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Submitted by:




I Y.KEERTHI hereby declare that this project is about CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY: .

Submitted by me is an original work undertaken by me. I have duly acknowledged all the sources
from which the ideas and extracts have been taken. The project is free from any plagiarism issue.
PLACE: Vishakhapatnam.

(Signature of the student)

Roll no: 2014049


NAME OF THE SUBJECT: Indian penal code(IPC)
NAME OF THE PROJECT: Criminal Conspiracy

An agreement between two or more persons to engage jointly in an unlawful or criminal act,
or an act that is innocent in itself but becomes unlawful when done by the combination of
actors. conspiracy is governed by statute in federal courts and most state courts. Before its
codification in state and federal statutes, the crime of conspiracy was simply an agreement to
engage in an unlawful act with the intent to carry out the act. Federal statutes and many
statutes now require not only agreement and intent but also the commission of an over act in
furtherance of the agreement. Conspiracy is a crime separate from the criminal act for which
it is developed.
For example: One who conspires with another to commit burglary and in fact commits the
burglary can be charged with both conspiracy to commit burglary and burglary.
Conspiracy is an inchoate, or preparatory, crime. It is similar to solicitation in that both
crimes are committed by manifesting an intent to engage in a criminal act.

Scope and Limitation:

The scope of the project is to deal with the criminal conspiracy and the and the judgement of
the other countries.
The objective of the study is to deal with the criminal conspiracy and independent people in
the project.

Literature Review:

Citation: Citation: 35 Harvard Law Review 393 1921-1922

Authors: Francis B. Sayre.

In this article the author states that the criminal conspiracy lends no strength or glory to the
law. The origin of the crime of conspiracy goes back to the very early pages of the history of
our common law. During the thirteenth century, according to Bracton,3 there were two modes
of commencing prosecution for felonies the one, by way of private appeal, generally
involving trial by battle, and the other by way of public inquest before what later developed
into the grand jury. Nevertheless, abuses sprang up children under twelve, who could not be
outlawed and against whom no damages could be recovered, were sometimes incited to bring
the appeal. "Conspirators be they that do confider or bind themselves by Oath, Covenant, or
other Alliance, that every of them shall aid and support the enterprise.
The record of a case decided in the court was called upon to decide whether the offense of
conspiracy could be so broadened as to include combinations to commit acts of a generally
illegal and oppressive nature. In the Poulterers' Case, the defendant poulterers had
confederated to bring against one, Stone, a false accusation of robbery; but Stone was so
manifestly innocent of the crime charged that the grand jury refused to indict him. In the
ancient phraseology, it was not necessary to show that anything had been "put in ure"; 17 the
mere conspiracy alone was held to constitute the gist of the offense and to be therefore
Citation: 72 Harv. L. Rev. 920 1958-1959 , Hardward law Review
With the growth of organized criminal activity the conspiracy indictment has become an
increasingly important weapon in the prosecutor's side. In some cases the criminal conspiracy

serves to nullify the opportunities for escaping punishment that the defendant might
otherwise obtain from the punishment of his position within a group or from the difficulty of
tracing his precise contribution to any given substantive offense. Conspiracy is usually
defined as an agreement between two or more persons to achieve an unlawful object or to
achieve a lawful object by unlawful means. In any event, a comparably broad doctrine of
conspiracy has not emerged in civil-law countries. However, as action toward a criminal end
nears execution, a point is reached at which the increasing risk to society is thought to
outweigh the diminishing likelihood of a change of heart or of a misreading of intent, and at
this point mere "preparation" becomes punishable as "attempt." A conspirator who has
committed himself to support his associates may be less likely to violate this commitment
than he would be to revise a purely private decision. There are some elements in the criminal
conspiracy that are The Act of Agreement, The Party Dimension, The Object Dimension etc.
Case Laws:
State of tamilnadu through superendentof police, cbi sit v nalini and others
R.P Dewagan vs state of Madhya Pradesh 2002

Introduction:Criminal conspiracy is an agreement between two or more persons formed for the purpose of
committing a crime. The application and to the evidence necessary to prove the existence of
the agreement. Criminalization of conspiracy performs two functions. The first function is
that performed by any inchoate offense-the interruption of criminal activity prior to its
completion. At least in theory, conspiracy subjects the defendant to criminal sanctions at a
stage earlier than any other offense, even attempt. "[Every criminal conspiracy is not an
attempt. One may become guilty of conspiracy long before his act has come so dangerously
near to completion as to make him criminally liable for the attempted crime." The courts
rarely have stated the rationale for this early sanction, although a few commentators have
offered justifications for it, arguing that individuals who band together have expressed,
immediately upon their agreement, a clear intent to violate society's laws. Also, it is argued
that when more than one person agrees to engage in the criminal activity, the likelihood of the
accomplishment of the crime is increased.

The effort of an individual to disturb this equilibrium can never be perceptible, nor carry the
operation of his interest on that of any other individual, beyond the limits of fair competition;
but the increase of power by combination of means, being in geometrical proportion to the
number concerned, an association may be able to give an impulse, not only oppressive to
individuals, but mischievous to the public at large; and it is the employment of an engine so
powerful and dangerous, that gives criminality to an act that would be perfectly innocent, at
least in a legal view, when done by an individual.'
Conspiracy is a crime at the moment the agreement is formed, or at the moment some minor
act is taken in furtherance of that agreement. This is an earlier stage of criminal activity than
is required for attempt, which usually involves either a substantial step toward the
commission of the contemplated crime, or else "conduct that, in fact, amounts to more than
mere preparation for, and indicates intent to complete, the commission of the crime.
Regardless of whether attempt could handle the inchoate conspiracy activities in theory, or
whether it would be desirable, attempt would seem to be able to handle those situations in
which prosecutors actually charge conspiracy. Conversations with prosecutors confirmed this.

One stated that "[no one will prosecute a case without an overt act; generally there is at least
an attempt unless you have an informant which is the rare situation, for you find out about the
conspiratorial relationship from the overt act."
A conspiracy consists not merely in the intention of two or more, but in the agreement of two
or more to do an unlawful act, or to do a lawful act by unlawful means. So long as such a
design rests in intention only it is not indictable. When two agree to carry it into effect, the
very plot is an act in itself, and the act of each of the parties, promise against promise, actus
contra actum, capable of being enforced, if lawful, punishable of for a criminal object or for
the use of criminal means.
Ingredients of criminal conspiracy:
Unlawful agreement :
It is an element of a criminal conspiracy. Generally, the crime of conspiracy is complete
when parties enter into a conspiratorial agreement. Moreover, if there is an agreement
between two or more persons for an unlawful purpose, it is considered a criminal conspiracy
even where there is no agreement regarding the details of the criminal scheme or the means
by which the unlawful purpose will be accomplished. The agreement will determine whether
single or multiple conspiracies exist between the parties. A single conspiratorial agreement
will constitute a single criminal conspiracy and multiple agreements to commit separate
crimes will constitute multiple conspiracies.
Similarly, conspiracy is considered a specific intent crime. A specific intent crime is one in
which a person acts with knowledge of what he/she is doing and also with the objective of
completing some unlawful act. The intent can be determined from words, acts, and conduct.
If the conspirators agree or conspire with specific intent to kill and commit an overt act in
furtherance of such agreement, then they are guilty of conspiracy to commit express malice

Ajeet Singh Chauhan and others v State of U.P. and others

knowledge:To be more specific, to make a person liable for criminal conspiracy as a co conspirator,
he/she must have knowledge of the existence of the conspiracy and knowledge of the illegal
object of the conspiracy. At the same time, a person having no knowledge of a conspiracy
cannot be considered a conspirator.
Similarly, in order to satisfy the statute, the government must prove that a conspirator
committed an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy. A conspiracy conviction requires
proof of the commission of at least one overt act by one of the conspirators within the fiveyear statutory period in furtherance of the conspiratorial agreement.3

Section 120-A of the I.P.C. defines conspiracy to mean that when two or more persons
agree to do, or cause to be done an illegal act, or an act which is not illegal by illegal means,
such an agreement is designated as criminal conspiracy.
No agreement except an agreement to commit an offence shall amount to a criminal
conspiracy, unless some act besides the agreement is done by one or more parties to such
agreement in furtherance thereof.
The main thing on which criminality lies under this section is the agreement, which
requires at least two persons. Here Agreement is not merely the stage of intention which is
not culpable, but is much more than that.
It is a plan or a design to bring in action. The plot is an act in itself. It is not necessary that all
the members of the conspiracy must be aware of each detail of the conspiracy, but it is
essential and required that there has to be a common design among them and every
conspirator from his end of the design must carry out into effect or execute the plan.
However, every conspirator will be aware of the major and important details of the
conspiracy if not the minutest details.

State of Delhi v Bashir Ahmed Ponnu and others

For example- If there is a conspiracy of committing a murder amongst some persons, each of
the conspirator will have to be aware of the major detail of the conspiracy in order to execute
the plan properly. Major details here would be, who is to be murdered and how, when he is to
be murdered and by whom, even though the other minute details might not be known to each
of them.
In determining criminal conspiracy it is immaterial whether the ultimate object of the
agreement is such illegal act or not. A conspirator to commit an offence punishable with death
imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upward and no
specific provision is made for such conspiracy then the offender will be punished in the same
manner as he has abetted the offence. If the conspiracy is not to commit an offence then the
provided punishment shall be term not exceeding six months or fine or both.
It is important that the culpability of an offence is inconsonance with the degree or grade of
the act of perpetrator, while determining the guilt of the accused persons, the degree and the
act of the participants in the offence has to be carefully and cautiously assessed.
The Act of Agreement. Although every other common-law crime includes both a criminal act and a criminal intent,
it has been contended that the law of conspiracy punishes intent alone. Such a view seems
unjustified. In its early development the crime might have been explained by considering its
criminal act to be the physical act of communicating, by words or otherwise, mutual
adherence to a common enterprise; for originally the statute of limitations began to run on a
conspiracy as soon as this communication was made. Today, however, it is established that
conspiracy is a continuing crime, extending beyond the initial communication of agreement.
It seems, therefore, that the criminal act of the modern crime is not the communication of
agreement, but the act of agreement itself, that is, the continuous and conscious union of wills
upon a common undertaking.
While this act is not physical, it still goes beyond the completely internal and subjective act
of intending. It requires on the part of each conspirator communion with a mind and will
outside himself, and it must be initiated by a communication of common intention and assent
through physical means. If some principle of law demands that the line of criminal

responsibility never be drawn short of a physical act, the act of agreeing should go unnoticed.
But the line the common law has chosen does not seem irrational. "Indeed, it seems a
reduction to absurdity, that procuring a single stand of arms should be a sufficient overt act to
make the disloyal design indictable, and that conspiring with a thousand men to enlist should

The Criminal Intent:In actuality, conspiracy defies division into the classic elements of criminal act and criminal
intent, since the act, being volitional, includes within itself the intent. For purposes of
analysis, however, the division remains meaningful. Therefore, this section is devoted to a
second consideration of intent, this time apart from its function as an element necessary to the
commission of the criminal act, and in its role as the mens rea required for criminal guilt
under the common law' Specific Intent. - It has been said that conspiracy requires "specific
intent." This phrase is properly used to denote something more than merely a corrupt or
wrongful purpose; it indicates a particular kind of purpose characteristic of the particular
"species" of crime. Larceny, for example, requires the specific intent to deprive someone of
his property permanently. The intent to deprive him of it only temporarily, while it may be
corrupt and wrongful, will not support a conviction 4. It has been observed that there are
really two intents required for the crime of conspiracy: an intent to agree and an intent to
achieve the object of the agreement. As applied to the former, the statement that conspiracy
requires a specific intent is clearly correct, for the intent to agree is indispensable to, and
characteristic of, this species of crime. But if the statement is meant to apply to the second
intent, as appears to be the case, it seems inaccurate. It is difficult, in fact, to conceive of any
crime in which the intent is less specific.

Wrongful Intent. 4

N. Ratnakumari v State of Odisha and others

A question of more practical significance than whether the intent in the crime of conspiracy is
specific is whether it need be wrongful, that is, whether any mens rea need be shown at all.
The view which has won general acceptance in this country was first proposed in People v.
Powell and was later well expressed by Justice Qua in Commonwealth v. Benesch: "In the
case of conspiracy, as with other common law crimes, it is necessary that criminal intent be
shown. Speaking in general terms, there must be an intent to do wrong." If the act that is
conspired to is malum in se, this intent merely requires knowledge of the relevant facts, so
that the parties know what they are planning; but if it is an act not wrongful in itself and
merely made unlawful by statute, the requisite intent to do wrong does not exist without
knowledge that the contemplated acts violate the law. Therefore, even when the commission
of a particular substantive offense does not require scienter, conspiracy to commit that
offense does. Such a view seems consistent with the general-danger rationale of conspiracy,
since it is difficult to say that a grouping is inherently antisocial and poses a continuing threat
merely because a contemplated act which it thinks to be lawful is in fact unlawful. It may be
argued that if the group plans such an act once, it may do so again, and so does constitute a
continuing danger. But merely informing the group of the illegality of its object, rather than
invoking the severe sanction of criminal punishment, may be all that is necessary to end such
danger. If this is not effective, then the group in its subsequent activity will possess the
requisite scienter, and so will be antisocial and punishable as a conspiracy.
Objects:General Nature.A famous maxim states that an indictment "ought to charge a conspiracy, either to do an
unlawful act, or a lawful act by unlawful means." In practice no real distinction has been
drawn between ends and means. Whether or not this clause is a "magic jingle" which obviates
"the necessity of correctly analyzing the doctrine of conspiracy" seems open to question.
'The precise limits of the word "unlawful" are unclear. There seems to be general agreement
that an indictable conspiracy exists whenever the object to be attained is felonious.
Conspiracy convictions may be sustained when the object of the conspiracy is a
misdemeanour, even when the penalty for conspiring is much more severe than the penalty
for the substantive offense.' Furthermore, when the object of the conspiracy is itself unlawful
only in the sense that liability for civil damages may result, and even when attainment of the
object intended involves no civil or criminal sanctions, conspiracy convictions are allowed.

Requisite Plurality:Husband and Wife:Criminal conspiracy requires a plurality of conspirators. At common law husband and wife
were one. Thus the rule was early established that husband and wife cannot be counted as the
minimum two parties necessary to make up a criminal conspiracy.' The rule, accepted initially
by American courts as the common law, was first questioned early in this century.' However,
it was not expressly repudiated by a state court until and not by a federal court until Some
earlier courts may have applied the common-law rule on the basis of the ancient doctrine that
the wife was not liable for substantive offenses committed jointly with her husband because
she was presumed to be under his control. Any presumption of control sufficient to defeat a
finding of plurality has been much weakened. In the other cases in which the rule has been
accepted, it seems to have been mechanically applied; similarly, when rejected, it has been
mechanically rejected. The courts in the latter cases simply note that in no other field of
modern law are husband and wife considered one.
At one time it was held that corporations could not be indicted for offenses requiring
criminal intent. However, a corporation is now indictable as a conspirator, arguably for the
reason that the intent of agents who conspire is imputed to the corporation. However, as in
situations involving husband and wife, problems in determining the existence of the plurality
necessary for indictment arise. When two corporations and an officer of each are indicted, the
necessary plurality is evident. It is also apparent when a corporation, one of its officers, and a
third person combine for unlawful ends. When, however, the corporate entity and a single
agent are the only two parties to a conspiracy, plurality seems lacking; and there appears to be
no conspiracy for which intent is imputable to the corporation.

The Wharton Rule. A defendant can be convicted of conspiracy although his co-conspirators are immune from
prosecution both for the conspiracy and for the substantive offense, but not when his coconspirators are without legal capacity. Moreover, a defendant can be convicted of conspiring
to commit a substantive offense for which he himself is not indictable. The latter rule is
upheld against the charge that it is contrary to legislative intent on the ground that the
conspiracy is "distinct" from the substantive offense. 5Although this merely states the
conclusion, the rule appears to be sound in view of the rationales underlying conspiracy. The
substantive offense seems more likely to be accomplished once the agreement is made, and in
any event, a combination dangerous in itself, no matter who is liable for the substantive
offense, introduces the normal general dangers of conspiracy. The argument that the
legislature intended to punish only the party who can actually commit the substantive offense
has force only when the party indicted for conspiring is a member of a legislatively protected
class. However, even in such a case, a conspiracy conviction was sustained when the
protected person was extraordinarily active in pursuing the criminal object.

Evidence :The problems of the conspiracy trial are complicated by the special evidentiary rules which
apply to this crime. The existence of conspiracy is usually proved in one or more of three
ways: by circumstantial evidence, by the testimony of a co-conspirator who has turned state's
evidence, or by evidence of the out-of-court declarations or acts of a co-conspirator or of the
defendant himself.

N. Ratnakumari v State of Odisha and others

1)Circumstantial Evidence:The gist of the conspiracy is the agreement, although many jurisdictions require an overt act
in addition. Since conspiracy is a crime which by its nature tends to be secret, the agreement
is seldom susceptible of direct proof. Most conspiracy convictions therefore rest on
inferences from circumstantial evidence. Further, there can be a conspiracy even if there is no
express communication of agreement. 6As a result, the courts have established less stringent
standards of relevance for the admission of circumstantial evidence in conspiracy trials than
for other crimes. "Wide latitude is allowed [the prosecution] in presenting evidence, and it is
within the discretion of the trial court to admit evidence which even remotely tends to
establish the conspiracy charged." Evidence of criminal offenses less related to the crime
charged is allowed in conspiracy prosecutions"' than in the prosecution of crimes other than
conspiracy. Finally, once the jury has found an agreement, only slight additional evidence is
necessary to connect the defendant with the conspiracy. In these respects the courts seem to
be overcompensating for the difficulties faced by the prosecution.
2) Testimony of a Co-conspirator. The testimony of a co-conspirator as to facts within his knowledge involves no hearsay
problem, since the statements are given on the stand and are open to cross-examination. Some
states, however, have statutory provisions that this testimony must be corroborated, although
there is no such federal statute. This requirement is sometimes relaxed by imposing a less
rigid standard for corroborative evidence in a conspiracy trial than would usually be the case.
3) Co-conspirator Hearsay Exception:The general rule regarding the admission of hearsay evidence as to the statements of a co
conspirator, although complex in application and often misunderstood, may nevertheless be
simply stated: any act or declaration by one co conspirator, committed in furtherance of the
conspiracy and during its pendency, is admissible against each co-conspirator provided that a
foundation for its admission is laid by independent proof of the conspiracy

Pawan Kumar Mittal and others v State of Uttar Pradesh and another

Case Law:
State Of Tamil Nadu Through Superintendent Of Police CBI /SIT Vs Nalini AIR (1999)
5 SCC 253
Under section 120A IPC offence of criminal conspiracy is committed when two or
more persons agree to do or cause to be done an illegal act or legal act by illegal
means. When it is legal act by illegal means overact is necessary. Offence of criminal
conspiracy is exception to the general law where the intent alone does not constitute
crime. It is intention to commit and joining hands with persons having the same
intention. Not one intention but there has to be agreement to carry out the object
intention which is an offence. The question for consideration in a case all the accused
had the intention and did they agree that the crime committed. It would not be enough
for the offence of conspiracy where the accused merely entertained a wish,
howsoever, horrendous it that offence be committed.
Acts subsequent to the achieving of object of conspiracy may tend to that a particular
accused was party to the conspiracy. Once the conspiracy has been achieved any
subsequent act which may be would not make the accused a part of the conspiracy
like giving should absconder.
Conspiracy is hatched in private or in secrecy. It is rarely establish a conspiracy by
direct evidence. Usually both the existence conspiracy and its objects have to be
inferred from the circumstance conduct of the accused.
Conspiracy is hatched in private or in secrecy. It is rarely possible to establish a
conspiracy by direct evidence. Usually both the existence of the conspiracy and its
objects have to be infered from the circumstances and the conduct of the accused.
conspirators may for example be enrolled in chain A and enrolling B, B enrolling in
C, and so on and all will be members of the single conspiracy if they so intend and
agree, even though each members knows only the person who enrolled him and the
person whom he enrols. there may be a kind of umbrella - spoke enrollement, where
a single person at the centre doing the enrolling and all the other members being
unknown to each other though they know that there are to be other members.
These are theories and in practice it may be difficult to tell whether the conspiracy in
a particular case falls into which category. it may however even overlap. but then

there has to be present mutual interest. persons may be members of single conspiracy
even though each is ignorant of the identity of many others who may have diverse
role to play. It is not a part of the crime of conspiracy that all the conspirators need to
agree to play the same or an active role.
It is not necessary that all the conspirators should agree to the common purpose at the
same time. They may join with other conspirators at any time before the
consummation of the intended objective, and all are equally responsible.
What part each conspirator is to play may not be known to everyone or the fact as to
when a conspirator is to play may not be known to every one or the fact as to when a
conspirator joined the conspiracy and when he left.
A charge of conspiracy may prejudice the accused because it is forced them into a
joint trial and the court may consider the entire mass of evidence against every
accused. Prosecution has to procedure evidence not only shown that each of the
accused has knowledge of object of conspiracy but also of the agreement.
In the charge of the conspiracy court has to guard itself against the danger of
unfairness to the accused. Introduction of evidence against some may result in the
conviction of all, which is to be avoided.
Case Analysis: On the night of 21.5.1991 a diabolical crime was committed. It stunned the whole
nation. Rajiv Gandhi, former Prime Minister of India, was assassinated by a human
bomb. With him 15 persons including 9 policemen perished and 43 suffered grievous
or simple injuries. Assassin Dhanu an LTTE (Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam)
activist, who detonated the belt bomb concealed under her waist and Haribabu, a
photographer (and also a conspirator) engaged to take photographs of the horrific
sight, also died in the blast.
As in any crime, criminals leave some footprints. In this case it was a camera which
was found intact on the body of Haribabu at the scene of the crime. Film in the
camera when developed led to unfolding of the dastardly act committed by the
accused and others. A charge of conspiracy for offences under the Terrorist and








Code (IPC), Explosive Substances Act, 1908, Arms Act, 1959, Passport Act,
1967, Foreigners Act, 1946, and the Indian Wireless Telegraphy Act, 1933 was laid
against 41 persons, 12 of whom were already dead having committed suicide and

three absconded. Out of these, 26 faced the trial before the Designated Court.
Prosecution examined 288 witnesses and produced numerous documents and material

Statements of all the accused were recorded under Section 313 of the Code of
Criminal Procedure (Code). They denied their involvement. The Designated Court
found them guilty of the offences charged against them. Thereafter all the accused
were heard on the question of sentence. Designated Court awarded death sentence to
all of them on the charge of conspiracy to murder. "A judicial massacre", bemoaned
Mr. Natarajan, learned senior counsel for the accused, and rightly so in our opinion.
Designated Court also sentenced each of the accused individually for various offences
for which they had been separately charged.

In view of the provisions of Section 20 of TADA, Designated Court submitted the

sentence of death to this Court for confirmation. The accused also filed appeals under
Section 19 of TADA challenging their conviction and sentence.
The accused have different alias and while mentioning the accused name it may not
be necessary to refer to them with all their respective alias and alias of an accused will
be indicated wherever necessary. There is no dispute about these alias. For proper
comprehension of the facts it will be appropriate to refer to the appellants as accused.
Three absconding accused are (1) Prabhakaran, (2) Pottu Amman @ Shanmuganathan
Sivasankaran and (3) Akila @ Akilakka. Prabhakaran is alleged to be the supreme
leader of Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE) - a Sri Lankan Tamil organization,
who along with Pottu Amman, Chief of Intelligence Wing of LTTE, Akila, Deputy
Chief of Women Wing of LTTE, and others designed criminal conspiracy to
assassinate Rajiv Gandhi and commit other offences in pursuance thereof.
Punishment for terrorist acts.(1) Whoever with intent to overawe the Government as by law established or to strike terror
in people or any section of the people or to alienate any section of the people or to adversely
affect the harmony amongst different sections of the people does any act or thing by using
bombs, dynamite or other explosive substances or inflammable substances or fire-arms or

other lethal weapons or poisons or noxious gases or other chemicals or by any other
substances (whether biological or otherwise) of a hazardous nature in such a manner as to
cause, or as is likely to cause, death of, or injuries to, any person or persons or loss of, or
damage to, or destruction of, property or disruption or any supplies or services essential to the
life of the community, or detains any person and threatens to kill or injure such person in
order to compel the Government or any other person to do or abstain from doing any act,
commits a terrorist act.
(2) Whoever commits a terrorist act, shall,(i) if such act has resulted in the death of any person, be punishable with death or
imprisonment for life and shall be liable to fine;
(ii) in any other case, be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than
five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.
(3) Whoever conspires or attempts to commit, or advocates, abets, advises or incites or
knowingly facilitates the commission of, a terrorist act or any act preparatory to a terrorist
act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years
but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.
(4) Whoever harbours or conceals, or attempts to harbour or conceal, any terrorist shall be
punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less than five years but which
may extent to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.
(5) Any person who is a member of a terrorists gang or a terrorists organisation, which is
involved in terrorist act, shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be
less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to
(6) Whoever holds any property derived or obtained from commission of any terrorist act or
has been acquired through the terrorist funds shall be punishable with imprisonment for a
term which shall not be less than five years but which may extent to imprisonment for life
and shall also be liable to fine.

Section 4.Punishment for disruptive activities.(1) Whoever commits or conspired or attempts to commit or abets, advocates, advises, or
knowingly facilitates the commission of, any disruptive activity or any act preparatory to a
disruptive activity shall be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be less
than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) For the purposes of sub-section (1), "disruptive activity" means any action taken, whether
by act or by speech or through any other media or in any other manner whatsoever,
(i) which questions, disrupts or is intended to disrupt, whether directly or indirectly, the
sovereignty and territorial integrity of India; or
(ii) which is intended to bring about or supports any claim, whether directly or indirectly, for
the cession of any part of India or the secession of any part of India from the Union.
Enhanced penalties.(1) If any person with intent to aid any terrorist or disruptionist, contravenes any provision of,
or any rule made under, the Arms Act, 1959 (54 of 1959), the Explosives Act, 1884 (4 of
1884), the Explosive Substances Act, 1908 (6 of 1908), or the inflammable Substances Act,
1952 (20 of 1952), he shall, notwithstanding anything contained in any of the aforesaid Acts
or the rules made there under be punishable with imprisonment for a term which shall not be
less than five years but which may extend to imprisonment for life and shall also be liable to
(2) For the purposes of this section, any person who attempts to contravene or abets, or
attempts to abet, or does any act preparatory to the contravention of any provision of any law,
rule or order, shall be deemed to have contravened that provision, and the provisions of subsection (1) shall, in relation to such person, have effect subject to the modification that the
reference to "imprisonment for life" shall be construed as a reference to "imprisonment for
ten years".

1 Certain confessions made to police officers to be taken into consideration.-(1)

Notwithstanding anything in the Code or in the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 (1 of 1872), but
subject to the provisions of this section, a confession made by a person before a police officer
not lower in rank than a Superintendent of Police and recorded by such police officer either in
writing or on any mechanical device like cassettes, tapes or sound tracks from out of which
sounds or images can be reproduced, shall be admissible in the trial of such person or coaccused, abettor or conspirator for an offence under this Act or rules made there under.
Over-riding effect.- The provisions of this Act or any rule made there under or any order
made under any such rule shall have effect notwithstanding anything inconsistent therewith
contained in any enactment other than this Act or in any instrument having effect by virtue of
any enactment other than this Act.
Power to make rules.Without prejudice to the powers of the Supreme Court to make rules under Section 27, the
Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, make rules for carrying out
the provisions of this Act.
(2) In particular, and without prejudice to the generality of the foregoing power, such rules
may provide for all or any of the following matters, namely:
(a) regulating the conduct of persons in respect of areas the control of which is considered
necessary or expedient and the removal of such persons from such areas;
(b) the entry into, and search of,
(i) any vehicle, vessel or aircraft; or
(ii) any place, whatsoever, reasonably suspected of being used for committing the offences
referred to in section 3 or section 4 or for manufacturing or storing anything for the
commission of any such offence;

Recording of confession made to police officers.(1) A confession made by a person before a police officer and recorded by such police officer
under Section 15 of the Act shall invariably be recorded in the language in which such
confession is made and if that is not practicable, in the language used by such police officer
for official purposes or in the language of the Designated Court and it shall form part of the
(2) The confession so recorded shall be shown, read or played back to the person concerned
and if he does not understand the language in which it is recorded, it shall be interpreted to
him in a language which he understands and he shall be at liberty to explain or add to his
(3) The confession shall, if it is in writing, be(a) signed by the person who makes the confession; and
(b) by the police officer who shall also certify under his own hand that such confession was
taken in his presence and recorded by him and that the record contains a full and true account
of the confession made by the person and such police officer shall make a memorandum at
the end of the confession to the following effect:(4) Where the confession is recorded on any mechanical device, the memorandum referred to
in sub-rule (3) in so far as it is applicable and a declaration made by the person making the
confession that the said confession recorded on the mechanical device has been correctly
recorded in his presence shall also be recorded in the mechanical device at the end of the
(5) Every confession recorded under the said section 15 shall be sent forthwith to the Chief
Metropolitan Magistrate or the Chief Judicial Magistrate having jurisdiction over the area in

which such confession has been recorded and such Magistrate shall forward the recorded
confession so received to the Designated Court which may take cognizance of the offence.

Bimbadhar Pradhan vs The State Of Orissa on 13 March,

The appellant and four others were placed on their trial before the Assistant Sessions Judge of
Sambalpur for offences under sections 120-B, 409,477-A and 109, Indian Penal Code with
having committed the offences of criminal conspiracy, criminal breach of trust in respect of
Government property, and falsification of accounts with a view to defraud the Government.
The appellant was the District Food Production Officer in Sambalpur and the other four
accused persons were agricultural sub-overseers in charge of their respective areas under the
appellant. Another such agricultural sub-overseer was Pitabas Sahu at Bargarh centre. He was
examined at the trial as P.W. 25 and (1) (1955) 2 S.C.R. 881
The prosecution case is that in furtherance of the Grow More Food Scheme initiated by
Government it was decided to subsidize the supply of oil cake to agriculturists with a view to
augmenting the production of food crops. Cultivators were to be supplied this variety of
manure at Rs. 440 per maund, though the Government had to spend per maund. The appellant
entered into a conspiracy with his subordinate staff including the agricultural sub- overseers
aforesaid to misappropriate the funds thus placed at their disposal for the procurement and
supply of oil cake to cultivators. To bolster up the quantity of oil cakes to be procured, they
showed false transactions of purchase and distribution thereof and falsified accounts,
vouchers, etc. Thus they were alleged to have misappropriated of Government money.
A large volume of oral and documentary evidence was adduced on behalf of the prosecution.
The three assessors who assisted at the trial were of the opinion that none of the accused was
guilty. The learned Assistant Sessions Judge in agreement with the assessors acquitted the
four agricultural sub-overseers aforesaid of all charges, giving them the benefit of the doubt.
But in disagreement with the assessors he convicted the appellant under all the charges and
sentenced him to rigorous imprisonment for four and a half years and a fine of Rs. 2,000
under section 409,Indian Penal Code, and to rigorous imprisonment for two years each
under sections 120-B and477-A of the Code, the sentences of imprisonment to run
concurrently. The learned trial Judge observed in the course of his judgment as follows:-

"Hence on a consideration of all the evidence as discussed above, I find that the prosecution
have fully proved their case that the accused Bimbadhar Pradhan, the D.F.P.O. has conspired
to embezzle the Government money. They have also proved that he has got an active hand
and in assistance of Pitabas Sahu has embezzled Government money amounting to Rs. 4,9434-0 and in that act he has also actively helped Pitabas Sahu in falsifying the Government
records by making false entries
The appellant went up in appeal to the High Court of Orissa. A Division Bench of that Court
allowed his appeal and set aside his convictions and sentences under sections 409 and 477A,Indian Penal Code, but upheld his conviction and sentence in respect of the charge of
conspiracy under section 120-B of the Code. We need not enter into the correctness of the
findings of the trial court in respect of the acquittal of the other four accused, or of the High
Court with regard to the acquittal of the appellant in respect of the charges under sections
409 and 477-A, Indian Penal Code. The High Court held that though the appellant had
withdrawn the sum of Rs. 27,000 from the Government treasury with a view to subsidizing
the procurement of oil cake, it had not been proved that there was an entrustment to the
appellant. Hence the charge against him undersection 409 failed.
As regards the charge under section 477-A, the High Court acquitted him on the ground that
the documents said to have been falsified, which were large in number, had not been
mentioned in the charge and a vague statement that "accounts, cash books, stock books, petty
cash sale register, cash memos, applications from cultivators, receipts, bills, vouchers, papers,
documents, letters, correspondence, etc. had been falsified" was made. As regards the charge
of conspiracy under section 120-B, the High Court observed that the most important witness
to prove the charge was the approver aforesaid (P.W. 25) who had given a full description of
the conspiracy on the 23rd or 25th September 1947 between the appellant and other suboverseers including himself for the purpose of showing bogus purchases and bogus
distribution of large quantities of oil cake. It also observed that "Most of the witnesses
examined by the prosecution to corroborate the evidence of Pitabas are themselves
accomplices in the conspiracy". The High Court found that in respect of that conspiracy the
evidence given by the approver got adequate corroboration from other independent witnesses.
After setting out the evidence the High Court recorded the following finding:- "This would be
strongest corroboration of the evidence of the approver about the appellant being the prime
mover and the brain behind the entire fraud. It was he who wanted to misuse his official

position and persuade his subordinates to join with him in showing false procurement and
distribution figures of oilcakes".

120-B. Punishment of criminal conspiracy (1) whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy to commit an offence punishable with death,
imprisonment for life or rigorous imprisonment for a term of two years or upwards, shall,
where no express provision is made in the Code for the punishment of such a conspiracy, be
punished in the same manner as if he had abetted such offence.
(2) Whoever is a party to a criminal conspiracy other than a criminal conspiracy to commit an
offence punishable as aforesaid shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for
a term not exceeding six months, or with fine or with both.
Acts done by several persons in furtherance of common intention.-- When a criminal act is
done by several persons in furtherance of the common intention of all, each of such persons is
liable for that act in the same manner as if it were done by him alone.

302. Punishment for murder -- Whoever commits murder shall be punished with death, or
imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.
Voluntarily causing grievous hurt by dangerous weapons or means.-- Whoever, except in the
case provided for by Section 335, voluntarily causes grievous hurt by means of any
instrument for shooting, stabbing or cutting, or any instrument which, used as a weapon of
offence, is likely to cause death, or by means of fire or any heated substance, or by means of
any poison or any corrosive substance, or by means of any explosive substance, or by means
of any substance which it is deleterious to the human body to inhale, to swallow, or to receive
into the blood, or by means of any animal, shall be punished with imprisonment for life, or
with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall
also be punished.

Ram Narain Popli vs Central Bureau Of Investigation on 14 January, 2003

Bench: M.B. Shah, B.N. Agrawal, Arijit Pasayat
It is the case of A-5 that except for first transaction he borrowed money from the
MUL because MUL had surplus funds which MUL were to invest and make
substantial profits out of investment. A-5 returned the borrowed amount on due date
with interest in each transaction. All the said four transactions were backed by BRs as
collateral security and the BRs were backed by requisite number of units. Loan was
for a short period e.g. 2nd transaction was for 12 days, 3rd was for five days, 4th was
for two days and 5th for five days. Interest rate was also high i.e. 16.75%, 21%,
26.25% and 25% respectively.
It is his submission that it is absurd to suggest that A-5 committed any offence or
offences, but the prosecution is a piece of political revenge against A-5 for disclosing
certain facts to the press against the political leaders. He contends that transactions
were loan transactions because in all these transactions the rate of interest and number
;f days for which the loan was being advanced was settled before die money and the
units changed hands. This is consistent only with the transaction being a loan
transaction. He also submitted that mainly the prosecution case in the FIR dated
15.4.1993 which was lodged after preliminary enquiry which started from 15.9.1992
as well as in the charge-sheet submitted by the CBE on 15.12.1994 was that MUL
gave loan to A-5 at a lower rate of interest and suffered toss.
The learned senior counsel submitted that FIR was lodged after investigation for
seven months and charge-sheet was submitted after more than one year and eight
months, which itself indicates mat CBI knew that there was no case to be put up
before a Court and the investigation was kept alive for sordid and dishonest motive.
He pointed out that-(I) the CBI itself understood that the FIR was based upon the one
single allegation that MUL should have received more interest than it actually
received. The charge-sheet nowhere states that at the time of the FIR the nature of

these five transactions was misunderstood or that they changed their mind after
investigation; descriptions of the remaining transactions.

The very heart of the crime of conspiracy is the agreement. To reach an agreement that
constitutes criminal behaviour, the parties must intend to agree and intend to achieve the
same object. This article has explored the problems, both practical and theoretical, that result
when applying this seemingly simple truism of criminal law. Proving intent is not easy,
particularly if: (1) the defendant denies he had the intent; (2) the defendant is an otherwise
honest business person; or (3) the courts require a different sort of intent than that required
for the substantive offense. The intent issue of conspiracy law is so very crucial that even this
brief treatment of the subject may aid those who study the crime, and more importantly, assist
those who prosecute or defend persons charged with criminal conspiracy is applicable to this
case as well.