Batch 5

CONSTI 2 : 5TH BATCH OF CASES
Compiled by Di Sardea for Twenty19 1
1. SALONGA vs HERMOSO
G.R. No. L-53622 April 25, 1980
JOVITO R. SALONGA, petitioner,
vs.
CAPTAIN ROLANDO HERMOSO, TRAVEL PROCESSING CENTER, and GENERAL FABIAN VER, respondents.
DECISION
FERNANDO, C.J.:
This is not the first time petitioner Jovito R. Salonga came to this Tribunal by way of a mandamus proceeding to
1
compel the issuance to him of a certificate of eligibility to travel. In the first case, Salonga v. Madella, the case
became moot and academic as the Office of the Solicitor General, in its answer to the petition, stated that the travel
eligibility certificate was not denied and, as a matter of fact, had been granted. Nonetheless, a brief separate
opinion was filed, concurring in the resolution, and worded thus: Clearly this petition had assumed a moot and
academic character. Its dismissal is thus indicated. May I just add these few words as my response to the plea of
petitioner in his Manifestation and Reply dated October 28, 1978. This is how I would view the matter not only
where petitioner is concerned but in all other similar cases. Respondent Travel Processing Center should discharge
its injunction conformably to the mandate of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the right to travel. One of
the highlights of the keynote address of President Marcos in the Manila World Law Conference in celebration of the
World Peace Through Law Day on August 21, 1977 was the lifting of the ban on international travel. There should
be fidelity to such a pronouncement. It is the experience of the undersigned in his lectures abroad the last few
years, in the United States as well as in Malaysia, Singapore and Australia, that respect accorded constitutional
rights under the present emergency regime had elicited the commendation of members of the bench, the bar, and
the academe in foreign lands. It is likewise worthy of notice that in his keynote address to the International Law
Association, President Marcos made reference to martial law being instituted in accordance with law and that the
Constitution had been applied in appropriate cases. As an agency of the executive branch, therefore, the Travel
Processing Center should ever be on its guard, lest the impression be created that such declarations amount, to
paraphrase Justice Jackson, to no more than munificent bequests in a paupers will. Petitioner, to my mind, is
justified, the more so in the light of the Answer of Acting Solicitor General Vicente Mendoza, to an affirmative
response to his prayer in his Manifestation and Reply that under the circumstances mentioned in the Petition,
Petitioner is entitled to travel abroad, and that it is in recognition of this right that Respondents have issued his
Certificate of Eligibility to Travel, as mentioned in the Answer.
The present petition is likewise impressed with a moot and academic aspect. In the motion to dismiss of the
Solicitor General dated April 21, 1980, it was stated that the certificate of eligibility to travel had been granted
petitioner. A xeroxed copy was enclosed. A resolution for dismissal is, therefore, in order.
From the docket of this Court, it appears that other petitions of this character had been filed in the past, namely,
3
Santos v. The Special Committee on Travel Abroad, Pimentel v. Travel Processing Center, and Gonzales v. Special
Committee on Travel. In the aforesaid cases, as in this and the earlier Salonga petition, there was no occasion to
pass on the merits of the controversy as the certificates of eligibility to travel were granted. The necessity for any
ruling was thus obviated. Nonetheless, in view of the likelihood that in the future this Court may be faced again with
a situation like the present which takes up its time and energy needlessly, it is desirable that respondent Travel
Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of
exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance. In the address of
President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos before the American Newspaper Publishers Association last
Tuesday April 22, 1980, emphasized anew the respect accorded constitutional rights The freedom to travel is
certainly one of the most cherished. He cited with approval the ringing affirmation of Willoughby, who, as he noted
6
was partial to the claims of liberty. Burdick and Willis, both of whom were equally convinced that there be no
erosion to human rights even in times of martial law, likewise received from President Marcos the accolade of his
approval. It would appear, therefore, that in case of doubt of the Officer-in-Charge of the Travel Processing Center,
the view of General Fabian Ver should immediately be sought. It goes without saying that the petition for such
certificate of eligibility to travel be filed at the earliest opportunity to facilitate the granting thereof and preclude any
disclaimer as to the person desiring to travel being in any way responsible for any delay.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for being moot and academic.
(digest)
97 SCRA 121 Political Law Right to Travel Even During Martial Law
During the time of Martial Law, Jovito Salonga filed a case for mandamus against Rolando Hermoso of the Travel
Processing Center to compel the latter to issue a certificate of eligibility to travel in favor of Salonga.
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to travel may be prohibited during martial law.
HELD: No. This issue became moot and academic because it appears that Hermoso did issue and did not deny
Salongas request for a certificate of eligibility to travel.
The issuance of the certificate was in pursuant to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights on the Right to Travel.
The Philippines, even though it is under martial law, shall in no instance facilitate the erosion of human rights. The
Travel Processing Center should exercise the utmost care to avoid the impression that certain citizens desirous of
exercising their constitutional right to travel could be subjected to inconvenience or annoyance this is to avoid
such similar cases to face the Court which needlessly expire the Courts effort and time.
1. SUBIDO vs OZAETA
FACTS:
Petitioner was the editor of the Manila Post, who sought the inspection of real estates sold to aliens and registered
with the RD. He was denied to do so which prompted him to file a petition for mandamus.
HELD:
Except when it is clear that the purpose of the inspection is unlawful, it is not the duty of the registration officers to
concern themselves with the motives, purposes, and objects of the person seeking to inspect the records. It is not
their prerogative to see that the information which the records contain is not flaunted before the public gaze.
G.R. No. L-1631

ABELARDO
February 27, 1948

SUBIDO,
Editor,
The
Manila
Post, petitioner,
vs.
ROMAN OZAETA, Secretary of Justice, and MARIANO VILLANUEVA, Register of Deeds of City
of Manila,respondents.
Abelardo
Subido
in
his
own
First Assistant Solicitor General Roberto A. Gianzon and Solicitor Felix V. Makasiar for respondents.
behalf.
TUAZON, J.:
Facts: This is a petition for mandamus. The petitioner, editor of the Manila Post, a morning daily, prays that an
order issue "commanding the respondents to furnish (petitioner) the list of real estates sold to aliens and registered
with the Register of Deeds of Manila since the promulgation of the Department of Justice Circular No. 128 or to
allow the petitioner or his duly accredited representatives (to) examine all records in the respondents' custody
relative to the (said) transactions."
The first alternative of the petition was denied by the Register of Deeds and later, on appeal, by the Secretary of
Justice. No request to inspect the records seems to have ever been made, but the Solicitor General, answering for
the respondents, gives to understand that not even this would the petitioner or his representatives be allowed to do
if they tried. As the petitioner appears not to insist on his request for a list of sales of real estate to aliens, we shall
confine our discussion to the second part of the prayer; namely, that the petitioner be allowed to examine all the
records in the respondents' custody to gather the material he wants. In this connection, the Solicitor General
contends that "the examination or inspection of the records in the office of the register of deeds may be made only
by those having special interest therein and subject to such reasonable regulations as may be prescribed by the
Chief of the Land Registration Office, and that the Secretary of Justice has reasonably ruled, to safeguard the
public interest and the interest of those directly concerned in the records, that records may not be disclosed for
publication."
Issue:
Doctrine and Held: The right of inspection of title records is a subject of express statutory regulation in the
Philippines. Section 56 of Act No. 496, as amended by Act No. 3300, provides that "All records relating to
registered lands in the office of the Register of Deeds shall be open to the public subject to such reasonable
regulations as may be prescribed by the Chief of the General Land Registration Office with the approval of the
Secretary of Justice." The Chief of the General Land Registration Office does not seem to have adopted any
regulations in pursuance of this provision. Nevertheless, we do not believe this omission relevant. The Register of
Deeds has inherent power to control his office and the records under his custody and has some discretion to
exercise as to the manner in which persons desiring to inspect, examine, or copy the records may exercise their
rights. (45 Am. Jur., 531.) The question at issue boils down to a determination of the scope of this discretion.
From the language of section 56 of Act No. 496, as amended, it is our opinion that the regulations which the
Register of Deeds, or the Chief of the General Land Registration Office, or the Secretary of Justice is empowered to
promulgate are confined to prescribing the manner and hours of examination to the end that damage to, or loss of,
the records may be avoided, that undue interference with the duties of the custodian of the books and documents
and other employees may be prevented, that the right of other persons entitled to make inspection may be insured,
and the like.
Except, perhaps, when it is clear that the purpose of the examination is unlawful, or sheer, idle curiosity, we do not
believe it is the duty under the law of registration officers to concern themselves with the motives, reasons, and
objects of the persons seeking access to the records. It is not their prerogative to see that the information which the
records contain is not flaunted before public gaze, or that scandal is not made of it. If it be wrong to publish the
contents of the records, it is the legislature and not the officials having custody thereof which is called upon to
devise a remedy.
Independently of statutes the petitioner, as editor of a newspaper, has the requisite interest in land records even
under the common law theory entitling him to the writ of mandamus. Newspapers have a better-established right of
access to records of titles by reason of their relations to the public than abstracters or insurers of title. Whether by
design or otherwise, newspapers perform a mission which does not enter into the calculation of the business of
abstracting titles conducted purely for private gain. Newspapers publish information for the benefit of the public
while abstracters do so for the benefit of a limited class of investors and purchasers of real estate only. It is through
the medium of newspapers that the public is informed of how public servants conduct their business. The public
through newspapers have the legitimate right to know the transaction in real estate which they believe, correctly or
erroneously, have been registered in violation of the constitution. The publication of these matters is certainly not
only legitimate and lawful but necessary in a country where, under the constitution, the people should rule.
Upon the foregoing considerations, mandamus is the appropriate remedy, and the petition will be granted
commanding the respondents to allow the petitioner or his accredited representatives to examine, extract, abstract
or make memoranda of the records of sales of real properties to aliens subject to such restriction and limitation as
may be deemed necessary not incompatible with his decision, without costs.
2. CHAVEZ vs PCGG
Francisco Chavez vs PCGG et.al.,

G.R. No. 130716, December 09, 1998
Facts: Petitioner, instituted a case against public respondent to make public any negotiations and/or agreements
pertaining to the latters task of recovering the Marcoses ill-gotten wealth. The respondents argued that the action
was premature since he has not shown that he has asked the respondents to disclose the negotiations and
agreements before filing the case.
Issue: Does the petitioner have the personality of legal standing to file the instant petition?
Held:
The instant petition is anchored on the right of the people to information and access to government records,
documents and papers a right guaranteed under section 7, article III of the Philippine Constitution. The petitioner
a former solicitor general, is a Filipino citizen, and because of the satisfaction of the two basic requisites laid down
by decisional law to sustain petitioners standing i.e.
1. ENFORCEMENT OF LEGAL RIGHT
2. ESPOUSED BY A FILIPINO CITIZEN
We rule that the petition at bar be allowed.
3. MARQUEZ vs DISIERTO
G.R.
No.
135882
June
27,
2001
FACTS: Respondent Ombudsman Desierto ordered petitioner Marquez to produce several bank documents for
purposes of inspection in camera relative to various accounts maintained at Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia
Vargas
Branch,
where
petitioner
is
the
branch
manager.
The order is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado Lagdameo, et. al. for
violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the Public Estates
Authority
and
AMARI.
Petitioner wanted to be clarified first as to how she would comply with the orders without her breaking any law,
particularly
RA.
No.
1405.
ISSUE:
Whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera inspection of the questioned account is allowed as an
exception
HELD:
to
the
law
on
secrecy
of
bank
deposits
(R.A.
No.1405).
No.
We rule that before an in camera inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of
competent jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of
the pending case before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be
notified to be present during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the
pending case
4. BEL AIR VILLAGE ASSOCIATION vs DIONISIO
Bel Air Village Association, Inc. vs Virgilio Dionisio G.R. L-383454 June 30, 1989
Facts: The Transfer Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of land issued in the name of Virgilio Dionisio,
the petitioner contains an annotation to the effect that the lot owner becomes an automatic member of Bel-Air
Village Association, the respondent, and must abide by such rules and regulations laid down by the Association in
the interest of the sanitation, security and the general welfare of the community.
The petitioner questioned the
collection of the dues on the following grounds: the questioned assessment is a property tax outside the corporate
power of the association; the association has no power to compel the petitioner to pay the assessment for lack of
privity of contract; the questioned assessment should not be enforced for being unreasonable, arbitrary, oppressive,
confiscatory and discriminatory; the respondent association is exercising governmental powers which should not be
sanctioned.
Issue: Whether or not the association can lawfully collect dues
Ruling: The Supreme Court dismissed the petition for lack of merit. It held that the purchasers of a registered land
are bound by the annotations found at the back of the certificate of title covering the subject parcel of land. The
petitioners contention that he has no privity with the respondent association is not persuasive. When the petitioner
voluntarily bought the subject parcel of land it was understood that he took the same free of all ecumbrances except
annotations at the back of the certificate of title, among them, that he automatically becomes a member of the
respondent association. One of the obligations of a member is to pay certain amounts for the operation and
activities of the association. The mode of payment as well as the purposes for which the dues are intended clearly
indicates that the dues are not in the concept of a property tax as claimed by the petitioner. They are shares in the
common expenses for necessary services. A property tax is assessed according to the value of the property but
the basis of the sharing in this case is the area of the lot. The dues are fees which a member of the respondent
association is required in hiring security guards, cleaning and maintaining streets, street lights and other community
projects for the benefit of all residents within the Bel-Air Village.
These expenses are necessary, valid and
reasonable for the particular community involved. The limitations upon the ownership of the petitioner do not
contravene provisions of laws, morals, good customs, public order or public policy. The constitutional proscription
than no person can be compelled to be a member of an association against his will applies only to governmental
acts and not to private transactions like the one in question. The petitioner cannot legally maintain that he is
compelled to be a member of the association against his will because the limitation is imposed upon his ownership
of property. If he does not desire to comply with the annotation or lien in question, he can at any time exercise his
inviolable freedom of disposing of the property and free himself from the burden of becoming a member of the
association.
5. REPUBLIC vs JUAN
(full case)
G.R. No. L-24740 July 30, 1979
REPUBLIC
OF
THE
PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
CELESTINO C. JUAN and ANA TANSECO JUAN, defendants-appellants.
Celestino C. Juan &, Associates for appellants.
Solicitor General's Office for the appellee.
MAKASIAR, J.:1wph1.t
Appeal by defendants-appellants from the decision dated September 28, 1964 of the Court of First Instance of La
Union in Civil Case No. 1835 for the expropriation of 338.7480 hectares of land owned by spouses Celestino C.
Juan and Ana Tanseco as the site for the La Union Regional Agricultural School, directing the plaintiff Republic of
the Philippines tot.hqw
... pay the legal owners Celestino C. Juan and Ana Tanseco the amount of P190,000.00 which is
the just and reasonable compensation that the Court rules in this case in favor of the defendants;
and it appearing that on May 7, 1963, P100,000.00 had already been paid, it is therefore ordered
that upon this decision becoming final the balance of P90,000.00 plus interest of 6% from May 4,
1963 shall be paid to defendants Celestino C. Juan and Ana Tanseco," aside from the costs of the
suit.
Defendants-appellants are the registered owners of two (2) adjoining parcels of land located at Barrio Sapilang,
Bacnotan, La Union with an aggregate area of 3,387,480 square meters or 338.7480 hectares, more or less, and
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-420 issued on April 14, 1959 (pp, 9-14, 46-47, ROA; Vol. 1, rec.).
Pursuant to the authorization issued on March 15, 1963 by the President of the Philippines through the Executive
Secretary (p 15, ROA), the Solicitor General filed on April 8, 1963 the complaint for expropriation of the aforesaid
parcels of land to be used as the site of the La Union Agricultural School, which was to be established by authority
of Republic Act 2692 (pp. 9-20, 43 ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
Before the institution of the expropriation proceedings Victor Luis, who was appointed principal of the proposed
school, recommended the property of defendants as the school site. Thereafter, together with Mrs. Avelina L.
Osias, he negotiated with the defendants for the purchase of their property (pp. 85-87, ROA, Vol. 1, rec.). On
January 25, 1963, he wrote a letter to defendant Celestino Juan, thus:t.hqw
... Feelers have come to you to inquire about the price that you would be willing to sell your land.
Mrs, Pacita Gonzales and the undersigned came to you personally and you informed us verbally
your least price of P170,000.00 which you explained to us is very reasonable.
May I request your kindness to confirm the above price in writing, as your offer as the selling price
of your above-mentioned land in order that there will be an official record or basis in negotiating
with authorities concerned in the purchase of your land as school site. (pp. 43-44, ROA, Vol. I,
rec.).
Defendant Celestino Juan replied on January 28, 1963.t.hqw
... that the selling price of my land is P170,000.00 net to me exclusive of the amount of my
obligation to the China Banking Corporation where the property is mortgaged.
The condition of the sale is at least P90,000.00 down and the balance within a period of one (1)
year. Title to the property will be transferred to you immediately provided that an annotation of the
remaining balance of the price be accordingly made in the new title.
I wish, however, to tell you that presently there are no less than 23 tenants in the land and they are
harvesting or about to harvest their tobacco crops. In justice to them, they should be allowed to
finish harvesting their crops before they are finally ejected.
It is with deep regret that I cannot part with the land at a lesser price. There are 3 parties at least
aside from you who are interested to buy the land. One of them is ready to sign the contract for a
price of P200,000.00 payable in cash or at least a period of ten (10) days. This party, through an
understanding with a certain bank can mortgage the property for P350,000.00. As you see, if the
primary consideration is money alone, then, if I am a smart, I should mortgage the land myself. It
should be noted, and I have all the records with me, that I have applied for a loan with the
Development Bank of the Philippines in the amount of P4,102,000.00 principally to establish a dairy
farm and mortgaging only as collateral the said land. From the conversation with said bank, it
seems to me that the same would be favorably considered if not for P4,000,000.00 at least
P1,000,000.00.
Kindly confirm your acceptance of the terms of this letter as I can hold the land for a period of ten
(10) days. (pp. 382-384, ROA).
After receipt of the aforequoted letter, Mr. Luis consulted his office in Manila (p. 86, ROA, Vol. I, rec.) as well as the
provincial officials of La Union and the municipal officials of Bacnotan (pp. 86,174, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
In an order dated April 15, 1963, the trial court authorized the Government to enter and take immediate possession
of the property after depositing the amount of P90,793.70 with the provincial treasurer of La Union as provisional
value (p. 20, ROA, Vol. I, rec.),
Defendants on April 24, 1963 filed their "Urgent Motion for Reconsideration and/or to Lift Writ of Possession"
questioning among others, the propriety and correctness of Resolution No. 13, series of 1962, of the Provincial
Appraisal Committee and pointing out that "the fair and reasonable market value ... should be at least fifty centavos
(P0.50) per square meter of P5,000.00 per hectare" and prayed that the complaint for expropriation be dismissed
for lack of jurisdiction; to set aside the order dated April 15, 1963 and instead order plaintiff to deposit the amount of
P300,000.00 as provisional value; and to set aside the writ of possession dated April 16, 1963 until the court has
decided the issue of jurisdiction and/or until plaintiff has deposited the amount of P300,000.00 as provisional value
of the property (pp. 22-32, ROA, Vol. I, rec.). On the same date, the lower court lifted the writ of possession until
further orders.
Acting on the aforesaid motion on April 26, 1963, the lower court found the expropriation proceedings in order and
the provisional value made by the Provincial Appraisal Committee inadequate and ordered the plaintiff Republic of
the Philippines to deposit the amount of P100,000.00 as provisional value until the true valuation of the lots can be
determined in accordance with law and further directed "that for the best interest of the defendants whose
improvements may be vandalized for lack of protection, let the writ be effected without prejudice to the final
determination of the true value of the property to be determined in due course" and forthwith ordered the issuance
of the writ of possession after the deposit by plaintiff of the amount of P100,000.00 is made (p. 45, ROA, Vol. I,
rec.).
On May 4, 1963, plaintiff Republic of the Philippines took possession and occupied the lots under expropriation (p.
86, ROA, Vol. I, rec.) and deposited on May 7, 1963 the amount of P100,000.00 which the appellants withdrew that
same day.
On May 7, 1963, defendants filed two simultaneous pleadings: motion for reconsideration of the provisional value
on the ground that the value fixed by the court is still inadequate; and a motion to dismiss which likewise embodied
defendants' answer to the complaint for expropriation (pp. 46-66, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
In an order dated June 13, 1963, the court denied the motion to dismiss of defendants for lack of merit (p. 66, ROA,
Vol. I, rec.).
In order dated January 8, 1964, the trial court directed the condemnation of the property,t.hqw
it appearing that the plaintiff has already deposited the amount of P100,000.00 the provisional
value of the property sought to be condemned, which amount has already been withdrawn by the
defendants and the property accordingly turned over to the Republic of the Philippines for the use of the La
Union Agricultural School, ..." (pp. 66-67, ROA, emphasis supplied).
and appointed as commissioners of appraisal (1) Atty. Rogelio Balagot, for the lower court and as chairman; (2)
Atty. Eufemio Molina, for the plaintiff; and (3) Atty. Pablito M. Rojas, for the defendants (pp. 4, 67-68, ROA, Vol. I,
rec.).
For a period of three days, these commissioners in the presence of the parties, conducted an extensive ocular
inspection and physical investigation of the property, after which they held protracted hearings until June 2, 1964,
wherein both parties were given full opportunity to present their respective positions with voluminous documentary
and oral evidence (p. 4, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
On June 29, 1964, Atty. Eufemio Molina, commissioner for plaintiff, filed his report dated June 25, 1964 (pp. 69-78,
ROA, Vol. I, rec.) recommendingt.hqw
... that the value of the land of defendants to be taken as the site of the La Union Agricultural
School at Sapilang, Bacnotan, La Union, be fixed at P135,000.00. which amount is the meeting
point between the government's offer of P100,000.00 and the defendants' price of P170,000.00.
Atty. Pablito M. Rojas, commissioner for the defendants, in his report of July 13, 1964, recommendedt.hqw
... as the price of the land to be paid by the plaintiff to the defendants the amount of P1,407,856.00
the same to bear interest at the legal rate from the date of possession by the plaintiff to the date the
amount is actually paid.
Commissioner Rogelio F. Balagot for the court and chairman recommended:t.hqw
... that the just compensation to be paid the defendants landowners be the following:
Value
of
the
Land.........................................................................
P1,044,163.70
Value of Improvements.................................................................. 1,712.60

Total Amount................................................................ P1,045,876.30
That the balance of P945,876.30 (deducting P100,000.00, the amount paid as provisional value)
earn legal interest (6%) until fully paid.
Defendants-appellants filed their objection to the reports of Commissioners Rojas, Balagot and Molina, claiming
that the true value of the land is P1,736,208.32 or P1,693,740.00 (pp. 284, 374, ROA, Vol. 1. rec.).
On September 4, 1964, defendants filed a petition entitled "Petition to Submit Case for Decision" without any
hearing on the reports (p. 378, ROA, Vol, I, rec.)
On September 28, 1964, the lower court rendered its decision (pp. 380- 426, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
A motion for reconsideration was filed by defendants on October 26, 1964 (pp. 426-508, ROA. Vol. I, rec.), but the
same was denied by the Court in an order dated May 10, 1965 (pp. 509-514, ROA. Vol. I, rec.).
I
Under their first assignment of error, appellants contend that the propriety of the expropriation and the manner in
which it was conducted were in dispute throughout the proceedings in the trial court and that they never waived
their objections thereto; that the conditions precedent as provided for by Executive Order No. 132, series of 1937,
as amended, were not complied with, for no proper and valid negotiation to purchase the lots or to have it donated
to the Government was undertaken by the State before the institution of the expropriation case in court; and that the
resolution of the Appraisal Committee which was the basis of the amount alleged in the complaint as the fair market
value of the lots to be expropriated was null and void, having been adopted contrary to legal requirements (pp. 2446, Appellants' Brief: p. 11. Vol. II. rec.). The same points were raised by the appellants in their motion for
reconsideration of the lower court's main decision and the trial court in its order of May 10, 1965 correctly overruled
them, stating that:t.hqw
Movants start by bringing to the front the alleged lack of negotiations between plaintiff and
defendants for the acquisition of the 338 hectares belonging to the latter. Non-compliance with
Executive Order No. 132 is mentioned repeatedly by the defendants as vitiating this case. It is even
hinted that the best resolution for this case would be to dismiss it because plaintiff failed to comply
with said Executive Order dictated in pre-war days. Plaintiff delivered to defendants through this
Court P100,000.00 as part of the fair and just compensation that the defendants are entitled. On
May 7, 1963, such amount was received by defendants and plaintiff started developing the area
and constructing the buildings needed for the La Union Agricultural School. This school is now in
operation; and it would certainly be the most disturbing step for the regularity of the functions of the
Government to dismiss the case, compelling the plaintiff to remove all buildings in the land that
once belonged to the defendants and return the property to them. Besides, interpreting with fair
liberality the pre-war Executive Order No. 132, the court shall now state that for the purpose of
negotiations with the land owners the letter of January 5, 1963 received by the defendants and the
latter's reply of January 28, 1963 are clear and sufficient compliance with the tenor and spirit of
said Executive Order. The court, therefore, rejects any request that this case having been filed
without sufficient compliance with said administrative procedures the whole proceeding shall have
to be dismissed. This cannot be done." (pp. 511-512, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
To begin with, it must be emphasized that plaintiff-appellee in this instant case is the Republic of the Philippines
which is exercising its right of eminent domain inherent in it as a body sovereign. In the exercise of his sovereign
right the state is not subject to any limitation other than those imposed by the Constitution which are: first, the taking
must be for a public use; secondly, the payment of just compensation must be made; and thirdly, due process must
be observed in the taking. Beyond these conditions, the exercise by the State of its right of eminent domain is
subject to no restraint. Section 64(h) of the Revised Administrative Code confers upon the Chief Executive the
power to determine when it is necessary or advantageous to exercise the power of eminent domain in behalf of the
Republic of the Philippines and to direct the Solicitor General to cause the filing of the appropriate condemnation
proceedings in court. By this grant, the executive authorities may then decide whether the power will be invoked
and to what extent (see pp. 87-89, Political Law of the Philippines, Ta;ada and Carreon, 1962 ed., citing Visayan
Refining Co. v. Camus, 40 Phil. 550).
Appellants in making their first assignment of error are under the wrong impression that the provisions of Executive
Order No. 132 are conditions precedent to the valid exercise of the State of its right of eminent domain. As a whole,
Executive Order No. 132 is purely an administrative procedure confined within the executive department of the
government designed merely to govern and regulate the taking of private properties for public use which may either
be by voluntary sale or by donation in favor of the government. Nothing is provided in said executive order
expressly or impliedly making the procedures therein enumerated as conditions precedent to the valid exercise by
the government of the right of eminent domain by filing the proper action in court. As stated, Executive Order No.
132 was intended merely to govern the taking of private property short of judicial action either by purchase or
donation. Being so, the same cannot limit or circumscribe the sovereign and inherent right of the State to
expropriate private property through the Courts.
Moreover, there has been substantial compliance with the requirements of Executive Order No. 132; because
negotiations for the purchase of the parcels were conducted between Victor Luis, the principal of the proposed
agricultural school, and Mrs. Avelina L. Osias on one hand, and the defendants-appellants on the other, which did
not result in a voluntary sale by the defendants-appellants for lack of agreement on the just compensation for the
parcels.
Paragraph (a) of Executive Order No. 132 provides that negotiations shall be conducted by the "Director of Public
works, city or district engineer, or other officials concerned ... The last term can comprehend the principal of the
proposed agricultural institution.
Furthermore, the unqualified withdrawal by appellant of the amount of P100,000.00 deposited in court by the
plaintiff as provisional value of the lots subject of expropriation, constituted recognition on their part of the right of
the government to expropriate the lots, (Republic v. Pasicolan, May 31, 1961, 2 SCRA 626).
If the unconditional withdrawal of the amount deposited as provisional value precludes the defendants-appellants
from questioning the right of the plaintiff to expropriate, it must necessarily follow that said withdrawal also estops
defendants-appellants from raising any objection to the manner and propriety of the exercise by the plaintiff of the
right of expropriation (18 American Jurisprudence 634-635, Francisco's The Revised Rules of Court in the
Philippines, Vol. IV-B, pp. 411-412).
There can be no debate that due process was observed in the instant case. Likewise, education is public use or
public purpose. Republic Act No. 2692 expressly authorizes the establishment of the La Union Regional Agricultural
School within the Province of La Union and the acquisition of a suitable site therefor. The inadvertent omission of
the term Regional in the complaint for expropriation could not nullify the expropriation of the lands of defendantsappellants. Such error in the complaint does not amend the law and can easily be corrected without affecting the
validity of the proceedings.
II
The valuation of the lots must be fair and just, not only to the owner but also to the taxpayers who are to pay for it.
Appellants are entitled to receive only the value of what they have been deprived of, and no more; because to
award them less, would be unjust to them, and to award them more, would be unjust to the public (27 Am. Jur., 2nd
s 266, footnote 17 pp. 52- 53).
The three commissioners appointed by the trial court to determine the fair market value of the lots did not reach
aconsensus as to the classification of the land, the allocation of areas as to each class, and the fair market value of each
class of land.
Commissioner Rogelio F. Balagot found and recommended as follows:
1
. Irrigated Riceland
70
P8,500.00
P595,000.00
2. Upland Rice
66
3,500.00
231,000.00
3. Orchard Land
52.0785
1,200.00
50,494.20
4. Pasture Land
90.6695
1,000.00
90,669.50
5. Forestland
70
1,000.00
77,000.00
TOTAL
338.7480 has.
1,044,163.70
and, after adding to the above amount the sum of P1,712.00, representing improvements, finally recommended the
amount of P1,045,876.30 less P100,000.00 earlier withdrawn by appellants, to earn legal interest until fully paid
(pp. 271-282, ROA, Vol. I, rec.) Commissioner Pablito M. Rojas appraised the land as follows:
Commissioner Pablito M. Rojas appraised the land as follows:
Land Classification
Total
Market
Total
Hectares
Value sq. meter
Market Value
Irrigated Palay Land
65.0000
P1.00
P650,000.00
Upland Palay
66.0000
0.30
198,000.00
Orchard
38.0785
25
98,200.00
Pasture Land
95.6695
10
92,669.50
Forestry Compound
8.0000
30
95,000.00
Forest Land
65.0000
15
97,500.00
Barrio Compound
4.0000
.50
20,000.00
TOTAL
338.7480
1,171,369.50
and after considering some factors, like the fact that the lots are titled, said commissioner finally recommended "the
amount of P1,407,856.00, the same to bear interest at the legal rate from the date of possession by the plaintiff to
the date the amount is actually paid" (pp. 160-166, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
Commissioner Eufemio Molina adopted the following classification and allocation:t.hqw
(a) With respect to Lot No. 1 (Exh. "B"), into t.hqw
1. Unirrigated riceland with an area of 120,000 sq. meters.
2. Upland rice with an area of 85,000 sq. meters.
3. Pasture land with area of 2,801,695 sq. meters.
(b) With respect to Lot No. 2 (Exh. 'B-l') , into-t.hqw
1. Unirrigated riceland with an area of 120,000 sq. meters,
2. Upland rice with an area of 85,000 sq. meters.
3. Pasture land with an area of 175,785 sq. meters.
and making a mass valuation of the entire two lots, recommended the amount of P135,000.00 by taking into
consideration the amount which to him is the price the government is willing to pay: P100,000.00 (actually the
provisional value deposited by the government to take possession of the lots); P170,000.00 which according to him
is the amount for which the defendants are willing to part with their lots (actually P190,000.00 including the bank
mortgage liability of the land) and also the fact that the lots in question were acquired by tile defendants in 1957 for
the amount of only P50,000.00 fro 'm Felipe Nebrija and his children (pp, 71- 78, ROA, Vol. 1, rec.).
Before the filing of the complaint, a Provincial Appraisal Committee composed of Provincial Assessor Ramon
Zandueta as chairman, and as members, Provincial Highway District Engineer( Oscar Data and Provincial Auditor
Gabino Ferrer, was constituted. On November 16, 1962, this committee conducted an ocular inspection of the
property, and on the same day, submitted its Resolution No. 13, Exhibit A, which classified defendant's property as
follows:t.hqw
60 hectares riceland at P800.00 per hectare .I................. P48,000.00
278.7480 hectares pasture land at P150.00 per hectare ...41,812.20t.hqw
TOTAL................................................................ 189,812.20
(p. 135, ROA, Vol. I. rec.). The aforesaid resolution was rejected as having been done in haste (pp. 135-136, ROA,
Vol. I, rec.).
According to Provincial Assessor Zandueta, the amount of P89,812.20 is the assessed value of the property, which
assessed value is the appraised value in expropriation cases (p. 141, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
La Union Agriculturist Pio A. Tadina was requested by Provincial Assessor Ramon Zandueta to appraise the
property. Pursuant to said request, Mr. Tadina went to the property thrice and thereafter submitted his classification
and valuation, as follows:
. 40 hectares riceland
P60,000.00
P200,000.00
2. 20 hectares riceland
20,000.00
60,000.00
3. 80 hectares pasture land
40,000.00
80,000.00
4. 120 hectares fruit trees
60,000.00
120,000.00
5. 72 hectares 2nd growth forest
78,000.00
156,000.00
TOTAL
P258,000.00
P616,000.00
(p. 145, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).

When the complaint was filed, the improvements on the property consisted of the following:
20
mango (bearing) P30 ea.
P800
21 coconut (bearing) P5 ea.
105.00
4 coconut (non-bearing) P2 ea.
8.00
4 caimito (star apple) P8 ea.
32.00
2 Chesa P5 ea.
10.00
4 Kasuy P2 ea.
8.00
12 bamboos (heavy) P0.30 ea.
3.60
1 bamboo (light) P0.10 ea.
0.10
1 breadfruit P5 ea.
5.00
1 jackfruit P4 ea.
4.00
1 guayabano P1 ea.
1.00
6 orange (non-bearing) P1 ea.
6.00
TOTAL
P982.70
(pp. 16-17, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).

Mr. Luis Victor, principal of the La Union Regional Agricultural School, testified that there were around 30 fruitbearing mango trees, once coconut fruit-bearing trees and banana plants (p. 139, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
Both Attys. Pablito M. Rojas and Rogelio Balagot, commissioners representing respectively the defendantsappellants and the trial court, agreed that the value of the improvements on the property was then P1,712.60 (pp.
163, 280-281, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).t.hqw
... Starting from the town proper of Bacnotan, one can reach the property by passing through the
barrios of Cabaroan, Sayoan, Salincob, Casiaman and finally Sapilang. The place is about 2.5
kilometers north of the Poblacion along the National Highway up to the so-called Cabaroan
junction. From this junction is about a 2-kilometer feeder road going eastward. And from this lateral
road is an unsurfaced road of approximately 1.5 kilometers leading to the site of the Agricutural
School. However, before the school took possession of the land on May 4, 1963, the place was not
accessible at all by any motor vehicles, and that the only means was to hike over rice paddies,
trails and creeks.
Topographically, the property of defendant is situated on a high elevation. It consists of mountains
and hills forming a semi-circle, and sloping on the sides towards an elongated portion or valley like
depression which is level and developed into ridefields. Because of its high elevation or location,
the climate of the place is healthful, temperate and especially invigorating when one is near or
within the vicinity of the waterfall or spring. The climate is of the kind which the Weather Bureau
would call the Type I climate; that is, the place has two distinct seasons, a dry season from
December to June, when there are light rains or no rains at all and wet season, from June to
December, when rains are abundant, heavy and frequent. The soil to the place is good. It has a
luxurient vegetation.
The property as per Original Certificate of Title No. 0-420 (Exh. '9-f') is divided into 2 lots; Lot No. 1
has an area of 3,006,695 square meters and covered by Tax Declaration No. 33043 (Exh. 'b'); and
Lot No. 2 which is under Tax Declaration No. 33043 (Exh. 'B-l') has an area of 380,785 square
meters, making a total land area of 338,7480 hectares, with an assessed value of P42,120.00.
Aside from the waterfall or spring within the property, there are also fruit trees, scattered bamboo
groves, banana trees in patches, forest area, upland and pasture land. The bamboo and banana
lands, however, cannot properly be considered as such because the land upon which they grow is
not planted principally for such growth. The improvements on the forestry area have been
introduced by the government, notably the Reforestation Administration of the Department of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. (Exh "D" and Exh. "I"). The other improvements on the land
have been itemized in the complaint filed before the Court. (pp. 69-71, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
The foregoing findings do not appear to be disputed.
Defendant-appellant Celestino Juan himself, stated in his letter of January 28, 1963 that his property is worth
P190,000.00 (including his bank loan), which he later increased to P300,000.00 in his motion for reconsideration
filed on April 24, 1963. It should be recalled that over three months earlier, appellant Celestino Juan, in his letter
dated January 2, 1963 to the Provincial Appraisal Committee, evaluated his property at approximately
P329,374.00, stating that he spent P15,000.00 for survey P5,000.00 for registration and P20,000.00 for bulldozing
and levelling; that 60 hectares are first class which should be worth P3,000.00 per hectare; and that the remaining
portion of 278.748 hectares should command at least P500.00 per hectare (pp. 35-37, ROA, Vol. I. rec.).
The last evaluation in the amount of P300,000.00 judicially given by the defendants-appellants is a declaration and
admission binding on them (Sec. 22, Rule 130, Revised Rules of Court), there being no showing that they were
laboring under an error of fact. No compelling reason has been advanced to justify their being relieved from the
binding effects of such admission. As We ruled in the Republic of the Philippines versus Narciso [99 Phil. 1031
(1956)], "the owners' valuation of the property may not be binding on the Government or the Court, but it should at
least set a ceiling price for the compensation to be awarded. Moreover, the prices to be considered are those at the
beginning of the expropriation, not the increased values brought about by the improvements and actuations of the
Government after occupying the premises" (Re-affirmed in R.P. v. PNB, April 12,1961, 1 SCRA 957-963).
When the defendants-appellants withdrew in 1963 the P100,000.00 deposited by the government, they already
obtained a clear profit of P10,000.00 on their alleged investment of P90,000.00 consisting of P50,000.00, the price
they allegedly paid for the property in 1957, and P40,000.00 allegedly representing expenses for levelling,
surveying and securing their Torrens title of the property from 1957 to 1959. The balance of P392,000.00
consisting of P200,000.00 and interest of P192,000.00 at 6% annually for 16 years from May 4, 1963 to 1979 is
all profit, even during times of inflation. From 1957 until May 4, 1963, when the government took possession of the
property, the defendants-appellants paid realty taxes on the basis of their tax assessment of only P42,120.00
(P89,812.20 according to Provincial Assessor Zandueta [p. 141, ROA, Vol. I, rec.]). Atty. Pablito M. Roxas and Atty.
Rogelio Balago, appraisal commissioners respectively for appellants and the trial court, conceded that the value of
the improvements was only P1,712.00 in 1963. To give them more than a million pesos about P1,111,360.00
on the basis of the appraisal of P616,000.00 by provincial agriculturist Pio Tadina, including interest for 16 years at
6% per annum, would be to mulct the tax-paying public, as the said amount is over ten times or over 1000% on
their alleged original investment of P90,000.00 from 1957, to 1959. Precisely, in their reply dated January 28, 1963,
their selling price was only P170,000.00 net to them, exclusive of their bank debt of P20,000.00.
The appraisal of Provincial Agriculturist Pio Tadina, Chief Agricultural Appraiser Rafael T. David of the DBP,
Commissioner Balagot and Commissioner Rojas, respectively, in the amount of P616,000.000, P1,006,400.00,
P1,044,163.70, and P1,171,369.50, is patently extravagant, considering that the property was bough in 1957 (1956
as claimed by appellants [pp. 112, 126, Appellants' Brie])) for P50,000.00 only and the value of the improvements
did not exceed P1,712.60 as of May 4, 1963, when the government took possession. It is doubtful that the property
would increase in value over 6 times or over 10 times or by over 600% or over 1,000% in six years, from 1957 to
1963, with the expenses for surviving, securing the Torrens title over and bulldozing said property amounting to not
more than P40,000.00, already included in the computation (p. 36, ROA, Vol.. I, rec.).
It should be emphasized that the property is about 6 kilometers from the poblaciosion of Bacnotan; that on May 4,
1963, when the government took possession of the same, it was not accessible at all by any motor vehicle and can
only be reached by hiking through rice paddies, trails; and creeks; that it was not fully developed: and that it was
then assessed at P42,120.00 (P89,812.20 according to Provincial Assessor Zandueta), although it has a waterfall
or- spring,
According to Commissioner Molina, the property has 24 hectares of Unirrigated rice land and 17 hectares
dedicated to upland rice with the greater portion of 297.748 hectares as pasture land (pp, 71-72, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
Pio Tadina reported that 60 hectares are riceland, 80 hectares pasture land 120 hectares with fruit trees and 78
hectares second growth forest (p. 146, ROA, Vol. I. rec.). According to Rafael 'I. David,, who was requested by
appellant Juan to make an appraisal (p. 145, ROA, Vol. I. rec.), 70 hectares are riceland, 66 hectares for upland
rice, 38.0785 hectares for orchard, 90.6695 hectares pasture land, 5 hectares forestry compound, 65 hectares
forest land and 4 hectares barrio compound (p. 150, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).
Even under the classification of Commissioners Balagot and Rojas, as aforestated, about 50% of the property is not
improved by man nor dedicated to agriculture, for about 95 hectares are pasture land and 70 hectares are forest
land.
The sales of farm lots in the vicinity of the property in question from April, 1959 to May 14, 1962 (pp. 74-75, 152153, 156-157, ROA, Vol. I, rec.), do not provide an adequate basis for appraisal of the property of defendantsappellants; because such sales involved very small developed areas of less than a hectare each, which small lots
usually command better prices within the reach f the ordinary buyer. The instant case involves the condemnation of
over 338 hectares.
III
It is argued that appellants judicial admission of P300,000.00 as the provisional value of their lots, should not bind
them, because said admission refers only to the provisional value of the said lots and not as an admission of the
actual - fair and just - value of the lots. The provisional value fixed by the Court pursuant to Section 2 of Rule 67 of
the Rules of Court, is the provisional value that does not bind the land-owners. But when the landowner himself
fixes the provisional value, he should abide thereby in obedience to the rule that admissions in pleadings bind the
party making them.
Section 2 of Rule 67, New Rules of Court reads:t.hqw
Entry of plaintiff upon depositing value with the National or Provincial Treasurer Upon the filing
of the complaint or at any time thereafter the plaintiff shall have the right to take or enter upon the
possession of the real or personal property involved if he deposits with the National or Provincial
Treasurer its value, as provisionality and promptly ascertained and fixed by the Court having jurisdiction
of the proceedings, to be held by such treasurer subject to the orders and final disposition o)f the
court...
Rule 69, Section 3 of the Old Rules of Court under which the present case was filed contained a similar provision.
(See also Visayan Refining Co. v. Camus. 40 Phil. 550-556 [1919] and Manila Railroad Co. v. Paredes (31 Phil.
118-142 [1915]).
For emphasis, We repeat that the price of P300,000.00 was the provisional value fixed not by the trial court, but by
the defendants-appellants as owners in their motion for reconsideration filed on April 24, 1963. The provisional
value fixed by the trial court in its order of April 15, 1963, was only P90,793.70, the reconsideration of which the
owners sought from the trial court. In its order of April 26, 1963, the trial court fixed the provisional value of
P100,000.00. The trial court, in its challenged decision of September 28, 1964, finally fixed the value at
P190,000.00, which is still more than double the alleged capital investment of P90,000.00 allegedly paid by the
owners for the purchase of the property, levelling and expenses for survey and titling of the property from 1957 to
1959. In his own letter of January 28, 1963, where he fixed his selling price at P170,000.00 net to him (plus
P20,000.00 bank mortgage on the property), defendant-appellant Celestino, Juan stated that the best offer he had
for the property was only P200,000.00.
While it may be true that the value provisionally fixed by the trial court "... does not necessarily represent the true
and correct value of the land ..." it is equally true that the said amount provisionally fixed may yet turn out to be the
true and correct value of the lots approximating the "just compensation" requirement of the Constitution. In fact, the
same may also turn out to be more than the true and correct value of the property condemned by the government
(see 27 AM JUR 2nd 111, footnote 16).
Furthermore, it can be justifiably inferred that when appellants themselves proposed on April 24, 1963 the amount
of P300,000.00 as the provisional value of their lots, they were referring actually to the highest value their lots could
command at that time, notwithstanding their very speculative and extravagant claim in the same pleading (where
they made the P300,000.00 proposal) that the "fair market value of (the) property should at least be fifty centavos . .
per square meter or P5,000.00 per hectare.
Consider the following circumstances: t.hqw
1. In his reply dated January 28,1963 to the letter of Mr. Victor Luis, appellant Juan stated that the
selling price of his land was "P170,000.00 net to me exclusive of the amount of my obligation to the
China Banking Corporation where the property is mortgaged", or P190,000.00 including the
mortgaged debt of P20,000.00 (pp. 382-384, ROA).
2. Appellants-spouses acquired the lots in 1956 (as claimed by appellants) or 1957 (as stated in
the decision of the trial court) from Felipe Nebrija and his children for only P50,000.00.
3. The lots in question were taxed on the basis of an assessment of only P42,120.00.
4. In his letter dated January 2, 1963 to the Provincial Appraisal Committee, appellant Celestino
Juan evaluated his lots at approximately P319,374.00.
As a matter of fact, appellant should be bound by his P190,000.00 admission. In the light of the above-mentioned
circumstances, the said amount of P190,000.00 is already just and reasonable.
Appellants' claim that they were forced to make the P190,000.00 offer because they were then under a pressing
need for money to defray expenses in connection with certain criminal case involving appellant Ana to settle said
cases, can hardly invite belief; because (1) appellant Celestino Juan did not aver this alleged urgent need for
money in his letter of January 28, 1963, and (2) notwithstanding appellant Juan's claim in that same letter of
January 28, 1963 that an interested buyer of the said lots was "ready to sign the contract for a price of P200,000.00
payable in cash or at least a period of ten (10) days," appellant did not dispose of the same to said interested
buyer, despite the lapse of ten days during which he could have had the money from the receipt by Victor Luis
of said letter. Moreover, the same letter belies his alleged dire need for money to settle the alleged criminal cases
against his wife for he stated therein that he had then a pending DBP loan application for P4,102,000.00 for a dairy
farm, and that by reason of his connection with DBP officials, his application would be favorably considered for
P1,000,000.00 with the expropriated property as collateral together with the dairy farm equipment, facilities and
stock.
Being a lawyer, appellant Celestino Juan knew that the reputation of his wife and for that matter his family would be
better protected and preserved by her acquittal after trial than by settlement of the case (see pp. 107-108,
Appellants' brief). Compromise of a criminal case, other than a private offense, does not remove the criminal liability
and the concomitant stigma. Settlement of a criminal case, unlike acquittal, will not stop the people from talking
about the guilt of the accused therein.
Of course "judicial or non-judicial admissions made by condemnees as to the value of their properties that are to be
expropriated should not be deemed conclusive if such admitted value be unjust, because the Constitution
imperatively requires the payment of 'just compensation'". But in the instant case, it could hardly be said that the
amount of P300,000.00 is unjust to the appellants. The delay in the payment is compensated by the liability for
6% .interest per annum, covering sixteen (16) years from 1963 to 1979 on the balance of P200,000.00 (on
May 7, 1963, appellants withdrew the P100,000.00 deposit) amounting to P192,000.00. The total balance due
appellants would be P392,000.00. The total payment to them then would be P492,000.00. Beyond this price, the
value would be excessive and unjust to the State and the taxpayer (27 Am. Jur. 2d 52-53 266, footnote 17).
It must be pointed out that the most reliable pieces of evidence in the records relative to the just compensation to
be paid herein appellants are those hereinbefore enumerated, namely, appellants' own evaluation in 1963, the
acquisition cost the tax assessment. This is so because the Committee failed to arrive at an acceptable valuation,
not to mention the fact that the individual reports of the commissioners of the Appraisal Committee did not undergo
the indispensable requirement of hearing before the trial court. It must be herein stressed that almost all the
evidence enumerated earlier are in the nature of admissions by the owner, which kind of evidence under existing
jurisprudence occupies a preferred position in the realm of proof of just compensation and valuation in eminent
domain.
Even the purchase price of P50,000.00 paid in 1956 or 1957 by appellants for the lots sought to be condemned in
1963 is generally held admissible as evidence of the lots' fair market value, unless such purchase is too remote in
point of time from the condemnation proceedings or more special consideration induced the sale at less than the
true market value (29-A C.J.S. 1203-04).
Similarly, the assessed valuation of land made by tax assessors when required by the law, and the owner's own
valuation may be considered together with other proofs in the determination of the just value of the lots condemned
(29-A C.J.S. 1201-1202).
As aforestated, appellants paid realty taxes on the property on the basis of an assessed valuation of only
P42,120.00, with improvements worth only P1,712.00. On January 28, 1963, appellants' offer was P190,000.00,
then P300,000.00 on April 24, 1963, as provisional value, after extravagantly claiming that the property is worth the
fantabulous price of at least P5,000.00 per hectare or a total of P1,693,040.00. Not even the irrigated rice lands
along the national highway in Nueva Ecija, the home province of appellants, could command that price to
P5,000.00 per hectare in 1963. And the lands in the case at bar are in La Union, hilly, and away from the national
highway without direct access to any feeder road.
In our jurisdiction, the statement of the value of his property by the owner in the tax declaration shall, since 1940
under C.A. No. 530, constitute prima facie evidence of the real value of the property in expropriation proceedings by
the Government and its instrumentalities.
In short, it could therefore be said taking into consideration the acquisition cost of P50,000.00 in 1956 or 1957 of
the lots subject matter of the case, the alleged cost of P40,000.00 for levelling, surveying and titling thereof from
1957 to 1959, the assessed value as well as the tax declarations of the appellants with respect to these lots of only
P42,120.00, the improvements worth P1,712.00 in 1963, and the several admissions or estimates made by the
appellants with respect to the value of the lots ranging from P190,000.00 to P319.374.00 to P300,000.00 to
P1,693,040.00 (P5,000.00 per hectare)that the amount of P300,000.00 is just to appellants, not to mention that in
addition to said amount a considerable interest of P192,000.00 for 16 years (1963-1979) would be paid on the
unpaid balance of P200,000.00 from May 4, 1963 by the Government, or a grand total of P492.000.00, which is
over five (5) times or over 500% their capital investment of P90,000.00 from 1956 to 1959. Anything beyond this
amount is grossly excessive and patently unjust to the government and the taxpaying public (29 Am. Jur.2d 52-53
266, footnote 17).
It cannot be seriously claimed by appellants that the declarations of value of the lots in Exhibits B and B-1 were not
made by them (pp. 346-347, ROA), considering that said tax declarations were made only after the title over the
lots was obtained by appellants. Exhibits B and B-1 clearly indicate that appellants and no one else made the said
declarations (p. 182, ROA).
Likewise, the valuation of Agriculturist Tadina should not be accorded too much weight for the following
reasons: t.hqw
1. His valuation report is based purely on his own estimate and opinion: hence in his letter to Atty.
Ramon Zandueta which embodied his evaluation, he therein stated that "... You will note hereunder
the technical analysis of the undersigned with regards to the area under consideration as a personal
opinion ..."
2. The factors he considered in evaluating the lots in question could hardly justify this valuation in
the amount of P616,000.00. Hence: "The 80 hectares of pasture land if properly grazed and
managed is capable of maintaining no less than 400 heads of cattle. The 120 hectares of fruit trees
is suitably adapted to cacao, coffee, bananas, mangoes. pineapple, citrus, avocado, rambutan,
lanzones, The 78 second growth forest if only planted to "alnos Mirando" a Japanese kind of forest
tree will also increase the volume of spring water for irrigation purposes ... The second growth
forest land has been evaluated higher than the pasture and fruit tree lands because forest lands do
not only conserve soil erosion and soil fertility but also provide organic matter for the irrigated
riceland. It will also conserve and promote the development of spring besides the value of the,
trees and other forest by-products which are now available as sources of income (pp.39-42,ROA).
3. Tadina is not "an experienced and competent appraiser" in the field of eminent domain or
expropriation cases. When cross-examined by the Fiscal of the Province of La Union, he declared
that the appraisal he made for the property in Damortis, La Union, and that in Aringay was only with
respect to its adaptability and suitability for agriculture and not for purposes of determining the fair and
reasonable value (tsn, pp. 505-506, pp. 201, 202, ROA; see also pp. 108-109. ROA). His
appointment as Chairman of the Appraisal Committee for public lands in La Union did not qualify
him as an "experienced and competent appraiser" in expropriation cases; because lands involved
therein are public lands and the appraisal or determination of the fair market value of said lots are
not for purposes of expropriation cases (p. 202, ROA). Neither would his participation in the Poro
Point expropriation add to his qualifications as an appraiser in expropriation cases, because he
was merely therein consulted (p. 202. ROA).
4. His classifications were made by estimates and not by actual measurements (tsn, p. 514; p. 204,
ROA).
That the land "had potential for conversion into subdivision" should not be considered in the valuation of the lots in
question; because (1) the records of the case do not show conclusive evidence as to the subdivision potentiality of
the lots; and (2) as held in Manila Electric Co. v. Tuason, "agricultural land should be appraised as such and not as
potential building site" (60 Phil. 663 [1934], reiterated in the case of The Municipal Government of Sagay v. Jison,
et al., 104 Phil. 1026, 1033 [1958]).
Republic vs. Castelvi lends no support to appellants' position; because in the Castelvi case, there was a finding by
this Court that "... the lands in question had ceased to be devoted to the production of agricultural crops, that they
had become adaptable for residential purposes, and that the appellees had actually taken steps to convert their
lands into residential subdivisions even before the Republic filed the complaint for eminent domain (p. 355, 58
SCRA).
As already noted above, the individual valuations made by the three commissioners are of little value, if at all;
because the same were irregularly prepared, not to mention the fact that the same were not subjected to the
indispensable hearing requirement before the trial court wherein the commissioners could have been crossexamined on their respective reports, the bases thereof, how they reached their conclusions, and their
qualifications, and related matters-vital to the credibility, or lack of it, of their valuations.
It is urged that, because the value of the peso at the time of the taking in 1963 by the government of the lots of
appellants and the value of the peso today when the just compensation to be awarded to appellants is to be paid,
are no longer the same, this factor should be considered in the determination of the final award to be given; and
that even if WE consider appellants as having judicially admitted the amount of P300,000.00 as the price of their
property, the doubling of this sum at this time is justified.
Actually, under this proposition, the amount to be doubled shou1d only be the balance of P200,000.00, for
appellants had ,withdrawn and made use of the P100,000.00 deposited by the government at the inception of this
case.
It is of course true that the value of the peso in 1963 and at present is no longer the same. But this does not justify
US in considering that factor nor in doubling the amount judicially admitted by appellants; because such
contingency is already well-taken care of by the interest to be awarded to appellants. For that is the true role or
nature of interest in expropriation cases; because said interest is not contractual in nature nor based on delict or
quasi-delict, but one that "runs as a matter of law and follows as a matter of course from the right of the landowner to be
placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking" (30 CJS 230). Stated otherwise:
"Where the payment of compensation does not accompany the taking of property for public use but is postponed to
a later date, the owner of the property is ordinarily entitled to the award of an additional sum which will compensate
for delay (cases cited) or which will, in other words, produce the full equivalent of the value of the property paid
contemporaneously with the taking" (29-A CJS 762). Under this view, the interest awarded is deemed part of the
just compensation required to be paid to the owner (27 Am. Jur, 112). This appears to be prevailing view in the
United States. As aptly and clearly explained in one American case:t.hqw
Article 1 18 of the Constitution of the State of Oregon, provides in part as follow: 'Private Property
shall not be taken for public use ... without just cornpansation.' The Fifth Amendment to the
Constitution of the United States contains substantially the same provision, 'nor shall private
property be taken for public use, without just compensation.' In construing this Identical language of
the Federal Constitution the Supreme Court of the United States holds as follows: lt is settled by
the decision of this court that just compensation is the value of the property taken at the time of the
taking (citing cases). And, if the taking precedes the payment of compensation, the owner is
entitled to such addition to the value at the time of the taking as will produce the full equivalent of
such value paid contemporaneously. Interest at a proper rate is a good measure of the amount to be
added'(numerous cases cited omitted). In these cases and others, the proper rate of interest is held to
be the legal rate of interest prevailing in the jurisdiction where the land is located. The Supreme Court
of West Virginia holds on the authority of these decisions and also of Dohany vs. Rogers, 281, U.S.
362, 50 SGt. 299. 74 L.Ed 904, 68 ALR434, that denial of the right of interest would be a violation
of the fourteenth Amendment to the Federal Constitution, Simons v. Dillon, 119 W. VA 284,193
S.E. 331, 113 A.L.R. 787. The following texts are authority for the allowance of such interest as
part of the damages sustained by the owner of the land. Nichols on Eminent Domain 653, 216
(3d ed.); Lewis, Eminent Domain (3d ed.) 1320, 742; 18 AM JUR., Eminent Domain, 272 [State
vs. Deal, 233 P 2d 242, 251-252, emphasis supplied].
This view is also well-discussed by JAHR in his book, Eminent Domain Valuation and Procedure (1953 ed.),
Chapter XXVIII Payment of Compensation, pp. 286-301; and by ORGEL in his book, Valuation Under Eminent
Domain, Vol. I (1953 ed.) on the subject of interest as part of just compensation and as a penalty for delay in
payment (Sec. 5, pp. 19-33).
In this jurisdiction, a study of the cases decided by this Court with respect to the award of interest to the condemnee
where there is a gap of time between the taking and the payment, shows that We tend to follow the view just
discussed. The first case-it would appear-where the question of interest arose in this jurisdiction was the Philippine
Railway Co. vs. Solon, February 20, 1909, 13 Phil. 35-45. The two issues taken there in connection with interest
were: (1) From what time should interest be reckoned, from time of the taking possession of the property by the
government or from judgment of the trial court; and (2) whether on appeal, appellant-condemnee is entitled to
interest during the pendency of the appeal. In disposing of the issues, the Court, relving heavily on American
jurisprudence, appears to treat interest as part of just compensation and as an additional amount sufficient to place
the owner "in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of the date of the taking." Thus, the Court
declared: t.hqw
It remains to consider what interest the defendant is entitled to from named date. It appears from
the record that thecompany opposed the confirmation of the award. Its objections were so far
successful that the court reduced the amount awarded by the commissioners. The owner was
compelled to appeal and in his appeal has been so far successful as to reverse the action of the the court
below.Under these circumstances we think he is entitled to interest on the award until the final
determination of this proceeding. What the result would be if he had failed in his appeal, we do not
decide. The interest thus allowed will be interest upon the amount awarded by the commissioners from the
2nd day of February, 1907, until payment (13 Phil. 40-44, emphasis supplied).
The Solon case thereafter became the basis of award of interest on expropriation cases like Philippine Railway v.
Duran, 33 Phil. 159 [1916]; Manila Railroad Co. v. Alano, 36 Phil. 501 [1917]; Manila Railroad Co. v. Attorney General,
41 Phil. 177 [1920]; Alejo v. Provincial Government of Cavite, 54 Phil. 304 1930]; Tayabas v. Perez, 66 Phil. 470
[1938]; Republic v. Gonzales, 94 Phil. 957 [1954]; Republic v. Lara, 96 Phil. 172 [1954]; Phil. Executive Commission v.
Estacio, 98 Phil. 219 [1956]; Republic of the Philippines v. Deleste, 46 al., 99 Phil. 1035 [1956]Republic v. Garcellano,
103 Phil. 237 [1958]; Yaptinchay, 108 Phil. 1053 [1960]; Republic v. Tayengco, 19 SCRA 900 [1967],and many
others, until the matter of payment of interest became an established part of every case where taking and payment
were not contemporaneously made.
And finally, We confirmed our adherence to the prevailing view in the United States when in the case of Urtula vs.
Republic, January 31, 1968, 222 SCRA 477, 480), We declared, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, that: t.hqw
... Said interest is not contractual, nor based on delict or quasi-delict, but one that t.hqw
runs as a matter of law and follows as a matter of course from the right of the
landowner to be placed in as good a position as money can accomplish, as of the
date of the taking'" (C.J.S. 230; see also Castelvi case, supra, and Republic v.
Nable-Lichauco, 14 SCRA 682).
In this connection, it must be pointed out that the judicial notice taken by this Court in the Castelvi case (supra, 363)
"... of the fact that the value of the Philippine peso has considerably gone down since the year 1959," was premised
not on the par value of the peso to the dollar, but on the dollarpeso exchange rates at the time of the taking of the
lots and at the time of the payment thereof.
In the case of Manuel & Co. vs. CB (38 SCRA. 533-542 [1971]), We distinguished between par value of the pesoand
the dollar-peso exchange rate. The par value of the peso to the dollar-two pesos to one dollar-is fixed by law and
remains intact (see 48, R.A. 265, 1948; Sec. 6, CA No. 699, 1945). Hence, while there was a change of the
exchange rate, the par value of the peso as established by law remains unchanged.
Such par value can only be altered by the President of the Philippines upon proposal of the Monetary Board with
five members concurring and approved by Congress (Sec. 49[3] RA No. 265).
On the other hand, the rate of exchange or exchange rate is the "price, or the indication of the price, at which one can
sell or buy with one's own domestic currency a foreign currency unit. Normally, the rate is deterniined by the law of
supply and demand for a particular currency" (38 SCRA 533-542).
It is submitted that the Castelvi doctrine on the value of our peso is of doubtful legality, considered in the context of
the Central Bank case, above discussed. In effect, the Castelvi ruling has devalued our peso; a case of devaluation
by judicial fiat.
In the light of the foregoing, the de facto devaluation of our peso should not be taken into account in the final
determination of the value of the lots, subject matter of the case.
In the 1970 case of Dizon-Rivera v. Dizon (33 SCRA 554-557 [1970]), WE ruled against appellants and held that the
decrease in the purchasing value of the Philippine peso provides no legal basis or justification for completing their
legitime with real properties of the estate instead of being paid in cash, reasoning thus: t.hqw
Neither may the appellants legally insist on their legitime being completed with real properties of
the estate instead of being paid in cash, per the approved project of partition. The properties are
not available for the purpose, as the testatrix had specifically partitioned and distributed them to her
heirs, and the heirs are called upon, as far as feasible to comply with and give effect to the
intention of the testatrix as solemnized in her will, by implementing her manifest wish of transmitting
the real properties intact to her named beneficiaries, principally the executrix-appellee. The
appraisal report of the properties of the estate as filed by the commissioner appointed by the lower
court was approved in toto upon joint petition of the parties, and hence, there cannot be said to be
any question-and none is presented-as to fairness of the valuation thereof or that the legitimate of
the heirs in terms of cash has been understated. The plaint of oppositors that the purchasing value
of the Philippine peso has greatly declined since the testatrix death in January, 1961 provides no
legal basis of justification for overturning the wishes and intent of the testatrix. The transmission of
rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment of death of the decedent (Article 777, and
accordingly, the value thereof must be reckoned as of then, as otherwise, estates would never be
settled if there were to be a revaluation with every subsequent flucluation in the values of the
currency and properties of the estate. There is evidence in the record that prior to November 25,
1964, one of the oppositors, Bernardita, accepted the suin of P50,000.00 on account of her
inheritance, which, per the parties' manifestation, "does not in any way affect the adjudication made
to her in the projects of partition." The payment in cash by way of making the proper adjustments in
order to meet the requirements of the law on non-impairment of legitimes as well as to give effect
to the last will of the testatrix has invariably been availed of and sanctioned see Articles 955, 1080
and 1104, Civil Code). That her co-oppositors would receive their cash differentials only now when the
value of the currency has declined further, whereas they could have received them earlier, like Bernardita, at
the time of approval of the project of partition and when the peso's purchasing value was higher, is due to
their own decision of pursuing the present appeal (emphasis supplied).
Additional distinction between the present case and the Castelvi case:
The proceedings before the commissioners and before the trial court in the Castelvi case were all in accordance
with the provisions of the rules, while this is not so in the present case; because the commissioner's herein did not
turn out a valid report, as the commissioners made their own and separate reports and no consensus was reached
by them on the classification of the lots, allocation of areas to each class, and the fair market value of each class
and the lots as a whole. Furtherinore, no hearing on the reports of the commissioners was made by the trial court in
the case at bar, because of the motion of the herein appellants to submit the same without any (hearing).
The finding of the trial court, which was sustained by this Court, that the lots involved in the Castelvi case were
residential, was supported by and based on the factual findings of the commissioners, who were unanimous
thereon, and the Provincial Appraisal Committee of Pampanga (58 SCRA 356-359): while in the present case no
one among the commissioners classified the lots or any portion thereof as residential or one with
residential/subdivision potentiality. With respect to Provincial Board Resolution No. 13 on the report of the
Provincial Appraisal Committee of La Union, the same was disregarded tor having been passed in haste.
In the present case, commissioner Balagot classified the two lots into irrigated riceland, upland riceland, orchard
land, pasture land and forest land, Commissioner Rojas similarly classified the lands as above, but adding thereto
forestry compound and barrio compound; while Commissioner Molina classified the lots into unirrigated riceland,
upland riceland and pasture land. It cannot be seriously claimed that the lots involved in the present case is suitable
as, or have potentials tor conversion into, a residential subdivision simply because a 4-hectare area of the same
was considered by a member of the provincial appraisal committee as residential. In fact, said 4-hectare area was
reflected in the Provincial Appraisal Committee Report, Resolution 13 (Exh. A) as grazing land, not as a residential
one (see pp. 138, 173, ROA; pp. 67, 143, Appellants' Brief). Furthermore, none among the commissioners believed
the testimony of the said member on that point as no one among them classified the lots or any portion thereof as
residential. The fact that the tenants of appellants previously occupied the said area and constructed houses
thereon, does not convert the whole area or the portion thus occupied into a residential one. The residential nature
of the lot is not determined alone by the presence or absence of houses thereon (Republic v. Garcia, 91 Phil. 46
[1952]). The determination of the true nature of a lot must take into consideration, among other things, the location
topography, kind of soil fertility or productivity, and surroundings of the lot (Manila Railroad Co. Caligsihan, 40 Phil.
326 [1919]; Republic v. Garcia, supra: Republic v. Lara, 50 O.G. 5778 [1954]). Indeed, the evidence relied upon by
this Court in concluding that the lots involved in the Castelvi case areresidential and not agricultural, shows that: t.
hqw
... Castelvi broached the Idea of subdividing her land into residential lots as early as July 11, 1965
in her letter to the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (Exh. 5-Castelvi). As a
matter of fact, the layout of the subdivision plan was tentatively approved by the National Planning
Commission on September 7, 1956. (Exh. 8-Castelvi). The land of Castelvi had not been devoted to
agriculture since 1974 when it was leased to the Philippine Army. In 1957 said land was classified as
residential, and taxes based on its classification as residential had been paid since then ( Exh. 13Castelvi). The location of the Castelvi land justifies its suitability fora residential subdivision. As found by
the trial court, "It is at the left side and the entrance of the Basa Air Base and bounded on two sides by
roads(Exh. 13-Castelvi; paragraphs 1 and 2, Exh. 12-Castelvi), the poblacion (of Floridablanca,) the
municipal building, and the Pampanga Sugar Mills are close by. The barrio schoolhouse and chapel are also
near (Tsn., Nov. 23, 1960, p. 68).
The land of Toledo-Gozun (Lot 1-B and Lot 3) are practically of the same condition as the land of Castelvi.
They are also contiguous to the Basa Air Base, and are along the road. These lands arenear the barrio
school house, the barrio Chapel, the Pampanga Sugar Mills, and the Poblacion of Floridablanca (Exhs. 1,
3 and 4-Toledo-Gozun). As a matter of fact, regarding Lot 1-B, it had already been surveyed and
subdivided, and its conversion into a residential subdivision was tentatively by the National Planning
Commission on July 8, 1959 Exhs. 5 and 6-Toledo-Gozun). As early as June, 1958, no less than 32 men
connected with the Philippine Air Force among them commissioned, officers, non-commissioned officers,
and enlisted men had requested Mr. and Mrs. Joaquin D. Gozun to open a subdivision on their lands in
question (Exhs, 8, 8-A to 8-ZZ-Toledo-Gozun)" (58 SCRA 357, emphasis supplied).
In the present case, there is no evidence in the record warranting a conclusion that the parcels involved have
potentials for conversion into a residential subdivision. On the contrary, the location, topography and the use to
which the lots involved were, devoted at the time of the filing of expropriation proceedings in the lower court,
indicate that they have none. In his report, Commissioner Molina described the location and topography of the lots
as follows: t.hqw
... Starting from the town propwer of Bacnotan, one can reach the property by passing through the barrios
of Cabaroan, Sayoan, Salincob, Casianan and finally Sapilang. The place is about 2.5 kilometers north of
the the Poblacion along the National Highway up to the so-called Cabaroan junction. From this junction is
about a 2-kilometer feeder road going eastward. And from this lateral road is an unsurfaced road of
approximately 1.5 kilometers leading to the site of the Agricultural School. However, before the school took
possession of the land on May 4, 1963, the place was not accessible at all by any motor vehicles, and that the
only means was to hike over paddies, trails and creeks.
Topographically, the property of defendants is situated on a high elevation. It consists of mountains and
hills forming a semi-circle, and sloping on the sides towards an elongated portion of valley-like depression
which is level and developed into ricefields. Because of its high elevation or location, the climate of the
place ishealthful, temperate and especially invigorating when one is near or within the vicinity of the
waterfall or spring. The climate is of the kind which the Weather Bureau would call the Type I
climate; that is, the place has two distinct reasons, a dry season from December to June, when
there are light rains or no raisn at all, and wet season, from June to December, when rains are
abundant, heavy and frequent. The soil of the place is good. It has a luxuriant vegetation (pp. 6970, ROA, emphasis supplied).
The presence of the houses of twenty-three (23) tenants in a 4-hectare area at the time the government took
possession of the lots herein involved, is not sufficient proof of that portion's potentialitv for conversion into a
residential subdivision, much less of the whole parcel of about 338 hectares. There was no evidence that the
houses of the tenants were there constructed because of its residential nature. In all likelihood, the tenants were
forced by necessity to construct their Rouses therein to be close to their respective tobacco farms. The fact that
under the leasehold system of land tenure, a tenant is allotted a portion for his dwelling does not render the entire
landholding no longer agricultural and thereby convert the same into a residential land.
WHEREFORE, THE JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS HEREBY MODIFIED AND THE PLAINTIFFAPPELLEE
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES IS HEREBY DIRECTED TO PAY THE DEFENDANTSAPPELLANTS
CELESTINO C. JUAN AND ANA TANSECO THE SUM OF TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS,
WITH INTEREST AT THE LEGAL RATE OF SIX PERCENT (6%) PER ANNUM FROM MAY 1, 1963. NO COSTS.
6. GUIDO vs RURAL PROGRESS

G.R. No. L-2089
October 31, 1949
JUSTA G. GUIDO, petitioner,

vs.
RURAL PROGRESS ADMINISTRATION, c/o FAUSTINO AGUILAR, Manager, Rural Progress
Administration, respondent.
Guillermo B. Guevara for petitioner.
Luis M. Kasilag and Lorenzo B. Vizconde for respondent.

TUASON, J.:
This a petition for prohibition to prevent the Rural Progress Administration and Judge Oscar Castelo of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal from proceeding with the expropriation of the petitioner Justa G. Guido's land, two adjoining
lots, part commercial, with a combined area of 22,655 square meters, situated in Maypajo, Caloocan, Rizal, just
outside the north Manila boundary, on the main street running from this city to the north. Four grounds are adduced
in support of the petition, to wit:
(1) That the respondent RPA (Rural Progress Administration) acted without jurisdiction or corporate power
in filling the expropriation complaint and has no authority to negotiate with the RFC a loan of P100,000 to
be used as part payment of the value of the land.
(2) That the land sought to be expropriated is commercial and therefore excluded within the purview of the
provisions of Act 539.
(3) That majority of the tenants have entered with the petitioner valid contracts for lease, or option to buy at
an agreed price, and expropriation would impair those existing obligation of contract.
(4) That respondent Judge erred in fixing the provisional value of the land at P118,780 only and in ordering
its delivery to the respondent RPA.
We will take up only ground No. 2. Our conclusion on this branch of the case will make superfluous a decision on
the other questions raised.
Sections 1 and 2 of Commonwealth Act No. 539, copied verbatim, are as follows:
SECTION 1. The President of the Philippines is authorized to acquire private lands or any interest therein,
through purchaser or farms for resale at reasonable prices and under such conditions as he may fix to their
bona fide tenants or occupants or to private individuals who will work the lands themselves and who are
qualified to acquire and own lands in the Philippines.
SEC. 2. The President may designated any department, bureau, office, or instrumentality of the National
Government, or he may organize a new agency to carry out the objectives of this Act. For this purpose, the
agency so created or designated shall be considered a public corporation.
The National Assembly approved this enactment on the authority of section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution
which, copied verbatim, is as follows:
The Congress may authorize, upon payment of just compensation, the expropriation of lands to be
subdivided into small lots and conveyed at cost to individuals.
What lands does this provision have in view? Does it comprehend all lands regardless of their location, nature and
area? The answer is to be found in the explanatory statement of Delegate Miguel Cuaderno, member of the
Constitutional Convention who was the author or sponsor of the above-quoted provision. In this speech, which was
entitled "Large Estates and Trust in Perpetuity" and is transcribed in full in Aruego's "The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution," Mr. Cuaderno said:
There has been an impairment of public tranquility, and to be sure a continuous of it, because of the
existence of these conflicts. In our folklore the oppression and exploitation of the tenants are vividly referred
to; their sufferings at the hand of the landlords are emotionally pictured in our drama; and even in the native
movies and talkies of today, this theme of economic slavery has been touched upon. In official documents
these same conflicts are narrated and exhaustively explained as a threat to social order and stability.
But we should go to Rizal inspiration and illumination in this problem of this conflicts between landlords and
tenants. The national hero and his family were persecuted because of these same conflicts in Calamba,
and Rizal himself met a martyr's death because of his exposal of the cause of the tenant class, because he
would not close his eyes to oppression and persecution with his own people as victims.lawphi1.nt
I ask you, gentlemen of the Convention, knowing this as you do and feeling deeply as you must feel a
regret over the immolation of the hero's life, would you not write in the Constitution the provision on large
estates and trust in perpetuity, so that you would be the very instrument of Providence to complete the
labors of Rizal to insure domestic tranquility for the masses of our people?
If we are to be true to our trust, if it is our purpose in drafting our constitution to insure domestic tranquility
and to provide for the well-being of our people, we cannot, we must fail to prohibit the ownership of large
estates, to make it the duty of the government to break up existing large estates, and to provide for their
acquisition by purchase or through expropriation and sale to their occupants, as has been provided in the
Constitutions of Mexico and Jugoslavia.
No amendment was offered and there was no debate. According to Dean Aruego, Mr. Cuaderno's resolution was
readily and totally approved by the Convention. Mr. Cuaderno's speech therefore may be taken as embodying the
intention of the framers of the organic law, and Act No. 539 should be construed in a manner consonant with that
intention. It is to be presumed that the National Assembly did not intend to go beyond the constitutional scope of its
powers.
There are indeed powerful considerations, aside from the intrinsic meaning of section 4 of Article XIII of the
Constitution, for interpreting Act No. 539 in a restrictive sense. Carried to extremes, this Act would be subversive of
the Philippine political and social structure. It would be in derogation of individual rights and the time-honored
constitutional guarantee that no private property of law. The protection against deprivation of property without due
process for public use without just compensation occupies the forefront positions (paragraph 1 and 2) in the Bill for
private use relieves the owner of his property without due process of law; and the prohibition that "private property
should not be taken for public use without just compensation" (Section 1 [par. 2], Article III, of the Constitution)
forbids necessary implication the appropriation of private property for private uses (29 C.J.S., 819). It has been truly
said that the assertion of the right on the part of the legislature to take the property of and citizen and transfer it to
another, even for a full compensation, when the public interest is not promoted thereby, is claiming a despotic
power, and one inconsistent with very just principle and fundamental maxim of a free government. (29 C.J.S., 820.)
Hand in hand with the announced principle, herein invoked, that "the promotion of social justice to insure the wellbeing and economic security of all the people should be the concern of the state," is a declaration, with which the
former should be reconciled, that "the Philippines is a Republican state" created to secure to the Filipino people
"the blessings of independence under a regime of justice, liberty and democracy." Democracy, as a way of life
enshrined in the Constitution, embraces as its necessary components freedom of conscience, freedom of
expression, and freedom in the pursuit of happiness. Along with these freedoms are included economic freedom
and freedom of enterprise within reasonable bounds and under proper control. In paving the way for the breaking
up of existing large estates, trust in perpetuity, feudalism, and their concomitant evils, the Constitution did not
propose to destroy or undermine the property right or to advocate equal distribution of wealth or to authorize of
what is in excess of one's personal needs and the giving of it to another. Evincing much concern for the protection
of property, the Constitution distinctly recognize the preferred position which real estate has occupied in law for
ages. Property is bound up with every aspects of social life in a democracy as democracy is conceived in the
Constitution. The Constitution owned in reasonable quantities and used legitimately, plays in the stimulation to
economic effort and the formation and growth of a social middle class that is said to be the bulwark of democracy
and the backbone of every progressive and happy country.
The promotion of social justice ordained by the Constitution does not supply paramount basis for untrammeled
expropriation of private land by the Rural Progress Administration or any other government instrumentality. Social
justice does not champion division of property or equality of economic status; what it and the Constitution do
guaranty are equality of opportunity, equality of political rights, equality before the law, equality between values
given and received on the basis of efforts exerted in their production. As applied to metropolitan centers, especially
Manila, in relation to housing problems, it is a command to devise, among other social measures, ways and means
for the elimination of slums, shambles, shacks, and house that are dilapidated, overcrowded, without ventilation.
light and sanitation facilities, and for the construction in their place of decent dwellings for the poor and the
destitute. As will presently be shown, condemnation of blighted urban areas bears direct relation to public safety
health, and/or morals, and is legal.
In reality, section 4 of Article XIII of the Constitution is in harmony with the Bill of Rights. Without that provision the
right of eminent domain, inherent in the government, may be exercised to acquire large tracts of land as a means
reasonably calculated to solve serious economic and social problem. As Mr. Aruego says "the primary reason" for
Mr. Cuaderno's recommendation was "to remove all doubts as to the power of the government to expropriation the
then existing landed estates to be distributed at costs to the tenant-dwellers thereof in the event that in the future it
would seem such expropriation necessary to the solution of agrarian problems therein."
In a broad sense, expropriation of large estates, trusts in perpetuity, and land that embraces a whole town, or a
large section of a town or city, bears direct relation to the public welfare. The size of the land expropriated, the large
number of people benefited, and the extent of social and economic reform secured by the condemnation, clothes
the expropriation with public interest and public use. The expropriation in such cases tends to abolish economic
slavery, feudalistic practices, and other evils inimical to community prosperity and contentment and public peace
and order. Although courts are not in agreement as to the tests to be applied in determining whether the use is
public or not, some go far in the direction of a liberal construction as to hold that public advantage, and to authorize
the exercise of the power of eminent domain to promote such public benefit, etc., especially where the interest
involved are considerable magnitude. (29 C.J.S., 823, 824. See also People of Puerto Rico vs. Eastern Sugar
Associates, 156 Fed. [2nd], 316.) In some instances, slumsites have been acquired by condemnation. The highest
court of New York States has ruled that slum clearance and reaction of houses for low-income families were public
purposes for which New York City Housing authorities could exercise the power of condemnation. And this decision
was followed by similar ones in other states. The underlying reasons for these decisions are that the destruction of
congested areas and insanitary dwellings diminishes the potentialities of epidemic, crime and waste, prevents the
spread of crime and diseases to unaffected areas, enhances the physical and moral value of the surrounding
communities, and promotes the safety and welfare of the public in general. (Murray vs. La Guardia, 52 N.E. [2nd],
884; General Development Coop. vs. City of Detroit, 33 N.W. [2ND], 919; Weizner vs. Stichman, 64 N.Y.S. [2nd],
50.) But it will be noted that in all these case and others of similar nature extensive areas were involved and
numerous people and the general public benefited by the action taken.
The condemnation of a small property in behalf of 10, 20 or 50 persons and their families does not inure to the
benefit of the public to a degree sufficient to give the use public character. The expropriation proceedings at bar
have been instituted for the economic relief of a few families devoid of any consideration of public health, public
peace and order, or other public advantage. What is proposed to be done is to take plaintiff's property, which for all
we know she acquired by sweat and sacrifice for her and her family's security, and sell it at cost to a few lessees
who refuse to pay the stipulated rent or leave the premises.
No fixed line of demarcation between what taking is for public use and what is not can be made; each case has to
be judge according to its peculiar circumstances. It suffices to say for the purpose of this decision that the case
under consideration is far wanting in those elements which make for public convenience or public use. It is
patterned upon an ideology far removed from that consecrated in our system of government and embraced by the
majority of the citizens of this country. If upheld, this case would open the gates to more oppressive expropriations.
If this expropriation be constitutional, we see no reason why a 10-, 15-, or 25-hectare farm land might not be
expropriated and subdivided, and sold to those who want to own a portion of it. To make the analogy closer, we find
no reason why the Rural Progress Administration could not take by condemnation an urban lot containing an area
of 1,000 or 2,000 square meters for subdivision into tiny lots for resale to its occupants or those who want to build
thereon.
The petition is granted without special findings as to costs.
7. CITY OF MANILA vs CHINESE COMMUNITY OF MANILA

City of Manila v Chinese Community 40 PHIL 349 (1919)
expropriation of Chinese cemetery
Facts: The City of Manila wants to expropriate a land owned by the Chinese community as cemetery for the
purpose of extending
Rizal Avenuefor public use. The respondents contend that the land already acquires a quasi-public character and
many dead bodies are already buried there. They stress that there is no necessity of taking the land for public
purpose since such is under Torrens title and the expropriation will disturb the resting place of the dead. The
plaintiff contends that under the Charter of City of Manila, they may condemn private lands for public purpose, such
being an exclusive function of the legislature and the only function of the court is to assess the value of the land
expropriated.
Issue: Whether or not the court can inquire into the necessity of expropriation.
Held: The court ruled that the power of judicial review on expropriation is not limited to the inquiry of the existence
of law that grants a municipal corporation to expropriate private lands for public purpose. The court has the
responsibility to (1) ensure that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the right of eminent domain, and (2) that
the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with the law. There are two conditions imposed upon the
authority conceded to the City of Manila: (1) the land must be private; and, (2) the purpose must be public. The
taking of land in the exercise of power of eminent domain of the state is not a judicial question but the court is
bound to interfere to prevent an abuse of the discretion delegated by the legislature. The very foundation of the
right to exercise eminent domain is a genuine necessity, and that necessity must be of a public character. The
ascertainment of the necessity must precede or accompany, and not follow, the taking of the land. The court ruled
that the cemetery is a public property and it found no great necessity to allow the expropriation of the land by the
City of Manila thus thereby affirmed the decision of the lower court.
8. CABRERA vs COURT OF APPEALS
163 SCRA 214
Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, and Felisa Gonzaga, Fernando Gonzaga, Aurora Gonzaga, et al.
163
RA 214 June 30, 1988
164
Facts: The parcel of land in dispute was originally owned by Diego and Patricio Gonzaga, the
grandparents of the private respondents herein. In 1921, the tax declaration was in the name of the
spouses Gonzaga. In 1944 it was made in the name of their child Eliseo Gonzaga. In 1953, it was changed
again in the name of Joaquin Cabrera.
In 1970, private respondents filed a complaint for recovery of the property from the petitioners in the Court of First
Instance. They claimed the property by right of succession. Petitioners claimed by virtue of an alleged sale between
them and Eliseo.
During the pendency of the complaint, private respondents request that the figures 1960 be changed to 1969
was approved without opposition from Cabrera.
CFI decided in favor of private respondents herein. The Court of Appeals affirmed this decision.
Note: A separate action for registration of the land instituted by Cabrera was pending when the case at the CFI was
being heard.
ISSUES:
1. Whether the complaint is barred by laches or prescription?
2. Whether the tax declarations serve as constructive notice because of their nature as public instruments?
3. Whether the action for reconveyance was prematurely filed?
Held:
1. No. The amendment requested by private respondents was allowed without objection from the petitioners.
Moreover, this defense should have been pleaded before the amendment was made.
2. No. The Court said its strange doctrine that every one is deemed charged with knowledge of every public
document simply because it is public in nature. There is no jurisprudence to support the claim.
3. No. The action for reconveyance may be filed even before the issuance of decree of
registration. There is no reason why one has to wait for the land to be registered before
filing such remedy.
Cabreras claim that respondents had no valid grounds to support the action for
reconveyance is untenable. The latter had established that the transfer of the land had been
made under fraudulent circumstances. They also proved that they didnt receive notice of
the registration proceedings and that no notice had been posted on the subject land as
required by law.
9. CO vs INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
Go vs. Intermediate Appellate Court

G.R. No. L-68138
May 31, 1991
In quasi-delict cases, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been
foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant.
Facts:
Floverto Jazmin, a visitor residing at Maravilla St. Mangatarem, Pangasinan, is an American citizen and a
retiree of the United States Federal Government. Being a pensionado of the US Government, he received
annuity checks through Mangatarem Post Office and used to encash it at the Prudential Bank Branch at
Clark Air Base, Pampanga. However, there was a time that he was not able to receive the checks on time,
thus prompted him to write a complaint due to the delay. Thereafter he received a substitute check and
encashed it at the Prudential Bank.
Meanwhile, Agustin Go in his capacity as the manager of the Solidbank (now Consolidated Bank and Trust
Corporation), allowed a person, in the name of Floverto Jasmin, to open a savings account thereby
depositing two US Treasury Checks. Deposited checks were sent to the drawee bank (First National City
Bank). Having no reply from the drawee bank, the Solidbank allowed the depositor to withdraw the amount
indicated in the checks.
A year later, the two dollar checks were returned to Solidbank with the notation that there was an alteration.
With that, Jazmin received radio messages requiring him to appear before the Philippine Constabulary
regarding the complaint filed by Go against him for estafa. It was then found out that the depositor who
withdrew the amount from Solidbank was an impostor. Thus, Jazmin filed a case against Go at the CFI
Pangasinan for moral and exemplary damages.
The lower court ruled in favor of the plaintiff. Defendants appealed to the IAC. Like the lower court, IAC
ruled in favor of the plaintiff but awarded nominal damages instead of moral and exemplary damages.
Thus, the case was elevated to the Supreme Court.
Issue:
Whether or not Go and the Solidbank are liable for nominal damages.
Ruling:
Yes, Go and the Solidbank are solidarily liable for nominal damages.
Under the law, quasi-delict cases are one of the sources of obligation.
In this case, the defendant shall be liable for all damages which are the natural and probable
consequences of the act or omission complained of. It is not necessary that such damages have been
foreseen or could have reasonably been foreseen by the defendant. Go has the obligation to pay nominal
damages because of the Jazmins right being violated and invaded in the case of estafa instituted at the
Philippine Constabulary. Nominal damages are awarded instead of moral and exemplary damages
because Jazmin did not suffer any loss from the action made by the plaintiff and such damages do not
intend to indemnify any loss to the latter. In fact, he was still able to receive the amount through the
substitute check sent to him. Therefore, Jazmin is not entitled to moral damages and as well as exemplary
damages. In the same way, the bank is co-equally liable with Go because it has been grossly negligent,
through its employee, in handling the business transaction involved.

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CONSTI 2 : 5TH BATCH OF CASES

Compiled by Di Sardea for Twenty19 1

CONSTI 2 : 5TH BATCH OF CASES

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G.R. No. L-1631

February 27, 1948

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Francisco Chavez vs PCGG et.al.,

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The petitioner questioned the

These expenses are necessary, valid and

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Value of Improvements.................................................................. 1,712.60

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Value sq. meter

Irrigated Palay Land

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3. 80 hectares pasture land

4. 120 hectares fruit trees

5. 72 hectares 2nd growth forest

(p. 145, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).

mango (bearing) P30 ea.

21 coconut (bearing) P5 ea.

4 coconut (non-bearing) P2 ea.

4 caimito (star apple) P8 ea.

12 bamboos (heavy) P0.30 ea.

1 bamboo (light) P0.10 ea.

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6 orange (non-bearing) P1 ea.

(pp. 16-17, ROA, Vol. I, rec.).

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CONSTI 2 : 5TH BATCH OF CASES