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Electronically Filed


This case is about rules, those who follow them, and those who do not. The rules at issue
are a garbled regulatory scheme one might suspect was intended to thwart its stated purpose.
Defendant Planned Parenthood of Indiana and Kentucky (PPINK) followed the rules in both
letter and spirit. Plaintiff Cabinet for Health and Family Services, lead by Governor Matt Bevins
general counsel Stephen Pitt,1 did not. The Cabinet has side-stepped its statutory and
administrative obligations, unilaterally changed the rules by which this process is guided, and
declared violations of its newly-minted rules that predate their invention. In doing so, it violated
the rights of PPINK and its patients. In a jaw-dropping display of authoritarian hypocrisy,

While the governor has the authority to employ attorneys to represent himself and other
executive departments, KRS 12.210 requires that the salary of the attorney be paid out of the
departments appropriations, and also that the Governor authorize the employment by executive
order. 12.210 (1). While the Cabinets counsel of record in this case has been properly appointed
as Governor Matt Bevins general counsel, (Executive Order 2015-012), there are no Orders
recorded with the Secretary of State approving Mr. Pitts retention as counsel for the Cabinet.

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NO. 16-CI-00802

impose penalties totaling well over $500,000 in fines.

This Complaint lacks merit on its face. The Cabinet lacks standing to file this action, and
the Court lacks jurisdiction to consider it. The Court should spare the system, the taxpayers, and
the women of Kentucky the burden of staging this political stunt and grant PPINK judgment as a
matter of law. In the alternative, the Court should dismiss the case for the Cabinets failure to
comply with its own regulations and the statutory prerequisites to bringing suit, the Cabinets
lack of standing, and the Courts lack of jurisdiction.
The facts of this case constitute the latest, but certainly not final, chapter in an ongoing
public dialogue over when and under what circumstances women should have access to abortion
services. That debate is not relevant here, except insofar as it provides a context for the
machinations animating this case. Should the Court deny this Motion, future pleadings will
deconstruct the history of these parties and their place in the larger context of the debate. For the
purposes of this Motion, however, the parties relationship over the last few months, as
documented in the Complaint and related public records, is sufficient for the Court to evaluate
the merits of the argument.
On November 19, 2015, PPINK submitted its completed application for a license to
operate an abortion facility pursuant to KRS 216B.0431 and 902 KAR 20:360 to the Cabinet for
Health and Family Services. (Complaint 9; Exhibit A). With that application, PPINK tendered
copies of transfer agreements with the Department of Obstetrics, Gynecology and Womens
Health at the University of Louisville Hospital and with Louisville Metro Emergency Medical
Services as required by KRS 216B.0435. (Complaint Exhibit A). The application was

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without notice and without process, the Cabinet filed this action asking this Court unilaterally to

Maryellen Mynear. (Complaint 21).

KRS 216B.0431 establishes the general licensing and regulatory requirements for
abortion facilities in Kentucky. The statute also requires that the Cabinet create administrative
regulations providing licensure standards and procedures for abortion facilities, which are found
at 902 KAR 20:360. Pursuant to the regulations established by the Cabinet, after the application
for licensure is processed, the next and final step is an on-site inspection of the facility. 902 KAR
20:360 2(3). As with other medical facilities, see 902 KAR 20:008 2(4), the inspection must
be done during the hours that the facility operates. 902 KAR 20:360 4(b). The inspection is
the Cabinets sole mechanism for evaluating compliance with the twenty-three sections of
regulation applicable to abortion providers. 902 KAR 20:360 2(4)(a). The inspection includes
evaluation of the medical staff (5), lab services (8), medical waste disposal (9), and patient
medical records (14).
The Cabinet instructed PPINK that compliance with this regulation required that the
facility be in operation at the time of the inspection. On December 1, 2015, before performing
any medical procedures,2 this instruction was memorialized in an email exchange between
PPINK attorneys and the Cabinets Office of Inspector General. Counsel for PPINK wrote:
It is our understanding that, in order to determine compliance with
the licensure criteria, it is the policy of the Office of Inspector
General that a facility must be operational when the licensure
survey is conducted. It is further our understanding that since
licensure surveys are not announced in advance, preparation for a
survey requires the applicant to initiate business operations after
filing an application so that your office will have an operational
facility to review when the unannounced licensure survey is

Defendant did not perform any medical procedures at its facility until December 3, 2015.
(Complaint 25, 35).

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immediately distributed for internal processing by the Inspector General of the Cabinet,

regulatory scheme and requested assurance that it is indeed expected to conduct operations
while waiting for your office to act on its licensure application. Id.
The same day, the Inspector General confirmed that understanding in no uncertain terms,
I have verified with OIG staff that your summary is correct a facility must be performing
services for which it seeks licensure so that the survey (i.e., inspection) process may fully
evaluate compliance with the applicable regulations. Id. She added, I have also verified that
OIG has received the necessary documentation and fees from your client so that the survey can
(and will) be scheduled. Id. In an apparent attempt to allay PPINKs concerns about carefully
complying with the regulations, the Inspector General concluded, I recognize the inherent
conflict in this approach but it is, indeed, the process by which OIG has historically issued
licenses and is a reasonable application of all statutes and regulations read in conjunction with
one another. Id.
In reliance on the Cabinets instructions, PPINK began seeing patients on December 3,
2015. After one day of operation, PPINK advised the Cabinet of its status and again sought
confirmation of its compliance. (Complaint Exhibit C).
The facility began operations yesterday so I am asking for
confirmation (reassurance) again that, because all the materials
needed for licensure have been filed, they may continue to be
operational until a survey can be arranged, without fear of such
services being deemed unlicensed.

This directly contradicts the Cabinets later claim that it first learned of these operations on
January 28. (Complaint 36, 37).

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(Complaint 22; Exhibit B). The email went on to note PPINKs desire to comply fully with the

confirmed that understanding, Yes, this is a correct statement of long standing OIG policy. As
we have discussed, the survey will be unannounced but I can confirm that [PPINK] is on the
schedule in our normal course of business. (Complaint 28; Exhibit F). During the four days
the clinic was operational, the Louisville facility performed twenty-three abortion procedures.
(Complaint 43, 45).
On January 28, 2016, the Cabinet abruptly and without explanation reversed course.
Acting Inspector General Stephanie Hold sent a letter to PPINK stating that PPINKs application
was deficient and that it was not permitted to perform the abortion procedure until a license is
issued following an inspection of your facility and shall cease and desist any such activity.
(Complaint 37; Exhibit G.)4 The Cabinet claimed that the transfer agreements PPINK had with
a local hospital and ambulance service were deficient. Id.5 PPINK immediately reached out to
counsel of record in this case, Stephen Pitt, who recently left the law firm representing PPINK to
work as general counsel to Governor Matt Bevin. (Exhibit A).6 PPINK sent Pitt a draft of its
intended response to the January 28 letter.
Pitt responded:

Four months after submitting its application, the facility has yet to be inspected.

There are no regulations specifying what is required to be in these agreements, and the statute
only requires a written agreement. See KRS 216B.0435. The claim that a deficiency in the
agreements placed patients at risk is a mendacious talking point invented by the Governor and
propounded by the Cabinet. The truth is that emergency rooms and ambulance services are
required to accept patients in need of care regardless of any explicit agreement under the
Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. 1395dd.

[A] court may consider matters of public record in deciding a motion to dismiss without
converting the motion to one for summary judgment. Northville Downs v. Granholm, 622 F.3d
579 (6th Cir. 2010) (citing Commercial Money Ctr. Inc. v. Illinois Union Ins. Co., 508 F.3d 327,
335-36 (6th Cir. 2007)).

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In an email response dated December 7, 2015, the Inspector General once again

PPINK incorporated Pitts suggestions and sent its letter advising the Cabinet again of its
commitment to full compliance with all applicable licensing regulations and its willingness to
work with the Cabinets new requests. (Complaint 38; Exhibit H). PPINK also acquiesced to
the Cabinets sudden policy shift and agreed to stop operations until the inspection is complete.
Despite these well-documented efforts at compliance and the multiple assurances from
the Cabinet, on February 18, 2016 Governor Bevin announced with great fanfare the filing of
this lawsuit, denouncing PPINKs brazen disregard for the rule of law. (Press Release, attached
as Exhibit B). The suit was filed by Bevins counsel Steve Pitt, who only weeks before was
advising PPINK on its compliance efforts. PPINK took Pitt, and others within the Cabinet, at
their word. Plaintiff now asks this Court to find that PPINK willfully and by intent, fraud,
deceit, unlawful design, willful and deliberate misrepresentation, or by careless, negligent, or
incautious disregard for the statute or administrative regulation violated KRS 216B.990(1) and
(6) and operated an illegal abortion clinic.

Carole Christian represented PPINK during its application process. During this time, she
worked as a law partner with Pitt at the Louisville law firm Wyatt, Tarrant & Combs, LLP.

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Id. 7


Standard of Review

CR 12.02(f) authorizes the Court to determine as a matter of law that a complaint has
failed to state a claim. See also, Bagby v. Koch, 98 S.W.3d 521, 522 (Ky. 2002). While the Court
must accept the factual allegations in the complaint as true, see City of Louisville v. Stock Yards
Bank and Trust Co., 843 S.W.2d 327, 328 (Ky. 1992), it need not rely upon a complaints
unwarranted inferences or legal conclusions. See Potter v. Trivette, 197 S.W.2d 245, 246 (Ky.
1946). Where the plaintiff fails to articulate a set of facts that support the claims in its complaint,
a Rule 12.02(f) motion should be granted. Id.

The Allegations Contained in the Complaint Fail to State A Claim

The Complaint seeks penalties against PPINK under KRS 216B.990. That statute only
applies to entities that willfully operate reproductive health facilities without adhering to the
statutory and regulatory requirements. Based solely upon the allegations contained in the
Complaint, it is clear that PPINK violated no law, complied with directives from the Cabinet,
and acted at all times without the kind of mens rea necessary for penalties to attach. Dismissal of
the complaint is therefore required.

Planned Parenthood Was Operating Its Clinic In Full Compliance

With Kentucky Law

KRS Chapter 216B sets the licensure regime for all health facilities in Kentucky and is
designed to insure that the citizens of this Commonwealth will have safe, adequate, and
efficient medical care. KRS 216B.010. The Cabinet for Health and Family Services is
authorized under the chapter to issue and revoke licenses, promulgate administrative regulations
pursuant to KRS Chapter 13A, and conduct public hearings with respect to denials, suspensions,
modifications, or revocations of licenses. KRS 216B.040.

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outlined in three statutes. KRS 216B.042 directs the Cabinet to promulgate regulations providing
licensing standards and procedures to ensure safe, adequate, and efficient abortion facilities,
health facilities and health services. Among the processes the Cabinet is directed to establish are
licensure application and renewal procedures. KRS 216B.042(1)(c)(2). KRS 216B.0435
requires that abortion facilities enter into a written agreement with a licensed acute-care
hospital and licensed local ambulance service. The statute is silent as to any requirement
beyond simply that the agreement be written. Finally, and redundantly, KRS 216B.0431 again
directs the Cabinet to promulgate regulations relating to licensure standards and procedures.
The Cabinet ostensibly fulfilled its obligations by promulgating 902 KAR 20:360. While
the regulation is long on details of clinic policies and equipment, it is short on its directives
towards the licensure process. Section 2 provides the licensure process. The process is so brief it
warrants a full quotation:

An applicant for licensure shall file with the Office of the

Inspector General, Division of Licensing and Regulation,
275 East Main Street, Frankfort, Kentucky 40621, an
application for license to operate an abortion facility.


An applicant for a license shall, as a condition precedent to

licensure or relicensure, be in compliance with the
applicable administrative regulations relating to an abortion

Compliance with licensure administrative

regulations shall be ascertained through an onsite
inspection of the facility. A licensure inspection
may be unannounced.


A representative of the inspecting agency shall have

access to the facility during the hours that the
facility operates.

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The process by which a health care provider can obtain an abortion license is loosely

addresses the notice requirements and procedures for correcting violations should they be found
during the inspection and the renewal process.
Administrative regulations are interpreted using the same rules of construction applied to
statutes. Comprehensive Home Health Servs. v. Prof'l Home Health Care Agency, Inc., 434
S.W.3d 433, 441 (Ky. 2013) (citing Revenue Cabinet v. Joy Technologies, Inc., 838 S.W.2d 406
(Ky. App. 1992)). [W]e presume that the legislature did not intend an absurd result in
directing the Cabinet to promulgate regulations . . . and that the Cabinet did not intend such a
result in issuing those regulations. Id. (citing Commonwealth, Central State Hosp. v. Gray, 880
S.W.2d 557, 559 (Ky. 1994)). Another common principle, codified in KRS 466.080, provides
that statutes will be liberally construed with a view to promote their objects and carry out the
intent of the legislature . . .
The object of this regulation simply cannot be effectuated unless the facility is in
operation. The Cabinets revised reading of the regulation would require facilities to be fully
staffed but not operating, with patients at the ready every day until the unannounced inspection.
That is an absurd result, and one that the Cabinet has never required of any medical facility.
Instead, the practice has been to allow an interim period of operation, a defacto provisional
license, during which the inspection is conducted. The application itself, crafted by the Cabinet,
plainly anticipates operation during the licensure process:

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The entire process under this regulation consists of five sentences. The remainder of Section 2

abortion facilities be operational before they receive a license. However, 920 KAR 20:008
regulating all health facilities addresses the situation directly. Under that regulation, health
facilities, including abortion providers (Complaint 6), are allowed to operate without a license
in order to facilitate inspection by the Cabinet. 2(11). The regulation simply requires a
submitted application and fee and notice from the Office of the Inspector General granting
temporary authority to operate pending submission of the application.
That is precisely what occurred here. PPINKs application was under submission, and it
had written authorization from the Inspector General to operate provisionally, pending
inspection, prior to starting operations on December 3. (Complaint 6; Exhibit B). The facts, as
plead by the Cabinet, fail to show that PPINK operated in violation of the statute.

The Facts Alleged in the Complaint Show Good Faith Compliance

Efforts, and As A Matter of Law are not Willful or Fraudulent

The Cabinets ability to impose monetary fines requires proof of the requisite mens rea.
Under KRS 216B.990 (6), the penalties require willful violation (KRS 216B.990(1)-(5)) or
violation by intent, fraud, deceit, unlawful design, willful and deliberate misrepresentation, or
by careless, negligent, or incautious disregard for the statute or administrative regulation. The
inclusion of specifically-named mental states means KRS 216B.990 does not impose strict
KRS 216B does not itself define willful. Under Kentucky criminal law, willful has
long meant intentionally, not accidentally or involuntary. Hall v. Commonwealth, 155 Ky. 541
(Ky. 1913). In the administrative realm, willful requires more than a finding of a statutory or
regulatory violation. In the unemployment context, willful or wanton, has required an element
of bad faith. Ky. Unemployment Ins. Comm'n v. Cecil, 381 S.W.3d 238, 247 (Ky. 2012). In the


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920 KAR 20:360 is twenty-three sections long but does not address its requirement that

willful requirement. Cabinet for Health & Family Servs. v. J.M.G., 475 S.W.3d 600 (Ky.
2015). It concluded that in the contempt context, willful is not merely knowing but
intentional, and the difference is along the lines of a conscious purpose to disobey the authority
of the court. Id. at 620. That distinction is analogous here. Addressing whether an agencys
violation of the Open Records statue was sufficiently willful to justify sanctions, the same court
found that willfulness requires more than a showing that the statute was violated; the action must
be without plausible justification and with conscious disregard of the requesters rights. City of
Ft. Thomas v. Cincinnati Enquirer, 406 S.W.3d 842, 854 (Ky. 2013).
This Complaint, even if contorted to the view most favorable to the Cabinet, fails to
allege a single solitary fact to support such an argument. What it does allege is that (1) PPINK
submitted its application in November, 2015 (Complaint 21); (2) PPINK had agreements in
place with both a hospital and ambulance service (Complaint 15-16); (3) PPINK requested
guidance from the Cabinet on its compliance with the sparse regulatory structure (Complaint
22); (4) The Cabinet instructed PPINK on how to comply with the regulatory structure
(Complaint 23); (5) the Cabinet verified the appropriateness of PPINKs application paperwork
(Complaint 23). After acting in accordance with the Cabinets written instructions, (6) PPINK
again asked for confirmation that it was proceeding appropriately (Complaint 25);and (7)
PPINK was a second time assured, in writing, of its compliance with the Cabinets requirements
(Complaint 26, 28).
The other mental states outlined in the statute similarly require conscious wrongdoing or
a lack of diligence on the part of the violator. [I]ntent, fraud, deceit, unlawful design, willful
and deliberate misrepresentation, . . . careless, negligent, or incautious disregard for the statute or


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context of contempt proceedings, our Supreme Court recently discussed the ambiguity of the

operating a facility. The Cabinet alleges that PPINK was reckless in its efforts to obtain a license
because it should have known that [the Inspector General] was without legal authority to
instruct it to operate in anticipation of an inspection. (Complaint 30). This proposition is
contrary to law. The OIG is vested with the responsibility of licensing and regulatory functions
of the Cabinet. KRS 194A.030(1)(c). As the agent responsible for the licensing and regulatory
functions of the Cabinet, the OIG has authority to act on behalf of the Cabinet and all applicants
for licenses are required by statute and regulation to follow its rules and instructions. KRS
216B.0431-0435; 920 KAR 20:360. Applicants must rely on the OIGs instructions and
determinations in order to comply with the law and receive a license.
While PPINK was certainly cognizant of the fact that its facility was operating, it was not
operating with the purpose of violating the statute. At a minimum, the Cabinet must plead facts
that support a finding that there was an intent to violate the law. What was actually plead were
facts that unequivocally show that PPINKs actions were taken in an effort to comply strictly
with the statute and in reliance on the Cabinets authorized agents. The Complaint should be
dismissed for failure to plead any facts supporting an inference of willfulness, much less fraud.
Cf. United States ex rel. Williams v. Renal Care Group, Inc., 696 F.3d 518, 531 (6th Cir. 2012)
(holding that company did not act with reckless disregard a less culpable mens rea than is
required herewhere it consistently sought clarification from outside counsel and the
government, followed industry practice, and was forthright with government officials about
its actions).

The Cabinet Has Not Complied with the Law and Its Own Regulations In
Filing This Action. As a Result, the Cabinet Has No Standing and PPINKs
Right of Due Process Has Been Violated.


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administrative regulation all describe some form of bad faith or recklessness in the course of

216B which they do not this lawsuit would still be improper. The General Assembly
prescribed a clear series of events that must occur before any suit may be filed. And even where
such a suit is proper, it may only be brought by the Attorney General, not the Governor. The
Cabinet filed this action, asking this Court to unilaterally impose penalties totaling well over
$500,000 pursuant to KRS 216B.990(1) and (6) even though it failed to provide any due process
prior to revoking PPINKs de facto provisional license, failed to follow its own regulations in
violation of its statutory and constitutional duty, and lacks standing to bring this action.
After accepting its application in November 2015, the Cabinet now charges PPINK with
deficiencies based upon its new requirements regarding the contents of transfer agreements.
Equally important, the Cabinet may not file a lawsuit asserting authority under KRS 216B.990
without first complying with statutory and regulatory requirements. There is a statutory and
regulatory process for addressing regulatory violations and deficiencies. It involves notice and
opportunities to cure, and a mandatory referral of any proposed action to the Attorney General.
902 KAR 20:360 2(c) requires written notice of a violation, followed by a written
response from the facility within ten days. Id. at 2(d). The Cabinet then has an obligation to
review the response and notify the facility if the corrected plan is acceptable. Id. at 2( (d)(2).
This process then can repeat indefinitely until the Cabinet obtains a satisfactory resolution to the
alleged violation. The Cabinet notified PPINK of its alleged violation on January 28. PPINK
responded with a proposed resolution on January 29. KRS 216B.055 directs the Cabinet to serve
notice of its decisions and orders by certified mail or personal service within fifteen (15) days of
its order. The only notice Defendant has received is a court summons.


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Even if the Bevin Administrations allegations did make out a plausible violation of KRS

Chapter 13B. 902 KAR 20:360 4. That process is set out in KRS 13B.050.9 It includes notice
and a hearing. Id. It requires the disclosure of exhibits and witnesses, and the right to crossexamine them. KRS 13B.090(3). KRS 13B.090(5) requires an opportunity for the offending
party to present its own evidence. The chapter also requires a written order stating the basis for
the imposition of the fine. KRS 13B.110. It is not until that process is exhausted that an appeal
may be made to this Court for enforcement. See Ky. Ret. Sys. v. Lewis, 163 S.W.3d 1, 3 (Ky.
2008) (holding that courts should not intervene before the completion of all prescribed
administrative proceedings, so that a complete record may be assembled and the agency may
issue deliberate rulings on key issues). None of these steps has been taken here.
There is one scenario where this procedure may be truncated, and the Cabinet failed to
follow even that. In the event of an emergency action the agency must issue an order that
shall contain findings of fact and conclusions of law upon which the agency bases the
emergency order. KRS 13B.125(2). This Order must be served upon those affected by it and
requires substantial evidence of a violation of law which constitutes an immediate danger to the
public health, safety, or welfare. KRS 13B.125(3). Every order, decision, and finding of the
Cabinet shall be in writing and shall be entered on the records of the cabinet. KRS 216B.045.
The role of the Circuit Court is to enforce the Cabinets lawful orders. 216B.050. Not only has
there been no finding and no order issued here, it is quite clear that the imposition of fines does
not constitute an emergency.

While licensure applications are exempted from this statutory scheme, (KRS
13B.020(3)(b)((1)), that process has its own statutory scheme set out in KRS 216B.105. The
imposition of fines and penalties by the Cabinet are not exempted from this process, and can
only be exempted upon certification by the Attorney General. KRS 13B.020(4).

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The regulation then provides for an appeal of the Cabinets decision, pursuant to KRS

gives the Attorney General the exclusive obligation to enforce state laws and regulations in
matters dealing with abortion facilities. This statute plainly delineates the roles of the various
branches of government. The Cabinets duty is to take administrative action against entities it
believes to be in violation of KRS 216B. As noted above, those administrative procedures allow
an entity like PPINK to fully and fairly defend itself and to appeal any adverse finding under
KRS Chapter 13B if necessary. Only if these administrative remedies prove ineffective may a
suit be brought. And it must be brought by the Attorney General, following certification by the
Cabinet. Nowhere does the statute permit the Cabinet to file suit, let alone the Governor
purporting to act on its behalf. The statute also specifically authorizes such an action only where
other administrative penalties and legal sanctions imposed have failed to prevent or cause a
discontinuance of the violation. As is clear from the allegations in the Complaint, none of these
prerequisites for filing this suit has been met. The Cabinet has not made any effort to (1) impose
penalties or legal sanctions; (2) the Cabinet has not made any effort to meet its administrative
obligations including notice and a hearing, before imposing a penalty of legal sanctions; (3) the
Cabinet has not shown, and obviously cannot, show, that the result of its sanctions were
ineffective, since there were no sanctions; and (4) the Cabinet has not shown, and cannot show,
that it certified the issue to the Attorney General.
The failure to follow these required procedural steps is not a mere formality. Indeed,
where the government creates a regulatory process, principles of constitutional due process
require that the government follow those rules. See, e.g. Ballard v. Commr, 544 U.S. 40 (2005)
(government agency is obliged to follow its own rules); Vitarelli v. Seaton, 359 U.S. 535, 540
(1959) (government official bound by regulations even if he could have taken disputed action in


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But the illegality of this effort by the Bevin administration goes even further. KRS 15.241

failure to follow its own rules here, in violation of PPINKs right to constitutional due process, is
yet another reason to dismiss this attempt to circumvent the law.

This action is being prosecuted by Governor Bevins own counsel. Neither the Governor
nor the Cabinet followed the law or the administrative regulations required by law before filing
this lawsuit. The Cabinet (and the Governor) have duties imposed by law which were simply
ignored, including the statutory exclusive authority of the Attorney General to file such a lawsuit.
As set forth in the Complaint, PPINK followed all directions and advice of the Cabinet during
the period it provided abortion services as part of the regulatory process. The allegations set forth
in this complaint fail to even approach the minimal pleading requirements for a colorable cause
of action.
For all of the above reasons, the Defendant respectfully submits that this lawsuit must be

Respectfully submitted,
/s/ Laura Landenwich
Thomas E. Clay
Laura E. Landenwich
101 Meidinger Tower
462 South Fourth Street
Louisville, KY 40202
(502) 561-2005
Counsel for Defendant


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absence of regulations); Service v. Dulles, 354 U.S. 363, 388 (1957) (same). The Cabinets

I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing was served via U.S. mail this 15th day of
March 2016, to:
M. Stephen Pitt
S. Chad Meredith
Office of the Governor
700 Capital Avenue, Suite 101
Frankfort, KY 40601
Attorneys for Plaintiff

/s/ Laura Landenwich

Laura E. Landenwich


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Motion having been made and the Court being sufficiently advised,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Plaintiff has failed to allege facts sufficient to state a
cause of action in this matter. It is further ordered that Plaintiff has failed to comply with the
statutory prerequisites for bringing suit, and this Court does not have jurisdiction to hear this
case. Defendants Motion to Dismiss is hereby GRANTED, and this cause is hereby

DATE: ________________________________

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NO. 16-CI-00802