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Topic: Constructive Dismissal

Ponente: Perez, J.
Chiang Kai Shek College v. Torres, G.R. No. 189456, April 2, 2014
Facts: Petitioner Chiang Kai Shek College is a private educational institution
that offers elementary to college education to the public. Individual
petitioner Carmelita Espino is the Vice-President of the school. Respondent
had been employed as a grade school teacher of the school from July 1970
until 31 May 2003.
Respondent was accused of leaking a copy of a special quiz given to Grade 5
students of HEKASI 5. Petitioners came to know about the leakage from one
of the teachers of HEKASI 5, Aileen Benabese. Ms. Benabese narrated that
after giving a special quiz, she borrowed the book of one of her students,
Aileen Regine M. Anduyan, for the purpose of making an answer key. When
she opened Aileen’s book, a piece of paper fell. Said paper turned out to be a
copy of the same quiz she had just given and the same already contained
answers.
Assistant Supervisor Encarnacion Koo, confronted respondent, who had
initially denied leaking the test paper but later on admitted that she gave the
test paper to Mrs. Teresita Anduyan, her co-teacher and the mother of Aileen.
The school’s Investigating Committee found respondent and Mrs. Anduyan
guilty of committing a grave offense of the school policies by leaking a
special quiz. The Investigating Committee had actually decided to terminate
respondent but the respondent pleaded that she suspended instead and that
she will resign at the end of the school year. Petitioners acceded to the
request.
On 14 February 2003 however, respondent’s counsel sent a letter to
petitioners demanding the payment of her backwages, bonus, teacher’s day
gift, moral damages and exemplary damages. Respondent’s counsel also
required petitioner to cease and desist from calling respondent for her
resignation at the end of the school year 2002 – 2003.
Petitioners, through counsel, wrote to respondent’s counsel asserting that
respondent was being terminated but the latter requested that "she be

suspended instead on condition that she will tender her voluntary resignation
at the end of the school year."
On 10 June 2003, respondent filed a complaint for constructive dismissal and
illegal suspension with the Labor Arbiter. However, the complaint was
dismissed for lack of merit. The Labor Arbiter deemed respondent’s
suspension coupled with petitioner’s allowance of respondent’s resignation
at the end of the school year as generous acts considering the offense
committed.
On appeal, the NLRC affirmed the decision but ordered the petitioners to pay
separation pay equivalent to one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of
service on the grounds of equity and social justice.
The Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC
Reconsideration was filed but it was denied.

decision.

A

Motion

for

Hence, this petition.
Issue: Does the school’s act of imposing the penalty of suspension instead
of immediate dismissal from service at the behest of the erring employee, in
exchange for the employee’s resignation at the end of the school year,
constitute constructive dismissal?
Ruling: NO.
Resignation is the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where
one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed for the favor of
employment, and opts to leave rather than stay employed. It is a formal
pronouncement or relinquishment of an office, with the intention of
relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. As the
intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment, the
acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be
considered in determining whether, he or she, in fact, intended to sever his
or her employment.
There is constructive dismissal when there is cessation of work, because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as
an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay and other
benefits. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or an act amounting to dismissal
but made to appear as if it were not, constructive dismissal may, likewise,

exist if an act of clear discrimination, insensibility, or disdain by an employer
becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose
any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. There was
here no discrimination committed by petitioners. While respondent did not
tender her resignation wholeheartedly, circumstances of her own making did
not give her any other option. With due process, she was found to have
committed the grave offense of leaking test questions. Dismissal from
employment was the justified equivalent penalty. Having realized that, she
asked for, and was granted, not just a deferred imposition of, but also an
acceptable cover for the penalty.
Respondent’s profession, the gravity of her infraction, and the fact that she
waited until the close of the school year to challenge her impending
resignation demonstrate that respondent had bargained for a graceful exit
and is now trying to renege on her obligation. Respondent should not be
rewarded for reneging on her promise to resign at the end of the school year.
Otherwise, employers placed in similar situations would no longer extend
compassion to employees. Compromise agreements, like that in the instant
case, which lean towards desired liberality that favor labor, would be
discouraged.
Topic: employer – employee relationship; illegal dismissal; doctrine
of strained relation
Ponente: Reyes, J.
Tenazas v. R. Villegas Taxi Transport, G.R. No. 192998, April 2, 2014
Facts: On July 4, 2007, Bernard A. Tenazas and Jaime M. Francisco filed a
complaint for illegal dismissal against R. Villegas Taxi Transport and/or
Romualdo Villegas and Andy Villegas. At that time, a similar case had already
been filed by Isidro G. Endraca against the same respondents. The two (2)
cases were subsequently consolidated.
Relaying the circumstances of his dismissal, Tenazas alleged that on July 1,
2007, the taxi unit assigned to him was sideswiped by another vehicle,
causing a dent on the left fender near the driver seat. The cost of repair for
the damage was estimated at P500.00. Upon reporting the incident to the
company, he was scolded by respondents Romualdo and Andy and was told
to leave the garage for he is already fired. He was even threatened with
physical harm should he ever be seen in the company’s premises again.
Despite the warning, Tenazas reported for work on the following day but was

told that he can no longer drive any of the company’s units as he is already
fired.
Francisco, on the other hand, averred that his dismissal was brought about
by the company’s unfounded suspicion that he was organizing a labor union.
He was instantaneously terminated, without the benefit of procedural due
process, on June 4, 2007.
Endraca, for his part, alleged that his dismissal was instigated by an occasion
when he fell short of the required boundary for his taxi unit. He related that
before he was dismissed, he brought his taxi unit to an auto shop for an
urgent repair. He was charged the amount of P700.00 for the repair services
and the replacement parts. As a result, he was not able to meet his boundary
for the day. Upon returning to the company garage and informing the
management of the incident, his driver’s license was confiscated and was
told to settle the deficiency in his boundary first before his license will be
returned to him. He was no longer allowed to drive a taxi unit despite his
persistent pleas.
For their part, the respondents admitted that Tenazas and Endraca were
employees of the company, the former being a regular driver and the latter a
spare driver. The respondents, however, denied that Francisco was an
employee of the company or that he was able to drive one of the company’s
units at any point in time.
The respondents further alleged that Tenazas was never terminated by the
company. They claimed that Tenazas went to the company garage to get his
taxi unit but was informed that it is due for overhaul because of some
mechanical defects reported by the other driver who takes turns with him in
using the same. He was thus advised to wait for further notice from the
company if his unit has already been fixed. On July 8, 2007, however, upon
being informed that his unit is ready for release, Tenazas failed to report back
to work for no apparent reason.
As regards Endraca, the respondents alleged that they hired him as a spare
driver in February 2001. They allow him to drive a taxi unit whenever their
regular driver will not be able to report for work. In July 2003, however,
Endraca stopped reporting for work without informing the company of his
reason.
On May 30, 2008, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision stating that there
was no illegal dismissal as there was no proof of overt act of dismissal
committed by the respondents.
On appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the LA. It held that the
additional pieces of evidence belatedly submitted by the petitioners sufficed

to establish the existence of employer-employee relationship and their illegal
dismissal.
The respondents then filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. The CA
agreed with the NLRC’s finding that Tenazas and Endraca were employees of
the company, but ruled otherwise in the case of Francisco for failing to
establish his relationship with the company. It also deleted the award of
separation pay and ordered for reinstatement of Tenazas and Endraca.
Hence, this petition.
Issue:
1. Is Francisco an employee of the respondent?
2. Is reinstatement of Tenazas and Endraca possible?
Ruling:
1. NO.
In determining the presence or absence of an employer-employee
relationship, the Court has consistently looked for the following incidents, to
wit: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee; (b) the payment of
wages; (c) the power of dismissal; and (d) the employer’s power to control
the employee on the means and methods by which the work is
accomplished. The last element, the so-called control test, is the most
important element."
There is no hard and fast rule designed to establish the aforesaid elements.
Any competent and relevant evidence to prove the relationship may be
admitted. Identification cards, cash vouchers, social security registration,
appointment letters or employment contracts, payrolls, organization charts,
and personnel lists, serve as evidence of employee status.
In this case, however, Francisco failed to present any proof substantial
enough to establish his relationship with the respondents. Bereft of any
evidence, the CA correctly ruled that Francisco could not be considered an
employee of the respondents.
2. YES.
The CA’s order of reinstatement of Tenazas and Endraca, instead of the
payment of separation pay, is also well in accordance with prevailing
jurisprudence. An illegally dismissed employee is entitled to two reliefs:
backwages and reinstatement. The two reliefs provided are separate and
distinct. In instances where reinstatement is no longer feasible because of

strained relations between the employee and the employer, separation pay
is granted. In effect, an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to either
reinstatement, if viable, or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer
viable, and backwages.
After a perusal of the NLRC decision, this Court failed to find the factual basis
of the award of separation pay to the petitioners. The NLRC decision did not
state the facts which demonstrate that reinstatement is no longer a feasible
option that could have justified the alternative relief of granting separation
pay instead.
The petitioners themselves likewise overlooked to allege circumstances
which may have rendered their reinstatement unlikely or unwise and even
prayed for reinstatement alongside the payment of separation pay in their
position paper. A bare claim of strained relations by reason of termination is
insufficient to warrant the granting of separation pay. Likewise, the filing of
the complaint by the petitioners does not necessarily translate to strained
relations between the parties. As a rule, no strained relations should arise
from a valid and legal act asserting one’s right. Although litigation may also
engender a certain degree of hostility, the understandable strain in the
parties’ relation would not necessarily rule out reinstatement which would,
otherwise, become the rule rather the exception in illegal dismissal cases.
Thus, it was a prudent call for the CA to delete the award of separation pay
and order for reinstatement instead, in accordance with the general rule
stated in Article 279 of the Labor Code.

Topic: probationary employment of teachers in private schools;
illegal dismissal
Ponente: Villarama, Jr., J.
Universidad De Sta. Isabel v. Sambajon, Jr., G.R. Nos. 196280 &
196286, April 2, 2014
Facts: Universidad de Sta. Isabel is a non-stock, non-profit religious
educational institution in Naga City. Petitioner hired Marvin-Julian L.
Sambajon, Jr. as a full-time college faculty member with the rank of Assistant
Professor on probationary status, as evidenced by an Appointment Contract
dated November 1, 2002, effective November 1, 2002 up to March 30, 2003.
After the aforesaid contract expired, petitioner continued to give teaching
loads to respondent who remained a full-time faculty member of the
Department of Religious Education for the two semesters of school-year
2003-2004 and two semesters of SY 2004-2005.
Sometime in June 2003, after respondent completed his course in Master of
Arts in Education, major in Guidance and Counseling, he submitted the
corresponding Special Order from the Commission on Higher Education
(CHED), together with his credentials for the said master’s degree, to the
Human Resources Department of petitioner for the purpose of salary
adjustment/increase. Subsequently, respondent’s salary was increased, as
reflected in his pay slips starting October 1-15, 2004. He was likewise reranked from Assistant Professor to Associate Professor.
In a letter dated October 15, 2004 addressed to the President of petitioner,
Sr. Ma. Asuncion G. Evidente, D.C., respondent vigorously argued that his
salary increase should be made effective as of June 2003 and demanded the
payment of his salary differential. The school administration replied by
explaining that there is no re – ranking during the employee’s probationary
period.
To resolve the issue, a dialogue was held between respondent and Sr.
Evidente but the parties gave conflicting accounts. On February 26, 2005,
respondent received his letter of termination.
On April 14, 2005, respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against
the petitioner.
The Labor Arbiter ruled that there was no just or authorized cause in the
termination of respondent’s probationary employment. Consequently,
petitioner was found liable for illegal dismissal.

Issues: 1. limit itself to reviewing those issues which are raised on appeal. in cases of perfected appeals. Section 92 of the revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools merely provides for the maximum lengths of the probationary periods of academic personnel of private schools in the three (3) levels of education (elementary. The NLRC shall. the NLRC rendered its Decision affirming the Labor Arbiter and holding that respondent had acquired a permanent status pursuant to Sections 91. as amended. 92 and 93 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. YES. 2008. As presently worded. As a consequence thereof. Was the respondent illegally dismissed? Ruling: 1. However. this petition. 2003. Both parties filed separate appeals before the CA. by them. Hence." Based thereon.Petitioner appealed to the NLRC raising the issue of the correct interpretation of Section 92 of the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and DOLEDECS-CHED-TESDA Order No. The periods provided therein are not requirements for the acquisition. in relation to Article 281 of the Labor Code. 01. series of 1996. the CA found it necessary to modify the decision of the NLRC to include the award of back wages to respondent. tertiary). Under the circumstances. of permanent status. On August 1. the complainant acquired permanent status on the first day of the first semester of SY 2003-2004. Did the NLRC correctly resolve an issue not raised in petitioner’s appeal memorandum? 2. it must be concluded that the complainant has acquired permanent status. and alleging grave abuse of discretion committed by the Labor Arbiter in ruling on a cause of action/issue not raised by the complainant (respondent) in his position paper. The CA sustained the conclusion of the NLRC that respondent had already acquired permanent status when he was allowed to continue teaching after the expiration of his first appointment-contract on March 30. secondary. The last paragraph of Article 281 of the Labor Code provides that "an employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. any other .

insofar as the probationary period for teachers. YES. It bears stressing that full-time teaching primarily refers to the extent of services rendered by the teacher to the employer school and not to the nature of his appointment. 2. In this case.issues which were not included in the appeal shall become final and executory. In this case. Since petitioner elevated the questions of the validity of respondent’s dismissal and the applicable probationary period under the aforesaid regulations. Its significance lies in the rule that only full-time teaching personnel can acquire regular or permanent status. On the matter of probationary period. In reviewing the Labor Arbiter’s finding of illegal dismissal. Such conclusion was but a logical result of the NLRC’s own interpretation of the law. The Labor Code is supplemented with respect to the period of probation by special rules found in the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. Probationary Period. Section 92 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools regulations states: Section 92. In this case. 01. and nine (9) consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are offered on a trimester basis. The probationary employment of teachers in private schools is not governed purely by the Labor Code. petitioner sought the correct interpretation of the Manual of Regulations for Private School Teachers and DOLE-DECS-CHED-TESDA Order No. the probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than three (3) consecutive years of satisfactory service for those in the elementary and secondary levels. it was explicitly provided in the third appointment contract of the respondent that unless renewed in writing respondent’s appointment automatically expires at the end of the stipulated period of employment. six (6) consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level. respondent had already become a permanent employee. the NLRC concluded that respondent had already attained regular status after the expiration of his first appointment contract as probationary employee. Simply because the word "probationary" no longer appears below the designation (Full-Time Faculty Member). series of 1996. – Subject in all instances to compliance with the Department and school requirements. the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in fully resolving the said issues. petitioner applied the maximum three-year probationary period – equivalent to six consecutive semesters – provided in the Manual of .

2005. During the said probationary period. and (c) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer. The services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following: (a) a just or (b) an authorized cause. Notwithstanding the limited engagement of probationary employees. 2005. petitioner terminated the services of respondent stating that his probationary employment as teacher will no longer be renewed upon its expiry on March 31. respondent’s termination after five semesters of satisfactory service was illegal. The circumstance that respondent’s services were hired on semester basis did not negate the applicable probationary period. . respondent had consistently achieved above average rating based on evaluation by petitioner’s officials and students. Thus.he enjoys a limited tenure. they are entitled to constitutional protection of security of tenure during and before the end of the probationary period.Regulations. No just or authorized cause was given by petitioner. Article 281 should assume primacy and the fixed-period character of the contract must give way. In a situation where the probationary status overlaps with a fixed-term contract not specifically used for the fixed term it offers. or if he fails to qualify in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by petitioner for the acquisition of permanent status of its teaching personnel.which has the force of law -. In a letter dated February 26. Clearly. respondent’s fifth semester of teaching. while no vested right to a permanent appointment had as yet accrued in favor of respondent since he had not completed the prerequisite threeyear period (six consecutive semesters) necessary for the acquisition of permanent status as required by the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools -. he cannot be terminated except for just or authorized causes. Prior to this. He had also been promoted to the rank of Associate Professor after finishing his master’s degree course on his third semester of teaching. which is three school years or six consecutive semesters.

2007. 2007. 2007. He was repatriated. Inc. he was declared fit to return to work from an orthopedic point of view. Sibug fell from a ladder while cleaning the silo sensor at a garbage room of the Volendam and injured his knee. and had surgery for his Ryndam injury. No. April 2.. In an email dated September 28. 2006. 2014 Facts: Petitioners United Philippine Lines. On August 5. J. the company-designated . He was repatriated and had anterior cruciate ligament (ACL) reconstruction surgery at the Manila Doctors Hospital. On September 7. and Holland America Line hired Sibug as waste handler on board the vessel MIS Volendam. the company-designated doctor issued a medical report that Sibug has a permanent but incomplete disability. Inc. 201072. On January 19. 2005. Sibug sought reemployment. G. Jr. United Philippine Lines.Topic: circumstances when a seaman may be allowed to pursue an action for permanent and total disability benefits. and was re-hired by petitioners in the same capacity for the vessel M/S Ryndam. v. On board Ryndam. passed the pre-employment medical examination. Sibug met another accident while driving a forklift and injured his right hand and wrist. He arrived in the Philippines on January 15. award of attorney’s fees Ponente: Villarama. Sibug.R.

Sibug filed two complaints for disability benefits.075 which is the equivalent award for the grade 10 disability rating issued by the companydesignated doctor. the NLRC denied Sibug’s motion for reconsideration. .000 for his Ryndam injury. Thus. He also passed the pre-employment medical examination when he sought reemployment. he is entitled to permanent and total disability benefit for both injuries. the NLRC reinstated the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. As regards the Ryndam case. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the Volendam case on the ground that Sibug was declared fit to work after his ACL reconstruction surgery. The NLRC reversed the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. Is Sibug entitled to permanent and total disability benefits for his Volendam and Ryndam injuries? 2. the Labor Arbiter awarded to Sibug US$10. Is he entitled to attorney’s fees? Ruling: 1. Sibug is not entitled to permanent and total disability benefit for his Volendam injury.doctor classified Sibug’s disability from his Ryndam injury as a grade 10 disability. On reconsideration. damages and attorney’s fees against petitioners anchored on his Volendam injury and Ryndam injury. illness allowance. this petition. The CA set aside the NLRC Decision dated May 29. Thus. 2009 and reinstated the NLRC Decision dated December 8. It ruled that Sibug was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days on account of his Volendam and Ryndam injuries. It ruled that Sibug is entitled to permanent and total disability benefit of US$60. Issues: 1. the case was elevated to the CA. 2008. Later. But he is entitled to permanent and total disability benefit for his Ryndam injury and to attorney’s fees.000 for his Volendam injury and another US$60. Hence. was reemployed and was able to work again in Ryndam.

as the case may be. Wallem Maritime Services. (b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification issued by the company-designated physician. (f) The company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work. but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion. Inc. hence. As regards his Ryndam injury.000. the following are the circumstances when a seaman may be allowed to pursue an action for permanent and total disability benefits: (a) The company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total disability. (c) The company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day period. believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well. (e) The company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading. on his own and jointly with his employer.. Sibug is entitled to permanent and total disability benefit amounting to US$60. .Sibug is not entitled to permanent and total disability benefit for his Volendam injury since he became already fit to work again as a seaman. The medical certificate declaring Sibug fit for sea service even bears his signature. He even admitted in his position paper that he was declared fit to work. And he was able to work again in the same capacity as waste handler in Ryndam. (d) The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other doctors who he consulted. In Millan v. justify an extension of the period to 240 days. He was also declared fit for sea service after his pre-employment medical examination when he sought reemployment with petitioners.

YES. 2007 to September 28. copy of which was attached as Annex 3 of petitioners’ position paper. Sibug was repatriated and arrived in the country on January 15. The company-designated doctor failed to issue a certification with a definite assessment of the degree of Sibug’s disability for his Ryndam injury within 240 days. et al. In Fil-Pride Shipping Company. he is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the award. and (h) The company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of said periods. He had surgery on his injured hand. Sibug is entitled to attorney’s fees of US$6. Section 2 of the Amended Rules on Employees Compensation. If he fails to do so and the seafarer’s medical condition remains unresolved. the company-designated doctor issued a medical report that Sibug has a permanent but incomplete disability. Where an employee is forced to litigate and incur expenses to protect his right and interest. Sibug’s disability is already deemed permanent and total. Only in an email dated September 28. In this case. Paragraph (b) applies to Sibug’s case. the latter shall be deemed totally and permanently disabled.(g) The company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits. On September 7. was Sibug’s disability from his Ryndam injury classified as a grade 10 disability by the company-designated doctor. 2007. Inc. we held that the "company-designated physician must arrive at a definite assessment of the seafarer’s fitness to work or permanent disability within the period of 120 or 240 days. From January 15. 2. . the 240-day extended period when the company-designated doctor must give the definite assessment of Sibug’s disability had lapsed. however. 2007. pursuant to Article 192 (c)(1) of the Labor Code and Rule X. By that time. 2007 after his Ryndam injury. But this medical report failed to state the degree of Sibug’s disability. Hence." This definite assessment of the seaman’s permanent disability must include the degree of his disability.. as required by Section 20-B of the POEA-SEC.000 since he was forced to litigate to protect his valid claim. 2007 is 256 days. v. Balasta.

if supported by substantial evidence. Labor Arbiter found illegal dismissal and ordered respondent to reinstate complainant and to pay him backwages. underpayment of salaries and non-payment of full backwages before the NLRC. instead of reinstatement Ruling: Yes. to wit: . G. such as respondent. premium pay for rest day and underpayment of ECOLA before the DOLE. Respondent filed a complaint for underpayment of wages. Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of illegal dismissal but ordered separation pay instead of reinstatement. Factual findings of quasi-judicial bodies like the NLRC. Carpio.: Emeritus Security and Maintenance Systems Inc. 2014 Facts: Petitioner hired respondent as one of its security guards. Respondent was relieved from his post. 204761.Topic: Illegal Dismissal/Floating Status Ponente: Antonio T. Article 279 of the Labor Code of the Philippines mandates the reinstatement of an illegally dismissed employee. J. April 2. Dailig. more so when they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter. are accorded respect and even finality by this Court. Respondent filed another complaint for illegal dismissal. The Court found that a floating status of a security guard.R. The hearing officer recommended the dismissal of the complaint since the claims were already paid. v. No. Issues: Whether or not there is illegal dismissal Whether or not respondent is entitled to separation pay. Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and payment of separation pay against petitioner before the Conciliation and Mediation Center of the NLRC. for more than six months constitutes constructive dismissal. non-payment of legal and special holiday pay. Respondent was on floating status from 10 December 2005 to 16 June 2006 or more than six months. No.

and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. respondent pointed out that he was not sreinstated by petitioner.’ or that reinstatement may no longer be feasible. the following reasons have been advanced by the Court for denying reinstatement under the facts of the case and the law applicable thereto. Thus. Thus. but was employed by another company. National Labor Relations Commission. respondent was assigned to one of petitioner's clients. inclusive of allowances. reinstatement is the general rule. while the award of separation pay is the exception. or that it will not serve any prudent purpose as when supervening facts have transpired which make execution on that score unjust or inequitable or. Respondent admits receiving a reinstatement notice from petitioner. . Petitioner countered that Emeritus and Emme are sister companies with the same Board of Directors and officers.Security of Tenure. or. due to the resultant atmosphere of ‘antipathy and antagonism’ or ‘strained relations’ or ‘irretrievable estrangement’ between the employer and the employee. that reinstatement can no longer be effected in view of the long passage of time (22 years of litigation) or because of the realities of the situation. in lieu of reinstatement. However. arguing that Emeritus and Emme are in effect one and the same corporation. there is no basis in respondent's allegation that he was not reinstated to his previous employment. that it will not serve the best interests of the parties involved. Emme Security and Maintenance Systems. or that it would be ‘inimical to the employer’s interest. Nothing in the records showed any strained relations between the parties to warrant the award of separation . according to respondent. thus: Over time. to an increasing extent. The circumstances warranting the grant of separation pay. are laid down by the Court in Globe-Mackay Cable and Radio Corporation v. Considering petitioner's undisputed claim that Emeritus and Emme are one and the same. Inc. he was not reinstated at all.x x x An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full back wages. Thereafter. or that the company would be prejudiced by the workers’ continued employment.

CoA because it was not published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. 1989. 1989. 1989. 10 (Rules and Implementation of RA 6758 for GOCCs and GFIs) specifically stated that the COLA and BEP granted to employees of GOCCs and GFIs shall be deemed integrated into the basic salary effective July 1. . The Court nullified DBM-CCC No. Topic: Integration of Allowances Ponente: Presbitero J. was enacted which provides the integration/consolidation of allowances and additional compensation into the standardized salary rates save for certain additional compensation enumerated therein and others that the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) is mandated to determine.A. otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law (SSL). 1995. 1989. LBP integrated the BEP into the basic pay of its employees effective as of July 1.R. as required by law. RA 7907 removed petitioner LBP from the coverage of the SSL. DBM-CCC No. April 7. J. R. On August 21. Thus. Velasco Jr. There is neither allegation nor proof that such animosity existed between petitioner and respondent. LBP issued a resolution integrating the COLA into the basic pay of LBP employees which took effect on May 16.: Land Bank v.. On February 23. Naval. 195687. 10 in De Jesus v. 6758. 2014 Facts: Petitioner LBP granted its officers and employees Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and a monthly allowance called a "Bank Equity Pay" (BEP). No.pay. G.

10 in the Official Gazette in March 1999. 1999. however. 10. hazard pay. Consolidation of Allowances and Compensation. 6758 pending the publication in the Official Gazette of DBM-CCC No. in the case of COLA. allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad. nothing in the decision suggested or intimated the suspension of the effectivity of Rep. 10. shall be deemed included in the standardized salary . DBM-CCC No. Act No. Respondents instituted a Petition for Mandamus before the RTC to compel LBP to pay their COLA and the BEP allowances over and above their basic salaries. After the publication of the Decision in De Jesus. clothing and laundry allowances. up to the finality of this Decision. and back payment of the same from the time that LBP stopped to extend them until the finality of the Decision in De Jesus. which interest rate should become 12% per annum from the finality of this Decision up to its satisfaction. Section 12 of SSL. 1989. 10 is irrelevant to the validity of the provisions of the SSL. – All allowances. 1989. Respondents appealed to LBP for the restoration of their COLA and BEP. and July 1. respondents started negotiating with LBP for the payment of their COLA and BEP benefits over and above their monthly basic salaries. subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels and hospital personnel. Court of Appeals affirmed with modification directing respondents to pay an interest of 6% per annum on all the amounts due to respondents effective May 16. Commission on Audit. Trial court granted the petition for mandamus and ordered LBP to pay respondents’ claim. as published. denied respondents’ appeal based on a Civil Service Commission (CSC) ruling citing DBM Budget Circular 2001-03 which prohibits the payment of COLA and similar allowances on top of the basic salary on the ground that it would constitute double compensation. 1999. took effect on July 16. the Court declared the nullity of DBMCCC No. Notwithstanding the ruling in De Jesus vs. which was released on July 1. Hence. except for representation and transportation allowances. and such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM. Issue: Whether or not respondents and intervenors are entitled to the COLA and the BEP on top of their basic salaries from 1989 up to the present Ruling: No.The DBM remedied its circular’s defect by publishing DBM-CCC No. 10. LBP. The Court clarified that the nullification of DBM-CCC No. in the case of BEP.

whether in cash or in kind. Existing additional compensation of any national government official or employee paid from local funds of a local government unit shall be absorbed into the basic salary of said official or employee and shall be paid by the National Government. 5. As defined. Subsistence allowance of hospital personnel. Such other additional compensation. Representation and transportation allowances. COLA is one of those allowances deemed integrated under Sec. 7. 3. And such other additional compensation not otherwise specified herein as may be determined by the DBM. 6. it is immediately apparent that the SSL mandates the integration of all allowances except for the following: 1. they should be considered as deemed integrated in the standardized salaries of LBP employees under the general rule of integration. From the foregoing provision. It is not payment in consideration of the fulfillment of official duty. being received by incumbents only as of July 1. Hazard pay. Allowances of foreign service personnel stationed abroad. Since the COLA and the BEP are among those expressly excluded by the SSL from integration. cost of living refers to "the level of prices relating to a range of everyday items" or "the cost of purchasing those goods and services which . 12 of the SSL because (1) it had not been expressly excluded from the general rule of integration and (2) it is a benefit intended to reimburse the employee for the expenses he incurred in the performance of his official functions. COLA is not in the nature of an allowance intended to reimburse expenses incurred by officials and employees of the government in the performance of their official functions. Clothing and laundry allowances. Subsistence allowance of marine officers and crew on board government vessels. 1989 not integrated into the standardized salary rates shall continue to be authorized.rates herein prescribed. 4. 2.

" Based on this premise. however.are included in an accepted standard level of consumption. The bank shall therefore be exempt from existing laws. the basic and net pay of the employees of GFIs. LOI Nos. 10. and separate from." It is at once apparent from the quoted provision that. It shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principle under Republic Act No. the back payment of the COLA and the BEP to respondents. This Court cannot dictate the inclusion of the COLA and BEP contrary to the sound business judgment of LBP recognized and sustained in RA 7907. petitioner LBP had been given sufficient independence and autonomy to design its own compensation plan. i. Thus. it is and should be integrated into the standardized salary rates. Sec. Thus.. would argue against the idea that they prohibit the integration of either allowance into the basic pay of GFI employees. rules and regulations on compensation. COLA is a benefit intended to cover increases in the cost of living. by RA 7907. position classification system and qualification. were reversed and set aside. The compensation loan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subjected to periodic review by the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudices to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and profitability. position classification and qualification standards. Nowhere in either issuance is it mandated that these allowances can only be paid on top of. Section 90 of the same Act is hereby amended to read as follows: "All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation. . The rule is that the payment of a salary may be amended by the power which granted it in the first place. 10 of RA 7907 simply reads as follows: Sec.e. standards approved by the Bank’s Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. 6758. 104 and 116. to decide whether to integrate the COLA and the BEP into the basic pay.

00 yearly for the three-year period of the new CBA. No.Topic: Unfair Labor Practice through Bad Faith Bargaining/ National Interest Ponente: Teresita J. the union filed a Notice of Strike in the NCMB.: Tabangao Shell Refinery Employees Association v.000. 2014 Facts: Near the expiration of the CBA.R. Thus. 170007. On that same day. petitioner and respondent started negotiations for a new CBA.00. During the cooling off period. the union proposed 20% annual increase in basic pay for the next three years while the company made a counter-proposal to grant all covered employees a lump sum amount of P80. G. or violated its duty. The . alleging bad faith bargaining on the part of the company. The union filed a complaint for unfair labor practice before NLRC on the ground that the company refused. Court of Appeals ruled that the SoLE did not commit grave abuse of discretion. Leonardo-De Castro. J. comparison with the then existing wage levels of allied industry. however. and the then existing total pay and benefits package of the employees. the union asked for additional justification and requested for a copy of the comparison of the salaries of its members and those from allied industries. the company filed a Petition for Assumption of Jurisdiction with the Secretary of Labor and Employment. The union replied that they would formally answer the proposal of the company a day after the signing of the official minutes of the meeting. The company denied the request on the ground that the requested information was entrusted to the company under a confidential agreement. Upon being aware of this development. Convinced that such a strike would have adverse consequences on the national economy. the members of the union unanimously voted for the holding of a strike.. Unsatisfied. Alleging failure on the part of the company to justify its offer. Pilipinas Shell Petroleum Corp. Initially. to bargain. The NCMB immediately summoned the parties for the mandatory conciliation-mediation proceedings but the parties failed to reach an amicable settlement. The company justified that its counter-offer is based on its affordability for the company. he assumed jurisdiction and the union was enjoined from any form of concerted action. April 7.000. the Secretary of Labor and Employment ruled that the labor dispute between the parties would cause or likely to cause a strike in an industry indispensable to the national interest. The union lowered its proposal to 12% while the company increased the lump sum amount to P88. the union manifested that the company was bargaining in bad faith. The company proposed the declaration of a deadlock and recommended that the help of a third party be sought.

is conclusively settled by the judgment therein.complaint was forwarded to SoLE because the issue raised by the union was a proper incident of the labor dispute over which the Secretary of Labor and Employment assumed jurisdiction. In this connection. – x x x xxxx (i) The Secretary of Labor and Employment. the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall be final and executory ten (10) calendar days after receipt thereof by the parties. SoLE held that there was already deadlock although the ground for the first Notice of Strike was unfair labor practice for bargaining in bad faith. in the same court or any other court of concurrent jurisdiction on either the same or a different cause of action. while the judgment remains unreversed or unvacated by proper authority. as far as concerns the parties to that action and persons in privity with them. Strikes. 263. the Secretary of Labor and Employment. Article 263(i) of the Labor Code is clear: ART. the Commission or the voluntary arbitrator shall decide or resolve the dispute within thirty (30) calendar days from the date of the assumption of jurisdiction or the certification or submission of the dispute. as the case may be. and was there judicially passed on and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction. The Decision of the SoLE in the labor dispute over which he assumed jurisdiction has long attained finality. Issues: Whether or not there is unfair labor practice through bad faith bargaining Whether or not the Secretary of Labor committed grave abuse of discretion when he assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute Ruling: No. and lockouts. . It found no unfair labor practice through bad faith bargaining. The doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment states that a fact or question which was in issue in a former suit. and cannot be again litigated in any future action between such parties or their privies. The only identities thus required for the operation of the judgment as an estoppel x x x are identity of parties and identity of issues. The decision of the President. picketing.

Pursuant to Article 263(i) of the Labor Code, the Decision of the SoLE
became final and executory after the lapse of the period provided under
the said provision. Moreover, neither party further questioned the Decision.
A question of fact cannot properly be raised in a petition for review
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The existence of bad faith is a
question of fact and is evidentiary. The crucial question of whether or
not a party has met his statutory duty to bargain in good faith typically turns
on the facts of the individual case, and good faith or bad faith is an inference
to be drawn from the facts. Thus, the issue of whether or not there was bad
faith on the part of the company when it was bargaining with the union is a
question of fact. It requires that the reviewing court look into the evidence to
find if indeed there is proof that is substantial enough to show such bad faith.
The issue of whether there was already deadlock between the union and the
company is likewise a question of fact. It requires the determination of
evidence to find whether there is a "counteraction" of forces between the
union and the company and whether each of the parties exerted "reasonable
effort at good faith bargaining."
It is so because a ‘deadlock’ is x x x the counteraction of things
producing entire stoppage; x x x There is a deadlock when there is a
complete blocking or stoppage resulting from the action of equal
and opposed forces x x x. The word is synonymous with the word
impasse, which x x x ‘presupposes reasonable effort at good faith bargaining
which, despite noble intentions, does not conclude in agreement between
the parties.’
The findings of fact of the SoLE that there already existed a bargaining
deadlock when she assumed jurisdiction over the labor dispute between the
union and the company, and that there was no bad faith on the part of the
company when it was bargaining with the union are both supported by
substantial evidence.
No.
As there is already an existing controversy on the matter of wage increase,
the Secretary of Labor and Employment need not wait for a deadlock in the
negotiations to take cognizance of the matter. That is the significance of the
power of the Secretary of Labor and Employment under Article
263(g) of the Labor Code to assume jurisdiction over a labor dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout in an industry

indispensable to the national interest. Article 263(g) is both an
extraordinary and a preemptive power to address an extraordinary situation a strike or lockout in an industry indispensable to the national interest. This
grant is not limited to the grounds cited in the notice of strike or lockout that
may have preceded the strike or lockout; nor is it limited to the incidents of
the strike or lockout that in the meanwhile may have taken place. As the
term "assume jurisdiction" connotes, the intent of the law is to give the Labor
Secretary full authority to resolve all matters within the dispute that gave
rise to or which arose out of the strike or lockout; it includes and extends to
all questions and controversies arising from or related to the dispute,
including cases over which the labor arbiter has exclusive jurisdiction.

Topic: Loss of Trust and Confidence
Ponente: Bienvenido L. Reyes, J.:
Bluer than Blue Joint Ventures v. Esteban, G.R. No. 192582, April 7,
2014
Facts: Esteban was hired as Sales Clerk by petitioner. Part of her primary
tasks were attending to all customer needs, ensuring efficient inventory,
coordinating orders from clients, cashiering and reporting to the accounting
department.
Petitioner received a report that several employees have access to its POS
system through a universal password given by Flores. Upon investigation, it
was discovered that it was Esteban who gave Flores the password. The
petitioner sent a letter memorandum to Esteban, asking her to explain in
writing why she should not be disciplinary dealt with for tampering with the
company’s POS system through the use of an unauthorized password.
Esteban was also placed under preventive suspension for ten days.
Esteban admitted that she used the universal password three times on the
same day, after she learned of it from two other employees who she saw

browsing through the petitioner’s sales inquiry. She inquired how the
employees were able to open the system and she was told that they used
the "123456" password.
Esteban’s preventive suspension was lifted, but at the same time, a notice of
termination was sent to her, finding her explanation unsatisfactory and
terminating her employment immediately on the ground of loss of trust and
confidence. Esteban was given her final pay, including benefits and bonuses,
less inventory variances incurred by the store. Esteban signed a quitclaim
and release in favor of the petitioner.
Esteban filed a complaint for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension, holiday pay,
rest day and separation pay. LA ruled in favor of Esteban and found that she
was illegally dismissed.
NLRC reversed the decision of the LA and dismissed the case for illegal
dismissal but ordered petitioner to refund to Esteban the illegal deductions
based on inventory variances.
Court of Appeals reinstated LA’s ruling.
Issue: Whether or not Esteban’s acts constitute just cause to terminate her
employment with the company on the ground of loss of trust and confidence
Ruling: No.
Loss of trust and confidence is premised on the fact that the
employee concerned holds a position of responsibility, trust and
confidence. The employee must be invested with confidence on delicate
matters, such as the custody, handling, care and protection of the
employer’s property and funds. Among the fiduciary rank-and-file employees
are cashiers, auditors, property custodians, or those who, in the normal
exercise of their functions, regularly handle significant amounts of money or
property. These employees, though rank-and-file, are routinely charged with
the care and custody of the employer’s money or property, and are thus
classified as occupying positions of trust and confidence.
In this case, Esteban was a sales clerk. Her duties, however, were more than
that of a sales clerk. Aside from attending to customers and tending to the
shop, Esteban also assumed cashiering duties. As consistently ruled by the
Court, it is not the job title but the actual work that the employee performs
that determines whether he or she occupies a position of trust and
confidence. In Esteban’s case, given that she had in her care and custody the
store’s property and funds, she is considered as a rank-and-file employee
occupying a position of trust and confidence.
Loss of trust and confidence to be a valid cause for dismissal must
be work related such as would show the employee concerned to be

unfit to continue working for the employer and it must be based on
a wilful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts.
Such breach is wilful if it is done intentionally, knowingly, and purposely,
without justifiable excuse as distinguished from an act done carelessly,
thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. The loss of trust and confidence
must spring from the voluntary or wilful act of the employee, or by reason of
some blameworthy act or omission on the part of the employee.
In this case, Esteban’s acts do not amount to a wilful breach of trust. Her
acts were out of curiosity and without any obvious intention of defrauding
the petitioner. She was acting in good faith in verifying what her co-staff told
her about the opening of the computer by the use of the "123456" password,
x x x. She even told her co-staff not to open again said computer, and that
was the first and last time she opened said computer. Moreover, the
petitioner even admitted that Esteban has her own password to the POS
system. If it was her intention to manipulate the store’s inventory and funds,
she could have done so long before she had knowledge of the unauthorized
password. But the facts on hand show that she did not. The petitioner also
failed to establish a substantial connection between Esteban’s use of the
"123456" password and any loss suffered by the petitioner. Indeed, it may be
true that, as posited by the petitioner, it is the fact that she used the
password that gives cause to the loss of trust and confidence on Esteban.
However, such breach must have been done intentionally, knowingly, and
purposely, and without any justifiable excuse, and not simply something
done carelessly, thoughtlessly, heedlessly or inadvertently. Her careless acts
do not merit the imposition of the penalty of dismissal.
Preventive suspension is a measure allowed by law and afforded to
the employer if an employee’s continued employment poses a
serious and imminent threat to the employer’s life or property or of
his co-workers. It may be legally imposed against an employee whose
alleged violation is the subject of an investigation.
In this case, the petitioner was acting well within its rights when it imposed a
10-day preventive suspension on Esteban. While it may be that the acts
complained of were committed by Esteban almost a year before the
investigation was conducted, still, it should be pointed out that Esteban was
performing functions that involve handling of the petitioner’s property and
funds, and the petitioner had every right to protect its assets and operations
pending Esteban’s investigation.
Article 113 of the Labor Code provides that no employer, in his own
behalf or in behalf of any person, shall make any deduction from the
wages of his employees, except in cases where the employer is

authorized by law or regulations issued by the Secretary of Labor
and Employment, among others.
The Omnibus Rules Implementing the Labor Code, meanwhile, provides:
SECTION 14. Deduction for loss or damage. – Where the employer is engaged
in a trade, occupation or business where the practice of making deductions
or requiring deposits is recognized to answer for the reimbursement of loss
or damage to tools, materials, or equipment supplied by the employer to the
employee, the employer may make wage deductions or require the
employees to make deposits from which deductions shall be made, subject
to the following conditions:
(a) That the employee concerned is clearly shown to be responsible for
the loss or damage;
(b) That the employee is given reasonable opportunity to show cause
why deduction should not be made;
(c) That the amount of such deduction is fair and reasonable and shall
not exceed the actual loss or damage; and
(d) That the deduction from the wages of the employee does not
exceed 20 percent of the employee’s wages in a week.
In this case, the petitioner failed to sufficiently establish that Esteban was
responsible for the negative variance it had in its sales and that Esteban was
given the opportunity to show cause the deduction from her last salary
should not be made. The petitioners should first establish that the making of
deductions from the salaries is authorized by law, or regulations issued by
the Secretary of Labor.
Thus, the decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed but the affirmation of
respondent’s preventive suspension was reversed. LA was ordered to recompute the monetary award in favor of Esteban and to exclude the award
of backwages during such period of preventive suspension, if any.

Topic: Award of loss of future earnings, moral damages, exemplary
damages and attorney’s fees for Seafarers.
Ponente: Justice Roberto A. Abad
MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION vs. OSCAR D. CHIN, JR, G.R.
No. 199022, April 7, 2014
Facts:
Thome Ship Management Pte. Ltd., acting through its agent
petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay) hired respondent
Oscar D. Chin, Jr. to work for nine months as able seaman on board MV Star
Siranger Chin was to receive a basic pay of US$515 per month. Chin
sustained injuries while working on his job aboard the vessel. Dr. Solan of
Wilmington, North Carolina, USA, found him to have suffered from
lumbosacral strain due to heavy lifting of pressurized machine. The doctor
gave him medications and advised him to see an orthopedist and a
cardiologist. Chin was repatriated. On return to the Philippines, Chin
underwent a surgical procedure called laminectomy and discectomy L-4-L-5.
A year after the operation, Dr. Robert D. Lim of the Metropolitan Hospital
diagnosed Chin to have a moderate rigidity of his tract.
Chin filed a claim for disability with PandimanPhils., Inc. which is the local
agent of P & I Club of which Magsaysay Maritime is a member. Pandiman
offered US$30,000.00 as disability compensation which Chin accepted. He
then executed a Release and Quitclaim in favor of Magsaysay Maritime. Chin
filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC),
claiming underpayment of disability benefits and attorney’s fees. He later
amended his complaint to include claims for damages. The Labor Arbiter
dismissed Chin’s complaint for lack of merit. The NLRC affirmed the
dismissal. On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed the
dismissal and ruled that Chin was entitled to permanent total disability
benefit of US$60,000.00. The CA remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for
determination of the other monetary claims of Chin. This prompted petitioner
Magsaysay to come before this court on a petition for review on certiorari.
The Court denied the petition, however, in a Resolution. This Resolution
became final and executor.
Magsaysay paid the deficiency award of US$30,000.00 in full and final
settlement of Chin’s disability compensation claim. On February 26, 2007,
however, the Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision ordering it to pay Chin: a)
P19,279.75 as reimbursement for medical expenses; b) US$147,026.43 as
loss of future wages; c) P200,000.00 as moral damages; d) P75,000.00 as
exemplary damages; and e) 10% of the total award as attorney’s fees. NLRC
modified the Labor Arbiter’s Decision by deleting the awards of loss of future
wages and moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual and legal bases.
On appeal, the CA reversed the NLRC’s Decision and ordered the
reinstatement of the Labor Arbiter’s Decision, hence, this petition.

Issue: Whether or not the award of loss of future earnings on top of his
disability benefits as well as awards of moral and exemplary damages and
attorney’s fees is valid.
Ruling:No.
Labor Arbiter’s award of loss of earning is unwarranted since Chin had
already been given disability compensation for loss of earning capacity. An
additional award for loss of earnings will result in double recovery. In a
catena of cases, the Court has consistently ruled that disability should not
be understood more on its medical significance but on the loss of
earning capacity. Permanent total disability means disablement of an
employee to earn wages in the same kind of work, or work of similar nature
that he was trained for or accustomed to perform, or any kind of work which
a person of his mentality and attainment could do. Disability, therefore, is
not synonymous with "sickness" or "illness." What is compensated is one’s
incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of his earning capacity.
Moreover, the award for loss of earning lacks basis since the Philippine
Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) Standard Contract of
Employment (POEA SCE), the governing law between the parties,
does not provide for such a grant. What Section 20, paragraph (G) of the
POEA SCE provides is that payment for injury, illness, incapacity, disability, or
death of the seafarer covers "all claims arising from or in relation with or in
the course of the seafarer’s employment, including but not limited to
damages arising from the contract, tort, fault or negligence under the laws of
the Philippines or any other country." The permanent disability compensation
of US$60,000 clearly amounts to reasonable compensation for the injuries
and loss of earning capacity of the seafarer.

2002. 152329. ABING and ANABELLE M. 437 (2003)) and Garcia v. Since the first CA decision that found the respondents had not been illegally dismissed was promulgated on Aug. January 20. Tuazon against petitioner Wenphil Corp. the period for computation should be from Feb. Among various views. until Nov. 2003. 2003.. 15. 27. According to the LA. 2009. 449 Phil. On the other hand. 27. TUAZON. relied on the case of Pfizer v. which merely echoes the rulings the Supreme Court (SC) made in the cases of Roquero v.R. 2003. 2002. But the period for the computation of the backwages set by the Labor Arbiter (LA) was inconsistent with that of the Court of Appeals (CA). Philippine Airlines (G. the CA was correct when it found that that the period of computation should end on Aug. the former were awarded backwages. in setting aside the NLRC’s rulings. No. No. whose ruling the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) affirmed. Garcia and Pfizer merely referred to the date of reversal. Brion WENPHIL CORPORATION vs. 645 SCRA 135) where the Supreme Court ruled that the backwages of the dismissed employee should be granted during the period of appeal until reversal by a higher court. Ruling:No. ALMER R. No.R.Topic:Computation of backwages Ponente: Justice Arturo D. then the reversal by the higher court was effectively made on Aug. In this light. 2014 Facts: In a complaint for illegal dismissal filed by respondents Almer R. 177467. The date when the SC’s decision became final and executory need not matter as the rule in Roquero. Philippine Airlines (G. Abing and Anabelle M. not the date of the ultimate finality of such reversal. 27. 2002 when the NLRC’s decision became final and executory. Velasco (G. 576 SCRA 479) that the period for computing the backwages due to the respondents during the period of appeal should end on the date that a higher court reversed the labor arbitration ruling of illegal dismissal. the commanding one is the rule in Pfizer. No.R. . March 9. In this case. the day when petitioner last paid respondents’ backwages. 8.R. 164856. the CA. the higher court that first reversed the NLRC’s ruling was not the SC but rather the CA.G. 207983 April 7. 2011. Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals is correct that the date of computation should start on February 15.

To start the computation on the same date would result to a duplication of wages for this day. 2002. . 16. 2002. 16. 15. thus. it should be on Feb. 2002. computation should start on the following date – Feb.As a last minor detail. Rather. 15. The respondents themselves admitted in their motion for computation and issuance of writ of execution that the last date when they were paid their backwages was on Feb. 2002. we do not agree with the CA that the date of computation should start on Feb.

She was informed that she should cease reporting for work the next day. INC.Mapua received through mail.R. Her laptop computer and company mobile phone were taken right away and her office phone ceased to function.Topic: Award of moral and exemplary damages Ponente: Justice Bienvenido L. VICTORIA K. The hard disk on Mapua’s laptop crashed. Yet. Inc. Mapua was the Corporate Development’s Research/Business Intelligence Unit Head and Manager of SPI Technologies. Mapua submitted an affidavit and alleged that Prime Manpower Resources Development posted an advertisement on the website of Jobstreet Philippines for the employment of a Corporate Development Manager in an . G. Lea Villanueva and asked if she can be transferred to another department within SPI. 2014 Facts: Victoria K. claiming reinstatement or for separation pay. the Vice President and Corporate Development Head. Nolan and Raina started giving out majority of her research work and other duties under Healthcare and Legal Division to the rank-and-file staff. Mapua allegedly saw the new table of organization of the Corporate Development Division which would be renamed as the Marketing Division. Mapua filed with the Labor Arbiter (LA) a complaint for illegal dismissal. Mapua informed Nolan and her colleagues that she was working on recovering the lost data and asked for their patience for any possible delay on her part in meeting deadlines. MAPUA. Nolan informed Mapua that she was realigning Mapua’s position to become a subordinate of co-manager Sameer Raina due to her missing a work deadline. Subsequently. where she was given a second termination letter. "refused to sign and acknowledge" with unintelligible signatures of witnesses. (SPI). a third Notice of Terminationbut the date of effectivity of the termination was changed. Mapua consulted these work problems with SPI’s Human Resource Director. It further stated that her separation pay will be released and a notation was inscribed. and LEA VILLANUEVA vs. 191154 April 7. Peter Maquera hired Elizabeth Nolan as Mapua’s supervisor. Reyes SPI TECHNOLOGIES. she went to a meeting with SPI. A recruitment advertisementof SPI was published in the Philippine Daily Inquirer. Mapua retrieved the lost data with the assistance of National Bureau of Investigation Anti-Fraud and Computer Crimes Division. It listed all vacancies in SPI. The new structure showed that Mapua’s level will be again downgraded because a new manager will be hired and positioned between her rank and Raina’s. including a position for Marketing Communications Manager under Corporate Support. Afterwards. No. causing her to lose files and data. the contents of which were similar to the first one.

She wasconvinced that her former position is not redundant. moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. through Villanueva. 2) Whether or not the award of moral and exemplary damages is valid. LA rendered a Decision. It promulgated its Decision. Before the effective date of her termination. which she refused to receive.unnamed Business Process Outsourcing company located in Parañaque City. the NLRC held that "[t]he determination of whether [Mapua’s] position as Corporate Development Manager is redundant is not for her to decide. sleepless nights. she applied for the position under the pseudonym of "Jeanne Tesoro". On that same day. On the day of her interview with Prime Manpower’s consultant. her termination is therefore hereby declared illegal. It essentially and necessarily lies within the sound business management. Issue: 1) Whether or not Mapua is illegally dismissed from work. served a written notice to Mapua. According to her. she should be paid her backwages. arguing that based on evidence. Accordingly. Mapua refused to receive the notice. She also claimed that SPI is the only BPO office in Parañaque City at that time. the LA decision should be reinstated. SPI filed an Establishment Termination Report with the Office of the Regional Director of the Department of Labor and Employment-National Capital Region (DOLE-NCR) informing the latter of Mapua’s termination. . she no longer reported for work." Mapua elevated the case to the CA by way of petition for certiorari. she underwent psychiatric counseling and incurred medical expenses as a result of emotional anguish.In ruling so. Mapua was offered her separation and final pay. thus. Portia Dimatulac the latter allegedly revealed to Mapua that SPI contracted Prime Manpower’s services to search for applicants for the Corporate Development Manager position. Ms. Mapua filed a motion for reconsideration which was granted by the CA. She also averred that the manner of her dismissal was unprofessional and incongruous with her rank and stature as a manager as other employees have witnessed how she was forced to vacate the premises on the same day of her termination. humiliation and shame from being jobless. informing her of her termination effective. separation pay in lieu of reinstatement. Mapua suspected that this advertisement was for SPI because the writing style used was similar to Raina’s. the redundancy of [Mapua’s] position being in want of factual basis. Thereafter. reinstating the LA’s decree. Villanueva made a notation "refused to sign and acknowledge" on the letter.Mapua’s petition was initially dismissed by the CA. The company. SPI appealed the LA decision to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). SPI has not hired a Corporate Development Manager since then.

000. Award of moral and exemplary damages for an illegally dismissed employee is proper where the employee had been harassed and arbitrarily terminated by the employer. respectively. and social humiliation occasioned by the employer’s unreasonable dismissal of the employee. 2) Ruling: Yes. the management should adduce evidence and prove that a position which was created in place of a previous one should pertain to functions which are dissimilar and incongruous to the abolished office. besmirched reputation. A position cannot be abolished by a mere change of job title. The award of such damages is based not on the Labor Code but on Article 220 of the Civil Code. is evidently excessive because the purpose for awarding damages is not to enrich the illegally dismissed employee.1) Ruling: Yes. Moral damages may be awarded to compensate one for diverse injuries such as mental anguish. the Court hereby reduces the amount of P50. Consequently. In cases of redundancy. but the nature of his functions. change in the job title is not synonymous to a change in the functions."It is not the job title but the actual work that the employee performs.00 each as moral and exemplary damages .000. The Court has consistently accorded the working class a right to recover damages for unjust dismissals tainted with bad faith.000.00 and P250. However. where the motive of the employer in dismissing the employee is far from noble. Also." What the above reasoning of the NLRC failed to perceive is that "[o]f primordial consideration is not the nomenclature or title given to the employee. the Court observes that the CA decision affirming the LA’s award of P500. then the company must have already hired a new one to replace her in order not to jeopardize its business operations. The fact that there is none only proves that her position was not necessary and therefore superfluous. The Court does not agree with the rationalization of the NLRC that "[i]f it were true that her position was not redundant and indispensable. wounded feelings.00 as moral and exemplary damages.

Regina Pascua Barba. Ltd. 188190. (petitioners). a company-designated physician. that he was repatriated for medical reasons and was treated for more than 120 days. gangrene and necrosis in skin and tissues of neck. Inc. payment of the unexpired portion of his contract. QUIJANO AND/OR FUYO KAIUN CO. To support his claim. Mohsen of the Dr.M.Nicomedes G. the respondent boarded the ocean vessel M/V Cape Iris. and. and his right jaw started to swell. G. ALCAYNO. The employment contract provided for a contract period of nine months. that he suffered a permanent total disability with Grade 1 impediment.Having passed the required Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) and found fit for sea service. who also medically assessed him to be suffering from cervical tuberculosis adenitis as similarly assessed by the companydesignated physician. INC. the respondent was examined by Dr. 2014 Facts: The respondent was employed by Fuyo Kaiun Co. through its local manning agent.Nazmy Hospital recommended hospital confinement. EBERLY S. Dr. Toxaemia and this condition may be due to chronic disease or malignancy. Reyes BARKO INTERNATIONAL. The respondent was placed under a six-month antituberculosis treatment. M/V Cape Iris. reimbursement of medical expenses. The Diagnosis indicated: Uncontrolled diabetes mellitus and tuberculous adenitis. among others. After one month on board the vessel.Topic: Seaman – Permanent Disability Ponente: Justice Bienvenido L. Thus. TEODORO B. he alleged that his illness was contracted while he was on board M/V Cape Iris. The respondent consulted a private physician. Barko International." The Medical Report issued by the Dr.. LTD. April 21. The respondent was repatriated to the Philippines.R. She recommended continuous treatment and medication for the respondent. Egypt where he was examined by a certain Dr. moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees against the petitioners.Nazmy Hospital. Mohsen’s diagnosis stated that the respondent had a "firm mass in the left side of neck with severe diffuse infection and pus collection in the neck. vs. Dr. No. /CAPT. Uncontrolled D. The respondent filed a complaint for disability benefits. His physical condition worsened despite medications given him on board until he signed off at the port of the Suez Canal. the respondent complained of stiff neck. The petitioners denied the claim and averred that a company- . was to paint and chip rust on deck or superstructure of ship and to give directions to the crew engaged in cleaning wheelhouse and quarterdeck on board the vessel. His prime duty. as Able-bodied Seaman.Upon arrival in Manila. he should be compensated by the petitioners. Michael H. Cruz.

.designated physician. The CA granted the petition of the respondent and reversed the resolution of the NLRC. What is important is that he was unable to perform his customary work for more than 120 days which constitutes permanent total disability. Undoubtedly. in fact. Issue: Whether or not the respondent is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits just because his injury rendered him incapable of performing his work for more than 120 days. moreover. or more than two years from the time the complaint was filed. The observance of the principle of prospectivity dictates that Vergara should not operate to strip the respondent of his cause of action for total and permanent disability that accrued since the time of his inability to perform his customary work. agrees with the CA regarding the applicability of the doctrine in the case of Crystal Shipping that a seafarer's continuous inability to work due to a work-related illness for a period of more than 120 days need not be qualified by a declaration of fitness to work by a company-designated physician for it to be considered as a permanent total disability which is compensable. The NLRC reversed the decision of the LA as it found no factual and legal basis to support the respondent’s allegation. It would. Ruling: Yes. there is no disability to speak of. Dr. and stable and therefore. issued a handwritten medical evaluation finding his condition well-controlled. the illness of the respondent which incapacitated him to work more than 120 days after repatriation is considered as work-related which entitles him to disability benefits. asymptomatic. The Court. be illogical to apply the ruling laid down in Vergara which was promulgated on October 6. Hence this petition. physically fit to resume work anytime. and not the actual injury itself. Cruz declared the respondent fit to work on even date after completion of the anti-Koch’s medication for six months. Such fact was not disputed. 2008. hence.LA granted the claim of the respondent. thus.

Jardine decided to reorganize and implement a redundancy program among its employees. v. 2014 Facts: Petitioners were former regular employees of respondent Jardine Pacific Finance. (formerly MB Finance) (Jardine).. J. In the settlement.Topic: Retrenchment differentiated from Redundancy Ponente: BRION. and granted Jardine’s petition for certiorari. On the claim of financial losses. The petitioners were also officers and members of MB Finance Employees Association-FFW Chapter (the Union). Issue: Whether or not the CA correctly ruled that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion when it found that Jardine validly terminated the petitioners’ employment because of redundancy Ruling: No. JARDINE PACIFIC FINANCE. a legitimate labor union and the sole exclusive bargaining agent of the employees of Jardine. The Union alleged unfair labor practice on the part of Jardine. The petitioners were among those affected by the redundancy program.. ARABIT.R. The CA reversed the LA’s and the NLRC’s rulings. as well as discrimination in the dismissal of its officers and members. The LA ruled in the petitioners’ favor. No. Jardine thereafter hired contractual employees to undertake the functions these employees used to perform. 1999. the petitioners accepted their redundancy pay without prejudice to their right to question the legality of their dismissal with the NLRC. On June 1. Negotiations ensued between the Union and Jardine under the auspices of the NCMB. and both parties eventually reached an amicable settlement. Inc. the petitioners and the Union filed a complaint against Jardine with the NLRC for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice. 181719. INC. April 21. . G. et al.

Retrenchment and redundancy are two different concepts.R. thus. and (4) fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining what positions are to be declared redundant and accordingly abolished. 2014 Facts: On April 30. 2009. employers resort to redundancy when the functions of an employee have already become superfluous or in excess of what the business requires. the respondents). 2008 decision that affirmed the LA’s order to release the garnished amount. the employer must comply with the following requisites: (1) written notice served on both the employees and the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment. The respondents appealed with the NLRC the May 31. SOUTH EAST ASIAN AIRLINES. among others. the NLRC affirmed in toto the LA’s March 13. The Court likewise denied the petitioners’ subsequent motion for reconsideration. 2008 resolution had become final and executory on March 9. (3) good faith in abolishing the redundant positions. whichever is higher. J. No. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners may recover the accrued wages prior to the CA’s reversal of the LA’s May 31. they are not synonymous. The CA rendered its decision (on the illegal dismissal ruling of the LA) partly granting the respondents’ petition. The NLRC issued an Entry of Judgment on February 6. A position is redundant where it is superfluous. or dropping of a particular product line or service activity previously manufactured or undertaken by the enterprise. 2005 decision. G. For the implementation of a redundancy program to be valid. and superfluity of a position or positions may be the outcome of a number of factors. for grave abuse of discretion. Primarily. In its July 16. they should not be used interchangeably. 2004. to immediately reinstate the petitioners with full backwages. decreased volume of business. BERGONIO v. and thereafter issued an Entry of Judgment certifying that its August 4. Redundancy exists where the services of an employee are in excess of what is reasonably demanded by the actual requirements of the enterprise. 2005 illegal dismissal ruling of the LA. 2007 declaring its November 29. 2008 resolution. April 21. 195227. 2006 resolution final and executory. (2) payment of separation pay equivalent to at least one month pay or at least one month pay for every year of service. Topic: Payment of accrued wages despite reversal of decision Ponente: BRION. 2008 order. the petitioners filed before the LA a complaint for illegal dismissal and illegal suspension with prayer for reinstatement against respondents South East Asian Airlines (SEAIR) and Irene Dornier as SEAIR’s President (collectively. The LA found the petitioners illegally dismissed and ordered the respondents. the NLRC’s July 16. . such as over hiring of workers. The CA reversed.

The respondent then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with damages against the petitioner and its officers.Ruling: Yes. therefore. despite the Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement. the delay must be without the employer’s fault. did not reinstate the employee during the pendency of the appeal up to the reversal by a higher tribunal may still be held liable for the accrued wages of the employee. i. et al. . 2005 that Walsh. The Labor Arbiter upheld the termination of probationary employment of the respondent holding that the termination was justified with no evidence showing that the officers of the Abbot Lab acted in bad faith when terminating her services. J. 2008. 192571. The respondents' failure in this case to exercise either option rendered them liable for the petitioners' accrued salary until the LA decision was reversed by the CA on December 17. Topic: Standards for regularization. the unpaid salary accruing up to the time the higher tribunal reverses the decision. Exception. Almazar and Bernardo formally handed to the respondent a letter terminating her employment with the detailed explanation for her termination. An employer. When the petitioner formally offered the position to the respondent.e. This entitlement of the employee to the accrued wages proceeds from the immediate and self-executory nature of the reinstatement aspect of the LA’s decision. who. v. the employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the LA’s decision. It was on May 23. conceptual underpinnings Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE. Under the facts and the surrounding circumstances. Perlie Alcaraz GR No. and (2) the delay must not be due to the employer’s unjustified act or omission. April 23. two tests must be satisfied: (1) actual delay or the fact that the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal.. The rule. the latter accepted the position. the delay was due to the acts of the respondents that we find were unjustified. Note that under the second test. Abbot Laboratories Philippines. a position that was published by the petitioner Abbot Laboratories in the newspaper. is that an employee may still recover the accrued wages up to and despite the reversal by the higher tribunal. 2013 Facts: The respondent Alcaraz was the Regulatory Affairs and Information Manager of Aventis Pasteur Philippines who showed interest in applying as a Medical and Regulatory Affairs Manager. To determine whether an employee is thus barred. If the delay is due to the employer’s unjustified refusal.

the best that Abbott could have done. 2009 decision. was to inform her of her duties and responsibilities. This conclusion is largely impelled by the fact that Abbott clearly conveyed to Alcaraz her duties and responsibilities as Regulatory Affairs Manager prior to. the employer must make such communication at the time of the probationary employee’s engagement. since the reasonableness . 2011 because the petitioner failed to file a timely appeal on the said decision.The NLRC annulled and set aside the ruling of the Labor Arbiter which prompted the petitioners to file before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari with prayer for issuance of a temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary injunction. (c) failed to train her staff effectively. was readily articulable to the employee at the outset. the employee is deemed as a regular and not a probationary employee. the action of the petitioner on its motion for reconsideration of the CA’s resolution in the second CA petition was denied that became final on January 10. Alcaraz was sufficiently informed of the reasonable standards. and second. Meanwhile. in the term of a sales quota. this is unlike the circumstance in Aliling where a quantitative regularization standard. Issue: Whether or not Alcaraz was validly terminated from her employment. and (d) was not able to obtain the knowledge and ability to make sound judgments on case processing and article review which were necessary for the proper performance of her duties. the adequate performance of which. Alcaraz further contends that the petitioners failed to comply with certification requirement under Section 5. during the time of her engagement. to repeat. Hence. in her comment. A punctilious examination of the records reveals that Abbott had indeed complied with the above-stated requirements. 2010 Memorandum of Appeal filed before the NLRC. Alcaraz. Due to the nature and variety of these managerial functions. Records show that Alcaraz was terminated because she (a) did not manage her time effectively. Ruling: Yes. (b) failed to gain the trust of her staff and to build an effective rapport with them. Rule 7 of the rules of court when they failed to disclose in their petition filed on June 16. the employer must communicate the regularization standards to the probationary employee. The employer is made to comply with two (2) requirements when dealing with a probationary employee: first. and the incipient stages of her employment. at the time of Alcaraz's engagement. raised the issue on forum shopping when the petitioner filed its second petition to the CA pending the resolution of the motion for reconsideration that they filed earlier in the December 10. If the employer fails to comply with either. is an inherent and implied standard for regularization.

v. et al. J. which are necessary in the performance of her functions as Regulatory Affairs Manager. Joselito A. April 23.G. 2014 Facts: Respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and money claims for 13th and 14th month pay. Stated therein were the reasons for her termination. 2005 which she received on May 23. Abbott determined that she failed to meet the reasonable standards for her regularization considering her lack of time and people management and decision-making skills. the usual two-notice rule does not govern. Section 2. Bear in mind that the quantum of proof which the employer must discharge is only substantial evidence which. means that amount of relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." As the records show.R. this written notice sufficiently meets the criteria set forth above.e. within a reasonable time from the effective date of termination. might conceivably opine otherwise. A different procedure is applied when terminating a probationary employee. Alcaraz's dismissal was effected through a letter dated May 19. equally reasonable. Book VI of the Implementing Rules of the Labor Code states that "if the termination is brought about by the failure of an employee to meet the standards of the employer in case of probationary employment. i. that after proper evaluation. Mirant (Philippines) Corporation. even if other minds. JR. No. Topic: Illegal Dismissal Ponente: VILLARAMA. bonuses and other benefits. it shall be sufficient that a written notice is served the employee. as defined in case law.. as well as the payment of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. 2005. 2005 and again on May 27. It is the contention of respondent that he was illegally dismissed by petitioner . her termination was justified.of Alcaraz's assessment clearly appears from the records. Rule I. 181490. Undeniably. Caro. thereby legitimizing the cause and manner of Alcaraz’s dismissal as a probationary employee under the parameters set by the Labor Code..

Issue: Whether or not the respondent was illegally dismissed Ruling: Yes." there was no notice of hearing and petitioner corporation’s investigation was not the equivalent of the "hearing" required under the law which should have accorded respondent the opportunity to be heard.46 In the exercise of its management prerogative. The CA disagreed with the NLRC and ruled that it was immaterial whether respondent failed.corporation due to the latter’s non-compliance with the twin requirements of notice and hearing. . or avoided being tested. refused. they are not liable for illegal dismissal because all of these circumstances prove that respondent really eluded the random drug test and was therefore validly terminated for cause after being properly accorded with due process. rules and regulations on work-related activities of the employees must always be fair and reasonable and the corresponding penalties. The NLRC found that respondent was not only validly dismissed for cause – he was also properly accorded his constitutional right to due process. He asserts that while there was a notice charging him of "unjustified refusal to submit to random drug testing. when prescribed. To the mind of petitioners. While the adoption and enforcement by petitioner corporation of its AntiDrugs Policy is recognized as a valid exercise of its management prerogative as an employer. such exercise is not absolute and unbridled. commensurate to the offense involved and to the degree of the infraction. J. The CA however found that award of moral and exemplary damages is without basis due to lack of bad faith on the part of the petitioner corporation which merely acted within its management prerogative. We agree with the disposition of the appellate court that there was illegal dismissal in the case at bar. Managerial prerogatives are subject to limitations provided by law. There was illegal dismissal. and the general principles of fair play and justice. While the adoption and enforcement by petitioner corporation of its anti-drugs policy is recognized as a valid exercise of management prerogative as an employer. Topic: Accident and Disability Benefits Ponente: Brion. Labor Arbiter found respondent to have been illegally dismissed.47 The Anti-Drugs Policy of Mirant fell short of these requirements. collective bargaining agreements. an employer must therefore ensure that the policies. such exercise is not absolute and unbridled.

No. The doctor instructed him to undergo Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI) of his lumbosacral spine.000. Virjen immediately offered Sunga the amount of US$ 16. The Labor Arbiter ruled that Sunga’s . Virjen denied Sunga’s demand. entered into a contract of employment with Sunga. Hence. while already on board the MT Sunway vessel. Dr. plus moral and exemplary damages. On the strength of these two certificates. Sunga started to experience an on-and-off right flank pain. Labor Arbiter ruled in Sunga’sfavour.R.00. Dr. 2007. in accordance with the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers. The complaint likewise prayed for attorney’s fees. Despite the therapy. Sunga’s employment was covered by the IBF JUS/AMOSUP-IMMAJ Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) executed between Virjen and Nissho Odyssey. Cruz. Sunga filed a complaint before the NLRC against Virjen for disability benefits as stated in the parties’ CBA (not under the POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers) in the amount of US$ 110.. However. The request was granted. Nissho Odyssey Ship Management Pte. The MRI’s results merited the medical advice that Sunga undergo physical therapy for a period of four (4) months under the supervision of Dr. acting in behalf of its foreign principal. Sunga rejected the offer. Cruz also issued another medical certificate recommending a disability grading of 25% (Back pains with considerable reduction of mobility) in accordance with the parties’ CBA. It ordered Virjen to pay Sunga his disability compensation benefits in the amount of US$ 110. Under the contract.00. Dr. All Japan Seamen’s Union and AMOSUP. The pain became more intense as the days progressed.000.00 pursuant to the provisions of the parties’ CBA.00. Sunga still experienced episodes of moderate to severe pain on his right lower extremity and back. on October 23.795. Cruz issued a medical certificate recommending a Grade 8 disability (Moderate rigidity or 2/3 loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk) based on the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract for Seafarers. Virjen Shipping Corporation. 2014 Facts: Virjen Shipping Corporation (Virjen). 198640. April 23. Sunga would be working as a fitter on board the ocean-going vessel MT Sunway for nine (9) months on a monthly salary of US$ 566. He also manifested limited trunk mobility and was unable to undertake lifting activities. Cruz. he demanded instead that his disability benefits be based on the disability grading of 25%.Sunga v. G. Sunga reported to Virjen’s company-designated physician. pursuant to the provisions of the parties’ CBA. Ltd. as full settlement for the latter’s disability benefits. making it difficult for him to work. for medical examination. thereby prompting him to request for repatriation. Sometime in 2007.

is limited to a simple review of whether there existed grave abuse of discretion. The CA. the weight of the globe valve. There is grave abuse of discretion when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility. Ruling: 1. coupled with the abruptness of the fall. YES. after evaluation of the evidence presented before it. Whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion to justify its substitution by the CA 2. the CA should not concern itself with the determination of whether the NLRC. amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. NO. Virjen filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. Grave abuse of discretion. a back injury is reasonably anticipated. 2. The CA reasoned that accident is an unintended and unforeseen injurious occurrence. had correctly ruled on the merits of the case. and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Whether the injury suffered by Sunga is accidental for him to get disability benefits. the injury was not accidental. therefore. The question of intrinsic merits is an issue best left to the labor tribunals which are deemed to have mastery over the subject matter. has been defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to or equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. As found by both the NLRC and the Labor Arbiter. for Sunga to be entitled to disability benefits.injury is not merely an anatomical defect but a bodily harm brought upon by the performance of his duties and functions as fitter of the vessel. According to the appellate court. Sunga’s injury was the result of the accidental slippage in the handling of the 200kilogram globe valve which triggered Sunga’s back pain. in a Rule 65 petition. Thus. attributing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC which was granted. it is common knowledge that carrying heavy objects can cause injury and that lifting and carrying heavy objects are part of his duties as fitter. Issues: 1. It cannot serve as basis. explained why the injury was so severe as to render Sunga immobile. The Court failed to see any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC which would authorize the appellate court to substitute its own ruling over that of the NLRC. There was ample evidence to support the findings of the NLRC. something that does not occur in the usual course of events or could not be reasonably anticipated. While indeed Sunga had not explained in the request for repatriation the proximate .

In Jarco Marketing Corporation. Court of Appeals. shall in addition to sick pay. be entitled to compensation according to the provisions of this Agreement. v. It is “a fortuitous circumstance. It arrived at a proper decision after fully appreciated of the parties' arguments and carefully considering the presented evidence.cause of the injury. but excluding permanent disability due to willful acts. Thus. Sunga's disability benefits should fall within the coverage of the parties' CBA. the CA thus grossly misappreciated and misread the ruling of the NLRC. or if happening wholly or partly through human agency.” Since Sunga encountered an accident on board MT Sunway. In other words. as the NLRC found. including accidents occurring while traveling to or from the ship. there was enough circumstantial evidence to substantiate the claim.” In sum. we ruled that an accident pertains to an unforeseen event in which no fault or negligence attaches to the defendant. et al. an event happening without any human agency. which provides: Article 28: Disability 28. an event which under the circumstances is unusual or unexpected by the person to whom it happens. we find that the NLRC did not abuse its discretion. event or happening.1 “A seafarer who suffers permanent disability as a result of an accident whilst in the employment of the Company regardless of fault. . and whose ability to work as a seafarer is reduced as a result thereof. leading the appellate court to find a grave abuse of discretion sufficient for a reversal of the NLRC ruling. there was no basis for the CA’s conclusion that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion..

Alberto suddenly felt severe headache accompanied by dizziness. Inc. The doctors. 2003 for further medical treatment. Transmarine Carriers. On November 15. He underwent a series of medical examination and was diagnosed to be suffering from hypertension.. Alberto was referred to Dr. Alberto underwent the required Preemployment Medical Examination (PEME) and was declared “fit for work” by PTCI’s designated physician. 2003.Topic: Reimbursement of medical expenses Ponente: Brion.00 for a contract period of nine months. Prior to his hiring on March 3. 2014 Facts: Philippine Transmarine Carriers. Pursuant to the agreement.R No. failed to either declare him as “fit to return to work” or to assess his disability grading. vomiting and physical weakness while he was on board MT Neptune Glory. Inc. This was Alberto’s 20th contract with the respondents. 2004. Alberto was repatriated to the Philippines on November 23. (PTCI) hired Alberto as “pumpman. Thus. On the doctors’ advice. however. Alberto was discharged from the Manila Doctors Hospital. Alberto was confined at the University of Texas Medical Branch Hospital in Galveston. a private doctor-cardiologist. On April 14. Cammayo at the Manila Doctors Hospital. 204101. 2004. Upon arrival in Manila.” on board the vessel MT Neptune Glory. who assessed Alberto’s disability as “impediment grade 1” and declared the latter as “unfit to resume work as . Texas. Alberto sought the opinion of Dr. July 02. EfrenVicaldo. On March 30. J. Alberto received a basic monthly salary of US$656. Alberto underwent coronary artery bypass surgery due to a three vessel Coronary Artery Disease. Javier v. In 2003. 2003. G. Alberto underwent a series of medical treatment and examination.

Alberto died after his employment contract with the respondents had already been terminated.40 or its Philippine Peso equivalent at the prevailing rate of exchange.886.” In view of Dr. It rejected the petitioners’ claim for death benefits. morals. These contracts have the force of law between the parties as long as their stipulations are not contrary to law. the NLRC ordered its deduction from the peso equivalent of the total monetary award of US$68.624. CA affirmed the NLRC’s resolution. The CA brushed aside the petitioners’ claim for reimbursement of medical expenses incurred by Alberto because the petitioners failed to appeal the portion of the LA’s decision that denied Alberto’s claim on these. it consisted of disability benefits (in the amount of US$60. Alberto filed before the LA a complaint for disability benefits.073. public order or public policy. 2004 certification acknowledging receipt in full of his sickness allowance equivalent to 120 days (in the amount of P144. Hence. Since these expenses. Hence. Alberto contracted his illness during the term of his contract with the respondents and because of his constant exposure to extraneous work. It pointed out that death benefits are granted to the heirs of the seafarer only when the seafarer dies during the term of the contract and for causes that are work-related. Alberto claimed from the respondents’ disability benefits and sickness allowance pursuant to the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEASEC).159.000. It also denied Alberto’s claim for sickness allowance because of Alberto’s April 12. and reimbursement of medical expenses.30. illness allowance. Every seaman and the vessel owner (directly or represented by a local manning agency) are .928.886.318. The LA ordered the respondents to pay Alberto the total amount of US$68. damages and attorney’s fees. In this case.seaman in any capacity” and “not expected to land a gainful employment given his medical background. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s decision with modification. and attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the monetary award. sickness allowance (in the amount of US$2. Issue: Whether Alberto’s heirs are entitled to reimbursement of the expenses that Alberto incurred for his medical treatment as medical expenses and sickness allowance are separate and distinct from one another and from disability benefits Ruling: YES. The NLRC found that Alberto made an April 12. in the total amount of P2. The employment of seafarers and its incidents are governed by the contracts they sign every time they are hired or rehired.03) and payment in full of his medical treatment (in the amount of P1.00 for four months). 2004 certification.841. Vicaldo’s assessment. The respondents denied Alberto’s claim.27). he is entitled to disability benefits. According to the LA.00 or Alberto’s basic monthly wage of US$656.00).40. have already been paid.

the constitutional policy.required to execute the POEA-SEC as a condition sine qua non to the seafarer’s deployment for overseas work.03 from the peso equivalent of the amount awarded to Alberto. 318. and the distinct considerations in. After all. be integrated in every seafarer’s contract. accords and guarantees full protection to labor. while Section 20 of the POEA-SEC did not expressly state that the employer’s liabilities are cumulative in nature – so as to hold the employer liable for the sickness allowance. its provisions must be construed fairly. and (2) compensate the seafarer for his permanent total or partial disability as finally determined by the company-designated physician. In other words. . While the seafarers and their employers are governed by their mutual agreements. The Court finds no compelling reason to overturn the NLRC and the CA’s factual finding that the respondents have fully paid Alberto’s sickness allowance. medical expenses and disability benefits – it does not also state that the compensation and benefits are alternative or that the grant of one bars the grant of the others. Section 20-B of the 2000 POEA-SEC (the governing POEA-SEC at the time the respondents employed Alberto in 2003) is the applicable provision. In the present case. the employers assume several kinds of liabilities to the seafarer for any work-related illness or injury that the seafarer may have suffered during the term of the contract. In this regard. employers must: (1) pay the seafarer sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage in addition to the medical treatment that they must provide the seafarer with at their cost. its ruling inequitably resulted in a double payment to Alberto at the respondents’ expense. The separate treatment of. it should be deleted from the monetary award. which we here uphold and emphasize in construing as we do these POEA-SEC provisions. the POEA rules and regulations require that the POEA-SEC. Under this section. The LA’s grant of sickness allowance despite its full payment is clearly contrary to the provisions of the POEA-SEC. these three kinds of liabilities under the POEA-SEC can only mean that the POEA-SEC intended to make the employer liable for each of these three kinds of liabilities. which contains the standard terms and conditions of the seafarers’ employment in foreign ocean-going vessels. Accordingly. both local and overseas. since the sickness allowance was already paid. we agree with the CA that the NLRC committed no grave abuse of discretion in ordering the deletion of the sickness allowance benefit in the amount of P144. reasonably and liberally in favor of the seafarer in the pursuit of his employment on board ocean-going vessels. the POEA-SEC is imbued with public interest. too. Significantly. the Court must be guided by the principle that as a labor contract. Under this setup. However.

legal and jurisprudential basis.27 incurred (and which the respondents had already paid in full) for Alberto’s medical treatment. Ampeloquio had filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against RMI before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).928. Grave abuse of discretion was patent when the NLRC acted contrary to the facts – that the LA did not award Alberto medical expenses – and the provisions of the law . both in fact and in law. As a matter of fact. Inc. J. The total monetary award of US$68. the Labor Arbiter found RMI guilty of illegal dismissal. As a matter of law. The NLRC’s action is whimsical and arbitrary for clear lack of factual. the LA did not award Alberto any amount as reimbursement for his medical expenses which the NLRC could arguably consider as double reimbursement or payment resulting in “unjust enrichment” on Alberto’s part. Jaka Distribution.886. (JAKA). sickness allowance and attorney’s fees. as earlier discussed. July 2. However. No. Previously. formerly RMI Marketing Corporation (RMI).. 196936. Topic: Reinstatement without loss of seniority rights Ponente: Perez. This clearly smacks of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack and excess of jurisdiction. unlike the deletion of sickness allowance benefits.R.841. Alberto was effectively left with only the disability benefits and the 10% attorney’s fees as his monetary award.40) the amount of P1.886. we find that the CA legally erred in not finding that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ordering the deduction of the medical expenses paid by the respondents from the total monetary award. Inc. The NLRC reached its conclusion even if the POEA-SEC treats these two kinds of liabilities distinctly and even if the bases for their payment are different.40 consisted only of the disability benefits. In this regard. the NLRC had no reason. Ampeloquio resumed work as . As earlier stated. to order the deduction from the total monetary award (US$68.in this case. the POEA-SEC. separate and distinct from the disability benefits and sickness allowance to which the seafarer is additionally entitled. G. the LA denied for lack of basis Alberto’s prayer for reimbursement of medical expenses. 2014 Facts: Ampeloquio is a reinstated employee of respondent Jaka Distribution. Ampeloquio v. we are bound by the NLRC and the CA’s factual finding that the respondents fully paid Alberto’s medical expenses.Similarly. Subsequently. the benefit of medical treatment at the employer’s expense is. In view of the NLRC’s ruling that ordered the deletion of the sickness allowance from the total monetary award.

the NLRC proper. In 2005. non-payment of meal and transportation allowances. The transportation reimbursement shall not include house to first outlet and last outlet to house.00. Shopwise Makati and Alabang." Aggrieved by the NLRC’s modification of what Ampeloquio obviously perceived as an acceptable monetary award. and (3) the deletion of the award of moral and exemplary damages.00. a complaint for underpayment of wages.172. states: "7. without meal and transportation allowance. and an increase from his previous request of salary differential which amounted to a total of P180. At that time. The only transportation expenses allowed to be reimbursed are those incurred from the first outlet to succeeding outlets. Ampeloquio requested for salary adjustment and benefits retroactive to the date of his reinstatement. basic and COLA and non-payment of allowances. in fact. meal and transportation.00. LA Hernandez granted Ampeloquio’s complaint for underpayment of wages. (2) the deletion of his entitlement to transportation expenses. In another letter. it is supported by substantial evidence. Ampeloquiois therefore entitled to a total salary differential of only P22.590.The appellate court dismissed Ampeloquio’s petition for certiorari finding no grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC’s ruling and finding that. he was receiving the same daily wage of P252. On appeal by JAKA. 6 August 2004.00. COLA.00. the latter filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals bewailing grave abuse of discretion in: (1) the reduction of his award of salary differential to only 22.00. Ampeloquio filed anew before the NLRC. Ampeloquio was transferred outside of Metro Manila. to Lucena City and subsequently to San Pablo City. in its Resolutionmodified the amounts ordered by the Labor Arbiter to be paid by JAKA to Ampeloquio. Ampeloquio was given a monthly cost of living allowance (COLA) of P720. Because of the discrepancy in wages.Ampeloquio based his request on what other merchandisers of JAKA received. Ampeloquio wrote JAKA reiterating his request for salary adjustment and payment of benefits retroactive to his reinstatement.00. He received a daily wage of P252.196. and payment of salary differential in the total amount of P42. Issues: .merchandiser at JAKA and reported at JAKA’s outlets within Metro Manila. without meal and transportation allowance.172. JAKA’s contention that Ampeloquio is not entitled to reimbursement of transportation expenses from the latter’s house to the outlet where he was assigned and back is impressed with merit as JAKA submitted a copy of their policies and the pertinent portion.

Receipt by these merchandisers of a benefit such as transportation or meal allowance is part of the monies they receive from their employer and . Such is likewise the rationale for reinstatement’s twin relief of full back wages. To say the least.JAKA’s decision to grant or withhold certain benefits to other employees is part of its management prerogative as a function of an employer’s constitutionally protected right to reasonable return on investments. specifically two regular messenger employees which Ampeloquio claims receive wages higher than what he is receiving from JAKA.1. but of a service provider company which has a service contract with JAKA. employees of JAKA. There is no employer-employee relationship between JAKA and these merchandisers. What is the salary rate he is entitled to? Ruling: Seniority rights refer to the creditable years of service in the employment record of the illegally dismissed employee as if he or she never ceased working for the employer. What is the scope vis-a-vis wages of reinstatement "without loss of seniority rights and other privileges. Ampeloquio cannot likewise compare his wages to that received by "casual or contractual merchandisers" or merchandisers who are admittedly outsourced from manpower agencies or those who are considered seasonal employees hired only during peak season when JAKA is in need of extra merchandisers."? 2. He is likewise senior to other regular employees subsequently hired by JAKA. The merchandisers in this case simply perform the work at JAKA’s outlets. In other words. The case of Ampeloquio is outside the ordinary. strictly speaking. He is not entitled to the same terms and conditions of employment as that which was offered to the other regular employees (not merchandisers) subsequently hired by JAKA. Attached to the recognition of seniority rights of a reinstated employee who had been illegally dismissed is the entitlement to wages appurtenant thereto. wearing uniforms approved by JAKA but provided by the service company who is actually their employer. His reinstatement was ordered when merchandisers like him were no longer employed by JAKA. these merchandisers are not. Ampeloquio is correct in asserting that he is a senior employee compared to the other merchandisers whom he himself designates as casual or contractual merchandisers. the employee’s years of service is deemed continuous and never interrupted.

as if there was no cessation of employment. it merely opted to reinstate Ampeloquio to the same position. JAKA did not claim exceptions to the rule of reinstatement. His employment cannot likewise be converted into a contractual employment as such is actually a downgrade from his regular employment enjoying security of tenure with JAKA. As applied to this case. the labor tribunals were right in using as guidepost the existing statutory minimum wages and COLA during the three (3) year prescriptive period within which Ampeloquio can make his money claims. Ampeloquio cannot be reinstated to a messengerial position although such is a regular employment enjoying the same employment benefits and privileges. However. To repeat. The option of reinstatement to a substantially equivalent position does not apply herein as reinstatement to a substantially equivalent position entails the same or similar job functions and not just same wages or salary. at the minimum. In all. Ampeloquio is not entitled to all benefits or privileges received by other employees subsequently hired by JAKA just by the fact of his seniority in the service with JAKA. i. As the sole regular merchandiser of JAKA.embedded in the contract price of the service agreement the employer has with JAKA. . Ampeloquio is likewise entitled to any increase which JAKA may have given across the board to all its regular employees. Ampeloquio’s reinstatement entitles him. specifically. or (2) abolition of the position. (1) strained relations. The phrase without loss of seniority rights applies with practical and real effect to Ampeloquio upon his retirement because he will reach earlier than other regular employees of JAKA the required number of years of service to qualify for retirement. We note that.e.. JAKA immediately complied with the Labor Arbiter’s order of reinstatement. JAKA could have claimed that the position of merchandiser no longer exists and has been abolished with the contracting of this job function. Ampeloquio is now the lone regular merchandiser of JAKA. There is no quarrel that with his reinstatement. In this case. We are not unaware that reinstatement is the rule and such covers reinstatement to the same or substantially equivalent position without loss of seniority rights and privileges. to the standard minimum wage at the time of his employment and to the wages he would have received from JAKA had he not been illegally dismissed.

Inc.R. . to the students’ subsidiary ledgers. She was ICA’s Chief Accountant and Administrator from June 2000 until her dismissal. In July 2004. Camilon G. Cristina Javier. 2014 Facts: Petitioner Immaculate Conception Academy (ICA) is an educational corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines and co-petitioner Dr. for pre-auditing the school cashier’s report. She has also direct supervision over the School Cashier. turned over and/or posted by the ICA Cashier. Jr. respondent was responsible. Immaculate Conception Academy v. J. nor were the collected amounts deposited in ICA’s account with the Rural Bank of Dasmariñas. b) The unaccounted collections received from more or less 186 ICA students amount to ONE MILLION ONE HUNDRED SIXTY SEVEN THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY-ONE PESOS and 45/100 (P1.181. Loba as cashier which were not accounted for. No.. As Chief Accountant. Ms. Internal Auditor of ICA.167. Respondent Evelyn Camilon was an employee of ICA for 12 years. conducted an audit upon the instruction of petitioner Campos.Topic: Payment of separation pay Ponente: Villarama.Janice C..45). checking the entries therein and keeping custody of the petty cash fund. Jose Paulo Campos is the president of ICA. Janice Loba (Loba). 188035 July 2. Loba. ICA’s Treasurer. Janice C. c) There were missing or unsurrendered booklets of official receipts issued to and received by Ms. received a complaint from the father of one student who claimed that his son was denied issuance of an examination permit for nonpayment oftuition fees despite the fact that the said fees had already been paid. She made the following findings: a) There were several payments of tuition and school fees made by a number of ICA students which were neither accounted for. Shirley Enobal. the amount of collection made therein is still undetermined. among others.

2004. separation pay and attorney’s fees.d) Ms. Petitioner Campos placed respondent under suspension pending investigation of the case in light of her duties and responsibilities as Chief Accountant of ICA. 2004. 2004 and the proportionate sick leave pay and 13th month pay. On October 27. The NLRC likewise ordered the payment to respondent of her unpaid salaries for the number of working days she remained under preventive suspension beyond 30 days. 2004. The issue of whether a validly dismissed employee is entitled to separation pay has been settled in the 2007 case of Toyota Motor Philippines Corporation Workers Association (TMPCWA) v. petitioners terminated the services of respondent after finding that respondent was negligent and remiss in her duties as the superior officer of Loba. 13th month pay and service incentive leave pay which respondent already earned even prior to her dismissal was upheld. respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and other money claims against petitioners. Respondent appealed to the CA. NLRC. Janice C. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decisiondeclaring ICA guilty of illegal dismissal. Issue: Whether the award of separation pay is proper despite legality of suspension and dismissal Ruling: NO. Loba manipulated entries in the computerized subsidiary ledger and destroyed records so that the unaccounted amounts collected by her and the missing official receipts issued to her as cashier could not be traced or detected. On November 26.Petitioners appealed the decision of the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC. Also. CA rendered a decision affirming the ruling of the NLRC but with the modification that petitioners are held liable to pay separation pay to respondent as a measure of social justice. Respondent claimed that she was suspended from work without pay despite the absence of any evidence directly or indirectly implicating her in the financial irregularity from September 1. she was not given her salary from August 16-30. The NLRC rendered a decision finding respondent’s dismissal and preventive suspension legal and setting aside the awards for back wages. However. She claimed that petitioners failed to cite specific negligent acts or to state the manner and means she employed in assisting or cooperating with the cashier in the misappropriation of school funds. 2004 until her termination on October 27. 2004. the awards for unpaid salary for the period from August 15-30. where it was further .Respondent denied any involvement in the irregularities committed and claimed that she had no intention of profiting at the expense of the school or of betraying the trust reposed on her by the corporation.

she should . Inc. respondent is clearly not entitled to separation pay. First Solid Rubber Industries.. labor adjudicatory officials and the CA must demur the award of separation pay based on social justice when an employee’s dismissal is based on serious misconduct or willful disobedience.45 to the prejudice of petitioners. the Court disallowed the payment of separation pay to an employee dismissed from work based on one of the grounds under Article 282 of the Labor Code or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer. we should be more cautious in awarding financial assistance to the undeserving and those who are unworthy of the liberality of the law. or commission of a crime against the person of the employer or his immediate family – grounds under Art. the Court held that Moya’s act of concealing the truth from the company is outside of the protective mantle of the principle of social justice. To quote: “To reiterate our ruling in Toyota. respondent proved to be unfit for the position when she failed to exercise the necessary diligence in the performance of her duties and responsibilities as Chief Accountant. The commitment of the Court to the cause of labor should not embarrass us from sustaining the employers when they are right.” Again in the recent case of Moya v. in dismissals based on other grounds under Art. Respondent’s dereliction in her duties spanned a period of 11 months thus enabling the school cashier to misappropriate tuition fee payments. check the entries therein and keep custody of the petty cash fund.282 of the Labor Code that sanction dismissals of employees. manipulate the school records and destroy official receipts. v. Respondent was guilty of gross and habitual negligence when she failed to regularly pre-audit the report of the school cashier. Diasnes. Therein. They must be most judicious and circumspect in awarding separation pay or financial assistance as the constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be an instrument to oppress the employers. as here. Pursuant to the aforementioned rulings." This ruling was reiterated in the case of Central Philippines Bandag Retreaders. fraud or willful breach of trust. separation pay should not be conceded to the dismissed employee. Respondent was holding a position which involves a high degree of responsibility requiring trust and confidence as it involves the financial interests of the school. gross and habitual neglect of duty.181.167. Inc. fraud or willful breach of trust.clarified that "in addition to serious misconduct. and commission of a crime against the employer or his family. where the Court set aside the award of separation pay to Diasnes in view of the latter’s gross and habitual negligence. In fine. gross and habitual neglect of duty. in the total amount of P1. thus justifying her dismissal from service. 282 like willful disobedience. Hence. However.

" As to whether respondent’s length of service with petitioners justifies the award of separation pay. v. As we held in Central Pangasinan Electric Cooperative. If an employee’s length of service is to be regarded as a justification for moderating the penalty of dismissal."separation pay is only warranted when the cause for termination is not attributable to the employee's fault. this case is not the appropriate instance for generosity. does not call for such award of benefits. NLRC.” . v. Inc. “although long years of service might generally be considered for the award of separation benefits or some form of financial assistance to mitigate the effects of termination. NagkakaisangLakasngManggagawa (NLM)Katipunan. Respondent’s 12 years of service and clean employment record cannot simply erase her gross and habitual negligence in her duties. As we held in Reno Foods. distorting the meaning of social justice and undermining the efforts of labor to cleanse its ranks of undesirables. such gesture will actually become a prize for disloyalty. It is not allowed when an employee is dismissed for just cause. Length of service is not a bargaining chip that can simply be stacked against the employer. betrayal of the company.not be granted separation pay. as well as in cases of illegal dismissal in which reinstatement is no longer feasible. To rule otherwise would be to reward respondent for her negligent acts instead of punishing her for her offense. we rule in the negative. The fact that private respondent served petitioner for more than twenty years with no negative record prior to his dismissal. Inc. such as those provided in Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code. since his violation reflects a regrettable lack of loyalty and worse. in our view of this case.

Topic: Jurisdiction Ponente: DEL CASTILLO. (Amecos) is a corporation duly incorporated under Philippine laws engaged in the business of selling assorted products created by its President Antonio F. 2003. 2014 Facts: Petitioner Amecos Innovations. Eliza R. Amecos Innovations. Inc. 178055. Amecos received a Subpoena from the Office of the City Prosecutor in connection with a complaint filed by the Social Security System (SSS) for alleged delinquency in the remittance of SSS contributions. Lopez. No. July 2. consequently. petitioners sent a demand letter to respondent for P27. Mateo (Mateo). Amecos settled its obligations with the SSS. J. . G. and Antonio F. On May 30. petitioners filed the instant Complaint for sum of money and damages against respondent.791. Thus. Mateov.R.65 representing her share in the SSS contributions and expenses for processing. but to no avail. SSS filed a Motion to Withdraw Complaintwhich was approved by the Office of the City Prosecutor. Inc. Thereafter..

Respondent filed her Answer with Motion to Dismiss claiming. They add that by reason of their payment of respondent’s counterpart or share in the SSS premiums even as it was not their legal obligation to do so. Article 217(a)(4) of the Labor Code is applicable. They argue that the employer-employee relationship between Amecos and respondent is merely incidental. and 2154 of the Civil Code. respondent was unjustly enriched. and does not necessarily place their dispute within the exclusive jurisdiction of the labor tribunals. the true source of respondent’s obligation is derived from Articles 19. it is noteworthy to state that "the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction to award not . The observation that the matter of SSS contributions necessarily flowed from the employer-employee relationship between the parties – shared by the lower courts and the CA – is correct. and 2154 of the Civil Code. 22. The petitioner argued that their Complaint is one for recovery of a sum of money and damages based on Articles 19. Triple A Glass and Aluminum Company.among others. and that she was self-employed as well. 22. have the legal duty to enroll her with the SSS as their employee and to pay or remit the necessary contributions. petitioners’ claims should have been referred to the labor tribunals. as employers. Ruling: The Court denies the Petition. the regular courts have jurisdiction over the case. Said provision bestows upon the Labor Arbiter original and exclusive jurisdiction over claims for damages arising from employeremployee relations. that the regular courts do not have jurisdiction over the instant case as it arose out of their employer-employee relationship. on the other hand. maintains that jurisdiction over petitioners’ case lies with the Labor Arbiter. for which reason she must return what petitioners paid to the SSS. At any rate. Thus. Issue: Whether the regular civil court and not the Labor Arbiter has jurisdiction over claims for reimbursement and claims for damages for misrepresentation arising from employer-employee relations. This Court holds that as between the parties. thus. Respondent. as their cause of action remains necessarily connected to and arose from their employer-employee relationship. that their cause of action is based on solutioindebitior unjust enrichment. In this connection. which arose from respondent’s misrepresentation that there was no need to enroll her with the SSS as she was concurrently employed by another outfit. respondent insists that petitioners.

only the reliefs provided by Labor Laws. G. 180343." Topic: Disability Compensation in relation to “fit to work” declaration of an in-house physician against the declaration of “unfit for further work” by a physician of choice of the claimant Ponente: BRION.R. but also damages governed by the Civil Code. July 9. BAHIA SHIPPING SERVICES. 2002. 2014 Facts: On February 27. CONSTANTINO. and FRED OLSEN CRUISE LINES LIMITED v. INC. No. respondent Crisante C. Constantino (Constantino) entered into a nine-month contract of employment as utility .CRISANTE C. J.

Ashad been declared by the Court in an earlier ruling. Constantino was repatriated and referred to petitioners’ physician. Lim. The contract had been verified and approved by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Dr. he was referred to a shore-based physician.Almeda). Marciano Almeda (Dr. The petitioners denied the claim. illness allowance. he was not rehired by the company. The ship doctor gave him medications and advised him to rest. the terms and conditions of the contract must be in accordance with the POEA-SEC and shall be strictly and faithfully observed. when the seafarer enters into an individual contract with the employer. However. Dr. It is customary therefore that the individual contract between the seafarer and the employer is verified and approved by the POEA. prompting Constantino to file a complaint for disability benefits. Constantino complained of low back pain radiating to his right thigh after allegedly lifting several pieces of heavy luggage. The employment relationship between Constantino and the petitioners is governed by the POEA-SEC. that the latter is unfit for further sea duties contrary to the declaration of Dr. damages and attorney’s fees against them. orthopaedic surgeon Dr. Constantinoengaged the services of a lawyer to claim disability compensation from the petitioners. Robert D. otherwise known as the Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers OnBoard Ocean-Going Vessels. who placed him under the care of an orthopaedic surgeon. First. Thorne diagnosed Constantino to besuffering from an acute exacerbation of a preexisting lumbar disc syndromeand declared him unfit to work for 10 days. for examination and Magnetic Resonance Imaging (MRI). Thus.with petitioners. . When the vessel arrived at the Barbados. Lim to be fit-for-work. Thorne. Jerry A. On April 25. Issue: Is Constantino entitled to receive disability compensation? Ruling: No. Constantino underwentseveral medical examinations until he was pronounced by Dr. The claim was grounded on the declaration of Dr. Lim) of the Metropolitan Hospital. physician of choice of Constantino. Lim (Dr. 2002. reimbursement of medical expenses.W. Sometime in April 2002 while at work on-board the vessel. as Constantino did.

Under the POEA-SEC.Almeda without informing the petitioners. To our mind. including an orthopaedic surgeon. Constantino was not precluded from seeking a second opinionon his medical condition or disability. upon his repatriation. Dr.Almeda found Constantino unfit to work. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.Almeda whose assessment of his medical condition and disability disagreed with that of Dr. Lim. The disagreement should have been referred to a third doctor for final determination.the POEA-SEC is the law between the parties. Lim who managed the petitioners’ medical team handling Constantino’s treatment and rehabilitation. a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. There is no dispute that under the POEA-SEC. Section 20 (B) 3 of the POEA-SEC provides: Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment. it is the company-designated physician who declares the fitness to work of a seafarer who sustains a work-related injury/illness or the degree of the seafarer’s disability. the non-referral cannot be blamed on the petitioners. he should have actively requestedthat the disagreement . jointly by Constantino and the petitioners. declared Constantino fit to work after almost six months of extensive examination. he gave him a POEA-SEC Grade 11 impediment equivalent to permanent partial disability as compared with the fit-to-work assessment of Dr. the seafarer shall be entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of his permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundredtwenty (120 days) Dr. if there any. Second. Since Constantino consulted with Dr. Constantino did consult Dr. the company-designated physician. Lim. together with their CBA. There was no such referral. The third paragraph of the Section 20 (B)3 of the POEA-SEC states that: If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment (of the company-designated physician). treatment and rehabilitation (therapy sessions) by the company-accredited specialists.

Simbajon was required to undergo and pass the mandatory Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME). In the absence of any request from Constantino (as shown by the records of the case). No.This was already the fourth time that NCL hired Simbajon through Magsaysay. HENRY M. (2) Disability Compensation in relation to “fit to work” declaration of an in-house physician against the declaration of “unfit for further work” by a physician of choice of the claimant Ponente: BRION. Lim’s assessment of Constantino’s health should stand.Almeda. SIMBAJON. 203472. MANESE AND NORWEGIAN CRUISE LINEv. For more than 120 days from embarkation.between his doctor’s assessment and that of Dr. He . Lim and Dr. Lim be referred to a final and binding third opinion. Constantino bears the burden of positive action to prove that his doctor’s findings are correct. As the party seeking to impugn the certification that the law itself recognizes as prevailing.R. Simbajon as a cook on board its vessel. EDUARDO U. MAGSAYSAY MARITIME CORPORATION. Topics: (1) 120 days inability to work in relation to permanent and total disability. the employer-company cannot be expected to respond.” Only six days after embarkation.G. Simbajon’s employment contract was coursed through petitioner Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay). he was not able to work. the Norwegian Star (Hotel). July 09. He consulted the doctor on board and was initially diagnosed with possible Diabetes mellitus Type II (DM Type II). 2014 Facts:Norwegian Cruise Line (NCL) hired respondent Henry M. Before hiring. as well as the burden to notify the company that a contrary finding had been madeby his own physician. he complained of increased urination and having a constant feeling of thirst. J. the authorized manning agent of NCL in the Philippines. Dr. Simbajon medical tests confirmed this claim and he was given a clean bill of health and declared “fit for employment” or “fit for sea service. In the absence of a third doctor resolution of the conflicting assessments between Dr. under a Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEASEC).

He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be permanent. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120 days. and attorney’s fees. Based on this medical assessmentSimbajon filed with the LA a complaint for disability benefits. The seaman may of course also be declared . (1) On Simbajon’s claim that his inability to resume his usual work as a cook for a period exceeding 120 days. Dissatisfied with the companydesignated physician’s medical opinion.Vicaldo opined that Simbajon’s DM Type II was “work-aggravated/related” and that “he is now unfit to resume work as a seaman in any capacity”. automatically entitles him to permanent and total disability benefits based on a Grade I (120%) impediment rating. After conducting a series of tests. illness allowance. Despite the “fit to work” declaration of Magsaysay’s designated physician. then the temporary total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days. an internal medicine doctor from the Philippine Heart Center. Vicaldo. must report to the company-designated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and treatment. as his condition is defined under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. Dr. Simbajon sought a second opinion from Dr. either partially or totally. If the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made because the seafarer requires further medical attention. Simbajon was not rehired by petitioners. the seafarer. The Court had the occasion to clarify when a seafarer becomes entitled to permanent and total disability benefits: As these provisions operate.Efren R. damages. upon sign-off from his vessel. subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a permanent partial or total disability already exists. against the petitioners.underwent several test and medication until he was finally declared “fit to work” by the company-designated physician. Issues: (1) Did Simbajon suffer a permanent and total disability because he was not able to work for 120 days? (2) Is Simbajon entitled to receive disability compensation? Ruling: No. reimbursement of medical expenses. the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to work.

but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion. Thus.fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical condition. on his own and jointly with his employer. (d) the company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other doctors who he consulted. believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well. (e) the company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading. and (h) the company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of the said periods. even assuming that Simbajon’s illness is work-related. he is still not . as the case may be. (f) the company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related under the POEA-SEC but his doctorof-choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work. Under this ruling. Thus. hence. his inability to resume work after the lapse of more than 120 days from the time he suffered his illness does not by itself automatically entitle him to permanent and total disability benefits. The Court enumerated the following instances when a seafarer may claim for permanent and total disability benefits: (a) the company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total disability. a finding by the company-designated doctor that the seafarer needs further treatment beyond the initial 120-day period results in the extension of the period for the declaration of the existence of a permanent partial or total disability to 240 days. (c) the company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day period. contrary to Simbajon’s claim. (b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification being issued by the company-designated physician. (g) the company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits. justify an extension of the period to 240 days.

no such thirdparty physician was ever consulted to settle the conflicting findings of the first two sets of doctors. In this case.e. a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer.Vicaldo. Dr.Vicaldo’s unfit-to-work findings. the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. came out with the findings that Simbajon’s illness had rendered him “unfit to resume work as a seaman in any capacity. The companydesignated physicians have declared Simbajon as “fit to work” after 172 days of treatment from his disembarkation. third-party physician rested on Simbajon’s shoulders. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties..” with a Grade VI (50%) disability rating. he clearly violated its terms. Under the POEA-SEC. The Supreme Court ruled that the duty to secure the opinion of a third doctor belongs to the employee asking for disability benefits. After being informed of Dr. which states: Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment. (2) We now resolve the issue of the conflicting findings of the petitioners’ designated physicians and Simbajon’s own physician. This move totally disregarded the mandated procedure under the POEA-SEC requiring the referral of the conflicting medical opinions to a third independent doctor for final determination. the law between the parties.entitled to permanent and total disability benefits because his situation does not fall in any of the foregoing circumstances. The obligation to comply with the requirement of securing the opinion of a neutral. And without a binding third-party . i. agreed upon by petitioners and Simbajon. Simbajon’s chosen physician.Vicaldo calls for the intervention of a third independent doctor. the applicable provision to resolve the issue of conflicting medical findings is Section 20-B (3). The glaring disparity between the findings of the petitioners’ designated physicians and Dr. By failing to observe the required procedure under the POEA-SEC. Simbajon proceeded to file his complaint for disability benefits with the LA. On the other hand. xxx If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment.

Vicaldo’s unfit-to-return-to-work finding. we have observed that Dr. TAGLE v. the fit-to-work certification of petitioners’ designated physicians prevails over that of Dr. J. SIALSA. ANGLO-EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT. GREGORIO B. No.. We take this is in comparison with the series of tests and treatments made by Magsaysay’s designated physicians to Simbajon. Lastly. ANGLO-EASTERN CREW MANAGEMENT (ASIA) AND CAPT. G. 209302. July 09. Between the two. Topic: Claim for Permanent Disability Benefits Ponente: MENDOZA.: ALONE AMAR P. INC. the latter’s medical opinion deserves more credence for being more thorough and exhaustive. 2014 .Vicaldo only examined Simbajon once. PHILS..R.opinion.

petitioner was found unconscious inside the engine room of the vessel. Instead. 2009. Escutin that he is given a (sic) PERMANENT DISABILITY. Inc. petitioner was advised to continue the rehabilitation and to return after three (3) weeks. HE IS UNFIT TO BE A SEAMAN (sic) ON WHATEVER CAPACITY.Facts: Petitioner was hired by Anglo-Eastern Crew Management. Petitioner refused and insisted that he be paid the benefits corresponding to that given to those suffering from permanent total disability. Following orders from the company-designated physician. petitioner no longer reported back to the company-designated physician. Acting on petitioner’s request for compensation.11 suggesting at the same time the following disability grading: Suggested disability grading is Grade 12 (neck) – slight stiffness of the neck and Grade 11 (chest-trunk-spine) – slight rigidity or 1/3 loss of motion or lifting power of the trunk. petitioner again complained of back pains. Just two days after boarding the vessel. Escutin). Petitioner was advised to continue his physical therapy and medication and to report back on February 3. petitioner was admitted at the Metropolitan Medical Center. While his back improved. During the consultation. A day after his return to the country. He was diagnosed to be suffering from cervical spondylosis and heat exhaustion. This time. respondents offered a settlement based on the disability grading given by the company-designated physician.” As a result. The company-designated physician conducted a repeat study on petitioner and found that he was suffering from “L5 riduculopathy. On January 6.. chronic L5 spondylosis and Grade 1 spondylolisthesis. for Anglo-Eastern Crew Management (Asia) and was assigned to work on board the vessel NV Al Isha’a as 3rd Engineer. however. was advised to continue with his medication. Nicanor F. Petitioner filed his complaint before the LA claiming permanent total disability benefits. 2009 for re-evaluation. Escutin (Dr. . Dr. petitioner reported for his check-up and. he sought the opinion of his own physician. petitioner continued his treatment and rehabilitation and had regular checkups. He was again examined by the company-designated physician. There. Phils. petitioner informed Dr. he continued to suffer from on and off bouts of pain on his neck. He was thereafter repatriated. thereafter. Per suggestion. petitioner was diagnosed to be suffering from cervical and lumbar spondylosis.

the limitation of the award of disability benefits to Grade 11 and/or 12 as suggested by its company-designated physician. (c) The company-designated physician declared that he is fit for sea duty within the 120-day or 240-day period. rather than upholding the findings of Dr. on his own and jointly with his employer. According to respondents. a seafarer may have basis to pursue an action for total and permanent disability benefits only if any of the following conditions are present: (a) The company-designated physician failed to issue a declaration as to his fitness to engage in sea duty or disability even after the lapse of the 120-day period and there is no indication that further medical treatment would address his temporary total disability. The LA ruled in favor of the petitioner. believed that his disability is not only permanent but total as well. but his physician of choice and the doctor chosen under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC are of a contrary opinion. The rule is that. as the case may be. or. The NLRC and CA ruled in favor of the respondent. justify an extension of the period to 240 days. (f) The company-designated physician determined that his medical condition is not compensable or work-related under the POEA-SEC but his doctor-of- .” the disability gradings suggested by the company-designated physicians should prevail considering that they thoroughly examined and treated petitioner from August 2008 to January 2009.Respondents sought the dismissal of the complaint for lack of merit. hence. (d) The company-designated physician acknowledged that he is partially permanently disabled but other doctors who he consulted. in the alternative. (e) The company-designated physician recognized that he is totally and permanently disabled but there is a dispute on the disability grading. Escutin that petitioner suffered from “permanent disability. Issue: Whether or benefits not the petitioner is entitled to permanent disability Ruling: NO. (b) 240 days had lapsed without any certification issued by the company designated physician.

Moreover. a reading of the medical report of Dr. Second.37 After an assiduous assessment of the evidence. In fact. Petitioner’s complaint is premature. Even assuming ex gratia argumenti that the company-designated physicians had arrived at a final conclusion of Grade 11/12 disability. respondents were deprived of the opportunity to determine whether his claim for permanent total disability benefits had any merit. and (h) The company-designated physician declared him partially and permanently disabled within the 120-day or 240-day period but he remains incapacitated to perform his usual sea duties after the lapse of said periods. Dr. Escutin’s assessment of “permanent disability” for petitioner merely hinged on general impressions. only 196 days had lapsed. . Clearly. At this juncture. Escutin’s conclusion that petitioner suffered from “permanent disability” and that he was unfit to serve as a seaman in any capacity was anchored primarily on petitioner’s own narration. only 110 days had lapsed. the Court finds that petitioner’s claim for permanent disability benefits is without basis at all. Dr. Escutin. the findings of the company-designated physicians are worth reiterating to wit. “suggested disability grading is Grade 12”. First. In stark contrast to the detailed medical reports by the company-designated physicians. To be sure. it was yet to be established by the companydesignated physicians whether he was totally or partially disabled. petitioner’s evidence would still cast doubt on such findings. however. from the results of the various examinations conducted on him as of that time. (g) The company-designated physician declared him totally and permanently disabled but the employer refuses to pay him the corresponding benefits. noteworthy. Escutin. At the time he instituted his labor complaint on February 11. he went to Dr. Escutin shows that it was not supported by any diagnostic tests and/or procedures sufficient to refute the results of those administered to petitioner by the company-designated physicians. 2009. he was still required to return for re evaluation but instead of returning. as the disability grading was tentatively given and only as a suggestion. is the observation of the CA that from the time petitioner sustained his injury until a disability grading of Grade 11 (for the chest-trunk-spine) and Grade 12 (for the neck). When petitioner decided to seek the opinion of Dr.choice and the third doctor selected under Section 20-B(3) of the POEA-SEC found otherwise and declared him unfit to work.

two elements must concur: (1) the injury or illness must be workrelated. In other words. for an illness suffered by a seafarer to be compensable. In this case. it must first fall within the definition of the term “work-related illness. Assuming that petitioner indeed suffered the most severe of back injuries. he could still not be entitled to his claim for permanent total disability benefits. it must also be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer’s illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted. to be entitled to compensation and benefits under this provision. it is not sufficient to simply establish that the seafarer’s illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled. in addition to his neck injury.” that is. It should be remembered that under the terms of the POEA-SEC. and (2) the work-related injury or illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract.Third. . the record is bereft of any evidence to prove satisfaction of the said conditions. for disability to be compensable under Section 20 (B)(4) of the POEASEC. any sickness as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A with the conditions set therein satisfied. Thus.

: COLEGIO DE SAN JUAN DE LETRAN-CALAMBA v. TARDEO. was employed as a full-time faculty member of the petitioner since 1985. Dulce Corazon T. In a Letter dated 25 March 2008. In connection therewith. she requested for fund assistance in the amount of P17. ENGR. July 9. In August 2006.00. 2014 Facts: Petitioner is an educational institution created and existing under Philippine laws. Engr. on the other hand. . Respondent’s suspension arose from her request for Faculty Development Program and Fund Assistance submitted for consideration of petitioner. significant portions thereof were missing which led him to conclude that the said parts were deliberately omitted by respondent. the Vice-Presidentfor Finance and concurrently Letran’s Controller Rodolfo Ondevilla (Ondevilla) noted that the supporting document appended to respondent’s request was altered. The foregoing request was recommended for approval by the Dean for College of Engineering. DEBORAH P. During pre-audit. Attached to her request was a two-page invitation allegedly downloaded from Philippine Physics Society’s (PPS) website which detailed the supposed expenses in the upcoming convention. No. While the documents appeared to have been taken from the PPS website. Rhodora Odejar. respondent manifested her intention to participate in the 30th National Physics Seminar Workshop Convention in Siquijor State College. Prof.Topic: Serious Misconduct as a just cause in termination Ponente: PEREZ. 190303.000. Respondent.R. G. Barraquio. Delfin Jacob (Jacob) and the Human Resource Director. respondentwas elected as Union President of Letran-Calamba Faculty and Employees Association (LECFEA) and served in such capacity until she was suspended from work in 2008. J. addressed to Vice-President for Academic Affairs Dr.

it must be of such grave and aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. to be just cause for termination. and by the apparent disparity between the amount requestedby the respondent from that of another faculty member who also applied for fund assistance for the same purpose. Delorino’s actual expense was only P10. the Committee of Discipline found that respondent is guilty of dishonesty and serious misconduct and meted out the penalty of suspension for one semester starting 19 August 2008 up to 20 December 2008. respondent assailed the adverse decision of the Committee of Discipline to the Office ofthe Voluntary Arbitrator arguing that she was denied of her right to dueprocess when she was not allowed to confront Ondevilla in person during the hearing. The Office of the Voluntary Arbitrator and the CA declared the suspension of respondent from employment illegal. Of course. Ondevilla disapproved respondent’s request for fund assistance on the ground that her fund request was significantly higher compared to the amount requested byanother faculty member who also wanted to participate in the same convention.00. Under Article 282 of the labor Code. The Committee of Discipline found that respondent’s guilt was established by her own admission that she deleted certain portions from the invitation before attaching it to her fund request. the misconduct. It was noted that after the convention. Misconduct is defined as improper and wrongful conduct. willful in character. It is the transgression of some established and definite rule of action. a certain Delorino only asked for P11. As amplified by jurisprudence.000.00. It is settled that in order for misconduct to be serious. Feeling aggrieved. must be serious. a forbidden act. (2) relate to the performance of the employee’s duties. and implies wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. and (3) show thatthe employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer. While respondent requested for the disbursement of the amount of P17.00. the misconduct must (1) be serious.000. Issue: Whether or not [respondent] committed dishonesty and serious misconduct in knowingly submitting a materially altered document to support her funding request. a dereliction of duty.9 After investigation.Consequently. Ruling: NO. This implies that it must be of such grave and .754. The law is explicit that the misconduct should be serious. ordinary misconduct would not justify the termination of the services of an employee.

00. Indeed. respondent acted in malicious and contemptuous manner with the intent to cause damage to the petitioner. as found by the Voluntary Arbitrator and the Court of Appeals. misrepresenting that a student is his nephew and pressuring and intimidating a co-teacher to change a student’s failing grade to passing. respondent has been rendering service untarnished for 23 years. there is no basis for the allegation that respondent’s actconstituted serious misconduct that warrants the imposition of penalty of suspension. considering the fact that before the act complained of. fighting within company premises. it is not easy to conclude that for P600. massaging the shoulder and caressing the nape of the secretary). Examples of serious misconduct justifying termination. . In other words. there is no substantial proof of petitioner's allegation of malicious conduct against respondent. uttering obscene. her infraction should still be measured against the foregoing standards considering that the charge leveled against her is serious misconduct. include: sexual harassment (the manager’s acts of fondling the hands. As correctly pointed out by the appellate court.aggravated character and not merely trivial or unimportant. as held in some of our decisions. there is no substantial evidence to prove that in not including a portion of the invitation to her fund request. Although respondent was not terminated from employment but was merely suspended from work for one semester or equivalent to 101 days school days. insulting or offensive words against a superior. In other words. respondent would willfully and for wrongful intentions omit portions of the documents taken from the PPS website.

was hired as Faculty Member by STI College Makati (Inc. (STI) is an educational institution duly existing under Philippine laws. G. Fernandez (Fernandez) are STI officers. STI College Makati (Inc. Ico. she was recalled to STI’s Makati Central Office orHeadquarters (STIHQ) and promoted to the position of Dean of STI College-Parañaque (STI Parañaque).Topic: Illegal Constructive dismissal Ponente: DEL CASTILLO. ICO v. Jacob (Jacob) and Peter K.).: GIRLY G. Respondents Monico V. In November 1999. INC. petitioner served under contract from June 1997 to March 1998. Petitioner Girly G.R. July 9. 185100. At STI. 2014 Facts: Respondent Systems Technology Institute. . the former being the President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the latter Senior VicePresident. Inc.. In April 1998. SYSTEMS TECHNOLOGY INSTITUTE. FERNANDEZ. MONICO V. No. she was again recalled to STI-HQ and STI appointed her as Full-Time Assistant Professor I reporting directly to STI’s Academic Services Division (ASD). JACOB and PETER K. a masteral degree holder with doctorate units earned. J.) is a wholly-owned subsidiary of STI. which operates STI College-Makati (STI-Makati).

Two months after confirming petitioner’s appointment as STI-Makati COO.483. Sometime in July 2003.58 effective April 1. effective May 20.In June 2000. 2004 and to turn over her work to one Victoria Luz (Luz). petitioner’s COO assignment at STIMakati. However.000. she was promoted to the position of Chief Operating Officer (COO) of STI-Makati. "Job Grade Manager B" with a gross monthly salary of P37. b) Ordering petitioner to report to STI-HQ on May 20. herein respondent Fernandez. and assigned to STI College-Guadalupe (STI-Guadalupe). She was re-appointed as COO of STI-Makati.).483. under the same position classification and salary level of "Job Grade Manager B". 2004. 2002. 2000 up to October 28. STI – "[i]n line with the recently approved organizational structure effective August 1.58. It likewise appears that she was not given benefits and privileges which holders of equivalent positions were entitled to. where she served as Dean from June 5. whereby the latter would be absorbed by STI. who shall function as STI-Makati’s School Administrator. After petitioner’s stint as Dean of STI-Guadalupe. 2003" – updated petitioner’s appointment as COO. or during petitioner’s stint as COO and School Administrator of STI-Makati. such as a car plan. In a March 12.00. 2003. petitioner was not given the salary commensurate to her position as COO. and STIMakati was placed under STI’s Education Management Division (EMD).) thus ceased to exist. STI College Makati (Inc. 2004 Memorandum. petitioner’s position as Dean was reclassified from "Job Grade 4" to "Job Grade Manager B" with a monthly salary of P37. petitioner was promoted to the position of Dean under ASD. citing management’s decision to undertake an "organizational restructuring" in line with the merger of STI and STI-Makati. She concurrently served as STI-Makati School Administrator. Meanwhile. and . 2002. Fabul (Fabul). 2004 was issued by STI Human Resources Division Head. a Plan of Merger was executed between STI and STI College Makati (Inc. which by this time appeared to be pegged at P120. and noted by respondent Jacob – a) Cancelling.00 salary petitioner was then receiving. up from the P27. another Memorandum dated May 18. signed and approved by STI Senior Vice-President for Corporate Services Division Jeanette B. Yolanda Briones (Briones).000. The merger was approved by the Securities and Exchange Commission on November 12. under the supervision of the AcademicServices Group of the EMD and reporting directly to the Head thereof.

petitioner took exception to the incidents of May 18 and 20. In a June 28. 2004.and Luz as the new STI-Makati School Administrator. According to STI.c) Appointing petitioner.petitioner protested anew her alleged maltreatment. 2004. under pain of suit. petitioner reported to her new office at STI’s School Compliance Group. who was not apprised of the official trip. claiming that she became the victim of a series of discriminatory acts and objecting to the manner by which she was transferred. Jacob replied through a June 7. effective May 20. petitioner’s achievement as a Silver Awardee for the 2004 STI Winners’ Circle Awards was announced. Petitioner. 2004. reporting directly to SchoolCompliance Group Head Armand Paraiso (Paraiso). the positions of Chief Executive Officer and Chief Operating Officer of STI Makati were abolished. Nor was a copy of the said audit findings attached to the memorandum. asserting that she was illegally demoted and that her name was tarnished as a result of the demotion and transfer. was thus left behind. That same day. In a May 24. as STI’s Compliance Manager with the same "Job Grade Manager B" rank and salary level. 2004. however. an official communication was disseminated throughout STI. claiming illegal constructive dismissal and demanding immediate reinstatement to her COO position and the payment of actual and other damages. only to find out that all members ofthe department had gone to Baguio City for a planning session. on May 25. this time stating that charges for the alleged violations have already been filed against her allegedly "based on the Audit Findings". 2004. claiming that she was too embarrassed to attend owing to the events leading to her transfer. 2004 letter advising petitioner that her letter was forwarded to Fernandez for comment. 2004 letter to Jacob. the "organizational re-structuring" was undertaken "in order to streamline operations. In the process. Fernandez as the new COO of STI-Makati. STI withheld petitioner’s prize – a South Korea trip termed "Travel Incentive Award" for the Winners’ Circle for STI fiscal year 2003-2004 – "pending the final result of the investigations being conducted" by STI relative to irregularities and violations of company policies allegedly committed by petitioner. petitioner’s appointment as Compliance Manager was left out. yet making reference to the June 21. during the 17th STI Leaders Convention held in Panglao. which to her was a demotion. announcing Jacob’s appointment as the new STI President and CEO. petitioner received another Memorandum from Briones dated June 23." On May 20. 2004. . 2004 demand letter29 addressed to Jacob. Bohol. Prior to that. On June 24. but she did not attend. 2004 Memorandum and without informing petitioner of the particulars of the charges or the results of the audit.

she was left alone at the office for several days. Issue: Whether or not petitioner is illegally constructively dismissed Ruling: YES. and her colleagues would have been inspired by her in return. The NLRC and CA reversed the decision of the LA. she was bullied. . or disdain by an employer becomes so unbearable on the part of the employee that it could foreclose any choice by him except to forego his continued employment. Her well-deserved awards and distinctions were unduly withheld in the guise of continuing investigation – which obviously was taking too long to conclude. as a result. As correctly observed by the Labor Arbiter. If the employer cannot overcome this burden of proof. Aptly called a dismissal in disguise or anact amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not. shouted at. constructive dismissal may. insensibility. She was shamed when. Then again. all of the employees of the department have gone on an official out-of-town event without her and. on May 20. even if belatedly. Fernandez as new STI-Makati COO. the investigation was still allegedly ongoing. Certainly. In cases of a transfer of an employee. causing her to incur unnecessary legal expenses as a result of her hiring the services of counsel. There is no doubt that petitioner was subjected to indignities and humiliated by the respondents. 2004. 2004 inside the latter’s own office. investigation began formally on May 28. and Luz asnew STI-Makati School Administrator. the employee’s transfer shall be tantamount to unlawful constructive dismissal. She was deprived of the privilege to attend company events where she would have received her well-deserved awards with pride and honor. STI made an official companywide announcement of Jacob’s appointment as new STI President and CEO. Respondents did not even have the courtesy to offer her the opportunity to catch up with the group sothat she could makeit to the event. likewise. Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because ‘continued employment is rendered impossible. yet by August 17 (date of memorandum informing petitioner of the withholding of Korea travel award). and treated insolently by Fernandez on May 18. the rule is settled that the employer is charged with the burden of proving that its conduct and action are for valid and legitimate grounds such as genuine business necessity and that the transfer is not unreasonable. exist if an act of clear discrimination. unreasonable or unlikely. on her very first day at the School Compliance Group. threatened. 2004 (start of audit). but petitioner’s appointment as new Compliance Manager was inconsiderately excluded. inconvenient or prejudicial to the employee.The Labor Arbiter found that the petitioner had been illegally constructively and in bad faith dismissed. Respondents made her go through the rigors of a contrived investigation. as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay’ and other benefits.

Indeed. since the position of STI-Makati COO was never abolished. Human nature dictates that petitioner should refuse to subject herself to further embarrassment and indignitiesfrom the respondents and her colleagues. Fernandez – or anyone who currently occupies the position of STIMakati COO – must vacatethe office and hand over the same to petitioner. A corporation. All told. Petitioner. As a rule. as a juridical entity. petitioner could not be faulted for taking an indefinite leave of absence. the Court failsto discern any bad faithor negligence on the part of respondent Jacob. they bordered on the personal. The principal character that figures prominently in this case is Fernandez. Jacob. After all. asit is a senior managerial office. Obligations incurred as a result of the directors’ and officers’ acts as corporate agents. for the most part. and petitioner directly reported to him at the time. rather than official. 2004. his position enabled him to pursue a course of action with petitioner that Jacob was largely unaware of. may act only through its directors. His superior. and there to receive exactly what Fernandez gets by way of salaries. Fernandez was the Head of the Academic Services Group of the EMD. He alone is guilty of persecuting petitioner. and for altogether failing to report for work after August 9. some of his actions were without sanction of STI itself. privileges and emoluments. the position of Chief Operations Officer is not merely an ordinary managerial position. Nonetheless. Indeed. officers and employees. benefits. To hold a director or officer personally liable for corporate obligations. and is deemed merely to take over the office from him. two requisites must concur: (1) it must be alleged in the complaint that the director or officer assented to patently unlawful acts of the corporation or that the officer was guilty of gross negligence or bad faith. he alone relentlessly caused petitioner’s hardships and suffering. In turn. may have been.respondents made sure that petitioner suffered a humiliating fate and consigned to oblivion. 2004. and (2) there must be proof that the officer acted in bad faith. deserving and loyal. are nottheir personal liability but the direct responsibility of the corporation they represent. . without diminution in amount and extent. and were committedoutside of the authority given to him by the school. Finally. multi-awarded. they are only solidarily liable with the corporation for the illegal termination of servicesof employees if they acted with malice or bad faith. petitioner was deemed constructively dismissed as of May 18. it follows that petitioner should bereinstated to the very same position. is entitled to what Fernandez receives. moreover. clueless of what Fernandez was doing to petitioner.

the CA ruled that apart from bare allegations of payment. Ruling: 1. Ducusin’s immediate filing of the labor complaint indicated that he did not abandon his employment. Petitioners appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) flatly denying the charges against them. Bucad. it characterizes him as one who deeply felt wronged by his employer. The best evidence of payment is the payroll. 196249. On the issue of money claims. respondents merely allege payment.Topic: Illegal Dismissal. There is thus no ground for awarding Berdin backwages and separation pay as well. Del Castillo Angeles v. that their defense that the relevant payroll and daily time records were stolen constitutes a lame excuse which cannot excuse them from proving that they have paid what they owed respondents. that petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving payment. Whether petitioners failed to discharge the burden of proving that respondents have been paidt heir monetary claims. the CA believed that they voluntarily left their jobs when they were caught by management having an illicit affair. whereas in this case. Whether Ducusin was illegally terminated. since Berdin resigned from his position after management caught him sneaking food out for his girlfriend. YES. petitioners have not satisfactorily shown – by adequate documentary evidence which should be in its custody and possession – that the salaries. No. The CA held that there is no proof that respondent Ducusin abandoned his employment. 2014 Facts: The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision adjudging Petitioners guilty of illegal dismissal and ordered to them to pay the Respondents their respective money claims.R. benefits and other claims due to the respondents have been accordingly paid. which does not entitle Benitez to an award of backwages and separation pay. G. With regard to respondents Benitez and Reynante. . The CA further held that petitioners did not commit illegal dismissal with respect to respondent Berdin. This showed that they abandoned their employment. July 21. Issues: 1. Money Claims Ponente: Mariano C. The NLRC held that the respondents failed to submit sufficient evidence to warrant the reversal of the findings of the Labor Arbiter. 2.

taking into account the policy of "no work. It is the reckoning point of the employer's corresponding obligation to him . then they only have themselves to blame. according to petitioners.This Court is not a trier of facts. especially if they coincide with those of the Labor Arbiter and are supported by substantial evidence. It is from that moment that an employee dons the cape of duties and responsibilities attached to his position in the workplace. There exists serious doubt with respect to petitioners’ proffered evidence. stolen. if the official payroll and daily time records are not taken into account. the NLRC. which however do not contain the latter's respective signatures and those of their superiors. They can hardly be considered proof sufficient enough for this Court to consider. there could be no sufficient basis for this Court to overturn the assailed Decision.to pay his salary and provide his occupational and welfare protection or benefits. It signifies and records the commencement of one's work for the day. it constitutes evidence of employment. they may not expect this Court to resort to unnecessary factual nitpicking in an attempt to forestall the effects of an adverse judgment. The findings of fact of the CA are conclusive and binding. and in the absence of an employment agreement. If petitioners believe that they have been prejudiced. YES. The punching of time card is undoubtedly work related. The purpose of a time record is to show an employee’s attendance in office for work and to be paid accordingly. This principle applies with greater force in labor cases. for not offering sufficient proof to prove their case. What "daily time records" petitioners refer to in this Petition pertain to the supposed attendance record of several of the respondents. They appear to be incomplete as well. It would be difficult if not impossible to validate and reconcile petitioners’ documentary evidence and unilateral claims of payment. considering that the relevant payroll and daily time records are missing as they were. it is a mandatory requirement for inclusion in the payroll. where this Court has consistently held that findings of fact of the NLRC are accorded great respect and even finality. 2. some are barely readable. A daily time record is primarily intended to prevent damage or loss to the employer. indeed. and the CA. which could result in instances where it pays an employee for no work done. no pay". For their blunder. the Court can only rely on the findings of the Labor Arbiter. . The Petition is DENIED. Without them.

.

Petitioner reply stated that these incidents are already indicators that the Management has already extended its utmost consideration to Quebral not only on one occasion but in several incidents and thus. Quebral. 2014 Facts: As part of its customer service. as part ofthe auxiliary review. Quebral’s parking records show that he used the discounted parking privilege reserved for patients and their representatives for his personal use at least 20 times.R. The Employee and Labor Relations Department (ELRD) issued a Notice to Explain and Invitation to Conference to Quebral. Villarama. through SLMCEA-AFW.Topic: Illegal Dismissal Ponente: Martin S. are tasked with claiming pre-approved parking tickets from the hospital’s Information and Concierge Section on behalf of the patients. The ELRD rendered a decision terminating Quebral’s employment. St. the management looked into the finer details of Quebral’s performance for the past 12 months preceding his dismissal and noted other violations he committed. Quebral stated that he did not know that employees and staff were prohibited to get a validation ticket and all that he knew was that. such as Respondent Quebral. appealed his dismissal. Quebral’s dismissal is final and irrevocable. . G. July 23. 193324. Jr. Wellness Center Assistants. petitioner provides free and/or discounted parking privileges to its patients. Thus. he needed to get a validation. Quebral. No. Luke’s Medical Center v. to be able to get a discount on their expensive parking.

It was incumbent upon him to read the terms and conditions stated thereon. he would have have been more careful in his actions. Quebral has no vested right to petitioner’s compassion. Thus. Moreover. Quebral cannot feign ignorance of the policy limiting to patients the privilege of the use of validated parking tickets. The CA’s conclusion that he has been a dependable and reliable employee and thus deserving of petitioner’s compassion is without basis. this only serves as a testament of his inefficiency in his job as he is not aware of his employer’s policies despite being employed for 7 years. Just because petitioner was compassionate to him numerous times in the past when he violated company rules does not give him the right to demand the same compassion this time on the ground of social justice. as Wellness Center Assistant whose task is to extend all needed assistance to the ECU patients. The auxiliary review of Quebral’s employment record revealed violations of company rules he committed for the preceding twelve months prior to his dismissal. Had Quebral valued the considerations extended to him by his employer in the past. even assuming he was not able to read said policy. Ruling: NO. it is written on the parking ticket itself. . it is expected that he is aware of all matters relating to patient rights and privileges. this Court recognizes the prerogative of an employer to prescribe rules and regulations in its business operations and its right to exact compliance with them by its employees. And for said violations. Social justice and equity are not magical formulas to erase the unjust acts committed by the employee against his employer. Moreover.Issue: Whether Quebral was illegally dismissed. And second. The record of an employee is a relevant consideration in determining the penalty that should be meted out on him. petitioner extended consideration to Quebral by lowering the penalty imposed on him. First. petitioner cannot be obliged to disregard altogether Quebral’s previous violations when determining the penalty to be imposed on him for his latest offense as if it was the first time he violated company rules.

A company has the right to dismiss its employees as a measure of selfprotection.Also. Whether he has already settled the amount he was supposed to pay for parking if not for the validated parking tickets is of no consequence. respondents failed to prove that the violation of the policy on validation of tickets is tolerated by petitioner as they failed to present any evidence that other employees were being issued validated tickets. . It need not wait for it to suffer actual damage or loss before it can rightfully dismiss an employee who it has already found to have been dishonest. The petition is GRANTED. The fact remains that he was dishonest in the performance of his duties which is a valid ground for termination of employment. The fact that petitioner did not suffer losses from the dishonesty of the respondent does not excuse the latter from any culpability.

The Labor Arbiter (LA) ruled that the dismissal of complainant is illegal. In justifying its reversal of its decision. 175293. The University President informed him that his contract would no longer be renewed. Quitclaim Ponente: Lucas P. Thus. and that his reinstatement would result in dual employment and double compensation which were prohibited by existing civil service rules and regulations. the NLRC reversed its ruling. July 23. 2014 Facts: Petitioner was a regular and full-time faculty member of the University's Accountancy Department in the College of Commerce. petitioner executed a receipt and quitclaim in favor of the University respecting his claim for benefits. Ateneo de Naga University. In the interim. and ordered respondents to reinstate complainant and to pay his money claims. Respondents appealed to the NLRC. the NLRC rendered its decision affirming with modification the ruling of the LA. On motion for reconsideration. they submitted a manifestation stating that neither actual nor payroll reinstatement of the petitioner could be effected because he had meanwhile been employed as a Presidential Assistant for Southern Luzon Affairs with the position of Undersecretary. Bersamin Castro v. he brought this complaint for illegal dismissal.R. Meanwhile. Petitioner elevated the matter to the CA. G. No.Topic: Reinstatement. the NLRC held that his execution of the receipt and quitclaim respecting his benefits under the . Simultaneously.

Whether the petitioner's claim for the payment of accrued salaries and benefits for the period that he was not reinstated was rendered moot and academic by his receipt of the retirement benefits and execution of the corresponding receipt and quitclaim in favor of the respondents. The payment petitioner had received in protest pertained only to his retirement benefits." As such. 2. pursuant to the Employee's retirement plan. both the NLRC and the CA should have easily seen that the quitclaim related only to the settlement of the retirement benefits.. The text of the receipt and quitclaim was clear and straightforward. and it was to the effect that the sum received by the petitioner represented ''full payment of benefits . Issue: 1. The CA dismissed the petitioner's petition for certiorari on the ground of its having been rendered moot and academic by the decision of the NLRC.. Whether the petitioner's claim for accrued salaries from the time of the issuance of the order of reinstatement by the LA until his actual reinstatement was rendered moot and academic by the reversal of the decision of the LA. NO. Ruling: 1.Plan estopped the petitioner from pursuing other claims arising from his employer-employee relationship with the University. . which benefits could not be confused with the reliefs related to the complaint for illegal dismissal. The execution of the receipt and quitclaim was not a settlement of the petitioner's claim for accrued salaries.

for instance. the rule is that all doubts in the interpretation and implementation of labor laws should be resolved in favor of labor. one which operates no further than may be necessary to achieve its specific purpose. If the requirements of Article 224 were to govern. Article 279 of the Labor Code. then the executory nature of a reinstatement order or award contemplated by Article 223 will be unduly circumscribed and rendered ineffectual. In Pioneer Texturizing Corporation v. as amended. and is intended to help the employee enjoy the remaining years of his life. The reason is simple. the reliefs awarded to an illegally dismissed employee are in recognition of the continuing employer-employee relationship that has been severed by the employer without just or authorized cause. Furthermore. the legislature is presumed to have ordained a valid and sensible law. In enacting the law. An application for a writ of execution and its issuance could be delayed for numerous reasons. entitles an illegally dismissed employee to reinstatement. Henceforth. Retirement is a form of reward for an employee's loyalty and service to the employer. In contrast. To require the application for and issuance of a wit of execution as prerequisites for the execution of a reinstatement award would betray and run counter to the very object and intent of Article 223.Retirement is of a different species from the reliefs awarded to an illegally dismissed employee. A mere continuance of postponement of a scheduled hearing. or without compliance with due process. we rule that an award or order for reinstatement is self- . and to lessen the burden of worrying about his financial support or upkeep. or an inaction on the part of the Labor Arbiter or the NLRC could easily delay the issuance of the writ thereby setting at naught the strict mandate and noble purpose envisioned by Article 223. National Labor Relations Commission: x x x The provision of Article 223 is clear that an award for reinstatement shall be immediately executory even pending appeal and the posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement.

for as long as the employer continuously fails to actually implement the reinstatement aspect of the decision of the LA. Hence. the employee has no way of knowing if he has to report for work or not.executory. In either instance. Considering that the respondents reinstated the petitioner only in November 2002. 2001) until his reinstatement in November 2002. 2. the employer's obligation to the employee for his accrued backwages and other benefits continues to accumulate. He remained entitled to accrued salaries from notice of the LA's order of reinstatement until reversal thereof. Capada. In Islriz Trading v. The notification is based on practical considerations for without notice. After receipt of the decision or resolution ordering the employee's reinstatement. the employee could be barred from claiming accrued salaries only when the failure to reinstate him was without the fault of the employer. It did not matter that the respondents had yet to exercise their option to choose between actual or payroll reinstatement at that point because the order of reinstatement was immediately executory. NO. the employer has to inform the employee of his choice. . The order of reinstatement of the petitioner was not rendered moot and academic. they were liable to pay his salaries accruing from the time of the decision of the LA (September 3. and that their inability to reinstate him was without valid ground. the employer has the right to choose whether to re-admit the employee to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or to reinstate the employee in the payroll.

R.Topic: claim for death benefits Ponente: Reyes. 2003 and 2004. Edwin’s death certificate indicates that the immediate cause of his death is Cardiopulmonary Arrest. Edwin was diagnosed through biopsy with Acute Myelogenous Leukemiaat the Chinese General Hospital. he was again hospitalized at the Chinese General Hospital. malaise and anorexia. J. G. Edwin was assigned at the Mercury Drug Store-Gagalangin Branch. On March 20. 2014 Facts: Rosemarie’s husband. Other significant condition contributing to his death is Acute Myelogenous Leukemia. Antecedent cause is Sepsis secondary to Pneumonia and the underlying cause of which is Pneumonia. Edwin was also admitted at the Jose Reyes Memorial Hospital because of persistent petechial rash. In October. Edwin C. 33-1555504. 192352. For the years 2002. In September. 2004. Esmarialino v. 2005. Esmarialino . 2004. 1993. Employees’ Compensation Commission. . 2004. No. with SS No. July 23. he succumbed to Sepsis secondary to Pneumonia. In May. worked as a Security Guard for Jimenez Protective and Security Agency since May.

Rosemarie ascribed grave error on the part of the ECC when it concluded that leukemia. In the case at bar. which significantly contributed to Edwin’s death. The CA. The ECC likewise dismissed the claim. The Court is generally bound by the CA’s factual findings.Edwin made his last premium contribution in May. Hence. On November 10. and c) SSS Death with Funeral Benefits effective March 20. among which is. denied the claim for EC death benefits on the ground that "there is no causal relationship between Acute Myelogenous Leukemiato the member’s job as a security guard. even if this Court were to exercise leniency and resort to re- . Rosemarie filed a Motion for Reconsideration. 2005 granted to his beneficiaries. Issues: Did the Ca err in sustaining the Decision of the ECC which denied the claim for Edwin’s death benefits? Is the illness which caused the death of Edwin work – related? Ruling: It is settled that Rule 45 limits the Court to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision." Rosemarie appealed the SSS decision to the ECC. however. The SSS. ECC and SSS uniformly found that Rosemarie cannot be granted death benefits as she had failed to offer substantial evidence to prove her claims. Thereafter. 2004. b) SSS Permanent Partial Disability (PPD) benefits of twenty-three (23) months effective February 11. this petition. Rosemarie filed before the CA a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court. except only in some instances. 2004. Besides. had no causal relation with the work of a security guard. 2005. essentially revolving on the alleged increased risk for Edwin to contract leukemia as a result of hardships incidental to his employment as a security guard. On account of his ailment. Edwin was granted the following medical benefits under the SSS law: a) SSS Temporary Total Disability (TTD) benefits of 120 days effective September 19. but it was denied. when the said findings are contrary to those of the trial court or administrative body exercising quasi-judicial functions from which the action originated. the issues are beyond the ambit of a petition filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court since they are factual in nature. 2009. the CA rendered a Decision affirming the ECC’s ruling.

evaluating the factual findings below. there is nothing in the documents from which the Court can infer or conclude that indeed. The intent was to restore a sensible equilibrium between the employer's obligation to pay workmen's compensation and the employee's right to receive reparation for workconnected death or disability.the Government Service Insurance System and Social Security System . the trust fund has the obligation to pay is contrary to the legal requirement that proof must be adduced. therefore. The SSS. The law. The existence of otherwise non-existent proof cannot be presumed. thus. hence. still. Rosemarie presented copies of her husband's daily time records. the Court finds no compelling reason to order their reversal. even if the Court were to corelate these to the medical abstract submitted by Rosemarie. the new principle being applied is a system based on social security principle. However. To say that since the proof is not available. It is well to stress that the principles of "presumption of compensability" and "aggravation" found in the old Workmen’s Compensation Act is expressly discarded under the present compensation scheme. the instant petition is susceptible to denial. Edwin's risk of contracting leukemia increased by reason of his work conditions. As illustrated in the said Raro case. the introduction of "proof of increased risk. ECC and CA decisions are amply supported. as it now stands requires the claimant to prove a positive thing – the illness was caused by employment and the risk of contracting the disease is increased by the working conditions. Compassion for the victims of diseases not covered by the law ignores the need to show a greater concern for the trust fund to which the tens of millions of workers and their families look to for compensation whenever covered accidents. Topic: certification election . diseases and deaths occur. It is worth noting that in an attempt to prove that Edwin's employment increased his chances of contracting leukemia.under the Employees Compensation Commission." As further declared therein: The present system is also administered by social insurance agencies .

July 23. and simultaneously sought the exclusion of some from the list of employees for occupying either confidential or managerial positions. alleging that the DOLE gravely abused its discretion in not suspending the certification election proceedings. The Heritage Hotel Manila v. The petitioner filed its opposition.Ponente: Bersamin. The following day. 2000. No. the pre-election conference was suspended until further notice because of the repeated non-appearance of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC. 1998. Fernando issued his order for the conduct of the certification election. the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) issued a notice scheduling the certification elections on June 23. The petitioner appealed the order of Med-Arbiter Fernando. J. On May 12. 2000. A pre-election conference was then scheduled. Secretary of Labor. however. It filed another motion on June 1. 2000. On January 29. 172132. however. National Union of Workers in the Hotel. 1996 when Med-Arbiter Napoleon V. respondent National Union of Workers in Hotel Restaurant and Allied Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHMSC) filed a petition for certification election.raising the prolonged lack of interest of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC to pursue its petition for certification election. 2000 to seek either the dismissal or the suspension of the proceedings on the basis of its pending petition for the cancellation of union registration. seeking to represent all the supervisory employees of Heritage Hotel Manila. 2000. Grand Plaza Hotel Corporation v. The petitioner primarily filed its comment on the list of employees submitted by NUWHRAIN-HHMSC. . the petitioner filed a petition for the cancellation of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC’s registration as a labor union for failing to submit its annual financial reports and an updated list of members as required by Article 238 and Article 239 of the Labor Code. On June 23. 2000 a special civil action forcertiorari. G. 1995. Dissatisfied. The petitioner filed a motion to dismiss on April 17. but the opposition was deemed denied on February 14. 2000. docketed as Case No.R. acting through its owner. Restaurant and Allied Industries-Heritage Hotel Manila Supervisors Chapter (NUWHRAIN-HHSMC). On February 20. NCR-OD0005-004-IRD entitled The Heritage Hotel Manila. the petitioner commenced in the CA on June 14. 2014 Facts: On October 11. NUWHRAIN-HHMSC moved for the conduct of the preelection conference. but the appeal was also denied.

par. The matter was elevated before the CA. An appeal was then filed before the DOLE Secretary. for that would be tantamount to making the collateral attack the DOLE has staunchly argued to be impermissible. Rule V of Department Order No. The CA dismissed the petition. and the employer is deemed an intruder as far . The DOLE has thus every reason to proceed with the certification election and commits no grave abuse of discretion in allowing it to prosper because the right to be certified as collective bargaining agent is one of the legitimate privileges of a registered union.the CA dismissed administrative the petition for certiorari for non-exhaustion of remedies. The fact that the cancellation proceeding has not yet been resolved makes it obvious that the legal personality of the respondent union is still very much in force. Series of 1997. and NUWHRAIN-HHMSC obtained the majority vote of the bargaining unit. The certification election proceeded as scheduled. that the dismissal of the petition for the certification election based on the legitimacy of the petitioning union would be inappropriate because it would effectively allow a collateral attack against the union’s legal personality. II. 9. Basic in the realm of labor union rights is that the certification election is the sole concern of the workers. The petitioner filed a protest (with motion to defer the certification of the election results and the winner). Hence. The DOLE Secretary declared that the mixture or co-mingling of employees in a union was not a ground for dismissing a petition for the certification election under Section 11. The Med – Arbiter ruled that the petition for the cancellation of union registration was not a bar to the holding of the certification election. this petition. insisting on the illegitimacy of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC. Issue: Will the certification election prosper? Ruling: YES. It is for the petitioner to expedite the cancellation case if it wants to put an end to the certification case. Rule XI of Department Order No. A motion for reconsideration was filed but the same was denied. but it cannot place the issue of the union’s legitimacy in the certification case. The DOLE Secretary denied the appeal and affirmed the ruling of the med – arbiter. 9. and that a collateral attack against the personality of the labor organization was prohibited under Section 5. that the appropriate remedy was to exclude the ineligible employees from the bargaining unit during the inclusion-exclusion proceedings.

the filing of the petition for the cancellation of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC’s registration should not bar the conduct of the certification election. false statement or fraud in connection with the adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto. In that respect. Thus.as the certification election is concerned.which reads: Article 238-A. 9481 amended Article 239 to read: ART. not even a mere allegation that some employees participating in a petition for certification election are actually managerial employees will lend an employer legal personality to block the certification election. it cannot interfere with. This rule is now enshrined in Article 238-A of the Labor Code. Effect of a Petition for Cancellation of Registration. – A petition for cancellation of union registration shall not suspend the proceedings for certification election nor shall it prevent the filing of a petition for certification election. and the list of members who took part in . The choice of their representative is the exclusive concern of the employees. Thus.--The following may constitute grounds for cancellation of union registration: (a) Misrepresentation. the minutes of ratification. as amended by Republic Act No.A. the employer cannot have any partisan interest therein. For that reason. only a final order for the cancellation of the registration would have prevented NUWHRAIN-HHMSC from continuing to enjoy all the rights conferred on it as a legitimate labor union. too. for the purpose thereof is to determine which organization will represent the employees in their collective bargaining with the employer. The employer's only right in the proceeding is to be notified or informed thereof. including the right to the petition for the certification election. 9481. Except when it is requested to bargain collectively. and should stand aside as a mere bystander who could not oppose the petition. the petitioner lacked the legal personality to assail the proceedings for the certification election. or even appeal the Med-Arbiter’s orders relative to the conduct of the certification election. an employer is a mere bystander to any petition for certification election. No. the process by filing a motion to dismiss or an appeal from it. The petitioner’s meddling in the conduct of the certification election among its employees unduly gave rise to the suspicion that it intended to establish a company union. such proceeding is nonadversarial and merely investigative. Under the long established rule. 239. R. the challenges it posed against the certification election proceedings were rightly denied. much less oppose. Grounds for Cancellation of Union Registration.

or amendments thereto. the minutes of ratification. minutes of the election of officers. and (d) Its list of members at least once a year or whenever required by the Bureau. (c) Voluntary dissolution by the members. Reportorial Requirements.--The following are documents required to be submitted to the Bureau by the legitimate labor organization concerned: (a) Its constitution and by-laws. 242-A.the ratification. and the list of voters. . or any appropriate penalty. (b) Misrepresentation. Failure to comply with the above requirements shall not be a ground for cancellation of union registration but shall subject the erring officers or members to suspension. and the list of members who took part in the ratification of the constitution and by-laws within thirty (30) days from adoption or ratification of the constitution and by-laws or amendments thereto. which provides: ART. minutes of the election of officers. and list of voters within thirty (30) days from election. (c) Its annual financial report within thirty (30) days after the close of every fiscal year. The ruling thereby wrote finis to the challenge being posed by the petitioner against the illegitimacy of NUWHRAIN-HHMSC. (b) Its list of officers. No. false statements or fraud in connection with the election of officers. expulsion from membership. 9481 also inserted in the Labor Code Article 242-A.A. R.

for the collection. of uncollected service charges for the last quarter of 1998 amounting to P2. Specifically. The PPHI and the Union executed the “Third Rank-and-File Collective Bargaining Agreement as Amended” (CBA).61. The CBA provisions merely reiterated similar provisions found in the PPHI-Union’s earlier collective bargaining agreement executed. transportation.” The Union presented this audit report to the PPHI’s management during the Labor Management Cooperation Meeting (LMCM). The Union’s Service Charge Committee informed the Union President. of a ten percent (10%) service charge on the sale of food. The CBA provided. July 23.R. Negotiated Contracts. laundry and rooms. G. through an audit report (1st audit report). Inc. INC.467. (2) the revenues did not belong to the PPHI .063.Topic: Service Charges. No. (PPHI).” and (3) “Staff and Promo.952.88 out of the P2. Brion NATIONAL UNION OF WORKERS IN HOTEL RESTAURANT AND ALLIED INDUSTRIES (NUWHRAIN-APL-IUF). by the PPHI. the PPHI admitted liability for P80. Special Rates Ponente: Justice Arturo D. Through a letter. among others. PHILIPPINE PLAZA CHAPTER v. the audit report referred to the service charges from the following items: (1) “Journal Vouchers. The PPHI’s management responded that the Hotel Financial Controller would need to verify the audit report. 2014 Facts:The Union is the collective bargaining agent of the rank-and-file employees of respondent Philippine Plaza Holdings. beverage. PHILIPPINE PLAZA HOLDINGS.” (2) “Banquet Other Revenue. 177524.467.61 that the Union claimed as uncollected service charges..952. The PPHI denied the rest of the Union’s claims because: (1) they were exempted from the service charge being revenues from “special promotions” (revenue from the Westin Gold Card sales) or “negotiated contracts” (alleged revenue from the Maxi-Media contract).

in relation with Article 96 of the Labor Code.” The Union’s Service Charge Committee made another service charge audit report for the years 1997.” .” The PHHI went to the CA on a petition for certiorari after the NLRC denied its motion for reconsideration.” The Union President presented the 3rd audit report to the PPHI. (2) “Banquet and Other Revenue. The parties agreed to refer the matter to a third party for the solution.” (3) “Promotions. they either fall within the CBA-excepted “Negotiated Contracts” and “Special Rates” or did not involve “a sale of food. In its formal reply (to the PPHI’s letter) (2nd audit report). NLRC reversed the LA’s decision and considered the specified entries/transactions as “service chargeable. No service charges were due from the specified entries/transactions. Ruling: No. The Union filed the present petition after the CA denied its motion for reconsideration in the CA’s resolution. the Union modified its claims. 1998 and 1999 (3rd audit report).566.” and (3) “Staff and Promo.Westin Gold Revenue and Maxi-Media” (F&B and Rooms Barter).62 from the following entries: (1) “Journal Vouchers. transportation.Excepted from the coverage of the 10% service charge are the so-called “negotiated contracts” and “special rates.007. filed before the LA (Regional Arbitration Branch of the NLRC) a complaint for non-payment of specified service charges and unfair labor practice.” (2) “Guaranteed No Show. beverage.but to third-party suppliers. During the LMCM. They considered two options – voluntary arbitration or court action – and promised to get back to each other on their chosen option. and (3) no revenue was realized from these transactions as they were actually expenses incurred for the benefit of executives or by way of good-will to clients and government officials. LA dismissed the Union’s complaint for lack of merit. When the parties failed to reach an agreement. the Union. the Union maintained its position on uncollected service charges so that a deadlock on the issue ensued. Section 68 states that the sale of food. beverage.” and (4) “F & B Revenue. laundry and rooms are subject to service charge at the rate of ten percent (10%). It claimed uncollected service charges from: (1) “Journal Vouchers . It affirmed the LA’s decision. This 3rd audit report reflected total uncollected service charges of P5. The CA granted the PPHI’s petition. Issue: Whether or not service charges should have been collected (and distributed to the covered employees) for the specified entries/transactions. etc.” The Union anchors its claim for services charges on Sections 68 and 69 of the CBA.

Excepted from the coverage are. the CA found the specified entries/transactions as either falling under the excepted negotiated contracts and/or special rates or not involving a sale of food.” Second. transportation. beverage. A constricted interpretation of this term.Following the wordings of Section 68 of the CBA. laundry and rooms. non-sale transactions or transactions that do not involve any sale even though they involve “food. must be positively shown either by the wordings of the CBA or by sufficient evidence of the parties’ intention to limit its application. The CA also found no factual and evidentiary basis to support the Union’s claim for service charges on the entries “Guaranteed No show” and “F & B Revenue. it considered the entries “Westin Gold Cards Revenue” and “Maxi Media Barter” to be negotiated contracts or contracts under special rates. beverage.” resulting from “negotiated contracts” and/or “special rates. the literal meaning of its stipulations shall prevail.” Nonetheless.e..” resulting from “negotiated contracts” and “special rates. beverage. as applicable to “airlines contracts” only. etc. but not involving “food. beverage. transactions that involve a sale but do not involve “food.. transactions involving “negotiated contracts” and “special rates” i. etc. With particular reference to “negotiated contracts. beverage. i.and (3) the sale does not result from negotiated contracts and/or at special rates. the term “negotiated contracts” should be read as applying to all types of negotiated contracts and not to “airlines contracts” only. all transactions involving a “sale of food.” non-sale transactions involving “food.” and sale transactions. This is in line with the basic rule of construction that when the terms are clear and leave no doubt upon the intention of the contracting parties. etc. as correctly declared by the CA.” resulting from “negotiated contracts” or at “special rates. In plain terms.” And third. first.” either from the wordings of the CBA or from the evidence. In reversing the NLRC’s ruling and denying the Union’s claim.” the CBA does not confine its application to “airline contracts” as argued by the Union. beverage. beverage. etc.e. The Union completely failed to provide support for its constricted reading of the term “negotiated contracts. (2) the sale transaction covers food. transportation. etc. beverage. etc. a “sale of food. three requisites must be present for the provisions on service charges to operate: (1) the transaction from which service charge is sought to be collected is a sale. the CBA likewise does not explicitly limit the use of these terms to specified transactions. etc. beverage.” . Thus. laundry and rooms” are generally covered..” Notably. and the entries “Business Promotions” and “Gift Certificates” as contracts that did not involve a sale of food. the CBA does not specifically define the terms “negotiated contracts” and “special rates. Specifically.

Sereno JORAINA DRAGON TALOSIG v. . The vessel is owned by respondent Holland American Line Wastours. July 28.." He boarded MS Zuiderdamon 26 August 2005. United Philippine Line.A. No. He passed the PEME and was declared "fit to work. Talosig underwent the required Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) prior to his deployment. 198388. 2014 Facts: Petitioner is the widow of Vladimir Talosig.R. The duration of the contract was twelve (12) months. G. a seafarer hired as an assistant butcher in the ship MS Zuiderdam. through its local manning agent.Topic: Entitlement to Death Benefits Ponente: Chief Justice Maria Lourdes P. UNITED PHILIPPINE LINES. INC. Talosig and respondent executed a Contract of Employment incorporating the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (Standard Employment Contract) as prescribed by the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA). Inc. Inc.

or that colon cancer was an accepted occupational disease. and (2) that there was neither any showing that the cause of his death was one of those covered by the POEA Standard Employment Contract. Thereafter. Ruling: No. A Petition for Certiorari was filed by petitioner with the CA. he was confined in the South Miami Hospital sometime after suffering a month of rectal bleeding and lower abdominal pain. It ruled that the LA erred when it formed its own scenarios. It is . The appellate court affirmed the NLRC and held that the death of a seafarer is compensable only if it occurs during the term of his contract of employment. nor was there any proof that it was work-related. the NLRC found that his death occurred after the termination of his contract. There he was diagnosed to be suffering from Stage IV colon cancer. Furthermore. The labor arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of petitioner and ordered respondents to pay USD 50. Upon appeal. and USD 1.000 as entitlement of one minorchild.During his employment with respondent. Petitioner is not entitled to the death benefits based on two grounds: (1) that at the time of his death. however. likely contributing to the worsening of petitioner’s condition.000 as death benefits. the obligation to pay the death benefits ceased in accordance with the parties’employment contract. Petitioner thereafter filed a Complaint with the NLRC for death benefits. It also stated that petitioner failed to provide sufficient proof that the illness was reasonably connected to Talosig’s work. He was then diagnosed with a "malignant neoplasm infiltrating colonic mucosa. Stage IV (bone metastasis).000 as burial benefits. damages and attorney’s fees. a fact that should have been the ground for the outright dismissal of petitioner’s claim. The CA further held that Talosig’s illness was not one of the occupational diseases enumeratedin the POEA Standard Employment Contract for seafarers. surmises and conclusions on what could have caused petitioner’s colon cancer on board the vessel. Upon Talosig’s medical repatriation. USD 7. it took judicial notice of the fact that the diet of the ship’s crew seldomcontained vegetables and high-fiber foods. Upon arrival in the Philippines. he was immediately confined at the Asian Hospital. Talosig was no longer under the employment of respondents. Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to the death benefits as claimed. he was medically repatriated. the NLRC reversed the ruling of the LA." Subsequently. The LA held that petitioner had failed to establish that Talosig’s death was reasonably connected to his work. he passed away as a result of cardiopulmonary arrest secondary to sepsis and multiple organ failure secondary to colon cancer.

Petitioner merely relied on presumption of causality.contributed to the disease contracted by Talosig. however. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the described risks.undeniable that the death of a seafarer must have occurred during the term of his contract of employment for it to be compensable. 4. Further. She failed either to establish or even to mention the risks that could have caused or. the Court cannot grant death benefits to his heirs based on mere presumptions. . The CA ruled that upon his repatriation. be read together with Section 32-A on the conditions to be satisfied for an illness to be compensable. It must reach the level of relevant evidence that a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion. Colon cancer is not one of those types of cancer that are compensable under Section 32 of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. The petitioner did not present any proof of a causal connection or at least a work relation between the employment of Talosig and his colon cancer. or compound products or residues of these substances. epithellematous or ulceration ofthe skin or of the corneal surface of the eye due to tar. however. Absent of any substantial proof of the causal connection between the disease of Talosig and his work. repatriated for medical reasons on 24 December 2005. pitch. Section 20 of the same Contract also states that those illnesses not listed under Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. Section 20 should. only two types of cancers are listed as occupational diseases – (1) Cancer of the epithelial lining of the bladder (papilloma of the bladder). bitumen. but must be able to present no less than substantial evidence to support her claim. For an occupational disease and the resulting disability or death to be compensable. at the very least. mineral oil or paraffin. 3. Under Section 32-A of the POEA Standard Contract. He was. Records show that the contract of Talosig was for the duration of 12 months commencing on the date of his actual departure from point of hire. and (2) cancer. the claimant must not merely rely on the disputable presumption. 2. Substantial evidence ismore than a mere scintilla. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it. The seafarer’s work must involve the risk described herein. all the following conditions must be established: 1. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. his employment was effectively terminated pursuant to Section 18 B(1)of the POEA Standard Employment Contract.

JOERALYN D.R. DELA CRUZ and VILMA MALUNES. No. 198093. July 28. J. G. FLP ENTERPRISES INC.Topic: Valid / Just Cause for Dismissal Ponente: Diosdado M. 2014 . Peralta.FRANCESCO SHOES v. . MA.

The CA set aside the NLRC ruling and pronounced respondents as having been illegally dismissed by FLPE. and implemented in all its retail outlets. The investigating authorities found that it resulted from an "inside job" since the cash register remained closed and there was no indication of forced entry into the store. Ruling: Yes. Upon appeal. respondents elevated the case to the CA. The LA dismissed respondents’ claim and held that FLPE was able to sufficiently prove that respondents were guilty of habitually violating the company standard procedure on safekeeping of cash collection.372. On March 10.75. Substantial evidence is also necessary for an employer to effectuate any dismissal. Gross negligence entails want of care in the performance of one’s duties. imputing grave abuse of discretion on the NLRC’s part. Subsequently. respondents filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against the company. It is a fundamental rule that an employee can be discharged from employment only for a valid cause. Here. Because of the several previous incidents of theft in its retail outlets. They both denied the existence of such company policy and having knowledge thereof. petitioner formulated a policy requiring its sales staff to keep the sales proceeds in the stockroom instead of the cash register. neglect of duty must be both gross and habitual. depending on the circumstances. both the LA and the NLRC found that respondents have been validly terminated for gross and habitual neglect of duties. amounting to 26.Facts: Petitioner FLPE hired respondent Dela Cruz in 1991 and respondent Malunes in 1998 as sales ladies and assigned them both at its Alabang Town Center store in Muntinlupa City. Issue: Whether or not Dela Cruz and Malunes were illegally dismissed by FLPE. It contended that respondents clearly violated its company policy prohibiting sales proceeds from being stored in the cash register. were missing. Accordingly. 2008. Uncorroborated assertions and accusations by the employer would . Aggrieved. constituting just cause for termination under Article 282 of the Labor Code. while habitual neglect imparts repeated failure to perform such duties for a period of time. FLPE thereafter removed respondents from service. 2008. posted. Petitioner alleged that said policy was properly announced. it was discovered that the store’s sales proceeds for March 7 to March 9. the NLRC affirmed the LA Decision in its entirety. particularly in Alabang Town Center. Dela Cruz and Malunes submitted their respective written explanations. FLPE thus required respondents to explain in writing why they should not be terminated. As a valid ground for dismissal under said provision.

FLPE could likewise have simply called some of its employees to testify on the rule’s existence. and convincing. that it was. and strict implementation. FLPE adduced nothing more. . FLPE claims that its company policy that requires its sales managers and staff to keep the sales proceeds in a shoebox in the stockroom and not inside the cash register. and a copy of the supposed policy. It must be stressed that the evidence to prove this fact must be clear. and if it does truly exist. running afoul of the State’s clear duty to show compassion and afford the utmost protection to laborers. Neither is there anything in the records which reveals that the dismissed respondents were informed of said policy. 2003. and implemented the subject Safekeeping Policy in all its retail stores. especially the one in Alabang Town Center. and legal cause for the termination of employment. The company vehemently insists that it posted. thus. the law considers the matter a case of illegal dismissal.not suffice. indeed. To rule otherwise and simply allow the presumption as to the existence and dissemination of the supposed company policy would lead to a proliferation of fabricated notices. FLPE miserably failed to discharge this burden. in order to sustain herein respondents’ dismissal. positive. Workers could then be arbitrarily terminated without much of an effort. 2) the dismissed employee must have been properly informed of said policy. 3) actions or omissions on the part of the dismissed employee manifesting deliberate refusal or wilfuldisregard of said company policy. the constitutional guaranty of security of tenure would be put in jeopardy. The one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it. and entice further abuse by unscrupulous persons. But aside from its self-serving and uncorroborated declaration. posted and/or disseminated accordingly. they have been notified of the existence of said company rule and that they have received. In this case. have been in existence since October 23. and understood the same. valid. read. FLPE should prove its allegation that it terminated respondents for a valid and just cause. however. When there is no showing of a clear. dissemination. It could have easily produced a copy of said memorandum bearing the signatures of Dela Cruz and Malunes to show that. FLPE must show. Unfortunately. In termination cases. otherwise. FLPE failed to establish that such a company policy actually exists. and 4) such actions or omissions have occurred repeatedly. However. announced. It. in fact. the burden of proof rests on the employer to show that the dismissal is for a just cause. that the following are extant: 1) the existence of the subject company policy. by substantial evidence. as the CA correctly ruled. failed to substantiate said claim.

valid. an employer has the discretion to regulate all aspects of employment and the workers have the corresponding obligation to obey company rules and regulations. However. and any justification that the disobedient employee might put forth is deemed inconsequential. FLPE is indubitably guilty of illegal dismissal.True. the Court must emphasize that the prerogative of an employer to dismiss an employee on the ground of willful disobedience to company policies must be exercised in good faith and with due regard to the rights of labor For lack of any clear. Deliberately disregarding or disobeying the rules cannot be countenanced. . and just cause in terminating respondents' employment.

R. the NLRC ruled that Alcantara is not an employee but a mere independent contractor of Royale Homes. appointed Alcantara as its Marketing Director for a fixed period of one year. Royale Homes had no control on how Alcantara would accomplish his tasks and responsibilities as he was free to solicit sales at any time and by any manner which he may deem appropriate and necessary. vehemently denied that Alcantara is its employee. J. and that the acts of the executive officers of Royale Homes amounted to his dismissal from work without any valid or just cause and in gross disregard of the proper procedure for dismissing employees.Employee Relationship Ponente: Mariano C. Alcantara alleged that he is a regular employee of Royale Homes since he is performing tasks that are necessary and desirable to its business. 195190 July 28. No. It based its ruling mainly on the contract which does not require Alcantara to observe regular working hours. In addition. It argued that the appointment paper of Alcantara is clear that it engaged his services as an independent sales contractor for a fixed term of one year only. 2003 and that the pre-termination of his contract was against the law. He was also free to adopt the selling methods he deemed most effective and can even recruit sales agents to assist him in marketing the inventories of .Topic: Existence of Employer . 2014 Facts: Royale Homes. Royale Homes. He never received any salary. ROYALE HOMES MARKETING CORPORATION v. moral and exemplary damages. Alcantara filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal against Royale Homes and its Executives. His work consisted mainly of marketing Royale Homes’ real estate inventories on an exclusive basis. overtime pay or holiday pay from Royale Homes as he was paid purely on commission basis. as well as to be paid backwages. a corporation engaged in marketing real estates. the last of which covered the period January 1 to December 31. FIDEL P. del Castillo. Upon appeal. on the other hand. He is even free to recruit his own sales personnel to assist him in pursuance of his sales target. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision holding that Alcantara is an employee of Royale Homes with a fixed-term employment period from January 1 to December 31. 2003 where he held the position of Division 5 Vice-PresidentSales. ALCANTARA. Royale Homes reappointed him for several consecutive years. He prayed to be reinstated to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges. 13th month pay. G.

Among the four. regulations. in view of the conflicting findings of the tribunals below. it held that Alcantara is an employee of Royale Homes. is subject to company rules.” This holds true where the issues to be resolved is whether a person who performs work for another is the latter’s employee or is an independent contractor. Ruling: No. regulations. . but a mere independent contractor. In determining the existence of an employer-employee relationship. the rules imposed by the hiring party on the hired party do not amount to the labor law concept of control that is indicative of employer-employee relationship. (3) the power of dismissal. Being an independent contractor. The NLRC also considered the fact that Alcantara was not receiving monthly salary. However. as observed by the CA. He was also bound by the company code of ethics. employeremployee relationship is deemed to exist. and (4) the employer’s power to control the employee with respect to the means and methods by which the work is to be accomplished. and code of ethics does not necessarily become an employee. A person who performs work for another and is subjected to its rules. Alcantara thus filed a Petition for Certiorari with the CA which granted said petition and reversed the NLRC’s Decision. the Court has generally relied on the four-fold test. but also the means by which such end is reached. As long as the level of control does not interfere with the means and methods of accomplishing the assigned tasks. as in this case. the Court is constrained to go over the factual matters involved in this case. (2) the payment of wages. However. not every form of control is indicative of employer-employee relationship. Issue: Whether or not Alcantara is an employee of Royale Homes.Royale Homes. the most determinative factor in ascertaining the existence of employer-employee relationship is the “right of control test”. Applying the four-fold and economic reality tests. to wit: (1) the selection and engagement of the employee. For where the person for whom the services are performed reserves the right to control not only the end to be achieved. and periodic evaluations. “It is deemed to be such an important factor that the other requisites may even be disregarded. is not within the province of the Supreme Court. Royale Homes exercised some degree of control over Alcantara since his job. Alcantara is not an employee of Royale Homes. the NLRC concluded that Alcantara’s Complaint is cognizable by the regular courts. but was being paid on commission basis as stipulated in the contract. The determination of whether a party who renders services to another is an employee or an independent contractor involves an evaluation of factual matters which. ordinarily.

The absence of control over the means and methods disproves employer-employee relationship. the provision on the absence of employer-employee relationship between the parties can be an aid in considering the Agreement and its implementation. The element of payment of wages is also absent in this case. Inc. Alcantara’s remunerations consist only of commission override of 0. At the same time. As provided in the contract. the contract. There is no proof that he received fixed monthly salary.. x xx the characterization of the juridical relationship the Agreement embodied is a matter of law that is for the courts to determine.). In Tongko v. Likewise. At the very least. While the existence of employer-employee relationship is a matter of law. particularly in this case where the parties’ written contract unequivocally states their intention at the time they entered into it. It is clear that they did not want to be bound by employer-employee relationship at the time of the signing of the contract. conspicuously provides that “no employer-employee relationship exists between” Royale Homes and Alcantara. and highlights his satisfactory services warranting the renewal of such contract. though." In this case. the Agreement’s legal characterization of the nature of the relationship cannot be conclusive and binding on the courts. and in appreciating the other evidence on record. and they were governed by this understanding throughout their relationship. duly signed and not disputed by the parties. the repeated hiring of Alcantara does not prove the existence of employer-employee relationship. as well as his sales agents.5%. sales incentive and other forms of company support. it was held that: "To be sure. the characterization the parties gave to their relationship in the Agreement cannot simply be brushed aside because it embodies their intent at the time they entered the Agreement. budget allocation. (Phils. . The continuous rehiring of Alcantara simply signifies the renewal of his contract with Royale Homes. The Manufacturers Life Insurance Co.The primary evidence of the nature of the parties’ relationship in this case is the written contract that they signed and executed in pursuance of their mutual agreement. the characterization made by the parties in their contract as to the nature of their juridical relationship cannot be simply ignored.

July 30. mainly. Nowella Reyes G. the HRDO. No.R. and the encashment of various crossed checks payable to the University Treasurer by Chinabank despite management’s intention to merely have the funds covered thereby transferred from one of petitioner’s bank accounts to another. 2004. respondent Nowella Reyes was appointed as WUP's University Treasurer on probationary basis. . JR. submitted an Investigation Report to the University President containing its findings and recommending respondent’s dismissal as University Treasurer. 2014 Facts: On March 16. Finding respondent’s Explanation unsatisfactory. A little over a year after. 208321. Respondent submitted her Explanation. WUP’s Human Resources Development Office (HRDO) conducted an investigation. Wesleyan University-Philippines v. Discovered following an audit were irregularities in the handling of petitioner’s finances. VELASCO. Following which. she was appointed as full time University Treasurer. Among its first acts was to engage the services of Nepomuceno Suner & Associates Accounting Firm (External Auditor) to investigate circulating rumors on alleged anomalies in the contracts entered into by petitioner and in its finances. the encashment by its Treasury Department of checks issued to WUP personnel. A new WUP Board of Trustees was constituted. a practice purportedly in violation of the imprest system of cash management.Topic: Termination due to trust and confidence Ponente: PRESBITERO J.

Article 282. The CA. Issue: Whether respondent Nowella Reyes' termination as University Treasurer of petitioner Wesleyan University . in the normal exercise of his or her functions. thus. respondent post-haste filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission.Philippines (WUP) on the ground of loss of trust and confidence was valid. the instant petition. Labor Arbiter Reynaldo V. regularly handles significant amounts of money or property of the employer. Petitioner filed an appeal with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) which was granted in the tribunal’s Decision. who.Upon receipt of her notice of termination. Hence. void and unjust. Ruling: Yes. declaring that respondent was legally dismissed. Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative. through its assailed Decision found the NLRC’s ruling tainted with grave abuse of discretion and reinstated the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. Termination by employer. The first requisite is that the employee concerned must be one holding a position of trust and confidence. The second requisite is that the loss of confidence must be based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts. or (2) a fiduciary rank-and-file employee. Abdon rendered a Decision finding that complainant was illegally dismissed by respondent Wesleyan University Philippines. She contended that her dismissal was illegal. . An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: xxxx c. one who is either: (1) a managerial employee.

Indeed. in fact admitted. respondent did not deny. At the end of the day. co-mingled with other funds or spent for other purposes. the Treasury Department made disbursements . not being a bank. based on a willful breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts as required by jurisprudence. Clearly. stolen. respondent put the funds covered thereby under the risk of being lost. her involvement in the irregularities attending to petitioner’s finances has also been proved. Here. as aptly detailed in the auditor’s report. actual and real breach of duty committed by respondent. had no business encashing the checks of its personnel. in encashing the said checks. Furthermore. the encashment of the three hundred thousand peso (PhP 300. As it were.The presence of the first requisite is certain. the question of whether she was a managerial or rank-and file employee does not matter in this case because not only is there basis for believing that she breached the trust of her employer.000) crossed check payable to the University Treasurer which covered the total amount of the "love gift" for administrative and academic officials of WUP. Jurisprudence has pronounced that the crossing of a check means that the check may not be encashed but only deposited in the bank. the Court finds that petitioner adequately proved respondent’s dismissal was for a just cause. WUP. disregarded management’s intentions and ignored the measures in place to secure the handling of WUP’s funds. respondent. the issuance of a crossed check reflects management’s intention to safeguard the funds covered thereby. By encashing the crossed checks. First. there was an admitted. Here. respondent knew or is at least expected to be aware of and abide by this basic banking practice and commercial custom. its special instruction to have the same deposited to another account and its restriction on its encashment. More importantly. So is as regards the second requisite. As Treasurer. the accommodation and encashment by the Treasury Department of checks issued to WUP personnel were highly irregular. which translates into a breach of trust and confidence in her.

and not from the cash available in the Treasury Department. . a poorly disguised afterthought. A company has the right to dismiss its employees if only as a measure of self-protection. the prevalence of this practice could have been contained if only respondent consistently observed the regular procedure for encashing crossed checks and properly handled requests for accommodation of checks issued to the WUP personnel.contrary to the wishes of management because. let it be remembered that respondent was not an ordinary rank-and-file employee as she was no less the Treasurer who was in charge of the coffers of the University. when her unbecoming carelessness in managing WUP’s finances was exposed. This is all the more true in the case of supervisors or personnel occupying positions of responsibility. In employer cannot be compelled to retain an employee who is guilty of acts inimical to the interests of the employer. It would be oppressive to require petitioner to retain in their management an officer who has admitted to knowingly and intentionally committing acts which jeopardized its finances and who was untrustworthy in the handling and custody of University funds. in issuing said checks. This was simply respondent’s convenient excuse. under a specific account. management has made clear its intention that monies therefor would be sourced from petitioner’s deposit with Chinabank. That the encashment of crossed checks and payment of checks directly to WUP personnel had been the practice of the previous and present administration of petitioner is of no moment. Moreover. In this case.

Tomas (UST).Topic: Grievance Procedure Ponente: ANTONIO T. University of Sto. University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union (USTFU) demanded from University of Sto. 2007. USTFU also sent UST a letter accompanied by a summary of its claims pursuant to their 1996-2001 CBA. July 30. remittance of the total amount of P65. Arceo informed USTFU that the aforesaid benefits were not meant to be given annually but rather as a one-time allocation or contribution to the fund. 2014 Facts: In a letter dated February 6. USTFU filed against UST. Fr. representing deficiency in its contribution to the medical and hospitalization fund ("fund") of UST’s faculty members. G.00 plus legal interest thereon. its contributions not only for the years 19961997 but also for the subsequent years. It contended that the case falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators because it involves the interpretation and implementation of the provisions of the CBA. through its Rector. O. UST sought the dismissal of the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction. 203957. ("Fr. USTFU then sent UST another demand letter reiterating its position that UST is obliged to remit to the fund. but to no avail. Arceo").000. Arceo. Fr. a complaint for unfair labor practice before the arbitration branch of the NLRC. Ernesto M.000. Thus. and the conflict between the herein parties must be resolved as grievance under the CBA and not as unfair labor practice.R. No. UST’s motion to dismiss was . CARPIO University of Santo Tomas Faculty Union v. Tomas.P.

it was clearly error for the LA to assume jurisdiction over the present case. which is defined in Article 261 as "flagrant and/or malicious refusal to comply with the economic provisions" of the CBA. The NLRC granted USTFU’s appeal and denied UST’s appeal for lack of merit. Article 261 of the Labor Code further provides that all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the CBA. specifically those concerning the fund. are under the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. Excluded from this original and exclusive jurisdiction is gross violation of the CBA. The NLRC Seventh Division. had jurisdiction over the interpretation of the CBA. Therefore. The CA stated that since USTFU’s ultimate objective is to clarify the relevant items in the CBA. and not LA. In a Resolution. Despite the allegation that UST refused to comply with the economic provisions of the 1996-2001 CBA. then USTFU’s complaint should have been filed with the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators.00 award had no basis.000. the P80. however. UST appealed the Order to the NLRC.denied by the LA in its August 8. The Labor Arbiter has no jurisdiction over the present case. and the fund should be remitted to the Hospital and Medical Benefits Committee. the NLRC denied UST’s motion for reconsideration for lack of merit. as stated in the CBA. we cannot characterize UST’s refusal as . not to USTFU. The CA disposed of the present case by agreeing with UST’s argument that the LA and the NLRC did not have jurisdiction to hear and decide the present case. dismissed the appeal and remanded the case to the LA.000. Article 217(c) of the Labor Code provides that the Labor Arbiter shall refer to the grievance machinery and voluntary arbitration as provided in the CBA those cases that involve the interpretation of said agreements. UST again claimed that the Voluntary Arbitrator. We see that UST and USTFU’s misunderstanding arose solely from their differing interpretations of the CBA’s provisions on economic benefits. The SC affirmed with modification the ruling of the CA. The case should have been resolved through the voluntary arbitrator or panel of voluntary arbitrators. The LA ruled in favor of USTFU. 2008 order. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals departed from the usual course of judicial proceedings in holding that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have no jurisdiction over the complaint for unfair labor practice (ULP) filed by USTFU. including violations of said agreement. UST filed a motion for reconsideration of the NLRC decision. Ruling: No.

and ignored Steps III and IV. to rule out any referral to voluntary arbitration." Section 2 excludes only termination and preventive suspension from the grievance procedure. and that the filing of a complaint before the LA is proper in the absence of a voluntary arbitration clause in the 1996-2001 CBA’s Article XXII: Permanent University-Union Committee. USTFU actually went beyond the text of the 1996-2001 CBA when it claimed that the integrated tuition fee increase as described in Section 1D(2) is the basis for UST’s alleged deficiency. USTFU’s adamant refusal to consider voluntary arbitration ignores Articles 261 to 262-A of the Labor Code. PUUC is established for "continuing problems and irritants which will require the continuing attention" of UST and USTFU. application or violation of any provisions of this Agreement or any complaint that a covered faculty member may have against the UNIVERSITY. as provided in the 1996-2001 CBA. as well as Steps III and IV of Section 3 of the 1996-2001 CBA. USTFU argues that the PUUC is the proper forum to resolve the issue. USTFU’s focus is on the 1996-2001 CBA’s provisions about the grievance process rather than the provision about the subject matters covered by the grievance process. . Despite UST’s alleged violation of the economic provisions of the CBA by its insufficient remittances to the fund. However. in fact."flagrant and/or malicious. We cannot subscribe to USTFU’s view that the 1996-2001 CBA’s Article X: Grievance Machinery is not applicable to the present case. USTFU insists on a literal interpretation of the 1996-2001 CBA. USTFU concludes that the 1996-2001 CBA’s provisions on grievance machinery only refer to a grievance of a faculty member against UST. UST’s literal interpretation of the CBA was. Clearly. the present case falls under Section 1’s definition of grievance:"any misunderstanding concerning policies and practices directly affecting faculty members covered by this collective bargaining agreement or their working conditions in the UNIVERSITY or any dispute arising as to the meaning. Indeed. the PUUC addresses matters not covered by the CBA. a dispute arising as to the meaning. To our mind. what led USTFU to file its complaint." Indeed. When the issue is about the grievance procedure. and that said provisions do not contemplate a situation where USTFU itself has a grievance against UST. application or violation of the CBA. USTFU used Step I in Section 3.

for and in behalf of its principal.Topic: Permanent disability benefits and sickness allowance Ponente: BIENVENIDO L. (Fairdeal). The employment contract was originally for a period of nine (9) months from July .00.300. REYES Status Maritime Corp. v. 198097. No.R. July 30. Spouses Delalamon G. as Chief Engineer with a monthly basic salary of US$1. Fairdeal Group Management S. 2014 Facts: Margarito was hired by Status Maritime Corporation (Status Maritime).A.

26. Loma B. the petitioners argued that Margarito concealed his illness when he was subjected to a Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) hence disqualified from claiming disability benefits. Status Maritime and its President. M/T Fair Jolly. he was brought to Las Piñas Doctor’s Hospital where he underwent a series of clinical and laboratory tests. Margarito was diagnosed with "Renal Insufficiency: Diabetes Mellitus. Margarito was found to be sufferingfrom "End Stage Renal Disease 2 Diabetic Nephropathy. When Margarito’s medical condition worsened. for diagnosis and treatment. He was sent to the National Medical Center at the Port of Fujairah. 2007 of Dr. 2006 but Margarito later on requested for. 2005 and forthwith discharged his duties. 2007. Salazar-Montemayor dated January 17. Based thereon." He was medically repatriated. Margarito complained of loss of appetite." The respondents averred that the petitioners failed to provide any medical assistance the entire time that Margarito was undergoing medical treatments for an illness he acquired while in their employ. sickness allowance. Elizabeth B. The LA found no merit in the respondents’ complaint for the reason that Margarito’s illness is not work-related. 2007. Pending the decision of the LA. According to the respondents. and was granted. Margarito’s illness is not compensable based on the medical report dated May 17. He was again hospitalized. In September 2006. He thus sought to rest athome and failed to report to the petitioners. while the vessel was in United Arab Emirates (UAE). Wilanie Romero Dacanay of the Marine Medical Services of Metropolitan Medical Center stating that "Chronic Kidney Disease secondary to Diabetic Nephropathy" is NOT work-related. extension until October 2006. His cause of death was "CVA" or Cardiovascular Accident. Margarito died on September 11. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s ruling and added that Margarito did . In a Medical Report. IHD Blood+CBC+Anemia. Based on the medical certificate issued by Dr. Margarito was physically weak when he arrived in the Philippines. UAE. Aguiman (petitioners). Margarito and his wife Priscila (respondents) filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter (LA) for the payment of permanent disability benefits. on July 26. damages and attorney’s fees against Fairdeal. Margarito left Manila to join the vessel. 2005 to April 26. According to the petitioners. M/T Fair Jolly. Priscilla nonetheless notified the petitioners of Margarito’s condition through a certain Allan Lopez.

not even bother to comply with the mandatory requirement of reporting to the petitioners’ office within three (3) days from his disembarkation for postemployment medical examination pursuant to Section 20 (B)[3] of the POEASEC. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS xxxx E. his physical condition was already deteriorating and was in need of urgent medical attention. The respondents elevated the case to the CA and. The CA reversed the findings of the labor tribunals. through Allan Lopez. (Emphasis ours) The fact that Margarito passed his PEME cannot excuse his willful concealment nor can it preclude the petitioners from rejecting his disability claims. Thus. A seafarer who knowingly conceals and does not disclose past medical condition. the present appeal. This may also be a valid ground for termination of employment and imposition of the appropriate administrative and legal sanctions. it could not be expected of him to prioritize the reporting requirement before attending to his medical needs. SECTION 20. The CA held that Margarito was exempt from complying with the 3-day mandatory reporting requirement because when he arrived in the Philippines. Also. his wife actually notified the petitioners of his medical condition. Hence. Issue: Whether the CA erred in finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC when the latter affirmed the LA's dismissal of Margarito's complaint for permanent disability benefits and sickness allowance Ruling: Yes. disability and history in the pre-employment medical examination constitutes fraudulent misrepresentation and shall disqualify him from any compensation and benefits. The PEME is nothing more than a summary examination of the seafarer’s physiological condition. it merely determines whether one is "fit to work" at sea or "fit for . The petitioners moved for reconsideration but the motion was denied in the CA Resolution. in support of their position that Margarito’s illness is work-related by a medical evaluation. PEME is not exploratory and does not allow the employer to discover any and all pre-existing medical condition with which the seafarer is suffering and for which he may be presently taking medication.

This means that he did not acquire his illness while working in the petitioner’s vessel and thus his diabetes is not work-related. Thus. for knowingly concealing his diabetes during the PEME. The beneficiaries must present evidence to prove a positive proposition. Disability compensation cannot rest on mere allegations couched in conjectures and baseless inferences from which work aggravation or relatedness cannot be presumed. It is evident from the foregoing medical reports of Drs. . Awards of compensation cannot rest on speculations or presumptions. The constitutional policy to provide full protection to labor is not meant to be a sword to oppress employers. his claim will still fail. 2005. in every case for the deserving. This finding renders any issue on work-relatedness irrelevant since the premise which bars disability compensation is the fraudulent misrepresentation of a pre-existing disease and not the fact that it was preexisting. The "fit to work" declaration in the PEME cannot be a conclusive proof to show that he was free from any ailment prior to his deployment. It cannot and does not prevent us from sustaining the employer when it is in the right. is." In as much as we commiserate with Margarito's widow. Even if we were to disregard Margarito’s fraudulent misrepresentation. and existing jurisprudence. he was already afflicted with diabetes. Justice. "[B]are allegations do not suffice to discharge the required quantum of proof of compensability.sea service" and it does not state the real state of health of an applicant. the Court's commitment to the cause of labor is not a lopsided undertaking. Dacanay and Vicaldo that when Margarito applied for and was given employment by the petitioners on July 26. the applicable law. and it must be dispensed with in the light of established facts. Margarito committed fraudulent misrepresentation which under the POEA-SEC unconditionally barred his right to receive any disability compensation or illness benefit.

Olarte served Fahad’s family diligently. Olarte was deployed as a domestic helper to Saudi Arabia for a contract term of two years. This notwithstanding. Castillo Nahas.Topic: Inconsistent Positions Ponente: Justice Mariano C. 1999. Fajad’s information sheet provides that there are two adults and three children living in his household and that no disabled or sick person is to be put under Olarte’s care. June 2.00 which was the only pay she received for the whole duration that she worked for Fahad. In fact complainant was successfully deployed by Royal Dream as represented to by Nahas. on the other hand. Respondent Nahas interviewed complainant and in all probability furnished her the entire requisites for her deployment. she was to serve her employer. Per her employment contract. No. doing business under the name and style Personnel Employment and Technical Recruitment Agency v.R. Olarte. It was only in December 1999 that she was given US$200. . she was not paid her salaries. However. Nahas represented to be the owner of and was connected with both PETRA and Royal Dream to facilitate her deployment. G. 169247. 2014 Facts: On August 27. Fahad. Upon arriving in Fahad’s home. Olarte was surprised that there were four children with one suffering from serious disability.

Olarte requested Fahad to just allow her go home to the Philippines. and also rejected their claim against liability after giving weight to the fact that Nahas admitted to have interviewed Olarte but failed to substantiate the claim that the latter withdrew her application. The NLRC denied her appeal because Nahas recanted her earlier admission that Olarte went to PETRA as a walk-in applicant. Issue: Whether or not Naha’s act of recanting her earlier admission is admissible Ruling: No. the fact that complainant was deployed thru the intercession of Nahas with the aid of both respondent agencies. Also.In the succeeding months. Because of her condition. Questions of fact are for the labor tribunals to resolve. claiming that the same was a mistake. Several months after her return to the Philippines. . Olarte had to be operated on due to water retention in her leg bones. when affirmed by the NLRC and the CA. damages. But her pleas fell on deaf ears. Fahad was already frequently maltreating her since she could no longer accomplish all the household chores due to her illness. Well-settled is the rule that the Court is not a trier of facts and this doctrine applies with greater force in labor cases. Only errors of law are generally reviewed in petitions for review on certiorari criticizing decisions of the CA. Olarte filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal." Also "settled is the rule that the findings of the Labor Arbiter. She was later diagnosed to be suffering from ostro-arthritis. The Labor Arbiter ruled that PETRA/Royal Dream/Nahas failed to discharge the burden of proving that Olarte’s termination and repatriation were for just cause. CA found nothing capricious or whimsical with the NLRC’s finding and thus affirm Nahas’ liability. At that point. attorney’s fees and refund of placement fees against her foreign employer Fahad and Nahas/PETRA/Royal Dream. recognized of the former’s authority. Olarte was able to escape from the abusive hands of his employer thereafter sought refuge at the Philippine Embassy.

if allowed.are binding on the Supreme Court. Nahas’ vacillating from one story to another and not being able to support them is nothing but a mere ruse to evade the lawful claims of Olarte. and the CA are one in their factual conclusion that Nahas. Before the Labor Arbiter. not duty-bound to inquire into the accuracy of this factual finding. June 2. interviewed Olarte." Inconsistent and unsupported as they are. Leonardo-De Castro People v. Daud. However. therefore. she admitted that Olarte indeed applied with PETRA and was interviewed by her. While still maintaining that she interviewed Olarte. would result in brazen deception." In this case. after the Labor Arbiter did not buy her claim that Olarte withdrew her application with PETRA due to her utter failure to support the same. the Labor Arbiter. It is quite obvious that Nahas started singing a different song. so to speak. G. Topic: Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale Ponente: Justice Teresita J. unless patently erroneous. 197539. and facilitated and made possible her deployment abroad. This cannot be tolerated. Nahas repudiated her earlier admission and averred that Olarte did not at all apply with PETRA. caused her to sign an employment contract. It has been held that "a party will not be allowed to make a mockery of justice by taking inconsistent positions which. the NLRC. she now claimed to have done so when she was still connected with Royal Dream as a mere employee. The Court is. acting for and in behalf of PETRA and Royal Dream. Clearly. No. the labor tribunals and the CA correctly rejected the contentions of Nahas. in her Memorandum of Appeal with the NLRC. 2014 . particularly in this case where there is no showing that it was arbitrary and bereft of any rational basis.R.

He admitted that he is married to co-accused Hanelita and that co-accused Daud. and Poserio testified against Gallemit. was not licensed to recruit workers for overseas employment. but modified the indeterminate penalties imposed on appellant for the three counts of estafa. Of all the private complainants. who processed documents. He insisted that he was not involved with Daud’s business and that he was always out of the house as he would often go to Cavite to ask for financial help from his siblings. Only appellant was apprehended. a certain Badjong. his mother-in-law. was set up and operated by appellant and his coaccused. He also claimed that he was not employed since they were applying for a job abroad.Facts: Angelita I. Evidence for the defense consisted solely of appellant’s testimony. undertaking any recruitment act or receiving any amount from the complainants considering that his name did not appear in the receipts. He applied with her when she convinced him that she could process his passport and papers to Korea. The presentation of a POEA representative was dispensed with after the defense admitted the due execution and genuineness of the POEA Certification. CA affirmed appellant’s conviction by the RTC. He was aware that Daud was a recruiter and owned an agency named Green Pasture Worldwide Travel and Tours which she operated in the same apartment. Decena. At first he did not apply with Daud because her business was still new. He claimed that Daud has only one employee. 2007 finding appellant guilty of Illegal Recruitment in Large Scale and Estafa on three counts. He knew private complainants De Guzman and Poserio are Daud’s business partner and applicant for a job abroad respectively. He denied he was present when the complainants gave their payments to Daud. All three complainants positively identified appellant in court. Gallemit (Hanelita) and appellant Roderick Gallemit were charged before the RTC with illegal recruitment in large scale. Daud (Daud). only De Guzman. . He denied owning the agency. The prosecution offered as evidence the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Certification stating that Green Pasture Worldwide Tour and Consultancy. RTC rendered its Decision dated January 15. Hanelita M. while his coaccused Daud and Hanelita eluded arrest and remained at large.

otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines: Provided. contract services. when undertaken by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. enlisting. contract services. and includes referrals.For purposes of this Act. Article 13(b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as “any act of canvassing. promising or advertising for employment abroad. or procuring workers and includes referring. contracting.Issue: Whether or not Roderick Gallemit committed large-scale illegal recruitment and estafa Ruling: Yes. promising or advertising for employment. or any of the prohibited practices enumerated under Article 34 of the said Code (now . without authority from the government. hiring. (b) the offender undertakes any of the activities within the meaning of “recruitment and placement” under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code. Section 6 of Republic Act No. hiring or procuring workers. Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving economic sabotage. 6. offers or promises for a fee employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged.” In the simplest terms. licensee or holder of authority: x x x x (m) Failure to reimburse expenses incurred by the worker in connection with his documentation and processing for purposes of deployment. give the impression that they have the power to send workers abroad for employment purposes. That any such non-licensee or non-holder who. locally or abroad. 8042 defined illegal recruitment as follows: SEC. in cases where the deployment does not actually take place without the worker’s fault. whether for profit or not. To constitute illegal recruitment in large scale. non-holder. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group. Definition. contracting. It shall likewise include the following acts. illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing. utilizing. transporting. whether committed by any person. . whether for profit or not. transporting. utilizing. enlisting. 442. illegal recruitment is committed by persons who. whether a nonlicensee. in any manner. as amended. three elements must concur: (a) the offender has no valid license or authority required by law to enable him to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers.

The three elements are present in the case. who without being duly authorized according to law. The crime of illegal recruitment. The Court found inconsistencies that accused-appellant harp on in the testimonies of the complainants to be inconsequential. the testimonies of the complainants on the matter are affirmative in nature and sufficiently corroborative of each other to be less than credible. along with his coaccused. a person. according to the Supreme Court is committed when. Lastly. The absence of receipts to evidence payment . It is in this light that. as in this case. represents or gives the distinct impression that he or she has the power or the ability to provide work abroad convincing those to whom the representation is made or to whom the impression is given to thereupon part with their money in order to be assured of that employment. Second.Section 6 of Republic Act No. A license is a document issued by the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) authorizing a person or entity to operate a private employment agency. among other things. nevertheless engaged in recruitment activities. it is not the issuance or signing of receipts for the placement fees that makes a case for illegal recruitment. It is the lack of the necessary license or authority that renders the recruitment activity. It would be contrary to human nature and experience for several persons to conspire and accuse appellant of a crime and send him to prison just to appease their feeling of rejection and vindicate the frustration of their dreams to work abroad if all he did was just to reside in the same apartment where Daud operated her recruitment agency. unlawful or criminal. Contrary to appellant’s mistaken notion. while an authority is a document issued by the DOLE authorizing a person or association to engage in recruitment and placement activities as a private recruitment entity. despite not having such authority. This is substantiated by the respective testimonies of the three private complainants who fell victim to their illegal activities. What is important is that they have positively identified accused-appellant as one of those who enticed them to part with their money in exchange for promised jobs abroad. neither the agency “Green Pastures World Wide Tours and Consultancy” nor appellant himself had a valid license or authority to engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. appellant. offering and promising jobs to private complainants and collecting from them various amounts as placement fees. First. and (c) the offender committed the same against three or more persons. individually or as a group. 8042). but rather the undertaking of recruitment activities without the necessary license or authority. This was established by the POEA certification stating that the said agency located in that apartment was not licensed to recruit employees for abroad.

if found to be credible and convincing. in relation to the Labor Code. conviction for estafa under par. A person charged with the illegal recruitment may be convicted on the strength of the testimony of the complainants. 2(a) of Art. 8042. 315 of the Revised Penal Code. As explained in People v. it is settled that a person who commits illegal recruitment may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under the Labor Code and estafa under par. Cortez and Yabut: In this jurisdiction. It is settled that a person may be charged and convicted separately of illegal recruitment under Republic Act No. 2(a) of Art. paragraph 2(a) of the Revised Penal Code. It is not essential that there be actual proof that all the conspirators took a direct part in every act. It follows that one’s acquittal of the crime of estafa will not necessarily result in his acquittal of the crime of illegal recruitment in large scale. Conversely. Conviction for offenses under the Labor Code does not bar conviction for offenses punishable by other laws. . and vice versa. When there is conspiracy. while estafa is malum in se where the criminal intent of the accused is crucial for conviction.is not necessarily fatal to the prosecution’s cause. and estafa under Article 315. The offense of illegal recruitment is malum prohibitum where the criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for conviction. 315 of the Revised Penal Code does not bar a conviction for illegal recruitment under the Labor Code. the act of one is the act of all. It is sufficient that they acted in concert pursuant to the same objective.

filed a sworn statement with the National Bureau of Investigation. Richard Tan. then an NLRC officer. No. Lim claimed that his employees were influenced by petitioner.Topic: Rule against the execution of a penalty of removal pending appeal to CSC Ponente: Chief Justice Maria Lourder P. The order created a panel (the Board) to look into the present case. G. and thereafter submit its report/recommendation.A. 2014 Facts: Respondent. conduct an investigation. The NBI organized an entrapment operation against petitioner.000 for the settlement of the labor case filed against Lim. Reports of the circumstances leading to the arrest and filing of the Complaints against petitioner were submitted by Tan and Lim to Chairperson Señeres. After being duly informed of his constitutional rights. he underwent ultraviolet light examination which confirmed his fingerprints on the money. owner of Tai Hing Glass Supply. The NBI Director recommended the prosecution of petitioner for robbery under Article 293 of the Revised Penal Code and violation of Republic Act No. the City Prosecutor filed with the Regional Trial Court against petitioner for the crime of robbery. petitioner was brought to the NBI office where he was booked. Finding a prima facie case against petitioner. The Order . require petitioner to file an answer to the charges. and fingerprinted. Finding probable cause. photographed. It was further discovered that while the inquest papers were being prepared by the NBI. to file a labor complaint against. Chairperson Señeres issued an administrative order.R. The NBI filed the Complaint. the owner of Top Gun Billiards. Petitioner allegedly demanded P 20. 189171. Dan Joel Lim and Richard Tan. formally charging him with dishonesty and grave misconduct. Sereno Edilberto Barcelona v. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. had filed a similar extortion Complaint against petitioner. Thereafter. June 3. Petitioner was arrested by the NBI right when he was about to put the marked money in his bag.

Issue: Whether the NLRC violated the Civil Service Rules provision.also placed petitioner under a 90-day preventive suspension upon receipt thereof. The Board conducted a hearing attended by petitioner with three of his lawyers. which amended the aforementioned provision of the Civil Service Rules: Section 43. pending appeal thereof to the CSC. Lim. he presented his side of the story. He manifested therein that he was not subjecting himself to its jurisdiction. The Board issued summons directing petitioner to answer the charges against him. Upon approval of this recommendation by NLRC Chairperson Señeres. Tan. Six years after petitioner had filed his Appeal Memorandum. but it was dismissed. 07-0244. provinces. but he refused to receive them. which allows the execution of a penalty of removal decreed by a bureau or office head. On 7 February 2007. and the NBI agents involved in the entrapment operations appeared at the preliminary investigation conducted by the in order to confirm their accusations against petitioner. municipalities and other instrumentalities imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30)days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary. agencies. The Board resolved the administrative case ex parte. CA denied the motion for reconsideration but Justice Veloso still signed the herein questioned Resolution to signify his concurrence. the CSC issued Resolution No. In his Appeal Memorandum. He never filed an answer. Petitioner appealed to the CSC. Petitioner filed a Petition for Review before the CA. cities. petitioner was dismissed from service. It found him guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. Thus. only when the penalty has been confirmed by the Secretary of the department concerned Ruling: No. Both the order and the summons were served on him. Filing of Appeals: Decisions of heads of department. he left without receiving copies of the Order and other documents pertinent to the case. may be . the CSC dismissed it. A Motion for Reconsideration with Motion for Voluntary Inhibition of Justice Veloso was then filed by petitioner.

When petitioner was dismissed. While the second paragraph provides that a penalty of removal "shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned. with its comment. it can and does now declare that the CSC had no right to retroactively apply the amended provision to petitioner’s case. The later shall submit the records of the case. Unless otherwise provided by law. or a few months before the CSC denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. the penalty imposed shall be executory. Pending appeal. unless the contrary is provided. the same may be initially appealed to the department head and finally to the Commission Proper. 07-0244 became effective 15 days after 21 March 2007. the penalty imposed shall be executory. Laws shall have no retroactive effect. However. the old Section 43 of the Civil Service Rules was . A notice of appeal including the appeal memorandum shall be filed with the appellate authority. demotion in rank or salary or transfer." the third paragraph states: "Pending appeal. including the penalty of removal from the service without need for the confirmation by the department secretary to which the agency is attached. This Court cannot declare that the amendment of the Civil Service Rules while the case of petitioner was pending proves the lack of impartiality on the CSC’s part as petitioner claims. the same shall be executory except where the penalty is removal. It appears that Section 43 of the Civil Service Rules is self-contradicting. within fifteen (15) days. which shall be systematically and chronologically arranged. removal or dismissal from office is appealable directly to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. to the appellate authority. in which case the same shall be executory only after confirmation by the Secretary concerned. copy furnished the disciplining office. Pending appeal.appealed to the Commission Proper within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt thereof. paged and securely bound to prevent loss. the decision of the head of an attached agency imposing a penalty exceeding thirty (30) days suspension or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days' salary. including the penalty of removal from the service without need for the confirmation by the department secretary to which the agency is attached. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission. the day it was published. Resolution No.

Provided further that should the respondent be on Maternity/Paternity leave. Had it been shown that he was prevented from returning to his post after the expiration of the legally sanctioned preventive suspension. The aforecited provision clearly states that the penalty of removal is not executory. unless otherwise provided by special law. Thus. Duration of Preventive Suspension. The records disclose that he made no attempt to return to work after the expiration of the suspension period. pending appeal. petitioner was automatically reinstated on 26 December 2000—the day after the preventive suspension period expired. Since he never attempted to resume the performance of his duties after the expiration of the preventive suspension.still in effect. provided that. — When the administrative case against an officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of his preventive suspension. The Court is convinced that petitioner was never actually barred from returning to work after the 90-day period lapsed. without the confirmation of the Secretary of Labor. he would have . he shall be automatically reinstated in the service. he was never prevented from returning to work—he just chose not to go back. specifically on 25 December 2000. unless the penalty is confirmed by Secretary of the Department where the dismissed employee works. Thus. He was allowed to go to work until 27 September 2000—the day he was supposedly barred from entering the office. his actual suspension from work began on the latter date and expired 90 days thereafter. when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault. he cannot now claim that the penalty of removal was executed. The moment the preventive suspension expired. said preventive suspension shall be deferred or interrupted until such time that said leave has been fully enjoyed. which reads thus: SECTION 20. petitioner was automatically reinstated in the service. By virtue of Section 20 of the Civil Service Rules. negligence or petition of the respondent. Petitioner refused to receive the Order dated 1 September 2001 implementing his 90-day preventive suspension. This rule is clear in Section 20 of the Civil Service Rules. pending his appeal to the CSC. the period of delay should not be included in the counting of the 90 calendar days period of preventive suspension.

After that period. or neglect of duty is authorized by the Civil Service Law. therefore. It is one of those sacrifices which holding a public office requires for the public good. the law provides that the employee shall be automatically reinstated. The preventive suspension of civil service employees charged with dishonesty. For this reason. He was never prevented from returning to work after his suspension. even if the investigation is not finished. . He has never rendered any service to government that would authorize him to collect backwages is beyond cavil. oppression or grave misconduct. be considered "unjustified.been entitled to the payment of his back salaries from the moment the suspension expired up to the time his dismissal would have been implemented. thus he is not entitled to any back salary." even if later the charges are dismissed so as to justify the payment of salaries to the employee concerned. it is limited to ninety (90) days unless the delay in the conclusion of the investigation is due to the employee concerned. It cannot.

acting for and in behalf of its principal. who diagnosed him to be suffering from Ischemic Heart Disease. 2004. MV HAITIEN PRIDE. He demanded payment of permanent total disability benefits. Their salaries were not given and they suffered extreme anxiety. Caseñas. Caseñas likewise consulted two (2) other physicians who certified him to be suffering from Essential Hypertension aside from Ischemic Heart Disease. Crew Management. From the time of Caseñas’ diagnosis by the company-designated physician. . although again because of incomplete documents. Casenas alleged that on June 16. as Chief Mate for vessel MV Perseverance for a period of eight (8) months starting from June 16. 197303.Topic: Seeking disability and other benefits Ponente: Justice Jose Catral Mendoza APQ Shipmanagement vs.00 by November 2006. APQ refused to provide him further medical attention. which lasted for at least 120 days as provided by law. He was referred to the company-designated physician. sickness allowance and medical expenses to which he was entitled under the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). Consequently. though the vessel could not leave the Florida port because of its incomplete documents for operation. which was in Haiti. He.R. which was a manifestation of organ damage. USA. 2005. but APQ refused to pay. In August 2006. he left Manila to join his assigned vessel in Miami. He was then repatriated due to his condition and he arrived in the Philippines on August 30. 2004 to February 16. G. Caseñas immediately reported to APQ for the required post-employment medical examination upon his return to the Philippines. that despite his unpaid wages and weakened condition. that he felt he became weaker and got tired easily. the vessel could not leave the port and remained at Cap Haitien. he performed his duties as Chief Mate diligently. he was transferred to another vessel. 2014 Facts: Casenas was hired by APQ. He was then brought to the Grand Bahamas Health Services and was diagnosed with hypertension and was given medicines. thus. 2006. Florida. he began to suffer shortness of breath. he was under the state of temporary total disability. He further alleged that his employment contract was extended by APQ from the original eight (8) months to twenty-six (26) months and the vessel eventually left for Bahamas. headache and chest pains.390. No. he incurred medical expenses in the amount of 6. June 4.

the POEA Rules and Regulations require that the POEA-SEC be integrated in every seafarer’s contract. Caseñas moved for reconsideration. . thus he is entitled to disability benefits Ruling: Yes. non-payment of salaries representing the extended portion of the employment contract. damages. there is no dispute that the symptoms of Caseñas’ illness began to manifest during the term of his employment contract. They are regulated and an imprimatur by the State is necessary. It claimed that he refused to return in the Philippines and extended its contract which the petitioner did not consent. there is no dispute that Caseñas’ employment contract was duly approved by the POEA and that it incorporated the provisions of the POEA-SEC. and that ultimately. and attorney's fees. Hence this petition. he suffered the illness after the 8-months contract. sickness allowance. the CA was correct in reinstating the NLRC resolution awarding sickness allowance as well as disability benefits in favor of Caseñas. Also. Employment contracts of seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels are not ordinary contracts. The CA granted the petition and nullified and set aside the questioned NLRC decision and resolution. that demands for payment were also made to the president of APQ. but despite efforts. he was compelled to seek redress and filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits. APQ still refused to pay their salaries. Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered the Decision dismissing Caseñas' complaint.15 In this case.together with other crew members. While the seafarer and his employer are governed by their mutual agreement. NLRC resolved the appeal by reversing and setting aside the LA decision. Caseñas filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA. but the NLRC denied his motion. The fact that the manifestations of the illness only came about in August 2006 will not bar a conclusion that he contracted the ailment while the contract was subsisting. but the same were refused. Issue: Whether or not the employment contract of Caseñas was extended with the consent of APQ/Crew Management. Thus. The overall state and condition that he was exposed to over time was the very cause of his illness. As to his claim for medical and other benefits. reimbursement of medical expenses. APQ denied the allegations of the respondent. sent a series of letters and e-mails to the representatives of the ship owners regarding their unpaid wages.

It contended that the said respondent did not met the 20% requirement. Bureau of Labor Relations. The document "Sama-SamangPahayagngPagsapisaUnyon" which it presented in its petition for certification election supported their claim of 119 members. Respondent denied the charge and claimed that the 119 union members were more than the 20% requirement for union registration. No. 2014 Facts: The Petitioner Takata Corporation Philippines filed with the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Regional Office a Petition3 for Cancellation of the Certificate of Union Registration of Respondent SamahangLakasManggagawangTakata (SALAMA1) on the groundthat the latter is guilty of misrepresentation.Topic: Cancellation of Union Registration Ponente: Justice Diosdado M. a quorumexisted for the conduct of the said meeting. false statement and fraud with respect to the number of those who participated in the organizational meeting. filed a Notice and Memorandum of Appeal . Mendoza Takata vs. June 4. Martinez. the adoption and ratification of its Constitution and By-Laws.. Domingo P. respondent. Respondent argued that the union members were informed of the contents of the documents they signed and that the 68 attendees to the organizational meeting constituted more than 50% of the total union membership.R. and had only 17%. Respondent also contended that petitioner was estopped from assailing its legal personality as it agreed to a certification election and actively participated in the pre-election conference of the certification election proceedings. Sr. 196276. Atty. and in the election of its officers. Mole. issued a Decision granting the petition for cancellation of respondent's certificate of registration. hence. G. Ricardo S. Dissatisfied. DOLE Regional Director. through BukluranngManggagawang Pilipino (BMP) Paralegal Officer.

The cancellation of a union’s registration doubtless has an impairing dimension on the right of labor to self-organization. Even if the total number of rank-and-file employees of petitioner is 528. The CA rendered its assailed decision which denied the petition and affirmed the decision of the BLR.with the Bureau of Labor Relations (BLR). The alleged failure of respondent to indicate with mathematical precision the total number of employees in the bargaining unit is of no moment. The appeal was granted and the decision of the Regional Director was reversed and set aside. Ruling: No The bare fact that two signatures appeared twice on the list of those who participated in the organizational meeting would not. or false statements. especially as it was able to comply with the 20% minimum membership requirement. while respondent declared that it should only be 455. Issue: Whether or not the registration of the union should be cancelled. we agree with the BLR and the CA that respondent could not have possibly committed misrepresentation. Hence this petition. provide a valid reason to cancel respondent’s certificate of registration. Petitioner went to the CA via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65. For fraud and misrepresentation to be grounds for cancellation of union registration under the Labor Code. fraud. which was denied by the BLR. the nature of the fraud and misrepresentation must be grave and compelling enough to vitiate the consent of a majority of union members. . In this case. to our mind. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration. Petitioner's motionfor reconsideration was denied. it still cannot be denied that the latter would have more than complied with the registration requirement.

he signed a four-year contract with Al Adwani as staff nurse.R. June 4. After completing his documentary requirements. he applied for employment with Princess Joy who referred him to Reginaldo Paguio and Cynthia Latea for processing of his papers. passport. plane ticket. J. he worked under his contract for only two years and returned to the Philippines. It was only after boarding his Saudi Arabia Airlines plane that he examined his papers and discovered that CBM was his deploying agency. Liability based on Contract Substitution Ponente: Brion.00 for twenty-four (24) months or for two years. No. a registered nurse. Left with no choice as he was then already bound for Saudi Arabia. he was told that he would be deployed to Al Adwani. Binalla also saw that under the four-year contract he signed.500 Saudi Riyals (SR) equivalent to $400. 2002. Princess Joy Placement and General Services. 197005. alleged that in April 2002. a copy of his Overseas Employment Certificate from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) and other documents. v. Under the contract certified by the POEA. his monthly salary was only 1. his salary was supposed to be US$550. 2014 Facts: Binalla. . or reprocessing. G. Inc. German Binalla. Paguio met him at the airport and gave him a copy of his employment contract. Binalla further alleged that on the day of his departure. On April 12.Topic: Liability based on fraudulent scheme or arrangement.

He disowned the contract. with CBM as his recruiting or deploying agency. . First. he opted not to return to Saudi Arabia to complete his four-year contract. as well as by Paguio and Lateo (who worked on the processing and documentation of Binalla’s deployment papers to Al Adwani). contract substitution constitutes "illegal recruitment" under Article 38 (I) of the Code. entity.Upon his return to the Philippines." Further. "it shall be unlawful for any individual. called "reprocessing" or otherwise. licensee. Out of frustration. He learned that the POEA indeed certified a different contract for him. participated in by Princess Joy and CBM. Under Article 34 (i) of the Labor Code on prohibited practices. Issue: Is Princess Joy liable under the complaint? Ruling: Yes. his two-year employment was marred from the start by violations of the law on overseas employment. or holder of authority to substitute or alter employment contracts approved and verified by the Department of Labor and Employment from the time of actual signing thereof by the parties up to and including the periods of expiration of the same without the approval of the Secretary of Labor. claiming that his supposed signature appearing in the document was a forgery. After an examination of the facts. respondent German A. in Taif. Binalla verified his employment contract with the POEA. Saudi Arabia. 2004. substantial evidence showied that Binalla was employed by Al Adwani in Saudi Arabia through a fraudulent scheme or arrangement. Binalla was a victim of contract substitution. Binalla filed a complaint against local manning agent CBM Business Management and Manpower Services (CBM)and/or Princess Joy/Al Adwani General Hospital (Al Adwani) for various money claims arising from his employment with Al Adwani. On August 9. Although the scheme enabled Binalla to be employed overseas.

the "ticket/telegram/advise (sic)" handed to BinallabyPaguio had no probative value as it was merely an unsigned and unauthenticated printout or that the four-year employment contract was signed only by Binalla and there was no showing that it was the contract implemented by Al Adwani. 1999 as Legal Assistant and was eventually promoted as ." It would not be an unreasonable presumption that indeed Princess Joy recruited complainant and that the latter had been transacting with Reginaldo Paguio. however. There were also Binalla’s claims of nonpayment or withholding of contractual employee benefits by Al Adwani and imposition of unreasonable financial burden or obligations in the course of his two-year employment. Princess Joy is as liable as CBM and Al Adwani for the contract substitution. Clearly shown thereat. Topic: Constructive DIsmissal Ponente: Peralta.Under the circumstances. G. Princess Joy claimed that Paguio and Lateowerenot its employees/representatives or that the principal piece of evidence relied upon by the labor arbiter. J. 2014 Facts: Private respondent was employed by petitioner McMer Corporation. This should be rectified. no matter how it tries to avoid liability by disclaiming any participation in the recruitment and deployment of Binalla to Al Adwani. The claims should be satisfied. Before the laborarbiter. Inc. it bears stressing. NLRC. especially in relation to his monthly salary and the term of his contract. on August 5. it was fortunate that the complainant was able to hold onto the ticket telegram/advise handed to him by Reginaldo Paguio. had not been disproved by Princess Joy. No. In the instant case. it carried the names "PRINCESS JOY" and "REGIE. Inc. Second. MCMER Corporation. These claims. June 4. The substitution of Binalla’s contract imposed upon him terms and conditions of employment inferior to those provided in the POEA certified contract. 193421. et al v.R. CBM or Al Adwani.

McMer’s General Manager and President. he then requested for petitioner Alvestir to go to petitioner Roque’s office instead. against petitioners McMer Corporation. private respondent Feliciano C. nonpayment of 13th month pay and separation pay. On August 6. Libunao. private respondent elected to discontinue work that afternoon and immediately proceeded to the Valenzuela Police Headquarters to report on the incident in the police blotter. Jr. and Cecilia R. 2007. Private respondent did not report for work from July 21. and another officer of the Logistics Departmentcertain unfounded score of inefficient performance of duty. Department Head III. Guiao. sensing some unusual development in the attitude of petitioner Roque. 2007 directing private respondent to explain within five (5) days why no disciplinary action should be imposed upon him for being in absence without official leave (AWOL). petitioner Roque gave an immediate summon upon private respondent to proceed to his office to discuss administrative matters. Private respondent. Ginalita C. at the height of anger. he and petitioners. At this juncture. 2007 up to July 30. and Alvestir. as well as attorney’s fees. including but not limited to the alleged absence and tardiness of private respondent. . According to private respondent. have been on a cold war brought often by the disagreement in the design and implementation of company policies and procedures. As a consequence of the foregoing. the subsisting rift between him and petitioners heightened on July 10. Because of this. moral and exemplary damages. 2007 when petitioner McMer started verbally and maliciously imputing against Ms. petitioner McMer. Moments later. constructive illegal dismissal. Logistics Department. Inc.. filed a complaint for unfair labor practices. as Officer-in-Charge of petitioner McMer' s Legal and Administrative Department. At around noon on July 20. for quite some time. and concurrently. Jr. through petitioner Alvestir. confronted private respondent and commanded him to proceed to his office. instead of responding to the summon. of which petitioner Alvestir conceded. private respondent was too scared to confront Roque as the latter may inflict physical harm on him.However. Roque. specifically Macario D. Alvestir.Head of Legal Department. 2007. petitioner Roque. Roque. issued a Memorandum dated July 30. respectively. 2007.

and has therefore personal knowledge of what transpired therein. we find her description of petitioner Roque’s disposition adequate to support a conclusion that private respondent was caught in the state of humiliation and embarrassment in the presence of his co-employees as a result thereof. Private respondent was approached sarcastically with commanding voice by petitioner Roque even in front of some officers and rank-and file employees and newly-hired employees. a dismissal in disguise. it is clear that there was constructive dismissal because of the following acts committed by petitioners against private respondent. About noon of July 20. Private respondent’s professional ethic or moral belief was compromised due to certain business practices of petitioner McMer that were never exposed due to the employee’s fear of reprisal. . petitioner Roque went to private respondent’s office at the height of his anger with threat to inflict physical harm. Further. 2. 2007. the employee who is constructively dismissed may be allowed to keep on coming to work. After a careful consideration of the evidence and records at hand. The test of constructive dismissal is whether a reasonable person in the employee’s position would have felt compelled to give up his position under the circumstances.Issue: Was there a constructive dismissal? Ruling: Yes. therefore. In fact. shouted a command for private respondent to proceed to petitioner’s office. to wit: 1. the same is likewise reliable and competent given that Guiao was physically present at petitioner Alvestir’s office when the incident happened. the law recognizes and resolves this situation in favor of employees in order to protect their rights and interests from the coercive acts of the employer. as shown in private respondent’s Position Paper. It is an act amounting to dismissal but made to appear as if it were not. The sworn statement of Guiao is not only relevant and material evidence. Constructive dismissal is. As such. and 3.

maintenance. Upon expiration thereof. Sungahid. whereby RDG undertook to provide Petron with janitorial. underpayment of wages. Gindang Contractor and RDG to work in the premises of the said bulk plant. Petitioners did not deny that RDG hired them and paid their salaries. 2002. In 1968. entailed them to work inside the premises of Petron using the required equipment and tools furnished by it and that they were subject to Petron’s supervision. G. Gindang Services(RDG). Avelino Alilin et al v. Lee. started recruiting laborers for fielding to Petron’s Mandaue Bulk Plant. No. their true employer. 2002 and further extended until September 30. They. which are directly related to Petron’s business. through Romeo D. On June 1. claimed that the latter is a labor-only contractor. damages and attorney’s fees against Petron and RDG. It owns several bulk plants in the country for receiving. packaging and other utility services in its Mandaue Bulk Plant. June 9. 2000.R. petitioners Alilin. Gindang. no further renewal of the service contract was done. which was owned and operated by Romualdo D. Calesa. Romualdo D. took over the business and continued to provide manpower services to Petron. 177592. When Romualdo died in1989. Claiming . storing and distributing its petroleum products. tanker receiving. 2000 to May 31. Petron Corporation. Gindang. however. They asseverated that their jobs. 2014 Facts: Petron is a domestic corporation engaged in the oil business. Petron and RDG entered into a Contract for Services for the period from June 1. Gindang Contractor. 2002. 2002. Petitioners were among those recruited by Romualdo D. Alleging that they were barred fromcontinuing their services on October 16. Hindang. Employer-employee Relationship Ponente: Del Castillo. which merely acted as an agent of Petron. Morato and Gabilan filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal. Gindang. his son Romeo D. This contract was extended on July 31. J.Topic: Labor-only Contractor.

defined as "supplying workers to an employer who does not have substantial capital or investment in the form of tools." . where the principal is the one claiming that the contractor is a legitimate contractor. Petron’s power of control over petitioners exists in this case. petitioners thus asserted that their dismissal allegedly in view of the expiration of the service contract between Petron and RDG is illegal. or service within a definite or predetermined period. "[A] finding that a contractor is a ‘labor-only’ contractor is equivalent to declaring that there is an employer-employee relationship between the principal and the employees of the supposed contractor. work. Permissible job contracting or subcontracting refers to an arrangement whereby a principal agrees to farm out with a contractor or subcontractor the performance of a specific job. on the other hand. the contractor is presumed to be a labor-only contractor. regardless of whether such job. work premises. service is to be performed or completed within or outside the premises of the principal. Petron. is a prohibited act." In distinguishing between prohibited labor-only contracting and permissible job contracting. equipment. machineries. unless such contractor overcomes the burden of proving that it has the substantial capital. However. Issue: Is RDG a labor – only contractor? Ruling: Yes. Hence. investment. among others. Labor-only contracting. maintained that RDG is an independent contractor and the real employer of the petitioners. Hence. said principal has the burden of proving that supposed status. Generally. the presumption that RDG is a labor-only contractor stands. on the other hand. this petition. and the workers recruited and placed by such person are performing activities which are directly related to the principal business of such employer. the totality of the facts and the surrounding circumstances of the case shall be considered. work or.to be regular employees. as in the present case. Petron failed to discharge the burden of proving that RDG is a legitimate contractor. tools and the like.

the Court finds that RDG is a labor-only contractor. (c) the power of dismissal. Petron could order petitioners to do work outside of their regular "maintenance/utility" job. (b) the payment of wages. The Fifth Division of the Hon. . Petron therefore. the facts that petitioners were hired by Romeo or his father and that their salaries were paid by them do not detract from the conclusion that there exists an employer-employee relationship between the parties due to Petron’s power of control over the petitioners. are solidarily liable for petitioners' illegal dismissal and monetary claims. Hence. it is considered merely as an agent of Petron.It was held in Orozco v. As such. Court of Appeals that:This Court has constantly adhered to the "four-fold test" to determine whether there exists an employer-employee relationship between the parties. and (d) the power to control the employee’s conduct. The four elements of an employment relationship are: (a) the selection and engagement of the employee. Consequently. One manifestation of the power of control is the power to transfer employees from one work assignment to another. being the labor-only contractor. Here. being the principal employer and RDG. the employeremployee relationship which the Court finds to exist in this case is between petitioners as employees and Petron as their employer. In sum.

against Italian Maritime Academy Phils. 2014 Facts: Petitioner Dionarto Q. Inc. gasoline and schooling allowances. IMAPI was a training center for seamen and an assessment center for determination of the qualifications and competency of seamen and officers for possible promotion. No.. Teresa R. (IMAPI). et al. Mendoza (Mendoza). Illegal Dismissal Ponente: Mendoza.Topic: Regular Employee.R. Nicolo S. Ferrez (Ferrez). After the expiration of the 3-month .2009. Capt. Mendoza was the company’s Administrative Manager. Terrei. June 9. 207888. Dionarto Noblejas v. and attorney's fees. food. G. tax refund. Terrei (Capt. wrote a Letter to Noblejas informing him that he had been appointed as training instructor/assessor of the company on a contractual basis for a period of three (3) months effective May 20. moral and exemplary damages. J. and Ma. Noblejasfiled a complaint for illegal dismissal. Raceli S. Record shows that Procerfina SA. Italian Maritime Academy Phils. monetized leave. IMAPI President. Capt. Inc. health insurance. Terrei). non-payment of 13th month pay. Terrei was the Managing Director of IMAPI while Ferrez was his secretary.

He claimed that after that incident. namely: (1) those who are engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. Issues: Whether or not petitioner is a regular employee Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed Ruling: The Court finds Noblejas to be a regular employee of IMAPI.by years of service. Terrei a letter. Capt. Pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code. for at least a year. Regular employees are further classified into (1) regular employees . In their position paper. whether continuous or broken. with respect to the activities in which they are employed. The absence of a written contract to cover the renewal of his employment became Noblejas’ major concern. so he sought an audience with Capt. 2009. 2010.period. IMAPI hired Noblejas anew as training instructor/assessor with the same salary rate. To address all his apprehensions. regardless of their length of service. . he wrote Capt. requesting that a new contract be executed to reflect the following provisions that they had allegedly agreed upon during their conversation on May 19. an altercation between them ensued. respondents submitted that they could not be adjudged guilty of illegal dismissal because there was no positive and overt act of dismissing Noblejas from employment. regardless of its nature thereof. During the meeting. Noblejas averred that the company did not act on his letter-request. but no written contract was drawn for his rehiring. Terrei on March 16. and (2) those who have rendered at least one year of service. 2010. Terrei instructed Ferrez to dismiss him from employment. there are two kinds of regular employees.The former refers to those employees who perform a particular function which is necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.by nature of work and (2) regular employees . dated March 9. while the latter refers to those employees who have been performing the job.

Illegal Dismissal . There was. Topic: Regular/Probationary Employee. Noblejas immediately instituted an illegal dismissal case against the respondents the day following the alleged incident and never reported back for work since then. he was rehired by IMAPI for the same position and continued to work as such until March 16. Terrei to dismiss him from employment. The Court is not unmindful of the rule in labor cases that the employer has the burden of proving that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause. Fair evidentiary rule dictates that before employers are burdened to prove that they did not commit illegal dismissal. however. no corroborative and competent evidence was adduced by Noblejas to substantiate his claim that he was dismissed from employment. The record is bereft of any indication that he was prevented from returning to work or otherwise deprived of any work assignment. Mere allegation is not evidence. Noblejas had indeed attained the status of a regular employee at the time he ceased to report for work on March 17. 2010.In the case at bench. that they should first establish by competent evidence the fact of their dismissal from employment. no illegal dismissal. however. There is no dispute that the work of Noblejas was necessary or desirable in the business or trade of IMAPI. it is incumbent upon the employee to first establish by substantial evidence the fact of his or her dismissal. Terrei what he heard from Ferrez. Aside from his mere assertion. 2010. a training and assessment center for seamen and officers of vessels. was actually authorized by IMAPI to terminate the employment of the company’s employees or that Ferrez was indeed instructed by Capt. Taken in this light. instead of clarifying from Capt. It is also noted that no evidence was submitted to show that respondent Ferrez. 2009. Noblejas was employed by IMAPI as a training instructor/assessor for a period of three (3) months effective May 20. After the end of the 3-month period. It is likewise incumbent upon the employees. Terrei. The Court finds it odd that. It is an age-old rule that the one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and the proof should be clear. positive and convincing. the secretary of Capt.

Mahilum was not seen around to supervise the program proper as he entertained some visitors of the company. Mahilum was designated as over-all chairman of the affair to be held on December 19. however. Vicky Evangelista (Evangelista). According to him. On the inaugural day. 205278 . CA. Mahilum’s attention was. Mahilum submitted his written explanation. hired Mahilum as Vice-President for Sales and Marketing for the BulacanSouth Luzon Area./DaniloLua v. June 11. Mahilum learned that Evangelista postponed the meetings because she accompanied the daughter of petitioner DaniloLua (Lua). VicePresident for Administration and Finance. he was placed under preventive suspension for thirty (30) days. Mahilum and his guests discussed sensitive legal issues relative to PSWRI’s water drilling inside the plant over the protest of nearby residents and the local water district. Later. . however. The next day. Evangelista took charge and assumed the lead role until the day of the affair. 2014 Facts: Petitioner Philippine Spring Water Resources. engaged in the business of manufacturing. the inauguration of PSWRI’s Bulacan plant would be celebrated at the same time with the company’s Christmas party. G. J. Philippine Spring Water Resources Inc. At the same time. President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO). called when Lua got furious because he was not recognized during the program. Mahilum requested Ms. selling and distributing bottled mineral water. was reset to the following day as some visitors arrived without prior appointment. Sometime in November 2004. The meeting. (PSWRI). to Bulacan. Thereafter. he delegated the task to Evangelista.Ponente: Mendoza. Inc. A few days after his designation. He attended a prior appointment with major clients in Makati City.R. Subsequently. to take charge of the meeting for the inauguration shouldhe fail to come back on time. No. meetings on the program of activities for the inauguration and Christmas party were conducted without Mahilum’s presence. 2004. an investigation was conducted. Mahilum called all committee chairpersons to a meeting for the program of action and budget plan.

Probationary employment shall not exceed six (6) months from the date the employee started working. an additional ground is provided under Article 281 of the Labor Code. however. the probationary employee may also be terminated for failure to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of the engagement. the . the services of an employee who has been engaged on probationary basis may be terminated for any of the following: (1) a just or (2) an authorized cause and (3) when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards prescribed by the employer. it is clear that the primary cause of Mahilum’s dismissal from his employment was borne out of his alleged lapses as chairman for the inauguration of the Bulacan plant company’s Christmas party. Sometime in the first week of March 2005. 2005. a clearance certificate was issued to Mahilum.998. On February 9. dated January 31.When his 30-day suspension ended. enjoys security of tenure. An employee who is allowed to work after a probationary period shall be considered a regular employee. he received a copy of the Memorandum. payment of back wages and damages. aside from just or authorized causes of termination. In cases of probationary employment. Thus. Waiver and Quitclaim in favor of the company and Lua. In fact. 2005.56 and was made to execute the Release. 2005. that is. The services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be terminated for a just cause or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. Mahilum filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for reinstatement. In this case. He received the amount of P43. terminating his services effective the next day or on February 1. Mahilum reported for work but was prevented from entering the workplace. unless it is covered by an apprenticeship agreement stipulating a longer period. A probationary employee. like a regular employee. Issue: Whether Mahilum is a regular or probationary employee Whether or not there was illegal dismissal Ruling: Mahilum is a regular employee.

Besides. 2005. he served the company for eight (8) months. Simply put. Mahilum was engaged to supervise the sales and marketing aspects of PSWRI’s Bulacan Plant. Mahilum became a regular employee. the petitioners may not be permitted to belatedly harp on its choice not to extend his alleged probationary status to regular employment as a ground for his dismissal. the petitioners were not able to prove that Mahilum was unfit to continue working for the company. having been allowed to work after the lapse of the probationary period. Under the circumstances. as the act complained of was not work-related. Further.termination letter to him cited "loss of trust and confidence" as a ground for his dismissal. Verily. his designation as the chairman of the whole affair did not form part of his duty as a supervisor. He was hired in June 2004 and was dismissed on February 5. Thus. Mahilum was illegally dismissed The Court finds no reason to depart from the finding that Mahilum’s failure to effectively discharge his assignment as the over-all chairman of the festivities was due to mere inadvertence and the mistaken belief that he had properly delegated the details of the program to another officer. the charge of loss of trust and confidence had no leg tost and on. .

and proposing that the schedule of her outright commissions should start at .Topic: Entitlement of Sales Commissions Ponente: Associate Justice Lucas P. and the proposed special incentives at P35-P38 million with P8. 162021. Inc.000. and later promoted her as a Group Publisher with a monthly salary of P60.00 bonus.05% outright commission and MMPI Total revenue at P30-P34 M 0. Respondent proposed to MMPI’s Executive Vice-President Sarita V.5 million total revenue. target and commissions.05% of P34. Yap accepted the resignation and responded with a "formalization" of her approval of the 1999 special incentive scheme proposed by the respondent through her memorandum revising the schedule by starting commissions at .1% of P35-P38 million. G. No. (MMPI) employed Margaret Defensor as an Associate Publisher in 1996. Inc. . Yap year-end commissions for herself and a special incentive plan for the Sales Department. 2014 Facts: Mega Magazine Publications.05% of P35-P38 million gross advertising revenue . Defensor.500.075% outright commission). Margaret A.al vs. Bersamin Mega Magazine Publications. June 16. Respondent tendered her letter of resignation effective at the end of December 1999. et.00. Yap made marginal notes of her counter-proposals about respondent's proposal crossing out some of the proposed items (MMPI Total revenue at P28-P29 M 0.R. Respondent sent another memorandum setting out the 1999 advertisement sales. and proposing instead that outright commissions be at 0. and that the special incentives be given when total revenues reached P35-P38 million..

the respondent had suggested the following schedule: (a) 0. This is plain from the fact that Yap even "bargained" with the respondent on the schedule of the rates and the revenues on which the bonus or incentive would be pegged. was entitled to her 0. and (f) 0.After respondent left the company. At no instance did Yap flatly refuse or reject the respondent’s request for commissions and the bonus or incentive. (b) 0. but Yap had countered by revising the schedule to start at 0. Moreover. (c) 0. the bonus does not accrue.00 as her share in the incentive scheme for the advertising and sales staff. What remained contested was only the schedule of the rates and the revenues. 1999. or is promised by the employer and expressly agreed upon by the parties.1% on P35-P38 million. 1999 considering that the grant of the bonus or special incentive remained a management prerogative.1% on P39-P41 million pesos. bonus is a gratuity or act of liberality of the giver. In her initial memorandum of February 25. the Supreme Court agrees with the CA’s ruling that the petitioners had already exercised the management prerogative to grant the bonus or special incentive. specifically demanding the payment ofP271. If the desired goal of production or actual work is not accomplished. salary or compensation of the employee.1% as outright commissions on a total revenue of P35P38 million. is not a demandable and enforceable obligation.500. except when the bonus or special incentive is made part of the wage. and cannot be considered part of an employee’s wages if it is paid only when profits are realized or a certain amount of productivity is achieved. on December 8.00 based on MMPI having reached the minimum target of P35 million in gross revenues paid in "bartered goods and cash in direct proportion to percentage of cash and bartered goods revenue for the year".500. However. Due to the nature of the bonus or special incentive being a gratuity or act of liberality on the part of the giver. Yap sent to the respondent a memorandum entitled Re: Formalization of my handwritten approval of 1999 . Margaret Defensor. 1999.05% outright commission on total revenue of P28-P29 million. (d) 0. and the special incentive bonus to start at revenues of P35-P38 million. Issue: Whether the respondent is entitled to the outright commissions and special incentive bonus for the sales staff being claimed Ruling: Yes Respondent.264. By its very definition.1% on P41 million or higher.68 as sales commissions and P8.075% on P30-P34 million. The grant of a bonus or special incentive.05% outright commissions and to the special incentive bonus of P8. the respondent could not validly insist on the schedule proposed in her memorandum of April 5. being a management prerogative. she filed a complaint for payment of bonus and incentive compensation with damages.

et. Inc. The Phimco Labor Association (PILA) is the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the PHIMCO regular rank-and-file employees. PILA filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice against PHIMCO. PHIMCO. PILA staged a strike on April 21. (PHIMCO) is a domestic corporation engaged in the production of matches. NLRC issued a temporary restraining order but the strike continued.R. Inc. Consequently. Three days later. June 18. Then Acting Secretary Jose Brillantes of DOLE assumed jurisdiction over the . for its part. PHIMCO served dismissal notices on the strikers for the alleged illegal acts they committed during the strike.Incentive scheme dated 25 February 1999. G. Phimco Industries. Due to a bargaining deadlock with PHIMCO. 2014 Facts: The Phimco Industries. On the other hand.. 203332. 1995. Topic: Immutability of Final Judgments Ponente: Associate Justice Arturo Brion Florencio Libongcogon. with the strikers blocking the company's points of ingress and egress.al vs. No. filed a petition to declare the strike illegal. Such actuations and actions by Yap indicated that the petitioners had already acceded to the grant of the special incentive bonus.

CA Special 12th Division. when its execution becomes impossible or unjust due to supervening facts. PILA then filed a complaint against PHIMCO with the following causes of action: (1) the illegal dismissal of the 7 employees. It found the 7 employees to have been illegally dismissed. blocked the points of ingress and egress of PHIMCO through a human blockade and the . As the CA pointed out in its amended decision. PILA filed an appeal which the NLRC dismissed. PILA ended its strike and PHIMCO resumed its operations. there were facts and/or events which transpired after the judgment was issued. on appeal. which presented a supervening cause that rendered the final and executory decision no longer enforceable. in concert with the other identified union members. and (3) the lay-off of 21 employees. the evidence in the illegal strike case clearly identified the petitioners as among the union members who. partly granted the petition. CA. The doctrine of immutability of final judgments admits of certain exceptions as explained in Hulst v.strike and issued a return-to-work order. Labor Arbiter Pati dismissed the complaint. there is nothing more left to be done but to enforce it. thus. Invoking the Court's ruling in David v. In this particular case. a supervening event transpired. even with the finality of judgment. One recognized exception is the existence of a supervening cause or event which renders the enforcement of a final and executory decision unjust and inequitable. it may be modified or altered to harmonize it with demands of justice and the altered material circumstances not existing when the decision was originally issued. (2) the forced retirement of 53 employees. PR Builders. Later. CA denied the petition and upheld the NLRC rulings on the ground that the decision of its Special 12th Division became final and executory. participated in a strike where the Court found the commission of illegal acts by the strikers. the CA held that while the judgment sought to be enforced by the challenged NLRC resolutions had attained finality. Twentytwo out of the 53 questioned the legality of their retirement. Inc. like the petitioners. PHIMCO laid off 21 of its employees and implemented a retirement program covering 53 other employees. The fact that the decision has become final does not necessarily preclude its modification or alteration. Ruling: No. which must be considered in the execution of the CA decision in the illegal strike case in order not to create an injustice to or an inequitable treatment of workers who. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals contravened the doctrine of immutability of final judgments when it issued its amended decision nullifying the final and executory decision of its Special 12th Division declaring petitioners' dismissal illegal.

this Court's 3rd Division declared in the illegal strike case these union members dismissed for their illegal acts in the conduct of the union's strike.. 2014 . The Court finds no reversible error or grave abuse of discretion in the CA amended decision. This is a prohibited act under the law. is the avoidance of illegal acts during the strike such as those committed by the petitioners.mounting of physical obstructions in front of the company's main gate. "For participating in illegally blocking ingress to and egress from company premises. Considering the substantial financial losses suffered by the company on account of the strike. during the PHIMCO strike in 1995. It is manifested in a work stoppage whose main objective is to paralyze the operations of the employer establishment. a strike enjoys recognition and respect only when it complies with the conditions laid down by law. as far as union members are concerned. Jordan. these petitioners were therefore validly dismissed. petitioner. Grandeur Security & Services. Because of its potential adverse consequences to the striking workers and the employer. vs.R. June 18. it would indeed be unjust to the company and the dismissed union members to allow the reinstatement of the petitioners and to reward them with backwages and other monetary benefits. A strike is a concerted union action for purposes of collective bargaining or for the workers' mutual benefit and protection.Inc. One of these conditions. BRION Ruben C." Considering that the petitioners had been positively identified to be among the union members who committed illegal acts during the strike. G. in concert with the other union members. No. Topic: Dismissal from service / Waiver of right to return to work Ponente: Associate Justice ARTURO D. as well as the community. 206716.

Grandeur Security denied that it terminated Jordan from employment. holiday. the LA ordered Grandeur Security to "reinstate" Jordan in employment and awarded the complainants monetary claims for Grandeur Security’s failure to adduce evidence of payment. "a charge of abandonment is totally inconsistent with the . The records clearly show that respondent never dismissed complainant Jordan from the service neither did they intend to do so in the first place for in spite of the serious offenses said complainant had committed in the early years of his employment with respondent such as sleeping while on duty.Facts: Ruben Jordan. They likewise claimed that Grandeur Security illegally deducted from their wages the amount of five hundred pesos per annum as premiums of their insurance policies. the Cacho Construction located at Taguig City for guarding duties. Jordan has been illegally dismissed from service. Thus. It claimed that it merely issued Jordan a memorandum reassigning him from Quezon City7 to Taguig City. it did not contest the "reinstatement order" as it allegedly mailed Jordan a return to work order. They alleged that Grandeur Security did not pay them minimum wages. Grandeur Security partially appealed the decision before the NLRC with respect to the grant of monetary awards. The Labor Arbiter held that Jordan had merely been transferred to another workplace. Instead of reporting to respondent’s office to effect his transfer of assignment he filed the instant complaint. Ruling: No. In defense. Valentino Galache and Ireneo Esguerra filed individual complaints for money claims against Nicolas Pablo and respondent Grandeur Security and Services Corp. It appears on record that complainant Jordan was merely relieved of his duty and was being transferred to another client of respondents. respondent’s intimation that complainant had abandoned his job has been rendered untenable under this circumstance. The LA also ruled that Jordan’s immediate filing of illegal dismissal case after the issuance of the subject memorandum belied Grandeur Security’s claim of abandonment. Grandeur Security also denied nonpayment of money claims to the complainants. premium. It further insisted that Jordan abandoned his work and opted to file an illegal dismissal case against it instead of complying with the memorandum. together with his co-employees. Issue: Whether the complainant Ruben C. However. Nothing on the memorandum sent to him indicated his termination of employment. service incentive leave. and thirteenth month pays as well as the cost of living allowance. said respondents never attempted to rid themselves of said complainant’s services. Jordan also appealed before the NLRC and insisted that he did not receive the letter. Jordan amended his complaint and included illegal dismissal as his additional cause of action. Thus.

The Court also find no justification whatsoever for complainant Jordan’s allegation of strained relations between him and respondents to warrant the grant of separation pay as prayed for by him. rules of procedure should not be applied in a very rigid and technical sense because they are merely tools designed to facilitate the attainment of justice. hereby ordered to accept him back without any backwages. Jordan should be as he is hereby ordered to return to his position as security guard with respondents and the latter in like manner. Even assuming that the NLRC has jurisdiction over Jordan’s "memorandum of appeal". Abandonment is a matter of intention and cannot lightly be presumed from certain equivocal acts. complainant Ruben C. a tribunal has no jurisdiction to substantially alter a final and executory judgment. To constitute abandonment. In labor cases. Thus. The operative act is still the employee's ultimate act of putting an end to his employment. As a rule. effectively negating any suggestion of abandonment. June 20. there must be clear proof of deliberate and unjustified intent to sever the employer-employee relationship. and (2) whenever circumstances transpire after the finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable. is no longer subject to substantial change or revision. except: (1) in cases of void judgments.immediate filing for illegal dismissal: (Icawat vs. 334 SCRA 75. a definitive final judgment. NLRC. Hence. 2008 decision. its final and executory character precludes these bodies from substantively altering its dispositive part. however erroneous. As a general rule. . pursuant to law and jurisprudence and under the circumstances obtaining in this case. That Jordan was actually informed of the return to work order and that Grandeur Security never prohibited him from reporting for work are sufficient compliance with the LA's return to work order. In the present case. The filing of this complaint is a proof of his desire to return to work. there could be no illegal dismissal in this case nor abandonment of job to speak of." Whether Jordan received Grandeur Security’s letter directing him to report to work is irrelevant in determining his waiver of employment in Grandeur Security. Jordan's filing of a complaint for illegal dismissal in the form of a "memorandum of appeal" before the NLRC is inconsistent with abandonment of employment. 2000). the Supreme Court agree with the CA that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in substantively altering the dispositive part of the May 27. This being the case. While tribunals and courts may correct clerical errors in a judgment that has attained finality. complainant Jordan resented his relief and subsequent reassignment to another post for guarding duty.

Cynthia Leynes who both confirmed his mental condition. Intel issued Deoferio a notice of termination. G. 2014 Facts: Intel Technology Philippines. Intel’s forensic psychologist. a consultant psychiatrist of the Philippine General Hospital. Deoferio underwent a series of medical and psychiatric treatment at Intel’s expense after his confinement in the United States. He was also referred to Dr. and to a certain Dr. Deoferio v.Topic: Authorized cause to dismiss an employee from service Ponente: Associate Justice ARTURO D. Intel assigned him to the United States as a validation engineer for an agreed period of two years and with a monthly salary of US$3. In 2002.R. and that his continued employment would be prejudicial to his and to the other employees’ health. In defense. he worked as a product engineer with a monthly salary of P23. employed Deoferio as a product quality and reliability engineer with a monthly salary of P9. Paul Lee. Deoferio was repatriated to the Philippines after being confined at Providence St. major depression. and/orMike Wentling. Lee’s certification that his schizophrenia was not curable within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment. . No. Norieta Balderrama. Intel Technology Philippines. Issue: Whether Marlo Deoferio was illegally dismissed from service due to his disease. Deoferio filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for money claims against respondents Intel and Mike Wentling.000. BRION Marlo A. After several consultations. Vincent Medical Center for major depression with psychosis. Lee issued a psychiatric report concluding and stating that Deoferio’s psychotic symptoms are not curable within a period of six months and "will negatively affect his work and social relation with his co-workers. In the Philippines. Inc. Dr.000. concluded that Deoferio was suffering from schizophrenia. June 18. He denied that he ever had mental illness and insisted that he satisfactorily performed his duties as a product engineer. In July 2001. 202996. the respondents argued that Deoferio’s dismissal was based on Dr. and auditory hallucination. Dr." Pursuant to these findings. Dr.000. Inc. He argued that Intel violated his statutory right to procedural due process when it summarily issued a notice of termination. Elizabeth Rondain of Makati Medical Center diagnosed him to be suffering from mood disorder.

the discharge must be for a valid cause in the manner required by law. Thus. To validly effect terminations of employment. procedural due process requires the employer to effect the dismissal in a manner specified in the Labor Code and its IRR. That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one month salary or to one-half month salary for every year of service. the Labor Code and its IRR require the presence of the following elements: (1) An employer has been found to be suffering from any disease. the Court liberally construed the phrase "prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his coemployees" to mean "prejudicial to his health or to the health of his coemployees. With respect to the first and second elements. as well as to the health of his co-employees. in termination cases. The purpose of these two-pronged qualifications is to protect the working class from the employer’s arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of its right to dismiss. – An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees: Provided. The certification from a competent public health authority is precisely the . substantive and procedural due process. a fraction of at least six months being considered as one whole year. On the other hand. 284.Ruling: No. The present case involves termination due to disease which is an authorized cause for dismissal under Article 284 of the Labor Code. Substantive due process means that the termination must be based on just and/or authorized causes of dismissal. whichever is greater. Disease as ground for termination. Concomitant to the employer’s right to freely select and engage an employee is the employer’s right to discharge the employee for just and/or authorized causes. (3) A competent public health authority certifies that the disease is of such nature or at such a stage that it cannot be cured within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment. these qualifications embody the due process requirement in labor cases. In concrete terms. Art. the law places the burden of proof upon the employer to show by substantial evidence that the termination was for a lawful cause and in the manner required by law." The Court does not limit the scope of this phrase to contagious diseases for the reason that this phrase is preceded by the phrase "any disease" under Article 284 of the Labor Code. Intel had an authorized cause to dismiss Deoferio from employment. As substantive requirements. (2) His continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health.

Nominal damages are pegged at P30. Dr. Pacot. In Jaka Food Processing Corp. its non-curability within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment.000 if the dismissal is due to an authorized cause under Article 283 of the Labor Code but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement. that his disease was not curable within a period of six months even with proper medical treatment. and that his continued employment would be prejudicial to his mental health. Intel’s violation of Deoferio’s right to statutory procedural due process warrants the payment of indemnity in the form of nominal damages.000 if the dismissal is based on a just cause but the employer failed to comply with the twin-notice requirement. Lee’s psychiatric report substantially proves that Deoferio was suffering from schizophrenia. . With respect to Article 284 of the Labor Code. This conclusion is further substantiated by the unusual and bizarre acts that Deoferio committed while at Intel’s employ. while terminations under Article 283 of the Labor Code are initiated by the employer in the exercise of his management prerogative. terminations due to disease do not entail any wrongdoing on the part of the employee. Deoferio is entitled to nominal damages for violation of his right to statutory procedural due process. a function associated with the employer's inherent right to control and effectively manage its enterprise. the Court distinguished between terminations based on Article 282 of the Labor Code and dismissals under Article 283 of the Labor Code. and the prejudice that it would cause to the health of the sick employee and to those of his co-employees. It also does not purely involve the employer’s willful and voluntary exercise of management prerogative.substantial evidence required by law to prove the existence of the disease itself. The reason is that dismissals for just cause imply that the employee has committed a violation against the employer. Terminations due to disease are occasioned by matters generally beyond the worker and the employer's control. nominal damages are pegged at P50. On the other hand. v.

Topic: Entitlement of Sales Commissions (in Foreign Currency)
Ponente: Associate Justice LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Netlink Computer Inc. vs. Eric Delmo;
2014

G.R. No. 160827;

June 18,

Facts: Netlink Computer, Inc. Products and Services hired Eric S. Delmo as
account manager tasked to canvass and source clients and convince them to
purchase the products and services of Netlink. Delmo worked in the field
most of the time. He and his fellow account managers were not required to
accomplish time cards to record their personal presence in the office of
Netlink. He was able to generate sales worth P35,000,000 from which he
earned commissions amounting to P993,558.89 and US$7,588.30. He then
requested payment of his commissions, but Netlink refused and only gave
him partial cash advances chargeable to his commissions. Later on, Netlink
began to nitpick and fault find, like stressing his supposed absences and
tardiness. In order to force him to resign, Netlink issued several memoranda
detailing his supposed infractions of the company’s attendance policy.
Despite the memoranda, Delmo continued to generate huge sales for
Netlink.
Delmo was shocked when he was refused entry into the company premises
by the security guard pursuant to a memorandum to that effect. His personal
belongings were still inside the company premises and he sought their return
to him. This prompted Delmo to file a complaint for illegal dismissal. Netlink
countered that there were guidelines regarding company working time and
its utilization and how the employees’ time would be recorded. Allegedly, all

personnel were required to use the bundy clock to punch in and out in the
morning, and in and out in the afternoon. Excepted from the rules were the
company officers, and the authorized personnel in the field project
assignments. Netlink claimed that it would be losing on the business
transactions closed by Delmo due to the high costs of equipment, and in fact
his biggest client had not yet paid. Netlink pointed out that Delmo had
become very lax in his obligations, with the other account managers
eventually having outperformed him. Netlink asserted that warning,
reprimand, and suspension memoranda were given to employees who
violated company rules and regulations, but such actions were considered as
a necessary management tool to instill discipline.
Labor Arbiter ruled against Netlink and in favor of Delmo ordering his
reinstatement to his former position without loss of seniority rights with full
backwages and other benefits On appeal, NLRC modified the decision of the
Labor Arbiter by setting aside the backwages and reinstatement decreed by
the Labor Arbiter due to the existence of valid and just causes for the
termination of Delmo’s employment.
Issue: Whether Eric Delmo is entitled for the payment of his sales
commissions in US currency.

Ruling: Yes.
As a general rule, all obligations shall be paid in Philippine currency.
However, the contracting parties may stipulate that foreign currencies may
be used for settling obligations. This is pursuant to Section 1 of the Republic
Act No. 8183 which provides that "All monetary obligations shall be settled in
the Philippine currency which is legal tender in the Philippines. However, the
parties may agree that the obligation ortransaction shall be settled in any
other currency at the time of payment".
In the case of C.F. Sharp & Co. v. Northwest Airlines, Inc. that the repeal of
Republic Act No. 529 had the effect of removing the prohibition on the
stipulation of currency other than Philippine currency, such that obligations
or transactions could already be paid in the currency agreed upon by the
parties. However, both Republic Act No. 529 and Republic Act No. 8183 did
not stipulate the applicable rate of exchange for the conversion of foreign
currency-incurred obligations to their peso equivalent. It follows, therefore,
that the jurisprudence established under Republic Act No. 529 with regard to
the rate of conversion remains applicable. In C.F. Sharp, the Court cited Asia
World Recruitment,Inc. v. NLRC, to the effect that the real value of the foreign
exchange-incurred obligation up to the date of itspayment should be
preserved.

There was no written contract between Netlink and Delmo stipulating that
the latter’s commissions would be paid in US dollars. Despite the absence of
any contractual stipulation, Netlink was still liable to pay Delmo in US dollars
because the practice of paying its sales agents in US dollars for their US
dollar-denominatedsales had become a company policy. This was impliedly
admitted by Netlink when it did not refute the allegation that the
commissions earned by Delmo and its other sales agents had been paid in
US dollars. Instead of denying the allegation, Netlink only sought a
declaration that the US dollar commissions be paid using the exchange rate
at the time of sale. The principle of non-diminution of benefits, which has
been incorporated in Article 10013 of the Labor Code, forbade Netlink from
unilaterally reducing, diminishing, discontinuing or eliminating the practice.
Verily, the phrase "supplements, or other employee benefits" in Article 100 is
construed to mean the compensation and privileges received by an
employee aside from regular salaries or wages.
With regard to the length of time the company practice should have been
observed to constitute a voluntary employer practice that cannot be
unilaterally reduced, diminished, discontinued or eliminated by the
employer, the Court finds that jurisprudence has not laid down any rule
requiring a specific mmimum number of years. With the payment of US dollar
commissions having ripened into a company practice, the commissions due
to Delmo were to be paid in US dollars or their equivalent in Philippine
currency determined at the time of the sales. To rule otherwise would be to
cause an unjust diminution of the commissions due and owing to Delmo.

Topic: Permanent disability and sickness allowance

Ponente: Reyes, J.

Teekay Shipping Philippines, Inc. v. Jarin, G.R. No. 195598, June 25,
2014

Facts: Teekay Phils. is a domestic corporation engaged in the recruitment of
maritime personnel for its foreign principal, Teekay Ltd. Verchez is the
president of Teekay Phils.

After passing the standard Pre-Employment Medical Examination, the
petitioners hired Jarin as Chief Cook on July 6, 2006. He was deployed on July
9, 2006 onboard M.T. Erik Spirit, a crude oil tanker. During the third week of
February 2007, M.T. Erik Spirit was in Canada when Jarin complained of
swelling in the joints of his two elbows. Jarin was taken to a Canadian
hospital where he was diagnosed with rheumatoid arthritis. Steroid-based
medications were administered to him and they caused him the side effects
of puffiness of the face and edema. Despite of this, however, Jarin was able
to complete his employment contract.

Upon arrival in the Philippines, Jarin immediately reported to the petitioners
and was referred to company-designated physician whose Post-Medical
Report showed that Jarin has "moon facies and bipedal edema secondary to
steroid intake, rheumatoid arthritis, resolving and upper respiratory tract
infection." Jarin was later referred to another company-designated physician
for further assessment under the care of Dr. Dacanay.

Dr. Dacanay opined in a medical report that Jarin’s rheumatoid arthritis was
not work-related because it is "an auto-immune disease in which joints,
usually those of hands and feet, are symmetrically affected, resulting in
swelling, pain and often eventual destruction of the joints interior." Jarin’s
cushingnoid features was also declared as not work-related since it is
"secondary to prednisone intake as medical management for his rheumatoid
arthritis."

Jarin underwent laboratory tests and was advised to come back on
September 17, 2007. The following day, Dr. Balbon stated that rheumatoid
arthritis is a chronic illness "which can become progressive that has the

potential to cause joint destruction and functional disability." Jarin was "no
longer recommended for further sea duties."

Jarin received a call on September 10, 2007 from Teekay Phils. directing him
to report at Pandiman Phils., Inc. (Pandiman) at Intramuros, Manila. On the
following day, Jarin was informed that his illness is not work-related and that
Teekay Phils. stopped paying for his medical treatments. Jarin asked for a
medical report supporting such conclusion but he was not furnished any.

Issues:
1) Whether Jarin suffered a work-related disability.
2) Whether Jarin should be awarded sickness allowance despite not being
medically repatriated.

Ruling:

1) Yes.

Under the 2000 POEA-SEC, a work-related illness is "any sickness resulting
to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under
Section 32-A with the conditions set therein satisfied."

However, that the enumeration in Section 32-A does not preclude other
illnesses/diseases not so listed from being compensable. The POEA-SEC
cannot be presumed to contain all the possible injuries that render a seafarer
unfit for further sea duties. This is in view of Section 20(B)(4) of the
POEA-SEC which states that "those illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this
Contract are disputably presumed as work-related." Concomitant with such

presumption is the burden placed upon the claimant to present substantial
evidence that his working conditions caused or at least increased the risk of
contracting the disease. "It is not sufficient to establish that the seafarer’s
illness or injury has rendered him permanently or partially disabled; it must
also be shown that there is a causal connection between the seafarer’s
illness or injury and the work for which he had been contracted."

Substantial evidence consists of such relevant evidence which a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion that there is a causal
connection between the nature of his employment and his illness, or that the
risk of contracting the illness was increased by his working conditions. Only a
reasonable proof of work-connection, not direct causal relation is required to
establish compensability of a non-occupational disease.

In the case at bar, Jarin was able to prove that his rheumatoid arthritis was
contracted out of his daily duties as Chief Cook onboard M.T. Erik Spirit. The
narration of facts in his position paper detailed the nature of his work as
Chief Cook and the daily working conditions on sea duty.

2) Yes.

The petitioners failed to present any evidence showing that they paid Jarin's
sickness allowance. The petitioners cannot escape such liability on the mere
fact that Jarin finished his contract and was not medically repatriated. It must
be borne in mind that when Jarin arrived in the Philippines, he was still
suffering from rheumatoid arthritis, moon facies and bipedal edema and
upper respiratory track infection, as confirmed by the petitioners' physician.

Topic: Illegal recruitment committed in large scale amounting to
economic sabotage
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
People v. Velasco, G.R. No. 195668, June 25, 2014
Facts: In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the entire findings of fact of
the RTC, stating:
The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are:
(1) that the accused engaged in acts of recruitment and placement of
workers as defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or in any
prohibited activities under Article 34 of the same Code;
(2) that the accused had not complied with the guidelines issued by the
Secretary of Labor and Employment with respect to the requirement
to secure a license or authority to recruit and deploy workers; and
(3) that the accused committed the unlawful acts against 3 or more
persons.
In simplest terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who, without
authority from the government, give the impression that they have the
power to send workers abroad for employment purposes. The following were
made by Inovero:
First, private complainants Baful and Brizuela commonly testified that
Inovero was the one who conducted orientations/briefings on them;
informed them, among others, on how much their salary would be as
caregivers in Japan; and what to wear when they finally will be
deployed.
Second, when Diala introduced Inovero to private complainant Amoyo
as one of the owners of HARVEL, Inovero did not bother to correct said
representation. Inovero’s silence is clearly an implied acquiescence to
said representation.
Third, Inovero, while conducting orientation on private complainant
Brizuela, represented herself as the one expediting the release of
applicants’ working visa for Japan.

there is a conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony. is inherently in fraud of the former. when it involves the transfer of funds from the victims to the accused. . Their positive assertions were far trustworthier than her mere denial. Inovero gave private complainants the impression that she can send them abroad for employment purposes. Ruling: Yes. and decide to commit it. civil liability should include the return of the amounts paid as placement. The complainants paid varying sums for placement. The Court upholds the CA’s affirmance of the factual findings by the trial court. Considering that the crime of illegal recruitment. training and processing fees. despite the fact that she had no license or authority to do so.Fourth. All that Inovero’s appeal has offered was her denial of complicity in the illegal recruitment of the complainants. It is a basic tenet of our criminal law that every person criminally liable is also civilly liable. Under the law. But the complainants credibly described and affirmed her specific acts during the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment. Issue: Whether Inovero committed illegal recruitment in large scale. training and processing fees. Strong and positive evidence demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt her having conspired with her co-accused in the recruitment of the complainants. Inovero and her coaccused were liable to indemnify the complainants for all the sums paid. The decision of the CA amply recounted her overt part in the conspiracy. in a Certification issued and attested to by POEA’s Versoza – Inovero had no license nor authority to recruit for overseas employment. Hence.

2001.437. 2003 investigation at Libcap’s . 2001 were covered by a single April 2. Respondent was required to explain in writing why the cash sales ofP1. respondent received a Notice of Administrative Investigation requiring her to attend a July 28.437.Topic: Due process. 2003. an audit of Libcap’s Super Express branch in Cagayan de Oro City was conducted.00 each for March 31. Respondent Baquial was employed by Libcap as accounting clerk for Libcap’s Super Express branch in Cagayan de Oro City. No. On July 26. 2001 and April 1. G. Baquial. 2001 validated bank deposit slip for only P1. and the resulting audit report showed that respondent made a double reporting of a single deposit made on April 2. 2014 Facts: Libcap is engaged in the freight forwarding business.R.00 was deducted from respondent’s salary each payday on a staggered basis.437. v. Libcap Marketing Corp. Nominal damages Ponente: Del Castillo. Meanwhile. In March 2003. June 30. J.00. 192011. the amount of P1.

she failed to attend. In doing so. respondent received a Notice of Termination dated August 9. respondent was adjudged guilty even before she could be tried – the payroll deductions being her penalty and recompense.437. stating that she was terminated from employment effective August 12. 2003. 2) Whether respondent should be awarded nominal damages. 2003.Iloilo office. in petitioners’ eyes. 2003 to August 12. Ruling: 1) Yes. Respondent was placed on preventive suspension from July 29. Issues: 1) Whether respondent was denied due process. inefficiency. This is evident from the fact that the amount of P1.00 – the amount which petitioners claim was embezzled – was peremptorily deducted each payday from respondent’s salary on a staggered basis. embezzlement. Respondent was unable to attend due to lack of financial resources. culminating one month prior to the scheduled investigation. 2003 for dishonesty. Respondent’s case has been pre-judged even prior to the start of the investigation. On August 16. petitioners have made it clear that they considered respondent as the individual responsible for the embezzlement. 2003. thus. and for commission of acts inconsistent with Libcap’s work standards. . She received a 2nd Notice of Administrative Investigation but again.

petitioners clearly violated her right to due process from the very beginning. under Article 283. . and is in the nature or takes the place of severance compensation. Though the Court is given the latitude to determine the amount of nominal damages to be awarded to an employee who was validly dismissed but whose due process rights were violated.By pre-judging respondent’s case. 2) Yes. it is wise to hold that: (1)if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement. The law and jurisprudence allow the award of nominal damages in favor of an employee in a case where a valid cause for dismissal exists but the employer fails to observe due process in dismissing the employee. initiated by an act imputable to the employee. the sanction to be imposed upon him should be tempered because the dismissal process was. and (2)if the dismissal is based on an authorized cause under Article 283 but the employer failed to comply with the notice requirement. and from then on it could not be expected that she would obtain a fair resolution of her case. in effect. the sanction should be stiffer because the dismissal process was initiated by the employer’s exercise of his management prerogative. a distinction should be made between a valid dismissal due to just causes under Article 282 of the Labor Code and those based on authorized causes. Accordingly. Financial assistance is granted as a measure of equity or social justice.

No. it cannot be invoked again as a justification to increase the award of nominal damages.Prescinding from the foregoing. Respondent.000.00. Nominal damages are awarded for the purpose of vindicating or recognizing a right and not for indemnifying a loss. J. is a recruitment and placement agency. CABILES. respondent. Joy was later asked to sign a one year employment contract for a monthly salary of NT$15. Cabiles.. Thus.8 She alleged that Sameer Overseas Agency required her to pay a placement fee of P70. 170139 August 5. JOY C. Facts: Petitioner. it is necessary to reduce the amount of nominal damages the CA awarded. After all. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency. Hence. the CA should have limited the justification of the award of nominal damages to petitioners’ violation of respondent’s right to due process in effecting her termination. submitted her application for a quality control job in Taiwan. . Joy C. vs. Topic: Termination of an OFW Ponente: LEONEN.00 when she signed the employment contract. Joy’s application was accepted. Petitioner.360.R. EN BANC G.. 2014 SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY. INC. the Labor Arbiter had already denied the same. It should not have considered the claimed unpaid overtime pay. Inc.5 Responding to an ad it published.

With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers." Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14. She asked for the return of her placement fee. negligence in her duties. payment of her salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages. Petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation with petitioner had already been transferred to the Pacific Manpower & Management Services."13 She was asked to "prepare for immediate repatriation. Thus. Joy filed a complaint with the National Labor Relations Commission against petitioner and Wacoal. How should the interest rate be computed? 4. petitioner asserts that it was already substituted by Pacific Manpower. Whether or not Joy is entitled to her salaries corresponding to the unexpired term of her contract. 2. Yes. She alleged that in her employment contract. Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in a different jurisdiction.000. she was asked to work as a cutter. she agreed to work as quality control for one year. 3.000. 1997. She identified Wacoal as Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s foreign principal. and her "failure to comply with the work requirements of her foreign employer. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency claims that on July 14. (Wacoal) on June 26.15 According to her.00. Issues: 1. The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee of P70. we follow the principle of lex loci contractus. . (Pacific). Whether or not Joy was illegally dismissed. 1997. Ltd. a certain Mr. 1997. She claimed that she was illegally dismissed.000 to cover her plane ticket to Manila. In Taiwan. Who is liable for the illegal dismissal of Joy? Ruling: 1. On October 15. without prior notice. Wacoal deducted NT$3. she only earned a total of NT$9. Huwang from Wacoal informed Joy. the withheld amount for repatriation costs.Joy was deployed to work for Taiwan Wacoal. Inc. 1997. that she was terminated and that "she should immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport. Co. Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's termination was due to her inefficiency.

its implementing rules and regulations. in Article XIII. This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow foreign employers to determine for and by themselves whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on the ground of illness would encourage illegal or arbitrary pretermination of employment contracts. . the Labor Code. or what particular acts of respondent constituted inefficiency. 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated to the employee. The regular employee must constantly attempt to prove to his or her employer that he or she meets all the standards for employment. and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the employee’s performance assessment. however. what efficiency standards were violated. To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid. No evidence was shown to support such allegations. overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be terminated for a just or authorized cause and after compliance with procedural due process requirements. and other laws affecting labor apply in this case. Therefore. There is no question that the contract of employment in this case was perfected here in the Philippines." This can be applied also to regular employment. it must be shown that: 1) the employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will be judged. This is similar to the law and jurisprudence on probationary employees.Lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in her work. guarantees the special protection of workers. The Constitution itself. the standards to be met are set for the purpose of retaining employment or promotion In this case. which allow termination of the employee only when there is "just cause or when [the probationary employee] fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his [or her] engagement. Section 3. This time. By our laws. Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements were not met.

states that overseas workers who were terminated without just. 1997 effective on the same day and barely a month from her first workday. having been illegally dismissed. One of the written notices must inform the employee of the particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal. whichever is less. 8042. otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of1995. The parties’ conflict as to the position held by respondent showed that even the matter as basic as the job title was not clear. The other notice must "inform the employee of the employer’s decision. A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of dismissal. The employer is required to give the charged employee at least two written notices before termination. They patently show that the employers did not comply with the due process requirement. 1997." Section 15 of Republic Act No." Petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and hearing requirements. Section 10 of Republic Act No.There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards against which her work efficiency and performance were judged. the employee must also be given "an opportunity to be heard. valid. or authorized cause "shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum. She was also repatriated on the same day that she was informed of her termination. Respondent started working on June 26. 8042 states that "repatriation of the worker and the transport of his [or her] personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed the worker . plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term. 2. Respondent Joy Cabiles. is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract that was violated together with attorney’s fees and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary. Yes." Aside from the notice requirement. Respondent’s dismissal less than one year from hiring and her repatriation on the same day show not only failure on the part of petitioner to comply with the requirement of the existence of just cause for termination. She was told that she was terminated on July 14.

2013. It is state policy to protect the rights of workers without qualification as to the place of employment. The rights violated when. For both workers. The award of the three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary should. a fixed-period local worker is illegally terminated are neither greater than nor less than the rights violated when a fixed-period overseas worker is illegally terminated. This means that they cannot be dismissed before the end of their contract terms without due process. Overseas workers regardless of their classifications are entitled to security of tenure. applies in this case. which they could have earned had they not been illegally dismissed. be increased to the amount equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract. however. the workers’ right to security of tenure is violated. this deprivation translates to economic insecurity and disparity. the Court cannot subscribe to the argument that overseas workers are contractual employees who can never acquire regular employment status. 3. at least for the period agreed upon in their contracts.overseas. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be recovered by an illegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution. The same is true for the distinctions between overseas workers with an employment contract of less than one year and overseas workers with at least one year of employment contract. and between overseas workers with at least a year left in their contracts and overseas workers with less than a year left in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed. the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799 of June 21." which as we have established. The Labor Code also entitles the employee to 10% of the amount of withheld wages as attorney’s fees when the withholding is unlawful. unlike local workers because it already justifies differentiated treatment. If they were illegally dismissed. The Court reiterated its finding in Serrano v. . For this reason. is not the case." The exception is when "termination of employment is due solely to the fault of the worker. In both cases. which revised the interest rate for loan or forbearance from 12% to 6% in the absence of stipulation. say. Respondent is entitled to all of these awards. the workers are deprived of their expected salary. On the interest rate.

the interest shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained). and in judgments when there is no stipulation on the applicable interest rate. And. shall be adjudged on unliquidated claims or damages. Accordingly. Civil Code). the interest due shall itself earn legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. whether the case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2. not constituting a loan or forbearance of money. goods. 3. When an obligation. 2013. shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of interest fixed therein. be on the amount finally adjudged.e. shall be 6% per annum from such finality until its satisfaction.In Nacar v. the rate of legal interest. . Further. from judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169 of the Civil Code. the interest due should be that which may have been stipulated in writing. where the demand is established with reasonable certainty. i. it is only applicable if the judgment did not become final and executory before July 1. 799 is applicable only in loans and forbearance of money. In the absence of stipulation. and it consists in the payment of a sum of money. When the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money becomes final and executory. 2. as follows: 1. or credits. the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. the rate of interest. this interim period being deemed to be by then an equivalent to a forbearance of credit. except when or until the demand can be established with reasonable certainty. the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default. i. a loan or forbearance of money. an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of the court at the rate of 6% per annum. Circular No.e. is imposed. as well as the accrual thereof.. The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall. 1169. however. but when such certainty cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made. No interest. in addition to the above. above. 2013. When the obligation is breached. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory damages. is breached.. judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1. in any case. Furthermore. Gallery Frames: II.

This is despite Section 1 of Circular No. which provides that the 6% interest rate applies even to judgments. the issuance of Circular No. This means that respondent is also entitled to an interest of 6% per annum on her money claims from the finality of this judgment.Circular No. The same cannot be said for awards of salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract under Republic Act No. these interest rates do not apply when the law provides that a different interest rate shall be applied. Only a law can repeal another law." Section 10 of Republic Act No. The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 ensures that overseas workers have recourse in law despite the circumstances of their employment. 799. These awards are covered by Circular No. other money claims under Section 10 of Republic Act No. If judgment did not become final and executory before July 1. By providing that the liability of the foreign employer may be "enforced to the full extent"139 against the local agent. "A Central Bank Circular cannot repeal a law. This section also provides that the performance bond filed by the local agency shall be answerable for such money claims or damages if they were awarded to the employee. the overseas worker is assured of immediate and sufficient payment of what is due them. 8042 provides that unlawfully terminated overseas workers are entitled to the reimbursement of his or her placement fee with an interest of 12% per annum. Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the foreign employer and the local employment agency are jointly and severally liable for money claims including claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship and/or damages. 799 because the law does not provide for a specific interest rate that should apply. 8042. Since Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas circulars cannot repeal Republic Act No. 799 does not have the effect of changing the interest on awards for reimbursement of placement fees from 12% to 6%. 8042 shall be subject to the 6% interest per annum in accordance with Circular No. 4. . While the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas has the power to set or limit interest rates. 8042. The Court clarified the liabilities of Wacoal as principal and petitioner as the employment agency that facilitated respondent’s overseas employment. 799 is not applicable when there is a law that states otherwise. 2013 and there was no stipulation in the contract providing for a different interest rate. 799.

This should not be an obstacle for the respondent overseas worker to proceed with the enforcement of this judgment. if any. The law does not preclude it from going after the foreign employer for reimbursement of whatever payment it has made to the employee to answer for the money claims against the foreign employer. With the present state of the pleadings. the provision on joint and several liability in the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 shifts the burden of going after the foreign employer from the overseas worker to the local employment agency. . it is not possible to determine whether there was indeed a transfer of obligations from petitioner to Pacific.Corollary to the assurance of immediate recourse in law. it must be emphasized that the local agency that is held to answer for the overseas worker’s money claims is not left without remedy. Petitioner is possessed with the resources to determine the proper legal remedies to enforce its rights against Pacific. However.

. SALVADOR ADVIENTO. 2002. G. respondent was advised by his doctor to totally avoid house dust mite and textile dust as it will transmute into health problems. In his Complaint. is a domestic corporation engaged in the business of manufacturing thread for weaving. respondent filed a complaint against petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). vs.R. alleging that he contracted such occupational disease by reason of the gross negligence of petitioner to provide him with a safe. he was diagnosed with Chronic Poly Sinusitis. Petitioner. actual damages and attorney’s fees. Distressed. separation pay. Respondent averred that. he conducts regular maintenance check on petitioner’s facilities including its dye house area. respondent consulted a physician due to recurring weakness and dizziness. respondent filed another Complaint9 with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Aparri. petitioner hired respondent Engr. Respondents.Topic: Jurisdiction Ponente: Peralta. By reason thereof. for alleged illegal dismissal and for the payment of backwages. severe and persistent Allergic Rhinitis. but to his dismay and frustration. healthy and workable environment. which is very hot and emits foul chemical odor with no adequate safety measures introduced by petitioner. Subsequently. ENGR. 1990. 2014 INDOPHIL TEXTILE MILLS. employers who knew ofhis present health condition discriminated against him and turned down his application. Bulacan. and thereafter. Marilao.4 On August 7. Facts: Petitioner Indophil Textile Mills. 171212 August 4. Pampanga. No. INC. Cagayan. being the only breadwinner in the family. respondent . with moderate.6 Accordingly. J. Inc. he made several attempts to apply for a new job. San Fernando. Salvador Adviento as Civil Engineer to maintain its facilities in Lambakin.5 Few days later. respondent alleged that as part of his job description. On August 21.

00) as compensatory damages. respondent was not required to pay any filing fee. While seemingly petitioner's claim for damages arises from employer-employee relations. and in the absence thereof.003. petitioner's claim for damages is grounded on the "wanton failure and refusal" without just cause of private respondent Cruz to report for duty despite repeated notices served upon him of the disapproval of his application for leave of absence without pay. praying for the recovery of the following: (1) Five Million Pesos (P5.000." wherein if there is a reasonable causal connection between the claim asserted and the employer-employee relations.008. Not all claims involving employees can be resolved solely by our labor courts.000. serious anxiety and wounded feelings.suffered intense moral suffering.00) as exemplary damages. the complaint was anchored not on the abandonment per se by private respondent Cruz of his job—as the latter was not required in the Complaint to report back to work—but on the manner and consequent effects of such abandonment of work translated in terms of the damages which petitioner had to suffer. . mental anguish. Clearly. 1691 and BP Blg. and (3) Seven Million Three Thousand and Eight Pesos (P7. coupled with the further averment that Cruz "maliciously and with bad faith" violated the terms and conditions of the conversion training course agreement to the damage of petitioner removes the present controversy from the coverage of the Labor Code and brings it within the purview of Civil Law. it is the regular courts that have jurisdiction. and the latest amendment to Article 217 of the Labor Code under PD No. (2) Two Million Pesos (P2.20 Claiming to be a pauper litigant. jurisdiction over the present controversy must be held to belong to the civil Courts. 130 provides that all other claims arising from employeremployee relationship are cognizable by Labor Arbiters [citation omitted]. then the case is within the jurisdiction of the labor courts. we have formulated the "reasonable causal connection rule.000. in essence. Issue: Who has jurisdiction over the case? Ruling: Regular courts of law.36 For this reason.00) asmoral damages. Upon the facts and issues involved.000. This. specifically when the law provides otherwise.

and deprived him of job opportunities. jurisdiction over the action is with the regular courts. injury and damages were allegedly suffered by respondent. as here. It also bears stressing that respondent is not praying for any relief under the Labor Code of the Philippines. the cause of action is based on a quasi-delict or tort. Villamor54 that: When. which has no reasonable causal connection with any of the claims provided for in Article 217. Inc.. Clearly. v. He neither claims for reinstatement nor backwages or separation pay resulting from an illegal termination.53 Hence. Such cause of action is within the realm of Civil Law. and jurisdiction over the controversy belongs to the regular courts . he suffered work-contracted disease which is now irreversible and incurable. an element of quasi-delict. but falls squarely within the elements of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code since the negligence is direct. the previous contract of employment between petitioner and respondent cannot be used to counter the element of "no pre-existing contractual relation" since petitioner’s alleged gross negligence in maintaining a hazardous work environment cannot be considered a mere breach of such contract of employment. respondent alleges that due to the continued and prolonged exposure to textile dust seriously inimical to his health. we ruled in Yusen Air and Sea Services Phils. substantive and independent.In the case at bar. It merely seeks to recover damages based on the parties' contract of employment as redress for respondent's breach thereof. Secondly.

2014 CONRADO A. HENRY BUNAG and NELSON CAMILLER. 201483 August 4. (HMR) and its officers. HMR PHILIPPINES. Legal Interest Ponente: MENDOZA. INC. HMR Philippines. vs. Santos-Castro. petitioner Conrado A. Inc. the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) reversed the LA and declared Lim to have been illegally dismissed. Respondents. LIM. 2003. On April 11. The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the complaint for lack of merit..R. Petitioner. Bunag and Nelson S. TERESA SANTOS-CASTRO. 200I. Lim (Lim) filed a case for illegal dismissal and money claims against respondents.Topic: Backwages and Other Monetary Benefits. Teresa G. No. Henry G. The dispositive portion of the NLRC decision reads: . Camiller. G. J. Facts: On February 8.

HMR opposed the computation arguing that the backwages should be computed until April 11. dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by HMR assailing the November 15. the date of promulgation of the NLRC decision. Pending resolution of the petitions. Whether the petitioner is entitled to the 10% annual salary increase after the year 2000? 3.053.5 On September 24. The LA issued the order10 granting the motion for execution filed by Lim. 2007.7 which computed the backwages from February 3." Insisting that his backwages should be computed up to his actual reinstatement. 2007. 2005 CA decision.Both Lim and HMR filed their respective petitions for certiorari before the CA. Aggrieved. The CA affirmed the NLRC decision with modification as follows: WHEREFORE.46. On November 28. up to October 31. the CA issued the Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) enjoining the execution of the NLRC decision. this Court. No. Lim filed his "Motion Ad Cautelam for Reconsideration or Recomputation and Partial Execution of Monetary Award. The NLRC treated the motion as an appeal and sustained the computation of the LA. petitioner filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. 2007. 2007. Whether the respondents should beheld jointly and severally liable for additional moral and exemplary damages? . Whether the petitioner is entitled to holiday pay? 4. the Decision of the National Labor Relations Commission is AFFIRMED. with MODIFICATION. 2001. the date of the illegal dismissal. in G. Entry of judgment was ordered on July 27. 175950-51. Issues: 1. the Computation and Research Unit (CRU) of the NLRC computed the total award to amount to P2. Lim moved for execution. Holding thatthe backwages should be reckoned until April 11. 2003 only in accordance with the NLRC decision. 2003 only. 2007.R. the date of actual reinstatement. Whether the petitioner is entitled to sick leave pay? 5.020. Whether the computation of backwages should be reckoned until actual reinstatement? 2. as stated in the dispositive portion of the NLRC decision. On February 7. which was dismissed.

That a judgment should be implemented according to the terms of its dispositive portion is a long and well-established rule.6. 279. The rule is that it is the dispositive portion that categorically states the rights and obligations of the parties to the dispute as against each other. Whether the interest in accordance with Eastern Shipping should be awarded? Ruling: 1. In accordance with this provision. amendment or modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law and regardless of what court renders it. the key question is whether a recomputation of backwages up to the date of the actual reinstatement of Lim would violate the principle of immutability of judgments. the employer shall not terminate the services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and to his full backwages. to wit: Art. 2003 NLRC decision expressly recognizes that Lim is entitled to his full backwages until his actual reinstatement. even if the alteration. A companion to this rule is the principle of immutability of final judgments. the body of the April 11. Thus. and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Article 279 of the Labor Code is clear in providing that an illegally dismissed employee is entitled to his full backwages computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of his actual reinstatement. Any attempt to insert. . Security of tenure. inclusive of allowances. amended or modified. Save for recognized exceptions. In cases of regular employment. it is the dispositive portion that must be enforced to ensure the validity of the execution. Considering that the judgment decreeing the computation of backwages up to the promulgation of the NLRC decision has long become final and executory. Yes. a final judgment may no longer be altered. change or add matters not clearly contemplated in the dispositive portion violates the rule on immutability of judgments.

2. salary increases cannot be interpreted as either an allowance or a benefit. as . However. however. The applicable base rate for the computation of the petitioner’s backwages from the time he was illegally dismissed on February 3. as expressed under Article 279 of the Labor Code. petitioner cannot be deemed to have refused reinstatement or to have abandoned his job. The re-computation of the consequences of illegal dismissal upon execution of the decision does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented. a computation of backwages until actual reinstatement is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments. A re-computation (or an original computation. the reliefs continue to add on until full satisfaction. who allegedly refused to be reinstated and abandoned his job. The nature of an illegal dismissal case requires that backwages continue to add on until full satisfaction. insist that the 10% annual salary increase be applied to his backwages past the year 2000 up to his actual reinstatement. 2007. HMR’s offer of reinstatement appeared superficial and insincere considering that it never replied to the petitioner’s letter. The computation required to reflect full satisfaction does not constitute an alteration or amendment of the final decision being implemented as the illegal dismissal ruling stands. only the computation of monetary consequences of this dismissal is affected and this is not a violation of the principle of immutability of final judgments. if no previous computation has been made) is a part of the law – specifically.125. Article 279 of the Labor Code and the established jurisprudence on this provision – that is read into the decision. Thus. By the nature of an illegal dismissal case. the Court held that although Article 279 of the Labor Code mandates that an employee’s full backwages be inclusive of allowances and other benefits.Under the terms of the decision under execution. thus. 2001 should be P15.00. The recoverable backwages. continue to run. It did not make any further attempt to reinstate the petitioner either. The illegal dismissal ruling stands. in the present case. Sadac. In Equitable Banking Corporation v. no essential change is made by a re-computation as this step is a necessary consequence that flows from the nature of the illegality of dismissal declared in that decision. Lim cannot. The respondents aver that the recoverable backwages cannot go beyond December 26. the date HMR offered to reinstate Lim. and must be reckoned up until the petitioner’s actual reinstatement. No.

Sundays. The LA found that that the petitioner was not entitled to have his sick leaves converted to cash because such was subject to the discretion of management in accordance with company policy. but was earned and owing to the petitioner before he was illegally terminated. If nonworking days are not paid. Whether or not holiday pay is included in the monthly salary of an employee. the divisor of the monthly salary to obtain daily rate should be 365. the divisor is 251.allowances and benefits are separate from salary. while a salary increase is added to salary as an increment thereto. 3. This matter is clearly for the LA to determine being the labor official charged with the implementation of decision and concomitant computations. if the petitioner’s base pay does not yet include holiday pay. 4. Hence. may be gleaned from the divisors used by the company in the computation of overtime pay and employees’ absences. Yes. the rule being that upon reinstatement. it must be added to his monetary award. To illustrate. which is a result of subtracting all Saturdays. It is clear from the above that the provision does not give HMR the absolute discretion to decide whether ornot to grant sick leave conversion. inclusive of regular allowances that the employee had been receiving such as the emergency living allowances and the 13th month pay mandated by law. The award of salary differentials was not allowed. if all nonworking days are paid. . illegally dismissed employees were to be paid their backwages without deduction and qualification as to any wage increases or other benefits that might have been received by their co-workers who were not dismissed. It was further held therein that the base figure to be used in the computation of backwages was pegged at the wage rate at the time of the employee’s dismissal. timeoff or vacation allowance at the end of the calendar year. The pertinent provision on sick leave conversion in the Personnel Policy handbook of HMR reads: d) Accumulated days of unused sick leave may be converted into cash. and the ten legal holidays. any of these upon the discretion of the General Manager. It must be noted that the NLRC did not err in awarding the unpaid salary increase for the years 1998-2000 as such did not constitute backwages as a consequence of the petitioner’s illegal dismissal.

There appears. Court of Appeals. entitled to conversion of unused sick leave. which became effective on July 1. however. nonetheless. namely – cash. 799. It was held therein that when the judgment of the court awarding a sum of money became final and executory. Pertinently. An HMR employee is. he is now entitled to have his unused sick leaves converted to cash. Yes. the rate of legal interest. Thus. no basis to award additional damages considering that the respondents simply availed of the remedies available to them under the law in good faith. Considering that the conversion options of time-off and vacation allowance are no longer feasible because the petitioner was illegally dismissed. therefore. and the new rate of 6% per annum shall be applied from July 1. 2013. it amended the rate of legal interest in judgments from 12% to 6% per annum. Petitioner Lim prays that the respondents be made to pay. and not to whether or not sick leave conversion will be granted at all.The discretion of the general manager only pertains to what form the sick leave conversion may take. namely. the 12% per annum legal interest in judgments under Eastern Shipping shall apply only until June 30. should be 12% per annumfrom finality until satisfaction. 2013. or vacation allowance. time-off. The rules on legal interest in Eastern Shipping have. . 6. jointly and severally. the Court. 5. subject only to the general manager’s discretion as to the form it will take. been recently modified in accordance with Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board (BSP-MB) Circular No. No. 2013 onwards. however. In some recent cases. The respondents counter that interest may no longer be added considering that such was not included in the any of the courts’ decisions before the judgment became final and executory. additional moral and exemplary damages on account of their bad faith in delaying the payment and his reinstatement. awarded legal interest. the payment of interest in case of delay in accordance with Eastern Shipping Lines v. no interest was expressly awarded before the judgments became final and executory. with the qualification that the new rate be applied prospectively. The decision had become a judgment for money from which another consequence flowed.

The interest of 6% per annum for obligations not constituting a loan or forbearance of money is one that may be imposed at the discretion of the court. This form of interest is not mandatory but discretionary in nature and therefore. .Petitioner also prays that he be awarded interest at a rate of 6% per annum on the amounts awarded from the time they became legally due him until entry of judgment. not necessarily owing to the petitioner in the present case.

2005. Respondent. Inc. Pellazar (Pellazar). MERCEDES M. an oiler in the vessel MIT Delphina. 20065 for evaluation and treatment.Topic: Disability benefits Ponente: Brion. 2005 to the company-designated physicians. Banaga) of the Physicians’ Diagnostic Services Center. Pellazar reported to OSG Manila and was referred on November 29. INC. while he was on duty onboard the vessel." He continued to report tothe company-designated physicians until August 14. De Guzman (Dr. his right hand was injured after it was struck by a solid iron pipe. & M/T DELPHINA. Petitioners. OSG Manila assumed full responsibility for all contractual obligations to seafarers incurred by C. Inc. he was medically repatriated. De Guzman was also the Medical Directorof the Center while Dr. 2014 OSG SHIPMANAGEMENT MANILA. He was given medical attention in a hospital in Brazil. OSG SHIPMANAGEMENT (UK) LTD. the respondent Joselito B. On November 12. Dr. that in accordance with POEA procedures. The petitioners manifested that the Philippine OverseasEmployment Administration (POEA) accreditation of the M/T Delphina had been transferred to OSG Ship Management Manila. 2005. On November 26. Dr. (OSG Manila) and. JOSELITO B. filed a complaint for permanent total disability benefits and damages against the petitioners. J. 2005 under an employment contract for eight months. vs. Pellazar was deployed to the M/T Delphinaon July 3." . distal part of 5th finger. right hand post-casting. RAVANOPOLOUS.F. Pedro S. Raymond C. Pellazar’s working diagnosis was "complete fracture. Banaga (Dr. G. Upon his arrival in Manila. Facts: In September 2006. De Guzman) and Dr. No.. The company-designated physicians gave Pellazar a Grade 10 disability rating7 for "loss of grasping power for large objects between fingers and palm of one hand. 198367 August 6. Sharp.R. Banaga was Pellazar’s attendingphysician. PELLAZAR.

Entitlement to disability benefits by seamen on overseas work is a matter governed. thus. Dr. not only by medical findings but. in relation with Rule X of the Rules and Regulations Implementing Book IV of the Labor Code. Sabado (Dr.075. Pellazar consulted a physician of his choice. By contract. and the fact that he had already undergone maximum medicalcare. by Philippine law and by the contract between the parties. Issues: 1.On September 30. loss of opposition between finger and thumb (r) and ankylosis of the 5th finger (r). The terms under the POEA-SEC are to be read in accordance with what the Philippine law provides. Raul F. Ruling: 1. 4. The material statutory provisions are Articles 191 to 193 under Chapter VI (Disability Benefits) of the Labor Code. No. Sabado) of the Dagupan Orthopedic Center in Dagupan City. Pellazar claimed that despite the lapse of 120 days.00 under the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC). he was still unfit for sea work. . the complaint for disability benefits under the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA). A Grade 10 disability is compensated US$10. Whether or not the NLRC’s reliance on the findings of companydesignated physician is tainted with grave abuse of discretion on two grounds: 3. series of 2000 of the Department of Labor and Employment (the POEA Standard Employment Contract) and the parties' CBA bind the seaman and his employer to each other. Whether mere lapse of the 120 day period not warrant payment of permanent total disability benefits. 2006. The petitioners argued that Pellazar was not entitled to disability compensation higher than what was provided under a Grade 10 disability rating as that was the companydesignated physician’s assessment ofhis disability." and certified that he was "permanently unfit for any sea duty. Department Order No." In addition to Dr. who diagnosed him with "loss of grasping power of 5th finger. Whether or not Pellazar is entitled to full disability benefits. 2. Sabado’s certification.

is liable to pay shall be determined by a doctor appointed by the Employer. the degree of disability arising from a work-connected injury or illness of a seafarer or his fitness to work shall be assessed by the company. on the other hand. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties.designated physician to make the employer liable. In granting Pellazar a Grade 10 disability rating in accordance with the finding of the company designated physician. the seafarer shall submit himself to a postemployment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so. the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. If the doctor appointed by the seafarer and his union disagrees with the assessment. the NLRC simply observed the provisions of the parties’ POEA-SEC. For this purpose. a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. No. If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment. Under the POEA-SEC and the AMOSUP/IMEC TCCC CBA. in which case a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. a third doctor may agree jointly between the Employer and the Seafarer and his Union. Under the CBA and the POEA-SEC. 2.The mere lapse of the 120-day period itself does not automatically warrant the payment of permanent total disability benefits. and the third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties. subject to this agreement. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. The parties’ CBA. . Section 20(B) 3 of the POEA-SEC provides: Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment. it is the company-designated physician who shall determine a seafarer’s disability or his fitness to work. states: The degree of disability which the Employer.

Sabado. This treatment started immediately upon his referral to the two doctors on November 29. even on this context. the matter should have been referred to a third doctor for final determination as required by the POEA-SEC and the parties’ CBA. That the seafarer should not be prevented from seeking an independent medical opinion proceeds from the theory that a company-designated physician. He then underwent evaluation and treatment under the management of Dr. whose findings are in conflict with those of the company designated physicians. Controversy arose. naturally. 2006. however. he immediately reported to the company-designated physicians.After Pellazar was medically repatriated because of his injury. led by Dr. Thus. the companydesignated physicians granted him a Grade 10 disability. 2005 and lasted for several months until August 14. Since Pellazar was responsible for the non-referral to the third doctor because of his failure to inform the manning agency that he would be consulting Dr. Since there is a conflict in the assessment of the company-designated physicians and Dr. the NLRC was well within the bounds of its jurisdiction. the Court observed that labor tribunals and the courts are not bound by the medical findings of the company-designated physician and that the inherent merits of its medical findings will be weighed and duly considered. De Guzman and Banaga as against Pellazar’s physician of choice. may downplay the compensation due to the seafarer because that is what the employer. after all. the POEASEC itself impliedly recognizesthe seafarer’s right to request a second medical opinion from a physician of his own choice. in upholding the disability assessment of Drs. when Pellazar consulted a physician of his choice. Eventually. Banaga. De Guzman. the NLRC’s ruling awarding Pellazar disability benefits based on the Grade 10 rating of Drs. as required by the POEA-SEC. By recognizing that a disagreement between the company designated physicians and the physician chosen by the seafarer may exist. Sabado’s certification in relation to Pellazar’s fitness or unfitness to work. Accordingly. he should suffer the consequences of the absence of a binding third opinion. De Guzman and Banaga can fully withstand a Rule 65 challenge since the Grade 10 rating had ample basis in the extensive evaluation and treatment of Pellazar by . expects of him. However.

the petitioners aver.5 of the CBA on Permanent Medical Unfitness provides: A seafarer whose disability is assessed at 50% or more under the POEA Employment Contract shall.000 for senior officers. Notwithstanding Dr. While Dr. Sabado certified Pellazar to be permanently unfit for sea service.these two company doctors. No. Furthermore.000 for junior officers and US$75. Section 20. considering as the petitioners point out. examined him only once and could have treated him for a few hours only.e.00 under the AMOSUP-IMEC TCCC CBA. Sabado’s diagnosis was consistent with that of the companydesignated physicians (which centered on the injury in Pellazar’s 5th right finger and the resulting loss of grasping power of said fifth finger). shall be entitled to 100% compensation.1.he cannot be entitled to the full disability benefits of US$75. where Dr.Pellazar’s chosen physician. . Sabado inDagupan City for a favorable certification. the NLRC gave more credence to the Grade 10 disability rating of Pellazar than the assessment of Dr.000. US$100. Sabado’s unfit-to-work certification (which the LA relied uponin ruling in Pellazar’sfavor). Pellazar sought out Dr.000 for ratings. Dr. Since the company-designated physicians gave Pellazar only a Grade 10 disability . that Pellazar came all the way from Antipolo. Sabado is practicing his profession. Sabado. for the purpose of this paragraph as regarded (sic) as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity and entitled to 100% compensation. any seafarer assessed at less than 50% disability under the contract but certified as permanently unfit for further sea service in any capacity by the company doctor.27 It is as if. where he resides. Dr. including an orthopedic specialist and a physiatrist. US$125. Sabado. i. to Dagupan City. 3.and not a permanent total disability .

R. 2014 BENSON INDUSTRIES EMPLOYEES UNION-ALU-TUCP and/or VILMA GENON. vs. Respondent. LOURDES ARANAS. RENEBOY LEYSON. TONY FORMENTERA. 200746 August 6. LORENZO ALIA. J. EDISA HORTELANO. DIOSDADO ANDALES. LUCENA ABESIA. G. ..Topic: Payment of Separation Benefits Despite Closure of Business Due to Serious Losses Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE. ALONA ACALDO. MARILYN POTOT. INC. NICIFORO CABANSAG. No. TERESITA CALINAWAN. BENSON INDUSTRIES. CONCEPCION ABAO. MA. Petitioners. MA. WELMER ABANID. LINO PARADERO. STELLA BARONGO. and ARMANDO YBAÑEZ.

Issue: benefits. 2008 on the ground of closure and/or cessation of business operations. (Benson) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing of greencoils with the brand name Lion-Tiger Mosquito Killer."10 Benson opposed petitioners’ claim. wherein the validity of Benson’s closure was brought up as well. Petitioners proffered a claim for the payment of additional separation pay at the rate of four (4) days for every year of service. Reaching an impasse on the conflict. is not sourced from law (particularly. As basis. including herein petitioners. to be effected on March 15. there is a complete cessation of business operations and/or an actual locking-up of the doors of the establishment. When the obligation to pay separation benefits. Article VIII of the existing collective bargaining agreement (CBA) executed by and between the Union and Benson which states that "Benson shall pay to any employee/laborer who is terminated from the service without any fault attributable to him. petitioners invoked Section 1.Facts: Respondent Benson Industries. however. Inc. While serious business losses generally exempt the employer from paying separation benefits. Benson sent its employees. In closure of business. the employer is required to pay its employees separation benefits. but from contract. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to said separation Ruling: Yes. it must be pointed that the exemption only pertains to the obligation of the employer under (new) Article 297 of the Labor Code. aimed at preventing further financial drain upon an employer who cannot anymore pay its employees since business has already stopped. the parties referred the issue to voluntary arbitration. it is treated as an authorized cause for termination. 2008. such as an existing collective bargaining agreement between the . averring that the separation pay already paid to them was already more than what the law requires. usually due to financial losses. a ‘Separation Pay’ equivalent to not less than nineteen (19) days’ pay for every year of service based upon the latest rate of pay of the employee/laborer concerned. except when the closure is due to serious business losses. On February 12. As a form of recompense. a notice5 informing them of their intended termination from employment. Under the Labor Code. Article297 of the Labor Code).

an examination of the latter’s provisions becomes necessary in order to determine the governing parameters for the said obligation. Benson. 2010. considered as an exculpatory parameter under the aforementioned CBA. freely and voluntarily entered into such agreement with petitioners. 2005 to June 30. Benson. In this case. Indeed. It is equally undisputed that Benson agreed to and was thus obligated under the CBA to pay its employees who had been terminated without any fault attributable to them separation benefits at the rate of 19 days for every year of service. A collective bargaining agreement refers to the negotiated contract between a legitimate labor organization and the employer concerning wages. 2003 between the parties. good customs. public order or public policy. As may be gleaned from the following whereas clauses in a Memorandum of Agreement30 dated November 20. terms and conditions as they may deem convenient provided these are not contrary to law. The records are also bereft of any showing that the petitioner made it clear during the CBA negotiations that the bonus was dependent on any condition. the said provision did not state that the Christmas package shall be made to depend on the petitioner’s financial standing. and its employees. Thus. morals. Terse and clear. As in all contracts. A reading of the provision of the CBA reveals that the same provides for the giving of a "Christmas gift package/bonus" without qualification. unlike Article 297 of the Labor Code. it becomes the law between the parties and compliance therewith is mandated by the express policy of the law.employer and its employees. with full knowledge of its financial situation. Clearly. if the . clauses. hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment in a bargaining unit. where the CBA is clear and unambiguous. the parties in a CBA may establish such stipulations. it is undisputed that a CBA was forged by the employer. to govern their relations effective July 1. Benson had been fully aware of its distressed financial condition even at the time of the previous CBA. through the Union. The postulation that Benson had closed its establishment and ceased operations due to serious business losses cannot be accepted as an excuse to clear itself of any liability since the ground of serious business losses is not.

From the foregoing. diminished.00 bonus would be dependent on the company earnings. The principle of non-diminution of benefits is founded on the constitutional mandate to protect the rights of workers and to promote their .petitioner and respondent Association intended that the 3.000. discontinued or eliminated by the employer. such intention should have been expressed in the CBA. Business losses are a feeble ground for petitioner to repudiate its obligation under the CBA. petitioner cannot insist on business losses as a basis for disregarding its undertaking. The rule is settled that any benefit and supplement being enjoyed by the employees cannot be reduced.

R. The respondents also alleged that Our Haus failed to pay them their holiday. they filed with the LA a complaint for underpayment of their daily wages. Respondents. the weekly cooking cost (cook’s wage. the five kasunduans executed by the respondents constitute the written authorization for the inclusion of the board and lodging’s values to their wages. service incentive leave (SIL). Whether or not Our Haus complied with the requirements for the deductibility of facilities. Eventually. their wages were below the minimum rates prescribed in the following wage orders from 2007 to 2010. JAY C. Our Haus only withheld the amount of P290. water) at P239. ERINCO. Issue: 1. Second. Facts: Respondents Alexander Parian. 2014 OUR HAUS REALTY DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION. Whether or not respondent are entitled to payment of their holiday. 13th month and overtime pays. the respondents were asked to report back to work but instead of doing so. First. . They claimed that except for respondent Bernardo N. G. LPG. Tenedero. ALEXANDER PARIAN. To alleviate its condition. service incentive leave (SIL). Jay Erinco. Our Haus argues that it complied with the requirements for deductibility of the value of the facilities.00 which represents the food’s raw value. to take vacation leaves.40 per person is a separate expense that Our Haus did not withhold from the respondents’ wages. a company engaged in the construction business. 13th month and overtime pays. Supplements Ponente: BRION. Sometime in May 2010. Our Haus suspended some of its construction projects and asked the affected workers.Topic: Facilities v. J. Our Haus experienced financial distress. vs. No. Petitioner. Alexander Canlas. including the respondents. BERNARD TENEDERO and JERRY SABULAO. 204651 August 6. Jerry Sabulao and Bernardo Tenederowere all laborers working for petitioner Our Haus Realty Development Corporation (Our Haus). 2. ALEXANDER CANLAS.

Moreover. The facilities must be charged at fair and reasonable value. These employees averred that they were recipients of free lodging. thus negating its claimed customary nature. this document would still work against Our Haus’ case.Ruling: 1. proof must be shown that’ such facilities are customarily furnished by the trade. and c. The facility must be customarily furnished by the trade One of the badges to show that a facility is customarily furnished by the trade is the existence of a company policy or guideline showing that provisions for a facility were designated as part of the employees’ salaries. then Our Haus should not deduct its values from the respondents’ wages. Our Haus did not show if these benefits were also provided in its other construction projects. Our Haus presented in its motion for reconsideration with the NLRC the joint sinumpaang salaysay of four of its alleged employees. This document did not state whether these benefits had been consistently enjoyed by the rest of Our Haus’ employees. as well as subsidized meals from Our Haus. Even assuming the sinumpaang salaysay to be true. Our Haus only produced the documents when the NLRC had already earlier determined that Our Haus failed to prove that it was traditionally giving the respondents their board and lodging. For one. . b. electricity and water provisions to its employees. the records reveal that the board and lodging were given on a per project basis. this will run contrary to the affiants’ claim that these benefits were traditionally given free of charge. Otherwise. If Our Haus really had the practice of freely giving lodging. electricity and water. the provision of deductible facilities must be voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee. No. The Court agreed with the NLRC’s finding that the sinumpaang salaysay statements submitted by Our Haus are self-serving. To justify its non-compliance with the requirements for the deductibility of a facility: a. To comply with this.

4 Separate sanitary. Peculiar to the construction business are the occupational safety and health (OSH) services which the law itself mandates employers to provide to their workers. 13.1 Adequate supply of safe drinking water 16. series of 1998 employers engaged in the construction business are required to provide the following welfare amenities: 16. As part of the project cost that construction companies already charge to their clients. Under Section 16 of DOLE Department Order (DO) No. .2 Adequate sanitary and washing facilities 16. which sets out the guidelines for the implementation of DOLE DO No. 13. If it were customary among construction companies to provide board and lodging to their workers and treat their values as part of their wages. mandates that the cost of the implementation of the requirements for the construction safety and health of workers. This is Our Haus’ obligation under the law. However.Apart from company policy. and as may be applicable. series of 2005.3 Suitable living accommodation for workers. Moreover. for their families 16. Our Haus cannot pass the burden of the OSH costs of its construction projects to its employees by deducting it as facilities. the value of the housing of their workers cannot be charged again to their employees’ salaries. The rationale behind this is to ensure that the living accommodation of the workers is not substandard and is strictly compliant with the DOLE’s OSH criteria. we would have more reason to conclude that these benefits were really facilities. This is to ensure the humane working conditions of construction employees despite their constant exposure to hazardous working environments. washing and sleeping facilities for men and women workers. shall be integrated to the overall project cost. DOLE DO No. the employer may also prove compliance with the first requirement by showing the existence of an industry-wide practice of furnishing the benefits in question among enterprises engaged in the same line of business. 56. Our Haus could not really be expected to prove compliance with the first requirement since the living accommodation of workers in the construction industry is not simply a matter of business practice.

While the rules serve as the initial test in characterizing a benefit as a facility. substantial consideration must be given to the nature of the employer’s business in relation to the character or type of work performed by the employees involved. Facilities vs. Supplements. only the value of the facilities may be deducted from the employees’ wages but not the value of supplements. Under the purpose test. In the present case.Purpose Test. The purpose test in jurisprudence Under the law. the board and lodging provided by Our Haus cannot be categorized as facilities but as supplements. the laborer would spend and pay for them just the same. the purpose test additionally recognizes that the employer and the employee do not stand at the same bargaining positions on benefits that must or must not form part of an employee’s wage. if a benefit or privilege granted to the employee is clearly for the employer’s convenience. but in the purpose for which it is given. If its provision is mainly for the employer’s advantage. "Supplements” constitute extra remuneration or special privileges or benefits given to or received by the laborers over and above their ordinary earnings or wages. even if a benefit is customarily provided by the trade. careful consideration is given to the nature of the employer’s business in relation to the work performed by the employee. Lastly. since if they are not so furnished. are items of expense necessary for the laborer's and his family's existence and subsistence so that by express provision of law (Sec. Here. it will not be considered as a facility but a supplement. This test is used to address inequitable situations wherein employers consider a benefit deductible from the wages even if the factual circumstances show that it clearly redounds to the employers’ greater advantage. lodging. they form part of the wage and when furnished by the employer are deductible therefrom. supplements or allowances given to employees. In the ultimate analysis. it must still pass the purpose test set by jurisprudence. The law also prescribes that the computation of wages shall exclude whatever benefits. on the other hand. then it is a supplement. "Facilities". Under this test. The distinction lies not so much in the kind of benefit or item (food. 2[g]). . the purpose test seeks to prevent a circumvention of the minimum wage law. bonus or sick leave) given.

in order to finish the project on the designated turn-over date. Accordingly. and lack the required energy to perform strenuous physical activities. The success of its projects is largely a function of the physical strength. their values cannot be considered in computing the total amount of the respondents’ wages. The board and lodging provision might have been a substantial consideration in their acceptance of employment in a place distant from their provincial residences. Our Haus only offered these documents when the NLRC had already ruled that respondents did not accomplish any written authorization. Under the purpose test. vitality and efficiency of its laborers. Under the circumstances. by ensuring that the workers are adequately and well fed. Its business will be jeopardized if its workers are weak. Oddly. the subsidized meals and free lodging provided by Our Haus are actually supplements. Moreover. the daily wages paid to the respondents are clearly below the prescribed minimum wage rates in the years 2007-2010. it will be more convenient to the employer if its workers are housed near the construction site to ensure their ready availability during urgent or emergency circumstances. Our Haus belatedly submitted five kasunduans. The provision of deductible facilities must be voluntarily accepted in writing by the employee As it diminishes the take-home pay of an employee. These five kasunduans were also undated. Thus. a labor intensive enterprise. contractors are usually faced with the problem of meeting target deadlines.Our Haus is engaged in the construction business. the employer is actually investing on its business. day and night. work is performed continuously. containing their conformity to the inclusion of the values of the meals and housing to their total wages. supposedly executed by the respondents. Also. This observation strongly bears in the present case since three of the respondents are not residents of the National Capital Region. the deduction must be with his express consent. sickly. More often than not. making us wonder if they had really been executed when respondents first assumed their jobs. in the construction business. to allow deduction from their wages. Thus. . productivity issues like tardiness and unexpected absences would be minimized.

2. But it now submits that it did not actually withhold the entire amount as it did not figure in the computation the money it expended for the salary of the cook. holiday and SIL pays.40 per week per person. which amounts to P249. records. The burden of proving payment of monetary claims rests on the employer on the reasoning that the pertinent personnel files. it was not mentioned that they also executed a kasunduan for their board and lodging benefits The facility must be charged at a fair and reasonable value Our Haus admitted that it deducted the amount of P290.00 deduction within the 70% ceiling prescribed by the rules. remittances and other similar documents — which will show that overtime. Our Haus is burdened to present evidence to corroborate its claim. water and LPG) to support its claim that it did not withhold the full amount of the meals’ value. in the earlier sinumpaang salaysay by Our Haus’ four employees. it appears that the total meal expense per week for each person is P529. are bereft of any evidence to support Our Haus’ meal expense computation. Unfortunately. Since Our Haus is using these additional expenses (cook’s salary. Our Haus’ valuation cannot be plucked out of thin air. the water. records will disclose the absence of any credible document which will show that respondents had been paid their 13th month pay. and the LPG used for cooking. it merely listed its supposed expenses without any supporting document. it cannot be said that Our Haus complied with this third requisite. Even the value it assigned for the respondents’ living accommodations was not supported by any documentary evidence. Our Haus merely presented a handwritten certification from its administrative officer that its employees automatically . The records however.00 per week from each of the respondents for their meals. Yes.40.Moreover. payrolls. From these. Without any corroborative evidence. service incentive leave and other claims of workers have been paid — are not in the possession of the worker but in the custody and absolute control of the employer. Our Haus never explained how it came up with the valuesit assigned for the benefits it provided. However. differentials. making Our Haus’ P290. In the present case. The valuation of a facility must be supported by relevant documents such as receipts and company records for it to be considered as fair and reasonable.

it failed to do so. Respondent Sr. Petitioner. Rosa-Makati as a part-time school physician in June 1993. the school nurse. MARILYN B. This certification was not even subscribed under oath. RIO. principally. Respondents. 189629 August 6. No. . vs.become entitled to five days of service incentive leave as soon as they pass probation. ROSAMAKATI and/or SR. G. Our Haus could have at least submitted its payroll or copies of the pay slips of respondents to show payment of these benefits. 2014 DR. Marilyn Gustilo charged petitioner and Mrs. of "grave misconduct. PHYLIS C. J. COLEGIO DE STA.R. However. Neneth Alonzo (Alonzo). to the health and well-being of the pupils based on the Manual of Regulations for Private Schools and Section 94 (a) and (b) and Article 282 (a). dishonesty and/or gross neglect of duty detrimental not only to the school but. GUSTILO. (b) and (c) of the Labor Code." In the same letter. Topic: Just Cause for Termination of Employment Ponente: PEREZ. Facts: Petitioner was hired by respondent Colegio De Sta.

petitioner and Alonzo were preventively suspended for a period of thirty (30) days. in relation to Section 94 of the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. thus could not have been the subject of medical examination/evaluation. and (4) students having medical records prior to their enrollment. and (3) failure to conduct medical/health examination on all students of several classes of different grade levels for the school year 2001-2002. Rosa Makati and Gustilo before the Labor Arbiter. (2) failure to conduct medical examination on all students for two (2) to five (5) consecutive years. Based on Article 282 of the Labor Code. It was unrefuted that: (1) there were dates when a medical examination was supposed to have been conducted and yet the dates fell on weekends. .3 Petitioner denied the charges through a letter to respondent on 2 August 2002. and negligence in the keeping of school or student records. Petitioner was made to answer for the following: (1) nine (9) students have medical records for school years during which they were not in the school yet. Gross neglect of duty or gross negligence refers to negligence characterized by the want of even slight care. Issue: Whether or not petitioner was illegally dismissed. with a conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be affected. petitioner’s actions fall within the purview of the above-definitions. On 9 August 2002 petitioner filed a complaint for constructive dismissal and illegal suspension against respondents Colegio de Sta. petitioner was legally dismissed on the ground of gross inefficiency and incompetence. Petitioner failed to diligently perform her duties. effective 30 July 2002. As borne by the records. acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act. Gross inefficiency is closely related to gross neglect because both involve specific acts of omission resulting in damage to another. not inadvertently but willfully and intentionally. (2) seventy-nine (79) students of several classes/sections during certain school years were not given any medical/health evaluation/examination. Ruling: No. (3) lack of medical records on all students. or tampering with or falsification of records.

2014 . Due to pressure and time constraints. Even assuming that petit10ner was telling the truth." Indeed. the fact remains that she had been grossly inefficient and negligent for failing to provide a proper system of maintaining and updating the students' medical records over the years of her employment with respondent.R. Alonzo erroneously transferred the entries of the medical examinations to the official records.As her defense. 192993 August 11. No. petitioner was grossly inefficient and negligent in performing her duties. which contains the official medical records. petitioner waited for two (2) years to finally have the cabinet opened. could not be opened. the personin-charge. G. Topic: Death Benefits Ponente: PERALTA. Because the cabinet. However. which was misplaced by Sr. Alonzo had to record the medical examinations temporarily. J. Zenaida. petitioner maintains that the discrepancies were due to the loss of the cabinet key.

Donnabelle sought the assistance of the Philippine National Police (PNP) Crime Laboratory to conduct a forensic examination on the remains of Hernani and to investigate the cause of his death. petitioner Wallem Maritime Services. In 2004.. Donnabelle also requested the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) to investigate the incident. DONNABELLE PEDRAJAS and SEAN JADE PEDRAJAS. His body was repatriated back to the Philippines in April 2005. and REGINALDO OBEN/WALLEM SHIPMANAGEMENT LIMITED. Petitioners’ claim that they have no obligation to pay death benefits to the heirs of Hernani because the latter's death was self-inflicted and therefore exempted from the coverage of death benefits under the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency-Standard Employment Contract (POEASEC) and the AMOSUP-CBA. She was also informed that investigations were being conducted by the Italian Government relative to Hernani's death. Inc. In March 2005. filed a claim for death compensation benefits under the POEA Standard Employment Contract and the Associates Marine Officer's and Seafarer's Union of the Philippines Collective Bargaining Agreement (AMOSUPCBA). moral. Respondnets. and Hernani Pedrajas (Hernani) entered into a contract of employment wherein Hernani was hired as Engine Boy on board the M/V Crown Jade. during the effectivity of his employment contract and while the vessel was in Italy. Issue: Whether Hernani committed suicide during the term of his employment contract which would exempt petitioners from paying Hernani's death compensation benefits to his beneficiaries. Donnabelle. was informed that Hernani hanged himself and was found dead in the vessel. She also demanded attorney's fees. Facts: Petitioner Wallem Maritime Services. Ruling: Yes. in June 2005. Donnabelle Pedrajas (Donnabelle). Due to the foregoing. as beneficiary of Hernani. Suspecting foul play. INC. Hernani's spouse and herein respondent. . and exemplary damages. vs. the PNP Crime Laboratory and the NBI concluded that homicide cannot be totally ruled out. After the investigation. Inc. is a domestic corporation licensed to engage in the manning business. Hernani was found hanging on the Upper Deck B of the vessel with a rope tied to his neck.WALLEM MARITIME SERVICES. Petitioners.

beyond all reasonable doubt. conforms to suicide. The death of a seaman during the term of his employment makes the employer liable to the former's heirs for death compensation benefits. In the case at bar. is an element which goes to confirm . This rule. The employer may be exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the seaman's death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act. xxxx Therefore no elements at all have emerged such as would lead us to believe that third parties may have intervened in causing the death. The Italian Medical Examiner further concluded that: x x x There are no elements which may lead one to suppose/assume the direct intervention of third parties in causing the death of the young seaman. in order to commit suicide. of his own accord. Italy was "weakened" by the . no other forms of injuries were noted on the body of Pedrajas and his viscera. the same as on the gangway. and the burden of proof rests on his employer. In the case at bar.even if of lesser value . everything points to Pedrajas having hung himself in order to commit suicide. incapacity. In other words. as described. respondents' entitlement to any death benefit depends on whether petitioners' evidence suffices to prove that Hernani committed suicide. and the way inwhich Mr. thisallows us to retain that Pedrajas suffered no physical violence before the hanging and that he hung himself. disability or death of a seafarer resulting from his willful or criminal act or intentional breach of his duties x x x. however. Pedrajas died. the banister and the pipe where the rope was fixed. the Italian Medical Examiner found that: During the necroscopic investigation. The CA held that the Forensic Report of the Public Prosecutor’s Office of Livorno.Section 20 (D) of the POEA-SEC provides: No compensation and benefits shall be payable in respect of any injury. is not absolute. The presence of flakes of white paint on the palms of both hands.the theory that Pedrajas himself tied the rope to the metal pipe. the CA did not give credit to the report and findings made by the Medical Examiner appointed by the Italian Court who conducted the autopsy on the body of Hernani. Hence.

victim’s behavior and other things related to it.16 From the foregoing. did not conduct any autopsy of the body of Hernani and just based their opinion on documents submitted to them and information coming solely from his relatives. The Medico-Legal Officer of the NBI found that: In view of the above facts and observations. The NBI. x x x To be able to determine if the strangulation is "suicide or homicide. who immediately conducted an autopsy on the seafarer's body upon his death. x x x xxxx Based on the following information and physical findings." it should not be only limited to the autopsy. The PNP Crime Laboratory. He. my knowledge of the case is limited by the fact that I have no police report and autopsy report done in Italy. we cannot totally rule-out homicide. it is the opinion of the undersigned that HOMICIDE cannot be totally ruled out. The Court reasoned. thus: We give credence to Dr. position of the body when it was found. likewise. Inthis case. noted. I only have the body and the verbal information disclosed to me by the wife and sister of the victim. type of knot. which upon his examination led him to conclude that Danilo died by hanging himself. on the other hand. He saw first-hand the condition of Danilo's body. it is more logical to rely on the findings of the Italian Medical examiner. Inc. stated thus: Unfortunately.17 the Court gave credence to the medical report made by the Saudi Arabian doctor. I have no pictures of the following: crime scene. Hameed's medical report establishing that Danilo committed suicide bychanging himself. that there . Hindang. In Maritime Factors.findings of the PNP Crime Laboratory and the NBI. v. Hameed conducted the autopsy of Danilo's remains immediately after the latter's death. but it must be based on several aspects like knowledge of the "crime scene. cord/rope. in its report.1âwphi1 Dr. This compliance was merely to render an opinion and should not be construed as judgment. His report was comprehensive and more detailed.

In said forensic report issued by the Italian Medical Examiner from the Public Prosecutor's Office. As sufficiently argued by the respondents (petitioners herein) the findings of the Medical Examiner appointed by the Italian Court was made after he personally and carefully examined the place of the incident immediately after the body of Mr. Since. x x x The report of the Italian Medical Examiner. it would only lend more credence to its genuineness and truthfulness. It is settled that when the death of a seaman . it should be noted that the Medical Examiner appointed by the Italian Court was not merely limited to the autopsy of the remains of Hernani. this Office is more than convinced that the death of the seafarer is due to his hanging himself which would disqualify his heirs from entitlement to death benefits under the POEA Contract and the CBA. temperature and position of the body when found. who confessed as to his participation in the drug operations which eventually led the Italian authorities to where the remaining cocaine and proceeds thereof were being hidden on-board the vessel. The medical examiner had the luxury ofinvestigating the crime scene. Hemani' s death is not compensable and his heirs are not entitled to any compensation or benefits. In fact. the statements contained in the notes led to the investigation and arrest of Deck Boy Harder. the Court agrees with the findings of the LA and his judgment to give weight and credence to the evidence submitted by the petitioners proving that Hernani committed suicide. Hence. Pedrajas was found. As aptly found by the LA: Moreover. type of knot. Here. The forensic report issued by the Italian authorities proves this fact. Moreover. Since the information in the notes proved to be informative and useful to the Italian authorities. it could only lead to the conclusion that the notes were written by no other person except Hemani. Verily. Pedrajas hanging himself to commit suicide. The findings of the Italian Medical Examiner were made after he personally and carefully examined the place immediately after the incident. it was found that the (sic) based on the evidence that he personally examined everything points to Mr.were no signs of violence or resistance. the petitioners were able to prove that Hemani committed suicide. which stated that Hernani committed suicide is more categorical and definite than the uncertain findings of the PNP Crime Laboratory and the NBI that homicide cannot be totally ruled out. the credibility and authenticity of Hemani's suicide notes are also beyond doubt. the rope used for hanging. or any external injuries except a very slight and artificial injury of nearly 5 cm among the toes of Danilo's right leg.

Petitioner.resulted from a deliberate or willful act on his own life. BELMONTE. before becoming a section editor and writer of its newspaper. INC. Inc. Inc. Topic: Prescriptive Period of Money Claims Ponente: LEONEN. Belmonte denied Arriola’s allegations. non-payment of salaries/wages. Arriola alleged that Pilipino Star Ngayon. Arguing that he was a regular employee. Arriola suddenly absented himself from work and never . attorney's fees. 1999. Respondents. illegally dismissed him. In their position paper. 175689 August 13.R. 1999. Facts: In July 1986. PILIPINO STAR . G. "arbitrarily dismissed"6 him on November 15. actual damages. On November 15. vs. He wrote "Tinig ng Pamilyang OFWs" until his column was removed from publication on November 15. and full backwages with the National Labor Relations Commission. Arriola never returned for work. Arriola as correspondent assigned in Olongapo Cityand Zambales. moral and exemplary damages. and/or MIGUEL G. 2002.NGAYON. Arriola contended that his rights to security of tenure and due process were violated when Pilipino Star Ngayon. Arriola had held various positions in Pilipino Star Ngayon. Inc. Inc. and Miguel G. Pilipino Star Ngayon. such death is not compensable. J. Arriola filed a complaint4 for illegal dismissal. No. 2014 GEORGE A. Pilipino Star Ngayon. ARRIOLA. Since then. In his position paper. they alleged that around the third week of November 1999. employed George A. and it is directly attributable to the seaman. Inc.

Whether Pilipino Star Ngayon. in essence. No Article 291 of the Labor Code does not cover "money claims" consequent to an illegal dismissal such as backwages. an action based upon an injury to the rights of a plaintiff must be filed within four years. The Labor Arbiter. Ruling: 1. After a few months. Issues: 1. He maintained that Pilipino Star Ngayon. to write "Boses ng Pamilyang OFWs. This four-year prescriptive period applies to claims for backwages." Arriola denied that he abandoned his employment.Inc. an action predicated "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff. according to this court. . when one is arbitrarily and unjustly deprived of his job or means of livelihood. . Under Article 1146. 1146 of the New Civil Code. This statement of account showed a computation of his separation pay as of November 30. It also does not cover claims for damages due to illegal dismissal. Inc. . 2. which provides: Art. A claim for backwages. 1999.To prove his allegation. NLRC and CA ruled that the action of Arriola has already prescribed under Art. which must be brought within four [4] years. The following actions must be instituted within four years: (1) Upon injury to the rights of the plaintiff. the action instituted to contest the legality of one's dismissal from employment constitutes.’s accounting head. Whether Arriola’s money claims have prescribed." as contemplated under Art. These claims are governed by Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. they learned that Arriola transferred to a rival newspaper publisher. Imbestigador. ordered him to stop reporting for work and to claim his separation pay. Inc. illegally dismissed Arriola.returned despite Belmonte’s phone callsand beeper messages. 291 of the Labor Code. Arriola presented a statement of account allegedly faxed to him by Pilipino Star Ngayon. Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines governs complaints for illegal dismissal. not the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code. 1146. This court explained: .

" It has two elements: first. a claim for backwages likewise prescribes in four years. therefore. This shows his clear intention to sever his employment with Pilipino Star Ngayon. Since an award of backwages is merely consequent to a declaration of illegal dismissal." Legally. damages. but. and attorney’s fees arising from his claim of illegal dismissal have not yet prescribed when he filed his complaint with the Regional Arbitration Branch for the National Capital Region ofthe National Labor Relations Commission.may be a money claim "by reason of its practical effect. an award of backwages "is merely one of the reliefs which an illegally dismissed employee prays the labor arbiter and the NLRC to render in his favor as a consequence of the unlawful act committed by the employer. 2003. Arriola’s claims for backwages. 1999 and only filed his illegal dismissal complaint on November 15. The second element is "the more determinative factor and is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employee has no more intention to work." Assuming that Arriola started writing for Imbestigador only on February 17. after November 15. He took three years and one day to remedy his dismissal. governs these actions. however. Inc." Though it results "in the enrichment of the individual illegally dismissed. the award of backwages is not in redress of a private right. second. No. Arriola abandoned his employment with Pilipino Star Ngayon. The prescriptive period for filing an illegal dismissal complaint is four years from the time the cause of action accrued. deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to continue his employment. the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason and. Inc. ." Actions for damages due to illegal dismissal are likewise actions "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff. a clear intention to sever employer-employee relations exists. he nonetheless failed to report for work at Pilipino Star Ngayon. Inc. rather. Abandonment is the "clear. without any intention of returning. is in the nature of a command upon the employer to make public reparation for his violation of the Labor Code. 2." Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. 2002.

BOTICA CLAUDIO Facts: Fernandez filed a cases of illegal dismissal.Topic: Remedies Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE. Dissatisfied with the LA’s ruling. J. 2008 before the NLRC. among others. Jose denied the foregoing allegations. against Jose. Fernandez filed a Notice of Appeal with Memorandum of Appeal on February 8. the same was nonetheless effected without procedural due process. and contended that Fernandez’s dismissal was valid. represented by GUADALUPE JOSE. 2014 LEI SHERYLL FERNANDEZ. Copies of . Respondent. The LA held that while just cause attended Fernandez’s dismissal from work based on the finding that she went on AWOL. 205870 August 13.R. Petitioner. vs. G. No.

It is settled that the filing of a motion for reconsideration from the order. 5 Sto. The CA gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to respondent’s Rule 65 certiorari petition despite its finding that the latter still had a pending motion for reconsideration from the Decision dated March 15. 2010. if any. Notwithstanding the pendency of the aforesaid motions for reconsideration. SFDM. and thereby reversing the LA’s ruling. On June 1. 2010. Jose filed a second motion for reconsideration28 dated February 2. 2010. The CA gave due course to the petition." On March 15. Ruling: Yes. resolution or decision of the NLRC is an indispensable condition before an aggrieved party can avail of a petition for certiorari. Solis. Jr.the same were purportedly sent by registered mail to one "Atty. Jose filed a motion for reconsideration dated January 20... 2010 before the NLRC. Having failed . 2011 before the NLRC. Ramon E. Jose filed a petition for certiorari before the CA. Consequently. No. the more prudent recourse for respondent should have been to move for the immediate resolution of its motion for reconsideration before the NLRC instead of filing a petition for certiorari before the CA. Nino St. claiming to have secured a copy of the NLRC Resolution and LA Order only upon personal verification on February 8. 2011 before the same tribunal. an Entry of Judgment24 was issued by the NLRC. 2010 (LA Order) granting Fernandez’s motion for execution. This is to afford the NLRC an opportunity to rectify its perceived errors or mistakes. 2011. Hence. Despite the fact that the NLRC had yet to act on the aforesaid motion for reconsideration. Counsel for respondents. 2011. Without disclosing the date when the foregoing resolution was received. 201031 and filed a motion for reconsideration therefrom on April 12. 1100 Quezon City.32 referring to her second motion for reconsideration dated February 2. the LA issued an Order dated August 17. the NLRC rendered a Resolution granting Fernandez’s appeal. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in holding that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in giving due course to Fernandez’s appeal. declaring its Resolution to have become final and executory on May 18.

to do so.R. the Court has held that the mere failure to serve the same upon the opposing party does not bar the NLRC from giving due course to an appeal. however. After all. 2. While Article 223 of the Labor Code and Section 3(a). the NLRC should require the appellant to provide the opposing party copies of the notice of appeal and memorandum of appeal. J. G. and the CA should have dismissed the same. a copy of her memorandum of appeal by registered mail. 198342 August 13. Topic: Death Benefits Ponente: PERALTA. and. the availment of the opportunity to seek reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of in labor cases amounts to due process. the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to be heard or as applied in administrative proceedings. As held in the case of Angeles v. an excusable neglect. Jose eventually participated in the appeal proceedings by filing not only one but two motions for reconsideration from the NLRC Resolution. No. thus. Rule VI of the then New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC require the party intending to appeal from the LA’s ruling to furnish the other party a copy of his memorandum of appeal. an aggrieved party cannot feign denial of due process where he had been afforded the opportunity to ventilate his side. the NLRC could not be expected to require compliance from Fernandez. hence. not a jurisdictional defect warranting the dismissal of an appeal. Jose. thereby negating any supposed denial of due process on her part. was not notified of her appeal. the appellant. Instead. since it was not aware that the opposing party. as Jose was in this case. Fernandez. an opportunity to explain one’s side or an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action or ruling complained of. The CA erred in declaring that the failure of Fernandez to furnish Jose with copies of her notice of appeal and memorandum of appeal before the NLRC deprived the latter of her right to due process. Such failure is only treated as a formal lapse. through her counsel. her petition for certiorari was prematurely filed. Hence. 2014 . What the law prohibits is absolute absence of the opportunity to be heard. it cannot be faulted in relying on Fernandez’s representation that she had sent Jose. In this case.

actual. with the diagnosis of "squamous cell carcinoma of the lungs with metastasis to the spine and probably the brain. On August 19. Sometime later.L. UCO-Marine Contracting W. 2006. On July 23. Facts: The deceased. 2005. Petitioner. While inspecting a lifeboat. 2006. 2005. YAP. and Ruel Benisano. He boarded the vessel on July 23. dated July 15. he met an accident. its foreign principal. substituted him as party-complainant and the claim for disability benefits was then converted into a claim for death benefits. L. L.. . Issue: Whether or not the petitioner is entitled to compensation for the death of her husband. Yap.REMEDIOS O.. he was hired as Third Mate on board vessel UCO for a period of one (1) year with a basic monthly salary of Six Hundred Dollars (US$600.00). and attorney’s fees. Remedios O. 2007. was a seafarer who had been employed by respondents Rover Maritime Services Corporation." On July 17. sickwages.10 During the pendency of the case. he was admitted at the Doctors Medical Center in Iloilo City for three (3) weeks for further treatment. 2006. Dovee Yap died of "Multiple Organ Failure Secondary To Pulmonary Squamous Cell CA With Distant Metastasis (Brain and Bone) And Obstructive Pneumonia Secondary To Electrolyte Imbalance Secondary To Gastric Ulcer Secondary To S/P Radio Therapy.7 He was brought to a hospital in Bahrain and was confined thereat for two (2) weeks. RUEL BENISANO and/or UCO MARINE CONTRACTING W. Dovee Yap. In his last contract with respondents. moral and exemplary damages. the last day of Dovee Yap’s contract. medical. ROVER MARITIME SERVICES CORPORATION." His widow. Yap. he slipped and hit his back on the steel lifeboat ladder. Dovee Yap was repatriated to the Philippines.L. Ruling: No. MR. Respondents. Dovee M. vs. Dovee Yap filed against respondents a complaint for permanent disability benefits. reimbursement of hospital. and doctor’s expenses. Dovee Yap was again confined at the (Iloilo) Western Visayas Medical Center. On August 17. in various capacities under different contracts of employment continuously for a period of ten (10) years.

not only by medical findings. 9. shall be strictly and faithfully observed. is a matter governed. but by the contract he entered into with his employer and the law which is deemed integrated therein. His contract of employment with respondents expired on July 23. .The terms and conditions of a seafarer’s employment. Neither was there any indication that he was physically incapacitated to do so. To ignore this mandatory rule would certainly be unfair to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant’s illness considering the passage of time. petitioner failed to adduce proof that the death of Dovee Yap was work-related. First. as the CA noted. Second. 2007. Dovee Yap did not even submit himself to the mandatory post-employment medical examination within three (3) days from his arrival in the Philippines. or (b) the sickness/ailment for which he died is an accepted occupational disease. Moreover. Series of 2000. it is clear from the evidence presented that petitioner’s husband did not pass away during the term of his employment. death compensation benefits cannot be awarded. Petitioner failed to prove by substantial evidence that the death of her husband occurred during the term of his employment contract and that the cause of death was work-related. entitled the Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers On Board OceanGoing Vessels (POEA Standard Employment Contract). Series of 2000. Paragraph 2 of the Contract of Employment between petitioner’s husband and respondents states that the terms and conditions of Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) Order No. or (c) his working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease for which he died. as amended by Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Memorandum Circular No. 4.2006 whereas his death occurred more than a year thereafter or on August 19. Petitioner failed to establish the link connecting Dovee Yap’s accidental slip to the lung cancer and pneumonia that killed him. including claims for death and disability benefits. Unless there is substantial evidence showing that: (a) the cause of the seaman’s death was reasonably connected to his work. Said issuances provide a set of minimum requirements acceptable to the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers on board ocean-going vessels.

Preemployment merely determines whether one is "fit to work" at sea or "fit for sea service. Petitioner failed to comply with its conditions. . thus.Neither can it be said that Dovee Yap’s working conditions increased the risk of contracting the disease for which he died. The mere fact that Dovee Yap was declared fit to work in his pre-medical examinationsfor the past ten (10) years of his employment does not necessarily follow that his pulmonary illness and cancer of the lungs was brought about by the accident he encountered. the award of death compensation benefits are barred." and does not reveal the real state of health of an applicant. while Dovee Yap’s pneumonia may be listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the POEA Standard Employment Contract. No evidence on record nor allegation in the pleadings showing how Dovee Yap’s working conditions involved exposure to the risks of contracting cancer of the lungs or pneumonia. basis of Section 32-A. In addition. We are not persuaded.

JOSE T. a 24-ha. FLORENCIA LAJOM GARCIADIAZ. .. ATAYDE. Accordingly. the LBP.434. (PD) 27. the DAR erroneously applied the provisions of PD 27 and Executive Order No. De Lajom) were the registered owners of several parcels of land in Nueva Ecija.00 for 11. JOSEFINA ATAYDE FRANCISCO. that in computing the amount of just compensation. otherwise known as the "Tenants Emancipation Decree. (b) 17. 2014 LAND BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES. No. Facts: Jose T.R.733. filed an amended Petition for determination of just compensation and cancellation of land transfers against the DAR.3060 has. Records show. and BLESILDA ATAYDE RIOS.3949 has. TOMAS ATAYDE. portion of the subject land (subject portion) was placed under the government's Operation Land Transfer Program pursuant to Presidential Decree No. J. offered to pay Lajom the following amounts as just compensation for the following constitutive areas of the subject portion: (a) 19. 184982 August 20. through the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP). Just Compensation Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE. instead. however. Lajom (Lajom) and his mother Vicenta Vda.. FRANCISCO LAJOM GARCIA. more or less. represented by PORFIRIO RODRIGUEZ. inter alia. Sometime in 1991. He alleged. and (c) 80.Topic: Agrarian Reform.65 for 2. G. that despite non-payment of the offered just compensation. Petitioner. Lajom rejected the DAR valuation and.4173 has.505. FERNANDO LAJOM RODRIGUEZ. (DAR valuation). LAJOM. the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR).. and the said farmer-beneficiaries. AUGUSTO MIRANDA.45 for 10. vs." as amended. DAR granted twelve (12) Emancipation Patents between 1994 and 1998 in favor of the 10 farmer-beneficiaries. RAMON L. De Lajom (Vda. Respondents. JR..

he asserted that the value of the subject portion should be computed based on the provisions of RA 6657. RA 6657 had already taken effect on June 15. Ruling: 1. such just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under RA 6657.contrary to Lajom’s stance. Hence. and not of PD 27 and/or EO 228. 1988. Lajom stressed that the DAR valuation was arrived at without due process. Thus. with PD 27 and EO 228 applying only suppletorily. For its part. as in this case." which took effect on June 15. When should just compensation be determined? 3.(EO) 228. In sum. highly prejudicial and inimical to his and his heirs’ property rights. were never abrogated by the passage of RA 6657. should make the final determination of just compensation in the exercise of its judicial function. He likewise claimed that the Barrio Committee on Land Production (BCLP) resolution – which fixed the average gross production (AGP) per ha. such as when the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled. Issues: 1. PD27 and EO 228 are superseded. where RA 6657 is sufficient. and which the DAR used in arriving at its valuation – was falsified and therefore cannot validly serve as basis for determining the value of the land. Similarly. 2. per year at 120 cavans of palay. Even before Lajom filed a petition for the judicial determination of just compensation in May 1993. 1988. on which the DAR valuation was based. (RA) 6657. sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. Whether or not just compensation should be determined and the process concluded under RA 6657. the emancipation patents had been issued in favor of the farmer-beneficiaries prior to . Yes. the LBP agreed with the DAR valuation and insisted that PD 27 and EO 228. Series of 1997. that have been repealed by Section 17 of Republic Act No.2 otherwise known as the "Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. Whether the RTC. When the agrarian reform process under PD 27 remains incomplete and is overtaken by RA 6657.

Domingo: The date of taking of the subject land for purposes of computing just compensation should be reckoned from the issuance dates of the emancipation patents. the RTC is required to consider the factors enumerated in Section 17 of RA 6657. and the assessment made by government . not conclusive. 17. thus. as amended. Heirs of Angel T. actual use and income. Yes. the current value of like properties. Just compensation should be determined at the time of the property’s taking.the filing of the said petition. As enunciated in LBP v. — In determining just compensation. In this respect. 3. with PD 27 and EO 228 applying only suppletorily. being considered the "time of taking" or the time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property. subject to the payment of just compensation to the landowner.: SEC. the just compensation therefor. the just compensation for the subject portion should then be reckoned therefrom. thus. viz. its nature. sitting as a Special Agrarian Court. the sworn valuation by the owner. the tax declarations. 2. Since the emancipation patents in this case had been issued between the years 1994 and 1998. its provisions should have been applied. Verily. While the LBP is charged with the initial responsibility of determining the value of lands placed under the land reform and. and both the taking and the valuation of the subject portion occurred after the passage of RA 6657. Taking may be deemed to occur. An emancipation patent constitutes the conclusive authority for the issuance of a Transfer Certificate of Title in the name of the grantee. for instance. which should make the final determination of just compensation in the exercise of its judicial function. Determination of Just Compensation. it is well-settled that it is the RTC. at the time emancipation patents are issued by the government. accordingly. its valuation is considered only as an initial determination and. the cost of acquisition of the land. The matters pertaining to the correct just compensation award for the subject portion were still in contention at the time RA 6657 took effect. It is from the issuance of an emancipation patent that the grantee can acquire the vested right of ownership in the landholding.

as amended. Thereafter. Series of 2013. Guidelines in Determining Proper Just Compensation 1. conformably with the modification on the rules respecting interest rates introduced by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Monetary Board Circular No." the law should NOT be applied retroactively to pending cases. Just compensation must be valued at the time of the taking. which amended further certain provisions of RA 6657. 2013. in this case. declaring "that all previously acquired lands wherein valuation is subject to challenge by landowners shall be completed and finally resolved pursuant to Section 17 of [RA 6657]. the RTC may impose the same on the just compensation award as may be justified by the circumstances of the case and in accordance with prevailing jurisprudence. The social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers and by the Government to the property as well as the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land shall be considered as additional factors to determine its valuation. 799. .assessors shall be considered. just compensation shall earn interest at the new legal rate of 6% p. should therefore apply. as amended. until fully paid. from the time of taking until June 30. Thus. . 2013. among them Section 17. The Court has previously allowed the grant of legal interest in expropriation cases where there was delay in the payment of just compensation. it is a penalty imposed for damages incurred by the landowner due tothe delay in its payment. is reckoned from the date of the issuance of the emancipation patents. While RA 9700 took effect on July 1. prior to its further amendment by RA 9700. Section 17 of RA 6657. legal interest shall be pegged at the rate of 12% p. 3. the valuation of the subject portion must be based on evidence showing the values prevalent on such time of taking for like agricultural lands.a. this incremental interest is not granted on the computed just compensation.. The evidence must conform to Section 17 of RA 6657. as amended. Hence. To clarify. 2. With respect to the commonly raised issue on interest.a. prior to its amendment by RA 9700. 2009. or the "time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property" which. or beginning July 1. rather. as amended. Considering that the present consolidated petitions had been filed before the effectivity of RA 9700. deeming the same to be an effective forbearance on the part of the State.

J. LOPEZ.4. vs. The determination of just compensation is a judicial function. and TOMAS SY SANTOS. in the exercise of its judicial function of determining just compensation. sitting as a Special Agrarian Court.R. it is not strictly bound thereby if the situations before it do not warrant their application. G. Regular Employment Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE. Petitioner. Topic: Illegal Dismissal. No. 2014 CRISPIN B. Respondents. The RTC. cannot be restrained or delimited in the performance thereof. 207253 August 20. IRVINE CONSTRUCTION CORP. The RTC. . is reminded that while it should take into account the various formulae created by the DAR in arriving at the just compensation for the subject land.

temporarily laid-off on December 27. whereupon he was told "Ikaw ay lay-off muna. on January 10.00 per day and working hours from 7 o'clock in the morning until 4 o'clock in the afternoon. allegedly sent to him within the six (6) month period under Article 286 of the Labor Code which pertinently provides that "the bona-fide suspension of the operation of a business or undertaking for a period not exceeding six (6) months x x x shall not terminate employment. On December 18. For its part. Whether or not Lopez was illegally dismissed. however. 2005. Issue: 1." Thus. Lopez was. Lopez was asked to return to work through a letter (return to work order). thereafter. with a salary of P238. Irvine argued that Lopez's filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal was premature. without any rest day. 2005 which Irvine previously submitted before the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). designated him as a guard at its warehouse in Dasmarinias." is whether or not the "project employees" were assigned to carry out a "specific project or undertaking. however." the duration and scope of which were specified at the time the employees were engaged for that project. Cavite in the year 2000." As such. 2006. Irvine denied Lopez's claims. As evidenced by an Establishment Termination Report dated December 28. Lopez was purportedly terminated from his employment. It initially hired Lopez as laborer in November 1994 and. he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with prayer for the payment of separation benefits against Irvine. alleging that he was employed only as a laborer who.Facts: Respondent Irvine Construction Corp. (Irvine) is a construction firm. 2005 after the Cavite project was finished. Ruling: 1. Yes. The principal test for determining whether particular employees are properly characterized as "project employees" as distinguished from "regular employees. sometimes doubled as a guard. Eventually. Whether or not Lopes was a regular employee. The project could either be: . 2.

2. Lopez is entitled to security of tenure. Yes. In light of the well-entrenched rule that the burden to prove the validity and legality of the termination of employment falls on the employer. As enunciated in Nasipit Lumber Co. Lopez was not a project but a regular employee.(1) a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of the employer company. dismissible only if a just or authorized cause exists. but which is distinct and separate. either in Cavite. Not every loss incurred or expected to be incurred by a company will justify retrenchment. with sufficient and convincing evidence. or possibly. or (2) a particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular business of the corporation. The losses must be substantial and the retrenchment must be reasonably necessary to avert such losses. NLRC: The burden of proving. from the other undertakings of the company. that such closure or suspension is bona fide falls upon the employer. in any of its business locations. . and identifiable as such. Irvine should have established the bona fide suspension of its business operations or undertaking that would have resulted in the temporary lay-off of its employees for a period not exceeding six (6) months in accordance with Article 286 of the Labor Code. or more than 10 years from the time he was laid off on December 27. Article 280 of the Labor Code provides that any employee who has rendered at least one year of service. As a regular employee. shall be considered a regular employee. citing Somerville Stainless Steel Corporation v. 2005. National Organization of Workingmen (NOWM). Lopez had been employed by Irvine since November 1994. and. In order to safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word "project" to prevent employees from attaining the status of regular employees. but also that there was indeed a project. hence. employers claiming that their workers are project employees should not only prove that the duration and scope of the employment was specified at the time they were engaged. should not have been affected by the culmination of the Cavite project alone. whether such service is continuous or broken. The continuation of his engagement with Irvine. v.

He was not given further assignment as he allegedly went on AWOL and lost interest to work. The employer should be able to prove that it is faced with a clear and compelling economic reason which reasonably forces it to temporarily shut down its business operations or a particular undertaking. As the records would show. . Case law states that the employer should also bear the burden of proving that there are no posts available to which the employee temporarily out of work can be assigned. in the case of Mobile Protective & Detective Agency v. by and of itself. Irvine failed to prove compliance with the parameters of Article 286 of the Labor Code. Thus. petitioners only alleged that respondent's last assignment was with VVCC for the period of September 29 to October 31. the Court found that the security guards therein were constructively dismissed considering that their employer was not able to show any dire exigency justifying the latter's failure to give said employees any further assignment. incidentally resulting to the temporary lay-off of its employees. Ompad. Again. it merely completed one of its numerous construction projects which does not. 1997.In this case. amount to a bona fide suspension of business operations or undertaking.

i. 177845 August 20.. At that time. had been deposited to the trustee-bank in her name. James Tan. G. service allowance. Filipinas was only 58 years old and still physically fit to work. Respondent." For their part. she was informed that her services were to be terminated effective May 31. contrary to the provisions of Republic Act No. damages. FILIPINAS A. JAMES TAN. with a monthly salary of 18. 2001. 2001.210. separation pay. 2001. No. 2014 GRACE CHRISTIAN HIGH SCHOOL. with a retirement pay of onehalf (½) month for every year of service. 13. Nonetheless. regardless of age. J.621.Topic: Retirement Pay Ponente: PERLAS-BERNABE. 2001. represented by its Principal. GCHS denied that they illegally dismissed Filipinas. .00 as of May 31. Dr.662. On August 30. non-payment of service incentive leave (SIL) pay. LAVANDERA. (RA) 7641. They asserted that the latter was considered retired on May 31. 2001 when she was informed that her year-to-year contract would no longer be renewed. vs. her services were retained on a yearly basis until May 11. DR. Petitioner. pursuant to GCHS’ retirement plan which gives the school the option to retire a teacher who has rendered at least 20 years of service. She pleaded with GCHS to allow her to continue teaching but her services were terminated.R. 1997 after having rendered 20 years of service pursuant to GCHS’ retirement plan and that she was duly advised that her retirement benefits in the amount of 136. otherwise known as the "Retirement Pay Law.5 Filipinas filed a complaint for illegal (constructive) dismissal.e.00 based on her salary at the time of retirement. Facts: Filipinas was employed by petitioner Grace Christian High School (GCHS) as high school teacher since June1977.00. and attorney’s fees against GCHS6 and/or its principal. She alleged that on May 11.

GCHS has a retirement plan for its faculty and nonfaculty members. Section 5. with a retirement pay of one-half (1/2) month for every year of service. being the more beneficent retirement scheme." The foregoing provision is applicable where: (a) there is no CBA or other applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits to employees. In the present case. or (b) there is a CBA or other applicable agreement providing for retirement benefits but it is below the requirement set by law.5 days: 15 days plus 2. further clarifies what comprises the "½ month salary" due a retiring employee. that GCHS computed Filipinas’ retirement pay without including onetwelfth (1/12) of her 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of her five (5) days SIL. in the case of Elegir v.Issue: How should the retirement pay be computed? Ruling: RA 7641.Inc. a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year – and that "unless the parties provide for broader inclusions. which was enacted on December 9. to wit: For the . 1992. which gives it the option to retire a teacher who has rendered at least 20 years of service. Filipinas’ retirement benefits should be computed in accordance withArticle 287 of the Labor Code. Considering. at least onehalf (1/2) month salary for every year of service. however.2.5 days representing one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the remaining 5 days for SIL. The Court. The said law states that "an employee’s retirement benefits under any collective bargaining [agreement (CBA)] and other agreements shall not be less than those provided" under the same – that is. amended Article 287 of the Labor Code. regardless of age. promulgated to implement RA 7641. as amended by RA 7641. as amended. providing for the rules on retirement pay to qualified private sector employees in the absence of any retirement plan in the establishment.. Philippine Airlines." The Court sees no reason to depart from this interpretation. Rule II38 of the Implementing Rules of Book VI of the Labor Code. has recently affirmed that "one-half (1/2) month salary means 22. the term one-half (1/2) month salary shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.

As used herein. although the actual base for the computation of legal interest shall be on the amount finally adjudged. the Court finds that the award of legal interest at the rate of 6% per annum on the amount of P68. It is only from the date of the LA's Decision that GCHS' obligation to pay Filipinas her retirement pay differentials may be deemed to have been reasonably ascertained and its payment legally adjudged to be due. profit-sharing payments and other monetary benefits which are not considered as part of or integrated into the regular salary of the employees. and includes the fair and reasonable value. clear that the whole 5 days of SIL are included in the computation of a retiring employees’ pay. the term "salary" includes all remunerations paid by an employer to his employees for services rendered during normal working days and hours. As to the legal interest. of food. . as determined by the Secretary of Labor and Employment.150. (b) The cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leave.00 representing the retirement pay differentials due Filipinas should be reckoned from the rendition of the LA's Decision on March 26. (d) All other benefits that the employer and employee may agree upon that should be included in the computation of the employee’s retirement pay. whether such payments are fixed or ascertained on a time.purpose of determining the minimum retirement pay due an employee under this Rule. 2002. (c) One-twelfth of the 13th month pay due the employee. The foregoing rules are. or other method of calculating the same. The term does not include cost of living allowance. task. thus. the term "one-half month salary" shall include all the following: (a) Fifteen (15) days salary of the employee based on his latest salary rate. lodging or other facilities customarily furnished by the employer to his employees. piece or commission basis.

respondent was appointed Purchasing Manager of the petitioner and. RENATO M. Temic failed to adduce any proof that [the] petitioner ever profited from the transactions involved in the purchase orders. The petitioner did not commit any act which was dishonest or deceitful. Issue: Is the dismissal valid? Ruling: No. He did not use his authority as the Purchasing Manager to misappropriate company property and derive benefits therein nor did he abuse the trust reposed in him by Temic with respect to his responsibilities. September 29. 200729. The supplies described in the . He was issued a suspension and later on was dismissed on the ground of loss of trust and confidence for deliberately violating the company procedures for the procurement of services and materials by allowing the proliferation of Process Deviation Temporary Authority (PDTA). Such irregularities were pointed to the respondent. 2014 Facts: Sometime in 1998. 2007. A team from the head office was assigned to audit the petitioner’s operations and found out that there were irregularities. he was named Warehouse & Import-Export Manager (Wimpex Manager). G. J. There was no demonstration of moral perverseness that would justify the claimed loss of trust and confidence attendant to [the] petitioner's job.Topic: Illegal Dismissal Ponente: BRION.R. INC. CANTOS. No. on December 1.: TEMIC AUTOMOTIVE (PHILIPPINES). v.

Topic: Floating Status Ponente: VELASCO JR. and then to his wife. SERRANO. Serrano was relieved by JG Summit from his duties.G. Johnson Robert L.On August 15. but this does not give him such a vested right in his position as would deprive the . No. EXOCET SECURITY AND ALLIED SERVICES CORPORATION AND/OR MA. Serrano was re-assigned as close-in security for Lance Gokongwei. After eight years. 198538. ARMANDO D. Go. TERESA MARCELO v.purchase orders are still with the company even up to the time when petitioner's services were terminated. 2006. September 29. Mary Joyce Gokongwei. Serrano as “close-in”security personnel for one of JG Summit’s corporate officers. An employee has the right to security of tenure. He was offered a position as a general security but he declined instead he filed a case for illegal dismissal. J. Issue: Was Serrano constructively dismissed? Ruling: No. For more than six months after he reported back to Exocet.R. Exocet assigned respondent Armando D. And neither was there evidence shown that the same deviates from the specifications of the company or has no more use to the company. Serrano was without any reassignment.. 2014 Facts: Exocet Security and Allied Services Corporation (Exocet) is engaged in the provision of security personnel to its various clients or principals.

Topic: Death Benefits from GSIS Ponente: BRION. This is especially true in the present case where the security guard’s own refusal to accept a non-VIP detail was the reason that he was not given an assignment within the six-month period. it is manifestly unfair and unacceptable to immediately declare the mere lapse of the six-month period of floating status as a case of constructive dismissal.R. The security agency.company of its prerogative to change his assignment or transfer him where his service. denied Jose’s claim. Elma died due to “Respiratory Failure secondary to Metastatic Cancer to the lungs. alleging that Elma’s stressful working condition caused the cancer that eventually led to her death. so long as such status does not continue beyond a reasonable time. J. the Court has repeatedly recognized that “off-detailing” is not equivalent to dismissal. Temporary “off-detail” or the period of time security guards are made to wait until they are transferred or assigned to a new post or client does not constitute constructive dismissal as their assignments primarily depend on the contracts entered into by the security agencies with third parties. September 24. 2009. Elma’s surviving spouse. JOSE M. as security guard. will be most beneficial to the client. . No.The GSIS. Facts: Elma Capacite (Elma) was an employee in the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR). without looking into the peculiar circumstances that resulted in the security guard’s failure to assume another post. Thus. 2009. however. Bowel cancer with Hepatic and Intraperitoneal Seeding and Ovarian cancer. G. On July 16.Indeed. Jose. the employee may be considered to have been constructively dismissed.when such a “floating status” lasts for more than six months. It opined that Jose had failed to present direct evidence to prove a causal connection between Elma’s illness and her work in order for the claimant to be entitled to the ECC death benefits. 2014 v. filed a claim for ECC death benefits before the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS). should not then be held liable.”On May 13. Exocet. GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM CAPACITE. 199780.

or (2) if not so listed. physical effort and mental exertion. otherwise. In this case. The Court cannot. it likewise provides that the employee should be employed as a vinyl chloride worker or a plastic worker. formulate and finalize reports. that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the working conditions. While item 17. was aggravated by her working conditions. analyze. She also had to constantly render overtime work. we would unreasonably open the floodgates of compensability and render the purposes of a system like GSIS meaningless. The records do not support the contention that she had been exposed to voluminous and dusty records. which are general consequences of working in practically all kinds of human activity. under this evidentiary situation. . All these involved prolonged sitting. exposure to cold room temperature at the office. for her lung cancer to be considered an occupational disease. Further. stress and strain. which is similar to lung cancer. Aside from Jose’s general allegations proving the stressful duties of his late wife. Jose also explained that Elma had to examine various financial statements for accuracy. grant death compensation benefits solely on the assumption that she might have been exposed to deleterious substances while working as bookkeeper and accountant. Jose failed to prove that the risk of contracting the disease was increased by the working conditions. the claimant must show either: (1) that it is a result of an occupational disease listed under Annex "A" of the Amended Rules on Employees' Compensation with the conditions set therein satisfied. Elma did not work in an environment involving the manufacture of chlorine or plastic. until she reached the position of Accountant I. Annex “A” of the Amended Rules of Employee’s Compensation considers lung cancer to be a compensable occupational disease. making her highly susceptible to physical and mental fatigue. she had a very demanding job. nor do they provide any definite picture of her working environment. even during weekends. balance. He merely alleged that throughout Elma’s 27-year service at the DAR. perform complex accounting reports. and prepare financial statements. no reasonable proof exists to support the claim that her respiratory disease. however. that she rose from the ranks as a Junior Statistician. For sickness and the resulting death of an employee to be compensable. in order to study. It cannot likewise award compensation benefits on the basis of stress and fatigue.Issue: Is the illness of Elma work related? Ruling: No.

MOUNT CARMEL COLLEGE EMPLOYEES UNION (MCCEU)/RUMOLO S. ANTONES v. MARIBEL TESALUNA. EVERSITA S. 187621. EVELYN R. MOUNT CARMEL COLLEGE.Topic: Retrenchment and the Right to Self-Organize Ponente: REYES. BASCAR. No. MAHILUM. MARILYN MANGULABNAN. JODELYN REBOTON. KENNETH BENIGNOS. BASCAR. ROLANDO TESALUNA. INCORPORATED. September 24.R. EMELINA I. J. 2014 . ERNA E. MAE BAYLEN. NACIONAL.G.

In the present case. serious. actual and real. and financial hardship for certain workers. The petitioners alleged that such closure was motivated by ill-will just to get rid of the petitioners who were all union members because in June 2001. but substantial. the school re-opened its elementary and high school departments with newlyhired teachers. standards have been laid down by the Court in order to prevent its abuse by an employer. seniority. to wit: (1) That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which. are not merely de minimis. efficiency. Issue: Is the dismissal of the petitioners valid? Ruling: No. and (5) That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the employees. that the expenses for its academic and non-academic personnel were already eating into its budget portion allocated for capital and administrative development. if already incurred. age. (4) That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees’ right to security of tenure. In April 1999. (3) That the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (½) month pay for every year of service. coupled with the decline in the enrolment. contend that such closure was merely a subterfuge of their termination due to the formation of their union. (2) That the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment.Facts: The petitioners were elementary and high school academic and nonacademic personnel employed by Mount Carmel College. Retrenchment is an authorized cause for a valid dismissal. However. are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer. on the other hand. left the school with no choice but to close down its grade school and high school departments. and that the teachers’ demand for increased salaries and benefits. whichever is higher. or if only expected. the respondent’s justification for implementing the retrenchment of the petitioners was due to the alleged closure or cessation . The petitioners. the petitioners were informed of their retrenchment by the respondent due to the closure of the elementary and high school departments of the school because of financial losses it suffered as result of a decline in its enrolment. such as status. physical fitness.

especially in the absence of any showing on the part of the respondent that it explored other less drastic and/or cost-saving measures to avoid serious financial or economic problems. wages and other benefits of its personnel. the continued operations of these departments was an exercise of management prerogative to protect its business and it was no longer viable to maintain the two departments as it was already being subsidized by the college department. According to them. The respondent must establish by substantial and convincing evidence that the impending losses it expected to incur. the respondent submitted its audited Financial Statements for the years 1997. Respondent claimed that in its case.of its elementary and high school departments. the dismissal shall be deemed unjustified. The employer bears the burden of proving the existence or the imminence of substantial losses with clear and satisfactory evidence that there are legitimate business reasons justifying a retrenchment. the Court is not convinced that the closure of the elementary and high school departments was a reasonable necessity. This is contrary to the respondent’s “perceived” impending loss considering that there was actually a demand for its educational services. personnel benefits are already “eating into” the portion of the budget allocated for capital and administrative development. Topic: Illegal Dismissal . it had “no choice” but to close down. As proof thereof. based on such allocation. 1998 and 1999. While enrolment may have declined. due to the “clamor” for its re-opening. Respondent also alleged that such closure was recognized by the “Tuition Fee Law. were imminent and that the retrenchment it conducted was necessary to prevent such losses. and faced further with the demands of the employees of additional increase in salaries and benefits. Another factor that militates against the respondent’s reason was that it re-opened after two years. Should the employer fail to do so.” which mandates that 70% of the tuition incremental proceeds should be allocated for salaries.

Jr. v. He claimed that respondent was paid on a piece-rate basis without supervision. Indeed. Villegas performed sugar farming job 8 hours a day. While it may indeed be an act of good will on the part of the Gamboas. Jr. He likewise worked in petitioner's coconut lumber business where he was paid P34. petitioner's length of service is an indication of the regularity of his employment. No. the same was succeeded by his son Ricardo Gamboa. still.Ponente: Peralta. continuously for not less than 302 days a year. Later on named Hacienda Leddy owned by Ricardo Gamboa Sr.: Hacienda leddy/Ricardo Gamboa.. Villegas was given a privilege of erecting his house inside the hacienda during his employment. 2014 Facts: Villegas is an employee at the Hacienda Leddy as early as 1960. Petitioner insisted that it was Villegas who has stopped working in the hacienda and that he was not dismissed. Even assuming that he was doing odd jobs around the farm. such act is usually done by the employer either out of gratitude for the employee’s service or for the employer's convenience as the nature of the work calls for it. Hence. During his employment up to the time of his dismissal.The Labor Arbiter found that there was illegal dismissal. 179654. Paquito Villegas. Gamboa went to Villegas' house and told him that his services were no longer needed without prior notice or valid reason. G. when it was still named Hacienda Teresa.00 per day. the NLRC set aside and vacated the Labor Arbiter's decision. Even Gamboa admitted that by act of generosity and compassion.. The Court of Appeals granted the petition and annulled and set aside the NLRC Decision.12 Petitioner added that since his job was not necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the hacienda. he cannot be considered as a regular employee. Issue: Whether or not there was illegal dismissal Ruling: Yes In the instant case. petitioner disputed that there exists an employer-employee relationship between him and Villegas. 6 days a week work.R. if we are to follow the length of time that Villegas had worked with the Gamboas. In his petition before the Supreme Court. it should be more than 20 years of service.00 a day for 8 hours work. Villegas filed the instant complaint for illegal dismissal. On June 9. September 22. J. such long period of doing said odd jobs is indicative that the same was either necessary or desirable to petitioner's . and for which services he was paid P45. 1993.

1993. with respect to the activity in which he is employed. it is vital in establishing if he was hired to perform tasks which are necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. “The term ‘wage’ is broadly defined in Article 97 of the Labor Code as remuneration or earnings. Gamboa likewise argued that Villegas was paid on a piece-rate basis. piece or commission basis. it does not make sense why Villegas would suddenly stop working therein for no apparent reason. there must be proof of a deliberate and unjustified refusal on the part of an employee to resume his employment. Payment by the piece is just a method of compensation and does not define the essence of the relations. If it was true that Villegas worked in the hacienda only in the year 1993. Villegas is entitled to security of tenure under Article 279 of the Labor Code and can only be removed for cause. Owing to the length of service alone. specifically February 9. why would then he be given the benefit to construct his house in the hacienda? More significantly. considering that he was employed with the Gamboas for more than 20 years and was even given a place to call his home. task. the fact that he was repeatedly re-hired over a long period of time shows that his job is necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. 1993 and February 11. payment on a piece-rate basis does not negate regular employment. describes a regular employee as one who is either (1) engaged to perform activities which are necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer.”cralawlawlibrary Morover. whether continuous or broken. Mere absence is not sufficient. Article 277(b) of the Labor Code provides that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary . To justify a finding of abandonment of work. Clearly.trade or business. one year after he was employed. The burden of proof is on the employer to show an unequivocal intent on the part of the employee to discontinue employment. It must be accompanied by manifest acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. However. While length of time may not be the controlling test to determine if Villegas is indeed a regular employee. he became a regular employee. Article 280 of the Labor Code. even assuming that Villegas' employment was only for a specific duration. by operation of law. We found no valid cause attending to his dismissal and found also that his dismissal was without due process. petitioner admitted that Villegas had worked in the hacienda until his father's demise. capable of being expressed in terms of money whether fixed or ascertained on a time. and (2) those casual employees who have rendered at least one year of service. cralawlawlibrary As a regular worker.

x x x Subject to the constitutional right of workers to security of tenure and their right to be protected against dismissal except for a just and authorized cause and without prejudice to the requirement of notice under Article 283 of this Code. the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the Department of Labor and Employment. Considering that reinstatement is no longer feasible because of strained relations between the employee and the employer. or separation pay if reinstatement is no longer viable. An illegally dismissed employee should be entitled to either reinstatement – if viable. however. the final decision effectively declares that the employment relationship ended so that separation pay and backwages are to be computed up to that point. while that for backwages is the actual period when the employee was unlawfully prevented from working. The decision also becomes a judgment for money from which another consequence flows – the payment of interest in case of delay. The basis for computing separation pay is usually the length of the employee’s past service. It should be emphasized. plus backwages in either instance. separation pay should be granted. that the finality of the illegal dismissal decision becomes the reckoning point. x x x The failure of the petitioner to comply with these procedural guidelines renders its dismissal of Villegas illegal. In allowing separation pay.c ralawlawlibrary .

blurred vision of his left eye and speech problem. Efren R. Libang filed with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) – National Capital Region Arbitration Branch a Complaint for disability benefit. Dr. v. He also had high blood sugar. Robert Lim (Dr. Indochina Ship Management Inc. Dr. the latter sought medical attention and assessment from another doctor. After such consultation.. Majestic Carriers. While Libang was on board M/V Baltimar Orion. Later. The Labor arbiter and NLRC granted the . Dr. Inc.. Lim’s failure to assess Libang’s disability despite his health status. damages and attorney’s fees against ISMI and Santos. Miguel Santos and Majestic Carriers. with normal hepatic and cardiac enzymes. Given his health condition. where he was found to be suffering from high blood pressure at 180/110 mmHg. J. (Majestic). difficulty in hearing from his left ear.. a domestic manning agency that acted for and in behalf of its foreign shipping company. Inc (ISMI). G. Lim issued to Libang a medical certificate indicating only therein that the illness may have been pre-existing. Vicaldo (Dr.Topic: Disability Benefits Ponente: Reyes. Mr. he reported to ISMI and was endorsed for medical attention to the company-designated physician.: Pedro Libang. No. Libang then obtained medical attention and was admitted for three days in a hospital in Dominican Republic. he experienced numbness on the left side of his face. September 17. 2014 Facts: Pedro Libang entered into an employment contract with Indochina Ship Management.r. Libang was engaged as a Cook 1 for the vessel M/V Baltimar Orion. inc. Libang was eventually repatriated in the Philippines. Vicaldo) of the Philippine Heart Center. Lim) of the Marine Medical Services in Metropolitan Hospital. 189863. Jr. Considering Dr. The respondents in the labor complaint disputed any liability by arguing that the disability benefit being claimed pertained to a pre-existing illness that was concealed by Libang during a pre-employment medical examination for his deployment.

Lim. the seafarer shall submit himself to a post-employment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to do so. The CA denied the same contending that the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) requires the company-designated physician to be the one to make a disability assessment of a seafarer. Issue: Whether or not Libang is entitiled to disability benefits Ruling: Yes. Lim that Libang’s illnesses were pre-existing and non-work-related was made only in his affidavit after the subject labor complaint had been filed. disability or fitness. Dr. COMPENSATION AND BENEFITS FOR INJURY OR ILLNESS The liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary xxxx Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment. his co-attending physician. Lim only reasoned in his medical certificate that “[Libang’s] hypertension could be pre-existing” and that “it [was] difficult to say whether [his diabetes mellitus and small pontine infarct] are pre-existing or not. Lim by one Dr. in which case. But rather than making a full assessment of Libang’s health condition. Dr. a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed as compliance. Dr. but was a mere hearsay purportedly relayed to Dr. diabetes mellitus type 2 and small pontine infarct. Still. Aileen Corbilla.claim for disabiltiy benefits. The alleged concealment by Libang of his hypertension during his pre-employment medical examination was also unsubstantiated. the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days.”His assessment was evidently uncertain and the extent of his examination for a proper medical diagnosis was incomplete. A categorical statement from Dr. There was no dispute that Libang suffered from hypertension. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the . Lim gave no explanation for his statement that Libang’s illnesses were not work-related. as this was indicated in the medical certificates that were issued by the company-designated physician. For this purpose. Section 20(B) of the POEA-SEC provides:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary B.

Vicaldo included a determination of the disability grade that applied to Libang’s condition. The alleged severity of Libang’s illnesses could be linked with Dr. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties. Lim. . there was a breach by Dr.” Dr. a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. the CA relied solely on Section 32-A (20) of the POEA-SEC which requires that a finding of essential hypertension be substantiated by diagnostic and laboratory reports. it is settled that strict rules of evidence are not applicable in claims for compensation and disability benefits. Vicaldo did not contradict any opposing view from Dr. however. Moreover. Section 32-A (20) was. and the effect of the severity of these illnesses on his fitness or disability. never invoked by the respondents during the proceedings before the LA. NLRC and the CA. neurologist and endocrinologist. Given the failure of Dr. the seafarer was justified in seeking the medical expertise of his physician of choice. Libang was diagnosed to have both Hypertensive Cardiovascular Disease and Diabetes Mellitus with an Impediment Grade VI. xxxx Clearly. Lim had not declared Libang to be fit to work or covered by any disability grade. Lim’s statement that Libang’s hypertension was “severe” and that he “ha[d] been under the care of [a] cardiologist. Lim on disability grade or fitness. Vicaldo’s assessment. Lim to fully evaluate Libang’s illness. the extent of the patient’s illnesses. Lim of his obligation as the companydesignated physician. It is then clear that the finding of Dr. As against an incomplete evaluation by Dr. In denying Libang’s claim.above benefits. the medical certificate issued by Dr. disability or fitness to work. He was declared to be unfit to resume to work as a seafarer in any capacity. The respondents even failed to sufficiently dispute the finding of the LA and NLRC that Libang’s illnesses had resulted in a Grade VI disability. The respondents could not be allowed to benefit from their physician’s inaction or refusal to disclose the results of the diagnostic tests performed upon Libang. The NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion in considering Dr. If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment.

nasal congestion. this condition persisted until the expiration of his contract. he experienced incessant cough. According to him. v. difficulty in breathing. Ltd.: Interorient Maritime Enterprises. J. Creer III. September 17. Victor was tasked to get provisions from the cold storage which is kept at its coldest temperature to maintain freshness of the food stored therein. G. . No. physical weakness. (Calidero). chills and extreme apprehension. Victor alleged that when he was about to get provisions from the cold storage he felt a sudden pain in his chest that radiated to his back. 2014 Facts: InterOrient hired Victor as Galley Boy on board the vessel M/V MYRTO owned by Calidero Shipping Company.. Victor commenced his employment on board the vessel where he performed the duties and responsibilities as Galley Boy/2nd Cook.Ch anRoblesVirtualawlibrary As 2nd Cook.TOPIC: Disability Benefits PONENTE: Del Castillo. Inc. Victor M.R. Since then. 181921. He would do this either immediately before or after his exposure to intense heat in the galley.

that he was released in good and perfect health. InterOrient negated argued that his discharge from the vessel was not occasioned by any illness or injury sustained or contracted on board but was simply due to completion or expiration of his contract. Instead. Ayuyao (Dr. Purugganan from Citihealth Diagnostic Center it was found out that he had far-advanced pulmonary tuberculosis. Dr. and that his illness was considered work-aggravated. Dr. After conducting a medical examination and evaluation. Thereafter. a certain Dr. Vicaldo).59%) and further declared him unfit to resume work as a seaman in any capacity. and Pulmonary Tuberculosis. Stage II. he reported to the office of InterOrient and informed the company about the pain he experienced while he was on board. he was still not given any medical assistance. However. that he voluntarily executed a Receipt and Release document wherein he acknowledged that he had not contracted any illness while on board. Vicaldo issued a medical certificate indicating that Victor was diagnosed with Hypertension. Vicaldo (Dr. found Victor to be suffering from Community-Acquired Pneumonia 1 and Bronchial Asthma. And as his requests for payment of the said allowance were consistently ignored. at the Philippine Heart Center. sign a Receipt and Release where he acknowledged receipt of the full payment of his monetary entitlements under the employment contract. and that there is no clear evidence that shows his entitlement to the benefits or damages being claimed.When Victor arrived in Manila. But when he consulted another doctor. .rVictor consulted another physician. he was merely told to continue medication and consultation. Issue: Wheter or not Victor is entitled to disability benefits Ruling: No. Victor averred that InterOrient merely advised him to consult a doctor without giving him any doctor’s referral. Fernando G. Dr. Victor claimed that he underwent medical examination at the Fatima Medical Clinic where he shouldered all expenses. Ayuyao). He gave Victor an impediment grade VIII (33. he filed with the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for permanent disability benefits. Although he reported his condition to InterOrient. however. Efren R. Victor went to the Heart and Lung Diagnostic Center where his attending physician. he was neither apprised of his rights to nor paid sickness allowance as mandated in the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA) 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions of Employment Contract Governing Seafarers (POEA Contract). He did. he regularly informed InterOrient of his sickness. cralawred Victor contended that during the course of his treatment.

Such is not present in the case at bar. deemed incorporated in the POEA Contract. For an illness to be compensable. Section 20(B)(6) of the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels (2000 Amended Standard Terms and Conditions). The employer would then have no protection against unrelated disability claims. he signed a Receipt and Release stating that he has not contracted or suffered any illness or injury from work and that he was discharged in good and perfect health. requires the concurrence of two elements: first. and second. Non-compliance with this mandatory requirement results in the forfeiture of the right to claim for compensation and disability benefits. that the illness must be work-related.For a seaman’s claim for disability to prosper. he is examined by a company-designated physician. cralawred Even if the mandatory three-day rule on post-employment medical examination by the company-designated physician is disregarded. But while pulmonary tuberculosis is listed as an occupational disease. As already mentioned. On the contrary. He offered no explanation for this. he opted to consult several doctors other than the company-designated physician. the reason for Victor’s repatriation was the completion/expiration of his contract and not because of any sickness. This are not present in this case. Victor’s claim for disability benefits must still fail for not being compensable. To ignore the rule might set a precedent with negative repercussions.” There is no question that Pulmonary Tuberculosis is listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A(18). Victor should have already been diagnosed with pulmonary tuberculosis when he sought medical help one month from his repatriation. Victor failed to show that his illness is work-related. No evidence on record shows . “Work-related illness” is defined under the 2000 Amended Standard Terms and Condition “as any sickness resulting in disability or death due to an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of [the said] contract[. it is mandatory that within three days from his repatriation. the records show that when he reported to InterOrient immediately after his repatriation. or causing unfairness to the employer who would have difficulty determining the cause of a claimant’s illness because of the passage of time. Ascertaining the real cause of the illness or injury beyond the period may prove difficult.] with the conditions set therein satisfied. like opening floodgates to a limitless number of seafarers claiming disability benefits. Also. then at the outset. that the work-related illness must have existed during the term of the seafarer’s employment contract. Moreover if indeed Victor needed medical services. The rationale for the rule [on mandatory postemployment medical examination within three days from repatriation by a company-designated physician] is that reporting the illness or injury within three days from repatriation fairly makes it easier for a physician to determine the cause of the illness or injury. the Court is not convinced that Victor’s pulmonary tuberculosis is work-acquired or work-aggravated because if it were so.

On the contrary.” cralawred Topic: Disability Benefits Ponente: Brion.: .how Victor’s working conditions caused or aggravated his TB. The Court cannot over-emphasize that “self-serving and unsubstantiated declarations are insufficient to establish a case x x x where the quantum of evidence required to establish as fact is substantial evidence. Victor himself acknowledged that he worked under normal conditions while on board the vessel. J.

(2) he suffered this illness during the term of his employment contract. general feeling of weakness and muscle spasms. On May 15. Upon arrival. Ravena filed his complaint for disability benefits with the LA. September 17. the law requires the seafarer to prove that: (1) he suffered an illness. Apex Maritime Ship Management Co. Ravena underwent the surgery on May 21. Issue: Wheter or not Ravena is entitled to diability benefits Ruling: No. Ravena and the petitioners agreed that the former shall shoulder the medical expenses for the surgery. . Ravena went to the St. and while on board M/V Tate J. and its principal. On June 18. On May 17. Ravena suffered extreme abdominal discomfort and pain. he informed the petitioners that he had to undergo Whipple surgery. Ravena entered into a contract of employment with petitioner Jebsen Maritime Inc. 2007. 2007. Nicomedes Cruz. Ravena. In situations where the seafarer seeks to claim the compensation and benefits that Section 20-B grants to him. 2007. Dr. and/or Estanislao Santiago. G. (4) his illness is one of the enumerated occupational disease or that his illness or injury is otherwise work-related. diarrhea. he was referred to Dr. No. subject to reimbursement by the latter. and (5) he complied with the four conditions enumerated under Section 32-A for an occupational disease or a disputably-presumed work-related disease to be compensable. Paul's Hospital in Iloilo City. 2007. a cancer surgeon and the companydesignated physician. Cruz opined that Ravena's illness was not work-related. 200566.R.. The petitioners denied Ravena's claim for disability benefits. (3) he complied with the procedures prescribed under Section 20-B.. accompanied by chills. Apex Maritime Ship Management Co. Ravena went directly to his hometown in Iloilo. he was subsequently diagnosed to be suffering from adenocarcinoma or cancer of the ampullary area. Ravena was employed as 4th Engineer on board the vessel "M/V Tate J" . Sometime in May 2007.. Under these considerations. The doctors found a mass in his ampullary area and he underwent a series of tests.Wilfredo E. he failed to substantially satisfy the prescribed requirements to be entitled to disability benefits.Jebsen Maritime Inc. v. 2006. After examination and the review of Ravena’s records and his illness. Ravena's claim must obviously fail. Ravena reported at Jebsen's office in Manila. 2007. LLC. LLC. 2014 Facts: On September 6. He was repatriated to the Philippines on May 12.

2007 or more than one (1) month from the time of his disembarkation. within the same three-day period. the seafarer and the employer may agree on a third doctor whose determination shall be final and binding on them. is not absolute as we have allowed.” On the other hand. of course. Dr. submit himself to a post-employment medical examination (PEME) to be conducted by the company-designated physician. Cruz certified that Ravena's illness is not at all work-related. 2007. Second. when the seafarer is physically incapacitated to comply with the reporting requirement.First. provided. is not irretrievably bound by such determination. he reported to Jebsen only on June 18. If the assessment of his chosen physician conflicts with those of the companydesignated physician. Failure of the seafarer to comply with this three-day mandatory reporting requirement shall result in the forfeiture of his right to claim the POEA-SEC granted benefits. the records show that Ravena was repatriated on May 12. or at the very least determine the appropriate disability grading. we note that Ravena's physician did not even certify that he was no longer fit-to-work. and (2) cancer. a seafarer who was repatriated for medical reasons must. The facts of this case. Under Section 20-B(3). The seafarer.cralawlawlibrary . in certain exceptional circumstances. he gives. Should he disagree with the determination of the company-designated physician. Ampullary cancer is not an occupational disease. i. Cruz nor Ravena's chosen physician made any determination of Ravena's disability. Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC considers only two types of cancers as compensable occupational disease: (1) cancer of the epithelial lining of the bladder. In this case. unfortunately. paragraph 2. within three working days from his disembarkation. a written notice of his incapacity to the manning agency. In fact. therefore. Ravena failed to comply with his three-day reporting duty under the POEA-SEC. the company-designated physician initially determines either the fitness-to-work or the degree of the permanent disability (total or partial) of the seafarer who suffered and was repatriated for work-related illness or injury. of course.e. he simply stated that “he must not be away from a treatment area for an indefinite period of time. epitheliomatous or ulceration of the skin or of the corneal surface of the eye due to certain chemicals. Under Section 20-B(3). The reporting requirement. Ravena failed to comply with the procedural requirements of Section 20-B of the POEA-SEC. a seafarer's claim despite his nonreporting within the mandated three-day period. In this case. the POEA-SEC allows him to seek a second opinion from an independent physician of his choice. do not support a disregard of the three-day reporting rule. Without doubt.. neither Dr.

The LA and the CA may have correctly afforded Ravena the benefit of the
legal presumption of work-relatedness. The legal correctness of the CA's
appreciation of Ravena's claim, however, ends here for as we pointed out
above, Section 20-B(4) affords only a disputable presumption that should be
read together with the conditions specified by Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC.
Under Section 32-A, for the disputably-presumed disease resulting in
disability to be compensable, all of the following conditions must be
satisfied:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
1. The seafarer's work must involve the risks describe therein;
2. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer's exposure to
the described risks;
3. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under
such factors necessary to contract it; and
4. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer.
Ravena failed to prove the work-relatedness of his ampullary cancer as he
failed to satisfy these conditions. To be exact, he simply claimed that "his
assignment had always been on (sic) the engine room" and that "exposure to
various substances over the years caused his disease." These bare
allegations, however, are not the equivalent of the substantial evidence that
the law requires of Ravena to adduce for the grant of his disability benefits
claim.
No reasonable conclusion of work-relatedness can also be inferred in this
case given the nature of ampullary cancer vis-à-vis the duties of and the
occupational hazards that a ship engineer encounters. The cause
of ampullary cancer is medically unknown, although certain risk factors are
believed to contribute to its development, i.e., genetic factors, like patients
with familial adenomatous polyposis, and certain genetic alterations;
smoking; and certain diseases such as diabetes milletus. Ampullary cancer
is a rare condition and experts are not certain what preventive steps, if any,
may be taken, although it is known to be more prevalent in men than
women. Having no substantial evidence presented, the claim must be
denied.

Topic: Vacation and Sick Leave/habitual absenteeism
Ponente: Per Curiam
Office of the Court Administrator v. Edgar S. Cruz, Clerk III, Regional
Trial Court, Branch 52, Guagua, Pampanga, . A.M. No. P-14-3260
(Formerly A.M. No. 12-2-38- RTC ), September 16, 2014
Facts: A report submitted by the Chief of the Leave Division, Office of
Administrative Services (OAS), Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) on 6
February 2012 indicated that Edgar S. Cruz (Cruz), Clerk III, Branch 52,
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Guagua, Pampanga, incurred three (3)
unauthorized absences in November and four (4) unauthorized absences in
December 2011. The OCA required Cruz to comment on the report submitted
by the Leave Division, OAS, OCA. In his letter, Cruz explained that he was
forced to skip work during the dates reported because of circumstances
beyond his control. He explained that since his wife works overseas, he had
to attend to the needs of their children first before reporting for work. He
added that he often got sick and, as proof, he submitted medical certificates
showing that he was diagnosed and treated for systemic viral infection on 3
November 2011, acute gastro-enteritis on 8 November 2011, and an infected
wound on 14 November 2011. The OCA found sufficient evidence to hold
Cruz and recommended that he be dismissed from the service.
Issue: Whether or not Cruz should be dismissed from service
Ruling: Yes.
Cruz admitted skipping work without filing the corresponding leave
applications during the dates mentioned in the report of the Leave Division,
OAS, OCA. In his comment, Cruz could only present medical certificates to
substantiate his explanation that he fell sick during the subject dates. He,

however, failed to submit any duly accomplished and approved leave
applications from his executive/presiding judge.
The Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of Executive Order No. 292 and
Other Pertinent Civil Service Laws (Civil Service Rules) mandate that an
employee must submit an application for both sick and vacation leaves, viz:
Rule XVI
Leave of Absence

Section 16. All applications for sick leave of absence for one full day or more
shall be on the prescribed form and shall be filed immediately upon the
employee’s return from such leave. Notice of absence, however, should be
sent to the immediate supervisor and/or to the office head. Application for
sick leave in excess of five days shall be accompanied by a proper medical
certificate.
Section 20. Leave of absence for any reason other than illness of an officer or
employee or of any member of his immediate family must be contingent
upon the needs of the service. Hence, the grant of vacation leave shall be at
the discretion of the head of department/agency.
Under the Civil Service Rules, an employee should submit in advance,
whenever possible, an application for vacation leave of absence for action by
the proper chief of agency prior to the effective date of the leave. In case of
sick leave of absence, the application should be filed immediately upon the
employee’s return. In the instant case, it is clear from respondent Cruz’s
own admission that he failed to file or acquire the necessary leave permits
for
his
absences.
Under Administrative Circular No. 14-2002 (Re: Reiterating the Civil Service
Commission’s Policy on Habitual Absenteeism), “[a]n officer or employee in
the civil service shall be considered habitually absent if he incurs
unauthorized absences exceeding the allowable 2.5 days monthly leave
credit under the law for at least three (3) months in a semester or at least
three (3) consecutive months during the year[.]”
Although strictly speaking respondent Cruz may not yet be considered
habitually absent on the basis of his unauthorized absences in November
and December 2011, he should still be penalized because his omissions
clearly caused inefficiency and hampered public service. In Re: Unauthorized
Absences of Karen R. Cuenca, Clerk II, Property Division-Office of
Administrative Services, this Court held that under Administrative Circular
No. 2-99, which took effect on 1 February 1999, “[a]bsenteeism and
tardiness, even if such do not qualify as ‘habitual’ or ‘frequent’ under Civil
Service Commission Memorandum Circular No. 04, Series of 1991, shall be
dealt with severely[.]”

An evaluation of his record with the Employees’ Leave Division, OAS, OCA
revealed that Cruz has the propensity of not reporting for work. From
January to April 2012 alone, Cruz incurred thirty (30) absences. It is evident
that Cruz can be held administratively liable for being habitually absent. In
fact, his habitual absenteeism has caused inefficiency in the performance of
his functions which seriously compromised efficiency and prejudiced public
service.

Topic: Just and valid causes for the dismissal of an employee
Ponente: Associate Justice Lucas P. Bersamin

Northwest Airlines, Inc. vs. Ma. Concepcion M. Del Rosario, G.R. No.
157633, September 10, 2014

Facts: Petitioner Northwest Airlines, Inc. employed respondent Ma.
Concepcion M. Del Rosario on December 10, 1994 as one of its Manila based
flight attendants. On May 18, 1998, Del Rosario was assigned at the Business
Class Section of Northwest Flight NW 26 bound for Japan. During the
boarding preparations, Kathleen Gamboa, another flight attendant assigned
at the First Class, needed to borrow a wine bottle opener because her wine
bottle opener was dull. Vivien Francisco, Gamboa’s runner, went to the
Business Class Section to borrow a wine bottle opener from Del Rosario, but
the latter remarked that any flight attendant who could not bring a wine
bottle opener had no business working in the First Class.

Upon hearing this, Aliza Ann Escaño, another flight attendant, offered her
wine bottle opener to Francisco. Apparently, Gamboa overheard Del Rosario’s
remarks, and later on verbally confronted her. Their confrontation escalated
into a heated argument. Escaño intervened but the two ignored her,
prompting her to rush outside the aircraft to get Maria Rosario D. Morales,
the Assistant Base Manager, to pacify them.

The parties differed on what happened thereafter. Del Rosario claimed that
only an animated discussion had transpired between her and Gamboa, but
Morales insisted that it was more than an animated discussion, recalling that
Del Rosario had even challenged Gamboa to a brawl (sabunutan). Morales
asserted that she had tried to pacify Del Rosario and Gamboa, but the two
did not stop. Because of that, she ordered them out of the plane and transfer
to another nearby Northwest aircraft.

She inquired from them about what had happened, and even asked if they
were willing to fly on the condition that they would have to stay away from
each other during the entire flight, because Del Rosario was not willing to
commit herself to do so, she decided not to allow both of them on Flight NW
26, and furnished them a Notice of Removal from Service (effectively
informing Del Rosario of her dismissal from the service pending an
investigation of the fighting incident between her and Gamboa).

Morales sent a letter to Del Rosario telling her that Northwest would conduct
an investigation of the incident involving her and Gamboa. On June 19, 1998,
Del Rosario was informed of her termination from the service. Northwest
stated that based on the results of the investigation, Del Rosario and
Gamboa had engaged in a fight on board the aircraft, even if there had been
no actual physical contact between them. Northwest considered her
dismissal from the service justified and in accordance with the Rules of
Conduct for Employees. Del Rosario subsequently filed her complaint for
illegal dismissal against Northwest.

In her decision the Labor Arbiter Teresita D. Castillon-Lora ruled in favor of
Northwest, holding that the dismissal of Del Rosario had been justified and
valid upon taking into account that Northwest had been engaged in the
airline business in which a good public image had been demanded, and in
which flight attendants had been expected to maintain an image of
sweetness and amiability.

Upon appeal, the NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter, and ruled
in favor of Del Rosario, declaring that the incident between her and Gamboa
could not be considered as synonymous with fighting as the activity
prohibited by Northwest’s Rules of Conduct. The CA sustained the NLRC
decision.

Issue: Whether Del Rosario’s dismissal from the service is valid?

Ruling: No.

As provided in Article 282 of the Labor Code, an employer may
terminate an employee for a just cause, to wit:

Art. 282. TERMINATION BY EMPLOYER
An employer may terminate an employee for any of the following causes:
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the
lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his
work;
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;

(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him
by his employer or duly authorized representative;
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the
person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his
duly authorized representative; and
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.

Northwest argues that Del Rosario was dismissed on the grounds of serious
misconduct and willful disobedience. Misconduct refers to the improper or
wrong conduct that transgresses some established and definite rule of
action, a forbidden act, a dereliction of duty, willful in character, and implies
wrongful intent and not mere error in judgment. But misconduct or improper
behavior, to be a just cause for termination of employment, must: (a) be
serious; (b) relate to the performance of the employee’s duties; and (c) show
that the employee has become unfit to continue working for the employer.

There is no doubt that the last two elements of misconduct were present in
the case of Del Rosario. The cause of her dismissal related to the
performance of her duties as a flight attendant, and she became unfit to
continue working for Northwest. Remaining to be determined is, therefore,
whether the misconduct was serious as to merit Del Rosario’s dismissal. In
that respect, the fight between her and Gamboa should be so serious that it
entailed the termination of her employment even if it was her first offense.

Based on the foregoing, the incident involving Del Rosario and Gamboa could
not be justly considered as akin to the fight contemplated by Northwest. In
the eyes of the NLRC, Del Rosario and Gamboa were arguing but not fighting.
The understanding of fight as one that required physical combat was absent
during the incident of May 18, 1998. Moreover, the claim of Morales that Del
Rosario challenged Gamboa to a brawl (sabunutan) could not be given
credence by virtue of its being self-serving in favor of Northwest, and of its
being an apparent afterthought on the part of Morales during the

Bersamin . Topic: Just and valid causes for the dismissal of an employee Ponente: Associate Justice Lucas P. the same could not be considered as of such seriousness as to warrant Del Rosario's dismissal from the service. even assuming arguendo that the incident was the kind of fight prohibited by Northwest's Rules of Conduct. The gravity of the fight. was not enough to tarnish or diminish Northwest's public image. Moreover. without Del Rosario having the opportunity to contest Morales' statement. which was not more than a verbal argument between them.investigation of the incident.

seeking her reinstatement and backwages. Del Rosario laid out the reason for the termination of the petitioner in her position paper. Del Rosario. and messenger/delivery person" at Jay-Anne's One Hour Photo Shop. the proprietress of which was respondent Reylita S. sales clerk. The National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) promulgated its resolution affirming the decision of the Labor Arbiter. Jr. 1998.R. 1992. tampered with the daily printer's production reports/sales which. the petitioner commenced her special civil action for certiorari in the Court of Appeals (CA). Del Rosario. Facts: On February 20.207 prints. G. In his decision. On July 23. alleging in her petition that the NLRC had committed grave abuse of discretion. it was discovered that complainant. the petitioner received a letter terminating her employment for dishonesty. No. Ramos. Reylita 158583. the CA promulgated its decision that the judgment . To answer the complaint for illegal dismissal. On September 27.305.00 computed at 2. photo printer. janitress. September 10. records inspection and investigation in the second week of March. On March 28. Labor Arbiter Cresencio G. dismissed the petitioner’s complaint for lack of merit. the petitioner started working as an "allaround employee" acting as "cashier. as consequence thereof. 2002. the total number of prints made for the day was podded and erroneously reported thru double entries of the same job envelope and one (1) twin check number for every fresh role [sic] of film for photo-developing and printing or even recopying. The petitioner sought reconsideration. it was on the same entry with two (2) twin check numbers instead of just one (1) number of the same job envelope that complainant pocketed and appropriated for her own benefit and gain the cash value or cash equivalent of the excessive or padded daily total of number of prints made and erroneously reported to the respondent store damage and prejudice amounting to P11. she lodged a complaint for illegal dismissal. 2001. As a result. Gargoles vs.Rosalie L. but the NLRC denied her motion to that effect. 2014 S. xerox operator. as follows: Through incisive sleuthing. 1998.

a labor tribunal cannot deny the employer the authority to dismiss him. In his decision. Certainly. which the NLRC affirmed for being correct. . include: (a) serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with her work. this Office finds the same to be reasonably sufficient to arrive at the conclusion that complainant was indeed guilty of the act(s) of dishonesty imputed upon her. (c) fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in her by her employer or duly authorized representative. the aforesaid dishonest act(s) committed by the complainant logically triggered an erosion of the trust reposed upon him by his employer and jurisprudence is explicit on the point that when an employee has been guilty of breach of trust or his employer has ample reason to distrust him. Ruling: No. Issue: Whether the CA erred in finding her dismissal from employment to have been upon just cause. the Labor Arbiter relevantly concluded as follows: After going over the evidence adduced by the respondent in support of its averments and principal defense. as enumerated in Article 282 of the Labor Code.appealed from is hereby affirmed and that the petitioner was dismissed from employment with a just cause. The just and valid causes for the dismissal of an employee. and (e) other causes analogous to the foregoing. (d) commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of her employer or any immediate member of her family or her duly authorized representative. (b) gross and habitual neglect by the employee of her duties.

As such. the respondent had presented to the Labor Arbiter as Annex 2 of her position paper the respondent’s letter requiring the petitioner to submit her explanation. the two-notice rule was evidently complied with by the respondent. Contrary to her assertion that there was no substantial evidence to justify her dismissal. Under the circumstances.The dishonesty imputed to the petitioner included the making of double entries in the production reports and thereby enriching herself by pocketing the extra cash generated from the double entries.. the production reports containing the double entries were presented as evidence. and her double entries were confirmed in the affidavit executed by Redelito Caranay. the finding of the just cause for her dismissal did not emanate from mere speculation. 1998 the respondent sent another letter to the petitioner informing her of the termination of her services. . suspicion or assumption. Jr. Topic: Illegally suspended employees are entitled to moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. It further appears that on March 28. but the latter again refused to sign in acknowledgment of the letter. The bottom of the letter contained the handwritten annotation refused to sign. thereby negating any denial of due process to the petitioner. coupled with her failure to submit her explanation within the time given in the letter. an indication of the refusal to receive and sign for the letter on the part of the petitioner. Such refusal to receive the letter containing the notice for her to explain. her co-employee. implied that she waived her right to contest the contents of the letter. Furthermore. thereby forfeiting her right to respond to the charge against her and to rebut the evidence thereon.

3-in-1 coffee packs. Montinola vs. Despite her counsel’s objections. USA. At that time. Hawaii. US customs personnel conducted a search of her person. September 8. This was followed by a notice of administrative charge and a clarificatory hearing followed. stating that she did not take anything from the aircraft. Montinola and other flight crew members were subjected to custom searches in Honolulu. finding that PAL never presented evidence that showed Montinola as the one responsible for any of the illegally taken airline items.V. . Court 198656. G. Narciso furnished Montinola the emails from the Honolulu customs official. US Customs and Border Protection Supervisor. She gave a handwritten explanation three days after. Montinola admitted that in Honolulu. and Cadbury hot chocolate. PAL’s International Cabin Crew Division Manager. Montinola allowed the clarificatory hearings to proceed because she "wanted to extend her full cooperation in the investigations. The Labor Arbiter found her suspension illegal. Montinola (Montinola) was employed as a flight attendant of Philippine Airlines (PAL) since 1996. Facts: Petitioner Nancy S. No bonded items were found but crew removed food items. Jaime Roberto A. Montinola brought the matter before the Labor Arbiter. No. Seven of the 10 crew members had items removed from the aircraft on their possession. 2014 of Appeals. The Labor Arbiter ordered Montinola’s reinstatement with backwages. sent an email to PAL regarding the search." During the hearing. On January 29. She was meted with suspension for one (1) year without pay.Ponente: Associate Justice Marvic M.R. Nancy Graham (Graham).F. PAL conducted an investigation. PAL’s Cabin Services SubDepartment required Montinola to comment on the incident. Items from the airline were recovered from the flight crew by customs officials. Montinola was among those implicated because she was mentioned in Graham’s email. PAL found Montinola guilty of 11 Violations of the company’s Code of Discipline and Government Regulation. 2008. Leonen Nancy S. she had in her possession only the following food items: cooked camote.

Jurisdiction of Labor Arbiters and the Commission. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decisions of the LA and NLRC in finding the suspension illegal. Ruling: Yes. The nature of moral damages is defined under our Civil Code. Claims for actual. Montinola is entitled to moral and exemplary damages. Issue: Whether Montinola’s illegal suspension entitled her to an award of moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. under the circumstances. whether agricultural or non-agricultural: 4. exemplary and other forms of damages arising from the employer-employee relations. such damages are justly due. Under the Labor Code. – (a) Except as otherwise provided under this Code. the following cases involving all workers. 217. Through the resolution NLRC affirmed the decision of the Labor Arbiter. She is also entitled to attorney’s fees. However. The same rule applies to breaches of contract where the defendant acted fraudulently or in bad faith. the Court of Appeals deleted the moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. moral. Article 2220 states that "willful injury to property may be a legal ground for awarding moral damages if the court should find that. even in the absence of stenographic notes. Labor Arbiters are authorized by law to award moral and exemplary damages: Art. the Labor Arbiters shall have original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide within thirty (30) calendar days after the submission of the case by the parties for decision without extension.inclusive of allowances and benefits. PAL appealed the Labor Arbiter’s decision to the NLRC." The employee is entitled to .

During the year of her suspension. besmirched reputation. temperate. and wounded feelings. Montinola is also entitled to exemplary damages. Suspension is temporary unemployment. liquidated or compensatory damages. . Moral damages are. thus. or public policy. there was clear and convincing evidence of bad faith adduced in the lower tribunals. in addition to the moral. PAL’s denial of her request to clarify the charges against her shows its intent to do a wrongful act for moral obliquity. it would have gathered more evidence from its contact in Honolulu or from other employees before it started pointing fingers." It is socially deleterious for PAL to suspend Montinola without just cause in the manner suffered by her. exemplary damages are necessary to deter future employers from committing the same acts. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code. fright. All these are grounds for an award of moral damages under the Civil Code. appropriate. Montinola and her family had to survive without her usual salary." Here. or c) in a manner contrary to morals. by way of example or correction for the public good. serious anxiety. If it were acting in good faith. b) in a manner oppressive to labor. PAL should not have haphazardly implicated Montinola and denied her livelihood even for a moment. PAL’s actions in implicating Montinola and penalizing her for no clear reason show bad faith. good customs." As this court has stated in the past: "Exemplary damages are designed by our civil law to permit the courts to reshape behavior that is socially deleterious in its consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents against such behavior. The deprivation of economic compensation caused mental anguish. Hence. Bad faith "implies a conscious and intentional design to do a wrongful act for a dishonest purpose or moral obliquity. "exemplary or corrective damages are imposed. This is also true for the case of suspension.moral damages when the employer acted a) in bad faith or fraud.

Montinola is also entitled to attorney’s fees. (8) In actions for indemnity under workmen’s compensation and employer’s liability laws. and seventh reasons why attorney’s fees are awarded under the Civil Code. (5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff’s plainly valid. attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation. In all cases. (6) In actions for legal support. . (11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation should be recovered. (10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded. (4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff. Article 2208 of the Civil Code enumerates the instances when attorney’s fees can be awarded: ART. cannot be recovered. (9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime. other than judicial costs. laborers and skilled workers. the attorney’s fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable. except: (1) When exemplary damages are awarded. (7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers. This case qualifies for the first. (3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff. (2) When the defendant’s act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur expenses to protect his interest. second. just and demandable claim. 2208. In the absence of stipulation.

Perlas-Bernabe Omni Hauling Services. Facts: Petitioner Omni Hauling Services. a company owned by petitioners Lolita and Aniceto Franco. When the service contract was renewed for another year. However. Ponente: Associate Justice Estela M. or for the period July 1. Bernardo Bon. petitioners required each of the respondents to sign employment contracts which provided that they will be "re-hired" only for the duration of the same period. 2004. 2003 to June 30.R. was awarded a one (1) year service contract by the local government of Quezon City to provide garbage hauling services for the period July 1. 199388. September 3. For this purpose. No. v. 2002 to June 30. 2003. Inc. Omni hired respondents as garbage truck drivers and paleros who were then paid on a per trip basis. claiming that they were regular employees since . respondents refused to sign the employment contracts. 2014 Inc. G. (Omni).Topic: Project employees and Regular employees.

Omni offered to re-employ respondents on the condition that they sign the employment contracts but respondents refused such offer. The CA reversed and set aside the NLRC’s earlier pronouncements. The LA ruled in favor of petitioners. finding that respondents were not illegally dismissed. at the time of their engagement. It held that the NLRC failed to consider the glaring fact that no contract of employment exists to support petitioners’ allegation that respondents are fixed-term project employees. thereby setting aside the NLRC’s Decision holding that respondents were project employees.they were engaged to perform activities which were necessary and desirable to Omni’s usual business or trade. Ruling: The Court finds that the CA correctly granted respondents’ certiorari petition since the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it held that respondents were project employees despite petitioners’ failure to establish their project employment status through substantial evidence. Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in granting respondents’ petition for certiorari. were informed that their employment will be limited for a specific period of one year and was co-terminus with the service contract with the Quezon City government. Hence. . this petition. Omni terminated the employment of respondents which resulted in the filing of cases for illegal dismissal. Thus. The NLRC affirmed the LA’s ruling in toto. During the mandatory conference before the Labor Arbiter (LA). The LA found that respondents. respondents were merely project employees whose hiring was solely dependent on the service contract. petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA. For this reason. Aggrieved.

the services of employees who are hired as "project employees" may be lawfully terminated at the completion of the project.Article 280 of the Labor Code distinguishes a "project employee" from a "regular employee" in this wise: Art. . from the other undertakings of the company. 280. The project could either be (1) a particular job or undertaking that is within the regular or usual business of the employer company. Unlike regular employees who may only be dismissed for just and/or authorized causes under the Labor Code. an employment shall be deemed to be regular where the employee has been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. or (2) a particular job or undertaking that is not within the regular business of the corporation. but which is distinct and separate. Regular and casual employment. The provisions of written agreement to the contrary notwithstanding and regardless of the oral agreement of the parties. but also that there was indeed a project. In order to safeguard the rights of workers against the arbitrary use of the word "project" to prevent employees from attaining a regular status. Even though the absence of a written contract does not by itself grant regular status to respondents. employers claiming that their workers are project employees should not only prove that the duration and scope of the employment was specified at the time they were engaged." the duration (and scope) of which were specified at the time they were engaged for that project. such a contract is evidence that respondents were informed of the duration and scope of their work and their status as project employees. According to jurisprudence. and identifiable as such. the principal test for determining whether particular employees are properly characterized as "project employees" as distinguished from "regular employees" is whether or not the employees were assigned to carry out a "specific project or undertaking. A project employee is assigned to a project which begins and ends at determined or determinable times. except where the employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season.

Thus. Neither is petitioners’ allegation that respondents were duly apprised of the project-based nature of their employment supported by any other evidentiary proof." Add to this the obvious fact that respondents have been engaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of Omni. the logical conclusion is that respondents were not clearly and knowingly informed of their employment status as mere project employees. with the duration and scope of the project specified at the time they were engaged. records are bereft of any evidence to show that respondents were made to sign employment contracts explicitly stating that they were going to be hired as project employees. with the period of their employment to be co-terminus with the original period of Omni’s service contract with the Quezon City government. i. whether such service is continuous or broken [– as respondents in this case –] shall be considered as [regular employees] with respect to the activity in which [they] are employed and [their] employment shall continue while such activity actually exists.. thereby confirming the strength of the aforesaid conclusion. the presumption of regular employment should be accorded in their favor pursuant to Article 280 of the Labor Code which provides that "[employees] who have rendered at least one year of service.e. .In this case. garbage hauling. As such.

J. Inc. 2014 Facts: On June 14. G. Philippine Touristers.R. 201237. respondent Samahan ng Manggagawa sa Mas Transit-Anglo-KMU (the Union) – a union organized through the affiliation of certain MTI bus drivers/conductors with the Alliance of Nationalist and Genuine Labor Organizations – filed a petition for certification election before .Topic: Appeal from the LA’s ruling to the NLRC Ponente: Perlas – Bernabe. Mas Transit Workers Union – Anhlo KMU. September 3. v. 2000. No.

Thereafter. and damages against MTI and/or Tomas Alvarez (Alvarez). The DOLE granted the Union’s petition. petitioners appealed before the NLRC. illegal lock out. Dissatisfied. 2000. MTI sent each of the individual respondents a Memorandum informing them of their termination from work.345. on behalf of its 98 members filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. effective on said date.43. and that the ground relied upon for the reduction of the bond was not substantiated. It also pointed out that the partial bond petitioners posted was invalid since it was not signed by an authorized signatory of the insurance company as advised by the NLRC in a Memorandum dated January 5. i.. the Union. and PTI and Yague (petitioners). in line with the cessation of its business operations caused by the sale of the passenger buses to the new owners. 2004. before the NLRC.the DOLE – NCR. prompting MTI to file a motion for reconsideration which was. On September 15. MTI issued a "Patalastas" apprising all of its employees of the sale and transfer of its operations to PTI and the former’s intention to pay them separation benefits in accordance with law and based on the resources available. MTI decided to sell its passenger buses together with its Certificate of Public Convenience (CPC) issued by the LTFRB to PTI for a total consideration of 98. denied. were actually made to subvert the right of its employees to selforganization. The employees were also advised to apply anew with PTI should they be interested to transfer. Records disclose that the sale of 50 passenger buses together with MTI’s CPC was approved by the LTFRB in a Decision dated December 28.834. allegedly due to serious financial reverses. In light of the foregoing. The NLRC dismissed the appeal for petitioners’ failure to post the required bond equal to the full judgment award within the ten (10)-day reglementary period prescribed under the NLRC Rules of Procedure. PTI was issued a new CPC authorizing it to operate the service on the Baclaran-Malabon via EDSA route using the passenger buses that were sold. The LA ruled in favor of the respondents. Claiming that the sale was intended to frustrate their right to self organization and that there was no actual transfer of ownership of the passenger buses as the stockholders of MTI and PTI are one and the same. As such. 2000. however.e. . unfair labor practice. It held that MTI’s closure of business and cessation of operations.

it ruled that the individual respondents were employees of MTI and not PTI. and . awards. The modification was brought about by the NLRC’s finding that there were no factual and legal bases to hold petitioners jointly and severally liable with MTI as the two corporations are separate and distinct juridical entities with different stockholders and owners. or orders.On MR. If the decision. Thereafter. If made purely on questions of law. the CA reversed the ruling of the NLRC finding the latter to have acted with grave abuse of discretion in applying a liberal interpretation of the rules on perfection of appeal. Issue: Is the NLRC guilty of grave abuse of discretion? Ruling: NO. To this end. 3. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds: 1. awards. 2000. Hence. including graft and corruption. Appeal. It held that PTI’s alleged liquidity problems cannot be considered as a meritorious ground to reduce the bond as there was no showing that they were incapable of posting at least a surety bond equivalent to the full judgment award. viz. – Decisions. or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions. When the case reached CA. 223. For an appeal from the LA’s ruling to the NLRC to be perfected. this petition. order or award was secured through fraud or coercion. 2. and that the sale of the passenger buses to PTI was not simulated or fictitious since the deed evidencing said sale was duly notarized and approved by the LTFRB in a Decision dated December 28. the NLRC reinstated the appeal. the NLRC dismissed the complaint against the petitioners.: ART. If there is a prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter. Article 223 (now Article 229) of the Labor Code requires the posting of a cash or surety bond in an amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from.

210. the Rules of Procedure of the NLRC. Here. While it has been settled that the posting of a cash or surety bond is indispensable to the perfection of an appeal in cases involving monetary awards from the decision of the LA.4. – In case the decision of the Labor Arbiter or the Regional Director involves a monetary award. 6. nonetheless allows the reduction of the bond upon a showing of (a) the existence of a meritorious ground for reduction. BOND. The appeal bond shall either be in cash or surety in an amount equivalent to the monetary award. an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond issued by a reputable bonding company duly accredited by the Commission in the amount equivalent to the monetary award in the judgment appealed from. petitioners filed a motion to reduce bond . The filing of the motion to reduce bond without compliance with the requisites in the preceding paragraph shall not stop the running of the period to perfect an appeal. and (b) the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary SEC. exclusive of damages and attorney’s fees. Instead. particularly Section 6. it is not disputed that petitioners filed an appeal memorandum and complied with the other requirements for perfecting an appeal.833. No motion to reduce bond shall be entertained except on meritorious grounds and upon the posting of a bond in a reasonable amount in relation to the monetary award. Rule VI thereof. an appeal by the employer may be perfected only upon the posting of a cash or surety bond. save for the posting of the full amount equivalent to the monetary award of P12. In this regard. In case of a judgment involving a monetary award. it bears stressing that the reduction of the bond provided thereunder is not a matter of right on the part of the movant and its grant still lies within the sound discretion of the NLRC upon a showing of meritorious grounds and the reasonableness of the bond tendered under the circumstances.00. If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant.

2014 Maritime Corporation. i. and. and considering further the significance of petitioners’ argument raised in their appeal. Facts: On July 14. G. and was declared fit to work by the company-designated physician. in support of their claim. with a basic salary of US$640. Magsaysay October 13. that there exists no employer-employee relationship between PTI and the individual respondents. Topic: entitlement of the seafarer’s beneficiaries to death benefits Ponente: Perlas – Bernabe. 2006.e. Nancing R. 2007. to be deployed on board the vessel M/V North Sea (vessel) for a period of twelve (12) months.00 a month. 190161. Canuel v. On February 20. on the basis of which lies their non-liability. No. On March 5. He underwent the required pre-employment medical examination. 2007. submitted PTI’s AFS which showed a deficit in income. respondent Kotani Shipmanagement Limited (Kotani). Thereafter.claiming that they were suffering from liquidity problems and. Nancing figured in an accident while in the performance of his duties on board the vessel..R. he joined the vessel and commenced his work on July 19. Since this claim was not amply controverted by respondents. as a result. Canuel (Nancing) was hired by respondent Magsaysay Maritime Corporation (Magsaysay) as Third Assistant Engineer for its foreign principal. he was brought to Shanghai . injured the right side of his body. J.. 2006. the Court deems that the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in deciding that these circumstances constitute meritorious grounds for the reduction of the bond.

herein petitioner Anita N. Moreover. Marie Cherry Lyn Samson-Fernando. death compensation of minor children. Dr. pneumonia and pulmonary edema. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners. and Charl Smith. 2007 occurred during the term of his twelve-month employment contract. Eduardo U. hence. Manese (respondents). not compensable. Charmaine. about the accident and his confinement. before the NLRC seeking to recover death benefits. Magsaysay’s Medical Coordinator. Charlene. Benigno A. lung tissue” or lung cancer. for herself and on behalf of their children. The said illness is not work-related per advise of their company doctor. Agbayani. respondents denied any liability and contended that while Nancing died of acute respiratory failure. The NLRC ruled that while respondents correctly argued that Nancing’s death did not occur during the term of his employment pursuant to Section 18 of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) as his employment was deemed terminated after his medical repatriation.Due to his worsening condition. Nancing informed his wife.. On May 23. damages. still. Jr. 2007. it cannot be doubted that his death was brought about by the same or similar cause or illness which caused him to be repatriated. He eventually died on April 25.Seamen’s Hospital in Shanghai. Canuel (Anita). and attorney’s fees. Hence. . Nancing was placed at the hospital’s intensive care unit on April 8.” On March 12. his death was the result of a work-related injury that occurred during the term of his employment. with lung metastasis and r/o bone cancer as antecedent cause and underlying cause. 2007. he was medically repatriated and immediately admitted to the Manila Doctor’s Hospital under the care of a team of medical doctors led by Dr. Nancing’s death certificate indicated the immediate cause of his death as acute respiratory failure. respectively. 2007. the real cause of his death. was “moderately differentiated andenocarcinoma. The LA found that Nancing’s death on April 25. In their defense. as shown in the autopsy conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation. Anita. as well as Magsaysay’s Manager/President. 2007. all surnamed Canuel (petitioners) filed a complaint against Magsaysay and Kotani. 2007. the evidence on record supports the conclusion that his demise was caused by the injury he sustained in an accident while performing his job on board the vessel. On March 24. China where he was diagnosed to have suffered “bilateral closed traumatic hemothorax. The respondents’ appeal was denied by the NLRC. burial allowance.

Inc. Citing the case of Klaveness Maritime Agency. While the 2000 POEA-SEC does not expressly define what a “work-related death” means. Deemed integrated in his employment contract is a set of standard provisions determined and implemented by the POEA. Hence. v. Part A (1) thereof states that the seafarer’s beneficiaries may successfully claim death benefits if they are able to establish that the seafarer’s death is (a) work-related.” which provisions are considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels. The provisions currently governing the entitlement of the seafarer’s beneficiaries to death benefits are found in Section 20 of the 2000 POEASEC. it held that the death of the seafarer after the termination of his contract is not compensable. Issue: Is the dismissal of the complaint for death benefits proper? Ruling: The terms and conditions of a seafarer’s employment are governed by the provisions of the contract he signs with the employer at the time of his hiring. Allas (Klaveness). it is palpable from Part A (4) as above-cited that the said term refers to the seafarer’s death resulting from a work-related injury or illness. called the “Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean-Going Vessels. and (b) had occurred during the term of his employment contract. This denotation complements the definitions accorded to the terms “work-related injury” and “work-related illness” under the 2000 POEA-SEC as follows:  Work-Related Injury – injury resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of employment.The CA dismissed the petitioners’ complaint for death benefits. First Requirement: The Seafarer’s Death Should Be Work-Related. even if the death is caused by the same illness which prompted the repatriation of the seafarer and the termination of his contract. this petition. . Beneficiaries of the Late Second Officer Anthony S.

the seafarer’s death occurring after the termination of his employment due to his medical repatriation on account of a work-related injury or illness constitutes an exception thereto. when the seafarer signs-off and is disembarked for medical reasons pursuant to Section 20 (B)[5] of this Contract. Work-Related Illness – any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied. Here. Second Requirement: The Seafarer’s Death Should Occur During the Term Of Employment. Concordant with the State’s avowed policy to give maximum aid and full protection to labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution. the Court takes this opportunity to clarify that while the general rule is that the seafarer’s death should occur during the term of his employment. such as the 2000 POEA-SEC. This is based on a liberal construction of the 2000 POEA-SEC as impelled by the plight of the bereaved heirs who stand to be deprived of a just and reasonable compensation for the seafarer’s death. which had been earlier established as work-related. With respect to the second requirement for death compensability. TERMINATION OF EMPLOYMENT B. Given that the seafarer’s death in this case resulted from a work-related injury as defined in the 2000 POEA-SEC above. he would not have been repatriated for medical reasons and his contract consequently terminated pursuant to Part 1 of Section 18 (B) of the 2000 POEA-SEC as hereunder quoted: SECTION 18. Nancing’s repatriation occurred during the eighth (8th) month of his one (1) year employment contract. notwithstanding its evident work-connection. Were it not for his injury. The employment of the seafarer is also terminated when the seafarer arrives at the point of hire for any of the following reasons: 1. it is clear that the first requirement for death compensability is present. are deemed to . contracts of labor.

reasonably and liberally in their favor as it is only then can its beneficent provisions be fully carried into effect. Rather. the Court is thus brought to the recognition that medical repatriation cases should be considered as an exception to Section 20 of the 2000 POEA-SEC. it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his death should have occurred during the term of his employment. should be as follows: if the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness (that eventually causes his medical repatriation and. the rule. the Court reckons that it is by this method of construction that undue prejudice to the laborer and his heirs may be obviated and the State policy on labor protection be championed. NLRC: The POEA Standard Employment Contract for Seamen is designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seamen in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. Thus. As enunciated in the case of Philippine Transmarine Carriers. then the employer becomes liable for death compensation benefits under Section 20 (A) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. v. the phrase “work-related death of the seafarer. his death. Taking all things into account. The rule therefore is one of liberal construction. Applying the rule on liberal construction. .be so impressed with public interest that the more beneficial conditions must be endeavoured in favor of the laborer. as in this case) occurs during the term of his employment. restated for a final time. The provision cannot be construed otherwise for to do so would not only transgress prevailing constitutional policy and deride the bearings of relevant case law but also result in a travesty of fairness and an indifference to social justice. considering the constitutional mandate on labor as well as relative jurisprudential context. Its provisions must therefore be construed and applied fairly. Accordingly. during the term of his employment contract” under Part A (1) of the said provision should not be strictly and literally construed to mean that the seafarer’s work-related death should have precisely occurred during the term of his employment. thereafter. Inc.

Bengson was hired as third mate and this was his 22nd contract with Magsaysay Inc. Bengson was brought to a hospital where he was confined for three days. Afterwhich. Thus. he was immediately brought to the hospital under the supervision of company-designated-physician. In the course of his employment. Claim for CBA Benefits Ponente: Del Castillo.Topic: Compensability of Heart Illnesses. Bengson. 2014 Facts: Juanito G. and/or MOL Tankship Management (Asia) PTE Ltd v.R. Inc. Juanito G. No. Upon Bengson’s discharge the Discharge Summary showed that he had a stroke. Upon Bengson’s arrival in the Philippines. Bengson’s immediate repatriation was arranged. . Magsaysay Mitsui OSK Marine. J. 198528. no further disability assessment was issued. The CT Scan of his head showed a "small hematoma in the left part of the crane". he suddenly experienced difficulty in breathing and numbness on half of his body prompting him to ask for assistance. The company-designated doctor opined that the illness of "hematoma in the cranium" was not work-related. G. Bengson had partial paralysis of the right hand and a minor partial paralysis of the right leg. October 13. Medical examination revealed that he had other sicknesses.

who contracted illness. It added that under the POEA-SEC. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of the seafarer and awarded $137. the companydesignated doctor’s findings that his illness is not work-related should prevail. hematoma is not included in the list of compensable illnesses. he suffered a stroke or cerebro-vascular accident (CVA). He then filed a claim for disability compensation. The Labor Arbiter also added that the companydesignated doctor’s opinion that seafarer’s illness is not work-related cannot be given credence. Seafarer should have proved that such illness was work-related and compensable. as it has been shown that prior to boarding he was declared “fit to work” by the company’s own physicians.Bengson. The Labor Arbiter declared that seafarer’s hematoma in the left part of his cranium is related to his work as Third Mate. The Court of Appeals reinstated the decision of the Labor Arbiter with modification. the performance of his functions as third mate. thus. continuously took medications and was unable to return to his work as a seaman due to the severity of his disability. the provisions of the POEA-SEC will apply instead.00 (instead of $137. The appellate court held that seafarer’s exposure to different hazards on the company’s vessel. his inability to work for more than 120 days is therefore irrelevant and does not entitle him to permanent total disability benefits. It held further that since seafarer’s illness is not work-related.000. and it is not enough for him to claim or show that it was contracted during his employment with the company. it can only be caused by his work and the conditions he was subjected to during his employment. Having failed to do so. which means .500 representing 100% compensation benefits under CBA. and the strenuous nature of his work and the conditions he was subjected to while working on board company’s vessel caused his illness. The court awarded $60. and the extraordinary physical and mental strain required by his position caused him to suffer his present illness.000) representing full disability benefits under POEA-SEC. on the other hand. The NLRC reversed the decision of the Labor Arbiter and held that the CBA is relevant only in cases of permanent disability arising from accident – which is not the case for the seafarer. The appellate court also added that in the course of performing his duties. and if he contracted heart disease while on board the ship.

However. that the failure to make a declaration entitles seafarer to permanent total disability benefits in the amount of US$60. and Amaurosis Fugax.000 stating that the disability did not arise from an accident. carotid bruit. Transient Ischemic Attack. The Court only awarded $60.000. which he failed to do. The Supreme Court affirmed the decision of the Court of Appeals. Issue: Whether or not Bengson’s illness (hypertensive cardio-vascular disease) is an occupational disease and thus compensable. the Court has held that cardiovascular disease. that such illness is an occupational disease under Section 32-A (12) of the POEA-SEC.00 in accordance with the POEA-SEC. Hemiplegia. he was saddled with . In the present case. Ruling: Yes. hypertension. coronary artery disease. the Court found that seafarer's illness is work-related. In the past. the Court of Appeals disallowed the benefits claimed under the CBA of $137. The undisputed facts indicate that Bengson has been working for petitioners as third mate for twelve years. and other heart ailments are compensable. the company flatly claims that Bengson’s hypertensive cardio-vascular disease is not compensable on the sole basis of its companydesignated physician’s declaration that such illness is not work-related.000. that according to the companydesignated physician’s Cerebrovascular Investigation Form. The company-designated physician should have made a declaration either of fitness or disability. and that as third mate.that a blood vessel within or about his brain burst which caused cerebral or intracranial hemorrhage. that the disease being work-related. However. the seafarer suffered from stroke.

and certainly contributed to the development of his illness. it is already recognized that any kind of work or labor produces stress and strain normally resulting in wear and tear of the human body. ship safety and management of emergencies. Respondent's illness. 'Notably. And equally significant. Besides. his years of service certainly took a toll on his body. His responsibilities have been heavy burdens on respondent's shoulders all these years. The POEA-SEC cannot be presumed to contain all the possible illnesses / injuries that render a seafarer unfit for further sea duties. it can be said that respondent spent much of his productive years with the company. The strain is even greater in the case of a seaman who is constantly subjected to the perils of the sea while at work abroad and away from his family.heavy responsibilities relative to navigation of the vessel. In one case the Court held that an employee's disability becomes permanent and total when so declared by the company-designated physician. it is not the injury which is compensated. bears a great degree of emotional strain while making an effort to perform his work well. having to ward off homesickness by reason of being physically separated from his family for the entire duration of his contract. The Court ruled that the list of illnesses/diseases in the POEA-SEC does not preclude other illnesses/diseases not so listed from being compensable. or. It is beyond doubt that Bengson was subjected to physical and mental stress and strain. Having worked for the company under several employment contracts that were continuously renewed. but rather it is the incapacity to work resulting in the impairment of one's earning capacity. and he could not have contracted his illness elsewhere except while working for the company. which has likewise been diagnosed as intracerebral hemorrhage or hemorrhagic stroke. it is a matter of judicial notice that an overseas worker. is a serious condition and could be deadly. in case .

as Bengson is deemed totally and permanently disabled. nor was he able to work for other employers. Thus.000 was not awarded as there was no accident. In the meantime.000. Quite understandably. The company-designated doctor did not make a definite assessment of seafarer's fitness or disability. . and the company did not renew or continue with respondent's employment. Topic: Illegal Dismissal Ponente: Brion. upon the lapse of the 120 or 240-day treatment period. seafarer's condition remains delicate given that his illness is serious and could be fatal. he is entitled to the corresponding benefit under the POEA-SEC in the peso equivalent of US$60. J. even up to this day and the latter’s medical condition remains unresolved.00.of absence of such a declaration either of fitness or permanent total disability. seafarer’s medical condition persists. Benefits under the CBA of US$137.

manpower and sanitation services to Robinsons Place Ermita Mall for a period of one year . 2014 Facts: The twenty-eight (28) respondents in this case were employees of petitioner FVR Skills and Services Exponents. (petitioner). 2008 to December 31. Pursuant to this. (SKILLEX).from January 1. October 22. . the petitioner dismissed the respondents as they were project employees whose duration of employment was dependent on the petitioner's service contract with Robinsons. unless earlier terminated. the petitioner asked the respondents to execute individual contracts which stipulated that their respective employments shall end on December 31.R. the petitioner entered into a Contract of Janitorial Service (service contract) with Robinsons Land Corporation (Robinsons). Fulgencio V. 2008. Jovert Sev A et.. Burgos v. 200857. Halfway through the service contract. Both agreed that the petitioner shall supply janitorial. They argued that they were not project employees. No. 2008. Rana and Monina R.FVR Skills and Services Exponents. the respondents were deployed to Robinsons. G. The petitioner and Robinsons no longer extended their contract of janitorial services. al. Consequently. they were regular employees who may only be dismissed for just or authorized causes. The respondents responded to the termination of their employment by filing a complaint for illegal dismissal with the NLRC. Inc. an independent contractor engaged in the business of providing janitorial and other manpower services to its clients. Inc. On April 21. 2008.

Ruling: Yes. namely. not project employees. but only with respect to the activity for which they have been hired. He held that the respondents were not regular employees. Issue: Whether or not the respondents have been illegally dismissed.The LA ruled in the petitioner's favor. there are two kinds of regular employees. and (2) those casual employees who became regular after one year of service. The CA dismissed the petitioner's certiorari petition and affirmed the NLRC's decision. some of them as early as 1998. This connection can be ascertained by considering the nature of the work performed and its relation to the scheme of the particular business or the trade in its entirety. They were project employees whose employment was dependent on the petitioner's service contract with Robinsons. . The respondents are regular employees. whether continuous or broken. Under Article 280 (now Article 294) of the Labor Code. (1) those who wereengaged to perform activities which are usually necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. The NLRC reversed the LA's ruling and held that they were regular employees. The primary standard in determining regular employment is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee and the employer’s business or trade. The NLRC considered that the respondents had been under the petitioner's employ for more than a year already.

the Supreme Court. the employer must observe the twin notice and hearing requirements in carrying out an employee's dismissal. (a) safe and healthful working conditions. under the law. and (e) security of tenure. collective bargaining and peaceful concerted action. Having already determined that the respondents are regular employees and not project employees. concluded that respondents’ work as janitors. in the case at bar. an employee's dismissal must comply with the substantive and procedural requirements of due process. To be valid. and that the respondents' belated employment contracts could not be given any binding effect for being signed under duress.. (c) social security and welfare benefits. The respondents were illegally dismissed. Although the respondents were assigned as contractual employees to the petitioner’s various clients. a dismissal should be supported by a just or authorized cause. they remain to be the petitioner’s regular employees.e. . are necessary or desirable to the petitioner’s business of providing janitorial and manpower services to its clients as an independent contractor. Substantively. who are entitled to all the rights and benefits of regular employment. we hold that illegal dismissal took place when the petitioner failed to comply with the substantive and procedural due process requirements of the law. (b) labor standards such as service incentive leave. (d) self-organization. i. service crews and sanitation aides. rest days. Procedurally.Guided by this test. holiday pay. overtime pay. 13th month pay and separation pay.

thereafter. The NLRC further ruled that. The failure to present contract of project employment means that the employees are regular.Petitioners. 2014 Facts: TNS Philippines Inc. Respondents. v. hired the petitioners as field personnel on a project-to-project basis. Later.. The LA rendered a decision. On October 21. and attorney’s fees against TNS. this petition. Whether or not the petitioners were merely project employees. On appeal. 208567. petitioners were illegally dismissed because TNS. damages. AND GARY OCAMPO. Whether or not there was abuse of discretion . JEANETTE V. Petitioners. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. which prompted them to file a consolidated complaint for regularization before the LA. TNS submits termination report with the DOLE-Regional Office. November 26. They were also asked to surrender their company IDs.Topic: Labor Law – Project Employees Ponente: MENDOZA. 2. The NLRC reversed said decision and held that in the absence of proof that the subsequent employment of the complainants continued to be on a project-to-project basis under a contract of employment. they were assigned in the “tracking” projects with “pulling-out” scheme. 2008. TNS PHILIPPINES INC. failed to show how and why the employment of petitioners was terminated on October 21.R. Issue: 1. a company engaged primarily in the business of marketing research and information. complainants are considered to have become regular employees after November 30. J. dismissing the complaint on the ground that petitioners were found to be project employees who knew the nature of their positions as such at the time of their employment and who agreed with full understanding that the contracts would lapse upon completion of the project stated in their respective contracts. Hence. as evidenced by a project-to-project employment contract. being regular employees. VILMA P. In August 2008. who had the burden of proving legality in dismissal cases. (TNS). 2008. and not reported to the DOLE either. overtime pay. petitioners were advised by TNS not to report for work anymore because they were being pulled out from their current assignments and that they were not being lined up for any continuing or incoming projects because it no longer needed their services. Petitioners were also given office-based tasks which were not on a per project basis. Thereafter. the labor cases for regularization and illegal dismissal were consolidated. TAIÑO. LOURDES LYNN MICHELLE FERNANDEZ AND LEILA B. MANALO. not evidenced by any contract. BARRIOS. the CA ruled in favor of TNS. No. 2007. G.

but continuously. necessary and indispensable to the usual business or trade of the employer. involving the very same tasks. Jr. Ultimately. the Court held that once a project or work pool employee has been: (1) continuously. petitioners were considered to have become regular employees. v. Hence. then the employee must be deemed a regular employee. clearly defined a project employee as one whose employment has been fixed for a specific project or undertaking the completion or termination of which has been determined at the time of the engagement of the employee or where the work or service to be performed is seasonal in nature and the employment is for the duration of the season. In Maraguinot. a project employee is one whose termination of his employment contract is reported to the DOLE everytime the project for which he was engaged has been completed. rehired by the same employer for the same tasks or nature of tasks. In the absence of proof that the subsequent employment of petitioners continued to be on a project-to-project basis under a contract of employment. NLRC. No. as amended. The reports belatedly submitted by TNS failed to show the corresponding project employment contracts of petitioners covering the period indicated in the said termination reports. Here. Article 280 of the Labor Code. and (2) these tasks are vital. petitioners are deemed to have become regular employees. month after month. the functions they performed were indeed vital and necessary to the very business or trade of TNS. contract after contract. Petitioners’ successive re-engagement in order to perform the same kind of work firmly manifested the necessity and desirability of their work in the usual business of TNS as a market research facility. . In sum. as opposed to intermittently. Additionally. Petitioners were rehired not intermittently. their dismissal is deemed illegal.Held: 1.

1998. The DOLE Secretary enjoined the parties from committing acts which will further exacerbate the situation. REYNALDO PAZ. On June 5. v. No. 1999. the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the pilots in PAL. J. holding that the respondent was illegally dismissed and ordered that he be reinstated to his former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and paid his full backwages inclusive of allowances and other benefits computed from June 12. G. Paz was a former commercial pilot of PAL and a member of the Airlines Pilots Association of the Philippines (ALPAP).R. claiming non-participation in the illegal strike. Joji Antonio. the DOLE Secretary resolved the motions for reconsideration filed by both parties and declared the strike staged by ALPAP illegal and that the participants thereof are deemed to have lost their employment. informed the members of the union that she has just received a copy of the return-to-work order and that they have until the following day within which to comply. 1998 up to his actual reinstatement. Facts: Reynaldo V. 2014 V. The Labor Arbiter (LA) rendered a Decision. the counsel for ALPAP. 192924. the respondent filed a complaint for illegal dismissal against PAL for not accepting him back to work. November 26. 1998. Then. ALPAP filed a notice of strike with the NCMB of DOLE. 1997.Topic: Labor Law – Reinstatement Salaries Ponente: REYES. the DOLE Secretary issued a return-to-work order on June 7. PAL filed a petition for approval of rehabilitation plan and for appointment of a rehabilitation receiver with the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). On December 9. 1998. On June 25.. claiming serious financial distress brought about by the strike. Respondent. 1998. To control the situation. the ALPAP officers and members staged a strike and picketed at the PAL’s premises. Atty. The respondent pursued his move for the issuance of a writ of execution. INC. on June 23. directing all the striking officers and members of ALPAP to return to work within 24 hours from notice of the order but to no avail. Subsequently. On June 1. the SEC appointed a rehabilitation receiver for PAL and declared the suspension of all claims against it. 1999. On June 25. PHILIPPINE AIRLINES. Petitioner. claiming that he was .

the employer may still be required to pay the salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s decision. the employee may be barred from collecting the accrued wages. In the case of Garcia v. Issue: 1. if it is shown that the delay in enforcing the reinstatement pending appeal was without fault on the part of the employer. the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee. specifically on the contemplation of the reinstatement aspect of the LA decision. the Court deliberated on the application of Paragraph 3. A scrutiny of the circumstances. Whether or not the respondent is entitled to the payment of reinstatement salaries. Held: 1. insofar as the reinstatement aspect is concerned. merely reinstated in the payroll. Inc. the respondent nonetheless secured a partial writ of execution on May 25. 2. The test is two-fold: (1) there must be actual delay or the fact that the order of reinstatement pending appeal was not executed prior to its reversal.entitled to reinstatement salaries which he supposedly earned during the pendency of the appeal to the NLRC. No. will show that the delay in reinstating the respondent was not due to the unjustified . Yes. however. It can be recalled that the LA rendered the decision ordering the reinstatement of the respondent on March 5. Article 223 of the Labor Code in light of the apparent divergence in its interpretation. pending appeal . And. If the delay is due to the employer’s unjustified refusal. and (2) the delay must not be due to the employer’s unjustified act or omission. In Garcia.at the option of the employer. 2001. Thus: In any event. 2001. the Court relaxed the rule by taking into consideration the cause of delay in executing the order of reinstatement of the LA. the respondent was not reinstated to his former position or even through payroll. Whether or not the award of reinstatement salaries to the respondent is proper. It is clear from the records that PAL failed to reinstate the respondent pending appeal of the LA decision to the NLRC.. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or. The rule is that the employee is entitled to reinstatement salaries notwithstanding the reversal of the LA decision granting him said relief. thus: After the labor arbiter’s decision is reversed by a higher tribunal. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the 2. It was declared. shall immediately be executory. Philippine Airlines. despite the self-executory nature of the order of reinstatement. Even then.

2005.00 basic salary per day. Victor and Enriquito filed a labor complaintfor underpayment/non-payment of salaries. 2014 Facts: Stanley Fine Furniture (Stanley Fine). and Social Security System (SSS) benefit. 13th month pay. No. Victor and Enriqui to claimed that they were dismissed on May 26. underpayment/non-payment of overtime pay. premium for holiday pay.R. J. wages. Victor and Enriquito filed an amended complaint on May 31. Gallano and EnriquitoSiarez G.refusal of PAL to abide by the order but because of the constraints of corporate rehabilitation. In the amended complaint.: Stanley Fine Furniture. Elena and Carlos Wang vs. Gallano and EnriquitoSiarez in 1995 as painters/carpenters. ECOLA. holiday pay. Emergency Cost of Living Allowance (ECOLA). through its owners Elena and Carlos Wang. Topic: Illegal dismissal LEONEN. The inopportune event of PAL’s entering rehabilitation receivership justifies the delay or failure to comply with the reinstatement order of the LA. They indicated in the complaint form that they were "still working"for Stanley Fine. . and 13th month pay. Victor and Enriquito each received 215. On May 26. Victor T. hired respondents Victor T. 190486 November 26. service incentive leave pay. 2005. for actual illegal dismissal.

Elena admitted that no notices of dismissal were issued to respondents. . "due to the filing ofan unmeritorious labor case. they were not allowed to work." is an admission against interest and binding against Stanley Fine Furniture. Held: There was no just cause in the dismissal of respondents The Court of Appeals found grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission when it reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties. Termination by employer. requiring them to explain their absences. As a consequence. The Court of Appeals held that respondents were illegally dismissed because no valid cause for dismissal was shown. memoranda were given to respondents. Also. ruling that the Labor Arbiter erred in considering the statement." as an admission against interest. the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. She claimed that the notices to explain disprove respondents’ allegation that there was intent to dismiss them. "filing of an unmeritorious labor case. Just causes for termination ofan employee are provided under Article 282 of the Labor Code: ARTICLE 282. premises considered.An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work.2005.Victor and Enriquito were allegedly scolded for filing a complaint for money claims. they are ORDERED to reinstate complainant to their former position and pay jointly and severally complainants’ full backwages from date of dismissal until actual reinstatement On appeal. there was no compliance with the two-notice requirement. Grounds for termination of employment are provided under the Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter resolved these contradictory statements in the following manner: WHEREFORE. respondents are hereby declared guilty of illegal dismissal.. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals erred when it agreed with the Labor Arbiter that the statement. Later on. However.

Emilia. 2005." To prove abandonment. (d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized representatives. this court has held that "abandonment is a form of neglect of duty. .(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his employer or duly authorized representative. and 2. Human experience dictates that no employee in his right mind would go through the trouble of filing a case unless the employer had indeed terminated the services of the employee. and (e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing.this court held that: Absence must be accompanied by overt acts unerringly pointing to the fact that the employee simply does not want to work anymore. In Hodieng Concrete Products v. A clear intention to sever the employer-employee relationship. Failure to report for work orabsence without valid or justifiable reason. The Court of Appeals further stated that: Long standing is the rule that the filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal negates the allegation of abandonment. two elements must concur: 1. Although abandonment of work is not included in the enumeration. The Court of Appeals ruled that the alleged abandonment of work is negated by the immediate filing of the complaint for illegal dismissal on May 31. And the burden of proof to show that there was unjustified refusal to go back to work rests on the employer.

Jr.R. Thus. Bartolome v. However. La Union. November 12. petitioner Bernardina P. sole remaining beneficiary. which led to his untimely death the following day.Topic: Entitlement to the benefit of ECP by the parent Ponente: Velasco... John was. No. allegedly. since February 2008. John’s biological mother and.. on June 2. Bernardina P. G. 2008. Inc. Social Security System and Scanmar Maritime Services. on board the vessel Maersk Danville. filed a claim for death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City. J. he was enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP). 2014 Facts: John Colcol was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime Services. Bartolome. Inc. As such. Unfortunately. the SSS La Union office denied the claim. childless and unmarried. stating they cannot give due course to . at the time of his death. an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John. 192531.

as provided for by Rule XV. petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration. The denial was appealed to the Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC). 626. The court disagreed with the factual finding of the ECC on this point. it was allegedly not proven that his adoptive parent. Consequently. Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. the instant petition. entitled. Neither. the ECC reasoned. To recall. as argued by the agencies. petitioner’s grandfather. Proc.the claim because petitioner is no longer considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL based on documents submitted to it. Cornelio C. it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary. was no longer alive. . 1985. in appropriate cases. by virtue of the Decision in Spec. one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s claim for death benefits is that even though she is John’s biological mother. As the ECC ratiocinated: The dependent parent referred to by Article 167 (j) of P. both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be considered John’s primary beneficiary. Thus. Hence. thus. The petition is meritorious. Colcol. Issue: Whether the biological parents of the covered. not petitioner. but legally adopted. Aggrieved. This Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a legitimate parent of the deceased. Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio). employee are considered secondary beneficiaries and. the adoption divested her of the status as the legitimate parent of the deceased. as amended relates to the legitimate parent of the covered member. which was likewise denied by the ECC. Cornelio. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated February 4. which affirmed the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch In denying the claim. John and his sister Elizabeth were adopted by their great grandfather. SC: Yes. The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record. having given up the latter for adoption to Mr.D. in effect. would petitioner qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary even if it were proven that Cornelio has already passed away. which decree of adoption attained finality. As culled from the records. No. to receive the benefits under the ECP.

As such." The term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the aforequoted Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is used and ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. therefore. as amended Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of the Labor Code. or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4. which attained finality. Based on Cornelio’s death certificate. In net effect. it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that the adoptive parent. Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate parents. it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative legislation. 167 of the Code an interpretation not contemplated by the provision. Rule XV. The phrase "dependent parents" should. the ECC read into Art. When the law does not distinguish. 1987. Cornelio. if not finality. 167 (j) of the Labor Code. in the extant case. it appears that John’s adoptive father died on October 26.Generally. include all parents. whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or by adoption. findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect. as amended. is Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code. Sec. The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in view of John’s work-related demise. 1985. However. has already passed away. by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative agenciesover matters falling under their jurisdiction. The pertinent provision. the ECC had overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner – Cornelio’s death certificate. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation deviates from the clear language of Art. as amended. in this regard. .

"dependent parents" are parents. clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. 167 (j) of the Labor Code. biological or by adoption. the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent children. however. the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are secondary beneficiaries.one should not distinguish. Indeed. then it would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants. who are in need of support or assistance. As jurisprudence elucidates. as amended by PD 626. to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern impartially. Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in contravention of the equal protection clause To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule. It requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. whether legitimate or illegitimate. as worded. the same Article 167 (j). such postulation cannot be countenanced.as couched. Such classification. illegitimate or parents by nature or adoption. the equal protection clause permits classification. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial . Rule XV. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification." The manner by which the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase "dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents – legitimate. Article 167 provides that "in their absence. however. equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike. The concept of equal protection. To Our mind." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive. both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Plainly. and it may not draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective. prevents the parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art. does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. In other words. Moreover.

there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate parents. there can be no other course of action to take other than to strike down as unconstitutional the phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV. November 12. collection of both retirement benefits and separation pay upon severance from employment Ponente: Del Castillo. Simply put.R. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification. 2014 ." In the instant case. Marina L. J. Topic: Retirement and separation pay. and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. and Remigio M. the above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the classification is not germane to the law being implemented. G. Angus. Ramos v. (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law. 185449. Goodyear Philippines. There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones. Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation. No. Absence of an express or implied prohibition against it.distinctions. (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only. Inc.

To support their claim.Facts: Angus was employed by Goodyear on November 16. However. Consequently. petitioners took back the checks given to her. termination due to redundancy or retrenchment is paid at 45 days' pay per year of service. Goodyear implemented cost-saving measures which included the streamlining of its workforce. LA upheld the validity of Angus’ termination." Section 1. on September 19. the Human Resources Director of Goodyear. She accepted the checks which covered payment of her retirement benefits computed at 4 7 days' pay per year of service and other company benefits. 2001. In order to maintain the viability of its operations in the midst of economic reversals. a letter which stated that her service is no longer necessary because her office is abolished and is redundant. Angus accepted the early retirement but did not agree with terms thereof. that you have rendered 34. Petitioners allege that there is a provision in the last CBA against the recovery of both retirement benefits and separation pay. it declared Angus entitled to separation pay in addition to the retirement pay she already received. Physical Disability Pay and Resignation Pay. Angus received from Ramos. As Company practice. 2001. can hardly be considered as substantial evidence because it does not appear to be an integral part of Goodyear's CBA. The same. Life Insurance. SC: Yes.92 years of service to the Company as of October 18. Considering. Management has decided to grant you early retirement benefit at 47 days' per year of service. Due to protest and refusal of Angus to sign quit claims. CA rendered a Decision partially granting Angus' Petition. NLRC affirmed the decision. petitioners submitted a copy of what appears to be a portion of the company CBA entitled "Retirement Plan. and have reached the required minimum age of 55 to qualify for early retirement. however. 1966 and occupied the position of Secretary to the Manager of Quality and Technology. On complaint. Article XI thereof provides that the availment of retirement benefits precludes entitlement to any separation pay. she placed an annotation that she received it under protest. While it found her dismissal valid in both substance and procedural aspects. Even . Issue: Whether Angus is entitled to both separation pay and early retirement benefit due to the absence of a specific provision in the CEA prohibiting recovery of both.

Moreover. the Court agrees with the CA that the amount Angus received from petitioners represented only her retirement pay and not separation pay." In view therefore of the clear showing that what petitioners decided to grant Angus was her early retirement benefits. was created to cover retirement benefit payment of employees. While it is obvious that Angus is not entitled to compulsory retirement as she has not yet reached the age of 60. Angus was already 57 years of age and had been in the service for more than 34 years. they cannot now be permitted to deny having paid such benefit. In addition. committed no error in reversing the Decisions of the labor tribunals when it ruled in favor of Angus' entitlement to both retirement benefits and separation pay. it would still not suffice as there is no showing if the CBA under which the said provision is found was the one in force at the time material to this case. Under the provision of the Retirement Plan of the CBA as earlier quoted. which. The exchange of correspondence between Angus and Ramos . A cursory reading of petitioners' September 18. In fact. Angus presented the parties' 20012004 CBA and upon examination of the same. shall be entitled to lump sum retirement benefits. the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC erred in ignoring this material piece of evidence which is decisive of the issue presented before them. a worker who is at least 50 years old and with at least 15 years of service. however. the document showing a detailed account of Angus' termination benefits speaks for itself as the same is entitled "Summary of Retirement Pay and other Company Benefits. and who has been recommended by the President of the Union for early retirement and duly approved by the Human Resources Director. This rate was arrived at after petitioners considered respondent's length of service with the company. there is no denying. that she is qualified for early retirement. At the time of her termination.assuming that it is. The Court disagrees. thus. On the other hand. Petitioners further argue that Angus is not entitled to retirement pay because she does not meet the requirements enumerated in the Retirement Plan provision of the CBA. the Court agrees with her that it does not contain any restriction on the availment of benefits under the company's Retirement Plan and of separation pay. Indeed. as correctly asserted by Angus. petitioners were even explicit in stating in the said letter that the amount she was to receive would come from the company's Pension Fund. as well as her age which qualified her for early retirement. The CA. 2001 letter notifying Angus of her termination from employment shows that they granted her early retirement benefits pegged at 4 7 days' pay per year of service.

separation pay is that amount which an employee receives at the time of his severance from employment. In the case at bar. offered. designed to provide the employee with the wherewithal during the period that he is looking for another employment and is recoverable only in instances enumerated under Articles 283 and 284 of the Labor Code or in illegal dismissal cases when reinstatement is not feasible. Article 283 clearly entitles Angus to separation pay apart from the retirement benefits she received from petitioners. CBAs.also shows that the latter. recommended and approved the grant of early retirement in favor of the former. Retirement benefits are a form of reward for an employee's loyalty and service to an employer and are earned under existing laws. Clearly. all the requirements for Angus' availment of early retirement under the Retirement Plan of CBA were substantially complied with. employment contracts and company policies. On the other hand. as Goodyear's Human Resources Director. It is worthy to mention at this point that retirement benefits and separation pay are not mutually exclusive. .

which provides that in the event the amount of gasoline is not fully consumed. the company deducted from the union members’ salaries the withholding tax corresponding to the conversion to cash of their unused gasoline allowance. the union members were receiving a transportation allowance of 3. the company considers the amount as part of the managers’ and AVPs’ compensation that is subject to income tax on compensation. On September 3. the company and the union entered into a MOA converting the transportation allowance into a monthly gasoline allowance starting at 125 liters effective April 1.. argued that the gasoline allowance for its members is a "negotiated item" under Article XV. Jr.300. No. is considered as compensation income that is subject to withholding tax. Inc. It thus opposed the company’s practice of treating the gasoline allowance that.00 a month. Section 15 of the new CBA on fringe benefits. Honda Cars Philippines. The union. The allowance answers for the gasoline consumed by the union members for official business purposes and for home to office travel and vice-versa. on the other hand. Panel of Voluntary Arbitrators rendered a decision/award declaring that the cash conversion of the unused gasoline allowance enjoyed by the members . the gasoline not used may be converted into cash. subject to whatever tax may be applicable. 2005. Honda Cars Technical Specialists and Supervisory Union. Inc.R. J. entered into a CBA effective April 1. they submitted the issue to a panel of voluntary arbitrators as required by the CBA. 2014 Facts: Petitioner Honda Cars Philippines. 2006 to March 31. when converted into cash.Topic: Cash conversion of the unused gasoline allowance Ponente: Velasco. 2005. 2005. v. Since the cash conversion is paid in the monthly payroll as an excess gas allowance. The company claimed that the grant of the gasoline allowance is tied up to a similar company policy for managers and assistant vice-presidents (AVPs). November 19. As it remained unsettled there. The disagreement between the company and the union on the matter resulted in a grievance which they referred to the CBA grievance procedure for resolution. and respondent Honda Cars Technical Specialists and Supervisory Union. 204142. Prior to April 1. the exclusive collective bargaining representative of the company’s supervisors and technical specialists. G. Accordingly. 2011.

. The Labor Code vests the Voluntary Arbitrator original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide all unresolved grievances arising from the interpretation or implementation of the Collective Bargaining Agreement and those arising from the interpretation or enforcement of company personnel policies. including unfair labor practices and bargaining deadlocks. Labor dispute means "any controversy or matter concerning terms and conditions of employment or the association or representation of persons in negotiating. regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of employer and employee. or arranging the terms and conditions of employment. and do not involve labor disputes. the company and the union cannot agree or compromise on the taxability of the gas allowance. changing. its imposition cannot be subject to the will of the parties. the Voluntary Arbitrator’s jurisdiction is limited to labor disputes. SC: The Voluntary Arbitrator has no jurisdiction to settle tax matters. not to income tax. the Voluntary Arbitrator shall also hear and decide all other labor disputes." The Voluntary Arbitrator has no competence to rule on the taxability of the gas allowance and on the propriety of the withholding of tax. Taxation is the State’s inherent power. fixing. they involve tax issues within a labor relations setting as they pertain to questions of law on the application of Section 33 (A) of the NIRC. Upon agreement of the parties. They do not require the application of the Labor Code or the interpretation of the MOA and/or company personnel policies. The panel held that the deductions made by the company shall be considered as advances subject to refund in future remittances of withholding taxes.of the union is a fringe benefit subject to the fringe benefit tax. In short. maintaining. To be exact. for taxation purposes. Furthermore. These issues are clearly tax matters. CA Eight Division denied the petition and upheld with modification the voluntary arbitration decision. Issue: Whether the cash conversion of the gasoline allowance of the union members is a fringe benefit or compensation income.

the employer as the withholding agent acts as both the government and the taxpayer’s agent. modification or reversal will be prejudicial to the taxpayers. it should have filed an administrative claim for refund with the CIR. The employer did not violate the employee's right by the mere act of withholding the tax that may be due the government. the NIRC only holds the withholding agent personally liable for the tax arising from the breach of his legal duty to withhold. As the employee’s agent. it/they should have requested for a tax ruling from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR). the . penalties imposed in relation thereto. The company merely performed its statutory duty to withhold tax based on its interpretation of the NIRC. Any revocation. the CIR shall have the exclusive and original jurisdiction to interpret the provisions of the NIRC and other tax laws. Under Section 79 (B) of the NIRC. except in the following cases: (a) Where the taxpayer deliberately misstates or omits material facts from his return or any document required of him by the BIR. As the Government’s agent. or (c) Where the taxpayer acted in bad faith. The union has no cause of action against the company Under the withholding tax system. the employer collects tax and serves as the payee by fiction of law. Section 4 of the NIRC expressly vests the CIR original jurisdiction over refunds of internal revenue taxes. Moreover. Consequently. as distinguished from his duty to pay tax. if the company and/or the union desire/s to seek clarification of these issues. Based on these considerations. (b) Where the facts subsequently gathered by the BIR are materially different from the facts on which the ruling is based. Section 4 of the NIRC. if the tax required to be deducted and withheld is not collected from the employer. if the union disputes the withholding of tax and desires a refund of the withheld tax. albeit that interpretation may later be found to be erroneous. the employer files the necessary income tax return and remits the tax to the Government. or other tax matters. upon the CIR’s recommendation.Under paragraph 1. modification or reversal of the CIR’s ruling shall not be given retroactive application if the revocation. the union has no cause of action against the company. On the other hand. Paragraph 2. fees or other charges. Except in the case of a minimum wage earner. subject to review by the Secretary of Finance. every employer has the duty to deduct and withhold upon the employee’s wages a tax determined in accordance with the rules and regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of Finance.

Despabeladeras. penalty. where he was diagnosed with “Ulna Styloid Fracture.No suit or proceeding shall be maintained in any court for the recovery of any national internal revenue tax hereafter alleged to have been erroneously or illegally assessed or collected. or of any penalty claimed to have been collected without authority. Topic: Entitlement to disability benefits for failure to perform his pre-injury duties as seaman for more than 120 days Ponente: Mendoza.. if the BIR illegally or erroneously collected tax. for and in behalf of its principal. Michael underwent the required Pre-Employment Medical Examination (PEME) and was declared “Fit for Sea Service” by the company doctor. v. . with a basic monthly salary of US$415. November 19. Michael experienced severe pain and swelling in his left wrist. Recovery of Tax Erroneously or Illegally Collected. On April 26. and not against the withholding agent. the withholding agent. 2009. St. 229. while going down the stairs of the vessel to get some tools to be used for dismantling the engine’s piston. until a claim for refund or credit has been duly filed with the Commissioner. 2014 Facts: Respondent Michael was hired by petitioner New Filipino Maritime Agencies Inc. 2009. and Angelina T. Paul Maritime Corp. the recourse of the taxpayer. Left Wrist.00. Michael joined the assigned vessel. A few days after the incident.. or of any sum alleged to have been excessively or in any manner wrongfully collected.” Michael was repatriated to the Philippines for better medical treatment and management. St.. No. Michael D. as Wiper to work on board the vessel M/V “ATHENS HIGHWAY” for a period of nine (9) months. New Filipino Maritime Agencies Inc. J. G. but such suit or proceeding may be maintained. The union's cause of action for the refund or non-withholding of tax is against the taxing authority. is against the BIR.employer shall not be relieved from liability for any penalty or addition to the unwithheld tax. 2009. Paul Maritime Corp. He was brought to the nearest hospital in Brunswick. and in proper cases. he . On August 20. and not against the employer. whether or not such tax. Upon arrival in Manila on August 31. Rivera.R. Section 229 of the NIRC provides: Sec. or sum has been paid under protest or duress. Thus. Michael slipped and fractured his left hand. (petitioners). Georgia. Prior to embarkation. 209201.

was referred to the company-designated physician, Dr. Nicomedes G. Cruz
(Dr. Cruz). Later on, Dr. Cruz endorsed Michael to an orthopedic surgeon.
Michael’s medical treatment was supervised by Dr. Cruz from August 2009
until February 10, 2010. Despite continuous treatment under the care of Dr.
Cruz, Michael alleged that his medical condition did not improve. This
prompted him to consult another physician, Dr. Rogelio C. Catapang, Jr. (Dr.
Catapang), who declared him unfit to resume his duties as a seaman on
January
16,
2010.
Michael’s check-up with the orthopedic surgeon on February 3, 2010 showed
minimal pain on the left hand, but he was advised to continue with his
medical therapy. Michael went back for his check-up on February 10, 2010,
and he was asked to return for a follow-up check up on February 17, 2010.
He failed to return on the said date. Instead, he demanded that he be paid
disability benefits.
After his demand for payment of disability benefits was refused, Michael filed
a complaint for disability compensation and other monetary claims before
the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).
Issue: Whether Michael is entitled to disability benefits for failure to perform
his pre-injury duties as seaman for more than 120 days.
SC: No.
Under Section 31 of the POEA-SEC, in case of any unresolved dispute, claim
or grievance arising out of or in connection with the contract, the matter
shall be governed by Philippine laws, as well as international conventions,
treaties and covenants where the Philippines is a signatory. This signifies that
the terms agreed upon by the parties pursuant to the POEA-SEC are to be
read and understood in accordance with Philippine laws, particularly, Articles
191 to 193 of the Labor Code and the applicable implementing rules and
regulations in case of any dispute, claim or grievance. Article 192(3) of the
Labor Code which deals with the period of disability states that:
The following disabilities shall be deemed total and permanent:
1. Temporary total disability lasting continuously for more than one hundred
twenty days, except as otherwise provided for in the Rules.

The rule adverted to is Section 2, Rule X of the Rules and Regulations
implementing Book IV of the Labor Code which provides:
Sec. 2. Period of entitlement. — (a) The income benefit shall be paid
beginning on the first day of such disability. If caused by an injury or sickness
it shall not be paid longer than 120 consecutive days except where such
injury or sickness still requires medical attendance beyond 120 days but not
to exceed 240 days from onset of disability in which case benefit for
temporary total disability shall be paid. However, the System may declare
the total and permanent status at any time after 120 days of continuous
temporary total disability as may be warranted by the degree of actual loss
or impairment of physical or mental functions as determined by the System.
The above provisions must be read together with Section 20(B)(3) of the
POEA-SEC which states as follows:
Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment, the seafarer is
entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is
declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed
by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed
one hundred twenty (120) days.
The seafarer, upon sign-off from his vessel, must report to the companydesignated physician within three (3) days from arrival for diagnosis and
treatment. For the duration of the treatment but in no case to exceed 120
days, the seaman is on temporary total disability as he is totally unable to
work. He receives his basic wage during this period until he is declared fit to
work or his temporary disability is acknowledged by the company to be
permanent, either partially or totally, as his condition is defined under the
POEA Standard Employment Contract and by applicable Philippine laws. If
the 120 days initial period is exceeded and no such declaration is made
because the seafarer requires further medical attention, then the temporary
total disability period may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days,
subject to the right of the employer to declare within this period that a
partial or total disability already exists. The seaman may of course also be
declared fit to work at any time such declaration is justified by his medical
condition
As recited earlier, upon Michael’s return to the country, he underwent
medical treatment in accordance with the terms of the POEA SEC. Upon his
repatriation on August 28, 2009, he was given medical attention supervised

by Dr. Cruz, the company-designated physician. He was later on endorsed to
an orthopedic surgeon. The company-designated specialist recommended
that he continue with his physical therapy sessions. During his visit on
February 10, 2010, he was required to return for a follow-up checkup on
February 17, 2010. For unknown reasons, he failed to return on the said date.
It should be noted that on February 10, 2010 when Michael last visited the
company-designated orthopedic surgeon, it had been 166 days since he was
referred to the company-designated physician upon his repatriation on
August 28, 2009. During this time, Michael was under temporary total
disability inasmuch as the 240-day period provided under the aforecited
Rules had not yet lapsed. The CA, therefore, erred when it ruled that
Michael’s disability was permanent and total. There being no assessment,
Michael’s condition cannot be considered a permanent total disability.
Temporary total disability only becomes permanent when declared by the
company physician within the period he is allowed to do so, or upon the
expiration of the maximum 240-day medical treatment period without a
declaration of either fitness to work or permanent disability.
On the issue of abandonment, the Court agrees with petitioners’ stance that
Michael was indeed guilty of medical abandonment for his failure to
complete his treatment even before the lapse of the 240 days period. Due to
his willful discontinuance of medical treatment with Dr. Cruz, the latter could
not
declare
him
fit
to
work
or
assess
his
disability.
The failure of Michael to observe the procedure under the POEA SEC provided
a sufficient ground for the denial of his claim for permanent total disability
benefits. Considering, however, that he was still under treatment by the
company doctors even after the lapse of 120 days but within the 240-day
extended period allowed by the rules, he remained to be under temporary
total disability and entitled to temporary total disability benefits under the
same rules.
Topic: Constructive Dismissal
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.:
Peak Ventures Corporation and/or El Tigre Security and
Investigation Agency v. Heirs of Nestor B. Villareal, G.R. No.
184618, November 19, 2014

Facts:
On June 16, 1989, Peak Ventures, the owner/operator of El Tigre,
hired Villareal as security guard and assigned him at East Greenhills Village.
On May 14, 2002, however, he was relieved from duty without any apparent
reason. Villareal was later informed by the management that he would no
longer be given any assignment because of his age. At that time, he was 42.
His repeated requests for a new posting during the months of June and July
of 2002 were likewise declined.
Due to his prolonged lack of assignmentand dwindling resources, Villareal
was constrained to claim his security bond deposits from petitioners.
However, he was advised to first tender a letter of resignation before the
samecould be released to him. Out of sheer necessity, Villareal submitted a
letter of resignation. He stated therein that he was constrained to resign
effective July 31, 2002 since he cannot expect to be given any assignment
for another one and a half months and that he can no longer afford the fare
going to petitioners’ office. Villareal alleged that the tenor of his resignation
letter was not acceptable to petitioners, who required him to submit another
one stating that his resignation is voluntary. In the first week of August 2002,
petitioners released to Villareal his security bond deposits.
Villareal filed before the Labor Arbiter a Complaint for illegal dismissal with
prayer for reinstatement, backwages, 13th month pay, holiday pay, service
incentive leave pay, moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees
against petitioners. He asserted that petitioners have no valid and authorized
cause to relieve him from duty and place him on floating status. For one, he
had dedicated almost 14 years of outstanding work performance to
petitioners as shown by his commendation and award. For another,
petitioners still had an existing security services contract with East Greenhills
Village at the time he was relieved from his post. Villareal averred that the
dire financial strait brought about by his unjustified relief from duty had
made it unbearable for him to continue his employment with petitioners.
Further, his illegal dismissal was effected without due p The Labor Arbiter, in
a Decision dated July 30, 2003, concluded that there was no valid and
effective resignation on the part of Villareal; that he was constructively
dismissed by petitioners; and that his dismissal was carried out without due
process of law. Petitioners were ordered to reinstate immediately Villareal to
his former position without loss of seniority rights and other privileges and
pay Villareal his backwages for the period from July 3, 2002 up to July 4,
2003, in the amount of P100,800.00, subject to further adjustment or
computation up to the reinstatement of Villareal or the finality of this

decision, as the case may be plus attorney’s fees. The NLRC agreed with the
Labor Arbiter’s findings and conclusion.
On December 1, 2005, Villareal died. The CA, in a Resolution dated August
22, 2007, required Villareal’s counsel of record, Atty. Alex B. Carpela, Jr. (Atty.
Carpela) to cause the substitution of Villareal’s heirs as respondents.
However, per Manifestation of Atty. Carpela, the said heirs cannot be located.
Nevertheless, the CA proceeded to resolve the case. On March 28, 2008, it
rendered a Decision upholding the NLRC ruling that it is a clear case of
constructive dismissal.
Issue: Whether Villareal was constructively dismissed.
SC: Yes.
The Court subscribes to the uniform rulings of the Labor Arbiter, the NLRC
and the CA that Villareal was constructively and illegally dismissed.
Petitioners anchor their claim of voluntary resignation on Villareal’s
resignation letter, the Talaan ng Pakikipagpanayam sa Pagbibitiw(exit
interview form) accomplished by him, and his notarized clearance. However,
the circumstances surrounding the execution of these documents prove
otherwise. When Villareal was relieved from duty, he was placed on floating
status. "A floating status requires the dire exigency of the employer’s bona
fide suspension of operation, business or undertaking." "It takes place when
the security agency’s clients decide not to renew their contracts with the
agency x x x" and also "in instances where contracts for security services
stipulate that the client may request the agency for the replacement of the
guards assigned to it x x x." In the latter case, the employer should prove
that there are no posts available to which the employee temporarily out of
work can be assigned.
As pointed out by the labor tribunals, petitioners failed to discharge the
burden of proving that there were no other posts available for Villareal after
his recall from his last assignment. Worse, no sufficient reason was given for
his relief and continued denial of a new assignment. And because of the dire
financial straits brought about by these unjustified acts of petitioners,
Villareal was forced to resign and execute documents in a manner as
directed by petitioners in order to claim his security bond deposits. From
these circumstances, petitioners’ claim of voluntary resignation is untenable.
What is clear instead is that Villareal was constructively dismissed. There is

constructive dismissal when an act of clear discrimination, insensitivity or
disdain on the part of the employer has become so unbearable as to leave
an employee with no choice but to forego continued employment.
"Constructive dismissal exists where there is cessation of work because
continued employment is rendered impossible, unreasonable or unlikely, as
an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay." Moreover,
Villareal’s immediate filing of a Complaint for illegal dismissal to ask for
reinstatement negates the fact of voluntary resignation.

Topic: Disability benefits; Employment contract
Ponente: Justice Marvic Mario Victor F. Leonen

Joel B. Monana v. MEC Global Ship Management and Manning Corp.,
G.R. No. 196122, November 12, 2014

Facts: MEC Global employed Monana as an ordinary seafarer for a six-month
duration on board M/V Bellavia. Monana boarded and performed his tasks
that "included cleaning, chipping, painting, and assisting in deck work."
Monana felt dizzy with blurring of vision and body weakness associated with
slurred speech and numbness of the right side of the face. The ship doctor
prescribed oral anti-hypertensive medication. Monana was airlifted to
Honolulu Medical Center the next day where he was treated and diagnosed
to have suffered a stroke. He then transferred to a rehabilitation hospital
where he underwent physical therapy for two days. He was repatriated to the
Philippines and referred to the company designated physician and was
treated. MEC provided medical assistance to Monana. Monana claimed
disability and illness allowance, which MEC refused.

Issue: Whether Monana is entitled to total and permanent disability benefits.

SC: NO. The POEA contract, deemed read and incorporated into Monana’s
employment contract, governs her claims for disability benefits. It provides
for the liability of the employer when the seafarer suffers work related injury
or illness during the term of his contract.

Under the POEA contract, “work-related illness” must satisfy all the
following conditions:

He was diagnosed with "hypertension Stage ASHD. Upon repatriation. b. . CAD at risk S/P stroke. he underwent extensive medical treatment and therapy. In this case. there is no dispute that Monana suffered a stroke during the term of his contract. The seafarer’s work must involve the risks described herein. However. that his work as ordinary seaman involved the risks of having a stroke. c. He was provided physical therapy even in his hometown. d. The disease was contracted within a period of exposure and under such other factors necessary to contract it. that his hypertension was contracted as a result of his exposure to his work. he failed to discharge the burden of proving the conditions set forth in Section 32-A particularly. that the disease was contracted within the period of exposure and such other factors necessary to contract it and that there was no notorious negligence on his part. There was no notorious negligence on the part of the seafarer. The disease was contracted as a result of the seafarer’s exposure to the described risks.a.

the company dismissed her on grounds of serious misconduct and breach of trust. Sometime after her employment. No. Lhuillier.J. and said that it was a simple mistake without intent to defraud the company. the sending branch . it being sufficient that there is some basis to believe that the employee concerned is responsible for the misconduct and that the nature of the employee’s participation therein rendered him unworthy of trust and confidence demanded by his position. A subsequent branch audit revealed that it came from a ‘Pera Padala’ remittance.Topic: Termination of Employee Ponente: Reyes. the employer was fully justified in claiming loss of trust and confidence in the employee.R. November 12. 198620. Complainant was hired as an Accounting Clerk PLI. After the investigation. J P. and (2) there must be an act that would justify the loss of trust and confidence. Issue: Whether there exists a valid dismissal SC: These are the requirements to be complied in order that an employer may invoke loss of trust and confidence in terminating an employee under Article 282(c) of the Labor Code: “(1) the employee must be holding a position of trust and confidence. considering that it was their first time to be working together in the same branch. Therein. implying that although the amount had been duly remitted to the consignee.00 was allegedly not reported immediately by her to the supervisor nor was it recorded at the end of that day. Lhuillier.” Here. Inc. G. v. she was served with a Show Cause Memo ordering her to explain her side against the charges. we must keep in mind that the unaccounted cash can only be imputed to the respondent’s own negligence in failing to keep track of the transaction from which the money came. 2014 Facts: A Labor Complaint was filed by Complainant Flordeliz Velayo for illegal dismissal against her employer defendant P. it does not require proof beyond reasonable doubt. she sent a written reply admitting her inability to report the overage as her supervisor was on leave and she was still tracing the overage. Inc (PLI). While loss of trust and confidence should be genuine. Then. Velayo. an overage amount of P540. While it is natural and understandable that the respondent should feel apprehensive about Tuling’s reaction concerning her cash overage.J.

Her excuses and failure to give a satisfactory explanation for the missing cash only gave the petitioners sufficient reason to lose confidence in her. For days following the overage. “it is sufficient that there is some basis for the same or that the employer has a reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for the misconduct.” It should be pointed out that “it is immaterial what the respondent’s intent was concerning the missing fund. the labor tribunal cannot justly deny the employer the authority to dismiss him. In dismissing a cashier on the ground of loss of confidence. notwithstanding that the shortage has been restituted. that of a cashier calls for utmost trust and confidence. she already deserved to be sanctioned. thus making him unworthy of the trust and confidence reposed in him. an employer is allowed to dismiss an employee for willful breach of trust or loss of confidence. Truly. more than most key positions.failed to record the payment received from the consigning customer. At the very least. for the undisputed fact is that cash which she held in trust for the company was missing in her custody. and for this inept handling of a ‘Pera Padala’ remittance. Misappropriation of company funds. the respondent tried but failed to reconcile her records. she was negligent and failed to meet the degree of care and fidelity demanded of her as cashier. employers are allowed wider latitude in dismissing an employee for loss of trust and confidence… it must also be stressed that only substantial evidence is required in order to support a finding that an employer’s trust and confidence accorded to its employee had been breached. Therefore. is a valid ground to terminate the services of an employee for loss of trust and confidence. if there is sufficient evidence to show that the employer has ample reason to distrust the employee. . and it is the breach of this trust that results in an employer’s loss of confidence in the employee. Under the Article 282 of the Labor Code. Indeed. “It has been held that a special and unique employment relationship exists between a corporation and its cashier.

Inc.R. he was immediately examined and he went through rehabilitation and medications. Fred Olsen Cruise Line. Considering that any extension of his employment is discretionary on the part of respondents and that the latter offered no . Mendoza Vs. he suffered back injury because of the heavy equipment to be use in his plumbing job. Hipe was made to continuously perform work aboard the vessel beyond his six-month contract without the benefit of a formal contract. upon his request. 204699. On the other hand. G. he claimed that his condition worsened and. 2008. And Ms. and was given the assurance that he will be repatriated at the next convenient port. Cynthia C. he was repatriated to Manila on August 5. the NLRC reversed and set aside the LA Ruling and dismissed Hipe’s complaint for permanent disability compensation. Hipe filed a complaint against Bahia Shipping and asking for the permanent disability compensation and other benefits. Despite the lapse of the sixmonth contract on June 6. The LA ruled in favor of HIpe and ordered Bahia to pay the benefits sought for. 2008. in the course of his duties. On appeal. First Division Bahia Shipping Services. No. Issue: Whether or not the the seafarer can legally demand and claim disability benefits from the employer/manning agency for an injury or illness suffered SC: The petition is meritorious. On June 22. Upon arrival.. and thereby upheld the NLRC Ruling in toto.Joel P. 12 November 2014 Facts: Hipe was employed by Bahia Shipping continuously under seven (7) contracts and he was last employed as a plumber for the vessel vessel M/S Braemar (vessel) under a six-month contract. 2008. In the present case. Jr. The CA dismissed the petition for certiorari. Thereafter. After one (1) month.Topic: Award of Permanent Disability Compensation Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe. Hipe. He was advised to rest and perform only light jobs. Hipe continued to work aboardthe vessel without any new contract. Bahia stated that Hipe is not etitled because of an expired contract.

or merely 65 days after his repatriation. Thus. Nonetheless. 2008. In fine. as in this case. can only be considered as a medical repatriation. Consequently. Hipe filed his complaint before the NLRC but prematurely did so without any regard to the conflict-resolution procedure under Section 20 (B) (3) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. thus negating the existence of any In light of the contrasting diagnoses of the company-designated physician and Hipe’s personal doctor. Verily. the NLRC did not gravely abuse its discretion in dismissing the complaint for permanent disability benefits. when the evidence presented then negates compensability. thereby warranting the reversal of the CA’s contrary ruling. consistent with Philippine Hammonia. The petition was granted. for which he was treated or rehabilitated. the claim for disability benefits must necessarily fail. the injury suffered by Hipe was a work-related injury and his eventual repatriation on August 5. Hipe was subsequently declared fit to work by the company-designated physician on October 9. given that Hipe’s permanent disability was not established through substantial evidence for the reasons above-stated. while the Court adheres to the principle of liberality in favor of the seafarer in construing the POEA-SEC. the fit-to-work certification of the company designated physician ought to be upheld. . 2008. 2008.explanation why Hipe was not repatriated when his contract expired on June 5. the CA correctly ruled that he was still under the employ of respondents when he sustained an injury on June 22. 2008.

G. with a basic monthly salary of US$799. 2008. Prior thereto. which was congenital and it had familiar strains according to a doctor. where he was seen by a company-designated physician.* And Fernando T. (UPL) for its principal. of which her husband was a member. He underwent surgery twice for the said ailment but developed complications and died on March 2. Racelis. Rodolfo experienced severe pain in his ears and high blood pressure causing him to collapse while in the performance of his duties. Upon arrival in Manila. Inc. Thus. Inc. Inc. Lising. He consulted a doctor in Argentina and was medically repatriated on February 20. 198408. Inc. Dr. denominated as the POEA-SEC or the Philippine .55. First Division Conchita J. No. (HAL) to serve as ‘Demi Chef De Partie’ on board the vessel MS Prinsendam.D. Legaspi). However.5 The Contract of Employment was for a term of four (4) months. he was immediately brought to Medical City. 12 November 2014 Facts: Complainant Conchita J. Gerardo Legaspi. respondent Holland America Lines. Rodolfo was repeatedly contracted by said respondents and was deployed under various contracts since December 17. complainant instituted a labor case against them.R.” On his last employment. (Dr.Topic: Claim of Death Benefits Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe. And/Or Holland America Lines. M. as the surviving spouse of Rodolfo L. 2008. Racelis v. “Deemed incorporated in every seafarer’s employent contract. Racelis. 2008 for further medical treatment. Rodolfo joined the vessel on January 25. Rodolfo L. After complying with the required pre-employment medical examination where he was declared fit to work. extendible for another two (2) months upon mutual consent. initiated a claim for death benefits pursuant to the International Transport Workers’ Federation-Collective Bargaining Agreement (ITWF-CBA). Previously. Pasig City. Racelis “was recruited and hired by respondent United Philippine Lines. 1985.” Issue: Whether or not the CA erred in annulling the NLRC’s grant of death benefits to petitioner on certiorari SC: The employer was held liable. United Philippine Lines.. and was diagnosed to be suffering from Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation. her claim was denied by the employer on the ground that the death was not work-related as it was due to Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation.

while the words ‘in the course of’ refer to the time. and are descriptive of its character.” Jurisprudence provides that “[t]he words ‘arising out of’ refer to the origin or cause of the accident. Section 20 (B) (4) of the same explicitly provides that ‘[t[he liabilities of the employer when the seafarer suffers work-related injury or illness during the term of his contract are as follows: (t)hose illnesses not listed in Section 32 of this Contract are dispuatbly presumed as work related. at a place where the employee reasonably may be. As a matter of general proposition.’ which are considered to be the minimum requirements acceptable to the government for the employment of Filipino seafarers on board foreign ocean-going vessels.” Here. and it becomes incumbent on the employer to overcome the presumption. “While it is true that Brainstem (pontine) Cavernous Malformation is not listed as an occupational disease under Section 32-A of the 2000 POEA-SEC. called the ‘Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on Board Ocean Going Vessels. an injury or accident is said to arise ‘in the course of employment’ when it takes place within the period of the employment.” On the other hand. “work-related injury” is defined as “injury(ies) resulting in disability or death arising out of and in the course of employment. and (b) such death had occurred during the term of his employment contract.’ In other words.” Under the 2000 POEA-SEC. it stipulates that “the beneficiaries of a deceased seafarer may be able to claim death benefits for as long as they are able to establish that (a) the seafarer’s death is work-related. place.Overseas Employment Administration-Standard Employment Contract.] saying that those illnesses not listed in Section 32 are disputably presumed as work-related. and while he is fulfilling his duties or is engaged in doing something incidental thereto. the death of the seafarer is evidently work-related.” In the 2000 POEA-SEC. the 2000 POEA-SEC ‘has created a disputable presumption in favor of compensability[. “work-related illness” is defined as “any sickness resulting to disability or death as a result of an occupational disease listed under Section 32-A of this contract with the conditions set therein satisfied. This means that even if the illness is not listed under Section 32-A of the POEA-SEC as an occupational disease or illness.’ This presumption should be . it will still be presumed as work-related. is a set of standard provisions determined and implemented by the POEA. and circumstances under which the accident takes place.

e.” Further. enough that the workrelated illness. In essence. reasonably.overturned only when the employer’s refutation is found to be supported by substantial evidence. i.00 as compensation for the death of Rodolfo in accordance with Article 21. it has been held that “a medical repatriation case constitutes an exception to the second requirement under Section 20 (A) (1) of the 2000 POEA-SEC. Where an employee is forced to litigate and incur . the seafarer’s death occurred during the term of employment.100. occurred while the contract was effective for recovery to be had.” The 1987 Constitution affords full protection to labor. the POEA-SEC was designed primarily for the protection and benefit of Filipino seafarers in the pursuit of their employment on board ocean-going vessels. in view of the terminative consequences of a medical repatriation under Section 18 (B) of the same. “While it is true that a medical repatriation has the effect of terminating the seafarer’s contract of employment. it is a standing principle that its provisions are to be construed and applied fairly.” As for the award.000. “Consistent with the State’s avowed policy to afford full protection to labor as enshrined in Article XIII of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.000. Hence. the NLRC’s grant of attorney’s fees in the amount of US$6.2.00 which is provided under Section 20 (A) (4) (c) of the 2000 POEA-SEC.. which eventually becomes the proximate cause of death. the NLRC’s award of US$60.1 of the ITWF-CBA was in order. that the seafarer’s death had occurred during the term of his employment. which.” Guided by these principles. Moreover. the work-related death need not precisely occur during the term of his employment as it is enough that the seafarer’s work-related injury or illness which eventually causes his death had occurred during the term of his employment. and liberally in their favor. As such. the Court held that under such circumstance. respondents never died and therefore admitted that “the late Rodolfo’s membership in the AMOSUP that had entered into a collective bargaining agreement with HAL. The same holds true for the award of burial assistance in the amount of US$1. conformably with existing case law. Its provisions therefore must prevail over the standard terms and benefits formulated by the POEA in its Standard Employment Contract. it is. however. or the ITWF-CBA” is applicable.00 was called for since petitioner was forced to litigate to protect her valid claim. as traditionally defined is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as sufficient to support a conclusion.

Nos. Arlene S.R. Inc. he is entitled to an award of attorney’s fees equivalent to 10% of the award.” Topic: Illegal Dismissal Ponente: Leonen. 2014 . J. Fuji Television. 204944-45.expenses to protect his right and interest. v. December 3. G. Espiritu.

Arlene was diagnosed with lung cancer. as a news correspondent/producer “tasked to report Philippine news to Fuji through its Manila Bureau field office. She informed Fuji about her condition. In consideration of the non-renewal contract. Inc. In turn. The contract also provided that the parties release each other from liabilities and responsibilities under the employment contract. Arlene affixed her signature on the non-renewal contract with the initials “U. year-end bonus. 2009 where it was stipulated that her contract would no longer be renewed after its expiration on May 31.00 representing her monthly salary from March 2009 to May 2009.” On May 6.Facts: In 2005. the day after Arlene signed the non-renewal contract. mid-year bonus.” Arlene’s employment contract initially provided for a term of one (1) year but was successively renewed on a yearly basis with salary adjustment upon every renewal. 2009.” However. Arlene “acknowledged receipt of the total amount of US$18. the Chief of News Agency of Fuji. She “insisted that she was still fit to work as certified by her attending physician. and separation pay.050. She alleged that she was forced to sign the non-renewal contract when Fuji came to know of her illness and that Fuji withheld her . informed Arlene “that the company will have a problem renewing her contract” since it would be difficult for her to perform her job. Arlene and Fuji signed a non-renewal contract on May 5.P. she filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and attorney’s fees with the National Capital Region Arbitration Branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. Sometime in January 2009. 2009. Arlene S.” After several verbal and written communications.” for “under protest. Espiritu was engaged by Fuji Television Network. Yoshiki Aoki.

Both motions were denied by the National Labor Relations Commission for lack of merit. The Supreme Court said that the Court of Appeals was correct in finding that the successive renewals of Espiritu’s contract indicated the necessity and desirability of her work in the usual course of Fuji’s business. thus making her a regular employee.salaries and other benefits for March and April 2009 when she refused to sign. The Court of Appeals held that Arlene was a regular employee. the Labor Arbiter held that Arlene was not Fuji’s employee but an independent contractor. with the right to security of tenure. ABS-CBN and applying the four-fold test. Citing Sonza v. It held that Arlene was a regular employee with respect to the activities for which she was employed since she continuously rendered services that were deemed necessary and desirable to Fuji’s business. . Issue: Whether or not Arlene S. The Labor Arbiter dismissed Arlene’s complaint. Arlene and Fuji filed separate motions for reconsideration. The National Labor Relations Commission reversed the Labor Arbiter’s decision. Both parties filed separate petitions for certiorari before the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals affirmed the National Labor Relations Commission with some modifications. Espiritu was illegally dismissed. Ruling: Yes.

The law does not preclude the possibility that a regular employee may opt to have a fixed-term contract for valid reasons. eight hours per day.’ then such employee is a regular employee. This is precisely what Article 280 [of the Labor Code] seeks to avoid.” Citing Philips Semiconductors.” Moreover. citing the case of ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. Espiritu." The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals which held that Espiritu was entitled to security of tenure and could be dismissed only for just or authorized causes and after the observance of due process.” Likewise.The Court. having no equipment. “where an employee’s contract ‘had been continuously extended or renewed to the same petition. the Court held that “Espiritu’s contract indicating a fixed term did not automatically mean that she could never be a regular employee. “in determining whether an employment should be considered regular or non-regular. The ruling in Brent remains as the exception rather than the general rule. v Fadriquela. said that the applicable test is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. . “an employee can be a regular employee with a fixed-term contract. Inc. had to use the facilities of Fuji to accomplish her tasks. Nazareno. the Supreme Court said. Likewise. with the same duties and remained in the employ without any interruption.” It noted that Espiritu had to report for work in Fuji’s office in Manila from Mondays to Fridays. The expiration of her contract does not negate the finding of illegal dismissal by Fuji. The continuous renewal is a scheme to prevent regularization.

” The Court held that Espiritu had been illegally dismissed since Fuji failed to comply with the requirements of substantive and procedural due process necessary for her dismissal since she was a regular employee. Non-compliance leads to the conclusion that the dismissal was illegal. In Espiritu’s case. or skill. The fact that everything used by Arlene in her work was owned by Fuji negated the idea of job contracting. For disease to be a valid ground for termination under the Labor Code.” The burden of proving compliance with these requirements is on the employer. and (2) certification issued by a competent public health authority that even with proper medical treatment. two requirements must be complied with: (1) the employee’s disease cannot be cured within six months and his “continued employment is prohibited by law or prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees”. “Espiritu was not contracted on account of any peculiar ability. Espiritu did not sign the non-renewal contract voluntarily and it was a mere subterfuge by Fuji to secure its position that it was her choice not to renew her contract.The Court agreed with the Court of Appeals in holding that Sonza v. the Court said that there was no evidence showing that she was given due process considering she was not even given the chance to present medical certificates. . special talent. ABS-CBN is not applicable because. the disease cannot be cured within six months.

charging him of: (a) oral defamation (or slander). 2014 Facts: Montallana was a faculty member of La Consolacion’s College of Arts and Sciences. Aside from this.Topic: Illegal Dismissal Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe. Del Fierro-Juan (Juan). . superiors. filed a formal administrative complaint with La Consolacion against Montallana. December 8. the Assistant Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences and the immediate superior of Montallana. Mrs. 2009. Mrs. (b) disorderly conduct in the school premises. G. Juan also filed grave oral defamation against him before the City Prosecutor’s Office. La Consolacion College Manila. et al. J. No. or anybody within the school premises. and (c) discourteous/indecent behavior or using profane or obscene language in addressing co-employees.R. Nerissa D. On January 16. Montallana v.. 208890.

Manalili terminated him from work on June 13. to reiterate. 2011. Pabito. Upon learning of the re-assignment of lockers of faculty members through drawing of lots. Montallana sought reconsideration of his suspension and explained that a written public apology was inappropriate at that time in view of the pendency of a criminal complaint for grave oral defamation filed by Juan against him before the City Prosecutor’s Office. La Consolacion’s fact-finding committee found Montallana guilty of serious misconduct in making derogatory and insulting remarks about his superior. Montallana begged for La Consolacion’s indulgence. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Montallana. Montallana no longer elevated the matter to the CA and the NLRC’s decision became final and executory on February 28. in a loud voice. resulting in a heated altercation that ended with the latter walking out of the room while Juan was still talking to him. Hence. Finding Montallana’s written explanation unsatisfactory. anong kabubuhan ng grade one yan. 2011. only in view of the pendency of the criminal case against him. remarked “oo nga naman para tayong mga grade one nyan. The request having been denied by La Consolacion’s President. Pabito commented.” Juan heard Montallana’s remark and confronted him. In a letter dated June 9. holding that his actions did not constitute serious misconduct. Beatriz V. While noting that the foregoing may be considered as a just cause for Montallana’s termination.” to which Montallana followed suit and. In a letter dated April 22. The NLRC disagreed with the findings of the LA and found Montallana’s acts to be constitutive of serious misconduct and against the rule of honor and decency expected of any teacher. Montallana’s suspension from employment was declared illegal. Montallana was conversing with a co-faculty member. pursuant to a policy implemented by Juan. 2011. At that time. and moral and exemplary damages against respondents.The said complaint arose from an incident that occurred in the faculty room on January 12. with prayer for payment of salaries during the period of suspension. Montallana meted the penalty of suspension without pay for a period of two (2) months and directed him to submit a written public apology to Juan. the committee observed that it was his first offense and stressed on the reformative and redemptive facets of the case. Dr. Asserting that his dismissal for . explaining that he had no intention of defying the directive to submit a written public apology and that his inability to comply therewith was. when the latter asked Ruiz and Saez what they were doing. 2009. aggravated by the fact that he made such remarks in a loud voice so that Juan would hear them. After due investigation. Montallana filed a complaint for illegal suspension and unfair labor practice. saying “para naman tayong bata nyan. 2009 while Dean’s Secretary Ann Ruiz and student assistant Kathlyn Saez were numbering the lockers.

in the sense above-described. the NLRC’s identical ruling.It found that Montallana deliberately refused to obey the directive of the respondents to apologize and that the pendency of the criminal case against him was not sufficient justification to excuse him from compliance. Ruling: Yes. warranted his termination. by substantial evidence. the conduct must be willful or intentional. however. In the case at bar.” The Court finds itself in complete agreement with the NLRC that the disobedience attributed to Montallana could not be justly characterized as “willful” within the contemplation of Article 296 of the Labor Code. “Willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders of his employer or representative in connection with his work” is one of the just causes to terminate an employee under Article 296 (a) (formerly Article 282[a]) of the Labor Code. In order for this ground to be properly invoked as a just cause for dismissal. trustees or officers attaches only when: (a) they assent to a patently unlawful act of the .failure to submit a written public apology was unjustified. that Montallana’s dismissal was based on a just or authorized cause under the Labor Code or was clearly warranted under La Consolacion’s Administrative Affairs Manual. It is a rule that personal liability of corporate directors. ordered respondents to reinstate Montallana and to pay him backwages from the time he was illegally dismissed up to his reinstatement. the Court rules that the dismissal was illegal. which was erroneously reversed by the CA on certiorari. willfulness being characterized by a wrongful and perverse mental attitude. The NLRC reversed and set aside the LA’s verdict. the CA gave due course to respondents’ petition and eventually reversed and set aside the NLRC’s Decision . Montallana filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims against respondents The Labor Arbiter dismissed Montallana’s complaint. that Montallana’s non-compliance with respondents’ directive to apologize was “willful or intentional. Since respondents failed to prove. Consequently. must be reinstated with the modification. hence. However. and thus. by substantial evidence. respondents failed to prove. Issue: Whether or not Montallana was illegally dismissed. holding that his refusal to apologize was tantamount to serious misconduct and. in that the order for respondents Mora and Manalili to pay Montallana backwages should be deleted.

its stockholders or other persons. were shown to be present in this case. do not forthwith file with the corporate secretary their written objection. (c) they agree to hold themselves personally and solidarily liable with the corporation. in so far as Mora and Manalili are concerned. or (d) they are made by specific provision of law personally answerable for their corporate action. None of these circumstances.corporation. having knowledge of such issuance. or when they are guilty of bad faith or gross negligence in directing its affairs. or when there is a conflict of interest resulting in damages to the corporation. (b) they consent to the issuance of watered down stocks or when. . hence. there is no reason for them to be held liable for Montallana’s backwages.

No. former members of the PHILEC Workers’ Union (PWU). the Court of Appeals denied due course and dismissed PHILEC’s petition for certiorari for lack of merit. alleging that Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez gravely abused his discretion in rendering his decision.. Ignacio. On August 18.Topic: Labor Procedure Ponente: Leonen. PWU submitted the grievance to the grievance machinery. PHILEC and PWU entered into a new collective bargaining agreement. Lipio (Lipio) and Emerlito C. did not conform to Article X. 1999. 1997 and with the previous collective bargaining agreements already expired. effective retroactively on June 1. Sr. 2000. Section 4 of the June 1. et al. The Court of Appeals affirmed Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez’s decision. Claiming that the schedule of training allowance stated in the memoranda served on Lipio and Ignacio. Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez held that PHILEC violated its collective bargaining agreement with PWU. Sr. 1997 collective bargaining agreement.). December 10. In its decision. PWU and PHILEC failed to amicably settle their grievance. On August 29. PWU is a legitimate labor organization and the exclusive bargaining representative of PHILEC’s rank-and-file employees. J. 1997 and expiring on May 31. 168612.R. On September 17. 2014 Facts: Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) is a domestic corporation “engaged in the manufacture and repairs of high voltage transformers. PHILEC selected Lipio for promotion from Machinist under Pay Grade VIII to Foreman I under Pay Grade B. 1997. .” Among its rank-and-file employees were Eleodoro V. Court of Appeals. G. Sr. (Ignacio. Philippine Electric Corporation (PHILEC) v. PHILEC filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals.

Since the office of a Voluntary Arbitrator or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators is considered a quasi-judicial agency. the case will also fail on its merits. There being no appeal seasonably filed in this case. The Voluntary Arbitrator’s decision dated August 13. A collective bargaining agreement is “a contract executed upon the request of either the employer or the exclusive bargaining representative of the employees incorporating the agreement reached after negotiations with respect to wages. its provisions “constitute the law between the parties” and must be complied with in good faith. The proper remedy to reverse or modify a Voluntary Arbitrator’s or a panel of Voluntary Arbitrators’ decision or award is to appeal the award or decision before the Court of Appeals. Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez correctly awarded both Lipio and Ignacio.” PHILEC must pay training allowance based on the step increases provided in the June 1. 1999 is already final and executory. 1997 collective bargaining agreement. Sr. hours of work and all other terms and conditions of employment.’s training allowance based on Article X.Issue: Whether or not Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez gravely abused his discretion in directing PHILEC to pay Lipio’s and Ignacio. Section 4 of the June 1. 1997 rank-and-file collective bargaining agreement.” A collective bargaining agreement being a contract. training allowances based on the amounts and formula provided in the June 1. Considering that Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez’s decision awarded sums of money. Sr. Lipio and Ignacio. Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez’s decision having become final and . a decision or award rendered by a Voluntary Arbitrator is appealable before the Court of Appeals. Sr. Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez’s decision is already “beyond the purview of this Court to act upon. including proposals for adjusting any grievances or questions arising under such agreement. are entitled to legal interest on their training allowances. Voluntary Arbitrator Jimenez’s decision became final and executory after 10 calendar days from PHILEC’s receipt of the resolution denying its motion for partial reconsideration. The insurmountable procedural issue notwithstanding. Ruling: No. 1997 collective bargaining agreement.

injuring his right leg again. for the second time on December 7. 2009. he was paid his sick wages. Dr. 211211.executory on August 22. Chua diagnosed petitioner to have suffered from contusion hematoma. About two and a half months later. From the time he was repatriated until he was declared fit to work. He was then medically repatriated on November 14. Inc. seeking permanent disability . Lim and Dr. Lim. Chua concluded that petitioner’s right leg was fully healed and that he was fit to work. Concurring in the findings and recommendations of Dr. No. The doctors of Meyer Servicos Medicus Clinic in Brazil found that he had sustained a severe bruise/hematoma on his right leg and recommended that he disembark from the vessel and continue his treatment in his home port. Specifically. Dr. 2007 to serve as motorman on board the vessel M/V Fayal Cement. he accidentally slipped and fell. Dr. 2000. INC. Lim found that petitioner had recovered from his injuries and declared him fit to work. G. while petitioner was working in the engine room. KGJS FLEET MANAGEMENT MANILA. While petitioner was working in the storage room. January 14. several steel plates fell and hit his leg. 2015 Facts: Petitioner was employed by KGJS Fleet Management Manila. On October 31. 2009. PHILEC is liable for legal interest equal to 12% per annum from finality of the decision until full payment. Topic: Permanent disability Ponente: Jose C.R. MENDOZA DARAUG v. it resulted in the fracture of his right fibula and tibia. petitioner filed a complaint against KGJS and KGJS AS.

The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties. The POEA-SEC is supplemented by the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between the owner of the vessel and the covered seaman. The CA opined. in which case. the parties entered into a contract of employment in accordance with the POEA-SEC and they agreed to be bound by the CBA. Issue:Whether petitioner properly invoked his right to claim disability compensation. a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. If a doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment. damages. as the NLRC did.2 The degree of disability which the employer. If a doctor appointed by the seafarer and his Union disagrees with the assessment. In this case. the Court will be guided by the procedures laid down in the POEA-SEC and in the CBA. Lim and Dr. On this point. Jurisprudence instructs that the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE). is liable to pay shall be determined by a doctor appointed by the Employer. The LA rendered his decision granting petitioner’s claims. the seafarer shall submit himself to a postemployment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to so. SC: No. this petition. subject to this Agreement. a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer .benefits under the NSA/NMU-AMOSUP CBA. Chua should have been given credence. sick wages.3. illness or injury in the case of Filipino seamen working on foreign ocean-going vessels. the CBA between petitioner and the respondents states that: 20. The NLRC reversed the LA ruling. For this purpose. On the other hand. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. in resolving petitioner’s claim for disability compensation. and attorney’s fees. Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC provides: Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment.1. a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed a compliance. that the findings of Dr. Every seaman and the vessel owner (directly or represented by a local manning agency) are required to execute the POEA Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) as a condition sine qua non prior to the deployment of the seaman for overseas work. Hence. the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. has simplified the determination of liability for work-related death. Thus. through the POEA.

R. Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. 198587 January 14. Sacar-Adiong. The copy/ies of the medical certificate and other relevant medical reports shall be made available by the Company to the seafarer. There could be no claim since the conditions were not complied with. Ma. Betia vs. Topic: Illegal Dismissal Ponente: Marvic Mario Victor Leonen Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) and Brenda J. . Makati City. Rebesencio Montassah B. Gil J. Metro House Building. No. It has a Philippine office located at 4/F. 2015 Facts: Petitioner Saudi Arabian Airlines (Saudia) is a foreign corporation established and existing under the laws of Jeddah. G. et al. Sen. Jopette M. and the third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties. Puyat Avenue.and the Seafarer and his Union.

13th month pay. Saudia would terminate them all the same. Under the Unified Contract. In their Comment on the present Petition. however. In Montassah's and Rouen Ruth's cases. The threat of termination entailed the loss of benefits. Saudi Arabia had disapproved their maternity leaves. the employment of a Flight Attendant who becomes pregnant is rendered void. In addition. 2006 from Saudia's office secretary informing them that their maternity leaves had been approved. Saudia. respondents emphasized that the Unified Contract took effect on September 23. retirement benefits. Faced with the dilemma of resigning or totally losing their benefits. 2006.Respondents (complainants before the Labor Arbiter) were recruited and hired by Saudia as Temporary Flight Attendants with the accreditation and approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration. moral and exemplary damages. Initially. well after they had filed and had their maternity leaves approved. Saudi Arabia that their maternity leaves had been disapproved. As respondents alleged. premium. separation pay. medical expense reimbursements. premium pay for holiday. respondents each received calls on the morning of November 6. Saudia had given its approval but later on informed respondents that its management in Jeddah. These letterheads already had the word "RESIGNATION" typed on the subject portions of their headings when these were handed to respondents. respondents filed separate appeal letters that were all rejected. service incentive leave pay. illegal deduction. it required respondents to file their resignation letters. they had informed Saudia of their respective pregnancies and had gone through the necessary procedures to process their maternity leaves. respondents executed handwritten resignation letters. overtime pay. such as separation pay and ticket discount entitlements. Respondents continued their employment with Saudia until they were separated from service on various dates in 2006. On the evening of November 6. lay-over expense and allowances. 2007. 2006 (the first day of Ramadan).28 . and attorney's fees. rest day. their resignations were executed on Saudia's blank letterheads that Saudia had provided. Saudia anchored its disapproval of respondents' maternity leaves and demand for their resignation on its "Unified Employment Contract for Female Cabin Attendants" (Unified Contract). night shift differentials. was quick to renege on its approval. Despite these initial rejections. On November 8. respondents filed a Complaint against Saudia and its officers for illegal dismissal and for underpayment of salary. Respondents contended that the termination of their employment was illegal. respondents again received calls informing them that it had received notification from Jeddah. Respondents were told that if they did not resign. They alleged that the termination was made solely because they were pregnant. Rather than comply and tender resignation letters.

The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint. the acts of the employee before and after the alleged resignation must be considered in determining whether he or she.Saudia assailed the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.108 Indeed. with the intention of relinquishing the office accompanied by the act of relinquishment. it goes against normal and reasonable human behavior to abandon one's livelihood in a time of great financial need. to sever his or her employment. All they did was avail of their maternity leaves. As noted by the Court of Appeals. pregnancy is a time when they need employment to sustain their families. The termination of respondents' employment happened when they were pregnant and expecting to incur costs on account of child delivery and infant rearing. constructive dismissal has been defined as "cessation of work because 'continued employment is rendered impossible. intended. as an offer involving a demotion in rank or a diminution in pay' and other benefits. Hence. this Appeal was filed. the very nature of a maternity leave means that a pregnant employee will not report for work only temporarily and that she will resume the performance of her duties as soon as the leave allowance expires. unreasonable or unlikely. It must be the result of an employee's exercise of his or her own will. . A means for determining whether an employee resigned voluntarily was also determined: As the intent to relinquish must concur with the overt act of relinquishment. It is a formal pronouncement or relinquishment of an office. Issue: Whether or not the respondents were legally dismissed. in fact. On the other hand. but this was reversed by the National Labor Relations Commission. essential to the act of resignation is voluntariness. Voluntary resignation has been defined as "the voluntary act of an employee who is in a situation where one believes that personal reasons cannot be sacrificed in favor of the exigency of the service. Hence. and one has no other choice but to dissociate oneself from employment. their termination was illegal." Applying the cited standards on resignation and constructive dismissal. It is clear that respondents intended to remain employed with Saudia. It claimed that respondents had no cause of action as they resigned voluntarily. it is clear that respondents were constructively dismissed. Evidently." Thus. SC: No.

If at all. respondents are entitled to a. b. "In termination cases. Mere compliance with standard procedures or processes. nothing more.It is also clear that respondents exerted all efforts to' remain employed with Saudia. As earlier pointed out. such as the completion of their exit interviews. received their separation pay. This minutia fails to surmount all the other indications negating any voluntariness on respondents' part. moral damages. These letterheads already had the word "RESIGNATION" typed on the subject portion of their respective headings when these were handed to respondents. As with respondent's resignation letters. respondents' resignations were executed on Saudia's blank letterheads that Saudia had provided. Reliefs Having been illegally and unjustly dismissed. good customs or public policy. and took more than a year to file their Complaint. neither negates compulsion nor indicates voluntariness. executed quitclaims. with a fraction of a year of at least six (6) months being counted as one (1) whole year." In this case. Saudia makes much of how respondents supposedly completed their exit interviews. Each of them repeatedly filed appeal letters asking Saudia to reconsider the ultimatum that they resign or be terminated along with the forfeiture of their benefits. because "[m]oral damages are awarded in termination cases where the employee's dismissal was attended by bad faith. however. the burden of proving just or valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer. The voluntariness of respondents' departure from Saudia is non sequitur. c. these same resignation letters are proof of how any supposed resignation did not arise from respondents' own initiative. or where it constitutes an act oppressive to labor. separation pay in the amount of one (1) month's salary for every year of service until the fmality of this Decision. or where it was done in a manner contrary to morals. Some of them even went to Saudia's office to personally seek reconsideration." In this case. Saudia terminated respondents' employment in a manner that is patently discriminatory and running afoul of the public interest that . malice or fraud. their exit interview forms even support their claim of illegal dismissal and militates against Saudia's arguments. full backwages and benefits from the time of their termination until the finality of this Decision. these circumstances prove only the fact of their occurrence. If at all. Saudia draws attention to how respondents' resignation letters were supposedly made in their own handwriting.

but more importantly. As such. in the amount of 10% of the total monetary award. respondents are entitled to moral damages. to the Constitution's dictum of fundamental equality between men and women. It is an affront not only to our statutes and policies on employees' security of tenure.underlies employer-employee relationships. therefore. not only to remind employers of the need to adhere to the requirements of procedural and substantive due process in termination of employment. In a long line of cases. to provide an "example or correction for the public good" as against such discriminatory and callous schemes. d. and tainted with bad faith as any reason for termination of employment can be. this court awarded exemplary damages to illegally dismissed employees whose "dismissal[s were] effected in a wanton. warranted. This is as wanton." Respondents were dismissed for no other reason than simply that they were pregnant. e. . oppressive. attorney's fees. This is a case of manifest gender discrimination. oppressive or malevolent manner. but more so. This is no ordinary case of illegal dismissal. for having been compelled to litigate to seek reliefs for their illegal and unjust dismissal. exemplary damages. The award of exemplary damages is. to demonstrate that gender discrimination should in no case be countenanced.

ordered the Corporations to post an additional appeal bond of P1 Billion. G./Fashion Accessories Phils.664. et al/Sara Lee Corporation vs.R.R. Macatlang. They posted a P4. et al. et al. Inc. vs. vs. 180685 January 14. 180149/G.R. respectively.710. SLC. No. which was later on modified by the Supreme Court. represented by Emilinda Macatlang (Macatlang petition). vs. the Labor Arbiter found the dismissal of 5. et al.NLRC. Macatlang. Macatlang.Emilinda D. 180148/G./Cesar C. On 30 October 2004. on 26 March 2007. Cruz vs. No. FAPI was incorporated prompting former Aris employees to file a case for illegal dismissal on the allegations that FAPI was a continuing business of Aris.R. The 5.984 rank-and-file employees.Topic: Compromise Agreement Ponente: Jose Portugal Perez Sara Lee Philippines.86. Macatlang. Macatlang.R. Emilinda D.5 Million bond. On 26 October 1995. The judgment award is composed of separation pay of one month for every year of service. The Court of Appeals. 180147/G. The NLRC granted the reduction of the appeal bond and ordered the Corporations to post an additional P4. Inc.5 Million bond. et al. SLP and Cesar Cruz were impleaded as defendants being major stockholders of FAPI and officers of Aris. No. 2015 Facts: Aris permanently ceased operations on 9 October 1995 displacing 5. While the case was pending before the appellate court./Aris Philippines.984 Aris employees illegal and awarded them monetary benefits amounting to P3. the NLRC prematurely issued an order setting aside the decision of the Labor Arbiter for being procedurally infirmed. Emilinda D. Inc. filed a petition for review before the Court of Appeals insisting that the appeal was not perfected due to failure of the Corporations to post the correct amount of the bond which is equivalent to the judgment award. The Corporations filed a Notice of Appeal with Motion to Reduce Appeal Bond.453. backwages. moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees. No. 180150/G. No. 180319 & G. et al.984 former Aris employees. Macatlang.Emilinda D. No.R. et al./Emelinda D. vs. Emilinda D. .

(Aris). Jurisprudence outlines the distinction between a compromise agreement/judgment on consent and a confession of judgment/judgment by confession. Hence. The court does not have the power to supply terms. The former is one the provisions and terms of which are settled and a agreed upon by the parties to the action. a judgment by confession is not a plea but an affirmative and voluntary act of the defendant himself. thus: x x x a motion for judgment on consent is not to be equated with a judgment by confession. (SLPI). or essential details not previously agreed to by the parties x x x. by making reciprocal concessions. A confession of judgment is an acknowledgment that a debt is justly due and cuts off all defenses and right of appeal. It is used as a shortcut to a judgment in a case where the defendant concedes liability. It is seen as the written authority of the debtor and a direction for entry of judgment against the debtor.This present petition treats of the 1) Motion for Reconsideration with Urgent Petition for the Court’s Approval of the Pending "Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Herein Statement and Confession of Judgment – to Buy Peace and/or Secure against any Possible Contingent Liability by Sara Lee Corporation" filed by Sara Lee Philippines Inc. Here. On the other hand. The Corporations reason that a resort to judgment by confession is the acceptable alternative to a compromise agreement because of the impossibility to obtain the consent to a compromise of all the 5.984 complainants. there must be an unqualified agreement among the parties to be bound by the judgment on consent before said judgment may be entered. the court exercises a certain amount of supervision over the entry of judgment. Issue: Whether or not the compromise agreement (confession of judgment) should be admitted. and which is entered in the record by the consent and sanction of the court. Inc. SC: No. Sara Lee Corporation (SLC) and Cesar C. (FAPI). Cruz.Aris Philippines Inc. as well as equitable jurisdiction over their subsequent status. It is an agreement between two or more persons. who. provisions. A compromise is a contract whereby the parties. and 3) Manifestation of Conformity to the Motion for Leave of Court to File and Admit Confession of Judgment – to Buy Peace and/or to Secure against any Possible Contingent Liability by Petitioner SLC. avoid a litigation or put an end to one already commenced. for preventing or putting an end to a lawsuit. The Corporations entered into a compromise with some of the former Aris employees which they designate as Confession of Judgment. adjust their difficulties by mutual consent in the manner . 2) Motion for Reconsideration filed by Fashion Accessories Phils.

On the other hand. leaving each employee with a measly P48. The judgment award is P3.00 compromise is to be distributed among 5. as modes of settling labor or industrial disputes. .86 or each employee is slated to receive P577. or coercion. A compromise agreement is valid as long as the consideration is reasonable and the employee signed the waiver voluntarily.664.00. A compromise must not be contrary to law. From this amount.710.149.984 employees which would translate to only P57."14 The provision reads: ART. the compromised amount roughly comprises only 10% of the judgment award. misrepresentation. mediation and conciliation. and must have been freely and intelligently executed by and between the parties. good customs and public policy. the P342.620. 227 Compromise Agreements.800.00 as attorney’s fees will be deducted. – Any compromise settlement. morals. P8. Article 227 of the Labor Code of the Philippines authorizes compromise agreements voluntarily agreed upon by the parties.which they agree on.00 per employee. voluntarily agreed upon by the parties with the assistance of the Bureau or the regional office of the Department of Labor.85. including those involving labor standard laws. A review of the compromise agreement shows a gross disparity between the amount offered by the Corporations compared to the judgment award. balanced by the danger of losing.453. in conformity with the basic policy of the State "to promote and emphasize the primacy of free collective bargaining and negotiations. and which everyone of them prefers to the hope of gaining. with a full understanding of what he was entering into.284.580. In fact. In fine. the Court will not hesitate to strike down a compromise agreement which is unconscionable and against public policy. including voluntary arbitration. shall be final and binding upon the parties. The National Labor Relations Commission or any court shall not assume jurisdiction over issues involved therein except in case of noncompliance thereof or if there is prima facie evidence that the settlement was obtained through fraud.200.

Ltd. for the vessel Heredia Sea as Chief Engineer Officer. . Delia Malipot.. Delia Malipot.Topics: (1) Compensability of Death by Suicide under the POEA Contract (2) Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court (3) Power of the NLRC to receive new evidence for the first time on appeal Ponente: Justice Diosdado M.R. Glicerio died while on board the Heredia Sea. filed a Complaint before the Labor Arbiter claiming death compensation under seaman Glicerio’s POEA contract. Glicerio’s surviving spouse. et al. During the effectivity of his employment contract. January 21. No. Consequently. 206562. 2015 Facts: Glicerio Malipot was employed by Unicol Management Services and Link Marine Pte. v. Peralta Unicol Management Services. G. Inc... Investigations revealed that Glicerio committed suicide by hanging himself.

among other things. refer technical matters or . The NLRC and Labor Arbiters are directed to use every and all reasonable means to ascertain the facts in each case speedily and objectively. it has been held that the NLRC may consider evidence. In Sasan. conduct its proceedings or any part thereof in public or in private.” the employer is liable to pay the heirs of the deceased seafarer for death benefits once it is established that he died during the effectivity of his employment contract. should not have been admitted by the NLRC. and Master’s Report were submitted for the first time on appeal to the NLRC. since Glicerio’s employers were able to substantially prove that seaman Glicerio’s death is directly attributable to his deliberate act of hanging himself. Is the CA correct? No. The NLRC may receive evidence submitted for the first time on appeal on the ground that it may ascertain facts objectively and speedily without regard to technicalities of law in the interest of substantial justice. such as documents and affidavits. is not compensable and his heirs not entitled to any compensation or benefits. therefore. agreements. Thus. contracts. In keeping with this directive.Issue: Whether or not death by suicide is compensable under the POEA Contract. SC: No. v. In addition. papers. and thus. National Labor Relations Commission 4 th Division [590 Phil. adjourn its hearings to any time and place. the Court held that the submission of additional evidence before the NLRC is not prohibited by its New Rules of Procedure considering that rules of evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity are not controlling in labor cases. 685 (2008)]. Powers of the NLRC: Among the powers of the Commission as provided in Section 218 of the Labor Code is that the Commission may issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or the production of such books. Under Section 20 of the POEA “Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Overseas Employment of Filipino Seafarers On-Board Ocean-Going Ships. the employer may be exempt from liability if it can successfully prove that the seaman’s death was caused by an injury directly attributable to his deliberate or willful act. matter or controversy within its jurisdiction. without regard to technicalities of law and procedure all in the interest of substantial justice. the Commission may. However. proceed to hear and determine the disputes in the absence of any party thereto who has been summoned or served with notice to appear. submitted by the parties for the first time on appeal. his death. records. and others. Sr. The CA held that the Investigation Report. statement of accounts. log book extracts. conduct investigation for the determination of a question.

petitioners Romeo Basan. Galo Falguera filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with money claims . Jr.. 2015 Facts: On February 18.R. Roberto Dela Rama. Nicolas. Thus. Ricky S. 174365-66. Jr. Nos. otherwise. much weight.. Danilo Dizon. it can be inferred that the NLRC can receive evidence on cases appealed before the Commission. Donor. and relevance when an adverse party assails the decision of the NLRC via petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court before the CA and then to the Supreme Court via a petition for review under Rule 45. Tumabiao. its factual conclusions would not have been given great respect. Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines.accounts to an expert and to accept his report as evidence after hearing of the parties upon due notice. Crispulo D. Topic: Dismissal for Just cause Ponente: Peralta Basan v. February 04. 1997. G. Jaime L.

however. The employment of such person is also then deemed to be regular with respect to such activity and while such activity exists. Petitioners. It is distinguished from a specific undertaking that is divorced from the normal activities required in carrying on the particular business or trade. petitioners are considered as regular employees. where a person thus engaged has been performing the job for at least one year. even if the performance is not continuous or is merely intermittent. is one of the leading and largest manufacturers of softdrinks in the country. supplied by the law itself. Inc.. That they merely rendered . But. the law deems the repeated and continuing need for its performance as being sufficient to indicate the necessity or desirability of that activity to the business or trade of the employer. fall under the first kind of regular employee above. a fact that can be assessed by looking into the nature of the services rendered and its relation to the general scheme under which the business or trade is pursued in the usual course. National Organization of Working Men. although the work to be performed is only for a specific project or seasonal. to wit Coca-Cola Bottlers Phils. when hired. Respondent corporation.. In determining whether an employment should be considered regular or non-regular. countered that it hired petitioners as temporary route helpers to act as substitutes for its absent regular route helpers merely for a fixed period in anticipation of the high volume of work in its plants or sales offices. Issue: Whether or not the petitioners in this case are regular employees. is whether the work undertaken is necessary or desirable in the usual business or trade of the employer. Inc. in this case. which is necessary or desirable in its usual business or trade. Respondent workers. Respondent workers have long been in the service of petitioner company. petitioners’ claims have no basis for they knew that their assignment as route helpers was temporary in duration. is necessary and desirable in its usual business or trade thereby qualifying them as regular employees. As route helpers who are engaged in the service of loading and unloading softdrink products of respondent company to its various delivery points. would go with route salesmen on board delivery trucks and undertake the laborious task of loading and unloading softdrink products of petitioner company to its various delivery points. As such. The standard.against respondent Coca-Cola Bottlers Philippines. alleging that respondent dismissed them without just cause and prior written notice required by law. the applicable test is the reasonable connection between the particular activity performed by the employee in relation to the usual business or trade of the employer. SC: It must be noted that the same has already been resolved in Magsalin v. wherein this Court has categorically declared that the nature of work of route helpers hired by Coca Cola Bottlers Philippines.

they are deemed as regular employees under the Labor Code. irrespective of the length of their service. .services for periods of less than a year is of no moment since for as long as they were performing activities necessary to the business of respondent.

Land Bank of the Philippines v. 8882. G. consisting of 43. No. In the interim. 2009. petitioner Land Bank of the Philippines valued the subject lands at P1. On the other hand. the Provincial Agrarian Reform Adjudicator. the CA affirmed the applicability of the provisions of DAR AO No. the LBP was prompted to deposit the said amount in cash and in Agrarian Reform Bonds in respondents’ name. the LBP filed a petition for determination of just compensation before the Regional Trial Court of Legazpi City averring that the PARAD’s valuation was excessively high and is contrary to the legally prescribed factors in determining just compensation.708. thereof.369.479. just compensation should be pegged at the price or value of the property at the time it was taken from the owner and not its value at the time of rendition of . Respondents Heirs of Jesus Alsua and their representative Bibiano C. series of 1998 in the computation of the just compensation for the subject lands but declared that the RTC erred in fixing the date of taking on June 30. but the latter rejected the valuation.744. hence. the presumptive date of taking pursuant to DAR AO No. and the LBP’s valuation approved on September 25.7158 has.. February 04. insisting that it considered all the factors that may be used as basis in order to arrive at a just and equitable valuation of the subject lands. 5. the RTC rejected the valuation of both the LBP and the PARAD and fixed the just compensation for the subject lands at P4. the CF was considered to have been received only on the latter date.820. of unirrigated riceland (subject lands).R. In a Decision. of cocoland and 3. Dissatisfied with the PARAD’s valuation. J. respondents maintained the correctness of the PARAD’s valuation. After summary administrative proceedings for the determination of just compensation. albeit containing incomplete documents. fixed the value of the subject lands at P5. including their potential use and corresponding increase in value.53.245. series of 2010. 211351. i. 2015 Facts: Jesus Alsua owned a parcel of unregistered agricultural land known as Lot No. Sabino voluntarily offered to sell the entire parcel of land to the government under the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law of 1988. The necessary documents were completed only in September 2001. but only 47. Thus. The DAR then offered to respondents the LBP’s valuation as just compensation for the lands. 2001. Heirs of Jesus Alsua.7377 has. Upon receipt from the DAR of the Claim Folder. 1. thus.e. were acquired. On appeal. the Register of Deeds of Albay issued Original Certificates of Title in the names of the agrarian reform beneficiaries.Topic: Fixing of Just Compensation Ponente: Perlas=Bernabe.4535 has.15. The LBP moved for reconsideration but was denied. It pointed out that the taking of lands under the agrarian reform program partakes of the nature of an expropriation proceeding.02.

(a) the acquisition cost of the land. Settled is the rule that when the agrarian reform process is still incomplete. (d) the owner’s sworn valuation. Issue: Whether or not the fixing of the just compensation for the subject lands is correct..judgment or the filing of the complaint if the government takes possession of the land before the institution of expropriation proceedings. (b) the current value of like properties. (g) the social and economic benefits contributed by the farmers and the farmworkers. 2001. (f) the assessment made by government assessors. In addition. upon the issuance of OCT Nos. (c) the nature and actual use of the property and the income therefrom. in this case.e. (e) the tax declarations. .Hence. C-27721 and 27722 in the names of the agrarian reform beneficiaries on November 29. i. or the “time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property. 04-02 to the RTC for the determination of just compensation in accordance with these factors. just compensation should be determined and the process be concluded under RA 6657. Just compensation must be valued at the time of taking. must be equally considered. as in this case. SC: No. The factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657 must be considered in computing just compensation. and (h) the non-payment of taxes or loans secured from any government financing institution on the said land. For purposes of determining just compensation. such as in this case where the just compensation due the landowner has yet to be settled. the Court finds a need to remand Agrarian Case No. if any. Accordingly. the evidence to be presented by the parties before the trial court for the valuation of the subject lands must be based on the values prevalent on such time of taking for like agricultural lands.” such as when title is transferred in the name of the beneficiaries. or the “time when the landowner was deprived of the use and benefit of his property. the factors enumerated under Section 17 of RA 6657. and by the government to the property. the fair market value of an expropriated property is determined by its character and its price at the time of taking.

and to pay her salary differentials. At odds with the verdict. The ruling of the LA was reversed whereby the NLRC declared Villena to have been illegally dismissed. and attorney’s fees. Batangas II Electric Cooperative. transportation benefits. and thus. which caused her to file a complaint for constructive dismissal before the Labor Arbiter. which provided for retirement benefits to its regular employees. she appealed to the NLRC the exclusion of her other benefits as well as her claim for separation pay. leave of absence” amounting to P1. her claim for separation pay in lieu of reinstatement was denied.14. and cellular phone usage allowances constitutes “other benefits” that should be awarded in favor of Villena. Meanwhile. Inc. February 04. BATELEC II issued Policy No. Moreover. The CA modified the NLRC Resolution and declared Villena to be entitled to the difference between the salary of the Finance Manager and that of the auditor.078. G. but was denied. However. The LA dismissed the complaint prompting her to seek recourse before the National Labor Relations Commission. representation allowance. holding that since reinstatement was no longer possible. She rose from the ranks and was promoted as Finance Manager in 1985. the LA declared that Villena was entitled only to salary differentials.14 excluding from the computation claims for bonus. and representation. but the same was denied. 2015 Facts: Villena was hired by respondent Batangas II Electric Cooperative. It also granted her attorney’s fees in the amount of 10% of the total monetary award. or its equivalent. In the course thereof.R. Villena moved for reconsideration. ordered BATELEC II to reinstate her to her former position as Finance Manager. With no further action having been taken by BATELEC II. transportation. benefits. Hence. Villena v.890. 2003. plus allowances and any other benefits pertaining to the position of Finance Manager at the time she was removed therefrom up to the date of her actual reinstatement. separation pay in lieu of reinstatement was justified. The NLRC granted the appeal of Villena. Issue: Whether or not retirement pay. . While Villena received the amount of P1. unused sick leave. she elevated the matter to the CA via petition for certiorari. In 1994. she was demoted to the position of Auditor. 205735. Villena moved for its execution. J. and attorney’s fees. (BATELEC II) as bookkeeper in 1978.890. Thus. Inc. on September 20. No.078. the NLRC Resolution attained finality. The case was then remanded to the NLRC for the computation of the total amount due to Villena. 03-003. BATELEC II moved for reconsideration. 13thmonth pay. the NLRC’s judgment was silent on the payment of allowances.Topic: Entitlement to Retirement Pay and Other Benefits Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe.

” cannot be granted. no. the same had already become immutable and unalterable. Thus. 2001 CA Decision and March 22. and Cellular Phone Usage Allowances. or after the August 31. and cellular phone usage allowances. Representation. transportation. as the matter left for determination is whether or not the aforesaid rulings. it is quite absurd for Villena to submit a “contemporaneous”44claim for retirement pay on the execution phase of these proceedings. and (b) her application squares with the requirements of entitlement under the terms of the company’s retirement plan. and damages. In order for her retirement pay claim to be considered. it is clear from BATELEC II’s pleadings and submissions that representation allowance.e. attorney’s fees. under the phrase “other benefits. what she sought for in her illegal dismissal complaint were the reliefs of reinstatement. the plea to include retirement pay in the execution of the final and executory August 31. Consequently. However. With the award of the “other benefits pertaining to the position of Finance Manager” made by the CA in its August 31. the Court will harken back only to the context of the illegal dismissal complaint from which such awards of “other benefits” stemmed from. 2001 CA Decision had already attained finality. payment of salary differentials. Retirement pay and separation pay are not mutually exclusive unless there is a specific prohibition in the collective bargaining agreement or retirement plan against the payment of both benefits. based on the records. should include retirement pay and representation. Villena’s complaint should have contained substantial allegations which would show that she (a) had applied for the same. however. in fact. 2001 Decision lapsing into finality. when executed. As the Court sees it. transportation allowance. this means that they may no longer be modified . On Transportation. the “other benefits” mentioned in these rulings cannot be construed to include retirement pay for the primary reason that they adjudged awards relative to Villena’s illegal dismissal complaint. 03-003.SC: On retirement pay. Policy No. these allowances ought to be included in the “other benefits pertaining to the position of Finance Manager” to which Villena is entitled to and which were awarded to her under the final and executory CA Decision and NLRC Resolution. i. all benefits and allowances that she may have received as Finance Manager. On the matter of the claimed allowances. and cellular phone usage allowance are given to the Finance Manager/Department Manager as part of their benefits.. 2007 NLRC Resolution. yes. 2003. which remains barren of a specific cause of action for retirement pay. unlike the separate entitlement to retirement pay which may be recovered only upon a meritorious subsequent application when the employee decides to retire. was issued on September 20. which. In fine. with Villena’s entitlement to retirement pay not included as an issue in an illegal dismissal case which had already been finally decided.

even if the modification is meant to correct what is perceived to be an erroneous conclusion of fact or law. .in any respect.

respondents interposed an appeal but the NLRC dismissed the same for non-perfection. According to the appellate court. Hence. Respondents averred that petitioners were separated from employment for just causes and after affording them procedural due process of law. Consequently. G. ART. SS Ventures International. this petition. SC: No. Monaliza Bihasa and Delfin Anzaldo were regular employees of the respondent company until their employments were severed for violation of various company policies. In a judgment involving a monetary award. Inc.R.000. 195109.. there was substantial compliance with the rules for the perfection of an appeal because respondents seasonably filed their Memorandum of Appeal and posted an appeal bond in the amount of P100. Inc. the Court of Appeals ruled that respondents were able to sufficiently prove their incapability to post the required amount of bond. the appeal shall be perfected only upon (1) proof of payment of the required appeal fee. (2) posting of a cash or surety . is not warranted in the instant case. Issue: Whether or not the posting of an appeal bond in full is a mandatory and a jurisdictional requirement that must be complied with in order to confer jurisdiction upon the NLRC. J.Topic: Rules on Posting an Appeal Bond for the Perfection of an Appeal from the Labor Arbiter’s Monetary Award Ponente: Perez. The NLRC ruled that posting of an appeal bond equivalent to the monetary award is indispensable for the perfection of the appeal and the reduction of the appeal bond. awards or orders of the Labor Arbiter. is a domestic corporation duly engaged in the business of manufacturing footwear products for local sales and export abroad. the Court of Appeals reversed the NLRC Decision and allowed the relaxation of the rule on posting of the appeal bond.00. Petitioners Andy Balite. 13th month pay and attorney’s fees before the Labor Arbiter. The Labor Arbiter rendered a Decision in favor of petitioners and held that respondents are liable for illegal dismissal for failing to comply with the procedural and substantive requirements in terminating employment. Balite v. 2015 Facts: Respondent SS Ventures International. 223 of the Labor Code provides that an appeal from the Labor Arbiter to the NLRC must be perfected within ten calendar days from receipt of such decisions. Aggrieved. It is represented in this action by respondents Sung Sik Lee and Evelyn Rayala. absent any showing of meritorious ground to justify the same. February 04. While the amount of the appeal bond posted was not equivalent to the monetary award. On certiorari. the three employees charged respondents with illegal dismissal and recovery of backwages. No.

which shall provisionally be deemed the reasonable amount of the bond in the meantime that an appellant’s motion is pending resolution by the Commission. the monetary award. the employees would still be assured of at least substantial compensation. all motions to reduce bond that are to be filed with the NLRC shall be accompanied by the posting of a cash or surety bond equivalent to 10% of the monetary award that is subject of the appeal.bond issued by a reputable bonding company. By reducing the amount of the appeal bond in this case. management will not be effectively denied of its statutory privilege of appeal. Rule VI of the NLRC Rules of Procedure that give parties the chance to seek a reduction of the appeal bond are effectively carried out. without however defeating the benefits of the bond requirement in favor of a winning litigant.00 which is equivalent to around 20% of the total amount of monetary bond is sufficient to perfect an appeal. . shall exclude damages and attorney’s fees. To ensure that the provisions of Section 6. The Court holds that the appeal bond posted by the respondent in the amount of P100. in case a judgment award is affirmed.000. Only after the posting of a bond in the required percentage shall an appellant’s period to perfect an appeal under the NLRC Rules be deemed suspended. In conformity with the NLRC Rules. and (3) filing of a memorandum of appeal. for the purpose of computing the necessary appeal bond. On the other hand.

through Alfredo Jingco. because of petitioners’ failure to vacate Solid Mills’ property. 2003. Petitioners refused to sign the documents and demanded to be paid. sent to petitioners individual notices to vacate SMI Village. petitioners’ right to the payment of their benefits and separation pay was vested by law and contract. this was out of liberality and for the convenience of its employees on the condition that the employees would vacate the premises anytime the Company deems fit. vacation leave benefits. NLRC. Solid Mills would cease its operations due to serious business losses. Solid Mills was justified in withholding their benefits and separation pay. The closure was recognized by the collective bargaining agent of the employees in a memorandum of agreement which provided for Solid Mills’ grant of separation pay less accountabilities. They were required to sign a memorandum of agreement with release and quitclaim before the benefits would be released. J. Solid Mills.Topic: Withholding of Terminal Pay and Benefits Ponente: Leonen. The Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of petitioners on the ground that Solid Mills illegally withheld petitioners’ benefits and separation pay. 2003.R. Petitioners filed a petition for certiorar before the Court of Appeals which dismissed the same. Inc. No. 202961. February 04. Milan v. petitioners filed complaints before the Labor Arbiter. Solid Mills granted the petitioners the privilege to occupy its property on account of petitioners’ employment. Solid Mills appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission which ruled that. Issue: Whether or not the payment of monetary claims of petitioners should be held in abeyance pending compliance of their accountabilities to . They and their families were allowed to occupy SMI Village. 2015 Facts: Petitioners are the employees of respondent Solid Mills. Hence. G. Solid Mills filed its Department of Labor and Employment termination report. According to Solid Mills. Petitioners were informed that effective October 10. which is outside the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter. Petitioners were no longer allowed to report for work by October 10. It had the prerogative to terminate such privilege. The memorandum of agreement stated no condition to the effect that petitioners must vacate Solid Mills’ property before their benefits could be given to them. a property owned by the employer. Their possession is not by virtue of any employer-employee relationship. Petitioners’ possession should not be construed as petitioners’accountabilities that must be cleared first before the release of benefits. Hence. According to the Labor Arbiter. accrued sick leave benefits. It is a civil issue. and 13th month pay to the employees. this petition.

National Labor Relations Commission. Thus. However. Petitioners were merely allowed to possess and use it out of respondent Solid Mills’ liberality. The Civil Code also provides that the employer is authorized to withhold wages for debts due. the Labor Code supports the employers’ institution of clearance procedures before the release of wages. The employer may. . What can be gathered from the findings of the Labor Arbiter. As a general rule. respondent Solid Mills has the right to withhold petitioners’ wages and benefits because of this existing debt or liability. “Debt” in this case refers to any obligation due from the employee to the employer.respondent Solid Mills by turning over the subject lots they occupy at SMI Village. The return of the property’s possession became an obligation or liability on the part of the employees when the employer-employee relationship ceased. It includes any accountability that the employee may have to the employer. as petitioners would argue. employers are prohibited from withholding wages from employees and the elimination or diminution of benefits is prohibited. An employer is allowed to withhold terminal pay and benefits pending the employee’s return of its properties. demand the property at will. SC: Yes. therefore. Petitioners do not categorically deny respondent Solid Mills’ ownership of the property. and they do not claim superior right to it. There is no reason to limit its scope to uniforms and equipment. and the Court of Appeals is that respondent Solid Mills allowed the use of its property for the benefit of petitioners as its employees.

In the hospital. 2015 Facts: On March 11. for and in behalf of St. Ramon A.” Dr. Cruz concurred in the initial findings of doctors in Japan that Gepanaga was suffering from a “crushing injuring with fracture distal phalanx left middle finger. to work on board the vessel M. as well as the IBF-JSU AMOSUP IMMAJ collective bargaining agreement (CBA).V. 2008. Melbourne Highway as Wiper Maintenance for six (6) months. the NLRC reversed the ruling of the Labor Arbiter. the parties agreed to be bound by the provisions of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC).. was likely to advance and serve its interests. By executing the contract of employment. Paul Maritime Corporation. as such. Inc. while Gepanaga was doing maintenance work. claiming that the latter is the foreign principal of Veritas and owner of the M. 206285. was a government physician. the company-designated physician. 2009. G.” Unconvinced that he had fully recovered from his injury.. Cruz noted that Gepanaga no longer suffered the pain in the affected area and that his “grip is good and functional. No. Cruz (Dr. As Gepanaga was able to complete his contract with no incident. Dr. J. Gepanaga reported right away to the clinic of Dr. On December 4. declaring that Gepanaga was “cleared fit to go back to work. Gepanaga entered into a contract of employment with Veritas. Gepanaga. Veritas Maritime Corporation and/or Erickson Marquez v.V.” After a series of medical treatments. February 04. Villa. his middle finger got caught between the cast metal piston liners of the diesel generator.Topic: Procedure in Procuring Permanent Total Disability Benefits. On November 28. left middle finger.” He was repatriated on December 3. Cruz). engaged and remunerated by Veritas and. Jr. Cruz thus issued his medical report. and the NLRC gave credence to his medical assessment of Gepanaga’s condition. Gepanaga filed a complaint against Veritas. the parties mutually agreed to extend his tenure as Wiper Maintenance. It opined that the assessment of the company-designated physician should not be binding in determining the true condition of Gepanaga.R. Dr. 2008. Marquez and “K” Line Ship Management. Attorney’s Fee Ponente: Mendoza. He was then given first aid on board the vessel and was later brought to a hospital in Omaezaki. 2008. After Gepanaga was referred to the orthopedic surgeon of his clinic. Japan. Nicomedez G. considering that he was chosen. dated March 4. on the other hand. Melbourne Highway. Dr. Gepanaga was diagnosed with “open fracture of [the] distal phalanx. Later. The Labor Arbiter dismissed the complaint for lack of merit. 2008. .

If a Doctor appointed by the seafarer disagrees with the assessment. the seafarer is entitled to sickness allowance equivalent to his basic wage until he is declared fit to work or the degree of permanent disability has been assessed by the company-designated physician but in no case shall this period exceed one hundred twenty (120) days. SC: The SC ruled that the evidentiary records favors the petitioners. had simplified the determination of liability for work-related death. The CBA between the petitioners and the respondent also states that: If a doctor appointed by the seafarer and his Union disagrees with the assessment. illness or injury in the case of Filipino seamen working in foreign ocean-going vessels. Failure of the seafarer to comply with the mandatory reporting requirement shall result in his forfeiture of the right to claim the above benefits. The POEA-SEC is supplemented by the CBA between the owner of the vessel and the covered seaman. Section 20(B)(3) of the POEA-SEC provides: Upon sign-off from the vessel for medical treatment. Every seaman and vessel owner (directly or represented by a local manning agency) are required to execute the POEASEC as a condition sine qua non prior to the deployment of the seaman for overseas work. a written notice to the agency within the same period is deemed a compliance. For this purpose. Thus. Whether Gepanaga is entitled to claim for permanent total disability benefits because his personal physician established that he was not fit to work. in resolving whether Gepanaga is entitled to disability compensation. through the POEA. a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the Seafarer . in which case. they also agreed to be bound by the CBA. when the parties entered into a contract of employment in accordance with the POEA-SEC. Whether the award of attorney’s fees was warranted as he was compelled to litigate.Issue: 1. the seafarer shall submit himself to a postemployment medical examination by a company-designated physician within three working days upon his return except when he is physically incapacitated to so. In order to provide a clear-cut set of rules in resolving the ubiquitous conflict between the seafarer and his employer for claims of permanent disability benefits. the Court will be guided by the procedures laid down in the POEA-SEC and the CBA. In this case. a third doctor may be agreed jointly between the Employer and the seafarer. the Court in Vergara. 2. The third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties. stated that the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).

Let it be stressed that the seafarer’s inability to resume his work after the lapse of more than 120 days from the time he suffered an injury and/or illness is not a magic wand that automatically warrants the grant of total and permanent disability benefits in his favor. .and his Union. 2009. Indeed. the Court has observed that when Gepanaga filed his complaint. For these reasons. Dr.26 Both law and evidence must be on his side. Villa. Melbourne Highway. for failure of Gepanaga to observe the procedures laid down in the POEA-SEC and the CBA. the Court is left without a choice but to uphold the certification issued by the company-designated physician that the respondent was “fit to go back to work. and the third doctor’s decision shall be final and binding on both parties. a few days before he filed his position paper on June 15. and without sufficient evidence to support the respondent’s ancillary claims for sick wages. Villa.” Gepanaga’s claim for benefits was also premature because when he filed the complaint with the arbitration office on March 25. that Gepanaga sought the services of Dr. 2009. he was armed only with the belief that he had yet to fully recover from his injured finger because of the incident that occurred on board the M. he had yet to consult his own physician. 2009. damages and attorney’s fees. the same are denied. It was only on June 9. In this case however.V.

2000 raid. (Lindo. Lindo.Topics: Power of the NLRC. 169303. 2000. the Philippine National Police. 11 February 2015 Facts: Protective Maximum Security Agency. Abandonment. filed the Complaint for robbery committed by a band against Fuentes. while the others were employed by Meshim Security Agency. Agusan del Sur. and others. At the time of Fuentes’ employment. Josefa-Veruela in . Fuentes (Fuentes) was hired as a security guard by Protective sometime in November 1999. Inc. three (3) carbine rifles. G. He was posted to a security checkpoint designated as Post 33 in Upper New Visayas. Filing of the complaint does not constitutes abandonment of work. Fuentes. This was based on the two (2) affidavits executed by Lindo. a group of armed persons ransacked Post 33 and took five (5) M-16 rifles. (Protective) provides security services for commercial. 2000. This was filed before the Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Trento Sta. the Philippine National Police found reason to believe that Fuentes conspired and acted in consort with the New People’s Army. After its initial investigation. and Cempron stated that Fuentes should be prosecuted for criminal acts done on July 20. Jr. Rule 45 in Labor Cases. Jr. industrial and agricultural firms. These armed persons inflicted violence upon Fuentes and the other security guards present at Post 33. as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Celso E. and Cempron. Right to procedural due process Ponente: Leonen. 2000. Inc. Francisco Dalacan was employed by Protective. Fuentes and his fellow security guards reported the raid to the Philippine National Police in Trento. Exceptions to the general rule that the findings of fact of labor tribunals. Agusan del Sur. No. On the same day of the incident. On July 20. Fuentes reported that he and the other security guards assigned to Post 33 were accosted at gunpoint by the New People’s Army.. a certain Mario Cabatlao. Time of filing the complaint for illegal dismissal. Beginning of computation of backwages. In their affidavits. Protective assigned him to Picop Resources. Inc. Rolando Gualberto Lindo. Protective Maximum Security Agency. all with live ammunition and magazines. When asked by the police.R. are binding on the SC. Cempron (Cempron). v. J. On July 24. who were both present in the July 20. through Senior Police Officer IV Benjamin Corda.). Jr. and one (1) Browning Automatic Rifle. Jr. Jr. Agency-issued uniforms and personal items were also taken. and personal residences. namely: Francisco Dalacan. and Wilson Maravilles.

The Complaint stated that Fuentes was a "cohort of the NPA in the raid.]. Judge Particio Balite of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Trento-Sta. Fuentes filed the Complaint "for illegal dismissal. Fuentes should have reported to his Team Leader or Officer-in-Charge. Fuentes claimed that "right after the criminal complaint for robbery against him was dismissed. Inc.” On August 15. Fuentes was detained at the Mangagoy Police Sub-Station. (Inspector Escartin) reported: “Celso Fuentes is no longer in the custody of this station and he is never detained in this station but requested that he will be put to custody for fear of his life. . non-payment of salaries. Protective claims that "as was usual and routine." Immediately upon the filing of the Complaint. premium pay for holiday and rest day. The last known address of subject person is Sta. 13th month pay. Bislig. Since the incident of July 20. Josefa. however. Espinosa on the ground that Fuentes was a member of the NPA and that his position had already been filled up by another security guard. Agusan del Sur. the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Surigao del Sur issued the Resolution dismissing the Complaint against Fuentes. During his detention. Mangagoy. In the Order dated August 1. Josefa-Veruela directed that Fuentes be transferred from the Mangagoy Police Sub-Station to Trento Municipal Jail in Trento. 2000. Emie S." Executive Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision in favor of Protective. private respondent has not yet reported to his Team Leader or to any of the officers of Protective. Trento. Surigao del Sur." On the other hand." In his Position Paper. Dolina and Wilfredo Fuentes before the National Labor Relations Commission Regional Arbitration Branch XIII in Butuan City. 2000 at around 2:45 in the afternoon accompanied by his mother. he alleged that he was "mauled and tied up by the security officers of [Protective]. 2000. Picop [Resources. 2001." To preserve proof of these claims. On March 14. service incentive leave and damages against [Protective]. 2002.Trento. He left this station on July 28. Agusan del Sur. Agusan del Sur. Fuentes had pictures taken of his injuries while in custody and acquired a medical certificate detailing his injuries. thus: As correctly pointed out by respondents PRI and/or Wilfredo Fuentes. It found during preliminary investigation that there was no probable cause to warrant the filing of an Information against Fuentes. In his return to this court order. he demanded to return to work but he was refused entry by a certain Mr. Police Inspector Ernesto Escartin Sr. overtime pay.

Whether the computation of backwages should only begin from the date of the filing of the Complaint. Whether the six-month period from the alleged date of dismissal by petitioner to the date of filing of the complaint is justified. or orders of the Labor Arbiter are final and executory unless appealed to the Commission by any or both parties within ten (10) calendar days from receipt of such decisions. as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. On appeal. SC: 1. are binding on this court is present in this case. Hence.complainant was unable to perform his duties and responsibilities as security guard due to the criminal charges filed against him. 4. Whether the filing of the complaint constitutes abandonment of employment. Whether determination of facts of the Labor Arbiter must prevail over the determination of facts of the National Labor Relations Commission. the National Labor Relations Commission reversed the Decision of Labor Arbiter Legaspi and found that Fuentes was illegally dismissed. the National Labor Relations Commission is not bound by the findings of the Labor Arbiter. Contrary to petitioner’s claims. The National Labor Relations Commission has the power to overturn the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter. Appeal. The Court of Appeals dismissed the Petition. Whether the right to procedural due process was not observed. 3. Whether Fuentes was justifiably dismissed due to abandonment. Protective filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission. 8. the Court of Appeals found that Fuentes should have been afforded his procedural due process rights. Decisions. hence he was replaced with another guard. It held that Protective failed to discharge its burden to prove a just cause for dismissal. Issues: 1. Article 223 of the Labor Code reads: Article 223. 7. . 2. 6. this petition. No. 5. awards. Whether the exceptions to the general rule that the findings of fact of labor tribunals. What is the general rule regarding Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari in labor cases. Further.

unless appealed to the National Labor Relations Commission within ten (10) calendar days by any or both of the parties. If there is prima facie evidence of abuse of discretion on the part of the Labor Arbiter. respondent was detained at the Mangagoy Police Sub-Station in Surigao del Sur. It should affect the disposition of the cause of the appellant. Agusan del Sur for allegedly conspiring and confederating with the members of the New People’s Army. 2000 "were never substantiated at all. and 4. The error must impact on the main issues and not some tangential matter. Evidently. The errors in the findings of fact that will justify a modification or reversal of the Labor Arbiter’s decision must be "serious" and. the National Labor Relations Commission decided that there was a serious error in the factual findings of Labor Arbiter Legaspi. In this case. 2. Such appeal may be entertained only on any of the following grounds: 1. but there must also be a showing that such error would cause grave and irreparable injury to the appellant. a showing of bias on the part of the Labor Arbiter or a lack of due regard for the procedural rights of the parties are indicia that serious errors may be present. Labor Arbiter Legaspi found that respondent was charged by the Philippine National Police in Trento." Serious errors refer to inferences of facts without evidence." In fact. the National Labor Relations Commission found that the . including graft and corruption. would lead to "grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant. If serious errors in the findings of facts are raised which would cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to the appellant. Not only must the error be palpable. The Labor Code vests in the National Labor Relations Commission the authority to reverse the decision of the Labor Arbiter. The National Labor Relations Commission found that petitioner’s claims that respondent consorted with the New People’s Army and committed robbery on July 20. Labor Arbiter Legaspi found that respondent was "unable to perform his duties and responsibilities as security guard due to the criminal charges that were filed against him. or orders." This led to petitioner replacing respondent with another security guard. provided that the appellant can prove the existence of one of the grounds in Article 223. Thus. order or award was secured through fraud or coercion. If made purely on questions of law.awards. If the decision. if left uncorrected. Thus. or mistakes in the interpretation of the evidence that border on arbitrariness or similar circumstances. 3. Article 223 provides that the decision of the Labor Arbiter is final and executory. the Complaint for robbery against respondent was dismissed after preliminary investigation.

2000 incident had no basis. not being a trier of fact. this court established the proper mode of appeal in labor cases: On this score we add the further observations that there is a growing number of labor cases being elevated to this Court which." Based on these premises. As for respondent’s absence from work.refusal to admit respondent to work based on the latter’s alleged conspiracy with the New People’s Army during the July 20. has its limits. 2000 incident. 2." Petitioner even submitted that "respondent’s last known address was given to the investigating court by Police Inspector Escartin in his report to the Municipal Circuit Trial Court. Labor Arbiter Legaspi found that the notice for respondent to explain his involvement in the July 20. has at times been constrained to remand the case to the NLRC for resolution of unclear or ambiguous factual findings. On appeal. a sham defense. 2000 incident at Post 33. respondent "was among those who reported the assault to the police. the National Labor Relations Commission found that petitioner’s claim that respondent’s whereabouts were unknown to the former was "unbelievable. respondent’s right to security of tenure would have been violated." Thus. It found that petitioner feigned ignorance of the reason of respondent’s absence. In St. 2000 incident could not be properly served despite "diligent efforts. that the Court of Appeals is procedurally . Petitioner prays that this court reverse the findings of fact of the National Labor Relations Commission. at best. The National Labor Relations Commission acted well within the discretion provided by Article 223 in deciding appealed cases from the Labor Arbiter. The errors in the findings of fact directly would affect the primary issues raised by the parties and their respective claims. National Labor Relations Commission. Labor Arbiter Legaspi found that respondent’s whereabouts were unknown to petitioner. he supported petitioner’s allegation that respondent "vanished" after the July 20." Contrary to Labor Arbiter Legaspi’s findings. the National Labor Relations Commission found that there was a serious error in the factual determination and conclusions of Labor Arbiter Legaspi. This court’s power to decide a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari." The National Labor Relations Commission found that after the July 20. It also found petitioner’s claim that respondent had "vanished" to be "ridiculous. the National Labor Relations Commission found that petitioner did not exert diligent efforts to locate respondent and afford him his right to due process. Martin Funeral Home v. If the errors in the findings of fact were not corrected. particularly in labor cases. which were affirmed by the Court of Appeals.

and that there is undeniably an imperative need for expeditious action on labor cases as a major aspect of constitutional protection to labor.. we have to view the CA decision in the same context that the petition for certiorari it ruled upon was presented to it. etc. Therefore. Hon. v. There is grave abuse of discretion when the power is exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of "passion or personal hostility. all references in the amended Section 9 of B. et al. this court elaborated on its role to determine whether the Court of Appeals was correct in either granting or dismissing the petition for certiorari: In a Rule 45 review. in contrast with the review for jurisdictional error that we undertake under Rule 65. has been defined as the capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment amounting to or equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. Inc. In other words.. not on the basis of whether the NLRC decision on the merits of the case was correct. No. all such petitions should henceforth be initially filed in the Court of Appeals in strict observance of the doctrine on the hierarchy of courts as the appropriate forum for the relief desired. where the Court limited its review under Rule 45 of the CA’s decision in a labor case to the determination of whether the CA correctly resolved the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the decision of the Secretary of Labor. Grave abuse of discretion. 129 to supposed appeals from the NLRC to the Supreme Court are interpreted and hereby declared to mean and refer to petitions for certiorari under Rule 65. and not on the basis of whether the latter's decision on the merits of the case was strictly correct. In Bani Rural Bank. Inc. we have to examine the CA decision from the prism of whether it correctly determined the presence or absence of grave abuse of discretion in the NLRC decision before it. we consider the correctness of the assailed CA decision." In Career Philippines Shipmanagement. we have to be keenly aware that the CA undertook a Rule 65 review. and must be so patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. Serna. In ruling for legal correctness. amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Tomas. aside from the increased number of its component divisions.equipped for that purpose. Rule 45 limits us to the review of questions of law raised against the assailed CA decision. De Guzman. this court discussed the primary issues to be addressed in a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari in labor cases: In question form. Patricia Sto. the question to ask is: Did the CA correctly determine whether the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion in ruling on the case? This manner of review was reiterated in Holy Child Catholic School v. v. Consequently.P. not a review on . Furthermore.

" The factual findings of the NLRC. (3) Where there is a grave abuse of discretion (Buyco v. an administrative body that has expertise in its specialized field. are generally conclusive on this Court. 30. this court will not review the factual determination of the administrative bodies governing labor. it is not our function to analyze or weigh evidence all over again. when affirmed by the CA. Jr: It is a well-settled rule in this jurisdiction that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. 74 Phil. "In the exercise of its power of review. Applying these cases. L-9590 Ap. however. (2) When the inference made is manifestly mistaken. none of which obtain in the instant petition: (1) When the conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation. There are exceptions to the general rule that the findings of fact of labor tribunals. the findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are conclusive and binding and consequently. Linatok. unrep. or substitute the findings of fact of the NLRC. we do not reexamine conflicting evidence. Sosing. of the NLRC decision challenged before it. this Court being bound by the findings of fact made by the Court of Appeals." 3. No. reevaluate the credibility of witnesses. L-4875. 257 [1953]). as affirmed by the Court of Appeals. absurd or impossible (Luna v. . surmises or conjectures (Joaquin v.appeal. 1953). Villaseca. 103 Phil.). The Court of Appeals can conduct its own factual determination to ascertain whether the National Labor Relations Commission has committed grave abuse of discretion. Nov. 93 Phil. Navarro. (4) When the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts (Cruz v.. 95 Phil. as well as the findings of fact by the Court of Appeals. (5) When the findings of fact are conflicting (Casica v. Nor do we substitute our "own judgment for that of the tribunal in determining where the weight of evidence lies or what evidence is credible. findings of fact by the Court of Appeals may be passed upon and reviewed by this Court in the following instances. Thus. 453 [1955]). Accordingly. is not without exception. The rule. Alto Suretyand Insurance Co. are binding on this court. In Medina v. in making its findings. Asistio. 401 [1958]). the general rule is that in a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari. (6) When the Court of Appeals. 1957. 27. went beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of both appellant and appellee (Evangelista v.People.15 [1942]).

(9) When the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs are not disputed by the respondents (Ibid. Thus. Petitioner justifies its actions against respondent by maintaining that respondent never reported to his supervising officer after the July 20. Abandonment as a just cause for dismissal is based on Article 282(b) of the Labor Code: Art. if the petitioner before this court can show grave abuse of discretion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission.). 4. The absence of respondent does not constitute abandonment. there was no "actual" dismissal of respondent. It is the petitioner’s burden to justify the existence of one of the exceptions to the general rule for this court to conduct a factual review.).(7) The findings of the Court of Appeals are contrary to those of the trial court (Garcia v. Termination by employer. 2000 raid at Post 33. the assailed Court of Appeals ruling (in the Rule 65 proceedings) will be reversed. this court may examine the records of the case and the questioned findings in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction. 142 SCRA 593 [1986]). Sandiganbayan. 33 SCRA 622 [1970]. Sacay v.. Petitioner asserts that since respondent failed to report for work after the raid. 282. Court of Appeals. this alleged prolonged absence from work constituted abandonment. Gutierrez. "Labor officials commit grave abuse of discretion when their factual findings are arrived at arbitrarily or in disregard of the evidence.. In labor cases. Abandonment constitutes a just cause for dismissal because "the law in protecting the rights of the laborer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the following causes: (b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties. No. authorizes neither oppression nor self- . In this case. (8) When the findings of fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are based (Ibid. we find that petitioner has failed to discharge this burden." the factual findings of the National Labor Relations Commission may be subjected to review and ultimately rejected. In addition. 33 SCRA 242 [1970]). and (10) The finding of fact of the Court of Appeals is premised on the supposed absence of evidence and is contradicted by the evidence on record (Salazar v." If the petitioner can show that "the labor tribunal acted capriciously and whimsically or in total disregard of evidence material to the controversy. if the findings of fact of the Labor Arbiter are in direct conflict with the National Labor Relations Commission.

Thus. which stated that respondent was "so traumatized that he actually asked to remain in the custody of the police because he feared for his life. Second. from respondent’s prison release to the time he actually reported for work. There is no abandonment in this case. and (2) a clear intention to sever employer-employee relationship. particularly the fundamental task of reporting to work. while in the custody of the police. the intervening period when respondent failed to report for work. "manifested by the fact that he left the custody of the police only when his mother accompanied him. He also failed to abide by company procedure and report to his immediate superior." The employer cannot be compelled to maintain an employee who is remiss in fulfilling his duties to the employer. suffered physical violence in the hands of its employees. petitioner must prove respondent’s overt acts showing a clear intention to sever his ties with petitioner as his employer. this court discussed the concept of abandonment: Abandonment is the deliberate and unjustified refusal of an employee to resume his employment. It is a form of neglect of duty. a just cause for termination of employment by the employer. First. National Labor Relations Commission. In Agabon v. respondent’s actions constitute a failure to report to work without a valid and justifiable reason. The National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals found that respondent’s failure to return to work was justified because of his detention and its adverse effects. The first element of abandonment is the failure of the employee to report to work without a valid and justifiable reason. it is incumbent upon petitioner to prove the two (2) elements of abandonment. For a valid finding of abandonment. with the second as the more determinative factor which is manifested by overt acts from which it may be deduced that the employees has [sic] no more intention to work. The intent to discontinue the employment must be shown by clear proof that it was deliberate and unjustified. petitioner must provide evidence that respondent failed to report to work for an unjustifiable reason. these two factors should be present: (1) the failure to report for work or absence without valid or justifiable reason. The Court of Appeals found that petitioner did not refute the allegation that respondent. hence. . the Court of Appeals gave credence to the report submitted by Inspector Escartin." The Court of Appeals further found that respondent experienced intense fear. Petitioner asserts that respondent failed to report for work immediately after his release from prison.89 (Citations omitted) The burden to prove whether the employee abandoned his or her work rests on the employer. Thus.destruction of the employer. According to petitioner." Thus.

the burden of proving just and valid cause for dismissing an employee rests on the employer and his failure to do so shall result in a finding that the dismissal is unjustified. Petitioner failed to discharge its burden to prove a just cause for dismissal. 5. Petitioner alleges that since respondent "vanished" and failed to report immediately to work. Petitioner was unable to discharge its evidentiary burden before the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals. Based on the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals. The rule is well established that in termination cases. . Respondent’s act of reporting for work after being cleared of the charges against him showed that he had no intention to sever ties with his employer. the first element of abandonment was not established. petitioner refused to allow respondent to resume his employment because petitioner believed that respondent was a member of the New People’s Army and had already hired a replacement. when the criminal Complaint against him was dropped. as well. The burden to prove a just cause for dismissal must be met by the employer. Thus. Taking all these into consideration. Outside of the allegation that respondent "simply vanished" and failed to report to petitioner. Thus. He attempted to return to work after the dismissal of the Complaint so that petitioner would not have any justifiable reason to deny his request to resume his employment. Since there was a justifiable reason for respondent’s absence. he clearly intended to sever ties with petitioner. However. the illegality of the dismissal stands. they found that petitioner was unable to provide additional evidence that would have justified its actions. respondent reported for work after August 15. Further. petitioner was unable to prove the two (2) concurrent elements necessary to constitute abandonment. The second element is the existence of overt acts which show that the employee has no intention to return to work.was justified. respondent’s actions showed that he intended to resume working for petitioner. 2001. The second element of abandonment was not proven. Yes. the Court of Appeals did not err in affirming the findings of the National Labor Relations Commission.

" Though it results "in the enrichment of the individual illegally dismissed.The six-month period from the alleged date of dismissal by petitioner to the date of filing of the complaint is justified. therefore. This is well within the four-year prescriptive period provided by Article 1146 of the Labor Code. after the charges against him were dropped. governs these actions. These claims are governed by Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. A claim for backwages. It also covers money claims arising from seafarer contracts. according to this court. the award of backwages is not in redress of a private right. an award of backwages "is merely one of the reliefs which an illegally dismissed employee prays the labor arbiter and the NLRC to render in his favor as a consequence of the unlawful act committed by the employer. Even after the dismissal of the Complaint against him. The Court of Appeals affirmed this finding." Legally. however. 1146. In this case. respondent averred that he "repeatedly" asked petitioner if he could resume employment. bonuses." Actions for damages due to illegal dismissal are likewise actions "upon an injury to the rights of the plaintiff. respondent received a beating from petitioner’s employees at the time of his detention. this court will give due consideration to the established facts which would justify the gap of six (6) months prior to the filing of the complaint. Article 291 covers claims for overtime pay. and illegal deductions by an employer. is in the nature of a command upon the employer to make public reparation for his violation of the Labor Code. salary differentials." The cases filed before the courts and administrative tribunals originate from human experience." Article 1146 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. it would have been reasonable for him to take time to recover from the physical and emotional trauma he received. This four-year prescriptive period applies to claims for backwages. Prior to the filing of . The provision. but. as mentioned in Arriola. The following actions must be instituted within four years: (1) Upon injury to the rights of the plaintiff. It also does not cover claims for damages due to illegal dismissal. Petitioner admits that respondent filed the Complaint for illegal dismissal six (6) months after the first time petitioner had refused to allow respondent to work. Second. does not cover "money claims" consequent to an illegal dismissal such as backwages. the six-month period from the date of dismissal to the filing of the Complaint was well within reason and cannot be considered "inexcusable delay. First. which provides: Art. may be a money claim "by reason of its practical effect. not the three-year prescriptive period under Article 291 of the Labor Code. service incentive leave pay. rather. holiday pay. Thus. however.

Respondent was illegally dismissed from the time petitioner refused to allow him to resume work. 7. Inc. Petitioner’s argument on this matter must fail. The employer gave the employee three (3) days to respond to the letter." the computation of backwages should only begin from the date of the filing of the Complaint. The employee in that case should have acted promptly in the interest of protecting his employment. . Yes. The "No work. Thus. Instead. 6. The distance he had to travel to ask petitioner to resume work would have placed an understandable constraint on respondent’s time and resources. In Republic v. No. This court held that by failing to respond to the letter. the employee filed a complaint alleging illegal dismissal against the employer. In Indophil. the employee effectively resigned from his employment. Indophil is not applicable as a defense against petitioner’s dismissal of respondent. illegal dismissal occurred in this case. Unlike Indophil.Josefa. dismissed or suspended. the National Labor Relations Commission and the Court of Appeals did not find evidence that petitioner afforded respondent the opportunity to explain his failure or inability to report for work. Agusan del Sur and Post 33 at Picop Resources. this court takes notice of the considerable distance between respondent’s last known address at Sta. Applying the doctrine of "no work. Lastly. They found that petitioner’s allegation that respondent "simply vanished" did not discharge its burden of proving that respondent was dismissed for a just cause. willing and ready to work but was illegally locked out. no pay" principle contemplates a "no work" situation where the employees voluntarily absent themselves.the Complaint on March 14. the employer gave the employee a letter requiring him to report and explain his unauthorized absences. unless of course the laborer was able. respondent did not sleep on his right to resume work. In this case. Trento. there was no dismissal of the employee. Pacheo: If there is no work performed by the employee there can be no wage or pay. Respondent cannot be prejudiced by the six-month period.. to begin with. Upper New Visayas. 2002. no pay. Agusan del Sur.

as amended. a notice of the decision to dismiss. the valid and authorized causes of employment termination under the Labor Code. 442. 2001. the manner of dismissal. Sec. 2. .. Petitioner alleged that the filing of the Complaint took place six (6) months after the alleged date that respondent’s request to return to work was refused. Procedural due process requirements for dismissal are found in the Implementing Rules of P. The facts do not categorically state that petitioner refused to allow respondent to resume working on August 15. Breaches of these due process requirements violate the Labor Code. like Constitutional due process. i. the date of the filing of the Complaint should serve as the basis from which the computation of backwages should begin. the employer must give the employee two written notices and a hearing or opportunity to be heard if requested by the employee before terminating the employment: a notice specifying the grounds for which dismissal is sought a hearing or an opportunity to be heard and after hearing or opportunity to be heard. otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines in Book VI. The employer must always observe the employee’s right to due process. as amended by Department Order Nos. . i. The date when the incident took place was not specified. respondent is not entitled to backwages from August 15. 9 and 10. . Thus.e. Due process under the Labor Code. .It would be unjust if petitioner were ordered to pay respondent for the period of time that respondent could not and did not work. and procedural. Respondent’s right to procedural due process was not observed. 2002 until actual reinstatement.e. Rule I. has two aspects: substantive. 2001. Constitutional due process protects the individual from the government and assures him of his rights in criminal. civil or administrative proceedings. if the dismissal is based on a just cause under Article 282. the date of petitioner’s refusal to allow respondent’s return to work was not established in the findings of fact of the labor tribunals and the Court of Appeals.. Absent proof of the actual date that respondent first reported for work and was refused by petitioner. Yes. 8. In this case. Applying Standard Electric.D. the date of the Resolution dismissing the Complaint against respondent. while statutory due process found in the Labor Code and Implementing Rules protects employees from being unjustly terminated without just cause after notice and hearing. In Agabon: Procedurally. this court finds that respondent is entitled to full backwages starting only on March 14.

In Agabon. There was no attempt from petitioner to serve the proper notice on respondent at the address contained in its employment records. For these violations. petitioner admitted before the Court of Appeals that "respondent's last known address was given to the investigating court by Police Inspector Escartin. petitioner must be held accountable. this court awarded an amount as indemnity to the dismissed employee due to the violation of the right to procedural due process. This court deems it just to confer an additional award of P30. Petitioner sought to excuse itself by claiming that there was no address where the proper notice could have been served. Petitioner has violated respondent's right to security of tenure. However.000. petitioner violated respondent's right to procedural due process. The two-notice requirement was not followed. as well as his right to procedural due process. Respondent was replaced without being given an opportunity to explain his absence.00 to respondent.In this case. .

J. a foreign shipping company. as well as total disability benefits.00 corresponding to Grade 10 disability the company gave him. One day in September 2009 while at work. February 11. upon the lapse of the 120.. working for hours inside the freezer in sub-zero temperature. in case of absence of such a declaration either of fitness or permanent total disability. Carter). or.000. James E. Significantly. Carter (Dr. 211454. Inc. (petitioners). Camoral G. Camoral’s job required lifting and carrying heavy blocks of ice and using heavy equipment and tools.partial or permanent Ponente: Reyes.00. through its local agent. the NLRC noted that the medical report and disability assessment submitted by the petitioners after more than 120 days of . Rodolfo M. In April 2009. chest and hands. It became so intense that he dropped to the floor.Topic: Seafarer’s injury . With no income for more than 120 days and having been declared unfit to return to his previous job due to loss of his pre-injury capacity. United States of America. Maunlad Trans. he suddenly felt excruciating pain in his neck.or 240-day treatment period. Dr. He was instead offered $10. Inc. Camoral failed to get further financial assistance from the petitioners for his subsequent treatment and medications. 2009. Maunlad Trans. Inc. he sued the petitioners before the LA for total disability benefits of US$60. the company doctors having declared him “Fit for Sea Duty (Without Restriction)” after the requisite physical evaluations. while the employee’s disability continues and he is unable to engage in gainful employment during such period. citing Philippine Overseas Employment Administration Standard Terms and Conditions Governing the Employment of Filipino Seafarers on board Ocean-going Vessels (POEA SEC for brevity).. v. a Magnetic Resonance Imaging scan was performed on Camoral’s cervical spine on September 25. Pain relievers could not relieve the pain. and the ship’s doctor advised the Chief Chef that Camoral was unfit for further duty on board. On advice of the company doctor in Florida. An employee’s disability becomes permanent and total when so declared by the company-designated physician. No. 2015 Facts: For 18 years since 1991. As ice carver.. Issue: Whether the disability grading provided by the petitioners for Camoral’s impediment must control SC: No. and the company-designated physician fails to arrive at a definite assessment of the employee’s fitness or disability. Camoral was continuously deployed overseas by Carnival Cruise Lines.R. The pain quickly radiated to his shoulder. they took him on board M/S Carnival Sensation as ice carver for a period of eight months.075.

But even without this observation. It simply stated that he was suffering from impediment Grade 10 disability. it is not disputed that Camoral has been declared unfit by both the petitioners’ and Camoral’s doctors to return to his previous occupation. but without any evidence that in fact only one-third limitation of motion of the neck or moderate stiffness had affected Camoral. . This. to the Court.treatment and rehabilitation did not show how the partial permanent disability assessment of Camoral was arrived at. is akin to a declaration of permanent and total disability.

It claimed that Paz only worked for at least six months in 1995. store and transport tobacco leaves during the tobacco season of March to September.Topic: Retirement Pay Ponente: Leonen. Thus. Zenaida Paz v.” NTRCI hired Zenaida Paz (Paz) sometime in 1974 as a seasonal sorter. with two other complainants.00 as retirement pay. Inc. 2004.50. and/or Angelo Ang. (NTRCI)..00 daily salary by 22½ working days in a month. NTRCI raised the requirement of at least six months of service a year for that year to be considered in the retirement pay computation. 2015 Facts: Northern Tobacco Redrying Co.alOn May 18. it computed the retirement pay of its seasonal workers based on Article 287 of the Labor Code.. for three years. Thus. process.487. A year later. Northern Tobacco Redrying Co. Complainant Appellant ZenaidaPaz’s retirement pay should be computed pursuant to RA . 1999. J. No. 2003.000. Paz’s retirement pay amounted to P12.R.00 daily. NTRCI told her she would receive P12.” The National Labor Relations Commission in its Decision the Labor Arbiter’s Decision. G.50 after multiplying her P185. She signed a seasonal job contract at the start of her employment and a proforma application letter prepared by NTRCI in order to qualify for the next season. Paz was P12. NTRCI regularly re-hired her every tobacco season since then. NTRCI countered that no Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) existed between NTRCI and its workers. and 2000 out of the 29 years she rendered service. Inc. a flue-curing and redrying of tobacco leaves business. The Labor Arbiter in his Decision “confirmed that the correct retirement pay of Zenaida M.487. Paz. paid P185. Paz was 63 years old when NTRCI informed her that she was considered retired under company policy.. filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against NTRCI on March 4. employs approximately 100 employees with seasonal workers “tasked to sort. 199554 February 18.

The services petitioner Paz performed as a sorter were necessary and indispensable to respondent NTRCI’s business of flue-curing and redrying tobacco leaves. Issue: Whether the Court of Appeals properly computed the retirement pay of Zenaida Paz. . . until she was informed in 2003 that she was being retired under company policy. These considerations taken together allowed the conclusion that petitioner Paz was a regular seasonal employee. The Court of Appeals in its Decision dated May 25.356. Since respondent NTRCI failed to present a copy of a Collective Bargaining Agreement on the alleged retirement policy. . Paz.356.7641 and that all the months she was engaged to work for respondent for the last twenty eight (28) years should be added and divide[d] by six (for a fraction of six months is considered as one year) to get the number of years [for] her retirement pay. . Primarily. respondent NTRCI engaged the services of petitioner Paz as a seasonal sorter and had been regularly rehired from 1974. unable to find employment. This provides for the proper computation of retirement benefits in the absence of a retirement plan or agreement: . As regards to retirement benefits.50 as retirement pay. Article 287 of the Labor Code. entitled to rights under Article 279 Security of Tenure of the Labor Code. Zenaida Paz in the amount of P60. now that she is weak and old.” The Court of Appeals found that while applying the clear text of Article 287 resulted in the amount of P12. 2011 dismissed the Petition and modified the National Labor Relations Commission’s Decision in that “financial assistance is awarded to . “this amount was so meager that it could hardly support . SC: YES but with modification. Otherwise. governs. the Court applies Article 287 of the Labor Code.” It discussed jurisprudence on financial assistance and deemed it appropriate to apply the formula: One-half-month pay multiplied by 29 years of service divided by two yielded P60. She was also regularly rehired as a sorter during the tobacco seasons for 29 years since 1974.25 as Paz’s retirement pay.25. an employer may provide for retirement benefits in an agreement with its employees such as in a Collective Bargaining Agreement. as amended.487. 7641. as amended by Republic Act No.

The Court of Appeals found “no positive proof o[n] the total number of months [petitioner Paz] actually rendered work [for respondent NTRCI]. the National Labor Relations Commission found that petitioner Paz “became a regular seasonal employee by virtue of her long years of service and the repetitive hiring of her services by respondent NTRCI every season. Based on these factual findings.487. and 2000.50 and was awarded to petitioner Paz. retirement pay pursuant to Article 287 of the Labor Code was correctly computed at P12. both the Labor Arbiter and the Court of Appeals established from the records that she rendered at least six months of service for 1995. The Labor Arbiter agreed with respondent NTRCI’s computation based on these three years and reached the same amount as petitioner Paz’s retirement pay.In the absence of a retirement plan or agreement providing for retirement benefits of employees in the establishment. but not beyond sixty-five (65) years which is hereby declared the compulsory retirement age. On appeal.” It then considered her as having worked for every tobacco season from 1974 to 2003 or for a total of 29 years. 1999.50 as retirement pay based on the three years she worked for at least six months in 1995. who has served at least five (5) years in the said establishment. an employee upon reaching the age of sixty (60) years or more. a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one whole year. . 1999. and 2000 only.487. Respondent NTRCI followed the formula in Article 287 and offered petitioner Paz the amount of P12. Unless the parties provide for broader inclusions. may retire and shall be entitled to retirement pay equivalent to at least one-half (1/2) month salary for every year of service. the term ‘one-half (1/2) month salary’ shall mean fifteen (15) days plus one-twelfth (1/12) of the 13 th month pay and the cash equivalent of not more than five (5) days of service incentive leaves.” On the other hand.

Respondent Dela Torre embarked on January 21.R. . the pain in his back persisted and he was repatriated. 2010. Dela Torre. On August 5. a local manning agency. Associated Marine Officers’ and Seamen’s Union of the Philippines. G. On August 4./Arklow Shipping Netherland and/or Christopher Dumatol v. L4L5 and L5-S1 disc dehydration. he was informed of the assessment only in May 2011. and finally on March 10. no significant neural for aminal compromise. he figured in an accident and injured his lower back. as an able seaman on board M/V Arklow Venture for a period of nine months at a basic monthly salary of US$545." The next day. L2-L1 disc space is now defined but slightly narrowed". during the crew’s rescue boat drill at the port of Leith. called "CBA for Filipino Ratings on Board Netherlands Flag Vessels" (Dutch CBA). 2010. 2011. 2010. Sealanes Marine Services. right paracentral disc protrusion at L5-S1 causing minimal canal compromise. 2015 Facts: Respondent was hired by Sealanes Marine Services. in behalf of its foreign principal. Christopher Dumatol (Dumatol). through its President. An X-ray of his lumbosacral spine was taken at a hospital at the port." Respondent underwent several physical therapy sessions.00.Topic: Entitlement to disability benefits Ponente: Reyes. 214132. Nonetheless. that he sustained "lumbar spine degenerative changes with associated L1 compression fracture." Again on December 16. On January 27. J. also covered his contract. No. a Magnetic Resonance Imaging scan of his lumbar spine revealed an "acute compression fracture body of L1. 2011 the company-designated physician assessed him with a Grade 11 disability for slight rigidity or one-third loss of motion or lifting power of trunk. the respondent was referred by Sealanes to the Marine Medical Services of the Metropolitan Medical Center. or more than 240 days since the accident. Inc. an X-ray of his lumbosacral spine showed. Inc. per the medical report. 2010. an X-ray showed "compression deformity of L1 vertebra. An overriding CBA between the respondent’s union. his fourth X-ray still showed a "compression fracture. On August 1. but while according to his attending physician he sustained no major injury. Arklow Shipping Netherland (petitioners). Scotland. February 18. 2010. (Sealanes). Arnel G. and the Netherlands Maritime Employers Association. L1 with narrowed L2-L1 disc space.

It lasted until July 20. and (c) a total and temporary disability becomes permanent when so declared by the company-designated physician within 120 or 240 days. or upon the expiration of the said periods without a declaration of either fitness to work or permanent disability and the seafarer is still unable to resume his regular seafaring duties. the appellate concurred that the respondent was entitled to total permanent disability benefits. as the case may be. plus 10% as attorney’s fees for the reason that such an award cannot be made to depend on the company-designated physician’s disability assessment which was issued more than 120 days after the accident. In Kestrel Shipping Co. especially if despite treatment for more than 240 days the respondent was still unable to return to his accustomed work. the POEA SEC. the assessment may be deemed tentative . Although he was given a Grade 11 disability rating on March 10. Citing Articles 191 to 193 of the Labor Code. 2010 and immediately underwent treatment and rehabilitation at the company-designated facility. Such decision was affirmed by the NLRC The CA ruled that the seafarer’s right to disability benefits is determined not solely by the company’s assessment of his impediment but also by law. Marine Medical Services of the Metropolitan Medical Center. SC: Yes. Inc. (b) the 120 days of total and temporary disability may be extended up to a maximum of 240 days should the seafarer require further medical treatment. The respondent was repatriated on August 4. only those injuries or disabilities classified as Grade 1 are considered total and permanent. Section 2. exceeding the 240 days allowed to declare him either fit to work or permanently disabled. 2011. the parties’ CBA..000. Under Section 32 of the POEA SEC. 2011. the Court read the POEA SEC in harmony with the Labor Code and the AREC. Issue: Whether respondent is entitled to disability benefits.00 in disability benefits as provided in the Dutch CBA.The LA rendered judgment awarding him US$80. Munar. and the employment contract between the parties. v. contract and medical findings. and explained that: (a) the 120 days provided under Section 20(B) (3) of the POEA SEC is the period given to the employer to determine fitness to work and when the seafarer is deemed to be in a state of total and temporary disability. Rule X of the AREC.

because he continued his physical therapy sessions beyond 240 days. despite his long treatment and rehabilitation. which fact entitled him under the Dutch CBA to maximum disability benefits. Yet. . he was eventually unable to go back to work as a seafarer.

.

Avestruz boarded the vessel on May 4. damages. 2011.. petitioner A. hired Avestruz as Chief Cook on board the vessel M/V Nedlloyd Drake for a period of six (6) months. he filed a complaint for illegal dismissal. Inc. Maersk.P. which prompted Captain Woodward to issue weekly reminders. Unfortunately. He alleged that no investigation or hearing was conducted nor was he given the chance to defend himself before he was dismissed. and that Captain Woodward failed to observe the provisions under Section 17 of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Standard Employment Contract (POEA-SEC) on disciplinary procedures. and attorney’s fees against Maersk. illegal. with a basic monthly salary of US$698. despite the reminders. Avestruz. Moller Singapore PTE. Issue: Whether Avestruz was illegally dismissed.P..P. Toribio C. No. SC: Yes. Ltd.00. and Jesus Agbayani v. A. Avestruz failed to attend to his tasks. on behalf of its foreign principal. Subsequently. In their defense. specifically to maintain the cleanliness of the galley. On that same day he was dismissed. Moller. In order to discharge this . (Maersk). an officer of Maersk. 2015 Facts: Petitioner Maersk-Filipinas Crewing. payment for the unexpired portion of his contract. and Jesus Agbayani (Agbayani).P. A. Maersk-Filipinas Crewing. Moller.R. there was a commotion that took place regarding the job of Avestruz. February 18. Limited. A. If the employer fails to meet this burden. G. therefore. the conclusion would be that the dismissal was unjustified and. J. In the course of the weekly inspection of the vessel’s galley. 207010. Moller Singapore Pte. It is well-settled that the burden of proving that the termination of an employee was for a just or authorized cause lies with the employer. Inc.Topic: Illegal Dismissal Ponente: Perlas-Bernabe. and Agbayani (petitioners) claimed that during his stint on the vessel. Avestruz still failed to perform his duties properly.

no other evidence was presented by the petitioners to support their claims. petitioners should have offered additional proof to corroborate the statements described therein. the employer must present substantial evidence. While rules of evidence are not strictly observed in proceedings before administrative bodies. Apart from Captain Woodward’s e-mails. and not based on mere surmises or conjectures. which is defined as that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to justify a conclusion.burden. .

he then filed a complaint against JLFP for underpayment of salaries and wages. and/or Paolo C. LA dismissed Tatel's illegal dismissal complaint for lack of merit. Pamintuan. 2010. without having been given any assignments. Inc. hired Tatel as one of its security guards. Tatel was placed on "floating status". he filed another complaint for illegal dismissal. a business engaged as a security agency. The LA did not give credence to Tatel' s allegation of dismissal in light of the inconsistent statements he made under oath in the two (2) labor complaints he had filed against the respondents. non-payment of other benefits and 13th month pay.400. the CA declared that if Tatel could not be truthful about the most basic information or explain such inconsistencies. He was required to work twelve (12) hours everyday from Mondays through Sundays and received only Pl2..Bernabe. J. thus. On October 24. Tatel v. February 25. 2011 Decision and reinstated the LA's September 20. G. or after the lapse of six (6) months therefrom. . Vicente C. 206942. 2015 Facts: On March 14. In this regard. Inc. NLRC reversed and set aside the LA's Decision and found Tatel to have been illegally dismissed.R. however. Jose Luis F. on May 4. 1998. Finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in rendering its assailed Decision. No. CA. 2009 because of several infractions he committed while on duty. the same may hold true for his claim for illegal dismissal. it directed respondents to reinstate him to his last position without loss of seniority or diminution of salary and other benefits. 2009.00 as monthly salary. Tatel alleged that he was last posted at BaggerWerken Decloedt En Zoon (BaggerWerken) located in Manila.Topic: Illegal dismissal Ponente: Perlas. Consequently. respondent JLFP Investigation Security Agency. Turno. 2010 Decision dismissing the illegal dismissal complaint filed by Tatel. JLFP denied that Tatel was dismissed and averred that they removed the latter from his post at BaggerWerken on August 24. the CA instead concurred with the stance of the LA that Tatel' s inconsistent statements cannot be given weight vis-a-vis the evidence presented by the respondents. (JLFP). reversed and set aside the NLRC's February 9. JLFP Investigation Security Agency.

on the part of the employer has become so unbearable as to leave an employee with no choice but to forego continued employment." Constructive dismissal exists when an act of clear discrimination. or when there is cessation of work because continued employment is rendered impossible. 2009. 2009 Memorandum. as an offer involving a demotion in rank and a diminution in pay. In this case. the day following his removal from his last assignment with IPVG on October 23. 2009 and then to IPVG from October 21 to 23. In security agency parlance. he was not given any other postings or assignments. and not on August 24. Placing an employee on temporary "off-detail" is not equivalent to dismissal provided that such temporary inactivity should continue only for a period of six (6) months. which Tatel acknowledged to have received on December 11. they subsequently reassigned him to SKI from September 16. and until Tatel filed the instant complaint for illegal dismissal six (6) months later. respondents themselves claimed that after having removed Tatel from his post at BaggerWerken on August 24. SC: Yes. Tatel is therefore deemed to have been constructively dismissed. dismissed after having been placed on "floating status" for more than six ( 6) months. 2010. While it may be true that respondents summoned him back to work through the November 26. 2009. or on May 4. 2009 due to several infractions committed thereat. unreasonable. 2009 as erroneously held by the NLRC. 2009 to October 12. Thereafter. not actually. As the "off-detail" period had already lasted for more than six ( 6) months. or disdain. or unlikely. insensibility.Issue: Whether the CA erred in ruling that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion in finding Tatel to have been illegally dismissed. 2009. reckoned from October 24. being placed "offdetail" or on "floating status" means "waiting to be posted. records are bereft of evidence to show that he was given another detail or assignment. 2009. . Tatel was constructively.

Inc. PCPPI implemented a company-wide retrenchment program denominated as Corporate-wide Rightsizing Program (CRP) from 1999 to 2000.R. Pepsi – Cola Products. who are permanent and regular employees of the Tanauan Plant. PCPPI’s Tanauan Plant allegedly incurred business losses in the total amount of P29. et al.390. Leyte. Cabaobas v. Inc. received their respective letters. 2015 Facts: Respondent Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines. 1999.00.Topic: Retrenchment Ponente: Peralta. which operates plants all over the country. petitioners. Inc. 2000. led by Anecito Molon. No. petitioners alleged that PCPPI was not facing serious financial losses because after their termination. On September 24.” In their Consolidated Position Paper.Philippines. one of which is the Tanauan Plant in Tanauan. v. Said complaints were docketed as NLRC RAB VIII-030246-00 to 03-0259-00. Pepsi-Cola Products. entitled “Kempis. and retrenched forty-seven (47) employees of its Tanauan Plant on July 31. G. pursuant to PCPPI's CRP. 2000. (PCPPI) is a domestic corporation engaged in the manufacturing. v. Philippines. 176908.” On January 15. twenty-seven (27) of said employees.. March 25. In 1999. filed complaints for illegal dismissal before the NLRC which were docketed as NLRC RAB Cases Nos. et al. it regularized four (4) employees and hired replacements for the forty-seven (47) . VIII-9-0432-99 to 9-0458-99. Pepsi-Cola Products. VIII in Tacloban City. Petitioners then filed their respective complaints for illegal dismissal before the National Labor Relations Commission Regional Arbitration Branch No. 1999. Philippines. entitled “Molon.167. informing them of the cessation of their employment on February 15. bottling and distribution of soft drink products. Inc. To avert further losses. J.

On December 15. the Executive Labor Arbiter's Decisions dated December 15. . PCPPI). petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the CA. 3-0246-2000 to 3-0258-2000. They also alleged that PCPPI's CRP was just designed to prevent their union. which as of date amounted to P947.000. Dissatisfied. 2006. V000071-01 (RAB VIII cases nos. pursuant to its CRP. Kempis. PCPPI appealed from the Decision of the Labor Arbiter to the Fourth Division of the NLRC of Tacloban City. In support of its argument that its CRP is a valid exercise of management prerogative. 2000. the CA 18th Division issued a Resolution denying petitioners' motion for reconsideration.558.000. 2007. et al. Leyte Pepsi-Cola Employees UnionAssociated Labor Union (LEPCEU-ALU).. 2002. denying their petition and affirming the NLRC Decision dated September 11. the NLRC consolidated all other cases involving PCPPI and its dismissed employees. plus commutation of all vacation and sick leave credits.32 inclusive of the 10% attorney's fees. further ordering PCPPI to pay the complainants their package separation benefits of 1 & ½ months salary for every year of service.previously dismissed employees. from becoming the certified bargaining agent of PCPPI's rank-and-file employees. In its Position Paper. PCPPI countered that petitioners were dismissed pursuant to its CRP to save the company from total bankruptcy and collapse. On February 21. 2003. On September 11.00. Meanwhile. Petitioners and PCPPI filed their respective motions for reconsideration of the consolidated decision. PCPPI submitted audited financial statements showing that it suffered financial reverses in 1998 in the total amount of P27. Inc. 2000 until they are actually reinstated. Labor Arbiter Vito C. On July 31. 2000 and the dismissal of the complaints for illegal dismissal. a valid exercise of management prerogatives. and in its stead DECLARING the retrenchment program of Pepsi Cola Products Phils. the NLRC rendered a Consolidated Decision which provides among others the nullification of the NLRC Consolidated Case No. of which was allegedly incurred in the Tanauan Plant in 1999. Bose rendered a Decision finding the dismissal of petitioners as illegal and ordering PCPPI to reinstate them to their former positions without loss of seniority rights and to pay them full backwages and other benefits reckoned from February 16. it sent notices of termination to them and to the Department of Labor and Employment. the CA rendered a Decision. which the NLRC denied in a Resolution dated September 15. thus. vs. 2002.

In contrast. and that the petitioners were illegally terminated. are reasonably imminent as perceived objectively and in good faith by the employer. et al. 2006 a Decision granting their petition and reversing the same NLRC Decision dated September 11. the employer must prove the requirements for a valid retrenchment by clear and convincing evidence. 1999 as legal. said ground for termination would be susceptible to abuse by scheming employers who might be merely feigning losses or reverses in their business ventures in order to ease out employees. it falling under the exception of Article 263. Corollary thereto. Essentially. or if only expected. that the corporate rightsizing program or retrenchment was effected by PEPSI-COLA to be contrary to the prescribed rules and procedure. Labor Code. whichever is higher. 4 That the employer exercises its prerogative to retrench employees in good faith for the advancement of its interest and not to defeat or circumvent the employees’ right to security of tenure. earlier questioned the consolidated decision of the NLRC via a petition for certiorari the CA rendered on March 31. the prerogative of an employer to retrench its employees must be exercised only as a last resort. 2 That the employer served written notice both to the employees and to the Department of Labor and Employment at least one month prior to the intended date of retrenchment. 2002. and 5 That the employer used fair and reasonable criteria in ascertaining who would be dismissed and who would be retained among the . These requirements are: 1 That retrenchment is reasonably necessary and likely to prevent business losses which. considering that it will lead to the loss of the employees' livelihood. when Molon. Issue: Is the dismissal of the petitioners pursuant to PCPPI’s retrenchment program valid? Ruling: YES. but substantial. if already incurred. serious. It is justified only when all other less drastic means have been tried and found insufficient or inadequate. this petition. Hence. actual and real. otherwise. PCPPI had validly implemented its retrenchment program. 3 That the employer pays the retrenched employees separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay or at least one-half (½) month pay for every year of service. are not merely de minimis. The decision provides that the strike conducted on July 23.

age. such as status. Contrary to the CA’s observation that Pepsi had singled out members of the LEPCEU-ALU in implementing its retrenchment program.employees. Therefore. Pepsi’s Corporate Rightsizing Program was a company-wide program which had already been implemented in its other plants in Bacolod. Inc. given the general applicability of its retrenchment program. and financial hardship for certain workers.. it must be underscored that Pepsi’s management exerted conscious efforts to incorporate employee participation during the implementation of its retrenchment program. Moreover. seniority. Pepsi could not have intended to decimate LEPCEUALU’s membership. much less impinge upon its right to self-organization. as aptly pointed out by the NLRC. Consequently.e. when it employed the same. In view of the Court's ruling in Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines. Oppositely. records reveal that the members of the company union (i. LEPCEU-UOEF#49) were likewise among those retrenched. Lastly. as all the requisites for a valid retrenchment are extant. Records also show that the respondents had already been paid the requisite separation pay as evidenced by the September 1999 quitclaims signed by them. . General Santos and Zamboanga. Iloilo. Davao. the Court observes that Pepsi had validly implemented its retrenchment program. the allegation that the retrenchment program was a mere subterfuge to dismiss the respondents considering Pepsi’s subsequent hiring of replacement workers cannot be given credence for lack of sufficient evidence to support the same. the said quitclaims serve inter alia the purpose of acknowledging receipt of their respective separation pays. efficiency. physical fitness. Records disclose that both the CA and the NLRC had already determined that Pepsi complied with the requirements of substantial loss and due notice to both the DOLE and the workers to be retrenched. records indicate that Pepsi did proceed to implement its rightsizing program based on fair and reasonable criteria recommended by the company supervisors. Also. Effectively. respondents never questioned that separation pay arising from their retrenchment was indeed paid by Pepsi to them. In due regard of these requisites. On the final requirement of fair and reasonable criteria for determining who would or would not be dismissed. the Court finds Pepsi’s rightsizing program and the consequent dismissal of respondents in accord with law. As such. Records indicate that Pepsi had initiated sit-downs with its employees to review the criteria on which the selection of who to be retrenched would be based. the foregoing fact is now deemed conclusive.

There is no dispute that the issues. Molon. The Court rules in the affirmative. PCPPI contends that the petition for review on certiorari should be denied and the CA decision should be affirmed under the principle of stare decisis. the validity of PCPPI's retrenchment program. However. 2000. subject matters and causes of action between the parties in Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines. Inc. That the validity of the same PCPPI retrenchment program had already been passed upon and.e. Molon and the present case are identical. Molon case. thereafter. namely. 1999. Inc. Guided by the jurisprudence on stare decisis. v. v. v. impels the Court to accord a similar disposition and uphold the legality of same program. v. while petitioners belong to the second batch retrenched on February 15. even if the latter was not impleaded in the first case. the Court finds no such reasons were shown to obtain in this case. There is also substantial identity of parties because there is a community of interest between the parties in the first case and the parties in the second case. The doctrine of stare decisis embodies the legal maxim that a principle or rule of law which has been established by the decision of a court of controlling jurisdiction will be followed in other cases involving a similar situation. The only difference between the two cases is the date of the employees' termination. Inc. belong to the first batch of employees retrenched on July 31. Inc. i. . Molon. albeit involving different parties. Molon are petitioners' former co-employees and co-union members of LEPCEU-ALU who were also terminated pursuant to the PCPPI's retrenchment program. Molon. After a careful review of the records. v. It is founded on the necessity for securing certainty and stability in the law and does not require identity of or privity of parties. abandonment of the ruling in Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines. Inc.v. and the legality of its employees' termination. et al. Molon on the same issue of the validity of PCPPI's retrenchment program must be based only on strong and compelling reasons. The respondents in Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines. the remaining question is whether the factual circumstances of this present case are substantially the same as the Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines. sustained in the related case of Pepsi-Cola Products Philippines..