event of an equipment failure.additional inspection activitydiminishing reductionpoint is reached return  very little additional - risk have minimal safety. collisions or falling objects) secondary effects from nearby units consequential effects from associated equipment in the same unit. risk cannot be reduced to zero solely by inspection efforts residual risk factors strongly influenced by the PSM system human error natural disasters external events (e. not cost effective RBI focused systematic determination of relative risks facilities. nature and quality of available data. quantitatively.g. Types of RBI Assessment choice of approachdependent on multiple variables: objective of the study. data requirements. complexity of facilities and processes. design errors unknown or unanticipated mechanisms of damage 5.3. force a unit shutdown and have an adverse economic impact.6. water leaks) serious consequence incidentslow probabilities rupture of a clean propane vessel) A conceptual result of this methodologylower curve in Figure 1indicates application effective RBI programlower risks achieved with the same level of inspection activityRBI inspection activities focused higher risk items and away from lower risk items serious (e. health. personnel qualifications. and how likely (probability) it is that the incident could happen - possible consequences: form a vapor cloud that could ignite causing injury and equipment damage. inspection planfocuses attention on the areas of highest risk user defined acceptable risk levelplotted as an ISO-risk line An ISO-risk constant risk level acceptable risk line separate the unacceptable and acceptable risk 6. documented methodology for managing risk through inspection. the amount of risk discrimination needed RBI procedurequalitatively. equipment. and/or economic impact failures relatively frequently no significant adverse safety. sabotage) fundamental limitations of inspection methods. Key Elements of an RBI Program management systems for maintaining documentation. units. environmental. release of a toxic chemical that could cause health problems. develop a prioritized listmore in depth inspection or analysis . identify areas of potential concern.g.2.g.

dike and drainage design. topography. Quantitative Approach Distinguished qualitative approach: analysis depth and integration of detailed assessments Resultstypically presented as risk numbers QRA refers prescriptive methodology resulted from the application of risk analysis techniques at many different types of facilities. requires data inputsbasis :engineering judgment and experience accuracy  dependent background and expertise risk analysts and team members Inputs data ranges Results  qualitative terms high. injury statistics.2. or operational characteristics that are the most important to risk QRA logic models consist of event trees and fault trees Event trees delineate initiating events and combinations of system successes and failures fault trees depict ways in which the system failures represented in the event trees can occur traditional QRA comprised of five tasks: systems identification. Semi-quantitative Approach has aspects derived from both the qualitative and quantitative approaches obtain the major benefits previous two approaches (e.g. the physical progression of accidents. and potential environmental and health effects high level qualitativeused at a unit levelselect the unit within a highest risk for further analysis QRAlogic modelscombinations of events that result in severe accidentsphysical models progression of accidents and the transport of a hazardous material to the environment qualitative consequence combined with a semi-quantitative probability analysis Modelsevaluated probabilisticallyprovide both qualitative and quantitative insightslevel of riskidentify the design. operating practices.risk ranking evaluating separately the POF and the potential COFcombined estimate risk of failure systems definition. medium. fire protection systems. data used in a quantitative approach needed but in less detail models not rigorous as for the quantitative resultsconsequence and probability categories/risk numbers but numerical values may be 6. low (numerical values may associated with categories) less precise than quantitative approaches effective in screening out units and equipment with low risk may used for any aspect of inspection plan development conservatism should be considered when making final mitigation and inspection plan decisions 6. Qualitative Approach enables completion risk assessment in the absence of detailed quantitative data. consequence analysis. component reliability. human actions. operating history.4. probability assessment. hazard detection systems. risk results screened after qualitativequantitative for the higher risk user cautioned about comparing specific results unless the same or very similar RBI methodologies and assumptions were applied user cautioned against drawing conclusions about different results when different methodologies are used to evaluate the same piece of equipment . land use 6. speed of the qualitative and rigor of the quantitative) Typically. including hydrocarbon and chemical process facilities identification and consequence QRA deals with total risk Data that typically analyzed in QRA: existing HAZOP or PHA results.1. hazard analysisintegrally linked approach selected at the beginning or may be changed as the analysis progresses consistency is vital Hazard identification  focuses identifiable failure mechanisms equipment (inspectable causes)not explicitly deal with other potential failure (power failures/human errors) risk below the acceptance criteria specified by the management no further analysis. site. weather conditions. release statistics. hazards identification. population distributions.3.3. Continuum of Approaches RBI approachesnot competing but complementary QRA integrates uniform methodology relevant information facility design.3.3.3. inspection or mitigation within time frame if conditions and assumptions valid 6.

normal start-up and shutdown. examination results . General other risk-based and safety initiatives: OSHA PSM programs .3. Risk Management Through Inspection Inspection influencesuncertainty of the riskimproving knowledge deterioration state and predictability of the POF Inspectionnot reduce risk directlyrisk management activity (provider of new information) that may lead to risk reduction inspection precipitates risk mitigation activitieschange the POF 6. pressures. Management of Risks 6. changes in the process fluids. quality data.6. fatigue) where avoidance of failure primarily depends on design and operating within a defined pressure/temperature envelope. Relationship Between RBI and Other Risk-Based and Safety Initiatives 6. flow rates. changes in operation.6. replacement or upgrade. or onstream inspections). the quality of the data and consistency of application Precision function of the selected metrics and computational methods Riskprecise numeric value (as in a quantitative analysis) implies a greater level of accuracy when compared to a risk matrix (as in a qualitative analysis) 6.1. tolerance of the equipment to the type of deterioration Precision vs Accuracy Accuracyfunction of the analysis methodology. conducting FFS Quantitativelogic modelscalculate POF COFcharacterize materials damage of equipment and determine the COFsignificant variabilityerror and inaccuracyimpacting the quality of the risk assessmentlogic models are validated by expert judgment 6. desired unit run length between scheduled shutdowns (turnarounds) current condition established IOW POFCOFriskmitigation.1. rate of deterioration.e. changes in rates of deterioration are noted in external. including cyclic and transient conditions.7. including cyclic and transient conditions.6.risk is dynamic RBI have the ability to be easily updated for changes: new data from inspection activities (i.4. accuracy depends sound methodology. idle or out-of-service time. scope and timing of inspection/examination recommended level of confidence inspection data and the technique should be considered many extraneous factors will affect estimate of damage rate (probability) and the magnitude of a failure (consequence) that cannot be fully taken into account with a fixed model level of the unmitigated riskevaluate the urgencyinspection 6. metallurgy change or change in operating conditions non-inspection mitigation actions equipment repair.7. emergency shutdown and subsequent start-up - Process variables process fluid. Using RBI to Establish Inspection Plans and Priorities inspection plandetail the unmitigated riskcurrent operation related unacceptable risk mitigation actionsreduce unmitigated riskacceptable level precision and accuracy may not existelement of uncertainty cost-effective inspectionplans describe the type. probability of identifying and detecting deterioration and predicting future deterioration states with inspection technique(s). Evaluation and Fitness-For-Service Analysis key parts RBI process Evaluate inspection. inspection. operating variables or operation outside of the IOW. temperatures. and knowledgeable personnel inspection process reduction in uncertaintybetter quantify calculated risk without inspection result evaluation and FFS after the inspection may not be accomplished effective risk reduction Understanding How RBI Can Help to Manage Operating Risks mechanical integrity and functional performance of equipment  operate safely and reliablynormal and abnormal (upset) operating conditions FFS knowledge and expertise inspector and engineers involved when deterioration is within known acceptable limits / engineering analysis API 579-1/ASME FFS-1 6. equipment redesign or maintenance of strict controls on operating conditionsmay only appropriate reduce risk to acceptable levels (section 14) 6. failure mechanisms (such as brittle fracture. contaminants and aggressive components. Other Risk Management inspection may not be sufficient manage risks acceptable levels: equipment nearing retirement. consequence-dominated risks susceptibility current and projected operating condition: normal operation upset conditions. internal. however small 6. POF due to such deterioration is a function of four factors deterioration type and mechanism.

Planning the RBI Assessment 7.2. 7. PHA identify and analyze hazards in a process unit Hazards potential equipment failure due to in-service degradation RBI can include a review of the output from any PHA Hazardincrease the POF Potential hazardsPHA affect the POF Events/ process design or instrumentation deficiencies hazard process upset - What are their roles in the RBI process? Who is responsible and accountable for what actions? Which facilities. assets. Management of Risks risks identifiedreducing risk to acceptable levelinspection actions and/or other mitigation that have a positive effect significantly different from the inspection actions undertaken during a statutory or certification type inspection program results of managing and reducing risk improved safety.1. Getting Started important to answer the following questions: Why the assessment is being done? How the RBI assessment will be carried out? What knowledge and skills are required for the assessment? Who is on the RBI team? and API 750 RBI focus inspection plan strengthened PSM program 6. Equipment Reliability provide inputprobability analysis RBI reliability recordsdevelop equipment failure probabilities and leak frequencies leaks secondary failures (loss of utilities) RCM linked with RBI reduce downtime RCM  reliability equipment other than pressure equipment and pressure equipment that do not pertain to loss of containment (e.g.4. avoided losses of containment. tray damage and valve reliability) 6.5. unnecessary or inappropriate inspection activities may be eliminated. more effective infrequent inspections may be substituted for less effective frequent inspections 7. and components will be included? What data is to be used in the assessment? What codes and standards are applicable? When the assessment will be completed? How long the assessment will remain in effect and when it will be updated? How the results will be used? What is the plan period? development of the RBI program should have been completed: establish the objectives of the risk analysis.3. maintenance and mitigation actions have on the risks 7. inspection of low-risk items may be eliminated or reduced on-line or noninvasive inspection methods may be substituted for invasive methods that require equipment shutdown.3. Relationship with Jurisdictional Requirements Codes and legal requirementsvary from one jurisdiction to another specific actions  type of inspections and inspection intervals jurisdictions prescriptive time-based inspection intervals do not preclude gaining significant benefits as long as jurisdictional requirements are met and as long as the local regulations do not specifically prohibit the use of RBI planning permit API inspection codes and standards RBI should be an acceptable method for establishing inspection plans and setting inspection due dates benefits from the application of RBI: provide evidence of sound risk management and integrity monitoring programs that can be used as a basis for advocating adoption of RBI by jurisdictions provide evidence of fulfilling requirements of meeting specific industry standards as well as other types of asset integrity programs provide a basis for reducing risk further than what may be achieved through timebased inspection rules. Meet Safety and Environmental Management Requirements RBI assessment  implementing effective inspection program meets performance-based safety and environmental requirements RBI focuses effortsgreatest risks . Reduce Costs RBI assessment Reducing inspection costs side effect of optimization cost reduction benefits: ineffective. Define Risk Criteria RBI team and managementjudge individual equipment item and cumulative risks are acceptable if user’s company risk criteria do not exist. identify the physical boundaries.4.6.2. PSM effective PSM  significantly reduce risk levels OSHA 29 CFR 1910. develop screening questions and criteria consistent with the objectives of the analysis and identified physical and operating boundaries Next step: identifying required data and information for collection Hazardeffect COF potential failure of an isolation valve increase the inventory of material available for release in the event of a leak 6.7.EPA risk management programs ACC responsible care ASME risk assessment publications CCPS risk assessment techniques RCM PHA safeguarding analysis SIL LOPA 6. identify the operating boundaries.2.2.1. General RBI assessmentclear objectives and goalsfully understood by all members 7. and avoided commercial losses 7.-->judge acceptability of risk could be an objective of the RBI assessment 7. Understand Risks understand the risks involved in the operation of a plant understand the effects that inspection. Establishing Objectives and Goals of an RBI Assessment 7.

2. and extent of inspection activities meet performance objectives. process control and adherence to IOWs data of RBI assessment determining the optimum economic strategy to reduce risk different at different times in a plant’s life cycle 7. Identify Mitigation Alternatives modification of the process to eliminate conditions driving the risk modification of operating procedures to avoid situations driving the risk chemical treatment of the process to reduce deterioration rates/susceptibilities change metallurgy of components to reduce POF removal of unnecessary insulation to reduce probability of corrosion under insulation - reduce or limit available inventories to reduce COF.2. scope. detection or loss limiting systems. change process fluids to less flammable or toxic fluids.7. change component design to reduce POF. New Project Risk Assessment . upgrade safety.8.RBIsystematic method to guide a userselection equipment to be inspected frequency. 7.