Globe Mackay Cable & Radio

Corp. v. Court of Appeals

GR 81262, Aug. 25, 1989
A right, though by itself legal because recognized or granted by law as such,
may nevertheless become the source of some illegality.
Thus, when a right is exercised in a manner which does not conform with the
norms enshrined in Art. 19 of the Code and results in damage to another, a legal
wrong is thereby committed for which the wrongdoer must be held responsible.
Quimiguing vs Icao
For a married man to force a woman not his wife to yield to his lust
constitutes a clear violation of the rights of his victim which entitled her to
compensation under Article 21 of the Civil Code.
Gashem Shookat Baksh v. Court of Appeals
Where a mans promise to marry is in fact the proximate cause of the
acceptance of his love by a woman and his representation to fulfill that promise
thereafter becomes the proximate cause of the giving of herself unto him in a
sexual congress, proof that he had, in reality, no intention of marrying her and that
the promise was only a subtle scheme or deceptive device to entice or inveigle her
to accept him and to obtain her consent to the sexual act, could justify the award of
damages pursuant to Article 21 not because of such promise to marry but because
of the fraud and deceit behind it and the willful injury to her honor and reputation
which followed thereafter. It is essential however, that such injury should have been
committed in a manner contrary to morals, good customs or public policy.
It was the petitioners fraudulent and deceptive protestations of love for and
promise to marry plaintiff that made her surrender her virtue and womanhood to
him and to live with him on the honest and sincere belief that he would keep said
promise, and it was likewise these fraud and deception on appellants part that
made plaintiffs parents agree to their daughters living-in with him preparatory to
their supposed marriage. In short, private respondent surrendered her virginity, the
cherished possession of every single Filipina, not because of lust but because of
moral seduction.
Wassmer v. Velez
L-20089, Dec. 26, 1964
Mere breach of promise to marry is not actionable wrong, but to formally set
a wedding and go through all the preparation therefore, only to walk out of it when
the marriage is about to be solemnized is quite different. Obviously, it is contrary to
good customs, and the defendant consequently must be held answerable for
damages in accordance with Art. 21 of the Civil Code.

Dumlao v. Quality Plastics Products, Inc.

L-27956, Apr. 30, 1976
FACTS: The CFI (now RTC) rendered a judgment against several defendants, one of
whom was already dead even before the complaint was fi led. The Court did not
know this fact, because the other defendants never told the Judge about the death.
The heirs of the dead man sued for the annulment of the judgment, but the CFI
(now RTC) refused alleging that voluntary appearance of the deceased had been
made thru the other defendants, and that the heirs of the dead man, who knew that
the latter had been made defendant, are now in estoppels for not correcting the
error. Is the judgment against the dead defendant valid?
HELD: The judgment is a patent nullity, insofar as the dead defendant is concerned,
because being already dead, summons could not be validly served on him for want
of civil personality. His juridical capacity was lost the moment he died. There is
therefore no question of voluntary appearance. Neither can estoppels be made to
apply.
Moy Ya Lim Yao v. Com. of Immigration
GR L-21289, 41 SCRA 29
The Supreme Court reversed the Burca ruling and held that under Sec. 15 of
Com. Act 473 (the Revised Naturalization Law) an alien woman marrying a Filipino,
native- born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipino provided, she is not
disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Sec. 4 of the same law.
Moreover, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently naturalized
here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the moment he takes his oath
as a Filipino citizen, provided she does not suffer from any of the disqualifications
under said Section 4. The decision in effect ruled that it is not necessary for an
alien citizen to prove in a judicial proceeding that she possesses all the
qualifications set forth in Sec. 2 and none of the disqualifications under Sec.4, both
of the Revised Naturalization Law. (Yap v. Republic, L-27430, May 17, 1972).