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Sommaire Contents
Pierfrancesco Basile
Foreword: Whitehead after Whitehead ............................................. 5
Sommaire Contents
James A. Marcum
Whiteheads Philosophy of Organism and Systems Biology .......... 143
Nicholas Rescher
The Uneasy Union of Reality and Pragmatism in Inquiry .............. 153
David Skrbina
On the Problem of the Aggregate .................................................. 159
Pierfrancesco Basile
Notes
1
University of Berne.
Alfred North Whitehead, Essays in Science and Philosophy, New York: Rider,
1948, p. 87.
I. Sminaires de recherche
Research Seminars
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Jean-Pascal Alcantara
11
12
Jean-Pascal Alcantara
De plus, le temps local ne concerne pas seulement une unique
particule matrielle. La mme dfinition de la simultanit est
valable travers lespace entier dun ensemble concordant du
groupe newtonien. La thorie du message ne rend pas compte
de la concordance de la reconnaissance du temps qui caractrise
un ensemble concordant, ni de la position fondamentale du
groupe newtonien5.
13
que nous avons appel une super-loi, appele rgir tous les
phnomnes physiques en dfinissant leur cadre spatio-temporel
commun, partir des proprits dun agent physique particulier
[]. Au surplus, linvariance de la vitesse de la lumire est un
fait empirique, donc provisoirement valide, et susceptible dtre
exprimentalement remis en cause par de nouvelles mesures
plus prcises9.
Aujourdhui, tout physicien sait que la constante c caractrise, outre la vitesse
de la lumire, encore celle du neutrino ou de toutes les particules dont la
masse serait nulle. des formes dinteractions autres que des radiations
lectromagntiques (faibles et fortes, gravifique) sappliquent avec un succs
non dmenti les quations relativistes. Le second principe einsteinien
risquerait alors de limiter la porte de la thorie de la relativit, au lieu de la
constituer en ce quelle est vritablement, une thorie universelle dcrivant la
structure de lespace-temps. Il faudrait en outre expliquer pourquoi une telle
structure dpendrait spcialement des proprits des radiations
lectromagntiques.
Dans le mme sens, ce ds les annes 19101912, le russe W. Ignatowsky,
bientt suivi par les allemands P. Frank et H. Rothe remarqurent que le
postulat de constance de la vitesse de la lumire ntait en rien indispensable
la dduction des formules de Lorentz10. Ignatowsky tenta de dduire les
transformations du seul principe de relativit, tandis que Frank et Rothe
tirrent parti du principe de relativit sous la forme de loi de groupe
mathmatique des transformations dinertie, toutefois sans en dgager ni les
conditions disotropie de lespace ni celle de causalit. Le franais V. Lalan fit
connatre la dmonstration un saut qualitatif important en 1937, toujours
sollicitant la thorie des groupes en lieu et place du principe de relativit11.
Ltonnant est de constater que ce regain dintrt pour ces travaux pionniers,
la suite de limpulsion donne par Lvy-Leblond, sest effectu sans
pratiquement jamais mentionner les recherches parallles de Whitehead12.
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Jean-Pascal Alcantara
15
16
Jean-Pascal Alcantara
17
18
Jean-Pascal Alcantara
5. Conclusions
Whitehead renverse lordre didactique habituel qui a t longtemps calqu sur
le cheminement historique de linvention : la construction de lespace-temps
minkowskien, construit de manire non-mtrique, prcde ltablissement
des relations de Lorentz. On pourrait son propos, au lieu de parler dune
thorie de la relativit restreinte, proposer le terme de chronogomtrie
que retient J.-M. Lvy-Leblond pour mieux signifier que lon se passe
dsormais du second postulat. Lexercice auquel on a vu se livrer Whitehead
partir de la mthode dabstraction extensive nous paratrait justifier une
semblable dnomination. Il est bien connu quEinstein lui-mme, en rponse
une remarque de Sommerfeld, avait a posteriori jug que, pour dsigner la
nouvelle lectrodynamique de llectron, le choix du terme relativit ne fut
peut-tre pas le meilleur, car ne mettant pas assez laccent sur la covariance
des quations de Lorentz. Mais, compte tenu de la place occupe par le
principe de relativit dans lexpos quil donne de la thorie, force est de
penser quun tel choix terminologique ne fut pas non plus le pire. Quant au
second principe, on peut se demander sil ne reprsente pas la part de la
prcision au sens de la philosophie de lducation whiteheadienne dans
larticle fondateur de 1905. La chronogomtrie du britannique atteindrait
alors le stade de la gnralisation. En effet Einstein justifia ainsi en 1922 la
place exceptionnelle de la constance de c daprs la relativit restreinte :
Afin de pouvoir prter, en gnral, au concept de temps, une
signification physique, il est ncessaire de faire usage de
phnomnes quelconques, susceptibles de mettre en relation des
lieux diffrents. Il est en soit indiffrent quels sont les
phnomnes dont on fait choix en vue dune telle dfinition du
temps. Mais il sera avantageux au point de vue thorique de ne
choisir quun phnomne au sujet duquel nous savons quelque
chose de certain. Cest le cas en ce qui concerne la propagation
de la lumire dans lespace vide, un degr suprieur que pour
tous les autres phnomnes auxquels on pourrait songer,
notamment grce aux travaux de Maxwell et dH.-A. Lorentz21.
Pour Whitehead, ltablissement de la relativit restreinte sur la base de la
contingence dun fait allait tre redoubl par lavnement dune seconde
contingence en relativit gnrale, du fait de la courbure des rayons lumineux
dans une structure spatio-temporelle lastique et cintre par la matire,
comme on le voit en 1922, dans un livre dont le titre, The Principle of
Relativity, ne parat toujours pas doter le principe de relativit dun rle
architectonique en physique, et anticipe plutt le rle mtaphysique quil
remplira pleinement dans Process and Reality22.
19
Notes
1
PNK, p. 53.
PNK, p. 32.
PNK, trad. p. 206 (cf. Robert Palter, Whiteheads Philosophy of Science, The
University of Chicago Press, 1960, pp. 88 et 189).
10
Archiv der Math. und Phys. III, 17 (1910) et Physik. Zeitschrift 11, 972
(1911).
11
12
Ces essais de dmonstrations ont t systmatiquement tudis par JeanPierre Lecardonnel loccasion dune thse de Troisime Cycle :
Variations sur le principe de relativit (Universit Paris VI, 1979).
13
14
15
I have also hitherto omitted to point out that all order in space is merely
the expression of order in time. For a series of parallel planes in the space
of our time is merely the series of intersections with a series of moments
of another time-system. Thus the order of the parallel planes is merely the
time-order of the moments of this other system (op. cit., 1922 ; reprint
Dover, 2004, p. 60).
16
Trad., p. 117.
17
Ibid., p. 118.
18
20
Jean-Pascal Alcantara
19
20
21
22
22
Pierfrancesco Basile
constituted by the slight pained-ness of all the LITTLE PAINS.6
23
In order to derive the contradiction, lets ask: What would it mean for
mental combination to be possible? One way to answer this question is by
considering the relation between the mind and the brain. The panpsychist
would speculate that the lesser minds that constitute the neurons
experiences come together to form the larger mind of a human being.
Presumably, this would involve that an experience E originally belonging to
(or even constituting) a neurons lesser mind, say N, becomes a component of
a larger whole, the human mind M. The proof now runs as follows:
(1) If mental combination is possible, there is an experience E
that belongs to two distinct experiential wholes, N and M.
According to phenomenological essentialism, an experience is nothing but the
way it feels; it follows that:
(2) E = E as felt within N
(3) E = E as felt within M
According to experiential holism, an experiences nature is determined by the
larger whole of which it is a part. Since N and M are per hypothesis different,
this implies
(4) E as felt within N E as felt within M
This, however, is inconsistent with the idea of discrete compositionality. On
that combinatory model, parts are free to enter into any combination without
any changes in their nature; hence, we can derive
(5) E as felt within N = E as felt within M
If we now substitute (2) and (3) in (4) and (5) respectively, we obtain the
contradictory pair:
(6) E E
(7) E = E
But this is a clear violation of the logic of identity!
One response to this situation is to take the argument as a valid reduction of
the idea that mental composition can take place. Since this idea is required by
a viable panpsychist theory, this is tantamount to rejecting panpsychism.
Apparently, this is Goffs and presumably Searles way of looking at this
difficulty. Another is to accept that the argument is valid but reject the logic of
identity. This is Jamess solution: the notion of mental combination is indeed
impossible, yet by a leap of faith we hold that it does take place.10
Alternatively, and more reasonably, one could reconsider any or all of the
principles used in the derivation. The principle of phenomenological idealism
is very plausible, at least for that class of mental events of which pains and
pleasures can be taken to be paradigmatic examples. Nor is it necessary to
24
Pierfrancesco Basile
revise it, for it is easy to see that experiential holism and discrete
compositionality are inconsistent with each other. Experiential holism implies
the internality of the relations between an experience and the whole of which
it is a part, so that the whole becomes constitutive of the partial experiences
inner nature. The idea of discrete compositionality, on the contrary, implicitly
models part/whole relations as external, so that it is entirely indifferent to the
nature of the parts whether they become constituent of the larger whole.
This inconsistency is also easily resolved: since the mind is plausibly
thought of as a holistic unity, it is the idea of discrete compositionality that
must be abandoned. But this, of course, does not mean abandoning the very
idea of combination, only a certain inadequate initial way of conceiving of it.
But how could my mind be composed of many little experiences with a
life of their own without me being aware of it? Well, this is surely a problem,
but it cant be answered unless one has some grasp of what mental
combination could plausibly mean. One should note, however, that the notion
of external constituents literally entering our experience is not without some
grounding in our phenomenology. Surely, the total psychical whole which is
my mind at any one moment is not a mere display of perceptions to a
detached spectator, as in Humes theatre-metaphor. What one experiences is
rather a vague yet pervasive awareness of external things moulding ones
own subjectivitywhy couldnt these external realities have themselves an
experiential nature instead of being simply thought of as inert material
particles?
Note also that the claim that one might experience ones own mind without
any complete awareness of its structural features does not invalidate the
intuition behind phenomenological essentialismthe identity between
appearance and reality and therefore the transparency of an experience for
the subject that enjoys it, for that is held to be true for at least some
identifiable contents (such as pains and tastes) within our total psychical field,
rather than for the whole field as such.
In sum, to hold that the composition problem cannot be solved would seem
to be guilty of the trivial fallacy of treating the mind as if it were an
assemblage of things, which is a special sort of category mistake. It is also
to put the cart before the horsefor it amounts to saying that the
composition problem cannot be solved on the implicit assumption that we
already have some general understanding of how the solution must look like.
This does sound, indeed it is, question begging. True, the explanatory work of
articulating adequate part/whole categories for mental phenomena still
remains to be done; yet pace Searle, Goff, and even William James!such
work need not be in vain.
25
Notes
1
University of Berne.
Although some versions of the theory might have this implication; see for
example the discussion of Spinozas panpsychism in D. Skrbina,
Panpsychism in the West, Cambridge, Mass.: the MIT Press, 2005, pp. 8791, and M. Della Rocca, Spinoza, London and New York: Routledge, 2008,
pp. 108-118. In his A Conscious Mind, Oxford: Oxford University Press,
1996, Chalmers notoriously speculates that there might be a what-it-islike-to-be-a-thermostat (p. 286).
5
6
7
8
9
10
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Emeline Deroo
1. Exigence cosmologique :
dimensions mondaine et divine de la co-cration
La ncessit du prir se retrouve dans deux problmatiques indissociables de
la cosmologie whiteheadienne : la thorie du sujet/superject et celle des deux
rythmes du procs.
Concernant tout dabord la rforme du sujet, le prir y joue un rle
prpondrant puisquil permet selon Whitehead de garantir le passage, le
basculement dun mode dexprience un autre. Lapport spcifique de la
notion de superject correspond notamment cette prise en compte de la
notion de prir dans la mesure o le superject se dfinit comme lactualit qui
a pri et qui, par l, acquiert limmortalit objective. Le superject est lentit
dont les conditions ont t fixes lors de la concrescence en vue dune
dtermination comme objet pour les futures actualisations. Toutes les
dterminations produites par la libert du sujet concernent donc son statut de
futur objet et elles ne deviennent effectives quaprs le prissement de cette
subjectivit.
De la mme manire, par rapport aux deux rythmes du procs que sont la
concrescence et la transition, nous observons cette fonction vectorielle
assume par le prir qui sert dagent causal transportant les lments
immortels du pass qui seront utiliss comme socle du devenir dautres
actualisations. Aussi, le prir se comprend comme linstant charnire qui
assure la transition de la subjectivation qui fonctionne sur le mode poqual
lobjectivation dans le continuum extensif.
Par consquent, l'exigence cosmologique signifie que le prir, considr
strictement de ce point de vue, constitue une condition de possibilit de
lavance cratrice, cest--dire que sa fonction transitoire, son rle vectoriel
assur plus prcisment par la transmission des sentirs, lui permet dassurer
29
2. Exigence thologique :
la bont dun Dieu ncrophage
Si nous considrons maintenant la problmatique du prir dans le cadre de la
nature consquente de Dieu telle que la prsente la 5 partie de PR, un
glissement sopre du champ cosmologique vers le champ proprement
thologique, voire religieux (en tant quayant trait lexprience consciente) :
le prir ne sintgre plus uniquement dans la dynamique cosmologique de
lavance cratrice, il na plus seulement le statut dun concept la fois
charnire et moteur dans le processus mais se retrouve comme nud dune
problmatique de type moral. Pourquoi ? La cinquime et dernire partie de
Procs et ralit, et plus particulirement la section IV du premier chapitre, est
notamment consacre rsoudre le problme de langoisse de la perte par
lexplication du rle de la nature consquente de Dieu. L'vocation d'une
dimension morale plutt que thologique nous permet en ralit de souligner
l'ide que cest seulement avec la nature consquente qumerge la finitude
de Dieu et par suite, sa bont. En effet, dans sa nature primordiale, Dieu se
caractrise uniquement par son illimitation conceptuelle ainsi que par son
indiffrence lgard du mondain. Limmortalit objective des entits
actuelles est donc rendue possible par Dieu dans sa nature consquente et, au
niveau humain, cette immortalit aura toujours raison du dchirement
ressenti en raison dune tension entre un dsir de nouveaut et un besoin de
30
Emeline Deroo
31
32
Emeline Deroo
33
34
Emeline Deroo
35
36
Emeline Deroo
Notes
1
PR, p. [345]/530.
10
11
PR, p. [340]/524.
12
AI, p. 367.
13
Ibid., p. 368.
14
15
16
Ibid., p. 459.
17
18
Ibid., p. 458.
19
Borges J. L., Confrences, Gallimard (Folio essais), Paris, p. 172. Cest nous
qui souligons.
20
PR, p. [222]/357.
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Ronny Desmet
Philosophy has been misled by the example of mathematics [].
(PR 8)
And:
the method of philosophy has [] been vitiated by the
example of mathematics. The primary method of mathematics is
deduction: the primary method of philosophy is descriptive
generalization. Under the influence of mathematics, deduction
has been foisted onto philosophy as its standard method, instead
of taking its true place as an essential auxiliary mode of
verification whereby to test the scope of generalities. (PR 10)
The confrontation of the Bradley quotes with the Whitehead quotes reopens
the question: Can Whiteheads speculative philosophy be considered as a
generalized mathematics? And yet, I agree with Bradley that the answer to
this question is Yes. In this paper I argue that what Bradley writes only
apparently contradicts the passages in Whiteheads writings he refers to, and
hence, that the yes-answer is indeed justified.
For Whitehead speculative philosophy is a voyage towards the larger
generalities. (PR 10) More specifically: Speculative philosophy is the
endeavour to frame a [] system of general ideas in terms of which every
element of our experience can be interpreted. (PR 3) So the first question
Whitehead has to address reads: What road leads to these larger
generalities? Whitehead makes clear that the answer to this question is not
offered by the method of pinning down thought to the strict systematisation
of detailed [] observation. (PR 4) In fact, he thinks that this method of
rigid empiricism collapses whenever we seek the larger generalities (PR 45), and he gives the example of natural science: In natural science this rigid
method is the Baconian method of induction, a method which, if consistently
pursued, would have left science where it found it. (PR 6) What Bacon
omitted, according to Whitehead, was the play of a free imagination,
controlled by the requirements of coherence and logic. (PR 6) Thus
Whitehead proposes an alternative method of discovery, both for natural
science, and for speculative philosophy: The true method of discovery is like
the flight of an aeroplane. It starts from the ground of particular observation;
it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization; and it again
lands for a renewed observation rendered acute by rational interpretation.
(PR 6)
One might write a book on this famous Whitehead aphorism, but I limit
myself to three aspects. In a first section (1) I focus on the starting point of
the Whiteheadian method; in a second one (2) I look at the conditions for its
success; and in a third section (3) I compare Whiteheads method of
imaginative generalization with the method of mathematics. While discussing
these three aspects, the apparent Bradley-Whitehead contradiction vanishes,
39
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Ronny Desmet
exhaust his definition of creativity. Whitehead adds: The many become one,
and are increased by one. (PR 21) In order to account for the complete
principle of creativity, Bradley utilizes an additional mathematical notion, the
notion of iterative series. In mathematics, an iterative process might be
described as composed of multiple series of successive functions or
operations, each of which takes the output of its predecessors as its input. In
Whiteheads speculative philosophy, the creative process might be described
as composed of multiple series of successive instances of creativity, in each of
which the many predecessors become one actual occasion that
consequentlyis added to the many that form the domains of subsequent
many-to-one syntheses. Given this additional step, we can understand that
Bradleys speculative generalisation of the function takes Whiteheads actual
occasions to be generalized functions or many-to-one mappings, and that he
takes Whiteheads creativity to be the ultimate generalization of iterative
series, in which occasions switch roles from being a successor mapping, or
synthetic subject, to being the predecessor, object, or basis [] of a
consequent successor mapping. (p. 265)
In the same paper Bradley also gives the following comment: The concept
of series of occasions can [] be regarded as an ontological generalization
and constructivist reinterpretation of the [] theory of numbers as serial
relations, for it installs serial relationality as an intrinsic feature of the nature
of things []. (pp. 264-265) In the other Bradley paper that I quoted in my
introductionWhitehead and the analysis of the propositional function
this comment is enlarged, and reads (p. 146):
Although it has gone wholly unrecognized, Whiteheads
speculative metaphysics is a generalization of the modern
mathematical definition of natural numbers []. On this
account, [] each number is a serial relation or connective in
series with functional structure n+1, known as the successor
operator, and its relata are themselves relations or connectives
in series with that structure. Generalized by Whitehead [], the
successor operator constitutes the category of the ultimate,
which he terms Creativity; it defines the nature and relation of
occasions, which are the basic units of existence.
Moreover, in this context Bradley links Whitehead to other Cambridge
figures such as Ramsey and Wittgenstein, and he adds: like Ramsey in his
last writings and Wittgenstein after 1929, the position Whitehead develops
from the early 1920s onwards is predominantly constructivist and finitist in
character. (p. 145)
Unfortunately, I cannot elaborate on all the interesting perspectives Bradley
opens. Hence, I conclude this section with a brief evaluation of his main
claim.
41
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Ronny Desmet
43
44
Ronny Desmet
45
46
Ronny Desmet
The method of mathematics that set a bad example for philosophy is the
Euclidean method to indicate premises which are severally clear, distinct,
and certain; and to erect upon those premises a deductive system of thought.
(PR 8) It set a bad example for Descartes, and, more recently, for Russell.
Indeed, Russell was deeply impressed by the Euclidean presentation of
geometry, and whenin 1900he initiated his project to indicate logical
premises, and to deduce from those premises all existing mathematical
axioms and propositions, he aimed at clear, distinct, and certain premises.
Russell hoped sooner or later to arrive at a perfected mathematics which
should leave no room for doubts. (My Philosophical Development, George
Allen & Unwin, London, 1975 [1959], p. 28.) In the philosophy of
mathematics this project is often called the logicism project, and it resulted in
Russells The Principles of Mathematics (1903), and in Whitehead and
Russells Principia Mathematica (PM 3 vols., 19101913).
Actually, PM embodies the failure to fulfil Russells initial urge for clarity,
distinctness, andabove allcertainty. Referring to PM in Process and Reality
(1929), Whitehead writes: the statement of the ultimate logical principles is
beset with difficulties, as yet unsuperable. (PR 8) In fact, Whitehead and
Russells awareness of the failure to deduce from clear, distinct, and certain
logical principles, first arithmetic, and then the rest of mathematics, arose
prior to the publication of the first volume of PM. Hence, in the 1910 Preface
of PM Russells initial perspective is reversed. His initial hope of adding
certainty to mathematics by deducing it from self-evident logical principles is
replaced by the hope of justifying the logical principles by the fact that, no
matter how dubious they may seem, they do lead to the self-evident
arithmetical truths. Thats why, in the PM Preface, Whitehead and Russell
write:
The justification [] of any theory on the principles of
mathematics [] must lie in the fact that the theory in question
enables us to deduce ordinary mathematics. In mathematics, the
greatest degree of self-evidence is usually not to be found quite
at the beginning, but at some later point; hence the early
deductions, until they reach this point, give reasons rather for
believing the premises because true consequences follow from
them, than for believing the consequences because they follow
from the premises.
I will explain why I call the result of this reversal of perspective the
regressive method, but already want to draw attention to the fact that this
method is indeed similar to Whiteheads method of speculative philosophy.
The similarity is made evident by simply quoting Whiteheads Process and
Reality again: [] the accurate expression of the final generalities is the goal
of discussion and not its origin. [] The verification of a rationalist scheme is
47
to be sought in its general success, and not in the peculiar certainty, or initial
clarity, of its first principles. (PR 8)
The reason why I call this method the regressive method is provided by
The regressive method of discovering the premises of mathematics, a
lecture Russell gave at the Cambridge Mathematical Club on 9 March 1907.
This lecture shows that, even prior to 1907, Russell became aware that the
system of logiccompleted with extra-logical additions such as a theory of
types in order to prevent paradox, and an axiom of infinity in order to be able
to generate all possible natural numberswas subject to a greater degree of
doubt than the system of arithmetic it intended to secure. In other words, by
1907, Russell knew that the PM project would not lead to an increase of
mathematical certainty, but was itself in need of justification. A first quote
shows where the above PM quote came from:
In mathematics, except in the earliest parts, the propositions
from which a given proposition is deduced generally give reason
why we believe the given proposition. But in dealing with the
principles of mathematics, this relation is reversed. [] Hence
we tend to believe the premises because we can see that their
consequences are true, instead of believing the consequences
because we know the premises to be true. (Essays in Analysis,
George Allen & Unwin, London, 1973, pp. 273-4.)
But Russell does not stop at this remark. He makes clear that the method to
use when dealing with the principles of mathematics, is similar to the overall
method of natural science. Hence Russell adds:
But the inferring of premises from consequences [] is
substantially the same as the method of discovering general laws
in any other science. In every science, we start with a body of
propositions of which we feel fairly sure. These are our empirical
premises, commonly called the facts, which are generally got by
observation. [] The general laws of a science are [] such that
the empirical premises, or some of them, can be deduced from
these laws.
[] it follows that the usual mathematical method of laying
down certain premises and proceeding to deduce their
consequences, though it is the right method of exposition, does
not, except in the more advanced portions, give the order of
knowledge. [] The various sciences are distinguished by their
subject-matter, but as regards method, they seem to differ only
in the propositions between the three parts of which every
science consists, namely (1) the registration of facts, which are
what I have called empirical premises; (2) the inductive
48
Ronny Desmet
discovery of hypotheses, or logical premises, to fit the facts; (3)
the deduction of new propositions from the facts and
hypotheses. (pp. 274 & 282)
This quote makes obvious that Russells regressive method of discovering the
logical premises of mathematics is similar to Whiteheads method of
discovering the larger generalities of speculative philosophy. In fact, there is a
one-one correspondence between the three parts of Russells method and the
three parts of Whiteheads method. This correspondence is at once clear upon
rereading Whiteheads famous aphorism: The true method of discovery is
like the flight of an aeroplane. [1] It starts from the ground of particular
observation; [2] it makes a flight in the thin air of imaginative generalization;
and [3] it again lands for renewed observation rendered acute by rational
interpretation. (PR 5)
By quoting Russells The regressive method of discovering logical
premises, I have strengthened the claim that the method of pure
mathematics is similar, not only to all other sciences, including applied
mathematics or mathematical physics, but also to Whiteheads speculative
philosophy. Hence, I have resolved the issue that Whitehead warns us not to
take the method of mathematics as an example to determine a method for
speculative philosophy, and, at the same time, invokes the history of
mathematics to illustrate his own method of speculative philosophy.
Whitehead clearly warns us against the Euclidean method of mathematics,
the method that initially seduced certainty-seeker Russell, but was ultimately
considered by him to be a method of mathematical exposition, rather than a
method of mathematical discovery. But, of course, Whitehead does not warn
us against Russells regressive method which, according to Russell, is suitable
for both mathematics and science. The reason is clear: this method is
indistinguishable from Whiteheads method of imaginative generalization
which, according to Whitehead is suitable for both science and speculative
philosophy.
As a second generation Maxwellian, Whitehead was aware that no Baconian
induction and no Euclidean deduction can ever account for the successful
application of mathematical theories (e.g. vector calculus) in the domain of
physics (e.g. electromagnetism). And, as Russells former collaborator and coauthor of PM, he was aware that even the path which led to PM, the path of
discovery of the principles of mathematics, is not Euclidean. No wonder that
he arrived at a method of discovery that is neither Baconian, nor Euclidean,
butabove allcharacterized by the imaginative generalization that lacks in
the empiricist and rationalist alternatives of induction and deduction. Given
Russells 1907 lecture, one might call Whiteheads method, the regressive
method, but an even better name, the method of retroduction, is coined
by Murray Code in Order and Organism. Steps to a Whiteheadian Philosophy
of Mathematics and the Natural Sciences (SUNY, Albany, 1985, p. 29). I think
49
this is an appropriate name for the Whiteheadian mixture of imaginationliberating induction, and observation-focussing deduction, a mixture in which
there is no certainty running bottom-up, but possibility of falsification running
top-down.
To clarify the notion of top-down falsificationwhich leads Code to
compare Whiteheads method with Lakatos quasi-empiricismI quote from
the applied mathematics part of Whiteheads contribution on Mathematics
for the eleventh edition of the Encyclopaedia Britannica (19101911):
In applied mathematics the deductions are given in the
shape of the experimental evidence of natural science, and the
hypotheses from which the deductions can be deduced are
sought. Accordingly, every treatise on applied mathematics,
properly so-called, is directed to the criticism of the laws from
which the reasoning starts, or to a suggestion of results which
experiment may hope to find. Thus if it calculates the results of
some experiment, it is not the experimentalists well-attested
results which are on their trial, but the basis of the calculation.
Newtons Hypotheses non fingo was a proud boast, but it rest
upon an entire misconception of the mind of man in dealing
with external nature. (ESP 282)
The last sentence of this quote nicely expresses Whiteheads firm belief in the
importance of imagination and lack of dogmatism. Imagination is needed,
since it is essential for the discovery of the principles of mathematics, natural
science, and speculative philosophy. And lack of dogmatism is required, since
none of the principles arrived at by our flight in the thin air of imaginative
generalization, are beyond refutationmere hypotheses, thats what they
are.
Notes
1
In: George W. Shields (ed.), Process and Analysis, SUNY, Albany, 2003, p.
145.
Whitehead et Leibniz
Xavier Verley1
Whitehead mentionne Leibniz comme il mentionne Spinoza non pas parce
quil en a une connaissance approfondie mais parce quil prouve le besoin de
confronter sa pense avec la tradition philosophique. Cest ainsi quil voque
Platon, Aristote, Descartes, Kant ou Hume. Mais le rapport Leibniz apparat
plus important mme sil en parle peu. Tous deux tentent daccorder une
vision mtaphysique et mathmatique du monde fonde sur une dynamique.
Tous deux sopposent au dualisme du corps et de lesprit, de laction et de la
passion, du fini et de linfini. Tous deux reconnaissent la ncessit daccorder
lordre de la causalit efficiente celui de la finalit. Enfin tous deux rejettent
la thorie abstraite de la matire rduite la substance tendue. Bien que
Whitehead nadhre pas lide dun Dieu sage et infini crant le monde le
meilleur partir dune mathmatique divine, il est proche de la thorie des
monades.
Leur mtaphysique repose sur un holisme qui vise plus runir qu
diviser ; lunit ne dpend pas dun principe mais dune convergence qui
conduit lincomplet se complter. Whitehead, comme Thophile dans les
Nouveaux Essais, saccorderait avec Leibniz quand ce dernier crit :
Cependant le fond est partout le mme, qui est une maxime fondamentale
chez moi et qui rgne dans toute ma philosophie. Et je ne conois les choses
inconnues ou confusment connues que de la manire de celles qui nous sont
distinctement connues ; ce qui rend la philosophie bien aise, et je crois
mme quil en faut user ainsi. Mais si cette philosophie est la plus simple dans
le fond, elle est aussi la plus riche dans les manires, parce que la nature les
peut faire varier linfini, comme elle le fait aussi avec autant dabondance,
dordre et dornements quil est possible de se figurer2. Rien nempche de
penser que ce fond commun consiste en une transformation en profondeur
des monades tout comme Whitehead suppose un procs des entits en
devenir.
Whitehead et Leibniz se sont inspirs de leurs recherches mathmatiques
pour comprendre la nature autrement que comme un automate dirig par son
crateur. Tous deux critiquent le mcanisme au nom dune conception
abstraite de la matire rduite une substance sans force et sans vie : rduite
une substance tendue, la matire, la nature et le monde sont abandonns
linertie. Mme Newton, qui a montr le rle essentiel de la dynamique dans
la cosmologie, reste prisonnier dune conception de la matire rduite des
fragments qui s'associent sans raison dans l'espace et le temps ce qui fait de
l'ordre une ncessit externe dont Dieu doit tre la raison. La nature ne peut
alors subsister que par un miracle permanent. S'il n'y a pas de relations
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Xavier Verley
internes entre les parties, il faut introduire une dimension surnaturelle qui
rend problmatique la vritable mtaphysique.
Whitehead et Leibniz
53
gnration reste hors de toute gense puisque le temps est rduit linstant :
Le temps nest pas autre chose que la grandeur du mouvement. Et puisque
toute grandeur est un nombre de parties, quoi dtonnant si Aristote a dfini
le temps comme le nombre du mouvement5. Pour identifier la matire
l'espace, le mcanisme rduit le mouvement des lments simples, savoir
des positions et des instants spars les uns des autres.
Leibniz verra rapidement que le mcanisme gomtrique auquel il adhrait
dans ses premiers travaux reste une thorie abstraite. La thorie du
mouvement devra intgrer une partie concrte une partie abstraite. Il pense
quAristote est moins tranger quon ne le dit aux nouvelles donnes de la
philosophie des modernes. Le couple acte / puissance permet de mieux
comprendre le rapport entre la continuit de ltendue et la continuit de la
matire : Le continu est divisible linfini. Ce qui dans la ligne droite
notamment rsulte de ce quune partie de la ligne est semblable au tout. Cest
pourquoi puisque le tout peut tre divis, la partie aussi pourrait ltre,
semblablement nimporte quelle partie de cette partie. Les points ne sont pas
des parties du continu, mais des extrmits, et il ny a pas plus de parties
minimum de la ligne que de fractions minimum de lUnit6. La matire ne
peut tre conue comme compose dindivisibles tels que les points. Les
positions des corps nont quun caractre relatif : ce ne sont que des
modalits des choses peu diffrentes de lantriorit et de la postriorit. Le
point mathmatique devient alors une entit abstraite que le mcanisme
spare de son rapport aux points voisins qui le prcdent ou le suivent :
Pour un point avoir une position nest rien dautre que la possibilit de
dterminer une position o un corps se termine7. Le point nest donc plus
une entit indivisible mais une partie de lespace et du corps qui loccupe.
Aussi on ne peut parler de partie minimum ou maximum.
De cette critique absolue de lespace qui associe la position un point
rsulte une conception nouvelle de la nature. La figure ne suffit plus
dterminer la forme du corps tendu car elle nest jamais exacte en raison de
la division actuelle linfini des lments de matire : Il ny a jamais ni globe
sans ingalits, ni droite sans courbures entremles, ni courbe dune certaine
nature, sans mlange quelquautre, et cela dans les petites parties comme
dans les grandes, ce qui fait que la figure, bien loin dtre constitutive des
corps, nest pas seulement une qualit entirement relle et dtermine hors
de la pense, et on ne pourra jamais assigner quelque corps une certaine
surface prcise, comme on pourrait faire sil y avait des atomes8. Dans la
distinction entre puissance et actualit dans le continu, Leibniz admet quil y a
dans ltendue comme dans la matire du dtermin et de lindtermin, du
fini et de linfini. Ainsi la nature qui implique la fois ltendue, la matire et
le mouvement ne pourra plus tre conue comme le simple rapport dune
forme dterminante une matire passive, prte recevoir la forme, mais
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Xavier Verley
comme relation entre des entits voisines aussi bien du point de vue du
temps que de lespace.
2. Gomtries et matire
Whitehead voit aussi dans ltendue un principe dexplication primordial des
entits perues mais il ne la rduit pas une substance. Comme Leibniz il
carte toute ide despace absolu (Newton) et ne conoit lespace que comme
ensemble de relations inhrentes aux entits quil inclut. Ses premiers travaux
mathmatiques, inspirs de la pense de Grassmann, ne considrent pas
lespace dans son rapport la perception des choses mais comme une
structure trs abstraite qui doit rendre possible la description physique et
psychologique de ce qui est peru. Quand il pense ltendue, il nentend pas
un milieu ou contenant immobile, indiffrent son contenu : comme
Grassmann il associe lespace la continuit mais celle-ci sapplique aussi
bien ce qui est discret que continu. Ainsi lespace, construit partir des
multiplicits positionnelles dans le livre III de UA, implique un potentiel de
relations mathmatiques dont la description donne limage. Lobjectif de On
the Mathematical Concepts of the Material World (1906) est de rendre possible
une classification des concepts mathmatiques partir dune langue logique
pour dcrire le monde matriel : comme pour Leibniz il sagit de comprendre
le rapport de lespace comme forme aux objets tendus qui loccupent :
Lobjet de ce mmoire est damorcer une recherche mathmatique des
diffrentes manires possibles de concevoir la nature du monde matriel9. Si
on admet que certaines entits peuvent tre runies sous une structure dfinie
par des relations multiples, il sagit alors de chercher les axiomes
gomtriques pouvant satisfaire les relations des entits lintrieur de cette
structure.
Le problme est de comprendre le rapport de la gomtrie euclidienne,
descriptive ou projective, au contenu du monde matriel. Whitehead pose le
problme des rapports du gomtrique notre connaissance de la nature : la
description de ce qui se donne dans la perception ne peut tre spare de la
langue logique et des axiomes qui structurent ses noncs. Le point projectif
se dfinit comme un faisceau de lignes. Les concepts III, IV et V, trs gnraux
et abstraits, sappliquent toutes les entits de lespace-temps. Le mmoire
de 1906 a pour objectif la construction de ces concepts pour permettre une
description de lespace qui exclut la relation de paralllisme et inclut lide de
point linfini.
Il introduit les concepts dinterpoint et de dimension de lespace de manire
ce quon puisse dfinir le point en terme de ligne infiniment petite. Ces
concepts transforment la conception traditionnelle (ce qui n'a pas de partie)
reste indtermine. Le rapport du point la ligne et de la ligne l'espace
Whitehead et Leibniz
55
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Xavier Verley
Whitehead et Leibniz
57
58
Xavier Verley
Whitehead et Leibniz
59
Notes
1
Ainsi, une mme cit se prsente avec une autre physionomie, vue de son
centre et du haut dune tour (au pied de laquelle elle stale), ce qui
correspond son essence ; et vue lorsquon y accde du dehors, ce qui
correspond la perception des qualits dun corps ; laspect externe de la
cit varie lui-mme suivant quon laborde par lest ou louest, etc.. : mes
qualits ont de semblables variations suivant la varits des organes. Par
ces arguments il est facile de voir maintenant de voir que le mouvement
peut expliquer tous les changements. (LT, p. 12)
LT, p. 18.
10
11
Si l'espace est une ralit absolue, bien loin d'tre une proprit ou
accidentalit oppose la substance, il sera plus subsistant que les
substances, Dieu ne le saurait dtruire ny mme le changer en rien. Il est
non seulement immense dans le tout, mais encore immuable et ternel en
chaque partie, il y aura une infinit de choses ternelles hors de Dieu. Dire
que l'espace infini est sans partie, c'est dire que les espaces finis ne le
composent point, et que l'espace infini pourrait subsister, quand tous les
espaces finis seroient rduits rien. Ce seroit comme si l'on disoit dans la
supposition cartsienne d'un univers corporel, tendu sans bornes, que cet
univers pourrait subsister quand tous les corps qui le composent, seroient
rduits rien. (Correspondance Leibniz-Clarke, prsents par A. Robinet,
PUF, 1957.)
MMW, p. 14