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WAR FINANCE AND THE “MONETARY CIRCUIT” IN ITALY, 1935-1943 A QUANTITATIVE EVALUATION
Giuseppe Della Torre Department of Political Economy University of Siena, Italy firstname.lastname@example.org
Graphs and Tables: see Italian draft
2 Summary: 1. which focused on the traditional division into funded and floating Treasury debt. Preliminary conclusions Methodological appendix and statistical tables References Abstract The characteristics and functional character of the “monetary or “capital” circuit” that played such a significant part in economic politics between the invasion of Ethiopia and the end of the fascist era have been given a great deal of space in the literature of the last decade. Analysis 3. the structure being later modified with the “indirect” circuit (market – banks Bank of Italy –Treasury). but does not permit identification of the circuits connecting the private sector to the Treasury and the Treasury’s monetary base. This interpretation is based on insufficient empirical analysis. Jel classification: E6.2 Placement of the Treasury Debt 4.Treasury) worked very well until 1942-43. H5.2 Franco Spinelli and Michele Fratianni. 1991 3.0 The dynamics of the Treasury debt. Zamagni. Salvemini and V. The evolution of the Treasury debt and some empirical studies on the “monetary circuit” 2.1 Marcello Mancini. This analysis better qualifies the historical stages of the “breakdown” (1940 rather than 1943) and the characteristics of the “monetary circuit” (which from the very outset were on an “indirect” basis). 1930-1943 2. The following quantitative analysis is based on actual distribution of Italian debt in credit sectors as well as on the debt series recently produced by G.1 The division into funded and floating Treasury debt 3. N4 2 . Introduction and contents 2. The Appendix contains a few considerations on the information available and which information has effectively been used. Most literature maintains that the “direct” circuit (market . with some integrations by the Author (not produced here). 1948 2.
Gianni Toniolo. 3 . Salvemini and V. The functioning of the direct circuit “market -Treasury” implies that the initial creation of monetary base by Bank of Italy should be reabsorbed by the Treasury through fiscal revenue and the issue of bonds for sale to the public. p. G. we would like to mention Confalonieri and Gatti 1986. and as a technical instrument to finance the war. Spinelli and Fratianni 1991. Gelsomino 1992. but these usually exceed the value of savings too. Asso 2000. For this reason it is necessary either to monetize public property or to issue currency. V. pp. it is necessary to recover – through loans and taxation – the expenditure exceeding normal revenue. which represented an important part of economic policy between the 1935 invasion of Ethiopia and the fall of the Fascism in 1943. Zamagni 1998.3 1 Introduction and contents1 The question of the characteristics and functioning of the “monetary circuit”. as an initial starter to the direct “monetary circuit”. In defining the quantitative information. On the other hand. Once this circuit is started. Mario Tonveronachi. and Vera Zamagni. Zamagni 1993b. which might otherwise be conveyed to the Treasury” (Thaon di Revel 1942. and Della Torre 2000b studies. Della Torre 2000a added their contributions to the works of Mancini 1948. De Cecco and Toniolo 2000. Subsequently we were fortunate and gratified to receive some useful comments on this first draft from a number of colleagues we would like to thank here: Leandro Conte. Zamagni 1993a. starting from the 1942 definition given by Thaon di Revel.2 Firstly. If the deficit in public expenditure can be translated into growth of the stock of Treasury bonds in the hands of the public. Toniolo and Ganugi 1992. then the “closing” of the circuit is perfect. As to the history of the economic thought we would like to refer to Pavanelli’s 1993 paper and to the Gattei and Dondi 1990 and Gattei 1995 anthologies. has recently been given some not insignificant consideration. the concept of “monetary circuit” in its “direct” and “indirect” forms. 401). if the monetary base remains in circulation (hoarding) or returns to the Treasury through monetization of the debt (by banks or Cassa Depositi e 1 We explained the qualifying criteria of this paper during a lunch seminar at the Department of Political Economy of the University of Siena in November 1999. In order to accomplish this re-entry of the currency issued into the Treasury it is necessary to prevent any kind of investment other than State bonds or savings deposits. quoted in Spinelli and Fratianni 1991. 2 Ganugi 1990. Ministry of Finance at that time: “in wartime public expenditure usually exceeds tax revenue and this necessitates the recourse to loans. Salvemini and V. Riccardo Fiorito. Confalonieri 1952 and Baffi 1958 in the field of political economy. Spinelli 1989. G. 226–27. Spinelli and Fratianni 1991.
Confalonieri 1986 [“the monetary circuit barely worked in Italy . and. together with military set-backs. as absorption of the monetary base is carried out by increasing monetary assets (bank and postal deposits). the banks are put under pressure to invest their deposits [. the authorities start operating through the central bank in order to convey the liquidity..4 Prestiti – CDP). Others held a different opinion: Baffi 1958 in connection with policy which goes under the name of capital circuit. 128–129). to fulfil its commitments within the limits of fiscal revenue and the long term debt of the private sector. “the attempt of the Government [in October 1942] to force the monetary market conditions too far by issuing a loan at a 4% rate of interest [. “the Government was unable to sustain financial orthodoxy. 54) and Pavanelli 1993 “Only in the two years from 1940-41 was the goal of reabsorbing the monetary surplus partially achieved by neutralising its effects through an increase in demand for consumer goods (p.. According to Ganugi. in January 1943. the indirect circuit policy came to act above all as a kind of compulsory reserve” (Spinelli and Fratianni 1991. pp. pp.] in government bonds or in deposits at the Bank of Italy.unlike in Great Britain and Germany . the interest rates on deposits to the Bank of Italy are raised.228) . The indirect circuit “market – banks . and also Gelsomino 1992. In the event of: “ difficulty in reabsorbing the excess currency through the direct circuit. interbank deposits are forbidden... to the Treasury. and marked the beginning of the breakdown of the direct circuit” (Ganugi 1990. i. 120. The liquidity of the economy continued to increase…” (p.e. the circuit is not “closed”.Bank of Italy . 406–408).e. In other words. through taxation and public loans. Some of the available sources maintain that the direct circuit had worked well until 1942-43. the banks holding deposits over 100 million lira were obliged to deposit monthly with the Bank of Italy 75% of the increase in funds collected the previous month.] had disastrous consequences. even if with some variants. Spinelli and Fratianni 1991. i. but later underwent a modification in its structure with the “indirect circuit”.even during the first years of war” (p.Treasury” gives a significant role to the financing of banks and the central bank. Mancini 1948. Toniolo and Ganugi 1992 gave a positive evaluation of that experience. which is increasingly concentrated in the bank system.122) . In pursuing this kind of policy. p. 4 .
ii. 5 . with some contributions from the Author. who noted a clear difference between the reduced dynamics of the floating debt and. This prevents identification of the quantitative dimensions of financial circuits that connect: i. 400 ff. central bank advances.7). the growing burden of financing the Treasury through the banks (the holding of Treasury bonds included). as on the level of real interest rates. Salvemini and V. pp. 3 A similar critical standpoint was already present in Baffi 1958. and graph 8. The main reason this interpretation is unsatisfactory is to be found in the use of traditional division in the funded and floating debt of the Treasury and in the types of financial instruments employed (medium and long bonds. the private sector (in a strict sense) to the Treasury.. in the Appendix the contents of the Treasury debt series used here are shown. Ganugi 1990. Other sources judge the working of the “circuit” by focusing not so much on the evolution of the composition of the Treasury debt. etc. the dynamics of the prices of goods and services. Zamagni. pp. vice versa. in § 3 we explain our quantitative analysis based on the transition from Treasury debt division in funded and floating debt to subdivision by sectors. as developed by G. pp. Treasury bills. with a few considerations with regard to other information available.5 The interpretations of the above mentioned sources are not based on a satisfying empirical analysis. currency. 117 ff. the Bank of Italy to the Treasury (that is the debt on a monetary base) 3.). and on the evolution of private consumption (sometimes compared with the somewhat less flattering experience of World War I) (es. This article is structured as follows: in § 2 we explain existing empirical analyses or analyses derived from studies of this question. Spinelli and Fratianni 1991. 229-231. and on the use of the debt series. therefore a quantitative evaluation of the experience is impossible even in the most systematic works from an empirical viewpoint.
1930-1943 In Graph 1 the Author shows the evolution of the Treasury’s total domestic debt compared to the GDP 4. wrote soon after the end of World War II about Treasury financing conditions during the war. director of Banca Nazionale del Lavoro’s Servizio Studi at that time. Zamagni 1998. advances by Bank of Italy. Graph 1 illustrates accelerated growth of the debt from 1940 to the end of 1942. with some integrations by Della Torre 2000b. In Graph 2 the dynamics of the % revenue trend and the floating and funded debt (compared to the accrued payments of the Treasury) are highlighted. 4 The GDP data at current prices are taken from Rossi. Graph 1 DOMESTIC TREASURY DEBT. Table III. Spinelli 1989. This is also confirmed by other sources available: Gatti 1986. deposits from the CDP and other banks. Zamagni 1993 series (% values to GDP) see Italian draft 2. etc. a table is provided illustrating Treasury revenues and payments (for the financial years between 1938-1939 and 1945-1946) and the funded and floating debt (Treasury bills.6 2 Evolution of Treasury debt and some empirical works on the “monetary circuit” 2. DGDP 1988. 6 .) (Mancini 1948.1 Marcello Mancini 1948 Marcello Mancini. Sorgato and Toniolo 1993 series. according to the recent studies by G. and Spinelli and Fratianni 1991 5.0 Treasury debt dynamics. p. In particular. Salvemini and V. Zamagni 1993b and V. 16). 1930-1943 G. Salvemini and V.
the growth of the Bank of Italy advances seems to be a direct consequence of the reduction of funded debt. FUNDED AND FLOATING DEBT Mancini 1948 series (% share to flows of payments) legenda: revenues. it has nothing whatsoever to do with the savers’ preference for medium-long term Treasury bonds. 369. From the above mentioned information. when the ever increasing growth of public expenditure.the limited value of the floating debt) was the result of the CDP purchase of nine-year Treasury bonds with funds previously accrued in Treasury deposits (Confalonieri 1986. funded debt.7 Graph 2 PAYMENTS COVERING: REVENUE. pp. Mancini determines the end of the “direct monetary circuit” in the financial year 1942-1943 as a drastic cut in funded debt and a rapid growth in floating debt (particularly the Bank of Italy advances to the Treasury). L. from the 1940-1941 financial year. in particular.13). 53 and Gatti 1986. floating debt.Treasury] bore the weight of the war efforts until the end of 1942. Mancini comes to the following conclusion: “the circuit [direct: market . 6 See the Appendix.1. resulting in a constant increase in time between the allotment of expenditure and [fiscal] absorption of purchasing power. tables XXI. In this study. In other words. p. 442-439). p. It is also to be noted that in the previous year the high value of the funded debt (and – as a mirror image . see Italian draft The above Graph shows the main role of floating debt as related to funded debt. Graph and Table A. pushed the Treasury to apply to Bank of Italy for funding” (Mancini 1948. Treasury bills. During the whole period 1938-1945 the two types of debt have always replaced each other (never complementing each other). Bank of Italy advances. 7 .
in covering the allotment of public expenditure – by funded debt and floating debt (Bank of Italy advances). which are different from strictly “private” ones: CDP. however. In brief. social insurance. For this reason the funded debt quota does not entirely mean placement of bonds with the private savers. 6 This is not aimed so much at the correct specification of the bonds owned by private savers. CDP and banks are connected with processes of credit monetization. in the worst hypothesis. 6 It is important to note that the role of private savers is not to be overestimated.8 Mancini’s consideration is based on a comparison between the importance assumed . However. banks. II. p. under the hypothesis that the relative dimensions of the funded debt and of the Bank of Italy advances are connected positively and negatively respectively . doc. 130) 8 .with the degree of “closure” of the circuit. It should not be forgotten that a significant share of the bonds was. Bank of Italy. owned by the public sector. Referring to the report dated July 4th 1936 of the then Treasury Director General to the then Minister of Finance: “even if. it would still be preferable to commit it to credit institutes suitably covered by the Central Bank. the public placement [of redeemable loan] was slow and difficult. because the funded debt includes the medium-long term bonds held by the CDP and the banks. by a gradual and careful placement on the market” (Confalonieri and Gatti 1986. the more the circuit is “closed”. etc. Mancini’s analysis is based on a number of unsatisfactory considerations: the funded debt is also absorbed by institutions. it should be remembered that exact information on how the “direct circuit” worked comes from the comparison between the evolution of the total Treasury debt and of the stock of government bonds in the hands of the public: the smaller the discrepancy between the dynamics of the two stocks. and therefore liable to conditions imposed by authorities of economic policy. as at the consideration that the bonds owned by Bank of Italy.4. The share of funded debt to total debt does not give any precise indication on the subject.
30-40. For reasons non mentioned in this volume the Authors decided to refer to this indirect method instead of the ones directly collected by Spinelli 1989. the analysis of the years between 1943-1945 (the period of the “war in Italy”) is less interesting. 2. 78). the analysis does not take into consideration the period 1935-1938. providing insight into the Treasury debt on monetary base (Spinelli and Fratianni 1991. 59-60 – the debt stock may not be considered as a result of the terms. pp. 9 . 1930-1943 Spinelli and Fratianni 1991 series (% share of domestic Treasury debt) see Italian draft 7 According to this process – as mentioned by Spinelli and Fratianni 1991. because the Bank of Italy advances to the Treasury are not the only way the Treasury achieves liquidity: to these can be added currency and Treasury bills held by the Bank of Italy. because it was not possible to define which public institution managed the economy at that time. and subsequently on not monetary Treasury (with regard to the public. banks and foreign institutions). pp.2 Franco Spinelli and Michele Fratianni 1991 Franco Spinelli’s and Michele Fratianni’s 1991 study deals specifically with that period. The Treasury debt stock is the result of the summation of the State deficit over the years7. which should be considered an integral part of the experience of the “monetary circuit”. This analysis is focused on total Treasury debt and monetary base created by the Treasury.9 the floating debt is not a precise indicator of how the circuit works. Graph 3 THE TREASURY DEBT ON MONETARY BASE.
In particular the stability of the other debts could be concomitant with the holding of State bonds. tab. with different trends.10 The difference between total debt and debt in monetary base. 58). CDP. loans granted to the Treasury by the monetary Authorities. The fact that the debt in monetary base remained quite stable during the years between 1935-41 allows exclusion of a decisive role on the part of the Bank of Italy. A. 8 Some doubt nevertheless arises with regard to the exact definition of Treasury debt on monetary base: “[The Treasury monetary base] BMTES is made up of money issued by the Treasury. by the private sector and by the CDP and banks respectively. as well as private savers’ post office deposits” (Spinelli and Fratianni 1991. 10 . The time of the actual breakdown of 1942-43 is clearly shown in Graph 3 (see also the Appendix. p. but says little or nothing of the importance of the “direct monetary circuit”. even greatly overestimating the stock of the bonds placed with private savers.2). still allows a far better focus on the phenomenon than Mancini’s study of 1948 8. public banks and national insurance. It means that the relative stability of the other Treasury debts does not imply the same for the quota of Treasury bonds placed with the private sector.
This is the result of replacement of CDP funds in the Treasury deposits with State bonds. highlighting the role of internal units of the “State” such as the CDP and the social security institutions administered by the CDP 9. Della Torre 2000 series (% share to total Treasury domestic debt) Legenda: total floating debt. Baffi 1958. Gelsomino 1992. a slight fall in the value of the 1940 quota (with an equivalent increase in the funded debt) can be noticed. the % quota of the floating debt to total debt rises only moderately (from 8. Our work confirms this increase. See Mancini 1948. from 1943 onward the quota of the floating debt undergoes a sharp increase (as mentioned by Mancini 1948. the empirical analysis of this question is usually focused on the subdivision of funded and floating debt (i.2% in 1930 to 12. 1993b.3 and A. Mancini 1948. Unlike Salvemini and Zamagni’s works. As shown in Graph 4.3% in 1942. Spinelli and Fratianni 1991.9% in 1935 to 45. In fact. and others). debt to Bank of Italy (bonds not included) see Italian draft 9 For additional data refer to Appendix. The increase of the floating debt quota is clearly a mirror image of the dynamics of the funded debt. CDP deposits with Treasury and advances to Treasury. and increasing steadily10 from 15. Gelsomino 1992. Graph 4 TREASURY FLOATING DEBT. This redefinition allows more exact explanation of the floating debt.5% in 1934).e. this study assigns to the Treasury the debt taken out by the “State”. Tables A.11 3.1 The division into funded and floating Treasury debt As previously stated. which had been decreasing since the middle of the 1930s. Analysis 3. of which: Treasury bills. DGDP 1988. 1930-44.6. Spinelli and Fratianni 1991. but also shows that it is the final result of a series of events that began halfway through the 1930s. and Zamagni 1998 are also relevant. during the first years of the decade. In truth. Subsequent articles by Salvemini and Zamagni 1993a. 10 11 . Salvemini and Zamagni 1993. banknotes. Ganugi and Toniolo 1992).
Confalonieri 1986. and particularly after 1941. Between 1940 and 1942 a structural shift emerges which is characterised by the reduction of the CDP deposits with the Treasury and Treasury bills in circulation and by the mirror image increase in recourse to the central bank. as it was with the CDP and social security institutions’ deposits with the Treasury (Marconi 1982). the development of the floating debt might seem to be a consequence of the reduction of funding by medium-long term bonds placed with private savers. The increase in the floating debt absorbed by the CDP (deposits with the Treasury and advances) and by the banks (Treasury bills) aimed. 11 This interpretation is in line with De Cecco and Toniolo 2000. the Treasury bills’ rate of interest at placing was kept below the rate of long-term bonds. As previously stated.long term bonds11. in concomitance with the reduction in CDP loans. 54-55). p. The nature of the circuit (“direct-indirect”) and the role of public institutions in this regard remain undefined. at the same time. it should be noted that the expansion of the floating debt was supported until 1939 by the development of CDP deposits.12 The reduction of funded debt from the middle of the 1930s implies that the “direct” circuit (private savers – Treasury) was already proving difficult to close in the second half of the 1930s. recourse to the Bank of Italy took on major importance. Moreover. it is possible the increase in the floating debt – Treasury bills (mostly placed with the banks) (Mancini 1948. In fact. On the other hand. 12 .17) and CDP deposits with Treasury – can be explained as a solution aimed at containing the cost of the Treasury debt and as limitations to the creation of a monetary base (requirements that were certainly needed and supported) (for instance. in addition to the issue of Treasury bills and by recourse to the Bank of Italy. at attempting to curb recourse to the central bank and to the issue of medium . By 1939. pp.
see DGDP 1988. A similar problem is posed in evaluating the bonds owned by the Bank of Italy (Salvemini and Zamagni 1993a. Tabs. Baffi 1958). the social security institutions and the public insurance institution. the above mentioned “institutions”’s share (rising at the end of that year to about 51% of the Treasury’s total domestic debt) is held by the CDP (about 24. the social security institutes and the banks in respect of the working of 13 . Confalonieri 1986 calculates a 20% difference (Table 7. Over the years from 1940-42 the CDP and the Bank of Italy held the largest share in turns. 40-41. pp. the CDP and to CDP managed institutions. 11-12. banks. since the CDP bonds are book value. CDP.13 3. Graph 5 THE TREASURY DEBT SHARED AMONG THE PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS. the banks. 160n).e. Gatti 1986. note 2. This division allows identification of the public debt shared among the public institutions (Confalonieri 1952.. the CDP. pp. Once again on the role of the CDP. at the end of 1949 the negotiable public debt in the hands of the Bank of Italy. the banks. We refer to the Bank of Italy (including the direct creation of liquidity by the Treasury). Graph 5 confirms that monetary circuit is initially “indirect”. p. It should be remembered that the CDP quota is certainly underestimated. the bank system about 10%. total see Italian draft 12 According to Confalonieri 1952. 33). Confalonieri 1952. 1930-44 Salvemini and Zamagni 1993. the CDP absorbs more than 20% of the total Treasury debt. and the public and private insurance companies amounted to about 48% of the total. the main social security institutions. At the end of 1934.2 The placement of the Treasury debt The subdivision of the Treasury debt purports to determine the weight of the creation of a monetary base and of the institutions conditioned by economic policy (i. The Bank of Italy owns about 11%. 275-277)12. 13 On the importance of the CDP during the period of the “circuit”. Until 1939. Clearly the total of the bonds placed with private savers (calculated as difference) is overestimated.5%)13 and the banks (over 11%). the total institutions about 36%. p. Della Torre 2000 (% shares of the total domestic debt) Legenda: Treasury monetary base. while the total amount is at nominal value.
14 . pp. 1935-1939. several considerations may be made as a form of preliminary conclusion: The “breakdown” of the circuit becomes evident in 1943. see Ganugi 1990. recently also Beltramelli and Soliani 2000. 118-119. Preliminary conclusions At this point in the above analysis. and Della Torre 2000a. Nevertheless since 1940 there had been a number of warning signs. From inception (1935) the circuit is mostly indirect and the importance of the “public” institutions had been growing from the middle of the 1930s to the armistice: at the end of 1934 the public institutions share was over 36% of the total debt and gradually reached 51% in 1939. De Cecco and Toniolo 2000. the circuit. when CDP financing of the Treasury began to shrink. The question of the “capital circuit” is a partial if emblematic example of the involvement between “market” and State in the history of Italy since the Unification (recently Ciocca and Toniolo 1998. due to the sharp increase in recourse to the monetary base. XV). p. and secondly the Bank of Italy. Until 1939.14 4. Consequently. two types of indirect circuit can be considered: firstly the CDP and the banks. Asso 2000. and 70% in 1943. in this sphere the CDP and the banks . 1940-1943.and later the Bank of Italy – were the most important.
underestimates the debt in the subsequent period. Spinelli and Fratianni 1991 (Graph and Table A. which are the benchmark of the other debt series14. the DGDP series shows similar dynamics to SZD. Apart from the level. The Spinelli 1989 series is much in agreement with information provided by the SZD series. highlights substantial overlapping of information from 1930-1939. Graph A. The data in Gatti.1 DOMESTIC TREASURY DEBT TO GDP. the importance of such hidden forms of debt seems only to have been relevant until 1936. Felicetti 1993 and Salvemini and Zamagni 1993b and Zamagni 1998 (SZ). Gatti 1986. Salvemini and V. It should be remembered that Spinelli and Fratianni referred to cash deficit data “rectified” by Répaci 1962. according to the SZD series. The comparison between the two methods of calculation indicates the possible presence of hidden debt.15 METHODOLOGICAL APPENDIX AND STATISTICAL TABLES A concise evaluation of the statistics available In this study the series of the total Treasury debt (1861-1946) was built up by G. The comparison between Spinelli 1989. “lower” than the Rossi. Zamagni 1993b and V. Sorgato and Toniolo 1993 series. As was predictable. and focuses late on the 1940 increase. The level and the composition of the debt. and from now on is referred to as SZD. DGDP 1988. This may well depend on the GDP series used in calculating the Treasury debt/GDP ratio. Spinelli 1989. 15 .1). 1930-1943 (Salvemini and Zamagni 1993b. with some contribution from Della Torre 2000b. See Baccini 1993’ well-documented work for better understanding the Répaci’s rectifications. on the other hand. Gatti 1986. 14 15 See Ercolani 1993 for a methodical comparison in the GDP series available. The DGDP 1988 series is decidedly higher than SZD. Spinelli and Fratianni 1991) see Italian draft The Gatti series during the period 1930-1935. both in respect of level and dynamics. taking into account also so-called “Treasury annuities” which were so very significant in financing reclamation and rearmament 15. with level and dynamics in line with the SZD series. The comparison between the Spinelli and Fratianni 1991 series (summation of the Treasury cash deficits) and the SZD series (sum of the parts of the Treasury debt) is interesting. Zamagni 1998. have been compared with the other available information: Gatti 1986. DGDP 1988. the above mentioned series are in line with each other in respect of funded debt. As can be seen in Graph 1.
16 .5) 16. Gatti 1986.6 indicate that Gatti 1-2 and Spinelli (particularly during the years 1935-1943) greatly underestimate the SZD series data concerning the floating debt and the timeframe. Studi 336. 1930-1945 (Salvemini and Zamagni 1993. Clearly the increase in the funded debt of the SZ series from 1940 (compared to Gatti and Spinelli ) works on the dynamics of the share of the debt absorbed by the “institutions”. Spinelli 1989 series) see Italian draft To be more specific the Gatti series overlaps the SZD series during the period 1930-34. Graph A.2 FUNDED TREASURY DEBT TO GDP. Della Torre 2000b. but reports the growth of the phenomenon rather late: in 1937 instead of 16 The three year period from 1940-1942 is characterized by the use of different statistical sources. but “the Gazzetta has little for the World War II period”.3 FLOATING TREASURY DEBT TO GDP.42).2 and Table A.4). The increase in this quota will be contained in the period from 1940-41 in the SZ series and accentuated in the Gatti series (Graph A. Gatti 1986. Spinelli 1989.16 however. Spinelli uses the Bank of Italy Bollettini Statistici. underestimate the phenomenon as reported by SZ during the years from 1940-1942. It is to be noted that Spinelli’s and in particular Gatti’s series “delay” the growth of the floating debt compared to the data recorded by SZD. This derives from the fact that the debt by its very nature is defined in many different ways. Gatti uses the Direzione Generale del Tesoro data. The SZ series shows that the increase in funded debt was actually traceable to 1940. Felicetti 1993 series) see Italian draft The comparison concerning the floating debt is even clearer. 1930-1943 (Salvemini and Zamagni 1993b. Salvemini and Zamagni use the Gazzetta Ufficiale . Graph A. which the Gatti series “perceives” to be in 1943 (Graph A. Graph 3 and Table A. So for that period Salvemini and Zamagni used the Rendiconti in the Atti parlamentari and for the 1943-1944 period a document from the Bank of Italy archives (ASBI.
Baccini A. De Cecco. G. De Cecco M. 1930-1943 (Salvemini and Zamagni 1993b. vol. no. G. 2000. G. See the subsequent Graph A..4 for the share of the debt placed with the “institutions”. con particolare riferimento agli anni 1918–39”. Storia economica d’Italia. Confalonieri A. 1935-37 for the working of differences in evaluating floating debt. G. E. in Rivista di Storia economica. Laterza. in M. De Cecco. Toniolo Eds.. Laterza. “L’evoluzione monetaria in Italia dall’economia di guerra alla covertibilità (1935–1958)”. G. in Ciocca P. 1. Ciocca P. the differences between the SZD series and the Gatti and Spinelli series have different effects at two different times: 1. Gatti 1986. Soliani 2000. “Introduzione”. “Alcuni aspetti macroeconomici e redistributivi della gestione del principale ente pensionistico italiano (1919–39)”. As stated earlier. Interpretazioni. 1919-1943”.. La politica del debito pubblico in Italia 1919–1943. Toniolo 2000. Toniolo Eds. Toniolo Eds. Della Torre 2000b. Banca Nazionale del Lavoro Quarterly Review. Baffi P. Gatti 1986... Caron M.4 TREASURY DEBT ABSORBED BY THE “INSTITUTIONS”.17 1935.. 17 . E. Zamagni 1993a. “La Cassa depositi e prestiti nell’economia italiana.4). L. Di Cosmo 1993. in M. G.. Toniolo Eds. 1993. 2. Cariplo – Laterza. 2000. in Confalonieri A.. Gatti 1986. 1940-41 for the differences in estimates of funded debt. Toniolo 1998. 1894–1990. which slowly grows until 1936 (Graph A. R. Beltrametti L.F. no.. 1. 1986. “Gli anni fra le due guerre”.. Storia della Cassa depositi e prestiti. De Cecco M. 1850–2000”. I bilanci degli istituti di emissione in Italia. Spinelli 1989 series) (% quota to total Treasury debt) see Italian draft References Asso P. Confalonieri A. This delay obviously affects the dynamics of the share of the debt placed with the “institutions” in the Gatti series. V. 2000. “La politica del debito pubblico in Italia e in alcuni paesi europei. “Sulle ricostruzioni del bilancio dello Stato. Appendix A. Graph A. 2000. 1958. I. in Salvemini G. 2. 47.2. vol. Laterza.
Della Torre G. n. 1948. in Salvemini G. Salvemini G. 1982. Toniolo 1993. Toniolo Eds. Ganugi P. “I conti economici dell’Italia: una ricostruzione statistica. A. no. Gatti 1986. 1990. in Confalonieri A. 1995. 1993. quotazioni e costo del debito pubblico interno dal 1861 al 1985”. “Le emissioni di titoli pubblici nel periodo 1919–39”. Marconi M. Rossi N.. “Appendice: dati quantitativi. 1993. Zamagni 1993a. 2000a. in A.. in Quaderni di Storia dell’Economia Politica. L’evoluzione del sistema monetario e bancario. Gelsomino C. 1993. 2000. Istituto poligrafico dello Stato. “La “cultura economica” del Ventennio (1923–1943): primo rapporto sulla letteratura recente”. Università degli Studi di Ancona. V. composizione. February. G. 1989.. V. Per la storia monetaria dell’Italia. Zamagni 1993b. 2000. Zanichelli. in De Cecco M. G. Sorgato. Zamagni 1993a. II. Il debito pubblico in Italia.. “La teoria della “economia di guerra” in Italia (1939-1943)”. 1861–1987. La finanza pubblica italiana nel secolo 1861–1960. 59. in Problemi di finanza pubblica tra le due guerre 1919–1939. Caracciolo Ed. 1. A. “Finanza pubblica e indebitamento tra le due guerre mondiali: il finanziamento del settore statale”.. nn. vol. 1986. E. in F. 1890-1990”. “Le serie storiche del debito e del fabbisogno confrontate con analoghe ricostruzioni statistiche”. no. in Moneta e Credito. Spinelli F. 1992. “Dimensione.1. Mancini M. Gattei G. in “Studi sullo sviluppo”. vol. in Problemi di finanza pubblica tra le due guerre 1919–1939. Ercolani P. Salvemini G. Laterza. Toniolo Eds. “Note sul “circuito monetario” e finanza di guerra nel dibattito economico italiano (1940–43) . “La politica monetaria italiana tra il 1936 e la fine della seconda guerra nondiale”. Spinelli F. il finanziamento del Tesoro e gli impieghi bancari per rami di attività economica”.. Dondi 1990. Direzione generale del debito pubblico 1988. 1962. Appendix A. Spinelli. 18 .. M.. fonti statistiche e note metodologiche”. Pavanelli G. ““Fatti stilizzati” per una storia quantitativa della Cassa depositi e prestiti”. Storia monetaria d’Italia. Laterza.O. vol. Fratianni 1991. “Prodotto interno lordo dell’Italia nel lungo periodo: vecchie e nuove stime”. I. in Storia del pensiero economico.A.. Giappichelli. Gatti E. La politica monetaria del fascismo. in Società e storia. Il Mulino. Laterza. Appendice statistica. 1. 29. Giuffrè. 2000b. I. Mondadori. n. Risparmio forzato e ricostruzione monetaria nei paesi in via di sviluppo. and V. Gattei G. Répaci F. “Il mercato monetario. in De Cecco M. G. La Banca d’Italia tra l’autarchia e la guerra 1936-1945.18 Della Torre G. Felicetti G. 2-3. in Rivista di storia economica. Relazione del direttore generale alla Commissione parlamentare di vigilanza.
in Rivista Internazionale di Scienze Economiche. Zamagni V. n. 203–238. in Il disavanzo pubblico in Italia: natura strutturale e politiche di rientro. “Il debito pubblico italiano in prospettiva secolare. n. xxx Zamagni V. dicembre. 19 . 3. 1942. Toniolo G. bancari e finanziari Luigi Einaudi. 1998. P.. Rivista di storia economica. “La finanza di guerra”. “Il debito pubblico italiano 1861–1946: ricostruzione della serie storica”.19 Thaon di Revel P. 1. in Rivista di storia economica. Rivista di storia economica. “Recensione a Confalonieri e Gatti 1986”. n. 1999. Il Mulino. Ganugi 1992. pp. 1987. “Una rettifica”. XIV (3). 1876–1947”. Zamagni V. a cura dell’Ente per gli studi monetari.
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