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Translated by





with Introduction and Notes,

C.D.C. Reeve

Hackett Publishing Company
Indianapolis I Cambridge

Aristotle: 384-322 B.C.
Copyright © 1998 by Hackett Publishing Company, Inc.
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Printed in the United States of America
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Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data
[Politics. English]
Politics/ Aristotle; translated, with introduction and notes, by
C.D.C. Reeve.
Includes bibliographical references and indexes.
ISBN 0-87220-389-1 (cloth). ISBN 0-87220-388-3 (pbk.)
1. Political science-Early works to 1800. I. Reeve, C.D.C.,
. II. Title.
1 948-97-46398
JC7l .A41R44 1998
320'.01'1-dc2 1
ISBN-13: 978-0-87220-389-1 (cloth)
ISBN-13: 978-0-87220-388-4 (pbk.)

Jay and Deborah

Master. Usury VII 1 2 5 6 7 9 12 12 15 18 .CONTENTS Acknowledgments Note to the Reader Introduction §1 Aristotle the Man §2 The Methods and Aims of Philosophy §3 Perfectionism §4 Human Nature §5 Practical Agents §6 Theorizers §7 Political Animals §8 Rulers and Subjects §9 Constitutions § 1 0 The Ideal Constitution §1 1 Conclusion Map Xlll XV XVll XVll XVlll XXV XXVll XXXV xliii xlviii lix lxv lxxii lxxviii lxxx POLITICS BooK I Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 The City-State and Its Rule The Emergence and Naturalness of the City-State Parts of the City-State: Household. and Slave Chapter 4 The Nature of Slaves Chapter 5 Natural Slaves Chapter 6 Are There Natural Slaves? Chapter 7 Mastership and Slave-Craft Property Acquisition and Household Management Chapter 8 Chapter 9 Wealth Acquisition and the Nature of Wealth Chapter 10 Wealth Acquisition and Household Management.

and Slaves Chapter 1 1 BooK II Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Ideal Constitutions Proposed by Others Plato's Republic: Unity of the City-State Plato's Republic: Communal Possession of Women and Children ( 1 ) Plato's Republic: Communal Possession of Women Chapter 4 and Children (2) Plato's Republic: Communal Ownership of Chapter 5 Property Plato's Laws Chapter 6 The Constitution of Phaleas of Chalcedon Chapter 7 The Constitution of Hippodamus of Miletus Chapter 8 The Spartan Constitution Chapter 9 Chapter 1 0 The Cretan Constitution Chapter 1 1 The Carthaginian Constitution Chapter 1 2 The Constitutions Proposed b y Solon and Other Legislators BOOK III Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9 City-States and Citizens What Is a City-State? What Is a Citizen? Unconditional Citizens Pragmatic Definitions of Citizens The Identity of a City-State Virtues of Men and of Citizens Virtues of Rulers and Subjects Should Craftsmen Be Citizens? Correct and Deviant Constitutions The Classification of Constitutions Difficulties in Defining Oligarchy and Democracy Justice and the Goal of a City-State Democratic and Oligarchic Justice 19 21 22 26 26 28 30 32 36 41 45 49 55 58 61 65 67 68 70 73 75 77 78 79 . Children. Women.Vlll Contents Practical Aspects of Wealth Acquisition Monopolies Chapter 1 2 The Branches o f Household Management Continued: Wife and Children Chapter 1 3 The Different Virtues of Men.

and Authority The Just Basis for Authority Types o f Kingship Kingship and the Law Absolute Kingship The Constitutions Appropriate for Different Peoples Chapter 1 8 The Ideal Constitution Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 BooK IV Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9 Chapter 10 Chapter 1 1 Chapter 12 Chapter 1 3 Chapter 14 Chapter 1 5 Chapter 1 6 B ooKV Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 The Tasks of Statesmanship Ranking Deviant Constitutions The Tasks of Book IV Constitutions Differ Because Their Parts Differ Precise Accounts of Democracy and Oligarchy Why Constitutions Differ Democracy and Its Parts Plato on the Parts of a City-State Kinds of Democracy Kinds of Oligarchy Kinds of Democracy and Oligarchy Kinds of Aristocracy Polities Kinds of Polities Kinds of Tyranny The Middle Class ( 1 ) The Middle Class (2) Devices Used in Constitutions The Deliberative Part of a Political System Offices Judiciary Changing and Preserving Constitutions The General Causes of Faction The Changes Due to Faction Three Principal Sources of Political Change Particular Sources of Political Change ( 1 ) IX 82 82 85 87 91 93 96 98 1 00 101 103 1 04 106 111 1 12 1 14 1 14 1 16 1 18 1 18 121 123 1 24 1 27 1 32 1 34 136 137 .Contents Who Should Have Authority i n a City-State? The Authority of the Multitude Justice. Equality.

and Messes Chapter 1 3 Happiness as the Goal of the Ideal City-State The Importance ofVirtue 1 76 1 78 1 79 1 82 1 84 185 1 87 191 193 196 197 200 200 202 203 205 206 209 211 212 .Contents X Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 Chapter 9 Chapter 1 0 Chapter 1 1 Chapter 1 2 BooK VI Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Chapter 8 BooK VII Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Particular Sources of Political Change (2) Political Change In Democracies Political Change In Oligarchies Political Change In Aristocracies and Polities How to Preserve Constitutions ( 1 ) How to Preserve Constitutions (2) Changing and Preserving Monarchies Preserving Kingships and Tyrannies Long-Lasting Tyrannies Plato o n Political Change 141 1 44 146 1 49 1 52 1 56 159 1 66 171 Mixed Constitutions Kinds of Democracies Principles and Features of Democracies Democratic Equality Ranking Democracies Preserving Democracies Preserving Oligarchies ( 1 ) Preserving Oligarchies (2) Kinds of Political Offices 1 75 The Most Choiceworthy Life The Political Life and the Philosophical Life Compared The Political and Philosophical Lives Continued Chapter 3 The Size of the Ideal City-State Chapter 4 The Territory of the Ideal City-State Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Access to the Sea and Naval Power Influences of Climate Chapter 7 Necessary Parts of a City-State Chapter 8 Offices and Who Should Hold Them Chapter 9 Chapter 1 0 The Division of the Territory Chapter 1 1 The Location of the City-State and Its Fortifications Chapter 1 2 The Location o f Markets. Temples.

Contents Chapter 14 Rulers and Ruled The Goals of Education Chapter 1 5 Education and Leisure Chapter 1 6 Regulation o f Marriage and Procreation Chapter 1 7 The Education o f Children BooK VIII Chapter 1 Chapter 2 Chapter 3 Chapter 4 Chapter 5 Chapter 6 Chapter 7 Education Should Be Communal The Aims of Education Education and Leisure Music ( 1 ) Gymnastic Training Music (2) Music (3): Its Place in the Civilized Life Music (4): Harmonies and Rhythms XI 214 218 220 223 227 227 228 23 1 232 236 239 Glossary 243 Bibliography 263 Literary References 275 Index of Names 276 General Index 281 .


I have shamelessly plundered other translations of the Politics. ordinary philosophical English. Paul Bullen not only arranged to have his Internet discussion list dis­ cuss parts of my work. "correct as humanly possible" and "ordinary English-where nec­ essary. I am also very grateful to David Keyt (Books V and VI) and Richard Kraut (VII and VIII) for allowing me to see their own forthcoming edi­ tions of these books. for that matter) will know that. and for characteristically trenchant and detailed comments on parts of Books I and III. who learned Greek regrettably late in life. could ever have made it unaided. they are enormously diffi­ cult to achieve. and sound judgment. Keyt also commented perceptively on the Introduc­ tion. Anyone who has translated Aristotle (or any other Greek writer. translators are traitors. are wholly mme. I hope others will find my own translation worthy of similar treatment. who late in the game. though easy to state. They are also thieves. I am greatly in his debt for guiding the cru­ cial early stages of this translation.ACKNOWLEDGMENTS Traduttori traditori. many of which I accepted gladly. The mistakes alone. extraordinary editorial skills. but he himself sent me hundreds of suggestions for improvement." I have tried to make my own. His ideals of transla­ tion. I owe an even larger debt. What is of value here belongs to all these generous Aristotelians. of which there must surely still be many. and by dint of their wonderfully thorough comments. borrowing where I could not improve. inspired me to a complete revision of the entire translation. to Trevor Saunders (Books I and II) and Christopher Rowe (III and IV). xiii . It is now much closer to Aristotle than I. truly unrepayable. and for allowing me to benefit from their enviable knowledge of them. Anyone who has worked with John Cooper knows what a rare privi­ lege it is to benefit from his vast knowledge.

for their friendship. in par­ ticular. and faith. encouragement. and Jay Hullett and Deborah Wilkes.XIV Acknowledgments Finally and wholeheartedly. . I thank Hackett Publishing Company for its extraordinary support.

. APr.NOTE TO THE READER References to Aristotle's works are made to Immanuel Bekker's edition ( 1 8 3 1 ) and are cited by abbreviated title. and line number (e. Pol. however. Po. Metaph. Cat. the line numbers in citations are those of the Greek text. Prt. Mete. Pr. and correspond only approximately to lines in translations. SE Top.g. DA EE Fr. 980•1). Rh. Posterior Analytics Prior Analytics De Caelo Categories De Anima Eudemian Ethics Fragments (Ross) Generation of Animals History of Animals Magna Moralia Metaphysics Meteorology Nicomachean Ethics Economics Parts of Animals Physics Politics Poetics Problems Protrepticus Rhetoric Sophistical Refutations Topics XV . GA HA MM Metaph. Most English translations have Bekker page numbers in the margins. NE Oec. page. The abbreviations used are as follows: APo. This also applies to the references in the indexes. Cael. PA Ph.

and page number (e. and are cited by au­ thor. Material in square brackets in the translation is my addition. But many editors propose a reordering in which IV-VI trade places with VII-VIII. Comicorum Atticorum Fragmenta. title. Ross is the basis for this translation.g.. because of its ready availability. giving us I. 1 880. Translations of Plato's works usually have Stephanus numbers in the margins. E. Significant deviations from Ross's text are recorded in the notes. A. Translations or editions of the Politics referred to by author in the notes are fully identified in the Bibliography. III. All dates in the footnotes and Glossary are B. There is perhaps some merit in this proposal (see IV footnote 1). 1889. Leipzig: Teubner. Kock. and Kranz. 1925. I-III.C. Nauck. 195 1 . ed. Die Fragmente der Vorsokratiker. T. Republic 47 l a). IV. II. and I have kept in constant contact with it.. prevent the reader from following the alterna­ tive order. in my view. v.) References to Plato are made to the edition of his works produced by Henri Estienne (known as Stephanus) in A. and Problems has been questioned. 2nd. . of course. VII.. Anthologia Lyrica Graeca. Less well known historical figures are identified in the footnotes when they are first referred to in the text (a glance at the Index of Names will reveal where this is). Explicit reference to it is sig­ naled by small capitals (e. 1 578.. v.XVI Note to the Reader (The authenticity of Magna Moralia. Economics.g. H. v. I-II. I have preserved the traditional ordering of the eight books of the Pol­ itics.D. Places referred to may be located on the Map. LAW) . but ease of citation and reference decisively favors tradition. Berlin: Weidmann. Leipzig: Teub­ ner. Diels. Leipzig: Teubner. I-III. W. Plato. Tragicorum Graecorum Fragmenta. The Glossary is fairly wide-ranging. 6th ed. VIII. and does not. V. VI as the order of the books. Other Greek authors are cited from the following standard collec­ tions: Diehl. Dreizehnter is in some re­ spects preferable.

Proxenus.C. leaving the Academy in the hands of his nephew. moreover. his mother. Three years later. was a patron of philosophy. His father. or to reconstruct scholarly consensus. but to provide a suggestive. initially as a student. He remained there for twenty years. and pow­ erful reasons to disagree with the ones I defend. who died while Aristotle was still quite young. It is difficult to say anything uncontroversial about him. He married Hermeias' niece. and by deeper study of Aristotle. eventually as a re­ searcher and teacher. also named Pythias. Hermeias. XVII . and had a daughter by her. Pythias. sent him to study at Plato's Academy in Athens. Nicomachus. This intro­ duction does not try to avoid controversy. When Aristotle was seventeen. his uncle. sometimes critical way to think about the central argument of the Politics that situates it within Aristotle's philosophy as a whole. Plato died in 347. In trying to determine just where the truth lies. Greek philosophy. Aristotle then left Athens for Assos in Asia Minor. Phaestis. Speusippus. into a well-off family living in Stagira. was doctor to King Amyntas of Macedon. and philosophy generally. readers will soon find alternative views. It is a reader willing to undertake this task that Aristotle re­ quires and most rewards. By exploring the works listed in the Bibliography. they will be doing something closely akin to what Aristotle himself is doing in the Politics-critically building on the thought of predecessors by weighing conflicting views against one another. where he met Theophrastus. on the island of Lesbos. was wealthy in her own right. Aristotle moved to Mytilene. § 1 Aristotle the Man Aristotle was born in 384 B. therefore. in northern Greece.I NTRODUCTION Aristotle has been intensively studied by a large number of first-rate thinkers beginning over two millennia ago with the Greek commenta­ tors. who was to become his best student and closest colleague. where the ruler. in 345.

" and that the bones of his wife. Here is his own description of it: . yet in English they occupy almost twenty-five hundred tightly printed pages. psychology. though not all. later called the Great. Perhaps as little as a quarter of Aristotle's writings survive. Legend has it that Aristotle had slender calves and small eyes. Then� is also a staggering breadth and depth of intellect. the knowl­ edge and insights he gained from them are manifest throughout the Politics. rhetoric. This accounts for some. and a large circle of friends. and philosophical and po­ litical history. zoology. he collected the con­ stitutions of one hundred and fifty-eight Greek city-states. spoke with a lisp. politics. and the cut of his hair. and was "conspicuous by his attire. §2 The Methods and Aims of Philosophy It is often and rightly said that Aristotle's philosophical method is dialectical. biology. Their son. also a native of Stagira. that Aristotle "escapes refutation by clothing a perplexing subject in obscure lan­ guage-using darkness like a squid to make himself hard to catch"." he wasn't exaggerating. In the will he asks his executors to take particular care of Herpyllis. a domestic partner. With other members of the Lyceum. the Lyceum. ethics. his rings. In 3 3 5 he returned to Athens and founded his own school. was named for Aristotle's father. While he was there his wife died. aesthetics. Most of these are not works polished for publication. Aristotle made fundamental contributions to a vast range of disciplines. even if none of it is intentional. physics. where he died in 322 at the age of sixty-two. It is unfair to complain. two children. Nicomachus. including logic. He directs that his slaves be freed "when they come of age. metaphysics. a considerable library (he is said to have been the first collector of books). but there is darkness and obscurity enough for anyone. Pythias." He left his library to Theophrastus. of their legendary diffi­ culty. When Dante called Aristotle "the master of those who know. be mixed with his "as she instructed. Aristotle left for Chalcis in Euboea.XVlll Introduction In 343 he was invited to be tutor to Philip of Macedon's thirteen­ year-old son Alexander. epistemology. as a Platonist opponent did." His will reveals that he had a sizable estate. In 323 Alexander the Great died. but sometimes in­ complete lecture notes and working papers (the Politics itself is incom­ plete). with the result that anti-Macedonian feeling in Athens grew in strength. and he established a relationship with Herpyllis.

Metaph. the following is a phe­ nomenon: "The weak-willed person knows that his actions are base. or the like. empir­ ical observations or perceptual evidence (APr. nor can "one or the other of these two classes disagree among themselves" (I04h3 1-36). it will be an adequate proof. 1 090bJ9-20).1 0 1 0'3. if just one notable philoso­ pher rejects a proposition that everyone else accepts. Rh. ideally all the endoxa. But to count as endoxa these opinions cannot be paradoxical ( 1 04' 1 0-1 1 ). Metaph. Gael. . in the first instance. 297'2-6. We shall meet the weak-willed and the self-controlled again in §5.2 Phenomena are usually neither proved nor supported by something else. 750'2 1-23. The endoxa. (NE 1 1 4Sh2-7) We must set out the phenomena. . devoid of interpretative content. 1 46b36. 46' 17-27. what we have is a problem. If there is such disagree­ ment. then most of them and the most compelling. Indeed. raw feels. but if not all. 1 009'38 . Sometimes the phenomena and the facts do not seem to be distinguished from one another (PA. For example. 1402'26-27). For if the problems are solved and the endoxa are left. They need not be. In this way we must prove the endoxa . . they are not Bacon­ ian observations. Indeed. whether veridically or nonveridically. are defined in the Topics as "those opinions accepted by everyone or by the majority or by the wise­ either by all of them or by most or by the most notable and reputable (endoxois)" (IOOh2I-23). 297h23 -25). the many cannot disagree with the wise about them. go through the problems. sense data. but does them because of his feelings.Introduction XIX As in all other cases. we must set out the phenomena and first of all go through the problems. such as propositions that strike people as true or that are commonly said or believed. they are usually contrasted with things that are supported by proof or evidence (EE 12I6h26-28). But there is no a priori limit to the degree of conceptualization or theory­ ladenness manifest in them. 759'1 1 . and in Aristotle seem rarely if ever to be. But they also include items that we might not comfortably call observations at all.1 They include. 2. Sometimes the two are contrasted (Top. while the self-controlled person knows that his appetites are base. and prove the endoxa. but because of reason does not follow them" (NE 1 1 4Shi2-14). But what are these things? And why is proving the most compelling of the endoxa an adequate proof of anything? Phenomena are things that appear to someone to be the case. that is to say. or putative endoxa. that is sufficient to I.

since then it only remains to make a correct choice of one of them" ( 1 63h9-12). 1 64h6-7). We now need to discuss what it is to go through problems and why doing so amounts to an adequate proof. and he will be able to go through these and determine which can be solved and which cannot. 1 04h22-24. 111. He will be able to see what problems these consequences in turn face. he will have concluded. It follows that endoxa are deeply unprob­ lematic beliefs-beliefs based on experience or perception to which there is simply no worthwhile opposition of any sort ( Top. the ability to discern and hold in one view the consequences of either hypothesis is no insignificant tool. Aristotle says. how­ ever. to determine whether rule by one person is better than rule by many (Pol. 1 6). as well as those of supposing that it is not. some beliefs that seemed to be endoxa. But these the philosopher will need to explain away: "For when we have a clear and good account of why a false view appears true. he provides another important clue to what he has in mind: "Where knowledge and philosophical wisdom are con­ cerned. 101•24-26). since there will be every reason to accept it and no reason not to. If he is a competent dialecti­ cian. If most of them and the most compelling are still in place. that makes us more confident of the true view" (NE 1 1 54•24-25). There is a joke to the effect that Aristotle died of . It also explains why he often seems to adopt a position in between those of a pair of con­ flicting parties: if both contain some truth. he will be able to follow out the consequences of supposing that it is. 1 70b6-9). the best position should con­ tain elements of each. In other words. "because the ability to go through the problems on both sides of a subject makes it easier to see what is true and what is false" ( Top. that seemed to be deeply unproblematic. It is because Aristotle employs this method that he almost always be­ gins by looking at what his predecessors have thought about a topic: the views of wise people are likely to contain some truth. The picture that emerges from these passages is something like this. The problem a philosopher faces is. In the end. But in the process of reaching that conclusion some of the endoxa on both sides will almost certainly have been modified or clarified. Dialectic is useful to philosophy. Later. that will be an adequate proof of the philosopher's conclusion. that one person rule is better. partly accepted and partly rejected ( Top.XX Introduction create a problem (I04h19-28). Others will have been decisively rejected as false. will have fallen from grace. let's say. provided that the person himself is outstandingly virtuous ( 1288• 1 5-29). we may suppose.

14bl 4-22.) Aristotle thinks of first principles in a variety of ways. of Aristo­ tle's conception of science and scientific knowledge. Aristotle's method is dialectical. but his goal is scientific. 993b30-3 1 . A person has scientific knowledge of such a science if and only if he knows its first principles. their structure will. 103 1 '12. Let us suppose that we want to ex­ plain why oak trees lose their leaves in the fall. to acquire scientific knowledge (episteme) . We now have a picture. a first principle is paradigmatically a definition (horismos). 1 0 1 1 b26-28). one that captures a nature or essence. and there are epistemic first prin­ ciples. and knows the demonstration of all the other propositions of the science from them. Top. conceived of as the non particular aspects of the world that con­ cepts pick out. But if our theories about the world are true.Introduction XXI an excess of moderation. An epistemic first principle could either be a concept or it could be a proposition. DA 40Zb25-403'2. principles of our knowledge of the world. See APo. An example may help to bring things down to earth. There are on­ tological first principles. which is a type of proposition or fact. an excessive love of the middle ground. Metaph. basic entities or fundamental explanatory causal factors out there in the world.3 Thus happiness. Aristotle's is therefore a realist conception of truth. An Aris­ totelian science is a structure of demonstrations from first principles (archai). albeit in somewhat abstract terms. conceived of as what makes propositions either true or false. 1 102'3. Metaph. which is a concept or universal. The ontological version of this distinction is between uni­ versals. . Aristotle sometimes seems to mark this distinction. What we are looking for is some feature of oak trees that causally explains this phenomenon. on his view. (The axioms of geometry or formal logic are familiar analogues. 1 5 8b1-4. 1 1 39bl-4). and facts (or ways the world is). Such 3 . knows that they are its first principles. is a first principle of ethics (NE 1 095b6-7. but just as often he ignores it. on Aristotle's view. so that the truth of epistemic first principles depends on ontological ones ( Cat. or again its definition. We can now see why he thought this love was just the love of wisdom. 90b24-27. it is to de­ velop a science. For. where propositions are first principles if and only if there are demonstrations of all the other propositions of the science from them but no demonstrations of them from anything else. So much for Aristotelian science. reflect or mirror the structure of the world.

in Posterior Analytics 11. But there are important conditions that ( 1 ) and (2) must satisfy if this demonstration is to yield a genuine scientific explanation: for example. they cannot be an adequate explanation of it either. the appropriate explanatory demonstration would look something like this (see APo. but the real reason surely has to do with the ideals of knowledge and explanation. (2) All oak trees have sap that solidifies at the joint between leaf and stem in colder temperatures. Why does Aristotle impose these austere conditions? It is sometimes thought that he does so because he mistakenly assimilates all the sciences to mathe­ matics. Hence in using them to explain (3) we would be implicitly engaging in circular ex­ planation. why do oak trees none the less still inevitably lose their leaves? On the other hand. 72b2S-73•20). and a col- . The first. Cog­ nitive access to first principles begins with ( 1 ) perception of particulars (99b34-35). 19. In some animals.xxu Introduction a feature might be. The nature of our scientific knowledge of derived principles is per­ haps clear enough. The retention of perceptual contents is memory. For in the true and complete biological theory the more fundamental (3) will be used to explain (I) and (2). There may be some truth in this. they will not adequately explain (3). the fact that the sap at the joint be­ tween leaf and stem solidifies in colder temperatures. if ( 1 ) and (2) are not biologically more fundamental than (3). runs as follows. (3) Therefore. since we cannot possibly demonstrate them (NE 1 140b33-1 141' 1)? Aristotle tells two apparently different stories by way of an answer. perception of particulars gives rise to (2) retention of the perceptual content in the soul (99h39-J OO•I). 98b36 -38): ( 1 ) All plants in which sap solidifies at the joint between leaf and stem in colder temperatures lose their leaves in the fall. But what sort of knowledge do we have of first prin­ ciples. For given that plants with sap of the kind in question do not have to lose their leaves or that oak trees do not have to have sap of that kind. some animals (3) "come to have an account from the perception of such things" ( 1 00•1-3). When many such perceptual contents have been retained. and circular explanation is not explanation at all (APo. If he is right. Aristotle thinks. all oak trees lose their leaves in the fall. If ( 1 ) and (2) are not necessary. (1) and (2) must be necessary and more fundamental than (3).

4 There are two ways to take this story. In the brief concluding section. 1 0 1 "26-b4) The problem with this story is to explain what dialectic's way. He has this on authority from the scientist. whose own knowledge is based on experience.6). Understanding is further discussed in §§4. Aristotle explains that it is because we human beings have understanding (nous). since the principles are pri­ mary among all [the truths contained in the science]. The second story is told in the Topics: Dialectic is useful with regard to the first principles in each science. that he is claiming that understanding is a form of intuitive reason that enables us to detect first principles in a way that justifies us in believing them to be intrinsically necessary.Introduction XXlll lection of remembered or retained perceptual contents. as other animals do not. ( Top. For it is impossible to discuss them at all from the principles proper to the science proposed for discussion. 6. it seems more plausible to plump for the first option: understanding is just the psychological resource that makes it possible for us to know first principles. it provides a way toward the principles of all lines of inquiry. toward first principles actually is. for since it examines. The second is to take it as a nonnor­ mative account which simply describes the psychological resources in­ volved in acquiring knowledge of first principles. The philosopher knows that the first principles in question are true and their negations false. 5. an explanation of how our claims to know them are justified. scientific knowl­ edge of first principles would be impossible (DA 430•25). they must be discussed through the endoxa about them. (4) From such experi­ ences we reach the universals that are the first principles we are seeking ( 100•6-9). or the account generated from them. It is commonly believed that Aristotle's story is normative. This is distinc­ tive of dialectic. Without understanding. . The first is as a normative ac­ count of our knowledge of first principles. the philosopher's way. that the four-step process just described leads in our case to uni­ versals and first principles. Yet when the philosopher uses his dialectical skill to draw out the consequences of these princi4. But given the existence of the second story. NE gives a parallel account of our knowledge of happiness ( 1 143•35 -b5. instead. or more appropriate to it than to anything else. 1 1 39h28-29). is an experience ( 1 00•3. without explaining how our claims to know them are justified.

Presum­ ably. with the preponderance of deeply unproblematic beliefs. then. Metaph. 5 In others. III Productive sciences (crafts): medicine. But so what? The principles were already true. and of their negations. Aristotle character­ izes problems as knots in our understanding which dialectical philoso­ phy enables us to untie. 46'17-30. Chs. is simply clarity of understanding: no knots. etc. Statesmanship is divided into legislative science and routine politics (which deals with day-to-day political matters). in Aristo­ tle's strict sense of the term. The Cambridge Companion to Aris­ totle. natural sciences II Practical sciences: ethics. I Theoretical sciences are paradigm Aristotelian sciences. EE 1 2 1 6b26-36. housebuilding. How are we epistemically any better off now that they have also been shown to be in accord with the most compelling endoxa. he sees problems and supporting argu­ ments. Aristotle's science is well discussed in ]. This account of dialectic and its relation to science is further developed and defended in my "Dialectic and Philosophy in Aristotle. ed. already known to the scientist. APr. NE 1 097b22-24." in Jyl Gentzler. statesmanship. the principle will have been shown to be in accord with most of the most compelling endoxa. we see how all the things we believe can be true si­ multaneously. Method in Ancient Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press.XXIV Introduction pies. indeed. how each science can be knit into the larger fabric of our deeply unproblematic beliefs.6 What dialectical phi­ losophy offers us in regard to the first principles of the sciences. including first principles. metaphysics) and mathematics being especially exem5. clear. with theology (first philosophy. his goal will be to solve the problems they face.. These sciences are concerned with ACTION. 1 997). he characterizes dialectic as enabling us to make beliefs. In many texts. while undoing the arguments that seem to support their negations. ed. mathematics. . 253'3 1-33. based on endoxa. 7 Aristotle categorizes the various sciences as follows: Theoretical sciences: theology or first philosophy.. household management. Ph. DA 4 1 3' 1 1-13. 4 and 5 . the answer is just this: we are no longer pulled asunder by our epis­ temic commitments. 263'1 5-18. If he is successful. 1 032'6-1 1 . Barnes. Since he knows that the princi­ ples are empirically true. Routine politics is further divided into deliberative science and judicial science (NE 1 14 1 b29-32). 7. 6. 995'27-33. NE 1 146'24-27. on both sides.

.Introduction XXV plary cases (Metaph. This distinction is alien to Aristotle. but as not being reducible to that core. One reason for this is that a huge part of ethics and statesman­ ship has to do. statesmanship or polit­ ical science (politike episteme) is the practical science that genuine states­ men use in ruling. But because we are by nature social or political animals (§7). l l03h34-l l04'10. it requires both knowledge of what justice is and DECENCY (epieikeia) (NE V. however.9 The former deals with the nature of the just or good society. which is happi­ ness or eudaimonia. 9. but with particular cases. See Will Kym­ licka. We shall return to this topic in §5. On his view. whose nearly infinite variety cannot be "easily summed up in a formula" (NE 1 1 09h2 1 ) . we should think of practical sciences as hav­ ing something like a demonstrative core. We also distinguish (not always very sharply. This dis­ tinction too is foreign to Aristotle. to be sure) between po­ litical philosophy and ethics or moral philosophy. 1374"18-b23 . in much the way that medicine is the science genuine doctors use in treating the sick. §3 Perfectionism We distinguish politics from the intellectual study of it. 102Sh34-1026'32). statesmanship aims at achieving that same good not j ust for an individual but for an entire COMMUNITY ( 1 323'14-23.l 0). the latter deals with individ­ ual rights and duties. The former is a hard-headed. but to know what justice requires in a particular case is not. which is a combination of virtue and a trained eye. personal good and evil. so that armed with a dialectically clarified concep­ tion of our end in life we can do a better job of achieving it (NE 1 094'22-24). practical matter engaged in by politicians. Rh. NE 1094h7-ll). is a good deal less clear. we can achieve our ends as individuals only in the context of a political 8. not with the universals theoretical science focuses on. virtue and vice. Contemporary Political Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press. See NE 1 094'14-22. the latter is often a rather speculative and abstract one engaged in by professors and intellectuals. then. The extent to which ethics or statesmanship fits the demonstrative paradigm. which we call political science or political philosophy. Perhaps. On his view. ethics pretty much just is statesmanship: ethics aims to define the human good. 1 990): 5-7. 8 The knowledge of what justice is may well be scientific knowledge. This was n o doubt more true thirty years ago than it i s today.

But it is unlike many of them in taking a perfectionist view of happiness rather than (say) identifying it with the satisfaction of our actual desires. then. they are often naturalistic. none the less. A certain conception of ethics. which Aristotle makes. He starts with a conception of human nature or the human essence. that these properties can be realized to the high­ est degree in a political community. Hence ethics and statesmanship coincide. Finally. and duties-not about happiness. In one way. the ideal political community will be the one in which they are most fully realized. Aristotle's ethics is a type of perfectionism. the precise degree of its naturalism is somewhat difficult to gauge (§3). This conception of ethics is controversial. On the assumption. rights. with its attendant pleasures. eds. . leads to a certain con­ ception of statesmanship. Aristotle's theory too is natu­ ralistic. arguing that certain properties are constitutive of it. especially those influenced by Immanuel Kant. Kant. because perfectionist theories identify ethical goodness with the realization to a high degree of properties constitutive or definitive of human nature. 10 Ethics. only in the context of a life with oth­ ers. would reject it. and the Sto­ ics: Rethinking Duty and Happiness (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aristotle's theory is perfectionist. to­ gether with a certain conception of human nature. and many con­ temporary ethicists. But because it allows as constituents of human nature some properties that we might balk at describing as naturalistic. it is like some contemporary utilitarian theories in taking happiness or welfare as the central concept of ethics. It is not so controver10. or flourishing. The ethically best life. and that desire satisfaction. Stephen Engstrom and Jennifer Whiting. in their view. Aristotle.. but it is also eudaimonistic: it argues that eudaimonia or happiness consists in realizing to a high degree the properties that are definitive of humanity. he then argues. is one important measure of a life's goodness (NE 1099•7-3 1). is the one that realizes these properties to the highest degree. and the practical wisdom that enables an individual to achieve happiness is more or less the same thing as the statesmanship that enables a ruler to achieve happiness for a community (NE 1141b23-24).XXVI Introduction community or CITY-STATE (polis). that Aristotle thinks that a good or happy life must satisfy the desires of the person liv­ ing it. to be sure. 1996) includes some useful comparative studies of Aristotle's ethics with Kant's. It is true. rather than in isolation from others or in a community of some other sort. is primarily about justice. then.

1 032'32-h lO). 1980). It is this end. Aristotle. as offering us a more promising approach than either Kant-inspired deontological theories or Mill-inspired utili­ tarian or consequentialist ones. 1 1 Thickening the controversy is yet a third group of thinkers. Aristotle's view of nat­ ural beings is therefore "teleological": it sees them as defined by an end for which they are striving. instead "the source is in something else and external. an internal source of "change and staying unchanged. some from other causes" (Ph. 1997). function (ergon). has no such source within it. Virtue Ethics (Oxford: Oxford University Press. Virtues and Vices (Los Angeles: University of California Press. For them. for example. 12.64 1'6.Introduction XXVII sial. or to so-called virtue ethics more generally. i. as to be wholly implausible. or al­ teration" ( 192h 1 3. a feline embryo has within it a source that explains why it grows into a cat. many other recent ethicists have defended a return to Aristotle's ethics. Pol. Indeed." namely. is a lucid modern defense and exposition.3 1 . A natural being's nature. by contrast. John Finnis. . eds. 192h8-9). whether in respect of place. Thus. especially as inter­ preted by Saint Thomas Aquinas. Roger Crisp and Michael Slote. growth and decay. EN 1 1 68'6-9. however. §4 Human Nature Of the various things that exist. has never ceased to be anything but the crucial philosopher. are intimately related. or function that fixes 1 1 . 1 98 1 ). and Alasdair Macintyre. and why it eventually decays and dies. A house or any other artifact. those who defend a so-called natural law ap­ proach to ethics and politics. essence.e. essence. EE 1 2 1 9' 1 3 . 1 2 Aristotle is an active player in a controversy. PA 640h33. and something that cannot perform its function ceases to be what it is except in name (Mete.1 5). therefore. 1 253'23-25). and end (telos). Philippa Foot. in the soul of the craftsman who manufactures it ( 192h30.1 7). 390•10-13. not a casualty on the wayside of advancing philosophical knowledge. contains some of the best recent papers. 1978). After Virtue (Indiana: University of Notre Dame Press. and as needing to have their behavior ex­ plained by reference to it. or that for the sake of which it exists (hou heneka). Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford: Clarendon Press. are contemporary classics.. "some exist by nature. Those that exist (or come into existence) by na­ ture have a nature of their own. For its end just is to actualize its nature by performing its function ( Cael. Metdph. 286'8 -9. why that cat moves and al­ ters in the ways it does..

Human be­ ings are also examples: their matter is (roughly speaking) their body. we find percep­ tive and desiring soul. their soul is their form. 1 3 34b20. Even city-states are examples: their matter is their inhabitants and their form is their CONSTITUTION (§7). we need to work through the famous function argu- . which.1 8 . Many of the things characterized as existing by nature or as products of some craft are hylomorphic compounds. and so is found in other animals but not in plants. 193b6-7). 1 3 3 3• 1 7. activity ( 1 3 33•25. which is responsible for perception. According to Aristotle. for one reason or another. he ceases to exist (Pol. but is more like the structural organization responsible for his body's being alive and functioning appropriately. can survive through change in its matter (we are constantly me­ tabolizing). can be influenced by it (Pol. these souls consist of hierarchically organized constituents (NE 1. 1 276bl-1 3). The lowest rung in the hierarchy is nutritive soul. imagination. NE 1097b33 -1098•8). This is the nonrational (alogon) part of the soul. Thus (with a possible exception discussed below) a person's soul is not a substance separate from his body. A human being. or he might. and the deliberative part. At the next rung up. and which is also found in plants and other animals. which is responsible for nutrition and growth. These com­ pounds have natures that owe something to their matter and something to their form (Metaph. which enables us to study or engage in theoreti­ cal activity or contemplation (theoria). including political. but if his form is changed. Ph. To discover which of these options Aristotle favors. Statues are examples: their matter is the stone or metal from which they are made. or what its perfections or virtues consist in (NE 1098•7-20. NE 1 1 03•1-3. focus on proper­ ties exemplified by one of the parts. But "form has a better claim than matter to be called nature" (Ph. which has reason ( 1 3 33• 1 7) and is identified with no us or understanding ( 1 254•8 -9. This part is further divided into the scientific part. and movement. 1 3). NE 1 1 39•3-b5). For these reasons an Aristotelian investigation into human perfection naturally focuses on human souls rather than on human bodies. The third part of the soul is the rational part. a perfectionist has a lot of places to look for the properties that define the human good.XXVlll Introduction what is best for the being. for ex­ ample. 1025b26-1 026•6). which enables us to engage in practical. 195•23-25). their form is their shape. compounds of matter (huli) and form (morphe). He might think that the good is defined by properties exemplified by all three of the soul's parts. 1 1 5 1" 1 5-28). Because the soul has these different parts. though it lacks rea­ son.

if a human being has some function. foot. seems to depend on its function. while a human being has none and is by nature inactive without any function? Or. 1333"16-30). Does this mean that it is over and above each of them. for whatever has a function and action. which relies on the implausibility of the view that they lack a function. [doing] well-for a flute-player. 1 3 [B] Then do the carpenter and the leather worker have their functions and actions. (B) says that the function of a human being is "over and above" all of the functions of his body parts. The function argument begins as follows: [A] Perhaps we shall find the best good if we first find the function or task (ergon) of a human being. l-3 . for the sake of some action.e. Like much else in philosophy. just as eye. so the whole body must evidently be for the sake of 13. nature. but other texts seem to show Aristotle committed to the stronger view: Just as every instrument is for the sake of something. end. essence. then. the as­ sumption that human beings have a function is somewhat controversial: do we really have an essence? is there really a single end or goal to our lives? But it is also bolstered by a lot more of Aristotle's overall philoso­ phy. When function is understood in terms of essence and end.. the parts of the body are also for the sake of something. 1 326'1 3-14.Introduction XXIX ment from the Nicomachean Ethics (a work whose final chapters lead nat­ urally into the Politics). By doing so we shall be armed with the kind of understanding of Aristotle's views on human nature and the good that he supposes we will have when we read the Politics (see VII. may we likewise ascribe to a human being some function over and above all of theirs? (NE 1097b24-33) (A) is an expression of Aristotle's perfectionism and is readily intelligi­ ble given what we have already said about the connections among func­ tion. but not controversial enough to be simply dismissed. See Pol. (B) is controversial. and in general every [body] part apparently has its functions. For just as the good-i. a sculptor. and every craftsman. hand. (B) is clearly not so much a direct argument that human beings have a function as an indirect one. that is to say. and good. . of course. and. the same seems to be true for a human being. in general. or all of them taken together? It is difficult to be sure.

in any case. the stronger conclusion often seems to be in view (§6). such as memory or perception. and understanding has a somewhat peculiar status.XXX Introduction some complex action. moreover. I said earlier (§3) that it is difficult to gauge the extent of Aristotle's naturalism. 1 33 3'24-30. the function of one part seems to be for the sake of the function of another. Aristotle's perfectionism seems to be narrowly intellectual­ ist: the good or happy life for humans will consist largely in theoretical activity alone. its activities are completely separate from those of the body: "bodily activity is in no way associated with the activity of understanding" (GA 736b28-29). §6. for example. 1 5 . 1 333"24-30. For the moment. however controversial or in­ credible we might initially find it. The next stage of the argument con­ cerns its identification: [C] What.15 Now theoretical wisdom is the virtue of understanding. hence we should set 14. 1 334b 1 7-28). that of practi­ cal wisdom for the sake of that of theoretical wisdom (Pol. MM 1 198b l 7-20. Similarly. which is over and above the functions of their body parts. then. Human beings have a function. precisely because it lies exclusively in our un­ derstanding and consists exclusively in theoretical activity? If the an­ swer is yes. then. NE 1 094'3 -7) . Could it be. NE 1 145'6-9. Unlike many other capacities of the soul. This doctrine is very much alive in the Politics ( 1 333'1 6-b5). None the less. the body too must be for the sake of the soul. that our function or essence is over and above the functions of all of our body parts. . could this be? For living is apparently shared with plants. Aristotle himself oc­ casionally settles for expressing a weaker disjunctive conclusion: the human function consists in practical rational activity or theoretical ra­ tional activity (Pol. Also EE 1 249b9-2 1 . and the parts of the body for the sake of those functions for which they are naturally adapted. 14 (PA 64Sb 14-20) Thus the parts of the body are for the sake of the complex action of the body as a whole. But it is not clear the answer is yes. but what we are looking for is special. Even within the soul itself. let us simply content ourselves by noticing how close to the func­ tion argument the stronger conclusion lies. but the body as whole is for the sake of the soul and its activities. Understanding is the major source of that difficulty. then. because it is difficult to determine how naturalistic (in our terms) some parts of his psychology are.

and some sort of action of what has reason (DA 41 3"20-4 1 5" 1 3). The specialness of the human function derives from the spe­ cialness of the human essence to which it is identical. Notice that. . on this account. 1 030" 1 1-14). with horse. the other as itself having it and exercising understanding. they would belong to the same species as those plants or beasts. since this seems to be called life to a fuller extent. one as obeying reason. but this too is apparently shared. life is also spoken of in two ways. the doctrine here seems to be simply this: a thing's essence determines its species (Metaph. but it is false that it is part of our essence or function to prostitute ourselves. The function argu­ ment is not open to the criticism often urged against it. then. and every other animal. made evident. which is the function of plants and vegetables. that the human function is the activity of the soul that expresses reason or is not without rea­ son. Since the human function is a life activity. if human beings shared their essence with plants or beasts. therefore. The life or life activity of growth and nutrition. 1325bl6-21)." This is so because Aristotle is presupposing what his biological re­ searches have. (C) is not assuming that whatever is special to human beings is their function. and the life activity of perception. ox. For Aristotle allows that study is itself a kind of ACTION (Pol. each of which has reason in a dif­ ferent way]. he thinks. that there are just three life ac­ tivities: nutrition and growth. "The re­ maining possibility. is some sort of action of what has reason. Now this [the part that has reason itself has two parts. which is the function of beasts. for example. The remaining possibility.16 Having identified the human function. Does this entail that the human function cannot be theoretical activity or study? No. 1 333" 1 6-bS) Subtleties aside. that any property special to human beings is as good a candidate for human function as rational activity. We have found. It may be true. compare Pol. hence. that prostitu­ tion is special to humans. is some sort of action of what has reason. Moreover. and we must take life as activity. Aristotle is ready to bring out its connection to virtue (areti): 16.Introduction XXXI aside the life of nutrition and growth. cannot be the distinctively human function. (NE 1 097b33-1 098"8. but neither func­ tion nor essence is determined by what is special. perception. it must then be some sort of action of what has reason. The life next in order is some sort of life of sense-perception. then. then.

which is that essence activated. and an excellent harpist is clearly one who best achieves the end (playing the harp). 1 993): 1 9-20. so we say. Republic 3 52d-354'. as (E) puts it. But neither does Aristotle think that it is. 17. In other words. 102 J h20-23. But why does virtue ensure that something will best achieve its end? Why is it that.xxxii Introduction [D] The function of a harpist is the same in kind. and that a good harpist is one who plays well. And the same is true without quali­ fication in every case. "each action or activity is completed well when its completion expresses the proper virtue"? The best answer is that a genuine virtue is by definition something that com­ pletes an activity well or guarantees that it will achieve its end. 1 366'36-b l . Now we take the human function to be a certain kind of life and take this life to be the activity and actions of the soul that accord with reason. But it is not guaranteed that the conventionally recognized ethical virtues-justice. and a good harpist's is to do it well. . when we add to the function the superior achievement that expresses the virtue. as the function of an excellent harpist. they constitute the human good. Perfectionism (Oxford: Clarendon Press. For a harpist's function. Rh. If our rational activities express genuine virtue. 18. (D)-(E) establish that the goodness or excellence of a harpist consists in playing the harp well. they do. it isn't a conceptual truth that the specifically moral virtues are what perfect our nature. It is not guaranteed that if our rational activities express them. But do they establish that the good for a harpist is playing the harp well? They do not. [E] Each action or activity is completed well when its completion ex­ presses the proper virtue. 246'10-15. for example. those activities constitute the human good. (NE 1098'9-17) Part of (D) is reasonably uncontroversial given the identification of function with essence and end: the essence of a harpist (say) is clearly the same as the essence of an excellent harpist. Plato. That is conceptually guaran­ teed. is to play the harp. [F] Therefore. But that conceptual truth cloaks a substantive one. See Ph. courage. But together with (A). the human good turns out to be an activity of the soul that expresses virtue.17 This makes (E) into a sort of conceptual truth. Metaph. We shall return to this topic in §5 . the perfectionist premise. Con­ trast Thomas Hurka.18 Thus Aristotle needs to show that the conventionally recognized virtues are indeed genuine ones. [Hence] the excellent man's function is to do these finely and well. and the rest-are genuine virtues. temperance.

Introduction XXXIll After all. (NE 1 098"1 7-20) (H) is perhaps clear enough: happiness needs to be spread throughout our lives in the right sort of way in order for us to count as happy (NE l i OOh22. Which one is that? Naturally enough. Again. in rational activity . (F). temperance. The con­ sequent of the conditional thus comes into play. But (G) is difficult. again. and that the good for us consists in excellent rational activity. and the human good with excellent understanding. which is expressed in excel­ lent theorizing or studying (NE l l 77"1 2-l9). But if we conclude that theoretical wisdom alone satis­ fies this description.l l 39•1 7). and so on. and theoretical wisdom. the good for them depends on their function. the fact that a human being's function is his end. in a complete life. We are to select from the list of practical virtues and virtues of thought the one that is best and most complete. And. sim­ ilarly. For to say that the good for human being is to best achieve his end is to say something that is at least a serious candidate for truth. Thus the antecedent of the conditional in (G) is true: there are more virtues than one. The second consists of the virtues of thought (NE l l 38h3 S . nor. the coda to the function argument would also lead us. which is expressed in excellent practical activities. nor does one day. courage. [H] Further. practical wisdom. the good will express the best and most complete virtue. For one swallow does not make a spring. or his essence activated. tells us that it is our na­ ture or essence to be practically or theoretically rational. as (B) did earlier. is that the human good is an activity of the soul expressing virtue. there is no need for us to do more than scratch its surface. The first of these consists of the familiar ethical virtues of character mentioned a moment ago-justice. in its weaker version. the conclusion of the function argument. then. all I suggest we do for the pre­ sent is notice how close to the function argument this apparently extravagant view lies. But to that conclusion Aristo­ tle adds a difficult coda: [G] And if there are more virtues than one. Aristotle recognizes two broad classes of virtues. The function argument. (A) explicitly states that if human beings (or anything else) have a function. makes this an intelligible view. this is a con­ troversial matter. to identify the human function with understand­ ing. Fortunately.l l O l• l 3 ) . with under­ standing that expresses wisdom. does one day or a short time make us blessed and happy.

it would be the conclusion of the argu­ ment that might have to be modified: "We should examine the first prin­ ciple [i. But the ultimate test of the function argument is not simply the cogency . The trouble (if that is the right word) is that the function argument is an abstract metaphysical or (maybe) biological argument that seems far removed from life experience. Aristotle himself explicitly recognizes this (NE 1 1 72•34-h7. on the one hand. on the other. consisted exclusively in being active in politics (remember that practical wisdom is pretty much the same thing as statesmanship for Aristotle) or in theorizing (contem­ plating). human good or happiness].XXXIV Introduction expressing virtue. essence. Certainly. and ethics and statesmanship. belong to Aristotle's metaphysics. This is a serious problem. The function argument employs concepts such as those of function. and "do not need pleasure to be added as some sort of orna­ ment" (NE 1099• 1 5-16). By using these concepts and by showing how they are re­ lated to the ethical and political notions of virtue and the good life. flatly to describe the function argu­ ment as providing the metaphysical or biological foundations of Aris­ totelian ethics and statesmanship. the function argument establishes the close connections between meta­ physics. but from what is said about it. and seems to some degree to be in conflict with it. whereas the truth soon clashes with a false one" (NE 1 098h9-l l ) . few people. would say that the good. he concedes that were such conflict to occur. and end which. if for no other reason than that people are far more likely to be guided by their experience in these matters than by philosophical arguments. for all the facts harmonize with a true account. I t would b e misleading. and our good with such activity when it expresses the virtue of wisdom. They are far more likely to think that the good is pleasure or en­ joyment. though perhaps biological in origin. For he thinks he can show that the various views of happiness defended by ordinary people on the basis of their experience and by philosophers on the basis of experience and argument (NE 1098b27-29) are all consistent with the conclusion of the function argu­ ment. if asked. Moreover. "not only from the con­ clusion and premises of a deductive argument. and that the good life is a pleasant or enjoyable one." he says. The stronger version more narrowly identifies our na­ ture or essence with theoretically rational activity.e. therefore. he thinks that the activities expressing virtue are pleasant. For example. or the good life. But he does not believe that the problem is insurmountable. too crude a naturalism.. so that the popular view that happiness is plea­ sure is underwritten rather than contradicted. 1 1 79• 1 7-22). This suggests too crude an inheri­ tance from metaphysics and biology.

it helps to un­ derwrite them. Should we order the fish (low fat. 1 23-38.Introduction XXXV of its biological or metaphysical roots. 1 1 1 3'3-5. . that we are faced with a lunch menu. This activity. essence. We deliberate about which of the ac­ tions available to us in the circumstances will best promote it. we have a deeply theoretical mind employing a group of carefully examined concepts and explanatory notions that have earned their keep in widely differing areas. and the human good consists in rational activity expressing virtue. If it is not underwritten by those facts. 19 §5 Practical Agents Our nature. it fails altogether. Whiting. But in the last analysis these are two sides of a single mind seeking to deal with experience in deeply unified and intellectually scrutable ways.20 Suppose. "Aristotle's Function Argument: A Defense. 20. or function lies in the rational part of our souls. for example. as we have seen. His interest in the facts of Greek political history is manifested. This aspect of the function argument makes it a nice paradigm of much of Aristotle's philosophy. We wish for the good or happiness. The more deeply theoretical side of his interest in politics is manifest. we have an intense awareness of the importance of the facts. see my Practices ofReason. and of experience. Such choice is a de­ sire based on deliberation (bouleusis) that requires a state of character and is in accord with wish (boulesis). high fiber)? 19. 1 1 39'3 1-bS.4. If the function argument is un­ derwritten by the facts of ethical and political experience. NE 1 1 1 3'9-14 (reading kata ten boulesin). while at the same time testing incipi­ ent theoretical explanations against experience. Canonical practical ACTION or activity is action that is deliberately chosen. On the other. for example. in IV. On the one hand. that expresses deliberate choice (proairesis). Both these sides of Aristotle's mind are mani­ fest in the Politics. and J. can be either practical or theoreti­ cal or some mix of the two. in Book V in his discussion of actual constitu­ tions and of what causes them to persist or to perish. for example. theoretical activity in the next. For further discussion of the function argument. a desire for the good or the appar­ ent good. in any case. high protein) or the lasagna (high fat." An­ cient Philosophy 8 ( 1 988): 33-48. But what more particularly do these types of rational activity themselves consist in? We shall discuss practical activity in this section. where biology and metaphysics guide his discussion of the various kinds of democracy ( 1 290b 2S-39).

and high fiber. Here appetite is in accord with wish. we choose it. This is one way character is involved in deliberate choice. self-control. This possibility is realized by a vicious person (a person who has vices). For we believe that this is the kind of food that best promotes health. Failing that. Second. self-controlled.XXXVI Introduction We choose fish with a salad (low fat. So if his ap­ petite is for a high-fat diet. we are self-controlled. we are weak-willed. then. as weak-willed or self-controlled people. Suppose we deliberately choose as before. 1 332•38-bS). at least not wish for it. 133 1 b26-34 ). He wishes for the good. but our appetite is for the lasagna. high protein. We do what we think best in the teeth of our insistent and soon-to-be-frustrated appetite. on the grounds that this combines low fat. we would have a different conception of that part of the good that involves diet. we would. high fiber). . If we had acquired "good eating habits" instead. Some people (virtuous. our wish is stronger and overpowers our still very insistent appetite. And it is in part because our deliberate choices exhibit these that they involve such states. that is what he wishes for and orders. and virtue are precisely states of character. It is revealed by a fourth possibility. so that we choose and eat the lasagna. such as lasagna with extra cheese followed by a large ice cream sundae. What explains this fact? Aristotle's answer in a nutshell is habits. We would want and would enjoy the fish and salad and not hanker for the lasagna and ice cream at all. If our appetite is consistently or habitually in accord with our wish. so that it does not overpower wish and wish does not have to overpower it. We come to enjoy fatty foods. and weak-willed ones) have true conceptions of the good. but he mistakenly be­ lieves that the good consists (say) in gratifying his appetites. and our action accords with our wish and our desire. especially those habits developed early in life (NE l09Sb4-8)­ although nature and reason also have a part to play (Pol. our appetite is stronger than our wish and overpowers it. and that being healthy pro­ motes our happiness. by being allowed to eat them freely when we are children and developing a taste for them (or perhaps by being forbidden them in a way that makes them irresistibly attrac­ tive). We know the good but don't do it. In this case. others (vicious ones) have false con­ ceptions. Aristotle says that (everything else being equal) we have the virtue of temperance (sophrosuni). Now these three things. weak will. but there is another. there are then two further possibilities. In this case. If our appetite is then for fish and salad. but wish is only for the apparent and not the genuine human good (Pol. First. for example.

that do much to fill in the rest of our picture of the good. and. To be sure. . is not that it happens to emerge from some type of life in this way. determines what the good is for us. Three broad patterns emerge in lives thus formed. it is our habits more generally. All the same. Habits can be bro­ ken. which conse­ quently continue to seem to be the only genuine ones. these patterns of habit. Our habits. of political activity. "it is not easy to alter what has long been absorbed by habit" (NE 1 1 79b l 6 . and so lock us to some extent into our old values. limit our capacities for new experiences of what is good or valuable. . If we have been brought up to do whatever we feel like doing.1 8). and not what we happen to wish for or choose. however. This should remind us of the money lovers. Per­ haps. . that "people not unreasonably reach their conception of the good. which together determine the type of life we lead. why it is crucial to be brought up in a constitution with correct laws: It is hard for someone to be trained correctly for virtue from his youth if he has not been brought up under correct laws. of study" (NE 1 09Shl8-20). our habits do still largely determine our conception of the good. but that it agrees with the experientially sanctioned conclusion of the function ar­ gument. Bad habits can be replaced by better ones and vice versa. That is one reason. habits that will lead us both to conceive the good correctly and to choose and do what will most promote it. however. it will usually be difficult for us to experience the goods that require discipline and long study to experience. function.21 And it is on the basis of these lives. honor lovers. What makes a certain conception correct. of happiness" (NE 1 09ShJ4-18). indeed. it is not enough for people to get the correct up­ bringing when they are young-they must continue the same prac2 1 .Introduction XXXVII Extending the picture. And without that experience we will usually find it difficult even to understand an argument in favor of those goods: "someone whose life follows his feelings would not listen to an argument turning him away or even understand it" (NE 1 1 79h26-28). we should not overdo the metaphors of locks and chains. yielding "roughly three most favored types of lives: the lives of gratification. So it is clearly of the greatest importance that we develop good habits of liking and disliking or desiring and rejecting. that is to say. Our nature. therefore. . third. and wisdom lovers of Plato's Republic. so that we cannot postpone gratification. None the less. or essence.

In the former case. we shall reach the mean. When this happens. The doctrine of the mean is intended to solve this problem. the feelings are said to be "in a mean" between excess and deficiency: "If. A genuine virtue is a state that is in a mean between excess and deficiency. we are then far more likely to achieve the good and be happy than if our feelings suc­ cessfully oppose wish or have to be overpowered by it. We must drag ourselves off in the contrary di­ rection. temperance. we achieve it but only at the cost of the pain and frustration of our unsatisfied feelings. Over time. Hence if the conventionally recognized virtues are such states. as they do in straighten­ ing bent wood. For if we pull far away from error. Some of Aristotle's advice about how we might achieve this mean state helps explain its nature: We must also examine what we ourselves drift into easily. (NE 1 1 79b3 1-1 1 80•3) But what more precisely are the good habits that correct laws foster? What is it that is true of our feelings.XXXVlll Introduction tices and be habituated to them when they become men. as we know. For dif­ ferent people have different natural tendencies toward different ends. but if it is in a mean. aiming at the same thing it does (NE 1 1 1 9h l 5-18). we are well off. and the same is true in other cases" (NE l i OSh2S-28. ob­ sessed with the forbidden lasagna and ice cream: an uncomfortable and unstable condition. 247•3 -4) . But it is not guaranteed that the conventionally recognized ethical virtues-justice. we can correct for them. also Ph. our feeling is too intense or too weak. We eat fish and salad but we remain "hungry" and. (NE 1 I 09b l -7) By noticing our natural proclivities. our feelings typically change. in the latter. and so are in accord with wish. becoming more responsive or less resistant to wish. Provided that wish embodies a correct conception of the good. with habit and practice. and the rest-are genuine ones. and we come to know our own tendencies by the pleasure and pain that arise in us. no doubt. in some cases. In §4 we noticed a problem. we are badly off in relation to anger. for example. courage. they are genuine . It is conceptually guaranteed that if our rational activities express genuine virtue. our desires and emotions. more in harmony with it. when they are such as good or bad habits make them? Aristotle's answer is that properly habituated emotions "listen to rea­ son" (NE 1 1 02b28-1 1 03•1). they constitute the human good. we miss the good altogether.

as far as any human being can. so that we have all the virtues of character. Imagine that all our feelings. which "seems to be the greatest external good" (NE 1 1 69b9-l0). bodily pleasure. especially between the rich and the poor. and Rosalind Hursthouse. The politi­ cal significance of the virtues is therefore assured. until we have seen how to solve the problems to which it gives rise. and how to 22. with honor. for external goods such as wealth and honor (V. generosity and magnificence.22 Feelings are concerned with external goods. temperance." which include money. Urmson. "A False Doctrine of the Mean. Haven't we got all we need to ensure. General justice (NE l l 29h2S-27) is especially concerned with friendship and community. Our feelings are in ac­ cord with our wish. l-2). and our wish is for the real and not merely the ap­ parent good. with wanting more and more without limit of the external goods of competition (NE 1 1 29h l-4). are worthwhile discussions. l ). . honor. with the pleasures of taste and touch (NE l l l 8•2J-h8). J. Books III-V of the Nicomachean Ethics are for the most part in­ tended to show that the antecedent of this conditional is true." Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 81 ( 1 980-8 1 ) : 57-72." American Philosophical Q]iarterly 10 ( 1 973): 223-30. magnanimity. Until we have engaged in the kind of dialectical clarification of our con­ ception of happiness undertaken in the Nicomachean Ethics. And indeed they are. with ACQUISITIVENESS (pleonexia). But it is these same needs that often bring us into conflict with one another. It is our needs for these goods that lead us to form communities that are characterized as much by mutuality of interest as by competition (l. We shall not probe their details here. all our emotions and desires are in a mean. that the virtues of character would be particu­ larly concerned with external goods. that we will achieve the good and live happily? Not quite. therefore. with "goods of competition. not all of which are entirely persuasive. The vast ma­ jority are concerned with the goods of competition. 0. that is to say. We would expect. ''Aristotle's Doctrine of the Mean. special justice. is competition. without them no con­ stitution can long be stable. with wealth. For "the law has no power to secure obedi­ ence except habit" ( 1 269•20-21). and in general goods that people tend to fight over. The single major cause of polit­ ical instability. It is enough for our purposes to see that the doctrine of the mean is intended to fill what would otherwise be a lacuna in Aristotle's argument. and with having friends. Courage is con­ cerned with painful feelings of fear and pleasant feelings of confidence. indeed.Introduction XXXIX virtues.

and the clear conception of the good is added to our virtuous soul. honor. we do not have the clear and explicit conception that we need for success in all circumstances (§2). Our feelings. are concerned with external goods. The exercise of practical wisdom. . would be a recognizably valuable one. we need money. in fact. Reflect for a moment on what this means. . then. in order to lead happy lives. but we do not yet have the kind of understanding of our goal in life that comes from philosoph­ ical inquiry. so far as is humanly possible. pleasure. is more valuable than the satisfactions it (if anything) ensures. as we discovered in §4. when they are in accord with wish or listen to reason. 1ts contribution (or one of its contributions) to action is that it makes us "more likely to hit the right mark" (NE 1094'22-24). being the same as statesmanship. we above all need friends. For we might well think-in any case. which is a single state.6). suitably equipped with external goods. by providing us with a clear and problem-free conception of it. that they are satisfied in a way that achieves the good or promotes our happiness. And. What we have before that is what Aristotle calls habit­ uated virtue: we are disposed to listen to reason. as soon as someone has practical wisdom. Aristotle thinks that we need to have been brought up with good habits and have feelings that are in a mean "if we are to be ad­ equate students of what is noble and just and of political questions gen­ erally" (NE 1 09Sb4. on the other. But what philosophy tells us. On the one hand. But it is also true that we simultaneously acquire the full-blown virtues of character: "We cannot be fully good without practical wisdom. which ensures that our desires are satisfied. pretty much there. Perhaps this will seem less strange when we reflect that practical wisdom. When philosophy has done this work of clarification and problem solving. at that point we acquire practical wisdom.6). he thinks that ethics is a practical science whose end or goal is "action not knowledge" (NE 1 095'5. We need these goods. But the very activity of practical wisdom. practical wisdom en­ sures. namely. practical rational activity.xl Introduction criticize competing conceptions. How much closer are we to getting what we wanted? We are. or have practical wisdom with­ out virtue of character . which involves and ex­ presses all of the virtues of character. is that our goal is rational activity that expresses virtue. we can surely find it intelligible to think-that a political life. he has all the virtues as well" (NE 1 1 44b30-1 145'2). our emotions and de­ sires. When they are in a mean. And what we wanted to know was what one type of this activity is. simply is practical activity. is best exempli­ fied in a life of political activity. .

so in addition to studying it. the community isn't really a city-state at all ( 1 280•34-b l S). For happiness is the same thing for a city-state or constitution as for an individual ( 1 32Sh30-32. Since happiness is rational activity expressing virtue. when practical wisdom assumes the role of statesmanship. Armed with that understanding. l l . This is the so-called MIDDLE CONSTITUTION ( 1 296•7). The fact that statesmanship engages in all these tasks may seem deeply problematic. Not every population can attain the ideal constitution. l 2-16 deals with this problem. The statesman's knowledge of the virtues and his possession of them will obviously help him with this task. Statesmanship is something only an unqualifiedly . and VIII are devoted to this task. Second. II. VII. But in other constitutions this is not so. Its primary task is to study the best constitution: Pol. in order to understand what prac­ tical wisdom and the virtues of character are. the con­ stitution that is best for a given type of people. To carry it out successfully a STATESMAN must know what happiness is ( 1 323•14-16). which is to study the various ways in which any variety of constitution can be preserved and destroyed. Book IV. NE 1094h7-8). might prove particularly impor­ tant. Aristotle argues that if the legislation in a community is not designed to foster virtue. and the ideal constitution is precisely the one in which all the citizens are as happy as possible ( 1 324•23 -25. and how they guarantee a correct conception of happiness. In the ideal constitution. we can per­ haps also better understand why being able to solve the problems that arise for our own conception of the good. §10). while being able effectively to criticize other competing conceptions. the laws that suit the constitution inculcate the unqualified virtues of character. the ways they are best preserved and destroyed in Books V and VI. There the laws inculcate virtues that. we are in a position to understand why. The various subvarieties of the various types of constitutions are dis­ cussed in IV. are not unqualified virtues. Indeed. l . a type of POLITY. while suited to the constitution. A substantial portion of the Politics deals with the final tasks of statesmanship. a statesman must also study other things. the laws of the ideal constitution must be designed to inculcate the virtues.4-10. We shall see why this is so in §9. it has the characteristics that Aristotle ascribes to it in IV. discussed in IV. So far we have been focusing primarily on practical wisdom as it is manifested in the life of an individual. First. the constitution that is most appropriate for all city-states.Introduction xli Given the identity of practical wisdom and statesmanship.

The difference is in­ structive." he says. See 1 309'14-26. l l . The first sort of person is some­ one who knows all of the various techniques of rhetorical persuasion. on its role in designing constitutions 23. The world is the way it is. 1 3 1 0'2-12. 24. and. which seldom presents us with ideal circumstances.xlii Introduction virtuous person can know or possess. can a statesman do something so ap­ parently unethical as to provide a tyrant with the type of information Aristotle provides in V. "may be called a rhetorician on the basis of his scientific knowledge and another on the basis of his deliberate choice" (Rh. then. for that matter-seems to have the effect. Now all Aristotle tells us is that a statesman must "study" ( 1 288h22) the various things we listed. we need to know what the first person knows. and the statesman has to make the best of it. 1 3 1 5•40-hl O . in­ cluding the illegitimate ones. 23 The fact that Aristotle thinks that statesmen (whether as political leaders themselves or as advisors to them) need to study more than just the ideal constitution is a tribute. On Aristotle's view. And that is quite compatible. But is that how Aristotle uses his own political knowledge in the Politics? Arguably. so that we can confute anyone who "argues unfairly. How. resources are what they are. since the psychological state activated in its exercise just is complete virtue (NE 1 145•1-6). of making their constitutions more just by making them come closer to promoting the common benefit. at least. The second is someone who knows what the first person knows but will use even illegitimate persuasive devices when needed . 1 355b l 8 -20). In the Politics Aristotle focuses on what we might call the uni­ versalist side of practical wisdom. with his making only ethical use of what he finds out as a result of such study. it is. on the other. For the advice that he gives the tyrant-and the oligarchs and democrats. of course. aiming not at the common benefit but at that of the tyrant himself (§9). to his own hard­ headedness (see 1 288b33-39). to the recalcitrance of reality. 1 355•29-33)." but we should not use the illegitimate techniques ourselves (Rh. Its exercise is an exercise in virtue. 1309h18-35. information that helps him stay in power? Tyranny is an unjust constitution. power is distributed as it is. Isn't helping to keep it in existence it­ self an act of injustice? A distinction Aristotle uses in discussing rhetoric has important bear­ ing on this matter. on the one hand. 1324h22-1325'14 i s particularly worth reading i n this regard. "One person. . 24 In the Politics Aristotle focuses on an aspect of practical wisdom which is much less prominent in the Nicomachean Ethics.

Hence the universalist side of his wisdom comes to the fore. Here the emphasis is on deciding what it is best to do in a particular case in which laws give at best fairly minimal guidance. 1 272b5-7. Our focus now will be on the na­ ture of that activity. by contrast. 1 39-97. therefore. Rh. And when our universal account is like that. 1 282bl .Introduction xliii and developing universal laws appropriate to them or to existing ones. the account of particular cases is all the more inexact" ( 1 1 04'3-7. and on the relationship between it and the practical activ­ ity we discussed in §5. have no fixed answers. 56-98. 1286'7-b40. they do not have to devise them for themselves. is charged with the business of devel­ oping laws in the first place. .6. and should leave as little as possible to "so unreliable a standard as human wish" ( 1 272bS-7). like questions about health. 1 374'18-b23.25 In the Nicomachean Ethics. NE 1 137bl 3-32. The major task they face is therefore the particularist one of determining what to do in these particular circumstances in light of the laws. 1 2 87'28 -32. we need to study both the Ethics and the Politics. if we are to understand practical wisdom or statesman­ ship correctly. 26. 69-92. We are forcefully reminded. on the other hand. we need to see both its sides. also 1 094b 14-22. It goes without saying.26 §6 Theorizers The political life is one of the three most favored types of lives. the second type of rational activity in which our good consists. Another is the life of study or contemplation (bios theiiretikos). or of modifying existing ones. See 1 269'9 . The explanation of this difference of focus is plain enough: private in­ dividuals within a city-state are given by the constitution itself the laws that must guide their decisions. however. In any case. Study of any of the various sciences Aristotle recognizes is an exercise of understanding (nous) and is a theoretical activity of some sort: 25. Rh.1 2. the particularist side of practical wisdom is more in focus. in which theoreti­ cal activity plays a very important role. see my Practices of Reason. of the limited utility of laws and principles: "questions about actions and ex­ pediency. that even statesmen will often have to be particularists as well in order to deal effectively with problems that outstrip the letter of the law. He claims that the laws should be as complete and detailed as possible. For further discussion of the topics covered in this section. The statesman. 1374' 1 8 -b23).

For although we grasp only a little of the former. The other reasons are these: God is the best or most estimable thing there is. no matter how numerous or large they are.xliv Introduction Of all beings naturally composed. things that are ungenerated and imperish­ able for the whole of eternity are the best kind to study. some are ungenerated and imper­ ishable for the whole of eternity. . so that theology. 27 The Aristotelian cosmos consists of a series of concentric spheres. That is why only the study of theology fully expresses wisdom (NE 1 1 412"1 6-20 with APo. with the earth at its center. because both the starting points of the inquiry and the things we want to know about present extremely few appearances to sense perception. the very best is God himsel£ Hence the very best theoretical activity consists in the study of God: theology. For even in the study of animals that are unattractive to the senses. because he is a pure or matter­ less form (Metaph. Both studies have their attractions. 87"3 1-37). our knowledge of them has the advantage over the other. Among these. we get more pleasure from it than from all the things around us. He is 27. But he does not act on the universe to cause it to move. or first cause of motion in the universe. He is not its efficient cause. The former possess value-indeed divin­ ity-but we can study them less. (PA 644b22. God is the eternal first mover. . they have their own compensations in comparison with the philosophy con­ cerned with divine things. But because our information about the things around us is better and more plentiful. He is also the most intelligi­ ble or most amenable to study of all things. . the nature that fashioned them likewise offers immeasurable pleasures to those who are naturally philosophical and can learn the causal explanations of things. j ust as a small and random glimpse of those we love pleases us more than an exact view of other things. yet be­ cause of the value of what we grasp. the science that studies him. whereas others are subject to com­ ing-to-be and perishing. . And be­ cause they are closer to us and more akin to our nature. 983'5-7. We are better equipped to ac­ quire knowledge about the perishable plants and animals because they grow beside us. 1026'1 0-32). 1075'1 1-12). One reason Aristotle holds this view about theology is this. He moves it in the way that an object of love causes motion in the things that love or desire it (DA 415"26-b7). 1074h34. is the most estimable sci­ ence (Metaph. and much can be learned about each existing kind if one is willing to take sufficient pains.645"10) As we see from this passage.

they achieve the greatest happiness possible (NE 1 1 77h26-1 1 79'32). until we understand what God is. eternally. Hence they best approximate God's condition by giving birth to offspring with the same form. 983'6-7). 28 Human beings participate in the divine in the same way as other ani­ mals do by having children. This is a struggle for life or ex­ istence. 1 074b33-35). an unmoved mover (Metaph. as themselves: The most natural act for any living thing that has developed nor­ mally .Introduction xlv its teleological cause. But most living things are both generated and perishable. For God. Aristotle claims. Theology is more intelligible. They thus become much more like God than they do by having children. theology can fully illuminate itself. and famously opaque. And once we do see them in that light we still do not understand them fully until we understand theology. NE 1 141'16-20. a plant). APo. than the other sciences for just this reason: the other sciences contain an area of dark­ ness that needs to be illuminated by another science. 1 075'1 1-12. 1 072'25-27). 1074b34. 29. some­ thing they accomplish by trying to realize their own natures or forms as completely or perfectly as he realizes his. in order to partake as best it can in the eter­ nal and divine. is the loss of life or exis­ tence. is to produce another like itself (an animal producing an animal. or doing anything else. since the loss of form. formulation that God is noesis noeseiis noesis: "thought thinking itself" or "an understanding that is an understanding of understanding" (Metaph. Metaph. But they can participate in it yet more fully because they have understanding. (DA 4 1 5'26-h2) Because all things are in essence trying to be as much like God as possi­ ble. That is what is meant by the famous. and so belonging to the same species. Things express their love for God by trying to be as like him as possible. as we saw in §4. is a pure understanding who is contemplating or holding in thought the complete science of himself: theology (Metaph. That is what all things strive for. we cannot understand them fully unless we see them in that light. since he is ungenerated and imperishable. . a plant. 28. . and hence better to study. Now God realizes his form perfectly and. and everything they do naturally is for the sake of that.29 Hence when human beings are actually studying theology they are participating in the very activity that is God himself. 87'3 1-37. . 1 14 l b2-8. In the process. on Aristotle's view.

What the present argument adds is that understanding is fully realized when it is the study of the most intelligi­ ble science: theology. What explains this caginess may not be faint-heartedness on Aristo­ tle's part. dialectically balancing the claims of the po­ litical life against the philosophical. the philosophical life is that of "an alien cut off from the political community" . 1 334b 1 S). the politi­ cal life and the philosophical or theoretical life (Pol. We saw how close that ar­ gument comes to identifying our nature or essence with theoretically ra­ tional activity.xlvi Introduction If we ask how Aristotle reaches this conclusion. as in the case of activities. Since this view of happiness has deep roots in Aristotle's larger theo­ ries. Aristotle himself is quite decisive and consistent on the first question: happiness is activity expressing virtue. EE 1 2 1 7'24-29). Once that is granted. Similarly. These lives sound like the activities already discussed but must not be confused with them. But it does not tell us what the best life is. but a confusion on ours. the palm of victory invariably goes to theoretical activity. . extolling its pleasures as highest of all ( 1 267'10-12). Yet when he turns to an explicit discussion of the best life in VII 2-3 . 1 324'29-3 1 ). the contenders are practical activity and theoretical activity. Yet Aristotle's commitment to it often seems equivocal or faint-hearted. perfectionism straightway identifies happiness with the activity of understanding fully realized (Pol. and psychology. he is cagey. Aristotle often explicitly says. for example. when he is discussing the soul in connection with the goals of legislation in VII. This is as true in the Politics as it is in the Nicomachean Ethics. These texts lead us to expect a round defense of the more divine life of study as the best human life. as Aristotle says. "most of all our understanding" (NE 1 1 68b3 1-33 with 1 1 78'2-8). indeed. The political life involves taking part in politics with other people and participating in a city-state ( 1 3 24'1 5-16). In the Politics. We need to distinguish the question of what happiness is from the question of what the best or happi­ est life is. but not giving decisive precedence to either. there are two contenders. it is not something that he could abandon without major surgery on his metaphysics. we are returned to his perfectionism and to the function argument. l4. theory of knowledge. Here. that no being can be happy to any degree without understanding (NE 1 1 78h24-32. he identifies philosophy as the virtue needed for the best use of leisure ( 1 3 34'23). We are. he strongly implies that theoreti­ cal activity is preferable to practical activity ( 1 333'27-29). however. although practical activity is often awarded second prize.

the philosophical life as charac­ terized in the Politics. without making that presupposition (this way of raising the question is set aside as not an appropriate one for statesmanship). and fellow citizens (NE 1 097b8-14. 1 1 78h3-7. which is "something divine" ( 1 1 77h30). But it is not a life in which practical political activity is the primary goal. That seems to be the gist of 1 324'13-29. second. desires. It is the task of practical wisdom (statesmanship) to provide human beings with a life of this sort: practical wisdom is thus "a kind of stew­ ard of wisdom. But a life filled with that activity alone. EE 1249b9-2 1 ). when compared 30. In this respect it is like the philosophical life. friends. procuring leisure for it and its task" (MM 1 1 98b l 7-20).30 And what we see from the answer it gives is that the best life must involve both unleisured po­ litical activity and leisured theoretical activity ( 1 333'30-hS). and it must be organized so as to promote and facilitate theoretical activity ( 1 1 77hl-24. then.1 7) to satisfy those appetites and desires. We have needs and inter­ ests that stem from our emotions. the question to be answered is: Which of the two lives should the best constitution provide to its citizens? This is a question statesmanship does try to answer. §7). If we adopt the first approach. and must be organized so that the former is for the sake of the latter ( 1 334'4-5). "would be too high for a human being" ( 1 1 77h26-27). This life is "happiest in a secondary way" (NE 1 1 78'9).Introduction xlvii ( 1 324' 1 6 . wife. from our merely human nature ( 1 1 78'9-22).1 7) and "released from external concerns" ( 1 324'27-28)." It cannot be the philosophical life. we can do so in two different ways ( 1 324'13-23): first. . children. Thus a happy human life needs an adequate supply of external goods (NE 1 1 0 1 ' 1 4. It is too high. When we raise the question of which of these is best. presupposing that life in a city-state is preferable for everyone. because our "nature is not self-sufficient enough for theoretical activity" ( 1 1 78h33-35). On this topic too the Nicomachean Ethics seems to tell the same story as the Politics (although it may well be telling it without presupposing that life in a city-state is best for everyone). it is one in which theoretical activity occupies that posi­ tion. and appetites. this is not the life of "an alien cut off from the political com­ munity. and so must be the po­ litical one. as well as a need to theorize that stems from our understanding. Theoretical activity is com­ plete happiness "if it receives a complete span of life" (1 1 77b24-26). Manifestly. it must be choiceworthy and lacking in nothing for a political animal whose happi­ ness depends on that of his parents. because a human being is a political animal (§7).

such as an Aristotelian household or city-state? Why not think that. but before we do we should look at the doctrines themselves. which is second-class happiness ( 1 178'8-10. political animals are a subclass of herding or gregarious animals that "have as their task (ergon) some single thing that they all do together. §7 Political Animals Aristotle famously claims that a human being is by nature a political an­ imalY Less famously. 1 253'7-18). 1253'1).xlviii Introduction to the philosophical life. ." Thus bees. But it might instead be taken to mark simply a difference in values or preferences. The latter is represented as abnor­ mal. See Pol. We now have some idea at least of what Aristotle means by saying that a human being is a political animal. We shall analyze that argument below. In HA 487h33-488'14. while others live solitary lives. indeed. because it has to contain a substantial amount of political activity. namely. unlike bees and ants. 1 252h30. For rational speech "is for making clear what is beneficial or harmful. But why should we think that they will best actualize this capacity in a community of a particular sort. ants. a house­ hold or city-state.1 8. which they alone possess. because they are naturally equipped for life in a type of community that is itself more quintessentially political than a beehive or an ant nest. According to Aristotle. and it is community in these that makes a household and a city-state" ( 1 253'14-1 7). EE 1242•19-28. wasps. and human beings are all political animals in this sense (HA 487h33-488'10). that they are based on the very same argument ( 1 252'24-1253'19). 1278b 1 5 -30. and hence also what is just or unjust . 1 253'7. These doctrines are closely related­ so closely. It may well be as uncontroversial to say that human beings have a nat­ ural capacity to live in communities with others as it is to make parallel claims about bees and ants. 32. NE 1 162' 1 6-19. But what does he mean by the far 3 1 . . Aristotle says that man "dualizes. . something that exists by nature (Pol. But human beings are more political than these others (Pol. 1 1 69b16-22. What equips human beings to live in such communi­ ties is the natural capacity for rational speech. §5)." that some live in groups. human beings might realize their natures equally well either in iso­ lation or in some other kind of political or nonpolitical community?32 We shall return to these questions in due course. but perhaps more controversially. he also claims that the city-state is itself a natural phenomenon.

this desire leads them to form a couple (a type of community or communal relation) with members of the opposite sex ( 1 252"27-30). so good: our desire to reproduce is something we share in common with the other animals. But it is easy to slide . potentialities that are parts of their natures are further actualized by craft. Instead. since something that comes into existence by nature has one (Ph 192b8-9). and is surely as much a natural fact about us as it is about them.1 6). however. now for Aristotle's argument in support of them.6). I shall say that something that has such a source has a canonical nature. as happens in the case of genuine craft products (Metaph. because in this way they participate to some degree at least in the divine (§6). Like other animals. 1 99" 1 5 . Not everything that has a canonical nature.xlix Introduction more mysterious claim that the city-state exists by nature? We saw in §4 that Aristotle thinks that things exist by nature only when they have a nature. For convenience. We shall first go through the argument much as Aristotle does. or alteration" (Ph . l 336b 40-1337"3). For example. To be sure. and these are acquired in part through habituation and the craft of education (NE 1 103"17-26. Thus the mere fact of a thing's needing to have its nature completed by craft or the like is no obstacle to its nature's being canonical. Their forms (or formal natures) do not flow into them from the souls or minds of a craftsman. growth and decay. he means that it has a canonical nature. 1 93b 5. "the best way to study these things is to observe their natural development from the beginning" ( 1 252"24-26)." he says. would suggest that when Aristotle says that the city-state exists by nature. So much for the doctrines. by the way he introduces his argument. but to perfect these they must acquire the virtues. "As in other cases. human beings exist by nature and so have canonical natures (Ph. Since they are sexually dimorphic. things that exist by nature are disjoint from things that are the products of a craft (Ph. 1 032•32-b l O). 1 332"39-b l l . human beings have a natural desire to reproduce. an inner "source of change and staying unchanged whether in respect of place. So far. indeed. 192b l 3-1 5). And this suggestion is borne out. Pol. This is strong evidence that he is intend­ ing to establish that city-states have a canonical nature. . Then we shall step back from the details of the argument to assess its overall strategy. then. Doctrinal continuity alone. But things that have their canon­ ical natures perfected by craft are not products of craft. realizes or per­ fects its nature by nature: craft is sometimes needed "to perfect or com­ plete the task that nature is unable to perfect or complete" (Ph. 192b8-33). commenting on each stage of it as we go.

Aristotle believes that this subordination is itself natural: women ought to be ruled by men. since the deliberative part of their souls "lacks authority" ( 1 260• 1 3). and child-bearing is shared more widely among the animals" ( 1 1 62•1 6 -19. that men and women with the same natural abilities and talents should receive the same education and play the same social roles. for example. and more necessary. Probably what he has in mind is that women lack authority over others. We might wonder. provided him with some empirical justification for this view. or of unoppressed or differently so­ cialized women. whether the empirical evidence actually favors the view that human be­ ings form couples in the way suggested. Are there such people? Probably not. No doubt the observation of oppressed Greek women. . because they are "naturally inferior" to them. the human desire for sexual union is fur­ ther characterized as follows: "The friendship of man and woman also seems to be natural. people who benefit from being wholly under the authority of a MASTER because their souls altogether lack a deliberative element ( 1 254• 1 0. That is one problem. 34. The first is that the household involves the subordination of WOMEN to men. the fact that it is built into Aristotle's conception of the household as something natural shows clearly just how controversial that conception actually is. But this charac­ terization is obviously controversial. Is Aristotle just claiming that sexual coupling for the purposes of reproduction is nat­ ural? Or is he saying more than this? In the Nicomachean Ethics. 2 1 7-20. to the extent that the household is prior to the city-state. 1 260• 1 2). 34 In any case. it is not clear why they 33. we might wonder whether they do naturally form Aristotelian households. socialized into passivity. Yet more controversial is Aristotle's claim that the household essen­ tially contains natural SLAVES ( 1 252b9 .Introduction from what is uncontentious into what is controversial. would do much to undermine this as a general hypoth­ esis about all females.1 2) or "animate property" ( 1 253b32). For human beings naturally tend to form couples more than to be political. 133 Sh37-1336•2 is worth reading in this regard.33 More important. See my Philosopher-Kings. It is regrettable that Aristotle does not discuss Plato's claims (Republic V) that the natural differences between men and women should have no politi­ cal consequences. also EE 1 242•22-26). To be sure. or whether this is not rather a social norm than a norm of nature. Two features of these are bound to give us particular pause in this regard . because they lack the spirit (thumos) required for command. But even if there were natural slaves. But a clear­ eyed survey of the animal kingdom.

The final stage in the emergence of the city-state. We don't have slaves. 12). we have to be told what they are. To determine whether these nonroutine needs are natural.35 freed (suppos­ edly) natural slaves do not simply die like flies.Introduction li would need masters. But all that Aristotle says is that house­ holds have to engage in barter with one another when the need arises ( 1 257• 19-25). to count as a village a community of several households must be governed in a characteristic way. We might wonder. Somewhat similar problems beset the next stage in the emergence of the city-state: the village. and we survive. Not only is Aristotle's conception of the household politically or eth­ ically controversial. since masters have bodies of their own and are capable of working on their own behalf. First. it is unclear why they need slaves in order to survive. by a king ( 1 252b20-22). Masters may indeed ben­ efit from having slaves to do the donkey work. But this is very implausible. because the things they ex­ change with one another seem to be just the sorts of things that the household itself is supposed to be able to supply. that it is better for animals to be ruled by man "since this will keep them safe" ( 1 254hiO-l 3). then. with all the heads of households ruling and being ruled in turn. because villages are off­ shoots of households. Aristotle explains. even if we granted him its controversial elements. he could succeed in showing that it is natural because "naturally constituted to satisfy everyday needs" (1252h12-14). but it isn't clear that. Second. yet they seem to survive quite nicely without human masters who can deliberate. while they spend their leisure on philosophy or politics ( 1 255b36-37). however. in which the eldest is king ( 1 252b20-22). a head of household rules his wife with political rule (1. For example. the village is "constituted from several households for the sake of satisfying needs other than everyday ones" ( 1252h1 5-16). therefore. or why the latter would need them. that is to say. This does not help very much. not just kingly rule. This is natural. and the conclusion of Aristotle's argument that the city-state exists by nature and that a human being is a political animal. Aristotle also believes. such as wine and wheat ( 1 257•2 5-28). on Aristotle's view. The problem is that on Aristotle's own view households involve various kinds of rule. namely. but. is presented in the following terse and convoluted passage: 3 5 . why a village has to be governed with kingly rule rather than with political rule. Animals also lack the capacity to deliberate. . Aristotle's own view is that masters and slaves form a union "for the sake of their own survival" ( 1 252•30-3 1).

is best. but what sustains a city-state in existence is that we are able to live well and achieve happi­ ness only in it. village. more of these needs seem to be better satisfied in the city-state than outside it (see 1278b 17-30)." we are told. that is to say. "An impulse toward this sort of community. . (B) separates what gives rise to the city-state from what sustains it once it exists. 1 2 6 1 '27-29). has reached the goal of pretty much total SELF-SUFFICIENCY. then. house­ holds. practically speaking. HA 487b33-488' 14). that a human being is by nature a politi­ cal animal. and that anyone who is without a city-state. [B] It comes to be for the sake of living. village. not by luck but by nature. constituted out of several villages. and self-sufficiency is both end and best. unlike the village. for we say that each thing's nature­ for example. a horse. What does this mean? It seems fairly clear that enough basic human needs are satisfied outside of the city-state for human life to be possible there: households and villages that are not parts of city-states do manage to persist for considerable pe­ riods of time ( 1 252b22-24. then villages. its end. since the first communities do. For the city-state is their end. (D) and (E) are the crucial clauses. individuals too can survive even in solitude ( 1 253'3 1-33. (D) tells us that household. Thus the city-state is self-sufficient not simply because our essential needs are satisfied there but because it is the community within which we perfect our natures ( 1 253'3 1-37). [E] It is ev­ ident from these considerations. "exists by nature in everyone" ( 1 2 53'29-30). [C) That is why every city-state exists by nature. then city-states. first. or a household-is the character it has when its coming-into-being has been completed. and mature adult: a single nature is present at each stage but developed or completed to different degrees. child. For it is always need that holds any community to­ gether as a single unit (NE 1 1 33b6-7). Where is that nature to be located? (E) suggests that it lies within the indi­ viduals who constitute the household. that of a human being.Iii Introduction [A] A complete community. that a city-state is among the things that exist by nature. but it remains in existence for the sake of living well. [D] Moreover. (1 252b27-1253'4) (A) tells us that the city-state. is a city-state. None the less. and city-state: they are po­ litical animals because their natural needs lead them to form. Fairly basic human needs do the former. is either a poor specimen or else superhuman. and city-state are like embryo. and nature is an end. once it reaches the limit of total self-sufficiency. that for the sake of which something exists.

village. This justifies us in speaking of a nature that is not simply constituted by the collective natures that individuals living anywhere would have. should suit its citizens to it by stamping de­ mocratic virtues into their souls by means of public education.Introduction Iiii The common nature of household. Aristotle says. each member of the household will have a nature of a sort that identifies him as a member of a household. But why assume that there is such a nature? Why not assume that there is just the collective natures of the inhabitants and nothing else? Imagine. Rather it is the same nature re­ alized. As a result. He is not born into a presocial state of nature of the sort described in Thomas Hobbes's Leviathan. a newborn baby. that marks him off as such. he shows himself to be. each indexes their na­ tures to itself. as it were. Since the human function or nature is ra­ tional activity expressing virtue. one's conception of hap36. Hence from the very beginning he is leading a sort of communal life. for a moment. developed. constitution. But. and city-state lies in their inhabitants. by nature democratic. Hence an individual who is a citizen of a democracy has a nature that marks him as such. It is worth expanding briefly on the further significance of this con­ clusion. located in the inhabitants of the house­ hold. or perfected to different degrees. even though we shall return to it in greater detail in §9. is the nature of the household. an oli­ garchy should do the same with oligarchic virtues. As we saw.1 8). This common nature. to pick up the point made in (D). but of one that is the nature of household dwellers as such. Each community educates its inhabitants into a type of virtue that suits them to be members of it. and so on ( 1 3 10•12-36. When he performs his function or realizes his nature by engaging in rational activity expressing virtue. If one has them in their unqualified form. The clearest examples of this sort of indexing are pro­ vided by the various types of constitutions that city-states can have: a democracy. this nature should not be thought of as wholly different from that possessed by citizens of other constitutions or by members of a village or household . Aristotle distinguishes household justice (to oikonomikon dikaion) from city­ state or political justice at NE 1 334bl 5-18. 1 337• 1 0 . And because he is leading such a life he is acquiring virtue of a sort (household virtue36). he is born into a family. the virtues of character determine one's conception of happiness (§5). The same line of argument applies in the case of the village and the city-state. . for it is "in the house­ hold we have the first sources and springs of friendship. and justice" (EE 1242•40-b 1). then.

not just in the sense that. It is for this reason that Aristotle thinks that human beings are by na­ ture political animals. like bees. But it is only in the best constitu­ tion that the virtues inculcated in a citizen through public education are unqualifiedly virtues of character (111. This presents a practical problem which it is an exercise of practical wisdom to solve. 1 293bJ-7). for example). Starting with the household. and new opportunities for the exercise of (a further developed) practical wis- . for example. only in a city-state. The move from household to village or from village to city-state coin­ cides. then. Its adult males possess a level of practical wisdom which they bring to bear in solving practical problems. It follows that in no other constitution will the virtues that suit citizens to the constitution provide them with a correct conception of their happiness or with un­ qualified practical wisdom. as we have seen) essentially involves a devel­ opment in their rational capacities. then. Hence to perfect their natures human beings must acquire the unqualified virtues of character. But this they do. what we have is a series of types of virtue and types of practical wisdom suited to different types of communities and constituting a single nature that is realized or developed to different degrees in these different communities. that the household already exists. new virtues of character (such as generosity and magnificence which pertain to wealth). whether practical (political) or theoretical. And it might be solved. they are natu­ rally found in communities. with a development in human virtue and practical w�sdom. The household is not self-sufficient: it produces a surplus of some needed items. new forms of communal control (laws governing commerce). in a city-state with the best constitution. an increase in the level of the practical wisdom they possess. the development would itself be one that occurred through the operation of nonrational natural causes.4.liv Introduction piness will be correct. their natural development (which is always communal. How should we conceive of this development as occurring? If human beings were nonrational animals. and one will possess practical wisdom in its un­ qualified form (NE 1 144b30 -1 14Sb2). Imagine. by notic­ ing that other nearby households are in the same boat. not enough of others. Aristotle has argued. for example. more specifically. The function argument has shown that human nature consists in ratio­ nal activity. then. But ex­ change eventually leads to the need for money and with it to the need for new communal roles (that of merchant. and that exchang­ ing goods with them would improve life for everyone involved. but also in the stronger sense that they per­ fect their natures specifically in political communities of a certain sort. But because human beings have a rational nature.

Introduction lv dom. or growth and decay. This account is modeled on the one Aristotle tells at 1 257' 14-hS. since it would conflict with the characterization of the city-state as existing by nature. or alteration"? A city-state is a hylomorphic compound. or that statesmanship (practical wisdom) is itself a craft. Since. and often likens statesmanship to a craft. a compound of matter and form: its form is its constitution. 743hZ0-25. this sort of talk would be disturb­ ing. 1268h34-38. its inhabi­ tants are its matter (Pol. 1 325h40-1 326'5. understood in the way we have been dis­ cussing. as we have seen. but a virtue of thought (NE VI. 1274b18-19. . Statesmanship (practical wisdom) is in fact not a craft. there­ fore. but it is just what we would expect given the close ties between our natures and its nature.37 1t is by engaging in this bootstrapping process that practical wis­ dom both causes new forms of communal life to emerge and causes itself to develop from the vestigial forms of it found in the household to the unqualified form of it found in Aristotle's best constitution. The appearance of the city-state at a stage in this process can now quite naturally be thought of as an exercise of practical wisdom or statesmanship. need to be perfected by craft. 789h8-12). will be a city-state. 1273h32-33. But does it have the others? Is it a "source of change and staying unchanged whether in respect of place. 39 If things possessing a canonical nature had to perfect their natures by nature. includ­ ing our own. as we saw in §4. is manifestly internal to it. 39. See Pol. 1 276b l-1 3). as the result (say) of a legislator having crafted a consti­ tution for a collection of suitably situated villages which. It thus has one of the defining marks of a canonical nature. 1282b 14-16. a self­ sufficient political community. a thing's 37. and analogizes nature to a craft ( GA 73Qb27-32. The nature of a city-state. But. like a table. many canonical natures. however. After all. But nature is not a craft nor are its products craft products.38 Notice that Aristotle himself often characterizes the city-state as something crafted by legislators. GA 73 1 '24 ).4-8). when appro­ priately realized by them and their members. Aristotle speaks of nature as crafting animals and other things (PA 645'7-10. 38. 1253'30-3 1 . It is important to be clear. That the legislator in question may not have been brought up in the com­ munity for which he is developing a constitution should not blind us to the fact that the practical wisdom he exercises in developing that constitution is itself a communal achievement-an achievement internal to community. that the fact that Aris­ totle speaks of statesmanship (practical wisdom) as crafting (demiourgein) a city-state or its constitution does not mean that either is a product of craft. That the city-state's nature is among them is not only no threat to its being a canonical nature.



form has a better claim to being called its nature than does its matter,
what we are really asking is whether Aristotle thinks that a city-state's
constitution is a source of its stability and change in the way that a
canonical nature is. And surely he does. A city-state can change its mat­
ter (population) over time, but cannot sustain change from one kind of
constitution to another ( 1 276"34-h l ) , or dissolution of its constitution
altogether ( l 272h l4-15). Thus its identity over time is determined by its
constitution. A population constitutes a single city-state if it shares a
single constitution ( 1 276"24-26). Thus its synchronic unity, its identity
at a time, is also determined by its constitution. A city-state can grow or
shrink in size, but its constitution sets limits to how big or small it can be
(VII.4-5). What causes it to decay or to survive is also determined by
the type of constitution it has (Book V discusses these constitution-spe­
cific causes in considerable detail). Thus a city-state's constitution is in­
deed a canonical nature, an inner source of stability and change, and the
city-state meets all of Aristotle's conditions for existing by nature. It is
no surprise, therefore, to find Aristotle claiming that the various kinds of
constitutions, the various kinds of natures that city-states possess, are to
be defined in the same way as the different natures possessed by animals
belonging to different species ( l 29Qh2S-39).
So far we have been discussing the individual human beings in a city­
state. But the very same process of nature indexing that occurs in them
as they become parts of a city-state also occurs in the various subcom­
munities that make up that city-state. Consider the village, for example.
When it is not yet part of a city-state, a village is a kingship. But when it
becomes part of a democratic city-state (say), though it may perhaps
have a village elder of some sort, it is no longer a kingship plain and sim­
ple. For in a democracy authority is in the hands of all the free male citi­
zens. Hence though the village elder may exercise kingly rule over village
affairs, he must do so in a way that fits in with the democratic constitu­
tion of which his village is a part. And in that constitution he is under the
authority of others as a real king is not. The same is true of the house­
hold. Various types of rule are present in the household, as we saw, but
these are transformed when the household becomes part of a city-state.
For the sort of virtue that a head of household possesses and the sort he
tries to develop or encourage in its other members must themselves be
suited to the larger constitution of which his household is a part (Pol.
1. 12-13). Thus households and villages that are parts of a city-state have
natures that are transformed by being indexed to the constitution of that
city-state. It is this that makes them into genuine parts of it.



With the details of Aristotle's argument before us, we are in a position
to assess its merits. We have seen that Aristotle's precise characterization
of the emergence of the city-state is not very compelling: his concep­
tions of the household and the village are far too contentious to be cred­
ible. None the less, he is surely right in thinking that we are (in some
sense or other) social animals from the very beginning of our lives, and
that more sophisticated forms of communal life emerge from more
primitive ones through some sort of rational bootstrapping. We might
agree with Aristotle in principle, therefore, while wanting to haggle over
the details. But, details aside, has Aristotle really shown that we are in­
deed political animals, that we do perfect our natures in a specifically po­
litical community, in a city-state?
To answer this question we need to explore Aristotle's views on polit­
ical communities or city-states in a little more detail. In Politics I, Aris­
totle characterizes the city-state in rather abstract ways: the city-state is
the community with the most authority; it is the most self-sufficient
community, one that is ruled in its own characteristic way, different
from that in which a master rules his slaves or a head of household rules
his wife and children. When he puts meat on these abstract bones, how­
ever, we see that an Aristotelian city-state is quite like a modern state in
these important respects: it establishes the constitution, designs and en­
acts the laws, sets foreign and domestic policy, controls the armed forces
and police, declares war, enforces the law, and punishes criminals (for
example, 1 328b2-23). Our question can then be reformulated as follows:
has Aristotle shown that human beings can only perfect their natures in
a political community that is in these ways like a state? Or in any other
community just in case it is a part of such a community?
Many people believe that leading the good life involves practicing a
religion and living according to its dictates as a member of a religious
community or church. But there are many different religions with dif­
ferent such dictates, many different religious communities. If the city­
state enforced any one religion or exerted more than fairly minimal au­
thority within the religions it allowed, it would have to prevent many of
its citizens from leading the good life as they understand it. To ensure
that this does not happen the city-state must be largely neutral on mat­
ters of religion, church and city-state must be separate, and the good life
must be lived somewhat outside the purview of the city-state, in reli­
gious communities largely protected from city-state intrusion. People
who conceive of the good life in this way, therefore, will not accept Aris­
totle's argument. They will, perhaps, see the need for a city-state, but



they will reject the idea that we perfect our natures or achieve our good
only as members of it: it is as members of nonpolitical communities that
we do that.
Many people also believe that leading the good life involves following
the cultural traditions and speaking the language of their own culture or
ethnic group. Aristotle would agree with them, but this is very largely
because he assumes that city-states (or at least their citizens) will be eth­
nically, nationally, and even religiously homogeneous ( 1 1 27b22-36,
1 328b l l-1 3): he is no cosmopolitan. Modern states by contrast are in­
creasingly multicultural and polyethnic. If they are to respect the rights
of their citizens, and allow them (within limits) to pursue their own con­
ceptions of the good, they need to be supportive of cultural and ethnic
diversity. They should not use their coercive powers to promote one cul­
ture or one ethnicity at the expense of others. Again, this means that
most people will achieve the good or perfect their natures as members of
different ethnic communities, and not as members of city-states as such.
Religion, nationality, and ethnicity aside, it is perhaps more natural
for us to think of public political life as being like work, something we
engage in in order to "be ourselves" in our private lives and leisure time.
We are most ourselves, we think, not in any public sphere, but in the pri­
vate one. Politics, like work, is necessary, but it is valuable primarily for
what it makes possible, not in itself.
These styles of objection can of course be generalized. Many people,
including probably most of us, believe that, at least as things stand, there
are many different, equally defensible conceptions of the human good
and the good life. We want to make room in the city-state for many of
these conceptions. We want to be left free to undertake what John Stuart
Mill calls "experiments in living" in order to discover new conceptions.
Consequently, we do not want the city-state to enforce any one concep­
tion of the good life but to be largely neutral. We want it to allow differ­
ent individuals and different communities (religious, ethnic, national) to
pursue their own conceptions of the good, provided that they do so in
ways that allow other individuals and communities to do the same. If we
hold views of this sort, we will not agree with Aristotle that we perfect
our natures or achieve our good as members of the city-state. We will
claim instead that we do so as members of communities that share our
conception of the good, but that lack the various powers, most particu­
larly the coercive powers, definitive of the city-state.
Needless to say, it might be responded on Aristotle's behalf that this
criticism of his argument for the naturalness of the city-state simply ig-



nares the function argument, since it implicitly denies (or at least seri­
ously doubts) that the human good just does consist in practical activity
or in theorizing. This is a reasonable response so far as it goes. But, as we
saw in §4, the function argument is compelling only to the degree that it
is underwritten by the facts of ethical and political experience. And what
is surely true is that those facts no longer underwrite it completely.
What experience has taught us is that there are many different human
goods, many different good lives, many different ways to perfect our­
selves, and much need for further experimentation and discovery in
these areas. That is one reason we admire somewhat liberal states which
recognize this fact and give their citizens a lot of liberty to explore vari­
ous conceptions of the good and to live in the way that they find most
valuable and worthwhile.40

§8 Rulers and Subjects
A human being is by nature a political animal, but there is more than
one way for him to encounter the political: he can do so either as a ruler
or as a subject. Moreover, just how he should encounter it is determined
by his nature, and by the natures of the other people in his city-state.
Though all human beings share a nature, they also differ from one an­
other by nature: men are naturally different from women, adults from
children, naturally free people from natural slaves. Some of these nat­
ural differences, such as differences in physical strength, are ethically
and politically inert ( 1 282b23 - 1 283•14). But others, because they are
differences in the very properties that Aristotle's perfectionism sees as
constitutive of human nature, are not like that; they do have ethical and
political significance. Women's souls have a deliberative element but it
lacks authority; those of free children have a deliberative element but it
is immature; those of natural slaves have no deliberative element at all.
Hence none of these people can have unqualified practical wisdom or
40. Recent discussions of the topics in this section include D. Keyt, "Three
Basic Theorems in Aristotle's Politics," W. Kullmann, "Man as a Political
Animal in Aristotle," and F. D. Miller, Nature, Justice, and Rights in Aristo­
tle 's Politics, 3 - 66. Some recent works on the natural origins of human com­
munities and virtues include J. H. Barkow, L. Cosmides, and]. Tooby (eds.),
The Adapted Mind: Evolutionary Psychology and the Generation of Culture
(New York: Oxford University Press, 1 992); M. Ridley, The Origins of
Virtue: Human Instincts and the Evolution of Cooperation (New York: Viking,
1997); R. Wright, The Moral Animal (New York: Vintage, 1994).



ethical virtue ( 1 260•9-bZO). And because they cannot, Aristotle thinks
that they should properly encounter the political only as subjects
(1 2S4bl 3-14 with 1277b2S-30). In the case of women and slaves, this is
their permanent status; in the case of the male children of free people, it
is theirs until they are mature adults.
But even adult males, such as the citizens of Aristotle's best constitu­
tion, who possess unqualified practical wisdom and virtue, and who may
encounter the political as rulers, are not guaranteed always to encounter
it in this fashion. If someone of outstanding practical wisdom emerges
in their community, they are obliged to become his subjects and accept
him as their king ( 1 284b25-34) . Thus a man's status as a ruler, unless he
happens to have a degree of unqualified practical wisdom and virtue that
is unsurpassable, is a fragile or vulnerable one; it is not absolute.
A person encounters the political as a ruler or a subject, but he also
encounters it as a ruler of a certain kind or as a subject of a certain kind.
And here too the determining factors are his own degree of practical
wisdom or virtue and that of others. Lacking a deliberative element, nat­
ural slaves are properly ruled with a master's rule (which is nonconsul­
tative and only incidentally in the slave's best interests). Possessed of an
immature deliberative element, free children are properly ruled with
kingly rule (which is nonconsultative but in the subject's best interests).
Possessed of a mature deliberative element that lacks authority, free
women are properly ruled with something close to political rule (which
is consultative and in their best interests). Possessed of a mature and au­
thoritative deliberative element that is none the less imperfect, free
adult males should sometimes rule their fellow citizens with political
rule and sometimes be ruled by them, turn and turn about. But where
some other male has superior practical wisdom and virtue, they should
be permanently ruled by him with kingly rule. In other words, they
should be as children to their superior in virtue and wisdom.
Aristotle thinks, then, that whether one encounters the political as a
ruler or as a subject, as a ruler of a certain sort or as a subject of a certain
sort, should depend in part on one's own degree of practical wisdom
and virtue and in part on the degree of practical wisdom and virtue pos­
sessed by others. This is a normative ethical or political doctrine. But he
also thinks that people do naturally differ in their degree of practical
wisdom and virtue in the ways we have just described. This is a factual
claim, subject to empirical refutation, a fate that some parts of it have
actually suffered; for what sensible person now believes in the subordi­
nation of women to men or in natural slaves? But even if the factual



claim were entirely true, it is not clear that it would support the norma­
tive ethical and political doctrines Aristotle rests on it.
Why should our status as rulers or subjects depend on the degree of
our practical wisdom or virtue? Aristotle does not directly confront this
question. And one reason he doesn't is that, like Plato before him, he
sees the city-state as analogous to the individual soul. In Politics 1. 5, for
example, he argues as follows: it is best for the body and desire to be
ruled by the part of the soul that has reason, that is to say, by practical
wisdom acting as the steward of understanding or theoretical reason
(§6); the city-state is analogous to the soul; hence it is best for those with
unqualified practical wisdom to rule those without it, whether they are
women, natural slaves, or wild animals ( 1 2 S4b6-20).
The psychological side of this analogy is relatively uncontroversial:
given Aristotle's characterization of practical wisdom as alone possess­
ing knowledge of the human good and of how best to achieve it, it surely
is best that practical wisdom should have authority over or rule the other
parts of the soul, since that maximizes the chances that the whole soul
and body, the whole person, will achieve what is best. But the political
side of the analogy is vastly more problematic.
We think that individual freedom or autonomy is a very important po­
litical value. We think not only that individuals want to achieve what is
in fact best, but that they want to be free to evaluate for themselves what
is best for them, and to act on their own j udgment about it. They want to
own their lives and choose their goals and projects for themselves, even
if this means that they sometimes make mistakes and regret their
choices. We are suspicious of paternalism, especially when it is exercised
by the state, and balk at the idea of having others determine what we
should do with our lives, even when they might be better qualified to
make such determinations than we are. Because autonomy does not
reach down below the individual, there is no comparable worry about
the parts of the soul. Autonomy is a personal, not a subpersonal, value.
Thus in making use of the analogy between the soul and the city-state as
a device for justifying rule in the latter, Aristotle conceals from himself
what is for us a fundamental political problem.41
4 1 . Another aspect of this problem is worth mentioning. It is harmless to claim
that practical wisdom should govern our economic activities. But it is very
controversial to claim, as Aristotle does ( 1 32 1 b12-1 8), that politics or the
city-state should regulate economic activities. Defenders of a free market
would object to the latter, not the former.



It might be replied in Aristotle's defense that he believes that those
capable of autonomy should be given it. It's just that he thinks that the
only truly free, the only genuinely autonomous people, the only ones
who are better off ruling themselves than being ruled by others, are
those who possess unqualified practical wisdom, since they alone are ca­
pable both of knowing their own good and of best achieving it. This is an
initially attractive defense, but it fails to be wholly compelling for an in­
teresting reason. We think that autonomy is intrinsic to a person. We
think that our status as autonomous beings depends on our intrinsic fea­
tures, not on those of other people. But Aristotle does not think analo­
gous thoughts about practical wisdom. For, as we saw, he thinks that
even people who have unqualified practical wisdom of a very high de­
gree can lose their status as rulers (as autonomous beings) if someone
with a much higher degree of practical wisdom appears in their commu­
nity. It is clear, therefore, that one's own degree of practical wisdom is
not for Aristotle a measure of one's degree of autonomy. One can have
more than enough practical wisdom to be autonomous, and still be
under the authority of others, when the others possess a higher degree
of practical wisdom than one's ownY
Because we think that autonomy is very important, we also think that
there is a deep problem of political legitimacy, a problem for the state in
justifying whatever degree of authority it claims to exercise over the
lives and actions of its citizens. The larger the impact this authority has
on autonomy, the more difficult the problem becomes. To see how diffi­
cult it is for Aristotle, therefore, we need to look at how much impact the
kind of authority he advocates has on the autonomy of the citizens sub­
ject to it.
Aristotle claims that a constitution should provide public education
from early childhood that gives its future citizens the sort of character,
the sorts of virtues, that will suit them to be its citizens in particular: a
democracy should stamp democratic virtues into its citizens' souls; an
oligarchy, oligarchic ones; and so on ( 1 3 1 0" 1 2-36, 1 337"10-1 8). These
different types of virtue are quite different, as we see from the discus­
sion of oligarchic and democratic conceptions of justice in 111 .9. Since
42. Notice that this would be a very surprising result if the exercise of states­
manship in ruling others were the human good (happiness) or the most im­
portant component of it. For Aristotle thinks that the reason A should rule
B is that B is better off or happier being ruled by A than by ruling himself.
But B could not be better off being ruled by anyone, if in fact ruling were
happiness or its most important component.

since that guarantees his happi­ ness. Aristotle does not respond directly to this criticism. it seems to do so only for con­ stitutions whose rulers do indeed have genuine practical wisdom. this is once again because he accepts the analogy between the city-state and the soul we discussed earlier: we positively and un­ problematically want practical wisdom to exercise goal-determining au­ thority within the soul of an individual. To some degree. largely determine their citizens' conceptions of the good. In democratic or oligarchic constitutions. since that will guarantee its happiness. In Aristotle's ideal constitution. Since they know what human happiness really is. so we want those who possess practical wisdom to exercise goal-determining authority in the city-state. 9). he largely ignores it. men possessed of unqualified practical wisdom rule one another by turns. they are able to design a system of public education that will pass on their knowledge to future citizens by inculcating the unqualified virtues of character in them. for the virtues incul­ cated in citizens to suit them to those constitutions do not coincide with the unqualified virtues of character. it follows that Aristotelian constitutions. But to the degree that this analogy provides any solution to the problem of political legitimacy at all. the goal­ determining authority exercised by the rulers in the ideal constitution is arguably in the best interests of the citizens. It is a small step to his confident conclusion that "living in a way that suits the constitution should not be considered slavery but . is surely one of the most important exercises in autonomy. what one's goals in life are to be. Yet. as in the case of the problem of autonomy itself. for example. Aristotle has a substantial problem of political legitimacy. it does not seem to be in anyone's best interests to consent to the kind of goal-determining rule found in such nonideal constitutions. it is a very different story. 7. He thinks that an educa­ tion that suits the constitution is the best safeguard of stability ( 1 3 10•14-18). but one can to some extent see how he would respond. however. through their control of education. and how best to achieve it. Hence the impact of such constitutions on autonomy is sub­ stantial. then. He thinks that people are better off living in a stable constitution of some kind. and so do not ensure the correct conception of happiness (§9).Introduction lxiii the virtues determine a person's conception of happiness or the human good (§§5. Since it does not seem to be in anyone's best interests to have such virtues. Since it is arguably in everyone's best interests to have those virtues and the true conception of happiness they guarantee. For discovering or deciding for oneself what one's good is.

Hence a stable. and educates its citizens accord­ ingly. one would be bet­ ter off living in such a constitution than in a rigid nonideal one. Surely a community that provided greater safeguards for autonomy would be a better option. But we might well wonder whether this is true.lxiv Introduction salvation" ( 1 3 1 0•34-36). but Aristotle's rather narrow brand of it. . But given the importance of au­ tonomy. Autonomy is an important value. 1997). and perhaps more plausible. for example. A rigid. critically reviews liberal arguments.34). that the state might need actively 43. Sher. and it will educate its citizens to be the engines of such transforma­ tion. Beyond Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Aristotle's ideal constitution is committed to allowing for its own transformation into an absolute kingship ( 1 284h2S. because rigid. however. If the analogy between city-state and soul justifies goal-determining rule in any constitution. on the other hand. That is the perfec­ tionist message of the function argument (§4 ). but on Aristotle's perfectionist view it is not the most important one. After all. it will allow for its own peaceful and orderly transformation into a constitution that better serves its citizen's inter­ ests. nonideal constitution cannot justify its goal-deter­ mining authority over its citizens by arguing that such authority serves their best interests. as arguably it is. will be supply adaptive. It is not perfectionism per se that threatens autonomy. by arming them with the means of discovering newer and more adequate conceptions of happiness. G. as surely they can. be a steadfast neutrality that allows individuals to work out their own life plans unimpeded but also largely unaided by the state. it would have to justify it in the best constitu­ tion. nonideal constitution. nonideal constitution resists all change. there would be room for an individual to exer­ cise autonomy in choosing which way in particular to perfect his nature. The problem with this defense is that it seems to confuse stability with rigidity. If our natures could be perfected in many different. even change for the better. or if the exercise of autonomy were itself a per­ fection. it is not clear that it is in one's best interests to live in a commu­ nity that allows one's autonomy to be vulnerable to that sort of threat. The best safeguard might. even if related ways. and a perfectionistically justified constitution would have to safeguard his capacity to make that choice and his capacity to live in the light of it.43 But it is also possible. happiness in the shape of practical po­ litical activity or theoretical activity takes that prize. A stable but nonrigid. Plainly. as liberal theorists of the state argue.

This allows him to see the importance of the middle classes. Rule by "the one" is either a kingship (correct) or a tyranny (deviant). provid­ ing the kind of public education. Compare NE 1095'17-1096'10: people agree that the human good is called happiness. Oligarchy is really control by the wealthy. One important difference between these constitutions is that they have different aims or goals ( 1 289' 1 7-28). among other things. rule by "the many" is either a polity (correct) or a democracy (deviant). It just so happens that the wealthy are always few in number. Our task in the present section is to un­ derstand these different constitutions. or a democracy. and to recognize the theoretical significance of a constitution. the few.44 The goal of the ideal constitu44. an oligarchy. Second. But there is another: the diversity exhibited by constitutions themselves. a so-called POLITY. First.Introduction lxv to safeguard the capacity for autonomy by.l l ) . and Aristotle's characterization of them as either correct or deviant. while the poor are always many ( 1 279b20-1 280•6. but introduces some important innovations. rule by "the few" is either an aristocracy (correct) or an oligarchy (deviant). democracy is really control by the poor. Hence just what a ruler or sub­ ject encounters in encountering the political also depends on the type of constitution he encounters it in. and fostering the kind of public debate. he argues that differences in wealth are of greater theoretical importance than differ­ ence in numbers. in which they play a decisive part ( 1 293•40-b l ) . or the many" ( 1 279•26-28): it can be either a monar­ chy. those who are neither very rich nor very poor but somewhere in between ( 1 29Sb l-3). The traditional Greek view is that a constitution can be controlled by "the one. Aristotle departs from tradition in thinking that each of these three traditional types of rule actually comes in two major varieties. one of which is correct and the other deviant ( 1 289bS . different conceptions of hap­ piness: "it is by seeking happiness in different ways and by different means that individual groups of people create different ways of life and different constitutions" ( 1 3 28'41-b2). Aristotle accepts this view to some ex­ tent. 1 290b l 7-20). but they disagree about what happiness actually is or consists in. and by preparing its citizens precisely to be citizens who themselves promote and safeguard autonomy. . that promotes it. §9 Constitutions Human beings encounter the political either as rulers or as subjects. That is one sort of political diversity.

sometimes as physical gratification ( 1 258"3 -4. Be­ cause different constitutions embody different conceptions of happi­ ness. Similarly. a genuine virtue is by definition something which guaran­ tees that a thing will achieve its end. Aristo­ crats. 9). Here the relationship between the accounts i s a little more difficult to see. and sometimes it too is said to be life as opposed to living well ( 1 280"3 1-32) . justice is complete virtue in relation to another (NE . on the other hand. So they think that the wealthiest should have authority over the constitution. but noble or virtuous living. participation in office. is unquali­ fied or blessed happiness ( 1 3 24"23-25). Hence they think that it is just for participation in the constitution to be based on virtue ( 1 283"24-26). as we saw in §4. A second important difference between these constitutions. or authority over the constitution) on the basis of one's contribution to achieving the goal of the constitution. The goal of a polity is a more modest level of that same sort of happiness. They all agree that justice is based on merit. and all should participate equally in office and its prerogatives. a conse­ quence of the first. But these accounts are related: people pursue wealth or property because they value life. think that the goal is neither wealth nor freedom. the goal of democracy is also multiply characterized: sometimes as freedom ( 1 3 1 0"29. For. they disagree about what this basis is. a level that most people and most city­ states can hope to attain ( 1 295"25-40). But perhaps what Aristotle has in mind is this: to value life is to value the freedom to satisfy those physical appetites that must be satis­ fied if life is to be sustained. whether it is a kingship or an aristocracy ( 1 289"30-32). in the ideal constitution. not living well ( 1 257b40-1 258" 14 ). All of them agree that justice consists in awarding political goods (such as unqualified citizenship. NE 1 095bl 4-1 7). But be­ cause they disagree about what the goal of a constitution should be. A third important difference is a consequence of the first two. is that they have different conceptions of justice (III. and that participation in office should be subject to a property assess­ ment. which is "a complete activation or use of virtue" ( 1 332"9-1 0). so all should get an equal share out. Hence if the conception of the end differs. 1 3 1 7"40-41 ). Democrats think that the basis is freedom: all free citizens bring an equal share into the constitution. The goal of oligarchy is multiply characterized: sometimes as wealth or property ( 1 280"25 -28). they must also embody different conceptions of the virtues. so must the conceptions of the virtues that promote it. Oligarchs think it is wealth.lxvi Introduction tion. some­ times as life as opposed to living well ( 1 280"3 1-32). By the same token.

then. though to a lesser extent. the conceptions embodied in the other constitutions. This is the conception embodied in a kingship or aristocracy (and. Aristotle distinguishes. only one is correct: the one that accords with nature. and it is just as important as they are. To be sure. for that reason too.5). as we have seen. with the con­ clusion of the function argument. 1 3 20'2-4). 1 293hS. are still different. These invariably make the constitution more moderate. Thus even the virtues that really do promote the stable. this difference isn't as systematically "thema­ tized" in the Politics as are the other two. None the less. while others are deviations from the correct ones. though now it is careful to ensure that as a result of the distribution "the multitude of those who want the constitution is stronger than the multi­ tude of those who do not" ( 1 309hl 7-1 8). that some of them are correct. between what the rulers in a consti­ tution typically think the virtues suited to their constitutions are and what these virtues actually are ( 1 309h20-35. justice. 1 3 37'1 1-2 1 ).6). in a polity). not those that represent the ten­ dency of the constitution at its most extreme. are not simply wrong. still distributes political office and benefit on the basis of wealth. for ex­ ample. A final difference between the constitutions is. Thus Aristotle argues that virtues and the education that inculcates them must suit the constitution ( 1 260h8-20. Aristotle explains this difference as follows: correct constitutions .Introduction lxvii 1 1 29h2S-27). Only in these constitutions do the virtues of a good man coincide with the virtues of a good citizen ( 1 288'37-39. and criticizes oligarchic virtue for being based on a misconception of happiness ( 1 27 1 '41-h l O. but they only go to a certain point and do not discuss the whole of what is j ust in the most authoritative sense" ( 1 280'9-1 1 ) . they must have different con­ ceptions of the other virtues that together make up complete virtue ( 1 309'3 6-39). more inclusive. The same could no doubt be said about their conceptions of happiness and the other virtues (NE 1. Hence if different constitutions have different concep­ tions of justice. though deviant. and aimed more at the common benefit than exclusively at that of the rulers themselves. 1 333b5-1 334' 1 0). The virtues truly suited to a constitution are those that will enable it to survive for a long time ( 1 3 1 0' 1 9-22. both democrats and oligarchs "grasp justice of a sort. The justice that is truly suited to an oligarchy. Of these different conceptions of happiness. For ex­ ample. they are true to an extent (NE 1 1 34'24-30). and virtue gener­ ally. the conceptions of hap­ piness they embody. but it is there all the same. however. 1 3 1 0' 12-36). But the goal of these more moderate constitutions. long-term realization of those goals are distinct from one another.

however. The first is to do so on the basis of the type of justice internal to the constitution.3 1 ) . For the common bene­ fit in a correct constitution is a matter of having a share in noble or virtuous living ( 1 278h20-23. G consists of all the free native inhabitants of the con­ stitution. or laborers. all the wives and children of members of G are members of G. those who participate in judicial and deliberative office (111. since there is "no element of virtue" in these occupations ( 1 3 1 9'26-28). His explanation is not very helpful. If a con­ stitution aims at the benefit of G. for example. who have an unqualifiedly just claim to be unqualified citi­ zens of the constitution. deviant ones at the benefit of the rulers ( 1 279'26. they are so only in correct constitutions. If we proceed in the first way. then. 1-2.lxviii Introduction aim at "the common benefit". it aims at the common benefit and is . But if we proceed in the second way. 1 294'1 9-20). and he doesn't tell us whether the common benefit is that of the individual members of G. There are two ways to con­ struct the class of unqualified citizens from N. is that we construct G as follows: all the mem­ bers of N. one that is pro­ portional to their virtue ( 1 283'1 4-26. no one else is a member of G. then. N. or that of G taken as some kind of whole. Perhaps. because he doesn't specify the group. the second is to do so on the basis of unqualified justice. " and the constitution is an oligarchy. Let us begin with the class. NE 1 142h3 1-33). of the free native inhabitants of the constitution. What I suggest. will count as deviant. These common characterizations of G all fail. but the last failure points in a promising direction. the unqualified citi­ zens will be the wealthy male members of N. Thus they ought to be unqualified citizens of any constitution. In fact. 1 280h40-128 1 '8. G. such as a polity. since they also seem to aim at the benefit of the wives and children of such citizens ( 1 260h8-20 with 1 3 1 0'34-36). because now even some correct con­ stitutions. we run into difficulties. No. that won't do either. even the deviant constitutions aim at the benefit of a wider group than that of the unqualified citizens. Hence a polity will not aim at the benefit of its native-born artisans. and the poor all have such a claim. is that it is the group of unqualified citizens. moreover. When we try to provide the missing information. A natural first thought about G. for example. And Aristotle thinks that the virtuous. the rich. tradesmen. not in deviant ones. since only the rulers participate in these offices. however. 5). the unqualified citizens of our oligarchy will be those who have an unqualifiedly just claim to that status. are members of G. Moreover. the common benefit and the private one coincide. But if G is restricted to these citizens. whose benefit is the common one.

since they are incapable of that ( 1280'30-34 ). His views on the use of ostracism seem to show him endors­ ing precisely such a sacrifice. yet even correct constitu­ tions may ostracize him.46 Presumably. . True enough. it is deviant. This sort of assumption is broadly shared. A correct constitution aims only at the benefit of G. if it aims at the benefit of the subset of G consisting of the rulers who have authority over the constitution (and their families). why should the fact that one has been born outside its borders (or born to people born outside its borders) always preclude one from being its citizen? Why. whether they are members of G or not. he ought to think the same things about the public slaves or non-Greek serfs who do all the work in his ideal constitution. but Aristotle probably thinks that it will be incidentally beneficial to all its subjects. but is it really justified? If one's level of virtue quali­ fies one to be a citizen of the ideal constitution.45 and justice is the common benefit" ( 1 282b l 6-18). The advantage of slaves is not a matter of their sharing in genuine happi­ ness. We turn now to the second prob­ lem I mentioned. 1279"17-19 makes it clear that unqualified justice is meant. It surely isn't beneficial to the superior person to be ostracized from his city-state. In any case. then.Introduction lxix correct. suggests that it might be as uncontroversial (or almost as uncontroversial) to sacrifice an individual for the good of the city-state as it would be to sacrifice a hand for the good of the individual whose hand it is. for example. in other words.2 that individuals are parts of city-states in the way that hands are parts of individuals ( 1 253"1 8 -29). as a matter of unqualified justice.) So much for the membership of G. This is what Aristotle has in mind when he writes: "the political good is justice. Is the common benefit that of each of the members of G? or is it that of G taken as some kind of whole? Is the common benefit to be understood individualistically or holistically? Some views es­ poused in the Politics suggest that Aristotle had fairly significant holistic or organicist leanings. when doing so serves the com­ mon benefit ( 1284b4-20). should nationality be relevant to citizenship ethi­ cally conceived? (Imagine if Kant had argued that one could not be a member of the kingdom of ends unless one had been born in Prussia. Aristotle argues. 46. 1 27Sb32-37). ought to be constructed from N. for example. His argument in 1. he certainly thinks that it is (incidentally) beneficial for household slaves to be ruled by vir­ tuous masters ( 1 252"34. the ideal constitution and other 45. Aristotle assumes that G. that the group to be benefited by a constitution ought to be restricted to native inhabitants of it. however.

however. aristocrats "rule with a view to what is best for the city-state and those who share in it" ( 1 279•35-37). moreover. or all of its parts are happy" ( 1 264b 1 7-1 9). correct constitutions will not need such a remedy.8). "it is evident that the best constitution must be the or­ ganization in which anyone might do best and live a blessedly happy life" ( 1 324•23 -25). to the extent that it contributes some share of living well to each" ( 1278h20-23). be­ cause of the foresight of their legislators. most. 1 3 3 5h22-25). Although it is also true that the common benefit brings them together. Even in such constitutions. In 1. But the point remains that cor­ rectness in a constitution is no guarantee that the benefit of each individ­ ual in G will be safeguarded there. ostracism seems not to be needed only because the legislator has ensured that no superior person will emerge in the constitution ( 1 302b 1 9-21). their religious freedom ( 1 330•8-9). And in our city-state all the citizens participate in the constitution.lxx Introduction well-constructed. should have his benefit justly sacrificed to the common benefit. but that each of them belongs to the city-state. that Aristotle means to be espousing some sort of individualism. since he is a part of it. "One should not consider. These views sound a good deal worse than just holistic. ." he writes. and even their freedom to dine as they choose ( 1 330•3. "even when they do not need one another's help. And it is natural for the supervision of each part to look to the supervision of the whole" ( 1 337•27-30)_47 Hence the ideal constitution should have laws that regu­ late or constrain the freedom of association of many of its inhabitants ( 1 327•37-40)." ( 1 332•32-35). and rear their off­ spring ( 1 3 3 5•4-b 1 9. their freedom of expression and artistic freedom ( 1 336b3-23). "a city-state is excellent because the citizens who participate in the consti­ tution are excellent. a similar claim is made about virtue: "the virtue of a part must be determined by looking to the virtue of the whole" ( l 260bJ4-16). Many other texts in the Politics suggest. not because he has recognized that no individual. they no less desire to live together. "the best life. reproduce.13. would be a life of action" ( 1 325h 1 5-16). "that any citizen belongs to himself alone. These texts show that Aristotle is an 47. their freedom to have extramarital af­ fairs ( 1 336•1-2). their freedom to marry. however superior. Aristotle also uses the doctrine that individuals are parts of the city­ state to justify fairly massive intrusion of the political into what we would consider to be the private sphere. whether for a whole city-state collec­ tively or for an individual. The following is a small sample: "it is impossible for the whole to be happy unless some.

. who thinks that the happiness of the city-state simply consists in the happiness of each of the individual members of G. the constitu­ tion may have to sacrifice his benefit to that of the other members of G. so that to achieve the happiness of the for­ mer is necessarily to achieve the happiness of the latter. if an individual in G actually threatens the stabil­ ity of the correct constitution. By the same token. At the same time. this con­ gruence is likely to be quite hard to preserve. and the justice it embodies. much easier. Aristotle is not an extreme individualist. presumably because the former constitution better promotes the benefit of each of the individuals in G than the lat­ ter. then. Thus. These views are compatible provided that promoting the benefit of the individual members of G need be no more than generally congruent with their actually being benefited. Aristotle thinks. than one that does need it. What he is is a moderate individualist. that is the closest the constitution can come to preserv­ ing the congruence I mentioned. in other words. What it does. he is not an extreme holist who thinks of the happiness of the whole of G as something distinct from the happiness of each of the indi­ viduals in it. and the very intrusive laws that are part of it. a cor­ rect constitution that has no need of ostracism is better. promote the virtue and so the happiness of the individuals in G. But the general point remains: no constitution short of an omnipotent and omniscient one can absolutely guarantee that this congruence will always be absolute. someone who thinks that the happiness of a city-state must be generally congruent with the happiness of the individual mem­ bers of its G class. for example. But whether we should call this position moderate in­ dividualism (as I have opted to do) or moderate holism is perhaps more a matter of taste than of substance. in times of peace and plenty. In these circumstances. The question is how can he believe this and also treat ostracism in the way he does? How is his apparent holism to be combined with his appar­ ent individualism? Aristotle's treatment of ostracism makes it clear that he thinks that a just constitution may require members of G to do things that do not promote their individual benefit. so that it is possible to achieve the happiness of the former without achieving the happiness of the latter. At the same time. is to sacrifice the benefit of an individual in G in a case in which failing to do so would risk destroying a constitution that promotes the benefit of each of the other members of G. he thinks that such a constitution must promote the benefit of the individual members of G.Introduction Ixxi individualist in at least this important sense: he believes that the ideal constitution. In times of war or scarcity.

Some of the topics in this section are further discussed in]. who are either natural slaves or non-Greek serfs ( 1 329•25-26). Aristotle's treatment of ostracism and his view that individuals are parts of city-states seem to be compatible with the sort of moderate individualism he espouses. Properly or at least plausibly interpreted. We may suppose. D.lxxii Introduction The fact that there need be no more than this sort of general congru­ ence between a city-state's happiness and the happiness of the individu­ als in its G class also explains why Aristotle's doctrine that individuals are parts of a city-state is no threat to his moderate individualism. Nature. Aristotle certainly fails to provide such reassurance. because it aims to promote the virtue and happiness of each. . for the sake of argument. on the other. then. for example. because it distributes political of­ fices and other political or social benefits on the basis of virtue. Aristotle thinks. in other words. he believes that the ideal constitution is unqualifiedly just. he believes that it is just to distribute 48. A hand can perform its task only as part of a body. the closest we can come to preserving this con­ gruence involves sacrificing a part." and F. 143-308. Miller. then. In this respect. He be­ lieves. Is he right to believe this? Aristotle divides the original adult inhabitants of the ideal constitu­ tion into two groups: the citizens (who are equally virtuous men of prac­ tical wisdom) and their wives. At the same time. that this division is made justly. But he then seems simply to assume that it is just to treat the children of citizens and noncitizens in the same way as their respec­ tive parents. we are like hands. One will find this insufficiently reassuring only if one thinks that general congruence between the aim of a just city-state and that of an individual in G is not enough. there is general con­ gruence between the health of a body and the health of all its parts. Barnes. ''Aristo­ tle on Political Liberty. Thus. on the one hand. that more is required. but in some circumstances. but this is almost certainly a strength rather than a weakness of his view. that his ideal constitution succeeds where others fail: it is more unqualifiedly just than they are and happier than they are. and the noncitizens. that con­ gruence must be guaranteed in all circumstances. 48 § 1 0 The Ideal Constitution Aristotle believes that the ideal constitution aims at the individual benefit of each of the members of G. Justice and Rights in Aris­ totle's Politics.

Hence he believes that the children of the free citizens will have the natural potential for virtue. And. But if he is unlucky enough to be born to the wrong parents. natural slaves. it will assign him a life and a type of work that will make it very likely that he will foil to develop the virtues no matter how capable he is of developing them. no rationally prudent one would either. 49 It follows that citizen children who lack the potential to develop virtue will receive benefits to which they are not justly enti­ tled. What may have caused Aristotle not to notice this defect in his con­ ception of the best city-state is probably this. to be cases in which a citizen child lacks the potential for virtue. A pruden49. because it cannot be based on virtue. distributing it to citizens alone would be unjust. however. while those of noncitizens will lack it. For virtue is not something that young children ac­ tually possess. Aristotle's constitution will not do that. . but there are exceptions ( 1254b32). believes that city-state-sponsored regulation of reproduction (the ancient equivalent of genetic counseling) can reduce the number of these cases. 1 283•36. There are bound. as Plato recognizes. Indeed. No doubt Aristotle. allows qualified offspring from one class to enter another. while noncitizen children who have that potential will fail to re­ ceive them. Indeed. No just person would want to be born into such an unjust constitu­ tion. 1 255bl-4. 1 327b l 9-38). For any such person would want to be born into a society that helps him develop his virtue to the fullest extent his nature allows. The weakness is this line of thought. unlike Aristotle. Since all subsequent benefits are distributed on the basis of virtue. Hence he. and non-Greek serfs form natural classes (or natural kinds).Introduction lxxiii public education to the children of citizens and not to those of the noncitizens. we can see what a catastrophe that would be. while a noncitizen child possesses it. like Plato. is that these natural laws or regularities are far from being exceptionless: natural classes for the most part breed true to type. Moreover. if we accept Aristotle's view of happiness as rational activity expressing virtue.34. as Aristotle himself usually recognizes. But since such regulation is itself a political ad­ vantage. it is arbitrary and unjust even in Aristotle's own terms. But this seems arbitrary and unjust: one's life chances should not depend so crucially on the accident of one's birth. Hence he believes that to distribute political benefits on the basis of membership of a natural class is as uncontrover­ sially just as distributing it on the basis of already developed virtue. the number of cases cannot be reduced to zero. then. He believes that free peo­ ple. and that natural classes breed true to type ( 1 254b27.

it would. on Aristotle's view. such as virtue. so that the means of acquiring virtue are distributed on the basis. The next problem concerns what gets distributed. He also believes that virtue is not something children possess at birth. it would ensure that people acquired their virtue in a just way. Yet the fact that Aristotle's theory of justice is unsatisfiable for this sort of reason suggests a way forward. such as being human. His theory of justice needs to be modified. a conse­ quence of receiving benefits. If Aristotle's ideal constitution were constructed in this way. but at least it wouldn't fail to meet its own standards of justice. If justice is going to be based on some feature of indi­ viduals. whether male or female. of course. he believes that virtue is a social or political output. for the ideal constitution to assign him no share or a very small share in political benefits or in true happiness. it fails to meet its own standards of justice. obviously. That problem. it would have to cull out as its future citizens those who had indeed acquired virtue in this way. have to be very different from the constitution he de­ scribes. Aristotle's ideal constitution thus fails to be just in its own terms. Aristotle's theory fails to meet this groundedness requirement. has to do with the basis on which benefits are distributed in the ideal constitution. perhaps now to some extent solved. that is un­ problematically possessed to an equal degree by all the children born in the constitution. it must be one that individuals do not acquire through a process which may itself be either just or unjust. and so is strictly unsatisfiable. For . whether born to citizens or to noncitizens. If this process were fairly carried out. Subse­ quent virtue-based distributions of benefits would then not be unjustly based. since injustice in the distribution of what constitutes the basis for all other distributions in­ fects all those other distributions with injustice as well. But it points the way to a yet more serious one and then to a possible solution. Aristotle believes that unqualified justice must be based on virtue. But no constitution can distribute all benefits on the basis of a property. But it does not follow that it will be just to assign him a share of political harms. such as public education. Then. but also an ethical one. which is itself the result of the distri­ bution of benefits. This is a major problem.lxxiv Introduction tial catastrophe. The ideal constitution would have to provide equal oppor­ tunities to all the children possessing this feature. Provided that his lack of such potential is determined by a fair process. not of virtue. that a constitu­ tion itself bestows. More than that. If someone is a natural slave or a non-Greek of one sort or another. but of a feature. at the appro­ priate stage. it will then be unqualifiedly just. Aristotle thinks that he has pretty well no natural potential for virtue.

but that doesn't mean that it won't be harmful to him in other ways. But how are we to tell whether or not the ideal constitution­ or any other constitution. True. Perhaps. the appropriate conclusion to draw is that they are ethically reprehensible occupations. Thus citizens can't be farmers because happiness cannot exist without virtue." it is initially introduced in connection with the exchange of property of different sorts: if n shoes are an equal exchange for one house. M M 1 194' 1 6-18). distribu­ tion of political benefits must be proportional to virtue. For a similar reason they cannot be VULGAR CRAFTSMEN or tradesmen. for that matter-meets this requirement? Aristotle claims that when political benefits are justly distributed. like political office itself. n shoes are reciprocally equal to one house. leisure is needed to develop virtue ( 1 329' 1-2). If the ideal constitution is to be unqualifiedly just. "since lives of these sorts are ignoble and inimical to virtue" ( 1 328b40-41 ). farming won't be harmful to a natural slave in the way that it would be to a citizen. is what preserves the constitution (Pol.3 1 . it won't have a negative effect on his capacity for virtue. and that no one in the ideal con­ stitution should pursue them in a way that threatens his virtue ( 1 277b 3-7. the citizens them­ selves should undertake them turn and turn about for short enough pe­ riods to leave their virtue and leisure sufficiently unscathed . to repeat. Aristotle thinks. If Aristotle is right about farming. Aristotle thinks.Introduction lxxv example. then. it must be equal for the unqualified citizens. 1 26 1'30. where it is called "pro­ portional reciprocity. Political offices themselves. peo­ ple who are equal in virtue receive "reciprocally equal" amounts of them. might well be considered just such a harm. like exchangeable property. 1 333'6-16). when one hates farming. because inimical to virtue. we will . that A's share of political benefits is the same size as B's? When we know the answer to this question. and B holds a very different office y. trading. NE 1 1 32b33. there are some occupations that Aristotle thinks it would be harmful for a citizen of the ideal constitution to have. scope. But he thinks it is perfectly all right to require (I intentionally use a fairly weak verb) natural slaves to work as farmers. This is the sort of equality that applies to political benefits. how are we to ensure that A's share in rul­ ing is equal to B's. are very different in nature. because. But reciprocal equality is b y n o means easy to understand. he says. Being required by a constitution to be a farmer. This. they aren't all of one sort ( 1 2 6 1 '32-b6. since Aristotle stipulates that they are equal in virtue. If A holds political office x. for example. In the Nicomachean Ethics. and farmers do not have leisure ( 1 3 1 8b l l-12). and authority. and artisanship. 1 300b J 0-12).

however. since it is no easier to establish equalities between shoes and money than it is to establish them between shoes and houses. Indeed. "since it measures everything" (NE 1 1 33•20 . and would require substantial restructuring not to fail quite so badly." but that "they can become sufficiently (hikanos) so in relation to our needs" ( 1 1 33b l 9-20.lxxvi Introduction have established a reciprocal equality between x and y. for example. This suggestion is itself prob­ lematic. But it is difficult to see how we could establish a type of commensurability between houses and shoes that was adequate for Aris­ totle's purposes on the basis of need. and it is even less clear how need might come into the picture. and the like. while a pair of shoes equals one unit (one dollar). while the other is a need for one house? Aristotle himself may have been aware of this problem. So one house is equal to n pairs of shoes because one house equals n units of money (n dollars. But that does not tell us how to establish that one house equals n units of money or that one pair of shoes equals only one such unit. What. In the case of exchangeable goods. and will be on our way to understanding what proportional equality applied to political benefits actually amounts to. There is some suggestion that Aristotle may have thought that need (chreia) offers us some assistance with this problem: "Everything. our problems multiply. The ideal constitution fails to be just in its own terms. must be measured by a single standard. then. But need has come to be conventionally rep­ resented by money" (NE 1 1 33•25-30). In reality. this is just the original problem all over again. Indeed. this standard is need. then. since he says that things so different as shoes and houses "cannot become commensurate in reality. the more fundamental claim that Aristotelian justice is true and unqualified justice because it alone is based on nature will itself come to have that same appearance: it will seem like magic rather than naturalistic meta­ physics. money provides the units of mea­ surement. since it is not easy to determine the conditions under which otherwise similar needs for different things are equal. But even such restructuring would not solve the problems presented by the .2 1 ) . say). also Pol. political benefits. When we turn from exchangeable goods to virtue. . . 1 283•4-10). could explain the fact that a need for shoes is equal to a need for houses just in case the one is a need for n pairs of shoes. . But if we are not able to tell some sort of reasonable story. the claim that the ideal constitution is unqualifiedly just will be bound to seem like stipulation rather than fact. Here we do not even have a credible unit of measurement like money to rely on.

Aristotle designs an intermediate position: some property should be communally owned and some should be privately owned. First. so that one cannot sell them or give them away.50 But if they are inalien­ able. Aristotle firmly rejects the idea. Would it. Moreover. one part of which is near the town. And. To avoid these defects in Plato's proposals. as Aristotle thinks. according to the Rhetoric. be the ideal constitution to live in from the point of view of happiness. or companions. he seems to favor making these allot­ ments inalienable ( 1 266b14-3 1 .1 4). like the others. He does so for three reasons. . however. If they were not inalienable. which are far too vague to do the work required of them. Second. Let us suppose for the sake of argument. is to have the power to alienate or dispose of it through either gift or sale ( 1 3 6 1 '2 1-22). as well as those generated by strictly private property. and do them favors. which together with propor­ tional equality is the sole guarantee of stability in a constitution ( 1 307'26 -27). defended by Plato. activity expressing virtue? There are many ways to look at this question. 1 270' 1 5 -34). communally owned property is ne­ glected. third. We shall consider just one very important one. that this defect. but the use of even the privately owned property should be communal ( 1 329b3 61 3 30'3 1 ) . once again granting that happiness is. as one can if one has property of one's own" ( 1 263bS-7). "it is very pleasant to help one's friends. that private property should be abolished and that the citizens of the ideal constitution should possess their property in common. guests. not for some chance period but throughout a complete life?" (NE 1 1 0 1 ' 1 4-16). Property is a necessary component of the happy life: "Why should we not say that someone is happy when his activities ex­ press complete virtue and he has an adequate supply of external GOODS.Introduction lxxvii terms themselves. they could hardly continue to serve the purpose they are introduced to serve at 1330'14-25. Is this proposal an improvement on Plato's? Is it one that should attract us to a constitution that embodies it? To own property. But Aristotle stipulates that each of the unqualified citizens in the ideal con­ stitution (each male head of household) should be given an equal allot­ ment of land. without private property one cannot prac­ tice the virtue of generosity ( 1 263bl l . then. private property. the other near the frontier ( 1 330' 14-1 8). what does owning them actually consist in? The natural thought is that it must consist in 50. But that does not tell us how the ideal constitution should handle property ownership. so that the ideal constitution was just in its own terms. could be remedied.

Nuss­ baum. Aristotle's First Principles. then. Function." with a reply by David Charles.Ixxviii Introduction having private or exclusive use of them. Another passage from the Rhetoric tells us that ownership of property is secure if the use of it is in the owner's power ( 1 36 1" 1 9-21). To be sure. . it seems to be not much more than a notational variant on a system of communal ownership. a pale pleasure compared to that of using what one actually owns to do favors for one's friends. does not seem to be best from the point of view of maximizing the citizen's happiness. It is scarcely surprising. this isn't what Aristotle intends to be true in the ideal constitution. Meikle. The system of property adopted in the ideal constitu­ tion. F. with the pro­ ceeds used to maintain public property and provide public servicesY 5 1 . S. Privately owned but communally used property would therefore seem to be inse­ curely owned at best. It seems. 399-469. to give someone something of which he already has the use and you con­ tinue to retain the use is a wishy-washy sort of generosity at best. So what we have in the ideal constitution is a somewhat notional own­ ership of not very much (nonlanded) property. Many other systems seem much more preferable. the expectation on the part of one citizen that another will do what virtue requires of him is pretty well bound to make the owner's power seem notional rather than real. and Rights in Aristotle 's Politics. He thinks that the use of private property remains in the owner's power but that he will grant it to his fellow citi­ zens out of virtue and friendship and not because the law requires him to do it (Pol. Aristotle's Economic Thought. and M. for example. None the less. and Capability: Aristotle on Political Distribu­ tion. that it does not help much with the problems Aristotle raises for Plato. Nature. 1 9 1-25 1 . This will hardly recom­ mend the constitution to those who think that private property is a good thing. and so don't particularly have to take care of and maintain. why will privately owned but communally used property fare any better? If I can use even what I don't own. D. By the same token. then. "Nature. If com­ munally owned property tends to be neglected. Topics treated in this section are discussed in T. Justice. Miller. 1 263"21-40). fair taxation on private property and income. be­ cause the use of private property is communal. therefore. that a major portion of what is called the private property of a citizen of the ideal constitution is not something that he really and truly owns. Indeed. Irwin. H. ownership seems more like a curse than a blessing. But that thought is derailed.

much fascinating material is to be found on the side roads. indeed. This is not quite what the Politics tells us. what it dramatizes. In some ways. but rather as an opportunity to think about some of the most important human questions in unparalleled intellectual company. in a way that is mildly subversive of its mes­ sage. is one of the best general accounts of this sort of modified Aristotelian theory. Parts of it discuss Aristotle explicitly. and that life's problems are no eas­ ier to solve in theory than in practice. that the give and take of dialectic is very like the give and take of politics. None the less. the Politics is best thought of not simply as an argument. to be sure. we have a theory with considerable attractions and possibili­ ties. The discussion in Books V and VI. . however: a major highway connect­ ing the Politics to the rest of Aristotle's philosophy. Thomas Hurka. and at the way Aristotle's perfectionism plays out there. 52 Arguably it is Aristotle's most important political legacy. one senses that the two are.Introduction lxxix § 1 1 Conclusion We have been looking at the central argument of the Politics. We have seen the enor­ mous price he pays in terms of political credibility for having too narrow a conception of what human perfection consists in (§§7-1 0): the political and philosophical lives are worthwhile but they are not the only ones that are. To some degree. if we strip away those accretions and broaden the perfec­ tionism. En­ gaged in the dialectical process of doing politics with Aristotle. But the Politics isn't reducible to its central argument. Aristotelian theory to the contrary. all of it is relevant to understanding his thought. 52. one ex­ periences the great seductive power of the philosophical life full force. Perfectionism. virtue is worthwhile but it provides a poor basis for distributive justice. We have seen the even larger price he pays for making false fac­ tual claims that are accretions to his perfectionism: without natural slaves or women whose nature makes them incapable of ruling. Aristo­ tle's ideal constitution would have to look very different than it does. of how different constitutions are preserved and destroyed is full of as­ tute observations about people and their motives. The central argument is just that. indeed. both his­ torically speaking and in fact. but it is. but one also experiences the rather different power of the political life. not all that different. for example.

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D. by C.C.ARI STOTLE Politics Translated. Reeve Hackett Publishing Company Indianapolis I Cambridge . with Introduction and Notes.

01'1-dc21 ISBN-13: 978-0-87220-389-1 (cloth) ISBN-13: 978-0-87220-388-4 (pbk. Includes bibliographical references and indexes.C.D.A4 1 R44 1998 CIP 320'.C. p. Reeve.) . I. ISBN 0-87220-389-1 (cloth). C. em. with introduction and notes. Political science--Early works to 1800. English] Politics/ Aristotle. Inc. translated. 194897-46398 JC7 1 . II. All rights reserved Printed in the United States of America 09 08 07 06 4 5 6 7 8 9 Cover and interior design by Dan Kirklin Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Aristotle [Politics.. Copyright © 1998 by Hackett Publishing Company.D. by C.C. ISBN 0-87220-388-3 (pbk.Aristotle: 384-322 B. Reeve.) 1. Title.

whereas someone who follows the principles of the appropriate KING. is the city-state. kuriotate koinonia: the most sovereign community. he has the position of statesman or king-the assumption being that there is no difference between a large household and a small city-state. HOUSEHOLD MANAGER. ruling and being ruled in turn. if still more. But these claims are not true. Plato. at the good that has the most authority of all. For they hold that each of these differs not in kind. that is to say. a household manager. directs the entire city-state toward happiness. The good with the most authority is HAPPINESS. while it is pursued solely for its own sake. since everything else is pursued in part for its sake. and that every community is established for the sake of some GOOD (for everyone performs every ACTION for the sake of what he takes to be good). but only in whether the subjects ruled are few or many: that if.1 Those. Statesman 258e-26 l a. some­ one rules few people. he is a master. etc. who think that the positions of STATESMAN. because all the other communities are encompassed (periechein) by it or are its parts. A more detailed version of this opening argument is given in NE 1.2). the community that has the most AUTHORITY of all and encompasses all the others aims highest. This community is the one called a city-state. villages. religious societies. 2. l 4 . are not cor­ rect. for example. Compare Xenophon. while every community aims at some good. The science with the most authority. if more. so that the goods for whose sake they are formed are pursued in part for the sake of the good for which it is formed (see 1.Z then. iv. the community that is political. and MASTER of slaves are the same. STATESMANSHIP. Clearly. III. if we examine the matter ac1 . What I am saying will be clear.B oo K I Chapter 1 We see that every CITY-STATE is a COMMUNITY of some sort. Memorabilia III. they say that someone who is in charge by himself has the position of king. 1252" 5 10 IS . l 2. 1-2. then. These subcommunities include households. As for the positions of statesman and king. the one with the most au­ thority. Here it is being adapted to define what a city-state is. has the position of statesman.

one would. 5. and whether or not it is possible to gain some expertise in connection with each of the things we have mentioned.5-7. master and slave. those who cannot exist without each other necessarily form a couple. masters. For as in other cases. since these are the smallest parts of the whole. 7. because the urge to leave behind something of the same kind as themselves is natural). This claim is qualified at 1278b32-37 and elaborated upon in 1. . it is a natural ruler and master.3 Chapter 2 25 30 12521 5 If one were to see how these things develop naturally from the beginning. of course.4 There is a natural distinction. For if something is capable of rational foresight. between what is female and what is servile. First. See Euripides. and kings each employ a different type of technical expertise in ruling? Expertise (technikon) is technical knowledge of the sort embodied in a CRAFT or SCIENCE. in this case as in others. Iphigenia in Au/is 1266. because every tool will be made best if it serves to perform one task rather than many. The communities of husband and wife. but. a WOMAN and a slave occupy the same position. get the best view of them. a composite has to be analyzed until we reach things that are incomposite. rather their community consists of a male and a female slave. The reason is that they do not have anything that naturally rules. like other animals and plants. 4.2 20 Politics I cording to the method of investigation that has guided us elsewhere. unlike the blacksmiths who make the Delphian knife. That is why our poets say "it is proper for Greeks to rule non-Greeks. but instead makes a single thing for a single TASK. then. whereas whatever can use its body to labor is ruled and is a natural SLAVE. That is to say. so if we also examine the parts that make up a city-state. The first thing to emerge from these two communities7 is a house3. 5 Among non-Greeks. 6."6 implying that non-Greek and slave are in nature the same. and [2] as a natural ruler and what is naturally ruled do for the sake of survival. however. That is why the same thing is ben­ eficial for both master and slave. nature produces nothing skimpily. we shall see better both how these differ from each other. 1 400. A Delphian knife seems to have been a multipurpose and cheaply made tool of some sort. For. statesmen. do household managers. See 1299bJO and note. as [ I ] female and male do for the sake of procreation (they do not do so from DELIBERATE CHOICE.

Plato."1 3 For they were scattered about."8 For an ox is a poor man's servant. For they were constituted out of people who were under kingships. Works and Days 405. 12 This is what Homer is describing when he says: "Each one lays down the law for his own wives and children. Laws 68 1 b. That is why every city-state exists by NATURE. and some still are. The reason all people say that the gods too are ruled by a king is that they themselves were ruled by kings in the distant past. 14 since the first communities do. 1 3 . and do the same to their way of life as well. A complete community constituted out of several villages. 10 1S 20 25 30 . 14. that of a human being. And so the same holds in the offshoots. "First and foremost: a house. Epimenides was a religious teacher of the late sixth and early fifth century. that for the 8.9 But the first community constituted out of several households for the sake of satisfying needs other than everyday ones is a village. Laws 776a-b. 12. The community naturally constituted to satisfy everyday needs. then. a horse. Charondas was a sixth-century legislator from Catana in Chalcidice in the southern part of Macedonia. and that is how people dwelt in the distant past. for we say that each thing's nature-for example. Moreover. 1 1 That is why city-states were originally ruled by kings. is a city-state. 10 a village seems to be par­ ticularly natural. its members are called "meal-sharers" by Charondas and "manger-sharers" by Epimenides the Cretan. and an ox for the plow. To lay down the law (themisteuein) i s to give judgments in particular cases about what is right or fitting (themis). As a COLONY or offshoot from a household. as nations still are. 10. 1 1 .Chapter 2 3 hold. Iliad X . This claim and the argument Aristotle is about to give for it are discussed in the Introduction xlviii-lix. 9. 1 14-15. Human beings model the shapes of the gods on their own. practically speaking. consisting of what some have called "sharers of the same milk. or a household-is the character it has when its coming-into-being has been completed. and nature is an end. once it reaches the limit of total SELF-SUFFICIENCY. A somewhat different explanation is given at 1286b8-1 1 . a wife. so that Hesiod is right when he said in his poem. but it remains in exis­ tence for the sake of living well. For the city-state is their end. The works from which Aristotle is quoting are lost. is the household. It comes to be for the sake of living. for in every household the eldest rules as a king. See Plato. because the villagers are blood relatives." sons and the sons of sons.

in comparison to the other animals. For if the whole body is dead. and the rest. just or unjust. Nature makes nothing pointlessly. not that nature is an agent (a kind of god. A voice is a signifier of what is pleasant or painful. and selfsufficiency is both end and best. 18 as we say.63-64. that they alone have perception of what is good or bad. there will no longer be a foot or a hand. say) that makes things for a purpose. That is to say. For it is peculiar to human beings. Like the one Homer condemns. And it is community in these that makes a household and a city-state.20 as one might speak of a stone "hand" (for a dead hand will be like that). like an isolated piece in a board game. 20. 18. and homeless. lvii-lxv. Hence that the city-state is natural and prior in nature to the individual is clear. but everything is defined by its TASK and by its capac­ ity. functioning foot or hand. is best. 16. its end. . that is to say. 17 It is also clear why a human being is more of a political animal than a bee or any other gregarious animal. lawless. that a human being is by nature a political animal. a foot or a hand that shares no more than a name with a living. Homer is describing a man who "loves fighting with his own people. so that in such condition they should not be said to be the same things but homonymous ones. he too is "clanless. A piece particularly vulnerable to attack by an opponent's pieces. 15 and that anyone who is without a city-state. Iliad IX.19 The city-state is also PRIOR in nature to the household and to each of us individually. For if an individual is not self­ sufficient when separated. then. See Cat."16 For someone with such a nature is at the same time eager for war. See Introduction xxvii-xxxv. he will be like all other parts in relation to the 1 5 . The idea is that features are present in a thing's nature in order to promote its end. 1i-lv. See Introduction xxvi.4 1253• S 10 IS 20 25 Politics I sake of which something exists. that a city-state is among the things that exist by nature. x1vii-x1viii. which is why it is also possessed by the other animals (for their nature goes this far: they not only per­ ceive what is pleasant or painful but signify it to each other). except homonymously. is either a poor specimen or else superhuman." 17. 1' 1-2. It is evident from these considerations. and no animal has speech except a human being. since the whole is necessarily prior to the part. and hence also what is just or unjust. not by luck but by nature. and so needing constantly to fight them off. But speech is for making clear what is beneficial or harmful. 19. Explained at 1 280hS-12.

Hence. 8-l l . Reading dike with Dreizehnter and the ms. and the primary and smallest parts of a household are master and slave. and rule over children. Here to be understood.2. we must first discuss household management. But there is also a part which some believe to be identical to household management. and a human being grows up with weapons for VIRTUE and PRACTICAL WISDOM to use.Chapter 3 5 whole. for every city-state is constituted from households. But we must first examine each thing in terms of its smallest parts. or who does not need to because he is self-sufficient. so when separated from LAW and JUSTICE he is worst of all. are discussed in 1. But justice is a political matter. which are particularly open to being used for opposite purposes. Rule over wives. which is an exercise of the former. "Marital" science (gamiki) and "procreative" science (teknopoietike) are shown at work in VII . The three in question are [ 1 J mastership. 23 2 1 . l 6. For injustice is harshest when it has weapons. I am speaking of what is called WEALTH ACQUISITION. We shall have to study its nature too. as the judicial justice administered by the courts. 22. Mastership is discussed in 1 . 1253h 5 10 . 1326'29-30. husband and wife. The weapons referred to are presumably various human capacities. So we shall have to examine these three things to see what each of them is and what features it should have. For as a human being is the best of the animals when perfected. whoever first established one was responsible for the greatest of goods.4-7 and wealth acquisition in 1. 30 35 Chapter 3 Since it is evident from what parts a city-state is constituted. for justice is the organization of a political community. and others believe to be its largest part. perhaps. and a complete household consists of slaves and FREE. and [3] "procreative" science (this also lacks a name of its own). as well as the worst where food and sex are concerned. See 1 322'5 -8. [2] "marital" science (for we have no word to describe the union of woman and man). that can be used for good or bad purposes. such as intelligence. of the latter.21 Hence he is the most unrestrained and most savage of animals when he lacks virtue. 23. is no part of a city-state-he is either a beast or a god. though an impulse toward this sort of community exists by nature in everyone. Anyone who cannot form a community with others. father and children. 12-13. The parts of household management correspond in turn to the parts from which the household is constituted. and justice22 decides what is just.

just as the specialized crafts must have their proper tools if they are going to perform their tasks. The discussion of the theoretical aspects of wealth acquisition occupies 1. and if like the statues of Daedalus or the tripods of Hephaestus-which the poet describes as having "en­ tered the assembly of the gods of their own accord"26-shuttles wove cloth by themselves. For. For example. if each tool could perform its task on com­ mand or by anticipating instructions. but at the same time with an eye to knowledge about this topic. some people believe that mastership is a sort of science." 26. l l is devoted to its practical aspects. Chapter 4 Since property is part of the household. but his lookout is an animate one. A piece of property. is for ACTION. on the other hand. a slave is a piece of animate property of a sort.376. partly to see how they stand in relation to our need for necessities. Hephaestus was blacksmith to the gods. and some are animate. for it involves force. for where crafts are concerned every assistant is classed as a tool. and the science of king­ ship are all the same. 25. For. property in general is the sum of such tools. Plato. For something comes from a SITION 25 30 35 1254" 24. Meno 97d). Alcidamas (a pupil of the sophist Gorgias). statesmanship. and all assistants are like tools for using tools. I. who says that "na­ ture never made any man a slave. Daedalus was a legendary craftsman and inventor. as we said at the beginning. So a piece of property is a tool for maintaining life. What are commonly called tools are tools for production. . which advertises this fact). His statues were so life-like that they ran away unless they were tied down (DA 406bl8-19. whereas by nature there is no difference between them). But others25 believe that it is contrary to nature to be a master (for it is by law that one person is a slave and another free. however. a master craftsman would not need assistants.24 to see whether we can acquire some better ideas than those currently entertained. Hence.6 15 20 Politics I But let us first discuss master and slave. and that master­ ship. who made the maze for the Minotaur and the thread for Ariadne. The ship captain's rudder. household management. and picks played the lyre. Some tools are inanimate. so too does the household manager. is an inanimate tool.4-10 (see 1 2S8b9-10. Iliad XVIII. for example. and masters would not need slaves. the science of PROPERTY ACQUI­ is also a part of household management (for we can neither live nor live well without the necessities). which is why it is not just either.

despite being human. but is entirely that thing's. their tools must differ in the same way as they do. 1 3JJh26-29. (Some rule also exists in lifeless things: 27. 1 325'27-30. 29. And he is someone else's when. slaves too are assistants in the class of things having to do with action. Unlike our bodies. not his simply. 20 25 30 . The same is also true of a piece of property. a ruling element and a subject element appear. and the better the ruled are. A hammer is the tool of a producer or craftsman. For ruling and being ruled are not only necessary. For a task performed by something better is a better task. since action and production differ in kind.Chapter S 7 shuttle beyond the use of it. That is why a master is just his slave's master. is by nature not his own but someone else's is a natural slave. 27 Pieces of property are spoken of in the same way as parts. which are tools or instruments of our souls. Therefore. not production. he is entirely his. A slave is a tool of a head of household. rule over humans is better than rule over beasts. A part is not just a part of another thing. but not slaves. whether continuous with one another or dis­ continuous. 28. they are also beneficial. a free agent who engages in action. he is a piece of property. some suited to rule and others to being ruled. and a piece of property is a tool for action that is separate from its owner. and whether it is better or just for anyone to be a slave or not (all slavery being against na­ ture)-these are the things we must investigate next. These are present in living things. For anyone who. 28 S 10 1S Chapter 5 But whether anyone is really like that by nature or not. and where one thing rules and another is ruled. PA 642' 1 1 ) . For whenever a number of constituents. Life consists in action. There are many kinds of rulers and ruled. they have a certain task.29 for example. and some things are distinguished right from birth. the better the rule over them al­ ways is. And it is not diffi­ cult either to determine the answer by argument or to learn it from actual events. See 125Sbl l-12. not production. It is clear from these considerations what the nature and capacity of a slave are. while a slave is not just his master's slave. but from a piece of clothing or a bed we get only the use. because this is how nature as a whole works. are combined into one common thing. See 1 3 1 Sb4-7. Besides. despite being human. and both need tools. because not separate from us (DA 4 1 Sb l 8-19.

. 32. and those in a depraved condition. 920'21-22. as I say. is to use their bodies are in this condi30. and that of ruler to ruled. . The former are perhaps permanently in the condition that the latter are in temporarily. the body the natural subject. Both statesmen and kings rule willing subjects. . For in depraved people. it is. 3 1 . Alternatively: "It is better for all of the tame ones to be ruled. it is natural for Greeks to rule non-Greeks. the body will often seem to rule the soul. the best thing to come from them. but physically weaker". In any case. not cor­ rupted. 35. and people whose task. the relation of male to female is that of natural superior to natural inferior. But. Presumably. and it is better for all of them to be ruled by human be­ ings. in the virtuous desires obey understanding "willingly.8 35 12546 S 10 1S Politics I for example. 35 Therefore those people who are as different from others as body is from soul or beast from human. in an animal that we can first observe both rule of a master and rule of a statesman. it is bet­ ter even for wild animals to be ruled by man. that of a harmony. the same holds true of all human beings. For domestic animals are by nature better than wild ones. because their condition is bad and unnaturalY At any rate. 33. whereas understanding rules desire with the rule of a statesman or with the rule of a king. exoterikoteras: see 1 278h3 1 note. and that it would be harmful to everything if the reverse held. or if these elements were equal. Metaph. 89Sh23-896' 1 1)." See Introduction xxv-xxxviii. But of course one should ex­ amine what is natural in things whose condition is natural. For example. and for the affective part to be ruled by understanding (the part that has reason). that is to say. since this will secure their safety. the latter corri­ gibly so. 1 0 1 8h26-29). the former incorrigibly depraved.33 In these cases it is evident that it is natural and beneficial for the body to be ruled by the soul. 30 But an examination of that would per­ haps take us too far afield. 34 Moreover. . The reference is to the mese or hegemiin (leader). in fact." But the dis­ tinction between tame and wild animals is not hard and fast: "All domestic (or tame) animals are at first wild rather than domestic. which is the dominant note in a chord (Pr. one in whom this is clear.31) Soul and body are the basic constituents of an animal: the soul is the natural ruler. 34. both make poor models. The same applies in the case of human beings with respect to the other animals. then. "under certain conditions of locality and time sooner or later all animals can become tame" (Pr. One should therefore study the human being too whose soul and body are in the best possible condition. The difference between depraved people and those in a depraved condition is unclear. For the soul rules the body with the rule of a master.

others naturally slaves. and he who shares in reason to the extent of understanding it. at any rate. But many of those conversant with the law challenge the justice of this.. up to a point. it is even more justifiable to make such a distinction with regard to the soul. 38 Their 36. For slaves and slavery are spoken of in two ways: for there are also slaves-that is to say. others.e. They bring a writ of illegality against it. then. the former strong enough to be used for necessities. 38. but does not have it himself (for the other animals obey not reason but feelings). to make the bodies of slaves and free people dif­ ferent too. the "war" rule would not be allowed in a civil context. for whom slavery is both just and beneficial. Nature tends. A more complex conclusion than we might expect. is evident: if people were born whose bodies alone were as excellent as those found in the statues of the gods. This. the latter useless for that sort of work. since both slaves and domestic animals help provide the necessities with their bodies. everyone would say that those who were substandard deserved to be their slaves. And if this is true of the body. The idea is perhaps this: being a slave might not be just or beneficial for a natural slave who has long been legally free. analogous to that brought against a speaker in the assembly. 36 20 25 30 JS 12SS• Chapter 6 But it is not difficult to see that those who make the opposite claim37 are also right. similarly. S . The difference in the use made of them is small. since it is also better for the other things we mentioned. 37. but upright in posture and possessing all the other qualities needed for political life-qualities divided into those needed for war and those for peace. i. But the opposite often happens as well: some have the bodies of free men. is a natural slave. the souls.Chapter 6 9 tion-those people are natural slaves. but the soul's beauty is not so easy to see as the body's. And it is better for them to be subject to this rule. It is evident. some of whom are naturally free. The law is a sort of agreement by which what is conquered in war is said to belong to the victors. That slavery is unjust. A speaker in the Athenian assembly was liable to a writ of illegality or graphe paranoman if he proposed legislation that contravened already existing law. then. For he who can belong to someone else (and that is why he actually does belong to someone else). that there are some people. being legally free might not be just or beneficial for a naturally free person who has long been a legal slave. people who are in a state of slav­ ery-by law.

when it is equipped with resources. 343c).10 10 15 20 25 Politics I supposition is that it is monstrous if someone is going to be the subject and slave to whatever has superior power and is able to subdue him by force. is this: virtue. and so will be "legal. others the former. and hence about whether the enslavement of conquered populations is unjust. If someone is able to conquer his foes. and anything that conquers always does so be­ cause it is outstanding in some good quality. and that only the justice of the matter is in dispute. 4 1 .40 whereas the other believes that it is precisely the rule of the more powerful that is just. 40. the other arguments have neither force nor anything else to persuade us that the one who is more virtuous should not rule or be masterY Then there are those who cleave exclusively. . including use force. Those who believe that justice is benevolence (i. as they think. The reason for this dispute. Once their accounts are disentangled it is readily ap­ parent that their contrasting positions do nothing to confute Aristotle's own view that the one who is more virtuous should rule (1. The two parties to the dispute share common ground because they both be­ lieve that "force never lacks virtue. that it is the good of another) believe that enslavement is unjust because not beneficial for the slaves. But at the same time they imply that it is not just. because justice (by definition) is always on the side of the conqueror. the proponent of the view here in ques­ tion denies both that enslaving is always just and that what is legal is always just. 42. this at least suggests that he has the virtues needed for success. Reading eunoia with Dreizehnter and the mss. For it is possible for wars to be started unjustly. to justice of a sort (for law is justice of a sort)." But they disagree in their accounts of justice.42 otherwise. is in a way particularly adept in the use of force. Aristotle is assuming that even an unjust war will be undertaken in accor­ dance with the laws governing declarations of war. since his victory shows him to have the greater power.39 This makes it seem that force is not without virtue. and for the overlap in the arguments. when these accounts are disentangled. Those who believe that justice is the rule of the more powerful be­ lieve that such enslavement is just. and maintain that enslavement in war is just. Some hold the latter view. and no one would say that someone is a slave if he did not deserve to be one. and this is true even among the wise. See 1324hZZ-1325'14." Thus by admitting that a person enslaved by the victor in an unjust war has been unjustly but legally enslaved. For one side believes that justice is benevolence. Both accounts are canvassed by Thrasymachus in Book I of Plato's Republic (338c. Virtue together with the necessary external goods or resources are what en­ able someone to do something well.e. 1 3). At any event.. those regarded 39.

3. fr. as slaves. The same holds of noble birth. 45. and where the one ought to be ruled and the other ought to exercise the rule that is natural for him (so that he is in fact a master). But it is also clear that in some cases there is such a distinction--cases where it is beneficial and just45 for the one to be master and the other to be slave. Nauck 802. in terms of virtue and vice alone. Reading kai dikaion. if any of them were taken captive and sold. That is why indeed they are not willing to describe them. the opposite holds. 43. See 1254b27-33. 46. and beast from beast. As Theodectes' Helen says: "Sprung from divine roots on both sides. in saying this. that the objection with which we began has some­ thing to be said for it. 44. but is based on law. but only non-Greeks. Nobles regard themselves as well born wherever they are. though nature does have a tendency to bring this about. They imply a distinction between a good birth and freedom that is unqualified and one that is not unqualified. whereas others are slaves nowhere. body and soul. Theodectes was a mid-fourth-century tragic poet who studied with Aristotle. and a slave is a sort of part of his master-a sort of living but separate part of his body. Yet. 30 JS 40 12SSb S 10 1S .Chapter 6 11 as the best born would be slaves or the children of slaves. there is a certain mutual benefit and mutual friendship for such masters and slaves as deserve to be by nature so related. "Every human being seems to have some relations of justice with everyone who is capable of community in law and agreement. and that the one lot are not always natural slaves. but they regard non-Greeks as well born only when they are at home. For the same thing is beneficial for both part and whole. But often. and they have been subjected to force. Helen is Helen of Troy. then. however. and where misrule harms them both. 44 It is clear. well born from low born. Hence there is also friendship between master and slave. not only when they are among their own people. it is nevertheless unable to do so. to the extent that a slave is a human being" (NE 1 16 1bl-8). they are seeking precisely the natural slave we talked about in the beginning. Hence.46 When their re­ lationship is not that way. For they think that good people come from good people in just the way that human comes from human. For they have to say that some people are slaves everywhere. they are in fact distinguishing slavery from freedom. nor the other naturally free. who would think that I deserve to be called a slave?"43 But when people say this.

"48 as the proverb says. for ex­ ample.2-3. are the distinctions to be made regarding slave and master. 47 The same is true of slave and free. then. fr. 50. some of which are more esteemed. master to master. For different slaves have different tasks. Hence for those who have the resources not to bother with such things. it is different from both of these. A master is so called not because he possesses a SCIENCE but because he is a certain sort of person. But there is nothing grand or impressive about this science. One with practical wisdom. there could be such a thing as mastership or slave-craft. For rule of a statesman is rule over people who are naturally free. in accordance with our guid47. rule of a statesman is rule over people who are free and equal. The master needs to know how to command the things that the slave needs to know how to do. a steward takes on this office. 49.492. rule by a household manager is a monarchy. since every household has one ruler. let us now study property and wealth acquisition generally. . Lessons in such things might well be extended to include cookery and other services of that type. is the science of using slaves. Both a master's science and a slave's. 54. Mastership. A line from the comic poet Philemon. on the other hand. then. See VII.49 As for the science of acquiring slaves (the just variety of it). 48. These. None the less. are the business of slaves.12 Politics I Chapter 7 20 25 30 35 It is also evident from the foregoing that the rule of a master is not the same as rule of a statesman and that the other kinds of rule are not all the same as one another. the sort that was taught by the man in Syracuse who for a fee used to train slave boys in their routine services. Chapter 8 1256• Since a slave has turned out to be part of property. while they themselves engage in politics or PHILOSOPHY. though some people say they are.50 and is a kind of warfare or hunting. whereas that of a master is rule over slaves. Kock II. All such SCIENCEs. for it is not in acquiring slaves but in using them that someone is a master. others more concerned with providing the necessities: "slave is superior to slave.

whereas the second provides the matter. But when their herds have to change pasture. in order to make it easier for them to get hold of these foods. Reading he de with Dreizehnter. so that differences in diet have produced different ways of life among the animals. since the former uses resources. 5 1 The first problem one might raise is this: Is wealth acqui­ sition the same as household management. For some beasts live in herds and others live scattered about. because some of them are carnivorous. Others hunt for a living. as if they were farming a living farm. Similarly. and some omnivorous. for their ways of life differ a great deal. and52 property and wealth have many different parts. we shall first have to investigate whether farming is a part of household management53 or some different type of thing. nature has made their ways of life different. have chrematistikes ("wealth acquisition"). and likewise the supervision and acquisition of food generally. that out of which the product is made-for example. The mss. or in the way that bronze smelting is assistant to statue mak­ ing? For these do not assist in the same way: the first provides tools. The idlest are nomads. they too have to move around with them. some herbivorous. So. dif­ fering from one another in the sort of hunting they do. among the carnivores and herbivores themselves the ways of life are dif­ ferent. for they live a leisurely life. while the latter provides them. Described at 1252' 1 7-20. And since the same things are not naturally pleasant to each. because they get their food effortlessly from their domestic animals. or an assistant to it? If it is an assistant. whichever is of benefit for getting their food. For if someone engaged in wealth acquisition has to study the various sources of wealth and property. for what science besides household management uses what is in the household? But whether wealth acquisition is a part of household management or a science of a different kind is a matter of dispute. or a part of it. among human beings too.) It is clear that household management is not the same as wealth ac­ quisition. Reading oikonomikes with Dreizehnter.Chapter 8 13 ing method. (By the matter I mean the sub­ strate. Some live by 5 1 . wool for the weaver and copper for the bronze smelter. 53. 52. For it is impossible to live without food. but rather different things to different ones. But there are many kinds of food too. is it in the way that shuttle making is assistant to weaving. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 . Hence the lives of both animals and human beings are also of many kinds.

and simi­ larly when they have reached complete maturity. supplementing their way of life where it has proven less than self-sufficient. One kind of property acquisition is a natural part of household man­ agement. in that a store of the goods that are necessary for life and useful to the community of city-state or household either must be available to start with. though Solon in his poetry says it is: "No boundary to wealth has been established for 54. when they are first conceived.14 40 ] 256h 5 10 15 20 25 30 Politics I raiding. at any rate those whose fruits are natural and do not provide food through EXCHANGE or COMMERCE. then. domestic ones both for using and eating. marshes. so that clothes and the other tools may be got from them. or a sea con­ taining fish-live from fishing. Animals that produce larvae or eggs produce their offspring together with enough food to last them until they can provide for themselves. each spending their lives as their needs jointly compel. farming. true wealth seems to consist in such goods. hunting. some live both a nomadic and a raiding life. Alternatively: "one form of natural property acquisition is a part of house­ hold management. others. some-those who live near lakes. Clearly. At any rate. namely. But some people contrive a pleasant life by combining several of these. and so on. we must suppose in the case of fully developed things too that plants are for the sake of animals. Animals that give birth to live offspring carry food for their offspring in their own bodies for a cer­ tain period. are roughly speaking these: nomadic. If then nature makes nothing incom­ plete or pointless. But the most numerous type lives off the land and off cultivated crops. For this science ought to be used not only against wild beasts but also against those human beings who are unwilling to be ruled." . Hence the ways of life. both a farming and a hunting one. since hunting is a part of it. will in a way be a natural part of property acquisition. raiding. it must have made all of them for the sake of human beings. the natural substance we call milk. That is why even the science of warfare. rivers.54 then. or household management must arrange to make it available. as this sort of warfare is naturally just. and some from birds or wild beasts. and that the other animals are for the sake of human beings. both right from the beginning. It is evident that nature itself gives such property to all living things. for exam­ ple. but naturally suited for it. For the amount of this sort of property that one needs for the self-suffi­ ciency that promotes the good life is not unlimited. fishing. and most but not all wild ones for food and other kinds of support.

57 Let us begin our discussion of the latter as follows. It first arises out of the natural circumstance of some people having more than enough and others less. and first architect of the Athenian constitution. Both are uses to which shoes can be put. because the two are close neighbors. The same is true of other pieces of property as well. For someone who exchanges a shoe. then. It is the reason wealth and property are thought to have no limit. It is evident.Chapter 9 15 human beings. 58 but they are not the same uses of it as such: one is proper to the thing and the other is not. See 1 323h7-10. and justifiably so. Every piece of property has two uses. But it is neither the same as the one we discussed nor all that far from it: one of them is natural. Both of these are uses of it as such. The limit to the amount of property needed for the good or happy life is determined by what happiness is. since the science of exchange embraces all of them. for MONEY or food. 1 1 53b21-25. is using the shoe as a shoe. kath ' hauto: what something is as such or in itself or in its own right is what it is UNQUALIFIEDLY. 1258'38-bS. This also makes it clear that the part of wealth acquisition which is commerce does not exist by nature: for people needed to engage in exchange only up to the point at which they had enough. and its use in exchange. See 1 257'41-b5. NE 1 1 28b1 8-25. Solon (c. 35 Chapter 9 But there is another type of property acquisition which is especially called wealth acquisition. but comes from a sort of experience and craft."55 But such a limit o r boundary has been established. Diehl 1. 57. whereas the other is not natural. 58. 1 . Take the wearing of a shoe. 56. then. EE 1 249'22-b25 . But this is not its proper use because it does not come to exist for the sake of exchange. with someone else who needs a shoe. 640-560) was an Athenian statesman and poet. It is clear. that exchange has no task to perform in the first community (that is to say. See 1257b28. that there is a natural kind of property acquisition for household managers and statesmen.2 1 . fr. the household). 40 1257" 5 10 15 20 . for example. For none has any tool unlimited in size or number. For many people believe that wealth acquisition is one and the same thing as the kind of property ac­ quisition we have been discussing. and it is also clear why this is so. but only when the com55.56 and wealth is a collection of tools belonging to statesmen and household managers. just as in the other crafts. 7 1 .

it is also held that money itself is nonsense and wholly conventional. but then it became more of a craft as expe­ rience taught people how and from what sources the greatest profit could be made through exchange. That is why it is held that wealth acquisition is concerned primarily with money. This kind of exchange is not contrary to nature. For it is pro­ ductive of wealth and money. For the members of the household used to share all the same things. which they had to exchange with one an­ other through barter when the need arose. So for the purposes of exchange people agreed to give to and take from each other something that was a useful thing in its own right and that was conve­ nient for acquiring the necessities of life: iron or silver or anything else of that sort. . so as to save themselves the trouble of having to measure it. its value was determined simply by size and weight. At first. as many non-Greek peoples still do even to this day. wine is exchanged for wheat. commerce was probably a simple affair. On the other hand. not natural at all. and often someone who has lots of money is unable to get the food he needs. wealth acquisition arose out of it. since the aim of a natural appetite is to fill a lack" (NE l l l 8 b l 8 -1 9). 59 None the less. and in an in­ telligible manner. but nothing beyond that-for example. commerce. necessary exchange gave rise to the second of the two kinds of wealth acquisition. At first. and wealth is often assumed to be a pile of money. For the stamp was put on to indicate the amount. but finally people also put a stamp on it. For they exchange useful things for other useful things. people increasingly got their supplies from more distant foreign sources. and that its task is to be able to find sources from which a pile of wealth will come. on the grounds that this is what wealth acquisition and com­ merce are concerned to provide. After money was devised. For if those who use money alter it. "Eating indiscriminately or drinking until we are too full is exceeding the quantity that suits nature. and so on with everything else of this kind. Since not all the natural necessities are easily transportable. it has no value and is useless for acquiring necessities. Through importing what they needed and exporting their surplus. nor is it any kind of wealth acquisition. whereas those in separate households shared next many different things. Yet it is absurd for something to be wealth if someone who has lots of it will 59.16 25 30 JS 40 J2S7b S 10 Politics I munity has become larger. for its purpose was to fill a lack in a natural self-sufficiency. the use of money had of necessity to be devised.

For one aims to increase it. the possession of money. there is no limit to the end of this kind of wealth acquisition. And those who do aim at living well seek what promotes physical gratification. does have a limit. Each of the two kinds of wealth acquisition makes use of the same thing.60 The wealth that derives from this kind of wealth acquisition is without limit. they also want an unlimited amount of what sustains it. it seems that every sort of wealth has to have a limit. For medicine aims at unlimited health.61 And since their appetite for life is unlimited. then. And the second kind of wealth acquisition arose because of this. If they 60. So. is that they are preoccupied with living. See 12S2h29-30. however. since each tries to achieve it as fully as possible. 1280'3 1-32. on the grounds that money is the unit and limit of exchange. See Introduction lxxvi. Yet. not in the full sense. that is to say. since they are uses of the same property. when everything set before him turned to gold in answer to his own greedy prayer. since this too seems to depend on having property. The unit (stoicheion) for obvious reasons. 6 1 . So some people believe that this is the task of household management. But they do not use it in accordance with the same principle. and each of the crafts aims to achieve its end in an unlimited way. on the other hand. the opposite seems true. so their uses overlap. they seek the craft that produces the excess needed for gratification. but through their exchange. whereas commerce has to do with the production of goods. It is held to be concerned with money. since the end itself constitutes a limit for all crafts. I5 20 25 30 35 40 1258• 5 . they spend all their time acquiring wealth. The kind of wealth acquisition that is a part of household management. For since their gratification lies in excess. (But none of the things that promote the end is un­ limited. whereas the other aims at a different end. like Midas in the fable. since this is not the task of household management. The reason they are so disposed. the limit (peras) because the price of something delimits its exchange value. for natural wealth and wealth acquisition are different. not with living well. and rightly so. if we look at what actually happens.) Similarly. Natural wealth acquisition is a part of household management. In one way. The expla­ nation of this is that the two are closely connected. That is why people look for a different kind of wealth and wealth acquisition. for its end is wealth in that form.Chapter 9 17 die of starvation. and go on thinking that they should maintain their store of money or increase it without limit. for all wealth acquirers go on increasing their money without limit.

we have also found the solution to our original problem about whether the craft of wealth acquisition is that of a household manager or a statesman.18 10 15 Politics I cannot get it through wealth acquisition. so too nature must provide land or sea or something else as a source of food. None the less. But above all. since the surplus of that from which they come serves as food for every one of them. and another in which he does not. but the kind that has to do with exchange is 62. nature must ensure that wealth is there to start with. . For the end of courage is not to produce wealth but to produce con­ fidence in the face of danger. the other with household management. that it is a natural part of household management concerned with the means of life. and an assistant craft does. as we said. using each of their powers in an unnatural way. or not-this having rather to be available. as we said. One has to do with commerce. For just as states­ manship does not make human beings. but has a limit. But. See 1256h10-12. So too with wealth: there is a way in which a household manager has to see to it. but rather victory and health. just as they need life and every other necessity. 62 That is why the craft of acquiring wealth from crops and animals is natural for all people. Chapter 1 0 20 25 30 35 Clearly. even though the members of a household need health. and that it is not limitless like this one. but in another way it is not his task but a doctor's. For the task of weaving is not to make wool but to use it. For one might be puzzled as to why wealth ac­ quisition is a part of household management but medicine is not. We have now said what unnecessary wealth acquisition is and why we need it. and that everything ought to promote the end. We have also said that the necessary kind is different. For it is the task of nature to provide food for what is born. but takes them from nature and uses them. and to know which sorts are useful and suitable or worthless and unsuitable. there are two kinds of wealth acquisition. And in fact there is a way in which it is the task of a household manager or ruler to see to health. they try to do so by means of something else that causes it. nor is it the end of generalship or medicine to do so. and a household manager must manage what comes from these sources in the way required. these people make all of these into forms of wealth acquisition in the belief that acquiring wealth is the end. The latter is necessary and commendable.

2] money lending. Because for everyone who makes a profit in a commercial transaction.66 The practical parts of [I] wealth acquisition are experience of: [ 1 . some wage earners are (2 . 3 . for one needs practical experience of which breeds are by comparison with one another the most profitable. and interest is money that comes from money. For money was introduced to facilitate exchange. 1] livestock. 1 ] trading. [2. but he will gain practical experience of them to meet necessary needs. 66. which has three parts: [2. which is now divided into land planted with fruit and land planted with cereals. Republic 507a.2] transport.2] others are unskilled. useful for manual labor only. 12S!Jb S Chapter 1 1 Now that we have adequately determined matters bearing on knowledge.Chapter 1 1 19 justly disparaged.67 [ 1 . we should go through those bearing on practice. 1 . (That is how it gets its name. These differ from one another in that some are safer. See 1253b14-18. 1 . 1 . and (2. Ancient farming consisted in the cultivation of wheat and other cereals on flat open plains (psili) and the cultivation of grapes. The second part of exchange is (2. are the parts of the primary and most appropriate kind of wealth acquisition. cattle. someone else makes a loss? See Rh. and which breeds yield the most profit in which places.3] wage earning. on the other hand. These. rather than from the very thing money was devised to facilitate. etc. sheep. 65 A FREE person has theoretical knowledge of all of these. 1 ] ship owning." See Plato. 64. 138 1'21-33. since it i s not natural but is from one another. 1 343'27-30.3] marketing. 10 1S 20 2S . then. for example. as different ones thrive in different places. [3] A third kind of wealth acquisition comes between this kind and 63. on more hilly areas (pephuteumeni). since it gets wealth from money itself. Alternatively: "but he cannot avoid practical experience of them. for offspring resemble their parents. that can be of some use. whereas (2.)64 Hence of all the kinds of wealth acquisition this one is the most unnatural.2] Farming." 67.3. 1 ] vulgar craftsmen. others more profitable. 65. whether fish or fowl. olives. As for wage earning. 63 Hence usury is very justifiably detested. Takas means both "offspring" and "interest. and similarly other animals yield the most profit in different places and conditions. (2] Exchange's most important part. but interest makes money itself grow bigger. [ 1 .3] Bee keeping and the rearing of the other creatures. the third is (2. Oec. is (2. what sorts of horses.

See 1337h l S-21. Apollodorus was a contemporary of Aristotle's who wrote on practical farm­ ing. People were reproaching Thales for being poor. A general account has now been given of each of them. Chares of Paras and Apollodorus of Lemnos69 have written on how to farm both fruit and cereals. But. Mining too is of many types. It deals with inedible but useful things from the earth or extracted from the earth. 68. He hired them at a low rate. and others have written on similar topics. the most slavish are those in which the body is used the most. Moreover. Chares is otherwise unknown. For instance. . but it would be VULGAR to spend one's time developing it. When the olive season came and many people suddenly sought olive presses at the same time. as I said. 69. is in fact quite generally ap­ plicable. For example. Sixth-century philosopher and thinker who regarded water as the funda­ mental principle of all things. some people have written books on these matters which may be studied by those interested . the most ignoble are those least in need of virtue.20 30 35 1259' 5 10 15 20 Politics I the primary or natural kind. A detailed and precise account might be useful for practical purposes. claiming that it showed his philosophy was useless. So. the more they damage the body. while it was still winter. there is the scheme of Thales of Miletus. his scheme involves a generally applicable principle of wealth acquisition: to secure a monop­ oly if one can. The story goes that he realized through his knowledge of the stars that a good olive harvest was coming. though credited to him on account of his wisdom. since it contains elements both of the nat­ ural kind and of exchange. 70. because no one was bidding against him. Hence some city-states also adopt this scheme when they are in need of money: they secure a monopoly in goods for sale. the more vulgar they are. since many kinds of things are mined from the earth.68 (The operations that are most craftlike depend least on luck. he raised a little money and put a deposit on all the olive presses in Miletus and Chios for future lease. since all of them are useful to those who value wealth acquisition. he hired them out at whatever rate he chose.) Be­ sides. showing that philosophers could easily become wealthy if they wished. Thales is said to have demon­ strated his own wisdom in this way. but that this is not their concern. 70 This is a scheme for getting wealthy which. Logging and mining are examples. the scattered stories about how people have succeeded in acquiring wealth should be collected. He collected a lot of money.

It is also useful for statesmen to know about these things.Chapter 12 21 There was a man in Sicily who used some money that had been lent to him to buy up all the iron from the foundries. because they tend by nature to be on an equal footing and to differ in nothing. whenever one person is ruling and another being ruled. and later. It seems that the natural kind of property acquisition. 73. but to remain in Syracuse no longer. [2] another that of a father. he was the only seller. Rule of a statesman normally involves ruling and being ruled in turn ( 1259b4-6).7. When Dionysius71 heard about this. At 1253b8-12 (see note) the science used by a father in ruling his children was called procreative science. when the merchants came from their warehouses to buy iron. tyrant of Syracuse (406-367). since many city-states have an even greater need for wealth acquisition and the asso­ ciated revenues than a private household does. The next sen­ tence explains why such science needs to be distinguished from marital sci­ ence. That is why indeed some statesmen restrict their political activities entirely to finance. it is true. Probably Dionysius I. Mastership is discussed in !. For a male.72 For a man rules his wife and children both as free people. is here being included within slave mastery. which is a branch of household management ( 1 2 56b26-27). marital. he told the man to take his wealth out. and someone older and completely developed is naturally more fitted to lead than someone younger and incompletely de­ veloped. He did not increase his prices exorbitantly and yet he turned his fifty silver talents into one hundred and fifty. In most cases of rule of a statesman. 40 J251J' 5 . is naturally more fitted to lead than a female. people take turns at ruling and being ruled. 25 30 35 Chapter 1 2 Household management has proved to have three parts: [ I ] one is mas­ tership (which we discussed earlier). 72. Yet this man's insight was the same as Thales': each contrived to secure a monopoly for himself. he rules his wife the way a statesman does. Nevertheless. but not in the same way: instead. as he had discovered ways of making money that were harmful to Dionysius' own affairs.73 and his children the way a king does. the one ruling tries to distinguish him- 7 1 . unless he is somehow constituted contrary to nature. but a husband always rules his wife and is never ruled by her (12S9b9-10). and [3] a third.

but he was now a king. See NE 1 1 60h24-27. 76. witness what Amasis said about his footbath. or a child be temperate or intemperate? Or not? The problem of natural rulers and natural subjects. Hence Homer did well to address Zeus. For example. If both of them should share in what is noble-and-good/6 why should 74. as "Father of gods and men. He had once been an ordinary per­ son. is this: Has the slave some other virtue more estimable than those he has as a tool or servant.22 10 15 Politics I self in demeanor. and other such states of character? Or has he none besides those having to do with the physical assistance he provides? Whichever answer one gives. or rank from the ruled. free? If they do not. The story of Amasis (596-525) is recounted in Herodotus II. kalokagathia: if someone is noble-and-good. a gentleman. and this is a type of kingly rule.544. in our parlance. So he had a gold footbath made into a statue of a god. in what respect will they differ from the. courage. l 72 . justice. is that of a king. needs to be investigated in general terms. since slaves are human and have a share in reason. Roughly the same problem arises about women and children. then. since a parent rules on the basis of both age and affection. and whether their virtue is the same or different. The Egyptians treated the statue with great respect. A noble-and-good man is. there are problems. who is the king of them all. that household management is more seriously concerned with human beings than with inanimate property. he must have a share in the virtues of character (EE 1248b8-1249•16). absurdity seems to result. courageous. worthy of honor and respect. I/iad l. Amatis pointed out that he was like the footbath. If slaves have temperance and the rest. 75. . When Amasis first became king of the Egyptians. Chapter 1 3 20 25 30 It is evident. and this is the condition of older in relation to younger and father in relation to child. Do they too have virtues? Should women be tem­ perate. For a king should have a natural superiority. The rule of a father over his children. then. with their virtue more than with its (which we call wealth). and with the virtue of free people more than with that of slaves. but be the same in stock as his subjects. and just. such as temperance. they treated him with contempt because he was of humble origins. The first problem to raise about slaves. on the other hand.74 Male is permanently related to female in this way.

while the parts of the soul are present in all these people. one belongs to the part that has reason and one to the nonrational part. Hence a ruler must have virtue of character complete. 78. how will he rule well? And if the subject is not going to be. or something of that sort. courage. Ruling and being ruled differ in kind. the other that of an assistant. therefore. that would be astonishing. but that there are differences in their virtue (as there are among those who are naturally ruled). that both must share in virtue. 79. It is far better to enumerate the virtues. as Socrates supposed:79 the one courage is that of a ruler. therefore. We must suppose. so that most instances of ruling and being ruled are natural. but things that differ in degree do not differ in that way. It is evident. It is clear. For people who talk in generalities. and man rules child in different ways. The deliberative part of the soul is entirely missing from a SLAVE. it will become clear. 77. a child has it but it is incompletely devel­ oped.Chapter 13 23 one of them rule once and for all and the other be ruled once and for all? (It cannot be that the difference between them is one of degree. if the one shares in what is noble­ and-good. how will he be ruled well? For if he is internperate and cowardly. a WOMAN has it but it lacks authority. 78 but each of the others must have as much as pertains to him. The soul by nature contains a part that rules and a part that is ruled. each must have a share sufficient to enable him to perform his own task. saying that virtue is a good condition of the soul. then. It is evident. male rules female. that the same holds in the other cases as well. or correct action. See 1253h33-1254' 1 . and justice of a man are not the same as those of a woman. but not in the same way. are deceiving themselves. they are present in different ways. that the same necessarily holds of the virtues of character too: all must share in them. since his task is unqualifiedly that of a master craftsman. as Gorgias does. For free rules slaves. and we say that each of them has a different virtue. For if the ruler is not going to be temperate and just. he will not perform any of his duties.) On the other hand. and similarly in the case of the other virtues too. If we investigate this matter in greater detail. that is to say. 35 40 126()' 5 10 IS 20 25 . Reading archomenim with Dreizehnter. that all those mentioned have virtue of character. and not the other. then. and that temperance. Meno 73a6--c5. rather. See Plato. 77 Consideration of the soul leads immediately to this view. and reason is a master craftsman. because.

not the one who possesses the science of teaching him his tasks.83 for slaves should be admonished more than children. See 1277b22-24. Meno 7 l d4-72a5. whereas no shoemaker is. Moreover. and how to achieve the good and avoid the bad-it will be neces­ sary to go through all these in connection with the constitutions. are mis­ taken. one might raise the problem of whether VULGAR CRAFTSMEN too need to have virtue. 85 Hence both women and children must be educated with an eye to the constitution. 84. and virtue pertains to him to just the extent that slavery does. If what we have now said is true. That is to say. Thucydides II. A reference to Plato. As for man and woman. 82 The same holds of a slave in relation to his master. 83. whereas a vulgar craftsman is at a greater remove. for they often fail to perform their tasks through intemperance. women. Ajax 293. Or are the two cases actu­ ally very different? For a slave shares his master's life. what is good in their relationship with one another and what is not good. Since a child is incompletely developed. But we said that a slave is useful for providing the necessities. See 1253'18-29. lists the dis­ tinct virtues of men. See Plato. No full discussion of these topics appears in the Politics as we have it. and slaves. But we may take these matters to be determined in this way.84 For every household is part of a city-state. Hence those who deny reason to slaves. but tell us to give them orders only. Laws 777e. 1337'27-30. Sophocles. following Gorgias. then. children. the virtue relevant to each of them. so he clearly needs only a small amount of virtue-just so much as will pre­ vent him from inadequately performing his tasks through intemperance or cowardice. for a vulgar craftsman has a kind of delimited slavery. we must take what the poet says about a woman as our guide in every case: "To a woman silence is a crowning glory"81-whereas this does not apply to a man. 85.8° Consequently. a slave is among the things that exist by nature.45. and toward which his father is leading him. It is evident. that the cause of such virtue in a slave must be the master. if indeed it makes any difference to the virtue of 80. father and children. it is clear that his virtue too does not belong to him in relation to himself but in relation to his end and his leader.24 30 35 40 126fl' 5 10 15 Politics I than to define them in this general way. 82. the end he will have as a mature adult (happiness). . 8 1 . these are parts of a household. and the virtue of a part must be determined by looking to the virtue of the whole. where Meno. nor any other sort of craftsman.

since we have determined some matters. And it must make a difference. So. and make a new beginning. since half the free population are women. and from children come those who participate in the constitution.Chapter 13 25 a city-state that its children be virtuous. and its women too. let us regard the present discussion as complete. And let us first investigate those who have expressed views about the best constitution. 20 . and must discuss the rest elsewhere.

In partic­ ular. in the first in­ stance. at the natural starting point of this investi­ gation. As not many people are. and citizens share that one city-state. and any others described by anyone that are held to be good. in order to see what is correct or useful in them. and property with one another. share their location.B ooK I I Chapter 1 30 35 40 126Ja 5 Since we propose to study which political community is best of all for people who are able to live as ideally as possible. 1 we must investigate other constitutions too. 26 . or nothing. that we have undertaken this inquiry because the currently available constitutions are not in good condition. however. It is evidently impossible for them to share nothing. Let it be held. For a constitution is a sort of community. See 423e-424a. women. but also to avoid giving the impression that our search for something different from them results from a desire to be clever. see 1 288b23-24. women. it is not evident from Socrates' arguments why he thinks this legis1 . as in Plato's Republic.2 For Socrates claims there that children. instead. We must begin. and property should be communal. 2. for one city-state occupies one location. 449a-466d. and so they must. But is it better for a city-state that is to be well managed to share everything possible? Or is it better to share some things but not others? For the citizens could share children. So is what we have now better. Ideal conditions are literally those that are answers to our prayers (kat' euchen). or what accords with the law described in the Republic? Chapter 2 10 That women should be common to all raises many difficulties. or some things but not others. both some of those used in city-states that are said to be well governed. For all citizens must share everything.

because all are naturally equal. For they rule and are ruled in turn. provided the multitude is not separated into villages. A nation will also differ from a city-state in this sort of way.4 But things from which a unity must come differ in kind.5 since this must exist even among people who are free and equal. That is why reciprocal EQUALITY preserves city-states. See Republic 462a. it is clearly better. 1 1 63h32-1 1 64'2. Hence. and where it is at the same time just for all to share the benefits or burdens of ruling. For they cannot all rule at the same time. EE 1 242bl -2 1 . But since it is better to have the latter also where a political community is concerned. as in fact described. Introduction lxv-lxvi. I am talking about the assumption that it is best for a city-state to be as far as possible all one unit. An alliance is useful because of the weight of numbers.Chapter 2 27 lation is needed. See NE 1 1 32b32-1 1 34'30. The Arcadians of Aristotle's day were organized into a confederacy of city-states. For we would surely say that a household is more of a unity than a city-state and an individual human being than a household. but of people of different kinds. It is the same way among those who are ruling. for the same people always to rule. since the natural aim of a military alliance is the sort of mutual as­ sistance that a heavier weight provides if placed on a scales. some another.3 And yet it is evident that the more of a unity a city-state becomes. Further discussed at III.9. as we said earlier in the Ethics. the end he says his city-state should have is impossible. 4. since it will destroy the city-state. and from a household into a human being. 15 20 25 30 35 126Jb 5 . and as it becomes more of a unity. but is like the Arcadians. it is at least possible to approximate to this if those who are equal take turns and are similar when out of office. it will turn from a city-state into a household. for that is the as­ sumption Socrates adopts. even if someone could achieve this. it should not be done. but each can rule for a year or some other period. For a city-state naturally consists of a certain multitude. 5 . 1 243b29-36. 3. the less of a city-state it will be. just as if they had become other people. since a city-state does not come from people who are alike. where possible. yet nothing has been settled about how one ought to delimit it. just as all would be shoemakers and carpenters if they changed places. Besides. some hold one office. But among those where it is not possible. A city-state consists not only of a number of people. instead of the same people always being shoemakers and the others always carpenters. As a result they all rule. For a city-state is different from a military alliance. even if they are all of the same kind.

7 For "all" is ambiguous. the same person his son. and a city-state than a household.6 It is also evident on other grounds that to try to make a city-state too much a unity is not a better policy. But the phrase is also harmful in another way." are ambiguous. since each will then call the same woman his wife." "odd. and give rise to contentious arguments even in discussion. See Republic 462a-e. what is less a unity is more choiceworthy than what is more so. not each. this does not seem to have been established by the argument that every­ one says "mine" and "not mine" at the same time (for Socrates takes this as an indication that his city-state is completely one). less to what is commu- 6. perhaps more of what Socrates wants will come about. For a household is more self-sufficient than a single person. since what is held in common by the largest number of people receives the least care." "both. It is evident. but not possible." and "even. - . then. ''A contentious (eristikos) argument is one that appears to reach a conclusion but does not" ( Top. 162hJ 5) . and that what has been alleged to be the greatest good for city-states destroys them. whereas in the other sense it is in no way conducive to concord. But this is not in fact how those who have women and children in common will speak. For people give most attention to their own property.28 10 15 Politics II It is evident from these considerations that a city-state is not a natural unity in the way some people say it is. For an example of a different sort.)8 Hence in one sense it would be good if all said the same. and so on for each thing that befalls him. and a city-state tends to come about as soon as a commu­ nity's population is large enough to be fully self-sufficient. "In discussion" perhaps refers to formal philo­ sophical or dialectical discussions. So. 8. See Republic 608e." (For "all. that there is an equivocation involved in "all say. see 1 307hJ6-39. the same things his property. 7. Chapter 3 20 25 30 But even if it is best for a community to be as much a unity as possible. And the same goes for property: all. If it means each individually. where higher standards of argumentation may be expected. whereas what is good for a thing preserves it. They will all speak. but not each. since what is more self-sufficient is more choiceworthy.

11 And there are some women. Moreover. 1 80. Each of the citizens acquires a thousand sons. See HA 586'12-14. And even then he is uncertain. They say that some of the inhabitants of upper Libya have their women in common. or that of one's relatives. that have a strong natural tendency to produce offspring resembling their sires. sons. like the mare in Pharsalus called "Just. or only as much as falls to them to give. What he really means is "mine or so-and-so's. and yet distinguish the children on the basis of their resemblance to their fathers. Still others call him "my fellow clansman" or "my fellow tribesman. or one who once born survived. See Republic 463e2-5. 1 1 . "my brother" by another. 1360'33-35. someone might have official responsibility for or a special in­ terest in some common property." referring in this way to each of the thousand or however many who constitute the city-state. "my cousin" by a third. as well as some fe­ males of other species such as mares and cows. each says "mine" of whoever among the citizens is doing well or badly10 in this sense. according to the reports of some of those who write accounts of their world travels. Yet is this way of calling the same thing "mine" as practiced by each of two or ten thousand people really better than the way they in fact use "mine" in city­ states? For the same person is called "my son" by one person. the thought that someone else is attending to it makes them neglect it the more (just as a large number of household servants sometimes give worse service than a few). She is called "Just" because in producing offspring like the sire. At Rh. that he is whatever fraction he happens to be of a certain number. and mothers are. in the first instance. And this is what actually happens. 1 2 .9 For apart from anything else. since it is not clear who has had a child born to him."12 9. and so will be equally neglected by them all." For it is better to have a cousin of one's own than a son in the way Socrates describes.Chapter 3 29 nal. but they do not belong to him as an individual: any of them is equally the son of any citizen. 10. For example. it is impossible to prevent people from having suspicions about who their own brothers. she made a just return on his investment. and showed herself to be a virtuous and faith­ ful wife. For the resemblances that occur between parents and children will inevitably be taken as evidence of this. Besides. or something else in virtue of some other connection of kinship or marriage. Aristotle comments on the util­ ity of such travel writings in drafting laws. Pharsalus was in Thessaly in northern Greece. one's own marriage. See Herodotus IV. fathers. 35 40 1262• S 10 IS 20 .

and philosopher-kings. he forbids sexual intercourse only between lovers. producers (farmers). in order to promote obedience and prevent rebellion.13 Yet they are bound to occur even more frequently among those who do not know14 their relatives than among those who do.18 But it is the ruled who should be like that. Homosexual male lovers are meant. since even against outsiders they are so. and slanders are pious when committed against outsiders. The ideal city-state described in the Republic has three parts. It is also strange that while making sons communal. In general. there are other difficulties that it is not easy for the establishers of this sort of community to avoid. the latter can perform the customary expi­ ation. since in this condition people are least likely to factionalize. It is strange. But it cannot mean or imply that homicides. None of these is pious when committed against fathers. mothers. 16 It would seem more useful to have the farmers rather than the guardians share their women and children . 16. are most indecent. See 1 264'1 1-bS.30 Politics II Chapter 4 25 30 35 40 J262h 5 Moreover. Laws 868c-873c. The text is less clear about whether this is also true of the producers. 17. 18. assaults. as it is by Ross and Dreizehnter. and the opposite of those that Socrates aims to achieve by organizing the affairs of children and women in this way. And Socrates himself 13. but regards the fact that the lovers are father and son or brother and brother as making no difference. . See Plato. the results of such a law are necessarily the opposite of those of a good law. Reading gnorizont011 with Dreizehnter and the mss. and other property in common. Reading hosper kai pros apothen with the mss. 17 For there will be less friendship where women and children are held in common. such as voluntary or involuntary homicides. 1 5 . even if kai is omitted. or not too distant relatives (just as none is even against outsiders). For we regard friendship as the greatest of goods for city-states. assaults. Perhaps for the sort of reason given at 1 263'8-21. guardians. See Republic 403a--c. The sentence is ambiguous. too. 15 but does not prohibit sexual love itself or the other practices which. whereas the former cannot. 14. between father and son or a pair of brothers. children. or slanders. The implication is that these acts are particularly impious when committed against relatives. since even the love alone is. And when they do occur. The latter two share their women. that Socrates forbids such sexual intercourse solely because the pleasure that comes from it is so intense.

Aristophanes appears as a character in Plato's Symposium. however. So much for our conclusions about community of women and children. so it is with the kinship connections expressed in these names.Chapter 4 31 particularly praises unity in a city-state. once born. 2 1 . is a greater good than something that is one among others. 10 15 20 25 30 35 . there are no favorites in Socrates' ideal city-state because everyone there is just "one among others." nor will those who have been transferred to the guardians use these terms of the other citizens. in these cases the results we mentioned earlier must of necessity happen even more often-1 mean assaults. Aristotle's discussion of favorite things (to agapeton) at Rh. is that one or both has necessarily perished. (Similarly. For just as adding a lot of water to a drop of sweet wine makes the mixture undetectable. of course." "children. where he ex­ presses the view under discussion ( 1 92c-1 93a). want to grow together and become one in­ stead of two." "fathers. For there are two things in particular that cause human beings to love and cherish something: their own and their favorite. since he deprives him of a favorite thing. in Aristotle's view. or a son his father as a father. Hence someone who puts out the eye of a one-eyed man does not do the same harm as someone who does this to a man who has two eyes. love affairs. and murders. 21 Those who do the transferring and re­ ceiving are sure to know who has been transferred to whom. wants to draw the opposite conclusion: that everyone is a favorite there. since it is unique. 20.) But in a city-state this sort of community inevitably makes friendship watery." Hence. 19 The result in such circumstances." Plato. so as to avoid committing." or "mothers. See Republic 4 1 5a--c. because of their excessive friendship. in the erotic dialogues. Besides. something that i s held to be. or brothers each other as brothers. through kinship. will be transferred from the farmers and craftsmen to the guardians. any such of­ fenses. since in a constitution of this sort a father has least reason to cherish his sons as sons. or son of father. and that he himself says is. in that father hardly ever says "mine" of son. we know that Aristophanes says that lovers. And neither can exist among those governed in this way. the result of friendship. 1 36Shl6-20 ex­ plains what he has in mind: "A favorite thing.20 But there is also a lot of confusion about the way in which the chil­ dren. 19. and vice versa. For those who have been transferred to the other citizens will no longer call the guardians "brothers.

would be much su­ perior. These. particularly in enterprises such as these. If the land is worked by others. virtue will ensure that it is governed by the proverb "friends share everything in common. Travelers away from home who share a jour­ ney together show this clearly. and others are the difficulties involved in the common ownership of property. For it would have the good of both-by "of both" I mean of the common ownership of property and of private ownership. [ 1 ] the land might be owned separately." 22. while the crops grown on it are communally stored and consumed (as happens in some nations). and how those in the best con­ stitution should arrange it. I mean even if women and children belong to separate individuals. But where use is concerned. For most of them start quarreling because they annoy one another over humdrum matters and little things. . or not? One could investigate these questions even in isolation from the legislation dealing with women and children. For while property should be in some way communal. It is generally difficult to live together and to share in any human enterprise. as each will be attending to what is his own. [2] Or it might be the other way around: the land might be owned and farmed communally. property arrangements will give rise to a lot of discontent. For when care for property is divided up. which is in fact the practice everywhere. it leads not to those mutual accusations. Should it be owned in common. [3) Or both the land and the crops might be communal. But if the citizens do the work for themselves. the constitution is different and eas­ ier. accusations will inevitably be made against those who enjoy or take a lot but do little work by those who take less but do more. it still might be best for property either to be owned or used commu­ nally. For if the citizens happen to be unequal rather than equal in the work they do and the profits they enjoy. then. More­ over.32 Politics II Chapter 5 1263" 5 10 15 20 25 30 The next topic to investigate is property. we get especially irritated with those servants we employ most regularly for everyday services. but rather to greater care being given. The present practice. while the crops grown on it are di­ vided up among individuals for their private use (some non-Greeks are also said to share things in this way). Reading ethesi with Dreizehnter and some mss. For example. provided it was enhanced by virtuous character22 and a system of correct laws. in general it should be pri­ vate.

guests. 25. It is the legislator's special task to see that people are so disposed . in Sparta they pretty much have common24 use of each other's slaves.Chapter 5 33 Such a practice is already present in outline form in some city-states. Such legislation may seem attractive. it is very pleasant to help one's friends. just as in the case of the love of money (since practically everyone does love each of these things). particularly when someone blames the evils now existing in constitutions on property's not being communal (I mean lawsuits brought against one another over contracts. which implies that it is not impracticable. 24.25 Besides. it is loving oneself more than one should. Moreover. See Republic 464d-465d. and generosity with one's property. But those who make the city-state too much a unity by abolishing private property exclude these pleasures. Reading idiois with Richards. they may take what provisions they need from the fields. it would be fair to mention not only how many 23. For we see that those who own and share communal property have far more disagreements than those whose property is sep­ arate. he makes part of it available for his friends to use and keeps part for his own use. disposed to treat property in that way. whereas others could come to be. But we consider those disagreeing over what they own in common to be few. See 1 329b36-1330'33. nor perform any generous action (for it is in the use made of property that generosity's task lies). They also openly take away the tasks of two of the virtues: of temperance in regard to women (for it is a fine thing to stay away from another man's woman out of temperance). and flattery of the rich). thinking that all will have an amazing friendship for all. since one cannot show oneself to be generous. That is to say. 26. and humane. Furthermore. and dogs and horses also. to regard a thing as one's own makes an enormous difference to one's pleasure. For the love each person feels for himself is no accident. Selfishness is rightly criticized. 35 40 126Jb 5 10 15 20 25 . Reading koinois with Richards.23 For ex­ ample. or companions. Evidently. and when on a journey in the countryside. For although each citizen does own private property.26 Yet none of these evils is caused by property not being com­ munal but by vice. then. In well-managed city-states. and do them favors. as one can if one has property of one's own. but is something natural. it is better for property to be private and its use communal. some elements exist. But it is not just loving oneself. in particular. perjury trials. because we compare them with the many whose property is private. For anyone who hears it accepts it gladly.

and the good use of LEISURE. . Rh. and not by habits. For practically speaking all things have been discovered. should think to set it straight by mea­ sures of this sort. as it goes on. Good habits promote the virtues of character. yet nothing has been determined about them. The multitude of the other citizens constitute pretty well the entire multitude of his city-state. but also how many good things. laws sustain both. nor is it easy to say. 27. which is the very thing the Spartans are trying to enforce even now. or a rhythm to a single beat. and who believed that through it the city-state would be excellent. For a household and a city-state must indeed be a unity up to a point. It is strange. And we must not overlook this point. But the fact is that Socrates has not said. 29 although some have not been collected. One has to think that the reason Socrates goes astray is that his assumption is incorrect. 993•30-hl l . promotes the virtues of thought. philosophy. by being nearly not a city-state. (2) Human beings are naturally adapted to form largely reliable beliefs about the world and what conduces to their welfare in it (Metaph. as we said before. For there is a point at which it will. See also 1329h25-35. if one could see such a constitu­ tion actually being instituted. that the one who aimed to bring in education. 28. nothing else will be legis­ lated except that the guardians should not do any farming. it will be a worse one. GA 7 3 J h24-732•3. DA 4 1 5•2S-h7). what the arrangement of the constitution as a whole is for those who participate in it. It is as if one were to reduce a harmony to a unison. 1355'1 5-17). that we should consider the immense period of time and the many years during which it would not have gone unnoticed if these measures were any good. philosophy. 3 52bl6-17. Two of Aristotle's other views explain this otherwise implausible claim: ( I ) The world and human beings have always existed (Mete. At 1261•18. But a city-state consists of a multitude. Consequently. where the legislator aimed to make property communal by means of the MESSES. The life they would lead seems to be totally impossible. and others are known about but not used. and another at which. not be a city-state. however. The matter would become particularly evident. here probably to be understood fairly loosely. but not totally so. at any rate. and laws28-as in Sparta and Crete.34 30 35 40 1 264• 5 10 Politics II evils people will lose through sharing. 742hJ7-743• 1 . 29. For it is impossible to construct his city­ state without separating the parts and dividing it up into common messes or into clans and tribes.27 and should be unified and made into a community by means of education.

36. if they31 too are to have such things. although he requires them to pay a tax. 32 For he makes the guardians into a sort of garrison. and the dif­ ference it makes to the preservation of the community of the guardians is not small. as they do in other city-states. 30 If all is to be common to all in the same way. On the other hand. education. 543b--c. and slaves that some people have today. lawsuits. 34. and the farmers. what sort of community will it be? For it will in­ evitably be two city-states in one. and such other bad things as he says exist in other city-states will all exist among them. neither are the related questions of what constitution. and those opposed to one another. and the others into the citizens. Aristotle is justified in thinking that Socrates is vague about this. and forbid them only the gymnasia and the possession of weapons. The character of these people is not easy to discover. 3 1 . And yet Socrates claims that because of their education they will not need many regulations. and laws they will have. 34 Besides. But be that as it may. but will be trained in the craft for which their natural aptitude is highest. Helots were the serf population of Sparta. that female producers will not necessarily be housewives.36 serfs. The citizens other than the guardians.Chapter 5 35 whether the farmers too should have communal property or each his own private property. 33. 33 Hence the indictments. such as town or market ordinances and others of that sort. he gives the farmers authority over their property. See Republic 4 16d--e. 32. See Republic 4 1 5a-417b. 15 20 25 30 35 12641 . But casual remarks at 433d and 454d--e suggest that this may not be so. Farmers initially seem to have a traditional family life and to possess private prop­ erty. nothing at any rate has been determined about them. who will manage the household in the way 30. But if Socrates is going to make their women communal and their property private. Yet he gives this education only to the guardians. This is a criticism that Socrates brings against other city-states at Republic 422e-423b. 3 5 . or whether their women and children should be private or communal. craftsmen. whether these matters are similarly essential or not.35 But this is likely to make them much more difficult and presumptuous than the helots. See Republic 424a-426e. 4 19a-42l c. how will they differ from the guardians? And how will they benefit from sub­ mitting to their rule? Or what on earth will prompt them to submit to it-unless the guardians adopt some clever stratagem like that of the Cretans? For the Cretans allow their slaves to have the same other things as themselves.

g. For happiness is not made up of the same things as evenness. but its integral parts are both odd. which becomes a cause of conflict even among people with no merit.. and not the selection of philosopher-kings that replaces it at 535a-536d. and all the more so among spirited and warlike men. he has the provisional selection of rulers at Republic 412b--. so we had better also briefly examine the constitution 37.4 1 7b in mind. See Republic 45 l d-e.40 whereas happiness cannot. He makes the same people rule all the time. But if the guardians are not happy. even though Socrates deprives the guardians of their hap­ piness. 5 19e-520d. which was written later. immediately at their birth. mixed gold into the souls of some. most. Aristotle is referring to Republic 420b--. and there are others that are no less great. 39." He thinks that the guardians will still be as happy as possible. 40. Aristotle is claiming that those who are not se­ lected will resent this.37 The way Socrates selects his rulers is also risky. Presumably. as far as possible. Moreover. since the gold from the god has not been mixed into the souls of one lot of people at one time and another at another. He says that the god. Chapter 6 Pretty much the same thing holds in the case of the Laws. since the latter can be present in the whole without being present in either of the parts. . silver into others. but always into the same ones. he says that the legislator should make the whole city-state happy. See. indeed. if the farmers' women and property are communal? It is futile to draw a com­ parison with wild beasts in order to show that women should have the same way of life as men: wild beasts do not go in for household manage­ ment.42 l c. The rulers (philosopher-kings) are selected from among them.36 5 10 15 20 25 Politics II the men manage things in the fields? Who will manage it. 38 But it is evident that he has to make the same people rulers. since it contains the Myth of the Metals. Two is an even number. What Socrates ac­ tually says there is that the aim of the legislator is not to make the guardians or any other single group "outstandingly happy but to make the whole city­ state so. or some of its parts are happy. who is? Surely not the skilled craftsmen or the multitude of VULGAR CRAFTSMEN. are the problems raised by the constitution Socrates describes. 38. and bronze and iron into those who are going to be craftsmen and farmers. The guardians are spirited and warlike. then. These. e. 465d-e.39 But it is impossible for the whole to be happy unless all.

for example. In the Laws. 806d-807d. Aristotle probably gets the number one thousand from Republic 423a. The constitution described in the Republic. the system of property. but it is perhaps difficult to do everything well. In fact. Socrates has settled very few topics in the Republic: the way in which women and children should be shared in common. See Republic 412b-41 7b.47 and. 428c--d.43 including those about the sort of education the guardians should receive. 46. In the Republic. 45. 48. though. Otherwise. 43. and the organization of the constitution.48 and whereas the other one consisted of one thousand weapon owners. Aristotle overlooks Republic 434a-c. See Laws 74l e. We must not forget that it would need a territory the size of Babylon or some other unlimitedly large territory to 4 1 . And from the latter he takes a third. Consider.49 All the Socratic dialogues have something extraordinary. 853c. 740c.Chapter 6 37 there. 535a-536d. See Laws 96la-968b. He wishes to make it more generally attainable by actual city-states. 42. Most of the Laws consist. with the exception of the communal possession of women and property. where Socrates provides explicit guidance on these topics. that guardian women should join in battle and receive the same education as the other guardians. See Laws 737e. 805b--d.. on the same principles. which is the part of the city-state that deliberates and is in authorityY But as to whether the farmers and skilled craftsmen will participate in ruling to some extent or not at all. innovative. he has filled out his ac­ count with extraneous discussions. female guardians share the same messes as the men ( 458c-d).46 the life of freedom from necessary work. of laws. in fact. 806e-807b. 9 1 9d ff. 47.44 yet he gradually turns it back toward the other consti­ tutionY For. sep­ arate from the men's (780d ff.42 He does think. 842d.. For he divides the multitude of the inhabitants into two parts: the farmers and the de­ fensive soldiers. 842b). 30 JS 40 1265" S 10 . Reading tois exothen logois with Dreizehnter and the mss. See Laws 739a ff. 49. 846d.. 745e ff. this one is to consist of five thousand. and he has said little about the constitution. the same messes--except that in this con­ stitution he says that there are to be messes for women too. and probing about them. sophisticated. the multitude just mentioned. 44. and whether or not they are to own weapons and join in battie-Socrates has settled nothing about these matters. the other things he puts in both constitutions are the same: the same education. all the female citizens have messes of their own.

52. The mss. City-states typically lead a political life in part by interacting with other city-states ( 1 327b3-6). to see whether it would not be better to determine it differently and on a clearer basis.38 15 20 25 30 35 40 1265b Politics II keep five thousand people in idleness. 747d. One cannot use property either mildly or courageously. property is indivisible. 949e ff. for it must then have the weapons that are useful for waging war not only on its own territory but also against the regions outside it. leaving the birth rate unrestricted in the belief that the exis­ tence of infertility will keep it sufficiently steady no matter how many births there are. But if one rejects such a life. the other to luxury. but one can use it temperately and generously. Besides. This is not said anywhere in our text of the Laws. too. both for the individual and for the city-state in common. See Laws 740b. 855a-b. 842c-e. Aristotle apparently overlooks Laws 736a. For these are the only choiceworthy states that bear on the use of property. 758c." The political life is discussed in the Introduction xlvi-xlvii. if first. 51 not a solitary one. But. It is stated that a legislator should look to just two things in establishing his laws: the territory and the people. the need to be formidable to enemies is just as great. because this seems to be what happens in actual citystates. 742c. and a crowd of women and ser­ vants along with them. the city-state is to live a politi­ cal life. 923d. His subsequent criticisms overlook 737d. 74 lb. Reading apousin with Bender. For in actual city-states no one is left destitute. 52 The amount of property should also be looked at. 53. .54 so that excess children will nee50. 740b-74 la. to be sure. many times as great. 54. in this city-state. both when they are invading its territory and when they are staying away from it. which is like saying "as much as he needs to live well. but nothing that is impossible." For the formulation is much too general. but even isolated city-states can lead such a life pro­ vided their parts interact appropriately ( 132Sb23-27). 5 1 . because property can be divided among however great a number. the states concerned with its use must be these. but Aristotle may be in­ ferring it from 704a-709a. for when separated. A better definition is "temperately and gen­ erously". 856d-e. for ex­ ample. have apelthousin: "when they are leaving it.53 But the same exactness on this matter is not required in actual city-states as in this one. it is possible to live a temper­ ate life but a wretched one. We should assume ideal conditions. It is also strange to equalize property and not to regulate the number of citizens. the one will lead to poverty. He says that a person should have as much as he needs in order to live temperately. 5° But it would also be good to add the neighboring regions too. Hence.

.. in case it is disadvantageous to household management. 775e-776b. The point of the division seems to bt: to pro­ vide a married son with a household of his own (776a).57 Another topic omitted from the Laws concerns the rulers: how they will differ from the ruled. Plato fixes the number of household estates and makes them of equal size. inevitably causes poverty among the citizens.55 one of the most ancient legislators. but. since hoplite weapons are expensive. 1335hl9-26. Despite these reser­ vations. See Laws 744e. thought that the number of citizens should be kept the same as the number of household estates. At 1 335bl9-1 336•2. no matter whether they are few or many. 96 l a ff. even if initially they all had estates of unequal size. but also 632c. so that no more than a certain number are born. 56. 58 Furthermore. (One should fix this number by looking to the chances that some of those born will not survive.61 If. a smaller one than the en­ tire citizen body. 5 10 15 20 25 30 . as is done in most city-states. Statesman 308d. it is called a POLITY. however.60 The overall organization tends to be neither a democracy nor an oli­ garchy but midway between them.) To leave the number unrestricted. Otherwise unknown. and that others will be childless. See 1 330•2-23. of the various constitutions. This is a larger class than the class of wealthy citizens. 61. 59 why should this not also hold of land up to a certain point? The division of homesteads also needs to be examined. he is establishing this as the one generally most acceptable to actual city­ states. it is just the opposite. Hence a polity is midway (or in a mean) between an oligarchy and a democracy. will have to be given later. Pheidon of Corinth. in Aristotle's view. 56 Our own view as to how these things might be better arranged. his proposal is perhaps good. but it is difficult to run two households. 58. he does not effectively limit the number of citizens. In fact. though for different reasons ( 1330•14-25). rather than property. and poverty produces faction and crime. 59. For he assigns two of the separate homesteads resulting from the division to each individual. 60. 8 1 8a. 9 5 l e ff. so should ruler be related to ruled.Chapter 6 39 essarily get nothing. but. See Laws 745c--e. but if as next best after the first con55. 57.3 l lc. But in the Laws. which rules in an oli­ garchy. One might well think instead that it is the birth rate that should be limited. since it is made up of those with HOPLITE weapons. See Laws 734e-735a. since he permits a person's total property to increase up to five times its original value. He says that just as warp and woof come from different sorts of wool. which rules in a democracy. Aristotle himself adopts a similar arrangement in his ideal city­ state.

or as being the worst ones of all. or some other more aristocratic one.9 and notes. 853c). 805b--d. which is not the best but the second best.. 9 5 1 d-e. they say the kingship is a monarchy.. For to select by lot from a previously elected pool is common to both. This is true of the market and city-state managers but it is not so clearly true of other important officials. he agrees with Aristotle that democracy and tyranny are the worst con­ stitutions possible (580a-c). monarchy. and democracy. For some say that it is made up of oligarchy. Some people believe. 64 Therefore. 763d-767d. 745e ff. 67. This is clear from the method of selecting officials. kings. 65. Others of them say that the overseership is a tyranny.63 But in the Laws it is said that the best constitution should be composed of democracy and tyranny. to vote for officials. But the point is perhaps this: a constitution in which principles drawn from a large number of other constitutions are mixed will serve the interests of more citizens (whatever their own political leanings) and so will be more stable ( 1 270h17-28) and more just ( 1 294' 1 5-25). On senators. See Laws 753b--d . See Laws 756b-e. because a constitution composed of a larger number is better. it is not goodY For one might well commend the Spartan con­ stitution. 64. But it is oli­ garchic to require richer people to attend the assembly. the proposal of those who mix together a larger number is better. Plato describes monarchy (not tyranny) and democracy as the "mothers" of all constitutions (Laws 693d-e). The conclusion hardly follows. 65 Next. Plato seems to have chosen his constitution for both reasons (Laws 739a ff. 63. the constitution plainly has no monarchical features at all. where he sets out the best constitu­ tion. In the Republic. indeed. which is why they commend the Spartan constitution. 766a-c. 946a. and that it is governed democratically be­ cause of the messes and the rest of daily life. without requiring these things of the others. 66.66 The same is true of the attempt to ensure that the majority of officials come from among the rich. and that it is governed democratically in virtue of the office of the overseers (because the over­ seers are selected from the people as a whole). constitutions one might well consider as not being CONSTITU­ TIONS at all. He describes the constitution he is propos­ ing. as a mean between monarchy and democracy (756e).40 35 40 1266" 5 10 Politics II stitution. 755b--756b. and to perform any other political duties. and overseers. the office of senators an oligarchy. that the best constitution is a mixture of all constitutions. See 1 294hl 3-40. with a tendency to lean more toward oligarchy. with the most important ones coming from among those with the highest PROPERTY ASSESSMENTY 62. . but only oligarchic and democratic ones. see 11.

He thought this was not difficult to do when city-states were just being founded. if even a relatively small number of people combine. they begin with the necessities. indeed.68 First. 1 296h34-1 297' 1 3 . For. is how things stand concerning the constitution of the Laws. I5 20 25 30 Chapter 7 There are other constitutions. everyone is required to elect candidates from the first property-assessment class. that the most im­ portant thing is to have property well organized. This. those from the highest assessment classes will be more numerous and better. Reading isos with Dreizehnter and Saunders. and only members of the first and second classes are required to elect candidates from members of the fourth. 70. For no one else has ever suggested the innovations of sharing children and women. or of messes for women. did so. Then from these. An older contemporary of Plato. As for the elections of officials. As a result. See IV. then. for they say that it is over property that everyone creates faction. then again in the same way69 from the second. It is evident from this. 69. 35 40 1 266b .72 the first to propose such a constitution.Chapter 7 41 He also makes the election of the council oligarchic. Aristotle gives a longer list o f Platonic innovations a t 1 274h9-1 5. 72.7-9. At Laws 756b-e. That is why Phaleas of Chal­ cedon. too. proposed either by private individuals or by philosophers and statesmen.71 Rather. electing from the elected is dangerous. but that in those already in operation it would be more difficult. an equal number must be selected from each assessment class. But all of them are closer to the established constitutions under which people are actually governed than either of Plato's. Some of them hold. then from members of the third--except that not everyone was required to elect candidates from members of it or of the fourth class. 71. since some of the common people will not vote because they are not required to. Nonetheless. he thought that a leveling could very quickly be achieved by the rich giving but not 68. he says. the election will always turn out the way they want. and from what we shall say later when our in­ vestigation reaches this sort of constitution/0 that such a constitution should not be constituted out of democracy and monarchy. for he says that the property of the citizens should be equal.

For one should level desires more than property. 77. he must also aim at the mean. Besides. people who make such laws should not forget. A Corinthian colony founded in the seventh century. for he thinks that city-states should have equality in these two things: prop­ erty and education. That leveling property has some influence on political communities was evidently understood even by some people long ago. so that it leads to luxurious living. people re73. as among the Locrians75 where the law forbids it unless an obvious misfortune can be shown to have occurred. Their legislator Zaleucus (mentioned at 1274'22. and that cannot happen unless people have been adequately educated by the laws. but that no citizen should have more than five times the smallest amount. for example. See 1337'10-32. 7 5 . 74.3 1 ) was famous for trying to reduce class conflict. For if the number of children exceeds the amount of property. it is a bad thing for many to become poor after having been rich. when writing the Laws. But one also ought to say what the education is going to be. that while regulating the quantity of property they should regulate the quantity of children too. it would be of no use. so that a penny-pinching life results. as in fact they do. Laws likewise prevent the sale of property. (Plato. Discussed at 1273h3S-1 274"2 1 . 76. 77 Phaleas would perhaps reply that this is actually what he means. It was the abrogation of this provision. to cite one example. For it can be one and the same. since as a result men no longer entered office from the designated assessment classes.42 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Politics II receiving dowries. thought that things should be left alone up to a certain point. since it is a task to prevent people like that from becoming revolutionaries. that it is not enough for the legislator to make property equal. and the poor receiving but not giving them. or too low. At 1 26Sb21-23. A Greek settlement in southern Italy. then. Yet even if one prescribed a moderate amount for everyone. it is cer­ tainly necessary to abrogate the law. But equality of property may exist and yet the amount may be too high. and may have been the author of the law in question. . But abrogation aside. It is clear. as we also said earlier-)13 However. both by Solon in his laws/4 and the law in force elsewhere which pro­ hibits anyone from getting as much land as he might wish. NE 1 179'33-1 1 8 1 b23. that made the constitution of Leucas76 too democratic. In yet other cases it is required that the original allotments be preserved in­ tact. And it is no use for it be one and the same. but of the sort that will produce people who deliberately choose to be ACQUISITIVE of money or honor or both.

The pleasure of satisfying one's hunger comes in part from alleviating the pains of hunger. then. however. For example. 583b-588a. about which he has said 78. 80. " But this makes Aristotle's proposed cure irrelevant to its target. 40 1267" 5 10 IS 20 . cultivated people because of honors. Homer. is the cure for these three? For the first.Chapter 7 43 sort to faction because of inequality not only of property but also of honors. they will seek to remedy it by committing injustice. but other pleasures need involve no pain. which involves living a life with other people. although in opposite ways in each case: the many do so because of inequality in property.79 What. are committed because of excess and not because of the necessities. while the latter. which Phaleas thinks equality of property will cure (in that they will not steal because of cold or hunger). So Phaleas' style of constitution would be a help only against minor injustices. Third. For the second. Reading autim with some mss. in­ volves pain. which is compatible with living a solitary life. 8 1 . if they happen to be equal. since all other pleasures require human beings. Therefore it is necessary for the constitution to have been organized with an eye to military power. 79. On Aristotle's view there are two relevant candidate pleasures-the pleasure of practical political activity and the pleasure of philosophical contempla­ tion. Republic 359c."78 Human beings do not commit injustices only to get the necessities. 373a-d. temperance. then noble and base are being honored to the same degree. no one becomes a tyrant to escape the cold. they will commit injustices in order to enjoy the pleasures that are without pain. Moreover. The former.80 he should not look for a cure be­ yond PHILOSOPHY. See NE 1 1 73bl 3-20. The contrast is particularly clear at NE 1 177'22-b26. if anyone wants to enjoy things because of themselves. does not. he wants to arrange most things to provide a basis on which they will govern well in the case of their relations to one another. Hence the saying: "Noble and base are held in a single honor. 3 1 9.81 The greatest injustices. Alternatively (Ross and Dreizehnter): "if any­ one should wish to find enjoyment through themselves (hautim). Achilles is complaining that if his war prizes can be taken away by Agamemnon. Nor is this remedy the only motive: but even without desires. whereas their relations with neighbors and outsiders as a whole should also be considered. in any case. Iliad IX. Plato. That is why the honors are great when one kills not a thief but a tyrant. For if they have a desire for more than the necessities. they also commit them to get enjoy­ ment and assuage their desires. moderate property and an occupation.

82 told him to consider how long it would take to capture the place. Eubu­ lus. 82. and then to figure what such time would cost. or we should leave all of them alone. its ruler. so to speak. while equalizing the property of citizens is among the things that helps prevent faction. and satisfying them is what the many spend their lives trying to do. For example. But even what he has said about the equalizing of property is not correct. but wealth also exists in the form of slaves. until they go beyond all limit.84 The starting point in such matters. That is why there should not be so much property on hand that more powerful neighbors will covet it. Phaleas has not settled how much wealth is beneficial to have. they go on always asking for more. See 1257b40-1258'14. Enough needs to be available for use within the city-state. on the grounds that they do not merit equality. The case of property is similar. and that base ones cannot be (and this is the case if they are weaker and are not treated unjustly). 83. and the owners will be unable to repel the attackers. So we should either seek to equalize or moderate all these. rather than leveling property. A wealthy money-changer who united Atarneus and Assos (two strongholds on the coast of Asia Minor) into a single kingdom. These words caused Autophradates to have second thoughts and to abandon the siege. a form of poor relief. but it must not be overlooked. 350. It seems to have been. 84. Thus two obols is enough at first. it is certainly no big thing. livestock. is to arrange that naturally decent people are dis­ posed not to want to be acquisitive. nor so little that they cannot sustain a war even against equal or sim­ ilar people. An obol is one sixth of a drachma. So. and when there i s a lot o f so-called moveable property. for he said he was willing to abandon Atarneus at once for less. For there is no natural limit to desires.44 25 30 35 40 1 267h 5 10 Politics II nothing. but also to meet external dangers. 83 but once that has become traditional. 3. when Autophradates was about to lay siege to Atarneus. That is why they are often seen to engage in sedition and start faction. For he equalizes only land holdings. The two-obol payment (diobelia) was in­ troduced after the fall of the oligarchy of 41 1 I 10. For culti­ vated people would get dissatisfied. Perhaps the best limit is such that those who are stronger will not profit if they go to war because of the excess. See Ath. which was attacked by the Persian general Autophradates c. XXVIII. . in effect. Besides. human greed is an insatiable thing. therefore. and money. but as they would if the property were not so great. and where Aristotle lived in the late 340s.

Chapter S


It is also evident from his legislation that the city-state he is establishing is a small one-at any rate, if all the craftsmen are to be public slaves
and will not contribute to filling out the membership of the city-state.
But if there have to be public slaves, it should be those engaged in public works (as, for example, in Epidamnus, under the scheme Diophantus
tried to introduce in Athens).85
These remarks about Phaleas' constitution should enable one to see
pretty well whether he has actually proposed anything good.



Chapter 8
Hippodamus of Miletus, the son of Euryphon, invented the division of
city-states and laid out the street plan for Piraeus. 86 His love of honor
caused him also to adopt a rather extraordinary general lifestyle. Some
people thought he carried things too far, indeed, with his long hair, expensive ornaments, and the same cheap warm clothing worn winter and
summer. He also aspired to understand nature as a whole, and was the
first person, not actually engaged in politics, to attempt to say something
about the best constitution.
The city-state he designed had a multitude of ten thousand citizens,
divided into three parts. He made one part the craftsmen, another the
farmers, and a third the defenders who possess the weapons. He also di­
vided the territory into three parts: sacred, public, and private. That
which provided what is customarily rendered to the gods would be sa­
cred; that off which the defenders would live, public; and the land belonging to the farmers, private. He thought that there are just three
kinds of law, since the things lawsuits arise over are three in number: AR­
ROGANT behavior, damage,87 and death. He also legislated a single court
with supreme authority, consisting of a certain number of selected el­
ders, to which all lawsuits thought to have not been well decided are to
be referred. He thought that verdicts in law courts should not be ren-

85. Epidamnus in the Adriatic was a colony of Corinth and Corcyra founded in
the seventh century. The identity of Diophantus is uncertain, and his
scheme otherwise unknown.
86. Hippodamus was a fifth-century legislator and city-state planner. Around
the middle of the fifth century he went as a colonist to Italy, where he laid
out the city-state ofThurii. Piraeus is the harbor area near Athens. Aristotle
comments on city-state planning at 1330h29-3 1 .
87. blabin: covering both personal injury and damage to property.












Politics II

dered by casting ballots. Rather, each juror should deposit a tablet: if he
convicts unqualifiedly, he should write the penalty on the tablet; if he
acquits unqualifiedly, he should leave it blank; if he convicts to some ex­
tent and acquits to some extent, he should specify that. For he thought
that present legislation is bad in this regard, because it forces jurors to
violate their judicial oath by deciding one way or the other. 88 Moreover,
he established a law that those who discovered something beneficial to
the city-state should be honored, and one another that children of those
who died in war should receive support from public funds. He assumed
that this had not been legislated elsewhere, whereas in reality such a law
existed both in Athens and in some other city-states. All the officials
were to be elected by the people, and the people were to be made up of
the city-state's three parts. Those elected should take care of commu­
nity, foreign affairs, and orphans. These, then, are most of the features
of Hippodamus' organization, and the ones that most merit discussion.
The first problem is the division of the multitude of citizens. The
craftsmen, farmers, and those who possess weapons all share in the con­
stitution. But the fact that the farmers do not possess weapons, and that
the craftsmen possess neither land nor weapons, makes them both virtually slaves of those who possess weapons. So it is impossible that every
office be shared. For the generals, civic guards, and practically speaking
all the officials with the most authority will inevitably be selected from
those who possess weapons. But if the farmers and craftsmen cannot
participate, how can they possibly have any friendly feelings for the constitution? "But those who possess weapons will need to be stronger than
both the other parts." Yet that is not easy to arrange unless there are lots
of them. And, in that case, is there any need to have the others partici­
pate in the constitution or have authority over the selection of officials?
Besides, what use are the farmers to Hippodamus' city-state? Skilled
craftsmen are necessary (every city-state needs them), and they can sup­
port themselves by their crafts, as in other city-states. It would be rea­
sonable for the farmers to be a part of the city-state, if they provided

88. In Athenian law juries decided guilt or innocence by casting a ballot. The
penalty for some crimes was prescribed by law. For others, the jury had to
choose between a penalty proposed by the prosecutor and a counterpenalty
proposed by the defendant. In neither case could a juror propose some
penalty of his own devising. Hippodamus is proposing to give a juror more
discretion in both sorts of cases. Jurors in Athens took a judicial oath to ren­
der the most just verdict possible.

Chapter 8


food and sustenance for those who possess weapons. But, as things
stand, they have private land and farm it privately.
Next, consider the public land, which is to feed the defenders. If they
themselves farm it, the fighting part will not be different from the farming one, as the legislator intends. And if there are going to be some others to do so, different from those who farm privately and from the war­
riors, they will constitute a fourth part in the city-state that participates
in nothing and is hostile to the constitution. Yet if one makes those who
farm the private land and those who farm the public land the same, the
quantity of produce from each one's farming will be inadequate for two
households. 89 Why will they not at once feed themselves and the soldiers
from the same land and the same allotments? There is a lot of confusion
in all this.
The law about verdicts is also bad, namely, the requirement that the
juror should become an ARBITRATOR and make distinctions in his deci­
sions, though the charge is written in unqualified terms. This is possible
in arbitration, even if there are lots of arbitrators, because they confer
together over their verdict. But it is not possible in jury courts; and, in­
deed, most legislators do the opposite and arrange for the jurors not to
confer with one another.90 How, then, will the verdict fail to be confused
when a juror thinks the defendant is liable for damages, but not for as
much as the plaintiff claims? Suppose the plaintiff claims twenty minas,
but the juror awards ten (or the former more, the latter less), another
awards five, and another four. It is clear that some will split the award in
this way, whereas some will condemn for the whole sum, and others for
nothing. How then will the votes be counted? Furthermore, nothing
forces the one who just acquits or convicts unqualifiedly to perjure himself, provided that the indictment prescribes an unqualified penalty. A
juror who acquits is not deciding that the defendant owes nothing, only
that he does not owe the twenty minas. A juror who convicts without believing that he owes the twenty minas, however, violates his oath
As for his suggestion that those who discover something beneficial to
the city-state should receive some honor, such legislation is sweet to lis-

89. Presumably, because of the lost efficiency of scale. One can produce less
from two farms than from a single farm of the same acreage.
90. Athenian juries of five hundred to one thousand members were not unusual.
They gave their verdicts directly without conferring.















Politics II

ten to, but not safe.91 For it would encourage "sychophancy,"92 and
might perhaps lead to change in the constitution. But this is part of an­
other problem and a different inquiry. For some people93 raise the ques­
tion of whether it is beneficial or harmful to city-states to change their
traditional laws, if some other is better. Hence if indeed change is not
beneficial, it is not easy to agree right off with Hippodamus' suggestion,
though it is possible someone might propose that the laws or the constitution be dissolved on the grounds of the common good.
Now that we have mentioned this topic, however, we had better ex­
pand on it a little, since, as we said, there is a problem here, and change
may seem better. At any rate, this has certainly proved to be beneficial in
the other sciences. For example, medicine has changed from its traditiona! ways, as has physical training, and the crafts and sciences gener­
ally. So, since statesmanship is held to be one of these, it is clear that
something similar must also hold of it. One might claim, indeed, that
the facts themselves provide evidence of this. For the laws or customs of
the distant past were exceedingly simple and barbaric. For example,
the Greeks used to carry weapons and buy their brides from one an­
other. Moreover, the surviving traces of ancient law are completely
naive; for example, the homicide law in Cyme says that if the prosecutor
can provide a number of his own relatives as witnesses, the defendant is
guilty of murder. Generally speaking, everyone seeks not what is tradi­
tional but what is good. But the earliest people, whether they were
"earth-born" or the survivors of some cataclysm, were probably like or­
dinary or foolish people today (and this is precisely what is said about
the earth-born indeed}.94 So it would be strange to cling to their opin­
ions. Moreover, it is not better to leave even written LAWS unchanged.
For just as it is impossible in the other crafts to write down everything
exactly, the same applies to political organizations. For the universal law
must be put in writing, but actions concern particulars.
9 1 . Though Aristotle does favor such legislation in at least one kind of case, see
1309' 1 3-14.
92. By the middle of the fifth century some people in Athens, known as sycho­
phants, made a profession of bringing suits against others for financial, po­
litical, or personal reasons. Aristotle worries that Hippodamus' law will en­
courage sychophancy through giving people an incentive to pose as public
benefactors by bringing false charges of sedition and the like against others.
93. See Herodotus 111.80; Plato, Laws 772a-d, Statesman 298c ff.; Thucydides
1.7 1 .
94. The cataclysm view i s expressed i n Plato, Laws 677a ff., Timaeus 22c ff. The
earth-born are described at Statesman 272c-d and Laws 677b-678b.

Chapter 9


So it is evident from these considerations that some laws must some­
times be changed. But to those who look at the matter from a different
perspective, great caution will seem to be required. For if the improve­
ment is small and it is a bad thing to accustom people to casual abrogation of the laws, then some of the rulers' or legislators' errors should
evidently be left unchanged, since the benefit resulting from the change
will not be as great as the harm resulting from being accustomed to disobey the officials. Moreover, the model drawn from the crafts is false,
since making a change in a craft is not like changing a law. For the law
has no power to secure obedience except habit; but habits can only be
developed over a long period of time. Hence casual change from existing
laws to new and different ones weakens the power of law itself. Finally, if
laws are indeed to be changed, are they all to be changed, and in every
constitution? And who is to change them? Anyone at all or certain people? For these things make a big difference. Let us therefore abandon
this investigation for the present: there will be other occasions suitable
for it.95




Chapter 9
There are two things to investigate about the constitution of Sparta, of
Crete, and, in effect, about the other constitutions also. First, is there
anything legislated in it that is good or bad as compared with the best or­
ganization? Second, is there anything legislated in it that is contrary to
the fundamental principle or character of the intended constitution?
It is generally agreed that to be well-governed a constitution should
have leisure from necessary tasks. But the way to achieve this is not easy
to discover. For the Thessalian serfs often attacked the Thessalians, just
as the helots-always lying in wait, as it were, for their masters' misfor­
tunes-attacked the Spartans. Nothing like this has so far happened in
the case of the Cretans. Perhaps the reason is that, though they war with
one another, the neighboring city-states never ally themselves with the
rebels: it benefits them to do so, since they also possess SUBJECT PEOPLES
themselves. Sparta's neighbors, on the other hand, the Argives, Messenians, and Arcadians, were all hostile. The Thessalians, too, first experienced revolts because they were still at war with their neighbors, the
Achaeans, Perrhaebeans, and Magnesians. If nothing else, it certainly
seems that the management of serfs, the proper way to live together with

95. This investigation is not pursued in the Politics.












Politics II

them, is a troublesome matter. For if they are given license, they become
arrogant and claim to merit equality with those in authority, but if they
live miserably, they hate and conspire. It is clear, then, that those whose
system of helotry leads to these results still have not found the best way. 96
Furthermore, the license where their women are concerned is also
detrimental both to the deliberately chosen aims of the constitution and
to the happiness of the city-state as well. For just as a household has a
man and a woman as parts, a city-state, too, is clearly to be regarded as
being divided almost equally between men and women. So in all consti­
tutions in which the position of women is bad, half the city-state should
be regarded as having no laws. And this is exactly what has happened in
Sparta. For the legislator, wishing the whole city-state to have endurance, makes his wish evident where the men are concerned, but has
been negligent in the case of the women. For being free of all con­
straint,97 they live in total intemperance and luxury. The inevitable re­
sult, in a constitution of this sort, is that wealth is esteemed.98 This is
particularly so if the citizens are dominated by their women, like most
military and warlike races (except for the Celts and some others who
openly esteemed male homosexuality). So it is understandable why the
original author of the myth of Ares and Aphrodite paired the two;99 for
all warlike men seem obsessed with sexual relations with either men or
women. That is why the same happened to the Spartans, and why in the
days of their hegemony, many things were managed by women. And yet
what difference is there between women rulers and rulers ruled by
women? The result is the same. Audacity is not useful in everyday matters, but only, if at all, in war. Yet Spartan women were very harmful
even here. They showed this quite clearly during the Theban invasion;100
for they were of no use at all, like women in other city-states, 1 0 1 but
caused more confusion than the enemy.

The best way to have leisure from necessary tasks.
Reading aneimenos with Richards.
See Plato, Republic 547b-555b.
Ares, the god of war, is often portrayed as the partner of Aphrodite, the
goddess of sexual love (e.g., Homer, Odyssey 8.266-366). Aristotle thinks
that myths generally contain a core of wisdom, though it may not be easy to
discover at first glance ( 1 34 l b2-8, Metaph. 1 074'38-bl 4).
100. In 369 under Epaminondas. See Plato, Laws 8 1 3e-8 14c; Xenophon, Hel­
lenica VI.5.28.
1 0 1 . The clause is ambiguous, but probably means that women in other city­
states were useful in wartime. Thucydides 11.4.2, 111.74.2 attests to the im­
portance of women during sieges.

Chapter 9


S o i t seems that license with regard t o women initially occurred in
Sparta for explicable reasons. For Spartan men spent a great deal of time
away from home during their wars with the Argives, and again with the
Arcadians and Messenians. So when leisure returned, they placed them­
selves in the hands of their legislator, 102 already prepared thanks to mili­
tary life, which includes many parts of virtue. But we are told that when
he attempted to bring the women under his laws, they resisted and he
retreated. These, then, are the causes of what happened, and so, clearly,
of the present error as well. But of course we are not investigating the
question of whom we should excuse and whom not, but what is correct
and what is not.
The fact that the position of women is not well handled seems not
only to create a certain unseemliness in the constitution, as we said be­
fore, but also to contribute something to the love of money. For what one
might criticize next, after the foregoing, is the uneven distribution of
property. For because some of the Spartans came to own too much
wealth and others very little, the land passed into the hands of a few.
This is poorly organized by the laws as well. For the legislator quite
rightly made it improper to buy or sell an existing land holding, but he
left owners free to give or bequeath their land if they wished, even
though this inevitably leads to the same results as the other.103 Indeed,
nearly two-fifths of all the land belongs to the women, both because
many become heiresses and because large dowries are given. It would
have been better if it had been organized so that there was no dowry or
only a small or moderate one. But, as it is, one may marry an heiress
daughter to whomever one wishes, and if a man dies intestate, the per­
son he leaves as his heir gives her to whom he likes. As a result, in a land
capable of supporting fifteen hundred cavalry and thirty thousand ho­
plites, there were fewer than a thousand. The very facts have clearly
shown that the organization of these matters served them badly. For
their city-state did not withstand one single blow, 104 but was ruined be­
cause of its shortage of men.
It is said that at the time of their early kings, they used to give a share
in the constitution to others, so that there was no shortage of men, de-

102. Lycurgus, the legendary architect of the Spartan constitution.
103 . Allowing estates to be sold in part leads to estates that are too small to sup­
port their owners adequately. Partial bequests'have the same result.
104. Aristotle is referring to the battle of Leuctra in 371, when the Thebans in­
flicted a shattering defeat on the Spartans.








g. Matters relating to the board of overseers 106 are also badly organized. But the law dealing with the procreation of children militates against this reform. intending there to be as many Spartiates as possible. 1320b26-28. 1 309b l 6-18. for the people remain contented because they participate in the most important office. the board of overseers does hold the constitution to­ gether. and the land is correspondingly divided. but not the former. a better way to keep high the number of men in a city-state is by leveling property. They supervised the operation of the political and judicial system as a whole. equal in power to a tyranny-even the kings were forced to curry favor with the overseers. many people will inevitably become poor. for example. every part of the city-state must want it to exist and to remain as it is. the more extreme versions of deviant constitutions satisfy the latter principle. e. Admittedly. For this office has sole authority over the most important matters. and the people. they say that there were once ten thousand Spartiates. 106. For if a constitution is to sur­ vive. since there is a law ex­ empting a father of three sons from military service.52 127rJ S 10 IS 20 25 Politics II spite lengthy wars. So. Indeed. ephoreia: Five ephors or overseers were elected annually by the Spartiates.. are107 open to bribery. it benefits Spartan affairs. and recently among the Andrians.105 Whether this is true or not. the noble-and-good. And this too has harmed the constitution. because of their poverty. Aristotle's reference is otherwise unknown. because the of­ fice is too powerful-in fact. 108. For the legislator. Reading eisin with Richards. But it is evident that if many children are born. 1 08) Moreover. 1 294b34-40. for from an aristocracy a democracy was emerging. and a father of four from all taxes. because of the senate (since this office is a reward of virtue). encour­ ages people to have as many children as possible. It should probably be distinguished from the principle expressed. and served as a limit on the powers of the two kings (see below). 1 320' 1 4-17. Generally speaking. but the overseers are drawn from among the entire people. because of the board of overseers (since selec- 105. Adult male Spartan citizens. for some. whether it came about because of the legislator or by luck. so that often very poor men enter it who. 109. . 109 And the kings want this because of the honor given to them. 107. (This has been shown on many occasions in the past too. at 1296b14-1 6. did everything in their power to destroy the entire city-state. This principle is repeated in various forms throughout the Politics. 1297b4-6. corrupted by bribes.

Reading tes politeias with Scaliger. 30 35 40 1271• 5 10 . All were over 60 years old. 1 1 5.Chapter 9 53 tions for it are made from all). it is not safe. 1 1 0 Furthermore. It might seem that the overseers should in­ spect every office. 1 13 Matters relating to the senate also do not serve the Spartans well. the overseers' lifestyle is not in keeping with the aim of the constitution. See Plato. 1 16 But when they are educated in such a way that even the legis­ lator himself doubts that they are good men. Lycurgus XXVI. as they are at present. and is not the way we say inspections should be carried out. Not only is the se­ lection made in a childish way. Plutarch. those who have participated in this of­ fice have been conspicuous in taking bribes and showing favoritism. See 1 306•18-1 9. And in fact in many matters of public concern.115 since the mind has its old age as well as the body. 1 389h1 3-1 390•24. Laws 692a. 117 but it is wrong for someone worthy of 1 1 0. This is precisely why it is better that the senators not be exempt from INSPEC­ TION.111 For it in­ volves too much license. which is exceed­ ingly childish. though they are ordinary people. so that they cannot endure it. The senate (gerousia) had 28 members in addition to the two kings (dis­ cussed below). The senate prepared the agenda of the citizen assem­ bly. See Plato. 1 1 1 . The apparent conflict with the characterization of the overseers at 1270b28-29 is perhaps removed by 1 275b9-1 1 . laws. and had other political and judicial functions. but secretly escape from the law and enjoy the pleasures of the body. the overseers have authority over the most important judicial decisions. 1 14 If the senators were decent people. though the overseers should be cho­ sen from all." 1 1 3. Again. Republic 548b. Although. 1 1 7. but it is also possible that they were chosen by lot. like the senate. 1 14. but this would give too much to the board of overseers. with an adequate general education in manly virtue. whereas in other respects112 it is too austere. but in accordance with what is written. Members of the senate were chosen by an elaborate process of acclamation. Hence it would be better if they decided cases not according to their own opinion. 1 1 6. See Rh. en de tois a/lois: or "in the case of other people. Alternatively: "not in keeping with the aim of the city-state (tes poleos). The method of electing senators is also defective. Still. that is to say." 1 12. one might well say that this office benefits the city-state. and were probably selected from aristocratic families. one might dispute about whether they ought to have lifelong authority in important matters. it should not be by the present method. The overseers may have been chosen by acclamation.

Yet their traditional way of delimiting the Spartan constitution is to exclude from it those who cannot pay this contribution. each descended from a different royal house. military virtue. He intended the institution of messes to be democratic. as pretty much another kingship. see 1301h18-2 1 . That is precisely why they used to send out a king's opponents as fellow ambassadors. since this is useful for conquest. they are scarcely democ­ ratic at all. But the fact is that the legislator is evidently doing the same thing here as in the rest of the constitution. 1 20. For they ought to be publicly supported. 119 but on the basis of his own life. 1 19. 1 22. The law dealing with the admirals has been criticized by others. and why they regard faction between the kings as a safeguard for the city-state. Yet the love of honor and of money are the causes of most voluntary wrong­ doings among human beings. At any rate he distrusts them. For examples.) Nor were matters relating to the messes (or so-called phiditia) well legislated by the person who first established them. At 625c-638b. as they are in Crete. as 1 1 8.121 For the office of admiral is established against the kings. since it becomes a cause of faction. who are permanent generals. 14-17. since the very poor cannot easily participate in them. 1 2 1 . on the grounds that they are not sufficiently good men.54 15 20 25 30 35 40 1271b Politics II the office to ask for it: a man worthy of the office should hold it whether he wants to or not.122 For the entire system of their laws aims at a part of virtue. One might also criticize the fundamental principle of the legislator as Plato criticized it in the Laws. See 1 272' 1 2-27. and rightly so. not as now. for no one would ask for office who did not love honor. 1306h3 1-33. both of whom were members of the senate and ruled for life. The question of whether or not it is better for city-states to have a kingship must be discussed later. but. 120 But among the Spartans each individual has to contribute. legislated as they are now. So. . (It is clear that even the Spartan legislator himself did not think it possible to make the kings noble-and-good. At 111. They had a military as well as a political and religious function. He makes the citi­ zens love honor and then takes advantage of this fact in the election of the senators. even though some are extremely poor and unable to afford the expense.ll8 but it is better to choose each new king. The result is thus the opposite of the legis­ lator's deliberately chosen aim. Sparta had two hereditary kings.

and most older things are less fully elaborated than newer ones. 5 10 IS Chapter 1 0 The Cretan constitution closely resembles that of the Spartans. they started to decline. no less serious.Chapter 10 55 long as they were at war. is that although they think (rightly) that the good things that people compete for are won by virtue rather than by vice. This criticism of Sparta and other oligarchies is repeated with various elaborations and emphases at 1334'2-h5. because of the kinship connection. and taxes are not properly paid. they do not scrutinize one another's tax payments. he spent most of his time in Crete. For the Lyctians were colonists from Sparta. The island seems naturally adapted and beautifully situated to rule 123." 125. Semimythical Cretan king. For they are compelled to fight major wars. For it seems. 1324h5-1 1 . 320a. b. husband of Pasiphae. For these are the things one might particularly criticize in it. 20 25 30 . Hence even now their subject peoples employ these laws. but most of it is less finished. and those who went to the colony adopted the or­ ganization of the laws existing among the inhabitants at that time. as most of the land belongs to the Spartiates. the mother of the Mino­ taur. 125 that the constitution of the Spartans is largely modeled on the Cretan. yet the public treasury is empty. because they did not know how to be at leisure. They say that after Lycurgus relinquished the guardianship of King Charillus126 and went abroad. Minos 3 18c-d. or at any rate it is said. they remained safe. they also suppose (not rightly) that these GOODS are better than virtue itself. for. l 3 33b5-1 l . in the belief that Minos127 first established the organization of the laws. 132 tells u s that the regular custom o f the Spartans was "never to act hastily in the case of a Spartan citizen and never to come to any irrevocable decision without indisputable proof. See Herodotus 1. and had never undertaken any kind of training with more AUTHORITY than military training. 124 Thus the result the legislator has produced is the opposite of beneficial: he has made his city-state poor and the private individuals into lovers of money. 127. Thucydides 1. Plato. So much for the Spartan constitution. in some small respects it is no worse. 126.123 Matters relating to public funds are also badly organized by the Spartiates.65. Another error. 124. But once they ruled supreme. The posthumous son of Lycurgus' elder bother King Polydectes.

Communal meals are better handled among the Cretans than among the Spartans. In Crete. as we said earlier. and another for the messes. things are done more communally. and the order keepers took over leadership in war. At 127 1"26-37. 131 The legisla­ tor regarded frugality as beneficial and gave much thought to securing it. where he met his death near Camicus. but presum­ ably enough was left over to feed them at home.56 35 40 1272" 5 10 15 20 25 Politics II the Greek world since it lies across the entire sea on whose shores most of the Greeks are settled. 131.132 It is evident. See Thucydides I. Sussitia i s the normal Attic term. 1 28. 8. where Aristotle cites communal meals for women as a peculiarity of Plato's con­ stitution.128 The Cretan way of organizing things is analogous to the Spartan. establishing settle -:1ents on others. The Cretans at one time had a kingship. one part is set aside for the gods and for PUBLIC SERVICES. Aristotle never returns to this topic. 1335b38-1336"2. Women and children did not participate in communal meals. and in the other from Asia (the part around Cape Triopium) and from Rhodes. that the messes have been better orga­ nized by the Cretans than by the Spartans. In one direction it is not far from the Pelopon­ nese. For the overseers have the same powers as the order keepers (as they are called in Crete). But see 1 262•32-40. except that the overseers are five in number and the order keepers ten.4. The helots do the farming for the latter. Out of all the public crops and livestock and the tributes paid by the subject peoples. 1 5 . so that all­ women and children and men-are fed at public expense. In Sparta. All Cretans participate in the assembly. 132. 129 like the Cretans-a clear indication that they came from Crete). 1 29. and to finding a place for sexual relations between men. The senators correspond to the senators. and to the segregation of women. the subject peoples for the former. there is the organization of the constitution. whom the Cretans call the council. and finally attacking Sicily. 1 269b23 -3 1 . That is why Minos established his rule over the sea too. if he does not. Both places have messes (in ancient times. Besides. See 1274b9-l l . 130 each person must con­ tribute a fixed amount per capita. but later they did away with it. but its authority is limited to vot­ ing together for the resolutions of the senators and order keepers. the Spartans called these an­ dreia rather than phiditia. . on the other hand. 1 30. There will be another opportunity to examine whether this was badly done or not. so as to prevent them from having many children. subjugating some islands. Laws 780e-78la. a law prevents him from participating in the constitution. and Plato. then.

xenelasia: the Spartan practice of expelling foreigners. since those who wish to attack it are also able to so. and it is dangerous that they rule not in accordance with what is written but according to their own opinion. Their habit is to divide the people and their own friends. which is not a safe standard. the order keepers have no profit. For this makes it clear that whereas the organization has some­ thing of a constitution about it. The fact that the people remain quiescent even though they do not participate is no indication that it has been well organized. But. 30 35 40 !272h S !0 IS . See 1270b17-28. 136 This is why the institution of subject peoples survives 133. since its distance has served to keep for­ eigners out. "disorder. far away. from any who might corrupt them. because the election is from all." 1 36. Yet how does this sort of thing differ from such a city-state ceasing temporarily to be a city-state.133 But here the order keepers are elected not from all but from certain families. because they live on an island. but the benefit to the constitution there is absent here. on the other hand. however. See Plato. The remedy they use for this offense is also strange. 134 often brought about by the powerful. is the suspension of order keepers. and the political community dissolving? A city-state in this condition is in danger. and so wish the constitution to continue. create anarchy. Laws 848a. anarchia: alternatively (Dreizehnter and the mss. and fight one another. Order keepers are also allowed to resign before their term has expired. at least. Crete's location saves it. yet it is not a constitution but more of a dynasty. are even less well organized than those relating to the overseers. For there the people participate in the most important office. Worst of all. as we said. For the order keepers are frequently expelled by a conspiracy either of their colleagues themselves or of private individuals." Thus akosmia (suspending the order keepers) results in akosmia (disorder). when they are unwilling to submit to justice. 135 form factions. 1 34. 135. For the board of order keepers shares the defect of the board of overseers (that it is com­ posed of ordinary people). For unlike the overseers. and the senators are elected from those who have been order keepers. not political but characteristic of a DYNASTY.): "create a monarchy (monarchia).Chapter 10 57 Matters relating to the order keepers. And the same remarks might be made about the senators as about those who become senators in Sparta: their exemption from in­ spection and their life tenure are greater prerogatives than they merit. But surely it is better if all these things should take place according to LAW and not human wish. akosmia: literally.

but it is better that the kings are neither from the same family nor from a chance one. whereas the helots frequently revolt. the office of the one-hundredand-four is like that of the overseers. Chapter 1 1 25 30 35 40 1273• S The Carthaginians also are thought to be well-governed. For these three constitutions. and that no faction even worth talking about has arisen among them. Points of similarity to the Spartan constitution are these. which has made the weakness of its laws evident. 139. but if any family distinguishes itself. the Cretan. For the kings and senators have authority over what to bring and what not to 1 37. though in some respects closely resembling the Spartans. For they have authority in important matters. But here-as at 1 294bl 0-1 1-he treats it and "polity" as equivalents. 137 So much for this constitution. Outside dominions involve foreign wars. Reading hekousion with Dreizehnter.139 some deviate more in the direction of democracy. the Carthaginian. rather than selected on the basis of seniority. whereas they elect to this of­ fice on the basis of merit). and it is an indication that their constitution is well organized that the people willingly138 stick with the way the con­ stitution is organized. which are one cause of serf re­ volts. and if they are insignificant people. The com­ panions' messes are like the phiditia. For the Cre­ tans do not rule outside their borders-though a foreign war has recently come to the island. and no tyrant. 1 38. Spartan.58 20 Politics II among the Cretans. and in many respects in an extraordinary way (compared to others). See 1269bS-7. . they do a lot of harm to the city-state (as they already have done to the city-state of the Spartans). Their kings and senate are analogous to those of Sparta. Aristotle usually uses the term "aristocracy" to refer to a single component of a mixed constitution. and. except that it is not worse (for the overseers are drawn from ordinary people. A polity is a mixed constitution ( 1 26Sb26-28). third. others more in the direction of oligarchy. Many of their arrange­ ments work well for them. Most of the criticisms one might make because of its deviations from the best constitution are actually common to all the constitutions we have discussed. But of those that are deviations from the fundamental principle of an aristocracy or a POLITY. are all in a way close to one another and very different from others. then the kings are elected from its members.

then this organization. But this deviation from aristocracy should be regarded as an error on the part of their legislator. Moreover. some by some and others by others. which have authority over many important matters. But perhaps Aristotle's idea is that because Carthaginian officials are elected on the basis of merit or virtue.141 But the major deviation of the organization of the Carthaginians away from aristocracy and toward oligarchy is their sharing a view that is held also by the many: that rulers should be chosen not solely on the basis of their merit but also on the basis of their wealth. or any­ thing else of that sort. be­ cause the power to execute or exile can then end up in the hands of a very small number (see 1 294b3 1-34). Hence. according to which the Carthaginians have organized matters relating to the constitution. it is oligarchic that the boards of five. not only when in office but in private life. it is also oligarchic that they hold office longer than the others (for they rule before taking office and after they have left it). the people have authority over these matters also. and anyone who wishes may speak against the proposals being made. 1 4 1 . the people not only are allowed to hear the officials' res­ olutions. giving them all the same judicial powers comes close to the aristocratic ideal of vesting those powers in the best people.Chapter 1 1 59 bring before the people. in Sparta. It is oligarchic to assign different judicial powers to different groups. 10 15 20 25 30 35 . This does not exist in the other constitutions. if indeed it is oligarchic to choose rulers on the basis of their wealth. And also that all legal cases are decided by the boards of five. But we must regard it as aristocratic that they are neither paid nor chosen by lot. some cases could be tried by a single overseer ( 1 27Sb9-10). still it is bad that 1 40. especially in the case of the most important officials. For they elect to office with an eye to both qualities. 1 40 which is the most important office. Moreover. indeed. On the other hand. For one of the most important things is to see to it from the outset that the best people are able to be at leisure and do nothing unseemly. but have the authority to decide them. and not. will be a third sort. elect themselves. as in Sparta. Referred to as "the one-hundred-and-four" at 1272b34-35. in order to ensure leisure. and elect to the office of one-hundred. since poor people cannot afford the leisure necessary to rule well. and aristocratic to choose them on the basis of their merit. the kings and the generals. when they make proposals. But even if one must look to wealth too. It is less clear why it is aristo­ cratic to adopt the Carthaginian model. And. but if they do not. provided they all agree.

But this is the result of luck. at least while they are ruling. 144.142 And even if the legislator ne­ glected the wealth of the decent people. it would certainly be odd if a worse one. then. 143. For one task is best performed by one person. and not require the same person to play the flute and make shoes. if some misfortune occurs and the multitude of those who are ruled revolt. It would also seem to be bad to allow the same person to hold several offices. should be for sale. where the city-state is not small. since in both of them ruling and being ruled extend through practically speaking everyone. a thing held in high esteem among the Carthaginians. Hence when virtue is not esteemed more than everything else.) But though their constitution is oligarchic. and give stability to their constitution.): "and each of the same things (autim) is better carried out. who has already spent money. when they rule by having spent money. and Carthaginian constitutions. will not want to. . For it is more widely shared. So. is better carried out. For this law gives more esteem to wealth than to virtue.60 40 1 27Jh S 10 IS 20 2S Politics II the most important offices. For if a poor but decent person will want to profit from office." Or: "each task. he had better look to their leisure. however. The city-states in question are presumably colonies of some sort where citizens could make money as government officials or in some other way. if more people participate in the offices. and makes the entire city-state love money. Hence those who are able to rule best should rule. as it belongs to the same persons (autim). (This is clear in the case of military and naval affairs. More like a genuinely political or statesman-like community. they are very good at es­ caping faction by from time to time sending some part of the people out to the city-states to get rich. It is reasonable to expect too that those who have bought office will become accustomed to making a profit from it. and each of the offices144 is better carried out and more quickly. Cretan. As things stand. whereas they ought to be free of faction thanks to their legislator. the laws provide no remedy for restoring peace. 143 and more democratic. it is more political. the constitution cannot be securely governed as an aristocracy. Alternatively (Ross and the mss. Reading archim with Dreizehnter. those of king and general. as we said. This." 145. Reading arist' archein with Spengel. is the way things stand with the Spartan. 142. See 1320h4-7. which are rightly held in high esteem.145 In this way they effect a cure. The legislator should see to it that this happens. the opinion of the other citizens too inevitably follows theirs. For whatever those in authority esteem.

he destroyed the other things. 147 and he established the ancestral democracy. it was a powerful oligarchic element in the constitution. About them pretty much everything worth saying has been said. They say that when he gave law courts selected by lot authority over all legal cases. Many poorer people had become enslaved through a process of debt bondage in which they offered their own persons as security on loans. Allowing the poorer people to serve on them without financial loss. however. 1 50. by mixing the constitution well. It seems that this did not come about through Solon's deliberate choice. On the other hand. and Solon did not abolish them. 149. Others became legislators. For when this element became powerful. and Pericles introduced payment for jurors. Ephialtes and Pericles were POPULAR LEADERS in Athens. for they established both laws and constitutions. Since its members were all rich. Ephialtes joined Pericles i n introducing legislation which stripped the Are­ opagus of most of its privileges. is why some people criticize him. but rather more by accident. some in their own city-states. such as Lycurgus and Solon. For the common people were the cause of Athens's naval supremacy during the Persian wars. he did set up the democracy. and the courts democratic. indeed. existed already.Chapter 12 61 Chapter 1 2 Some of those who have had something to say about a constitution took no part in political actions. crafted a CONSTITUTION too. those who flattered the common people like a tyrant changed the constitution into the democracy we have now: Ephialtes and Pericles149 curtailed the power of the Areopagus. some think he was an excellent legislator because: he abolished an oligarchy which had become too unmixed. others in foreign ones as well. engaging in politics themselves. For they think the council of the Areopagus is oli­ garchic. 147.148 the election of officials aristocratic. We have already discussed that of the Spartans.146 As for Solon. From earliest times. each popular leader enhanced the power of the people and led them on to the present democracy. Which was the work of Lycurgus. In 462 1 1 . That. by making law courts open to all. 148. 30 35 40 1274a 5 10 .150 In this way. he put an end to the slavery of the common people. whereas others. As 146. Solon canceled all existing debts and put an end to this practice. the council of the Areopagus had jurisdiction over homicide cases. But it seems that the first two. Solon made it the special guardian of his constitution. but always lived privately. and was murdered in that same year. Some of these men crafted LAWS only. the council and the election of officials.

they became arrogant. who worked in Sparta. the third. 155 a member of the Bacchiad family. and Charondas was a pupil of Zaleucus. Ononmacritus may be the poet and divine of that name who was active in Athens at the end of the sixth century. The first class consisted of men whose property produced the equivalent of 500 measures (medimnoi) of corn. (Some people actually try to establish connections by telling the following story: Onomacritus was the first person to become an expert in legislation. the rest of the citizens made up the fourth class. the so-called hippeis. those whose property produced 300 measures. Diodes left Corinth in disgust at the lust his mother. Otherwise unknown. But when they say these things. that of electing and INSPECTING officials (since if they did not even have authority in these. they permitted the kind of upward mobility that the earlier lineage system effectively excluded. where they both ended their days. 1 54. 152 But he drew all the officials from among the notable and rich: the pentakosiomedimnoi. 151 Solon. and the third class. Lycurgus and Zaleucus were pupils of Thales. Thales was his companion. the second. although one is visible 1 5 1 . 1 53 . and Charondas of Catana for his own citizens and for the other Chalcidian city-states in Italy and Sicily. See 1 28 lbJ l-2. and who could keep a horse and fight as cavalrymen (hippeis). those whose property produced 200 mea­ sures. Plato. and chose inferior people as their popu­ lar leaders when decent people opposed their policies. the thetes.62 15 20 25 30 35 Politics II a result. at any rate. Since these divisions were based solely on wealth or property. 1 52. Zaleucus was a seventh-century legislator for the Locrians living in south­ ern Italy. Even now people point out their tombs. Laws 707a-d. . But the fourth class. 153 Zaleucus became a legislator for the Epizephyrian Locrians. Thales (Thaletas). and so were able to maintain a team of oxen (zeugos). VII. Ath. Charondas was probably sixth century. not on lineage. had for him. Though a Locrian. the people would have been enslaved and hostile). was a seventh-cen­ tury poet from Gortyn in Crete. the victor in the Olympic games. 1 55. they speak without regard to chronology. and went off to Thebes. Alcyone. He became the lover of Diodes. seems to have given the people only the minimum power necessary. did not participate in any office. which are in full view of one another. the zeugitai. See Aristotle. he trained in Crete while on a visit connected with his craft of divination. or wine. who became a legislator for the Thebans. See 1304'1 7-24. olive oil.)154 There was also Philolaus of Corinth.

on the grounds that one of the hands should not be useful and the other useless. which is here attributed to Phaleas. 1 59. On his treat­ ment of drunken offenders. 156 messes for women. And to Plato: the sharing of women. But Philolaus became legislator both on other matters and about procreation (which they call "the laws of adoption"). then. except the severity of the punishments. There is nothing peculiar to his laws worth talking about. Pittacus too crafted laws. A law peculiar to him requires a drunken person to be punished more severely for an offense than a sober one. Aristotle points out that Phaleas equalized only landed property. 1 1 10h24-33. and Philolaus so that it might be visible from his. but not a constitution. 67 1 a. There are also Draco's laws. he is more polished than even present-day legislators. and so the amount of wine con­ sumed (Laws 637a-b. There is nothing peculiar to Charondas except lawsuits for perjury.672d). At 1 267h9-10. It was for this sort of reason. one of the fabled Seven Sages. 158 but Draco established his laws for an existing constitution. 1 58. 40 1274h 5 10 I5 20 . symposiarchei: serve as the symposiarch. Draco published a code of laws for Athens in 621 notorious for its severity (hence our word "draconian"). But in the precision of his laws. children. He is mentioned again at 1285'35-40. that the sober should preside at drinking parties. children. Pittacus paid attention not to the greater indulgence one should show to those who are drunk. its purpose being to keep the number of estates fixed. 1 57. was appointed tyrant of Myti1ene in 589 to restore order.159 Androdamus of Rhe1 56. Pittacus seems to have thought that drunkenness was indeed a mitigating circumstance. The equalizing of women. 1402h8-12. For since more drunken people than sober ones commit acts of arrogance. he was the first to introduce denunciations for perjury. the law about drinking.157 and the one requiring ambidextrous training for soldiers. Pittacus. The feature peculiar to Phaleas is the leveling of property. but not the equalizing of property as such (see 1266'34-36). that the two of them settled among the Thebans. This is peculiar to his legislation. who controlled the toasts at a drinking party or symposium (sumpiisia). see NE 1 1 1 3h30-33. Rh. and property. The story goes that they arranged to be buried in just this way. but that social benefit was more important than equity. Diodes having the land of Corinth not be visible from his burial mound because of his loathing for what he had experienced there. and property is distinctively Platonic. but to what is beneficial.Chapter 12 63 from the land of the Corinthians and the other is not.

So much. both those that are actually in force and those described by certain people. Otherwise unknown. then. 160. But there is nothing peculiar to them to report. for our study of the various constitutions.64 2S Politics II gium160 became a legislator for the Chalcidians in the region of Thrace: those dealing with homicides and heiresses are his. .

so that their participation in this sort of communal relationship is in a way 1 . 2. For as things stand now. for example. 65 35 40 1275• 5 10 . Hence we must investigate who should be called a citizen. to see what the city-state is. honorary citizens and the like. one that is a whole and. Presumably. For a city-state is some sort of multitude of citizens. and what each is and is like. whereas others say that it was not the city-state that performed the action. Some people say. there are disputes about this. to the extent of prosecuting others in the courts or being judged there themselves. Moreover. A whole (holon) is a composite that is a substance possessing an essence or nature (Metaph. pretty well the first subject of investigation concerns a city-state. for resident aliens and slaves share the dwelling place with him. 104 l b l l-33). But since a city-state is a composite. that the entire occupation of statesmen and legislators concerns city-states. those who participate in the justice system. but they need a sponsor. For the sort of person who is a citizen in a democracy is often not one in an oligarchy. a constitution is itself a certain organization of the inhabi­ tants of a city-state. for example. For there is often dispute about the citizen as well. and who the citizen is.2 Nor is a citizen a citizen through residing in a place. We see. See Introduction xxvii-xxxv. Again. We should leave aside those who acquire the title of citizen in some exceptional way. are not citizens: parties to treaties can also do that (though in fact in many places the participation of resident aliens in the justice system is not even complete. but rather the oligarchy or the tyrant did.1 it is clear that we must first inquire into citizens. Composites are always analyzed into their parts ( 1 252' 1 7-20). like any other whole. that a city-state performed a certain action. too. since not everyone agrees that the same person is a citizen.B OOK I l l Chapter 1 When investigating constitutions. those who are made citizens. constituted out of many parts.

their sponsor had to do this for them.7 But we see that constitutions dif- 3.3 Like minors who are too young to be enrolled in the citi­ zen lists or old people who have been excused from their civic duties. insofar as these things are such. Now someone might say that the latter sort are not officials at all. The unqualified citizen is defined by nothing else so much as by his participation in judgment and office. or only in some attenuated way. For we are looking for the unqualified citi­ zen. Because of being jurors. For what a juror and an assemblyman have in common lacks a name that one should call them both. We take it. such as "incomplete" or "super­ annuated" or something else like that (it does not matter what. or is the sub­ ject of which that property is predicated. or can be held again only after a definite period. 5 . We must not forget. but they could represent themselves in legal proceedings. At the age of 18. young Athenians were enrolled in the citizen list kept by the leader of the deme. 6. 5 participate in any office as such. so they cannot be held twice by the same person at all. As jurors and members of the assembly do in certain sorts of democracies ( 1 27Jb4 1-1274" l l ) . another second. Another person. a common element either is not present at all. But exercise is healthy because it . and the like. since the argument is only about a word.6 But let this make no difference. Yet surely it would be absurd to deprive of office those who have the most authority.66 I5 20 25 30 35 Politics III incomplete). such as the juror or assemblyman . a qualification must be added. because of this. 4. since what we are saying is clear). Older men were released from having to serve in the mili­ tary. that those who participate in office in this way are citizens.4 they must be said to be citizens of a sort. Each of them underlies the property of being healthy. and a certain physical condition is healthy. it seems. that in case of things in which what underlies differs in kind (one coming first. and so on). and do not. holds office indefinitely. Resident aliens in Athens had to have a citizen "sponsor" (prostates). Instead. For the sake of definition. and perhaps also from jury duty and attendance at meetings of the as­ sembly. then. however. And this is pretty much the definition that would best fit all those called citi­ zens. Exercise is healthy. a complexion i s healthy. the one whose claim to citizenship has no defect of this sort that needs to be rectified (for one can raise and solve similar problems about those who have been disenfranchised or exiled). But some offices are of limited tenure. let it be indefinite office. assemblymen. 7 . however. Elsewhere. but not UNQUALIFIED citizens.

but not necessarily. That is precisely why the citizen that we defined is above all a citizen in a democracy. since there certain officials decide all cases. and other cases by perhaps some other official. 1 1 .Chapter 2 67 fer in kind from one another. because it figures in the diffirent accounts of why a complexion and exercise are healthy. For some constitutions have no "the people" or assemblies they legally recognize. for mistaken or deviant constitutions are necessarily posterior to those that are not mistaken. 1275h 5 10 15 20 . whereas cases of homicide are judged by the senate.4° etc. It is the same way in Carthage. and not on one only-for exam- causes a certain bodily condition: health. the citizen in each constitution must also be different. adequate for life's self-sufficiency. EE 1 2 1 8'1-10. some cases concerning contracts are tried by one overseer. Chapter 2 But the definition that gets used in practice is that a citizen is someone who comes from citizens on both sides. our definition of a citizen admits of correction. and that some are posterior and others prior. In Sparta. a complexion is healthy because it signifies that condition. The correct constitution is PRIOR to the deviant because the latter is defined in terms of the former. 10. For it is either to some or to all of the latter that deliberation and judgment either about some or about all matters is assigned. and may possibly be one in other constitutions.6-7. See NE 1096' 1 7-23.) is healthy because it is that condition. 11 it is not the holder of indefinite office who is assemblyman and juror. See 1273'1 8-20 and note. For in the other constitutions. Here the bodily condition is healthy in the primary way. but someone whose office is definite. for example.10 None the less.)9 Consequently. and a bodily condition (having a temperature of 98. 9. For we can now say that someone who is eligible to participate in deliberative and judicial office is a citizen in this city-state. The nondemocratic ones. and that a city-state. but only specially summoned councils and judicial cases decided by different bodies. 8. See III. simply speaking. It is evident from this who the citizen is.8 (What we mean by "deviant" will be apparent later. others by another. is a multitude of such people.

At 12. A Larisean is both a citizen of Larissa and a kind of pot made there. So Gorgias of Leontini. And yet a further question might be raised as to whether one who is not rightly a citizen is a citizen at all. as we said). 15 For some people raise a problem about how to de­ termine whether a city-state has or has not performed an action. and since a citizen is defined as someone who holds a sort of office (for someone who participates in such office is a citizen. In Larissa. said that just as mortars are made by mortar makers. 1 4 . the word demiourgos. that of father or of mother. as "wrong" and "false" seem to have the same force. when an oligarchy or a tyranny is replaced by a democracy. . At 1 275b17. whom we say are holding it though not rightly. it is clear that these people too must be admitted to be citizens. and other place. two or three or more generations of ancestors. half perhaps to raise a real problem and half ironically. since some of them are Larisean makersY But this is easy: if the ancestors participated in the constitu­ tion in the way that accords with the definition just given. going back.or fourth-generation ancestors will be citi­ zens. 483-376) who visited Athens in 427. but whether they are rightly or wrongly so. Cleisthenes was a sixth century Athenian statesman whose wide-ranging re­ form of the Athenian constitution was as significant and abiding as that of Solon." is also the title of a certain sort of public official.2 1 . 13 they were citizens. Some people look for more here too. But since we see that there are also some people holding office wrongly. for ex­ ample. But the dispute in relation to these people is not which of them is a citizen. But quick political definitions of this sort lead some people to raise the problem of how these third. For "what comes from a citizen father and mother" cannot be applied to even the first inhabitants or founders. for example. Gorgias was a famous orator and sophist (c. Chapter 3 The problem of rightly and not rightly is connected to the dispute we mentioned earlier.68 25 30 35 1276• 5 Politics III pie. which means "crafts­ man. At 1 274b34-36. But perhaps a bigger problem is raised by the next case: those who come to participate in a constitution after a revolution. such as the citizens created in Athens by Cleisthenes14 after the expulsion of the tyrants (for he enrolled many foreigners and alien slaves in the tribes). 1 5. 1 3 . so Lariseans too are made by craftsmen.

9 1 ) describes Babylon as "a vast city-state in the form of a square with sides nearly fourteen miles long. 17. For the fact that a thing is said to be a city-state in many different ways makes the investigation of such problems pretty easy. since a single wall could be built around the Pelopon­ nese. But when the same people are inhabiting the same place. a single city-state can have a split population and location. 18. See Introduction. Hence the problem must be regarded as a rather tame one. both as regards numbers and as re­ gards whether it is beneficial for it to be one or10 several.Chapter 3 69 these times. it must be conceded that the acts of their con­ stitution are the city-state's in just the same way as are those of the oligarchy or the tyranny. or anywhere else that has the dimen­ sions of a nation rather than a city-state. Because the problem about whether or not a city-state performed a given ac­ tion hinges exclusively on the identity conditions for city-states. There seems to be a close relation between this argument and the problem of when we ought to say that a city-state is the same. If (2) is what is meant. nor to do many other things of the same sort. 1 77. 19 But it will be useful to investigate this problem in another context.17 The most superficial way to investigate this problem is by looking to location and people. For a city-state's location and people can be split." 20. a city-state whose population and location splits will be two city-states. When people say that something is a city-state. 19. since it was not the citystate but its tyrant who entered into them. some do not want to honor treaties. a part of the city-state was unaware of it for three days. Certainly not because it is enclosed by walls. they say that when Babylon was captured. Reading hen e with Lord for the conjectural ethnos hen e. Perhaps Babylon is like that. and some can live in one place and some in an­ other. Herodotus (1. is the citystate to be called the same as long as the inhabitants remain of the same stock. on the grounds that some constitutions exist by force and not for the common benefit. I f ( 1 ) i s what is meant.1 8 Things are similar if one asks when people inhabiting the same location should be considered a single city-state. 10 15 20 25 30 35 . if indeed some democrats also rule in that way. should not be overlooked by the statesman. o r something else. or not the same but a different one. The text is uncertain. even though all the time some are dying and others being born (just as we are accustomed to say that rivers and springs remain the 1 6.16 Accordingly. they may mean that it is ( 1 ) a political community o r (2) a place. At any rate. For the size of the city-state. not one. lxvi-lxxii.

Aristotle thinks that the name (onoma) of a thing can be replaced by an ac­ count (logos) or definition (horismos) signifying the essence or form of that thing (Metaph. when the constitution changes its form and becomes different. it is evident that we must look to the constitution above all when saying that the city-state is the same. 21 For example. Top. Just as a sailor is one of a number of members of a community. we say.70 40 1276h S 10 1S Politics III same. or not the same. it would seem that the city-state too cannot remain the same. and others have other sorts of titles). but the city-state is different? For if indeed a city-state is a sort of community.22 But whether it is just to honor or not to honor agreements when a city-state changes to a different constitution requires another argument. another a lookout. a chorus that is at one time in a comedy and at another in a tragedy is said to be two different choruses. can remain the same whether its inhabitants change or not. even though all the time some water is flowing out and some flow­ ing in)? Or are we to say that human beings can remain the same for this sort of reason. 1012"22-24. He is claiming that the form or constitution of a city-state. we call a melody composed of the same notes a different melody when it is played in the Dorian harmony than when it is played in the Phrygian. is a citizen. that Corinth can continue to be called "Corinth" or have its name changed to "Argos" whether its population remains the same or not. But if this is so. and similarly that there will 2 1 . Similarly. and hence the name that signifies that form. so. 1045•26. See Introduction xxvii-xxviii. the virtue of a citizen must first be grasped in some sort of outline. 1Qlh38). it is clear both that the most exact account of the virtue of each sort of sailor will be peculiar to him. a community of citizens sharing a constitution. His point here is not. another a captain. But the name to call it may be different or the same one whether its inhabitants are the same or completely different people. And though sailors differ in their capacities (for one is an oarsman. 22. At any rate. even though the human beings in it are often the same. with any other community or composite: we say it is different if the form of the composite is different. . Chapter 4 20 The next thing to investigate after what we have j ust discussed is whether the virtue of a good man and of a good citizen should be re­ garded as the same. therefore. But surely if we should indeed in­ vestigate this. lvi. then.

Hence the virtue of a citizen must be suited to his constitution. But will there. be anyone whose virtue is the same both as a good citizen and as a good man? We say. 1 3 that the virtues of natural rulers and subjects are differ­ ent. from the sons of kings being educated in horsemanship and warfare. then. the citizens too. In the same way. Reading politen with Ross and Dreizehnter. indeed. so a city-state. then. But the good man. then. indeed. too. 23 It is evident from these things. as is evident. any more than can the leader of a chorus and one of its ordinary members. we say.Chapter 4 71 also b e some common account that fits them all. but that a citizen24 need not possess practical wisdom. 24. a soul of reason and desire. and property of master and slave. Evidently. Alternatively (mss. If it is impossible for a city-state to consist entirely of good people. and this requires virtue. consists of all these. a household of man and woman." 25 30 35 40 1277• 5 10 15 . then the citizens cannot all have one virtue. By going through problems in a different way. The examples given are all of natural ruler-subject pairs. and of other dissimilar kinds in addition). too. Consequently. Some say. and from Euripi23. and if it is impossible for all the citizens to be similar. Again. that an excellent ruler is good and possesses practical wisdom. then the virtue of a citizen and that of a good man cannot be a single virtue. that the education of a ruler is different right from the beginning. even though they are dissimilar. and if each must at least perform his own task well. For the safety o f the voyage is a task of all of them. have the safety of the community as their task. the same argument can be made about the best constitution. it is clear that there cannot be a single virtue that is the virtue-the complete virtue--of a good citizen. does ex­ press a single virtue: the complete one. But the community is the constitution. it is possible for someone to be a good citizen without having acquired the virtue expressed by a good man. that the virtue of a man and of a citizen cannot be unqualifiedly the same. if indeed there are several kinds of constitution. For that of the good citizen must be had by all (since this is necessary if the city-state is to be best). Aristotle has al­ ready shown in 1 . unless all the citizens of a good city-state are necessarily good men. but the virtue of a good man cannot be had by all. since a city-state consists of dissimilar elements (I mean that just as an animal consists in the first instance of soul and body. therefore. since this is what each of the sailors strives for.): "but that a statesman (politikon) need not be practically-wise.

16. 27. since their tasks vary. 29. That is why among some peoples in the distant past craftsmen did not participate in office until extreme democracy arose. A ruler must learn it by 25. Perhaps this is why Jason said that he went hun­ gry except when he was a tyrant. then the two virtues would not be equally praiseworthy. since the virtue of a ruler and that of a citizen would not be the same. both these views are sometimes accepted. See Plato. One part consists of those tasks performed by manual laborers. Yet the capacity to rule and be ruled is at any rate praised. Jason was tyrant of Pherae in Thessaly (c. and if the man who is ruled is also a citizen. then the virtue of a citizen would not be unqualifiedly the same as the virtue of a man (though that of a certain sort of citizen would be). then. by which we mean the kind concerned with the necessities. these are people who work with their hands. except perhaps to satisfy some personal need of his own (for then it is no longer a case of one person becoming master and the other slave).28 that ruler and ruled should learn different things and not the same ones. the tasks performed by people ruled in this way should not be learned by a good person. Laws 643e-644a. King Aeolus is apparently speaking about the education his sons are to receive. nor by a good citizen. we may see what follows from that. 26. Since. From the lost play Aeolus (Nauck 367 fr. 380-370). But if the virtue of a good ruler is the same as that of a good man. but what the city-state needs. and that a cit­ izen should know and share in both. For there is rule by a master.1 5 . This we call "political" rule. but rather how to make use of those who do."25 (since this implies that rulers should get a special sort of education). and being able to do both well is held to be the virtue of a citizen. See 1 34 JbJ0. . the former is servile. we say. (By "the former" I mean actually knowing how to perform the actions of a servant. but a citizen's to consist in both. . VULGAR CRAFTSMEN are included among them. .26 He meant that he did not know how to be a private individual. 27 So if we take a good man's virtue to be that of a ruler. nor by29 a statesman. In fact. 2-3). 28.30 But there is also a kind of rule exercised over those who are similar in birth and free. Reading dokei amphO hetera with Dreizehnter. The ruler does not need to know how to produce these.) But there are several kinds of slaves. As their very name implies. Accordingly. 30.72 20 25 30 35 1 27Jb 5 Politics III des saying "No subtleties for me . Reading oude ton.

or to be a general by serving under a general.33 So then. Plato. a good man too possesses both.60. but includes one kind for ruling and another for being ruled. See 1282'17-23. for the others. On the 3 1 . even if a ruler does have a dif­ ferent kind of justice and temperance. Hence this too is rightly said. 32. At any rate. practical wisdom is not the virtue of one who is ruled. those who do not share in office should be regarded as citizens. 33.602b.Chapter 5 73 being ruled. that one cannot rule well without having been ruled. "Learn to obey before you command. 601 d. just as one learns to be a cavalry commander by serving under a cavalry commander. or under a major or a company commander to learn to occupy the office. just as a man's and a woman's courage and temperance differ. Greek women were expected to say very little. A saying to this effect. 34. must be common to both rulers and ruled. See Diogenes Laertius 1. for example) will clearly not be of one kind. Republic 429b--430c. his virtue (justice. In fact. 10 15 20 25 30 Chapter 5 But one of the problems about the citizen still remains. it would seem. Practical wisdom is the only virtue peculiar to a ruler. For a man would seem a coward if he had the courage of a woman. and a woman would seem garrulous if she had the temperance of a good man. The virtue that enables one to rule and be ruled well. For those ruled are like makers of flutes." is attributed to Solon. a good citizen must have the knowledge and ability both to be ruled and to rule. and this is the virtue of a citizen. and how they are the same and how different. For if a good person is ruled. but true opinion is. 433c-d. 35 . whereas being a good speaker was a male virtue. is evident from the preceding. to know the rule of free people from both sides. indeed.32 since even household management differs for the two of them (for his task is to acquire property and hers to preserve it). See 1 260'28-3 1 . whereas rulers are like the flute players who use them. then this sort of virtue34 cannot belong to every citizen (for these will then be citizens). but is a free citizen. or should vulgar craftsmen also be regarded as citizens? If. whether the virtue of a good man is the same as that of an excellent citizen or different. 473c-480a. For is the citizen really someone who is permitted to participate in office.31 And whereas the virtues of these are different.

nothing absurd follows. if none of this sort is a citizen. however. at least. there must also be several kinds of citizens. or even to all free people. how­ ever. in any so-called aristocracy in which offices are awarded on the basis of virtue and merit. Explained somewhat at 1 260'38-h l . for in some democracies the descendant of a citizen mother is a citizen. since it is because of a shortage of legitimate citizens that they make such people citizens (for it is because of underpop35. it will be evident how things stand in these cases. particularly of citizens who are being ruled. At III. 37. Hence in some constitutions vulgar craftsmen and hired laborers must be citi­ zens. since neither slaves nor freed slaves are in the aforementioned classes either? For the truth is that not everyone without whom there would not be a city-state is to be regarded as a citizen. but if they too are citizens. since in fact most craftsmen become rich (though in Thebes there used to be a law that anyone who had not kept away from the market for ten years could not participate in office)Y In many constitutions. For it is impossible to engage in virtuous pursuits while living the life of a vulgar craftsman or a hired laborer. and in many places the same holds of bas­ tards too. Those who per­ form necessary tasks for an individual are slaves. The best city-state will not confer citizenship on vulgar craftsmen. For children are not citizens in the way men are. whereas in others it is impossible-for example. but only to those who are freed from necessary tasks. vulgar craftsmen could be. it is clear from what we have already said. If we carry our investigation a bit further. I . Aristotle thinks that oligarchies should impose restrictions of this sort on vulgar craftsmen (1321'26-29). whereas the former are only citizens given certain assumptions: they are citizens.74 1278• S 10 1S 20 25 30 Politics III other hand. while hired laborers could not be citizens (since participation in office is based on high property assessments). The latter are unqualified citizens. . which is why most of them still are even today. 36 In oligarchies. however. Vulgar craftsmen were slaves or foreigners in some places long ago. Or shall we say that from this argument. those who perform them for the community are vulgar craftsmen and hired laborers. 36. Nevertheless. In fact. then what we have characterized as a citizen's virtue cannot be ascribed to everyone.35 For since there are several constitutions. in what category should they each be put?-for they are neither resident aliens nor foreigners. 1 337h4-21 . the law even goes so far as to admit some foreigners as citizens. but incomplete ones.

10 15 . we must set down what it is that a city-state is constituted for. and how many kinds of rule deal with human beings and communal life. For the gov­ erning class has authority in every city-state. And that person is not just anyone. as Homer too implied when he wrote: "like some disenfranchised alien. it is for the sake of deceiving coinhabitants. first. they gradually disqualify. indeed. And we shall give the same account of the other constitutions as well. for example. therefore. until finally they make citizens only of those who come from citizens on both sides. while in another they are different. In our first discussions. then. and. then those with citizen mothers.648. When this is concealed. First. the few have it. it is clear from what has been said that in one sort of city-state both are the same person. It is evident from these considerations. XVI. who has authority or is capable of exercising authority in the supervision of communal matters. the next thing to investigate is whether we should suppose that there is just one kind of constitution or several. 40. A constitution is an organization of a city-state's various offices but. by contrast. but the statesman. See 1264'19-22. and we also say the constitutions of these are different. how many they are. 35 40 1278" 5 Chapter 6 Since these issues have been determined."38 For people who do not participate in the offices are like resident aliens. Achilles is complaining that this is how Agamemnon is treating him. and how they differ. 39. and that the one who participates in the offices is particularly said to be a citizen. where conclusions were reached 38. when they are well supplied with a crowd of them. particularly. either by himself or with others. what they are. Iliad IX.'�{) I mean. of the one that has authority over everything. 59. and the governing class is the constitution. that there are several kinds of citizens. those who have a slave as father or mother. if there are several.Chapter 6 75 ulation that they employ laws in this way). Aristotle is relying on his doctrine that "a city-state and every other com­ posite system is most of all the part of it that has the most authority" (NE 1 168h31-33). that in democratic city-states the people have authority.39 As to whether the virtue expressed by a good man is to be regarded as the same as that of an excellent citizen or as different. whereas in oligarchic ones.

they think it right to take turns at ruling.. In any case. whether of everyone in common or of each separatelyY But human beings also join together and maintain po­ litical communities for the sake of life by itself.76 20 25 30 35 40 1279" 5 10 Politics III about household management and rule by a master. 44 For rule by a master cannot be preserved if the slave is de­ stroyed. and only coincidentally for that of the slave. Hence. it is for the sake of the ruled. although it is also true that the common benefit brings them to­ gether. 12Wl 5-1255•3. although in truth the same thing is beneficial for both natural masters and natural slaves. just as the captain of a ship is always one of the sailors. The master has a reason to keep his slaves alive and healthy. as if it had a sort of joy inherent in it and a natural sweetness. l-3. 12W5-1 5). and the other crafts to be.41 That is why. But surely it is also easy to distinguish at least the kinds of rule people talk about. is nevertheless rule exercised for the sake of the master's own benefit. becomes one of the trained. Thus a trainer or a captain looks to the good of those he rules. but when he becomes one of them himself. For the captain is a sailor. See. then. and the trainer. 44. since we too often discuss them in our own external works. 43. he shares coincidentally in the benefit. people no less desire to live to­ gether. But rule over children. they thought it 4 1 . and the household generally. to the extent that it contributes some part of living well to each. it was also said that a human being is by nature a political animal. wife. in the case of political office too. EE 1 2 1 7b22-23. 42. See Introduction xlviii-lix.43 For rule by a master. . Aristotle argues for this in VII. The reference may be to lost works of Aristotle intended for a wider audi­ ence than the Politics. is either for the sake of the ruled or for the sake of something common to both. as we see medicine. In the past. but only be­ cause it is in his own interest as a master to do so ( 1 2 52•3 1-34. where it has been established on the basis of equality and similarity among the citizens. This above all is the end. it is clear that most human beings are willing to endure much hardship in order to cling to life. Essentially. as is natural. even when they do not need one another's help. which we call household management. e. as long as it is not too over­ burdened with the hardships of life.g. though still a trainer. For nothing prevents the trainer from sometimes being one of the athletes he is training. physical training. For there is perhaps some share of what is NOBLE in life alone. but coincidentally it might be for the sake of the rulers as well.

perhaps the latter would pursue office in that way. that those constitutions that look to the common benefit turn out. politeia. and then to have someone look to their good. 47. 25 30 35 40 12 7CJ' . people want to be in office continuously. whereas a city-state is a community of free people. we must next investigate how many kinds of constitutions there are and what they are. That is precisely why the class 45. or few. namely.46 and the governing class is the authoritative element in any city-state. according to what is unqualifiedly just. or the many rule for the common benefit. to be correct. the insertion of me. just as they had earlier looked to his benefit when they were in office. the deviant ones will also be made evident. See 1274b32-33 and note. these constitutions must be correct. as if they were sick and would be cured by being always in office. Nowadays. because of the profits to be had from public funds and from office. But if they aim at the private benefit. A monarchy that looks to the common benefit we customarily call a kingship.45 starting first with the correct constitutions. Since "constitution" and "governing class" signify the same thing. For while it is possible for one or a few to be outstandingly virtuous. Moreover. whereas those which look only to the benefit of the rulers are mistaken and are deviations from the correct constitutions. 46. but it can be so in military virtue in particular. or many. then. this happens reasonably. For they are like rule by a master. or they should share in the benefits). the few. At any rate. however. or because they rule with a view to what is best for the city-state and those who share in it). and the authoritative element must be either one person. it is called by the name common to all CONSTITUTIONS. Rejecting with the mss. then whenever the one. they are deviations (for either the participants47 should not be called citizens. For once they have been defined. See 1278bl l and note. an aristocracy (either because the best people rule. It is evident. and rule by a few but more than one. 15 20 Chapter 7 Now that these matters have been determined. But when the multitude governs for the common benefit. whether of the one or the few or the MULTITUDE.Chapter 7 77 right to perform public service when their turn came. it is difficult for a larger number to be accomplished in every virtue.

see 1271'4 1-bZ. and democracy is for the benefit of the poor. It would seem. The constitution is a POLITY.48 Deviations from these are tyranny from kingship. another problem arises. as we said. yet when a small group has authority it is said to be an oligarchy. On military virtue. to take the opposite case. Suppose that the MAJORITY were rich and had authority in the city-state. Similarly. and describes the constitutions accordingly (oligarchy as that in which the rich are few in number and hold the offices. Chapter 8 I0 I5 20 25 30 We should say a little more about what each of these constitutions is. exists when a monarchy rules the political com­ munity like a master. yet there is a democracy when­ ever the majority has authority. and when one is carrying out any investigation in a philosophical manner. But even if one combines being few with being rich in one case. oligarchy from aristocracy. then. but each has authority in its 48. A tyranny. in an oligarchy those in authority in the constitu­ tion are the ones who have property. oligarchy is for the benefit of the rich. those who do not possess much property. . are in authority. that these constitutions have not been well defined. it is appropriate not to overlook or omit anything. those where the rich are a majority and the poor a minority. For certain problems arise. and are poor. For what are we to call the constitutions we just described. which is the one virtue that is broadly sharable. and democracy from polity. It is the correct form of government by the many because its governing class are as virtuous as possible. For tyranny is rule by one person for the benefit of the monarch. the ones who possess the weapons. The first problem concerns this definition. That is why Aristotle agrees that it is reason­ able to call the correct form of government by the many a polity. and being a majority with being poor in the other. has the most authority in this constitution. and democracy as that in which the poor are many and hold them). A democracy is the opposite. sup­ pose the poor were fewer in number than the rich. but to make the truth about each clear. since they possess military virtue.78 5 Politics III of defensive soldiers. but were stronger and had authority in the constitution. and not merely with a practical purpose in view. which is governed by the HOPLITE class. But none is for their com­ mon profit.

The inserted numbers help reveal the structure of what is. The reason is that the judgment concerns themselves. NEV. That is why. See 1290'30-bZO. For example. that they judge badly about what concerns themselves. a resuit of the fact that everywhere the rich are few and the poor many. but not for everyone. and judge badly. 10 15 20 . the six listed in the previous chapter. This is largely because of what was just men­ tioned. and whenever the poor rule. 5 1 . but not for everyone. For [1] they all grasp justice of a sort." however. See Introduction lxv-lxviii.54 they agree about what constitutes equality in the thing but disagree about it in the people. 5° 35 40 128()' 5 Chapter 9 The first thing one must grasp. 52.3. 54. and most people are pretty poor judges about what is their own. and it is. What does distinguish democracy and oligarchy from one another is poverty and wealth: whenever some. only fo r equals.Chapter 9 79 own constitution-if indeed there is no other constitution besides those just mentioned?49 What this argument seems to make clear is that it is a coincidence that the few have authority in oligarchies and the many in democracies. But it turns out. even for Aristotle. is what people say the defining marks of oligarchy and democracy are. Presumably. Democrats give the first definition. and what oligarchic and democratic justice are. indeed. the constitution is necessarily an oligarchy. rule because of their wealth. but all share in freedom. since indeed it is. For only a few people are rich. 50. See 1 287'41-bJ. and these are the reasons they both dispute over the constitution. As the remainder of the chapter will establish. 53. whether a minority or a majority.51 but they go only to a certain point and do not discuss the whole of what is just in the most authoritative sense. however. the reasons just mentioned are not the reasons for the differences. only for unequalsY They disregard the "for whom. as we said. a rather complexly struc­ tured argument. that the former are in fact few and the latter many. justice seems to be EQUALITY. and consists in dividing things and people in the same way (as we said earlier in the Ethics). 1 267'37-41).53 So since what is just is just for certain people. it is necessarily a democracy. oligarchs the second ( 1266b38-1267'2. Justice also seems to be inequality. but also 49.

He may have be­ longed to the school of Gorgias. but only that neither city-state acts unjustly toward the other. 55 Hence it is quite evident that the city-state (at any rate. but rather for the sake of living well." as the sophist Lycophron56 said. since otherwise there could be a city-state of SLAVES or animals. they think they are speaking about what is unqualifiedly just. and the oligarchic argument would as a result seem to be a powerful one. Lycophron is known only from the writings of Aristotle. because these share neither in HAPPINESS nor in a life guided by DELIBERATIVE CHOICE. they have import agreements. but not such as to make the citizens good and just.80 25 30 35 40 1 28rJ 5 10 Politics III because. nor [4] to facilitate exchange and mutual assistance. but no offices common to all of them have been estab­ lished to deal with these matters. To be sure. For one lot thinks that if they are unequal in one respect (wealth. whereas in fact there is not. or that none of those covered by the agreements should be unjust or vicious in any way. But about the most au­ thoritative considerations they do not speak. and formal documents of alliance. . 55. since they are both speaking up to a point about justice of a sort. say) they are wholly equal. and all those who have treaties with one another would virtually be citizens of one city-state. See 1 28 1'4-8. For otherwise the community becomes an alliance that differs only in loca­ tion from other alliances in which the allies live far apart. and law becomes an agreement. treaties about refraining from injustice. whether of the principal or of the interest. "a guarantor of just behavior toward one another. Nor are those in one city-state concerned with what sort of people the others should be. with the one who has contributed all the rest. 1 340b41-1341'3. And suppose [3] they do not do so for the sake of an alliance to safe­ guard themselves from being wronged by anyone. But those who are concerned with good government give careful attention to political virtue and vice. (For it is not just that someone who has contributed only one mina to a sum of one hundred minas should have equal shares in that sum. instead each city-state has different ones. 56.) But suppose [2] they do not do so only for the sake of life. say) they are wholly unequal. For suppose people constituted a community and came together for the sake of property. whereas the other lot thinks that if they are equal in one respect (freedom. and 1 254b27-32 with 1 334'1 1-40. then their participation in a city-state would be proportional to their property. since otherwise the Etruscans and the Carthaginians. the one truly so called and not just for the sake of argument) must be concerned with virtue.

What. since the deliberative choice of living together constitutes friendship. For even if [5] one were to bring their territories together into one.Chapter 9 81 I t i s evident that this is right. IS 20 25 30 35 40 128]• 5 . as well as brotherhoods. but each nevertheless treated his own household like a city-state. if there were some who lived separately. so that the city-state of the Megarians was attached to that of the Corinthians by walls. it still would not be a single city-state. Nor would it be so if their citizens intermarried. And a city-state is the community of families and villages in a complete and self-sufficient life. when all of them are present there is still not yet a city-state. For suppose they joined together while continuing to share in that way. while these must be present if indeed there is to be a city-state. and not for the sake of living together. That is why marriage connections arose in city­ states. then. and the LEISURED PURSUITS of living together. another a cobbler. if indeed they continued to associate with one another in the same manner when together as when separated. another a farmer. and does not exist for the purpose of [4] preventing mutual wrongdoing and [3] exchanging goods. even though this is one of the forms of community characteristic of city-states. which we say is living happily and NOBLY. and their number were ten thousand). another something else of that sort. but [2] only when households and families live well as a community whose end is a complete and self-sufficient life. Rather. it is not because of the non­ proximate nature of their community. yet they shared nothing else in com­ mon besides such things as exchange and alliance-not even in this case would there be a city-state. but these other things are for the sake of the end . yet not so separately as to share nothing in common. So political communities must be taken to exist for the sake of noble actions. The end of the city-state is living well. a city-state is not [5] a sharing of a common location. But this will not be possible unless they do inhabit one and the same location and practice intermarriage. religious sacrifices. For things of this sort are the result of friendship. then. and the others like a defensive alliance formed to provide aid against wrongdoers only. Hence those who con­ tribute the most to this sort of community have a larger share in the city­ state than those who are equal or superior in freedom or family but infe­ rior in political virtue. Even then this still would not be thought a city-state by those who make a precise study of such things. Sim­ ilarly. and had laws against wronging one another in their business transactions (for example. if one were a carpenter. then. Evidently. and those who surpass in wealth but are surpassed in virtue. is the reason for this? Surely.

they are evidently destroying the city-state. For offices are positions of honor. the rest must necessarily be deprived of honors. or decent people. then. being stronger. since surely it is either the multitude. 58 But the view that the multitude rather than the few best peo57. should divide up the property of the minority. someone might say that it is a bad thing in general for a human being to have authority and not the LAW. that all these things are bad and unjust. But all of these apparently involve difficul­ ties. therefore. then. for the rich minority to rule? If they too act in the same way. by Zeus. l2-13. since it seemed just to those in authority. . just as the multitude do against the rich. since he at any rate has the passions that beset the soul. for he. Besides. that [ 1 ] those who dispute about constitutions all speak about a part of justice. But if law may be oligarchic or de­ mocratic. Perhaps. and when the same people always rule. because they are the greater number. then the other case is as well. Chapter 1 1 As for the other cases. everything done by a tyrant must be just as well. But is it better that the one who is best should rule? But this is even more oligarchic. divide up the property of the rich. if the majority. 58. what difference will that make to our problems? For the things we have just described will happen just the same. But is it just. should we call extreme in­ justice? Again. or a tyrant. everyone else must be deprived of honors by being excluded from political office. that this law57 can­ not be just." What. Chapter 1 0 15 20 25 30 35 There is a problem as to what part of the state is to have authority. See III. it isn't. But should decent people rule and have authority over everything? In that case. uses force. or the one who is best of all. nor is justice something capable of destroying a city-state. isn't that unjust? "No. or the rich. But virtue certainly does not ruin what has it. How so? If the poor. The law requiring wealth to be divided up. however. we say.82 10 Politics III It is evident from what has been said. we may let them be the topic of a different dis­ cussion. since those deprived of honors are more numerous. It is evident. then. So it is clear. then. and this is just. having seized everything. plundering and confiscating the property of the multitude.

not individually but collectively. For one of them judges one part. and senses. to give them no share and not to allow them to participate at all would be cause for alarm. By means of these considerations.Chapter 1 1 83 pie should be in authority would seem to be held. 40 12811 5 10 15 20 25 30 . and when they come together. For it would not be safe to have them participate in the most important offices. the multitude of the citizens who are not rich and have no claim whatsoever arising from virtue. nevertheless can. which is precisely why Solon and some other 59. since. that is to say. with many feet. A panel chosen by lot selected the three best comedies and tragedies at the annual theater festivals in Athens. the multitude is just like a single human being. and as things painted by craft are superior to real things: they bring to­ gether what is scattered and separate into one-although. be­ cause of their lack of justice and practical wisdom. this person's eye and some other feature of someone else will be more beautiful than the painted ones. it is clear that in some of them it cannot possibly do so. at least if taken separately. be better than the few best people. and so too for their character traits and wisdom. just as beautiful people are said to differ from those who are not beautiful. For the many. by Zeus. The remaining alternative. another another. then. one might solve the problem mentioned earlier and also the related one of what the free should have authority over. and while it involves a problem. For a state in which a large number of people are excluded from office and are poor must of necessity be full of ene­ mies. it perhaps also involves some truth. they would inevitably act unjustly in some instances and make mistakes in others. since the same argument would apply to beasts. too. between some people and beasts? But nothing prevents what has been said from being true of some multitude. 59 It is in this way that excellent men differ from each of the many. is to have them participate in deliberation and judgment. Though presumably. who are not as individuals excellent men. hands. That is why the many are better judges of works of music and of the poets. each of them can have some part of virtue and practical wisdom. when they have come together. practically speaking. Whether this superiority of the many to the few excellent people can exist in the case of every people and every multitude is not clear. For being many. just as feasts to which many contribute are better than feasts provided at one person's expense. On the other hand. For what difference is there. and all of them the whole thing.

Therefore. In the first place. and to treat patients and cure them of disease when it is present-namely. the one who uses it is an even better j udge (and the one who uses is the household manager). But perhaps not all of these things are correctly stated. to a master craftsman. too. when mixed with their betters. a feast. so others should also be inspected by their peers. 61 Taken individually. just as a mixture of roughage and pure food-concentrate is more useful than a little of the latter by itself. how­ ever. then. And we assign the task of judging to generally educated people no less than to experts. but prevent them from holding office alone. But this organization of the constitution raises problems itself. and thirdly. each of them is an imperfect j udge. Moreover. 62 60. to someone with a general EDUCATION in the craft. but a better or no worse one when they all come together. For example. they benefit their states. since each may be a worse judge than those who know. For there are people of this third sort in (practically speaking) all the crafts. the doctor. . See GA 728'26-30. j ust as a doctor should be inspected by doctors. at least they do not play a larger role than the experts. and choosing a ship's captain is a task for expert captains. and because there are some crafts in which the maker might not be either the only or the best judge-the ones where those who do not possess the craft nevertheless have knowledge of its products. and a guest. since choos­ ing correctly is also a task for experts: choosing a geometer is a task for expert geometers. 61. and. For even if some laymen are also involved in the choice of candidates in the case of some tasks and crafts.84 35 40 I282• 5 IO I5 20 Politics III legislators arrange to have them elect and INSPECT officials. 62. The same would also seem to hold in other areas of experience and other crafts. the maker of a house is not the only one who has some knowledge about it. See 1 274' 1 5-21. it might be held that election is the same way. rather than the cook. 6° For when they all come together their perception is adequate. According to this argument. for example. See 1 277b25-30. the multitude should not be given authority over the election or inspection of officials. it might be held that the same person is able to j udge whether or not someone has treated a patient correctly. judges a rudder better than a carpenter. A captain. both because according to the earlier argument the multitude may not be too servile. But "doctor" applies to the or­ dinary practitioner of the craft.

but the court. For it is held to be absurd for in­ ferior people to have authority over more important matters than decent people do. Still. and the people. should be in authority. also solve this problem in the same way. See 1281'34-39. It is not yet clear. and the problem stated earlier remains to be solved. the greatest and best good is the end of the science or craft that has the most authority of all 63. and the court consist of many individuals. hold the important offices. and in deliberation and decision. whereas those with high property assessment are the treasurers and generals and hold the most important offices. 63 it makes nothing else so evident as that the laws. For per­ haps these things are also correctly organized. and that the ruler. the council. the assemblyman. it is clear that laws that accord with the correct constitutions must be just. the council. these are assigned to the people. The one raised at 1281' 1 1 of who should have authority in the city-state. whereas each of the individuals mentioned is only a part of these. But one can. at least it is evident that the laws must be established to suit the constitution. because it is not easy to make universal declarations about everything.) Hence it is just for the multitude to have authority over the more important matters. 25 30 35 40 1282b 5 10 Chapter 1 2 Since in every science and craft the end is a good. and those that accord with the deviant constitutions not just. But inspections and elections of officials are very important things. whether individually or in small groups. nor the individual councilor. and just or unjust. what correctly established laws should be like. nor the individual assemblyman who is ruling. whether one or many.64 For the laws must necessarily be bad or good. at the same time and in the same way as the constitutions. As to the first problem we mentioned. in fact. however. For it is neither the indi­ vidual juror. and the juror. when correctly established. But if this is so. For the people. And yet those with low property assessments and of whatever age participate in the assembly. (By "part" I mean the councilor. 64. should have authority over only those matters on which the LAWS cannot pronounce with precision. But there is another connected with it. So much for how these matters should be determined. since the assembly has authority over all such matters.Chapter 12 85 This problem might be held to be adequately solved in such a way. and their collective property assessment is greater than the assessment of those who. 15 . And in some constitutions. as we said.

at least. For if a certain amount of size is better than a certain amount of virtue. . then all goods would be commensurable. those who are of better birth do not get more or better flutes. and if height in general is of more weight than virtue. but in fact they contribute nothing to it. If what has been said is somehow not clear. even if each of these (I mean birth and beauty) is a greater good than flute playing. too. Since this is impossible. or height. For the superiority in wealth and birth would have to contribute to the performance. it is clear that some amount of the one is equal to some amount of the other. but is very inferior in birth or beauty. since where people differ. The reference seems to be to NE 1 13 1 '9-b24. For among flute players equally proficient in the craft. But equal­ ity in what and inequality in what. and they say it should be something equal to those who are equal. But if this is true. Suppose someone is superior in flute play­ ing. all agree with what has been determined in those philosophical works of ours dealing with ethical issues. and up to a point. so does what is just and what accords with merit. should not be overlooked. 66. For this in­ volves a problem and political philosophy.65 For justice is something to someone. For if being a certain height counted more. it is clear that in political matters.86 20 25 30 35 40 1283" S 10 Politics III of them. Someone might say. and this is the science of statesmanship. that offices should be unequally distrib­ uted on the basis of superiority in any good whatsoever. So if one person is more outstanding in height than another is in virtue. provided the people did not differ in their remaining qualities but were exactly similar. And isn't that plainly false? The matter is evident in the various sciences and capacities. then those who are superior in complexion.66 height in general would be in competition with both wealth and freedom. Besides. perhaps. For if some are slow run65. it will become so if we take it still further. But the political good is justice. it is reasonable not to dispute over political office on the basis of just any sort of inequality. Now everyone holds that what is just is some sort of equality. according to this argument every good would have to be commensurable with every other. for the conjectural enamillon. Reading mal/on with the mss. and is proportionately more superior to flute playing than he is superior in flute playing. since they will not play the flute any better if they do. It is the superior performers who should also get the superior instruments. then. and justice is the common benefit. he should still get the outstanding flutes. or any other good whatsoever will get more of the things with which political justice is concerned.

as was also said earlier. Schiitrumpf.Chapter 13 87 ners and others fast. they have a claim because better people are likely to come from better people. of these would seem to have a correct claim in the dispute. or at any rate some. The dispute must be based on the things from which a city-state is constituted. Rather. and that. so too. 72. 15 20 Chapter 1 3 As regards the existence of a city-state. is a com­ munal virtue. The rich have a claim due to the fact that they own a larger share of the land. but that not all do so in an unqualifiedly just way. nor inequality if they are unequal in only one thing. and the land is something common.68 But since those equal in one thing only should not have equality in everything. sumbolaia: or contracts. are justice and political67 virtue. then. Hence the well-born. any more than of slaves. it is clear. for those who are better born are more properly citizens than those of ignoble birth. we say. At 128 1'1-8. Because justice is complete virtue i n relation t o another person (NE 1 129h2S-1 1 30'5). education and virtue would seem to have the most just claim of all in the dispute. all constitutions of this sort must be deviant. But as regards the good life. For there must be both free people and those with as­ sessed property. and good birth is honored at home by everyone. since justice. since a city-state cannot consist entirely of poor people. this is no reason for the latter to have more and the former less: it is in athletic competitions that such a difference wins honor. But if these things are needed in a city-state. 25 30 35 40 . Reading politikis with Ross." 68. Besides. they are usually more trustworthy where treaties70 are concerned. since good birth is virtue of family. and some mss. The FREE and the well-born have closely related claims.): "military (polemikis). which all the other virtues necessarily accompany. without the former a city-state cannot exist. in addition. We said before69 that all dispute somewhat justly. and the rich reasonably lay claim to office. since a city-state cannot be managed without these. all. the free.72 But the majority too have a just claim against the minority. 70.71 Similarly. Alternatively (Dreizehnter and some mss. since they are 67. 69. At 1280'7-25. 7 1 . A slightly different definition is given at 1 294'2 1 . we shall say that virtue has a just claim in the dispute. and without the latter it cannot be well managed.

richer. For nothing prevents the multitude from being sometimes better and richer than the few. For it is clear that if someone is richer again than everyone else. on the basis of the same justice. then. for example. So if the majority too should be in authority be­ cause they are superior to the few. and a political multitude in addition). and similarly those claim­ ing to do so because of their family. how should the matter be settled? Should their fewness be considered in relation to the task? To whether they are able to manage the city-state? Or to whether there are enough of them to constitute a city-state by themselves? But there is a problem that faces all who dispute over political office. For if one man were better than the others in the governing class. this one person will have to rule them all . the good. these should be in authority rather than the multitude. Hence the problem that some people raise and investigate can also be . then. and similarly against those who base their claim on wealth. If they were all present in a single city-state. not as individuals but collectively. Suppose. For the multitude would have an argument of some justice even against those who claim that they deserve to have authority over the governing class because of their virtue. and each of the others differs the same way. this man should be in authority. because in one the rich are in authority. that those who possess virtue are extremely few in number. in another the excellent men. or more than one but fewer than the many. will there be a dispute as to who should rule or not? Within each of the constitutions we have mentioned. were superior to the others. we are investigating how the matter is to be determined when all these are present simultaneously. the well-born. on the basis of the same justice. Perhaps the same thing will also occur in the case of virtue where aristocracies are concerned. then. But be that as it may. that none of the definitions on the basis of which people claim that they themselves deserve to rule. the rich. then. even though they were excellent men. is correct. Those who claim that they deserve to rule because of their wealth could be held to have no j ustice to their claim at all. if one person. Similarly. for example. to be sure. whereas everyone else deserves to be ruled by them. therefore (I mean. All this seems to make it evident. when taken as the majority in relation to the minority. for example. it is clear that some­ one who is outstanding when it comes to good birth should rule those who dispute on the basis of freedom. the decision as to who should rule is indisputable. since these differ from one another because of what is in authority.88 1283b 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 Politics III stronger. and better.

40 1284" S 10 1S 20 25 . For. For anyone of that sort would reasonably be regarded as a god among human beings. anyone who attempted to legislate for them would be ridiculous. For they would be treated unjustly if they were thought to merit equal shares. For they raise the problem of whether a legislator who wishes to establish the most correct laws should legislate for the benefit of the better citizens or that of the majority. too. or banishment without loss of property or citizenship for ten (later five) years. It is in the best one. since they would presumably respond in the way Antisthenes tells us the lions did when the hares acted like popular leaders and demanded equality for everyone. But what is correct must be taken to mean what is equitable. XXII. however. that the Argonauts left Heracles behind for this sort of reason: the Argo refused to carry him with the other sailors on the grounds that his weight greatly exceeded theirs. Athena had built a board into the Argo that enabled it to speak. banishing them from the city-state for fixed periods of time. indeed. although in each constitution he is someone different.75 That is also 73. or any other source of political power). indeed. and what is equitable in relation to the benefit of the entire city-state. when the case just mentioned occurs. And a citizen generally speaking is someone who participates in ruling and in being ruled. Antisthenes was a follower of Socrates and a founder of the school of philosophers known as the Cynics. was introduced into Athens by Cleisthenes. and that for the other sort there is no law. and the common benefit of the citizens.74 The story goes. Fables 241 . For of all city-states these are held to pursue equality most. since they themselves are law. that he is the one who has the power and who deliberately chooses to be ruled and to rule with an eye to the virtuous life. their many friends.Chapter 13 89 dealt with in this way. See Ath. But if there is one person or more than one (though not enough to make up a complete city-state) who is so outstanding by reason of his superior virtue that neither the virtue nor the political power of all the others is commensurable with his (if there is only one) or theirs (if there are a number of them). democratically governed city-states introduce ostracism. 73 That is why. and so they ostracize those held to be outstandingly powerful (whether because of their wealth. then such men can no longer be regarded as part of the city-state. 74. when they are so unequal in virtue and political power. The lions' reply was: "Where are your claws and teeth?" See Aesop. 75. Ostracism. Hence it is clear that legislation too must be concerned with those who are equals both in birth and in power.

The most powerful city-states in the Athenian alliance. nor would a shipbuilder allow this in the case of the stern or any of the other parts of the ship. Thrasybulus was tyrant of Miletus. even the correct ones. reported what had happened. Periander was tyrant of Corinth (625-585). from this point of view. there is nothing to prevent monarchs from being in harmony with the city-state they rule when they resort to this sort of practice. For no painter would allow an animal to have a disproportionately large foot. The problem is a general one that concerns all constitutions. But this is also clear in the case of the other crafts and sciences. and the king of the Persians often cut the Medes and Babylonians down to size. For ostracism has the same sort of effect as cutting down the outstanding people or sending them into exile. it humbled Samos. The full story is told by Herodotus V. 77. But the next best thing is to try to fix the constitution. however. nor are tyrants the only ones who follow it. For though the deviant constitutions use such methods with an eye to the private benefit. if the legislator established the constitu­ tion in the beginning so that it had no need for such a remedy. certainly. 76. 76 This advice is not beneficial only to tyrants. who did not know why Periander did this. who reverses the roles of Periander and Thrasybulus. not even if it were an outstandingly beau­ tiful one. should the need arise. When the messenger. It would be better. the position is the same with those that aim at the common good. . Where acknowledged sorts of superiority are concerned. 92. For they say that Periander said nothing to the messenger who had been sent to him for advice. nor will a chorus master tolerate a member of the chorus who has a louder and more beautiful voice than the entire chorus. but leveled a cornfield by cutting off the outstandingly tall ears. So. as soon as Athens had a firm grip on its imperial rule. then. provided their rule benefits their city-states. as well as any others who had grown presumptuous because they had once ruled empires of their own. Chios. and Lesbos. For exam­ ple.90 30 35 40 1284b S 10 15 Politics III why those who criticize tyranny or the advice that Periander gave Thrasybulus should not be considered to be unqualifiedly correct in their censure. there is some political j ustice to the argument in favor of os­ tracism. The same situation holds too in oligarchies and democracies. Thrasybulus un­ derstood that he was to get rid of the outstanding men.77 in violation of the treaties it had with them. But those in control of power treat city-states and nations in the same way.

What we have to investigate is whether or not it is beneficial for a city-state or territory which is to be well managed to be under a kingship. does not have authority over everything. such as power or wealth or having many friends. but when the king leaves the country. there is a considerable problem. or under some other constitution instead. but used ostracism for purposes of faction. 20 25 30 Chapter 1 4 After the matters just discussed. he does have leadership in military affairs. but when there happens to be someone who is superior in virtue. For kingship in the Spartan constitution. is a sort of permanent autocratic generalship. It is evident. on the basis of the law of force. In the case of the best constitution. but neither would they say that they should rule over him. So that he ruled and was ruled in turn. Reading en tini basileia(i) with the mss. then. Agamemnon put up with being abused 78. For surely people would not say that such a person should be expelled or banished. that in each of the deviant constitutions ostracism is privately ad­ vantageous and just. For they did not look to the benefit of their own constitutions. except when exercising a certain sort of kingship/9 similar to that exercised in ancient times on military expeditions. however. For the king does not have the power of life and death. Moreover. it may perhaps be well to change to an investigation of kingship. then. but it is perhaps also evident that it is not unquali­ fiedly just. dividing the offices. which is held to be the clearest example of kingships based on law. 35 40 1285' 5 10 . But first it must be determined whether there is one single type of kingship or several different varieties. however. 80.Chapter 14 91 with a corrective of this sort. 78 The remaining possibility-and it seems to be the natural one-is for everyone to obey such a person gladly. [ 1 ] This type of kingship. For that would be like claiming that they deserved to rule over Zeus. or whether it is beneficial for some but not for others. since we say that it is one of the correct consti­ tutions.80 Homer provides a clear example. matters relating to the gods are assigned to the kings. 79. In fact this is easy to see-that kingship includes several types. and that the manner of rule is not the same in all of them. It permitted summary execution without trial. This is not what actually tended to happen in city-states. so that those like him will be permanent kings in their city-states. not about superiority in other goods.

Their bodyguards are kingly and not tyrannical for the same reason.86 was voluntary. For the citizens guard their kings with their weapons. For . then. which existed among the ancient Greeks. Put simply. 82. whereas a foreign contingent guards tyrants. which existed in the heroic pe­ riod. but they are stable because hereditary and based on law. which differs from non-Greek king­ ship not because it is not based on law but only because it is not heredi­ tary. Some of these are based on lineage. The powers all these have are very like those tyrants have. which is like kingships that exist among some non-Greeks. and established on the basis of law. others elective. those they call dictators. others for a fixed time or purpose. Diehl 1. whereas the latter have their bodyguards to protect them against the citizens. Because non-Greeks are by nature more slavish in their character than Greeks. "84 These are and were tyrannical because like the rule of a master. I5 20 25 30 35 I28Sb S . So for this sort of reason these kingships are tyrannical. then. 83.Politics III 92 in the assemblies. 87. for I myself shall put him to death. it is Al­ caeus who makes it clear in one of his drinking songs that they did elect Pittacus tyrant. shall have no hope of escaping dogs and vultures. Some hold this office for life. this is an elected tyranny.391-393. is one kind of kingship-a generalship for life. Alcaeus (born c."81 This. Some non-Greek kingships were also of this sort. [2] But there is another kind of monarchy besides this. At any rate. 84. 82 These. see 1295•1 1-14. The last line Aristotle quotes is not in our text. See Plato. He complains that "They set up base-born Pittacus as tyrant of that gutless and ill-omened city-state. . whereas the latter rule unwilling ones. 85. those in Asia being more so than those in Europe. see 1274b18-23 and note. The period described in the Homeric poems. the Mytileneans once elected Pittacus to defend them against the exiles led by Antimenides and the poet Alcaeus. For kings rule willing sub­ jects on the basis of law.· 8 1 .85 [4] A fourth kind of kingly monarchy. Antimenides was his brother. they tol­ erate rule by a master without any complaint.427. but when they went out to fight he had the power even of life and death. elective. 83 Indeed. Iliad 11. but kingly because elective and voluntary. fr. with great praise from the assembled throng. 86. Thus the former have bodyguards drawn from the citizens. Republic 567a-568a. but they are based on law and are hered­ itary. are two kinds of monarchy. On Pittacus. he says: ''Anyone I find far from the battle . 620) was a lyric poet from Mytilene in Lesbos. For example. [3) But there is another.

In fact. some doing so under oath. which is rule by a master based on lineage and law. There are. They had authority in regard to leadership in war. then. since this is something that can come to exist in any constitution. which. Fourth among them is Spartan kingship. whether or not it is beneficial for a city-state to have a permanent general (whether chosen on the basis of family or by turns). The second is the non-Greek kind. and religious sacrifices not requiring priests. and others were taken away by the crowd in various city-states. In ancient times. The third is so-called dictatorship. they ruled continuously over the affairs of the city-state. For most of the others lie in between them. whether or not it is beneficial for one person to control everything. when one person controls everything in j ust the way that each nation and each city-state controls the affairs of the community. however.Chapter IS 93 because the first of the line were benefactors of the multitude in the crafts or war. when the kings themselves relinquished some of these prerogatives. the king was general and judge and had authority over matters to do with the gods. and even where there was a kingship worthy of the name. But later. So our investigation is pretty much about two questions: First. 10 1S 20 25 30 Chapter 1 5 Practically speaking. the last one and the Spartan. 35 1 286" . simply put. Second. It is organized along the lines of household management. and others not (the oath consisted in lifting up the scepter) . They also d ecided legal cases. [5] But there is a fifth kind of kingship. they became kings over willing subjects. the investigation of this sort of generalship has the look of an investigation of LAWS rather than of constitutions. then. so this kingship is household management of one or more city-states or nations. these four kinds of kingship. differ from one another in this way. which is elective tyranny. namely. and their descendants took over from them. is permanent generalship based on lineage. One belongs to the heroic age: this was over willing subjects and served certain fixed pur­ poses. it was only leadership in military affairs conducted beyond the frontiers that the king held on to. For j ust as household management is a sort of kingship over a household. then. both domestic and foreign. there are just two kinds of kingship to be ex­ amined. only the sacrifices were left to the kings. These. since they control less than absolute kingship but more than Spartan kingship. or through bringing them together or providing them with land.

See 1279'39-b4. 88. that the best constitution is not one that follows written lawsY All the same. who do nothing outside the law. whereas in the same situation it is a task to get all the citizens to become angry and make mistakes at the same time. it is clear that the ruler must be a legislator. It is evident. except about matters the law cannot cover-not an easy thing to arrange where numbers are large. it is foolish to rule in accordance with written prescriptions in any craft. But perhaps it ought to be said. deliberate. and do not prescribe with a view to actual circumstances. The starting point of the investigation is this: whether it is more ben­ eficial to be ruled by the best man or by the best laws. 1 278'6-1 1 . Besides.94 S 10 IS 20 2S 30 3S Politics III So the first question may be set aside. Hence we must study it and go through the problems it involves. however. and doctors in Egypt are rightly allowed to change the treat­ ment after the fourth day (although. Conse­ quently. like a larger quantity of water. a large quantity is more incorruptible.88 But suppose there were a 87. but they must not have authority insofar as they deviate from what is best. whereas every human soul necessarily possesses it. Aristotle returns to this argument at 1 287"33-1287b5. just like a feast to which many contribute. But the remaining sort of king­ ship is a kind of constitution. This element is not present in the law. the rulers should possess the universal reason as well. and the decisions themselves all concern particu­ lars. As to what the law cannot decide either at all or well. so the multitude. to oppose this. for the same reason. and decide. That is why a crowd can also judge many things better than any sin­ gle individual. and is better than one that is a unity and simple. In that case. or everyone? For as things stand now. And something to which the passionate element is entirely unattached is better than something in which it is innate. any one of these people is perhaps inferior to the best person. should the one best person rule. are more incorruptible than the few. Those who think it beneficial to be ruled by a king hold that laws speak only of the universal. Let the multitude in question be the free. though they should certainly have authority everywhere else. therefore. people come together to hear cases. if they do so earlier. that a human being will deliberate better about particulars. But a city-state consists of many people. . it is at their own risk). Taken individually. and that laws must be established. The judgment of an individual is inevitably corrupted when he is overcome by anger or some other passion of this sort.

Besides. men were made kings because of benefactions. Perhaps this too is the reason people were formerly under kingships-because it was rare to find men who were very outstanding in virtue. they no longer put up with kingship. lxv-lxvi. 9 1 . so one might reasonably suppose. See 1 3 1 1 '9-1 0. particularly as the city-states they lived in at that time were small. because of a shameful desire for profit. 90 Then from oligarchies they changed first into tyrannies. which Greek kings typically possessed ( 1 285'25-27. For somewhat different explanations of the changes constitutions undergo. and which could be used in a tyrannical fashion.89 provided that it is possible to find a number of people who are similar. that oli­ garchies arose. however.Chapter 15 95 number who were both good men and good citizens. Republic 554a. is to be considered an aristocracy. 1286h 5 10 15 20 25 . which it is precisely the task of good men to confer. and demands greater virtue than human nature allows. he will not give it to his children. for they made wealth a thing of honor. because he is in control. For by concentrating power into ever fewer hands. 1 3 1 6'1-b27." One should no doubt oppose this objection by pointing out that they may be excellent in soul just like the single person. and it was from some such source. they became less good. The "force" in question is probably the citizen bodyguards. 91 But now if one does posit kingship as the best thing for a city-state." But this is hardly credible. Plato. but looked for something communal and established a polity. 90. how is one to handle the matter of children? Are the descendants to rule as kings too? If they turn out as some have. Because the end that oligarchy sets for itself is wealth. So then. and the rule of a single person a kingship. whereas the single person is free of faction. "But perhaps. But when they began to acquire wealth from the common funds. 1 286h27-40). if the rule of a number of people. see 1297b l 6-28. Introduction. they made the multitude stronger. all of whom are good men. with the result that it revolted and democracies arose. it would be harmful. When there began to be many people who were similar in virtue. which would be more incorruptible-one ruler. 89. it is perhaps no longer easy for any other constitution to arise besides democracy. Now that city-states have become even larger. or a larger number all of whom are good? Isn't it clear that it would be the larger number? "But such a group will split into factions. For it is a difficult thing to do. and from tyrannies to democracy. aristocracy would be more choiceworthy for city-states than kingship (whether the rule is supported by force or not).

which has to be regu­ lated by statute. therefore. and. One who rules in accordance with the laws. and many places put one per�on in control of managing affairs. to be in control. 94. 93.96 30 35 40 Politics III There is also a problem concerning force. and never acted in accordance with his own wishes contrary to the law. But this is already law. from among all the citi­ zens. If not.94 Thus it is more choiceworthy to have 92. and when Dionysius93 asked for bodyguards. but a force of such a kind as to be stronger than an individ­ ual. But as regards so-called absolute kingship (which is where the king rules everything in accord with his own wish). The same also holds. too. This is the way the ancients gave bodyguards when they selected someone from the city-state to be what they called a dictator or tyrant. See also 1 326'29-30. Chapter 1 6 1287• 5 10 15 Now that we have reached this point the next topic must be that of the king who does everything according to his own wish. For the so-called king according to law does not. There is an office of this sort in Epidamnus. it would still be necessary for him to have some power with which to protect the laws. In the case of this sort of king. . for the organization is law. when the city-state consists of similar people. and to a lesser ex­ tent in Opus as well. The organization of ruling and being ruled in turn. Dionysius I. but weaker than the mul­ titude. See 1 259'28-36 and note. whether by himself or together with many. Hence. where offices are concerned. to do so in turn. amount to a kind of constitution. in a democracy and an aristoc­ racy). some hold that it is not even in accordance with nature for one person. For justice and merit must be by nature the same for those who are by nature similar. the same holds.92 it is perhaps not difficult to determine the solution. if indeed it is harmful to their bodies for equal people to have unequal food or clothing. Which is precisely why it is j ust for them to rule no more than they are ruled. so we must investi­ gate this. as we said. and whether anyone who is going to rule as king should have some force in attendance with which he can compel anyone who does not wish to obey his rule. therefore. when equal people have what is unequal. He should have a force. since a permanent generalship can exist in any constitution (for example. indeed. how can he possibly manage his office? For even if he were a king exercising authority in accord with the law. someone advised the Syracusans to give him bodyguards of this sort.

Yet. and while in pain. but earn their pay by healing the sick. the sort of things at least that the law seems unable to decide could not be discovered by a human being either.Chapter 1 6 97 law rule than any one of the citizens. their assumption being that they are unable to judge truly because they are judging about their own cases. Those who hold political office. for there to be only one. they should be selected as guardians of and assistants to the laws. For there do have to be some rulers. So it is clear that in seeking what is just they are seeking the mean. See Introduction §6. And. Anyone who instructs LAW to rule would seem to be asking GOD and the understanding alone to rule. Consequently. 95. and passion perverts rulers even when they are the best men. and trainers call in other trainers when they are exercising. so that even if a human ruler is more reliable than written laws. For doctors never do things contrary to reason because of friendship.96 Again. for the law is the mean. would seem to be false. 96. what difference is there between having them there from the beginning and having one person appoint them in this way? Besides. they say. at any rate. on the other hand. Moreover. That is precisely why law is understanding without desire. they would prefer to seek treatment derived from books. it is certainly not easy for a single ruler to oversee many things. 20 25 30 35 40 128 7h 5 10 . For appetite is like a wild beast. Moreover. that it is bad to give medical treat­ ment in accordance with written prescriptions and more choiceworthy to rely on those who possess the craft instead. not when all are similar. it allows them to make any corrections by introducing anything found by experience to be an im­ provement on the existing laws. The comparison with the crafts. doctors themselves call in other doctors to treat them when they are sick. by this same argument. although it is not just. even if it is better to have certain people rule. The mean here being impartial treatment rendered according to the written rules of a craft by someone exercising trained judgment. laws based on custom are more authoritative and deal with matters that have more authority than do written laws. having educated the rulers for this special pur­ pose. hence there will have to be numerous officials appointed under him. he is not more so than those based on custom. But the law. And indeed if people suspected their doctors of having been bribed by their enemies to do away with them. do many things out of spite or in order to win favor.95 whereas someone who asks a human being asks a wild beast as well. Moreover. hands over the rest to be decided and managed in accordance with the most just opinion of the rulers.

and feet. therefore. nor in that of the other deviant constitutions. when judging with one pair of eyes and one pair of ears. however. These. since they come about contrary to nature). since. two good ones are better than one. the latter lead people to raise and investigate the problem whether it is more choiceworthy for the best law to rule or the best man (since to legislate about matters that call for de­ liberation is impossible). are pretty much the arguments of those who dispute against kingship. . But suppose they are friendly to him and his rule-well. so if he thinks they should rule.97 if it really is just for the excellent man to rule because he is better. . . and acting with one pair of feet and hands. But because some matters can be cov­ ered by the laws. as things stand. "98 Even nowadays. another in the case of kingship. . For. could see better than many people with many pairs. monarchs provide themselves with many eyes. At 1 286b3-5. Chapter 1 7 40 1288' But perhaps these arguments hold in some cases and not in others. a friend is someone similar and equal. "May ten such counselors be mine. it is neither beneficial nor just for one person to control everything. For each official judges well if he has been educated by the law." and Agamemnon's prayer. as regards those matters the law can determine. while others cannot. is not that it is not necessary for a human being to decide such matters. certainly no one disputes that the law it­ self would rule and decide best. This 97. officials. he must think that those who are equal and similar to him should rule in a similar fashion. But it is surely evident from what has been said that in a case where people are similar and equal. The counterargument. And it would perhaps be accounted strange if someone. they will not do as the monarch chooses. For what is by nature both just and beneficial is one thing in the case of rule by a master. Iliad X. Now if they are not friendly in this way. For they appoint those who are friendly to their rule and to themselves as co-rulers.98 IS 20 25 30 35 Politics III as we said earlier. then. 98. Hence the saying "When two go together .372. not one only. well.224 and 11. hands. have the authority to decide some things the law cannot determine. and another in the case of rule by a statesman (nothing is by nature both just and beneficial in the case of a tyranny. ears. but that there should be many judges. such as jurors. however.

oligarchic. 103. may be determined in this way. then. whose virtue is so superior as to exceed that of all the others. For it is not natural for the part to be greater than the whole. Whenever it happens. then. for which and how. At 1284h2S-34. this not only accords with the kind of justice customarily put for­ ward by those who establish constitutions. though not superiority in the same kind of thing). For. A multitude is suited to aris­ tocracy when it naturally produces a multitude100 capable of being ruled with the rule appropriate to free people by those who are qualified to lead by their possession of the virtue required for the rule of a states­ man. And a multitude is suited to polity when there naturally arises in it a warrior multitude101 capable of ruling and being ruled. as was said earlier. 102. What these circumstances are must now be stated-although we have in a way already stated it. but this is what happens in the case of someone who has this degree of superiority. and for this one individual to be king. but also with what was said earlier. 99. So the only remaining option is for such a person to be obeyed and to be in control not by turns but un­ qualifiedly. or a not good one ruling not good ones. A multitude should be under kingship when it naturally produces a family that is superior in the virtue appropriate to political leadership. and what its varieties are.103 Kingship. under a law which distributes offices to the rich on the basis of merit. and if so. and what to polity. Reading plethos polemikon with Dreizehnter and the mss. and whether it is beneficial for city-states or not. or whether there are laws. At 1 284'3-b35. Reading plethos with Dreizehnter and the mss. The argument in this paragraph is discussed in the Introduction §8. that there is a whole family.Chapter 1 7 99 holds whether there are no laws except the king himself. it is just for this family to be the kingly family and to control everything. whether aristocratic. 100. nor to claim that he deserves to be ruled in turn. we must determine what kind of people are suited to kingship. whether he is a good person ruling good people. or even some one individual among the rest. 5 10 I5 20 25 30 . and even whether he is their superior in virtue--except in one set of circumstances. 101. or even democratic (for they all claim to merit rule on the basis of superiority in something. what to aristocracy.99 First. 1 02 For it is surely not proper to kill or to exile or to ostracize an individual of this sort.

. then. as we showed in our first discussions. Anyone. 106. Hence it is evident that the ways and means by which a man becomes excellent are the same as those by which one might establish a city-state ruled by an aristocracy or a king. III. Fur­ thermore. This is the sort of constitution in which there happens to be either one particu­ lar person or a whole family or a number of people whose virtue is superior to that of all the rest. This sentence appears again in a slightly different form as part of the opening sentence of Book VII.4-5. and that the education and habits that make a man excellent are pretty much the same as those that make him statesmanlike or kingly. and where the latter are capable of being ruled and the former of ruling with a view to the most choiceworthy life. 105.100 Politics III Chapter 1 8 35 40 J288h 5 We say that there are three correct constitutions. who intends to do this must conduct the investigation in the appropriate way. the way it naturally arises and how it is es­ tablished.1 05 Now that these matters have been determined. and that the best of them must of necessity be the one managed by the best people. 104 the virtue of a man must of necessity be identical to that of a citizen of the best city-state. we must attempt to discuss the best constitution. It is bracketed as incomplete by Ross. See Introduction xxv-xxvi. 106 104.

and so neither the unqualifiedly best constitution nor the one that is best in the circumstances should be neglected by the good legislator and true statesman. 3. See 1 338b6-8. clothing manufacture. ship building. But Aristotle's own candidate is not formally discussed until VII-VIII. The end of iii. This is to some extent true. For a statesman must be able to study how any given constitution might initially come 1. Also [2] which constitution is appropriate for which city-states. We see a similar thing in medicine. and every other craft. Namely. but IV does not contain one. l 8 prepares us for a discussion of the best constitution. what it must be like if it is to be most ideal.Chapter 1 Among all the crafts and sciences that are concerned not only with a part but that deal completely with some one type of thing. Further. it belongs to a single one to study what is appropriate for each type. Consequently. [3] which constitution is best given certain assumptions.2 seems to suggest that the best constitution has already been discussed. what sort is best (for the sort that is appropriate for the sort of body that is naturally best and best equipped is necessarily best). and what single sort of training is appropriate for most bodies (since this too is a task for physical training).best constitution in discussing both other people's candidates for that title and aristocracy and kingship ( 1 289h30-32). 2. Indeed. 101 10 15 20 25 . that is to say. For example: what sort of physical training is beneficial for what sort of body. if someone wants neither the condition nor the knowledge required of those involved in competition. Further. it is clear that it belongs to the same science3 to study: [ I ] What the best constitution is. and if there were no external obstacles. the opening sentence of IV. that is to say. For achieving the best constitution is perhaps impossible for many. because much is said about the . STATESMANSHIP. it be­ longs no less to coaches and physical trainers2 to provide this capacity too.

As things stand. what element is in authority in the constitution. and praise the Spartan or some other. while others. 6.4 given what they already have. even if what they say is good in other respects. however. it might be preserved for the longest time. a statesman should also be able to help existing constitutions. for example. and how. do away with the constitutions actually in place. some seek only the constitution that is highest and requires a lot of resources. and all do establish them. and what the end is of each of the communities.102 30 35 40 1289' S 10 IS Politics IV into existence. when some city-state happens to be governed neither by the best constitution (not even having the necessary resources) nor by the best one possible in the existing circumstances. Alternatively (Ross): "will easily be able to use for the first time (kainizein). See Introduction lxv-1xvi. just as it is no less a task to correct what we have learned than to learn it in the first place. to suit the consti­ tution and not the constitution to suit the laws. I mean. For laws should be established. For a constitution is the organization of offices in city-states. once in existence. some people think that there is just one kind of democracy and one of oligarchy. but also what is possible. But what should be done is to introduce the sort of organization that people will be easily persuaded to accept and be able to par­ ticipate in. Aristotle switches labels here. 7. how many they are and how many ways they can be combined. as it is no less a task to reform a constitution than to establish one initially. . see 1290b25-1293'34. 8. the way they are distributed. as was also said earlier. Reading koinonein with Dreizehnter and many mss. As it is. For an explanation. 8 Laws. At 1 288b28-39. Since practical wisdom is the same state of the soul as statesmanship (NE 1 14 1 b23-24). a statesman should know [4] which constitution is most appropriate for all city-states. Besides all these things. Consequently. certainly fail when it comes to what is use­ ful. apart from those that reveal what the constitu- 4.6 And [6] it is with this same practical wisdom7 that one should try to see both which laws are best and which are appropriate for each of the constitutions. 1 3 17'18-1 3 1 8'3 . those who have expressed views about constitutions. but by a worse one. and similarly what is easier and more attainable by all. however. in addition to what has just been mentioned." 5 . That is why. For one should not study only what is best. So one must not overlook the varieties of each of the constitutions. But this is not true.5 But this is impossible if he does not know [5] how many kinds of constitu­ tions there are. though they discuss a more attainable sort.

polity) and three devi­ ations from them (tyranny from kingship. See also NE 1 160'3 1-bZZ. 14. and democracy the most moderate.Chapter 2 1 03 tion is. Kingship is presumably "most divine" because Zeus rules the other gods with kingly rule ( 1 2SZb24-27). 12 it remains to deal with the constitution that is called by the name common to all CONSTI­ TUTIONS. oligarchy from aristocracy. and also with the others--oligarchy. Hence tyranny. 1 0 we distinguished three correct constitutions (kingship. we have determined how aristocracy and kingship differ from one another. tiln onomatiln: See 1276b J J. A reference to Book III. and since further. An earlier thinker14 has already expressed this same view. Clearly. 11. 13. democracy.1 3 and note. I follow Lord in taking basilean nomizein in this way. 1 2. 10. are those by which the officials must rule. being the worst. and democracy from polity). 17. It is also evident which of these deviations is worst and which second worst. Alternatively: "when to have a kingship. 14-16. then. Statesman 302e-303b. and must guard against those who transgress them. aristocracy. 11 since each of them tends to be established on the basis of virtue furnished with resources. and not one kind of democracy nor one kind of oligarchy only. Plato. 30 35 40 1289" 5 . and when a constitution should be considered a kingship.13 But kingship either must be in name only and not in fact or must be based on the great superiority of the person ruling as king. oligarchy is second worst (since aristocracy is very far removed from this constitution).8. It is unclear why having discussed the former topic (as opposed to the latter) would help support the conclusion Aristotle draws in the next sentence. Reading arithmon with the mss. when to consider a constitution a kingship is discussed in III. 20 25 Chapter 2 Since our initial inquiry concerning constitutions.6-8. for studying the best constitution is the same as discussing these names. a knowledge of the varieties of each constitution and of their number9 is also necessary for establishing laws. is furthest removed from being a constitution. For the deviation from the first and most divine constitution must of necessity be the worst." When to have a kingship is discussed in III. Tyranny "worst" for the reasons given in V. For the same laws cannot be beneficial for all oligarchies or for all democracies-if indeed there are several kinds. and tyranny. and since we have already discussed aris­ tocracy and kingship. though 9.

After these things. whereas for others the reverse holds). each kind of democracy or oligarchy).6. Aristotle gives a number of different (but perhaps equivalent) explanations of why there are different kinds of constitutions (IV. both in general and in the case of each one separately. (That is why. [2] which kind is most attainable. and. since this is not easy for those without wealth to do. indeed. l-7). 130lb29-1 302•2. it is the best. [3] how someone who wishes to do so should establish these constitutions (I mean. Chapter 3 30 35 The reason why there are several constitutions is that every city-state has several parts. and which most choiceworthy after the best constitution (if indeed there is some other constitution which. . is at the same time appropriate for most city-states). and some who are in the middle. and that of the rich and of the poor. how many varieties of the constitu­ tions there are (if indeed there are several kinds of democracy and oli­ garchy). though aristocratic and well constituted. But let us leave aside the judgment of this matter for the present. [4] we must try to go through the ways in which constitutions are destroyed and those in which they are preserved.104 10 15 20 25 Politics IV he did not look to the same thing we do. And among the notables there are differences in wealth and in extent of their property-as. that within this multitude there have to be some who are rich. a trading part. and also the others). Finally. and a vulgar craftsman part. there were oligarchies among those city-states in ancient times whose power lay in 1 5 . and that it is not right to speak of one kind of oligarchy as better than another. when we have gone as far as we can to give a succinct account of each of these topics. But we say that these constitutions are all of them mistaken. 1 30 1 '25-33. In­ stead. some who are poor. 1 5 For in the first place. but that when they are bad. next. and also which of the other constitutions is more choiceworthy for which people (for democracy is perhaps more necessary than oligarchy for some. Next. in the breeding of horses. We also see that the people comprise a farming part. VI. democracy is the worst of them. we see that all city-states are composed of households. the one possessing weapons and the other without weapons. when an oligarchy is good. we must determine: [ I ] First. but as less bad. For he judged that when all these constitutions are good (for example. and through what causes these most naturally come about. for example.

wealth. on virtue.) There are also differences based on birth. so there are also said to be two constitutions. For example. there must be as many constitutions as there are ways of organizing offices on the basis of the superiority and varieties of the parts." and others from the best constitution. or some equality common to both). for example.17 Therefore. and the others deviations from these. 40 1290" S 10 15 20 25 . Because a polity is a kind of majority rule ( 1279'37-39). since these parts themselves also differ in kind. east winds are counted as southerly. Winds are thus called northerly or southerly on the basis of this division between cold and hot or warm" (Mete. on the grounds that it is a sort of rule by the few. 17. 19. but VII. and the other arrangements are called either Phrygian types or Dorian types. which are regarded as being of two kinds. and who used horses in wars with their neighbors-as. For aristocracy is regarded as a sort of oligarchy. People are generally accustomed. sometimes fewer of them. 18 just as the west wind is regarded as northerly. some from the well-mixed "harmony. the Eretrians did. democracy and oligarchy. For a constitution is the organization of offices. of the poor or of the rich. that there must be several constitutions that differ in kind from one another. for example. to think of constitutions in this way. the more 16. and the Chalcidians. and the east as southerly. as we have. and on everything else of the sort that we characterized as part of a city-state in our discussion of aristocracy. 18. and all consitu­ tions distribute these either on the basis of the power of the partici­ pants.16 For sometimes all of these parts participate in the con­ stitution. the Magnesians on the river Menander. or on the basis of some sort of equality common to them (I mean. Probably a reference to 1283'14-26. since there we distinguished the number of parts that are necessary to any city-state. equality in virtue. But it is truer and better to distin­ guish them. But there are held to be mainly two constitutions: just as the winds are called north or south. the Dorian and the Phrygian. West winds are counted as northerly. 19 According to some people.Chapter 3 105 their cavalry. Winds are "generally classified as north or south. therefore. since they blow from where the sun sets and are therefore colder. then. It is evident. and say that two constitutions (or one) are well formed. sometimes more. 364' 1 8-27). and that the others are deviations from them. and many of the others in Asia.7-9 also contains a discussion of this topic. or freedom. whereas a so-called polity is regarded as a sort of democracy. the same thing also happens in the case of harmonies. since they blow from where the sun rises and are warmer.

in Apollonia on the Ionian Gulf and in Thera. if the poor were few. 21. 24. Namely. did not participate in office. the descendants of the first colonists. Similarly. See 1 294•1 1-14 for an explanation. The well-mixed constitution is identified in IV. since both democracy and oligarchy have a number of parts. we must further grasp that it is not a democracy if a few free people rule over a majority who are not free.9. no one would call such a constitution an oligarchy if the others. as was formerly the case in Colophon. Nor is it an oligarchy24 if the rich rule be­ cause they are the multitude. The example of music results in this extended musical metaphor in which "harmony" (harmonia) is used as a metaphor for a balanced mixture in a constitution. since beautiful peo­ ple and tall ones are both few in number. Thus it is better to say that a democracy exists when the free are in authority and an oligarchy exists when the rich are. Alternatively (Dreizehnter and the mss. the larger part is in authority). 22.): "democracy (demos). 22 Nor should an oligarchy be regarded as being where the few are in authority over the constitution. Rather. For in each of these city-states the offices were held by the well born. although they were few among many. though rich. and the unrestrained and soft ones democratic. as. Statesman 29ld. since many are free but few are rich. Otherwise there would be an oligarchy if offices were distributed on the basis of height (as is said to happen in Ethiopia) or on the basis of beauty. who were a majority. where the majority possessed large properties before the war against the 20. wealth and freedom." . but it happens that the former are many and the latter few. for example. 23. Yet these23 are not sufficient to distinguish these constitutions. For if there were a total of thirteen hundred peo­ ple. no one would say that the latter were demo­ cratically governed even if they were free and otherwise similar to the rich.20 Chapter 4 30 35 40 J29(J 5 10 15 One should not assert (as some are accustomed to do now)Z1 that democ­ racy is simply where the multitude are in authority (for both in oli­ garchies and everywhere else. but stronger than the rich. See Plato. out of which a thousand were rich people who give no share in office to three hundred poor ones.106 Politics IV tightly controlled ones and those that are more like the rule of a master being more oligarchic. Reading oligarchia with Ross.

and sense organs. we would first determine what it is necessary for every animal to have: for example. They are concerned with the crafts without which a city-state cannot be managed (of these some are necessary. species. taking as our starting point what was agreed to earlier. and diaphora. 28. 26. For the same animal cannot have mouths or ears of many different varieties. A fifth is [5] the defensive warriors.29 It is the same way with the constitutions we have mentioned. But let us now say why there are more than the ones men­ tioned. If these were the only parts. then the number of ways of combining these would nec­ essarily produce a number of types of animals. A fourth is [4] the hired Iaborers. all the possible ways of pairing them together will produce kinds of animals. but they had varieties (I mean. whereas others contribute to luxury or fine living). if the inhabitants are not to become the slaves of any ag­ gressor. that is to say. it is a democracy when the free and the poor who are a majority have the authority to rule. The reference could be to ( 1 ) the list of six constitutions given at 1 289'26-30. retail trade. For no city-state that is naturally slavish can possibly deserve to 25. which are no less necessary than the others.28 For we are agreed that every city-state has not only one part but several. and variety are the genos. that there are a number of constitutions and why this is so. for example. as many kinds of animals as there are combinations of the necessary parts. 1 4. If we wanted to grasp the kinds of animals. the genus. something with which to work on and absorb food (such as a mouth and a stomach). See 1 279h39-1 280'6. Type.3. (2) the shorter list said to constitute the present agenda at 1289'35-38.Chapter 4 1 07 Lydians. and commerce) . certain of the sense organs. A second is [2] those called vulgar craftsman. and how they arise.27 what they are. eidos. do. then. See Herodotus 1 . stomachs. Hence. who are few. For city-states are constituted not out of one but many parts. In IV. when these have been grasped. and an oligarchy when the rich and well born. 27. and also of locomotive parts). 26 It has been stated. kind. if there were several types of mouths. 20 25 30 35 40 1291" 5 . of Aristotelian biology. and differentia. and also parts by which it moves. or (3) oligarchy and democracy. A third is [3] the traders (by which I mean those engaged in selling and buying.25 Rather. which are the dominant focus of discussion after 1 289h6. One of these parts is [ I ] the multitude concerned with food. as we have often said . 29. the ones called farmers.

1 328b l J-15.32 [7] Seventh are those who perform PUBLIC SERVICE by means of their property. farmers. There must. Consequently. 3 1 . 33 This is the class we call the rich. Yet even in these communities of four (or however many) classes. be some who are able to rule and perform this public service for the city-state 30. Then. it encroaches on that of its neighbors. That is why what is said in the Republic. those who serve in connection with the various offices. then. See 1253'37-39. and had equal need of both shoemakers and farm­ ers. since deliberation is a task for po­ litical understanding. The unidentified sixth part may be the class of priests (listed as an impor­ tant part of any city-state at 1328h 1 1-1 3). is not adequate. For Socrates says that a city-state is constituted out of four ab­ solutely necessary classes. 33. Nor does he assign it defensive warriors until. the latter. etc. and also those who deliberate. on the grounds that these are not self-sufficient. The former are those that deal with our necessary needs. At 369d-371e.108 10 IS 20 25 JO JS Politics IV be called a city-state at all. [8] Eighth are the civil ser­ vants. since a city-state cannot exist without officials. there must be someone to assign and decide what is justY So if indeed one should regard the soul as a more important part of an animal than the body. if both the former and the latter are to be regarded as parts of a city-state. he says. since in fact it often happens that the same people both possess weapons and engage in farmin g. at any rate. with the expansion of its territory. must be a part of a city-state. and gets involved in a war.30 though sophisticated. What is evident is that a city-state must at least have warriors among its parts. one should regard things of the following sort to be parts. But it will often need a navy as well. 32. it is evident that those who possess weapons. and house builders. . But it is also possible that the long aside about the Republic has caused Aristotle to go astray in his numbering. and those engaged in retail trade and commerce. in the case of city-states too. It does not matter to the argument whether these tasks belong to separate people or the same ones. those who participate in administering judicial justice.S for further discussion. whereas something that is slavish is not self-sufficient. shoe­ makers. All these be­ come the full complement of his first city-state-as if every city-state were constituted for the sake of providing the necessities. are weavers. he adds blacksmiths. people to look after the necessary livestock. for a city-state is self-sufficient. rather than those dealing with our neces­ sary needs: the warriors. See VII. the war­ riors. not for the sake of what is noble. and these. therefore.

If these characteristics are themselves indivisible. especially 643'7-8. A type (genus) is divided into kinds (species) on the basis of opposite vari­ eties (differentia). 37 This is in fact evident from what has been said. of the people. and craftsmen. See PA 643'3 1-b8. NE 1 14 l b23-24). Hence these in particular. there will then be just two kinds (species). the fact that the former are usually few in number and the latter many makes it seem that among the parts of the city-state these two are opposites. part in fer­ rying passengers. The sorts of superiority claimed by the rich and the poor are wealth and freedom respectively. the free people who are not of citizen parentage on both sides. and the kind concerned with the sea--of which part is the navy. those who have too little property to enable them to be at leisure. For there are several kinds both of the people and of the so-called notables. the rich and the poor. Presumably. Consequently. 38. and ferrymen in Tenedos. and thinks he is capable of ruling in most offices.) In addition to these. if these things must indeed take place in city-states. l-7. that of statesmen. the virtue peculiar to a statesmen ( 1 277h2S-26. and why this is so has been stated earlier. another. which is en­ gaged in buying and selling. there must also be some who share in the virtue of statesmen. But for the same people to be both rich and poor is impossible. are held to be parts of a city-state. those who deliberate and decide the claims of people involved in disputes. one is the farmers. 34 As for the other capacities. the kind involved in trading. See 1 289h27-1290'1 3 . for example. and both deliberators and judges be­ sides. many hold that they can belong to the same people. Deliberating in a way that is noble and just requires practical wisdom. See VI. and do so in a way that is noble and just. traders in Aegina and Chios. that it is possible for the same people to be warriors. Besides. There remain those we happened to dis­ tinguish just now. then. And everyone claims to possess the virtue35 too. a particular one of these amounts to a large crowd. and part in fishing. But we may now say that there are also several kinds of democracy and oligarchy. 38 For example. there are the manual laborers. Therefore. those concerned with the crafts. farmers. democracy and oligarchy. and whatever 34. navy men in Athens. fishermen in Tarentum and Byzantium.36 That there are a number of constitutions. and there are held to be two constitutions. for example. 37. 35. 36. 40 129Jh 5 10 15 20 25 . (In many places. constitutions are established on the basis of the superiority of these.Chapter 4 1 09 either continuously or in turn. part is engaged in wealth acquisition.

42 and the law rules. A larger class participates in (4) than in (3) ( 1 27Sh34-1276'6). Those whose citizen birth is clear ( 1 292h3S-36. [4] Another kind of democracy is where everyone can participate in office merely by being a citizen. popular lead­ ers do not arise. Plato. That is to say. When Homer says that "many­ headed rule is not good. The result is that flatterers are held in esteem. This.1 10 30 35 40 1292" 5 10 15 Politics I V other kind of multitude there may be. 42. This arises when DECREES have au­ thority instead of laws. For in city-states that are under a democracy based on law. or the kind where there are a number of individual rulers. then.S and VI. For if indeed freedom and equality are most of all present in a democracy. not the law. This kind does not appear on the other lists Aristotle gives in IV. For the law in this democracy says that there is equal­ ity when the poor enjoy no more superiority than the rich and neither is in authority but the two are similar. however. as some people suppose."44 it is not clear whether he means this kind of rule. . That is also why their characters are the same: both act like masters toward the bet- 39. But since the people are the majority. since it is a monarchy. but the multitude has authority. The notables are distinguished by wealth. and the other characteristics that are ascribed on the basis of the same sort of difference.204.39 this would be most true in the constitution in which everyone participates in the most similar way. then. but all together. and the law rules. 127Sh22-26). and where anyone who acquires the requisite amount may participate. [3] Another kind of democracy is where all uncontested citizens41 participate. Instead. is one kind of DEMOCRACY. a people of this kind. whereas anyone who loses it may not. For the people become a monarch. and majority opinion has authority.40 [2] Another is where offices are filled on the basis of property assess­ ments. [ 1] The first democracy. one person composed of many. and this happens because of POPULAR LEADERS. education. the best citizens preside. although these are low. virtue. seeks to exercise monarchic rule through not being ruled by the law. are the most powerful ( 1 308'22). 40. 43. this constitution is necessarily a democracy. and that a democracy of this kind is the analog of tyranny among the monarchies. popular leaders arise. good birth.43 Where the laws are not in authority. is the one that is said to be most of all based on equality. and becomes a mas­ ter.4. For example. 44. In any case. since the many are in authority not as individuals. 1/iad 11. Republic 557a-c. 562b-563d. 41. [5] Another kind of democracy is the same in other respects.

17). then. For the law should rule uni­ versally over everything. but anyone who does acquire the requisite amount may participate in the constitution. popular leaders with a people of this kind. The oddity of the claim that the constitution decides particular cases is reduced if we remember that "the governing class is the constitution" ( 1 278b l l). If they elect from among all of these. oligarchic. which. One might hold. since the multitude are persuaded by them. a genuine CON­ STITUTION is defined by and governed in accordance with LAWS. flatterers with tyrants. [ 1 ] one has offices filled on the basis of such a high property assessment that the poor. a popular leader is either the same as a flatterer or analogous. The suggestion is gladly accepted. [2] In another the offices are filled on the basis of a high assessment and they themselves elect someone to fill any vacancy. In the kind of democ­ racy under discussion. Each of these has special power in his own sphere. if from some specified people. while offices and the constitution45 should decide particular cases. since democracy is one of the constitutions. 46. Besides. This results in their becoming powerful because the people have authority over everything. 40 1 292h . must be universal. 20 25 30 35 Chapter 5 Of the kinds of oligarchy. in which everything is managed by decree. the decrees of the one are like the edicts of the other. that it is reasonable to object that this kind of democracy is not a CONSTITUTION at all. 48 [3] In 45. since no decree can possibly be universal. should be distinguished in this way. it is evident that this sort of arrangement. So. un­ like DECREES. Reading ten politeian with Dreizehnter and the mss.46 The kinds of democracy. All who have the assessed amount of property. 47. 48.Chapter 5 111 ter people. with the result that all offices are destroyed.47 it is held to be more aristocratic. on the grounds that there is no constitution where the laws do not rule. those who make accusations against officials say that the people should decide them. do not participate. even though they are the majority. With the explicable exception of absolute kingship (III. Hence a democracy governed by decrees is arguably not a constitution. They are responsible for decrees being in authority rather than laws because they bring everything before the people. is not even a democracy in the most authoritative sense. the people are the governing class. and popular leaders have it over the people's opinion. however. See 1 300'8-b7 for an explanation.

[2] Another kind arises through the following distinction. [4] In a fourth what was just mentioned occurs. Chapter 6 25 30 JS It is evident from what has been said that there are this many kinds of democracy and oligarchy. . ( 1 ] So when the part that farms and that owns a moderate amount of property has authority over the constitution. Similarly. Hence all those who have acquired it may participate. is one kind of democracy and these are the rea­ sons for it. the reverse has happened: the constitution is more democ­ ratic in its laws.1 12 S 10 IS 20 Politics IV another kind of oligarchy a son succeeds his father. and not the law but the officials rule. prosodiin me ousiin. but for only those who have leisure actually to do so. (3] A third kind is when 49. generally speaking. although those who have changed the consti­ tution are dominant. Reading to de exeinai. For it is possible for everyone of uncontested birth to participate. And the others may participate when they have acquired the property assessment defined by the laws.49 This. For they have enough to live on as long as they keep working. it is governed in accor­ dance with the laws. For either all of the aforementioned parts of the people must participate in the constitution. Such an oligarchy is called a dynasty. The text is uncertain. These. in other places. then. Hence the pre-existing laws remain in effect. For the change is not immediate. So they put the law in charge and hold only such assemblies as are necessary. or some must and others not. Hence in this kind of democ­ racy the laws rule because there is no revenue. This is to oligarchies what tyranny is to monarchies. For. but people are content at first to take from others in smaller ways. and to the democracy we spoke of last among democracies. then. are the kinds of oligarchy and democracy. But one must not overlook the fact that it has happened in many places that constitu­ tions which are not democratic according to their laws are none the less governed democratically because of custom and training. ou. but is governed in a more oligarchic way as a result of custom and training. it is oligarchic when not all of these may partic­ ipate. This happens especially after there has been a change of constitution. though not if what makes being at leisure impossible is the absence of revenues. but they cannot afford any leisure time. scholazein d'adunatein.

Hence the multitude of poor citizens come to have authority over the constitution and not the laws. But as they are not yet powerful enough to rule without law. the more removed they are from exercising monarchy. since they get paid. the property owners expect to get more. not law. everyone shares in the constitution. because even the poor are able to be at leisure. [2] But if the property owners are fewer and their properties greater than those mentioned before. [ 1] when a number of people own property. But it does impede the rich. and human beings are in authority.Chapter 6 1 13 all who are free may participate in the constitution. For anyone who acquires the amount may participate. and so the multitude preponderates. 50 [3] But if they tighten this process by becoming fewer and owning larger properties. not human beings. 50. they do not participate. the third stage of oligarchy is reached. Hence they themselves elect from among the rest of the citizens those who are to enter the governing class. This is the fourth kind of oligarchy. [4] A fourth kind of democracy was the last to arise in city-states. indeed. the second kind of oligarchy arises. they pass a law of this sort. [ 4] But when they now tighten it excessively through their property holdings and the number of their friends. a dynasty of this sort approximates a monarchy. since care for their own property does not impede them. 40 1293" 5 10 15 20 25 30 . but. but do so in accordance with a law requiring deceased members to be succeeded by their sons. where they keep the offices in their own hands. For because city-states have become much larger than the original ones and possess abundant sources of revenue. and the more they have neither so much property that they can be at leisure without worrying nor so little that they need to be supported by the city-state. The kinds of democracy. are such and so many because of these necessities. And be­ cause of the multitude participating in the governing class. law is necessarily in authority. so that law necessarily rules in this kind also. who often fail to take part in the assembly or serve on juries as a result. but a smaller amount-not too much-this is the first kind of oli­ garchy. And they all do participate and govern. For it is necessary for them to consent to having the law rule and not themselves. Permitting already existing members of the ruling oligarchy to elect new members. As for the kinds of oligarchy. for the reason just mentioned. being more powerful. corresponding to the final kind of democracy. A multitude of this sort is particularly leisured. then. For.

Chapter 8 It remains for us to speak about so-called polity and about tyranny. oligarchy. and where there is a mixture of these two things. these two kinds of aristocracy besides the first. There is a fifth. See Republic VIII-IX.1 14 Politics IV Chapter 7 35 40 129Jh 5 10 15 20 There are also two constitutions besides democracy and oligarchy. and. democracy. The four they mention are monarchy. 1 278h1-5. like Plato. 53. There are. 1288'37-1288h2. even though neither polity nor the aris5 1 . which look to only two. it gets over­ looked by those who try to enumerate the kinds of constitutions. virtue and the people. there are some constitutions that differ both from constitutions that are oligarchically governed and from so-called polity. like the constitution of the Spartans. It is well to call the constitution we treated in our first discussions an aristocracy. however. Nevertheless. and not of those who are good men only given a certain assumption. [4] those kinds of so-called polity that lean more toward oligarchy.52 For the only constitution that is rightly called an aristoc­ racy is the one that consists of those who are unqualifiedly best as regards virtue. and are called aristocracies. We have adopted this arrangement. then. Hence wherever a constitution looks to wealth. so-called aristocracy. namely. 53 as also are those. See 1273'21-hi. 1 286h3-7. which is the best constitution. there are still some who are of good repute and held to be decent. and there is also a third. virtue. . 1279'34-37. 52. fourth. it is aristocratic. one of which is mentioned by everyone and which we said was one of the four kinds of constitutions. and the people (as it does in Carthage). and. democracy and virtue. For even in those constitutions where virtue is not a concern of the community. But those who are good in other constitu­ tions are so relative to their constitutions. Perhaps a reference to 1276h34-1277' 1 . 51 list only the four in their discussion of constitutions. For only here is it unqualifiedly the case that the same person is a good man and a good citizen. For a constitution where officials are elected not only on the basis of wealth but also on the basis of merit differs from both of these and is called aris­ tocratic. But because it does not occur often. which is referred to by the name shared by all constitutions: the one called a politeia (polity). 1278'17-21.

the rich are held to possess already what unjust people commit injustice to get. Now in most city-states the kind of constitution is wrongly named. 25 30 35 40 1294• 5 10 15 20 . to call those mixtures that lean to­ ward democracy polities. though well established. wealth. For in oligarchy and aristocracy and in democracies. For polity. But GOOD GOVERNMENT does not exist if the laws. because in truth they all fall short of the most correct constitution. It is customary. 1 289'26-bS. and freedom of democracy. and equally impossible for a city-state that is not well governed to be governed aristocratically. and so are counted among the deviations. since it is least of all a constitution. And it is held to be impossible for a city-state to be well governed if it is not governed aristocratically. but by bad people. 54 On the other hand. to put it simply. and those that lean more toward oligarchy aristocracies. Besides. For virtue is the defining mark of aristocracy.Chapter S 115 tocracies just mentioned are deviant. which they call good birth. since the mixture aims only at the rich and the poor. as we mentioned in the beginning. it is reasonable to treat tyranny last. which is why the rich are referred to as noble-and-good men. The second situation can come about in two ways: people may obey either the best laws possible for them. But we must now set forth our views on polity. are not obeyed. For among pretty much most people the rich are taken to occupy the place of noble-and-good men. So since aristocracies strive to give superiority to the best citizens. at wealth and freedom. however. (The fourth. and in another when the laws that are in fact obeyed are well established (for even badly established laws can be obeyed). At 1 279b4-6. and our inquiry is about constitutions. and virtue. So much for the reason for organizing things in this way. oligarchies too are said to consist primarily of noble-and-good men. Hence we must take good government to exist in one way when the established laws are obeyed. because education and good birth more commonly accompany those who are richer. or the unqualifiedly best ones. and as notables. But there are in fact three grounds for claiming equal participation in the constitution: free­ dom. Aristocracy is held most of all to exist when offices are distributed on the basis of virtue. wealth of oligarchy. and these deviations are deviations from them. Its nature should be more evident now that we have determined the facts about oligarchy and democracy. the opinion of the major part of those who participate in the constitution has authority. But MAJORITY opinion is found in all of them. is a mixture of oligarchy and democracy. is a 54.

That is to say. This. whereas democracies pay the poor but do not fine the rich. In democra­ cies. Chapter 9 30 35 40 / 294h 5 After what has been said. the rich and the poor. some from oligarchic law and others from democratic law. which is a mixture formed from both. then. The common position here is to require neither of these assessments but the one that is in a mean between the two of them. and oligarchy. and how it should be estab­ lished. in addition to democracy and oligarchy. let us next discuss how. democracy. .) Hence it is evident that the mixture of the two. But what is common to both constitutions and a mean between them is doing both. At the same time. for example. the defining principles of democracy and oligarchy will also become clear. And hence this is characteristic of a polity. For what we must do is get hold of the division of these. [3] A third is to take elements from both organi­ zations. and polities from aristoc­ racy. I mean. For example. and then take as it were a token from each to put together. and then a characteristic from the former must be put together with an appropriately matching one from the latter. We have said. is one way to conjoin them. A token (sumbolon) was one half of a coin used to identify its possessor to the person with the other half. but provide no payment for the poor. then. since good birth is a combination of old money and virtue. oligarchies impose a fine on the rich if they do not take part in deciding court cases. however. so-called polity arises. membership in the assembly is either not based on a property assessment at all or on a very small one. whereas in oligarchies it is based on a large property assessment. how aristocracies differ among themselves. [2] An­ other is to take the mean between the organizations of each. ought to be called polity. 55 There are three defining principles of the combination and mixture: [ 1 ) One is to take legislation from both constitutions. and that they are not far apart from one another. And it is evident what they are. for example. that there are other kinds of constitutions besides monarchy. in the case of deciding court cases.116 25 Politics IV consequence of two of the others. it is held to be democratic for officials to be chosen 5 5 . the defining characteristics of a democracy must be divided off from those of an oligarchy. whereas a mixture of the three most of all the others (except for the true and first kind) deserves to be called an aristocracy.

"Those that are termed aristocracies" presumably refers to polities that lean toward oligarchy ( 1 293h33-38). This. For nothing distinguishes a rich person from a poor one: the food at the messes is the same for everyone. Aristotle can legitimately claim to have told us how to establish such aristocracies: just add more oligarchic elements and fewer democratic ones ( 1 295'3 1-34). by making officials elected. See 1 270b2 J-22 and note. 58 56. For it is clear that speakers speak of it in this way because the mixture is a good one. First. oligarchic on such a basis. a few have authority to impose death and exile. It is aristocratic. for example. when they have become men. In a constitution that is well mixed. The mean too is like this. as in a democracy. Hence by telling us how to establish a well­ mixed polity. and are educated in a way that the sons of the poor could be. for they elect the senators and participate in the overseership. and because of itself. But the defining principle of a good mixture of democracy and oligarchy is when it is possible to speak of the same constitution both as an oligarchy and as a democracy. the people elect candi­ dates to one and participate in the other. and the rich wear clothes that any poor person could also provide for himself A further democratic ele­ ment is that of the two most important offices. 58. and oligarchic by election. because it has many democratic elements in its organization. But other people call the Spartan consti­ tution an oligarchy on account of its having many oligarchic elements. For example. it is the same way. See 1 273'4-5 and note. therefore. all the officials are chosen by vote and none by lot. however. is the way to mix them. and it should survive because of itself and not because of external factors. 10 IS 20 25 30 35 40 . and there are also many other such elements. but not on the basis of a property assessment. not because a majority wishes it (since that could happen in a bad constitution too).Chapter 9 1 17 by lot. both ele­ ments should be held to be present-and neither. then. 57 We have now described how a polity should be established and likewise those constitutions that are termed aristocracies. Those of the rich are brought up like those of the poor. Similarly. and characteristic of a polity56 to take one element from one and another from the other. This is precisely how it is with the Spartan constitution. democratic not on the basis of a property assessment. as in an oligarchy. but because none of the parts of the city-state as a whole would even want another constitution. For many people attempt to speak of it as if it were a democracy. 57. there is the way sons are brought up. at the next age. since each of the extremes is visible in it.

in as much as the monarchs ruled like masters in accordance with their own judgment. nor by the ideal consti­ tution. being a counterpart to absolute kingship. with an eye to his own benefit.l4. At 1 29Jb7. but so that it can take its place in our inquiry. but by a life that most people can share and a constitution in which most city-states can participate? For the constitutions called aris­ tocracies. . It is therefore rule over unwilling people. 6 1 .61 either fall outside the reach of 59. since we as­ sign it too a place among the constitutions. 60. For some non-Greeks choose [ 1 ] autocratic monarchs. however. who and from what source should be established in it.l4-17. owing to the fact that both are based on law. The kinds of tyranny are these and this many. There are. At III. but both were tyrannical. not that of the ruled. certain differences between these. nor by a kind of education that requires natural gifts and resources that depend on luck. but both were kingly in as much as they were based on law. judging neither by a virtue that is beyond the reach of ordinary people. and in what manner).60 But [3] there is also a third kind of tyranny. See III. for the aforemen­ tioned reasons. Now we dealt with kingship in our first discussions59 (when we investigated whether the kind of kingship that is most particularly so called is beneficial for city-states or not beneficial. and what is the best life for most city­ states and most human beings. which we discussed just now. then.2 1 . and in former times among the ancient Greeks there were [2] people called dictators who became monarchs in this way. because their power somehow also overlaps with kingship. not because there is much to say about it.1 18 Politics IV Chapter 1 0 1295• 5 10 15 20 It remained for us to speak about tyranny. and in­ volved monarchical rule over willing subjects. And we distinguished two kinds of tyranny while we were investigating kingship. Chapter 1 1 25 30 What is the best constitution. which is held to be tyranny in the highest degree. Any monarchy is necessarily a tyranny of this kind if the monarch rules in an unaccountable fashion over people who are similar to him or better than him. since no free person willingly endures such rule.

Decision about all these matters depends on the same elements. since enemies do not wish to share even a journey in common. third. the middle classes are least inclined either to avoid ruling or to pursue it. and this condition belongs particularly to those in the middle. 1 390' 17-18. Introduction xxxv-xxxix. For the former sort tend more toward ARROGANCE and major vice. whereas whatever is exceedingly beautiful. In all city-states. there are three parts of the city-state: the very rich. So. 35 40 1295' 5 10 15 20 25 . well born. Furthermore. See NE 1 140'25-26. and other such things) neither wish to be ruled nor know how to be ruled (and this is a characteristic they acquire right from the start at home while they are still children. 1 1 01' 1 4-16. since a constitution is a sort of life of city-state. wealth. For if what is said in the Ethics is right. both of which are harmful to city-states. tends to consist as much as possible of people who are equal and similar. on the other hand.Chapter 11 1 19 most city-states or border on so-called polities (that is why the two have to spoken about as one). For it most readily obeys reason. at least. friends. but only how to rule as masters rule. But a city-state. strong.63 Besides. 1389b7-8. or wealthy. and wrongdoing is caused in the one case by arrogance and in the other by malice. 63. Those. Hence the latter do not know how to rule. the very poor. The resuit is a city-state consisting not of free people but of slaves and masters. who are exceedingly deprived of such goods are too humble. the one group full of envy and the other full of arrogance. it is evident that possessing a middle amount of the GOODS of luck is also best. this city-state. even in school). those in between these. but only how to be ruled in the way slaves are ruled. the mean that each sort of person can actually achieve. Rh. has a hard time obeying reason. 62. those who are superior in the goods of luck (strength. and. 1378b26-1379'9. then the middle life. or conversely whatever is exceedingly poor. since it is agreed that what is moderate and in a mean is best. whereas the former do not know how to be ruled in any way. must be best. See 1271'17. For community involves friendship. or lacking in honor. Nothing is further removed from a friendship and a community that is political. and a happy life is the one that ex­ presses virtue and is without impediment. and virtue is a mean. for because of their luxu­ rious lifestyle they are not accustomed to being ruled. Consequently.62 These same defining principles must also hold of the virtue and vice of a city-state or a constitution. whereas the latter tend too much toward malice and petty vice. weak.

Democracies are also more stable and longer lasting than oligarchies because of those in the middle (for they are more numerous in democracies than in oligarchies and participate in office more). that more are many in the middle. as the poor desire that of the rich. or. By joining the poor it prevents extreme oligarchy. Phocylides was a sixth century poet from Miletus. namely. For tyranny arises from the most vigorous kind of democracy and oligarchy. on the other hand.65 That is precisely why it is the height of good luck if those who are governing own a middle or adequate amount of property. In small city-states. failure sets in and they are quickly ruined. than one of them. since it alone is free from faction. therefore. as a result of both excesses. The fact that the best legislators have come from the middle citizens should be regarded as evidence of this. by joining the rich it pre­ vents extreme democracy. that the political community that depends on those in the middle is best too. fr. tyranny.1 20 30 35 40 1296• 5 10 15 Politics IV the one constituted out of those from which we say the city-state is nat­ urally constituted. must of necessity be best governed. 65. Perhaps a reference to 1 308"18-24. Moreover. preferably than both of the others. For neither do they desire other people's property as the poor do. And because they are neither plotted against nor engage in plotting. . I want to be in the middle in a city­ state. either extreme democracy arises or unmixed oligarchy or. 1 0. Large city-states are also freer from faction for the same reason. 1 3 1 0b3-4. 67. 66. Diehl I. That is why Phocylides did well to pray: "Many things are best for those in the middle. those in the middle survive best in city-states."64 It is clear. See 1 3 1 2b34-38.SO. and that city-states can be well governed where those in the middle are numerous and stronger. since when the poor predominate without these. For conflicts and dissensions seldom occur among the cit­ izens where there are many in the middle.67 That the middle constitution is best is evident. nor do other people desire theirs. they live out their lives free from danger. For 64. of all citizens. because when some people own an excessive amount and the rest own nothing.66 but much less often from middle constitutions or those close to them. it is easy to divide all the citizens into two. For it will tip the balance when added to either and prevent the opposing extremes from arising. failing that. We will give the reason for this later when we discuss changes in constitutions. so that no middle is left and pretty well everyone is ei­ ther poor or rich.

In addition to this. and pretty well most of the others. which of them is to be put first. As a consequence of all this. because of the conflicts and fights that occur between the people and the rich. but take their superiority in the constitution as a reward of their victory and make in the one case a democracy and in the other an oligarchy. and so on in the same way. only one man69 has ever been persuaded to introduce this kind of organization. so that it becomes either a democracy or an oligarchy. For the one nearest to this must of necessity always be better and one further from the middle worse-provided one is not judging on the basis of certain assumptions. It is also evident from these considerations why most constitutions are either democratic or oligarchic. Then too each of those who achieved leadership in Greece68 has looked to their own con­ stitutions and established either democracies or oligarchies in city­ states. As for the other constitutions (for there are. and why it is so is evident from these considerations. I say "on the basis of cer­ tain assumptions. Charondas. which second. they establish neither a common constitution nor an equal one. while one constitution is more choiceworthy. as is clear from his poems. What the best constitution is.Chapter l2 121 Solon was one of these. as were Lycurgus (for he was not a king). Democratic Athens and oligarchic Sparta. 69. Identity unknown. but either to seek rule or to put up with being dominated . according to whether it is better or worse. 20 25 30 35 40 1296b 5 10 . then. the middle constitution either never comes into existence or does so rarely and in few places. several kinds of democracies and of oligarchies). whichever of the others preponderates (whether the property owners or the people). as we say. aiming not at the benefit of these city-states but at their own. is not hard to see now that the best has been determined. For among those who have previously held positions of leadership. nothing prevents a different one from being more beneficial for some. For because the middle class in them is often small. those who overstep the middle way conduct the constitution to suit themselves. Chapter 1 2 The next thing to go through after what has been said is which constitu­ tion and which kind of it is beneficial for which and which kind of peo68. and it has now become customary for those in city-states not even to wish for equality." because it often happens that. whenever one side or the other happens to gain more power than its opponents.

if the multitude of farmers is predominant. But where the multitude of those who are rich and notable is more superior in quality than it is inferior in quantity. For example. 7 1 . and an ARBITRATOR is most trusted everywhere. and the middle person is an arbitrator. and similarly for the others in between these. whereas the quantity belongs to an­ other. namely. or even only one of them. and if democratic ones. a general point must be grasped about all of them. it is possible to have a stable constitution. he must bring them in by these laws.122 IS 20 25 30 35 40 1297" 5 Politics IV pie. But many of those who wish to establish aristocratic constitutions make the mistake not 70. education. So that the poor are more superior in quantity than they are inferior in qual­ ity. by "quantity. they will find none. the low-born may be more numerous than the well­ born or the poor more numerous than the rich. And where the multitude of those in the middle outweighs either both of the extremes together.7° Every city-state is made up of both quality and quantity. and if they look for a constitution that is more com­ mon than this. wealth. The better mixed a constitution is. .6. if the vulgar craftsmen and wage earners are." I mean the superiority of size. For example. that the part of a city-state that wishes the constitution to continue must be stronger than any part that does not. But it is possible that the quality belongs to one of the parts of which a city-state is constituted. 72 But the legislator should always include the middle in his constitution: if he is establishing oligarchic laws. since neither will ever want to serve as slaves to the other. 72. The various kinds of democracy and oligarchy referred to are specified in IV. the more stable it is. though. For they would not put up with rul­ ing in turn. because they distrust one another. he should aim at those in the middle." I mean FREEDOM. and good birth. it will be the first kind of democracy.71 there it is natural for a democracy to exist. Hence these have to be judged in relation to one another. in the same way as before. See 1270h2 I-22 and note. the last kind. there an oligarchy is natural. For there is no fear that the rich and the poor will conspire together against these. By "quality. Where the multitude of poor people is superior in the proportion mentioned. but yet the one may not be as superior in quantity as it is inferior in quality. First. with each particular kind of oligarchy corresponding to the superiority of the multitude of oligarchs. with each particular kind of democracy correspond­ ing to the superiority of each particular kind of the people.

as in the laws of Charondas. The aim is to get people to avoid enrolling because of the fine. and concern the assembly. To take an oath that holding the office would be unduly burdensome for fi­ nancial or other reasons. [4] For the poor are permitted not to possess weapons. and not to serve or to attend because of not being enrolled. weapons. and physical training. but the rich are fined if they do not. whereas in the other way the constitution comes to belong to one side alone. For the poor are paid to attend the assembly and serve on juries. then. For sooner or later. but it is impossible unqualifiedly to define the size of the relevant property assessment. and the rich are not fined for failing to. but once they have enrolled.Chapter 13 1 23 only of granting more to the rich. In some places. That way the rich will participate because of the fine. will not participate. they are heavily fined. [2] As regards offices: not allowing those with an assessed amount of property to swear off. not being in danger of it. in democracies there are opposite devices.74 but allowing the poor to do so. [ 1 ] As regards the assembly: allowing all citizens to attend as­ semblies. but also of deceiving the people. 15 20 25 30 35 40 1297b . If one wants to mix justly. and say that it must be so much. everyone who has enrolled may attend the assembly and serve on juries. 73 10 Chapter 1 3 The devices used in constitutions to deceive the people are five in number. but the latter are fined. the courts. for the acquisitive behavior of the rich does more to destroy the constitution than that of the poor. One 73. 74. or a much heavier one on them. The constitution should consist only of those who possess weapons. whereas the poor. but either imposing a fine only on the rich for not attending. there is no fine for the former. but not the poor. it is evident that one must combine elements from either side. and pay the poor while fining the rich. [5] and if they do not train. or else imposing a large fine on the former and a small one on the latter. [3] As regards the courts: fining the rich for not serving on juries. if they do not attend or serve. For in this way everyone would participate. false goods inevitably give rise to a true evil. offices. See 1 307' 1 2-20. These legislative devices are oligarchic. They legislate in the same way where possessing hoplite arms and physical training are concerned.

.1 24 S 10 IS 20 25 30 Politics IV should instead look for what amount15 is the highest that would let those who participate in the constitution outnumber those who do not. Reading poion with Dreizehnter and the mss.2] what their varieties are. the constitution consisted of both. and similarly with the others). and quite understandably so.3] why they arise. and [ 1 . although the officials were elected from among the active soldiers. See 1 286b 1 1-1 3. it consisted of the cavalrymen. For the poor are willing to keep quiet even when they do not participate in office. and fix on that. however. let us once again discuss constitutions generally and each one separately. need not be prohibitively high. the constitution consists not only of those who are serving as hoplites but also of those who have served as hoplites in the past. since strength and superiority in war lay in them. they will fight. This sentence and its predecessor explain why the costs of excluding a poor minority from participation. [ 1 ] why there are several constitutions-[1 . But the ancient constitutions were oligarchic and kingly. Also the first constitution that arose among the Greeks after kingships also consisted of the defen­ sive warriors. For a hoplite force is useless without organized formations. for the majority of cases. We have said. and [3] among the other constitutions which suits which sort of people. provided no one treats them arrogantly or takes away any of their property (not an easy thing. taking the starting point that is appropri75. and experience in such things and organizations did not exist among the ancients. 76. whether in terms of social unrest or ability to fight a war. But as city-states grew larger and those with hoplite weapons be­ came a stronger force. the people put up with being ruled. People are also in the habit of shirking in time of war if they are poor and do not receive provisions. being small in number and poor in organization. 1] why there are others besides those spoken of (for democracy is not one in number. but if food is provided. 76 In some places. since those who do participate in the governing class are not always cultivated people).77 Initially. [ 1 . Hence their strength lay in their cav­ alry. more people came to participate in the constitu­ tion. In Malea. That is precisely why what we now call polities used to be called democracies. 77. Chapter 1 4 35 As regards what comes next. [2] we have said which constitution is best. so that. then. In addition. For because of their small population they did not have much of a middle class.

1 ] For all to deliberate about all issues is characteristic of a democracy. for example. When these parts are in good condition. until all have been gone through. 1 . and all enter office in turn from the tribes and from the smallest parts of the city-state. [ 1 . and other matters are deliberated on by the officials chosen to deal with the particular area in question. these being chosen from all the citizens either by election or by lot. or to several. matters of war and peace. Discussed in IV. I S . which offices there should be. It is necessary that these matters for decision [ 1 .2] all to some (to some single office.80 There are other constitutions too in which deliberation is carried out by boards of officials meeting jointly. for legislation. these being the ones where it is neces- 78. In these cases all meet together only to consider legislation and matters pertaining to the constitution.3] some to all and some to some. Otherwise unknown. as in the constitution of Telecles of Miletus. [ 1 . and in relation to the selection and inspection of officials. 1 ] One way is in turn rather than all to­ gether. and laws. or [ 1 . the making and breaking of alliances. and constitutions necessarily differ from one another as a result of differing in each of these parts. But there are several ways of having all deliberate. 1 ] be assigned either all to all citizens. or some to some and others to others). A reference to legislation has perhaps been accidentally omitted at this point. l 6. 79. and to listen to official announcements. and the confiscation of property.2] Another way is where they all meet. since this is the equality the people seek. 1 . the constitution is neces­ sarily in good condition. [ 1 . and in what way officials should be chosen/8 and the third [3] is what decides lawsuits.Chapter 14 125 ate to the subject. One of the three parts [ I ] deliberates about public affairs. and to deliberate about81 war and alliance. and in relation to death. and for inspections. exile. 1 . that is to say. and for other matters to be dealt with by offices of which as few as possible are filled by election. but only for choosing officials. 80. Discussed in IV. with authority over what things. 40 1298" S 10 1S 20 25 .3] Another way is for the citizens to meet together about offices and inspections. as Newman suggests. or [ 1 . 81. [ 1 . 79 [ I ] The deliberative part has authority in relation to war and peace. All constitutions have three parts by reference to which an excellent legislator must study what is beneficial for each of them. the second [2] concerns the offices.

. on account of its moderateness. when all have it over war and peace and inspections.3] When those who have authority over deliberation elect themselves. one with the character of a polity. as before. whereas officials who are elected. whereas officials chosen by lot. 84.2 . Alternatively (Dreizehnter and the mss. [ 1 . when some have authority over some matters-for example. and they have authority over the laws. not84 chosen by lot. the one we say is analo­ gous to a dynastic oligarchy or a tyrannical monarchy. but prepares issues for decision only. 83 All these ways. and there are more of them because of the moder­ ateness of the assessments. have it in others.2.4] A fourth way is for all to meet and deliberate about all matters. it is an aristocracy or85 a polity. it is beneficial from the point of view of improving delib­ eration to do precisely the same thing as is done in oligarchies in regard 82. But [ 1 ." 85. or if elected officials and officials cho­ sen by lot share authority. they rule in accordance with law. Reading e with Dreizehnter. But if it happens that elected officials have authority in some areas. while the office decides nothing.2.2] When not everyone participates in deliberation but only those elected. and each constitution administers matters in accord with the determinations mentioned. and where they follow the law and do not at­ tempt to make changes that it forbids. and where everyone who has the assessed amount may participate-such a constitution is certainly an oligarchy. See 1 292'4-30. This is the way in which the final kind of democracy is actually managed.): "elected or (e) chosen by lot.126 30 35 40 J298b 5 10 IS Politics IV sary to have knowledgeable people holding office. [ 1 . 1 . then. This is the way. and when. a generalship) required expert knowledge ( 1 3 17h20-21). [ 1 .SZ [ 1 .3] But. have it in the other areas. then. Democratic constitutions favored election by lot.2] for some people to de­ liberate about all matters is oligarchic. some of these are features of an aristocratic constitution and others of polity itself. 83. 1 ] For when they are chosen on the basis of more moderate property assessments. And here too there are several varieties. and when son succeeds father. that the deliberative part is distinguished in re­ lation to the various constitutions. it is oligarchic. In the kind of democracy that is most particularly held to be a democ­ racy nowadays (I mean the kind in which the people have authority over even the laws). either simply or from a pre­ selected group. this organization is necessarily most oligarchic. but were willing to make an exception when the office (for example. [ 1 . are democratic. but.

89 For this part of a constitution too has many varieties: how many offices there are. with regard to time: how long each 86. with authority over what things. In oligarchies. the people will share in deliberation. 5 . or chosen by lot. it is beneficial not to provide pay for all of them. and the latter with the multitude. For they establish a fine for those people they want to have on juries to ensure that they serve (whereas democrats pay the poor). di0risthai with Dreizehnter. . it is beneficial either to select some additional people from the multitude of citizens to serve as officials or to establish a board of officials like the so-called preliminary councilors or law­ guardians that exist in some constitutions. This. Reading politon with Ross rather than politikon ("statesmen") with Dreizehnter and the mss. decrees of the latter sort are always referred to the majority instead. then. they should be referred back to the officials instead. or on nothing contrary to them. but will not be able to abolish anything connected to the constitution. however. Or constitutions generally. It is also beneficial to have the people vote only on decrees brought before them that have already un­ dergone preliminary deliberation. but only for a number to balance the number of notables. and then have the assembly deal only with issues that have been considered by this board. The same should be done in the case of assemblies too. is the way the deliberative part. One should in fact do the opposite of what happens in polities.Chapter 15 127 to the courts. in equal numbers from these parts. This topic is further discussed in Vl. 87 For the multitude should have authority when vetoing measures but not when approving them. in the latter case. It is beneficial too if those who do the deliberating are elected. should be determined. 88. . or else to let all advise and have only officials deliberate. for they will de­ liberate better if they all deliberate together. And even if the democrats among the citizens86 are greatly superior in numbers. 89. Reading dei . they do the contrary. For in polities. the part that has authority over the constitution. or to exclude the excess by lot. In this way. the people with the notables. 87. since the few have authority when vetoing decrees but not when passing them.8. 88 20 25 30 35 40 1299" Chapter 1 5 [2] Next after these things comes the division of the offices.

there are the priests: for a priesthood must be regarded as something other than and apart from the political offices. For one should be able to determine how many ways all these can be handled. and further. the offices most properly so called are those to which are assigned deliberation. and how. some make it a year. For in large city-states one can and should assign a single office to a single task. and issuing orders about certain matters. patrons of the theater and heralds are elected. In the first place. since issuing orders is most characteristic of office. when there are the resources. are yet useful with a view to an excellent constitution. there is some theoretical work yet to be done. so that not everyone who is selected by vote or by lot can be regarded as an official. and then fit the kinds of offices to the kinds of constitu­ tions for which they are beneficial. or neither of these. But some sorts of supervision are political. Simply speaking. One might rather raise a problem with regard to any constitution about what sorts of offices and how many of them are necessary for the existence of a city-state. but instead to be held by the same person several times. so that some offices are held again only after a long interval and others are held only once. but since terminological disputes have not been resolved. the supervisors of women or children).90 while others are subor­ dinate. For a political community needs many sorts of supervisors. by whom. some a longer period). for example. are as­ signed to slaves. and whether they are to be held permanently or for a long time. Some are related to household man­ agement (for corn rationers are often elected). some less. 9 1 . a corn rationer (sitometres) was elected to distribute it among the citizens. ambassadors too. decision. especially the latter. Also every task is better performed when its supervi90. but one might particu­ larly raise it with regard to constitutions in small city-states. and are of the sort that. For because there are many citizens. This problem makes scarcely any difference in practice.91 and which sorts. though not necessary. however. as regards the selection of officials: from whom they should come. Listed in VI.8. Besides. either concerned with all the citizens involved in a certain activity (as a general supervises those who are serving as soldiers) or some part of them (for example. In times of scarcity or when a gift of corn had been given to the city-state. But even to determine what should be called an office is not easy. or not even twice but only once. there are many people to take up office. .128 10 I5 20 25 30 35 Politics IV office is to last (some make it six months.

since there must be some body of this sort to 92. we can say how many offices every city-state must have. It is also appropriate not to overlook the question of which matters should be supervised by many boards of officials on a local basis. whether the types of offices also differ in each. but from different sorts in different constitutions (the generally educated in aristocracies. or the same one everywhere? Should the offices be distinguished by their tasks or by the people they deal with? I mean. the same offices have authority. 93. except that the latter need the same ones often. 423c-d. for who will succeed them in their turn? But sometimes small city-states need the same offices and laws as large ones. and how many it need not but should have. that of the preliminary councilors.93 If. since underpopulation makes it hard to have a lot of people in office. whereas the former need them only at long intervals. then. they must make their boards of officials like spit-lamps. 443b-c. or one for children and another for women. and the free in democracies). to determine which offices it is appropriate to combine into a single office. For example. whereas a council is democratic. indeed. 1291/' S 10 1S 20 25 30 . 394e. or whether certain offices exist precisely because constitutions differ. Some offices are indeed peculiar to particular constitutions. A spit-lamp (obeliskoluchnion) was a military tool which could be used either as a roasting spit or as a lamp holder.94 For it is undemocratic. and why. even though they are not composed of equal or similar people. with sometimes the same offices and sometimes different ones being beneficial (since it is appropriate for the same office to be large in some places and small in others). also Plato. the rich in oligarchies. in the light of this. and another official in another place. See 1 298h26-1299'2. good order: should a market supervisor have authority over this in the marketplace.92 In small city-states. and a monarchy. whether in a democracy. however.Chapter IS 1 29 sion is handled as a single matter rather than as one matter among many. Republic 370a-b. nothing prevents their assigning many types of supervision at the same time (for they will not impede one another). an aristocracy. 453b. 94. or not at all. A common claim. many offices have to be co-assigned to a few people. whether there should be a single office for good order. it will be easier. That is why. an oligarchy. for exampie. see 1 252h l -5. 433a. And with regard to the constitutions too. 127Jh9-15. because of underpopulation. 374a-c. for example. For example. and which a single office should everywhere have authority over.

3 . is an aristocratic feature.2.2) . 1] who selects the officials.2] from whom. (2. 1 304b34-39.97 and they select either [2. [2.2 . a preliminary councilor. and so this arrangement is oligarchic. The supervisor of children. (2. and were seldom allowed to be seen in public. however.3] all may select for some offices and some for others. 1 . the first is [2. Of these three. so that they can do their work.2. 1 . 96. Poor ones had to work in the fields or other public places. Where both these offices exist.96 So much about these matters for now. 1 .2. again. 1 ] from all or [2. and they select either [2. second.3] in what way. we must try to go through things from the beginning.1 30 35 130(}' 5 10 I5 20 Politics IV take care of preliminary deliberation on behalf of the people. (2. 1 . and [2. the combination of which necessarily yields all the different ways. The nine varieties are: (2. But the power of the council is also destroyed in those kinds of democracies in which the people themselves come together and transact all business.2] some do. these may be paired-! mean that [2.2] from certain specified people (determined by a property assessment. and. Reading tis ei e misthos with Lord and the mss.3) all select for some offices and some select for others. 1 .2) some select.3. Either [2. but as regards the selection of officials. or by birth. for example. 1 ) all are selectable. ( 2 . [2. On oligarchic women see 1 269hl 2-39. This is oligarchic if the councilors are few in number. Of each of these there are three different varieties. or some other such feature. the preliminary councilors are established as a check on the councilors.2] by lot.95 since they then have the leisure to meet often and decide everything themselves.2 .98 95.3] some offices may be selected for from all and others from some. What seem to be further refer­ ences to it occur at 1 3Q2h30-3 1 . 98. 1 ] all the citizens select or [2. the supervisor of women. 97. but the preliminary councilors are necessarily few in number. and any other office that has authority over this sort of supervision. and. It is uncertain when this event took place. Well-off women in Athens were kept in a kind of purdah in the houses first of their fathers and then of their husbands. Differences here lie in three defining principles.3] some may be selected for by lot and others by election. lastly. 1) all select. not democratic (for how can one prevent the women of the poor from going outdoors?) or oli­ garchic (since the women of oligarchs live luxuriously). This is the usual result when those who attend the assembly either are rich or receive pay. 1] by election or [2. for a councilor is democratic. virtue.3 . as in Megara where they selected from those who had re­ turned from exile together and fought in alliance against the people). 1 . oli­ garchic. [2.

25 30 35 40 .3) all select for some offices and some select for others. or by both (that is. or partly in the first way and partly in the second-that is to say. or both (by "both. (5) all select from all partly by election and partly by lot. ( 10) some select from some by lot. (4) all select from some by lot. The twelve ways referred to are: ( 1 ) all select from all by election. or from some by election or from some by lot. When some appoint from all. Deleting ei. lot. but do so for all from all or from some. (2. or both (for some offices by lot for others by vote).2) selection is by elec­ tion. or from some by election or from some by lot. some are selectable. (9) some select from some by election. they may do so either from all by election or from all by lot. ( 1 2) some select from some partly by election and partly by lot. by lot. and many reorganizations and emenda­ tions have been proposed. for some from all by election and for some by lot.3) all are selectable for some offices and some are selectable for others. The two omitted combinations are: (2. when all select from all by election.2. (2. (6) all select from some partly by election and partly by lot.3 . 104. this is 99. 101. 100. until all the citizens have been gone through---{)r from all on every occasion). setting aside two of the combinations. for example.3) selection is by lot for some offices and by election for others. lot. whether by election. (2. But when some offices are selected for from all and others from some or when some are selected for by election and some by vote. (7) some select from all by election. 1 . The text of this entire paragraph is difficult. Deleting the material added by Ross. (8) some select from all by lot. Again.102 or partly in the first way and partly in the second.3. Reading tettares with the mss in place of Ross's conjectural hex. (2. it is oligarchic-although it is more oligarchic to do so by both. if only some do the selecting. or both." I mean some by lot and others by election)-it is characteristic of a polity. Adding e ek tinon hairesei e ek tiniin klero{i). whether by election. ( 1 1 ) some select from all partly by election and partly by lot.2. But when not all select at the same time. or by deme or clan. 102. (2) all se­ lect from all by lot. which Newman brackets. for some offices by election and for some by lot). 104 Three of these ways of selecting are democ­ ratic. Deleting the material added by Ross. 103. whether by election. and (2. which also appears at •28-29. (3) all select from some by election.3) all are selectable for some offices and some are selectable for others.3. namely.Chapter IS 131 In the case o f each o f these varieties. Either all select from all by election or all select from all by lot100 (and101 from all either by sections-by tribe. 1) selection is by lot. there are four99 different ways to proceed. or from all for some offices and from some for others. lot. 103 This gives rise to twelve ways.

A fourth [iv] deals with officials and private individuals in disputes about fines. And we must grasp the ways that it can be organized by following the same sup­ position as before. When some select from some by election.l] that concerned with in­ voluntary homicide. How: whether by lot or by election. and how. it is aristocratic. The differences between courts are found in three defining principles: from whom. [vi. One is [i] concerned with inspection. . 106 Another [iii] with matters that affect the constitution.3] that concerned with cases where there is agreement on the fact of homicide but the justice of it disputed. Chapter 1 6 15 20 25 Of the three parts. are the number of ways of selecting for offices. From whom: I mean whether they are selected from all or from some.4] concerned with charges brought against those who have been exiled for homicide after their return (the court of Phreatto in 105. See 1 297h36-1298'3. then. Another [ii] deals with anyone who wrongs the community. and when some select from some in both ways. By the "power of an office" I mean. the man who avoids military service wrongs the community" (Rh. let us distinguish how many kinds of courts there are. First. is different from that of authority over marketplace contracts. A fifth [v] deals with private transactions of some magnitude. 1373h23-24). The kinds of homicide court. for example. it is oligarchic. It will be­ come evident which ways are beneficial for which constitutions. then. Besides these there is [vi] a court that deals with homicide and [vii] one that deals with aliens. About what: how many kinds of courts are there. and a fourth [ vi. 105 it remains to speak about [3] the judicial. For the kind of power of a generalship. and this is how they are distinguished in relation to the constitutions. and which these are. when we determine the powers of the offices. about what. l ] that concerned with premeditated homicide. for example. They are eight in number. having authority over revenues or authority over defense. also when some select from some by lot (even though this does not happen). These. whether having the same juries or not. and when all select from some by election. 106. and how selections are to be made. [ vi. "The man who is guilty of adultery or assault wrongs some definite per­ son. But when some select from all.132 JJO(J 5 10 Politics IV characteristic of an aristocratic polity. are: [vi.

are the counterparts of the ones we mentioned earlier. Of these the first. 1 . and others from both (as for example if the same court had juries selected partly from all and partly from some). Besides all these. others from some. The third [3. some may be selected from all.3] some are selected by lot and some by election. he could not enter Attica for trial. 1 ] by lot or [3 . those which are partly selected from all and partly from some. those which are selected from some and decide all cases. [3 .4] although dealing with the same case.2] by election. some jurors may be selected by lot and some by election. there are just the following possibilities: [3 .Chapter 16 133 Athens107 is said to be an example). We have now listed the possible ways the courts can be organized.3] some may be selected by lot and some by election. 1 ] those which are selected from all and decide all cases. Of necessity. these same ones may be conjoined-! mean. [3 . as we said. or [3. or [3. [3. 30 35 40 1301• 5 10 15 .2. and the selection may be either by lot or by election or by both. These ways. on the east side of Piraeus. [3. when not well managed. The second [3 . 1 .2.4] some courts dealing with the same cases may be composed of both members selected by lot and elected members. but he could offer his defense from a boat offshore at Phreatto.3] Furthermore. The aliens' court has [ vii. 1 ] all decide all of them.2] There are as many again when selection is from only some of the citizens. 1] the juries are selected from some by election and decide all cases. five drachmas.2]. 1] All decide all the cases just distin­ guished. give rise to factions and constitutional changes. but it should not fall to a multitude of jurors to give it).2] a part for aliens disputing with citizens.2. or. are oligarchic. or a little more (for judg­ ment must be given in these cases too.3]. for example. are democratic. or [3 .1 . For here again either [3.2] they are selected from some by lot and decide all cases. and are selected either [3 . which. but such cases are rare at any time even in large city-states. there is [viii] a court that deals with petty transactions: those involving one drachma. If someone exiled for involuntary homicide was charged with a second vol­ untary homicide. or [3 . But let us set aside these courts as well as the homicide and aliens' courts and talk about the political ones. 107. Thus these ways are four in number. and [3.2.l] a part for aliens disputing with aliens and [ vii. are aristocratic or characteristic of a polity. 1 .

2. although unqualifiedly speaking they are mistaken. whereas the latter. Oli­ garchy. [ 4] the ways to preserve constitutions in general and each constitution in particular. on the other hand. However. 1 .2 For democracy arose from those who are equal in some respect thinking themselves to be unqualifiedly equal. on the grounds that they are all equal. they take themselves to be unqualifiedly unequal. (4) The ways to preserve a constitution. 1 We should take as our initial starting point that many constitutions have come into existence because. 4. About the nature of proportional equality. though everyone agrees about justice (that is to say. And this is why. arose from those who are unequaP in some respect taking themselves to be wholly unequal. then. finally. they are mistaken about it. when one or another of them does not partic­ ipate in the constitution in accordance with their assumption.9. [3] from what sort into what sort they principally change. for because they are equally free. Next. A t III. [5] the means by which each constitution is principally preserved. those who would be most justified in starting faction. they think they are unqualifiedly equal. further. being unequal. how many they are and of what sort. superior ( 1 302b26-27). as we also mentioned earlier.B OOK V Chapter 1 20 25 30 35 Pretty well all the other topics we intended to treat have been discussed. 3 . after what has been said. The result is that the former claim to merit an equal share of everything. [2] what things destroy each constitution. ( 5) the steps or devices needed to implement them. 1 3 1 9b37-1 320b l 7 . for being unequal in property. 134 . we should investigate: [ I ] the sources of change in constitutions. All these constitutions possess justice of a sort. and.4 they start faction. Specifically. See 1 3 1 3'34-b32. seek to get more (for a bigger share is an unequal one). proportional EQUALITY).

) For faction is everywhere due to inequality. For people generally engage in faction in pursuit of equality.Chapter 1 135 namely. Again. Lysander was a Spartan general and statesman who fought against Athens in the Peloponnesian war. those of good birth. a permanent king­ ship is unequal if it exists among equals). when unequals do not re­ ceive proportionately unequal things (for example. [2. to establish or abolish a certain office. are the least likely to do so. those who are outstandingly virtuous. and was killed in 395. or from these to polity or aristocracy. and similarly. 7. from democracy to oligarchy. who suppose that they do not merit a merely equal share because they are unequal in this way. This change may also be referred to at 1304'13-17. 6. 1 ] want to have it i n their own hands.7 In Epidamnus too the constitution was partially altered. [2] But sometimes instead of trying to change the established constitution (for example. as some say Lysander tried to abolish the kingship in Sparta. [ 1 ] For sometimes people aim to change the established constitution to one of another kind-for example. since a council replaced the tribal rulers. practically speaking. or from oligarchy to democracy.2] it may be a question of degree: where there is an oligarchy. [2.5 For they alone are the ones it is most reasonable to regard as unqualifiedly unequal. the aim may be to tighten or loosen them. where there is a democracy. for example. 6 Again. 8 (Having a single supreme official was also an oligarchic feature of this constitution. But equality is of two sorts: numerical 5. For the reason given at 1304b2-5. an oligarchy or a monarchy). are the origins and sources of factions. Hence the changes that are due to faction are also of two kinds. in the case of the remaining constitutions. For people are thought to be noble when they have ancestral wealth and virtue behind them. the factors that lead people to start it. Pausanias was largely responsible for the Greek victory over the Persians at the battle of Platea in 479.3] the aim may be to change a certain part of the constitution. or the latter into the former. the aim may be to make the governing class more oligarchic or less so. but [2. 40 JJ01b 5 10 15 20 25 . though it is still the case that only those members of the governing class who actually hold office are obliged to attend the public assembly when election to office is taking place. the aim may be to make it more democratic or less so. and King Pausanias the overseership. These. The metaphor of tightening and loosening is introduced at 1290'22-29. 8. There are also certain people. He failed in his attempt to introduce elective monar­ chy in Sparta. they deliberately choose to keep it.

10. By numerical equality I mean being the same and equal in number or magnitude. The basis of aristocracy. we must first grasp their general origins and causes. they still disagree. since there is none worth mentioning among the people themselves. The reason is that when one begins from an erroneous beginning. three of these.9. since both are halves. For two and one are equal parts of four and two. the only faction is against the oligarchs. For example. since no constitution of this kind is stable. But. . but there are rich ones11 in many places. whereas others claim to merit an unequal share of everything if they are unequal in a certain respect. and equality according to merit in others. one among the oligarchs themselves and another against the people. three exceeds two and two exceeds one by a numerical amount. 11. something bad in­ evitably results in the end. 12 Besides. But four exceeds two and two exceeds one in ratio. Omitting kai aporoi ("and poor ones") with Dreizehnter and the mss. For no city-state has a hundred good and well-born men. This is evident from what actually happens. though people agree that what is unqualifiedly just is what is according to merit. For good birth and virtue10 are found in few people. a constitution based on the middle classes is closer to a democracy than to an oligarchy. Hence numerical equality should be used in some cases. roughly speaking. For in oligarchies. and. In democracies. where a somewhat different explanation is offered. on the other hand. democracy is more stable and freer from faction than oligarchy. Chapter 2 20 Since we are investigating the sources from which both factions and changes arise in constitutions.9 For some consider themselves wholly equal if they are equal in a certain respect. 9. At III.136 30 3S 40 1302" S 10 IS Politics V equality and equality according to merit. We must grasp [ 1 ] the con­ dition people are in when they start faction. That is also why two constitutions principally arise: democracy and oligarchy. each of which must first be determined in outline by itself. as we said earlier. 12. See 1296'13-18. [2] for the sake of what. two sorts of faction arise. By equality accord­ ing to merit I mean what is the same and equal in ratio. whereas wealth and freedom are more widespread. and it is the most secure constitution of this kind. But it is a bad thing for a constitution to be organized unqualifiedly and entirely in accord with either sort of equality. There are. Nevertheless.

For people also start faction in city-states to avoid dishonor and fines. and disproportionate growth in power. getting more. Of the four causes mentioned in the final sentence. which is what we said before. Still other ones. The seven causes mentioned at '36-37 are profit. in the sense of the factors that dispose people to feel the way we described about the issues we mentioned. although operating in another way. [3] what the origins are of political disturbances and factions among people. whereas those who desire inequality (that is to say. are from one point of view seven in number and from an­ other more. whether justly or unjustly.) For inferiors start factions in order to be equal. So much for the condition of those who start faction. but because they see others. though they are unequal. superiority. even though they are the equals of those who are getting more. sometimes unjust. are electioneering. 5 . fear. (Sometimes these desires are just. care­ lessness. su­ periority) do so when they believe that. honor. fear. and the way the two operate. contempt. carelessness. arrogance. and dissimilarity. are pretty much evident. and equals do so in order to be superior. but not in their manner of operation. either for themselves or for their friends. [ 1] The principal general cause of people being in some way disposed to change their constitution is the one we have in fact already men­ tioned. but not by giving rise to faction in the way the initial seven (or nine) do (1 303' 1 3 -1 4) . contempt. Two are the same as those just mentioned. there are then more than seven causes. [3] The causes and origins of the changes. The two points of view are: ( l ) treating profit and honor as two causes each of which oper­ ates in two ways and (2) treating these two ways of operating as distinct causes. 13 25 30 35 40 13026 Chapter 3 The effect of arrogance and profit. For when officials behave arrogantly and become 1 3 . they are not getting more but the same or less. For people are also stirred up by profit and honor not simply in order to get them for themselves. and gradual alteration) cause political change. the first three (electioneering. gradual alteration. su­ periority. For those who desire equality start faction when they believe that they are getting less. at least "until people learn to pull together" ( 1 303'25-26). honor. Other causes are: ARROGANCE.Chapter 3 137 third. The fourth (dissimilarity) also gives rise to faction. and their opposites. and disproportionate growth. [2] The things over which they start such faction are profit. If (2) is adopted.

this occurs in oligarchies when those who do not participate in the constitution are in a majority (since they consider themselves the stronger party). 1 5 . 16. Presumably the event referred to at 1300'17-19 and 1304h34-39. when it ac­ cords with merit. 18 The same happened to the democracy in Syracuse before the tyranny of Gelon. Gelon became tyrant in 485.15 People also start faction and hostilities because of contempt. This occurs unjustly when people are honored or dishonored contrary to their merit. Presumably the event referred to at h23-24 and 1304h27-3 1 . 18. justly. 16 and in democracies. Presumably the event referred to at b32-33 and 1304b27-3 1 . sometimes at that of public funds. such as Argos and Athens. when the rich are contemptuous of the disorganization and anarchy. For the usual outcome of such a situation is a monarchy or a dy­ nasty. Yet it is better to see to it from the beginning that no one can emerge whose superiority is so great than to supply a remedy afterwards. In this case the majority are moved to engage i n faction by the arrogance exhibited by the few in excluding them from office. With Athens in 456. 17 as was the democracy of the Megarians when they were defeated be­ cause of disorganization and anarchy.19 and to the one in Rhodes prior to the revolt.138 10 1S 20 25 30 Politics V acquisitive. (Sometimes their ACQUISITIVE­ NESS is at the expense of private properties. . 20 Changes also occur in constitutions because of disproportionate 14. See 1284'17-25. Introduction lxix-lxxii. 19. Superiority causes faction when some individual or group of individuals is too powerful for the city-state and for the power of the governing class. 14 People start faction through fear both when they have committed in­ justice and are afraid of punishment and when they think they are about to suffer an injustice and wish to avoid becoming its victims. people start faction with one another and with the constitu­ tions that gave the officials authority. have a prac­ tice of ostracism. For people start faction both when they themselves are dishonored and when they see others being honored. 20. See 1 3 1 2h J 0-16. That is why some places. For example. Thus the democracy in Thebes col­ lapsed because they were badly governed after the battle of Oenophyta. The latter occurred in Rhodes when the notables united against the people because of the lawsuits being brought against them. 17.) It is also clear what honor is capable of. and how it causes faction.

Thus a democracy took the place of a polity in Tarentum when many notables were killed by the lapygians shortly after the Persian wars. the multitude of the poor in democracies or polities. or navy. or. "satyriasis. after the death of those citizens killed on the seventh23 by the Spartan Cleomenes. For when the rich become more numerous or their properties increase in size. however. when they had bad luck fighting on land. Aristotle describes a disease. Lists were kept of those citizens eligible for service in the cavalry. For just as a body is composed of parts which must grow in proportion if balance is to be maintained (since otherwise it will be de­ stroyed. that an animal (or any of its parts) can actually change into an animal (or a part of an animal) of another species (see the discussion of so-called monsters at GA 769bl 0 -30. and in Athens. one of which often grows without being noticed-for example.Chapter 3 139 growth.24 This sort of change also occurs in democracies. so that it comes to resemble the face of an animal. as happened in Heraea (for they replaced election with selection by lot for this reason. and the rest of the body two spans [fifteen inches]. Cleomenes I was a Spartan king c. Thus the oligarchy in Oreus was overthrown when 2 1 . This war. 23. 57. b l 6-17). 35 40 1303" S 10 1S . But constitutions also change without the occurrence of faction. l70). During the Peloponnesian war (43 1-404). the notables were reduced in number. both because of electioneering. which took place in 473. He does not think. whereas in Aristotle's day it often consisted of mercenaries. the notables were forced to admit some of their SUBJECT PEOPLES to citizenship. and also because of carelessness. that those who electioneered were elected). This sometimes also happens because of luck. because at the time of the war against Sparta those serving in the army were drawn from the citizen service-list. if the disproportionate growth is not only quantitative but also qualitative. hoplites. 5 19-487. 24. See Herodotus VI. Apollo was believed to have been born on the seventh day of the month. involved "the greatest slaughter of the Greeks that we know of" (Herodotus VII. when people who are not friendly to the constitution are allowed to occupy the offices with supreme authority. 22. democracies change into oligarchies or polities." which pro­ duces changes in a human face. especially. for example. At GA 768b27-37. 22 In Argos too. though to a lesser extent. its shape might change to that of another animal). 21 so a city-state too is composed of parts. the army was recruited from the wealthier citizens. as when a foot is four cubits [six feet] long. and was specially honored at Sparta on that day.

3 1 . The events in Heraea are otherwise unknown.140 20 25 30 35 JJ03b Politics V Heracleodorus became one of the officials and established a polity. 1326' 16-25. In Ambracia. or about the one in Antissa mentioned in the next sentence.30 The Amphipolitans admitted late-settlers from Chalcis and were almost all expelled by themY In oligarchies.28 The Antissaeans forcibly expelled the Chian exiles they had admitted. but in the end people with no property came to hold of­ fice. Ethnic difference also causes faction. the property-assess­ ment was small. The original Athenian settlers were driven out and Amphipolis was incorporated into the powerful Chalcidian Confeder­ acy in around 370. when the Achaeans became more numerous. The conflict at Zancle is described in Herodotus VI. I mean that often a great change in the laws occurs unnoticed when a small alteration is overlooked. occurred in 377 when it revolted from the Spar­ tans and joined the Athenian Confederacy. 29. For just as a city-state does not arise from any chance multi­ tude. 29 The Apolloniates on the Black Sea became factionalized after admitting late-settlers. 27. The Achaeans co-settled Sybaris with the Troezenians. Nothing is known about this conflict. after the fall ofThrasybulus in 467. See 1290h38-1291 b 1 3. . because there is little or no difference between small and none.26 neither does it arise in a chance period of time. Also referred to at 1 306'2-4. The changes in Oreus. The expelled Troezenians were received at Croton. In Byzantium.22-24. or rather a democracy. which destroyed Sybaris in 510. as we said earlier. for when they claimed to merit a larger share on the grounds that the coun­ try was theirs. they were expelled. also called Hestiaea ( 1303h33). they expelled the Troezenians (this was the cause of the curse that fell on the Sybarites)Y In Thurii too. but later. Sybarites came into conflict with their co-settlers. That is to say. 1328b 16-17. for example. the late-settlers were discovered plotting against the original settlers and were forcibly ex­ pelled. the many start faction on the grounds 25. but to drive out fellow colonists would have been viewed as a great sacrilege. The Zanclaeans were themselves expelled by the Samians they had admitted. 30. The Syracusans became factionalized and fought with one another when they granted citizenship to foreigners and mercenaries after the period of the tyrants. constitutions change because of small alterations. 28.25 Moreover. The precise nature of the curse is unknown. until people learn to pull together. That is why most of those who have admitted co-settlers or late-settlers have experienced faction. 26. in place of the oligarchy.

when their territory is not naturally suitable for a city-state that is a unity. enraged at him. for example. For the constitution underwent change because two young men in office started a faction about a love affair. For the error arises at the beginning." as the saying goes. as did the inhabitants of Colophon and those of Notium. Republic 545c-d. but not over them. Notium was the seaport of Colophon. the notables do so because they do participate equally. Alternatively: "An error here i s i n the ruler (ARCHi). and "well begun is half done. but those in Piraeus are more democratic than those in the town. 36 32. then. which was overthrown by the people shortly before Gelon's seizure of power in 485 (re­ ferred to at 13Q2b3 1 ) . The first. This paragraph seems out of place here.Chapter 4 141 that they are treated unjustly because they do not participate equally. For just as in battles. See Plato. and so on for the others. Hence a small error there is compara­ ble in effect to all the errors made throughout the other parts (mere). 35. when they arise among those in authority. 34. Part of Clazomenae was on the mainland. though his comrade. 3 6 . in spite of being equal. In Clazomenae. too. however. part on an island. the inhabitants of Chytrus came into conflict with those on the island. with each one greater than the next. The greatest fac­ tional division is probably between virtue and vice. Thought to have occurred during the oligarchy of the Gamori. The upshot was that they drew the entire governing class into their quarrel and split it into factions. in spite of not being equal Y City-states also occasionally become factionalized because of their lo­ cation. it is over im­ portant issues that people start faction.' a s the saying goes. where crossing even small ditches breaks up the phalanx. S 10 1S Chapter 4 Factions arise from small issues.34 as happened in Syracuse in ancient times. and break up the factions of leaders and powerful men. Even small factions gain greater power. so every difference seems to result in factional division. 35 While the first was away. Conse­ quently. But 'the ruler (archi) i s half o f the whole. the second." 20 25 30 . including the one we have just discussed. That is precisely why one should be circumspect when such things are beginning.33 At Athens. seduced his boyfriend. the people are not all similar. retaliated by inducing the second's wife to commit adultery. In democracies. next that between wealth and poverty. 33. even a small error at the beginning is comparable in effect to all the errors made at the later stages.

The bridegroom came to fetch the bride. An agent (proxenos). and he left without her. In Mytilene. had his suit rejected. a conflict concerning heiresses was the source of many misfortunes. and when Dexander. With Thebes (355-347). was the representative of one city-state to another. 38. or polities when some office or part of the city-state acquires prestige or increases in size. Constitutions also change into oligarchies. which was situated on Phocian territory. claiming that his brother had not declared the true value of the property or of the treasure his father had found. which must have occurred prior to the absorption of Hestiaea by Athens in 446. For example. whereupon the first allied himself with all those who were outside the constitution on the grounds that he had been insulted. in which Paches captured their city-state. but some accident occurred that he interpreted as a bad omen. The War was ended by Philip of Macedon. was held to have made the Athenian constitution 37. but he was a citizen of the latter. Mnason seems to have been a friend of Aristotle's. For example. whose agent39 he was. This conflict was the beginning of the sacred war for the Phocians. 38 For a rich citizen named Timophanes left behind two daughters. who had much property. Nothing else is known about this event. too. 40. and the father of the one to whom he had betrothed her became an offi­ cial and imposed a fine on him. 37 In Delphi.Z-50. . to interfere. 39. For a man had betrothed his daughter. relating to control of the temple of Apollo at Del­ phi.40 In Epidamnus the constitution was changed because of a marriage. Her family considered that they had been treated arrogantly. Among the Phocians.142 35 1304• S 10 15 20 Politics V Factions among the notables generally cause the whole city-state to join in. democracies. enlisted the aid of the people. enlisted the aid of the rich. like a consul or ambassador. and then killed him as a temple robber. See Thucydides III. he started a faction and incited the Athenians. a quarrel arising from a marriage was the ori­ gin of all the subsequent factions. and the other. not the former. which won prestige in the Persian wars. the Council of the Areopagus. who wanted to obtain them for his sons. so they planted some sacred objects on him while he was sacrificing. this happened in Hestiaea after the Persian wars when two brothers quarreled over the division of their inheritance. an heiress was the source of a conflict involving Mnaseas the father of Mnason and Eu­ thycrates the father of Onomarchus. the war with the Athenians. The poorer one. particularly. Referred to as Oreus at 1303•1 8 .

In general. Plato. Thus the Four Hundred44 deceived the Athenian people by telling them that the King of Persia would provide money for the war 4 1 . For either those who envy them for being honored start a faction. In Chalcis the people. 43. the origins and causes of conflict and change are of this sort in all constitutions. The navy was recruited from the poorest classes and was a powerfully de­ mocratic force in Athenian politics. Further details are given at 1 3 1 1'39-b l . a part or multitude of any sort. the other will be unwilling to risk going up against their manifestly superior strength. Republic 396a-b. tribes. Sometimes they first deceive the others into consenting to a change in the constitution and then later keep hold of it by force when the others no longer consent. But people change constitutions sometimes through force. Deceit is also employed in two ways. or they themselves. and so for hegemony based on sea power. Force may be used right at the beginning or later on. then. are unwilling to remain as mere equals. overthrew the tyrant Phoxus. who were responsible for victory at Salamis. described in Thucydides VIII. and then im­ mediately took control of the constitution. 44. made the democracy more powerful. 25 30 35 J304b 5 10 . Prior to the mid fifth century the Areopagus consisted of wealthy citizens of noble birth and was a power­ fully oligarchic component of the Athenian constitution. having been responsible for victory in the war against the Athenians. then. in Ambracia the people joined with the opponents of Periander to expel him and after­ wards took the constitution into their own hands. The oligarchy which replaced the democracy at Athens in 4 1 1 . changed the constitution from a polity to a democracy. having acquired prestige in connection with the battle against the Spartans at Mantinea. for they are few against many. whether private individuals. start faction. or. Constitutions also undergo change when parts of a city-state that are held to be opposed. practically speaking. officials.45-98. 42.43 Generally speaking. In c. because of their superior achievement. in a word. That is to say. this should not be overlooked-that the people responsible for a city-state's power.41 in return.42 In Argos the notables. That is why those who are outstandingly virtuous do not cause any faction. Similarly. For if either of the parts becomes greatly superior. See 1321'1 3-14. In Syracuse the people. the seafaring crowd. Laws 707b-c. 580. with the aid of the notables. less democratic ( 1290•22-29). and there is little or no middle class. become equal to one another.Chapter 4 143 tighter. such as the rich and the people. sometimes through deceit. undertook to overthrow the democracy.

Democracies undergo change principally because of the wanton behavior of popular leaders. the democracy in Heraclea was also overthrown because of its popular lead­ ers. tried to keep the con­ stitution in their own hands. and. they persuade them at the beginning.. 1 320•4-17. it is a very early example of a democratic city-state. Plato. but some have thought them to be connected with the defection of Cos from the Athenian Confederacy in 357. Simply stated.49 A similar thing happened to the democracy in Cyme. If so. At other times. See 1292•2-38. and overthrew the democracy. then. Later the exiles united. Chapter 5 20 25 30 35 We must now take each kind of constitution separately and study what happens to it as a result of these factors. the latter were then forced to unite and overthrow the democracy because of the lawsuits brought against them. and continue to persuade them later on and rule with their consent. The exiles then returned. 49. For the popular leaders expelled many of the notables in order to declare the latters' wealth public property. returned home. For the notables were treated unjustly by them and went into exile. until they made numerous exiles. 47. One may see this sort of thing happening in many instances. 48.45 who sometimes bring malicious lawsuits against individual property owners.46 and also in Rhodes. The popular leaders used money owed to the naval officials (triifrarcho1) for outfitting ships to pay the poor for public service on juries and the like. having deceived them. causing them to join forces (for a shared fear unites even the bitterest enemies). For the popular leaders provided pay for public service and pre­ vented the naval officials from getting what they were owed. defeated the people in battle. . Probably the colony of Megara on the Black Sea.47 Right after the colony was settled. Nothing is known about these events. changes generally occur in all constitutions as a result of the factors that have been stated. 46. The democracy in Megara48 was overthrown in a somewhat similar way. and at others. Republic 565a-{. founded in the middle of the sixth century. 45. Also referred to at 1 302b3 1 . In Cos the democracy was overthrown when evil pop­ ular leaders arose (for the notables banded together). The officials were then sued by the creditors they were unable to pay. and established an oligarchy. openly egg on the multitude against them.144 IS Politics V against the Spartans.

See Plato. because the president had authority over many important matters. Herodotus 1. 1305" 5 10 15 20 25 . however. 52. where one arose out of the presidency. Dionysius I prosecuted the Syracusan general Daphneus for failing to save Agrigentum from capture by the Carthaginians. Now. so whenever democratic leaders became skilled warriors they attempted to establish a tyranny. For the vast majority of ancient tyrants started as popular leaders. Republic 564d-566d .56-64. Tyrannies also arose more frequently in the past than they do now because important offices were in the hands of particular individuals. But because of their inexperience in military matters. Pisitratus. 56. 5 1 . 55 And Dionysius was judged to merit the tyranny for prosecuting Daphnaeus and the rich. with the development of rhetoric. XIII. See Ath. 54. The "plains-dwellers" were wealthy land owners. and this trust was based on their hatred of the rich. See 1 3 10h14-16. 51 The reason this happened then but not now is that then popular leaders came from the ranks of those who held the office of general (for men were not yet skilled at public speaking).20. 53. Nothing is known about the events referred to. Because of his hostility he was trusted as a man of the people. 54 as did Theagenes in Megara. they do not try to become tyrants. capable speakers become popular leaders. For popular leaders sometimes treat the notables unjustly in order to curry favor with the people and force them to combine. democracies changed to tyrannies.4-XVII. 56 50. and sometimes they bring slanderous accusations against the rich so as to be in a position to confiscate their property.86-96.52 Furthermore. 55.2. In ancient times. They all did this after gaining the people's trust. although this may have occurred in some places. 50 Study would show that changes occur pretty much this way in the case of other city-states as well. the leader of the democratic "hill-dwellers. as in Miletus." was later tyrant at Athens (561-527).Chapter 5 145 which was overthrown by Thrasymachus. city-states were not large then and the people lived on their farms and were busy with their work. See Herodotus !. because he slaughtered the rich men's cattle when he caught them grazing by the river. See Diodorus Siculus XIII. whenever the same person was both a popular leader and a general. Thought to be a reference to the tyranny of Thrasyboulus. Nothing is known about this event. by redistributing their properties or their income by means of PUBLIC SERVICES. 53 Thus Pisistratus started a faction against the plains-dwellers.

The revolt at Cnidus is referred to again at 1306bJ-5. but not on the basis of a property assessment. This occurred in Massilia. lstrus. Herodotus 1. And in Erythrae in ancient times. 58. during the oligarchy of the Basilids. a father and son. He became tyrant c. the one in Istrus ended in a democracy. who actually became tyrant of the Naxians later on. Heraclea.) In Massilia. the oligarchy became more like a polity. [ 1 . and. though not the ones in office. 64. (For in some city-states. [ 1 . A remedy that prevents this. and the one in Heraclea went from a small number to six hundred. 59. 57 For any leader is adequate for the task when that happens.3] The oligarchy in Cnidus also changed when the notables became factionalized because so few participated in office. The other is not discussed until 1 305h22. nor. attacked. 60.61. where those who did not participate in office agitated until first elder brothers and then younger ones were admitted. Chapter 6 130Sb S 10 1S 20 Oligarchies principally undergo change in two ways that are most evi­ dent. in order to curry favor. that the people have authority even over the laws. . and the people do the electing.146 30 40 Politics V Democracies also change from the traditional kind to the newest kind. picked one of the notables as their leader. See Ath. and were victorious (for what is factionalized is weak). if a father participated. 59 [ 1 . if there were several brothers. the people inter­ vened in the conflict. like Lygdamis of Naxos. those seeking office. Nothing is known about these events. an elder and younger brother. his son could not. as was mentioned. when those holding the offices are very few. 1 ] The first is when they treat the multitude unjustly. may not hold office simultaneously.60 57. is to have the tribes nominate the officials rather than the people as a whole. and other city-states. For while they were engaged in faction. Other than the oligarchs themselves. Pretty well all the changes in democracies. the people nevertheless resented being ruled by a few and changed the constitution. XV. particularly if he comes from the ranks of the oligarchs themselves. happen for these reasons. and in others. For when officials are elected.2] For sometimes the overthrow comes from the rich themselves. could any but the el­ dest alone. bring matters to this point. even though those with authority over the constitution governed well. or diminishes its effect. 540. then. 58 There are also several other varieties of faction that originate with other people.

66. The oligarchy of the Thirty Tyrants. and either aim at tyranny themselves or help to institute it for someone else. In 406-405. This is what occurred in Heraclea on the Black Sea. XXVIII-XXXVIII. 65. 1] One exists among the oligarchs themselves. The oligarchy of the Four Hundred gained control there in 41 1 . 1 . [2. [2. For those who want equality are forced to bring in the people to assist them. after they arrived. but offices are filled either from those with high property assess­ ments or those who belong to certain political clubs. which is what happened in Apollonia on the Black 6 1 . Nothing is known about this event. of which Charicles was a member. and likewise in the time of the Four Hundred with Phrynichus and his followers.61 [2. 64 In Amp hipolis. either they themselves or those who are opposed to their stealing start a faction against the oligarchs. 66 Sometimes such people try to make changes immediately. 25 30 35 40 1 306• 5 . was in control of Athens for a brief period in 404/3. Charides and his followers became powerful by currying favor with the Thirty. 64. 1 . Nothing is known about this event. and the electors are either those who possess hoplite weapons or (as in Abydus) the people. 62. at other times they steal public funds.Chapter 6 147 [2] Oligarchies undergo change from within. But the same holds in all oligarchies where those who elect to office are not those from whom the officials are drawn. the man who negotiated with Chares tried to overthrow the constitution for this sort of reason. Chares was an Athenian general at the head of a troop of mercenaries sta­ tioned in Corinth in 367 (a likely date for his negotiations). For such people seek to stir up change. stirred up faction between them and the rich. however. In the latter case.2] Changes in oligarchy also occur when they spend their private resources on loose living. See 1 268'22. since a popular leader can arise even when they are very few. 1 ] through the rivalry of those seeking popular leadership. It also happens wherever law courts are not drawn from the governing class.3] Moreover.2] Another sort is where the oligarchs curry favor with the crowd. For example. note. a man named Cleotimus brought in late-settlers from Chalcis and. for by currying favor in order to influence judicial decisions the oligarchs change the constitution. 63. See Ath. in Larisa the guardians of the constitution62 sought popularity with the crowd because it elected them. it occurs when some draw the oli­ garchy into fewer hands. [2. This popular leadership is of two sorts. among the Thirty in Athens.63 [2. 1 . For example.65 In Aegina. as Hipparinus did for Dionysius in Syracuse.

The constitution in Pharsalus provides evidence of this. For example.4. Timoleon IV. but very few of them became senators. Nothing is know about the events in Abydos.67 An oligarchy that is of one mind. the cases mentioned earlier in which marriage was the cause. [2. like Timophanes in Corinth. Timophanes became tyrant in 350.4] Change in oligarchies occurs both in wartime and in peacetime. though the entire gov­ erning class consists of only a few people.2] In peacetime. mutual distrust some­ times leads the oligarchs to put their defense in the hands of mercenar­ ies and a neutral official.148 10 15 20 25 30 Politics V Sea. The constitution was in the hands of a few. See Plutarch.71 [2. their opponents do so if they sanction the theft of publilfunds. The Simus referred to is most probably the one who helped bring Thessaly into subjection to Philip of Macedon in 342.72 And Diagoras overthrew the oligarchy of the cavalrymen in 67. 1 ] It occurs in wartime when the oligarchs are forced by their dis­ trust of the people to employ mercenaries. 72. Sometimes fear of these consequences leads the oligarchs to give a share of the constitution to the multitude. 7 1 . [2.70 And if several men are placed in charge of them. however. 68 [2 . and were elected in a manner characteristic of a dynasty. is not easily destroyed from within. This happened in Larisa at the time of the rule of Simus the Aleuad. who numbered only ninety.69 [2. and was later killed by his brother Timolean. This happens when.5] Factions also arise over marriages and lawsuits when some mem­ bers of an oligarchy are scorned by others and are driven to start a fac­ tion. held permanent office.4-8. 70. they have authority over many because they treat one another well. This occurred once in Elis. For the senators. for though the oligarchs are few in number. Nothing is known about this oligarchy. they often set up a dynasty for themselves. one of which was that of lphiades. See 1271'9-18. like the one used to elect the senators in Sparta. The thieves attack the oligarchs to avoid punishment. For the man placed in charge of them often becomes a tyrant. . during the war with Argos.4. Nothing is known about the event referred to. 68. The Aleuds were a great Thessalian family. because they are forced to make use of the people. 69.3] Oligarchies are also overthrown when another oligarchy is formed within the oligarchy. not all of them participate in the most important offices. and in Abydos at the time of the political clubs. At 1 303b37-1304' 17. and he then occasionally gains authority over both sides.

both democracies and oligarchies sometimes change not into the opposing kinds of constitutions but into others of the same type. when Eurytion (in Heraclea) and Archias (in Thebes) were justly but factiously punished for adultery by the courts. for example. their enemies had them bound in the pillory in the marketplace. But when peace or some other sort of good luck leads to prosperity. Pillory was not a punishment commonly inflicted on notables.Chapter 7 1 49 Eretria because he was treated unjustly in connection with a marriage. 75. [ 1 . at other times it happens quickly. where eligibility for the council. At any rate. See l 3QSh l 2-18. 76. For motivated by factional rivalry. so that only a few will par­ ticipate in the oligarchy and only the middle classes in the polity. generally speaking. 1 . properties come to be assessed at many times their original value. 73 [2. from democracies and oligarchies based on law into those with complete authority/5 and vice versa. 1 ] when there is a group of people who consider them­ selves equal in virtue to the ruling few-for example. 1292hS-10 (oligarchies). 35 1306b 5 10 15 20 Chapter 7 [ I ] In aristocracies factions arise because few people participate in office. See 1 292'4-6 (democracies). 74. Nothing is known about the events in Chios.74 But changes also occur because of accidents both in so-called polities and in oligarchies. But. For often the first as­ sessment is set to suit existing circumstances. 25 . the so-called Sons 73. though not for the same reason. For the rulers are few in both.6] Many have also been overthrown by those in the constitution who became resentful because the oligarchies were too much like the rule of a master. as. that is why an aristocracy too is thought to be a kind of oligarchy. the one in Cnidus and the one in Chios. Sometimes the change happens gradually and is unnoticed. Nothing is known about these events. for these sorts of reasons. 76 because aristocracy too is oligarchy of a sort. and the other offices is based on a property assessment. then. Oligarchies change and factionalize. At 1 306'13-22. for example. the courts. 1 ] Such conflict is particularly inevitable [ 1 . so that all the citizens participate in all the offices. which is just what is said to change oligarchies as well. The faction in Heraclea and Thebes arose over a decision in a law court.

Tyrtaeus was a seventh century Spartan elegiac poet. 2-5 .77 or [ 1 . but particularly the two. He may be the Carthaginian general of that name who fought against Dionysius II in Sicily. I mean by the two democracy and oligarchy. who possessed sufficient wealth to enable them to participate in the communal meals (see 127 1'25-37). 80 [2] Polities and aristocracies are principally overthrown. Hellenica 11. For what begins the process in a polity is failing to get a good mixture of democ­ racy and oligarchy.81 and this is why the former of them are less and 77. who were discovered in a conspiracy and sent off to colonize Taren­ tum. be­ cause of a deviation from justice within the constitution itself. as Pausanias (who was general during the Persian war) is held to have done in Sparta. In their way of mixing democracy and oligarchy. The Equals (homoioi) were Spartan citizens.29. Various ancient accounts are given of the Sons of the Maidens: they were the offspring of Spartans degraded to the rank of helots for failing to serve in the First Messanian War. who instigates conflict in order to become sole ruler. as Lysander was by the kings. See Xenophon. [ 1 . fr. 8 1 . They founded Tarentum in 708. For aristocracies differ from what are termed polities in this.3] when a man of courage does not participate in office.78 or. 78. they were the illegiti­ mate sons of young unmarried Spartan women who were encouraged to in­ crease the population during that war. Annon's identity is uncertain. Lysander was a Spartan general whose plans were thwarted by king Pausa­ nius in 403. or they were the sons of adulterous Spartan women conceived while their husbands were fighting in that war. however. 1 .2] when some people are very poor and others very rich. 400. failing to get a good mixture of these and virtue as well. who instigated the rebellion against the Spartiates in the reign of Agesilaus. c. Lysander XXIII. 79.4.I SO 30 35 1307" S 10 Politics V of the Maidens at Sparta (for they were descended from the Equals). again. or. 80. since these are what polities and most so­ called aristocracies try to mix.7-9. again. Plutarch. See Diehl l. or [ 1 . and later by king Agesilaus. . a situation which is particularly prevalent in wartime. like Cinadon. and also happened in Sparta at the time of the Messenian war (this is clear from the poem of Tyrtaeus called "Good Government"). born of citizen parents. and Annan in Carthage. Cinadon's rebellion of 398 was dis­ covered and he was executed. and in an aristocracy. [ 1 . 1 .3] when there is a powerful man capable of becoming still more powerful. 79 for those who were hard pressed because of the war demanded a redistribu­ tion of the land.2] when powerful men who are inferior to no one in virtue are dishonored by others who are more esteemed.

84.Chapter 7 151 the latter more stable. This is precisely what was said earlier as a genera! point about all constitutions. 83 [4] Aristocracies are particularly apt to change imperceptibly by being overturned little by little. because a marriage alliance was formed with the tyrant Dionysius. But the people. The notables are also freer to do as they please and make marriage alliances as they please. Locri accepted a marriage alliance with Dionysius I. for example. and forced those who had more than their fair share of the land to give it up. 15 20 25 30 35 40 1307h . the latter sort are more secure than the former. the notables in them tend to get more. properties keep passing into fewer and fewer hands. Be­ cause the property assessment for holding office was rather high. For the only stable thing is equality in accordance with merit and the possession of private property. indeed. Later (starting in 3 56) it suffered under the oppressive tyranny of the offspring of this marriage. 346-343. and polity changes into oligarchy. That is why. 83. For the majority of citizens are the more powerful party and they are quite content with an equal share. whereas if the rich are granted superiority by the constitution.84 namely. who had received military training during the war. that even a small thing can cause them to change. whichever direction a constitution leans is the direction in which it changes when either party grows in power. Dionysius II. they act arrogantly and try to get even more for themselves. The aforementioned change82 occurred at Thurii. who was tyrant of Syracuse 367-356. proved stronger than the garrison troops. [3] because all aristocratic constitutions are oligarchic in character. The city-state of the Locrians was ruined. aristocracy changes into democracy (when the poorer people pull it toward its opposite because they are being unjustly treated). From aristocracy to democracy. they were able as a result to get more. for example. indeed. At 1 303'20-1304h 1 8. Generally speaking. Or it changes in the opposite direction. For once one thing relating to the constitution is 82. polity into democracy and aristocracy into oligarchy. Even in Sparta. something that would not have occurred in a democracy or a well-mixed aristocracy. For those constitutions that lean more toward oli­ garchy get called aristocracies. whereas those that lean more toward the multitude get called polities. But because the notables illegally acquired all the land (for the constitution was still too oligarchic). a change was made to a smaller one and to a larger number of offices. for example. Moreover. Nothing is known for certain about the events referred to.

Nothing else is known about these events. Later. in the first place. 86 Pretty well all the origins of change and faction in constitutions have now been discussed. however. until they alter the entire order. 85 All constitutions are subject to change. But when some of the young men showed military ability and became popular with the multitude of garrison troops. small violations should be particularly guarded against. that if we know what destroys a constitution. we also know what preserves it. See 1296'32-b l . the so-called councilors. . They first undertook to abrogate this law. so as to make it possible for the same men to serve as generals continuously. then. For opposites are productive of opposite things. in just the way that property gets used up by frequent small ex­ penditures: the expense goes unnoticed because it does not occur all at once. the rest of the constitution would be left alone. they were unable to do anything more. Chapter 8 30 35 Our next topic is the preservation of constitutions generally and each kind of constitution separately.152 5 10 15 20 25 Politics V abandoned. For the law allowed the same man to be general only after a four-year interval. and the Spartans democracies. and destruction is opposite to preservation. For the mind is led to reason fallaciously by them. For the Atheni­ ans overthrew oligarchies everywhere. people can more easily change something slightly larger next time. But they were won over. [ I ] It is clear. they came to have contempt for the men who were in charge of affairs. if care should be taken to ensure that no one breaks the law in other ways. In well-mixed constitutions. however. for they saw that the people would vote for them with enthusiasm. For illegality creeps in unno­ ticed. were at first inclined to oppose this. sometimes from within) when there is a constitution of the op­ posite type either nearby or far away but powerful. This also happened to the constitution of Thurii. During the Peloponnesian war. because they thought that once this law was changed. as in the so85. l 312'39-b4. when they wished to prevent other things from being changed. and the entire organization of the constitution was changed into a dynasty ruled by those men who had begun the process of stirring up change. The officials in charge of such matters. (sometimes from outside. 86. This is what hap­ pened in the time of the Athenian and Spartan empires. and thought that they themselves could easily prevail.

For offi­ cials who rule a short time cannot so easily do wrong as those who rule a long time. is not only just for those who are similar but also beneficial. At 1 30Sb23-27. is destruc­ tion that has a starting point of this sort. namely. since in both constitutions. oligarchies and aristocra­ cies of this sort are less likely to fall into the hands of dynasties. the ones who do participate. by not being unjust to those who love honor by depriving them of honor. equality. the ones who attempt to estab­ lish a tyranny are either the most powerful (popular leaders in democra­ cies. all are also. 88. having offices be tenable for six months in order that all those who are similar can participate in them. but it is composed of small parts. At I V. in a democratic manner. They do this by not being unjust to the nonparticipants and by bringing their leading men into the constitution. l 3 . so that the citizens will de87. we should notice that not only some aristocracies but also some oligarchies survive. and hold them for a long time. then. but sometimes too because they are nearby. dynasts in oligarchies) or those who hold the most important of­ fices. as we mentioned earlier. (I mean the sort of devices used in constitutions that we dis­ cussed earlier. [2] Secondly. or to the many by depriving them of profit. if the governing class is large. 40 1308" s 10 JS 20 25 . 89. for example. One thing to guard against. in another false: the whole composed of all the parts is not small. many democratic legislative measures prove beneficial. which is why popular leaders arise even among them. but because those in office treat well both those outside the constitution and those in the governing class. since they are shown to be useless by the facts. Hence those who are concerned about their constitution should excite fears and make faraway dangers seem close at hand. For this is what causes tyrannies to arise in oligarchies and democracies. That is why. For those who are similar are al­ ready a people of a sort. not because their constitutions are secure. [4) Constitutions are preserved not only because of being far away from what destroys them. For what democ­ rats seek to extend to the multitude.89 For fear makes people keep a firmer grip on the constitution.Chapter 8 1 53 phistical argument "if each is small. See 1 307h l 9-21. Aristotle seems to encourage the use of just such a device at 1308'28-30. we must not put our faith in the devices that are de­ signed to deceive the multitude. )87 [3) Next. 88 Furthermore." In one way this is true. and by treating each other.

For people are corrupted by major honors. and not every man can handle good luck.9° Failing that. Failing that. If the total is many times greater or many times less than it was when the rates qualifying someone to participate in the constitution were established. both by means of the laws and by preventing those who are not involved in the rivalry from getting caught up in it them­ selves. a democracy arises from a polity and either a polity or a democracy from an oligarchy. whether to the democ­ racy in a democracy. monarchy. For it takes no ordinary person to recognize an evil right from the beginning but a man who is a statesman. 9 1 . [5] Moreover. tightening it in proportion to the increase if the total has increased. with that of last year's in city-states with annual assessment. an office should be set up to keep an eye on those whose lifestyles are not beneficial to the constitution. and if it has increased. For when oligarchies and polities do not do this. it is beneficial to discover what the total communal assessment is compared with that of the past.9 1 [8] But since people also attempt to stir up change because of their private lives. but to try to give small honors over a long period of time rather than large ones quickly. constitutions should at least try not to take away all at once honors that have been awarded all at once. NE 1 1 53b19-25. See 1334'25-34. but to do so gradually. They should try to regulate matters by means of the laws. or similarly for 90. [6] As for change from an oligarchy or a polity because of property assessments-if it occurs while the assessments remain the same but money becomes more plentiful.1 54 30 35 40 130!Jb S 10 1S 20 Politics V fend the constitution and. the re­ sult is that if the total has decreased. oligarchy. like sentries on night-duty. relaxing it or making it less if the total has decreased. they should ensure that such men are removed from the city-state by being ostracized.2 1 . to the oligarchy in an oligarchy. . with that of three or five years ago in larger city-states. indeed. See 1 302b 1 5 . one should try to guard against the rivalries and fac­ tions of the notables. and every constitution not to allow anyone to grow too great or out of all due pro­ portion. it is beneficial to have a law that tightens or relaxes the assessment. an oligarchy arises from the latter and a dynasty from the former. so as to ensure that no one arises who is far superior in power because of his friends or wealth. [7] It is a rule common to democracy. never relax their guard.

and copies of the accounts should be deposited with each clan. But this is what will happen if it is impossible to profit from office. A company (lochos) was originally a military classification. 93. the transfer of the money95 should take place in the presence of all citizens. one must guard against the prospering of the city-state one part at a time. Indeed. See Plato. For allowing everyone to hold office is democratic. whereas the rich will be able to hold it. From an official leaving office to his successor. made it impossible for people to profit from holding office.96 and tribe. they are then pained both at not sharing in office and at not sharing in its profits. At any rate. 92. For the many are not as resentful at being excluded from office-they are even glad to be given the leisure to attend to their private affairs-as they are when they think that officials are stealing public funds. A constitution in which aristocratic and democratic coexist is described in IV. and the notables will not have to be ruled by anybody and everybody. (I mean that the decent are opposite to the multitude. 25 30 35 40 1309" 5 10 . That is to say. since this dissolves faction caused by inequality.) Another remedy is to try to mix the multitude of the poor with that of the rich or to increase the middle class. there should be a law that assigns honors to reputable officials. but will prefer to attend to their private affairs. For the poor will not want to hold office. because there is no profit in it. because they need no support from public funds. 96. 95. For the same reasons.93 One should pay particular heed to this in oligarchies.9. But to prevent public funds from being stolen.Chapter S 1 55 each of the other constitutions. but here it refers to a civil administrative division of the city-state. 94. And to ensure that people will hold office without seeking profit. company. [9] But the most important thing in every constitution is for it have the laws and the management of other matters organized in such a way that it is impossible to make a profit from holding office. the only way it is possible for democracy and aristocracy to coexist is if someone instituted this. The result will be that the poor will become rich through spending their time working. 92 A remedy for this is always to place the conduct of affairs and the offices in the hands of opposite parts. but having the notables actually hold the offices is aristocratic.94 since it would then be possible for both the notables and the multitude to have what they want. the poor to the rich. Republic 520e-52lb. So that one part prospers while another does not.

1 56 15 20 25 30 Politics V [ 1 0] In democracies. For everyone shares in generalship less. on the other hand. It is beneficial. if one man is an expert general but is vicious and no friend to the constitution. how is the choice to be made? For example. but the knowledge they require is common to all. and more of the poor could join the ranks of the rich. not only by not having redistributions of their property but by not having redistributions of their incomes either (as happens unnoticed in some constitutions). in the case of a generalship. Inheritances should be passed on not by bequest but by kinship. In this way. In the case of guardianship or stewardship. but in decency more. and other similar things. officiating at torch races. whereas another is just and friendly to it. both in democracy and in oligarchy. the rich in a democracy and the poor in an oligarchy. Chapter 9 35 40 1301Jh 5 Those who are to hold the offices with supreme authority should pos­ sess three qualities: first. and which a smaller one? That is why. even if they are will­ ing to do so. such as equipping choruses. It is also better to prevent the rich. One might also raise the following problem. For these require more virtue than the many possess. one should con­ sider experience more than virtue. his punishment should be greater than if he treated a member of his own class arrogantly. to give ei­ ther equality or preference in all other matters to those who participate least in the constitution. But the offices of the constitution that have supreme authority should be kept solely or largely in the hands of those who do participate in the constitution. why does he . how should the choice be made? It seems that one should consider two things: which quality does everyone have a larger share in. on the other hand. the opposite holds. from taking on expensive but useless public services. the rich should be treated with restraint. and distribute offices that yield some gain to them. in each constitution the sort of virtue or justice that is suited to the constitution (for if what is just is not the same in all constitutions. the greatest possible capacity for the tasks of office. property holdings would be more equitable. third. one should take good care of the poor. In an oligarchy. If a rich person treats them arrogantly. When all of these qualities are not found in the same person. and the same person should not receive more than one inheritance. But there is a problem. If someone has the capacity for the tasks of office as well as friendship for the constitution. next. friendship for the established constitution. there must be dif­ ferences in the virtue of justice as well).

so that just as people can fail to serve their own interests well even though they have the knowledge and are friendly to them­ selves. the part will first be thrown out of due proportion. but one that deviates from being straight and tends toward being hooked or snub can nevertheless still be beautiful to look at. but when a leveling of property occurs. 98. In democracies popular leaders make it where the multitude have authority over the 97.97 In addition to all this. of keeping watch to ensure that the multitude that wants the constitution is stronger than the mul­ titude that does not. one thing must not be overlooked. and in the end it will cease to look like a nose at all. A mistake is made in both democracies and oligarchies. and in the end it will not be a constitution at all. Hence by destroying these classes through extreme legislation. See 1270b2 1-22 and note. and many that are held to be oligarchic destroy oligarchies. For neither of these constitutions can exist and survive without rich people and the multitude. or which oligarchic features have these effects on an oligarchy. they destroy their constitution. For it is possible for an oligarchy or a democracy to be adequate even though it has diverged from the best organization. the resulting constitution is necessarily of a different kind. since even the first two will produce beneficial results? Or is it possible for someone who possesses these two qualities to be weak-willed. This can also happen in the case of the constitutions. They do not know that constitutions are just like parts of the body. he will first make the constitution worse. which is in fact overlooked by deviant constitutions: the mean. That is why legislators and statesmen should not be ignorant about which democratic features preserve a democracy and which destroy it. See Introduction lxvi-lxviii. The same holds of the other parts as well. because it has too much of one and too little of the other of these opposites. as does the most important fundamental principle. Virtue as they conceive of it. But those who think that this98 is the only kind of virtue push the constitution to extremes.Chapter 9 157 also need virtue. so often mentioned. For many of the things that are held to be democratic destroy democracies. 10 1S 20 2S 30 JS 40 131()' . But if someone tightens either of them more. so nothing prevents them from behaving in the same way where the common interest is concerned? Simply speaking. everything in laws that we say is beneficial to consti­ tutions also preserves those constitutions. A straight nose is the most beautiful. Yet if it is tightened still more toward the extreme.

and "according to his fancy. it also exists in a city-state. yet they should do the opposite. For living in a way that suits the constitution should be considered not slavery. and the factors through which they are preserved and maintained. so that the poor are more inclined to stir up change and are better able to do so. .1 58 S 10 IS 20 2S 30 35 Politics V laws. are the sources of change and destruc­ tion in constitutions. See 1 3 I 6h24. 1 3 I 9hJO. the sons of the rulers live in luxury. But being educated in a way that suits the constitution does not mean doing whatever pleases the oligarchs or those who want a democracy. the very opposite of what is beneficial has become estab­ lished. even when ratified by all who are engaged in politics. Rather. The reason for this is that they define freedom incorrectly. and freedom is doing whatever one likes. 89 1 . fr. they now swear "and I will be hostile to the people and will plan whatever wrongs I can against them. are of no use if people are not habituated and educated in accord with the constitu­ tion-democratically if the laws are democratic and oligarchically if they are oligarchic. In oligarchies. it means doing the things that will enable the former to govern oligarchically and the latter to have a demo­ cratic constitution. In present-day oligarchies. See Aristotle's advice to tyrants at 1 3 1 4'29-1 3 1 5hiO." as Eu­ ripides says."99 But of all the ways that are mentioned to make a constitution last. whereas the sons of the poor are hardened by exer­ cise and toil. 1 0 1 . equality is for the opinion of the multitude to be in au­ thority. 100. which everyone now despises. then. 100 But this is bad. and always be regarded as spokes­ men for the rich. See Introduction lxii-lxiv. and should take oaths that are the opposite of the ones they take nowadays. simply speaking. the oligarchs should be regarded as spokesmen for the people. Republic 557b. For there are two things by which democracy is held to be defined: by the majority being in supreme authority and by freedom. Nauck 646. but salvation. For if weakness of will indeed exists in a single indi­ vidual. and declare in their oaths that "I will not wrong the people. the most important one. In those democracies that are held to be particularly democratic. For in some oligarchies. So in democracies of this sort everyone lives as he likes." But they ought to hold and to seem to hold the opposite view. Plato. For the most beneficial laws. is for citizens to be educated in a way that suits their constitutions. For they divide the city-state in two by always fighting with the rich. however.10 1 Such. 99. For justice is held to be equality.

See 1 308'19-24." 1 04. What happens in the case of kingships and tyrannies is pretty much similar to what we said happens in constitutions. 1 3 1 2h34-38. Ultimate oligarchy is dynasty ( 1293'30-34). 103 and a king is selected from among the decent men on the basis of a superiority in virtue. "sacred ambassadors" (theoroi) were sent to attend religious games and festivals and to consult oracles. indeed.): "to provide help from the people (apo tou demou) for the decent. Each of these kinds of monarchy comes to be from directly opposite circumstances. both the sources of its destruction and the means by which it is naturally preserved. 40 131(/ 5 10 15 20 25 . the ultimate democracy is where the people are in authority rather than the laws ( 1 293'1-1 0). "Doers of the people's business" (demiourgoi) existed in many Greek city-states. For kingship is akin to aristocracy. Alternatively (Dreizehnter and the mss. however. because of the power they already possessed through the kingship or through other 1 02. and tyranny is a combination of ultimate oligarchy and ultimate democracy. For kingship came into existence to help the decent against the people. the multitude) to oppose the notables. comes from the people (that is to say. For almost all tyrants began as popular leaders who were trusted because they abused the notables. For some tyrannies were established in this way in city-states that had already grown large. so that the people may suffer no injustice at their hands. A tyrant. 1 02 That is why. 104 Still others arose in oligarchies that gave a single elected official authority over the most important offices. Reading epi ton demon. on the other hand. the people appointed "doers of the people's business" and "sacred ambassadors" to serve for long periods of time. tyranny is also the most harmful to those it rules. Other earlier ones arose when kings departed from ancestral customs and sought to rule more in the manner of a master. 1 03 . 1 J 1 Qh32-34).Chapter 10 1 59 Chapter 1 0 It remains to go through monarchy too. but just to both parties ( 1 3 10h40-1 3 1 1'2). For in all these ways people could easily become tyrants if only they wished. Others were established by people elected to the offices that have supreme authority. This is evident from what has happened. Kingship corresponds to aristocracy because both are based on virtue or merit ( 1 289'30-35. or on the basis of a superiority of family of this sort. for in ancient times. The help he provides is not partisan. seeing that it is composed of two bad constitutions and involves the deviations and errors of both. On the nature of tyranny as a mixture of these two forms. or in the actions that spring from virtue. see 1 296'3-4.

Cyrus was the first ruler of the Persian empire (559-529). as has often been said.160 30 35 40 1311• 5 10 15 Politics V high office. According to one traditional account he was already king when he gave his life to prevent Athens from Dorian invasion. at 1279h6-1 0. Macedonians. and likewise others. 1 06. the son of Achilles. see 1257h40-1258'5. A tyrant aims at what is pleasant. from having been popular leaders. Cypselus in Corinth. on the other hand. see 1 305'23-24 note. 108 never looks to the common benefit ex­ cept for the sake of private profit. 1 07. as we said. indeed. Also. l lO. 107 A king tends to be a guardian. Codrus was a legendary early king of Athens. and that is why it is characteristic of a tyrant to be most acquisitive of wealth 109 and of a king to be most acquisitive of what is noble. whereas a tyrant's consists of foreigners. 106 an organization like aristocracy. At 1 3 1 0b2-3. or on these together with the capacity to perform them. like the kings of the Spartans. 109. Phalaris was a no­ toriously cruel sixth-century tyrant of Agrigentum in Sicily. seeing to it that property owners suffer no injustice and the people no arrogance. It is common to both constitutions (oligarchy and tyranny) to ill-treat the multitude. like Cyrus. saved their people from enslavement in war. then. he freed Persia from the Medes in 559. 655-625. Cypselus was tyrant of Corinth c. since it is based on merit. 1 10 That tyranny has the vices of both democracy and oligarchy is evident. For Pisistra­ tus. and Molossians. others. indeed. the Ionian tyrants and Phalaris as a result of their high office. oth­ ers acquired or settled territory. Neoptolemus. For all those who obtained this office either had benefited or were capable of benefiting their city-states or nations. Pisistratus in Athens. conquered the Molossians and became their king. Dionysius is Dionysius I. a king at what is noble. For example. set them free. and its mistrust of the multitude (which is why. and Panaetius in Leontini. From oligarchy comes its taking wealth to be its end (for. 1295' 1 7-22. like Codrus. or on benefac­ tions. 1 08. drive them out of the town. and disperse them. whether individual or familial virtue. . 105 Kingship is. comes its hostility 1 05. a king's bodyguard consists of citizens. From democracy. Some. Pheidon as tyrant in the middle of the seventh century. Dionysius in Syracuse. only in this way can the tyrant possibly maintain his bodyguard and his luxury). See 1285'24-29. Thus Pheidon of Argos and others became tyrants having al­ ready ruled as kings. But tyranny. tyrants deprive them of weapons). On the connection between wealth and the pursuit of pleasure.

not ambition. and its exiling of them as rivals in the craft of ruling and impediments to its rule. 112 People plotted against Periander. its destruction o f them both b y covert and overt means. one should consider the sources of change both in CONSTITUTIONS and in monarchies to be the same.115 he felt arrogantly treated because Evagoras' son had taken away his wife. The attack on the Athenian Pisistratid tyranny in 5 14 is discussed in Ath. The ends sought are also the same there as in tyrannies and kingships. Philip was attacked by Pausanias because he allowed him to be treated arrogantly by Attalus and his coterie. Herodotus V. 20 25 30 35 40 131 Jh 5 . 1 14 The same is true of the attack on Evagoras of Cyprus by a eunuch. For it is because of injustice.113 Amyntas the Little was attacked by Derdas because he boasted of having deflowered him. Evagoras ruled Salamis in Cyprus from 41 1 until his death in 374. Philip of Macedon was murdered by Pausanius (a young Macedonian) in 330. 1 12. tyrant of Ambracia. XVIII. For example. since monarchs possess the great wealth and high office that everyone desires. arrogance is the principal cause. 1 1 5. in others. Thucydides VI. For it is from the notables that conspiracies arise. attack is directed against the person of the rulers. and others not to be enslaved. since some of them wish to rule themselves. Those caused by arrogance are directed against the person. See 1284'26-33. fear. the attack on the Pisistratids took place because they abused Harmodius' sister and showed contempt for Harmodius himself (for Harmodius attacked because of his sister. but each of them is a cause of anger.55-65. The attack on Archelaus116 1 1 1 . he asked whether he was pregnant by him yet. Hence too the advice that Periander gave to Thrasybulus when he cut down the tallest ears of corn. Arrogance has many forms. In some cases. 1 1 1 A s has pretty much been said. 1 16. then. and most angry people act out of revenge. because once when he was drinking with his boyfriend. 1 14. Amatorius 23. that it is always necessary to do away with the outstanding citizens.54-9. See Plutarch. and contemptuous treatment that many subjects attack monarchies. but sometimes too the seizure of private property. King of Macedon 4 13-399. namely. In the case of injustice. 1 13 . Amyntas and Dardas are otherwise unknown.Chapter 10 161 t o the notables. and Aristogeiton because of Harmodius). Many attacks have also occurred because of the shameful treatment of other people's bodies by certain monarchs. against their office.

Hellanocrates of Lar­ isa joined him in the attack for the same reason. Darius was his son. which is a cause of change in monarchies and constitutions. the source of Crataeas' estrangement was his disgust at his sexual activities with Archelaus. The reason for his anger was that Archelaus had handed him over to the poet Euripides for flogging (Eu­ ripides had been enraged by a remark he had made about his bad breath). At 1 3 1 1"25 . an illegitimate son of Orestes. For because Archelaus deflowered him and then persistently refused to return him to his home as promised. he thought that the king's sexual relations with him were motivated by arrogance rather than sexual desire. Similar attacks also occur out of fear. when the Penthilids of Mytilene118 went around beating up people with clubs. killed Cotys1 17 to avenge their father. 1 18 . Artapanes (or Artabanus) was the captain of Xerxes' bodyguard. since Xerxes would not remember what orders he had given on account of his dining. would have been enough. For example. Archelaus gave his elder daughter to the king of Elimeia and the younger one to his own son Amyntas. Xerxes usually drank heavily at dinner. Smerdis killed Penthilus because he had dragged him away from his wife and beaten him. Many others have been killed or plotted against for reasons such as these. thinking that this would be likely to prevent Amyntas from quarreling with his son by Cleopatra. when hard pressed in the war against Sirras and Arrabaeus. though he had agreed to do so. Artapanes had hanged him without being or­ dered to do so by Xerxes. killed or tried to kill those responsible. on the other hand. outraged by blows to their bodies. Decamnichus became leader of the revolt against Archelaus and was the first to incite his adversaries.1 19 For example. because he had been castrated by him when he was a boy. so that even a lesser excuse than the fact that Archelaus did not give him one of his daughters in marriage. thinking he would be pardoned. Presumably. Later. For Crataeas always felt disgust at their sexual relations. as we mentioned.1 62 10 15 20 25 30 35 Politics V by Crataeas is an example. even those who held office or were associated with kingly dynasties. on the grounds of arrogant treatment. (Instead. Xerxes was king of Persia. Megacles and his friends attacked and killed them. But Adamas revolted on the grounds of arrogant treatment. which claimed descent from Penthilus. Python and Heraclei­ des of Aenus. . 1 19. The ruling family in the early Mytilenian oligarchy. 120.) In any case. Artapanes killed Xerxes because he feared that he would be accused in connection with the murder of Darius. King ofThrace 382-358. have. 120 1 17. Many people.

The events in Thrace are otherwise unknown. Astyages was the last king o f the Medes (594-559). For it is because of their power and the contempt for the danger their power gives them that they are ready to try their luck. and it is because of both of these that people attack and think that they will easily prevail. 40 1312" 5 10 15 20 25 . if what the storytellers say is true.Chapter 1 0 1 63 Other attacks on monarchs have been motivated by contempt. a man killed Sardanapalus121 out of contempt because he saw him carding wool with the women (though if this is not true of Sardanapalus. For example. Dion 22-5 1 . 124 Attempts of this sort are made principally by those of a bold nature who are assigned to military office by their monarch. 1 22. as Mithridates attacked Ariobarzanes out of contempt and out of a desire for profit. as Newman suggests. For some attack tyrants because they see great profit and high office in store for themselves. See 1 3 1 2b l 6-18. and was succeeded by his son Mithridates II. Thus. 123. which had declined while he was living in luxury. Amadocus was king of the Odrysians. Plutarch. For the fact that they are trusted makes them contemptuous and confident they will not be discovered. That is why generals attack their mon­ archs. however. or. but the latter do so for the same reason that they would do any other extraordinary deed that made a name for themselves and made them notable in the eyes of others: because they want not 1 2 1 . 122 Even a monarch's friends sometimes attack him out of contempt. The last king of the Assyrian empire at Nineveh. For boldness is courage combined with power. 1 07-30. And Seuthes the Thracian attacked Amadocus while he was his general. 123 Others attack monarchs from several of these motives. See Herodotus ! . Perhaps the Ariobarzanes who was satrap of the Persian province of Pontus from 363 to 336. Cyrus was his grand­ son as well as his general. it might well be true of someone else). when he saw that the citizens had the same reactions to his always being drunk. but this is not why someone whose attack is motivated by love of honor deliberately chooses to take the risk. And those who think they have the power to take over as ruler attack out of contempt in a way. And Dion attacked Dionysius the Younger out of contempt. The former attack for the reasons mentioned. 1 24. This sentence seems to have been transposed from the end of the previous paragraph. from directly following the word "drunk" (methuonta) at •6. 125 In cases where the attack is motivated by love of honor. 125. the explanation is of a different sort from those previously discussed. Cyrus attacked Astyages out of contempt both for his lifestyle and for his power.

He was succeeded by his brother Hiero who died in 467. The family got together to destroy not the entire tyranny. since it presupposes a total disregard for their own safety in the event that the action is not successful. That is why the Spartans over­ threw a large number of tyrannies. but was himself killed afterwards. but many 126. Like each of the other constitutions. . The tyranny of Gelon was destroyed when Thrasyboulus. See 1 3 1 5b34-39.126 For the wish to destroy a tyranny will clearly be present. and people always do what they wish when they have the power. won over the people. For Dion accompanied by a small force marched against Dionysius. in that of the family of Dionysius. because the deliberate choices of the two are opposed. and expelled him. for example. and that if. kingship. See 1 307h19-25. and aristocracy. if there is a more powerful constitution opposed to it. Dion. curried favor with Gelon's son and led him into a life of sensual pleasure. hatred always attaches to tyrants. in order that he himself might rule. 127 since the extreme sort of democracy is also a tyranny. The two principal motives people have for attacking tyrannies are ha­ tred and contempt. he would have a noble death. They must be guided by the same fundamental principle as Dion (something that is not easy for most people). See 1 292•2-38. saying that whatever point he was able to reach. as did the Syracusans while they were well governed . he would be satisfied to have completed that much of the enterprise. Works and Days 25. when those partic­ ipating in it start a faction. 129. who was related by marriage to Dionysius. Another way a tyranny is destroyed is from within. but Thrasyboulus. This happened in the tyranny of the family of Gelon and. 1 28. Nevertheless. Gelon was tyrant of Syracuse (485-478). the brother of Hiero. 129 But those who joined them seized the opportunity and expelled all of them. He had been in control for just ten months when the tyranny was overthrown in 466. one way a tyranny is destroyed is from the outside. Democracy is opposed to it as "potter to potter" (as Hesiod puts it). 127. marched against him. in our own time. Of them. he were killed after having just set foot on land. The constitutions opposed to tyranny are democracy. very few people are impelled by this sort of motive.164 30 35 40 J]J2b S 10 1S Politics V monarchy but fame. Thrasyboulus succeeded in becoming tyrant of Syracuse on Hiero's death. 128 Kingship and aristocracy are opposed to it because of opposition of constitution.

whether through force or deceit. For then overthrow is easy. they tend more to be tyrannical monarchies. For angry people attack more vehemently because passion does not employ rational calculation.Chapter 10 1 65 overthrows are due to contempt. But hatred employs calculation more than anger does. even though they exercise kingly office. Hence people are unwilling to put up with this sort of rule. the fact that many kings easily become objects of contempt and behave arrogantly. when those who participate in the kingship start faction. when the kings try to manage affairs in a more tyrannical fashion. but if any do happen to occur. namely. Tyrannies in which power is not in just one person's hands. monarchiai kai turannides mal/on: I follow Pellegrin in treating the phrase as a hendiadys. People are partic­ ularly apt to be led by their angry spirit on account of arrogant treat­ ment. whereas their successors almost all lost it right away. The sources of its destruction generally come from within. it is more con­ ducive to action than hatred. and. which is also why it is long-lasting. 1 3 1 . For living lives of indulgence. since in a way it gives rise to the same sorts of actions. they easily be­ came contemptible and gave others ample opportunity to attack them. this is immediately held to be a tyranny. For a king whose sub- 1 30. 20 25 30 35 1313• 5 10 . And if someone comes to exercise it. But nowadays there are numerous men of equal quality. second. and pain makes rational calcu­ lation difficult. 1 30 Kingship is destroyed least by outside factors. although none so out­ standing as to measure up to the magnitude and dignity of the office of king. claiming that they deserve to have authority over more areas than is customary. In the case of kingships based on lineage. Kingships no longer arise nowadays. To speak summarily. the causes that we said destroy un­ mixed or extreme oligarchies and extreme democracies should also be regarded as destroying tyranny. but hatred does not involve pain. Evidence of this is the fact that most of those who won the office of tyrant held onto it. For anger involves pain. Often. and to be beyond the law. not tyrannical power. This was the cause of both the overthrow of the Pisistratid tyranny and that of many others. however. 1 3 1 This is because kingship is rule over willing subjects and has authority over more important matters. Anger must also be considered a part of the hatred. For these are in fact divided tyrannies. there is something besides the factors already mentioned that should be considered a cause of their destruction. It is destroyed in two ways: first. in fact.

135." he said.136 1 32. besides moderating it in other ways. For they themselves become less like masters. when his wife asked him whether he was not ashamed to hand over a lesser kingship to his sons than the one he had inherited from his father: "Certainly not. education. These include the device we mentioned some time ago135 as tending to preserve a tyranny (to the extent that it can be preserved): [ I ] cutting down the outstanding men and eliminat­ ing the high-minded ones. 133. the longer must their office remain intact. Chapter 1 1 20 25 30 35 40 13131 It is clear. Monarchies are destroyed for these reasons. instituted the office of the overseers. and less envied by those they rule. that monarchies are preserved by the opposite causes.132 But kingships in particular are preserved by being made more moderate. In the latter case it was because the office was divided into two parts from the beginning. That is also why the kingships of the Molossians lasted a long time. clubs. "for I am handing over one that will be longer lasting. It is useful to compare Aristotle's forthcoming account of tyranny with that given in Plato. 133 By diminishing the power of the kingship he increased its duration. Republic 562a-569c. [4] Prohibiting schools and other gatherings connected with learning. indeed. so that in a way he made it greater. 770-720). Others are: [2] Prohibiting messes. At 1 3 1 1'1 5-22. then. 1 36. to put it simply. and conversations like those of Socrates that take place in the agora and gymnasia. Theopompus was King of Sparta (c. A broad characterization intended to cover formal schools (like Aristotle's own Lyceum). " Tyrannies134 are preserved in two quite opposite ways. The overseers acted as a check on the monarchy ( 1 270h6-17).1 66 15 Politics V jects are unwilling immediately ceases to be a king whereas a tyrant can rule even unwilling subjects. He is supposed to have given precisely this answer. and that of the Spartans as well. One of them is traditional and is the way most tyrants exercise their rule. Periander of Corinth is said to have instituted most of its devices. Opposite to the causes that preserve them. and again be­ cause Theopompus. not lesser. [3] Keeping an eye on anything that typically engenders two things: high-mindedness and mutual trust. more equal in their characters. . For the fewer areas over which kings have authority. and other things of that sort. and for others of the same sort. symposia. 1 34. but many may also be seen in the Persian empire.

as in Syracuse. since knowledge tends to give rise to mutual trust. or the eavesdroppers that Hiero138 sent to every meeting or gathering. they are less likely to go unnoticed. And while a kingship is preserved by its friends. and [ 1 3] the license of slaves for the same reason. but to retain spies. Tyrant of Syracuse 478-467. [8] Another is to slander people to one another. Dionysius I (409-367). [7] Another is trying to let nothing done or said by any of his subjects escape notice. on the grounds that while all his subjects wish to overthrow him. like the so-called women informers of Syracuse. 1 38.Chapter 11 1 67 and doing everything to ensure that people are as ignorant of one an­ other as possible. Polycrates was a sixth-century tyrant of Samos. 140 taxation ate up a per­ son's entire estate in five years. the Cypselid monuments. [ 1 0] And there is taxation. and the rich against themselves. [9] It is also tyrannical to impoverish the people. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 . 1 4 1 . during the reign of Dionysius. it is the mark of a tyrant to distrust his friends. [6] Imposing all the other restrictions of a similar nature that are found in Persian and non-Greek tyrannies (for they are all capable of producing the same effect). 137 For their activities will then be hard to keep secret and they will become humble-minded from always acting like slaves. action usually follows ( 1 3 12b1-3). so that they cannot afford a militia and are so occupied with their daily work that they lack the leisure for plotting. and if they do speak freely.l41 All the practices found in the extreme kind of democracy are also characteristic of a tyranny: [ 1 2] the dominance of women in the house­ hold. lack of leisure and poverty for the ruled. the construction of the temple of Olympian Zeus by the Pisistratids. So as to be at the tyrant's beck and call. The Cypselids were tyrants of Corinth. 1 39. 139 For all these things have the same result. when. 140. setting friend against friend. these are particularly capable of doing so. For people speak less freely when they fear the presence of such spies. The pyramids of Egypt. When ability and wish coincide. and the works on Samos commissioned by Polycrates are all examples of this. the people against the notables. [ 1 1 ] A tyrant also engages in warmongering in order that his subjects will lack leisure and be perpetually in need of a leader. [5] Requiring the residents to be always in public view and to pass their time at the palace gates. For slaves and women not only do not plot against tyrants but. because they prosper under them. are inevitably well 137. in order that they may report on the men.

1 1 25'19-27. . the popular leader (for the popular leader is a flatterer of the people). a flatterer is someone who seems to do this but does not. Third. Thus the wishes of tyrants may be reduced in fact to these three defining principles. They view them as harmful to their rule not only because they refuse to be ruled as by a master. that they think small. and so no one tries to overthrow a tyranny if he lacks the power." 144. that the ruled think small. They all fall into three categories. But anyone who is a rival in dignity or free-mindedness robs tyranny of its superiority and its status as a master of slaves. A true friend loves one for one's own qualities. For a tyrant thinks that he alone deserves to be like that. More usually. that the ruled be powerless to act. but also because they command trust among both themselves and others. for a tyranny will not be overthrown until some people trust each other. decent people act out of friendship. on the grounds that the former are hostile to him. See NE 1 123b9-26. 1371'17-24). On the con­ trary. If decent people seem friendly it will be be­ cause they are so. since all tyrannical aims might be reduced to these three tenets: that the ruled not trust one another. And it is also characteristic of a tyrant to have foreigners rather than people from the city-state as dinner guests and companions. These devices are characteristic of tyrants and help preserve their rule. "nail is driven out by nail. For that is also why tyranny loves vice. broadly speaking.143 And it is characteristic of a tyrant not to delight in anyone who is dignified or free-minded. that they be powerless. not because they are engaging in flattery (Rh. that they distrust one another. in tyrannies." as the saying goes. 142 The vicious are also useful for vicious tasks-"nail to nail. For tyranny aims at three things: first.1 68 40 1314• 5 10 J5 20 25 Politics V disposed toward tyrannies and toward democracies as well (for the peo­ ple too aspire to be a monarch). and so tyrants hate him as a threat to their rule. those who are obse­ quious in their dealings with the tyrant. For tyrants delight in being flattered.144 second. not flattery. This is also why tyrants attack decent people. and do not inform on one another or on anyone else. For no one tries to do what is impossible. But no free-minded person would flatter them. which is precisely a task for flattery. 142. whereas the latter oppose him in nothing. for a pusillanimous person would plot against no one." but here something like "it takes a nail to do a nail's work. 143. but there is no vice they leave out. That is why a flatterer is honored in both constitutions-in democracies.

taking money from people who are laboring and toiling in penury. the kind of person who inspires awe rather than fear in those who meet him. [2] He should also appear not harsh but dignified. he will give the impression of managing the city-state like the head of a household rather than a tyrant. For the citizens accompany him. so one way to preserve a tyranny is to make it more like a kingship. He should also render an account of funds received and expended. For in this way. while the guards stay behind. For those who guard the city-state will be less likely to seize his things. a tyrant should perform or seem to perform everything else in a noble. He should not be afraid of running short of funds. At any event. is one way in which the preservation of tyrannies comes about. He should not squander them on gifts that enrage the multitude. One may grasp it by considering the destruction of kingships. Next. as some tyrants in the past have done. kingly fashion. But this is not easily achieved if he is contemptible. That is why even if a tyrant neglects the other virtues. and craftsmen. The other involves precautions that are pretty much the opposite of those just discussed. In a word: a tyrant should pose as a guardian and steward of the public funds. Furthermore. it is even more beneficial for tyrants who are often away on foreign campaigns to do this146 than to amass a great hoard of wealth and leave it behind. First. and to meet the needs of military emergencies. For if this power is lost. Of rendering public accounts and seeming to take care of public funds. then. 146. he must cultivate military virtue147 and get himself a reputation for it. than from the citizens. have "political virtue (politike areti). foreigners. [3] not only should he himself avoid any appearance of behaving arrogantly toward any teenage boys and girls among his sub- 145. A tyrant on a foreign campaign has more to fear from such guards. since he has authority over the city­ state. it should appear that taxes and public services exist for the purposes of administration. the tyrant's power. not of his own private estate." 30 3S 40 1314b S 10 1S 20 . 145 But while this must remain a basic principle. so he can rule not just willing subjects but unwilling ones as well.Chapter 11 169 This. the tyranny is also. and lavishing it on prostitutes. For just as one way to destroy a kingship is to make its rule more tyrannical. One thing only must be safeguarded. Since tyranny differs from kingship in being rule over unwilling subjects. indeed. The mss. [ 1] he should seem to take care of public funds. 147. then.

but it is easy to attack or despise a drunk or drowsy one. he should at least avoid exhibiting his indulgence to others. For people are less afraid of suffering illegal treatment at the hands of such people. at all events it should not be someone of courageous character. but where necessary to elevate several. but they also wish to be seen doing so by others. the tyrant should do the oppo­ site of what some in fact do. and from two in particular: corporal punishment and arrogance toward adolescents. But above all the tyrant should be moderate in such matters. not all at once. The women of his house­ hold should also be similarly respectful toward other women.170 2S 30 3S 40 131 s• S 10 IS Politics V jects. 148 For he must lay out and beautify the city-state as if he were a household steward rather than a tyrant. or failing that. but neither should any of his followers. . If it happens to be necessary to make one man important. [4] A tyrant must do the opposite of pretty well all the things we men­ tioned a while back. honor lovers and decent human beings resent those involving dis- 148. his prerogatives should be taken away gradually. in order that they may be admired as happy and blessed. He should bestow such honors himself. but punishments should be administered by other officials and by the courts. For it is not easy to attack or despise a sober or wakeful man. And if it is considered necessary to remove someone from power. But it is a precaution common to every sort of monarchy not to make any one man important. [5] a tyrant should always be seen to be very zealous about matters concerning the gods. since they think that he has the gods on his side. but without appearing foolish in the process. [6] A tyrant should so honor those who prove to be good in any area that they do not expect that they would be more honored by citizens liv­ ing under their own laws. as the ar­ rogant behavior of women has caused the downfall of many tyrannies. Where bodily pleasures are concerned. And if they regard their ruler as a god-fearing man who pays heed to the gods. For they not only begin their debaucheries at dawn and continue them for days on end. [7] A tyrant should refrain from all forms of arrogance. At 1 3 1 3'34. so that they will keep an eye on one another. they plot against him less.1 3 1 3b32. This is particularly true where those who love honor are concerned. For men of this sort are the most enterpris­ ing in any sphere of action. Again. For while lovers of money resent contemptuous acts affecting their prop­ erty. however.

1 50. The tyranny was founded in 670. it is best if both believe that they owe their safety to the tyrant's rule."149 [8] Since city-states consist of two parts. Cleisthenes was grandson of Orthagoras and grandfather of the Athenian reformer of the same name. not vicious but half vicious. poor and rich. For as a result. Hence either he should not treat people in these ways or else he should appear to punish like a father. while playing the popular leader with the many. but since he rules better people who have not been humiliated he will not end up being hated and feared. the shortest-lived of all constitutions are oligarchy and tyranny. For their aim is evident. he should com­ pensate apparent dishonors with yet greater honors. Chapter 1 2 Yet. He should also pursue the moderate things in life.Chapter 12 171 honor. As Heraclitus said. For people who attack out of anger are careless of themselves. and his character will either be nobly disposed to virtue or else half good. not as an embezzler but as a steward. not out of contempt. Hence he should be particularly wary of people who think that he has behaved arrogantly toward them or those they happen to cherish. maintaining close relations with the notables. For the longest lasting tyranny was that of Orthagoras and his sons in Sicyon. 20 25 30 JS 40 131Sb S 10 . Diels-Kranz B85. 540-480) was one of the greatest of the Presocratic philosophers. "Anger is a hard enemy to combat. because it pays for what it wants with life. and not as if it were a prerogative of his office. and that nei­ ther is unjustly treated by the other because of it. a tyrant should most fear and take the greatest precautions against those who are ready to sacrifice their own lives to de­ stroy him. not only will his rule necessarily be nobler and more enviable. It lasted a hundred years. But whichever of them is the stronger should be particularly attached to his rule. not excess. Heraclitus of Ephesus (c. And his rule will be longer lasting. Of those who make attempts on his life. so that with his power thus increased he will not need to free slaves or confiscate weapons. A tyrant should appear to his subjects not as a tyrant but as a head of household and a kingly man. 150 This was because they treated their 149. and to engage in sexual relations with young people out of sexual desire. For the latter of the two parts added to his force will be enough to make them stronger than attackers. But it is superfluous to discuss all such measures in detail. And as a general rule.

For Gelon was tyrant for seven and died in the eighth. which lasted seventy-three years and six months. Periander for forty and a half. At any rate. The longest lasting of the remaining tyrannies was the one associated with Gelon and Hiero at Syracuse. whereas Thrasyboulus was expelled after ten months." whenever the number of this figure becomes cubed. Tyrant at Athens (56 1-527). Yet even this did not last long. Since his sons ruled for eighteen years. was able in battle. 153. For Cypselus was tyrant for thirty years. They also say that Pisistratus151 once allowed himself to be summoned for trial before the Areopagus. have now pretty well all been discussed. and Psammeticus. difficult to despise. in particular. But the majority of tyrannies have all been quite short-lived. which "mar­ ried with five. And some say that the seated figure in the marketplace is a statue of the man who gave the verdict. In the Republic Socrates discusses change. 1 54 Perhaps he is not wrong in saying this. so that in a period of thirty­ three years he was tyrant for seventeen. Cleisthenes. just eighteen years total. since there may be some people who are ineducable and can151. But it was not continuous. the tyranny lasted for thirty-five years altogether. and Periander. Gorgus was Periander's successor. but that everything undergoes a sort of cyclical change. 1 53 The third was that of the Pisistratids in Athens. For in the case of the first and best constitution he does not discuss the change peculiar to it. give two harmonies. was also not easy to despise because of his ability in battle. His idea is that nature sometimes produces people who are mediocre and stronger than education. Hiero for ten. Therefore.172 15 20 25 30 35 40 1316• 5 10 Politics V subjects moderately and were subservient to the laws in many areas. For he claims that its cause is that nothing is permanent. the son of Gorgus. The various causes that destroy constitutions and monarchies. See Republic 545c ff. . though he became tyrannical. 1 54. The second longest tyranny was that of the Cypselids in Corinth. and also those that preserve them. Cypselus was a popular leader who went without a bodyguard through­ out his rule. 1 52. and they acted as popular leaders by looking after the people's interests in various ways. but he does not discuss it well. and that the origin of this lies in the elements four and three. For Pisistratus went into exile twice. for three. Cleisthenes is said to have given a crown to the judge who denied him victory in a competition. 15 2 The reasons it lasted are also the same.

to that of Cleander. as happened in most of the ancient oligarchies in Sicily: in Leontini. it was to the tyranny of Panaetius.23. and into aristocracy. VII . Yet change may also occur in the opposite direction. and to it more than to monarchy. 1 57 Change also occurs from oligarchy to tyranny. 156 The same remark also applies to the other changes. 159 and not because those who are far superior in property holdings think it unjust for those who do not 155. The bracketed clause may well be an interpolation. Reading dia tou chronou with the mss. everything changes. for example. 158 It is also absurd to hold that a constitution changes into an oligarchy because the office holders are money lovers and acquirers of wealth. 1 3 1 6b5-6 states that it never suffered change. then to a tyranny. since that would make the cycle continuous. like that of Antileon in Chalcis. although according to him it should change into his first or best constitution. like that of Charillus in Sparta [or the one in Carthage]. As Socrates does at Republic 555d ff. 1 56. like that of Gelon and his family at Syracuse. VI. l 65. But in fact tyranny can also change into an­ other tyranny. 158. 1S 20 25 30 JS 40 1316b . then to a democracy. or what causes it to change. 155 due to which. and similarly in many other city-states. Moreover. Nor does he tell us what sort of con­ stitution it changes into. l 54-55. 1 57. 1 272b24-33 states that Carthage never had a tyranny or any significant fac­ tion. Nothing is known of Antileon. For he says that the Spartan constitution changes to an oligarchy. why does the best constitution change into a constitution of the Spartan sort? For all constitutions more often change into their opposites than into the neighboring one. into democracy. see Herodotus VII. he does not tell us whether tyranny undergoes change. that even things that did not begin to exist at the same time change at the same time? If something comes into existence on the day before the completion of the cycle. as he says. and on Anaxilaus. The reason for this is that he could not easily have told us. 1 59.Chapter 12 173 not become good men. into oligarchy. On Cleander. in Rhegium. as the constitution at Sicyon changed from the tyranny of Myron to that of Cleisthenes. See 1307"20-27. and is it during this period of time. if it does. 170. since the matter is undecidable. to that of Anaxilaus. But how could this sort of change be any more peculiar to the constitution he says is best than common to all the others and to everything that comes into existence? Yes. as Rackham suggests. does it still change at the same time as everything else? Furthermore. For example. in Gela. from democracy to oligarchy.

But this is false. they stir up change. 1 63. if the rich happen to be more powerful than the multitude. Reading timokrateumene(i) with Newman. Socrates discusses their changes as if there were only one of each. It is also absurd to claim that an oligarchic city-state is really two city­ states. And in many oligarchies office holders are not only not allowed to ac­ quire wealth. in Carthage. not an oligarchic city-state. Also. See Republic 5 5 5 c ff. nothing terrible happens. 161 . See Republic 555d. Alternatively (Ross. or any other constitution where the citizens do not all own an equal amount of property or are not all similarly good men? And even when no one becomes any poorer than he was. but there are laws to prevent it. and the latter are careless." See 1272b24-33. is too much freedom). which is governed timocratically. 1 60. 160 the officials do engage in acquiring wealth. . though there are many reasons why oligarchies change into democracies. Dreizehn­ ter and the mss. but when some of the others do so. even if they have not squandered all their property through being free to do whatever they like (the cause of which. Aristotle seems to be taking Socrates' explanation of how prop­ ertyless people arise in democracies to apply to oligarchies too. while the former set their mind to change. 563d-564d. or from democracy to oligarchy. As Socrates does at Republic 55 l d . Socrates says. On the other hand. Rather. Socrates makes excessive liberty the mark of a democratic. 161 For why is this any more true of it than of the Spartan constitution. 1 62. one of the rich and one of the poor.): "governed democratically demokratoumene(i) . And even when change does occur. when some of the leading men lose their properties. Besides. Oligarchs are timocrats or honor lovers. 163 Although there are many kinds of oligarchies and democracies. if the poor become a majority. Perhaps on the basis of 564'10-hZ. Socrates mentions but one: poverty caused by riotous living and paying interest on loans162-as if all or most of the citizens were rich at the start. if people have no share in office or are treated unjustly or arrogantly. constitutions still undergo change from oligarchy to democracy. they start factions and change constitutions. and it has not yet undergone change. it is no more likely to result in a democracy than in some other constitution.1 74 5 10 15 20 25 Politics V own anything to participate equally in the city-state with those who do.

1-12. 14-16. At IV. and similarly of the other constitutions. At IV. 4. For these. similarly. I mean those couplings which should be investigated but at present have not been. Still. These combinations are not discussed in the Politics as we have it. where the deliberative part and the part that deals with the choice of officials are organized oli­ garchically. or where. or where the part that deals with the courts and the deliberative part are oligarchic. AtV.B oo K V I Chapter 1 We have already discussed 1 the number and varieties of the deliberative and authoritative elements of constitutions. we have to investigate the combinations of all the ways of organizing the things we mentioned. since we should make clear not only which kind of constitution is best for a city-state. and the part that deals with the choice of officials is aristocratic. 175 30 35 40 1317• 5 10 . when coupled. which is suited to which constitution. Moreover. 2. we would do well to con­ sider whatever remains to be said about these. 3. but the part that deals with the courts is aristocratic. and to determine which ways of organizing things are appropriate for and beneficial to each of them. not all the parts appropriate to the constitution are combined. cause constitutions to overlap. 12. and also what the origins and causes are of the destruction and preservation of constitu­ tions.3 We have already discussed4 the question of which kind of democracy is suited to which kind of city-state. the ways of organizing offices and courts. which kind of oligarchy is suited to which kind of people. resulting in oligarchic aristocracies and democratically inclined polities. For example. in some other way. and which of the remaining constitu­ tions is beneficial for which.2 But since it turned out that there are several kinds of democracies. but also how it and the 1.

One component of freedom is ruling and being ruled in turn. let us briefly go through this. not on merit. we need to grasp all the features that are democratic and that are held to go along with democracy. cause democracies to differ. 6. But they err in doing so.176 15 20 25 30 35 Politics VI other kinds should be established. A t 1309b20 . For it is commonly asserted that freedom is shared only in this sort of constitution. For democratic justice is based on numerical equality. since it is said that all democracies have it as their aim. that of vulgar craftsmen. 7. At 1 291b14-28. 1 296b24-3 1 . Numerical EQUALITY (to ison kata arithmon) involves equal participation in political office by each citizen. character. then of necessity the multitude must be in authority. and more than one variety of each kind of democracy.5 that there are different kinds of people.7 But if this is what justice is.6. whether for the purpose of establishing whichever kind of democracy one happens to want. And when the first of these is added to the second. and the third again to both of them. or for that of reforming an existing kind. more with a second. and aims of the various kinds of democracy. the one some call oligarchy.1 3 1 0"2. and 5. since a few of these features will go with one kind of democracy. and all of them with a third. It is useful to be familiar with each of them. since that will at the same time throw some light on the opposite constitution. For it is as a re­ sult of the way these are combined that the various kinds of democracy arise. We may begin with democracy. when they are differently combined. For there are two reasons why there are several kinds of democracy. But the second reason is the one we are discussing now. For there is the multitude of farmers. and so an interchange of ruling and being . as was pointed out earlier in our discussions of what causes the destruction and preservation of constitutions. IV.6 Let us now discuss the fundamental principles. 1 3 1 0' 12-36. For those who are establishing a constitution try to combine all the features that are in keeping with its fundamental principle. it also changes its kind. Chapter 2 40 13J7b 5 The fundamental principle of the democratic constitution is freedom. The first is the one mentioned earlier. To carry out this inquiry. and that of laborers. For the features that go along with democracy and are held to be appropriate to this kind of constitution. it not only affects the quality of the democ­ racy for better or worse.

From these presuppositions and this sort of principle arise the follow­ ing democratic features: [ I ] Having all choose officials from all. since that of slavery is not to live as one likes. and the ones that are most important and involve the most authority. but where such resources exist even this office is stripped of its power. or one as low as possible. is one mark of freedom which all democrats take as a goal of their constitution. Another is to live as one likes. for the assembly. [2] Having all rule each and each in turn rule all. For when the people are well paid.8 [9] Having pay provided. since oligarchy is defined by family. From it arises the demand not to be ruled by anyone. since none of the ways of establishing it discussed in VI. and public offices. or for those offices that require their holders to share a mess. decide all cases. this is what is final and this is what is just. to rule and be ruled in turn. is the second goal of democracy. This. it is de­ mocratic to have no office be permanent. courts. [5] Having no office. preferably for everyone. [3] Having all offices. or failing that. The council is the most democratic office in city-states that lack adequate resources to pay everyone. 8 . courts. Besides. or failing that. or private contracts. but having no office with au­ thority over anything or over as little as possible. or most of them. and assemblies that are in authority. filled by lot. and education. they say. such as those having to do with the inspection of officials. or few besides military ones. At 1 299b38-1300•4. [8] Having the assembly have authority over everything or over all the important things. and majority opinion is in au­ thority. or all that do not require experience or skill. it does not seem necessarily to involve equality of property. the consti­ tution.Chapter 2 1 77 whatever seems right to the majority. for service in the offices. [4] Having no property assessment for office. or bodies selected from all. This. In this way the second goal contributes to freedom based on equality. wealth. and if such an office happens ruled (see 1261•30-b6). This. held twice or more than a few times by the same person. For they are the majority. The result is that the poor have more authority than the rich in democracies.3 involves a redistribution of property. and vulgarity) are held to be characteristically democratic.9 [ 1 0] Furthermore. [7] Having all. they take all decisions into their own hands (as we said in the inquiry preceding this one). their opposites (low birth. Dreizehnter brackets this sentence as an interpolation. poverty. 10 I5 20 25 30 35 40 . [6] Having all offices or as many as possible be short-term. then. 9. council. is the result of freedom. then. since they say that each of the citizens should have an equal share.

we have tyranny. At 1281'14-28. then. Should they divide assessed property so that the property of five hun­ dred citizens equals that of a thousand others. For they say that quantity of property should be the deciding factor. comes what is held to be most of all a democracy and a rule by the people. If we so distribute political power that each group has the same amount. then. but in all ruling equally on the basis of numerical equality. We have two groups. But both views are unequal and unjust. And from the type of justice that is agreed to be democratic. are the features commonly found in democracies. 1 3 What sort of equality there might be. then take an equal number of citizens from the five hundred as from the thousand and give them authority over the elections and the courts? Is this the constitution that is most just from the point of view of democratic jus­ tice? Or is it the one based on quantity? For democrats say that whatever seems just to the greater number constitutes justice. to strip it of its power. another of one thou­ sand (the poor). 12 On the other hand. and have it filled by lot rather than by election. it is just for him alone to rule. For if justice is whatever the few de­ cide. and then give equal power to the thousand as to the five hundred?10 Or is this not the way to pro­ duce numerical equality? Should they instead divide as before. at least. These. See 1 3 1 7bS-7 12. which consists in everyone having numerical equality. 13. since if one person has more than the others who are rich. one of five hundred (the rich). from the point of view of oligarchic justice. See 1 283h13 -27.178 1318" S 10 Politics VI to survive an ancient change. Chapter 3 IS 20 25 The next problem that arises is how they will achieve this equality. since in that way they would consider equality and freedom to be present in the constitution. that both would agree on is something we must investigate in light of the definitions of justice 1 0. if justice is what the numerical majority decide. have we treated both the rich and the poor as numerical equality demands? 1 1 . each of which has the same amount of property. . they will commit injustice by confiscating the property of the wealthy few (as we said earlier). then. 1 1 whereas oligarchs say that it is whatever seems just to those with the most property. since equality consists in the poor neither ruling more than the rich nor being alone in authority.

10 1S . it is still easier than to persuade people of it when they have the power to be ACQUISITIVE. whatever is the opinion of both or of a majority of each should have authority. they are busy at their tasks and do not desire other people's property. When the assessed properties of both the rich and the poor on each side are added together. 15. the rich and the poor. that there are ten rich citizens and twenty poor ones. they find working more pleasant than engaging in politics and holding office. the first in order is the best. In­ stead. and the question must be decided by lot or something else of that sort. For they both say that the opinion of the MAJORITY of the citizens should be in authority. and so it is also possible to create a democracy where the multitude live by cultivating the land or herding flocks. If the amounts happen to be equal. the strong pay no heed to them. Indeed. Even if it is very difficult to discover the truth about what equality and justice demand. And because they do not15 have the necessities. so long as no one prevents them from working or takes anything away from them. Evidence of this is that they even put up with the ancient tyrannies. For the first or best kind of people is the farming kind. they lack leisure and cannot attend meetings of the assembly frequently. since the many seek money more than honor. 1 292h2S-1293'10. however. as it is at present when the assembly or the court is split. For because they do not have much property. 14 It is also the oldest of them all. So let this stand. this should be considered a failure for both sides. Reading m e with the mss. the opinion of the majority (that is to say. For equality and justice are always sought by the weaker party.Chapter 4 1 79 they both give. 30 JS 40 131Sb S Chapter 4 Of the four kinds of democracy. as we said in the discussions before these. whereas four of the rich have sided with the poor. For in no time some of them become 14. But if they are opposed. the group whose assessed property is greater) should prevail. for example. and five of the poor with the rich. and continue to put up with oligarchies. though not fully. the side whose assessed property is greater should have authority. Suppose. But I call it first as one might distinguish people. since there are in fact two classes in a city-state. At 1291b30-1 292'38. and that six of the rich have voted against fifteen of the poorer ones. where no great profit is to be had from office.

Nowadays.180 20 25 30 35 40 131 Ci' 5 10 Politics VI rich. indeed.) That is why. then. is that the decent people rule with­ out falling into wrongdoing and the multitude are in no way short­ changed. electors are selected from all the citizens by turns. in ancient times) forbidding even the sale of the original allotments of land. or alternatively for officials not to be elected on the basis of property assessments at all. People governed in this way are necessarily governed well. the offices will always be in the hands of the best. since freedom to do whatever one likes leaves one defenseless against the bad things that exist in every human being. some of the laws that ex­ isted in many city-states in ancient times are extremely useful. For to be under constraint. (This arrangement too should be regarded as a form of democracy. and not to be able to do whatever seems good. In fact. since they will not be ruled by their inferiors. as in Mantinea. they are content. instead. which is the very one most beneficial in constitutions. and also the reason why: that it is because the people are of a certain kind. for exam­ ple. forbidding lending against more than a certain portion of each person's land. said to derive from Oxylus. and this organization is necessarily satisfactory to the decent and reputable people. . in some democracies. however. 16 and also one. it is both beneficial and customary for all the citizens to elect and inspect of­ ficials and sit on juries. Oxylus was an ancient king and legislator in Elis. or else more than a certain amount situated between a given place and the city-state's town. the multitude do not participate in the election of officials. prohibiting the ownership of more than a certain amount of land under any circumstances. the higher the assessment). See 1266bl9-24 for some examples. yet if they have authority over deliberation. Besides. 17 with a similar sort of effect. but on the basis of ability. if they do have any love of honor. And for the purpose of establishing a farming people. So the necessary result. but for the holders of the most important offices to be elected from those with a certain amount of assessed property (the higher the office. And there used to be a law in many city-states (at any rate. as it was at Mantinea. as it too 16. having authority over the election and inspection of officials will give them what they need. It is evident. and will rule justly because the others have authority over the inspection of officials. while the others at least escape poverty. one should also attempt reform by using the law of the Aphytaeans. that this is the best of the democracies. 17. in the aforementioned kind of democracy. is beneficial. while the people will consent and will not envy the decent.

But where the lay of the land is such that the countryside is widely separated from the CITY-STATE. so that. one should simply not hold assemblies in democracies without the multitude from the country. 15 20 25 30 35 40 131CJh . 19. the best sort of people consists of herdsmen. it is even easier to create a democracy that is serviceable and a CONSTITUTION. 2 1 . on the other hand. is not one that every city-state can afford. For one thing. always exeluding a worse multitude. and la­ borers put their hand. That is. For herding is in many respects similar to farming. neither attend so readily nor have the same need for this sort of meeting. Explained at 1 260•39-b l .Chapter 4 181 is useful for the purpose under discussion. they are particularly well prepared. practically speaking this entire class can easily attend the assembly. they all engage in farming.20 The ultimate democracy.21 nor can it easily endure. if its laws and customs are not well put together. who get their living from livestock. Farmers. because everyone participates in it. For their way of life is bad. For though the citizens of Aphytis are numerous and have little land. But how the others should be established is also ev­ ident. l 337b4-2 l . even if there is a whole crowd that frequents the market­ place. The other multitudes. How. The best kind of democracy includes only the best multitude (the farmers) and excludes the multitude that is only slightly worse (the herdsmen). because they are physically fit and able to live in the open. then. the best or first kind of democracy should be established has been described. and there is no element of virtue involved in the task to which the multitude of vulgar craftsmen. For they should deviate in order from the best kind. the original allotments. Thus at each stage a worse multitude is ex­ cluded. the next best kind includes the herdsmen but excludes the next worst multitude (the craftsmen). because they wander around the marketplace and town. only a wealthy city-state can afford to provide the payment needed to enable everyone to participate ( 1 293"1-10). are almost all very inferior to these. of which the remaining kinds of democracies are composed. because property assessments are based not on whole estates18 but on such small subdivisions of them that even the poor can exceed the as­ sessment. and where military activities are concerned. For the multitude are forced to make their settlements out in the country areas. tradesmen. because they are scattered throughout the countryside. and so on. 19 Furthermore. 20. (The factors that cause the de18. After the multitude of farmers.

25 and allowing everyone to live as he likes. The reforms of Cleisthenes are described in Ath. Also useful to a democracy of this kind are the sorts of institutions that Cleisthenes used in Athens when he wanted to increase the power of the democracy.23 For a small class of worthless people gets overlooked. and that those setting up the democracy used at Cyrene.)22 With a view to establishing this sort of democracy and making the people powerful.24 For different and more numerous tribes and clans should be created. 2 3 . On this sort of supervision. then. 1 322b37-1 323'6. For this whole class are particularly at home in this sort of democracy. including not only the legitimate children of citizens but even the illegitimate ones. however. they make the constitution more disorderly and provoke the notables to such an extent that they find the democracy hard to en­ dure (which was in fact the cause of the faction at Cyrene). or for those seeking to establish a constitution of this kind. or of women or children. For when they do overshoot it.S . and those descended from citizens on only one side (I mean their mother's or their father's). 1 323'3-6. but as it grows larger it gets more noticed. and every device should be used to mix everyone together as much as possi­ ble and break up their previous associations. The reference to the democracy at Cyrene may be to the one established there in 462. . For many people will support a constitution of this sort. the leaders usually admit as many as possi­ ble to citizenship. for example. and not go beyond this. setting it up is not the most important task nor indeed the 22. all tyrannical institutions are held to be democratic. 25. private cults should be absorbed into a few public ones. The advantage of not having it in a democracy is explained at 1 3 1 3b32-39. see 1 300'4-8. 24. Furthermore. This. yet they should add citizens only up to the point where the multitude outnumber the notables and middle classes. is how popular leaders usually establish such a constitution.1 82 5 10 15 20 25 30 Politics VI struction of this and other constitutions have pretty well all been discussed earlier. the lack of supervision of slaves (which may really be beneficial to a democracy up to a certain point). I mean. In V. Perhaps the revolution o f 401 i n which five hundred rich people were put to death. since for the many it is more pleasant to live in a disorderly fashion than in a temperate one. XXI. Chapter 5 For a legislator.

See 127Qb21-22 and note. but sacred property instead. one should not do what popular leaders do nowadays. while establishing the sort of LAWS. and courts with many jurors should be in session for only a few days. See 1 268b2S and note. For the wages have to be obtained from taxes. Where rev­ enues are lacking. 35 40 132(1' 5 10 15 20 25 30 . provided the rich are not paid for jury service but only the poor. but are willing to be so for brief periods. in their efforts to curry favor with the people. failing that. which best encompass the features that preserve constitutions. but if it will make it be so for the longest time. since they will gain nothing by doing so.Chapter 5 1 83 only one. or. for the rich are unwilling to be away from their private affairs for many days. That is why those who care about the constitution should counteract this by passing a law that nothing confiscated from a condemned person should become common property. but rather ensuring its preservation. Popular leaders nowadays. since they will be fined in the same way as before. carefully avoiding the causes of destruction. For it is not difficult for those who govern themselves in any old way to continue for a day or even for two or three days. where they also happen to have a dearth of revenues. few assemblies should be held. not democrats. confiscate a lot of property by means of the courts. 27. however. and from them try to institute stability.26 For they are usually brought against notables. That is why legislators should make use of our earlier studies of what causes the preservation and destruction of constitutions. then. they should at least not regard those in authority as their enemiesY Since the ultimate democracies have large populations that cannot easily attend the assembly without wages. For they distribute any surplus. confiscations of property. Where there are revenues. this is hostile to the notables. whereas the crowd will less frequently condemn defendants. but people no 26. Public lawsuits too should always be kept to an absolute minimum. and those who bring frivolous o nes should be deterred by large fines. however. but all the citizens should be well disposed to­ ward the constitution. and corrupt courtsthings that have already brought down many democracies. It also greatly improves the quality of deci­ sions in lawsuits. For wrongdoers will be no less deterred. They should consider a measure to be democratic or oligarchic not if it will make the city-state be as democratically governed or as oligarchically governed as possible. both written and unwritten. For this helps reduce the fears of the notables about expense.

It is by governing in this sort of way that the Carthaginians have won the friendship of their people. But this can also be done by dividing the same office between those people chosen by lot and those elected.1 84 35 132rJ 5 10 15 Politics VI sooner get it than they want the same again. those that are elected and those chosen by lot: those by lot. whatever is left over from the rev­ enues should be collected together and distributed in lump sums to the poor. or failing that. Helping the poor in this way. And if this cannot be done for all. Forty-nine of Danaus' fifty daughters murdered their hus­ bands on their wedding night and were punished in Hades by having end­ lessly to fill leaking jugs with water. See 1267bl-5. Compare l 273b l 8 -24. We have said. And. 29. See 1263'35-40 where this policy is attributed to the Spartans. is like pouring water into the proverbial leaking jug. particularly if enough can be accumulated for the acquisition of a plot of land. so the people partici­ pate. as in the case of the best mixed and first of the oligarchies. This is the one very close to so-called 28. be devised to ensure long-term prosperity. In the meantime the rich should be taxed to provide pay for necessary meetings of the assembly.30 They also divide all their offices into two classes. For each oligarchy should be assembled from its opposites. therefore. so they are governed better. then. It is a good thing too to imitate the policy of the Tarentines. . since this is also beneficial to the rich. those elected. distribution should instead be by turns on the basis of tribe or some other part. indeed.28 But the truly democratic man should see to it that the multitude are not too poor (since this is a cause of the democracy's being a corrupt one). 29 But it is also char­ acteristic of notables who are cultivated and sensible to divide the poor amongst themselves and give them a start in some line of work. while being released from useless sorts of public service. Mea­ sures must. who retain the goodwill of the multitude by giving communal use of their property to the poor. 30. for a start in trade or farming. by analogy with the opposite democracy. who were the ancestors of the Tarentines. since they are always sending some of them out to their subject city-states to become rich. Chapter 6 20 It is also pretty well evident from these remarks how oligarchies should be established. how democracies should be established.

then from the artisans. which is the most dynastic and tyrannical of oligarchies. the worse it is. on the contrary. conditions favor the next kind of oligarchy. Since heavy armor is expensive. on the other hand. so too the worst constitutions need the most guarding. Democracies are generally kept safe by their large citizen populations (for this is the opposite of justice based on merit). 5 10 . See 1 289h33-40. the more guarding it requires. tradesmen. 33 But as for the kind of oligarchy opposite to the ultimate democracy. 25 30 35 1321• Chapter 7 Since there are four principal parts of the multitude (farmers. and horse breeding is the privilege of those who own large estates. VI. since ho­ plites are more often rich than poor. Anyone who acquires a qualifying property should be allowed to participate. except that the qualifications for citizenship should be slightly tighter. and so on. 35 3 1 . light infantry. but it is clear that an oligarchy should. 32. From the farmers first. 34. the smaller ones making people el­ igible for the necessary offices. and four useful in war (cavalry. then from the herdsmen. natural conditions favor the establish­ ment of a powerful oligarchy. 32 The next kind of oligarchy should be established in a similar way. and the assessment should be used to admit a suffi­ ciently large number of the people that those who participate in the con­ stitution will be stronger than those who do not. For just as bodies that are in good health or ships with crews that are in fine shape for a voyage can undergo a large number of mishaps without being destroyed. secure its preservation by being well organized. See 1 290'22-29 and note. for the offices with more authority. where the country happens to be suitable for cavalry. HOPLITES. Those required for the very existence of a city-state ( 1 283'1 7-22. whereas diseased bodies and ships with loose timbers and worthless crews cannot survive even a small number. 9). 33. and hired laborers).34 Where the country is suitable for hoplites. and naval forces). 35. vulgar craftsmen.Chapter 7 185 polity. For the security of the inhabitants depends on horse power. some being made smaller and some larger. Here the property assessments should be divided in two. See 1 3 1 9'39-h1 and note.3 1 the larger ones. and those who do share should always be drawn from the better part of the people.

1 86








Politics VI

Light infantry and naval forces, however, are entirely democratic.
Therefore, as things stand, wherever there are large numbers of these,
and there is faction, the oligarchs often get the worst of it. As a cure for
this, one should adopt the practice of military commanders who couple
an appropriate contingent of light infantry to their forces of cavalry and
hoplites. This is the way the people prevail over the rich during factional
conflict (or light infantry can easily take on cavalry and hoplites). There­
fore, oligarchs who establish such a force drawn from them are estab­
lishing a force against themselves. But since there is a difference of age,
and some are older and others younger, they should have their own sons
trained in unarmed and lightly armed combat while they are young, so
that when they have been taken out of the ranks of the boys they will
themselves be skilled practitioners of these tasks.
The multitude should be given a share in the governing class, either
in the way mentioned earlier,36 to those who own an assessed amount of
property, or, as in Thebes, to those who have kept out of vulgar occupa­
tions for a given period of time,37 or, as in Massilia, to those who are
judged to merit it, whether they come from inside or outside the gov­
erning class.
Furthermore, the offices with the most authority, which those in the
constitution must hold, should also have public services attached to
them, so that the people will be willing not to participate in them, and
will sympathize with officials who have paid a heavy price for office. It is
also appropriate that, on entering office, they should offer magnificent
sacrifices and provide something for the community, so that the people,
through sharing in the festivities, and seeing the city-state adorned here
with votive statues and there with buildings, will be glad to see the con­
stitution endure. In addition, the notables will have memorials of their
expenditure. As things stand, however, those connected with oligarchies
do the opposite of this, because they seek profit no less than honor. That
is precisely why it is well to call them small democracies. 38
This, then, is the way to determine how democracies and oligarchies
should be established.

36. At 1320b2S-29.
37. See 1278'25-26.
38. "Small": because ruled by the few instead of the many; "democracies": be­
cause the few pursue money just like the many (see 1 3 1 8b16-17).

Chapter 8

1 87

Chapter 8
After what has just been said, the next topic, as was mentioned earlier,39
is the matter of correctly distinguishing what pertains to the offices, how
many they are, what they are, and what they are concerned with. For
without the necessary offices a city-state cannot exist, and without those
concerned with proper organization and order it cannot be well man­
aged. Furthermore, in small city-states the offices are inevitably fewer,
while in larger ones they are more numerous, as was also said earlier.40
Consequently, the question of which offices it is appropriate to combine
and which to keep separate should not be overlooked.
The first of the necessary offices, then, deals with [ 1 ] the supervision
of the market, where there must be some office to supervise contracts
and maintain good order. For in almost all city-states people have to be
able to buy and sell in order to satisfy each other's necessary needs. This
is also the readiest way to achieve self-sufficiency, which is thought to be
what leads people to join together in one constitutionY
Another kind of supervision, connected to this one and close to it, is
[2] the supervision of public and private property within the town, so
that it may be kept in good order; also, the preservation and repair of de­
caying buildings and roads, the supervision of property boundaries, so
that disputes do not arise over them, and all other sorts of supervision
similar to these. Most people call this sort of office town management,
though its parts are more than one in number. More populous city­
states assign different officials to these; for example, wall repairers, well
supervisors, and harbor guards.
Another office is also necessary and closely akin to this one, since it
deals with [3] the same areas, though it concerns the country and mat­
ters outside the town. In some places its holders are called country man­
agers, in others foresters.
These, then, are three kinds of supervision that deal with necessities.
Another is [4] the office that receives public funds, safeguards them, and
distributes them to the various branches of the administration. Its holders are called receivers or treasurers.
Another office is [5] that where private contracts and the decisions of

39. At 1 298'1-3, IV. 1 5 .
40. A t 1 299'31-b30.
4 1 . See 1 278b18 -30.














Politics VI

law courts must be recorded. Indictments and initiations of judicial pro­
ceedings should also be recorded with these officials. In some places this
office too is divided into several parts, in others a single office has au­
thority over all these matters. The officials are called sacred recorders,
supervisors, and recorders.
The next after this, and pretty well the most necessary and the most
difficult of the offices, is [6] the one concerned with actions against
those who have been convicted in court, and those whose names are
posted for fines, and with the custody of their persons. It is a difficult of­
fice because it provokes a lot of hatred. So where it is not possible to
make large profits from it, either people are unwilling to hold it, or those
who do hold it are unwilling to act in accordance with the laws. It is a
necessary office because there is no benefit in having lawsuits about mat­
ters of justice if they do not achieve their end. Consequently, if people
cannot live in a community with each other when lawsuits do not take
place,42 they cannot do so either where no actions are taken. That is why
it is better for this not to be a single office but to consist of several peo­
ple drawn from different courts, and why one should try to divide up the
tasks connected with posting the list of debtors in a similar way. Fur­
thermore, officials too43 should take some actions; in particular, incom­
ing officials should take those imposed by outgoing ones, and, in the
case of sitting officials, one should pass sentence and another take the
action. For example, the town managers should take the action imposed
by the market supervisors, while other officials take those imposed by
the town managers. For the less hatred there is toward those who exact
the penalty, the more the actions will achieve their end. To have the
same people both pass sentence and carry it out certainly doubles the
hatred; and to have the same people carry out every sentence makes
them inimical to everyone. In many places, the office that keeps prison­
ers in custody is different from the one that carries out the sentence, as
in the case of the office of the so-called Eleven in Athens. 44 Hence it is
also better to split it up, and to use the same device in its case too, since
it is no less necessary than the previous one. Decent people particularly
42. See 1253'29-39.
43. In addition to those normally assigned the task.
44. Prisoners were kept in custody pending punishment; prison itself was not
used as a punishment. The Eleven, who were in charge of the custody of
prisoners, did carry out executions, but not other sentences. Thus they did to
some degree exemplify the separation Aristotle is praising. But because they
do not perfectly exemplify it, many editors consider the clause in which they
are mentioned to be a marginal gloss which has made its way into the text.

Chapter S

1 89

avoid it, however, and giving bad ones authority over it is not safe, since
they are more in need of guarding than capable of guarding others. That
is why there should not be a single office in charge of guarding prisoners, nor the same office continuously. Instead, prisoners should be su­
pervised by different people in turn, chosen from among the young
men, in places where there is a regiment of cadets or guards,45 or from
the other officials.
These offices must be put first, then, as the most necessary. After
these are others that are no less necessary, but ranked higher in dignity,
since they require much experience and trustworthiness. The offices [7]
that deal with the defense of the city-state are of this sort, and any that
are organized to meet its wartime needs. In peacetime and wartime alike
there should be people to supervise the defense of the gates and walls,
and the inspection and organizing of the citizens. In some places there
are more offices assigned to all these areas, in others there are fewer (in
small city-states, for example, a single office deals with all of them).
Such people are called generals or warlords. Furthermore, if there is a
cavalry, a light infantry, archers, or a navy, an office is sometimes established for each of them. They are called admirals, cavalry commanders,
or regimental commanders, whereas those in charge of the units under
these are called warship commanders, company commanders, or tribal
leaders, and so on for their subunits. But all of these together constitute
a single kind, namely, supervision of military affairs. This, then, is the
way things stand with regard to this office.
But since some if not all of the offices handle large sums of public
money, there must be [8] a different office to receive and examine their
accounts which does not itself handle any other matters. Some call these
inspectors, accountants, auditors, or advocates.
Besides all these offices, there is [9] the one with the most authority
over everything; for the same office often has authority over both imple­
menting and introducing a measure, or presides over the multitude
where the people have authority. For there must be some body to convene the body that has authority over the constitution. In some places,
they are called preliminary councilors, because they prepare business
for the assembly. 46 But where the multitude are in authority they are
usually called a council instead.
45. In Athens and other city-states young men served from the time they were
eighteen until they were twenty in such regiments, which acted as police or
civic guards.
46. See 1 298b26-34.








1 90








Politics VI

This, then, is pretty much the number of offices that are political. But
another kind of supervision is [ 1 0] that concerned with the worship of
the gods: for example, priests, supervisors of matters relating to the
temples (such as the preservation of existing buildings, the restoration
of decaying ones), and all other duties concerning the gods. Sometimes
it happens, for example, in small city-states, that a single office super­
vises all this, but sometimes, apart from the priests, there are a number
of others, such as supervisors of sacrifices, temple guardians, and sacred
treasurers. Next after this is the office specializing in the public sacri­
fices that the law does not assign to the priests; instead, the holders have
the office from the communal hearth.47 These officials are called archons
by some, kings or presidents by others.
To sum up, then, the necessary kinds of supervision deal with the following: religious matters, military matters, revenues and expenditures,
the market, town, harbors, and country; also matters relating to the
courts, such as registering contracts, collecting fines, carrying out of
sentences, keeping prisoners in custody, receiving accounts, and in­
specting and examining officials; and, finally, matters relating to the
body that deliberates about public affairs.
On the other hand, peculiar to city-states that enjoy greater leisure and
prosperity and that also pay attention to good order are [ 1 1 ] the offices
dealing with the supervision of women, [ 12] the guardianship of the laws,
[ 1 3 ] the supervision of children, [ 1 4] authority over the gymnasia, and
also [ 1 5] the supervision of gymnastic or Dionysiac contests,48 as well as
of any other such public spectacles there may happen to be. Some of
these are obviously not democratic, for example, the supervision of
women and that of children, for the poor have to employ their women
and children as servants, because of their lack of slaves.
There are three offices that city-states use to supervise the selection
of the officials who are in authority: [ 1 6] the office of law guardian, [ 17]
that of preliminary councilor, and [ 1 8] the council. The office of law
guardian is aristocratic, that of preliminary councilor oligarchic, and a
council, democratic.
Pretty well all the offices have now been discussed in outline.

47. The communal hearth (koine hestia) derives from the hearth in the king's
palace which had both a practical and a magico-religious significance.
48. The dramatic festivals in which tragic and comedic poets competed.

B oo K V I I

Chapter 1
Anyone who intends to investigate the best constitution in the proper
way must first determine which life is most choiceworthy, since if this
remains unclear, what the best constitution is must also remain unclear.
For it is appropriate for those to fare best who live in the best constitution their circumstances allow-provided nothing contrary to reasonable expectation occurs. That is why we should first come to some agree­
ment about what the most choiceworthy life is for practically speaking
everyone,1 and then determine whether it is the same for an individual as
for a community, or different.
Since, then, I consider that I have already expressed much that is ad­
equate about the best life in the "external" works,2 I propose to make use
of them here as well. For since, in the case of one division at least, there
are three groups--external GOODS, goods of the body, and goods of the
soul-surely no one would raise a dispute and say that not all of them
need be possessed by those who are BLESSEDLY HAPPY. For no one would
call a person blessedly happy who has no shred of courage, temperance,
j ustice, or practical wisdom, but is afraid of the flies buzzing around
him, stops at nothing to gratify his appetite for food or drink, betrays his
dearest friends for a pittance, and has a mind as foolish and prone to
error as a child's or a madman's. But while almost all accept these
claims, they disagree about quantity and relative superiority. For they
consider any amount of virtue, however small, to be sufficient, but seek
an unlimitedly excessive amount of wealth, possessions, power, reputation, and the like.
We, however, will say to them that it is easy to reach a reliable conclu­
sion on these matters even from the facts themselves. For we see that the
1 . At 1 324'18-19 it is allowed that participating in a city-state may not be most
choiceworthy for absolutely everyone.
2. See 1278b3 1 note.






1 92







Politics VII

virtues are not acquired and preserved by means of external goods, but
the other way around,3 and we see that a happy life for human beings,
whether it consists in pleasure or virtue or both, is possessed more often
by those who have cultivated their characters and minds to an excessive
degree, but have been moderate in their acquisition of external goods,
than by those who have acquired more of the latter than they can possibly use, but are deficient in the former. Moreover, if we investigate the
matter on the basis of argument, it is plain to see. For external goods
have a limit, as does any tool, and all useful things are useful for some­
thing; so excessive amounts of them must harm or bring no benefit to
their possessors. 4 In the case of each of the goods of the soul, however,
the more excessive it is, the more useful it is (if these goods too should
be thought of as useful, and not simply as noble).
It is generally clear too, we shall say, that the relation of superiority
holding between the best condition of each thing and that of others cor­
responds to that holding between the things whose conditions we say
they are. So since the soul is UNQUALIFIEDLY more valuable, and also
more valuable to us, than possessions or the body, its best states must be
proportionally better than theirs. Besides, it is for the sake of the soul
that these things are naturally choiceworthy, and every sensible person
should choose them for its sake, not the soul for theirs.
We may take it as agreed, then, that each person has just as much hap­
piness as he has virtue, practical wisdom, and the action that expresses
them. We may use GOD as evidence of this. For he is blessedly happy, not
because of any external goods but because of himself and a certain quality in his nature.5 This is also the reason that good luck and happiness
are necessarily different. For chance or luck produces goods external to
the soul, but no one is just or temperate as a result of luck or because of
luck. 6
The next point depends on the same arguments. The happy city-state
is the one that is best and acts nobly. It is impossible for those who do
not do noble deeds to act nobly; and no action, whether a man's or a city­
state's, is noble when separate from virtue and practical wisdom. But the

3. The point is probably not that virtue invariably makes you rich, but that,
without virtue, wealth and the rest can do you as much harm as good.
4. See 1256b3 5-36, 1 257h28.
5. See Introduction xliii-xlv. Luck (tuche) and chance (to automaton) and the
difference between them are discussed in Ph. Il.4-6.
6. See NE 1 1 53bJ9-25.

then. or the life of an alien cut off from the political community? Second. And those who honor the tyrannical life above all would claim that the city-state that rules the greatest number10 is happiest. So much. he will also say that the more excellent city-state is happier. however. our task is the second question. which life is more choiceworthy. let us assume this much. whereas the former is a further task. is a task for political thought or theory. 11. ethics. justice. Presumably.7 For we cannot avoid talking about these issues altogether. practically wise. - S 10 1S 20 . both for individuals separately and for city-states collectively. 10. and regardless of whether participating in a city-state is more choiceworthy for everyone or for most but not for all. That is. And since that is the investigation we are now engaged in. And if someone approves of an individual because of his virtue. See Introduction xlvi-xlviii. that the best life. but neither can we go through all the arguments pertaining to them. but investigate them later. and practical wisdom of a city-state have the same ca­ pacity and are of the same kind as those possessed by each human being who is said to be just. if any happen not to be persuaded by what has been said. JS 40 1324" Chapter 2 It remains to say whether the happiness of each individual human being is the same as that of a city-state or not. 8. since everyone would agree that they are the same. the one that involves taking part in politics with other people and participating in a city-state. which condition of the city­ state. since that is a task for another type of study.8 But for now. With regard to those who dispute this. for the preface to our discussion. which constitution. Namely. 1 3 i s all prefatory. is best? This second question. For those who suppose that living well for an individual consists in wealth will also call a whole city-state blessedly happy if it happens to be wealthy. l l 7. a s 132Sb33 makes clear. is a life of virtue sufficiently equipped with the resources9 needed to take part in virtuous actions. First.Chapter 2 193 courage. we must ignore them in our present study. external GOODS. Two questions need to be investigated. the greatest number of other city-states. and not the one about what is choiceworthy for the individual. VII. and temperate. But here too the answer is evi­ dent. 9.

those who have not killed an enemy are not permitted to drink from it. the Scythians. does involve an impediment to one's own well­ being. There was once a law in Macedonia too that any man who had not killed an enemy must wear a halter for a belt. for example. Thracians. But the very people who agree that the most choiceworthy life is the life of virtue are the ones who dispute about whether it is the political life of action that is worthy of choice or rather the one released from external concerns-a contemplative life. when the cup passes around at a feast. for example. And it makes no small difference on which side the truth lies. others by custom. For some people. And there are many other similar practices among other peoples. and Celts. though it involves no injustice. some of them even have laws designed to foster military virtue. with the greatest love for the honor accorded to virtue have chosen between these two lives (I mean the political life and the philosophic one). . Some give this reply. even though most customs have been established pretty much at random in most cases.194 2S 30 JS 40 J324b S 10 1S 20 Politics VII It is evident that the best constitution must be that organization in which anyone might do best and live a blessedly happy life. political life is the only one for a man. it is al­ ways domination. they receive armlets as decorations for each campaign in which they take part. some prescribed by law. the fundamental aim of the constitution and the laws just is to rule their neighbors like a master. anywhere the laws have to some extent a single aim. Besides. For it is evident that almost all of those. but others claim that only a constitution that involves being a master or tyrant is happy. which some say is the only life for a philosopher. indeed. past or present. they place small obelisks in the earth around a man's tomb to show the number of enemies he has killed. And among the Iberians. Among the Scythians. a warlike race. It is said that in Carthage. since any­ one with sound practical wisdom at least must organize his affairs by looking to the better target-and this applies to human beings individu­ ally and to the constitution communally. Some people think that ruling over one's neighbors like a master involves one of the greatest injustices. and that rule of a statesman. since the actions expressing each of the virtues are no more available to private individuals than to those engaged in communal affairs and politics. they say that an active. Persians. So in Sparta and Crete the educational system and most of the laws are set up for war. Indeed. all the nations that have the power to be ACQUISITIVE honor military power-for example. then. Others think almost the opposite. That is why.

in some of the laws that are instituted. it would perhaps seem quite absurd if the task of a statesman involved being able to study ways to rule or master his neighbors. whether they are willing or not. it is possible for even a single city-state to be happy all by itself. 14. one should not hunt human beings for a feast or sacrifice. Similarly. but only over those who are fit to be ruled by a master. whereas it is quite possible to dominate unjustly. See 1 252'7-16 and note. Reading despozon with Lord and the mss. this is not what we see in the other sciences. The task of an ex­ cellent legislator. 12 and what they all say is unjust or nonbeneficial when it is done to them. but only when they are pursued for the sake of the highest end. not when they are pursued as the highest end of all. for it is not the doctor's or captain's task to use force on his patients or passengers if he cannot persuade them. but pay no attention to justice in their dealings with others. or any other community can come to have a share in a good life and in the hap­ piness that is possible for them. 1 3 . it belongs to legislative science to consider what sorts of military training are needed in relation to which sorts of people and which mea­ sures are to be used in relation to each. however. 1 3 So. For they seek just rule for themselves. 1 4 12. then. And its constitution will not be organized for the purposes of war or of dominating its enemies (for we are assuming that it has none). if indeed one is that way. therefore. and if there are neighboring peoples. that one thing is fit to be a master and another not fit to be a master. that all military practices are to be regarded as noble. There will be differences. one should not try to rule as a master over everyone. they are not ashamed to do to others. a race of men. is to study how a city-state. since it is possible for a city-state to be settled somewhere by itself and to employ excellent laws.Chapter 2 195 Yet to anyone willing to investigate the matter. of course. Yet many seem to think that statesmanship is the same as mastership. when it is not even lawful? But to rule not only justly but also unjustly is unlawful. It is absurd to deny. Certainly. 25 30 35 40 1325• 5 10 15 . Furthermore. For how could this be a political or legislative task. VII . provided it is well governed. It is clear. But the question of which end the best constitution should aim at will receive a proper investigation later. but only animals that are fit to be hunted for these purposes: and that is any wild animal that is edible. 1 3-15.

On the one hand. and that a father should disregard his children. What they say is perhaps true. For the difference between rule over free people and over slaves is no smaller than the difference be­ tween being naturally free and being a natural slave. For there is certainly nothing grand about using a slave as a slave. if indeed those who use force and commit robbery will come to possess the most choiceworthy thing there is. or a master to his slaves. it is wrong to consider that every kind of rule is rule by a master. For what is best is most choiceworthy. since it is im­ possible for someone inactive to do or act well. and that doing well and happiness are the same. and many noble things reach their end in the actions of those who are just and temperate. and doing well is best. a friend his friend. 15 On the other hand. Perhaps someone will take these conclusions to imply. and nothing contrary to nature is 1 5 . 1. that having authority over everyone is what is best. . For among those who are similar. We must reply that they are both partly right and partly wrong. and the underlying assump­ tion here is false. But perhaps they cannot come to possess it. a transgressor could never make up later for his deviation from virtue. For in that way one would have authority over the greatest number of the very noblest actions. For someone cannot do noble actions if he is not as su­ perior to those he rules as a husband is to his wife. For some rule out the holding of political office and consider that the life of a free per­ son is both different from that of a statesman and the most choiceworthy one of all. but disagree about how to practice it. But unequal shares for equals or dissimilar ones for similars is contrary to nature. however. and pay no attention to anything except ruling. For happiness is ACTION. ruling and being ruled in turn is just and noble. to praise inaction more than action is not correct either. Therefore. since ordering people to do neces­ sary tasks is in no way noble. a child his father. since this is equal or similar treatment. It would follow that someone who has the power to rule should not surren­ der it to his neighbor but take it away from him. None the less. But others consider that the political life is best.196 Politics VII Chapter 3 20 25 30 35 40 1325b 5 We must now reply to the two sides who agree that the virtuous life is most choiceworthy.4-7. a father to his children. it is true to say that the life of a free person is better than that of a master. We have adequately distinguished them in our first discussions.

then. do not necessarily have to be inactive. And even in the case of actions involving external objects. For to do or act well is the end. 17 Simi­ larly. In Book II. but also the power he needs to do these things. a city-state is politically active when it exercises leader­ ship over other city-states or has other sorts of political relations with them (see 1 327b4-6). however. whether for a whole city-state collectively or for an individual. although none should 16. it is noble to follow and just to obey him. strictly speaking. 18 the starting point for the remainder of our investigation is first to discuss the conditions that should be presupposed to exist by the ideal city-state we are about to construct. It is evident.Chapter 4 197 noble. would be a life of action. 16 Moreover. which have deliberately chosen to live that way. since ac­ tivity can take place even among their parts. 10 I5 20 25 30 Chapter 4 Since what has just been said about these matters was by way of a preface. the one who does them most fully is. the master craftsman who directs them by means of his thought. But he should possess not virtue alone. this holds for any human being taken singly. 35 . for a life of action to involve relations with other people. as some suppose. For the best constitution cannot come into existence without commensurate resources. that the same life is necessarily best both for each human being and for city-states and human beings collectively. nor are those thoughts alone active which we engage in for the sake of action's consequences. Hence we should presuppose that many circumstances are as ideal as we could wish. the study and thought that are their own ends and are engaged in for their own sake are much more so. For the parts of a city-state have many sorts of communal relationships with one another. 18. so that ACTION of a sort is the end too. 17. then the best life. and since we studied the various constitutions earlier. See 125Jb27-1254'8. city-states situated by themselves. For otherwise GOD and the entire universe could hardly be in a fine condition. and we should assume that happiness is doing well. Normally. for they have no external actions. Yet it is not necessary. If these claims are correct. Hence when someone else has superior virtue and his power to do the best things is also superior. only the internal ones proper to them.

For a great city-state is not the same as a densely populated one. and of what sort? Similarly for the territory.19 For other craftsmen-for example. A city-state that can send a large number of vulgar craftsmen out to war. the number of citizens and the size of the territory. for an overly populated city-state to be well gov­ erned. this should not be any chance multitude (for city-states inevitably contain a large number of slaves.ZZ For possessing a superior number of these is the sign of a great city-state. At any rate. those who form one of the parts from which a city-state is properly constituted. among those that are held to be nobly governed. perhaps impossible. one should say that Hippocrates21 is a greater doctor than someone who exceeds him in physical size.23 and good government must of necessity be good organization. . See 1265'17-18. they are ignorant of the quality that makes a city-state great or small. we see none that fails to restrict the size of its population. that is to say.8. 22. Argument also convinces us that this is clearly so. on the other hand. How many should there be of them. so that the city-state that is best able to complete it is the one that should be considered greatest. how large should it be. Yet even if one had to judge the greatness of a city-state by looking to the multitude. and foreigners). and the better the material that has been prepared. but only a few hoplites. cannot possibly be great. For law is a kind of organization. For that 19. and of what nature? Most people suppose that a happy city-state must be a great one. So too a statesman or legisla­ tor should be supplied with proper material in a suitable condition. For a city-state too has a task to perform. A famous fifth-century doctor from the island of Cos. a weaver or a shipbuilder-should also be supplied with suitable material to work on. the finer the product of their craft must necessarily be. Furthermore it is evident from the facts at least that it is difficult. See NE 1 098'7-20.20 Similarly. resident aliens. But an excessively large number of things cannot share in organization. 21. for example. See VII. whereas they ought to look not to number but to ability. I have in mind. 23. First among the political resources needed for a city-state is the multitude of people. 20. not a greater human being. For they judge a city-state to be great if the number of its inhabitants is large. but rather to those who are part of it.1 98 40 1326" S 10 1S 20 2S 30 Politics VII be impossible. but even if what they suppose is true. Compare 1287'18.

since the excessive size of the population makes escaping detection easy. is still no city-state. it will sail badly. For beauty is usually found in number and magnitude. It is also possible for a city-state that ex­ ceeds this one in number to be a greater city-state. that the best limit for a citystate is this: it is the greatest size of multitude that promotes life's self­ sufficiency and that can be easily surveyed as a whole. since to act haphazardly is unjust in both these proceedings. unless he has the voice of Stentor. But in order to decide lawsuits and distribute offices on the basis of merit. For example. each citizen must know what sorts of people the other citizens are. it will have its own proper ca­ pacity. Hence a city-state whose size is fixed by the aforementioned limit must also be the most beautiful. but. And a ruler's task is to issue orders and decide. For when each of them is neither too small nor too excessively large. but one that consists of too many. Stentor was a Homeric hero gifted with a very powerful voice. while it is self-sufficient in the necessities. this is not possible indefinitely. But the size of city-state. like everything else. and who. Besides. it is easy for resident aliens and foreigners to participate in the constitution. For a city-state's actions are either those of the rulers or those of the ruled. then. The size of the city-state. Similarly for a city-state: one that consists of too few people is not SELF-SUFFICIENT (whereas a city-state is self-sufficient). the way a nation is. the business of electing officials and deciding lawsuits must go badly. since it is not easy for it to have a constitution. and as it approaches a certain size. For where they do not know this. should be determined in this way. 24. But this is plainly what occurs in an overly populated city­ state. has a certain scale: animals. the sort that holds the entire universe together. and tools.Chapter 4 199 would be a task for a divine power. 35 40 13266 5 10 I5 20 25 . nor will one of two stades [twelve hundred feet]. For who will be the general of its excessively large multitude. plants. then. it will either be wholly deprived of its nature or be in poor condition. as we said. because it either is still too small or still too large. The limit to its expansion can easily be seen from the facts. otherwise. will serve as its herald?24 Hence the first city-state to arise is the one composed of the first mul­ titude large enough to be self-sufficient with regard to living the good life as a political community. a ship that is one span [seven and a half inches] long will not be a ship at all. It is clear.

If the CITY-STATE is to be ideally sited. so that crops.25 But whether this defining principle is rightly or wrongly formulated is something that must be in­ vestigated with greater precision later on. For a territory easy to survey as a whole is easy to defend. it should be large enough to enable the inhabitants to live a life of leisure in a way that is generous and at the same time temperate. and any other such materials the surrounding territory happens to possess can be easily transported to it. The relationship between ownership of property and its use is discussed in 1262b37-1263'40. luxury in the other. 27. 26. . as far as its quality is concerned. it is appropriate for it to be well situated in relation to the sea and the surrounding territory. For there are many disputes about this question raised by those who urge us to adopt one extreme form of life or the other: penury in the one case. it is clear that everyone would praise the most self-sufficient. The remaining defining principle is that the city-state should be accessible to transportation. The general investigation advertised in this passage does not appear in the Politics as we have it. euexodon: "get out of. In size or extent.200 Politics VII Chapter 5 30 35 40 1327" S Similar things hold in the case of territory. See 1265'3 1-38. 1266b24-3 1 . and how and in what way this is related to its use." But see 1 327'6-7. Chapter 6 There is much dispute about whether access to the sea is beneficial or harmful to well-governed city-states. One defining principle was mentioned above: defensive troops should have access to all parts of the territory. the same holds of the territory. as we said. For it is said that entertaining for- 25. For. when we come to discuss the question of possessions generally-what it is to be well off where property is concerned. 27 Moreover. The defining principle mentioned is endorsed at 1265'28-38. timber. And as such it must produce everything. for self-sufficiency is having everything and needing nothing. be easy to survey as a whole.26 The layout of the territory is not difficult to describe (although on some points the advice of military experts should also be taken): it should be difficult for enemies to invade and easy for the citizens to get out to. just as the multitude of people should.

29 Those who open their market to everyone do so for the revenue. City-states must also import the commodities that are not available at home and export those of which they have a surplus. so that they are neither too far away from it nor are yet parts of the same town but are kept under its authority by walls and other similar defenses. But when it comes to the number and size of these forces.Chapter 6 201 eigners as guests who have been brought up under different laws is detrimental to good government. since they should not be part of the city-state. it is quite clear that it is better for a city-state and its territory to have access to the sea. and it is they who are in authority and command the crew. it must possess naval as well as other forces adequate for its actions. And if the city-state contains a multitude of SUBJECT PEOPLES and 28. the citizens should be capable of defending themselves on both land and sea. 28 But if these conse­ quences are avoided. Even nowadays we see many territories and city-states that have ports or harbors naturally well situated in relation to the city-state. we have to consider the city-state's way of life. 15 20 25 30 35 40 1327b 5 10 . it can be prevented by means of laws that specify or define the sorts of people that should or should not have dealings with one another. For the marines who are part of the infantry are free. and if they are unable to attack their assailants on both land and sea. But there is no need for city-states to suffer the overpopulation associated with including a crowd of sailors. if they have access to both. 29. and that the overpopulation which results from having a multitude of traders who use the sea for importing and exporting is contrary to being well governed. But a city-state that should not be involved in this sort of acquisitiveness should have no market of this sort. As far as naval forces are concerned. not others. See 1277'33-h7. it will be available to the city-state. So it is evident that if any good comes from this sort of connection with a port or harbor. For a city-state should be formidable on both land and sea. at least they will be in a better position to do so on one or the other. whereas if there is any­ thing harmful. both for the purposes of safety and to ensure a ready supply of necessities. See VI. For a city-state should engage in trade for itself. If it is going to have a political life and one of leadership. able to defend not just itself but some of its neighbors as well. For to be able to withstand war more easily and ensure their own safety. 1337hl 7-2 1 . it is quite clear that it is best to have a certain amount of them.4.

it was far too large for that. That is precisely why it remains free. Matters regarding territory. That is precisely why they remain comparatively free. A sign of this is that our spirit is roused 30. For it can man many triremes.4. That is precisely why they are ruled and enslaved. then. have souls endowed with intelli­ gence and craft knowledge. The nations in cold re­ gions. and naval force. harbors. In VII. For it is both spirited and intelligent. governed in the best way. and at the way the entire inhabited world is divided into nations. are full of spirit but somewhat deficient in intelligence and craft knowledge. if it chances upon a single constitution.32 and that spirit is what makes them be friendly. Plato. whereas in others both of these capacities are well blended. One may pretty much grasp what these qualities are by looking at those Greek city-states that have a good reputation. however. but they lack spirit. Republic 37Sb-376c. 32.202 15 Politics VII farmers. It is evident. despite being more modest in size than many other city-states. he is supposing that it might consist of different city-states that are friendly to one another be­ cause (unlike Sparta and Athens) they have the same kind of constitution. Aristotle cannot be supposing that all of Greece might form a single city­ state. . For some have a nature that is onesided. and so shares in both sets of characteristics. but are apolitical and incapable of ruling their neigh­ bors. of ruling all the others. Those in Asia. occupies an in­ termediate position geographically. particularly Europe. city-states. For spirit is the capacity of the soul by which we feel friendship. then. Presumably. should be determined in this way. that both spirit and intelligence should be present in the natures of people if they are to be easily guided to virtue by the legislator. then. and capable. in the city-state of Hera­ clea. 3 1 . on the other hand. there cannot be any shortage of sailors. Some say that guardians should have precisely this quality: they must be friendly to those they know and fierce to those they do not. We see this happening in certain city-states even now-for example.30 Let us now discuss what sort of natural qualities they should have. The Greek race.31 Greek nations also differ from one another in these ways. Chapter 7 20 25 30 35 40 We spoke earlier about what limit there should be on the number of cit­ izens. the sea.

they consider themselves to have been deprived of the benefit companions owe to one another. But it is not correct to claim that guardians should be harsh to those they do not know. For communities should have one thing that is common and the same for all their members. 35."33 Ruling and being free invariably derive from this capacity. Presumably. 25 30 . and likewise for any other community that constitutes a single type of thing. Archilochus was a seventh-century poet from Paros. whether they share in it equally or unequally: for example. though they are harsher to companions they think are wronging them. The first quotation is from Euripides (Nauck 672."34 Enough has now been determined about the people who should par­ ticipate in politics. Rather. 975). for example. Hence the sayings: "Wars among brothers are harsh" and "Those who have loved excessively will hate excessively. 34. fr. the things that it cannot exist without are not all parts of it. too. 35 1328• 5 10 IS 20 Chapter 8 Since. 33. when Archilochus was complaining about his friends. the relationship of every tool or craftsman to the work produced. fr. clearly the things that are necessary for the existence of a city-state should not be assumed to be parts of it either. For the house and the builder have nothing in common. a piece of territory.Chapter S 203 more against associates and friends who we think have slighted us than against strangers. as in the case of every other naturally constituted whole. except to wrongdoers. because no theoretical discussion can take account of all the empirical details (observation or perception must provide these). and about the size and type of the city-state's territory. it was appropriate for him to say to his spirit: "It is you who are choked with rage against your friends. fr. as we said earlier. since one should not treat anyone in this way. Nor are magnanimous people naturally harsh. they have nothing in common except that one produces and the other gets produced. We should not expect theo­ retical discussions to provide the same precision as what comes through perception.230. or something else of this sort. For in addition to the wrong they have suffered. I mean. for spirit is both imperious and in­ domitable. 67b. their number and their natural qualities. food. But whenever one thing is for the sake of an­ other and the other is the end for whose sake it is. And it is reasonable that this should be so. 78) is from an unknown author. Diehl !. Hence. the second (Nauck 854.

Second. however. priests.36 and since. Sixth. For what we are calling the parts of a city-state would of necessity be included among them. 37. For a city-state is not just any chance multitude. What is necessary is what justice requires (see 1328b l 4). 38. 39 36. 130 1"25-33. Hence a city-state must be organized around these tasks. Vl.3. as we say. and most necessary of all. l-7. there should be a food supply. That is why. 39. but a city-state is a community of similar people aiming at the best possible life. Compare IV. Deliberative judgment concerns what is beneficial. crafts (for life needs many tools). a community cannot be unqualifiedly self-sufficient. but of primary importance. though city­ states need property. For it is by seeking happiness in different ways and by different means that individual groups of people create different ways of life and differ­ ent constitutionsY But we must also investigate the question of how many of these things there are that a city-state cannot exist without. Among the parts of property are many living things. So there should be a multitude of farmers to provide the food. and people to decide matters of necessity and benefit. craftsmen. IV. judgment about what is beneficial and what is just in their relations with one another. since this will make the answer clear. Fifth. and it is some sort of acti­ vation or complete exercise of virtue. it is clear that this is why there are several kinds and varieties of city-state and a plurality of constitutions. rich people. 38 These. as it happens. . some people are able to share in happiness. Fourth. So we must determine the number of tasks there are. 130 Jb29-1 302•2. See Introduction xxxi-xxxv. Third. but one that is self-sufficient with regard to life.6. for the members of the commu­ nity must also have weapons of their own. are the tasks that need to be done in practically speaking every city-state. both in order to rule (since there are people who disobey) and in order to deal with outsiders who attempt to wrong them. both for inter­ nal needs and for wars. then. whereas others are able to do so only to a small degree or not at all. soldiers. property is not a part of a city-state. the supervi­ sion of religious matters. Since happiness is the best thing. a ready supply of wealth.204 35 40 I328h S I0 IS 20 Politics VII the builder's craft is for the sake of the house. judicial judgment what is just or unjust (see 1 328h6-7). First. which is called a priesthood. weapons. and if any of these tasks is lacking.

then. See Introduction. Nor should those who are going to be citizens engage in farming. it remains to investigate whether everyone should share in all the tasks we mentioned (for it is possible for all the same people to be farmers. and since it is evident that these. the citizens should not live the life of a vulgar craftsman or tradesman. as was said earlier-it evidently follows that in a city-state governed in the finest manner. is for the constitution to assign both tasks to the same people. in that one requires practical wisdom and the other physical strength. and in another they should be assigned to different ones. 25 30 35 40 132(}' 5 10 . The only course remaining. For lives of these sorts are ignoble and inimical to virtue. should these tasks also be assigned to different people. l-5. or are both to be assigned to the same people? This is also evident. Since we are investigating the best constitution. On the other hand. since leisure is needed both to develop virtue and to engage in political actions. II. deliberators and judges). as we said.40 for everyone to share every task. For those who control the weapons also control whether a constitution will survive or not. or whether different people should be assigned to each of them. more than anything else. they should be assigned to dif­ ferent people. or for not everyone to share in every task. whereas others can be shared by everyone. For example. but certain people in certain ones. craftsmen. lxvi-lxvii. But it is not the same in every constitution. but not at the same time. however. the one that would make a city-state most happy-and happiness cannot exist apart from virtue. whereas in oligarchies it is the opposite. For since the best time for each of the two tasks is different. or whether some tasks are necessarily specialized. possessing men who are unqualifiedly just (and not given certain assumptions41). For it is possible. for this reason the two tasks should be assigned to the same people. But since the best city-state contains both a military part and one that deliberates about what is beneficial and makes judgments about what is just. In democracies everyone shares in everything. be­ cause in one way the tasks should be assigned to the same people.Chapter 9 205 Chapter 9 Having determined these matters. since it 40. For these differences too make constitutions differ. are parts of the city-state. since those capable of using and re­ sisting force cannot possibly tolerate being ruled continuously. those that a deviant constitution makes about the nature of justice. Instead. For example. 41.

some per­ manently. the property should belong to them. since it is appropriate for the gods to be honored by citizens. so all the parts must have virtue. and how many parts of a city-state there are. then. We have now discussed the things without which a city-state cannot be constituted. the military and the deliberative. Its organization is also evident. But because the political or citizen class is divided into two parts. and because it is appropriate for those who have retired because of age to render service to the gods and find rest. since the farmers must be either slaves or non-Greek subject peoples. nor does any other class whose members are not "craftsmen of virtue.206 IS 20 25 30 35 Politics VII is natural for physical strength to be found among younger men and practical wisdom among older ones. craftsmen. The best constitution must be happy. For it is still this way even 42. For happiness necessarily ac­ companies virtue. seem not to be the only ones to recognize that a city-state should be divided into separate classes. vul­ gar craftsmen cannot have virtue. happiness goes along with virtue. Moreover. 43. Farmers. whether nowadays or in recent times. only the class of priests remains. but the military and deliberative classes are a city­ state's parts. but by looking at all the citizensY It is also evident that the property should be theirs. since this division is based on merit. Chapter 1 0 40 1329" Those who philosophize about constitutions. and that the military class should be different from the class of farmers. and the laboring class generally are necessary for the exis­ tence of city-states. others by turns. No farmer or vulgar craftsman should be appointed a priest. and a city-state must not be called happy by looking at just a part. Republic 500d. it is beneficial and just to assign the tasks to each group on the basis of age. Plato. For the class of vulgar craftsmen does not participate in the city-state. . Each of these classes is separate from the others. a constitution is happy if all its parts are. hence they cannot be parts of the best constitution."42 This is clear from our basic assumption. hence they cannot be happy. Of the things we listed earlier. and these people are the citizens. For the citizens must be well supplied with resources. the priesthoods should be assigned to them.

45 It was Italus. for the kingship of Sesostris is much earlier than that of Minos. That all such matters are ancient is indicated by the facts about Egypt. who were then (as now) called Ausonians. 45. Timaeus 24b. but those in Italy are much older. and first introduced messes. we explained why the class of farmers should be different from them. The separation of the political multitude into classes.46 Hence we should suppose that the same is true of matters pertaining to constitutions. 46. were the Chonians. Sesostris having made such a law for Egypt. For the Egyptians are held to be the most ancient people. Those living near Tyrrhenia were the Opicians. Local his­ torians say that the Oenotrians changed their name to Italians when a certain I talus who settled there became their king. Therefore. and Minos for Crete. they arose in Crete during the reign of Minos. indeed. See Herodotus II. but also try to investigate whatever has been overlooked. on the other hand.Chapter 10 207 today in Egypt and Crete. Our first task now is to dis­ cuss the distribution of land. the things that add refinement and luxury to life quite naturally develop. and they have always had laws and a political organization. and once they are present. See 1264'5 and note. so it is said. in a region called Siritis. and we discussed how much territory there should be and of what sort. those living near Iapygia and the Ionian Gulf. l 64-67. We do not agree with those who claim that 44. as well as some of his other laws. Plato. that pretty well everyth�ng else too has been discovered many times. enacted laws for them. We said earlier that the territory should belong to those who possess weapons and participate in the constitution. It was because of him that the promontory of Europe that lies between the Gulfs of Scylletium and Lametius (which are a half-day's journey apart) was given the name Italy. For our needs are likely to teach the necessities. So it was in this region that messes were first or­ ganized. one should make adequate use of what has been discovered. 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 . who the farmers should be. who made the nomadic Oenotrians into farmers. and what sort of people they should be. or rather an infinite number of times. originated in Egypt. We should take it. they say. 2099-2061 . That is why some of his descendants still use messes even today. who were related to the Oenotrians by race. in the long course of history.44 MESSES also seem to be an ancient organization. The area referred to is the "toe" of modern Italy between the Gulfs of Squillace and Eufernia. Sesostris or Senusret III was king of Egypt c.

49. See Oec. one of which is communal and another that belongs to private individuals. For wherever things are not this way. with two allotments assigned to each citizen. but it should be commonly used. but ensures greater unanimity in the face of wars with neighbors. the land must be divided in the way we described. so that. A promise unfulfilled in the Politics as we have it. expenses relating to the gods should be shared in common by the entire city-state. since they would then be useful workers. As a second best. they should be non-Greek subject peoples. And each of these must again be divided in two: one part of the communal land should be used to support public services to the gods. similar in nature to the slaves just mentioned. Those who work on private land should be the private possessions of the own­ ers. ideally speaking. some citi­ zens make light of feuds with bordering city-states. . because their private interests are thought to prevent them from deliberating well. those who work on the communal land should be communal prop­ erty. (Our own reasons for agreeing with this will be stated later. the other near the city-state. one part of the private land should be located near the fron­ tiers. )48 All the citizens should participate in these meals. Later we shall discuss how slaves should be treated and why it is better to hold out freedom as a reward to all slaves. all of them may share in both locations. everyone agrees that it is useful for well-orga­ nized city-states to have them. This not only ac­ cords with justice and equality.49 47. That is why some city-states have a law that prohibits those who dwell close to the border from par­ ticipating in deliberations about whether to go to war with neighboring peoples. 1 344b l l-2 1 . Introduction lxxvi-lxxviii. even though it is not easy for the poor to contribute the required amount from their private resources and maintain the rest of their household as well. So the territory must be divided into two parts.208 1 330" S 10 1S 20 25 30 Politics VII property should be communally owned. Furthermore. The promised further discussion is missing from the Politics as we have it. then. 48. un­ likely to stir up change.47 As for messes. they should be racially heterogeneous and spiritless slaves. as it is among friends. For these reasons. the other to defray the cost of messes. As for the farmers. while others are overly and ignobly concerned about them. See 1 263'2 1-41. and no citizen should be in need of suste­ nance.

35 40 133rJ 5 10 15 20 . and water and air are by nature of this sort. and indeed to its entire territory. and second. Hence if it happens that all the springs are not equally healthy or if the healthy ones are not abundant. The same type of fortification is not beneficial for all constitutions. But if it does not. 5° The first is health. well-planned city-states should keep apart those suitable for drinking from those used for other pur­ poses. and order or beauty (see 1 33Qb3 1 . toward the winds that blow from the direction of the rising sun. on using healthy water supplies. should have neither of these. For the things our bodies use most frequently and in the greatest quantity contribute most to health. An aristocracy. this too should be matter of more than incidental concern. For example. City-states that slope toward the east. and military re­ quirements. As regards its own situation.Chapter 11 209 Chapter 1 1 We said earlier that a city-state should have as much access to land and sea. since it is a necessity. Reading pros hauten at '36 with Dreizehnter and the mss. Hippodamus of Miletus: see U. clean water. since they have milder winters. the city-state should be easy for the citizens themselves to march out from but difficult for their enemies to approach and blockade. the construction of many large reservoirs for rain water has been found as a way to prevent the supply from running short when the citizens are kept away from their territory by war. It should also possess a plentiful water supply of its own. are healthier. 1 33 1' 12).S. as circumstances allow. on the other hand. A further factor is that the city-state should be well sited for political and military activities. Since we must of necessity consider the health of the inhabitants. 51. military requirements. one should ideally determine its site by looking to four factors. Those that slope away from the north wind are second healthiest. political requirements. political requirements. especially springs. As regards military activities. but rather a number of strongholds. one on level ground for a democracy. The four factors could be either fresh air. or health (which is largely a matter of fresh air and clean water). the modern Hippodamean51 scheme of laying them out in straight rows is considered pleasanter and 50. Where private dwellings are concerned. an acropolis [hill fort] is suitable for an oligarchy or a monarchy. and it depends on the city-state being well situated on healthy ground and facing in a healthy direction. that is.

Laws 778d-779b. The level of nonheroic virtue achievable by most humans ( 1295•25-3 1 ). when it comes to security in wartime. it should take care to ensure that they both enhance the beauty of the city-state and satisfy military requirements. which prevailed in ancient times. . but not the city-state as a whole. but it can and does happen that the superior numbers of the attackers are too much for human virtue56 or the virtue of a small number of people. But this is a very old-fashioned notion. This is possible if the houses are laid out like vine "clumps" (as some farmers call them). especially those brought 52.): "difficult to get out of" (dusexodos). Ross. 53 that is. the opposite plan. Hence the best city-state should share in the features of both plans. we should not forget that the inhabitants of a city-state with surrounding walls can treat it either as having walls or as not having them. is thought to be better. a city-state not only should have surrounding walls. when it was invaded by the Theban Epaminondas ( 1 269h37). Probably an allusion to Sparta. Reading duseisodos with Richards. Alternatively (mss. Especially when it is plain to see that city-states that pride themselves on not having walls are refuted by the facts. See 1 330h2-3. 55 It may not be noble to seek safety behind fortified walls against an evenly matched or only slightly more numerous foe. 53. To claim that city-states should not have sur­ rounding walls is like flattening the mountains and trying to make the territory easy to invade. and suffered humiliating defeat in 369. and battering rams had all been fairly recently in­ troduced. 54. siege towers. For it makes it difficult for foreign troops to enter52 and for attackers to find their way around. 56. In this way. See Plato. But. The virtue in question is primarily courage (see 1331'6). or like not having walls for private houses. Furthermore. Some people say54 that city-states that lay claim to virtue should not have walls. Hence if the city-state is to survive without suffering harm or arrogant treatment. particularly now that the invention of projectiles and siege engines57 has reached such a high degree of precision. both safety and beauty will be well served.210 25 30 35 40 1331• 5 10 Politics VII more useful for general purposes. on the grounds that they make the inhabitants cowardly. Catapults. it should be left to military expertise to determine what the most secure kind of fortified walls are for it to have. which prided itself on having no walls. 55. 57. whereas the inhabitants of a city-state without walls lack this option. Given that this is how things stand. if certain parts and areas are laid out in straight rows. and others. A vine clump was laid out like the five spots on a die.

conveniently located for collecting together goods sent in from both land and sea. while the older men should spend time with the other officials. That.): "This site should be adequately conspicuous as a place of virtue (epiphaneian . Some of the of­ ficials should spend their time with the younger men.Chapter 12 211 to light by recent discoveries." and named as such in Thessaly. 20 25 30 35 40 13J1b 5 . For when people are well prepared in the first place. though some defensive devices have already been discovered. and the principal messes for officials. on the other hand. Below this site. farmers. so too. . For j ust as attackers are always busily con­ cerned with new ways to get the better of city-states. The place would have added appeal if the gymnasia for adults were situated there. This site should be adequate for the display of virtue58 and also better fortified than the neighboring parts of the city-state. or the like may enter unless summoned by officials. But as for the buildings assigned to the gods. . accepted by Ross and Pellegrin. is how one might arrange these matters. it is fitting to establish the kind of marketplace called "free. it is fitting for them to be located together on a suitable site (except in the case of temples as­ signed a separate location by the law or the Delphic Oracle). It is also fitting that these be organized by division into age groups. defenders should keep searching for and thinking out new ones. As for the boards of officials that supervise con- 58. it is fitting too for the messes of the priests to be located in the vicinity of the temples. and the kind of fear appropriate to free people. thesin). It should have a separate site. epiphaneian with Thomas and Lord. Since the city-state's governing class60 is divided into priests and offi­ cials. ." 59. Reading thesin . For being under the eyes of the officials is what most engenders true shame. Alternatively (mss. 60. The mss. no one even thinks of attacking them. The marketplace for merchandise. Reading onomazousin at '32 with Dreizehnter and the mss. and that no vulgar craftsmen. then. have plethos ("multitude"). and the walls should have guard houses and towers in suitable places. . gives a better sense. 15 Chapter 1 2 Since the multitude of citizens should be assigned to messes. should be different from the free one. clearly some messes should be provided in these guard houses. 59 This is one that should be kept clear of all merchandise. Newman's proestos ("the governing class").

212 IO 15 20 Politics VII tracts. others. as well as those that deal with marketplace management and so-called town management. These factors can be in harmony with one another or in disharmony. and from which and what sorts of people a city-state should be constituted if it is to be a blessedly happy and well governed. in medicine it sometimes happens that doctors are neither correct in their judgment about what condition a healthy body should be in. In all cases. It would be a waste of time. 61 Hence any further discussion of them may be set aside for the present. they should have buildings near the marketplace or in some public meeting place in the vicinity of the "neces­ sary" marketplace. Sometimes they make both mistakes. legal indictments. more if we are in a worse one. summonses. It is evident that everyone aims at living well and at happiness. and sometimes they achieve everything that promotes the end. however. For the upper marketplace is intended for leisurely activities. for necessary ones. to speak about such things in detail here. some temples dedicated to gods and others to heroes have to be distributed throughout the countryside. For people sometimes set up the end well but fail to achieve it in action. the end and the actions directed toward it. . but the end they set up is a bad one. well-being consists in two things: setting up the aim and end of action correctly and discover­ ing the actions that bear on it. In the crafts and sciences both of these have to be under control. cannot. The organization of the country areas should mimic the one just de­ scribed. just hard to do. For the officials that some call foresters and others country managers must have messes and guard houses in order to promote secu­ rity. and other administrative matters of that sort. Others. See 1 332'28-32 for a more careful statement. though they could 6 1 . the task of good luck is to bring them about. Speaking about them is a task for ideal theory. nor successful in producing the condition they have set up as their end. although we need fewer of them if we are in a better condition. whether because of luck or because of something in their nature. Moreover. the lower. Chapter 1 3 25 30 35 40 1332" But we must now discuss the constitution itself. But while some can achieve these ends. For we also need resources in order to live a good life. For example. For they are not hard to think out.

and since a city-state is best governed under a constitution that would above all make it possible for the city-state to be happy. since it would be more choiceworthy if no individual or city-state needed such things. A city-state is excellent. We say. 1 10 1 '14-17. Clearly. by "unqualified" I mean those that are NOBLE. and others): "destruction (anairesis). Reading hairesis with the mss. and in our city-state all the 62. his use of them must also be un­ qualifiedly good and noble. That is why we pray that our city-state will be ideally equipped with the goods that luck controls (for we assume that luck does control them). For according to the definition established in our ethical works. it is clear that we should not overlook the question of what happiness actually is. 5 10 15 20 25 30 . For example. These things must be done if justice is to be served. but are necessary uses of it. That is why people think that external GOODS are the causes of happiness. See NE 1 098'7-20. Alternatively (Ross. The former involve choosing63 something that is somehow bad. that happiness is a complete ac­ tivation or use of virtue. Dreizehnter. that some goods must be there to start with. and this is the one under which a city-state will be best governed. 63. whereas others must be provided by the legislator. search for i t i n the wrong place from the outset.Chapter 13 213 achieve happiness. an excellent man is the sort whose virtue makes unqualifiedly good things good for him. and we have given this definition in our ethical works (if any­ thing in those discussions is of service)." Both punishment and retribution involve choos­ ing to do bad things to someone in order to bring about a good or just end. however. in the case of just actions. because the citizens who participate in the constitution are excellent. Yet we might as well hold that a lyre is the cause of fine and brilliant lyre playing. and are noble only in a necessary way. To be sure. 62 By "qualified uses" I mean those that are necessary. and other sorts of bad luck in a noble way. and not a qualified use but an unqualified one. just actions that aim at honors and prosperity are unqualifiedly noblest. then. 1 102'5-7. an excellent man will deal with poverty. but no just person would choose to do them simply for their own sake. and not the performer's craft. It follows. But since we are proposing to look at the best constitution. On the other hand. just retributions and punishments spring from virtue. disease. When we come to making the city-state excellent. however. But blessed happiness requires their opposites. then. that is no longer a task for luck but one for scientific knowledge and deliberate choice. from what has been said. whereas the latter are the opposite: they construct and generate goods.

Scylax of Caryanda in Caria was a geographer of the late sixth century. Now if they differed from one another as much as gods and he­ roes are believed to differ from human beings. and reason. For clearly their education must correspond to this division. therefore. Evidently. if they happen to be persuaded that some other course of action is better. others by instruction. For even if it is possible for all the citizens to be collectively excellent without being so individu­ ally. See Herodotus 4. [3] But human beings live under the guidance of reason as well. .7. The three are nature. there is no benefit in just being born with them. since they alone have reason. 66. But in the case of some of these qualities. as Scylax66 says there are in India. and not that of some other an­ imal. one's body and soul must be of a certain sort.214 35 40 13J2b S 10 Politics VII CITIZENS participate in the constitution. kings that are so superior to the ruled. 64. [2] For some qualities are naturally capable of being developed by habit either in a better direction or in a worse one. 64 For people often act contrary to their habits and their nature because of reason. 65. is how a man becomes excellent. first in body and then in soul. We have already determined65 the sorts of natures people should have if it is to be easy for the legislator to take them in hand. although some are guided a little by habit. all three of these factors need to be harmonized with one another. that of a human. if the former were so greatly superior. But surely people become excellent because of three things. The matter we have to investigate. For first [I] one must possess a certain na­ ture from birth. because they are altered by our habits. we must investigate whether rulers and ruled should be the same or different throughout life. See 1 334b6-28 for further explanation. namely. The other animals mostly live under the guidance of nature alone. Similarly. Chapter 14 IS 20 Since every political community is composed of rulers and ruled. that their superiority was indisputable and manifest to those they ruled-it would clearly be alto­ gether better if the same people always ruled and the others were always ruled. since if each is excellent. and there are not. the latter is still more choiceworthy. habit. For some things are learned by habituation. Consequently.44. At VII. Everything thereafter is a task for EDUCATION. all are. But this is not easy to achieve.

however. the legislator 67.72 and that the same man should be ruled first and a ruler later. For if someone is going to rule well. 1325b7-10. 68 for nature itself settled the choice by making part of the same species younger and part older. on that for the sake of which they are performed.Chapter 14 215 then. See l277b l l-13 note. For equality consists in giving the same to those who are alike. particularly when they are going to be compensated for their contribution69 when they reach the proper age.70 As we said in our first discussions/1 however. See 1261"30-b5. At 1329'2-17. and for many different reasons. The contribution (eranos) the young make is their obedience to their elders. For the difference between noble and shameful actions does not lie so much in the acts themselves as in their ends.67 and it is difficult for a constitution to last if its organization is contrary to justice. the latter rule over free people. See 111. We discussed this earlier. 72. 1293b5-6.4. Now some commands differ not with respect to the tasks they assign but with respect to that for the sake of which they are done. there is a kind of rule that is for the sake of the ruler and a kind that is for the sake of the ruled. For young people do not object to being ruled. True because Aristotle is discussing the best constitution. Since we say that the virtue of a citizen or ruler is the same as that of the best man. 68. Consequently. their education too must be in one way the same and in another different. At l277'29-1277b l 6. as the saying goes. the former fit to be ruled and the latter to rule. or think themselves better than their rulers. Hence the legislator should investigate the question of how this is to achieved. and the governing class cannot possibly be numerous enough to be more powerful than all of them. Surely it is indisputable. and how they should share with one another. 69. The former. That is why it is noble even for free young men to perform many of the tasks that are held to be appropriate for slaves. 1332'32-35. that the rulers should be different from the ruled. 1288'37-39. 1316b9-10. that rulers and ruled are in one way the same and in another different. 70. they are compensated when they are older by being obeyed in turn. 25 30 35 40 1333• 5 10 . we say. For the citizens being ruled will be joined by those in the surrounding territory who want to stir up change. it is necessary for all to share alike in ruling and being ruled in turn. 71. he should first have been ruled. We must conclude. l278b30-1279'21. therefore. is rule by a master.

but even better able to remain at peace and leisure. and legislate in a way that suits the parts of the soul and their actions. A statesman must. 74. and of actions some are necessary or useful. But the whole of life too is divided into work and leisure. look to all these things. good. And he should legislate in the same way where life and the divisions74 of actions are concerned. particularly to those that are better and those that are ends. but instead were vulgarly inclined to promote 73. and the legislators who established their constitutions. It is evident. war and peace. and it. necessary and useful things for the sake of noble ones. both when they are still children and whenever else they need education. in accor­ dance with our usual way of dividing. The divisions are those re­ ferred to in the opening sentence of the paragraph. and those that belong to the naturally better part must be more choiceworthy to anyone who can carry out all or only two of them. Reading diaireseis with Newman and the mss. But the part that has reason is better. to those who make the distinction we mentioned it is not unclear what must be said. however.216 15 20 25 30 35 40 I 333h 5 Politics VII should make it his business to determine how and through what practices men become good. So it is clear that the rational part of the soul must also be divided in the same manner. but better able to perform noble ones. others noble. Actions too. For one should be able to work or go to war. therefore. War must be chosen for the sake of peace. that those Greeks who are currently held to be best governed. For the worse part is always for the sake of the better. able to perform necessary or useful actions. are divided analogously. did not organize the various aspects of their constitutions to promote the best end. See Introduction xlvi-xlvii. Nor did they organize their laws and educational system to promote all the virtues. one of which has reason intrinsi­ cally. and we say that the virtues of the latter entitle a man to be called. whereas the other does not. we will say. is divided in two: for there is practical reason and theoretical reason. As to the question of which of these the end is more particularly found in. but is capable of listening to it. work for the sake of leisure. in a certain way. These then are the aims that should be kept in view when educating citizens. and this is as evident in the products of the crafts as it is in those of nature. The SOUL is divided into two parts.73 For what is most choiceworthy for each individual is always this: to attain what is highest. and what the end of the best life is. . And the same choice must be made among these as among the parts of the soul and their actions.

1324b5-l l . Moreover. that the legislator should give more serious attention to how to organize his legislation. both the part that deals with military affairs and the part that deals with other matters. The constitutions held to be best governed include Sparta and Crete. Besides. first. What they say is easy to refute by argument. nor are they beneficial or true. For they praise the Spartan constitution and express admiration for the aim of its legislator. but. See 1307'2-5. second. and that their legislator is not a good one. Pausanias. that the Spartans are not a happy people. For clearly any citizen who is able to should also try to acquire the power to rule his own city-state. 77. The other writers referred to presumably include Xenophon. of doing. one should not consider a citystate happy or praise its legislator because he trained it to conquer and rule its neighbors. For the same things are best both for individuals and for communities. because his entire legislation was intended to pro­ mote conquest and war.75 Some later writers have expressed the same opinion in the same spirit. 78. Both facts and arguments testify. then. 133 4'2-b5. since such things involve great harm. then. and it is these that a legislator should implant in the souls of human beings. 75. it is absurd if it was by keeping to his laws and putting them into practice without impediment that they lost their fine way of life.Chapter 14 217 the ones held to be more useful and more conducive to acquisition. to pursue a position of leadership in order to benefit the ruled. See 1325'3 4. not to be masters of all of them. even though he held so high an office. to avoid becoming enslaved to others. They are also incorrect in their conception of the sort of rule a legislator should be seen to honor. And Thibron and all these other writers76 are no different: they admire the Spartan legislator because by training the Spartans to face danger he enabled them to rule over many. Thibron is otherwise unknown. to be masters of those who deserve to be slaves.78 Arguments and laws of this sort are not worthy of a statesman.41. and. And yet it is clear. now that their empire is no longer in their hands at any rate. For rule over free people is nobler and more virtuous than rule by a master. and has now been refuted by the facts too. 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 1334• . 77 Yet this is precisely what the Spartans accused their king. Training in war should not be un­ dertaken for the sake of reducing those who do not deserve it to slavery. For most human beings are eager to rule as masters over many because it provides a ready supply of the goods of luck. The same criticism of them is leveled at 1271'41-blO. 76. third.

who live in the isles of the blessed. but come to ruin once they have acquired empire. and endurance.218 S 10 Politics VII for the sake of peace and leisure. people like those. if there are any. For the difference between the Spartans and 79. as has been said repeatedly. Courage and endurance are required for work. but others do so while one is at work. 79 That is why it is appropriate for our city-state to have temperance. For many necessities must be present in order for leisure to be possible. Works and Days 168-73. peace is the end of war. For. but the enjoyment of good luck and the leisure that accompanies peace tend to make them arrogant. Chapter 15 iS 20 25 30 JS 40 Since it is evident that human beings have the same end. by those who are held to be doing best and who enjoy all the things regarded as blessings. 80 as the poets call them. why a city-state that is to be happy and good should share in these virtues. and since the best man and the best constitution must of necessity have the same aim. but It is even more shameful to be unable to make use of them in leisure time-to make it plain that we are good men when working or at war. Much justice and temperance are needed. who did not educate them to be able to be at leisure. then. courage. there­ fore. and people who are unable to face danger courageously are the slaves of their attackers. For as the proverb says. Some of the virtues useful for leisure and LEISURED PURSUITS accomplish their task while one is actually at leisure. but slaves when at peace and leisure. And the acquisition and proper use of these goods requires the virtues con­ nected with work. and justice the more they live at leisure amidst an abundance of such goods. and temperance and justice for both. But the one responsible is their legislator. it is evident that the virtues suit­ able for leisure should be present in both. For it is shameful to be unable to make use of good things. Like an iron sword. philosophy for leisure. temperance. and leisure of work. For war compels people to be just and temperate. That is why one should not cultivate virtue as the citystate of the Spartans does. It is evident. they lose their edge when they remain at peace. but particularly for peace and leisure. 80. For they will be most in need of philosophy. both individu­ ally and collectively. . there is no leisure for slaves. For most city-states of the sort de­ scribed remain secure while they are at war. See Hesiod.

See Introduction §4-6. 81. This much at least is evident. and ignore the virtue that is exercised in leisure. habit. 82. wish.] But it is evident from what we have said. See Plato. 86 That is why supervision of the body comes first and precedes that of the soul. For spirit. and reason. We have already determined83 the natural qualities our citizens should have. 85. but that they believe that these goods are obtained by means of a particular virtue. has a starting point. The bracketed material is conjectural.Chapter 15 219 others is not that they consider different things to be the greatest goods. 86. 84. like the production of any other kind of thing. one that is nonrational and one that has reason. And just as the development of the body is prior to that of the soul. At VII. It remains to study whether they are to be educated through reason first or through habits. and that of the body for the sake of the soul. so we see that the soul has two parts as well.81 We distinguished earlier82 three requirements: nature. then comes supervision of appetite or desire. This too is evident. The correct supposition about what happiness is. [they train themselves only in the virtue that is useful for acquiring them. There is a gap in the text at 1334b4. 1 3J4b 5 10 1S 20 25 . and also appetite are present in children right from birth. We must now study how and through what means this will come about. At 1332'38-b11.7. Second. 83. Their states are also two in number. so the nonrationa! part is prior to the rational. and some starting points have ends that are the starting points of further ends. 85 Hence they are the ends that procreation and the training of our habits should be organized to promote. whereas rea­ soning and understanding naturally develop as they grow older. For the harmony between those should be the best kind of harmony. But supervision of desire should be for the sake of understanding. But reason and understanding constitute our natural end. First. just as soul and body are two. And because they consider these goods and the enjoyment of them to be better than the enjoyment of the virtues. desire and understanding. For it is possible for someone's reason to have missed the best supposition84 and for him to be led similarly astray by his habits. procreation. that [the latter virtue should be cultivated] on its own account. Republic 44l a-b.

a man's fertility comes to an end at a maximum age of seventy. as happens when the man is still capable of procreat­ ing but the woman is not. so that they reach the same stage of life at the same time: that is to say. since the gratitude of children is of no benefit to older fa­ thers. the wellknown oracle was given to the Troezenians not because of anything to do with the harvest but because their custom of marrying off younger 87. In all those city-states in which the coupling of young men and women is the local custom. For in all animals the young are more likely to bear offspring that are imperfect. or when the woman is capable and the man not. and when. For there is less respect for them. or undersized. the legislator should see to it from the start that the bodies of children being reared develop in the best possible way. female. . For children should not be too far removed in age from their fathers. According to some accounts. The partnership or community consisting of husband and wife (12S2b l 0). Hence the beginning of their sexual union should be so timed that they reach their decline si­ multaneously.220 Politics VII Chapter 16 30 35 40 1335• 5 10 15 20 Since. The following is evidence of this. and more of them die in childbirth. Second. But they should not be too close in age either. as for contemporaries. These results can pretty well all be achieved by a single sort of super­ vision. In legislating for this community. however. there should be no disharmony between their procreative powers. and the closeness in age leads to conflict over the management of the house­ hold. he must first supervise the union of the sexes. since this leads to many difficulties.87 he should have regard both to the people involved and to their life spans. then. and so the same must occur in human beings as well. and a woman's at fifty. Third. Next. The coupling of young people. For in the majority of cases. the legislator should ensure that the bodies of those who are born are as he wishes. and the assistance of such fathers is of no benefit to their children. to return to the point at which we began this digression. indeed. he should have regard to the difference in age between parents and children. since these things cause conflicts and disagreements among couples. is a bad thing from the point of view of childbearing. people's bodies are imperfect and undersized. young women have longer labors. and determine what sorts of people should have marital relations with one another.

they will be at the beginning of their prime when their father's period of vigor has come to an end. Hence it takes a lot of nourishment to replace. and natural scientists have discussed the winds.93 It is sufficient to speak of it in outline now. If a young man has frequent sexual intercourse (as he no doubt would with a licentious young wife). for the women to be married at around the age of eighteen. As to difference in age between parents and children. Dreizehnter. his growth is likely to suffer. 93. at around the age of seventy. with regard to temperance or chastity. as can reasonably be expected. favoring northerly over southerly ones. if males have sex while their bodies89 are still growing. For doctors have adequately discussed the times that are right as regards the body. 92. as for the season. This promise is unfulfilled in the Politics as we have it. therefore. if the children are born soon after marriage occurs. sexual union will occur when their bodies are in their prime. 25 30 35 40 1335h 5 . Reading e mikron proteron with Kraut. one should use the time many people use." 90. Neither the physical condition of athletes nor one that is overly reliant on medical treatment and poorly suited to exertion is useful from the point of view of health or procreation. Alternatively (Ross. this is held to impair their growth. and others): "if males have sex while their semen (spermatos) is still growing. how­ ever.90 It is fitting. for this growth too takes a definite period of time. 91. and will end. Fourth. In Aristotle's biological the­ ory. because the nourishment needed for it will be ex­ pended to produce semen. since women who have had sex when they are young are held to be more licentious. male semen is a very concentrated or "concocted" blood product. at the time when they cease to be fertile. after which it is no longer extensive. or is 88. Laws 747d-e. Omitting e mikron with Dreizehnter and Kraut. Reading siimatos with Pellegrin and some mss. it is beneficial for women to be given in marriage when they are older. couples should study for themselves what is said by doctors and natural scientists about procreation. conveniently for both. the men at thirty-seven or a little before.91 At those ages. we must deal with that topic at greater length in our discussion of the supervision of children. For nowadays they cor­ rectly set aside the winter as the time to begin this sort of cohabitation.Chapter 16 221 women resulted in so many deaths.92 As to the bodily characteristics in parents that are most beneficial to the offspring being produced. 88 Third. The scholiasts tell us that the oracle in question said: "Do not plow the young furrow. See Plato. We have said when sexual union should occur. In addition." 89.

For example. As to the question of whether to rear offspring or expose them.97 Therefore. there should be a law against rearing deformed ones. we should also specify the appropriate length of time for them to perform public service by having children. In most cases. 95.96 And if some people have sex in violation of this regulation and conceive a child. For sensation and life distinguish what is pious from what is impious here. Perhaps for the reason suggested at 1339'7-10. 96. 97. . Exposure or abandonment of newborns was a fairly common form of birth control in ancient Greece. . Hence we should define the length of the time in question by reference to the time when the mind is in its prime. but the actions of free people. Laws 789e.94 But in contrast with their bodies. Aristotle does not approve of this practice. For the offspring of parents who are too old. but not by violent exertion.95 For unborn children obviously draw resources from their mothers.222 10 IS 20 25 30 35 Politics VII the condition needed in a good citizen. Diehl 1. but where it is because of the number of children. and those of people who have actually reached old age are weak. like Plato (Republic 459d-46l c). The proper physical condition. as the athletic condition does. are imperfect in both body and mind. See Plato. it should be aborted before the onset of sensation and life. a limit should be imposed on procreation. this occurs around the fiftieth year. kolue(i) at h21-2 with Dreizehnter and hilristhai dei at b22 with Kraut. if it happens that the way custom is organized prohibits the exposure of offspring once they are born. 17. is one that is achieved by exertion. just as plants do from the earth. See Solon. . Since we have specified the earliest age at which men and women should begin their sexual union. Reading ean . But the condition that is a mean between these two is useful for these purposes. since he goes on to condemn the abortion of sentient fetuses. fr. Artemis and Eileithuia. it is appropri­ ate for their minds to remain somewhat inactive. like those of parents who are too young. therefore. and that promotes not just one thing.31-32. The legis­ lator can easily prevent them from doing these things by requiring them to take a walk every day to worship the gods whose assigned prerogative is to watch over birth. men who exceed this age by four or five years should be 94. Even pregnant women should take care of their bodies and not stop exercising or adopt a meager diet. he does require that deformed offspring be exposed. as some of the poets who measure age in periods of seven years have pointed out. But. and that any offspring conceived in violation of the laws be aborted. And these should be pro­ vided to women and men alike.

If they have sex after that. 111. it should be evident that it is for the sake of health. As to having sex with another man or another woman when one is a husband or referred to as such. his views are more unconven­ tional. Other reasons for a male to avoid adultery are given in Oec. the Celts­ dress them in light clothing. atimia: here used in the legal sense to refer to the loss of the rights and priv­ ileges possessed by citizens. at least during the period in which the male is procreating as a public service. Athenian law required a man to divorce an adulterous wife. Since Aristotle thinks that all adultery is wrong (NE 1107'9-17). since this is very useful both from the point of view of health and from that of military affairs. whereas many others-for example. It is evident to anyone who investigates the other animals or those nations concerned to cultivate a military disposition that the nourish­ ment particularly suited to children's bodies has a lot of milk in it but very little wine. 99 40 1336• Chapter 17 It should be recognized that the sort of nourishment children are given once they are born makes a large difference to the strength of their bodies. But on the topic of male adultery. to keep their bodies straight. S 10 ) 1S . 100 Furthermore. See HA 588'3-8. It is beneficial. No doubt the intention of the law is to restrict the number of illegitimate children. Aristotle criminalizes it. or for some other such reason. then. Presumably. it is also beneficial for them to make whatever movements are possible at that age.2. a man who commits homosexual adultery dur­ ing this period will suffer a smaller loss of honor. there are certain mechanical devices. to habituate children to the cold right from the time they are small. which some nations already employ. 98. because of the diseases it produces. but to do so gradually. due to softness. But to prevent curvature of the limbs. it should be regarded as shameful to be openly involved in any form of it with anyone. he probably agreed that this sort of legal sanction was appropriate.Chapter 17 223 released from procreating for the community. too. 1 00. Male adultery was unregulated in Athens. That is why many non-Greeks have the custom of submerging newborn chi!dren in a cold river. For whenever it is possible to create habits. If a man is discovered doing something of this sort during his period of procreation. 99. it is better to create them right from the start. he should be punished with a loss of honor98 appropriate to his offense. which is the only kind under discussion here.

224 20 25 30 35 40 13361 S 10 Politics VII And because their bodily condition is hot. lest it interfere with their growth. For. and this should be provided to them through play and other such activities. the officials called child su­ pervisors should deal with that issue. since they are a sort of exercise for the body. 872'3 -8. As for the kinds of stories and fables children of this age should listen to. But if he is older than this. then. 666a. Hence many of the games they play should imitate the serious occupations of later life. But the games they play should not be either unfit for free people or exerting or undisciplined. it is beneficial to adopt this sort of su­ pervision as well as any other similar to it. none the less. For all such things should pave the way for their later pursuits. See GA 737b36-738'1. for they contribute to growth. 1 03. he should be punished with those dishonors usually 1 01 . 1 3 89' 1 8-20 and Pr. since by speaking lightly of a shameful activity one comes closer to doing it. The legislator should altogether outlaw shameful talk104 from the city-state. If it hap­ pens. He should particularly outlaw it among chil­ dren. 102. Plato. they should ensure that they pursue it as little as possible in the company of slaves. that any free man who is not yet old enough to have been givrn a seat at the messes is found saying or doing something forbidden. The natural heat of children is discussed at Rh. which lasts until the age of five. 1 04. . and until they are seven. children are naturally suited to being trained to bear the cold. Laws 664e.103 and this is just what occurs in children when they are screaming their lungs out. So it is reason­ able to expect that they will pick up some taint of servility from what they see and hear even at that early age. at this age. Laws 79 l d-792e. Rh. See Plato. aischrologia: obscene but also abusive language of various sorts (NE 1 128'9-32. In particular. During the next stage. For holding the breath gives strength to those who are exerting themselves. as he would any other shameful thing. Those in the Laws who pre­ vent children from screaming and crying102 are wrong to prohibit such things. The child supervisors should pay attention to the way the children pursue leisure. so that they neither say nor hear anything of the sort. But they should engage in enough exercise to avoid physical laziness.101 In the first stage of life. he should be punished by being dishonored or beaten. 140Sb8-16). children must be educated in the household. it is not a good idea to have children engage in any kind of learning or any necessary tasks.

Chapter 17 225 reserved for the unfree. A promise unfulfilled in the remainder of the Politics. but only to the extent nec­ essary for present purposes. There are then two stages in their education that should be distinguished. 109. however. because audiences become accustomed to the voice they hear first. whatever we encounter first we like better. and their education has rendered them immune to the harm such things can do. because he has acted in a manner characteristic of slaves. But one should be guided by a 105. A famous actor of the fourth century the quality of whose voice is praised at Rh. 108 It was right to touch on it at this juncture. That is why everything bad or vulgar should be alien to the young. Probably. 108. to play a part before he did. For those who divide the stages of life into seven-year periods are for the most part correct. it is evident that we should also outlaw looking at unseemly pictures or stories. put the point rather well. that there are no statues or pictures representing unseemly acts. from age seven to puberty and from puberty to age twenty-one. Demeter. first raising the problem of whether the attendance of the young at such performances should or should not be prohibited. 1404b22-24. 106. and other gods. they should spend the two years till they are seven as observers of the lessons they themselves will even­ tually have to learn. The officials should en­ sure. When children reach the age of five. 107. But younger people should not be per­ mitted to witness iambus or comedy106 until they have reached the age when it is appropriate for them to recline at the communal table and drink wine. at the age of twenty-one (1336b40). particularly if it involves vice or malice. Comedy. 1 09 the tragic actor. The same is true of our relationships with people and things. Iambus is the name given to the mocking songs sung at certain religious festivals. Perhaps Theodorus. 1 07 Our present discussion of this issue has been cursory. and if so how it should be handled. I5 20 25 30 35 40 . was often abusive and obscene. therefore. except those kept in the temples of those gods at whose fes­ tivals custom permits even mockery to occur. especially the so-called old comedy of such writers as Aristophanes. not even an incompetent one. Ritualized obscenity and mockery played a role in certain religious festivals honoring Dionysus. Later we must stop and determine it at greater length. Since we are outlawing shameful talk. 1 05 Custom allows men of suitable age to pay this sort of honor to the gods on behalf of themselves and of their wives and children. He said that he never allowed any other actor.

we should investigate whether some organization should be established to deal with the children. First.226 1337• S Politics VII natural division. and third. . what sort of supervision it should be. sec­ ond. whether it is beneficial for their supervision to be established by the community or arranged on a private basis (as is the case in most city­ states nowadays). since every craft and every sort of education is in­ tended to supplement nature. then.

In fact. that legislators should be particularly concerned with the education of the young. Chapter 2 It is evident. the democratic character. one should not consider any citizen as belonging to himself alone. that there should be legislation regarding education. 1 And it is natural for the supervision of each part to look to the supervision of the whole. and a better character is always the cause of a better con­ stitution. Besides. See 1253'18-29. not private as it is at present. For education should suit the particular constitution. Since the whole city-state has one single end. and the oligarchic one. the constitutions are harmed. since in city-states where this does not occur. but as all belonging to the city-state. it is evident that education too must be one and the same for all. 1 254•9-10.BooK VIII Chapter 1 No one would dispute. But the questions of what kind 1. and that education should be communal. the character peculiar to each constitution usually safeguards it as well as establishes it initially (for example. since each is a part of the city-state. prior education and habituation are required in order to perform certain elements of the task of any capacity or craft. For this reason one might praise the Spartans. At the same time. since they pay the most serious attention to their children. and do so as a community. Introduction lxix-lxxii. then. an oligarchy). 227 1S 20 25 30 . Training for communal matters should also be communal. therefore. Hence it is clear that this also holds for the activities of virtue. however. a democracy. when each indi­ vidual supervises his own children privately and gives them whatever private instruction he thinks best. and that its supervision must be communal.

for they debase the mind and deprive it of LEISURE. That children should be taught those useful things that are really nec­ essary. (Any task. and that they should share only in such use­ ful things as will not turn them into vulgar craftsmen. craft. Following Lord I have transposed it to the beginning of the present chapter. In the mss. however. music. But it is evident that they should not be taught all of them. in what conduces to virtue. as was mentioned earlier. whether to promote virtue or the best life. For. 3 But generally speaking there are four that are cus­ tomarily taught: reading and writing. there is dispute at present about what its tasks are.2. gymnastics.2 Investigation of the education we see around us results in confusion. in the first place. since there is a difference between the tasks of the free and those of the unfree. For what one does for one's own sake. or in something out of the or­ dinary. nor is it evident whether it is more appropriate for education to develop the mind or the soul's char­ acter. this sentence concludes VIII. people do not all esteem the same virtue. For all of these proposals have acquired some advocates. or branch of learning should be considered vulgar if it renders the body or mind of free people useless for the practices and activities of virtue. is not unclear. 3. For not all consider that the young should learn the same things. for the sake of friends. while it is not unfree to participate in them up to a point. In fact.228 35 40 13J7h 5 10 15 20 Politics VIII of education there should be and how it should be carried out should not be neglected. but someone who does the same thing for others would often be held to be acting like a hired laborer or a slave. so they quite understandably do not agree about the training needed for it. since it is not at all clear whether people should be trained in what is useful for life. Besides. What one acts or learns for also makes a big difference. or on account of virtue is not unfree. and fourth (but 2. That is why the crafts that put the body into a worse condition and work done for wages are called vulgar. The subjects customarily taught .) Even in the case of some of the sciences that are suitable for a free person. Aristotle's own answer is that education must develop both (1323bl-3). Chapter 3 The subjects that are now established tend in two directions. there is no agreement about what promotes virtue. to study them too assiduously or exactly is likely to result in the harms just mentioned.

until we have it in view. we cannot know what the best political system is. This pleasure is not the same for everyone. Compare NE 1176b9-1 177'11. we should try to discover what people should do for leisured activity. presumably do not include anything out of the ordinary (1337'42). then we should. but only to those who are engaged in leisured activity. the one that comes from the noblest things. writing. But if that is impos­ sible. gymnastics is taught because it contributes to courage. And these subjects and 4. and the best person takes it to be the best pleasure. 1 333'30-b5. If both are required. drawing. 7. dispensing it as a medicine for the ills of work. relaxation is the end of amuse­ ment. however.5 I propose to discuss it once again. 5. 6.Chapter 3 229 only occasionally).4 Since this is the starting point for everything else. For surely they should not be amusing themselves. But those who originally included it as a part of education did so. Reading. that we should learn and be taught certain things that promote leisured activity. otherwise amusement would have to be our end in life. See NE 1176'15-19. whereas happiness is an end that everyone thinks is accompanied not by pain but by pleasure. 2S 30 3S 40 1338a S 10 . permit amusement. 1334'2-b28. Nowadays. This is not available to those who are working. but each takes it to be what suits himself and his condition. For one who is working is doing so for the sake of some end he does not possess. the end for the sake of which we pursue all our other ends. and drawing are taught because they are useful for life and have many applications. or what sort of education should be part of that system (see 1323'14-21). for this reason. See 1271'41-b10. and work is accompanied by toil and strain). happiness. but in the case of music a problem immediately arises. then. so that the two directions referred to are ( 1 ) being useful for life and (2) conducing to virtue (1337'41-42).7 It is evident. but we should be careful to use it at the right time. Leisured activity is itself held to involve pleasure. however. most people take part in music for the sake of pleasure. and living blessedly. because nature itself aims not only at the correct use of work but also at the capacity for noble leisured activity. and if amusements are more to be used while one is at work (for one who exerts himself needs relaxation. 6 For this sort of motion of the soul is relaxing and restful because of the pleasure it in­ volves. NE 1 177b2-18. Noble leisured activity is a starting point (ARCHE) because it is happiness. but leisured activity is more choiceworthy than work and is its end. as has often been said. Hence.

that there is a certain kind of education that children must be given not because it is useful or necessary but because it is noble and suitable for a free person. acquiring further learning. 1 2 8. This promise is not fulfilled in our Politics. Odysseus says that the best leisured pursuit is when men are en­ joying good cheer and "the banqueters seated in due order throughout the hall. but also because many other areas of study become possible through them. music being an obvious case in point. for we see that neither of these resuits from music. But the number of subjects involved (whether one or many). Furthermore. or that. and how they should be taught-these are questions that must be discussed later on. Magnanimity is discussed in NE IV. 7-8. or sketch a piece of furniture one was commissioning. 382-5. What remains. Hence Homer's instruction to "call the bard alone to the rich banquet.11 but rather because it makes them contemplate the beauty of bodies. Similarly. give ear to the bard. they should be taught drawing not in order to avoid making mistakes in their private purchases or being cheated when buying or selling products. like gym­ nastics.10 But as things stand. or for a large number of political activities."8 Else­ where." And he goes on to mention certain others who "call the bard that he may bring delight to all. it is clear that children should be taught some useful subjects (such as reading and writing) not only because of their utility. managing a household. so as to be able to understand an architect's plan. because we have some evidence from the ancients about the educational subjects they established.230 15 20 25 30 35 40 1338h Politics VIII studies are undertaken for their own sake. The first line is not in the poem as we have it but seems to have followed line 382 in Aristotle's version. it promotes health and vigor. it is useful for making money. 9. or that. 12. For example.3. For they give it a place among the LEISURED PURSUITS they considered appropriate for free people. whereas those relating to work are necessary and for the sake of things other than themselves. 11. It is for this reason that our predecessors assigned music a place in ed­ ucation. 10. which is evidently the very reason our predecessors included it in education. . It is completely inappropriate for magnanimous and free people to be always asking what use something is. then. Odyssey XVII."9 It is evident. what they are. is that music is for pursuit in leisure. They did not do so because they supposed: that it is necessary for life (for it is nothing of the sort). like reading and writing. a certain amount of progress has been made. Odyssey IX. then.

lionlike character. as we have said many times. who live around the Black Sea. For they make them useful to states13. But even if this one were the aim. it clearly follows that children must be put in the hands of physical trainers who will bring their bodies into a certain condition. For in other animals or in non-Greek nations. courageous. 14. lions are "free. Yet. 1334'2-b28. And there are similar peoples on the mainland. thinking that this will greatly enhance their courage. S Chapter 4 At present. dangerous while feeding.Chapter 4 231 Since it is evident that education through habituation must come be­ fore education through reason. and thus distort the shape and development of their bodies. 10 IS 20 25 30 . Besides. but gentle when no longer hungry (629h8-9). but of courage they have no share. the Spartans do not succeed in producing it. At 1271'41-blO. the city-states that are thought to be most concerned with children turn them into athletes. and others who are even worse. are now inferior to others in both gymnastic and military contests. who were superior to others as long as they alone persisted in their devotion to rigorous exertion. not brutality. Those who throw the young into too much of this sort of rig­ orous exertion and leave them without training in what is necessary pro­ duce people who are truly vulgar. These nations are skilled in raiding. For no wolf or other wild beast faces danger when it is noble to do so. especially not this one. 13 the supervision of children should not aim to promote just one virtue. though they do not make this mistake. we do not find that courage goes along with the greatest savagery. we know that even the Spartans. while their adver­ saries had none. They were superior to others not because they trained their young people in that rigorous way. and that education of the body must come before education of the mind. the Achaeans and Heniochi. So nobility. none the less brutalize their children through rigorous ex­ ertion. and coaches who will teach them to do certain physical tasks. but only because they had training. but that it goes along with a tamer. whereas the Spartans.14 Many of these nations think nothing of killing and cannibalizing people-for example. should play the leading role here. 1333bS-10. According to Aristotle. to be sure. and nobly-bred" (HA 488h16-17). but a good man does.

For it is not easy to determine what the power of music is. and at the same time they "put an end to care.16 But it will be well to take them up again now and develop them further. 17. so that nothing impedes their growth. robs them of their strength. or why one should take part in it. 16. since these kinds of exertion naturally produce opposite effects: exerting the body impedes the mind and exerting the mind impedes the body." as Euripides says. Bacchae 381 . For now there are people who rival them in education. and one at which they are worse than other people. but of their present ones. but a strict diet and strenuous exertions should be for­ bidden. whereas earlier there were none. One should judge the Spartans on the basis not of their earlier deeds. At 1 337h25-1 338b4. then. But when they have spent the three years after puberty on other studies. and how it is to be employed.17 That is why people include music in the same class as sleep and drink. and treat them all in the same way. just as gymnastics gives us a body of a cer­ tain quality. Chapter 5 l5 20 25 As for MUSIC. Until children reach puberty they should be given lighter exercises. on the grounds that. . because the training of the young. and the strenuous exercises involved. indeed. Is it for the sake of amusement and relaxation. that we must make use of gymnastics. For one should not exert the mind and the body at the same time. They also include dancing in this class. in order to provide a sort of prelude to the arguments that might be made in an exposition of the subject.15 it is appropriate for them to spend the next period of their lives exerting themselves and maintaining a strict diet. we have mentioned some of the problems in our earlier discussion. like sleep and drink? Sleep and drink are not in themselves serious matters. See EDUCATION. as our argument shows. by instilling the habits that enable us to enjoy ourselves in the right way? Or does music contribute something to leisured pursuits and 15 . so music has the power to give us a character of a certain quality. It is no small indication that such exertions can have this impeding effect that one finds only two or three people on the list of Olympic victors who were victorious both as men and as boys. We have agreed. they are pleasant.232 35 40 1339" 5 10 Politics VIII manship for one task only. Or should we believe instead that music contributes something to virtue.

and take part in musical learning and its pleasure through listening to others performing? Aren't those who have made music their very task and craft bound to produce something better than those who devote only as much time to it as is needed to learn it? On the other hand. The same problem arises. On the other hand. and that a true man would not perform music unless he were drunk or amusing himself. by the same token. it is not ap­ propriate to give children of that age leisured pursuits. however.6. even if music is able to improve people's character. so they say. since learning is a painful process.Chapter 5 233 to practical wisdom (which must be set down as third among the possi­ bilities that are mentioned)? It is clear that the young should not be educated for the sake of amusement. Children have not yet developed the VIRTUES and so are incapable of HAPPI­ NESS and the leisured pursuits in which it consists. however. who enjoy the music of others in the right way and are able to judge it? For the Spartans do not learn it themselves. On the contrary. 19.18 But perhaps it might be held that the serious activities of children are undertaken for the sake of their amusement when they have be­ come men and are complete. rather than being like the Spartans. 20. If that were true. if they have to study music in depth. If they need to study music in depth to appreciate it. we even say that musicians are VULGAR CRAFTSMEN. however. but are still able. since the end (something complete) is not appropriate for someone who is incom­ plete. why should they have to learn music themselves? Why shouldn't they be like the kings of the Persians and the Medes. For while they are learning they are not amusing them­ selves. they would. and in which of the three areas we mentioned earlier 1 8. 30 35 40 133'1' 5 10 . The same argument also applies if music is to be used to promote well-being and the leisured pursuits appropriate to someone who is free. for Zeus himself does not sing or accompany poets on the lyre.19 But that is absurd. Why should they learn it themselves rather than benefiting from the fact that others practice it? In this regard. At VIII. have to become chefs to appreciate delicate food.20 The question we must first investigate is whether music is to be included in education or not. Why should they learn it themselves. they would also have to take up the activity of cooking delicacies. we may consider the conception we have of the gods. to determine which melodies are good and which are not. Perhaps we should investigate these matters later on.

but see whether music influences one's character and soul in some way. since it is of a natural sort. and whether one should not take part only in the common pleasure that derives from music (a pleasure everyone per­ ceives. But people do not take part in music for that reason alone. For harmless pleasures are suitable not only because they promote the end of life. One might plausibly conclude. It is generally agreed. moreover. since happiness is both. or leisured pursuits. . But since people rarely achieve this end. whereas they do fre­ quently relax and make use of amusements (not only because relaxation and amusements lead to other things. that one's leisured pursuits should be not only noble but also pleasant. and in their search for it they mistake amusement for it. but because they promote relax­ ation too. since it is a sort of cure for the pain caused by one's exertions. therefore. but also because of the pleasure they provide). then. Museus says that "singing is the most pleasant thing for mortals. For the end is not choiceworthy for the sake of what will come later. and it seems to have a share in. Yet we must investigate whether this effect of music is not simply coincidental. however. For amusement is for the sake of relaxation. all three. and relaxation is of necessity pleasant. and so is agreeable to people of all ages and characters). it seems. because of its power to delight. whereas its true nature is more estimable than the usefulness we mentioned suggests. It seems rea­ sonable to assign it to. But everyone says that music is among the very greatest pleasures. is that people make amusement their end. it is reasonably included in social gatherings and among leisured pursuits. but also because it is useful for promoting relaxation. and these sorts of amusements are not choiceworthy for what will come later. What has happened. be­ cause it has a certain similarity to the end of action. At any rate. for example). One might suppose. This would be clear if one came to be of a certain qual2 1 . Museus was a semi-legendary bard to whom a number of sayings and verses were attributed. but because of things that have happened already (exertions and pains. For the end perhaps involves a certain pleasure (though not just any chance one). that this is the reason people try to achieve happiness by means of pleasant amusements. education.234 I5 20 25 30 35 40 / 34(}' 5 Politics VIII its power lies: amusement.m1 That is why. that young people should be educated in music for this reason too. it would be useful to allow the young to find rest from time to time in the pleasures of music. whether it is un­ adorned or with voice accompaniment.

26 This is not to deny. only by representing people expressing them. everyone who listens to representations comes to have the corresponding emotions. and hating in the right way. and are de­ rived from a body in the grip of the emotions. Colors and shapes are likenesses of emo­ tions etc. 1 3 41h23-24. that other perceptible objects. such as those of touch or taste. they are not really likenesses of the components of character. Plato. 24. contain no likenesses of the components of character. 1 448'5-6). Moreover. For ex­ ample. however. gentleness. Laws 669d--e. Rejecting ou with Dreizehnter. 25. if someone enjoys looking at an image of something for no other reason than because of its shape or form. and virtue is a matter of enjoying. Reading apo tou sifmatos at '3 4-35. he is bound to enjoy looking at the very thing whose image he is looking at. The facts make this clear. A Phrygian composer of the seventh century. loving. al­ though the objects of sight contain faint ones. For there are a few shapes that do contain such likenesses. But getting into the habit of being pained or pleased by likenesses is close to being in the same condition where the real things are concerned. 10 15 20 25 30 35 . however. Pauson represented them as worse" (Po. Alternatively (Ross): "and not (ou) every­ one. It happens. "Polygnotus represented people as better than they actually were. and25 everyone perceives them. that insofar as it also makes a difference which of these objects we look at. and of all the other components of character as well. But that we do indeed come to be of a certain quality is evident on many different grounds. 23. and inspiration is an emotion that affects the character of one's soul. rather. even when the rhythms and melodies these representations contain are taken in isolation. and not least from the melodies of Olympus. courage.Chapter 5 235 ity in one's character because of music. But rhythms and melodies contain the greatest likenesses of the true natures of anger. From the words. not those of PausonP 22. the shapes and colors that are produced are signs of characters. the young should look at the works of Polygnotus or any other painter or sculptor who deals with character. See 1339h20-21. Still.22 For it is generally agreed that they cause souls to become inspired." 26. and their opposites. See Introduction xxxv-xxxix. 23 And since music hap­ pens to be one of the pleasures. For when we listen to such representations our souls are changed. temperance.24 it is clear that nothing is more important than that one should learn to judge correctly and get into the habit of enjoying decent characters and noble actions. 27.

to others (for example. since it is difficult if not impossible for people to be­ come excellent judges of performance if they do not take part in it. of course. It is evident from all these considerations that music has the power to produce a certain quality in the character of our souls. others get us moving. 29 Chapter 6 20 25 We must now discuss the problem we mentioned earlier of whether or not the young ought to learn to sing and to play an instrument them­ selves. their response to the Dorian (which is held to be the only mode that produces this effect) is particularly balanced and com­ posed. . It is not difficult to see. and refers to Damon (an important fifth-century writer on music and meter) for a fuller discussion of music. so that listeners are affected differently and do not respond in the same way to each one. in the first place. that if someone takes part in performance himself. harmonies have divergent natures. and some of these movements are more slavish or boorish. the young are unwilling to put up with any­ thing that is unsweetened with pleasure. that melodies themselves contain representa­ tions of the components of character. and music is something natu­ rally sweet. 92a-95a). At the same time. their response is more tender minded. Some have a steadying character. The same also holds of the different rhythms. 28.236 40 134(/' S 10 1S Politics VIII It is evident. Also there seems to be a natural affinity for harmonic modes and rhythms. the more relaxed modes). For on account of their age. Plato that it had a harmony (Republic 443c-444e). For. whereas others are more free. Plato. They respond to some (for example. however. the so-called Mixo-Lydian) in a more mournful and solemn way. Plato discusses the effects of the different harmonic modes in Republic 397a-40 l b. education in music is appropriate to their youthful nature. whereas the Phrygian causes them to be inspired. children should have something to keep them occupied. And if it has this power.28 since they base their arguments on the facts them­ selves. children should clearly be introduced to music and educated in it. Besides. Pythagoras held that the soul was a harmony (see DA 407hJ0-408'28. Phaedo 85e-86d. That is why many of the wise say the soul is a harmony. others that it has a harmony. These views have been well discussed by those who have philosophized about this type of education. 29. it makes a great difference in the development of certain qualities.

3 1 . . 30 35 40 1341• 5 10 15 . A rattle is suitable for children in their infancy. for this reason they should engage in performance while they are young and stop performing when they are older. matheseis with Dreizehnter. if we investigate the extent to which those being educated in political virtue should take part in performance. As for the objection raised by some people. . first. because of what they learned while they were young.31 useless for military or political training. An autos ("flute" is the standard translation) is actually a reed instrument. and on which sorts of instruments they should learn (since this too probably makes a difference). in­ stead of just the common sort of music. It is also evident from these considerations what sorts of instruments should be used. Moreover. which appeals even to some of the other animals. then. For it is quite possible that certain styles of music do have the effect we mentioned. The refutation depends on these issues. It is evident.Chapter 6 237 and the rattle of Archytas. and education is a rattle for older children. since youngsters cannot keep still. 33. 134Ihl4-17. or make children's bodies into those of vulgar craftsmen. or to solve the problem raised by those who say that to care about performance is vulgar. a Pythagorean philosopher of the first half of the fourth century. or later studiesY This could be achieved where lessons in music are concerned if the students do not exert themselves to learn either what is needed for pro­ fessional competition or the astonishing or out-of-the-ordinary works which have now made their way into competitions and from there into education. Flutes33 should not be introduced into their education. what sorts of melodies and rhythms they should take part in. should be considered a good in­ vention. since one should take part in per­ formance in order to judge. current employment. These considerations make it evident that children should be edu­ cated in music so as to be able to take part in its performance. 32. but rather learn the ones not of this sort and only up to the point at which they are able to enjoy noble melodies and rhythms. but be able to judge which melodies are noble and enjoy them in the right way. rather like a modern oboe. 30. See 1 2S4b27-32. For. that learning music should not be an impediment to later activities.30 which is given to young children to keep them from breaking things in the house. Reading chreseis . and to the majority of slaves and children as well. it is not difficult to determine what is suitable or unsuitable for them at various ages. then. it is not difficult to refute. Archytas of Tarentum. that performing music makes one vulgar.

and so the correct occasions for its use are those where observing has the power to purify rather than educate. a vulgar craftsman. whether to musical education or to education of any other sort. Reading chriimatiin with Immisch and Kraut. 35. as is clear from the tablet Thrasippus. But we do not learn either how to do or feel the ethically correct thing in the process. as in wild dancing or competitive sports. they seized indiscriminately on every sort of learning and pursued them all. or any other professional instruments of that sort. 34 The fact that playing the flute interferes with speech also tells against its use in education. the flute has more to do with religious frenzy than with character. the pektis and the barbitos). even when they had played it earlier. Thrasippus is otherwise unknown. Besides.238 20 25 30 35 40 134Jb Politics V/11 nor should the cithara. They say that Athena invented flutes. . not someone rich and free. For these reasons. 36 Later. In Sparta. For when they came to have more leisure as a result of greater prosperity. and took greater pride in their virtue. Ecphantides was one of the earliest comic poets. they rejected flute playing because of their experience with it. but we are not educated (1 342'1-16. when they were better able to distinguish what does promote virtue from what does not. We undergo purification (katharsis). There is nothing wrong with saying that the goddess did this out of annoyance at 34. The barbitos was a lyre. and had in addition re­ flected on their accomplishments both before and after the Persian Wars. those that en­ hance the pleasure of people who listen for embellishments37 (the hepta­ gon. 1336b14-17. The story told by the ancients about flutes is also plausible. there was even a patron of the theater who played the flute him­ self to accompany his own chorus. The flute accompaniment was provided by a pro­ fessional flute player. In religious frenzy. 1340'8-12). the trigona. but discarded them. so that we are less likely to fall prey to them in real life. And the same thing happened to many other ancient instruments (for example. all the others are harps of some sort. 36. Hence they also included flute playing among their studies. set up for Ecphantides. our predecessors were right to reject the practice of having the young or the free play the flute. we are able safely to discharge powerfully violent or destructive emotions. the theater patron. They should learn only those instruments that will make them good listeners. and all those requiring professional knowledge. and the sambukai). 37. 35 And in Athens flute playing became such a local custom that most free people took part in it. The patron (choregos) was usually a wealthy man who paid for the chorus as part of his public service.

I shall refer anyone who wants a precise account of each particular to their works. For performers do indeed become vulgar. S 10 1S Chapter 7 As for harmonies and rhythms and their role in education. and a boorish pleasure at that. But since I con­ sider that current experts on music as well as those in philosophy40 who happen to be experienced in issues pertaining to musical education say many good things on these topics. I take the division referred to in the first question to be between ( 1) the class of rhythms and harmonies to be used in the best city­ state for any purpose (for example. or whether we should divide them. we should also investigate: whether all the harmonies and rhythms should be used. but the more likely explanation is that the flute does nothing to develop the mind. and we shall speak in outline only. since the end they aim at is a base one. The listener. 39. whether the same division should be established for those who are at work on their education. (and by pro­ fessional education I mean the kind that aims at competition). For the performer does not take part in this kind of education for the sake of his own virtue38 but to give his audience pleasure. See 1340h6 note. namely. because he is boorish himself. the discussion concerns legislation.39 Since we can certainly see that music consists of melody making and rhythms.Chapter 7 239 how flute playing distorted her face. typically has an influence on the music. whereas we attribute scientific knowledge and craft to Athena. 20 25 30 . The second ques­ tion asks whether the rhythms and harmonies in ( 1 ) are all to be used in ed­ ucation or whether a third class is needed. then. in that he imparts certain qualities to the professionals who perform for him. That is precisely why we judge this sort of activity to be more ap­ propriate for hired laborers than for free men. We reject professional education in instruments. and to their bodies as well. 38. because of the movements he requires them to make. Here. See 1277h1-7. (3) the class consisting of those members of ( 1 ) useful in education. or a third class introduced. however. we should not neglect the power that each of these has to promote education but ask whether we should prefer music that has a good melody or the kind that has a good rhythm. for purification or for listening to when at leisure) and (2) the class not to be used for any purpose. The opening sentence is difficult and many repunctuations and deletions have been proposed. 40.

The same thing. Hence those who compete before a theater audience of the second sort should be permitted to use the second type of music.240 35 40 1342• 5 10 ]S 20 25 Politics VIII Since we accept the division made by some people in philosophy who divide melodies into those relating to character. then. and other people of that sort. we see that they calm down. but I shall return to it in my work on poetics and discuss it in greater detail). the latter too must be provided with competitions and spec­ tacles for the purposes of relaxation. See 1337b42. hired laborers. Reading kathartika with Dreizehnter and the mss. and another to another. and what gives each person pleasure is what is akin to his nature. claiming that the harmonies are by nature peculiarly suited to these particular melodies. 43. for leisured pursuit. Just as there are souls that are dis­ torted from the natural state. In a similar way. fear. and since we claim that music should not be used for the sake of one ben­ efit but several-for it is for the sake of education and purification (I shall not elaborate on what I mean by purification here. For any emotion that strongly affects some people's souls (for example. That is why competitors who perform music for the theater should be permitted to use such harmonies and melodies. by those who are generally emotional. and by others to the extent that they share in these emotions: they all undergo a kind of pu­ rification and get a pleasant feeling of relief. must be experienced by those who are prone to pity or fear. pity. the other boor­ ish and composed of vulgar craftsmen. . but that they are not all to be used in the same way. 4 1 . Purification (katharsis) is mentioned in the Poetics at 1449b26-28. and for the relaxation of one's tensions-it is evident that all the harmonies are to be used. so too there are deviant harmonies and melodies that are strained and over-ornamented. although to a greater or lesser degree. for rest. 42. one being suited to one melody. the purifying43 melodies provide harmless enjoyment for people.41 and third. as if they had received medical treatment and a purifying purga­ tion. The ones that most pertain to character should be used in education. one free and generally educated. and inspiration. For there are some who are prone to become possessed by this motionY But under the influence of sacred melodies (when they make use of the ones that induce a frenzy in their souls). action. But since theater audi­ ences are of two kinds. or inspiration) is present in everyone. whereas those that pertain to action or in­ spiration should be used for listening to while others perform them. but the reference here is probably to the lost second book.

At 1342'3. Poetry shows this clearly. since the Dorian has this nature. So. But possibility and suitability are determined by one's stage of life. There are two things to aim at: what is possible and what is suitable. it is evident that Dorian melodies are more suitable for the education of younger people. As for the Dorian. 48. See 1337h42. we praise what is in a mean between two extremes. and say that it is what we should pursue. however. 30 1342h S 10 1S 20 25 . Republic 398d-399a. when compared to the other harmonies.45 but we should accept any other that passes the inspection carried out for us by those who share in the practice of philosophy and musical education. 45. the Phrygian melodies are the ones that are suited to them. Plato. with an eye to that future stage of life--old age--children should take up 44. as we said earlier. notably the fact that when Philoxenus tried to compose a dith­ yramb-The Mysians-in Dorian. For all Bacchic frenzy and all motions of that sort47 are more closely associated with the flute than with any of the other instruments. For example. but the very nature of his material forced him back into Phrygian. 46. The Socrates of the Republic was not right to retain only the Phrygian along with the Dorian. which is the harmony naturally appropriate to it. 47. particularly since he in­ cludes the flute among the instruments he rejects. Plato.46 For the Phrygian has the same power among the harmonies that the flute has among the instruments. At 1340'38-hS.Chapter 7 241 But. the dithyramb is generally held to be Phrygian. everyone agrees that it is the steadiest and has a more courageous character than any other. whereas among the harmonies. he could not do it. Besides.44 the melodies and harmonies that pertain to character should be used for education. Republic 399a-d. For example. And experts on these matters cite many instances to prove this. That is why some musical experts rightly criticize Socrates because he rejected the relaxed harmonies for the pur­ poses of education. So. The Dorian is of this sort. since both are frenzied and emotional.48 not because they have the power that drink has of producing Bacchic frenzy. And each individual should undertake what is more possible and more suitable for him. as we said. but because like drink they make us weak. it is not easy for people exhausted by age to sing harmonies that are strained-nature recommends the relaxed har­ monies at their stage of life.

if there is a certain sort of harmony that is suited to childhood. . and the suitable. because it has the power to provide both order and education at the same time (as seems particu­ larly true of the Lydian harmony). Moreover. the possible. then it is evident that these three things must be made the defining principles of education: the mean.242 30 Politics VIII harmonies and melodies of this relaxed sort.

or the type of rule he exercises as a holder of that office.l l . canoni­ cal sense (Ph. which. an arche is the office held by an official or ruler. the action ceases to exist when the performance of it ceases. but acting is not. are for the sake of or because of their products." usually in the sense of a share that is larger than one's fair share (although 1302' 1 makes it clear that it is possible to get a larger share justly). starting point. none the less has a substantial potential to lead to vicious action-in particular (dis­ tributive) injustice. or character trait. they are for their own sakes or because of themselves. an undemonstrated premise (often a definition) used to establish other things. In his metaphysics. whereas productions. or cause (often the thing in the world that a definition picks out). For example. In his epistemology an arche is a first principle. his unqualified end is simply happiness or acting well. aisumnetes DICTATOR ARCHE In Aristotle's political science (statesmanship). are all actions or activities of the canonical sort. though not always a vice. When someone produces a chair. but he also uses it in a stricter. p/eonektein Pleonektein means "get the better of" or "get or have a larger share.G LOSSARY ACQUISITIVENESS. EE 1224'28-29) to refer only to what results in the ap­ propriate way from DELIBERATE CHOICE. an arche is an ori­ gin. Because actions have no further end beyond acting well. For example. which have a further end. 243 . which is not different from his performance of the ac­ tion as the chair is different from the production. GET MORE THAN pleonexia. since its end is acting well (eupraxia)" (NE 1140b6-7). the chair comes into existence only when the production of it ceases. ACTION praxis Aristotle sometimes uses the term praxis and the cognate verb prattein to refer to any intentional action (NE 1111'25-26). in which happiness consists. his end (the chair) is different from his production of it. is acquisitiveness. Canonical actions are explained by contrast with productions (poieseis): "Producing is different from its end. 197b l. The corresponding disposi­ tion. The NOBLE or LEISURED actions preferred by FREE people. But when someone performs an action.

Presumably. But Aristotle also uses the term "citizen" in a broader sense. 1 179'1-9). he regards those who share in the ben­ efits of office. . but simply for the pleasure involved . 1378h23-29). banausos. But sometimes he marks off the blessedly happy person as enjoying a particularly high level of HAPPINESS untinged with misfortune and well equipped with external GOODS (NE 1 101'6-8. Various lesser kinds of aristocracy are distinguished in IV. At 1 285'25-29. autarkeia SELF-SUFFICIENCY AUTHORITY. as citizens. banausos technites VULGAR. 5). . At 1 332'32-35. but not in office itself. unlike tyrants. or because some harm has been done to him. kurios For X to be kurion Y is for X to have authority or control or to be sovereign over Y. The best constitution described in Books VII-VIII is an aristoc­ racy of this sort. chernetes MANUAL LABORER chrematistike WEALTH ACQUISITION CITIZEN po/ites An UNQUALIFIED citizen (polites haplos) is someone who participates in judicial and deliberative office (see III.244 Glossary arete VIRTUE ARISTOCRACY A constitution whose citizens are virtuous men of practical wisdom (see Intro­ duction §10). At 1 279'3 1-32. barbaric basileus KING BLESSEDLY HAPPY makarios Often Aristotle does not distinguish between a happy person and a blessedly happy one. he contrasts citizens who participate in the constitution with a larger class of citizens who do not. ARROGANCE hubris A kind of belittling (oligoria) or dishonoring "in which the sufferer is shamed.1-2. . have fellow citizens as their bodyguards. The cause of pleasure to those committing arrogance is that they think they become superior to others by ill-treating them. VULGAR CRAFTSMAN barbaros NON-GREEK. At 1 260b1 5-20 and 1299'20-23 women and children are implicitly included among the citizens. AUTHORITATIVE kurion. again imply­ ing that it is possible to be a citizen without participating in office (only the king is an unqualified citizen). That is why the young and the rich are arrogant: by being arrogant they think they are being superior" (Rh. 7. not so that some benefit may come to the doer. he says that kings. . A kurion F is an F in the fullest or most authoritative (kurios) sense of the term.

children. however large. it often sent some of its citizens out to colonize new territory . In this looser sense of the term. is itself often re­ ferred to as the city-state (Book VII provides many examples of this). but strictly speaking only the unqualified citizens who participate in judicial and deliberative office are genuine "parts" of it ( 1 328'2 1-h2. since there. A city-state is always identical to the totality of its citizens. Because a city-state is a multitude of citizens ( l 276h10-1 1). religiously. or to those cities or towns themselves.2 (for exam­ ple. Unlike a typical contemporary state. See MAJORITY. Somewhat confusingly. city-states with different constitutions are also different (1276hJO). 19-22). See Introduction §7. A city-state includes women. A city-state. It is the natural community for human beings to live in ( 1 2 53'7-18. the population of a Greek city-state became too large for its available resources. EDUCATION. is a political community consisting of free citizens governed by a constitution ( 1 326h5): a community of equals that aims at the best life possible ( 1 328'35-37). so that a person might be referred to as a citizen if he counted as a citizen relative to some constitution. Because a city-state is a community of citizens sharing a constitution ( 1276h1-2). Unlike a typical contemporary city. 1269h 1 4-19.Glossary 245 some of the apparent disunity in Aristotle's notion of a citizen is to be explained by the fact that a citizen is defined relative to a city-state and a constitution ( l 275'33-h2 1). can they achieve the happiness that is their natural end. and culturally unified community. having parents who are citizens). make war. with a citadel and a marketplace. unqualifiedly speaking. even though neither of these is a canonical city­ state. CITY-STATE polis A canonical city-state is a unique organization. Aristotle also uses the term "polis" to refer to large states that may comprise many cities or towns. EE 1242'22-27). is a city-state. enter into alliances.a there and inside the town proper.if not entirely happy-translations of "polis"). NATION. which. NE 1 162' 17-19. it was a politically. 1329'2-5. But a city state also included the surrounding agricultural land. In every constitution. for example. and slaves ( 1 260h8-20. 1 278h 1 9-25. and so on. 1277'5-12). Aristotle's con­ ception of it inherits some of the complexity inherent in his notion of a CITIZEN. and quite small-scale. the office holders and the unconditional citizens are the same. COLONY apoikia When. in a way that states and cities are not. But it is also no doubt true that Aristotle sometimes uses the term in the loose and popular sense to apply to anyone who passes the sorts of pragmatic tests of citizenship mentioned in III. as the political and governmental heart of a city-state. any state with a city or any city. something like a city and some­ thing like a state (hence both "city" and "state" are common . and the citizens lived bo . The territory of city-state included a single (typically) walled town (astu). a city-state enjoyed the political sovereignty characteristic of a modern state: it could pos­ sess its own army and navy. and only there.

This colony was politically autonomous but typically retained some ties with its mother city-state. namely. however. . or the partners in a business transaction. instead it is the community of people whose laws those are. DECENT epieikeia. And all these communities are subordinate to the political community. COMMUNITY. CRAFT techne Sometimes "techne" is a synonym for "episteme" (science). 1289'1 5-18). Thus a house­ hold is a community. DECENCY. It is con­ trasted with PRACTICAL WISDOM. but not of HOUSEHOLD MANAGE­ MENT ( 1 2 57'41-1 258'18). a POLITY ( 1265b26-28. A politeia is like that. an organization of its inhabitants (1274b38) and offices. epieikes Decency is "a sort of justice" (NE 1 1 38'3). A Greek colony is thus quite different from what we call a colony. koinos A community consists of different people who engage in a common enterprise that involves sharing something in common ( 1260b39-40). (3) Most often. and is neither practical nor productive. 1279'37-b4.") Aristotle gives a num­ ber of characterizations of a politeia which show this clearly: A constitution is a sort of life of a city-state ( 1 295'40-b l ). But strictly speaking a craft is a rational discipline concerned exclusively with production. as in "He has a strong constitution. Usury is a part of it ( 1 258'38-b2). thus understood. (2) Sometimes it refers to a system of a particular sort. 1273'4-5. which aims at knowledge alone. a CITY-STATE is a community. (The English word "constitution" has a parallel sense. 1 1 53'25).9." Decent people are often contrasted with the "many" or the majority. or even fellow travelers. COMMERCE kape/ike The craft that is part of WEALTH ACQUISITION. which is concerned with ACTION (NE 1 140b3. and with theoretical science. and involves getting wealth at the expense of others. Aristotle uses the term politeia. 1289b28). its governing class ( 1 278b l l).246 Glossary elsewhere. It is concerned with money as opposed to natural WEALTH. in a number of different ways: ( 1 ) Sometimes it refers to a political system of any sort ( 127 Jb20 with 1272b9-l l). COMMUNAL. that produces wealth through EXCHANGE ( 1 257b 20-22). COMMON koinonia. and "decent" is often used as a near synonym of "good" (NE 1 1 37'35-b2) or "virtuous. but so are a master and a slave. 1286b l3. It is embodied in a document. CONSTITUTION po/iteia The United States Constitution is the highest law of the land. but it isn't just a set of laws. See NEVII. it refers to any political system defined by and governed in accordance with universal LAWS ( 1 289'18-20). and who are bound to one another by a sort of friendship and a sort of justice as a result. However. especially those with authority over everything ( 1 278b 8-10.

which is based on the various kinds of common people distinguished at 1290b39-•10. which seem to correspond to (2b-e). as Aristotle recognizes (see 1293b33-38). does not seem to result in (2b-e) in any obvious way. democracy is rule of the poor for the sake of the poor (1280'2-3). are in authority. (4) The recipe given at 1 3 1 9'39-bJ for generating the various kinds of democracies. (2) At 1291b30-1292'38 he distinguishes five kinds of democracy: (a) the rich and the poor are equal by law and neither has author­ ity. on the other hand. . whereas (2e) is identical to ( lb). just four kinds of democracy are listed. 1 111b26-30. An effective desire resulting from wish and based on deliberation to do what best promotes happiness is a deliberate choice (NE 1113'9-14). its inhabitants or members. It is the most moderate of the deviant constitutions (1289b4-S). distinguishing them in a num­ ber of different (and not obviously equivalent) ways: (1) At 1306h20-21. (2a-d) are presumably subvarieties of ( l a). where the many rule in the interests of the entire city-state. But this definition captures its essence only accidentally ( 1279b3 4-39): unqualifiedly speaking.Glossary 2 47 DECREE psephisma Unlike a LAW. (3) At 1292b22-1293'12. This list omits (2a). 4. which is universal. a democracy is rule by the multitude for the benefit of the poor (1279b8 -9). (d) all citizens (contested or uncon­ tested) participate and the law rules. demagogos POPULAR LEADER DEME demos A local territorial district. It says what is to be done in a particular case. See also ACTION. a decree is adapted to particular circumstances (NE 1137h27-32). (b) offices are filled on the basis of a low property assessment. (e) is the same as (d) except the citizens. DEMOCRACY demokratia Democracy is a deviant form of the constitution Aristotle calls a politeia (POLITY ) . Aristotle recognizes a variety of democracies. (2a) is also omitted from the list given in VI. and so is the last thing reached in a piece of deliberation (NE 1141b24-28). DELIBERATE CHOICE prohairesis Wish (boulesis) is a desire for the good (HAPPINESS ) or what is taken to be such (NE 1113'23-25). on the order of a village. (c) all uncon­ tested citizens participate and the law rules. perhaps because it combines elements of democracy (rule by the many) and oligarchy (rule by the few) and so is more of a polity than a democ­ racy-the distinctions here are somewhat fluid. 1112hl2-16). not the laws. Deliberation (bouleusis) is a process of practical reasoning through which we discover what we can do in order h:st to promote our happi­ ness in the particular circumstances we are in (tv. The political signifi­ cance of decrees is discussed at 1292'4-37. he dis­ tinguishes between (a) a democracy based on law and (b) one in which the peo­ ple have complete authority. Unlike the latter.

Aristotle says that a FREE person has theoretical knowledge of all of the practical aspects of WEALTH ACQUISITION ( 1 258b9-1 1). 1330'3 1-33. l l . and their informal training up to the age of 5. (3) From ages 7 to 14. however. and music in (3). NE 1094b28-1095'2). If the "other studies" are not reading. b25-26. DEMOCRACY.248 Glossary demos PEOPLE. This is someone who studies practically all subjects. 1336b24-27. people are unified and made into a community by means of education (1263b36-37). and drawing. and music until age 14? ) and a sufficiently large departure from common Greek practice and Plato's recommendations that we would expect Aristotle to acknowledge it as an innovation and defend it carefully. They could be reading and writing. it is difficult to get clear even about the elementary education described in VII . but in order to become a good judge (PA 639'1-6. DEME. writing. in part because the Politics is incomplete (see 1326b32-39. writing. (4) From ages 14 to 2 1 . writing. 1338'32-34. he is as capable as an expert doctor ( 1282'3-7) of judging whether or not someone has treated a . Four stages are. children observe the studies they will later learn for themselves ( 1336b35-37). l7-VIII. drawing. for example. And in various places he refers to what he calls a gen­ erally educated person (pepaideumenos). 134lbl9-23). EDUCATION paideia Aristotle thinks that education is of enormous political importance ( 13 10'12-14. (2) From ages 5 to 7. The "other studies" mentioned in connection with (4) are not explicitly iden­ tified. dunasteia DYNASTY DYNASTY dunasteia Hereditary OLIGARCHY in which not law but officials rule. and drawing ( 1337b24-25). Generally educated in medicine. this includes (ages 17 to 21) arduous physical training combined with a strict diet ( 1339'5-7). not to acquire expert scientific knowledge in all of them (which would be impossible). however. But then the only thing that children are taught in (3). The fact that he does neither of these things suggests that he is in fact intending to follow tradition and include reading. as well as three years (ages 14 to 17) of "other studies" ( 1339'5). drawing. diagoge LEISURED PURSUIT DICTATOR aisymnetes The holder of an elective TYRANNY based on LAW. 1335b2-5. See 1285'30-bl. This is sufficiently implausible on its own terms (why post­ pone reading. music. In I. 1332b10-l l): a community could not really be a city-state if it did not train its citizens in virtue ( 1280bl-8). a period of seven whole years. is light gymnastics. is sketchily described at 1336'3-1336b35. Yet. discernible in it: ( 1 ) The treatment of infants. what are they? There are a number of possibilities.7. this includes "easier gymnastic exercises" ( 1 338b40-42). music.

Such education presumably takes place after (4). a generally edu­ cated person is free from the sort of intellectual enslavement to them that would otherwise be his lot. he knows "what we should and should not seek to have demonstrated" (Metaph. Ethical training (in the shape of habituation) must take place be­ fore more formal education in ethics and statesmanship (for example. 1334'23) and other theoretical sciences.3. but precisely when and in what form we can only guess (see 1 333b3-5). which all the citizens of the best city­ state must have if they are to rule successfully when their turn comes (NE 1 103'14-17). that.Glossary 249 disease correctly. for example. Moreover. rhetoric." and not so assiduously or pedantically as "to debase the mind and deprive it of leisure" ( 1 3 37bl4-17). listening to Aristotle's own lectures in the Lyceum) can begin (NE 1095b4-8). We know. he has done so only "up to a point. See also MESSES. . there is the vexed question of explicitly ethical or political training and education. while he has indeed studied all the civilized sciences (liberal arts). But he is also free from the inner enslavement that is all too often the lot of the narrow expert. whose imagination is straitjacketed by the one thing he knows too well. it must surely educate them in these subjects and sciences (see VII . are crucial to spending one's leisure time well and achieving happiness. 1 1 06'5-1 1 ) and "seeks exactness in each area to the extent that the subject-matter allows" (NE 1094b23-27). It seems reasonable to conclude. the citizens of the best city-state. particularly philosophy ( 1263b29-40. then. must be trained in these subjects at some point. in addition to ethical habituation. in part because they are NOBLE and free and contribute to LEISURE ( 1 338'21-22. 1 3 56'7-9). For. and perhaps in these sciences too must occur after (4). we are promised a discussion of a kind of education "that sons must be given not because it is useful or necessary but because it is noble and suitable for a free person" ( 1 338'30-34). who are all civilized and generally educated men. 1 267' 10-12. Presumably. He knows who is and who isn't worth listening to on any matter and so can get good expert advice when he needs it. but we do nevertheless have some clues to go on as to the nature of these studies. The promise is unfortunately not fulfilled in our Politics. that music and drawing are both to be taught. therefore. however. in order to develop the PRACTICAL WISDOM (including the knowledge of what happiness really is). 1 338bl-2). Acquainted with many subjects. and areas of study. Formal ethical education is required. 1 5). some training in the theoretical sciences must be included in ( 1)-(4) and that some further education in ethics. Since the end of a city-state is to enable its citizens to lead the good life and be happy. if not as part of (3). we know from the Rhetoric that training in rhetoric is crucial for political success in most city-states and that it too is part of general education (Rh. then later in their lives. 1 3 36' 23-34 suggests that some of this already occurs in (1). But we also know that many other subjects. methodologies. In VIII. Finally. Because he is able to judge the works and advice of experts.

respectively. but they disagree about those under which Merit (A) = Merit (B). trans­ port. That is to say. eunomeisthai GOOD GOVERNMENT euthuna INSPECTION excellent spoudaios allattein. that are then dis­ tributed to two people. Some of the problems involved in numerical equality are discussed in VI. oligarchs.250 Glossary Just as important as the content of the education Aristotle advocates is the fact that he explicitly conceives of it not in the traditional Greek way as privately provided ( 1 3 37'1 8-26) but as public education suited to the constitution and provided to citizens by it ( 1 260h l 5 . 1 335hl l-12). aristocrats claim that merit is proportional to VIRTUE. allage. and aristocratic and oligarchic equality seem to be equality according to merit or proportional equality ( 1 30 l h29-30). if EQUALITY Value (X) I Value (Y) = Merit (A) I Merit (B). none the less. good episteme SCIENCE to ison. The other kinds are parts of COMMERCE. all of whom are. eleutheros FREE epieikes DECENT. isotes Suppose a piece of land is divided into two parcels. their education is bound to differ substantially. A and B. money lending. It seems certain. and wage earning ( 1 258h20-27). Democrats claim that all free citizens are equal in merit. that most of his remarks about the education provided in the best city-state concern the education of future unqualified citizens. ergon TASK ethnos NATION eudaimonia HAPPINESS eunomia. See Introduction lxxv-lxxvi. Democratic equality seems to be numerical equal­ ity. males. 1 3 ). But since he thinks that male and female virtues are different (!.3 . of course. The distribution is just in Aristo­ tle's view if the ratio between the value of X and the value ofY is the same as the ratio between the merit of A and the merit of B. and democrats agree about the conditions under which Value (X) = Value (Y). that he thinks that public education should also be provided to girls and WOMEN (1260h l 3 -20. 1 2 69hl 2-24. 1 337'14). It is no surprise. and marketing). therefore. Aristocrats. EXCHANGE . The kinds of exchange that involve bartering surplus goods for other needed goods are natural and are not a part of WEALTH ACQUISITION ( 1257'14-30). oligarchs claim that it is proportional to wealth (NE 1 1 3 1"14-h23). X and Y. metab/etike The three parts of exchange are trading (whose subparts are ship owning.

or first cause of motion in the universe. God is described as being his own happiness (EE 1245h16-29). (2) The GOOD. further distinguish him from those who are vulgar or uncivilized ( 1342'19-32. Thus a good man is someone who is able to perform well the rational activities that are characteristic and de­ finitive of human beings (NE 1097h24-1098'20). typically between aristocrats. But he does not act on the universe to cause it to move. 1338h2-4)." which is another important mark of being free (Rh. His cosmological role is that of first mover. and democrats.Glossary 25 1 FACTION. FREE free-minded. God is an incorporeal being whose only activity is the STUDY or contemplation of himself (Metaph. In this sense the farmer citizens of a DEMOCRACY are free men. Hence he is also an unmoved mover (Metaph. stasiazein Internal political conflict (extending from tensions to actual civil war). GOODS . A person who is free in this second sense has distinctive character traits. The art and MUSIC he enjoys. and outlook. His role in the universe is like that of understanding (nous) in the human soul (EE 1248'25-29). GOD theos The Aristotelian cosmos consists of a series of concentric spheres. in the first instance. he does not need to work for a living. and so does not "live in de­ pendence on another. he is not obsessed with practical or useful things ( 1 333h9-10. Unlike a slavish or VULGAR person. which sometimes leads to the overthrow or modification of the constitution. Po. EDUCATION. Therefore. 1072'25-27). 1072h 1 3 -30. Since this sort of activity is the highest kind of happiness (NE 1 178'6-10). 1367'32-33). Hence he is able to judge or assess the credi­ bility and appropriateness of discussions belonging to different professions and disciplines in which he is not himself an expert (PA 639'1-6). 1074h33-1075'5). instead he moves it in the way that an object of love causes motion in the things that love or desire it (DA 41 5'26-h7). But a farmer must work in order to get the necessities. he is not a man of LEISURE. preferring NOBLE and unproductive ones (NE 1 125'1 1-12). generous e/eutheros A free person is. rather than a narrow­ minded or overly specialized one. Hence he alone has what it takes to be an unqualified citizen in the best kind of city-state ( 1329'2-17). See Introduction §8. 1461h26-1 462'4). there is an­ other sense in which he is not free. But even such a citizen is often under the au­ thority of others. 1334'1 1-40. and the use he makes of his leisure. Since that city-state ensures that he has the resources needed for LEISURE ( 1329'17-26). 983'6-7. START A FACTION stasis. Only the free man has PRACTICAL WISDOM and the VIRTUES of character. with the earth at its center. someone who is not a SLAVE. whom he must obey. He has human virtue. agathon. There are thus substantial limitations on his freedom or self-determination. oligarchs. His gen­ eral education gives him a broad perspective on the world. agatha ( 1 ) A good F is one that possesses the features that enable it to perform well the TASK (ergon) characteristic and definitive of Fs.

are capacities or tools that the virtuous person uses to achieve good ends. NE 1 1 53h16-19). eunomia. and the vicious bad ones (1323h7-12. 1227h27) and provided b y a trainer (gumnastikos). is happiness. See also GYMNASTICS MUSIC. and these either are the best possible for that city-state or constitution or are unqualifiedly best ( 1294'4-9). for example. beauty. like some external goods. such as money. so that many external goods admit of at least limited human control (NE 1 140' 17-20. NE 1 098h12-16). a s well as more focused education aimed to inculcate specific physical skills (including athletic and military ones) provided by a coach (paidotribes) ( 1 338h6-8). the sphere of luck can be reduced by craft. and those they do not compete for. Other things we aim at are good to the degree that they promote our happiness (NE 1097'15-h22). money. Metaph. 1 360h26-29. simply . less controlled by luck. See Introduction xxxix. while others. external goods and goods of the body are the re­ sult of luck (1323h27-29. happiness. on the other hand. Things that promote an end other than happiness are good rela­ tive to that end. not unqualifiedly good (NE 1 1 13'1 5-33). and bodily plea­ sure. and because our bodies are parts of us. are more controlled by it. good birth. and honor are external" (Rh. or good birth (NE 1 169'20-21 ). The former form the area of focus for many of the virtues of character. For some goods of the body are. and goods of the body (1 323'25-26. goods of the soul. no doubt. GOOD GOVERNMENT. EE 1 2 1 8'35-36. External goods and goods of the body. WELL GOVERNED GOVERNING CLASS po/iteuma The group or class of CITIZENS that is eligible to hold office and has supreme au­ thority in the city-state. 981'1-5). Goods of the soul are states (the virtues) and the activities that express them. Aristotle divides the goods that typically promote happiness into three classes: external goods (also called resources or goods of luck). eunomeisthai A city-state or constitution exhibits good government or is well governed if it has laws (nomoi) that are in fact obeyed. the human good. that Aristotle sometimes seems to waver on whether to class goods of the body as internal goods or as external resources: "Goods of the body and of the psyche are internal.252 Glossary ultimate good for human beings. However. c( NE 1 178h33-35). It is for these reasons. friends. External goods are also subject to another important kind of subdivision be­ tween those that people compete over. like goods of the psyche. gumnastike Gymnastics includes general exercises aimed at physical fitness (NE 1 138'3 1 . NE 1 129'1 1-16). Unlike the goods of the soul. unqualifiedly. honors. such as friends. haplos UNQUALIFIED.

Citizen hoplites. Other parts are mastership of slaves. organized in phalanxes. 1 2-13). PHILOSOPHY. oikonomia Household management is the science that deals with the use of property ( 12 56'10-13). In Athens. and procreative science (see 1. Rh. the final end of all ACTION (NE 1 1 02'2-3. It is really more a matter of living successfully by living a life in which really valuable things are achieved. Thus both activity expressing practical wisdom and political activity. and of those other goods as its parts (NE 1 1 29bJ7-19. Even from this brief sketch. and. and a sword. HOUSEHOLD MANAGEMENT hubris ARROGANCE euthuna Inspection (scrutiny. which are goods of the soul. body armor. MM 1 1 84'1 8-19. That is why the most important part of happiness consists in ac­ tivities like MUSIC. NE 1 1 77b2-18. The natural part of PROPERTY ACQUISITION is a part of it ( 1256b26-27). and the contemplation of GOD ( 1 267'10-12. so that external GOODS and goods of the body are cho­ sen for the sake of goods of the soul ( 1 323bJ8-2 1 ). 1 1 76'30 -3 1 ) . a round shield (hop/on). but COMMERCE is not. But it is also clear that Aristotle thinks of these goods as being organized into a system. Aristotle sometimes speaks of happiness as being made up of other goods. HOPLITE A heavily armed infantryman. only people at least moderately wealthy could af­ ford to be hoplites. EE 1249b9-21 ). This may explain why it is complete (choiceworthy because of itself and never because of something else (NE I 097'30-34) ). HOUSEHOLD oikos. Since he had to provide this equipment at his own expense. mari­ tal science. Poorer people rowed in the navy or served as light-armored troops. see Introduction xxv-lix. a spear. were the principal fighting force until merce­ naries replaced them late in the fourth century. though less directly. an official was usually inspected at the end of his term of office. Wealthier citizens who could afford a horse fought in the cavalry. are chosen for the sake of LEISURE and the activities of leisure (1 334'1 1-40. all production (NE 1 1 39'35-b3). 1360bJ 9-26). auditing) was a device to ensure public control of officials. NE 1 1 77'27-b J ). See Introduction I-Ii.Glossary 253 HAPPINESS eudaimonia Happiness is the highest good for human beings. and some goods of the soul are chosen (at least in part) for the sake of others. His equipment included a bronze helmet. it is clear that Aristotelian happiness is not a feel­ ing of contentment or pleasure. For further discussion.3. although pleasure and contentment are involved in it. The INSPECTION . and self-sufficient (something that "all by itself makes a life choiceworthy and lacking in nothing" (NE 1097'8-9)). It is the end of the city-state as well as of all its individual citizens (1323b40-1 324'2).

Leisurely actions or activities are engaged in for their own sake. beautiful. as they typically do. basileia A kingship is a monarchical constitution that aims at the common benefit ( 1279'32-34 ). 1 5 ( 1 285b33-37). 1 287'28-32). Being ruled by law is generally better than being ruled by human beings. The nature of this contrast is explained at 1 289' 1 5-25. scho/azein Leisure is usually contrasted with work (ascholia) or what one must do in order to acquire the necessities ( 1 33 J b 10-13). None the less. Five kinds of kingship are dis­ cussed in III. and usually associated with what is NOBLE or FREE. on the grounds that it is not a kind of constitution ( 1 287'3-4) . l4: ( 1 ) Spartan. LEISURED ACTIVITY . Making laws that benefit a constitution is a task of statesmanship or practical wisdom ( 1 289' 1 1-13). 1375'32). Thus there is a fair amount of overlap beLEISURE. 1375'27-b8). these are reduced to two fundamental kinds: Spartan and absolute. Spartan kingship is removed from the list of genuine kinds of kingship. In III . so "the law educates the rulers specially for this task and then appoints them to decide and manage whatever it omits in accordance with their most just opinion" ( 1287'25-27. Specific law is the written law followed by some city-state. fine basi/eus. The in­ spectors could dismiss the objections or pass them on to the courts. 1373b4-7. and (5) absolute. the law cannot cover every eventuality and cannot dictate how it is to be applied in every particular case. Specific law and com­ mon law can conflict. common law is unwritten but "agreed to among all" (Rh. The deviation from it is TYRANNY. and was con­ ducted by a board of ten accountants. or they can have the same content. 1374'18-b23). In II. Laws are sometimes contrasted with the constitution itself ( 1 265"1-3. dealt with other objections to his conduct while in office. 1373b9-13. be­ cause the law is dispassionate ( 1286'17-20. good. 1 6. Law "based on custom (kata to ethos)" is common law. see also Rh. KING. 1 286'2-4). Common law is "based on nature" (Rh.254 Glossary first part of the inspection dealt with his handling of public funds. The second part. as the fact that it is contrasted with written law strongly suggests (see VV 1250b1 5-18). ka/on NOBLE. KINGSHIP ktetike PROPERTY ACQUISITION kurion AUTHORITY LAW nomos Laws are universal commands ( 1 269'1 1-12. 1368b7-9). There are two kinds of law: specific (idion) and common (koinon). (2) non-Greek. (4) heroic. and not for the sake of something else. in deviant constitutions (Rh. (3) DICTATORSHIP. conducted by a board of ten inspectors. for example. scho/e. NE 1 137b13-14) typically backed by sanctions that compel compliance (NE 1 180'2 1 ).

diagoge scho/e A leisured pursuit is an activity appropriate to LEISURE time. Sometimes a broader class. but philosophical con­ templation is the only activity that is truly and fully leisured ( 1 267'10. such as slaves and resident aliens). never the majority of its total population (which includes many noncitizens. In the case of an aristocracy or an oligarchy.Glossary 255 tween our conception of leisure and Aristotle's. the places where such meals are eaten. this may be a very small number of people. This is why FREE people spend their time on politics and philoso­ phy ( 1255b35-37. despotike. Political action is leisured to some extent. The majority is always the majority of the citizens of a city-state. the contrast between a democracy and the other types of constitutions would collapse. But whereas we are inclined to think that almost anything can be a leisured activity provided we enjoy it and do it for pleasure. NE 1 177h2-18). Because of this it inherits some of the problems inherent in the notion of a CITIZEN. They are organized by the city- . LEISURED PURSUIT diagoge.2. What Aristotle has in mind here is presumably the majority of those who pass the kinds of pragmatic tests for citizenship discussed in III. Jeitourgia PUBLIC SERVICE MAJORITY p/eion The notion of the majority is a complex one. Aristotle thinks that some actions or activities are objectively or intrinsically leisurely. MANUAL LABORER despotes. See Introduction xxxv-xlviii. or the meals themselves. MASTER. who may be quite wealthy ( 1278'24-25). despotike episteme A master is someone who (in the best case) exercises the rule of a master (despotike) over SLAVES (unfree and unwilling subjects) in accordance with the science of mastership (I. 98 1b13-25). or mathematics (Metaph. MASTERSHIP MESSES sussitia Sussitia are groups of people who regularly eat meals together.1 2. phi­ losophy. But when a democracy is characterized as control by the majority. If it were. These are the canonical ACTIONS or activities that are their own ends and that we perform only for their own sakes and never for the sake of something else. such as music. which includes the VULGAR CRAFTSMEN ( 1277'38-bl ). the majority in question cannot be the majority of the unqualified citizens. who are poor ( 1 29 1b25-26). when Aristotle tells us that the majority (or majority opinion) has authority in all constitutions ( 1 294' 1 1-14). For example. makarios BLESSEDLY HAPPY chernetes Sometimes the class of hired laborers. 7). the majority he is referring to is the majority of un­ qualified citizens ( 1 275'19-23) who participate in the offices of the constitution. such as being born of citizen parents. 1324'25-32).

at which there was music and dis­ cussion. and as a way of storing wealth for future use. Moreover. another was to foster community among them. It seems certain that Aristotle plans to have such symposia in his best city-state ( 1336h20-23. Lydian. MUSIC ethnos A nation occupied a larger territory than a city-state. had a larger population. See I. form. Laws I-11. and often paid for from public funds. A harmony or har­ monic mode is an arrangement of tones of a particular sort (Dorian. MONEY p/ethos Any large group of people.256 Glossary state. Mixo-Lydian. and tyrants forbid messes because they do not want the citizens to know and trust one another ( 1 3 13'41-h6). Some understanding of the political and educational significance of symposia can be gleaned from Plato. however. it eventually becomes an unnatural form of WEALTH that is dealt with by a science of its own: COM­ MERCE. Introduction liv-lv. MONARCHY KINGSHIP is its correct and TYRANNY its deviant nomisma First introduced to facilitate EXCHANGE of needed goods. monarchia Monarchy is one-person rule.9-10. Melodies (songs. 1263b40-1264'1 ). me/os is itself used to refer to a harmony. or (occasionally) of the constituents of melodies other than the words ( 1 341h23-24). l l . 1338'21-30). poems) consist of words (logos). and a less tight social organization. MIDDLE CONSTITUTION Described in IV. lxxv-lxxvi. Sometimes. Phrygian). It is not the unqualifiedly best constitution. Thus having messes tends to foster the communal use of property. NATION . and may consist of many scattered villages. because it requires fewer resources and less than perfectly virtuous citizens. there was often a symposium after the meal itself. MULTITUDE mousike Music consists of melodies (me/os). It need not have a single town or urban cen­ ter. harmony (harmonia). it serves as a unit of value. which Aristotle favors ( 1 263'2 1-41 . Despite the fact that Aristotle's promised discussion of this institution is missing ( 1 330'4-5). but it is the best one for most city-states and most people. In addition to functioning as a medium of exchange. and harmonia is used to refer to a way of tuning an instrument that suits it to a particular mode. but often the poor citizens as opposed to the few rich ones. and rhythm (ruthmos). the middle constitution is probably a POLITY. it seems pretty clear from what he does say that though one of its functions was to feed the citi­ zens ( 1330' 1 ).

" it consists in doing noble actions ( 1 332'9). time o/kos HOUSEHOLD OLIGARCHY o/igarchia Rule by the few rich for the their own benefit ( 1280'1-2). NOBLE nomisma MONEY nomos LAW. A deviation from ARISTOCRACY. phronesis PRACTICAL WISDOM. kata phusin: see Introduction §4. but often the poor or the common people. pleion MAJORITY p/ethos MULTITUDE polis CITY-STATE po/iteia CONSTITUTION. which is either rule by the major­ ity of citizens or rule by the poorer classes. 1332'7-17) or VULGAR ( 1 333h9). I S (EXISTS) BY NATURE. paideia EDUCATION PEOPLE demos Sometimes the entire body of citizens regardless of their social class ( 1 268'12). Since happiness is "a complete activation or employment of virtue. 1366'33-34). perioikoi SUBJECT PEOPLES PHILOSOPHY philosophia: See Introduction §2. FREE people prefer what is noble to everything else. Hence what is noble is usually contrasted with what is merely useful ( 1 323bl l-12) or necessary ( 1325'26-27. This ambiguity gives rise to a parallel ambiguity in DEMOCRACY (rule by the demos). "The virtues and the actions re­ sulting from virtue" are the only unqualifiedly noble things (EE 1248h 36-37). NATURAL 257 phusis. ka/on The opposite of shameful (aischron). POLITY po/iteuma GOVERNING CLASS po/itike STATESMANSHIP . Something is noble if it is "both choice­ worthy because of itself and praiseworthy" (Rh.Glossary NATURE. rule that "results from wealth and power" (NE 1 16 1'2-3). custom OFFICE ARCHE.

1049b12-17.9). 1050b6-19. POLITY demagogos Occasionally demagogos is a neutral term used to describe an influential democ­ ratic leader such as Pericles ( 1274'1 0). The following are particularly relevant to the Politics: ( 1 ) X is prior in na­ ture to Y if X can exist without Y. but for the following reasons it seems that the latter just is a (well-mixed) polity: ( 1 ) There are just six types of constitutions: kingship. 1 392'20-23). aristocracy. but more often it has a negative connota­ tion ("demagogue"). Metaph. and tyranny (1 289'26-30). so is the middle constitu­ tion ( 1296'22-40). Aristotle never explicitly identifies a polity with the MIDDLE CONSTITUTION described in IV. 1035b4-6. 989'15-18). Metaph.258 Glossary politikos STATESMAN politeia Aristotle gives a number of different accounts of what a polity is: ( 1 ) a constitu­ tion ruled by the multitude for the common benefit ( 1279'37-39). 265'22-24. PRIOR prohairesis DELIBERATE CHOICE psephisma DECREE . (3) X is prior in de­ finition (or formula) to Y if and only if X is mentioned in the definition ofY but not Y in the definition of X (Metaph. (2. (4) a constitution that depends on the hoplite or warrior class ( 1 265b26-28. the middle constitution must be a well-mixed polity. 1077'36-b1 1). democracy. polity. The nature of the mixture mentioned in (2} is also variously characterized: (2. 1294'22-23). 1307'10-12). oligarchy. This is also sometimes referred to as priority in substance (Metaph. 1 297b1-2). Hence one would expect the middle constitution to be one of these. referring to those who curry favor with (demagogein) the people and undermine the rule of LAW ( 1292'4-37) in order to gain power. This is also sometimes referred to as priority in nature (Ph. (2) X is prior in substance to Y if and only if X is more nearly perfect or more complete than Y (GA 742'19-22. PA 646'25-26. 1 288'12-15. (2) a mixed constitution ( 1 293b33-34. proteron Aristotle recognizes many different ways in which one thing can be prior to an­ other. but Y cannot exist without X (Metaph. wealth and freedom ( 1 294'16-17). 1019'2-4). 1050'4-b6. 261'13-14. 1 1 (except perhaps at 1297'39-40). What could it be besides a polity? (2) A well-mixed polity is in the middle between an oligarchy and a democracy ( 1 294b 14-18).3) a mixture of elements drawn from de­ mocratic and oligarchic constitutions (IV. 1) a mixture of democracy and oligarchy (1293b34. Rh. (3) a constitution that depends on the middle class ( 1295b34-1296'9). Since there cannot be two middles between two extremes. (2. POPULAR LEADER PRACTICAL WISDOM phronesis: See Introduction §5.2) a mixture of the rich and the poor. 1 077b3-4).

happy lives ( 1 3 S2b27. For many such people. 1330'30-3 1). yet Aristotle thinks that all slaves. 1 260'14-20. yet those who have the resources delegate the position of household manager (a position that seems to require both deliberative ability and foresight) to a steward who is himself (presumably) a slave ( 1255b33-37). A city-state is self-sufficient. though not perhaps for those who have been living as free people ( 1255'1-3). SELF-SUFFICIENCY SLAVE doulos A slave is a piece of animate property who belongs wholly to a single master. . cannot be happy ( 1280'32-34). should be offered free­ dom as a reward for good service ( 1330'3 1-33). leisured activity SCIENCE (episteme) See Introduction §2. Hence they are not self-sufficient ( 129 1 '10). 1260' 12. autarkeia Something is self-sufficient if it can carry out its TASK or fulfill its function by itself. or to pay for the pro­ duction of a play at a theater festival. some with a larger share in virtue (or reason) than others (1255b27-29. But it is neither just nor beneficial for merely legal slaves to be enslaved. for use in matters having to do not with production but with ACTION (I. scholazein LEISURE. unless perhaps they have been living as slaves for some time ( 1255'1-3). PUBLIC SERVICE rule ARCHE schole. there are various kinds of slaves. leitourgia Rich people in Athens were required to equip a trireme.4). but they can be somewhat lessened if we bear in mind a few facts and distinctions. Happiness is self-sufficient because by itself it makes life choiceworthy (NE 1097bl4-16). often used to determine citizenship or access to political office. 1254b21-23. These tensions are real. This was. no doubt. and more so than a household or village. and are (generally) better off being under the au­ thority of someone to whose reason they can listen. not to a community ( 1278'1 1-13). because it enables its inhabitants not just to live but to fulfill their func­ tions and live leisured. 1326b30-32). Many tensions and apparent inconsistencies have been detected in Aristotle's various remarks about slaves: It is just and beneficial for natural slaves to be en­ slaved. or the like as a public service.1 353'1.Glossary 259 ktetike The craft or science dealing with the acquisition but not the use of property. natural or legal. Slaves lack deliberation and foresight. First. 1280'33-34). in effect. an extension of his master's body. slavery is coincidentally beneficial ( 1278b32-37) and just. Some people are natural slaves because their souls lack a deliberative part ( 1252'31-34. a form of taxation on their wealth. He is a tool. PROPERTY ACQUISITION PROPERTY ASSESSMENT timema A measure of wealth or property for the purposes of taxation or determining PUBLIC SERVICE.



Second, there are also various kinds of free people; a VULGAR CRAFTSMAN is a
free man who shares in virtue to the extent that he is a limited slave still to some
extent under the authority of a master ( 1260'39-b7), but he is not a free CITIZEN
in most constitutions (III. 5).
We are not likely to find congenial Aristotle's views on slaves, however consis­
tent, but we should remember that they provide a basis for the ethical critique of
contemporary Greek practices. How many actual Greek slaves, we might won­
der, would turn out to be credibly categorized as natural ones?

psuche: see Introduction xxxviii.

spoudaios excellent, good

stasis FACTION
A statesman ("politician," "political ruler" are common alternative translations)
is a man of practical wisdom, capable of ruling free and equal subjects ( I ZSShZO)
in accordance with the precepts of statesmanship (IV. I), and of being ruled by
them in that way when his turn comes (1259b4-6).



politike: see Introduction xxv-xxvi.

theorein, theoria, theoretikos
The verb theiirein (to view or look at) often means to study or contemplate or en­
gage in theoretical activity (see Introduction §6). The adjective theiiretikos is fre­
quently contrasted with praktikos (practical, or pertaining to ACTION) . But in
Aristotle's technical sense, theorizing is more practical, more of a canonical AC­
TION, than such paradigm practical matters as engaging in politics or running a
city-state ( 132SbJ6-21).


Perioikoi ("those who dwell around") were the subject peoples found in various
Greek city-states such as Sparta and Crete. They sometimes paid taxes, or
served in the army, or provided farm labor. They did not participate in govern­
ment, but were not SLAVES, and could not be bought and sold.

sussitia MESSES

ergon: see Introduction §4.

thes hired laborer

A deviant form of monarchy. It is rule of unwilling subjects ( 1 3 1 3'14-16,




1314•34-38) by one master, who aims at his own advantage rather than that of
the community as a whole (see 1279h6-7, 16-17). It is a mixture of extreme oli­
garchy and extreme democracy ( 1 3 1 Qb2-7) and so is the worst constitution of
all, the one that is furthest from being a true constitution (see 1 289b1-2,
1293h27-30, 1309h30-35). If a tyrant listens to a true statesman, however, he
will rule in a more moderate way and will either be "nobly disposed to virtue or
else half good, not vicious but half vicious" ( 1 3 1 5b9-10). Types of tyranny dis­
cussed in 111.14 and IV. IO include foreign kingship and DICTATORSHIP.
Something is unqualifiedly F or simply F if it is F intrinsically (kath ' hauto) or
by nature (phusei); it is qualifiedly F if it is F only in relation to something else
(pros ti) or coincidentally (kata sumbebekos) or on the basis of an assumption (pros
hupothesin) or from a perspective, or in some other qualified way (1274b14-20,
1293b3-7, 1 328'38-39, NE 1 1 39h1-3, 1 1 5 1'35-h3, 1 1 53'5-6, 1 1 57b3-5).

If something is a knife (say) or a man, its arete or virtue as a knife or a man is that
state or property of it that makes it a good knife or a good man, able to perform
its task or function well. The arete of a knife might include having a sharp blade;
the arete of a man might include being intelligent, well born, just, or courageous.
Arete is thus broader than our notion of moral virtue. It applies to things (such
as knives) that are not moral agents. And it applies to aspects of moral agents
(such as intelligence or family status) that are not normally considered to be
moral aspects of them. See Introduction xxxii.

People or activities that are the opposite of NOBLE or FREE are vulgar or com­

VULGAR CRAFTSMAN banausos, banausos technites
Vulgar craftsmen have a rather odd position in Aristotle's scheme of things.
They are free men, not slaves. Yet they seem to be further removed from virtue
than slaves ( 1260'39-b1). The work they do prevents them from acquiring virtue
and being happy ( 1337h4-21). Yet nothing in their nature fits them to do that
work rather than some other kind ( 1 260bl-2). This suggests that if they hadn't
become vulgar craftsmen, they might have been capable of virtue and happiness.
WEALTH chremata, ploutos
Natural wealth consists of the tools required by household managers and states­
men (1256h36-37). Unnatural wealth is MONEY. See COMMERCE, HOUSEHOLD

The craft or science of acquiring WEALTH. Because of complexity in the latter
notion, there are at least two different kinds of wealth acquisition. The natural



kind is concerned with the acquisition (but not the use) of natural wealth, and is
a part of (1253bl2-13) or assistant to ( 1256•3-7) HOUSEHOLD MANAGEMENT.
The unnatural kind of wealth acquisition is COMMERCE. And in 1. 1 1 a third kind
that "comes between" these two is discussed; it deals with metals etc. extracted
from the earth, and timber and other nonfoodstuffs grown on it (1 2S8b27-31).

gune, to the/u
By nature men are rulers and women are ruled; hence women are naturally infe­
rior to men ( 1 2S4bl3-14, Po. 1 454•20-22) and have different virtues from them
(1.1 3). A woman can make deliberate choices, but the deliberative part of her
SOUL is akuron, it lacks AUTHORITY ( 1 260•12-13). Part of what this might imply
is that a woman, having arrived through deliberation at what she judges is the
best thing to do in particular circumstances, may sometimes do something else,
because she tends to be less able to control her own appetites and emotions than
a man. This would explain why those who are weak-willed are likened to women
(NE 1 1 S0•32-bl6). Notice, however, that having said that the deliberative ele­
ment in women lacks authority, Aristotle goes on to talk about their fitness to
command ( 12S9bl-3). This makes it much more likely that what he thinks
women lack is authority over other people, for females have less spirit or as­
sertiveness than males (HA 608•33-bl2, PA 66Jb33-34), and spirit is responsible
for the ability to command (1328•6-7). Since these differences between men and
women are natural, we would expect to find an explanation of them in Aristotle's
embryology. But no such explanation is given. No doubt Aristotle is postulating
some unknown biological basis for the differences he observes (or thinks he ob­
serves) between men and women, and between males and females of other
species, rather than deriving the latter from the former.
Also relevant are Aristotle's views on the age at which women should marry,
the factors that conduce to harmony in marriage (VII. l 6), (certain sorts of) male
adultery (1335b38-1336•2), and public EDUCATION for women.


ascholia: opposite of LEISURE.


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Five useful collections of essays have recently appeared:

( 1 ) BARNES, ]., M. SCHOFIELD, R. SORABJI, eds. Articles on Aristotle. Vol. 2.
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the Politics:
VoN FRITZ, K., & E. KAPP. "The Development of Aristotle's Political Philosophy and the Concept of Nature," 1 13-34.
FORTENBAUGH, W. W. ''Aristotle on Slaves and Women," 135-39.
FINLEY, M. I. "Aristotle and Economic Analysis," 140-58.
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KELSEN, H. ''Aristotle and the Hellenic-Macedonian Policy," 170-94.
DEFOURNEY, M. "The Aim of the State: Peace," 195-201 .



WEIL, R. "Aristotle's View of History," 202-17.
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Vanderhoeck & Ruprecht, 1990:
SCHOFIELD, M. "Ideology and Philosophy in Aristotle's Theory of Slavery,"
1-27. Comments by C. H. KAHN, 28-3 1 .
SEEL, G. "Die Rechtfertigung von Herrschaft in der 'Politik' des Aristote­
les," 32-62. Comments by T EBERT, 63-72.
IRWIN, T. H. "The Good of Political Activity," 73-98. Comments by G.
STRIKER, 99-100.
BODEOS, R. "Savoir politique et savoir philosophique," 1 01-23.
PELLEGRIN, P. "Naturalite, excellence, diversite. Politique et biologie chez
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NuSSBAUM, M. "Nature, Function, and Capability: Aristotle on Political
Distribution," 1 53-86. Comments by D. CHARLES, 187-20 1 .
LORD, C. "Politics and Education in Aristotle's 'Politics' ," 203-15. Com­
ments by D. A. REEs, 2 16-19.
CoOPER, ]. M. "Political Animals and Civic Friendship," 220-41 . Comments
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BARNES, ]. "Aristotle and Political Liberty," 249-63. Comments by R.
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EUCKEN, C. "Der aristotelische Demokratiebegriff und sein historisches
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NATALI, C. ''Aristote et Ia chrematistique," 296-324.
BIEN, G. "Die Wirkungsgeschichte der aristotelischen 'Politik,' " 325-56.
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KAHN, C. H. "The Normative Structure of Aristotle's 'Politics, ' " 369-84.
(3) KEYT, D., & F. D. MILLER }R., eds. A Companion to Aristotle's Politics. Ox­
ford: Blackwell, 199 1 :
BRADLEY, A . C . ''Aristotle's Conception of the State," 13-56.
RowE, C. ''Aims and Methods in Aristotle's Politics," 57-74.
ADKINS, A. W. H. "The Connections Between Aristotle's Ethics and Politics,"
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427.492. fr.376 53h36-37 Odyssey IX. fr. 2-3) 77'19-20 Bacchae 381 39' 1 8 Iphigenia in Au/is 1266. fr. fr. 78) 28' 1 6 275 .7-9. 382-85 38h25-26 PHILEMON (Kock II.2 1 . 2-5) Q6h39 UNKNOWN (Nauck 854. fr. fr. 1400 52h8 (Nauck 646. fr. 59 78'37 XVIII. fr. 975) 28'1 5 HERACLITUS (Diels-Kranz B85) 1 5'30-31 HESIOD Works and Days 25 1 2b4-5 405 52h l l-12 HOMER Iliad 1.544 59h13-14 II. 1. 3) 55'36-38 TYRTAEUS (Diehl I.649 78'37 X.7-8 38h29-30 XVII. lO) 95h34 PLATO Republic 500d 29'2 1 SOLON (Diehl I.204 92'13 II. 87) 85'39-hl ANTISTHENES 84'15-17 ARCHILOCUS (Diehl !.224 87h14 XVI. 54) 55h28 PHOCYLIDES (Diehl !.3 19 67'1-2 IX.L IT E RARY R E F E R E N C ES ALCAEUS (Diehl !.71) 56h33-34 SOPHOCLES Ajax 293 60'30 THEODECTES Helen (Nauck 802. fr.39 1-3 85'13-14 IX.230.50. fr. l 14-15 52h22-23 X. fr. 16 Ins.372 87h14-15 II. 891) 10'33 (Nauck 672. 67b) 28'5 EURIPIDES Aeolus (Nauck 367.

03'33 Aphrodite. 74'35 Athena. 91 b24. 58h40 Charicles. 16'32 76'28. Antileon. 91 h23. 70h J 2 Annon. 84'22-25 Argos. 06'5 Chares of Paros. 22'20. J5h22 Ares. Athenians. 1 1 h8. 16'38 Ausonians. 69h28 Argo. 68'10. 71 h40 Appolodorus of Lemnos. Ambracia. OOh28. 84' 1 5 Black Sea. 70'2. 75hJ2. Areopagus. 05h25-27. 06'4 Arrabaeus. 06'31 Ariobarzanes. 85'1 1 . 05h25-26 276 . 1 1 '38 Adamas. 06'2 Amyntas the Little. Aphytaeans. Babylonians. 19'14 Byzantium. 66'39 Archytas of Tarentum. 03h2. J Jh J 2 Aenus. 04'3 1 . 73h39. 89h40. 28'3 Chalcedon. 06'3. 59'1 Carthage. 85'37 Atarneus. 12'12 Alcaeus. Amphipolis. 62h J J. 27h27 Agesilaus. 1 1'40 05'23. 84hJ Antimenides. 04'6. (in Thrace) 74h24. 69h4. 04'25. 04'9. I I h38 Agamemnon. (in Italy and Sicily) 74'24-25. 06' 30 Athens. 38h22 Aristogeiton. 12' 1 4 73h34-74'2 1 . 05hJ9 Antisthenes. 67h30-37 Alcyone. 85'21. 74h23 Autophradates 67'3 1-37 Andros. Asians. 06'9. 65'14. 1 2' 1 6 Achaeans. 74'33 Antissaeans. J Oh27 03h2. Babylonia. 6 1'29. 1 1 h3. 03'6. 87h14 Asia. 07'5. 59h8 02h19. 03'29-3 1 . 04'20. 75h35. J Oh30. 1 1 h30 80'36. 69h26. 90h J J . 05h33. 69h4. 05h36. 1 1 hJ4 J9h2J. Chalcidians. Apolloniates. 71 h36. 70'3 Archelaus. 74'23 Archias. Argonauts. I I h22 Aristophanes. 84'39. 4 J h J. 06'9 Camicus. 07'5 Babylon. 9 J h24. 24hJ2. 1 1 h3 Anaxilaus. Amasis. 16'3 1 Chares.8 Aleuads. 4 1'34 Attalus. 03'34 Basilids. 74'7. 1 1. 03•8. 29h20 Androdamus of Rhegium.I N D EX OF N AM ES Abydus. 07h22-25. 69h6. Argives. 36'18 Archilochus of Paros. 06h3 5 Astyages. 89h39.1 2 Aegina. 03'37. 03hJO. Amadocus. 67h J 8-19. 03'23. 06h I Celts. 1 1 h2J Artapanes. 20h4 Catana. Amphipolitans. 02hJ8. 40h26 Chalcis. 93hJ5. Carthaginians. 04'29. 85'36 Bacchiads. 69h29 Apollonia. 11. 38h2 J Aphis. Arcadians. 04'28.

J 5 h26 Daphnaeus. 69' 1 . Euripides. 86' 1 3 . 12'12 Good Order. 96'2 1 . 87'7. 07'39. J5bJ6-21. 55'36 Derdas. 96'33. 1 2'34. 06b5 Ethiopia. 13b22. 16'3 1 Epidamnus. 59'28-36. 27b24. J5b23. 53b35 Gorgus. 76b8-9. I I h38 72'2. 29h3. JOb37 Etruscans 80'36 Colophon.Index of Names 277 Charillus (or Charilaus). 06' 1 . J 5h34-36. 05bJ8-22 Cnidus. 1 3h22. 29h3. II bJ7 Dexander. 4 1 '36 Chytrus. 75b36. I I b5 Cyme. 71 b34. 84'23 Heraclitus of Ephesus. 04'9 Heniochi. 85'21. 06'23. 74'23 -30. 63h4J. 04b3 J-34. Greeks. 67hJ8. J Ob30. Eretrians. 22 Gelon. 65hJ3. 53b36 Diodes. 52h J 5 . 67'3 1-37 Corinth. Cypselids. 52h8.10. JOh38. Darius. 03'7 Epimenides of Crete. 24b8. Heracleodorus. 06'39 Crete. 04'1 3 Cleomenes. 28'15. 60'28. 06b9 29b24. 29h J J Cotys. 06'39. 77'19. J2bJ6 Heracles. 52bJ4. 64'20. 29h2. J 5b22 39'19 Cos. 03'15 . Dion 12'4. I I h2J Euryphon. 97'23 Chios. 05'1 Cyprus. 06'36 Hephaestus. 05hJ2-18. J2bJ0-16. 04'1 2 11. 03h9 Elimeia. 67hJ8 Charondas of Catana. J2hJ6 06•37. 69'29. Chians. 23'2 Heracleides of Aenus. J lb33. 16'37 Elis. 80b J 5 . 74'32-b5 Heraclea. 33b5 Delphi. 29h20 Ecphantides. J2h l l . 05'26 Greece. 75h26 Daedalus. J 5b27 Gela. J9b2J Ephialtes. 04b25 Europe. 03b9 Egypt. 84'40. 89h39. Cinadon. 97bJ6. 85'21. 74'8 Cleisthenes (of Sicyon). 07'1 Gorgias of Leontini. II b5 Four Hundred. 35-36. Egyptians. 86h39-40. 06'35 Cleotimus. 73b25. OJb2 J . 29b6 Evagoras o f Cyprus. 27bJ4 Dionysiac contests. 04bJ2-15. 90hJ5. 71 b25. 9 1 '24. 12'4. J9bJ8. 03'34. 90'20-22. II b30 27b22-36. 03b37 Delphian knife. Decamnichus. 29b32 Clazomenae. I I b4 Hellanocrates of Larisa. 06'2 Erythrae. 74h J 5 -1 8 06b5 Chonians. 71 b33. 69'39. 12'35. 29b5. 1 5 '30 Heraea. J Oh29.1 5 Draco. 67h22 Crataeas. 16'34 Diophantus. Euthycrates. 52hJ4 Cleopatra. J Ob29. 95'13. 05h26-27 Cypselus. 74'32-b5. 1 1' 1 5-20. 52b2 Helen of Troy. 68b40. 16'37 Cyrene North Africa. 74b5. 42b J 0. I I b J 5 Eretria. 42'34. Dorian harmony. 42'30. 10'34. 13'37. I I b2J Dionysius I. I I b8 Eurytion. 40b4. 13b27 Dionysius II. 03'19 05'26-29. 90b5 Codrus. J 5b24. Corinthians. 05b5-12. 16'33 Cyrus. 06'16 Cleisthenes (of Athens). 38h22 Diagoras. 03bJO Eubulus. 02h32. l l b J 3 Cleander. 59'13.

38'24 Mnaseas. 77'24 Oenotria. 04'32. 42b l O Ionia. 1 5b34. 05b29. Hiero. 06'31 Naxos. 75b27. 03'5. Milesians. Italians. 1 5b37 05' 1 7 Hipparinus. 59'6 -21 . 89b40 Heniochi. 03'5. 67b22. 69b4. 1 1 b29 Mantinea. 1 8b25. 1 6'30 India. 1 0b29. 24bl5 Peloponnese. 00'17. 92'13. 1 1 '37-39 Menander river. 7 l b3 1-40. {Epizephyr- Oreus. 11. 74'8-9 Megara. 06'29. Medes. 74'25 Leucas. 1 5b 1 3 Oxylus. 69b6 04b35. 26'15 Mithridates. 87'8 Locri. 78'37. Mytilenians. Olb l9-20. Locrians. 10b40. 80bl0 Orthagoras of Sicyon. 29b25 Hippocrates. 29b 1 3 Olympic Games. 1 1 b27 Malea. 03'18 ian) 74'22-23. 1 1 b l 7 Olympus. Megarians. 75b29. 12bl2. 29b10. O l b20-2 1 . 84•26-33. 04'26. 1 1 b26 Ionian Gulf. 02b29 Jason. 57bJ6 Hestiaea. 40'36 Macedonia. 52b22. 1 1 '20. 1 1 b2 Lygdamis of Naxos. 1 1 b27 Pericles. 52bl0. 29b4. 53'5. 29"9. 7 1 b28 Lycurgus. Oenotrians. 05b4-12. Perrhaebeans. 39b20 Iberians. 13bl4. 29b20 Museus. 59b13. 40bl Homer. 98'13. 04'6 Panaetius of Leontini. 04' 1 2 Lesbos. 10b39. 29bl5 Olympian Zeus. 06'1 Minos. battle of. 96'20 Paches. 12'16 Hippodamus of Miletus. 12bl l . 32b24 Mysians. Macedonians. 40'9-10 Leontini. 19' 1 2 Libya. 73b33. 80bl4. 89b39 Penthilids of Mytilene. 84bl. 24bl9 Myron. 05b5 Notium 03bl0 I talus. 06b33 33b34 Pauson. 29bl4 Italy. 90b 1 1 . 13b23 Lametius.8. 06b38 Hesiod. 69b7. 29b l l Odysseus. 1 6'37 Lydians. 76'27 Magnesians. 85'35. 84'4 1 . IOb29. 70'7. 38b22 Messenians. 39'35 13'37. 29b6. 1 3'24 Iapygia. 30b24 Mixo-Lydian. 84b l . 05'40-bl Pausanias {Spartan). 07'4. 2 1'29-3 1 Periander of Corinth. 29b20 lphiades. . 04'4. 85'10. 04' 1 1 Molossians. 70'3. 74'13. 03b33. 12b4 Midas. 1 5b27 Megacles. 66b 19. 90bl7.278 Index of Names Harmodius. 29b8. 04' 1 1 Mnason. 74'27. 02b3 1 . IOb28 Mytilene. 16'36 Onomacritus of Locris. 66b22 Onomarchus. 42b32 Pausanias (Macedonian). lapygians. 84'40 Opicians. The. 74'34 Larisa. 03b33 Miletus. 19' 1 2 Lyctia. Lysander. 74•29. 05'40-bl Istrus. 07'38 Lycophron. 18b27 Periander of Ambracia. 38'28 Oenophyta. 15b25. 05'24 Persians. 7 l b25. 74'24. 71 b36. 1 1 '39 Massilia. 62'20 Opus. 66b 19. 97bl4 Penthilus. 29b7.

74"9 Pharsalus. 1 5b30-31 Pittacus of Mytilene. 96' 1 9 Pheidon of Argos. 74'25. 90bl l Thessaly. 29b21 4 1'30 Sirras. court of. Statesman 89b5-l l Theagenes of Megera. 98' 1 3 Tenedos. Thebans. 13b13. Tarentines. 03b20. 06b29 Pheidon of Corinth. 66b5.Index ofNames 04'2 1 . 11. 24b l l .9. 74b24 Sardanapalus. 42b23-27. 2 1 '28 Theodectes. 24b8. 42'33 Solon. 06'19. 10b30. Republic Thales of Miletus. 85'35. 88b4 1 . 03'38. 02b29. 24bl l . 1 5b26 Python. 69b37. Phocians. 39'34. Spartans.1-5. 76b8-9. 60'22. 33b l 8 Salamis. 05'1 Sicyon. Philolaus of Corinth. 12b3 1 . 16'1-b27. 04'29 41'33. 1 6'34. 85b26. 59'23. Sybarites. 06b l . Phrynichus. 06' 10 279 Socrates. 55b4. 38bl2. 13'25-33. 1 1 b20 Thebes. 03'5 Phalaris. 03'31 Syracuse. Thales (or Thaletas). 41 b9 03'7. 29b10 Sesostris. 73b34-74'2 1 . 03'3.1-5. 84'39. compared to Carthage 11. Oligarchy a t Athens i n 404/3: 05b25-6 Thrace. 16'38 Rhodes. Pisistratids. 12bl4. 1 1. 42b2. 11. 9 1 ' 10-33. 07'27. 74b9-15. 9 1 b23. 1 6' 1 8. Thracians. 74b23. Samians. 42b9 06b29-07'5. 67b23. 06b3 1 Telecles of Miletus. 03'36. 1 5b35. 7 l b l . Phoxus. 03'10. 04'22 Samos. 32b24 Thrasyboulus of Miletus. 16' 1-b27. 1 3'26 Rhegium. 02b32. 1 1 b l 2 Persian wars. 04'26. 40'37 Psammeticus. 1 1 b2 85b35-37. 9 1 b25 Laws 11. 55'36 Theodorus. 85'38 Plato. 1 1'36. Phreatto. 13'38. 04b27 Thera. 03'29. 94b l9. 74'32-b5. 10b26-27 Sons o f the Maidens. 37'3 1 . 69b5. 74'32-b5. 1 3"9. 40b5. 7 lb37. 59'5-33 11. 42b7. 03bl l J2b8. Piraeus. 42b l l Sybaris. 06'30. 3 1'32 Thibron. 13b24 Thirty Tyrants. Philip of Macedon. 86b40. 04'27. 07'36. Scylletium. O l b l9. 04' 10-13 12b7. 12bl l . 16'30 Thurii. Philoxenus. 42'33. 05'23-24. 64' 10. Philemon. 1 5b 1 3. 10b39. 61'6. 1 0 Phrygian harmony. 02b23. 78'25. Tarentum. 34'40-b5. II. 90'20-22. 74'28-29 42'32-b3. 12'14 Sicily. 95b33 33b5-35. 29b25 Seuthes the Thracian.6. 56b32-33. 29b4. 1 Ob28 Phaleas of Chalcedon. 74b l8-23. 93b l . 75b9. Phocylides. Syracusans. 63b4 1 . 59'30. 05'24-26 Polycrates. OOb29 compared to Crete 11. 9 1 ' 12. 63'35. 06'38. 15b38 Thrasymachus. 65b35. 39b2. 04b l4. 59b29-30 65b32. 07b6-19 Simus the Aleuad. 1 0b30. 66b l7. 16'35 1 1'20 Thrasyboulus of Syracuse. 05b27 02b32. 06'23 . 8 lb32. 36'34-39. 93bl6. 41'36 Scylax of Coryanda. 13b26. 36b28 Theopompus. 65b l2 Sparta. 07'4. 84'26-33. 7. Siritis. 12' 1 Thrasippus. 69'37. 06' 1 . 13b23. 03'3 1 . 74' 13. 27b38-' 1 6. 16' 1-b27. 16'33 Pisistratus. Phocis. 20b9. 06'30 Timophanes of Corinth. 07b22-25. 62'24. Thessalians. 41 b2. 85'3. 13b24 Polygnotus. 1 5b2 1 . 7 1 b39.

04'7 Index ofNames Xerxes. 39h8 . 03'35 Tyrtaeus. 8 1' 1 6. Cape. 84h3 1 . 59h J 3. 8 1 b l 8 . 74'22. 03'3 1 . 03'29. 35'20 Zaleucus. 1 1 b38 Triopium. 29b l 8 Zancleans. 06b39 Zeus. 71 b36 Troezenians. 74'29 Tyrrhenia.280 Timophanes of Mytilene.

111. 78b3. 63b29-64'1 . 29'24. 99'22. 60b41-61'1. 78'27. 00'4. 12b26-34 cavalry 77b 1 1 . 1 6"32. uncon­ tested. 1 8'16. 28b40. 74' 17. 22b39. 86'37. 02'26. game 36'28. 3 1' 1 5 25'36. 62b7-8. 95b l l . 98bl9. 09•34. su­ archers 22b 1 pervision of. OOb5. 93b6. 78'15. 79b3. 75'7. 87bl6. 94b3. 69bl4-19. 111. 73'27. 25•35. 1 2b30. 68b22-25. 67b22-27. 90b 13. 94'14. 77b39. 07'20. 08'3. adoption of. 92'2. 96' 19. aristocrat 73•18. 09'3. 13'20. 8 l b l9. 40b27. 39. 77'5-10. 1 1' 1 1 ambidexterity 74b l 3 amusement. 111. 64bl-2. 75b7. 17'2. OOb24. 92b3. 24b lO. 19'30. 52b27-53'7. 54bl7. 02b9. 1 8b l 2.G E N E RA L I N D EX 82bl5. 93'10. 02b2. assembly 72'10. 98'4 bodyguards 85'24. 17b28. 02b7. 83'2. 75bl4. get the better o f 06' 1 1 . 93bl-2 1 . resident birth. 23'4. 64b4. 70b2 1-22. foreign 75b37.8. 10b32. 75'26. 56b30. abrogation. 60b l 3 . 37b36. 36'39. 20'23.4 07'20. 87b5. 75b37. 14b27. 69' 1 5 94b33. 1 0'3 1 . 93'9. 60'13. 34'28 city-state 52'1-7. 1 8'40. 1 8b2 1 . 92b28. 39'16. 19'37. 72' 1 1 . 03bl9. 28 1 . 88•39. 30b20 20'16. 90'3 1 . 68'30. 93'17. 85'27. 69'9-12. 20'18. 1 1 '33. 06b22-07bl9. 69b l4-19. 97bl8. 09'22. 61'16-b l 5. of laws or political system 92'12. alien. 14-15. 87'30. 69'9-12. 1 1'2.78'3. 77'2-3. 70b29. 88'7. 60bl7. 17b30. 10'29. 35'12. 35. 78'35. 76'17-b13. 92'5. 00'3. 1 1'8. 30'6. 78'30. 1 1'27. 94•9-29. 68'28. 82'37 65bl0-12. 97' 1 1 . 93b36. 39b l 3 cannibalism 38b20 anger 86'33. 78'7. 98b7. 77b39. 56b24. b l 9. 73'40. 64'33. 53bl-3. 71 b6. 52'20. 99b25. 1-1 1 . 90bl. 78'3. 26'20. 25bl6 beast 54'26. 64b34. 97'5 child 34b24. 14b4. IV. arbitrate 68b6. 80'34-b l 2. 67b22-27. 10b3. 02b5. 75b20-2 1 . 00'6. 93'38. aristocracy. 79'35. 03'17. 90'16. man. 74b34-75'5. 01'35. 74'4. 30'2. 1 5'14. 05'32. 85' 1 1 . -bearing. 1 1'7. 92•24. 97b7. 85'29. get more. 09'30. 01'13. 92b35. 89'27. 37'28.1-2. arrogance 95b9. 68•23. 87' 1 1 . 79'26. 9 l b28. 65'20-28. 9 l b34. 29'19. 9 l b l . 29'29. 75'12. 53'18-39. 41'16. 72b4 1. acquisitiveness. 12b6. 38b30 alien. 93b37. 111. 68'30. 82'34. 2 1 '7. 36'32. 22b l . 02b l . 86'23. 92bl9. citizen 60b37-61'1. 26b21 O l b40 alliance 61'24-27. 1 6'33. 1 8b4. 79b3 1 . 87'6. Olb9. 87'19. 35b7. 26bl7. 83b41. 65b7. 1 1'34. authority 52'5. 32'30 acropolis 30bl9 action 54'1-8. 22b3 arbitrator. abortion 35b23-26 89'17. 75b28. 94'2 1 . 70b39. virtue of. 74b3. 95b29. 75'3 1 . 2 1 '32. superior. 37. 24'26-29. 55b2. 78blO. 17'6. 27' 1 . 68b22-25. 36'40 86b4. 26'20. 29'12. 97' 1 5 . 93b40. 59'2 1 . well-born 82b37. 88'2. 92b26. 32'34. 66bl2. 63b7-14. 82'28. 67b7. 70b7. 92'10. 33'1 1 . 83'34. 08b39. 93'23.

19'3. 2 l h34. 99h20. 33'23. 18h35. 80b34. 9 1'1-4. 35'16. 22h4 deceit. 82bl4. 07b2-3. 89'17. 04h8. 3lh21. 91'6. 29'22-24. 86' 1 5 . 30'34. 28'25. 80h37. 14'3. 08b l l . decree 92'6 76b10-l l . colony 52hl7. 37"9. 92'6-8. 10'35. 72b9-l l . 79'25-h3 1. 10h10. 77h l l . 07h9. 52h9-16. community 52' 1-7. 6lh13. 96h29. commander. 32'29-35. 32'32 deliberation. 25hl4-16. 37'2. 02'1-2. 00'28. 42'20 22'7. 86b20-22. 9 l b4. 76b l . in politics 78'39. 2 1 '29. 70h37. 28'34-35. 10'12-14. ideal. 13'41 country manager 2 lh30. 60h29. 92h l 5 . 60h24. 8 lb3 1 . 82'26. 29'1 1-12. 16h23. 95b25-26. 23b40-24'2. 68h36. 04' 19. 3 lh37. 8 1 '28. 77h33-78'34. 34•19. see also juror craft 53h25. 2 l h l7. 25h37-38. 07h l9. 98h29. 82b10-l l . 79'17. in politics 95b23. 28h35. 17b3 1 . 89h33. 29'20. 28'3 1 . 89b7. 37'17-18. 37bl2. 25b23-27. 63'2-8. 65'18. 86'26. 03h32. 90hl4 court 73h41. 89' 15-18. 20'6. 26'22. comedy 68h20 commerce 56'4 1 . 88'38-h l . 75bl9. 00'12. 23b30-36. 58'38.00'4. 25b23. 2 1 '3 1-32. 32'5. 23'2 1 . 1 5'19. 75h35. 32h29 contempt. 09'35. 30'8-9. 90'4-13. 02h2. 84'8. 90b38-91 b5 clan 64'8. 60'17. 82'35. 93hl4. 92'32. 39'30-33. 37'13. 2 l b6-8. 8 1 ' 1 2. 80h8. 53b30. 1 8'40. 94'1 5-16. 89' 1 1 . 28b 1 5-23. 80b33. 82'35. 75bl6. 32'4-7. 3 l h24. 86'3. 8lbl2. 39"9. 89'39-41. 80b6-12. l6. 32'9. 58'39. 26b22-25. 74b38. 80'34. 27'20. 30'3-4. 17'40. parts of. 56b34. 17'36. 78'6. 41'7. 26bl l-12. 60h27. 26' 1 3-27. 09'30-32. essary offices of. 03'26-27. 69'19. 06h8. 29'35-38. 26'14. 81 '1 . see 86'12. 52b32. 66'1-4. 98hl6. 3 l h l 5 colonist. 22'23 75'38. 3 l h4. 95b34-38. 99'34. 22bl6. 84'2. 76'12-13. also end 25"40-26'5. 3 lh7 32'15. 09hl4-19. 21 b35. 57b4. 27'3. 16b3 1. 06'3 1 . 26h9. 75'17. . 9lbl l . 80b l 8 . 87'33. 37'16. 84' 1 . 95h 13 . 04'39. 77hl . 32b8-9. 89'4. 8lb38. crops 56'39. 28'38. 32'27. 28'35-37' 28'40. 37'6. 91'39. 58h36. 87'4. 83h4-5. 19'1-4. 97'21 . 37b8. 30'28. 15'7. 69'34-35. 88h37. 78h25. 17'6. 88b23.8. 08h31-33. 17'25. 95'26. 8 1'3. 91' 16 completeness 52b28. 37' 13. 81'5. 89h27. 39'37 craftsman. 68'23-25. 83' 1 5 -22. 60'14. 97h40. 22'9. 03b7. 18'3 1 . 56h30. 27'7 28'36. 89b27-28. 25h30-32. 29'5. 89'13-18. 25b36. treaty 94'35. 81 b29-30. councilor 82'34. 84b7. 7 1'41. 99•26. 61'37. 17' 1 . 25b39. 24h41-25'5. see also deliberation clubs. 37'29. 82'30. 24'23-25. 16'18-20. 17b37. 27'27-28. 95hl-3. 76b34. deliberative office 64h33. 84hl8. 52h2 1 . 22h34. 14'19. 28b6.82'23. 69hl7-19. 23'14-17. 79'21 . 24' 1 5. 33b29. fundamental principle of. political 05h32. 19b24 99b30. 73b3-7. corn rationer 99'23 36h4. 16"33. 79'26-27. 96hl5-17. 57'41-b23. 76bl-4. 75b3-5. 75'12. 04h10. 08h20. 27'4. 02h25-33. 2lbl5. 08h27. 20'21 . 10'20. 88b l 0-2 1 . 23'8. 60'36-b2. 13'9 constitution 60h l2-16. 29'20. 24'13. decent 67h6. 26'5-6. 2 1'36. 72b30. VI. 96'40-b2. 52h27-53'39. 91'2. 60b40. 97'16. 76b29. 12'1-b20 contract. 14. 24'5-7. 10'25. 79' 1 . 81'1. preliminary. 9 1 '27. deliberate choice 52'28. 37'19. 27h4. 25'9. 79'21 . 76b13. 56b2 1 .2 1 . OOhl2. stir up change in.1 5. 95b35. 20'23. 89'20-22. 89'3 1 . 22bl7. 20'14-17. 57'18. 07' 19-22. 37'21-27. 95b23. 99b3 1 . 95'29. 53'3 1 . 57'5. 58h37. 66h37. 05h34. 74' 1 5. 74b32. 16b7.69'9. 27'4. 56h9. 3 1 '34. 20b39-21'40. 26h7-9. 1 1 '25. nec­ council. 32'34. 57b26-30. 37'32 company 09'12. IV. 80h29. 23'7. 28'23-25. 60'3 1 . 99'14. 79hlO. 76h29. 73'41-b l . 78b8-l l . 17b37. 53h4. 26'36. 12h3. 64'37. 57'20. 60h20.282 General Index 78b10-l l . 73'4. 19'27. 59b3. IV. 72hl5. 34'13. vulgar 58b26. 86'29-30. 80h29-8 1'2. 28bl9. 32hl2. 08'27-30.

87'5. 1 1'10. 60'9. 10'14-18. preser­ 1 9'6. 02bJ J . 60'32. J 8b J J . farming 56'17. 33'8. 66b38. friendship 55b13. 4 1 b7 food 56'18-bJ9. 07b J8. 75b5. 00'32. 57'23. 02'9. 99b3 J . 06'24. 8 1'23. 58b29. 37bJ9 . 86bJ7. 28b26. 90b40. 14-VIII. 77b8. 02' 1 1 . 80•24. 28b20. 25'7. OOb22. 80'35. 34' 1 1 . 9 J b J 5-92'37. 70b37. wineless 36•8. 33b28. 03b6. 3 1'41 dictator. 3 1'30 08b8. 02'20. 36b22. 85b25. 03b 1 1 . J7b1 1 . 97b20. 13b38. 03bJ7. 08' 1 1 . 08b3 J . fine. 02bJ4. I I b26. 09b36. 17'25. 87'3 1 life. 55bJ8. multitude. 03' 1 1 . 65bJ2. 17'18. 1 5'23. 55'40. in politics 7 1 '2. J 6b22. 67'41 . 96'7. 7 J b4 J . 62b7. 67b36. 89'29. 96b37. 56bJ. 06' 18. 10'30. 03'25. 82b J 8-83' 1 5 . 24b3 J. 19' 19 fear. 9 J b29. 07•8. 10'17. 67'6. J 8b6. de­ 06b22. 92b13. 20'14. 86bJ. 84b27. J 7b4. 14'3. 99b24. J9b28. 99b27. 83'33. 36'1. 86b2. 87b25. 63b6. 87b33. 01 b29. 58'14. 84'35. 68'24. 94'40. 08'18. 95b8. 93'3 1 . 80b38-39. 52b34-53' 1 . 37bJ5. 42b26 dynasty 72b3. 83b20. 42'19 friend. political importance of 02b2. 83'25. I 1'8. flattery 92'17. 29b40. 98'10. 97'4. 8 1 '6. 83'16. 38'5. 63'30. 79bJ8. 67'38. 05bJ. fishing 56'36. 97•36. 68'17. 9 J b22-93'10. 42'19 end 52bJ-2. political 97'35. democratic. 4 1 '27. finition 79b8. 90'18. J7b2J. 66b30. 0 1'27. 29'3 1 . 06b3 J . 04'36. 95'14 diet. 06b J 8 desire 66b29. OJb6. 30b37. 08b9. 09'27. 96bJ8. 88b J . 1 4'6. 24�. 08'2 1 . 02b7. 94b27. 08'12. 28b26. 82'1. 39b5. 30b4 J . 07'39. 70b37.General Index 17'5. 1 1 b36. 20b20. revolution in and 28b4 J . 08'28. 6 1 ' 13. 96'23. 39'17. destruction of. 1 6'22. 22'21 04b24. 3 1 '34. 08'2. 28'29. 0J b29-02'8. reciprocal. 04b8. 19'2 1 . 1 8'5. 58b13. equality 80'19. J 7b39. 06'2 1 . 39'30-3 1 . 1 8'4. kinds of. 77bJ8. 99b25. free of 73b2 J . 28b32. 20'2. faction 64b8. 58bJ J . 96'9. 29'38 democracy. 94'20. 98bJ8. 39b26. 3 J b25-32'7. 29'3. see also diet force 55'9. 13b30-3 1 .7. 94' 1 1 . 283 equal. see also complete 27b40-28'5. 02'9 farmer. 04b4. 86b30. 20bJ. 72bJ2. 92b5-10. 78'28. 94bJ4. 29'26. 80'9. 78b23. 57b38. 94' 1 1 . 94b7. 25bJ . educate. 92b22-93'10. J8b25. 95b23-24. 86'36. democrat 73b13. 22'32. 95bJ4. 87'25. 80b23 experience 57'4. 90'30-b20. 29b J . 90bJ. 56b5. 39b3J-38. 02bJ J . 12'6. 81 b23. 88'10. 13bJ. 98bJ7. 1 7'7. 41'35. strict 39'6. 02'33 fisherman. 56'34. 62b J . 94'33. vation. 97b J J . freedom 53b2J. 91 b22 flatterer. 96'3 1 . 99b37. 57'13. 23'22. 72b10. 01'30. 59' 1 . 1 1 '25. 90'36. 80·5. 02'33. 55bJ5. 89bJ8. of children 35bJ9 00'6. 07b40. 93b37. 23'9. 1 7'40. 2 1 ' 14. 20•33. 29'10 foreign: See alien 02bJ8. 08b39. 87'35. 13b39 flute playing 4 1 '25. 08'3 1 . 09'2. 07'26. 9 1 '30. VII. 96b28. 34bJ4. 89'37-b 1 1 . 92b39. 09b5. 06'27. 03'13. 90bJ8. 27b3 J . dictatorship 85'3 1 . 89b32. 14'3. 9J b4. 95'23. 77'20. 55'2. 2 J b J . 19'16. 57'9. 94'39. general. 56b2. 37b34. 09b20. J 6b24. 67b32. 27b25. 57b3. 13b3 J drinking 74b 1 1 . 82'4. equals. 09' 14. 91 b34. 90'28. deviant 79b6. 82bJ5. 4 J b29 exposure. 37'2 1 . 1 3b J 7. 39'20. 67b4. 57b5-30. education 60bJ5. 1 5'19. 58bJ8. legal 94'38. 02b28. 04b7. 29b38. 33'20. 93'38. 09bJ8. 86b38. 57bJ. devices. 63bJ7. 96'1 3 . 78'10. 75'4. 4 Jb5. 06'32. 09b3 J . 61'30 exchange 56'4 1 . 30'33. 80'7. 1 0'2. fortification 30bJ8. 89'17. 90b40. Q4b20-05'40. 7 1 '39. see also food dishonor 8 1 '30. 33'16. 97'18. 9 J b27. 25b2J. 7 1 '23. 94'17. 77b J 5. 23'4. 97b25. 98'34. 1 8' 10. 9 J bJ2. 39b27. 36bJ J distrust. 33'6. 1 7'40-b J7. 9 J bJ8. 30' 1 . 25'33. 1 1' 1 5 . 08'9. 09'34. 13'9. 80b39-40. 73b4J. 33b7. 92b25. 0 1' 1 1 . 34'14. 66'38. 0 1 '39. 96b26. 06b30. 02b2 J . 22b37. 1 8' 19. 25'28. 20b3J free.

1 5b i . oob 1 1 . 88'20. 24h3. 02'32-34. OOh25. 30'29. 38'3. 09'37-39. 1 5'38. 71 b41. 14h39. 84h35-88'32. 2 l h l 4.9-13. divine 52h24. 87' 1 3. 86'24-35. 9 1'27. in couples 65'4 1 . 80'8. 24'10. 02'29. 56•35. 85h3 1 . 95'4. 75'9. 28h22. 26'32. 22h29. 18h37. 8 1'2. 69hl4. 73'37. 85'7. 29'3 1 . 87hl6. 12h6. 97h20. 87'5. 94'1 . 32'3. 20'26 just. 70h30. 77h24-25. 55'5. 22h39 governing class 78h10. 35'3. 29'16. 9 1 '24. 3 1'24. 33h22. 98'8. III. 14h3 1 . 87'29. 98'22. 95b8. !Oh2-1 1'8. 65h!O inspection. 26'9. 68h40. 23h24. 2 1'2. 76h 1 3 . kingship 52'8.3 -13. 7 1 '40. 02hl0-14. 98'25. 83h22. happy 64hl 5 -24. 97hi7. 28h35. 32' 1 1 harbor 22h33. 32' 1 5 preservation of 13'1 8-33 hoplite. 77'18. 39hl9. 32'20. 65' 1 . 53'33. 97b26. 2 l h20. 85'32. 2 1'6. 02h14. 97h lO. 0 1'27. 23h33-36. 93'24. 59h24. 22'2. 24' 13. communal 22h28 59hl. inspired 40• 1 1 . 89'27. 28bl2. 1 3' 1 5. 14'40. OOh35. 85'20. 29'23. 99'2 1 . 12'21. 17h27. 7 1'8. 22b1 1 inspiration. 18hi7. 85'17. 69h i2. 98bl8. 22hl9. 28'37-h2. Spartan 64'3 5. household man­ ager. 23'27. jury 68h8. 12'1 1 . 23h28. 30'8. 77hl7. 87'23. 77hiO. 59h39. 09h2. hoplite weapons 79h4. 39h39. 05'8. 80'33. 17'25. 19'28. 29'36. 79'34. 53hl9. 42'7 83'35. 87h4. 56h23. 0 1 '3. 05h34. 26'30. 84' 10. on money 58h5 good government. 87'17. 25hi2. 30'17. 1 8h29. 28hl4. 25'33. 30'12. 74' 17. of offices and officials 7 1'6. 82'37. 55'34. 72'8. 88'17. 23'28. 85' 1 5 . judgment. 72h9. 08' 1 1 . 67' 1 5 . 93'16. 82'2. 53h21. 23hl6 judge. 72hl9 honor 66h34. 05h35. 9 l h5. 0 1 '36. 95'36. 72b6. 26'26. I l h26. 75h l 5. 39h7. 42'19 good birth. intelligence 52•30 94'21 . 59h3 1 . 08hl2-15. blessedly. OOh34. 23h30. 65h37. hunting 55h38. 83hl9. 22h22. 9 1'6. 8 l h33. 07'7. 27'1 5 good order 99hl6. 32hl7. 7 1'14-18.67'2. 22' 1 5 king. 10'30. 83'37. 24'25. 29h25. 65'19. 1 7h3-7. 2 1 h26 hatred 05'23. hearth. 26bl4. 38'5. 95' 1 5 . 85h23. 98h6. 97h23. 94'38. 06' 14 Greek. justice 53'1 5 . blessed. 27'12. 25h7. 85h38. 97'29. 86b l5. 89h32. 23h2 1 . non. OOhl9. hired laborer 72'2 1 . 18b22. 17h33. 85h27. 54' 1 8. 25'32. 24h27. Olh36. 98'4. generalship 58' 1 1 . 55'22. 02hl. 77hl9. 34'34. 85h22. 89h i . 88h2. 1 5b l . 82'14. 55b l 5 . 3 lb29. 97'22. 71 b l . 32'7. guards. 32'25. 60'22. 02'39. 24b33. 80h6. 93h37. 53'17. 23hl. helot. Vl. 93'9. 78'13.52h5. 4 J hl4. iambus 36h20 infertility. O l h28. see also free God. 2 l b35. 79'25. 38'2. 87hl2. 89'40. 07b l2.3. 56h2. 29'26. 36hl6. 53'29. 25bl4. 52hl9. happiness. 1 5'19. OIN. 26'23. 7 1'19. 22'39. 91 b28. 42'20 law 53'32. 29h36 household management. 63'8. 26bl8. 87h39. 23h24. 1 8h30. 29'22. 24' 1 1 . 25'10. 98'6. 25' 1 . 62h4. 3 lh 1 8.284 General Index general. see also live well 28b37. 57'25. 05h33. 90h 13 . 09h l . 65'3 1-38. 13hlO. 83'36. 23h26. 24'5. 36hl9. 1 8'4. 53h22. 6 1 h l . 56h26. 83'2. 99hl9. 2 1'7. 63h40. . 82h39. 28hl4. 53'38-40. 27'33. 36' 1 5 guardhouse 3 1 '20. 75'26. 29'32. 79h5. 28h7. Olh40 interest. 40h4. 87'26. well governed 60h30. 82'26. 24h39 86'2. 94'37. 91'32. 14'33. 31 b25. 33h29. 4 l h34. 1 8h37. 83'39. 40h25 juror. kingly. well-born 82h37. 96hl8. 59h 1 1 . 82'34. head of household 1. 14h7. 35hl5. 24h35. 29'4. destruction of 12h38-13'17. 22'6. 97b2. 28h36. 87hl6. 56b5. 1 1'13 . 8 1 '3 1 . 85h24. 73'37. 75'30. 25'2 1 . 69'38. 9 1'41. 05'1 1 . 26h3 1 . 88'4 1 . judging 8 l h3 1-82'23. 26b5 generous 63h l i . 37h2 J . 38'16 laborer. 27hl6. 68'22. 55h38. 24'30. 09h4. 95' 1 1 .

69' 17. marketplace OOh 1 1 . 66'Z3. ZlhlZ.7 . lot. 68h9. J7hZ7. 30'Zl . 1 9'7. 06'3 3. SJb18. 88'37. 9 1'4. ZShJO. 14'8. 07hJ 1. Z4'36. 8ShJJ. 67'19. 54'3 1 . SJhZO. Z6'4. 37'33 leisure. 53•1-5. 8 1 ' 1 . JZhJS. 86'3. 93'5. 38'14-30. JJhJS-34'10. 69hJ. 91 '1 5. 60hZ. 95'1Z. Z9' 1 . Z7hJ8. 7JhZZ. Z4•40. 4ZhJ7 ZS' l l . leisured pursuit 56'3Z. 1 5'1 8. 70'Z0. 8ZhZ7. 3 1 '3 1-h lJ. 69'40. 08hJZ. 94hS. Z4hZ6. love of. 4Zh14. market supervisors. 41'Z8 mixture. lObJJ. 7Jh6. Z9'17 messes 13'4 1 . milk SZh18. 92'15. 66hZ7. S6h8. science of 68bZ4. 72'17. 34' 1 5 . legislator 6 1 ' 1 1 . ZS'lZ. 1. 80h16. see also happiness livestock 67b 1 1 . ZZhZ. SZ•JZ. SZhlJ. 1 . OZh l J . 53•19. best. J l hZZ. marines Z7h9 86bZ7. Z7hJS. nobly. Z4'Z8. 95'38. 3 5'6. J8h17. SJ•ZS. 3 1 ' 19. sailors 7Jb16. Z4hJ-ZZ. 19h40. 80h10. 5Sb7. 97'6. 64' 1 . OJ•zz. middle 66hZ8. S6b14. 8