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Boston equity v CA

(jurisdiction over the person)

On 24 December 1997, petitioner filed a complaint for sum of money with a prayer for the issuance of a writ
of preliminary attachment against the spouses Manuel and Lolita Toledo. Herein respondent filed an Answer
dated 19 March 1998 but on 7 May 1998, she filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Amended Answer in which
she alleged, among others, that her husband and co-defendant, Manuel Toledo (Manuel), is already dead.
As a result, petitioner filed a motion, dated 5 August 1999, to require respondent to disclose the heirs of
Manuel. Petitioner then filed a Motion for Substitution, praying that Manuel be substituted by his children as
party-defendants. This motion was granted by the trial court in an Order dated 9 October 2000.


On 26 May 2004, the reception of evidence for herein respondent was cancelled upon agreement of the
parties. On 24 September 2004, counsel for herein respondent was given a period of fifteen days within
which to file a demurrer to evidence. However, on 7 October 2004, respondent instead filed a motion to
dismiss the complaint, citing the following as grounds: (1) **********; (2) that the trial court did not
acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel pursuant to Section 5, Rule 86 of the Revised Rules of Court;
(3) ******
The trial court, denied the motion to dismiss for having been filed out of time, citing Section 1, Rule 16 of
the 1997 Rules of Court which Aggrieved, respondent filed a petition to the Court of Appeals alleging that
the trial court seriously erred and gravely abused its discretion in denying her motion. CA granted the
W/N the RTC acquired jurisdiction over the dead (Manuel Toledo) person?
Ruling: No. Jurisdiction over the person of a defendant is acquired through a valid service of
summons; trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of Manuel Toledo.
Citing the case of Sarsaba:
The courts failure to acquire jurisdiction over ones person is a defense which is personal to
the person claiming it.Obviously, it is now impossible for Sereno to invoke the same in view of his
death.Neither can petitioner invoke such ground, on behalf of Sereno, so as to reap the benefit of
having the case dismissed against all of the defendants.

Boston equity v CA

Facts: ----- supra----Issue: W/N the Estate of Manuel Toledo is an indispensable party?
Rule 3, Section 7 of the 1997 Rules of Court states:
SEC. 7. Compulsory joinder of indispensable parties. Parties-in-interest without whom no final
determination can be had of an action shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants.

Applying the foregoing pronouncements to the case at bar, it is clear that the estate of Manuel is not an
indispensable party to the collection case, for the simple reason that the obligation of Manuel and his wife,
respondent herein, is solidary.

The contract between petitioner, on the one hand and respondent and respondents husband, on the other,

FOR VALUE RECEIVED, I/We jointly and severally46 (in solemn) promise to pay BOSTON EQUITY
RESOURCES, INC. x x x the sum of PESOS: [ONE MILLION FOUR HUNDRED (P1,400,000.00)] x x x
It is crystal clear that Article 1216 of the New Civil Code is the applicable provision in this

Heirs of Santiago Nisperos V Nisperos

When the spouses Santiago died, all the 9 siblings tilted the land of their parents.
Maria and Cipriana paid the taxes of the land since 1988 on behalf of their siblings.
All 9 siblings agreed that the taxes and papers of the land will be under their sister
Maria. Maria has an adopted daughter, Marissa, which was a minor when the land
was awarded to Marian in 1992. But because of turn of event, Maria named Marissa
as the beneficiary of the land even she still a minor. When the land was finally
transferred to Marias name, Marissa claimed that the 58t square meter property
belongs to her adoptive mother. The other siblings filed a case before the Regional
adjudicator board since the land contested is an agriculture land. The board
dismissed the contention of Marissa that shes the owner of the land since the land
was awarded to Maria while shes a minor. Marissa filed a petition to DARAB and
granted the petition under the contention that since the land is already transferred
to Maria without any problem, the heirs of Santiago is already barred to question
the title. Hence this petition reached the Supreme Court
W/N DARAB has a jurisdiction over the contested land
The complaint should have been lodged with the Office of the DAR Secretary and
not with the DARAB.
Thus, in Morta, Sr. v. Occidental, 24 this Court held that there must be a tenancy
relationship between the parties for the DARAB to have jurisdiction over a case. It is
essential to establish all of the following indispensable elements, to wit: (1) that the
parties are the landowner and the tenant or agricultural lessee; (2) that the subject
matter of the relationship is 23 Sutton v. Lim, G.R. No. 191660, December 3, 2012,
686 SCRA 745, 753. 24 367 Phil. 438 (1999). Decision 8 G.R. No. 189570 an
agricultural land; (3) that there is consent between the parties to the relationship;
(4) that the purpose of the relationship is to bring about agricultural production; (5)
that there is personal cultivation on the part of the tenant or agricultural lessee; and
(6) that the harvest is shared between the landowner and the tenant or agricultural
lessee. It is axiomatic that the jurisdiction of a tribunal, including a quasijudicial
officer or government agency, over the nature and subject matter of a petition or
complaint is determined by the material allegations therein and the character of the
relief prayed for, irrespective of whether the petitioner or complainant is entitled to
any or all such reliefs. Jurisdiction over the nature and subject matter of an action is

conferred by the Constitution and the law, and not by the consent or waiver of the
parties where the court otherwise would have no jurisdiction over the nature or
subject matter of the action. Nor can it be acquired through, or waived by, any act
or omission of the parties. Moreover, estoppel does not apply to confer jurisdiction
to a tribunal that has none over the cause of action. The failure of the parties to
challenge the jurisdiction of the DARAB does not prevent the court from addressing
the issue, especially where the DARABs lack of jurisdiction is apparent on the face
of the complaint or petition.