You are on page 1of 14

1 TECSON V COMELEC

Facts:
Petitioners sought for respondent Poes
disqualification in the presidential elections for
having allegedly misrepresented material facts in his
(Poes) certificate of candidacy by claiming that he is
a natural Filipino citizen despite his parents both
being foreigners. Comelec dismissed the petition,
holding that Poe was a Filipino Citizen. Petitioners
assail the jurisdiction of the Comelec, contending
that only the Supreme Court may resolve the basic
issue on the case under Article VII, Section 4,
paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Issue:
Whether or not it is the Supreme Court which had
jurisdiction.
Whether or not Comelec committed grave abuse of
discretion in holding that Poe was a Filipino citizen.
Ruling:
1.) The Supreme Court had no jurisdiction on
questions regarding qualification of a candidate for
the presidency or vice-presidency before the
elections are held.
"Rules of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal" in
connection with Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987
Constitution, refers to contests relating to the
election, returns and qualifications of the "President"
or "Vice-President", of the Philippines which the
Supreme Court may take cognizance, and not of
"candidates" for President or Vice-President before
the elections.
2.) Comelec committed no grave abuse of
discretion in holding Poe as a Filipino Citizen.
The 1935 Constitution on Citizenship, the prevailing
fundamental law on respondents birth, provided
that among the citizens of the Philippines are "those
whose fathers are citizens of the Philippines."
Tracing respondents paternal lineage, his
grandfather Lorenzo, as evidenced by the latters
death certificate was identified as a Filipino Citizen.
His citizenship was also drawn from the presumption
that having died in 1954 at the age of 84, Lorenzo
would have been born in 1980. In the absence of any
other evidence, Lorenzos place of residence upon
his death in 1954 was presumed to be the place of
residence prior his death, such that Lorenzo Pou
would have benefited from the "en masse
Filipinization" that the Philippine Bill had effected in
1902. Being so, Lorenzos citizenship would have
extended to his son, Allan---respondents father.
Respondent, having been acknowledged as Allans
son to Bessie, though an American citizen, was a
Filipino citizen by virtue of paternal filiation as
evidenced by the respondents birth certificate. The
1935 Constitution on citizenship did not make a
distinction on the legitimacy or illegitimacy of the
child, thus, the allegation of bigamous marriage and
the allegation that respondent was born only before
the assailed marriage had no bearing on
respondents citizenship in view of the established

paternal filiation evidenced by the public documents


presented.
But while the totality of the evidence may not
establish conclusively that respondent FPJ is a
natural-born citizen of the Philippines, the evidence
on hand still would preponderate in his favor enough
to hold that he cannot be held guilty of having made
a material misrepresentation in his certificate of
candidacy in violation of Section 78, in relation to
Section 74 of the Omnibus Election Code.
MIRIAM DEFENSOR SANTIAGO versus FIDEL RAMOS
(253 SCRA 559)
Facts:
The protestant, Miriam Defensor-Santiago ran for
presidency and lost in the May 1992 election. In her
Motion on the 16th day of August in the year 1995,
reiterated in her comment of the 29th of August of
the same year, protestant Defensor-Santiago prayed
that the revision in the remaining precincts of the
pilot areas be dispensed with and the revision
process in the pilot areas be deemed computed.
The Court deferred action on the motion and
required, instead, the protestant and protestee to
submit their respective memoranda. Hence, this
petition.
Issue:
Whether or not the election protest filed by
Defensor-Santiago is moot and academic by her
election as a Senator in the May 1995 election and
her assumption of office as such on the 30th of June
in the year 1995.
Held:
YES. The Court held that the election protest filed by
Santiago has been abandoned or considered
withdrawn as a consequence of her election and
assumption of office as Senator and her discharge of
the duties and functions thereof.
The protestant abandoned her determination to
protest and pursue the public interest involved in the
matter of who is the real choice of the electorate.
Moreover, the dismissal of this protest would serve
public interest as it would dissipate the aura of
uncertainty as to the results of the 1992 presidential
elections, thereby enhancing the all too crucial
political stability of the nation during this period of
national recovery.
Also, the PET issued a resolution ordering the
protestant to inform the PET within 10 days if after
the completion of the revision of the ballots from her
pilot areas, she still wishes to present evidence.
Since DS has not informed the Tribunal of any such
intention, such is a manifest indication that she no
longer intends to do so.
3 Clinton v Jones
Facts of the case

Paula Corbin Jones sued President Bill Clinton. She


alleged that while she was an Arkansas state
employee, she suffered several "abhorrent" sexual
advances from then Arkansas Governor Clinton.
Jones claimed that her continued rejection of
Clinton's advances ultimately resulted in punishment
by her state supervisors. Following a District Court's
grant of Clinton's request that all matters relating to
the suit be suspended, pending a ruling on his prior
request to have the suit dismissed on grounds of
presidential immunity, Clinton sought to invoke his
immunity to completely dismiss the Jones suit
against him. While the District Judge denied Clinton's
immunity request, the judge ordered the stay of any
trial in the matter until after Clinton's Presidency. On
appeal, the Eighth Circuit affirmed the dismissal
denial but reversed the trial deferment ruling since it
would be a "functional equivalent" to an unlawful
grant of temporary presidential immunity.
Question
Is a serving President, for separation of powers
reasons, entitled to absolute immunity from civil
litigation arising out of events which transpired prior
to his taking office?
No. In a unanimous opinion, the Court held that the
Constitution does not grant a sitting President
immunity from civil litigation except under highly
unusual circumstances. After noting the great
respect and dignity owed to the Executive office, the
Court held that neither separation of powers nor the
need for confidentiality of high-level information can
justify an unqualified Presidential immunity from
judicial process. While the independence of our
government's branches must be protected under the
doctrine of separation of powers, the Constitution
does not prohibit these branches from exercising any
control over one another. This, the Court added, is
true despite the procedural burdens which Article III
jurisdiction may impose on the time, attention, and
resources of the Chief Executive.
CASE DIGEST: ESTRADA VS. ARROYO; ESTRADA VS.
DESIERTO
G.R. No. 146738 Estrada vs. Arroyo
G.R. No 146710-15 Estrada vs. Desierto
March 2, 2001
FACTS:

Estrada was inaugurated as president of the


Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with
Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President.
In October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis Chavit
Singson, a close friend the President, alleged that he
had personally given Estrada money as payoff from
jueteng hidden in a bank account known as Jose
Velarde a grassroots-based numbers game.
Singsons allegation also caused controversy across
the nation, which culminated in the House of

Representatives filing of an impeachment case


against Estrada on November 13, 2000. House
Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment
complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the
Senate and an impeachment court was formed, with
Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer.
Estrada, pleaded not guilty.
The expos immediately ignited reactions of rage.
On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA,
bolstered by students from private schools and leftwing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan
and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines and other bar associations joined
in the thousands of protesters.
On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the
Armed Forces of the Philippines also withdrew their
support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA
Shrine.
At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the
first time since the beginning of the protests and
maintains that he will not resign. He said that he
wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing
that only a guilty verdict will remove him from office.
At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television,
calling for a snap presidential election to be held
concurrently with congressional and local elections
on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in
this election.
OnJanuary 20, the Supreme Court declared that the
seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada
constructively resigned his post. Noon of the same
day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office
in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the
14th president of the Philippines.
At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had
strong and serious doubts about the legality and
constitutionality of her proclamation as president,
but saying he would give up his office to avoid being
an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his
family later left Malacaang Palace.
A heap of cases then succeeded Estradas leaving
the palace, which he countered by filing a peition for
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary
injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent
Ombudsman from conducting any further
proceedings in cases filed against him not until his
term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment
"confirming petitioner to be the lawful and
incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the
duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have
taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of the
President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the
provisions of the Constitution.
ISSUE:

1.) Whether or not the case at bar a political or


justiciable issue. If justiciable, whether or not
petitioner Estrada was a president-on-leave or did he
truly resign.
2.) Whether or not petitioner may invokeimmunity
from suits.
HELD:
The Court defines a political issue as those
questions which, under the Constitution, are to be
decided by the people in their sovereign capacity, or
in regard to which full discretionary authority has
been delegated to the legislative or executive
branch of the government. It is concerned with
issues dependent upon the wisdom, not legality of a
particular measure.
The Court made a distinction between the Aquino
presidency and the Arroyo presidency. The Court
said that while the Aquino government was a
government spawned by the direct demand of the
people in defiance to the 1973 Constitution,
overthrowing the old government entirely, the
Arroyo government on the other hand was a
government exercising under the 1987 constitution,
wherein only the office of the president was affected.
In the former, it The question of whether the
previous president (president Estrada) truly resigned
subjects it to judicial review. The Court held that the
issue is legal and not political.
For the president to be deemed as having resigned,
there must be an intent to resign and the intent
must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. It is
important to follow the succession of events that
struck petitioner prior his leaving the palace.
Furthermore, the quoted statements extracted from
the Angara diaries, detailed Estradas implied
resignation On top of all these, the press release he
issued regarding is acknowledgement of the oathtaking of Arroyo as president despite his questioning
of its legality and his emphasis on leaving the
presidential seat for the sake of peace. The Court
held that petitioner Estrada had resigned by the use
of the totality test: prior, contemporaneous and
posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing
a material relevance on the issue.
As to the issue of the peitioners contention that he
is immuned from suits, the Court held that petitioner
is no longer entitled to absolute immunity from suit.
The Court added that, given the intent of the 1987
Constitution to breathe life to the policy that a public
office is a public trust, the petitioner, as a non-sitting
President, cannot claim executive immunity for his
alleged criminal acts committed while a sitting
President. From the deliberations, the intent of the
framers is clear that the immunity of the president
from suit is concurrent only with his tenure(the term
during which the incumbent actually holds office)
and not his term (time during which the officer may
claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the

interval after which the several incumbents shall


succeed one another).
Estrada v Arroyo MR
Facts
Petitioner filed a Motion of Reconsideration and
Omnibus Motion on the Supreme Courts decisions in
G.R. Nos. 146710-15 and G.R. No. 146738 of March
2, 2001.Certain events had transpired, leading to the
build up of irresistible pressure for the petitioner to
resign.This includes exposes and speeches, motions
to impeach, demanding letters by the church, mass
resignations, impeachment proceedings,
prosecutors walkou
t and resignation, postponement of
impeachment proceedings, EDSA rally, withdrawal of
support from the AFP and PNP, and petitioners
agreement to snap elections, amongst others.These
accounts were highly manifested and publicized
through the media.In establishing intent of petitioner
to resign, the Courts used the Angara Diary, as well
as press releases,final statements issued after oath
taking of respondent Arroyo, and subsequent
abandonment of theMalacanang Palace. The
Supreme Court contends that these are overt acts
which leave no doubt as to
the petitioners intent to resign.
Petitioner claims that said resignation was due to
duress, and that an involuntary resignation is
noresignation at all.
Petitioner further alleges that the Courts use of the
Angara Diary to determine the state of mind of the
petitioner on the issue of resignation violates the
rule against admission of hearsay evidence,
alsocontending that its use violates the rule on
res inter alios acta
: The rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an
act, declaration, or omission of another, except as
herein provided
in Section 28 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court.Use of
Angara Diary is also said to have violated the rules
on Proof of Private Writings and Best
EvidenceRule.Petitioner also argues that a reading of
Section 3 (7) of Article XI of the Constitution, which
provides
Judgment in cases of impeachment shall not extend
further than removal from office and
disqualification to hold any office under the Republic
of the Philippines, but the party convicted should
nevertheless be liable and subject to prosecution,
trial and punishment, according to law
will tell us thatpetitioner must first be convicted
before he could be criminally prosecuted. Petitioner
contends that
the private and public prosecutors walk out during
the impeachment proceedings
should be
considered failure to prosecute on the part of the
public and private prosecutors, and the termination
of the case by the Senate is equivalent to acquittal
,
further concluding that
Dismissal of a case for failureto prosecute amounts
to an acquittal for purposes of applying the rule
against double jeopardy.

Petitioner also argues that even a sitting president


is entitled to absolute immunity from suit during
histerm of office.Lastly, petitioner claims that he has
been prejudiced by pre-trial publicity.
Issue(s)
1.
Whether or not President Estrada is entitled to
immunity from suit2.
Whether or not he was acquitted in the
impeachment proceedings, and therefore cannot
becriminally prosecuted3.
Whether or not the use of Angara Diary is admissible
as evidence
SC Ruling Held
Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration and Omnibus
Motion are DENIED for lack of merit.
President Estrada, in the case at bar, is
not entitled to absolute immunity from suit
. We look into thediscussions of the Constitutional
Committee, in particular, a discussion between Fr.
Bernas and Mr.Suarez on the deletion of the first
sentence, that the President should be immune from
suit during histenure, and then we differentiate
tenure from term. A term means the time during
which the officermay claim to hold office as of right,
and fixes the interval after which the incumbent
actually holds
office. Tenure, on the other hand, represents the
term during which the incumbent
actually
holdsoffice.The tenure may be shorter than the term
for reasons within or beyond the power of the
incumbent.From the deliberations, the intent of the
framers is clear that the immunity of the president
from suit isconcurrent only with his tenure and not
his term.And in this case, the President had already
resigned and abandoned the Malacanang Office,
whicheffectively terminated his tenure.He was not
merely a
President-on-leave
, as petitioner so vehemently claims. Looking at the
AngaraDiary, and other overt acts committed by
petitioner, it is clear that his intent was to resign.As
for the issue on The Angara Diary, it has been held
that a
mans acts,
conduct, and declaration,wherever made, if
voluntary, are admissible against him, for the reason
that it is fair to presume thatthey correspond with
the truth, and it is his fault if they do not. (
U.S. vs. Ching Po, 23 Phil. 578, 583
)The Angara Diary contains direct statements of
petitioner which can be categorized as admissions of
aparty: his proposal for a snap presidential election
where he would not be a candidate; his
statementthat he only wanted the five-day period
promised by Chief of Staff Angelo Reyes; his
statements that he
would leave by Monday if the second envelope
would be opened by Monday and Pagod na pagod
na

ako. Ayoko na, masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako


sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very tired.
I dont want any more
of this

its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the


bureaucracy, the intrigue).I just want to clear my
name, then I will go.
The use of the Angara Diary is also not a violation of
the res inter alios acta, since one of its exceptions
isprovided in Section 29 of Rule 130, with respect to
admissions by a co-partner or agent, which Angara
isto Estrada.As to whether or not the petitioner was
acquitted during the impeachment proceedings, we
look at therecords of the proceedings.The records
will show that the prosecutors walked out in the
January 16, 2001 hearing of theimpeachment cases
when by a vote of 11-10, the Senator-judges refused
to open the second envelopeallegedly containing the
P3.3 billion deposit of the petitioner in a secret bank
account under the name Jose Velarde. The next
day, January 17, the public prosecutors submitted a
letter to the Speaker of the
House tendering their resignation. They also filed
their Manifestation of Withdrawal of Appearancewith
the impeachment tribunal. Senator Raul Roco
immediately moved for the indefinite suspension of
the impeachment proceedings until the House of
Representatives shall have resolved the resignation
of the public prosecutors. The Roco motion was then
granted by Chief Justice Davide, Jr. Before the
Housecould resolve the issue of resignation of its
prosecutors or on January 20, 2001, petitioner
relinquishedthe presidency and respondent Arroyo
took her oath as President of the Republic. Thus, on
February 7,2001, the Senate passed Resolution No.
83 declaring that the impeachment court is functus
officio.
Petitioners claim of double jeopardy cannot be
predicated on prior conviction for he was not
convicted
by the impeachment court.
Planas v Gil
In November 1938, Carmen Planas, then a municipal
board member of Manila, published a statement
criticizing the acts of certain government officials
including Pres. Manuel Quezon in a newspaper. The
following morning, she received a letter from Jorge
Vargas (Secretary to the President) by order of the
president directing her to report before the Civil
Service Commission (CSC). She was directed to
explain and prove her allegations.
She appeared before the CSC but she questioned the
jurisdiction of the CSC over the matter. She said that
as an elective official, she is accountable for her
political acts to her constituency alone, unless such
acts constitute offenses punishable under our penal
laws, and not to executive officials belonging to a
party opposed to that to which petitioner is
affiliated. Further, she contends that her statement
in the newspaper was made by her as a private
citizen and in the exercise of her right to discuss

freely political questions and cannot properly be the


subject of an administrative investigation; that the
issue is only cognizable by courts of justice in case
the contents of said statement infringe any provision
of the Penal Code. The CSC, acting through
Commissioner Jose Gil, however took cognizance of
the case hence Planas appealed to the Supreme
Court. The Solicitor General replied for the CSC
arguing that under the separation of powers marked
by the Constitution, the court has no jurisdiction to
review the orders of the Chief Executive which are of
purely administrative in character.
ISSUE: Whether or not the SC has jurisdiction to
review orders issued by the President.
HELD: The acts of the Chief Executive performed
within the limits of his jurisdiction are his official acts
and courts will neither direct nor restrain executive
action in such cases. The rule is non-interference.
But from this legal premise, it does not necessarily
follow that the SC is precluded from making an
inquiry into the validity or constitutionality of his
acts when these are properly challenged in an
appropriate legal proceeding. The classical
separation of governmental powers viewed in the
light of political philosophy is a relative theory of
government. There is more truism and actuality in
interdependence than in independence and
separation of powers.
In the present case, the President is not a party to
the proceeding. He is neither compelled nor
restrained to act in a particular way. The CSC is the
party respondent and the theory is advanced by the
Sol-Gen that because an investigation undertaken by
him is directed by authority of the President of the
Philippines, the SC has no jurisdiction over the
present proceedings instituted by Planas. The
argument is farfetched. A mere plea that a
subordinate officer of the government is acting
under orders from the Chief Executive may be an
important averment, but is neither decisive nor
conclusive upon this court. Like the dignity of his
high office, the relative immunity of the Chief
Executive from judicial interference is not in the
nature of a sovereign passport for all the
subordinate official and employees of the executive
Department to the extent that at the mere
invocation of the authority that it purports the
jurisdiction of this court to inquire into the validity or
legality of an executive order is necessarily abated
or suspended.
Nevertheless, SC ruled that the CSC can take
cognizance of the case. Planas was not denied the
right to voice out her opinion but since she made
allegations against the administration it is but right
for her to prove those allegations. The CSC has the
right to elicit the truth.
Myers v US
Brief Fact Summary. Appointee to the postmaster of
the first class in Oregon was forced to resign.

Synopsis of Rule of Law. The Constitution grants to


the President the executive power of the
government- i.e., the general administrative control
of those executing the laws, including the power of
appointment and removal of executive officers-a
conclusion confirmed by his obligation to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed; that article 2
excludes the exercise of legislative power by
Congress to provide for appointments and removals,
except only as granted therein to Congress in the
matter of inferior offices; that Congress is only given
power to provide for appointments and removals of
inferior officers after it has vested, and on condition
that it does vest, their appointment in other
authority than the President with the Senates
consent; that the provisions of the second section of
article 2, which blend action by the legislative
branch, or by part of it, in the work of the executive,
are limitations to be strictly construed, and not to be
extended by implication; that the Presidents power
of removal is further established as an incident to his
specifically enumerated function of appointment by
and with the advice of the Senate, but that such
incident does not by implication extend to removals
the Senates power of checking appointments.

Facts. Under an 1876 rule, the President had to get


the Senates permission to remove the postmaster
of Portland, Oregon. That individual had been
appointed with the Senates advice and consent. The
President asked for the individuals resignation
without consulting the Senate first, and the Senate
refused the President permission to do so.
Issue. [W]hether under the Constitution the
President has the exclusive power of removing
executive officers of the United States whom he has
appointed by and with the advice and consent of the
Senate.
Held. Yes. The Supreme Court of the United States
(the Supreme Court) produced a long-winded
opinion, examining the legislative and adjudicative
history of executive appointments, including
Marbury v. Madison. It concluded that Tenure of
Office Act of 1867, in so far as it attempted to
prevent the President from removing executive
officers who had been appointed by him by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, was invalid,
and that subsequent legislation of the same effect
was equally so. Dissent. Justice McReynolds found
that it is impossible for me to accept the view that
the President may dismiss, as caprice may suggest,
any inferior officer whom he has appointed with
consent of the Senate, notwithstanding a positive
inhibition by Congress after his own lengthy review
of precedent. Justice Brandeis felt that the central
issue was May the President, having acted under
the statute in so far as it creates the office and
authorizes the appointment, ignore, while the
Senate is in session, the provision which prescribes
the condition under which a removal may take

place? Justice Holmes emphasized the fact that the


office was created by Congress.
Discussion. To hold [an opposite rule] would make it
impossible for the President, in case of political or
other difference with the Senate or Congress, to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.
MARCOS VS. MANGLAPUS [177 SCRA 668; G.R. NO.
88211; 15 SEPT 1989]
Friday, February 06, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic
Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

right to enter one's country cannot be arbitrarily


deprived. It would be therefore inappropriate to
construe the limitations to the right to return to ones
country in the same context as those pertaining to
the liberty of abode and the right to travel.

Facts: This case involves a petition of mandamus


and prohibition asking the court to order the
respondents Secretary of Foreign Affairs, etc. To
issue a travel documents to former Pres. Marcos and
the immediate members of his family and to enjoin
the implementation of the President's decision to bar
their return to the Philippines. Petitioners assert that
the right of the Marcoses to return in the Philippines
is guaranteed by the Bill of Rights, specifically
Sections 1 and 6. They contended that Pres. Aquino
is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so within the
limits prescribed by law. Nor the President impair
their right to travel because no law has authorized
her to do so.

The court held that President did not act arbitrarily


or with grave abuse of discretion in determining that
the return of the Former Pres. Marcos and his family
poses a serious threat to national interest and
welfare. President Aquino has determined that the
destabilization caused by the return of the Marcoses
would wipe away the gains achieved during the past
few years after the Marcos regime.

They further assert that under international law,


their right to return to the Philippines is guaranteed
particularly by the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, which has been ratified by the
Philippines.
Issue: Whether or not, in the exercise of the powers
granted by the constitution, the President (Aquino)
may prohibit the Marcoses from returning to the
Philippines.
Held: "It must be emphasized that the individual
right involved is not the right to travel from the
Philippines to other countries or within the
Philippines. These are what the right to travel would
normally connote. Essentially, the right involved in
this case at bar is the right to return to one's
country, a distinct right under international law,
independent from although related to the right to
travel. Thus, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights treat the right to freedom of
movement and abode within the territory of a state,
the right to leave the country, and the right to enter
one's country as separate and distinct rights. What
the Declaration speaks of is the "right to freedom of
movement and residence within the borders of each
state". On the other hand, the Covenant guarantees
the right to liberty of movement and freedom to
choose his residence and the right to be free to
leave any country, including his own. Such rights
may only be restricted by laws protecting the
national security, public order, public health or
morals or the separate rights of others. However,

The Bill of rights treats only the liberty of abode and


the right to travel, but it is a well considered view
that the right to return may be considered, as a
generally accepted principle of International Law and
under our Constitution as part of the law of the land.

The return of the Marcoses poses a serious threat


and therefore prohibiting their return to the
Philippines, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Webb v De Leon (Criminal Procedure)
Webb v De Leon
GR No. 121234
August 23, 1995
FACTS:
On June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of
Investigation filed with the DOJ a letter-complaint
charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael
Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and 6 other persons
with the crime of Rape and Homicide of Carmela N.
Vizconde, her mother Estrellita Nicolas-Vizconde, and
her sister Anne Marie Jennifer in their home at
Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Paranaque,
Metro Manila on June 30, 1991.
Forthwith, the DOJ formed a panel of prosecutors
headed by Asst Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R.
Zuno to conduct the preliminary investigation.
Petitioners: fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of
probable cause. They assail the credibility of Jessica
Alfaro as inherently weak and uncorroborated due to
her inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and
May 22, 1995 sown statements. They criticize the
procedure followed by the DOJ Panel when it did not
examine witnesses to clarify the alleged
inconsistencies.
charge that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and
respondent Judge Amelita Tolentino issued warrants
of arrest against them without conducting the
required preliminary examination.
Complain about the denial of their constitutional
right to due process and violation of their right to an
impartial investigation. They also assail the
prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary
investigation.

ISSUES:
(1) Did the DOJ Panel gravely abuse its discretion in
holding that there is probable cause to charge
accused with crime of rape and homicide?
(2) Did respondent judges de Leon and Tolentino
gravely abuse their discretion when they failed to
conduct a preliminary examination before issuing
warrants of arrest against the accused?
(3) Did the DOJ Panel deny them their constitutional
right to due process during their preliminary
investigation?
(4) Did the DOJ Panel unlawfully intrude into judicial
prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in
the information as an accused?
HELD:
(1) NO. Valid determination -- A probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that more
likely than not, a crime has been committed and was
committed by the suspects. Probable cause need not
be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt,
neither on evidence establishing guilt beyond
reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence
establishing absolute certainty of guilt.
(2) NO. Valid arrest -- In arrest cases, there must be
a probable cause that a crime has been committed
and that the person arrested committed it.
Section 6 of Rule 112 provides that upon filing of
an information, the RTC may issue a warrant for the
accused.
Clearly then, our laws repudiate the submission that
respondent judges should have conducted
searching examination of witnesses before issuing
warrants of arrest against them.
(3) NO. There is no merit in this contention because
petitioners were given all the opportunities to be
heard.
The DOJ Panel precisely requested the parties to
adduce more evidence in their behalf and for the
panel to study the evidence submitted more fully.
(4) NO.
Petitioner's argument lacks appeal for it lies on the
faulty assumption that the decision whom to
prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative
of courts and beyond executive and legislative
interference.
In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the
executive department whose principal power and
responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully
executed. A necessary component of this right is to
prosecute their violators.

The steel seizure case


Sarmiento v mison
Drilon v. Lim
G.R. No. 112497, August 4, 1994Cruz, J.
Facts:
The principal issue in this case is the
constitutionality of Section 187of the Local
Government Code
1
. The Secretary of Justice (on appeal to himof four oil
companies and a taxpayer) declared Ordinance No.
7794(Manila Revenue Code) null and void for noncompliance with theprocedure in the enactment of
tax ordinances and for containing certainprovisions
contrary to law and public policy. The RTC revoked
the Secretarys resolution and sustained
theordinance. It declared Sec 187 of the LGC as
unconstitutional because itvests on the Secretary
the power of control over LGUs in violation of
thepolicy of local autonomy mandated in the
Constitution. The Secretaryargues that the annulled
Section 187 is constitutional and that theprocedural
requirements for the enactment of tax ordinances as
specifiedin the Local Government Code had indeed
not been observed. (Petitionoriginally dismissed by
the Court due to failure to submit certified truecopy
of the decision, but reinstated it anyway.)
Issue:
WON the lower court has jurisdiction to consider
theconstitutionality of Sec 187 of the LGC
Held:
Yes. BP 129 vests in the regional trial courts
jurisdiction over all civilcases in which the subject of
the litigation is incapable of pecuniaryestimation.
Moreover, Article X, Section 5(2), of the Constitution
vests inthe Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction over
final judgments and ordersof lower courts in all
cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
anytreaty, international or executive agreement,
law, presidential decree,proclamation, order,
instruction, ordinance, or regulation is in question.In
the exercise of this jurisdiction, lower courts are
advised to actwith the utmost circumspection,
bearing in mind the consequences of adeclaration of
unconstitutionality upon the stability of laws, no less
thanon the doctrine of separation of powers. It is
also emphasized that everycourt, including this
Court, is charged with the duty of a purposeful
1
Procedure For Approval And Effectivity Of Tax
Ordinances And Revenue Measures; Mandatory
Public Hearings. The procedure for approval of
localtax ordinances and revenue measures shall be
in accordance with the provisions of this Code:
Provided, That public hearings shall be conducted
forthe purpose prior to the enactment thereof;
Provided, further, That any question on the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or
revenuemeasures may be raised on appeal within
thirty (30) days from the effectivity thereof to the
Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision
withinsixty (60) days from the date of receipt of the
appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall
not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of
the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the

tax, fee, or charge levied therein: Provided, finally,


That within thirty (30) days after receipt of
thedecision or the lapse of the sixty-day period
without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the
appeal, the aggrieved party may file
appropriateproceedings with a court of competent
jurisdiction.
2
hesitation before declaring a law unconstitutional, on
the theory that themeasure was first carefully
studied by the executive and the
legislativedepartments and determined by them to
be in accordance with thefundamental law before it
was finally approved. To doubt is to sustain. The
presumption of constitutionality can be overcome
only by the clearestshowing that there was indeed
an infraction of the Constitution.
Issue:
WON Section 187 of the LGC is unconstitutional
Held:
Yes. Section 187 authorizes the Secretary of Justice
to review onlythe constitutionality or legality of the
tax ordinance and, if warranted, torevoke it on either
or both of these grounds. When he alters or modifies
orsets aside a tax ordinance, he is not also permitted
to substitute his own judgment for the judgment of
the local government that enacted themeasure.
Secretary Drilon did set aside the Manila Revenue
Code, but hedid not replace it with his own version
of what the Code should be.. Whathe found only was
that it was illegal. All he did in reviewing the
saidmeasure was determine if the petitioners were
performing their functionsin accordance with law,
that is, with the prescribed procedure for
theenactment of tax ordinances and the grant of
powers to the citygovernment under the Local
Government Code. As we see it, that was anact not
of control but of mere supervision.An officer in
control lays down the rules in the doing of an act. If
they are not followed, he may, in his discretion,
order the act undone orre-done by his subordinate or
he may even decide to do it himself.Supervision
does not cover such authority. The supervisor
orsuperintendent merely sees to it that the rules are
followed, but hehimself does not lay down such
rules, nor does he have the discretion tomodify or
replace them.Significantly, a rule similar to Section
187 appeared in the LocalAutonomy Act. That
section allowed the Secretary of Finance to
suspendthe effectivity of a tax ordinance if, in his
opinion, the tax or fee leviedwas unjust, excessive,
oppressive or confiscatory. Determination of
theseflaws would involve the exercise of judgment or
discretion and not merelyan examination of whether
or not the requirements or limitations of thelaw had
been observed; hence, it would smack of control
rather thanmere supervision. That power was never
questioned before this Court but,at any rate, the
Secretary of Justice is not given the same latitude
underSection 187. All he is permitted to do is
ascertain the constitutionality orlegality of the tax
measure, without the right to declare that, in
hisopinion, it is unjust, excessive, oppressive or

confiscatory. He has nodiscretion on this matter. In


fact, Secretary Drilon set aside the Manila
3
Revenue Code only on two grounds, to with, the
inclusion therein of certain ultra vires provisions and
non-compliance with the prescribedprocedure in its
enactment. These grounds affected the legality, not
thewisdom or reasonableness, of the tax measure.
The issue of non-compliance with the prescribed
procedure in theenactment of the Manila Revenue
Code is another matter. (allegations: Nowritten
notices of public hearing, no publication of the
ordinance, nominutes of public hearing, no posting,
no translation into Tagalog) Judge Palattao however
found that all the procedural requirementshad been
observed in the enactment of the Manila Revenue
Code andthat the City of Manila had not been able to
prove such compliance beforethe Secretary only
because he had given it only five days within which
togather and present to him all the evidence
(consisting of 25 exhibits) latersubmitted to the trial
court. We agree with the trial court that
theprocedural requirements have indeed been
observed. Notices of thepublic hearings were sent to
interested parties as evidenced. The minutesof the
hearings are found in Exhibits M, M-1, M-2, and M-3.
Exhibits B andC show that the proposed ordinances
were published in the Balita and theManila Standard
on April 21 and 25, 1993, respectively, and the
approvedordinance was published in the July 3, 4, 5,
1993 issues of the ManilaStandard and in the July 6,
1993 issue of Balita, as shown by Exhibits Q,Q-1, Q2, and Q-3. The only exceptions are the posting of
the ordinance as approvedbut this omission does not
affect its validity, considering that itspublication in
three successive issues of a newspaper of
generalcirculation will satisfy due process. It has also
not been shown that thetext of the ordinance has
been translated and disseminated, but
thisrequirement applies to the approval of local
development plans and publicinvestment programs
of the local government unit and not to
taxordinances.
Carpio v exec sec
In 1990, Republic Act No. 6975 entitled AN ACT
ESTABLISHING THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE
UNDER A REORGANIZED DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES was passed. Antonio Carpio, as a
member of the bar and a defender of the
Constitution, assailed the constitutionality of the said
law as he averred that it only interferes with the
control power of the president.
He advances the view that RA 6975 weakened the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM) by limiting
its power to administrative control over the PNP
thus, control remained with the Department
Secretary under whom both the NPC and the PNP
were placed; that the system of letting local
executives choose local police heads also undermine
the power of the president.

ISSUE: Whether or not the president abdicated its


control power over the PNP and NPC by virtue of RA
6975.
HELD: No. The President has control of all executive
departments, bureaus, and offices. This presidential
power of control over the executive branch of
government extends over all executive officers from
Cabinet Secretary to the lowliest clerk. Equally well
accepted, as a corollary rule to the control powers of
the President, is the Doctrine of Qualified Political
Agency. As the President cannot be expected to
exercise his control powers all at the same time and
in person, he will have to delegate some of them to
his Cabinet members.
Under this doctrine, which recognizes the
establishment of a single executive, all executive
and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various
executive departments are assistants and agents of
the Chief Executive, and, except in cases where the
Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or law
to act in person on the exigencies of the situation
demand that he act personally, the multifarious
executive and administrative functions of the Chief
Executive are performed by and through the
executive departments, and the acts of the
Secretaries of such departments, performed and
promulgated in the regular course of business, are,
unless disapproved or reprobated by the Chief
Executive presumptively the acts of the Chief
Executive.
Thus, and in short, the Presidents power of control
is directly exercised by him over the members of the
Cabinet who, in turn, and by his authority, control
the bureaus and other offices under their respective
jurisdictions in the executive department.
Additionally, the circumstance that the NAPOLCOM
and the PNP are placed under the reorganized DILG
is merely an administrative realignment that would
bolster a system of coordination and cooperation
among the citizenry, local executives and the
integrated law enforcement agencies and public
safety agencies created under the assailed Act, the
funding of the PNP being in large part subsidized by
the national government.
David v macapagal arroyo
THE FACTS
On February 24, 2006, as the Filipino nation
celebrated the 20th Anniversary of the EDSA People
Power I, President Arroyo issued PP 1017,
implemented by G.O. No. 5, declaring a state of
national emergency, thus:
NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
President of the Republic of the Philippines and
Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested upon me
by Section 18, Article 7 of the Philippine Constitution
which states that: The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed

forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion. . ., and in


my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to
maintain law and order throughout the Philippines,
prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as
well as any act of insurrection or rebellion and to
enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me
personally or upon my direction; and as provided in
Section 17, Article 12 of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.
In their presentation of the factual bases of PP 1017
and G.O. No. 5, respondents stated that the
proximate cause behind the executive issuances was
the conspiracy among some military officers, leftist
insurgents of the New Peoples Army, and some
members of the political opposition in a plot to
unseat or assassinate President Arroyo. They
considered the aim to oust or assassinate the
President and take-over the reins of government as a
clear and present danger.
Petitioners David and Llamas were arrested without
warrants on February 24, 2006 on their way to EDSA.
Meanwhile, the offices of the newspaper Daily
Tribune, which was perceived to be anti-Arroyo, was
searched without warrant at about 1:00 A.M. on
February 25, 2006. Seized from the premises in the
absence of any official of the Daily Tribune except
the security guard of the building were several
materials for publication. The law enforcers, a
composite team of PNP and AFP officers, cited as
basis of the warrantless arrests and the warrantless
search and seizure was Presidential Proclamation
1017 issued by then President Gloria MacapagalArroyo in the exercise of her constitutional power to
call out the Armed Forces of the Philippines to
prevent or suppress lawless violence.
II.

THE ISSUE

1. Were the warrantless arrests of petitioners


David, et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, valid?
2. Was the warrantless search and seizure on the
Daily Tribunes offices conducted pursuant to PP
1017 valid?
III. THE RULING
[The Court partially GRANTED the petitions.]
1. NO, the warrantless arrests of petitioners David,
et al., made pursuant to PP 1017, were NOT valid.
[S]earches, seizures and arrests are normally
unreasonable unless authorized by a validly issued
search warrant or warrant of arrest. Section 5, Rule
113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides [for the following circumstances of valid
warrantless arrests]:

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. - A


peace officer or a private person may, without a
warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
(b) When an offense has just been committed and
he has probable cause to believe based on personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances that the person
to be arrested has committed it; and
x x x.
Neither of the [provisions on in flagrante nor hot
pursuit warrantless arrests] justifies petitioner
Davids warrantless arrest. During the inquest for the
charges of inciting to sedition and violation of BP
880, all that the arresting officers could invoke was
their observation that some rallyists were wearing tshirts with the invective Oust Gloria Now and their
erroneous assumption that petitioner David was the
leader of the rally. Consequently, the Inquest
Prosecutor ordered his immediate release on the
ground of insufficiency of evidence. He noted that
petitioner David was not wearing the subject t-shirt
and even if he was wearing it, such fact is
insufficient to charge him with inciting to sedition.
2. NO, the warrantless search and seizure on the
Daily Tribunes offices conducted pursuant to PP
1017 was NOT valid.
[T]he search [and seizure in the Daily Tribune
premises] is illegal. Rule 126 of The Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure lays down the steps in the
conduct of search and seizure. Section 4 requires
that a search warrant be issued upon probable cause
in connection with one specific offence to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may produce.
Section 8 mandates that the search of a house,
room, or any other premise be made in the presence
of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his
family or in the absence of the latter, in the
presence of two (2) witnesses of sufficient age and
discretion residing in the same locality. And Section
9 states that the warrant must direct that it be
served in the daytime, unless the property is on the
person or in the place ordered to be searched, in
which case a direction may be inserted that it be
served at any time of the day or night. All these
rules were violated by the CIDG operatives.
Aquino v military commission
In September 1972, after the declaration of Martial
Law, Ninoy was arrested and was placed under
custody. He was brought Fort Bonifacio. He filed for
the issuance of the Writ of Habeas Corpus which was
denied by the SC. Ninoy then questioned the validity
of such denial and the declaration of martial law; at
the same time he questioned the authority of the
military court [No. 2] created [pursuant to GO 2-A] to
try him and his other companions. He was being
charged for illegal possession of firearms,
ammunition and explosives. He was also being
charged for violation of the Anti-Subversion Act and

for murder. All were filed before the military court.


Ninoy argued that the military court has no
jurisdiction or civilian courts are still operational.
ISSUE: Whether or not Ninoy can be validly charged
before the military court.
HELD: The SC upheld the power of the president to
create military tribunals or military courts which are
authorized to try not only military personnel but also
civilians even at that time civil courts were open and
functioning. The SC basically rejected the open
court theory observed in the USA.
Olaguer v military commission
FACTS: Petitioners, as civilians, have been charged
the crime of subversion. Consequently, the Chief-ofStaff of the AFP created a military tribunal, named
Military Commission No. 34, to try criminal case
against petitioners. Petitioners were then convicted
and have been imposed a penalty of death penalty.
Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition to enjoin the
military tribunal from taking further action on their
case for the tribunal should be considered null and
void. Respondents invoked that the creation of
Military Commission is constitutional as ruled upon
in a previous case Aquino v. Military Commission
No. 2.- as decided upon by the Supreme Court.
However, petitioners contend that such ruling must
be overturned because the ruling is now inapplicable
since Martial Law has already been lifted.
ISSUE: Whether or not the ruling in Aquino v. Military
Commission be abandoned and/or modified in so far
as the case at bar is concerned?
HELD: Yes.
REASONING: First, the Court considered that since
the martial law has been lifted during the case is still
pending, military tibunals, which were created for
the purpose of martial law, shall be held void already
since the law itself is lifted. Second, the Court relied
on the dissenting views of some justices in AQUINO
V. MILCOMM, stating that Civilians like the
petitioner placed on tiral for civil offenses under
general law are entited o trial by judicial process, not
by executive or military processxxx..Judicial power
exist only in courts.1Moreover, the Court
emphasized that Reverence for precedent, simply
as precedent, cannot prevail when constitutionalism
and the public interest demand otherwise. Thus, a
doctrine which should be abandoned or modified
should be abandoned or modified accordingly. after
all, more important than anything else is that this
Court should be right.
1Justice Tehankee in his separate dissenting opinion.
FELIX BARCELONA,
Petitioner
, v. DAVID J. BAKER, JR., AND JOHN DOE THOMPSON,
Respondents
.
This case was an application for a writ of
habeas corpus which it alleged that Barcelon is
detained and restrained of his liberty at the town of
Batangas, in the Province of Batangas, and that the

detention and restraint of the said applicant is is


wholly without legal authority and not under or by
virtue of any process issued by any court.
Respondents admit that they are detaining the body
of the said Felix Barcelon, but deny the right of the
court to inquire into the reasons therefor by virtue of
the resolution issued by the Philippine Commission
and the executive order of the Governor-General
suspending the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus
in the Provinces of Cavite and Batangas. The
Philippine Bill section 5 provides that the GovernorGeneral is hereby authorized to suspend writ of
habeas corpus in the said provinces because of the
fact that certain organized bands of ladrones in said
provinces were in open insurrection against the
constituted authorities; and the said bands, or parts
of them, and some of their leaders, were still in open
resistance to the constituted authorities. ISSUE:
Whether or not the judicial department of the
Government may investigate the facts upon which
the legislative and executive branches of the
Government acted in providing for the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habes corpus in the
province of Cavite and BAtangas HELD: NO. It is the
duty of the legislative branch of the Government to
make such laws and regulations as will effectually
conserve peace and good order and protect the lives
and property of the citizens of the State. It is the
duty of the Governor-General to take such steps as
he deems wise and necessary for the purpose of
enforcing such laws. If the judicial department of the
Government, or any officer in the Government, has a
right to contest the orders of the President or of the
Governor-General under the conditions above
supposed, before complying with such orders, then
the hands of the President or the Governor-General
may be tied until the very object of the rebels or
insurrectos or invaders has been accomplished. IN
THIS CASE, Congress had authority to provide that
the President, or the Governor-General, with the
approval of the Philippine Commission, might
suspend the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus
in cases of rebellion, insurrection, or invasion, when
the public safety might require it. the conclusion set
forth in the said resolution and the said executive
order, as to the fact that there existed in the
Provinces of Cavite and Batangas open insurrection
against the constituted authorities, was a conclusion
entirely within the discretion of the legislative and
executive branches of the Government, after an
investigation of the facts. That one branch of the
United States Government in the Philippine Islands
has no right to interfere or inquire into, for the
purpose of nullifying the same, the discretionary acts
of another independent department of the
Government. The doctrine that whenever the
Constitution or a statute gives a discretionary power
to any person, to be exercised by him upon his own
opinion of certain facts, such person is to be
considered the sole and exclusive judge of the
existence of those facts has been recognized in this
case. The authority to suspend the privilege of writ
of habeas corpus is exclusively vested in the

legislative and executive branches of the


government and their decision is final and conclusive
upon the Judicial Department and upon all persons.
Therefore, the application for the writ of habeas
corpus is denied.
Marcelo Montenegro vs Castaeda
November 17, 2010 No comments
1Facebook1Twitter0Pinterest0LinkedIn0Email0
ADVERTISEMENTS

Suspension of the Privilege of the Writ Habeas


Corpus as a Political Question being a Prerogative
by the President
In October 1950, Montenegros son was arrested by
military agents. Three days after the arrest, PP 210
was proclaimed suspending the privilege of the writ
of habeas corpus. Montenegro then filed before the
court to have his son be set free for his arrest was
w/o cause and that the said PP should not be applied
retroactively to his son for it would then constitute a
violation of the constitutional prohibition against bill
of attainders. Montenegro then filed a petition for
the writ of habeas corpus demanding the detainers
to bring his sons body and explain his detention.
Castaeda et al argued that the court has no judicial
authority over the matter invoking the PP and the
previous ruling in Barcelon vs Baker.
ISSUE: Whether or not Montenegros petition should
be granted.
HELD: As ruled by the SC in the Barcelon case,
Montenegros petition is likewise denied. The
constitutional authority of the President to suspend
in case of imminent danger of invasion, insurrection
or rebellion under Article 7 may not correctly be
placed in doubt.
Teodosio Lansang vs Garcia (G.R. No. L-33964)
Posted: August 10, 2011 in Case Digests, Political
Law
0
Abandonment of the Doctrine Held in the Barcelon
Case & the Montenegro Case
FACTS: Due to the throwing of two hand grenades in
a Liberal Party caucus in 1971 causing the death of 8
people, Marcos issued PP 889 which suspended the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. Marcos urged
that there is a need to curtail the growth of Maoist
groups. Subsequently, Lansang et al were invited by
the PC headed by Garcia for interrogation and
investigation. Lansang et al questioned the validity
of the suspension of the writ averring that the
suspension does not meet the constitutional
requisites.
ISSUE: Whether or not the suspension is
constitutional.

HELD: The doctrine established in Barcelon and


Montenegro was subsequently abandoned in this
case where the SC declared that it had the power to
inquire into the factual basis of the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus by Marcos in
Aug 1971 and to annul the same if no legal ground
could be established. Accordingly, hearings were
conducted to receive evidence on this matter,
including two closed-door sessions in which relevant
classified information was divulged by the
government to the members of the SC and 3
selected lawyers of the petitioners. In the end, after
satisfying itself that there was actually a massive
and systematic Communist-oriented campaign to
overthrow the government by force, as claimed by
Marcos, the SC unanimously decided to uphold t5he
suspension of the privilege of the Writ of Habeas
Corpus.
Garcia-Padilla v. Enrile
121 SCRA 472
FACTS:
The case is an application for the issuance of the
writ of habeas corpus on behalf of 14 detainees.
Sabino Padilla and 8 others out of the 14 detainees
were then having a conference in the dining room at
Dr. Parong's residence. Prior thereto, all the 14
detainees were under surveillance as they were then
identified as members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines. engaging in subversive activities. They
were arrested and later transferred to a facility only
the PCs know, hence, the present petition of
Josefina, mother of Sabina, for writ of habeas corpus.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the arrests done to the present
detainees are valid
HELD:
The suspension of the privilege of writ of habeas
corpus raises a political, not a judicial, question and
that the right to bail cannot be invoked during such
a period. PD 1836 and LOI 1211 have vested,
assuming a law is necessary, in the President the
power of preventive arrest incident to the
suspension of the privilege of the writ. In addition,
however, it should be noted that the PCO has been
replaced by Preventive Detention Action (PDA)
pursuant to PD 1877. As provided for in the said
decree, a PDA constitute an authority to arrest and
preventively detain persons committing the
aforementioned crimes, for a period of one year,
with the cause or causes of their arrest subjected to
review by the President or the by the Review
Committee created for the purpose.
PEOPLE VS SALLE, JR.FACTS: Francisco Salle, Jr. and
Ricky Mengote were found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt andeach is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay an indemnity.
Theappellants seasonably filed their Notice of
Appeal. On 24 March 1993, the Court accepted
theappeal. On 6 January 1994, however, appellant
Francisco Salle, Jr. filed an Urgent Motion toWithdraw
Appeal. They were granted a conditional pardon
that with their acceptance of theconditional pardon,

the appellants will be released from confinement,


the appellants impliedlyadmitted their guilt and
accepted their sentence, and hence, the appeal
should be dismissed.They were discharged from
the New Bilibid Prison on 28 December 1993. Atty.
Lao furtherinformed the Court that appellant Ricky
Mengote left for his province without consulting her.
Shethen prays that the Court grant Salle's motion to
withdraw his appeal and consider it withdrawnupon
his acceptance of the conditional pardon. Mengote
has not filed a motion to withdraw hisappeal.ISSUE:
Whether or not Mengotes conditional pardon is
valid?RULING: No. Since pardon is given only to one
whose conviction is final, pardon has no effectuntil
the person withdraws his appeal and thereby allows
his conviction to be final and Mengotehas not filed a
motion to withdraw his appeal. WHEREFORE,
counsel for accused-appellantRicky Mengote y
Cuntado is hereby given thirty (30) days from notice
hereof within which tosecure from the latter the
withdrawal of his appeal and to submit it to this
Court. The conditionalpardon granted the said
appellant shall be deemed to take effect only upon
the grant of suchwithdrawal. In case of noncompliance with this Resolution, the Director
of the Bureau ofCorrections must exert every
possible effort to take back into his custody the said
appellant, forwhich purpose he may seek the
assistance of the Philippine National Police or the
NationalBureau of Investigation.
MONSANTO v. FACTORAN
October 26, 2012 Leave a comment
February 9, 1989 (G.R. No. 78239)
PARTIES:
Petitioner: SALVACION A. MONSANTO
Respondent: FULGENCIO S., JR.
FACTS:
In a decision by the Sandiganbayan convicted
petitioner Salvacion A. Monsanto was accused of the
crime of estafa thru falsification of public documents
and sentenced them to imprisonment and to
indemnify the government in the sum of P4,892.50
representing the balance of the amount defrauded
and to pay the costs proportionately.
She was given an absolute pardon by President
Marcos which she accepted.
Petitioner requested that she be restored to her
former post as assistant city treasurer since the
same was still vacant, she also asked for the
backpay for the entire period of her suspension.
Finance Ministry ruled that petitioner may be
reinstated to her position without the necessity of a
new appointment
The Office of the President said that that acquittal,
not absolute pardon, of a former public officer is the
only ground for reinstatement to his former position
and entitlement to payment of his salaries, benefits
and emoluments due to him during the period of his
suspension pendente lite.
In fact, in such a situation, the former public
official must secure a reappointment before he can
reassume his former position. And a pardon shall in
no case exempt the culprit from payment of the civil
indemnity imposed upon him by the sentence.
Petitioner argued that general rules on pardon

cannot apply to her case by reason of the fact that


she was extended executive clemency while her
conviction was still pending appeal in this Court.
There having been no final judgment of conviction,
her employment therefore as assistant city treasurer
could not be said to have been terminated or
forfeited.
The court viewed that is not material when the
pardon was bestowed, whether before or after
conviction, for the result would still be the same
ISSUE:
(1) Effects of a full and absolute pardon
(2) WON a public officer, who has been granted an
absolute pardon by the Chief Executive, is entitled to
reinstatement to her former position without need of
a new appointment.
HELD:
(1) A pardon reaches both the punishment
prescribed for the offense and the guilt of the
offender; and when the pardon is full, it releases the
punishment and blots out of existence the guilt, so
that in the eye of the law the offender is as innocent
as if he had never committed the offense. If granted
before conviction, it prevents any of the penalties
and disabilities, consequent upon conviction, from
attaching; if granted after conviction, it removes the
penalties and disabilities and restores him to all his
civil rights; it makes him, as it were, a new man, and
gives him a new credit and capacity. But unless
expressly grounded on the persons innocence
(which is rare), it cannot bring back lost reputation
for honesty, integrity and fair dealing.
A pardon looks to the future. It is not retrospective. It
makes no amends for the past. It affords no relief for
what has been suffered by the offender. It does not
impose upon the government any obligation to make
reparation for what has been suffered.
(2) No. To insist on automatic reinstatement because
of a mistaken notion that the pardon virtually
acquitted one from the offense of estafa would be
grossly untenable. A pardon, albeit full and plenary,
cannot preclude the appointing power from refusing
appointment to anyone deemed to be of bad
character, a poor moral risk, or who is unsuitable by
reason of the pardoned conviction.
The absolute disqualification or ineligibility from
public office forms part of the punishment prescribed
by the Revised Penal Code for estafa thru
falsification of public documents.
The pardon granted to petitioner has resulted in
removing her disqualification from holding public
employment but it cannot go beyond that. To regain
her former post as assistant city treasurer, she must
re-apply and undergo the usual procedure required
for a new appointment.
Dames moore and regan
Brief Fact Summary. The Supreme Court of the
United States held that the President may nullify
attachments and order the transfer of frozen Iranian
assets pursuant to Section 1702(a)(1) of the
International Emergency Economic Powers Act
(IEEPA). Based on the Courts inferences from
legislation passed by Congress (IEEPA and the
Hostage Act) regarding the Presidents authority to
deal with international crises and from the history of

congressional acquiescence in executive claims


settlement, the President may also suspend claims
pursuant to the Executive Order.
Synopsis of Rule of Law. Where Congress has a
history of acquiescence, as with claims settlement, it
thereby implicitly approves of the Presidents actions
regarding that specific subject matter about which
Congress was silent.

Facts. In response to the seizure of American


personnel as hostages at the American Embassy in
Iran, the President issued various Executive Orders
and regulations by which the President nullified
attachments and liens on Iranian assets in the
United States, directed that theses assets be
transferred to Iran, and suspended claims against
Iran that may be presented to an International
Claims Tribunal. On December 19, 1979, Petitioner,
Dames & Moore, filed suit in the United Sates District
Court against Defendants, the government of Iran,
the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, and many
Iranian banks, alleging that its subsidiary was a
party to a contract with the Atomic Energy
Organization and that the subsidiarys interest had
been assigned to Petitioner. Petitioner alleged it was
owed over 3 million dollars. The District Court issued
orders of attachment directed against the
Defendants property and the property of certain
Iranian banks. In a January 20, 1981 Executive
Agreement, the
President agreed to nullify attachments and ordered
the transfer of frozen Iranian assets. On February 24,
1981, the President ratified an earlier Order wherein
he suspended all claims which may be presented
to the Tribunal and provided that such claims shall
have no legal effect in any action now pending in
U.S. courts.
Issue. Whether the Presidents acts of nullifying
the attachments and ordering the transfer of all
frozen assets are specifically authorized by
Congress.
Whether the President has authority to suspend
claims pending in American courts.
Held. Yes. Because the Presidents actions in
nullifying the attachments and ordering the transfer
of assets were taken pursuant to congressional
authorization (Section 1702 (a)(1) of IEEPA), it is
supported by the strongest of presumptions and
widest latitude of judicial interpretation and the
burden of persuasion rests heavily on any who might
attack it.
Yes. Based on the legislation (IEEPA and the Hostage
Act) which Congress has enacted in the area of the
Presidents authority to deal with international
crises, and from the history of congressional
acquiescence in executive claims settlement, the
President was authorized to suspend claims
pursuant to the Executive Order

Discussion. The majority resorts to drawing


inferences from Congress legislation to conclude
that the President has authority to suspend claims in
American Courts.
ECHEGARAY v. SEC. OF JUSTICE
October 26, 2012 Leave a comment
January 19, 1999 (G.R. No. 132601)
PARTIES:
Petitioner: LEO ECHEGARAY
Respondents: SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL
FACTS:
On January 4, 1999, the SC issued a TRO staying the
execution of petitioner Leo Echegaray scheduled on
that same day. The public respondent Justice
Secretary assailed the issuance of the TRO arguing
that the action of the SC not only violated the rule
on finality of judgment but also encroached on the
power of the executive to grant reprieve.
ISSUE: Whether or not the court abused its discretion
in granting a Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) on
the execution of Echegaray despite the fact that the

finality of judgment has already been rendered


that by granting the TRO, the Honorable Court has in
effect granted reprieve which is an executive
function.
HELD:
No. Respondents cited sec 19, art VII. The provision
is simply the source of power of the President to
grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons and
remit fines and forfeitures after conviction by final
judgment. The provision, however, cannot be
interpreted as denying the power of courts to control
the enforcement of their decisions after their finality.
The powers of the Executive, the Legislative and the
Judiciary to save the life of a death convict do not
exclude each other for the simple reason that there
is no higher right than the right to life.
For the public respondents therefore to contend that
only the Executive can protect the right to life of an
accused after his final conviction is to violate the
principle of co-equal and coordinate powers of the
three branches of our government.