(Slip Opinion)

OCTOBER TERM, 2007

Syllabus
NOTE: Where it is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be released, as is
being done in connection with this case, at the time the opinion is issued.
The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of the Court but has been
prepared by the Reporter of Decisions for the convenience of the reader.
See United States v. Detroit Timber & Lumber Co., 200 U. S. 321, 337.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

Syllabus

JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT
No. 061164. Argued November 6, 2007Decided January 8, 2008
In a Court of Federal Claims action, petitioner argued that various fed
eral activities on land for which it held a mining lease amounted to
an unconstitutional taking of its leasehold rights. The Government
initially asserted that the claims were untimely under the court of
claims statute of limitations, but later effectively conceded that issue
and won on the merits. Although the Government did not raise time
liness on appeal, the Federal Circuit addressed the issue sua sponte,
finding the action untimely.
Held: The court of claims statute of limitations requires sua sponte con
sideration of a lawsuits timeliness, despite the Governments waiver
of the issue. Pp. 29.
(a) This Court has long interpreted the statute as setting out a
more absolute, jurisdictional limitations period. For example, in
1883, the Court concluded with regard to the current statutes prede
cessor that it [was] the duty of the court to raise the [timeliness]
question whether it [was] done by plea or not. Kendall v. United
States, 107 U. S. 123, 125126. See also Finn v. United States, 123
U. S. 227, and Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270. That the
statutes language has changed slightly since 1883 makes no differ
ence here, for there has been no expression of congressional intent to
change the underlying substantive law. Pp. 26.
(b) Thus, petitioner can succeed only by convincing the Court that
it has overturned, or should overturn, its earlier precedent. Pp. 69.
(1) The Court did not do so in Irwin v. Department of Veterans Af
fairs, 498 U. S. 89, where it applied equitable tolling to a limitations
statute governing employment discrimination claims against the
Government. While the Irwin Court noted the similarity of that
statute to the court of claims statute, the civil rights statute is unlike

JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

Syllabus
the present statute in the key respect that the Court had not previ
ously provided a definitive interpretation. Moreover, the Irwin Court
mentioned Soriano, which reflects the particular interpretive history
of the court of claims statute, but said nothing about overturning it or
any other case in that line. Finally, just as an equitable tolling pre
sumption could be rebutted by statutory language demonstrating
Congress contrary intent, it should be rebutted by a definitive earlier
interpretation finding a similar congressional intent. Language in
Franconia Associates v. United States, 536 U. S. 129, 145, describing
the court of claims statute as unexceptional and citing Irwin for the
proposition that limitations principles should generally apply to the
Government in the same way that they apply to private parties re
fers only to the statutes claims-accrual rule and adds little or noth
ing to petitioners contention that Irwin overruled earlier cases.
Pp. 67.
(2) Stare decisis principles require rejection of petitioners argu
ment that the Court should overturn Kendall, Finn, Soriano, and re
lated cases. Any anomaly such old cases and Irwin together create is
not critical, but simply reflects a different judicial assumption about
the comparative weight Congress would likely have attached to com
peting national interests. Moreover, the earlier cases do not produce
unworkable law, see, e.g., United States v. International Business
Machines Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 856. Stare decisis in respect to statu
tory interpretation also has special force. Congress, which remains
free to alter what [the Court has] done, Patterson v. McLean Credit
Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172173, has long acquiesced in the interpreta
tion given here. Finally, even if the Government cannot show detri
mental reliance on the earlier cases, reexamination of well-settled
precedent could nevertheless prove harmful. Overturning a decision
on the belief that it is no longer right would inevitably reflect a will
ingness to reconsider others, and such willingness could itself
threaten to substitute disruption, confusion, and uncertainty for nec
essary legal stability. Pp. 89.

457 F. 3d 1345, affirmed.

BREYER, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS,
C. J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, SOUTER, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., joined.
STEVENS, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which GINSBURG, J., joined.
GINSBURG, J., filed a dissenting opinion.

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008)

Opinion of the Court

NOTICE: This opinion is subject to formal revision before publication in the
preliminary print of the United States Reports. Readers are requested to
notify the Reporter of Decisions, Supreme Court of the United States, Wash
ington, D. C. 20543, of any typographical or other formal errors, in order
that corrections may be made before the preliminary print goes to press.

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 061164
_________________

JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[January 8, 2008]

JUSTICE BREYER delivered the opinion of the Court.

The question presented is whether a court must raise on
its own the timeliness of a lawsuit filed in the Court of
Federal Claims, despite the Governments waiver of the
issue. We hold that the special statute of limitations
governing the Court of Federal Claims requires that
sua sponte consideration.
I
Petitioner John R. Sand & Gravel Company filed an
action in the Court of Federal Claims in May 2002. The
complaint explained that petitioner held a 50-year mining
lease on certain land. And it asserted that various Envi
ronmental Protection Agency activities on that land (in
volving, e.g., the building and moving of various fences)
amounted to an unconstitutional taking of its leasehold
rights.
The Government initially asserted that petitioners
several claims were all untimely in light of the statute
providing that [e]very claim of which the United States
Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction shall be barred
unless the petition thereon is filed within six years after

JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

such claim first accrues. 28 U. S. C. 2501. Later, how

ever, the Government effectively conceded that certain
claims were timely. See App. 37a39a (Governments
pretrial brief). The Government subsequently won on the
merits. See 62 Fed. Cl. 556, 589 (2004).
Petitioner appealed the adverse judgment to the Court
of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. See 457 F. 3d 1345,
1346 (2006). The Governments brief said nothing about
the statute of limitations, but an amicus brief called the
issue to the courts attention. See id., at 1352. The court
considered itself obliged to address the limitations issue,
and it held that the action was untimely. Id., at 1353
1360. We subsequently agreed to consider whether the
Court of Appeals was right to ignore the Governments
waiver and to decide the timeliness question. 550 U. S.
___ (2007).
II
Most statutes of limitations seek primarily to protect
defendants against stale or unduly delayed claims. See,
e.g., United States v. Kubrick, 444 U. S. 111, 117 (1979).
Thus, the law typically treats a limitations defense as an
affirmative defense that the defendant must raise at the
pleadings stage and that is subject to rules of forfeiture
and waiver. See Fed. Rules Civ. Proc. 8(c)(1), 12(b), 15(a);
Day v. McDonough, 547 U. S. 198, 202 (2006); Zipes v.
Trans World Airlines, Inc., 455 U. S. 385, 393 (1982).
Such statutes also typically permit courts to toll the limi
tations period in light of special equitable considerations.
See, e.g., Rotella v. Wood, 528 U. S. 549, 560561 (2000);
Zipes, supra, at 393; see also Cada v. Baxter Healthcare
Corp., 920 F. 2d 446, 450453 (CA7 1990).
Some statutes of limitations, however, seek not so much
to protect a defendant's case-specific interest in timeliness
as to achieve a broader system-related goal, such as facili
tating the administration of claims, see, e.g., United States

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Opinion of the Court

v. Brockamp, 519 U. S. 347, 352353 (1997), limiting the

scope of a governmental waiver of sovereign immunity,
see, e.g., United States v. Dalm, 494 U. S. 596, 609610
(1990), or promoting judicial efficiency, see, e.g., Bowles v.
Russell, 551 U. S. ___ , ______ (2007) (slip op., at 78).
The Court has often read the time limits of these statutes
as more absolute, say as requiring a court to decide a
timeliness question despite a waiver, or as forbidding a
court to consider whether certain equitable considerations
warrant extending a limitations period. See, e.g., ibid.; see
also Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 514 (2006).
As convenient shorthand, the Court has sometimes re
ferred to the time limits in such statutes as jurisdic
tional. See, e.g., Bowles, supra, at ___ (slip op., at 5).
This Court has long interpreted the court of claims
limitations statute as setting forth this second, more
absolute, kind of limitations period.
A
In Kendall v. United States, 107 U. S. 123 (1883), the
Court applied a predecessor of the current 6-year bar to a
claim that had first accrued in 1865 but that the plaintiff
did not bring until 1872. Id., at 124; see also Act of Mar.
3, 1863, 10, 12 Stat. 767 (Rev. Stat. 1069). The plaintiff,
a former Confederate States employee, had asked for
equitable tolling on the ground that he had not been able
to bring the suit until Congress, in 1868, lifted a previ
ously imposed legal disability. See 107 U. S., at 124125.
But the Court denied the request. Id., at 125126. It did
so not because it thought the equities ran against the
plaintiff, but because the statute (with certain listed ex
ceptions) did not permit tolling. Justice Harlan, writing
for the Court, said the statute was jurisdiction[al], that
it was not susceptible to judicial engraft[ing] of unlisted
disabilities such as sickness, surprise, or inevitable acci
dent, and that it [was] the duty of the court to raise the

JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

[timeliness] question whether it [was] done by plea or not.

Ibid. (emphasis added).
Four years later, in Finn v. United States, 123 U. S. 227
(1887), the Court found untimely a claim that had origi
nally been filed with a Government agency, but which that
agency had then voluntarily referred by statute to the
Court of Claims. Id., at 229230 (citing Act of June 25,
1868, 7, 15 Stat. 7677); see also Rev. Stat. 10631065.
That Government reference, it might have been argued,
amounted to a waiver by the Government of any limita
tions-based defense. Cf. United States v. Lippitt, 100 U. S.
663, 669 (1880) (reserving the question of the time bars
application in such circumstances). The Court nonethe
less held that the long (over 10-year) delay between the
time the claim accrued and the plaintiffs filing of the
claim before the agency made the suit untimely. Finn, 123
U. S., at 232. And as to any argument of Government
waiver or abandonment of the time-bar defense, Justice
Harlan, again writing for the Court, said that the ordinary
legal principle that limitation . . . is a defence [that a
defendant] must plead . . . has no application to suits in
the Court of Claims against the United States. Id. at 232
233 (emphasis added).
Over the years, the Court has reiterated in various
contexts this or similar views about the more absolute
nature of the court of claims limitations statute. See
Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S. 270, 273274 (1957);
United States v. Greathouse, 166 U. S. 601, 602 (1897);
United States v. New York, 160 U. S. 598, 616619 (1896);
De Arnaud v. United States, 151 U. S. 483, 495496
(1894).
B
The statutes language has changed slightly since Kend
all was decided in 1883, but we do not see how any
changes in language make a difference here. The only

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Opinion of the Court

arguably pertinent linguistic change took place during the

1948 recodification of Title 28. See 2501, 62 Stat. 976.
Prior to 1948, the statute said that [e]very claim . . .
cognizable by the Court of Claims, shall be forever barred
unless filed within six years of the time it first accrues.
Rev. Stat. 1069 (emphasis added); see also Act of Mar. 3,
1911, 156, 36 Stat. 1139 (reenacting the statute without
any significant changes). Now, it says that [e]very claim
of which the Court of Federal Claims has jurisdiction
shall be barred unless filed within six years of the time it
first accrues. 28 U. S. C. 2501 (emphasis added).
This Court does not presume that the 1948 revision
worked a change in the underlying substantive law
unless an intent to make such a change is clearly ex
pressed. Keene Corp. v. United States, 508 U. S. 200, 209
(1993) (quoting Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Products
Corp., 353 U. S. 222, 227 (1957) (alterations omitted)); see
also No. 308, 80th Cong., 1st Sess., pp. 18 (1947) (herein
after Rep. No. 308) (revision sought to codify, not substan
tively modify, existing law); Barron, The Judicial Code:
1948 Revision, 8 F. R. D. 439 (1948) (same). We can find
no such expression of intent here. The two linguistic
forms (cognizable by; has jurisdiction) mean about the
same thing. See Blacks Law Dictionary 991 (4th ed. 1951)
(defining jurisdiction as the authority by which courts
and judicial officers take cognizance of and decide cases
(emphasis added)); see also Blacks Law Dictionary 1038
(3d ed. 1933) (similarly using the term cognizance to
define jurisdiction). Nor have we found any suggestion
in the Revisers Notes or anywhere else that Congress
intended to change the prior meaning. See Rep. No. 308,
at A192 (Revisers Note); Barron, supra, at 446 (Revisers
Notes specify where change was intended). Thus, it is not
surprising that nearly a decade after the revision, the
Court, citing Kendall, again repeated that the statutes
limitations period was jurisdiction[al] and not suscepti

JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

ble to equitable tolling. See Soriano, supra, at 273274,

277.
III
In consequence, petitioner can succeed only by convinc
ing us that this Court has overturned, or that it should
now overturn, its earlier precedent.
A
We cannot agree with petitioner that the Court already
has overturned the earlier precedent. It is true, as peti
tioner points out, that in Irwin v. Department of Veterans
Affairs, 498 U. S. 89 (1990), we adopted a more general
rule to replace our prior ad hoc approach for determining
whether a Government-related statute of limitations is
subject to equitable tollingnamely, that the same rebut
table presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits
against private defendants should also apply to suits
against the United States. Id., at 9596. It is also true
that Irwin, using that presumption, found equitable toll
ing applicable to a statute of limitations governing em
ployment discrimination claims against the Government.
See id., at 96; see also 42 U. S. C. 2000e16(c) (1988 ed.).
And the Court noted that this civil rights statute was
linguistically similar to the court of claims statute at issue
here. See Irwin, supra, at 9495.
But these few swallows cannot make petitioners sum
mer. That is because Irwin dealt with a different limita
tions statute. That statute, while similar to the present
statute in language, is unlike the present statute in the
key respect that the Court had not previously provided a
definitive interpretation. Moreover, the Court, while
mentioning a case that reflects the particular interpretive
history of the court of claims statute, namely Soriano, 352
U. S. 270, says nothing at all about overturning that or
any other case in that line. See 498 U. S., at 9495.

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Opinion of the Court

Courts do not normally overturn a long line of earlier

cases without mentioning the matter. Indeed, Irwin
recognized that it was announcing a general prospective
rule, see id., at 95, which does not imply revisiting past
precedents.
Finally, Irwin adopted a rebuttable presumption of
equitable tolling. Ibid. (emphasis added). That presump
tion seeks to produce a set of statutory interpretations
that will more accurately reflect Congress likely meaning
in the mine run of instances where it enacted a Govern
ment-related statute of limitations. But the word rebut
table means that the presumption is not conclusive.
Specific statutory language, for example, could rebut the
presumption by demonstrating Congress intent to the
contrary. And if so, a definitive earlier interpretation of
the statute, finding a similar congressional intent, should
offer a similarly sufficient rebuttal.
Petitioner adds that in Franconia Associates v. United
States, 536 U. S. 129 (2002), we explicitly considered the
court of claims limitations statute, we described the stat
ute as unexceptional, and we cited Irwin for the proposi
tion that limitations principles should generally apply to
the Government in the same way that they apply to pri
vate parties. 536 U. S., at 145 (internal quotation marks
omitted). But we did all of this in the context of rejecting
an argument by the Government that the court of claims
statute embodies a special, earlier-than-normal, rule as to
when a claim first accrues. Id., at 144145. The quoted
language thus refers only to the statutes claims-accrual
rule and adds little or nothing to petitioners contention
that Irwin overruled our earlier casesa contention that
we have just rejected.
B
Petitioners argument must therefore come down to an
invitation now to reject or to overturn Kendall, Finn,

JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

Opinion of the Court

Soriano, and related cases. In support, petitioner can

claim that Irwin and Franconia represent a turn in the
course of the law and can argue essentially as follows:
The law now requires courts, when they interpret statutes
setting forth limitations periods in respect to actions
against the Government, to place greater weight upon the
equitable importance of treating the Government like
other litigants and less weight upon the special govern
mental interest in protecting public funds. Cf. Irwin,
supra, at 9596. The older interpretations treated these
interests differently. Those older cases have consequently
become anomalous. The Government is unlikely to have
relied significantly upon those earlier cases. Hence the
Court should now overrule them.
Basic principles of stare decisis, however, require us to
reject this argument. Any anomaly the old cases and
Irwin together create is not critical; at most, it reflects a
different judicial assumption about the comparative
weight Congress would likely have attached to competing
legitimate interests. Moreover, the earlier cases lead, at
worst, to different interpretations of different, but simi
larly worded, statutes; they do not produce unworkable
law. See United States v. International Business Machines
Corp., 517 U. S. 843, 856 (1996) (internal quotation marks
omitted); California v. FERC, 495 U. S. 490, 499 (1990).
Further, stare decisis in respect to statutory interpretation
has special force, for Congress remains free to alter
what we have done. Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,
491 U. S. 164, 172173 (1989); see also Watson v. United
States, ante, at 8. Additionally, Congress has long acqui
esced in the interpretation we have given. See ibid.;
Shepard v. United States, 544 U. S. 13, 23 (2005).
Finally, even if the Government cannot show detrimen
tal reliance on our earlier cases, our reexamination of
well-settled precedent could nevertheless prove harmful.
Justice Brandeis once observed that in most matters it is

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Opinion of the Court

more important that the applicable rule of law be settled

than that it be settled right. Burnet v. Coronado Oil &
Gas Co., 285 U. S. 393, 406 (1932) (dissenting opinion). To
overturn a decision settling one such matter simply be
cause we might believe that decision is no longer right
would inevitably reflect a willingness to reconsider others.
And that willingness could itself threaten to substitute
disruption, confusion, and uncertainty for necessary legal
stability. We have not found here any factors that might
overcome these considerations.
IV

The judgment of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

It is so ordered.

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008)

STEVENS, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 061164
_________________

JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[January 8, 2008]

JUSTICE STEVENS, with whom JUSTICE GINSBURG joins,

dissenting.
Statutes of limitations generally fall into two broad
categories: affirmative defenses that can be waived and socalled jurisdictional statutes that are not subject to
waiver or equitable tolling. For much of our history, stat
utes of limitations in suits against the Government were
customarily placed in the latter category on the theory
that conditions attached to a waiver of sovereign immu
nity must be strictly observed and exceptions thereto are
not to be implied. Soriano v. United States, 352 U. S.
270, 276 (1957); see also Finn v. United States, 123 U. S.
227, 232233 (1887); Kendall v. United States, 107 U. S.
123, 125126 (1883). But that rule was ignoredand thus
presumably abandonedin Honda v. Clark, 386 U. S. 484
(1967),1 and Bowen v. City of New York, 476 U. S. 467
(1986).2

1 In

Honda, we concluded, as to petitioners attempts to recover assets

that had been seized upon the outbreak of hostilities with Japan, that it
was consistent with the overall congressional purpose to apply a
traditional equitable tolling principle, aptly suited to the particular
facts of this case and nowhere eschewed by Congress. 386 U. S., at
501.
2 In Bowen, we permitted equitable tolling of the 60-day requirement
for challenging the denial of disability benefits under the Social Secu

JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

In Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89,

9596 (1990), we followed the lead of Bowen (and, by
extension, Honda), and explicitly replaced the Soriano
rule with a rebuttable presumption that equitable tolling
rules applicable to suits against private defendants
should also apply to suits against the United States.3 We
acknowledged that our previous cases dealing with the
effect of time limits in suits against the Government [had]
not been entirely consistent, 498 U. S., at 94, and we
determined that a continuing effort on our part to decide
each case on an ad hoc basis . . . would have the disadvan
tage of continuing unpredictability without the corre
sponding advantage of greater fidelity to the intent of
Congress, id., at 95. We therefore crafted a background
rule that reflected a realistic assessment of legislative
intent, and also provided a practically useful principle of
interpretation. Ibid.
Our decision in Irwin did more than merely mentio[n]
Soriano, ante, at 7; rather, we expressly declined to follow
that case. We noted that the limitations language at issue
in Irwin closely resembled the text we had confronted in
Soriano; although we conceded that [a]n argument [could]
undoubtedly be made that the statutes were distinguish

rity Act. We cautioned that we must be careful not to assume the

authority to narrow the waiver that Congress intended, or construe the
waiver unduly restrictively. 476 U. S., at 479 (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted).
3 During the Irwin oral arguments, several Members of the Court
remarked on the need to choose between the Soriano line of cases and
the approach taken in cases like Bowen. See Tr. of Oral Arg., O. T.
1990, No. 895867, pp. 2526 (Question: [W]hat do you make of our
cases which seem to go really in different directions. The Bowen case,
which was unanimous and contains language in it that says statutory
time limits are traditionally subject to equitable tolling, and other cases
like maybe Soriano . . . which point in the other direction[?] ); see also
id., at 8 (Question: . . . I think we sort of have to choose between
Soriano and Bowen, dont you think? ).

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STEVENS, J., dissenting

able, we were not persuaded that the difference between

them [was] enough to manifest a different congressional
intent with respect to the availability of equitable tolling,
498 U. S., at 95. Having found the two statutes function
ally indistinguishable, we nevertheless declined the Gov
ernments invitation to follow Soriano, and we did not so
much as cite Kendall or Finn. Instead, we adopted a
more general rule to govern the applicability of equitable
tolling in suits against the Government, 498 U. S., at 95,
and we applied the new presumption in favor of equitable
tolling to the case before us.4 Nothing in the framing of
our decision to adopt a general rule to govern the avail
ability of equitable tolling in suits against the Govern
ment, ibid., suggested a carve-out for statutes we had
already held ineligible for equitable tolling, pursuant to
the approach that we had previously abandoned in Honda
and Bowen, and definitively rejected in Irwin.
Indeed, in his separate opinion in Irwin, Justice White
noted that that the decision was not only inconsistent with
our prior cases but also that it directly overrule[d] Sori
ano. 498 U. S., at 98 (opinion concurring in part and
concurring in judgment). Neither the Courts opinion nor
my separate opinion disagreed with that characterization

4 In

the years since we decided Irwin, we have applied its rule in a

number of statutory contexts. See, e.g., Scarborough v. Principi, 541
U. S. 401, 420423 (2004) (applying the rule of Irwin and finding that
an application for fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, 28
U. S. C. 2412(d)(1)(A), should be permitted to be amended out of time).
Most significantly, in Franconia Associates v. United States, 536 U. S.
129, 145 (2002), we affirmed, in the context of 28 U. S. C. 2501, the
rule that limitations principles should generally apply to the Govern
ment in the same way that they apply to private parties (citing Irwin,
498 U. S., at 95). Although the Government is correct that the question
presented by Franconia was when a claim accrued under 2501, our
reliance on Irwin undermines the majoritys suggestion that Irwin has
no bearing on statutes that have previously been the subject of judicial
construction.

JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

STEVENS, J., dissenting

of our holding. The attempt of the Court today, therefore,

to cast petitioners argument as an entreaty to overrule
Soriano, as well as Kendall and Finnand its response
that [b]asic principles of stare decisis . . . require us to
reject this argument, ante, at 8has a hollow ring. If the
doctrine of stare decisis supplied a clear answer to the
question posed by this caseor if the Government could
plausibly argue that it had relied on Soriano after our
decision in IrwinI would join the Courts judgment,
despite its unwisdom.5 But I do not agree with the major
itys reading of our cases. It seems to me quite plain that
Soriano is no longer good law, and if there is in fact ambi
guity in our cases, it ought to be resolved in favor of clari
fying the law, rather than preserving an anachronism
whose doctrinal underpinnings were discarded years ago.6

5 The majority points out quite rightly, ante, at 8, that the doctrine of
stare decisis has special force in statutory cases. See Patterson v.
McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172173 (1989). But the doctrine
should not prevent us from acknowledging when we have already
overruled a prior case, even if we failed to say so explicitly at the time.
In Rasul v. Bush, 542 U. S. 466 (2004), for example, we explained that
in Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court of Ky., 410 U. S. 484 (1973), we
had overruled so much of Ahrens v. Clark, 335 U. S. 188 (1948), as
found that the habeas petitioners presence within the territorial reach
of the district court was a jurisdictional prerequisite. Braden held,
contrary to Ahrens, that a prisoners presence within the district courts
territorial reach was not an inflexible jurisdictional rule, 410 U. S., at
500. Braden nowhere stated that it was overruling Ahrens, although
Justice Rehnquist began his dissent by noting: Today the Court
overrules Ahrens v. Clark. 410 U. S., at 502. Thirty years later we
acknowledged in Rasul what was by then clear: Ahrens was no longer
good law. 542 U. S., at 478479, and n. 9.
Moreover, the logic of the special force of stare decisis in the statu
tory context is that Congress remains free to alter what we have done,
Patterson, 491 U. S., at 172173. But the amendment of an obscure
statutory provision is not a high priority for a busy Congress, and we
should remain mindful that enactment of legislation is by no means a
cost-free enterprise.
6 See Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897)

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008)

STEVENS, J., dissenting

With respect to provisions as common as time limita

tions, Congress, in enacting statutes, and judges, in apply
ing them, ought to be able to rely upon a background rule
of considerable clarity. Irwin announced such a rule, and
I would apply that rule to the case before us.7 Because
todays decision threatens to revive the confusion of our
pre-Irwin jurisprudence, I respectfully dissent.

(It is revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it
was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the
grounds upon which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the
rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past).
7 The majority does gesture toward an application of Irwin, contend
ing that even if Irwins rule is apposite, the presumption of congres
sional intent to allow equitable tolling is rebutted by this Courts
definitive earlier interpretation of 2501, ante, at 7. But the major
itys application of the Irwin rule is implausible, since Irwin itself
compared the language of 2501 with the limitations language of Title
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, and found that the comparison did
not reveal a different congressional intent with respect to the availabil
ity of equitable tolling, 498 U. S., at 95.

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008)

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

_________________

No. 061164
_________________

JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL COMPANY, PETITIONER v.

UNITED STATES
ON WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS FOR THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT

[January 8, 2008]

JUSTICE GINSBURG, dissenting.

I agree that adhering to Kendall, Finn, and Soriano is
irreconcilable with the reasoning and result in Irwin, and
therefore join JUSTICE STEVENS dissent. I write sepa
rately to explain why I would regard this case as an ap
propriate occasion to revisit those precedents even if we
had not already directly overrule[d] them. Cf. Irwin
v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U. S. 89, 98
(1990) (White, J., concurring in part and concurring in
judgment).
Stare decisis is an important, but not an inflexible,
doctrine in our law. See Burnet v. Coronado Oil & Gas
Co., 285 U. S. 393, 405 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)
(Stare decisis is not . . . a universal, inexorable com
mand.). The policies underlying the doctrinestability
and predictabilityare at their strongest when the Court
is asked to change its mind, though nothing else of signifi
cance has changed. See Powell, Stare Decisis and Judicial
Restraint, 47 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 281, 286287 (1990).
As to the matter before us, our perception of the office of a
time limit on suits against the Government has changed
significantly since the decisions relied upon by the Court.
We have recognized that the same rebuttable presump
tion of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private
defendants should also apply to suits against the United

JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

States, Irwin, 498 U. S., at 9596, and that limitations

principles should generally apply to the Government in
the same way that they apply to private parties, Franco
nia Associates v. United States, 536 U. S. 129, 145 (2002)
(internal quotation marks omitted). See also Scarborough
v. Principi, 541 U. S. 401, 420422 (2004). It damages the
coherence of the law if we cling to outworn precedent at
odds with later, more enlightened decisions.
I surely do not suggest that overruling is routinely in
order whenever a majority disagrees with a past decision,
and I acknowledge that [c]onsiderations of stare decisis
have special force in the area of statutory interpretation,
Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 U. S. 164, 172
(1989). But concerns we have previously found sufficiently
weighty to justify revisiting a statutory precedent counsel
strongly in favor of doing so here. First, overruling Kend
all v. United States, 107 U. S. 123 (1883), Finn v. United
States, 123 U. S. 227 (1887), and Soriano v. United States,
352 U. S. 270 (1957), would, as the Court concedes, see
ante, at 8, achieve a uniform interpretation of similar
statutory language, Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc., 490 U. S. 477, 484 (1989).
Second, we have recognized the propriety of revisiting a
decision when intervening development of the law has
removed or weakened [its] conceptual underpinnings.
Patterson, 491 U. S., at 173. Irwin and Franconianot to
mention our recent efforts to apply the term jurisdic
tional with greater precision, see, e.g., Arbaugh v. Y & H
Corp., 546 U. S. 500, 515516 (2006)have left no tenable
basis for Kendall and its progeny.
Third, it is altogether appropriate to overrule a prece
dent that has become a positive detriment to coherence
and consistency in the law. Patterson, 491 U. S., at 173.
The inconsistency between the Kendall line and Irwin is a
source of both theoretical incoherence and practical confu
sion. For example, 28 U. S. C. 2401(a) contains a time

Cite as: 552 U. S. ____ (2008)

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

limit materially identical to the one in 2501. Courts of

Appeals have divided on the question whether 2401(a)s
limit is jurisdictional. Compare Center for Biological
Diversity v. Hamilton, 453 F. 3d 1331, 1334 (CA11 2006)
(per curiam), with Cedars-Sinai Medical Center v. Sha
lala, 125 F. 3d 765, 770 (CA9 1997). See also Harris v.
Federal Aviation Admin., 353 F. 3d 1006, 1013, n. 7
(CADC 2004) (recognizing that Irwin may have under
mined Circuit precedent holding that 2401(a) is jurisdic
tional). Todays decision hardly assists lower courts
endeavoring to answer this question. While holding that
the language in 2501 is jurisdictional, the Court also
implies that Irwin governs the interpretation of all stat
utes we have not yet construedincluding, presumably,
the identically worded 2401. See ante, at 7.
Moreover, as the Court implicitly concedes, see ante, at
8, the strongest reason to adhere to precedent provides no
support for the Kendall-Finn-Soriano line. Stare decisis
has added force when the legislature, in the public sphere,
and citizens, in the private realm, have acted in reliance
on a previous decision, for in this instance overruling the
decision would dislodge settled rights and expectations or
require an extensive legislative response. Hilton v. South
Carolina Public Railways Commn, 502 U. S. 197, 202
(1991). The Government, however, makes no claim that
either private citizens or Congress have relied upon the
jurisdictional status of 2501. There are thus strong
reasons to abandonand notably slim reasons to adhere
tothe anachronistic interpretation of 2501 adopted in
Kendall.
Several times, in recent Terms, the Court has discarded
statutory decisions rendered infirm by what a majority
considered to be better informed opinion. See, e.g., Leegin
Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U. S.
___, ___ (2007) (slip op., at 28) (overruling Dr. Miles Medi
cal Co. v. John D. Park & Sons Co., 220 U. S. 373 (1911));

JOHN R. SAND & GRAVEL CO. v. UNITED STATES

GINSBURG, J., dissenting

Bowles v. Russell, 551 U. S. ___, ___ (2007) (slip op., at 9)

(overruling Thompson v. INS, 375 U. S. 384 (1964) (per
curiam), and Harris Truck Lines, Inc. v. Cherry Meat
Packers, Inc., 371 U. S. 215 (1962) (per curiam)); Illinois
Tool Works Inc. v. Independent Ink, Inc., 547 U. S. 28, 42
43 (2006) (overruling, inter alia, Morton Salt Co. v. G. S.
Suppiger Co., 314 U. S. 488 (1942)); Hohn v. United States,
524 U. S. 236, 253 (1998) (overruling House v. Mayo, 324
U. S. 42 (1945) (per curiam)). In light of these overrulings,
the Courts decision to adhere to Kendall, Finn, and Sori
anowhile offering nothing to justify their reasoning or
resultsis, to say the least, perplexing. After todays
decision, one will need a crystal ball to predict when this
Court will reject, and when it will cling to, its prior deci
sions interpreting legislative texts.
I would reverse the judgment rendered by the Federal
Circuit majority. In accord with dissenting Judge New
man, I would hold that the Court of Appeals had no war
rant to declare the petitioners action time barred.