DECISIONS OF PRINCIPLE

4.1.2 It sometimes seems to be implied by writers on ethics that it is immoral, on

certain sorts of occasion, to consider the effects of doing something. We ought, it
is said, to do our duty no matter what the effects of doing it. As I am using the
word 'effects', this cannot be maintained. I am not making a claim for
'expediency' (in the bad sense) as against 'duty'. Even to do our duty -- in so far
as it is doing something -- is effecting certain changes in the total situation. It is
quite true that, of tthe changes that it is possible to effect in the total situation,
most people would agree that we ought to consider certain kinds more relevant
than others (which than which, it is the purpose of moral principles to tell us). I
do not think that the immediacy or remoteness of the effects makes any
difference, though their certainty or uncertainty does. The reason why it is
considered immoral to fail to right an injustice whose effects will maximize
pleasure, is not that in such a choice the effects are considered when they should
not have been; it is that certain of the effects -- namely, the maximization of
pleasure -- are given a relevance which they should not have, in view of the prior
claim of those other effects which would have consisted in the righting of the
injustice.
For reasons which will become apparent when we have examined the logic of
value-words, it is most important, in a verbal exposition of an argument about
what to do, not to allow value-words in the minor premiss. In setting out the
facts of the case, we should be as factual as we can. Those versed in the logic of
these words, and therefore forewarned against its pitfalls, may in the interests of
brevity neglect this precaution; but for the inexperienced it is very much better to
keep value-expressions where they belong, in the major premiss. This will
prevent the inadvertent admission of an ambiguous middle term, as in the
example in 3.3 sub fine. I do not mean that in discussing the facts of the case we
should not admit any words which could possibly have an evaluative meaning;
for this, in view of the way in which evaluative meaning pervades our language,
would be well-nigh impossible. I only mean that we must be sure that, as we are
using the words in the minor premiss, there are definite tests (not themselves
involving evaluation) for ascertaining its truth or falsity. In the last paragraph I
was using the word 'pleasure' in such a sense, though it is not always so used.