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People vs.

Shirley Casio
Applicable SPL: RA 9208 Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003
DOCTRINE: As defined under Section 3(a) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9208, trafficking in persons
can still be committed even if the victim gives consent.
FACTS: Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of Republic Act No. 9208,
Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a). The said accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to
gain, did then and there hire and/or recruit AAA, a minor, 17 years old and BBB for the purpose
of prostitution and sexual exploitation, by acting as their procurer for different customers, for
money, profit or any other consideration. On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM), a
non-governmental organization, coordinated with the police in order to entrap persons engaged
in human trafficking in Cebu City. IJM provided them with marked money, which was recorded in
the police blotter.
The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and 25. Room 24 was designated
for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of the police team. AAA was then met by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development personnel who informed her that she was
rescued and not arrested. AAA described that her job as a prostitute required her to display
herself, along with other girls and receives P400.00 for every customer who selected her.
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City found accused guilty beyond reasonable
doubt and held that the accused had consummated the act of trafficking of person[s] . . . as
defined under paragraph (a), Section 3 of R.A. 9208 for the purpose of letting her engage in
prostitution as defined under paragraph [c] of the same Section; the act of sexual intercourse
need not have been consummated for the mere transaction i.e. the solicitation for sex and the
handing over of the bust money of Php1,000.00 already consummated the said act.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the fine and awarded
moral damages
Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she was instigated into committing
the crime.46 The police did not conduct prior surveillance and did not even know who their
subject was.47Neither did the police know the identities of the alleged victims.
Accused further argues that AAA admitted that she worked as a prostitute. Thus, it was her
decision to display herself to solicit customers
ISSUE: Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in persons, considering that AAA
admitted that she works as a prostitute.


RATIO: Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be trafficked, we affirm the
text and spirit of our laws. Minors should spend their adolescence moulding their character in
environments free of the vilest motives and the worse of other human beings. The evidence and
the law compel us to affirm the conviction of accused in this case. For liability under our law, this
argument is irrelevant. As defined under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in
persons can still be committed even if the victim gives consent.


Crime/Violation: SPL: violation of RA 3019
Presidential Proclamation No. 168 was issued by then President Diosdado Macapagal which
provides, among others, that: do hereby withdraw from sale or settlement and reserve for
recreational and health resort site purposes, under the administration of the municipality of
General Santos, a certain parcel of land of the public domain situated in the said municipality.
The property was thereafter subdivided into three lots. Former President Ferdinand E.
Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2273 amending Proclamation No. 168 which excludes
the two of the three lots from coverage of PD 168. Only Lot X was covered by
Presidential Proclamation No. 168 and is therefore reserved for recreational and health
resort site purposes.
As a result of such exclusion, the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop applied for Free Patent with the District
Land Office and consequently Certificates of Title were issued sometime in 1983.
two cases were filed by the local government of General Santos City against the said Heirs of
Kusop for Declaration of Nullity of Titles and, on the other hand, the Heirs of Kusop filed a case
against the said local government for Injunction and Damages
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of General Santos City passed Resolution No. 87, Series of 1991,
entitled Resolution Approving the Compromise Agreement to be entered into by and between
the City Government of General Santos represented by the City Mayor and the Heirs of Cabalo
Kusop, re: Magsaysay Park
Said Compromise Agreement was signed by respondent City Mayor Rosalita Nuez, assisted by
respondent Pepito Nalangan III, and the heirs and beneficiaries of Cabalo Kusop.
on July 22, 1997, respondent Judge Abednego Adre issued an Order

The movants heirs of Kusop are, however, enjoined to donate to the City of
General Santos in keeping with the intent and spirit of the compromise
On July 23, 1997, the private respondents applied for Miscellaneous Sales Patent over portions
of Lot X, to be divided. Lot X was subdivided into 16 lots.
On August 2, 1997, respondent City Mayor Rosalita T. Nuez issued 1st Indorsements (refer to
application documents, Record, pp. 421-500) addressed to CENRO, DENR , stated therein
that this office interposes no objection to whatever legal proceedings your office may pursue on
application covering portions thereof after the Regional Trial Court, General Santos City, Branch
22 excluded Lot X, MR-1160-D from the coverage of the Compromise Judgment dated May 6,
1992 per said courts order dated July 22, 1997.
on August 4, 1997, respondent Cesar Jonillo prepared a letter-report addressed to the Regional
Executive Director of DENR for each of the sixteen (16) applicants recommending for the
private sale of the subject lots to the above-named applicants-respondents,
A notice of sale was issued by respondent Julio Diaz also on the same date stating therein that
on September 5, 1997 the subject lot/s will be sold
the registered owners of lot numbers X-6 and X-7 executed a Deed of Exchange with AFPRSBS, represented by respondent Jose Ramiscal, Jr., consenting to the exchange of lots
While lots X-15 and X-16 were exchanged with one office unit or condo unit to be given or
ceded to respondent Nilo Flaviano
As a result, petitioner together with Cesar Jonillo, et al filed a verified complaint-affidavit before
the Ombudsman against the respondents for violation of Paragraphs (e), (g) and (j), Section 3
of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended, and for malversation of public funds or property
through falsification of public documents.
the Ombudsman held that Mayor Nuez and Nalangan, among others, entered into the
Compromise Agreement on behalf of the city and pursuant to the authority granted to them by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod by virtue of Resolution No. 87; hence, it is not the sole
responsibility of Mayor Nuez and Nalangan but of the entire Sangguniang Panlungsod.
The Ombudsman also ruled that the Order of Judge Adre was made in accordance with the
facts of the case, while Diaz, Borinaga, Momongan and Cruzabra were found to have regularly
performed their official functions.
Petitioner contention: Petitioner avers that the Ombudsman ignored substantial evidence
pointing to the existence of a conspiracy among all the respondents and those indicted, which
led to the illegal and fraudulent disposition of Lot X of the Magsaysay Park.
Respondent contention: Cruzabra avers that there is no showing that conspiracy exists between
her and other respondents charged before the Ombudsman.

Such allegations did not discuss how the alleged conspiracy was committed; they are merely
conjectures and bare allegations.
Mayor Nuez and Nalangan contend that Mayor Nuez did not violate the Charter of the City,
because when she entered into the Compromise Agreement with the Heirs of Cabalo Kusop,
she was authorized by the Sangguniang Panlungsod under Resolution No. 87, series of 1991,
after almost one (1) year of committee and public hearings
Issue: WON private respondents violated RA 3019?
Held: The instant Petition lacks merit.
The Ombudsman ruled that the Order of Judge Adre was made in accordance with the facts of
the case, while Diaz, Borinaga, Momongan and Cruzabra were found to have regularly
performed their official functions.
We concur with the disquisition of GIO I Rubillar-Arao in dismissing the charges against
respondents, as approved by Ombudsman Desierto
while the Ombudsman's discretion in determining the existence of probable cause is not
absolute, nonetheless, petitioner must prove that such discretion was gravely abused in order to
warrant the reversal of the Ombudsman's findings by this Court. In this respect, petitioner fails
Laws applied
the elements of the offense, essential for the conviction of an accused under Section 3(e), R. A.
No. 3019, are as follows:
The accused is a public officer or a private person charged in
conspiracy with the former;
The said public officer commits the prohibited acts during the
performance of his or her official duties, or in relation to his or her public
That he or she causes undue injury to any party, whether the
government or a private party;
Such undue injury is caused by giving unwarranted benefits, advantage
or preference to such parties; and
That the public officer has acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable neglect.
Thus, in order to be held guilty of violating Section 3(e), R. A. No. 3019, the act of the accused
that caused undue injury must have been done with evident bad faith or with gross
inexcusable negligence. Bad faith per se is not enough for one to be held liable under the
law; bad faith must be evident.
as found by the Ombudsman, such conspiracy alleged in the complaint was not supported by
ample evidence. At best, the evidence adduced was not clear as to respondents' participation in
the acts in question

All told, the Ombudsman did not act with grave abuse of discretion in dismissing the criminal
complaint against respondents. the petition is DISMISSED
G.R. No. 157870 November 3, 2008
The three petitions before the court seek the constitutionality of Section 36 of Republic Act No.
(RA) 9165, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, insofar as it
requires mandatory drug testing of candidates for public office, students of secondary and
tertiary schools, officers and employees of public and private offices, and persons charged
before the prosecutors office with certain offenses.
Petitioner Aquilino Q. Pimentel, Jr., a senator of the Republic and a candidate for re-election in
the May 10, 2004 elections,[1] filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition under Rule 65. In it,
he seeks (1) to nullify Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 dated
December 23, 2003 for being unconstitutional in that they impose a qualification for candidates
for senators in addition to those already provided for in the 1987 Constitution; and (2) to enjoin
the COMELEC from implementing Resolution No. 6486. According to Pimentel, the Constitution
only prescribes a maximum of five (5) qualifications for one to be a candidate for, elected to, and
be a member of the Senate. He says that both the Congress and COMELEC, by requiring, via
RA 9165 and Resolution No. 6486, a senatorial aspirant, among other candidates, to undergo a
mandatory drug test, create an additional qualification that all candidates for senator must first
be certified as drug free. He adds that there is no provision in the Constitution authorizing the
Congress or COMELEC to expand the qualification requirements of candidates for senator.
Meanwhile, Social Justice Society (SJS) seeks to prohibit the Dangerous Drugs Board (DDB)
and the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) from enforcing paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and
(g) of Sec. 36 of RA 9165 on the ground that they are constitutionally infirm. For one, the
provisions constitute undue delegation of legislative power when they give unbridled discretion
to schools and employers to determine the manner of drug testing.
Petitioner Atty. Manuel J. Laserna, Jr., as citizen and taxpayer, also Sec. 36(c), (d), (f), and (g)
of RA 9165 be struck down as unconstitutional for infringing on the constitutional right to privacy,
the right against unreasonable search and seizure, and the right against self-incrimination, and
for being contrary to the due process and equal protection guarantees.
(1) Do Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 and COMELEC Resolution No. 6486 impose an additional
qualification for candidates for senator? Corollarily, can Congress enact a law prescribing
qualifications for candidates for senator in addition to those laid down by the Constitution? and

(2) Are paragraphs (c), (d), (f), and (g) of Sec. 36, RA 9165 unconstitutional? Specifically, do
these paragraphs violate the right to privacy, the right against unreasonable searches and
seizure, and the equal protection clause? Or do they constitute undue delegation of legislative
The Congress cannot validly amend or otherwise modify the qualification standards for public
official as provided for in the Constitution, as it cannot disregard, evade, or weaken the force of
a constitutional mandate, or alter or enlarge the Constitution.
Pimentels contention is well-taken. Accordingly, Sec. 36(g) of RA 9165 should be, as it is hereby
declared as, unconstitutional. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm
of the Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic
law to which all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution. In
the discharge of their defined functions, the three departments of government have no choice
but to yield obedience to the commands of the Constitution. Whatever limits it imposes must be
In the same vein, the COMELEC cannot, in the guise of enforcing and administering election
laws or
promulgating rules and regulations to implement Sec. 36(g), validly impose
qualifications on candidates for senator in addition to what the Constitution prescribes. If
Congress cannot require a candidate for senator to meet such additional qualification, the
COMELEC, to be sure, is also without such power. The right of a citizen in the democratic
process of election should not be defeated by unwarranted impositions of requirement not
otherwise specified in the Constitution.
The Court can take judicial notice of the proliferation of prohibited drugs in the country that
threatens the well-being of the people, particularly the youth and school children who usually
end up as victims. Accordingly, and until a more effective method is conceptualized and put in
motion, a random drug testing of students in secondary and tertiary schools is not only
acceptable but may even be necessary if the safety and interest of the student population,
doubtless a legitimate concern of the government, are to be promoted and protected.
Just as in the case of secondary and tertiary level students, the mandatory but random drug test
prescribed by Sec. 36 of RA 9165 for officers and employees of public and private offices is
justifiable, albeit not exactly for the same reason. The Court notes in this regard that petitioner
SJS, other than saying that subjecting almost everybody to drug testing, without probable
cause, is unreasonable, an unwarranted intrusion of the individual right to privacy, [23] has failed
to show how the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing under Sec. 36(c) and (d) of
RA 9165 violates the right to privacy and constitutes unlawful and/or unconsented search under
Art. III, Secs. 1 and 2 of the Constitution.[24] Petitioner Lasernas lament is just as simplistic,
sweeping, and gratuitous and does not merit serious consideration.

The random drug testing shall be undertaken under conditions calculated to protect as much as
possible the employees privacy and dignity. As to the mechanics of the test, the law specifies
that the procedure shall employ two testing methods, i.e., the screening test and the
confirmatory test, doubtless to ensure as much as possible the trustworthiness of the results.
But the more important consideration lies in the fact that the test shall be conducted by trained
professionals in access-controlled laboratories monitored by the Department of Health (DOH) to
safeguard against results tampering and to ensure an accurate chain of custody. In addition, the
IRR issued by the DOH provides that access to the drug results shall be on the need to know
basis; that the drug test result and the records shall be [kept] confidential subject to the usual
accepted practices to protect the confidentiality of the test results. Notably, RA 9165 does not
oblige the employer concerned to report to the prosecuting agencies any information or
evidence relating to the violation of the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act received as a
result of the operation of the drug testing. All told, therefore, the intrusion into the employees
privacy, under RA 9165, is accompanied by proper safeguards, particularly against
embarrassing leakages of test results, and is relatively minimal.
To reiterate, RA 9165 was enacted as a measure to stamp out illegal drug in the country and
thus protect the well-being of the citizens, especially the youth, from the deleterious effects of
dangerous drugs. The law intends to achieve this through the medium, among others, of
promoting and resolutely pursuing a national drug abuse policy in the workplace via a
mandatory random drug test. To the Court, the need for drug testing to at least minimize illegal
drug use is substantial enough to override the individuals privacy interest under the premises
Like their counterparts in the private sector, government officials and employees also labor
under reasonable supervision and restrictions imposed by the Civil Service law and other laws
on public officers, all enacted to promote a high standard of ethics in the public service. [37] And if
RA 9165 passes the norm of reasonableness for private employees, the more reason that it
should pass the test for civil servants, who, by constitutional command, are required to be
accountable at all times to the people and to serve them with utmost responsibility and
Unlike the situation covered by Sec. 36(c) and (d) of RA 9165, the Court finds no valid
justification for mandatory drug testing for persons accused of crimes. In the case of students,
the constitutional viability of the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing for students
emanates primarily from the waiver by the students of their right to privacy when they seek entry
to the school, and from their voluntarily submitting their persons to the parental authority of
school authorities. In the case of private and public employees, the constitutional soundness of
the mandatory, random, and suspicionless drug testing proceeds from the reasonableness of
the drug test policy and requirement.
We find the situation entirely different in the case of persons charged before the public
prosecutors office with criminal offenses punishable with six (6) years and one (1) day
imprisonment. The operative concepts in the mandatory drug testing are randomness and
suspicionless. In the case of persons charged with a crime before the prosecutors office, a
mandatory drug testing can never be random or suspicionless. The ideas of randomness and
being suspicionless are antithetical to their being made defendants in a criminal complaint. They

are not randomly picked; neither are they beyond suspicion. When persons suspected of
committing a crime are charged, they are singled out and are impleaded against their will. The
persons thus charged, by the bare fact of being haled before the prosecutors office and
peaceably submitting themselves to drug testing, if that be the case, do not necessarily consent
to the procedure, let alone waive their right to privacy. [40] To impose mandatory drug testing on
the accused is a blatant attempt to harness a medical test as a tool for criminal prosecution,
contrary to the stated objectives of RA 9165. Drug testing in this case would violate a persons
right to privacy guaranteed under Sec. 2, Art. III of the Constitution. Worse still, the accused
persons are veritably forced to incriminate themselves.