PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,

Petitioner,

G.R. No. 176933

Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, * J.
CARPIO MORALES,**
Acting Chairperson,
PERALTA,***
DEL CASTILLO, and
ABAD, JJ.

- versus -

LUIS PLAZA Y BUCALON,

Respondent.
Promulgated:
October 2, 2009
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Raising only questions of law, the Peoples petition for review on certiorari assails the
January 31, 2007 Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the November 12,
2002 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Surigao City, Br. 29 in Criminal Case
No. 5144 (the case) fixing bail for the temporary liberty of Luis Bucalon Plaza
alias Loloy Plaza (respondent) who was indicted for Murder.
The case was originally raffled to Branch 30 of the Surigao RTC presided by Judge
Floripinas Buyser (Judge Buyser).
After the prosecution rested its case, respondent, with leave of court, filed a
Demurrer to Evidence.[2] The Demurrer was denied by Judge Buyser by
Order[3] of March 14, 2002, the pertinent portion of which reads:
xxxx
The evidence thus presented by the prosecution is sufficient to
prove the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt, but only for the
crime of homicide and not for murder, as charged. This is because
the qualifying circumstance of treachery alleged in the information cannot
be appreciated in this case.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The defense thereupon presented evidence [4] in the course of which respondent
filed a Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond,[5] contending that in view of Judge Buysers
ruling that the prosecution evidence is sufficient to prove only Homicide, he could be
released on bail. He thus prayed that the bail bond for his temporary liberty be fixed
atP40,000.00 which he claimed was the usual bond for Homicide in the RTC of Surigao
City and Surigao del Norte.
In its Opposition to Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, [6] the prosecution
contended, in the main, that the case being for Murder, it is non-bailable as the
imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to death; that it is the public prosecutor who
has exclusive jurisdiction to determine what crime the accused should be charged with;
that the accused should have filed a motion/application to bail and not just a motion to
fix the amount of the bail bond; that the accused had already waived his right to apply
for bail at that stage of the proceedings; that Judge Buysers March 14, 2002 Order,
being a mere opinion and not a ruling or a dispositive part thereof, produced no legal
effect inasmuch as it had no jurisdiction to rule on a matter outside the Demurrer; and
that under the Rules, the prosecution could still prove the existence of treachery on
rebuttal after the defense has rested its case.
During the hearing of the Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond, Senior State
Prosecutor Rogelio Bagabuyo questioned Judge Buysers impartiality, prompting the
judge to inhibit himself and to order the case transferred to Branch 29 of the RTC for
further proceedings.
Branch 29 Presiding Judge Jose Manuel Tan (Judge Tan) heard the Motion to Fix
Amount of Bail Bond.
By Order[7] of November 12, 2002, Judge Tan, concurring with the finding of
Judge Buyser that since the prosecution evidence proved only Homicide which is
punishable by reclusion temporal and, therefore, bailable, ruled that respondent could
no longer be denied bail. He accordingly granted respondents Motion and fixed the
amount of his bond at P40,000.

Petitioners motion for reconsideration cum prayer for inhibition of Judge Tan was
denied for lack of merit.[8]
Respondent was subsequently released[9] after he posted a P40,000 bond.

Roberto Murcia (Roberto), the victims brother, impleading the People as copetitioner, assailed the trial courts orders via petition for certiorari [10] with the Court of
Appeals.
Roberto faulted Judge Tan for granting bail without an application for bail having
been filed by respondent and without conducting the mandatory hearing to determine
whether or not the prosecutions evidence is strong.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) adopted Robertos argument that the
grant of bail to respondent without any separate hearing is contrary to prevailing
jurisprudence.
By Decision of January 31, 2007, the appellate court, observing that the
allegations in respondents Motion to Fix Amount of Bail Bond constituted an application
for bail, dismissed Robertos petition and affirmed Judge Tans orders. [11]
In its present petition, the People contends that
THE COURT OF APPEALS DECIDED A QUESTION OF SUBSTANCE
CONTRARY TO LAW AND SETTLED JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT
RULED THAT THE HEARING CONDUCTED SATISFIES THE
REQUIREMENT OF DUE PROCESS AND THAT RESPONDENT IS
ENTITLED TO BAIL[12] (Underscoring supplied)

Section 13, Article III of the Constitution provides that "All persons, except those
charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is
strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on
recognizance as may be provided by law.
Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended, thus provides
that all persons in custody shall, before conviction by a regional trial court of an offense

not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted to bail as

a matter of right.
The exercise by the trial court of its discretionary power to grant bail to an accused
charged with a capital offense thus depends on whether the evidence of guilt is strong.
Stressing this point, this Court held:
. . . [W]hen bail is discretionary, a hearing, whether summary or
otherwise in the discretion of the court, should first be conducted to
determine the existence of strong evidence or lack of it, against the
accused to enable the judge to make an intelligent assessment of the
evidence presented by the parties. A summary hearing is defined as such
brief and speedy method of receiving and considering the evidence of guilt
as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of hearing which
is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of
bail. On such hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter
into any nice inquiry as to the weight that ought to be allowed to the
evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the outcome
of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and
admitted. The course of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court
which may confine itself to receiving such evidence as has reference to
substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary examination and cross
examination.[13] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Since Judge Tan concurred with the assessment by Judge Buyser of the
prosecution evidence when he denied the Demurrer and the latters statement that the
evidence was sufficient to convict respondent of Homicide, holding a summary hearing
merely to determine whether respondent was entitled to bail would have been
unnecessary as the evidence in chief was already presented by the prosecution.
The Peoples recourse to Section 5, [14] Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure to support its contention that respondent should be denied bail is unavailing,
for said Section clearly speaks of an application for bail filed by the accused after a
judgment of conviction has already been handed down by the trial court.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. Nos. L-32951-2 September 17, 1971

RICARDO DE LA CAMARA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL LOPEZ ENAGE, Presiding Judge of the Court of First Instance of
Agusan del Norte and Butuan City (Branch II), respondents.
Demosthenes Mediante, Puro Velez, Francisco Fabe, Federico del Puerto and Pelaez,
Jalandoni & Jamir for petitioner.
Hon. Manuel Lopez Enage in his own behalf.
RESOLUTION

FERNANDO, J.:
An order of respondent Judge Manuel Lopez Enage, fixing the bail of petitioner, Ricardo
de la Camara, in the sum of P1,195,200.00 is assailed in this petition for certiorari as
repugnant to the constitutional mandate prohibiting excessive bail. 1 The merit of the
petition on its face is thus apparent. Nonetheless, relief sought setting aside the above
order by reducing the amount of bail to P40,000.00 cannot be granted, as in the
meanwhile, petitioner had escaped from the provincial jail, thus rendering this case
moot and academic. It is deemed advisable, however, for the guidance of lower court
judges, to set forth anew the controlling and authoritative doctrines that should be
observed in fixing the amount of the bail sought in order that full respect be accorded to
such a constitutional right.

The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner, Ricardo, de la Camara, Municipal Mayor of
Magsaysay, Misamis Oriental, was arrested on November 7, 1968 and detained at the
Provincial Jail of Agusan, for his alleged participation in the killing of fourteen and the
wounding of twelve other laborers of the Tirador Logging Co., at Nato, Esperanza,
Agusan del Sur, on August 21, 1968. Thereafter, on November 25, 1968, the Provincial
Fiscal of Agusan filed with the Court of First Instance a case for multiple frustrated
murder 2 and another for multiple murder 3 against petitioner, his co-accused Nambinalot
Tagunan and Fortunato Galgo, resulting from the aforesaid occurrence. Then on
January 14, 1969, came an application for bail filed by petitioner with the lower court,
premised on the assertion that there was no evidence to link him with such fatal incident
of August 21, 1968. He likewise mantained his innocence. Respondent Judge started
the trial of petitioner on February 24, 1969, the prosecution resting its case on July 10,
1969. As of the time of the filing ofthe petition, the defense had not presented its
evidence.
Respondent Judge, on August 10, 1970, issued an order granting petitioner's
application for bail, admitting that there was a failure on the part of the prosecution to
prove that petitioner would flee even if he had the opportunity,but fixed the amount of
the bail bond at the excessive amount of P1,195,200.00,the sum of P840,000.00 for the
information charging multiple murder and P355,200.00 for the offense of multiple
frustrated murder. Then came the allegation that on August 12, 1970, the Secretary of
Justice, Vicente Abad Santos, upon being informed of such order, sent a telegram to
respondent Judgestating that the bond required "is excessive" and suggesting that a
P40,000.00bond, either in cash or property, would be reasonable. There was likewise a
motion for reconsideration to reduce the amount. Respondent Judge however remained
adamant. Hence this petition.
The answer filed by respondent Judge on March 5, 1971 set forth the circumstances
concerning the issuance of the above order and the other incidents of the case, which,
to his mind would disprove any charge that he wasguilty of grave abuse of discretion. It
stressed, moreover, that the challengedorder would find support in circulars of the
Department of Justice given sanction by this Court. He sought the dismissal of the
petition for lack of merit.
In the hearing of the case set for March 31, 1971, there was no appearance for both the
petitioner and respondents with the former, upon written motion, being given thirty days
within which to submit a memorandum in lieu of oral argument, respondent Judge in
turn having the same period from receipt thereofto file his reply. Such a memorandum
as duly submitted by petitioner on April 6, 1971.

Instead of a reply, respondent Judge submitted, on May 26, 1971, a supplemental

answer wherein he alleged that petitioner escaped from the provincial jail on April 28,
1971 and had since then remained at large. There was a reiteration then of the
dismissal of this petition for lack of merit, towhich petitioner countered in a pleading
dated June 7, 1971, and filed with this Court the next day with this plea: "The
undersigned counsel, therefore, vehemently interpose opposition, on behalf of
petitioner, to respondent's prayer for dismissal of the present petition for lack of merit.
For, the issue in this case is not alone the fate of petitioner Ricardo de la Camara. The
issue in the present petition that calls for the resolution of this Honorable Tribunal is the
fate of countless other Ricardo de la Camaras who maybe awaiting the clear-cut
definition and declaration of the power of trial courts in regard to the fixing of bail." 4
While under the circumstances a ruling on the merits of the petition for certiorari is not
warranted, still, as set forth at the opening of this opinion, the fact that this case is moot
and academic should not preclude thisTribunal from setting forth in language clear and
unmistakable, the obligationof fidelity on the part of lower court judges to the
unequivocal command of theConstitution that excessive bail shall not be required.
1. Before conviction, every person is bailable except if charged with capital offenses
when the evidence of guilt is strong. 5 Such a right flows from the presumption of
innocence in favor of every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom
as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless his guilt be proved beyond
reasonable doubt. Thereby a regimeof liberty is honored in the observance and not in
the breach. It is not beyondthe realm of probability, however, that a person charged with
a crime, especially so where his defense is weak, would just simply make himself
scarceand thus frustrate the hearing of his case. A bail is intended as a guarantee that
such an intent would be thwarted. It is, in the language of Cooley, a "mode short of
confinement which would, with reasonable certainty, insure the attendance of the
accused" for the subsequent trial. 6 Nor is there, anything unreasonable in denying this
right to one charged with a capital offense when evidence of guilt is strong, as the
likelihood is, rather than await the outcome of the proceeding against him with a death
sentence, an ever-present threat, temptation to flee the jurisdiction would be too great to
be resisted.
2. Where, however, the right to bail exists, it should not be rendered nugatory by
requiring a sum that is excessive. So the Constitution commands. It is understandable
why. If there were no such prohibition, the right to bail becomes meaningless. It would
have been more forthright if no mention of such a guarantee were found in the
fundamental law. It is not to be lost sight of that the United States Constitution limits
itself to a prohibition against excessive bail. 7 As construed in the latest American
decision, "the sole permissible function of money bail is to assure the accused's

presence at trial, and declared that "bail set at a higher figure than an amount
reasonablycalculated to fulfill thus purpose is "excessive" under the Eighth
Amendment." 8
Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the challenged order of August 10, 1970
fixing the amount of P1,195,200.00 as the bail that should be posted by petitioner, the
sum of P840,000.00 for the information charging multiple murder, there being fourteen
victim, and the sum of P355,200 for the other offense of multiple frustrated murder,
there being twelve victims, is clearly violative of constitutional provision. Under the
circumstances, there being only two offenses charged, the amount required as bail
could not possibly exceed P50,000.00 for the information for murder and P25,000.00 for
the other information for frustrated murder. Nor should it be ignored in this case that the
Department of Justice did recomend the total sum of P40,000.00 for the twooffenses.
3. There is an attempt on the part of respondent Judge to justify what, on its face,
appears to be indefensible by the alleged reliance on Villaseor v. Abano. 9 The
guidelines in the fixing of bail was there summarized, in the opinion of Justice Sanchez,
as follows: "(1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense; (3) penalty
for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5) health of the
accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the accused
appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused wasa fugitive
from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for appearance at trial
in other cases." 10 Respondent Judge, however, did ignore this decisive consideration
appearing at the end of the above opinion: "Discretion, indeed, is with the court called
upon to rule on the question of bail. We must stress, however, that where conditions
imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof and render
nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we will not hesitate to exercise our
supervisorypowers to provide the required remedy." 11
No attempt at rationalization can therefore give a color of validity to the challenged
order. There is grim irony in an accused being told that he has a right to bail but at the
same time being required to post such an exorbitant sum. What aggravates the situation
is that the lower court judge would apparently yield to the command of the fundamental
law. In reality, such a sanctimonious avowal of respect for a mandate of the Constitution
was on a purely verbal level. There is reason to believe that any person in the position
of petitioner would under the circumstances be unable to resists thoughts of escaping
from confinement, reduced as he must have been to a stateof desperation. In the same
breath that he was told he could be bailed out, the excessive amount required could
only mean that provisional liberty would bebeyond his reach. It would have been more
forthright if he were informed categorically that such a right could not be availed of.
There would have beenno disappointment of expectations then. It does call to mind

these words of Justice Jackson, "a promise to the ear to be broken to the hope, a
teasing illusion like a munificent bequest in a pauper's will." 12 It is no wonder that the
resulting frustration left resentment and bitterness in its wake.Petitioner's subsequent
escape cannot be condoned. That is why he is not entitled to the relief prayed for. What
respondent Judge did, however, does call for repudiation from this Court.
Nor is there any justification then for imputing his inability to fix a lesser amount by
virtue of an alleged reliance on a decision of this Tribunal. Even if one were charitably
inclined, the mildest characterization of such a result is that there was a clear reading of
the Abano opinion when such a meaning was ascribed to it. No doctrine refinement may
elicit approval if to doso would be to reduce the right to bail to a barren form of words.
Not only isthe order complained of absolutely bereft of support in law, but it flies in the
face of common sense. It is not too much to say that it is at war with thecommand of
reason.
With petitioner, however, having escaped from the provincial jail, no ruling can be had
on his plea to nullify the above order.
WHEREFORE, this case is dismissed for being moot and academic. Without
pronouncement as to costs.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Teehankee, Barredo and
Villamor, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., concurs in the result.
Makasiar, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 79269

June 5, 1991

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. PROCORO J. DONATO, in his official capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch XII, Manila; RODOLFO C. SALAS, alias Commander
Bilog, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Jose Suarez, Romeo Capulong, Efren Mercado and Movement of Attorneys for
Brotherhood, Integrity, Nationalism, Inc. (MABINI) for Rodolfo Salas.

DAVIDE, JR., J.:

The People of the Philippines, through the Chief State Prosecutor of the Department of
Justice, the City Fiscal of Manila and the Judge Advocate General, filed the instant
petition for certiorari and prohibition, with a prayer for restraining order/preliminary
injunction, to set aside the order of respondent Judge dated July 7, 1987 granting bail to
the accused Rodolfo Salas alias "Commander Bilog" in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 for
Rebellion,1 and the subsequent Order dated July 30, 1987 granting the motion for
reconsideration of 16 July 1987 by increasing the bail bond from P30,000.00 to
P50,000.00 but denying petitioner's supplemental motion for reconsideration of July 17,
1987 which asked the court to allow petitioner to present evidence in support of its
prayer for a reconsideration of the order of 7 July 1987.
The pivotal issues presented before Us are whether the right to bail may, under certain
circumstances, be denied to a person who is charged with an otherwise bailable
offense, and whether such right may be waived.
The following are the antecedents of this petition:
In the original Information2 filed on 2 October 1986 in Criminal Case No. 86-48926 of
the Regional Trial Court of Manila, later amended in an Amended Information 3 which
was filed on 24 October 1986, private respondent Rodolfo Salas, alias "Commander
Bilog", and his co-accused were charged for the crime of rebellion under Article 134, in
relation to Article 135, of the Revised Penal Code allegedly committed as follows:
That in or about 1968 and for some time before said year and continuously
thereafter until the present time, in the City of Manila and elsewhere in the
Philippines, the Communist Party of the Philippines, its military arm, the New
People's Army, its mass infiltration network, the National Democratic Front with
its other subordinate organizations and fronts, have, under the direction and
control of said organizations' leaders, among whom are the aforenamed
accused, and with the aid, participation or support of members and followers
whose whereabouts and identities are still unknown, risen publicly and taken
arms throughout the country against the Government of the Republic of the
Philippines for the purpose of overthrowing the present Government, the seat of
which is in the City of Manila, or of removing from the allegiance to that
government and its laws, the country's territory or part of it;

That from 1970 to the present, the above-named accused in their capacities as
leaders of the aforenamed organizations, in conspiracy with, and in support of
the cause of, the organizations aforementioned, engaged themselves in war
against the forces of the government, destroying property or committing serious
violence, and other acts in the pursuit of their unlawful purpose, such as . . .
(then follows the enumeration of specific acts committed before and after
February 1986).
At the time the Information was filed the private respondent and his co-accused were in
military custody following their arrest on 29 September 1986 at the Philippine General
Hospital, Taft Ave., Manila; he had earlier escaped from military detention and a cash
reward of P250,000.00 was offered for his
capture.4
A day after the filing of the original information, or on 3 October 1986, a petition
for habeas corpus for private respondent and his co-accused was filed with this
Court5 which, as shall hereafter be discussed in detail, was dismissed in Our resolution
of 16 October 1986 on the basis of the agreement of the parties under which herein
private respondent "will remain in legal custody and will face trial before the court having
custody over his person" and the warrants for the arrest of his co-accused are deemed
recalled and they shall be immediately released but shall submit themselves to the court
having jurisdiction over their person.
On November 7, 1986 , private respondent filed with the court below a Motion to Quash
the Information alleging that: (a) the facts alleged do not constitute an offense; (b) the
Court has no jurisdiction over the offense charged; (c) the Court has no jurisdiction over
the persons of the defendants; and (d) the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished,6 to which petitioner filed an Opposition7 citing, among other grounds, the
fact that in the Joint Manifestation and Motion dated October 14, 1986, in G.R. No.
76009, private respondent categorically conceded that:
xxx

xxx

xxx

Par. 2 (B) Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face
trial before the court having custody over his person.
In his Order of March 6, 1987,8 respondent Judge denied the motion to quash.
Instead of asking for a reconsideration of said Order, private respondent filed on 9 May
1987 a petition for bail,9which herein petitioner opposed in an Opposition filed on 27
May 198710 on the ground that since rebellion became a capital offense under the
provisions of P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834, which amended Article 135 of the Revised
Penal Code, by imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death on those who
promote, maintain, or head a rebellion the accused is no longer entitled to bail as
evidence of his guilt is strong.

On 5 June 1987 the President issued Executive Order No. 187 repealing, among
others, P.D. Nos. 1996, 942 and 1834 and restoring to full force and effect Article 135 of
the Revised Penal Code as it existed before the amendatory decrees. Thus, the original
penalty for rebellion, prision mayor and a fine not to exceed P20,000.00, was restored.
Executive Order No. 187 was published in the Official Gazette in its June 15, 1987 issue
(Vol. 83, No. 24) which was officially released for circulation on June 26, 1987.
In his Order of 7 July 198711 respondent Judge, taking into consideration Executive
Order No. 187, granted private respondent's petition for bail, fixed the bail bond at
P30,000.00 and imposed upon private respondent the additional condition that he shall
report to the court once every two (2) months within the first ten (10) days of every
period thereof. In granting the petition respondent Judge stated:
. . . There is no more debate that with the effectivity of Executive Order No. 187,
the offense of rebellion, for which accused Rodolfo Salas is herein charged, is
now punishable with the penalty of prision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P20,000.00, which makes it now bailable pursuant to Section 13, Article III, 1986
Constitution and Section 3, Rule 114, 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. Unlike
the old rule, bail is now a matter of right in non-capital offenses before final
judgment. This is very evident upon a reading of Section 3, Rule 114,
aforementioned, in relation to Section 21, same rule. In view, therefore, of the
present circumstances in this case, said accused-applicant is now entitled to bail
as a matter of right inasmuch as the crime of rebellion ceased to be a capital
offense.
As to the contention of herein petitioner that it would be dangerous to grant bail to
private respondent considering his stature in the CPP-NPA hierarchy, whose ultimate
and overriding goal is to wipe out all vestiges of our democracy and to replace it with
their ideology, and that his release would allow his return to his organization to direct its
armed struggle to topple the government before whose courts he invokes his
constitutional right to bail, respondent Judge replied:
True, there now appears a clash between the accused's constitutional right to
bail in a non-capital offense, which right is guaranteed in the Bill of Rights and, to
quote again the prosecution, "the existence of the government that bestows the
right, the paramount interest of the state." Suffice to state that the Bill of Rights,
one of which is the right to bail, is a "declaration of the rights of the individual,
civil, political and social and economic, guaranteed by the Constitution against
impairment or intrusion by any form of governmental action. Emphasis is placed
on the dignity of man and the worth of individual. There is recognition of certain
inherent and inalienable rights of the individual, which the government is
prohibited from violating" (Quisumbing-Fernando, Philippine Constitutional Law,
1984 Edition, p. 77). To this Court, in case of such conflict as now pictured by the
prosecution, the same should be resolved in favor of the individual who, in the
eyes of the law, is alone in the assertion of his rights under the Bill of Rights as

against the State. Anyway, the government is that powerful and strong, having
the resources, manpower and the wherewithals to fight those "who oppose,
threathen (sic) and destroy a just and orderly society and its existing civil and
political institutions." The prosecution's fear may or may not be founded that the
accused may later on jump bail and rejoin his comrades in the field to sow further
disorders and anarchy against the duly constituted authorities. But, then, such a
fear can not be a reason to deny him bail. For the law is very explicit that when it
comes to bailable offenses an accused is entitled as a matter of light to bail.Dura
est lex sed lex.
In a motion to reconsider12 the above order filed on 16 July 1987, petitioner asked the
court to increase the bail from P30,000.00 to P100,000.00 alleging therein that per
Department of Justice Circular No. 10 dated 3 July 1987, the bail for the, provisional
release of an accused should be in an amount computed at P10,000.00 per year of
imprisonment based on the medium penalty imposable for the offense and explaining
that it is recommending P100,000.00 because the private respondent "had in the past
escaped from the custody of the military authorities and the offense for which he is
charged is not an ordinary crime, like murder, homicide or robbery, where after the
commission, the perpetrator has achieved his end" and that "the rebellious acts are not
consummated until the well-organized plan to overthrow the government through armed
struggle and replace it with an alien system based on a foreign ideology is attained."
On 17 July 1987, petitioner filed a supplemental motion for reconsideration 13 indirectly
asking the court to deny bail to the private respondent and to allow it to present
evidence in support thereof considering the "inevitable probability that the accused will
not comply with this main condition of his bail to appear in court for trial," a
conclusion it claims to be buttressed "by the following facts which are widely known by
the People of the Philippines and which this Honorable Court may have judicial notice
of:
1. The accused has evaded the authorities for thirteen years and was an
escapee from detention when arrested;
2. He was not arrested at his residence as he had no known address;
3. He was using the false name "Manuel Mercado Castro" at the time of his
arrest and presented a Driver's License to substantiate his false identity;
4. The address he gave "Panamitan, Kawit, Cavite," turned out to be also a false
address;
5. He and his companions were on board a private vehicle with a declared owner
whose identity and address were also found to be false;
6. Pursuant to Ministry Order No. 1-A dated 11 January 1982 , a reward of
P250,000.00 was offered and paid for his arrest,

which "clearly indicate that the accused does not entertain the slightest intention to
appear in court for trial, if released." Petitioner further argues that the accused, who is
the Chairman of the Communist Party of the Philippines and head of its military arm, the
NPA, together with his followers, are now engaged in an open warfare and rebellion
against this government and threatens the existence of this very Court from which he
now seeks provisional release," and that while he is entitled to bail as a matter of right in
view of Executive Order No. 187 which restored the original penalty for rebellion under
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code, yet, when the interest of the State conflicts with
that of an individual, that of the former prevails for "the right of the State of selfpreservation is paramount to any of the rights of an individual enshrined in the Bill of
Rights of the Constitution." Petitioner further invokes precedents in the United States of
America holding "that there is no absolute constitutional barrier to detention of
potentially dangerous resident aliens pending deportation proceedings, 14 and that an
arrestee may be incarcerated until trial as he presents a risk of flight; 15 and sustaining a
detention prior to trial of arrestee charged with serious felonies who are found after an
adversary hearing to pose threat to the safety of individuals and to the community which
no condition of release can dispel.16
On 30 July 1987 respondent Judge handed down the Order 17 adverted to in the
introductory portion of this decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the
"supplemental" motion for reconsideration to be without merit and hereby denies
it but finds the first motion for reconsideration to be meritorious only insofar as
the amount of bail is concerned and hereby reconsiders its Order of July 7, 1987
only to increase the amount of bail from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00, subject to the
approval of this Court, and with the additional condition that accused Rodolfo
Salas shall report to the court once every two (2) months within the first ten (10)
days of every period thereof (Almendras vs. Villaluz, et al., L-31665, August 6,
1975, 66 SCRA 58).
In denying the supplemental motion for reconsideration the respondent Judge took into
account the "sudden turn-about" on the part of the petitioner in that a day earlier it filed
a motion for reconsideration wherein it conceded the right of the private respondent to
bail but merely asked to increase the amount of bail; observed that it is only a reiteration
of arguments in its opposition to the petition for bail of 25 May 1987; asserted that the
American precedents are not applicable since the cases involved deportation of aliens
and, moreover, the U.S. Federal Constitution does not contain a proviso on the right of
an accused to bail in bailable offenses, but only an injunction against excessive bail;
and quoted the concurring opinion of the late Justice Pedro Tuason in the cases of
Nava, et al. vs. Gatmaitan, L-4853, Hernandez vs. Montesa, L-4964 and Angeles vs.
Abaya, L-5108, October 11, 1951, 90 Phil, 172.
Unable to agree with said Order, petitioner commenced this petition submitting therein
the following issues:

THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED

WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS
JURISDICTION, AND IN TOTAL DISREGARD OF THE PREVAILING
REALITIES, WHEN HE DENIED PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION WITH PRAYER TO BE GIVEN THE OPPORTUNITY
TO ADDUCE EVIDENCE IN SUPPORT OF ITS OPPOSITION TO THE GRANT
OF BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO SALAS.
THE HONORABLE RESPONDENT JUDGE PROCORO J. DONATO ACTED
WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IN EXCESS OF HIS
JURISDICTION WHEN HE GRANTED BAIL TO THE RESPONDENT RODOLFO
SALAS.
in support of which petitioner argues that private respondent is estopped from invoking
his right to bail, having expressly waived it in G.R. No. 76009 when he agreed to
"remain in legal custody and face trial before the court having custody of his person" in
consideration of the recall of the warrant of arrest for his co-petitioners Josefina Cruz
and Jose Concepcion; and the right to bail, even in non-capital offenses, is not absolute
when there is prima facie evidence that the accused is a serious threat to the very
existence of the State, in which case the prosecution must be allowed to present
evidence for the denial of bail. Consequently, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse
of discretion when he did not allow petitioner to present all the evidence it may desire to
support its prayer for the denial of bail and when he declared that the State has forfeited
its right to do so since during all the time that the petition for bail was pending, it never
manifested, much less hinted, its intention to adduce such evidence. And that even if
release on bail may be allowed, respondent judge, in fixing the amount of bail at
P50,000.00 (originally P30,000.00 only), failed to take into account the lengthy record of
private respondents' criminal background, the gravity of the pending charge, and the
likelihood of flight.18
In Our resolution of 11 August 198719 We required the respondents to comment on the
petition and issued a Temporary Restraining Order ordering respondent Judge to cease
and desist from implementing his order of 30 July 1987 granting bail to private
respondent in the amount of P50,000.00.
In his Comment filed on 27 August 1987,20 private respondent asks for the outright
dismissal of the petition and immediate lifting of the temporary restraining order on the
following grounds:
I
RESPONDENT SALAS NEVER WAIVED HIS RIGHT TO BAIL; NEITHER IS HE
ESTOPPED FROM ASSERTING SAID RIGHT. ON THE CONTRARY IT IS
PETITIONER WHO IS ESTOPPED FROM RAISING THE SAID ISSUE FOR
THE FIRST TIME ON APPEAL.

II
RESPONDENT SALAS ENJOYS NOT ONLY THE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO BE PRESUMED INNOCENT BUT ALSO THE RIGHT TO BAIL.
III
RESPONDENT SALAS IS NOT CHARGED WITH A CAPITAL OFFENSE
(RECLUSION PERPETUA), HENCE HE HAS THE RIGHT TO BAIL AS
MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION.
IV
THE ORDER OF JULY 30, 1987 DENYING PETITIONER OPPORTUNITY TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE IS CORRECT. PETITIONER'S ALLEGED RIGHT TO
PRESENT EVIDENCE IS NON-EXISTENT AND/OR HAD BEEN WAIVED.
V
THE ISSUANCE OF A TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER IN THIS CASE
VIOLATES NOT ONLY RESPONDENT SALAS' RIGHT TO BAIL BUT ALSO HIS
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS.
We required the petitioner to reply to the comment of private respondent. 21 The reply
was filed on 18 September 1987.22
In Our resolution of 15 October 198723 We gave due course to the petition and required
the parties to file simultaneously their memoranda within twenty days from notice.
In their respective manifestations and motions dated 5 November 24 and 23 November
198725 petitioner and private respondents asked to be excused from filing their
Memoranda and that the petition and reply be considered as the Memorandum for
petitioner and the Comment as the Memorandum for private respondent, which We
granted in Our resolution of 19 November 1987 26 and 1 December 1987,27 respectively.
In Our resolution of 14 September 1989 We required the Solicitor General to express
his stand on the issues raised in this petitions,28 which he complied with by filing his
Manifestation on 30 May 199029 wherein he manifests that he supports the petition and
submits that the Order of respondent Judge of July 7, July 17 and July 30, 1987 should
be annulled and set aside asserting that private respondent had waived the light to bail
in view of the agreement in G.R. No. 76009; that granting bail to him is accepting wideeyed his undertaking which he is sure to break; in determining bail, the primary
consideration is to insure the attendance of the accused at the trial of the case against
him which would be frustrated by the "almost certainty that respondent Salas will lump
bail of whatever amount"; and application of the guidelines provided for in Section 10 of
Rule 114, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure on the amount of bail dictates denial of

bail to private respondent. The Solicitor General likewise maintains that the right of the
petitioner to hearing on the application of private respondent for bail cannot be denied
by respondent Judge.
And now on the issues presented in this case.
I.
Unquestionably, at the time the original and the amended Informations for rebellion and
the application for bail were filed before the court below the penalty imposable for the
offense for which the private respondent was charged was reclusion perpetua to death.
During the pendency of the application for bail Executive Order No. 187 was issued by
the President, by virtue of which the penalty for rebellion as originally provided for in
Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code was restored. The restored law was the
governing law at the time the respondent court resolved the petition for bail.
We agree with the respondent court that bail cannot be denied to the private respondent
for he is charged with the crime of rebellion as defined in Article 134 of the Revised
Penal Code to which is attached the penalty ofprision mayor and a fine not exceeding
P20,000.00.30 It is, therefore, a bailable offense under Section 13 of Article III of the
1987 Constitution which provides thus:
Sec. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion
perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by
sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be prescribed by law.
The right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ
ofhabeas corpus is suspended. Excessive bail shall not be required.
Section 3, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, as amended, also provides:
Bail, a matter of right: exception. All persons in custody shall, before final
conviction, be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a
capital offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission
and at the time of the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion
perpetua, when evidence of guilt is strong.
Therefore, before conviction bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a matter
of right when the offense charged is punishable by any penalty lower than reclusion
perpetua.31 To that extent the right is absolute.32
And so, in a similar case for rebellion, People vs. Hernandez, et al., 99 Phil. 515,
despite the fact that the accused was already convicted, although erroneously, by the
trial court for the complex crime of rebellion with multiple murders, arsons and
robberies, and sentenced to life imprisonment, We granted bail in the amount of
P30,000.00 during the pendency of his appeal from such conviction. To the vigorous
stand of the People that We must deny bail to the accused because the security of the

State so requires, and because the judgment of conviction appealed from indicates that
the evidence of guilt of Hernandez is strong, We held:
. . . Furthermore, individual freedom is too basic, too transcendental and vital in a
republican state, like ours, to be derived upon mere general principles and
abstract consideration of public safety. Indeed, the preservation of liberty is such
a major preoccupation of our political system that, not satisfied with guaranteeing
its enjoyment in the very first paragraph of section (1) of the Bill of Rights, the
framers of our Constitution devoted paragraphs (3), (4), (5), (6), (7), (8), (11),
(12), (13), (14), (15), (16), (17), (18), and (21) of said section (1) to the protection
of several aspects of freedom.
The 1987 Constitution strengthens further the right to bail by explicitly providing that it
shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended. This overturns the Court's ruling in Garcia-Padilla vs. Enrile, et al., supra.,
to wit:
The suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry
with it the suspension of the right to bail, if the government's campaign to
suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and rendered effective. If the right to
bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion, and those
arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they
would, without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby
jeopardizing the success of government efforts to bring to an end the invasion,
rebellion or insurrection.
Upon the other hand, if the offense charged is punishable by reclusion perpetua bail
becomes a matter of discretion. It shall be denied if the evidence of guilt is strong. The
court's discretion is limited to determining whether or not evidence of guilt is
strong.33 But once it is determined that the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail also
becomes a matter of right. In Teehankee vs. Director of Prisons, supra., We held:
The provision on bail in our Constitution is patterned after similar provisions
contained in the Constitution of the United States and that of many states of the
Union. And it is said that:
The Constitution of the United States and the constitution of the many
states provide that all persons shall be bailable by sufficient sureties,
except for capital offenses, where the proof is evident or the presumption
of guilt is great, and, under such provisions, bail is a matter of right which
no court or judge can properly refuse, in all cases not embraced in the
exceptions. Under such provisions bail is a matter of right even in cases of
capital offenses, unless the proof of guilt is evident or the presumption
thereof is great!34

Accordingly, the prosecution does not have the right to present evidence for the
denial of bail in the instances where bail is a matter of right. However, in the
cases where the grant of bail is discretionary, due process requires that the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all
the evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the
motion for bail.35
We agree, however, with petitioner that it was error for the respondent court to fix
the bond at P30,000.00, then later at P50,000.00 without hearing the
prosecution. The guidelines for the fixing of the amount of bail provided for in
Section 10 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court are not matters left entirely to the
discretion of the court. As We stated in People vs. Dacudao, et al., 170 SCRA,
489, 495:
Certain guidelines in the fixing of a bailbond call for the presentation of
evidence and reasonable opportunity for the prosecution to refute it.
Among them are the nature and circumstances of the crime, character and
reputation of the accused, the weight of the evidence against him, the
probability of the accused appearing at the trial, whether or not the
accused is a fugitive from justice, and whether or not the accused is under
bond in other case. . . .
In the instant case petitioner has sufficiently made out allegations which
necessitate a grant of an opportunity to be heard for the purpose of determining
the amount of bail, but not for the denial thereof because aforesaid Section 10 of
Rule 114 does not authorize any court to deny bail.
II.
It must, however, be stressed that under the present state of the law, rebellion is
no longer punishable byprision mayor and fine not exceeding P20,000.00.
Republic Act No. 6968 approved on 24 October 1990 and which took effect after
publication in at least two newspapers of general circulation, amended, among
others, Article 135 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalty for
rebellion such that, as amended, it now reads:
Article 135. Penalty for rebellion, insurrection or coup d'etat. Any
person who promotes, maintains, or heads a rebellion or insurrection shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
Any person merely participating or executing the commands of others in a
rebellion or insurrection shall suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
xxx

xxx

xxx

This amendatory law cannot apply to the private respondent for acts allegedly
committed prior to its effectivity. It is not favorable to him. "Penal laws shall have
a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a felony, who is not a
habitual criminal, as this term is defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code,
although at the time of the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same. 36
III.
We agree with Petitioner that private respondent has, however, waived his right
to bail in G.R. No. 76009.
On 3 October 1986, or the day following the filing of the original information in
Criminal Case No. 86-48926 with the trial court, a petition for habeas corpus for
herein private respondent, and his co-accused Josefina Cruz and Jose
Concepcion, was filed with this Court by Lucia Cruz, Aida Concepcion Paniza
and Beatriz Salas against Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel Ramos, Brig. Gen.
Renato de Villa, Brig. Gen. Ramon Montao, and Col. Saldajeno praying, among
others, that the petition be given due course and a writ ofhabeas corpus be
issued requiring respondents to produce the bodies of herein private respondent
and his co-accused before the Court and explain by what authority they arrested
and detained them. The following proceedings took place thereafter in said case:
1. In a resolution of 7 October 1986 We issued a writ of habeas corpus, required
respondents to make a return of the writ on or before the close of office hours on
13 October and set the petition for hearing on 14 October 1986 at 10:00 o'clock
in the morning.
2. On 13 October 1986 respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General,
filed a Return To The Writ of Habeas Corpus alleging therein that private
respondent and Josefina Cruz alias "Mrs. Mercado", and Jose Milo
Concepcion alias "Eugene Zamora" were apprehended by the military on
September 29, 1986 in the evening at the Philippine General Hospital Compound
at Taft Ave., Mangga being leaders or members of the Communist Party of the
Philippines, New People's Army and National Democratic Front, organizations
dedicated to the overthrow of the Government through violent means, and having
actually committed acts of rebellion under Article 134 of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended. After their arrest they were forthwith charged with rebellion before
Branch XII of the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region in Criminal Case
No. 86-48926 and on 3 October warrants for their arrest were issued and
respondents continue to detain them because of the warrants of arrest and the
pendency of the criminal cases against them. Respondents further allege that,
contrary to the allegation in the petition, herein private respondent was not a
member of the NDF panel involved in peace negotiations with the Government;
neither is he and his companions Cruz and Concepcion covered by any, safe
conduct pass issued by competent authorities.

3. At the hearing on 14 October 1986 the parties informed the Court of certain
agreements reached between them. We issued a resolution reading as follows:
When this case was called for hearing this morning, Attorneys Romeo
Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado, Edgardo Pamin-tuan,
Casiano Sabile, Ramon Cura, and William Chua appeared for the
petitioners with Atty. Capulong arguing for the petitioners. Solicitor General
Sedfrey Ordonez, Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and
Trial Attorney Josue E. Villanueva appeared for the respondents, with
Solicitor General Ordoez arguing for the respondents.
Petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, manifested in open Court that
in conformity with the agreement reached with the government, the
petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn with detainee Rodolfo Salas
to remain under custody, whereas his co-detainees Josefina Cruz and
Jose Milo Concepcion will be released immediately.
Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez, also in open Court, confirmed the
foregoing statement made by petitioners' counsel regarding the withdrawal
of the petition for habeas corpus, declaring that no objection will be
interposed to the immediate release of detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose
Milo Concepcion, and that no bond will be required of them, but they will
continue to face trial with their co-accused, Rodolfo Salas; further, that
they will not be rearrested on the basis of the warrants issued by the trial
court provided that they manifest in open Court their willingness to subject
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Court and to appear in court when
their presence is required.
In addition, he stated that he is willing to confer with petitioners' counsel
today relative to the compromise agreement that they have previously
undertaken to submit.
Upon manifestation of petitioners' counsel, Atty. Romeo Capulong, that on
his oath as member of the Bar, the detainees Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion have agreed to subject themselves to the jurisdiction of the
trial court, the Court ordered their immediate release.
Thereafter, the Court approved the foregoing manifestations and
statements and required both parties to SUBMIT to the Court their
compromise agreement by 4:00 o'clock this afternoon. Teehankee, C.J., is
on official leave.
4. At 3:49 o'clock in the afternoon of 14 October 1986 the parties submitted a
Joint Manifestation and Motion duly signed by Atty. Romeo Capulong, counsel for
petitioners, and Solicitor General Sedfrey Ordoez, Assistant Solicitor General

Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial Attorney Josue S. Villanueva, counsel for

respondents, which reads as follows:
COME NOW petitioners and the respondents, assisted by their respective
counsel, and to this Honorable Tribunal respectfully manifest:
1. That in the discussion between Romeo Capulong, petitioners' counsel,
and Solicitor General Sedfrey A. Ordoez on October 13, 1986 exploratory
talks were conducted to find out how the majesty of the law may be
preserved and human considerations may be called into play.
2. That in the conference both counsel agreed to the following terms of
agreement:
a. The petition for habeas corpus will be withdrawn by petitioners
and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion will be immediately
released but shall appear at the trial of the criminal case for
rebellion (People v. Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case No. 4886
[should be 86-48926], Regional Trial Court, National Capital
Judicial Region) filed against them under their personal
recognizance.
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face
trial before the court having custody over his person.
c. The warrant of arrest for the persons of Josefina Cruz and Jose
Milo Concepcion is hereby deemed recalled in view of formal
manifestation before the Supreme Court that they will submit
themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person.
3. That on October 14, the Solicitor General was able to obtain the
conformity of the Government to the foregoing terms which were likewise
accepted by petitioner (sic) and their counsel of record.
4. That the two counsel submitted their oral manifestation during the
hearing on October 14 and the present manifestation in compliance with
the resolution announced in court this morning.
WHEREFORE, it is prayed that the petition for habeas corpus be
dismissed.
5. On 16 October 1986 We issued the following resolution:
G.R. No. 76009 [In the Matter of the Petition for Habeas Corpus of
Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, et al. v. Hon.
Juan Ponce Enrile, Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, Brig. Gen. Renato de Villa, Brig.

Gen. Ramon Montao and Col. Virgilio Saldajeno] considering the Joint
Manifestation and Motion dated October 14, 1986 filed by Attorneys
Romeo Capulong, Arno V. Sanidad, Efren H. Mercado and Ricardo
Fernandez, Jr. as counsel for petitioners and Solicitor General Sedfrey A.
Ordonez and Assistant Solicitor General Romeo C. de la Cruz and Trial
Attorney Josue S. Villanueva as counsel for respondents which states that
they have entered into an agreement whereby: [a] the petition for habeas
corpus will be withdrawn by petitioners, and Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo
Concepcion will be immediately released but shall appear at the trial of the
criminal case for rebellion [People vs. Rodolfo Salas, et al., Criminal Case
No. 4886, Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch
XII, Manila], filed against them, on their personal recognizance; [b]
petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before
the court having custody over his person; and [c] the warrant of arrest for
the person of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion is hereby deemed
recalled in view of the formal manifestation before this Court that they will
submit themselves to the court having jurisdiction over their person and in
view of the said agreement, the petition for habeas corpus be dismissed,
the Court Resolved to DISMISS the petition for habeas corpus but subject
to the condition that petitioners' lead counsel, Atty. Capulong, upon his
oath as member of the Bar, shall abide by his commitment to ensure the
appearance of Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion at the trial of the
criminal case for rebellion filed against them. Teehankee,C.J., is on official
leave.
It is the stand of the petitioner that private respondent, "in agreeing to remain in legal
custody even during the pendency of the trial of his criminal case, [he] has expressly
waived his right to bail."37 Upon the other hand, private respondent asserts that this
claim is totally devoid of factual and legal basis, for in their petition for habeas
corpus they precisely questioned the legality of the arrest and the continued detention of
Rodolfo Salas, Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion, which was not resolved by this
Court or by the compromise agreement of the parties but left open for further
determination in another proceeding. Moreover, the matter of the right to bail was
neither raised by either party nor resolved by this Court, and the legal steps promptly
taken by private respondent after the agreement was reached, like the filing of the
motion to quash on 7 November 1986 and the petition for bail on 14 May 1987, were
clear and positive assertions of his statutory and constitutional rights to be granted not
only provisional but final and permanent liberty. Finally, private respondent maintains
that the term "legal custody" as used in the Joint Manifestation and Motion simply
means that private respondent agreed to continue to be in the custody of the law or
in custodia legis and nothing else; it is not to be interpreted as waiver.
Interestingly, private respondent admits that:
"Custody" has been held to mean nothing less than actual imprisonment. It is
also defined as the detainer of a person by virtue of a lawful authority, or the

"care and possession of a thing or person." (Bouviers Law Dictionary, Third Ed,
Vol. I, pp. 741-742 citing Smith v. Com. 59 Pa. 320 and Rolland v. Com. 82 Pa.
306)
He further admits that, in the light of Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court and
settled jurisprudence, the "constitutional right to bail is subject to the limitation that the
person applying for admission to bail should be in the custody of the law or otherwise
deprived of his liberty."38
When the parties in G.R. No. 76009 stipulated that:
b. Petitioner Rodolfo Salas will remain in legal custody and face trial before
the court having custody over his person.
they simply meant that Rodolfo Salas, herein respondent, will remain in actual physical
custody of the court, or in actual confinement or detention, as distinguished from the
stipulation concerning his co-petitioners, who were to be released in view of the recall of
the warrants of arrest against them; they agreed, however, "to submit themselves to the
court having jurisdiction over their persons." Note should be made of the deliberate care
of the parties in making a fine distinction between legal custody and court having
custody over the person in respect to Rodolfo Salas and court having jurisdiction over
the persons of his co-accused. Such a fine distinction was precisely intended to
emphasize the agreement that Rodolfo Salas will not be released, but should remain in
custody. Had the parties intended otherwise, or had this been unclear to private
respondent and his counsel, they should have insisted on the use of a clearer language.
It must be remembered that at the time the parties orally manifested before this Court
on 14 October 1986 the terms and conditions of their agreement and prepared and
signed the Joint Manifestation and Motion, a warrant of arrest had already been issued
by the trial court against private respondent and his co-accused. The stipulation that
only the warrants of arrest for Josefina Cruz and Jose Milo Concepcion shall be recalled
and that only they shall be released, further confirmed the agreement that herein
petitioner shall remain in custody of the law, or detention or confinement.
In defining bail as:
. . . the security given for the release of a person in custody of the law, . . .
Section 1 of Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court admits no other meaning or
interpretation for the term "in custody of the law" than that as above indicated. The
purpose of bail is to relieve an accused from imprisonment until his conviction and yet
secure his appearance at the trial.39 It presupposes that the person applying for it should
be in the custody of the law or otherwise deprived of liberty.40
Consequently, having agreed in G.R. No. 76009 to remain in legal custody, private
respondent had unequivocably waived his right to bail.

But, is such waiver valid?

Article 6 of the Civil Code expressly provides:
Art. 6. Rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order,
public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right
recognized by law.
Waiver is defined as "a voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a
known existing legal right, advantage, benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such
waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary abandonment or surrender, by a
capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that such right shall be
surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an
act inconsistent with claiming it."41
As to what rights and privileges may be waived, the authority is settled:
. . . the doctrine of waiver extends to rights and privileges of any character, and,
since the word "waiver" covers every conceivable right, it is the general rule that
a person may waive any matter which affects his property, and any alienable right
or privilege of which he is the owner or which belongs to him or to which he is
legally entitled, whether secured by contract, conferred with statute, or
guaranteed by constitution,provided such rights and privileges rest in the
individual, are intended for his sole benefit, do not infringe on the rights of others,
and further provided the waiver of the right or privilege is not forbidden by law,
and does not contravene public policy; and the principle is recognized that
everyone has a right to waive, and agree to waive, the advantage of a law or rule
made solely for the benefit and protection of the individual in his private capacity,
if it can be dispensed with and relinquished without infringing on any public right,
and without detriment to the community at large. . . .
Although the general rule is that any right or privilege conferred by statute
or guaranteed by constitutionmay be waived, a waiver in derogation of a statutory
right is not favored, and a waiver will be inoperative and void if it infringes on the
rights of others, or would be against public policy or morals and the public
interest may be waived.
While it has been stated generally that all personal rights conferred by statute
and guaranteed by constitution may be waived, it has also been said that
constitutional provisions intended to protect property may be waived, and even
some of the constitutional rights created to secure personal liberty are subjects of
waiver.42
In Commonwealth vs. Petrillo,43 it was held:

Rights guaranteed to one accused of a crime fall naturally into two classes: (a)
those in which the state, as well as the accused, is interested; and (b) those
which are personal to the accused, which are in the nature of personal privileges.
Those of the first class cannot be waived; those of the second may be.
It is "competent for a person to waive a right guaranteed by the Constitution, and to
consent to action which would be invalid if taken against his will." 44
This Court has recognized waivers of constitutional rights such as, for example, the right
against unreasonable searches and seizures; 45 the right to counsel and to remain
silent;46 and the right to be heard.47
Even the 1987 Constitution expressly recognizes a waiver of rights guaranteed by its
Bill of Rights.1wphi1 Section 12(l) of Article III thereof on the right to remain silent and
to have a competent and independent counsel, preferably of his own choice states:
. . . These rights cannot be waived except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
This provision merely particularizes the form and manner of the waiver; it, nevertheless,
clearly suggests that the other rights may be waived in some other form or manner
provided such waiver will not offend Article 6 of the Civil Code.
We hereby rule that the right to bail is another of the constitutional rights which can be
waived. It is a right which is personal to the accused and whose waiver would not be
contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a
third person with a right recognized by law.
The respondent Judge then clearly acted with grave abuse of discretion in granting bail
to the private respondent.
WHEREFORE, the Orders of respondent Judge of July 7, 1987 and July 30, 1987 in
Criminal Case No. 86-48926 entitled People of the Philippines vs. Rodolfo C.
Salas alias Commander Bilog/Henry, Josefina Cruz alias Mrs. Mercado, and Jose Milo
Concepcion alias Eugene Zamora, for Rebellion, are hereby NULLIFIED and SET
ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J., Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Feliciano,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Grio-Aquino, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento, J., took no part.

EN BANC
[A.M. No. RTJ-92-863 and AC. No. 3815. July 11, 1994.]
JOHNSON LEE and SONNY MORENO, Complainants, v. HON. RENATO E.
ABASTILLAS, Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50 Bacolod City, Respondent.
JUDGE RENATO E. ABASTILLAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ENRIQUE S.
CHUA, Respondent.
Enrique S. Chua for complainants.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Johnson Lee and Bonny Moreno filed with this Court a verified complainant dated June
8, 1992, docketed as Adm. Case No. RTJ- 863, charging respondent Judge Renato E.
Abastillas with a violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act for soliciting a bribe
in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 pending in his sala entitled "People v.
Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno," serious misconduct and conduct unbecoming a
member of the Bench, gross ignorance of the law, rendering unjust interlocutory orders
and manifest partiality, oppression and inordinate delay in the administration of justice
"which may result or has resulted in falsification of public documents or in the
commission of falsehood."cralaw virtua1aw library
In his comment dated September 28,1992, Judge Abastillas vehemently denied the
charges against him. He averred that Atty. Chua had an axe to grind against him
because of a prior incident between them. Judge Abastillas pointed out that on
September 28, 1992, Atty. Chua as counsel for the accused in Criminal Cases Nos.
10010 and 10011, filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration where he made
statements which were highly contemptuous of Judge Abastillas. Hence, according to
Judge Abastillas, he issued an order on March 2, 1993 requiring Atty. Chua to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt of court and recommended for
suspension from the practice of law. After due proceedings, Judge Abastillas issued an
order on March 11, 1993 finding Atty. Chua guilty of contempt of court and imposing
upon him a fine in the amount of P500.00. Judge Abastillas then recommended Co this
Court that Atty. Chua be suspended from the practice of law. This order of March 11,

1993 became the basis of Adm. Case No. 3815 entitled "Judge Renato Abastillas v.
Enrique S. Chua."cralaw virtua1aw library
The two administrative cases were consolidated and referred to Associate Justice
Alfredo J. Lagamon of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and
recommendation in a resolution of this Court dated May 6, 1993.
After hearing of the two cases, Justice Lagamon submitted his report recommending the
dismissal of the administrative complaint against Judge Abastillas in Adm. Matter No.
RTJ-92-863 and the imposition of appropriate disciplinary measures against Atty.
Enrique 5. Chua in Adm. Case No. 3815.
Evidence in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-563.
Complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 sought to prove their charges of violation
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and gross misconduct and conduct
unbecoming a magistrate against Judge Abastillas, through the affidavits and
testimonies of Johnny K.H. Uy, Johnson Lee and Atty. Enrique S. Chua.
The testimony of Atty. Chua who claimed to have delivered the bribe money of
P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas on May 2 or 3, 1991 as down payment of the
consideration for the dismissal of the criminal cases against his clients, is summarized
in the report of Justice Lagamon, to wit:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Atty. Enrique S. Chua as counsel for the complainants and also as their principal
witness declared in his Affidavit that when criminal cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 were
raffled to RTC, Br. 50, Bacolod City, presided by the respondent, he was heartened
because the respondent was among the few judges he was comfortable with.
Consequently, Atty. Chua allegedly approached the respondent in his chambers and
apprised him of the background of the cases and requested that the warrants of arrest
be held in abeyance because of the irregularity in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation. That the respondent accordingly instructed the docket clerk not to release
the warrants of arrest. After the clerk left, the respondent allegedly said, Ike, dont worry
toe much, anyway, that is not your personal problem. They are just cases of your
clients. What is important is that you are assured of your attorneys fees. Why, how
much is your fee there? P50,000.00? Make it double, so that I can have a share there
and I will take care of everything (Affidavit of Atty. Chua;
Exh.H).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Atty. Chua then apprised his client Johnson Lee of what happened and told him not to
worry but at the same time informed him that the judge is asking for P50,000.00 to take
care of everything. Johnny K.H. Uy advised Atty. Chua that they are willing to give
P50,000.00 to the respondent because of their sad experience with the Department of
Justice and insisted that the amount be given over the objections of Atty. Chua. That Mr.
Uy sent a check in the amount of P20,000.00 to Atty. Chua, which the latter should in
turn give to respondent as initial payment for the bribe. In the meantime, Atty. Chua

deposited the check in his account.

Sometime in the second week of April, 1991, the criminal docket clerk of the respondent
informed Atty. Chua that the bail bond for his clients was increased from P18,000.00 to
P100,000.00 each, upon ax paste motion filed by the private prosecutor. Aware of the
adverse development, Johnny Uy blamed Atty. Chua for not giving the money yet to
the Respondent. Atty. Chua again went to the chambers of the respondent where
accordingly he was advised by the latter to file a motion to strike out the ex-parte motion
for the reduction of the bail and at the same time moved for the reduction of the bail
provided it shall be in cash. The motion was filed and the respondent granted it the
following day. The respondent instructed Atty. Chua that the bail bond should be in cash
to facilitate the collection of his attorneys fees so that both of them can receive their
respective compensation for their efforts (Exh.H, par. 9).
Again, in his Affidavit Atty. Chua stated that on May 2, 1991 at about 4:00 oclock in the
afternoon he delivered P20,000.00 to the respondent and before he left the chambers,
the respondent jestingly said where will they celebrate that evening.
Moreover, he indicated therein that on January 29,1992, Johnson Lee and Atty. Chua
appeared before the Judicial and Bar Council and briefly related the delivery of the
P20,000.00 to the respondent where he was rebuked by Dean Palma for allowing
himself to be used as a conduit for illegal and immoral act. Dean Palma asked Atty.
Chua if he was not as guilty as the respondent (Affidavit, par. 16).
During the cross examination of Atty. Chua, he affirmed that his first meeting with the
respondent was between April 10 to 15, 1991 in his chambers when the criminal docket
clerk was instructed not to release the warrants of arrest (p. 52, TSN, Sept. 16, 1993; p.
41, TSN, Sept. 15, 1993). He further testified that it was also at that time when the
respondent solicited P50,000.00 when he said, why, how much is your fees there?
P50,000.00? You double it. (p. 54, TSN, Sept. 16, 1993). The second meeting was
when Atty. Chua discussed the reduction of the bail bend which he said could be on
April 17, 18 and 19, 1991, but most probably on the 18th (pp. 85, 86, TSN, Sept. 15,
1993), and the third meeting was when he delivered the P20,000.00 which he said was
on May 2, 1991 but which he rectified during cross examination that he withdrew the
amount on May 2, 1991 and the delivery of P20,000.00 to the respondent was on May
3, 1991 at about 4:00 oclock in the afternoon (pp. 63-64, TSN, Sept. 15,
1993).chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
"In the Memorandum filed by Atty. Chua on Dec. 28, 1993, he pointed out the following
facts which were either admitted or undisputed and which he believes established the
misconduct and the impropriety of the respondent as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
a) Respondent Judges admission that he met complainant Lee ahead of witness
Johnny Uy, whom he tagged as the financier of the herein complainants on May 29,
1991; while he met Uy only on October 7, 1991 (p. 11, Comment dated September 28,

1992 of respondent).
b) Respondent Judges admission that, indeed, on May 29, 1991, he and complainant
Lee saw each other at the Quezon City Sports Center, during the meeting of the
Philippine Judges Association (p. 11, Comment, supra).
c) As to witness Uy, respondent Judge admitted that it is true that respondent met with
Johnny N.H. Uy on October 7, 1991 at the residence of respondent at Unit A-2, 157
Katipunan Road Quezon City . . . (p. 7, Comment, supra).
Atty. Chua is of the opinion that the meeting of the respondent with the accused who
were charged with two (2) criminal cases before his sala will render him liable for gross
misconduct or conduct unbecoming of (sic) a magistrate."cralaw virtua1aw library
Atty. Chua further declared that after he delivered the P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas,
the latter told him that the accused (in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011) could see
the Judge at the forthcoming convention of Philippine Judges Association to be held at
the Quezon City Sports Center.
Johnson Lee, one of the accused in the Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011,
narrated on the witness stand that he received a long distance call from Atty. Chua
advising him that Judge Abastillas wanted to see him (Johnson Lee) at the Quezon City
Sports Center on May 29, 1991 where the Philippine Judges Association was to hold a
convention. Johnson Lee went to the place on said date. Alter introducing himself to
Judge Abastillas, they repaired to a function room where they had a private
conversation for about twenty minutes. During the meeting, Johnson Lee naked Judge
Abastillas if he had received what they sent to Atty. Chua. Judge Abastillas said yes, but
added, "I cannot give you what you are asking. It will take a little time to study." Johnson
Lee responded by saying, "Judge, the balance later on na lang." Judge Abastillas
replied, "Okay, okay. Anyway, I know they have no case against
you." chanrobles.com:cralaw:red
On the same occasion, Johnson Lee took the opportunity to ask Judge Abastillas why
he approved three ex-parte motions of the private prosecutor in the criminal cases, one,
for issuance of a warrant of arrest of the accused and, another, for increase of their bail
bond, without giving the accused an opportunity to oppose the same. Judge Abastillas
assured Johnson Lee that there was nothing to worry "because that is my style. I will
just give them a little favor. Anyway, the case will be decided in your favor."cralaw
virtua1aw library
Before they parted, Johnson Lee told Judge Abastillas that one Johnny Uy, a brother of
Ban Hun Flores, who had a hand in the filing of the criminal cases, wanted to see the
judge. Judge Abastillas said yes. "You just give him my telephone number and call me."
Judge Abastillas had earlier given Johnson Lee his calling card bearing his telephone
number 7222968.

The meeting of Judge Abastillas with Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center
became the basis for the charges of "gross misconduct and conduct unbecoming of
(sic) a magistrate."cralaw virtua1aw library
Johnny K.H. Uy testified that he was concerned with the two cases pending before
Judge Abastillas where the accused were charged with embezzlement of the funds of
Neugene Marketing Corporation. According to Uy, he was interested in the outcome of
the cases, more particularly in the acquittal of the accused, for the reason that the
pendency of the criminal cases had adversely affected the operation of the corporation,
75% of which stocks had been assigned to him. Uy declared that he visited Judge
Abastillas at his residence in St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City, on October 7, 1991 at
about 11:30 in the morning. Before going to Judge Abastillas house, Uy called him by
telephone and Judge Abastillas gave him the direction of his place. During that visit,
where the background and merits of the criminal cases were discussed, Judge
Abastillas assured Uy that he would take care of the cases. Before they parted Judge
Abastillas told Uy to ask Johnson Lee if he could help Judge Abastillas with 5,000 U.S.
dollars. Uy replied that he would talk to Johnson Lee about the matter and would inform
Judge Abastillas by telephone of the result. On October 16, 1991 at about 7:00 oclock
in the evening, Uy called up Judge Abastillas telling him that there will be no problem
about the 5T (meaning US $5,000.00) as long as the cases of Johnson Lee will be
cleared first. Judge Abastillas told Uy to take up the matter with Al Simbulan. Al
Simbulan, a lawyer, was a mutual friend of Uy and Judge Abastillas. The telephone
conversation was taped by Uy (Exh. "B").
Going back to the testimony of Johnson Lee, said witness further declared that
sometime in the middle of June, 1991, Atty. Simbulan called his office and left a note
that they would have dinner with Judge Abastillas at six oclock in the evening at Manila
Hotel. Johnson Lee obliged. Towards the end of the dinner, Judge Abastillas told
Johnson Lee and Atty. Simbulan in a low voice: "Johnson, dont worry," Huwag kang
mag-alala. Nakatimbre na ang kaso nyo sa akin.chanrobles law library
After some waiting and obviously realizing that Judge Abastillas was giving the accused
a runaround, not having done anything relative to the criminal proceedings to indicate
that he would perform his part of the bargain, Johnson Lee appeared before the Judicial
and Bar Council (JBC) sometime in the middle of 1992 to oppose Judge Abastillas
application for transfer to Manila as RTC Judge on the ground of his lack of good moral
character. Johnson Lee saw Justice Loreno Relova to whom he cited the incidents
where the Judge allegedly solicited money in the sums of P50,000.00 and $5,000.00
and accepted the amount of P20,000.00 in connection with Criminal Cases Nos. 10010
and 10011. Justice Relova advised him to come back together with Johnny Uy and
bring with them the tape containing the conversation between Johnny Uy and Judge
Abastillas in the evening of October 16, 1991. A week later or on January 29, 1991
Johnson Lee, together with Johnny Uy and Atty. Chua, returned to JBCs office where
the tape was replayed before then JBC member Calcetas-Santos. Atty. Calcetas-Santos
obtained an English translation of the taped conversation and gave it to Justice Relova
and Dean Rodolfo Palma, another JBC member. Both extensively interrogated Johnson

Lee, Johnny Uy and Atty. Chua. At one point, Dean Palma sternly reprimanded Atty.
Chua for having allowed himself to be a conduit in the bribery, pointedly reminding Chua
that by delivering himself the advance payment of P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas, he
was as guilty as the judge.
As specifics in support of their other charges against Judge Abastillas, complainants in
Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 averred and sought to prove the following:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
1.) When complainants Filed a Consolidated Motion to Quash the Information in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, Judge Abastillas, instead of acting on the same,
issued an order for their arrest and confiscation of their bailbonds in view of their failure
to appear at the arraignment scheduled for that day;
2.) Likewise, although complainants had already posted bail, Judge Abastillas still
insisted that they be present at their arraignment. Judge Abastillas gave preferential
treatment to some cases, particularly Criminal Cases Nos. 8846 and 8847, entitled
"People v. Espinosa" for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Acts and for Illegal
Possession of Firearms and Ammunitions, which were heard and the accused acquitted
in just five (5) months, and in which the accused were not required to be present at the
hearing of the Motion to Quash the Information; whereas in connection with
complainants Consolidated Motion to Quash the Information, their presence was
required in a "full-blown type of hearing" and the motion was denied in open court in a
"trifling manner.
3.) Complainants Urgent Motion to Reset Arraignment and to Set Arraignment, Pre-trial
and Continuous Trial dated June 2, 1991 was arbitrarily denied, their bonds were
declared forfeited and the bondsmen were asked to show cause why no judgment shall
be rendered against them for the amount of their bonds. In addition, Judge Abastillas
issued an order for complainants arrest and fixed an excessive bond of P50,000.00
each for their provisional liberty.
4.) In Criminal Case No. 8847, Judge Abastillas issued an order posthaste requiring the
delivery to court of the illegally possessed firearm and ammunition, which order was not
necessary because the items should have been forfeited in favor of the Government
and deposited in Camp Crame.
5.) Two of complainants motions in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 had
remained unresolved beyond the 90-day reglementary period.
In his verified Comments dated September 28, 1992 and Sworn Affidavit of October 22,
1993, as well as in his testimony in his own behalf, Judge Abastillas denied having
solicited P50,000.00 from Atty. Chua or having received P20,000.00 from him as initial
payment at 4:00 p.m. on May 2 or May 3, 1991. To prove his defense, Judge Abastillas
obtained a joint affidavit from the personnel of his sala, namely, Pablo D. Juguan
(Branch Clerk of Court), Estanes A. Alvior (Legal Researcher), Aurora Leda S. Exito,

Alma M. Ronato, Wilma B. Cepeda and Julieta D. Jarce (Stenographers), Diana B.

Lamur (Interpreter), Amando N. Eso (Deputy Sheriff), Maribec B. Alvior (Staff Asst. 2)
and Edwin O. Navaja (RTC Aide) stating, in essence, that during the incumbency of
Judge Abastillas of RTC Branch 50 in Bacolod City, they had never seen Atty. Chua
enter the judges chambers.chanrobles law library
While on direct examination, Atty. Chua declared that he delivered the P20,000.00 to
Judge Abastillas either on May 2 or May 3 of 1991, on cross-examination Atty. Chua at
one point adverted when pressed to give the exact date that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q Now, we go back to your allegation that sometime either on May 2 or the next day,
you delivered P20,000.00 to Judge Abastillas?
"A Yes. Correct.
"Q Can you please be a little bit more specific. Was it May 2 or May 3?
"A Because as far as I can recall, when I appeared before the JBC I had then with me
my old bank passbook. I traced the deposit and withdrawal in that passbook. There was
a withdrawal on May 2, 1991 of the sum of P20,000.00. So most probably, its either on
that very same day or immediately the next day that I delivered the money.
"A I think most probably it would be May 3 because if I am not mistaken, the next day is
either a non-working day or a Saturday and I remember that. Yes, yes. Correct. when I
placed the P20,000.00 in my attache case, I remember my kid commenting that Papa,
you have so much money in your attache case. So the money stayed overnight with
me. Yes, Correct. It was May 3." (TSN, p. 11, Sept. 15, 1993.)
Seizing upon Atty. Chuns above-quoted assertion that the delivery of the money "most
probably was on May 3,1991, Judge Abastillas argued that he could not have received
the money in the afternoon of May 3 as he left Bacolod City early in the morning of that
day by ferry boat for Iloilo City and then proceeded by car to Roxas City where he
stayed up to the following day to attend a testimonial in honor of Justice Bellosillo who
was appointed as Court Administrator. To prove his alibi, Judge Abastillas submitted an
affidavit of Judge Bernardo T. Ponferrada (then Presiding Judge of Branch 42, RTC,
Bacolod City) certifying that he and his wife were with Judge Abastillas in their journey
to Roxas City. Judges Sergio Pestano, Ramon B. Berjamin and Jose V. Alovera of the
Regional Trial Court at Roxas City also executed a joint affidavit to the effect that Judge
Abastillas arrived at Roxas City just before noon of May 3, 1991 where he stayed up to
the following day.cralawnad
Judge Abastillas admitted that he met Johnson Lee on May 29, 1991 at the Quezon City
Sports Center during the convention of the Philippine Judges Association. But he
denied having asked Johnson for a meeting there or having talked to him privately
regarding the criminal cases. Judge Abastillas said that RTC Judge Joselito de la Rosa
of Manila, was introduced to him by Judge Ponferrada. Judge de la Rosa, a friend of

Johnson Lee, in turn introduced Lee to him. According to Judge Abastillas, he gave his
calling card to Judge de la Rosa who must have handed it to Johnson Lee afterward.
This was the same calling card that was introduced as evidence by the complainants in
Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863.
Judge Abastillas, likewise, confirmed the fact that he met Johnson Lee at the Manila
Hotel in the evening of June 7, 1991 but that the latter was never invited by him to be
there on that occasion. This is the account of Judge Abastillas in his sworn affidavit
(Exh. "27") of the meeting:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"23. It is true that Lee attended the dinner which I and my wife had with my cousin and
his wife, Mr. and Mrs. Arturo Sena, at the Manila Hotel on the evening of June 7, 1991.
He was a gatecrasher on that occasion. what happened was this: My cousin and I
agreed to a foursome at the Manila Hotel on June 7, 1991. When my wife and I were
already on our way to the Manila Hotel, Atty. Simbulan called me up and said he wanted
to see me. I told him that I was going to a dinner at the Manila Hotel. He insisted in
seeing me; and I had an inkling it was because of the above-mentioned criminal cases,
so I told him, I was willing to see him, as long as he did not bring along either or both
Lee or Moreno. (Prior to this, he informed me that Lee and Moreno were clients of his
partner, Atty. Pineda), and I made this condition because I did not want to meet Lee
and/or Moreno outside of the court and especially not during a social occasion; I was
willing to see Atty. Simbulan because his brother is a friend of mine, and he was counsel
for one of my brothers-in law (bilas-husband of my wifes sister). Atty. Simbulan agreed
that he would not take with him either of his clients, so I told him to join us at the Manila
Hotel. Much to my surprise and anger, Lee was at the Manila Hotel Lobby, when he
reached the place. So, when I saw Atty. Simbulan, I asked him: Bakit ba nandito iyan?
(Why is that person here?). Atty. Simbulan answered: Ewan ko ba diyan. Pasensiya ka
na; Huwag ka nang magalit. Hayaan mo na siya (I dont know. Please be patient; dont
get angry. Let him join us). I contained my irritation. My cousin and his wife, and my wife
were civil and hospitable. We, Filipinos, are a hospitable people. Unlike Americans, we
tolerate gatecrashers, as in this instance of gatecrashing by Johnson Lee, who is a very
pushy person, as indeed he also gatecrashed during the Judges Convention.
Furthermore, as indicated by their attempts to see and talk to Justice Alfredo Lagamon,
the Investigating Justice in this proceeding.
"24. During the dinner, altho my wife, my cousin and his wife tried to be cordial to Lee, I
showed my displeasure by not addressing him. It is not true that I told him I will take
care of the two criminal cases." (At pp. 13 and 14.)
Again, Judge Abastillas did not deny that Johnson Lee, one of the accused in Criminal
Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, went to his residence at Quezon City on October 7,
1991. But the visit, according to Judge Abastillas, was not at his own initiative and the
amount of $5,000.00 was never discussed on that occasion. This is his version of the
meeting:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"25. It is not true that on October 7, 1991 that I asked for $5,000.00 from Johnny Uy. He

did come to my residence on that date, but that was not on my initiative. Prior to
October 7, 1991, I had been getting word from our maid and from my son, that a certain
Mr. Uy had been calling up asking for me, but refused to leave any message. And then
on October 7, 1991, just as I was preparing to go out for a luncheon meeting, our maid
informed me a certain Mr. Uy wanted to talk to me over the phone. When I answered
the phone Johnny Uy introduced himself and insisted that I let him come over to my
house; he said he wanted to talk to me and explain his S.E.C. Case where his sister
Banhua is opposing party. He did not say outright that he was going to discuss the
Criminal Cases against Lee and Moreno; if he had, I would have refused to see him,
because I did not want to talk with or about Lee, at this time, I was getting fed up with
the pushiness and aggressive behavior of Uy, who plainly wanted to establish a close
relationship with me. Uy was very insistent that I see him, so just to accommodate him, I
agreed to see him. And he came to my house on said date, October 7, 1991. He did talk
about the S.E.C. case and also about Commissioners. I never asked him for $5,000.00.
I never asked him for money, Philippine or American currency, on that occasion, or over
the phone. Uy was lying when he testified that when he came to see me at home, I
asked for $5,000.00 from him and/or Lee. He was likewise lying when he said that in a
telephone conversation with me on October 16, 1991, said $5,000.00 was discussed.
That is not true. It is possible I may have talked with him over the phone, but I
categorically declare that I have never mentioned, nor have we ever discussed
$5,000.00. Also, I have never consented to the taping of any conversation, with him, or
with anybody else." (Sworn Statement, Exh. "27", pp. 14 and 15.)chanrobles virtual
lawlibrary
Evidence in Adm. Case No. 3815
The offending statements of Atty. Chua that were the subject of the March 11, 1993
contempt order were contained in the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration dated
February 21, 1992 he filed in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011, to wit:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
1.And at the risk of incurring the ire of the Court, defense counsel regrets to say that in
denying the six (6) incidents in the manner above-described, the Court acted no better
than a pre-school kid who murmurs a favorite nursery rime (sic) (Page 3, par. 5 of the
Motion).
2.To put it bluntly, Accused have the feeling that these cases are being railroaded
against them (Page 5, 2nd par. of the Motion).
3.Inasmuch as this motion not only seeks to reconsider the various palpable erroneous
actuations of the Court, which have gone so far out of hand, but also cries for prompt
extraordinary remedies or corrective disciplinary sanctions urgently required, so as to
restore order and sanity in the entangled situations created by the series of plainly and
outrageously, if not maliciously, erroneous orders of His Honor, which are highly
prejudicial to the rights of the accused and injurious to the administration of justice and
in effect, constitute a desecration of our entire judicial system, which have therefore

rendered the President Judge RENATO E. ABASTILLAS unfit to continue wearing the
judicial robe and sitting any second longer in the Bench, a copy of this Motion is made
under oath and furnished the Supreme Court thru the Hon. Chief Justice Andrea R.
Narvasa; Judicial and Bar Council and the Court Administrator, without prejudice to the
impending formal administrative complaint the accused will in due time institute with the
Supreme Court (Page 12, No. (7) of the Motion)."cralaw virtua1aw library
In the course of the joint hearing of the administrative cases, Judge Abastillas expanded
his charges against Atty. Chua to include the following:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
A.) Atty Chua does not have the good moral character required of a member of the Bar
and he violated his oath of office for the reason that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. He admitted during cross-examination that in his conspiracy with Lee, Moreno and
Uy, he committed the crime of bribery which is penalized in Articles 210 and 212 of the
Revised Penal Code;
2. He has been charged with the crime of Falsification of Public Document in People of
the Philippines versus Enrique B. Chua, docketed as Criminal Case No. 12036 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City;
3. An administrative case has been filed against him in Adm. Case No. 1425, entitled "J.
Bautista Rabago v. Atty. Enrique S. Chua;"
4. Atty. Chua committed perjury in conspiracy with Lee, Moreno and Uy, by testifying in
the proceedings under oath that he gave P20,000.00 as a bribe to Judge Abastillas on
May 3, 1991, when he knew that he never gave any bribe money to Judge Abastillas;
and that Atty. Chua also made other false statements in the proceedings to harass
Judge Abastillas.
B. Atty. Chua violated the provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as
follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1. Canon 1, Rules 1.01 and 1.02 for falsely testifying under oath that he gave
P20,000.00 bribe money to Judge Abastillas on May 3, 1991;
2. Canon 8, Rule 8.01 for using abusive and offensive language in his pleadings and
memoranda against Undersecretary Bello of the Department of Justice;
3. Canon 10, Rules 10.01, 10.02 and 10.03, for not only by perjuring himself in declaring
that be gave P20,000.00 bribe money to Judge Abastillas, but also by offering false
evidence in the form of a taped conversation, indicating lack of candor, fairness and
good faith with the Court, and which acts of Atty. Chua violate his duties not to do any
falsehood to mislead or allow the court to be misled by any artifice; and
4. Canon 12, Rule 12.04 for advising his client the two (2) accused in Criminal Cases

Nos. 10010 and 10011 not to attend the scheduled arraignment.

Atty. Chua categorically testified on cross-examination during the proceedings before
Justice Lagamon that he gave P20,000.00 as bribe to Judge Abastillas.
Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Q In this particular case, with a solicitation bribe allegedly made by Judge Abastillas,
what was your advise to your clients?
"A I admonished them that the defense in these two cases are intrinsically meritorious.
So I do not see any reason giving money or bribing any Judge. And that I am not in the
habit doing that.
"Q Did you agree with your clients that you would not give the bribe?
"A That is what I told them.
"Q What did your clients tell you?
"A They are so insistent and finally they prevailed upon me. Because their reason is the
sad experience they had undergone with the Dept. of Justice. And according to Mr. Uy
he told me, he said you just cannot underestimate my sister Banua and perhaps you do
not know her. And he said giving of money is not in reality a bribe because we are in
effect buying justice. And he told me I have to be practical about the whole thing.
"Q So you were convinced by your clients that this was not really a bribe but you were
only buying justice?
"Q I still have reservation. Actually, up to this date I do not as a way of life approach
such practice but I really do not know why I gave in to their constant persistent
pleadings.
"Q Was it because as you said you emotionally identified yourself to your clients?
"A Partly maybe.
"Q So you agreed that you are going to give what Judge Abastillas was allegedly asking
from you?
"A That was the effect because finally I delivered P20,000.00 to him." (TSN., Oct. 27,
1993, pp. 7-8.)
Findings in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863
We find no sufficient proof to sustain the charge that Judge Abastillas accepted the
amount of P20,000.00 in view of Atty. Chuas uncertainty as to the date he delivered the

money. His final estimate of the date on cross-examination May 3, 1993 had
afforded Judge Abastillas a credible defense of alibi.
However, there is strong and convincing evidence that Judge Abastillas had willingly
and knowingly discussed with interested parties with whom he met at least three (3)
times, the possible dismissal of the criminal cases for a certain consideration.
Judge Abastillas made no denial that he met and talked with Johnson Lee, one of the
accused in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 on May 29, 1991 at the Philippine
Judges convention at the Quezon City Sports Center on May 29, 1991 and at the
Manila Hotel on June 7, 1991. Also, he did not deny that he accepted as visitor in his
house at St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City, on October 7, 1991 Johnny K.H. Uy, a party
interested in the outcome of the criminal cases. This meeting was followed by a
telephone call made by Uy to Judge Abastillas on October 16, 1991 wherein the former
informed the latter that there will be no problem about the 5T (meaning US$5,000.00)
as long as the cases of Johnson Lee would be cleared first, to which Judge Abastillas
suggested to Uy to take up the matter with Al Simbulan, a mutual friend to both.
Judge Abastillas cleverly hedged in answering whether or not he talked to Johnny Uy on
the phone on October 16, 1991, except to say, "It is possible I may have talked with him
over the phone, but I categorically declare that I have never mentioned, nor have we
even discussed $5,000.00, (p. 16, Sworn Statement, Em. "27"). Judge Abastillas also
declared on cross-examination that "it is possible (that Johnny Uy talked to him over the
phone on October 16) but I cannot remember exactly the caller, maybe one of the
callers might be a certain Uy but I cannot recognize because I have never heard his
voice." (TSN, p. 25, November 11, 1993.) Yet, in his verified comment dated September
28, 1992 (Exh. 4), Judge Abastillas declared he had telephone conversation with
Johnny Uy just before Uy went to his house on October 7, 1991.
Thus:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Then in (sic) October 7, 1991 in the morning, our aforesaid maid Beth informed me that
Mr. Johnny Uy wanted to talk to me. When respondent answered the phone, Mr. Uy
introduced himself and asked that he be allowed to see respondent in his house.
Respondent demurred because he was in a hurry because he had a 2 p.m. appointment
in the Court of Appeals. But Uy was very insistent, so, just to get rid of him, respondent
agreed to see Uy for a few minutes. So Uy went to see respondent at the latters house.
After introducing himself, Uy started discussing the criminal cases against complainants
herein.
"What respondent repeatedly told Uy is that he (Uy) should rely on the counsel of Lee
and Moreno to do all that need to be done in the case." (pp. 6-7.)
Since Judge Abastillas had already heard Johnny Uys voice on the phone and in fact
they had a face-to-face conversation on October 7, 1991 in the Judges house, it is
highly unbelievable that Judge Abastillas could not say definitely whether he had a talk
with Johnny Uy on the phone on October 16, 1991. His lame and shallow stance only

serves to emphasize the obvious.

There is no doubt in the mind of the Court that the voices in the telephone conversation
as recorded in the tape by Johnny Uy on October 16, 1991 were those of Uy and
Abastillas. The taped conversation was replayed at the hearing before Justice Lagamon
with the consent of both parties. Johnny Uy identified and recognized the voices in tape
as belonging to him and Judge Abastillas.
In the taped conversation already adverted to, Johnny Uy told Judge Abastillas that
there will be no problem about the 5T (meaning US $5,000.00) as long as the (criminal)
cases of Johnson Lee will be cleared first. Judge Abastillas response was to advise Uy
to take up the matter with Al Simbulan.
It may be argued that that would not prove that Judge Abastillas solicited US$5,000.00.
However, the taped conversation as the evidence of the complainants in Adm. Case No.
RTJ-93-863 would show, was just a sequel of a series of interlinked events that had
earlier taken place, starting with the solicitation by Judge Abastillas of P50,000.00 of
which he received P20,000.00 as initial payment, followed by the meeting between
Judge Abastillas and Johnson Lee at the Quezon City Sports Center and at the Manila
Hotel, and the meeting between Johnny Uy and Judge Abastillas at the latters house at
St. Ignatius Village, Quezon City where the judge asked for US $5,000.00. All the
interrelated events ineluctably point to the conclusion that Judge Abastillas knew that
the "5T" meant $5,000.00 he tried to solicit.
Besides, if Judge Abastillas during the telephone conversation had no idea at all about
the "5T" mentioned by Johnny Uy, he should have expressed surprise and inquired from
Uy what he meant by it. He did not, which goes to show he filly understood what the
"5T" stood for.cralawnad
It is, likewise, suggested that when Johnny Uy mentioned "5T" to Judge Abastillas, the
latters reply did not appear to be responsive because he mentioned something like
Take up the matter with Al Simbulan." The theory is advanced that it would be illogical
for a person who is soliciting a bribe to involve a third party and a lawyer at that referring
to Atty. Al Simbulan. We do not agree. Atty. Simbulan is a mutual friend of Judge
Abastillas and Johnny Uy. He could serve as a convenient conduit between the two,
thus avoiding the direct personal involvement of the taker in the payoff.
In this connection, Judge Abastillas cannot now question the admissibility of the taped
conversation (Exh. 13) as evidence. He offered no objection to its replay at the hearing
before Justice Lagamon.
We do not believe that Judge Abastillas meeting with Johnson Lee at the Quezon City
Sports Center was not pre-arranged. Neither do we accept his explanation that Johnson
Lee was a "gate crasher" at the judges party at Manila Hotel. On this point, we find the
discussion in complainants memorandum in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92-863 dated
December 3, 1993 convincing. We quote:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"2. The circumstances as narrated by respondent Judge under which he first met
complainant Lee by way of his justification in meeting the said Complainant, should he
taken with a grain of salt, so to speak. Respondent Judge seems to heap the blame on
his fellow Judges Ponferrada and de la Rosa, as being instrumental in paving the way
for his meeting complainant Lee, but neither of these two judges was presented by him
to substantiate his version. Worse, if respondent was able to secure the affidavit of
Judge Ponferrada (Annex 4 of his sworn affidavit dated 27th October, 1993) to support
the fact that on May 3, 1991, he was in Roxas City, then, there is no reason why he
cannot at least secure a similar affidavit from Judge Ponferrada to bolster the
circumstances under which he met complainant Lee."cralaw virtua1aw library
Hence, that respondent Judge and complainant Lee met under mutually conducive and
cordial circumstances which subsequently led to the latters (sic) solicitation of bribe
from witness Uy, is very probable.
3. Moreover, the pretension of the respondent Judge that after that meeting of May 29,
1991 with complainant Lee at the Judges convention, he did not give him the
opportunity to see respondent again and that he took all steps necessary so that he
could not have to talk again to Lee, is a pure lie, and thus cannot be believed, because
when respondent Judge, without his slightest expectation, was confronted with a calling
card (EXH.D) of his own cousin Mr. Arturo Sena, given by said Mr. Sons to complainant
Lee, in the presence of respondent Judge and his wife, at a dinner at the Manila Hotel
on June 7, 1991 or barely a weck after respondent Judge, realizing that he could no
longer pretend to be that resolute in avoiding complainant Lee, vainly set up the pretext
that complaint (sic) Lee was a gatecrasher on that occasion. This, by itself is extremely
difficult to believe.
Even respondent Judges explanation about the presence of complainant Lee at that
Manila Hotel dinner is silly, if not childish and ridiculous. According to respondent Judge,
he already had an inkling on what was in Arty. Simbulans mind when the latter insisted
in seeing him at the time he and his wife were already on their way to the Manila Hotel
for a foursome dinner. That inkling according to respondent Judge, are the two
criminal cases where complainant Lee is one of the accused, but respondent Judge
nonetheless willingly allowed Atty. Simbulan to join them in the dinner, notwithstanding
the fact that, in his own words, prior to this, he (Atty. Simbulan) informed me that Lee
and Moreno were clients of his partner, Atty. Pineda. Thus if indeed respondent Judge
is so determined in not seeing complainant Lee again and so resolute in avoiding at all
costs complainant Lee as what he wants to impress upon the Investigating Justice,
then, he could have easily set up an alibi to mislead Atty.
Simbulan.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
Thus, there was indeed a prior understanding on where and when to meet Lee again
after their meeting at the Judges convention.
Besides, why did not respondent call on his own cousin Mr. Sons to prove that

complainant Lee was really a gatecrasher or request Atty. Simbulan to substantiate his
version that Lee was the most unwanted guest during that Manila Hotel dinner. Worse,
respondent Judge did not offer an explanation regarding Lees having his calling card
(EXH.C), which witness Uy subsequently used in calling him up by telephone prior to
their seeing each other on October 7, 1991 at the residence of respondent
Judge."cralaw virtua1aw library
The three (3) meetings by Judge Abastillas with interested parties who had a stake in
the outcome of Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 100~I and the recorded telephone
conversation where said cases were discussed manifested Judge Abastillas
willingness, nay, propensity to ester into deals with motivations incongruous to the
merits of the cases pending before him. Judge Abastillas committed serious misconduct
no less.
The Code of Judicial Conduct requires that a judge should be the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence (Rule 1.01). He should administer justice
impartially and without delay (Rule 1.02). He should so behave at all times as to
promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary (Rule 2.01).
It is peculiarly essential that the system for establishing and dispensing justice be
developed to a high degree of proficiency, to gain the absolute confidence of the public
in the integrity and impartiality of its administration, because appearance is as important
as reality, so much so that a judge, like Cesars wife, must not only be pure but beyond
suspicion. The actuations of Judge Abastillas transgressed against the high standard of
moral ethics required of judges.cralawnad
We find, however, the rest of charges of the complainants in Adm. Case No. RTJ-92863 against Judge Abastillas without merit. We quote with approval the pertinent
portions of Justice Lagamons report relative to said accusations:chanrob1es virtual 1aw
library
The undersigned finds nothing irregular when the Court issued an Order of Arrest when
the accused Johnson Lee and Sonny Moreno failed to appear during the scheduled
arraignment on Sept. 26,1991. Atty. manifested that he instructed his clients not to
appear in Court because a day before the date set for arraignment he allegedly filed a
consolidated motion to quash which he requested that the same be heard on Oct. 11,
1991. Both accused and counsel were duly notified of the arraignment. They should
have displayed their respect for the Court by appearing personally and prayed for the
deferment of the arraignment. There was nothing that could have prevented the Court
from orally denying the motion to quash and proceeding with the arraignment. It
appears that the motion which was filed only one day before the scheduled date of
hearing was intended to delay and derail the speedy trial of the case, taking into
account that the Sept. 16, 1991 date of arraignment was originally agreed in open court
in the presence of Atty. Chua as early as August 5, 1991 and set for Sept. 3, 1991 but
reset to Sept. 26.

The undersigned finds nothing untoward in the proceedings of People v. Espinos (Crim.
Cases 8846 and 8847) where the respondent ordered that the firearms involved in the
case be delivered to the custody of the Court for proper disposition.
The complainants maintain that the respondent treated the cases in a favored manner
just because counsel for the accused Atty. Roger Z. Reyes is close to him. Accordingly,
a full-blown trial type hearing was conducted in a motion to quash and, eventually, the
case was dismissed. Whereas, in the cases of the complainants the accused were
ordered arrested upon their failure to appear on Sept. 26, 1991 arraignment
notwithstanding the pendency of a motion to quash. It is our observation that the two
cases cannot be equated because in the first place the complainants failed or refused to
appear in court notwithstanding notice to them and counsel. In the Espinos case the
accused consistently appeared in court. Moreover, the Order of the Court directing the
delivery of the firearms in the custody of the police is properly and in order. We are fully
aware of the evil practice of irresponsible policemen who hold on to the possession of
the firearms for their personal use. The Court, therefore, has to issue an Order for the
delivery of the firearms for proper disposal. In fact, Atty. Chua is guilty of deliberately
misquoting the Order of the Court changing the phrase to this Court to to him, thereby
creating an implication that the respondent entertained personal interest in the firearms.
The records show that the public prosecutor also moved that the firearm in question be
delivered to the court and after an Order of Forfeiture be forwarded and deposited with
the Firearms and Explosives Unit, PC Headquarters, Bacolod City (Exh.15, p. 143,
records).chanrobles lawlibrary : rednad
The charge that the respondent failed to decide Civil Case No. 2423 (Susana Lim v.
Lim) within 90 days cannot be given much consideration taking into account the
Certification issued by the Clerk of Court of the branch to the effect that the case was
partially tried by the respondent and that the stenographer who took down the
stenographic notes left for the United States without transcribing the same. There is.
therefore, a need for the retaking of the testimonies of the witnesses.
The failure of the respondent to resolve the motion to disqualify private prosecutor dated
April 20, 1991 as well as the motion for reinvestigation dated July 3, 1991 which were
resolved in open court only on February 5, 1992 is rather a minor violation in the face of
the series of motions filed by Atty. Enrique S. Chua. Respondent lost track of what
motions are due for resolution until he was reminded on January 20, 1992 through a
supplemental motion filed by Arty. Chua, however, sixteen days thereafter the pending
motions were all resolved."cralaw virtua1aw library
Findings in Adm. Case No. 3815
Undoubtedly, Atty. Chua is guilty of violating Rule 1.01, canon 1, of the Code of
Professional Responsibility in view of his admission that he allegedly delivered
P20,000.00 as bribe money to Judge Abastillas, thereby allowing himself to be used as
a conduit for an illegal and immoral act. Rule 1.01 provides that "A lawyer shall not

engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct."cralaw virtua1aw library

However, we take note that Atty. Chua during the investigation before Justice Lagamon
humbly expressed his genuine regrets for having acted the way he did. He said: "I
considered that particular moment of my life as one of the human weaknesses." He felt
sorry for "a lapse in my life." "I was not strong enough to resist," he added (TSN, Oct.
27, 1983, pp. 11-12).
Atty. Chua declared that while he believed that his clients case was meritorious, his
clients prevailed upon him to offer bribe money as the practical way to obtain
justice.chanrobles.com.ph : virtual law library
Under the circumstances, and in addition to Atty. Chuas profound expression of
remorse, we do not find it difficult to mitigate his liability when we consider his
willingness to come forward, at the risk of being administratively penalized himself, to
expose what we considered illegal and immoral acts perpetrated by the very ones
tasked with the sacred duty to uphold the law and dispense justice.
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Renato E. Abastillas, Regional Trial Court, Branch 50
Bacolod City, is hereby found GUILTY of serious misconduct in Adm. Matter No. RTJ92863 for having met with persons involved and/or interested in Criminal Cases Nos.
10010 and 10011 entitled "People v. Johnson Lees and Sonny Moreno" of the Regional
Trial Court of Bacolod City, for the purpose of discussing or soliciting bribe in connection
said cases and is hereby DISMISSED from office, with forfeiture of all retirement
benefits and accrued leave credits and with prejudice to re-employment in any branch
or instrumentality of government, including government owned or controlled
corporations.
This Court holds Atty. Enrique S. Chua administratively liable in Adm. Case No. 3815 for
violation of Rule 1.01 of the Code of professional Responsibility for allegedly bribing
Judge Abastillas.
Respondent Atty. Enrique S. Chua is STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of a similar
act or acts or violation committed by him in the future will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Melo, Puno, Vitug and
Kapunan, JJ., concur.
Narvasa, C.J., no part. Close relation to family of party.
Bellosillo, J., no part. My name is mentioned a number of times in the case.
Quiason, J., no part, Judge R.E. Abastillas being a client of my former law office.

Mendoza, J., no part.

Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION

G.R. No. L-31665 August 6, 1975

LEONARDO ALMEDA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. ONOFRE A. VILLALUZ, in his capacity as presiding judge of the Circuit
Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District, Pasig, Rizal, and HON. GREGORIO
PINEDA, City Fiscal of Pasay City, respondents.
Honorio Makalintal, Jr. for petitioner.
Pasay City Fiscal Gregorio Pineda for respondent.

CASTRO, J.:
The petitioner Leonardo Almeda (alias Nardong Paa) was charged, together with five
others, with the crime of qualified theft of a motor vehicle (criminal case 285-Pasay) in
the Circuit Criminal Court of Pasig, Rizal, presided by the respondent Judge Onofre
Villauz. The amount of the bond recommended for the provisional release of Almeda
was P15,000, and this was approved by the respondent judge with a direction that it be
posted entirely in cash.
At the hearing of February 18, 1970, Almeda asked the trial court to allow him to post a
surety bond in lieu of the cash bond required of him. This request was denied, and so
was an oral motion for reconsideration, on the ground that the amended information
imputed habitual delinquency and recidivism on the part of Almeda.
At the same hearing, the respondent city fiscal, thru his assistant, reiterated his oral
motion made at a previous hearing for amendment of the information so as to include

allegations of recidivism and habitual delinquency in the particular case of Almeda. The
latter vigorously objected, arguing that (a) such an amendment was premature since no
copies of prior conviction could yet be presented in court, (b) the motion to amend
should have been made in writing in order to enable him to object formally, and (c) the
proposed amendment would place him in double jeopardy considering that he had
already pleaded not guilty to the information. The trial court nevertheless granted the
respondent fiscal's motion in open court. An oral motion for reconsideration was denied.
Immediately thereafter, the assistant fiscal took hold of the original information and, then
and there, entered his amendment by annotating the same on the back of the
document. The petitioner forthwith moved for the dismissal of the charge on the ground
of double jeopardy, but this motion and a motion for reconsideration were denied in
open court.
Hence, the present special civil action for certiorari with preliminary injunction.
Two issues are posed to us for resolution: First, whether the respondent judge has the
authority to require a strictly cash bond and disallow the petitioner's attempt to post a
surety bond for his provisional liberty, and second, whether the amendment to the
information, after a plea of not guilty thereto, was properly allowed in both substance
and procedure.
1. As defined by section 1 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, bail is "the security required
and given for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will
appear before any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the
bail bond or recognizance." The purpose of requiring bail is to relieve an accused from
imprisonment until his conviction and yet secure his appearance at the trial. 1
In this jurisdiction, the accused, as of right, is entitled to bail prior to conviction except
when he is charged with a capital offense and the evidence of guilt is strong. This right
is guaranteed by the Constitution, 2 and may not be denied even where the accused has
previously escaped detention, 3 or by reason of his prior absconding. 4 In order to
safeguard the right of an accused to bail, the Constitution further provides that
"excessive bail shall not be required." This is logical cause the imposition of an
unreasonable bail may negate the very right itself. We have thus held that "where
conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail would amount to a refusal thereof
and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we would not hesitate to exercise our
supervisory powers to provide the required remedy." 5
Coming to the issue at hand, the amount fixed for bail, while reasonable if considered in
terms of surety or property bonds, may be excessive if demanded in the form of cash. A

surety or property bond does not require an actual financial outlay on the part of the
bondsman or the property owner, and in the case of the bondsman the bond may be
obtained by the accused upon the payment of a relatively small premium. Only the
reputation or credit standing of the bondsman or the expectancy of the price at which
the property can be sold, is placed in the hands of the court to guarantee the production
of the body of the accused at the various proceedings leading to his conviction or
acquittal. Upon the other hand, the posting of a cash bond would entail a transfer of
assets into the possession of the court, and its procurement could work untold hardship
on the part of the accused as to have the effect of altogether denying him his
constitutional right to bail.
Aside from the foregoing, the condition that the accused may have provisional
liberty only upon his posting of a cash bond is abhorrent to the nature of bail and
transgresses our law on the matter. The sole purpose of bail is to insure the attendance
of the accused when required by the court, and there should be no suggestion of
penalty on the part of the accused nor revenue on the part of the government. The
allowance of a cash bond in lieu of sureties is authorized in this jurisdiction only
because our rules expressly provide for it. Were this not the case, the posting of bail by
depositing cash with the court cannot be countenanced because, strictly speaking, the
very nature of bail presupposes the attendance of sureties to whom the body of the
prisoner can be delivered. 6 And even where cash bail is allowed, the option to deposit
cash in lieu of a surety bond primarily belongs to the accused. This is clearly deducible
from the language of section 14 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 14. Deposit of money as bail. At any time after the amount of bail
is fixed by order, the defendant, instead of giving bail, may deposit with the
nearest collector of internal revenue, or provincial, city, or municipal
treasurer the sum mentioned in the order, and upon delivering to the court
a proper certificate of the deposit, must be discharged from custody.
Money thus deposited, shall be applied to the payment of the fine and
costs for which judgment may be given; and the surplus, if any, shall be
returned to the defendant.
Thus, the trial court may not reject otherwise acceptable sureties and insist that the
accused obtain his provisional liberty only thru a cash bond.
But while we repudiate the particular measure adopted by the respondent judge, we
cannot fault the motive that caused him to demur to the petitioner's offer of a surety
bond. Based on the petitioner's past record, 7 the range of his career in crime weighs
heavily against letting him off easily on a middling amount of bail. The likelihood of his

jumping bail or committing other harm to the citizenry while on provisional liberty is a
consideration that simply cannot be ignored.
Fortunately, the court is not without devices with which to meet the situation. First, it
could increase the amount of the bail bond to an appropriate level. Second, as part of
the power of the court over the person of the accused and for the purpose of
discouraging likely commission of other crimes by a notorious defendant while on
provisional liberty, the latter could be required, as one of the conditions of his bail bond,
to report in person periodically to the court and make an accounting of his movements.
And third, the accused might be warned, though this warning is not essential to the
requirements of due process, that under the 1973 Constitution 8 "Trial may proceed
notwithstanding his absence provided that he has been duly notified and his failure to
appear is unjustified."
With respect to the amount of the bail bond, the trial court is well advised to
consider, inter alia, the following factors, where applicable: (1) the ability of the accused
to give bail: (2) the nature of the offense; (3) the penalty for the offense charged; (4) the
character and reputation of the accused (5) the health of the accused; (6) the character
and strength of the evidence; (7) the probability of the accused's appearance or nonappearance at the trial; (8) forfeiture of previous bonds; (9) whether the accused was a
fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) whether the accused is under bond for
appearance at trial in other cases. 9
It is not amiss, at this point, to remind all courts to exercise extreme care and caution in
the screening of bondsmen and sureties in regard to their reputation, solvency and
promptitude. Aside from the other precautions hitherto considered useful courts should
see to it that all surety bonds are accompanied by corresponding clearances from the
Office of the Insurance Commissioner. Bondsmen who cannot make good their
undertaking render inutile all efforts at making the bail system work in this jurisdiction.
2. Anent the second issue posed by the petitioner, the amendment of the information to
include allegations of habitual delinquency and recidivism, after a previous plea thereto
by the accused, is valid and in no way violates his right to be fully apprised before trial
of the charges against him.
Under section 13 of Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the trial court has discretion to allow
amendments to the information on all matters of form after the defendant has pleaded
and during the trial when the same can be done without prejudice to the rights of the
defendant. What are prohibited at this stage of the proceedings are amendments in
substance. And the substantial matter in a complaint or information is the recital of facts

constituting the offense charged and determinative of the jurisdiction of the court. All
other matters are merely of form. 10
Under our law, a person is considered a habitual delinquent "if within a period of ten
years from the date of his release or last conviction of the crimes of serious or less
serious physical injuries, robo, hurto, estafa orfalsification, he is found guilty of any of
said crimes a third time or oftener." 11 The law imposes an additional penalty based on
the criminal propensity of the accused apart from that provided by law for the last crime
of which he is found guilty. Habitual delinquency is not however, a crime in itself, it is
only a factor in determining a total penalty. 12 Article 62 of the Revised Penal Code
which treats of habitual delinquency does not establish a new crime, but only regulates
the "effect of the attendance of mitigating or aggravating circumstances and of habitual
delinquency." as its caption indicates. In fact, the provision on habitual delinquency is
found in a section of the Code prescribing rules for the application of penalties, not in a
section defining offense. 13 A recidivist, upon the other hand, is one who, at the time of
his trial for one crime, shall have been previously convicted by final judgment of another
crime embraced in the same title of the Revised Penal Code. Recidivism is likewise not
a criminal offense; it is but one of the aggravating circumstances enumerated by the
said Code.14
The additional allegations of habitual delinquency and recidivism do not have the effect
of charging another offense different or distinct from the charge of qualified theft (of a
motor vehicle) contained in the information. Neither do they tend to correct any defect in
the jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject-matter of the case. The said new
allegations relate only to the range of the penalty that the court might impose in the
event of conviction. They do not alter the prosecution's theory of the case nor possibly
prejudice the form of defense the accused has or will assume. Consequently, in
authorizing the amendments, the respondent judge acted with due consideration of the
petitioner's rights and did not abuse his discretion.
Anent the petitioner's claim that the amendment of the information by the State places
him in double jeopardy, it should be remembered that there is double jeopardy only
when all the following requisites obtain in the original prosecution; (a) a valid complaint
or information; (b) a competent court; (c) the defendant had pleaded to the charge; and
(d) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted, or the case against him was dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his consent. 15
It is clear that the petitioner Almeda has not yet been convicted nor acquitted of the
charge of qualified theft of a motor vehicle contained in the original information. Neither
has the case against him been dismissed or otherwise terminated. The mere
amendment of the information to include allegations of habitual delinquency and

recidivism does not have the effect of a dismissal of the criminal action for qualified theft
alleged in the original information.16
It cannot likewise be said that the accused is being placed in jeopardy a second time for
the past crimes of which he had been convicted. The constitutional objection, on the
ground of double jeopardy, to the statute providing an additional penalty to be meted out
to habitual delinquents, has long been rejected. 17
The procedure taken by the respondent fiscal and allowed by the respondent judge in
the amendment of the information does not, however, merit our approbation. Under
section 2 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, "all motions shall be made in writing except
motions for continuance made in the presence of the adverse party, or those made in
the course of a hearing or trial." A motion to amend the information, after the accused
has pleaded thereto, is certainly one that should be placed in writing and properly set for
hearing. We are loath to give our imprimatur to the kind of shortcut devised by the
respondents, especially as it relates to an alteration in the information. Considering,
however, that the petitioner was not deprived of his day in court and was in fact given
advance warning of the proposed amendment, although orally, we refrain from
disturbing the said amendment.
ACCORDINGLY, the order of the respondent judge of February 18, 1970 denying the
motion of the petitioner Almeda that he be allowed to post a surety bond instead of a
cash bond is hereby set aside, without prejudice, however, to increasing the amount of
the bail bond and/or the imposition of such conditions as the respondent judge might
consider desirable and proper for the purpose of insuring the attendance of the
petitioner at the trial, provided they are consistent with the views herein expressed. No
costs.
Makasiar, Esguerra, Muoz Palma and Martin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., is on leave.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 46490. January 24, 1939.]
MARIANO MARCOS, PIO MARCOS and QUIRINO LIZARDO, Petitioners, v. ROMAN
A. CRUZ, Judge of First Instance of Ilocos Norte, Respondent.
Vicente J. Francisco, Bartolome Guirao, Federico Diaz, Alberto Saguitan, and

Juliana E. Castro, for Petitioners.

Solicitor-General Ozaeta for respondent judge.
SYLLABUS
1. CRIMINAL LAW AND PROCEDURE; RIGHT OF AN ACCUSED TO BAIL;
DISCRETION OF COURT. Section 63 of General Orders, No. 58 does not run
counter to section 1, paragraph 16, Article III of the Constitution, since in this jurisdiction
every accused person is bailable before conviction, unless charged with a capital
offense, when proof of guilt is evident and presumption of guilt strong (U. S. v. Babasa,
19 Phil., 198; Montalbo v. Santamaria, 64 Phil., 966). When the crime charged is a
capital offense, admission to bail lies within the discretion of the court, and depends
upon whether the proof is evident and the presumption of guilt strong (Montalbo v.
Santamaria, supra).
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; "ONUS PROBANDI." The fundamental reason the courts had in
holding that the accused must prove his right to bail is the presumption of guilt arising
from the filing of the indictment. It has further been said that the filing of the indictment
likewise destroys the presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. Is this theory
has some persuasive force, it is due to the procedural system followed in nearly all the
States of the Union for securing the indictment. There the district attorney gathers the
evidence for the prosecution and presents it before the Grand Jury, which, after
examining it, deliberates upon whether or not to present the indictment. This indictment
is presented only after the jury is morally convinced that the crime has been committed
and that the accused is guilty. In this jurisdiction there is no jury, and the evidence for
the prosecution is gathered and organized by the fiscal, who later files the information.
Undoubtedly the legal requirement that the indictment be presented by the jury aims at
surrounding the citizen with greater guarantees before being molested with his arrest,
preliminary investigation, trial, and the consequent expenses of his defense. This
guarantee in favor of the citizen does not exist in our jurisdiction, because we have no
jury, for which reason we incline towards the second theory that the filing of the
information does not raise the presumption of guilt or destroy the presumption of the
defendants innocence provided for in section 57 of General Orders, No. 68. Held: That
when a person accused of a capital offense asks to be admitted to bail before
conviction, the burden of proof lies, not on him, but on the prosecution to show that he is
not bailable.
3. ID; ID.; ID.; ID.; PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION; SUMMARY INVESTIGATION.
We are not unmindful of the fact that in People v. Solon (47 Phil., 443), and in Payao v.
Lesaca (63 Phil., 210), we said that when the investigation of a criminal case is
conducted by a judge of first instance, it includes both the summary investigation
spoken of in Act No. 194, as amended by Acts Nos. 1450 and 1627, and the preliminary
investigation referred to in section 13 of General Orders, No. 58; and we are aware of
the contention of the prosecution that applying the doctrine laid down in those two
cases, the evidence adduced before the respondent judge could be used against the
accused and in fact established the presumption of guilt. But it must be borne in mind

that the hearing required by section 66 of General Orders, No. 58, is essentially different
from the preliminary investigation to which every person is entitled who is accused of a
crime triable before the Court of First Instance, and that if the prosecution had intended
the summary investigation conducted by the respondent judge to be a preliminary
investigation, its duty was to summon the accused and adduce its evidence in their
presence.
4. CERTIORARI. Certiorari lies in this case because the respondent judge exceeded,
as we have pointed out, the discretion conferred upon him by law (sec 217, Cod. of Civ.
Proc.) .
DECISION
IMPERIAL, J.:
In their petition for certiorari and prohibition the petitioners pray that the order of the
respondent judge dated December 29, 1938, denying another motion filed by them to
be admitted to bail, be set aside, and by way of affirmative relief ask that they be set at
liberty upon giving bail in the amount to be fixed.
On December 7, 1938, the provincial fiscal of Laguna, who was assigned as such in
Ilocos Norte, filed the following information:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"The undersigned charges Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos, Quirino
Lizardo, and John Doe (whose identity has so far not been established), with the crime
of murder, committed as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"That on or about the night of September 20, 1935, in the municipality of Batac,
Province of Ilocos Norte, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the aforenamed accused, armed with firearms, acting upon a common understanding
and conspiring with one another, wilfully, unlawfully, and feloniously, with treachery,
evident premeditation, and intent to kill, fired at Julio Nalundasan, then representativeelect for the second district of Ilocos Norte, hitting him in the right side, the bullet having
entered vital internal organs and injuring them, which wounds cause the instant death of
said Julio Nalundasan.
"Contrary to law, with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity and the perpetration
of the crime in the home of the deceased.
Laoag, Ilocos Norte, December 7, 1938.
(Sgd.) "HIGINO B. MACADAEG

"Provincial Fiscal for Laguna

with special designation in the
Province of Ilocos Norte
"Witnesses:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"DR. RAMON RABAGO, c/o Phil. Army
Cotabato, Cotabato
"DR. DOMINGO SAMONTE, c/o Dept. del Interior
Manila, and others"
The information was submitted to the respondent judge who, after examining
prosecution witnesses Calixto Aguinaldo and Valentin Rubio, on that very day issued
the warrant for the arrest of the accused, stating that from the testimony of these
witnesses it was evident that the crime charged had been committed and that the
accused had probably committed it. Being of the opinion that the crime charged was
penalized with a capital punishment, and that the accused were not entitled to bail, the
court likewise decreed that the accused remain in detention. At the investigation
conducted by the respondent judge, where Calixto Aguinaldo and Valentin Rubio
testified, the accused were not present, and the whole proceeding took place in their
absence. On December 8, 1938, Mariano Marcos moved to be admitted to bail. The
motion was set for hearing that same afternoon, which was orally opposed by the fiscal,
and without either party adducing any evidence, the motion was submitted. Pio Marcos,
Ferdinand Marcos, and Quirino Lizardo on the 12th also moved to be admitted to bail.
This motion was set for hearing on the 20th of December, 1938, but at the request of
the accused, who wanted to file a supplementary motion, the hearing was postponed till
the following day. On December 21st, the four accused filed the supplementary motion,
attaching thereto their sworn statements marked A, B, C and D. Here as in the original
motion the accused urgently prayed that they be released on bail, and in their sworn
statements Mariano Marcos, Ferdinand Marcos and Quirino Lizardo declared that the
testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo and Valentin Rubio accusing them of murder was false,
and that they were innocent. On December 21st these motions came up for hearing
before the respondent judge, Fiscal Macadaeg appearing for the prosecution, and
Attorney Vicente J. Francisco for the defense. The latter asked that the prosecution
present its evidence to show that the accused fell within the exception of section 1,
paragraph 16, Article III of the Constitution, and section 63 of General Orders, No. 58,
that is, that they were accused of a capital offense, that the proof of guilt was evident
and the presumption of guilt strong. The fiscal refused to do so and contended that
under the law the prosecution was not bound to adduce such evidence, that the judge
might take into account that adduced during the investigation he had made, and that at
any rate it was the defense that was bound to establish the right of the accused to bail.

The respondent judge sustained the fiscal and the hearing came to a close without
either party adducing any evidence. The motions having thus been submitted, the
respondent judge on December 29, 1938 issued an order denying them and ruling that
the accused Mariano Marcos, Quirino Lizardo and Pio Marcos were not entitled to bail
because they were charged with a capital offense, the proof against them was evident,
and the presumption of guilt strong. Prior to this date they had asked for a preliminary
investigation. The motion to that effect was denied on the ground that the investigation
conducted by the respondent judge before issuing the warrant of arrest was in the
nature of a preliminary investigation. Motion for reconsideration was filed, and on
December 27, 1938 this motion was likewise denied, but the judge in the same order
admitted Ferdinand Marcos to bail on the ground that he was under 18 when the crime
was committed, that he was a remarkably bright student of the College of Law in the
University of the Philippines, that he would finish his studies the following March, and
that he had given assurances, together with his lawyers, that he would not leave the
Philippines.
As may be seen, the question of law raised by this petition is whether the accused
Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, and Quirino Lizardo are entitled to be admitted to bail at
this stage of the criminal proceedings, that is, before conviction. Section 1, paragraph
16, Article III of the Constitution, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"(16) All persons shall before conviction be bailable by sufficient sureties, except those
charged with capital offenses when evidence of guilt is strong. Excessive bail shall not
be required."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 63 of General Orders, No. 58, provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SEC. 63. All prisoners shall be bailable before conviction, except those charged with
the commission of capital offenses when proof of guilt is evident or the presumption of
guilt i5 strong."cralaw virtua1aw library
Section 63 of General Orders, No. 58, does not run counter to section 1, paragraph 16,
Article III of the Constitution, since in this jurisdiction every accused person is bailable
before conviction, unless charged with a capital offense, when proof of guilt is evident
and presumption of guilt strong (U. S. v. Babasa, 19 Phil., 198; Montalbo v. Santamaria,
54 Phil., 955). When the crime charged is a capital offense, admission to bail lies within
the discretion of the court, and depends upon whether the proof is evident and the
presumption of guilt strong (Montalbo v. Santamaria, supra).
When the motions filed by the three accused came up for trial, counsel asked that the
prosecution adduce its evidence to show whether they fell within the exception, and
whether or not they were entitled to bail; but the court upheld the prosecution and
declared that the burden of proof was on the accused to show that they were entitled to
bail. The controversy thus gave rise to the legal question as to which side bears the
burden of proof in such cases. Section 66 of General Orders, No. 58,
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 66. When admission to bail is a matter of discretion, the court must require that
reasonable notice of the hearing of the application for bail be given to the promotor
fiscal."cralaw virtua1aw library
It will be seen that this section provides for a hearing of the application for bail, but it
says nothing about the party bound to prove the right to bail. The prosecution contends
that the burden of proof lies on the accused because they must prove their affirmative
allegation that they are entitled to bail and because the filing of the information sets up
the presumption of their guilt. The defense contends that since it is the exception to the
rule that the accused are not entitled to bail, it is the prosecution, and not the accused,
which is bound to prove it.
In the States of the Union there are two tendencies or theories touching the onus
probandi where there is a petition to be admitted to bail before conviction of the
accused. In some States it has been held that the burden of proof lies on the accused
who asked to be admitted to bail because the filing of the indictment raises the
presumption of guilt and that the proof against the accused is evident or clear (8. C. J.
S., sec. 34, p. 61; McAdams v. State, 147 N. E., .64; 196 Ind., 184; Ex parte Cooper, 45
P. [2d], 584). In Shaw v. State (47 S. W. [2d], 92; 164 Tenn., 192), the Supreme Court of
Tennessee held that in the absence of proof by the petitioner that he is bailable for a
capital offense, the indictment raises the presumption of guilt required by the
constitutional provision regarding bail. In State v. Kutcher (129 A., 632; 3 N. J., Misc.,
636), the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that although the indictment does not raise
the presumption of guilt sufficient for the trial on the merits, it does raise that
presumption for all intermediate proceedings, such as a petition to be admitted to bail.
In State v. Lowe (86 So., 707; 204 Ala., 288), the Supreme Court of the State held that a
person under an indictment for a capital offense is presumed guilty to the extent of not
being entitled to release on bail.
In other States it has been held that in petitions for admission to bail the burden of proof
to show that the accused is not bailable lies on the prosecution (8 C. J. S., sec. 34, p.
61; 6 Am. Jur., par. 25, p. 59; Ford v. Dilley 156 N. W., 513; 174 Ia., 243; Ex parte
Johnson, 280 S. W., 702; Ex parte Dumas, 7 S. W. [2d], 90; 110 Tex. Cr., 1; Ex parte
Fleming, 261 S. W., 1037; 97 Tex. Cr., 304; Commonwealth v. Stahl, 35 S. W. [2d], 563;
237 Ky., 388; Ex parte Readhimer, 60 S. W. [2d], 788; 123 Tex. Cr., 635; Ex parte
Martin, 45 S. W. [2d], 965; 119 Tex Cr., 141; Ex parte Landers, 9 S. W. [2d], 1106; 110
Tex. Cr., 604; Ex parte Crawford, 265 S. W., 906; 98 Tex. Cr., 289; Ex parte Townsley,
220 S. W., 1092; 87 Tex. Cr., 252). In Ford v. Dilley, supra, the Supreme Court of Iowa
held that at a hearing regarding bail the State must begin to adduce evidence if it denies
that the offense is bailable. It was stated that since according to the provisions of law
the rule is that the accuses is bailable, and the exception is that he cannot be admitted
to bail, the burden of proving that a case falls within the exception lies on the
prosecution opposing the grant of bail.
As may be seen, the fundamental reason the courts had in holding that the accused

must prove his right to bail is the presumption of guilt arising from the filing of the
indictment. It has further been said that the filing of the indictment likewise destroys the
presumption of innocence in favor of the accused. If this theory has some persuasive
force, it is due to the procedural system followed in nearly all the States of the Union for
securing the indictment. There the district attorney gathers the evidence for the
prosecution and presents it before the Grand Jury, which, after examining it, deliberates
upon whether or not to present the indictment. This indictment is presented only after
the jury is morally convinced that the crime has been committed and that the accused is
guilty. In this jurisdiction there is no jury, and the evidence for the prosecution is
gathered and organized by the fiscal, who later files the information. Undoubtedly the
legal requirement that the indictment be presented by the jury aims at surrounding the
citizen with greater guarantees before being molested with his arrest, preliminary
investigation, trial, and the consequent expenses of his defense. This guarantee in favor
of the citizen does not exist in our jurisdiction, because we have no jury, for which
reason we incline towards the second theory that the filing of the information does not
raise the presumption of guilt or destroy the presumption of the defendants innocence
provided for in section 57 of General Orders, No. 58. We therefore hold that when a
person accused of a capital offense asks to be admitted to bail before conviction, the
burden of proof lies, not on him, but on the prosecution to show that he is not bailable.
It is argued that the respondent judge, before issuing the warrant for the arrest of the
accused, examined the two witnesses for the prosecution presented by the fiscal, and
that their testimony raised the presumption of the defendants guilt and supplied the
further requirement that proof of guilt must be evident. We cannot give our assent to this
contention. It ought not to be forgotten that such testimony was taken in the absence of
the accused, and that the latter had no opportunity to see the witnesses testify or to
cross-examine them. We are not unmindful of the fact that in People v. Solon (47 Phil.,
443), and in Payao v. Lesaca (63 Phil., 210), we said that when the investigation of a
criminal case is conducted by a judge of first instance, it includes both the summary
investigation spoken of in Act No. 194, as amended by Acts Nos. 1450 and 1627, and
the preliminary investigation referred to in section 13 of General Orders, No. 58; and we
are aware of the contention of the prosecution that applying the doctrine laid down in
those two cases, the evidence adduced before the respondent judge could be used
against the accused and in fact established the presumption of guilt. But it must be
borne in mind that the hearing required by section 66 of General Orders, No. 58, is
essentially different from the preliminary investigation to which every person is entitled
who is accused of a crime triable before the Court of First Instance, and that if the
prosecution had intended the summary investigation conducted by the respondent
judge to be a preliminary investigation, its duty was to summon the accused and adduce
its evidence in their presence. Other reasons preventing the consideration of such
evidence against the accused are: that the fiscal did not reproduce or offer it at the
hearing of the petitions for bail; and that in the sworn statements which the accused
attached to their supplementary motion, they denied the imputation of guilt, and rebutted
the testimony of Calixto Aguinaldo and Valentin Rubio, which they described as false
and improbable. In these circumstances it was the duty of the respondent judge, to
require the fiscal to adduce his evidence in order to show that the crime charged was

capital that the proof was evident, and the presumption of guilt strong.
Although the petition filed is entitled certiorari and prohibition, we consider that the
proper relief is only the first, since there is no allegation or ground for invoking the
second. Certiorari lies in this case because the respondent judge exceeded, as we have
pointed out, the discretion conferred upon him by law (section 217, Code of Civil
Procedure; De Castro and Morales v. Justice of the Peace of Bocaue, 33 Phil., 595;
Valdez v. Querubin, 37 Phil., 77ds; Leung Ben v. OBrien, 38 Phil., 182; Salvador
Campos y Cia. v. Del Rosario, 41 Phil., 45; Larrobis v. Wislizenus and Smith, Bell & Co.,
42 Phil., 401; Encarnacion and Navarro v. Sheriff of Rizal, 63 Phil., 467; Carreon v.
Buyson Lampa, 63 Phil., 449).
Wherefore, let the writ of certiorari issue and the order of December 29, 1938 denying
bail to the accused Mariano Marcos, Pio Marcos, and Quirino Lizardo be set aside. The
respondent judge, or whoever acts in his stead, shall set the petitions filed by these
three accused regarding bail for hearing, at which the fiscal should prove that they fall
within the exception and are therefore not entitled to bail because they are charged with
a capital offense, the proof is evident, and the presumption of their guilt is strong. The
evidence thus adduced may be rebutted by the accused with other evidence to show
their right. Without special award of costs. So ordered.
Avancea, C.J., Villa-Real, Diaz, Concepcion and Morar, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23599

September 29, 1967

REYNALDO C. VILLASEOR, petitioner,

vs.
HON. MAXIMO ABANO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Marinduque and
THE PROVINCIAL FISCAL OF MARINDUQUE, respondents.
Maximo Abano for respondents.
No appearance for petitioner.

SANCHEZ, J.:

The questions presented in this an original petition for certiorari, took root in Criminal
Case 2299 (Court of First Instance of Marinduque) for the murder of Boac police
sergeant Alfonso Madla, lodged by the Provincial Fiscal against petitioner.1 Petitioner,
defendant below, was, on motion, admitted to a P60,000.00-bail. The amount of the
bond was, on verbal representation of petitioner's wife, reduced to P40,000.00. On May
29, 1964, petitioner posted a property bond, was set at provisional liberty.
Before arraignment on the murder charge, however, respondent Provincial Fiscal
amended the information. This time he accused petitioner with "Direct Assault Upon an
Agent of a Person in Authority with Murder."
On August 7, 1964, respondent judge sua sponte cancelled petitioner's bond, ordered
his immediate arrest.
On petitioner's motion. to reconsider, respondent judge, on September 9, 1964, after
hearing, resolved to admit him to bail provided he puts up a cash bond of P60,000.00.
On September 15, 1964, on petitioner's motion that the original bond previously given
be reinstated, respondent judge resolved to fix "the bond anew in real property in the
amount of P60,000.00, but to be posted only by residents of the province of Marinduque
actually staying therein" with properties which "must be in the possession and
ownership of said residents for five years."
On October 1, 1964, petitioner came to this Court on certiorari, with a prayer for
preliminary injunction. He seeks to set aside respondent judge's orders of August 7,
September 9 and September 15, 1964; to reinstate the bail bond theretofore approved
by respondent judge on May 29, 1964, and for other reliefs. He charges respondent
judge having acted without any or in excess of his jurisdiction and with grave abuse of
discretion, and with violation of the Constitution and the Rules of Court in issuing the
disputed orders.
On October 3, 1964, this Court issued a writ of preliminary injunction upon a P1,000.00bond. We restrained respondents from enforcing the orders in question and from further
proceeding with the case. On November 5, 1965, we modified the writ of preliminary
injunction; we lifted the portion thereof which prohibited continuation of the proceedings
in the case below, Criminal Case 2299, to avoid delay in the prosecution thereof.
Upon respondents' separate returns, the case was submitted without argument.
1. We need not pass upon respondent judge's orders of August 7, 1964
cancelling petitioner's bail, and September 9, 1964 admitting the accused anew

to cash bail. The August 7, 1964 order was superseded by that of September 9,
1964. This, in turn, was replaced by the last order of September 15, 1964, by
virtue of which the cash bond required was reverted back to property bond. The
two orders of August 7 and September 9, 1964 thus became functus officio.2 A
rule of ancient respectability is that it is not the function of a court of justice to
furnish answers to purposeless questions that no longer exist. 3 Our inquiry
accordingly narrows down to the three-pronged attack levelled by petitioner
against the September 15, 1964 order of respondent judge. We propose to
discuss them in seriatim.
2. Forefront amongst the three problems is this: Does the P60,000.00-bond fixed
by respondent judge transgress the constitutional injunction that "(e)xcessive bail
shall not be required"?4 Petitioner's submission is that he is a mere government
employee, earning but a monthly salary of P210.00, and the sole breadwinner of
a family of five.
To be read with the constitutional precept just adverted to is Section 12, Rule 114, Rules
of Court, which provides that "the court may, upon good cause shown, either increase or
reduce the amount" of the bail, and that "defendant may be committed to custody
unless he gives bail in the increased amount he is called upon to furnish."
Along with the court's power to grant bail in bailable cases is its discretion to fix the
amount thereof, 5 and, as stated, to increase or reduce the same.6 The question of
whether bail is excessive "lays with the court to determine." 7
In the matter of bail fixing, courts perforce are to be guided at all times by the purpose
for which bail is required. The definition of bail in Section 1, Rule 114, Rules of Court,
gives this purpose "the security required and given for the release of a person who is
in the custody of the law, that he will appear before any court in which his appearance
may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or recognizance." 8 And, in amplification
thereof, Section 2 of the same rule states that the condition of the bail is that "defendant
shall answer the complaint or information in the court in which it is filed or to which it
may be transferred for trial, and after conviction, if the case is appealed to the Court of
First Instance upon application supported by an undertaking or bail, that he will,
surrender himself in execution of such judgment as the appellate court may render, or
that, in case cause, is to be tried anew or remanded for a new trial, he will appear in the
court to which it may be remanded and submit himself to the orders and processes
thereof."
Expressions in varying, language spell out in a general way the principles governing bail
fixing. One is that the amount should be high enough to assure the presence of

defendant when required but no higher than is reasonably calculated to fulfill this
purpose.9 Another is that "the good of the public as well as the rights of the
accused,"10 and "the need for a tie to the jurisdiction and the right to freedom from
unnecessary restraint before conviction under the circumstances surrounding each
particular accused",11 should all be balanced in one equation.
We are not to consider solely the inability of a defendant to secure bail in a certain
amount. This circumstance by itself does not make the amount excessive. 12 For, where
an accused has no means of his own, no one to bail him out, or none to turn to for
premium payments, any amount fixed no matter how small would fall into the category
of excessive bail; and, he "would be entitled to be discharged on his recognizance." 13
So it is, that experience has brought forth certain guidelines in bail fixing, which may be
summarized as follows: (1) ability of the accused to give bail; (2) nature of the offense;
(3) Penalty for the offense charged; (4) character and reputation of the accused; (5)
health of the accused; (6) character and strength of the evidence; (7) probability of the
accused appearing in trial; (8) forfeiture of other bonds; (9) whether the accused was a
fugitive from justice when arrested; and (10) if the accused is under bond for
appearance at trial in other cases.14
But, at bottom, in bail fixing, "the principal factor considered, to the determination of
which most other factors are directed, is the probability of the appearance of the
accused, or of his flight to avoid punishment." 15 Of importance then is the possible
penalty that may be meted. Of course penalty depends to a great extent upon the
gravity of offense.
Here petitioner is charged with a capital offense, direct assault upon an agent of a
person in authority with murder. A complex crime, it may call for the imposition of the
capital punishment. Then, Circular 47 dated July 5, 1946 of the Department of Justice,
reiterated in Circular 48 of July 18, 1963, directed prosecuting attorney's to recommend
bail at the rate of P2,000.00 per year of imprisonment, corresponding to the medium
period of the penalty prescribed for the offense charged, unless circumstances warrant
a higher penalty. The reasonableness of this circular has already received this Court's
imprimatur in one case.16 We are unprepared to downgrade this method of computation,
what with a compound of reduced peso value and the aggravated crime climate.
We see no discernible abuse of discretion, given the facts and the law, when
respondent judge fixed petitioner's bail at P60,000.00.
3. Exacting serious consideration is that portion of the disputed order of
September 15, 1964, where respondent judge requires of the property bond be

posted only by "residents of the province of Marinduque actually staying therein."

This question is of first impression.
The drive of petitioner's argument is that this condition collides with Section 9, Rule 114,
Rules of Court, which in part recites:
Sec. 9. Qualification of sureties. The necessary qualifications of sureties to a
bail bond shall be as follows:
(a) Each of them must be a resident householder or freeholder within the
Philippines.
xxx

xxx

xxx

We read this statute to mean that the directive that bondsmen be resident householders
or freeholders in the Philippines, is but a minimum requirement. Reason for this is that
bondsmen in criminal cases, residing outside of the Philippines, are not within the reach
of the processes of its courts. The provision under consideration, however, makes no
attempt to cover the whole field of what is necessary for a bondsman before he is
allowed to make bonds in the various courts;" nor does it "attempt to take away the
inherent right of the court to properly administer its affairs." 17 Residence within the
country is not the only thing that could be required by the courts; it is not intended to tie
up the hands of a judge to approve bail so long as it is offered by a resident
householder or freeholder within the Philippines. It is to be treated "as cumulative, rather
than exclusive, of the inherent power" of the courts to determine whether bail proffered
should be accepted. 18 For, in principle, a court has broad powers essential to its judicial
function.19
We look in retrospect at the situation confronting respondent judge. What prompted him
to require as condition that petitioner's bondsmen be residents of the province of
Marinduque actually staying therein? In his return to the petition before this Court,
respondent judge reasons out that it has been his experience that "it is hard to send
notices to people outside the province." He explains that the usual procedure of his
clerk of court is to send notices by registered mail accompanied by return cards; that
when trial comes, the return cards in many instances have not yet been received in
court; that when the parties fail to appear; there is no way of knowing whether the
notices have been duly received; that he cannot order the confiscation of the bond and
the arrest of the accused, because he is not sure whether the bondsmen have been
duly notified; that sending telegrams to people outside the province is costly, and the
court cannot afford to incur much expenses.

The posture taken by respondent judge does not offend the good sense of justice. Bail
is given to secure appearance of the accused. If bondsmen reside in far away places,
even if within the Philippines, the purpose of bail may be frustrated. There is the
insufficiency of the mails as an effective means of communication. And then, there is the
problem of complying with the constitutional mandate of speedy trial. If notice to sureties
is not served, no trial can be had. For sureties, in legal contemplation, are defendant's
mancupators. In the circumstances here obtaining, it would not seem unfair if the judge
should require, as he did, that sureties be so situated that court processes could reach
them on time. Because, by both the Constitution and the law, sureties should be
sufficient. 20 And, sureties are deemed sufficient not only when they are of sufficient
financial ability. They must also be "of sufficient vigilance to secure the appearance and
prevent the absconding of the accused." 21 They cannot be said to be of sufficient
vigilance to secure defendant's appearance wheneverrequired, if the court should
experience difficulty in communicating with them. Here respondent judge only wanted to
make sure that when the proper time comes for the court to order the sureties to
produce the person of defendant, no undue delay will be incurred.
Weighing as heavily against petitioner's case is the fact that a reading of his petition
fails of an averment that the requisite exacted that bondsmen be residents of and
actually staying in Marinduque would cause him prejudice. The burden of his argument
solely that still a condition runs counter to the rules of court. He did not even say that he
cannot secure such sureties. On the contrary, suggestion there is in record that he is a
former agent of the governor of Marinduque. Implicit in all these is that if error there was
in the disputed order of September 15, 1964, petitioner has not shown that it was
prejudicial error calling for correction. 22
The situation here presented does not warrant substitution of our judgement for that of
our judgment for that of respondent judge's. We are not called upon to strike down
respondent judge's order on this point as an abuse of discretion.
4. Also assailed as beyond the power of respondent judge is the requirement that
properties to be offered as bond must be "in the possession and ownership of the
sureties for at least five years." Respondent judge, in his return, relies on Circular
2, dated January 23, 1964, of the Honorable, the Secretary of Justice,
addressed, among others, to Judges of First Instance. That circular recites that it
had been brought to the attention of the Department of Justice that in certain
provinces, unscrupulous persons who are spurious landowners, have been
accepted as sureties. The Secretary then suggested that "(i)t may be a good
policy not to accept as bail bonds real properties not covered by certificate of title
unless they have been declared for taxation purposes in favor of the person
offering them as bond for at least five (5) years."

Basically, reason is with this requirement. Its purpose, so the circular states, is to
"prevent the commission of frauds in connection with the posting of personal bail bonds
and to protect the interests of the Government." Really, if the bondsman is not the
owner, bail fails of its purpose, prejudice to the government sets in.1awphl.nt
We note, however, that the order of September 15, 1964 spoke of properties in general.
It did not exclude properties registered under the Torrens system. A Torrens title is
indefeasible. Failure of specificness on the part of respondent judge then could have
been a case of oversight. To obviate misunderstanding, we take it upon ourselves to
clarify that order. We do say now that the order of September 15, 1964 is to be
understood as excluding properties covered by Torrens titles from the requirement that
properties to be offered as bond must be "in the possession and ownership of the
sureties for at least five years."
5. In the end we say that respondent judge's order of September 15, 1964, as thus
clarified, is here confirmed considering the overall environmental circumstances. We are
not to be understood as laying down here specifics in bail fixing, bail approval or bail
denial. Discretion, indeed, is with the court called upon to rule on the question of bail.
We must stress, however, that where conditions imposed upon a defendant seeking bail
would amount to a refusal thereof and render nugatory the constitutional right to bail, we
will not hesitate to exercise our supervisory powers to provide the required remedy.
With the observations heretofore adverted to, we vote to dismiss the petition
for certiorari, and to dissolve the writ of preliminary injunction issued herein.
Costs against petitioner. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.
Bengzon, J.P., J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-66939 January 10, 1987
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner
vs.

THE INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and ANGELITO ALIVIA Y

ABALOS, respondents.

PARAS, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of respondent Intermediate
Appellate Court (IAC) now Court of Appeals (CA), in AC-G.R. No. SP-01320-22
promulgated January 24, 1984, granting the petition for bail of accused Angelito Alivia y
Abalos and nullifying the Orders of the trial court, dated February 23, 1983 and May 13,
1983 in Criminal Cases Nos. 1272-74, entitled People of the Philippines vs. Angelito
Alivia y Abalos. Said orders of the trial court denied accused's application for bail
holding that the accused Angelito Alivia is charged with three (3) capital offenses, the
evidence of guilt of which, in each case, is strong.
Accused Angelito Alivia y Abalos was charged before the then CFI of Isabela with the
crimes of (1) assault upon an agent of person in authority with murder with the use of
illegally possessed firearm, with respect to the killing of Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa (Crim. Case
No. 1272), (2) assault upon an agent of person in authority with murder with use of
illegally possessed firearm (Crim. Case No. 1274) and (3) murder of Atty. Norberto
Maramba with the use of illegally Possessed firearm, (Crim. Case No. 1273). The trial
court ordered the consolidation of the three (3) criminal cases since they arose from the
same incident. The Provincial Fiscal recommended no bail for the accused in the three
aforementioned cases. Accused filed an omnibus motion praying among other things
that he be allowed bail contending that the evidence of his guilt is not strong, but said
motion was denied by the trial court. Upon denial of his Motion for Reconsideration,
accused filed with the IAC a petition for certiorari questioning the decision of the trial
court on his motion for bail. After considering the records of the criminal cases which
were transmitted to it from the trial court, the IAC promulgated a decision granting
petitioner bail and nullifying the Orders of the trial court dated February 23, 1983 and
May 13, 1983 and fixing the amount of bail at Eighty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
After denial of petitioner's motion for reconsideration, the present petition was filed,
The facts as found by the trial court, which facts were adopted by respondent IAC, 1 are
as follows:
At the recently concluded barangay elections for barangay Sarangay,
Cabatuan, Isabela, two candidates ran for the position of Barangay
Captain thereat, namely accused Angelito Alivia and one Antonio
Bagauisan. Herein accused lost in that election, but he filed with the

Municipal Circuit Court of Cabatuan, an election protest. Antonio

Bagauisan was duly proclaimed and he assumed office accordingly. The
late former Municipal Judge of Cabatuan, Atty. Norberto Maramba
(Criminal Case No. 1273) was counsel for the protestee. (tsn., pp. 27-28,
November 16, 1982).
The hearing of the election protest was set in the morning of June 4, 1982,
but was postponed. After which, at about 10:00 o'clock that same morning,
the late Atty. Maramba invited witness Virgilio Yanuaria, the late Police Lt.
Cesar Rumbaoa (Criminal Case No. 1272), Antonio Bagauisan and others
to play bowling/billiards at the Cabatuan Recreation Center. They played
up to 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon of the same day with the bet that the
loser will pay the beer they will order. (tsn., pp. 28-29, Ibid).
Later, the late Atty. Maramba, Police Lt. Rumbaoa and witness Virgilio
Yanuaria (Antonio Bagauisan did not join them) proceeded to the Azarcon
Restaurant at the public market, Cabatuan, Isabela, for lunch. They
occupied round table No. 2 (see sketch). The late Police Lt. Rumbaoa was
seated on chair No. A, facing west, the late Atty. Maramba, on chair No. B,
facing south and witness Virgilio Yanuaria in chair No. C, facing east. They
ordered lunch and three (3) bottles of beer, but Atty. Maramba did not
drink, because he joined the group of accused Angelito Alivia. (tsn., pp.
20, 29- 34, Ibid)
It appears that the group of the accused Angelito Alivia arrived at the
Azarcon Restaurant much earlier, and those members of the group are (1)
Angelito Alivia, accused herein; (2) Municipal Judge Estanislao Cudal; (3)
Feliciano Gaspar; (4) Pat. Elpidio Sagun; (5) Pat. Danilo Rosario; (6) Engr.
Charlie Martin; (7-8) a newly married couple, not Identified. The late
Patrolman Elpidio Sagun and witness Pat. Danilo del Rosario also went to
the Azarcon Restaurant to buy pansit noodles, but were invited by the
accused to join them in their group while drinking beer with chaser
(pullutan).lwphl@it Accused Angelito Alivia told Pat. del Rosario to drop
by his house and get ammunition for pistol Cal. .38 and Pat. Elpidio Sagun
for the armalite magazine. (tsn., pp. 88- 93, November 17, 1982).
The relative positions and sitting arrangements of the two groups as found
in the ocular inspection conducted in the morning of November 17, 1982,
at the Azarcon Restaurant, Cabatuan are the following (pp. 130-131,
record, Crim. Case No. 1272)

The group of accused Angelito Alivia was the first to arrive at the Azarcon
Restaurant, and this group joined two small square tables, Identified as
square tables Nos. 5 and 6, to form a rectangle. There are eight (8) of
them, namely: (1), accused Angelito Alivia, who seated himself on a stool
marked (AA) north of square table No. 5; (2) Pat. Danilo Rosario, was
seated on a stool marked (DR) left of accused Alivia, who was facing
south, square table No. 5; (3) a man, unknown, occupied a stool marked
(UK); (4) further left, by Feliciano Gaspar, occupied a stool marked (EG);
(5) exactly opposite the accused, was seated Municipal Judge Estanislao
Cudal marked (EC) on square table No. 6; (6) on his left, was seated the
late Pat. Elpidio Sagun, on a stool marked (ES) in square table No. 6; (7)
left of Elpidio Sagun, was seated, Engr. Charlie Martin, marked (CM) on
table No. 6, and (8) on his left, was the woman, unknown, on square table
No. 5, (tsn., pp. 24- 29 November 17, 1982).
The three member group of the late Atty. Maramba, who arrived later,
occupied round table No. 2, namely: (l) the late Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa,
facing west, occupied chair A; (2) the late Atty. Maramba, facing south,
occupied chair B; and (3) witness Virgilio Yanuaria, facing east, occupied
chair C. (tsn, pp. 22-23, November 17, 1982).
The distance from chair B, occupied by the late Atty. Maramba, in round
table No. 2, to the tip of square table No. 6, where Judge Cudal was
seated is 90 centimeters, and the distance from the seat of accused
Angelito Alivia, north of square table No. 5, to the stool of Judge Cudal,
which was later occupied by the late Atty. Maramba is around 189
centimeters. (tsn., pp. 19-21, Ibid)
Upon arrival at the Azarcon restaurant, the late Atty. Maramba, engaged
Municipal Judge Estanislao Cudal in a conversation on topics, among
which was about the barangay election. Thereafter, Judge Cudal and
Feliciano Gaspar left and proceeded to the municipal building. When
Judge Cudal and Gaspar left, the late Atty. Maramba seated himself on
the stool formerly occupied by Judge Cudal and engaged the accused
Angelito Alivia who was seated opposite north of square table No. 5, at a
distance of 189 centimeters facing each other, in a conversation on
matters the witness can not remember. (tsn., pp. 30-31, November 17,
1982; tsn., pp. 94- 97, November 17, 1982)
Meanwhile, Pat. del Rosario noticed accused Angelito Alivia go out from
the Azarcon Restaurant thru the main door (No. 1) towards the west of the

restaurant, where his car was parked three (3) meters from the main door,
east (west) side of the restaurant. (Tsn., pp- 98-100, November 17, 1982).
Later, Angelito Alivia returned to his former place. In a little while,
Patrolman Danilo del Rosario stood up and went to the municipal building,
while the late Patrolman Elpidio Sagun remained inside the restaurant.
(tsn., pp. 103-104, November 17, 1982).
The lunch ordered by the group of the late Atty. Maramba being ready, the
late Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa called for Atty. Maramba to join them and
eat ("kakain na tayo"). Hence, the late Atty. Maramba stood up from where
he was then seated with the group of accused Angelito Alivia. However, he
was not able to reach round table No. 2 to eat, because he was suddenly
shot on the chest (Dr. Angobung) by accused Angelito Alivia using a
firearm Identified as Llama Automatic Pistol Super 38, SN-532937 (Exh.,
"K") causing him to fall the cemented floor. ( t.s.n., pp. 32-34, November
17, 1982)
While in that lying position, again he was shot on the neck, Both gunshot
wounds caused his instantaneous death. Before the second gun report
when Virgilio Yanuaria was about to run, the late Patrolman Elpidio Sagun
who was on his left pushed Virgilio Yanuaria to save him using his right
hand pressing the left shoulder of Yanuaria. After which, Yanuaria walked
crouching passing thru the inside door (No. 3) and went out thru door No.
2, and proceeded to the municipal building to report the incident, after
hearing successive gun reports, the number he cannot remember. (tsn.,
pp. 20-22, 34-35, November 17, 1982)
Witness Virgilio Yanuaria reported the incident to Cpl. Jose Pascual in the
presence of Pat. Danilo del Rosario saying "Lito Alivia shot Atty.
Maramba." Immediately, four policemen, namely, Pat. Danilo del Rosario,
Pat, Jose Pascual, Pat. Jose Angangan and another one, went to the
crime scene. They were later followed by Pat. Celestino Apaya and Pat.
Ricardo Pedro. Thereat, they saw the body of the late Police Lt. Rumbaoa
(dead already) at the main door (door No. 1) lying face upward, and inside
they saw the body of the late Atty. Maramba (dead already) face
downward and that of the late Pat. Sagun (still breathing) face upward
(tsn., pp. 45-49), November 17, 1982)
Meanwhile, Dr. Benedicto Acosta, the incumbent Municipal Mayor of
Cabatuan, arrived from Ilagan, at about 3:10, afternoon of June 4, 1982. In

front of his business residence at Centro, Cabatuan, he was informed by

Dr. Rolando Dacuycuy, a brother-in-law of the accused, about the shooting
incident. Because he was then riding on his car, he invited him to see the
incident, but Dr. Dacuycuy did not get inside the restaurant, while Mayor
Acosta went inside to investigate the matter in his capacity as Chief
Executive of the town. (tsn., pp. 237-238, September 21, 1982)
Inside the restaurant, he saw the owner of the restaurant Mrs. Azarcon,
two maids and two dead bodies, Identified as those of the late Atty.
Maramba and Police Lt. Rumbaoa. He did not see the body of the late
Pat. Elpidio Sagun because he was informed that he was then still alive
and was rushed to the emergency hospital in Cauayan but died at the
junction at Luna, Isabela. In his ocular inspection of the crime scene, he
picked up five (5) empty shells (Exhs. "K-2", K- 3", "K.4", "K-5" and "K-6"),
the four inside the restaurant, while the other one was recovered outside
just in front of the main door. He likewise recovered inside the restaurant
one (1) deformed lead/slug (Exh. "K-8") and two (2) lead cores (Exhs. "K9" and "K-10").lwphl@it He asked the owner Mrs. Delia Azarcon who shot
and kill the late Atty. Maramba and Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa and she
said it was Angelito Alivia who shot them. Being a doctor himself, he
examined the two bodies and found that the late Atty. Maramba suffered
two gunshot wounds, one at the left occipital region on the head and one
at the interior surface of the scapula (chest) with a bore at his T-shirt. In
the case of the late Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa, he suffered a gunshot
wound at the left maxilla surrounded by blackening discolorations and
another wound at the left lateral surface, both of the neck and also a
gunshot wound at the right lateral root of the neck. (tsn., pp. 238-250, Ibid)
When Pat. Pedro Constancio arrived, Mayor Acosta directed him to call for
a photographer and also Dr. Juan Rigor, Jr., the Rural Health Officer of
Cabatuan. Photographer de la Cruz took the pictures and Dr. Rigor
examined the cadavers of the two bodies. The pictures taken were
developed and Mayor Acosta Identified the pictures of the late Police Lt.
Cesar Rumbaoa, as Exhs. "P", "P-1", "P-2", and "P-3", appearing on
Pages 35-36-A, record, in Criminal Case No. 1272. Similarly, pictures
were taken of the dead body of the late Atty. Maramba, duly Identified by
Mayor Acosta (Exh. "Q," p. 22, record, Crim. Case No. 1273). Later Mayor
Acosta called for Pat. Miguel Orodio, INP, Investigator, Cabatuan, Isabela.
lie also found inside the restaurant one, revolver, inside a tuck in holster.
He likewise noticed three (3) bullet marks, one beside the fallen body of

Atty. Maramba, another just beneath the head of Police Lt. Rumbaoa and
the other at the left side wan of the restaurant. (tsn., pp. 250-274, Ibid)
The empty shells and slugs were given to Cpl. Jose Pascual and the latter
submitted them to the Police Investigator. These empty shells, cartridge
and deformed slugs, together with the Llama automatic pistol Cal. 38 with
magazine were later submitted to the NBI, Manila, for ballistic
examination, which were examined by Feliciano S. Lunasco, NBI,
Supervising Ballistician, and testified in Court that the empty shells,
deformed slugs, cartridge and lead cores were fired from the same firearm
(Exh. "K"). (tsn., pp. 285-288, September 21, 1982; tsn., pp. 203-210,
December 15, 1982)
Dr. Ruben Angobung, NBI, Medico Legal Officer, testified that he
conducted the autopsy examination on the cadaver of the deceased Atty.
Norberto Maramba, Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa and Pat. Elpidio Sagun
upon request of their relatives. The cause of death of each of the three (3)
victims was hemorrhage due to gun shot wounds. It was possible that
deceased Atty. Maramba and Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa were likewise
shot when they have already fallen on the cemented floor as evidenced by
the, gunshot wounds on their heads. He found - and marks on the head of
Police Lt. Rumbaoa which shows that the assailant ' was shot at close
range and the muzzle of the gun used was at distance of not more than 24
inches from the head. From the trajectory of the gunshot wounds on the
head of the deceased Atty. Maramba and Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa, it
was possible that the assailant was then at the back of said victims
(Testimony of Dr. Angobung). (tsn., pp. 86-148, December 1, 1982)
Immediately after the shooting, the accused Angelito Alivia, accompanied
by his uncle and counsel de parte, Atty. Artemio Alivia, voluntarily
surrendered to the Provincial Commander, Col. Oscar M. Florendo, at the
PC Headquarters, Calamagui, Ilagan, Isabela. The accused verbally
admitted to Col. Florendo that he shot to death the late Atty. Maramba,
Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa and Pat. Elpidio Sagun, at the Azarcon
Restaurant, located at the public market, Cabatuan, Isabela. In the
process, the accused surrendered the firearm, Llama automatic Pistol SN532937 (Exh. "K") which he used in the killing of the three (3) victims,
(tsn., pp. 158-167, December 15, 1982)
In addition to this, the accused executed an extra-judicial confession
(Exhs. "J", "J-1" and "J-2"), taken by M/Sgt Severino Goday ,Jr., PC, in

that same afternoon of June 4, 1982, at PC, Headquarters in the presence

of his lawyer uncle. He freely and voluntarily admitted having shot to death
Atty. Norberto Maramba at Centro, Cabatuan, Isabela, Police Lt. Cesar
Rumbaoa and Pat. Elpidio Sagun, both of INP, Cabatuan, at around 2:00
o'lock P.M. of June 4, 1982, inside the Azarcon Restaurant, located inside
the public Market of Cabatuan, Isabela with the use of Llama automatic
pistol Cal. 38, SN-532937 (Exh. "K"). (Testimonies of Col. Oscar M.
Florendo and M/Sgt. Severino Goday Jr., PC). (tsn., pp. 218-225,
September 21, 1982).
C. FACTUAL ANALYSIS
Counsel for the defense admits that the offenses with which the accused
was charged are capital offences, which carry the ;supreme penalty of
death.
Eyewitness Virgilio Yanuaria testified that the accused Angelito Alivia
suddenly shot the late Atty. Norberto Maramba, when the latter stood up,
to eat lunch upon call by the late Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa. The first gun
shot wound was fatal and the victim Atty. Maramba fen to the cemented
floor. There is evidence that the accused again shot the victim while lying
down.
Meanwhile, the late Pat. ElpidioSagun who was on his left side, bushed
Virgilio Yanuaria on the shoulders to save him and the latter escaped
crouching towards the inside door (door No. 3) and exited thru door No. 2,
southern portion of the restaurant. He heard several gun reports
thereafter, while he proceeded to the municipal building to report the
incident to Cpl. Jose Pascual in the presence of Pat. Danilo del Rosario,
both INP of Cabatuan, Isabela, and based on this report, police
investigators repaired to the scene of the crime immediately thereafter.
There is no eyewitness presented on the shooting of the other two victims,
namely. the late Police Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa and the late Pat. Elpidio
Sagun. However, there is evidence that said two victims were likewise
shot by the accused Angelito Alivia. The cadavers were examined and the
autopsy reports reveal that the cause of death of said two victims was
hemorrhage due to gun shot wounds. The five (5) empty shells (Exhs.
"K.2", "K-3", "K.4", "K.5", and "K-6") and the two lead cores (Exhs. "K-9"
and "K-10"), an recovered at the crime scene (Azarcon restaurant), were
subjected to ballistic examination at the NBI, Manila. Witness Feliciano

Lunasco, NBI, Supervising Ballistician, Manila, testified that the empty

shells, deformed slugs, cartridge and lead cores were fired from the same
gun, Llama automatic pistol Cal. 38 (Exh. "K").
Mrs. Delia Azarcon, the owner of the restaurant, when interviewed by
Mayor Benedicto Acosta who arrived at the restaurant upon being
informed of the incident that same afternoon not long after the shooting,
told the Mayor, that it was the accused Angelito Alivia who shot the three
(3) victims, whose bodies lay prostrate on the cemented floor, There were
three (3) bullet marks on the cemented floor, one beside the fallen body of
the late Atty. Maramba, another just beneath the head of the late Police Lt.
Rumbaoa, and the other at the left side wall of the restaurant. Pictures
were taken of the cadavers of the late Atty. Maramba (Exh. "Q") and that
of the late Police Lt. Rumbaoa (Exhs. "P", "P-1", "P-2" and "P-3", p. 2, and
pp. 36-36-A, respectively, record, Crim. Case No. 1272).
To top it all, accused Angelito Alivia, duly assisted by his lawyer-uncle,
immediately after the incident, left for Ilagan and voluntarily surrendered to
Col. Oscar M. Florendo, Provincial Commander, PC, Ilagan In the
process, accused surrendered the firearm used, Llama automatic pistol
Cal. 38 (Exh. "k"), and orally admitted to Col. Florendo advised the
accused in the presence of his lawyer to have his oral confession reduced
in writing, which the accused and counsel agreed. M/Sgt. Severino Goday
Jr., PC Investigator, was tasked to get the statement of the accused who,
when called to testify in Court told the story that the extra-judicial
confession (Exh. "J", p. 7, record, Crim. Case No. 1272) was freely and
voluntarily given by the accused duly assisted by his counsel.
There are present, two (2) mitigating circumstances which may be
credited in favor of the accused, namely: (1) voluntary surrender and (2)
drunkenness probably not habitual but at this stage of the proceedings as
they relate to the legal incident in question, such circumstances may not
sway to mitigate the question on bail in favor of the accused. Persuasively,
said two mitigating circumstances may have great weight after trial on the
merits. (pp. 10-20, Rollo)
Notwithstanding said finding of facts, the IAC ruled that accused is entitled to bail in the
amount of P80,000.00 thus nullifying the Orders of the trial court, dated January 23,
1983 and May 15, 1983. Hence, this petition with the following assigned alleged errors:

I. Respondent lntermediate Appellate Court gravely erred in holding that

the evidence of guilt of accused is not strong, contrary to the findings of
the trial court.
II. Respondent lntermediate Appellate Court gravely erred in holding that
Lt. Cesar Rumbaoa and Pat. Elpidio Sagun were not in the official
performance of their duties as peace officers at the time of the incident
and
III. Respondent Intermediate Appellate Court gravely erred in relying on
the resolution in the case of"Montano vs. Ocampo" which is not
controlling. (p. 21. rollo)
The contentions of petitioner are well-taken. The crimes charged are clearly capital
offenses as the phrase is defined in Sec. 5 Rule 114 of the Rules of Court. An offense is
capital, if it may be punished by death under both the law prevailing at the time of its
commission and that prevailing at the time of the application for bail, even if after
conviction a penalty less than death imposed. In its assailed decision, respondent (IAC)
concurred with the trial court that the charges against accused are capital offenses and
that the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong. However, the respondent Court ruled
that while the evidence clearly established that the petitioner 2 was responsible for the
shooting of Atty. Maramba, Lt. Rumbaoa and Patrolman Sagun and he so admitted
responsibility for their death in his confession" the crime is ostensibly that of homicide
merely, not murder.
The criterion to determine whether the offense charged is capital is the penalty provided
by the law regardless of the attendant circumstances. As pointed out by the petitioner in
its memorandum, The rationale of the provision lies in the difficulty and impracticability
of determining the nature of the offense on the basis of the penalty actually imposable.
Otherwise, the test will require consideration not only of evidence showing commission
of the crime but also evidence of the aggravating and mitigating circumstances. Thus,
there has to be not only a complete trial, but the trial court must also already render a
decision in the case. This defeats the purpose of bail, which is to entitle the accused to
provisional liberty pending trial. 3
The posture taken by the respondent Court in granting bail to the accused and in
disregarding the findings by the trial court of the guilt of the accused (respondent herein)
is a clear deviation from Our ruling laid down in the case of Bolanos vs. dela Cruz, to
wit:

Under the Constitution, all persons shall, before conviction, be bailable by

sufficient sureties, except those charged with capital offenses when
evidence of guilt is strong. It is the trial court which is tasked to determine
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong and it has determined the
affirmative in this case after consideration of the evidence already
presented by the prosecution, In the absence of Manifest abuse of
discretion We are not prepared to substitute our judgment for that of the
trial court. (Bolanos vs. Dela Cruz, supra) (Emphasis supplied) (p. 164,
rollo)
Anent the issue of whether or not the deceased Lt. Rumbaoa and Pat. Sagun were
killed while in the performance of their duties, the evidence shows that while both were
admittedly in civilian clothes during the incident in question they were in the
performance of their duties as police officers when fired upon and killed by the bullets of
the accused. As peace officers, their initial reaction to the shooting was to assert their
authority in protecting and covering civilians from the indiscriminate firing by the
accused. Accused instead suddenly and without warning, successively shot Lt.
Rumbaoa and Pat. Sagun to death knowing fully well that they were peace officers.
Although both were armed with their service guns, they were unable to offer resistance
and put up a defense due to the suddenness and close succession of the shots. This is
indicated by the fact that a revolver still tucked in its holster was found at the crime
scene beside the bodies of the victims showing that one of the victims was unable to
pull out his gun.
The commission of the crimes charged was attended by treachery as established by the
testimony of the eyewitness Virgilio Yanuaria to the shooting of Atty. Maramba and by
strong evidence as to the treacherous shooting of the two peace officers. Virgilio
Yanuaria testified that accused suddenly and without warning shot the deceased Atty.
Norberto Maramba when the latter turned his back towards the accused and returned to
his table to eat. Atty. Maramba was fatally hit on the back of his head and fell to the
cement floor. Atty. Maramba did not sense any danger that he would be shot by the
accused considering that he and the accused knew each other personally and that, as
respondent admitted, there was no previous grudge or misunderstanding between him
(accused) and Atty. Maramba. Successive shots hit the two peace officers who were
caught by surprise as a result of which they died. The deceased had no inkling that the
accused was armed and that he would be carried by passion to resort to violence
considering his prominent stature in the locality. On these issues the trial court ruled:
There is treachery although the shooting was frontal, when the attack was
so sudden and unexpected that the victim was not in a position to offer an
effective defense (People vs. Cuadra, L-27973, October 23, 1978), and

when there was a deliberate surprise attack upon an unarmed victim the
killing is murder qualified by treachery (People ple vs. Alegria, L-40792,
August 18, 1978), and furthermore, sudden, unexpected, without warning,
and without giving the victim ,the opportunity to defend himself or repel the
initial attack, the qualifying circumstance of treachery is evident and the
crane committed is murder (People vs. Candado, L- 34089-90, August 9,
1979; People vs. Pay-an, L-39089-90, July 31, 1978). (p. 171, rollo)
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered giving due course to the petition; the
assailed decision of respondent IAC is hereby SET ASIDE and the orders of the lower
court, denying the petition for bail are hereby REINSTATED. If the accused is out on
bail, his bail bond is hereby cancelled and he is ordered committed to prison. This
decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Feria (Chairman), Fernan, Alampay and Gutierrez, Jr., JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-62100 May 30, 1986
RICARDO L. MANOTOC, JR., petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, HONS. SERAFIN E. CAMILON and RICARDO L.
PRONOVE, JR., as Judges of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig branches,
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, the SECURITIES & EXCHANGE COMISSION,
HON. EDMUNDO M. REYES, as Commissioner of Immigration, and the Chief of
the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM), respondents.

FERNAN, J.:

The issue posed for resolution in this petition for review may be stated thus: Does a
person facing a criminal indictment and provisionally released on bail have an
unrestricted right to travel?
Petitioner Ricardo L. Manotoc, Jr., is one of the two principal stockholders of TransInsular Management, Inc. and the Manotoc Securities, Inc., a stock brokerage house.
Having transferred the management of the latter into the hands of professional men, he
holds no officer-position in said business, but acts as president of the former
corporation.
Following the "run" on stock brokerages caused by stock broker Santamaria's flight from
this jurisdiction, petitioner, who was then in the United States, came home, and together
with his co-stockholders, filed a petition with the Securities and Exchange Commission
for the appointment of a management committee, not only for Manotoc Securities, Inc.,
but likewise for Trans-Insular Management, Inc. The petition relative to the Manotoc
Securities, Inc., docketed as SEC Case No. 001826, entitled, "In the Matter of the
Appointment of a Management Committee for Manotoc Securities, Inc., Teodoro Kalaw,
Jr., Ricardo Manotoc, Jr., Petitioners", was granted and a management committee was
organized and appointed.
Pending disposition of SEC Case No. 001826, the Securities and Exchange
Commission requested the then Commissioner of Immigration, Edmundo Reyes, not to
clear petitioner for departure and a memorandum to this effect was issued by the
Commissioner on February 4, 1980 to the Chief of the Immigration Regulation Division.
When a Torrens title submitted to and accepted by Manotoc Securities, Inc. was
suspected to be a fake, six of its clients filed six separate criminal complaints against
petitioner and one Raul Leveriza, Jr., as president and vice-president, respectively, of
Manotoc Securities, Inc. In due course, corresponding criminal charges for estafa were
filed by the investigating fiscal before the then Court of First Instance of Rizal, docketed
as Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400, assigned to respondent Judge Camilon, and
Criminal Cases Nos. 45542 to 45545, raffled off to Judge Pronove. In all cases,
petitioner has been admitted to bail in the total amount of P105,000.00, with FGU
Instance Corporation as surety.
On March 1, 1982, petitioner filed before each of the trial courts a motion entitled,
"motion for permission to leave the country," stating as ground therefor his desire to go
to the United States, "relative to his business transactions and opportunities." 1 The
prosecution opposed said motion and after due hearing, both trial judges denied the
same. The order of Judge Camilon dated March 9, 1982, reads:

Accused Ricardo Manotoc Jr. desires to leave for the United States on the
all embracing ground that his trip is ... relative to his business transactions
and opportunities.
The Court sees no urgency from this statement. No matter of any
magnitude is discerned to warrant judicial imprimatur on the proposed trip.
In view thereof, permission to leave the country is denied Ricardo
Manotoc, Jr. now or in the future until these two (2) cases are
terminated . 2
On the other hand, the order of Judge Pronove dated March 26, 1982, reads in part:
6.-Finally, there is also merit in the prosecution's contention that if the
Court would allow the accused to leave the Philippines the surety
companies that filed the bail bonds in his behalf might claim that they
could no longer be held liable in their undertakings because it was the
Court which allowed the accused to go outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippine Court, should the accused fail or decide not to return.
WHEREFORE, the motion of the accused is DENIED.

It appears that petitioner likewise wrote the Immigration Commissioner a letter

requesting the recall or withdrawal of the latter's memorandum dated February 4, 1980,
but said request was also denied in a letter dated May 27, 1982.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari and mandamus before the then Court of
Appeals 4 seeking to annul the orders dated March 9 and 26, 1982, of Judges Camilon
and Pronove, respectively, as well as the communication-request of the Securities and
Exchange Commission, denying his leave to travel abroad. He likewise prayed for the
issuance of the appropriate writ commanding the Immigration Commissioner and the
Chief of the Aviation Security Command (AVSECOM) to clear him for departure.
On October 5, 1982, the appellate court rendered a decision 5 dismissing the petition for
lack of merit.
Dissatisfied with the appellate court's ruling, petitioner filed the instant petition for review
on certiorari. Pending resolution of the petition to which we gave due course on April 14,
1983 6 petitioner filed on August 15, 1984 a motion for leave to go abroad pendente
lite. 7 In his motion, petitioner stated that his presence in Louisiana, U.S.A. is needed in
connection "with the obtention of foreign investment in Manotoc Securities, Inc." 8 He
attached the letter dated August 9, 1984 of the chief executive officer of the Exploration

Company of Louisiana, Inc., Mr. Marsden W. Miller 9 requesting his presence in the
United States to "meet the people and companies who would be involved in its
investments." Petitioner, likewise manifested that on August 1, 1984, Criminal Cases
Nos. 4933 to 4936 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati (formerly Nos. 45542-45545)
had been dismissed as to him "on motion of the prosecution on the ground that after
verification of the records of the Securities and Exchange Commission ... (he) was not
in any way connected with the Manotoc Securities, Inc. as of the date of the commission
of the offenses imputed to him." 10 Criminal Cases Nos. 45399 and 45400 of the
Regional Trial Court of Makati, however, remained pending as Judge Camilon, when
notified of the dismissal of the other cases against petitioner, instead of dismissing the
cases before him, ordered merely the informations amended so as to delete the
allegation that petitioner was president and to substitute that he was
"controlling/majority stockholder,'' 11 of Manotoc Securities, Inc. On September 20, 1984,
the Court in a resolution en banc denied petitioner's motion for leave to go
abroad pendente lite. 12
Petitioner contends that having been admitted to bail as a matter of right, neither the
courts which granted him bail nor the Securities and Exchange Commission which has
no jurisdiction over his liberty, could prevent him from exercising his constitutional right
to travel.
Petitioner's contention is untenable.
A court has the power to prohibit a person admitted to bail from leaving the Philippines.
This is a necessary consequence of the nature and function of a bail bond.
Rule 114, Section 1 of the Rules of Court defines bail as the security required and given
for the release of a person who is in the custody of the law, that he will appear before
any court in which his appearance may be required as stipulated in the bail bond or
recognizance.
Its object is to relieve the accused of imprisonment and the state of the
burden of keeping him, pending the trial, and at the same time, to put the
accused as much under the power of the court as if he were in custody of
the proper officer, and to secure the appearance of the accused so as to
answer the call of the court and do what the law may require of him. 13
The condition imposed upon petitioner to make himself available at all times whenever
the court requires his presence operates as a valid restriction on his right to travel. As
we have held in People vs. Uy Tuising, 61 Phil. 404 (1935).

... the result of the obligation assumed by appellee (surety) to hold the
accused amenable at all times to the orders and processes of the lower
court, was to prohibit said accused from leaving the jurisdiction of the
Philippines, because, otherwise, said orders and processes will be
nugatory, and inasmuch as the jurisdiction of the courts from which they
issued does not extend beyond that of the Philippines they would have no
binding force outside of said jurisdiction.
Indeed, if the accused were allowed to leave the Philippines without sufficient reason,
he may be placed beyond the reach of the courts.
The effect of a recognizance or bail bond, when fully executed or filed of
record, and the prisoner released thereunder, is to transfer the custody of
the accused from the public officials who have him in their charge to
keepers of his own selection. Such custody has been regarded merely as
a continuation of the original imprisonment. The sureties become invested
with full authority over the person of the principal and have the right to
prevent the principal from leaving the state. 14
If the sureties have the right to prevent the principal from leaving the state, more so then
has the court from which the sureties merely derive such right, and whose jurisdiction
over the person of the principal remains unaffected despite the grant of bail to the latter.
In fact, this inherent right of the court is recognized by petitioner himself,
notwithstanding his allegation that he is at total liberty to leave the country, for he would
not have filed the motion for permission to leave the country in the first place, if it were
otherwise.
To support his contention, petitioner places reliance upon the then Court of Appeals'
ruling in People vs. Shepherd (C.A.-G.R. No. 23505-R, February 13, 1980) particularly
citing the following passage:
... The law obliges the bondsmen to produce the person of the appellants
at the pleasure of the Court. ... The law does not limit such undertaking of
the bondsmen as demandable only when the appellants are in the
territorial confines of the Philippines and not demandable if the appellants
are out of the country. Liberty, the most important consequence of bail,
albeit provisional, is indivisible. If granted at all, liberty operates as fully
within as without the boundaries of the granting state. This principle
perhaps accounts for the absence of any law or jurisprudence expressly
declaring that liberty under bail does not transcend the territorial
boundaries of the country.

The faith reposed by petitioner on the above-quoted opinion of the appellate court is
misplaced. The rather broad and generalized statement suffers from a serious fallacy;
for while there is, indeed, neither law nor jurisprudence expressly declaring that liberty
under bail does not transcend the territorial boundaries of the country, it is not for the
reason suggested by the appellate court.
Also, petitioner's case is not on all fours with the Shepherd case. In the latter case, the
accused was able to show the urgent necessity for her travel abroad, the duration
thereof and the conforme of her sureties to the proposed travel thereby satisfying the
court that she would comply with the conditions of her bail bond. in contrast, petitioner in
this case has not satisfactorily shown any of the above. As aptly observed by the
Solicitor General in his comment:
A perusal of petitioner's 'Motion for Permission to Leave the Country' will
show that it is solely predicated on petitioner's wish to travel to the United
States where he will, allegedly attend to some business transactions and
search for business opportunities. From the tenor and import of petitioner's
motion, no urgent or compelling reason can be discerned to justify the
grant of judicial imprimatur thereto. Petitioner has not sufficiently shown
that there is absolute necessity for him to travel abroad. Petitioner's
motion bears no indication that the alleged business transactions could
not be undertaken by any other person in his behalf. Neither is there any
hint that petitioner's absence from the United States would absolutely
preclude him from taking advantage of business opportunities therein, nor
is there any showing that petitioner's non-presence in the United States
would cause him irreparable damage or prejudice. 15
Petitioner has not specified the duration of the proposed travel or shown that his surety
has agreed to it. Petitioner merely alleges that his surety has agreed to his plans as he
had posted cash indemnities. The court cannot allow the accused to leave the country
without the assent of the surety because in accepting a bail bond or recognizance, the
government impliedly agrees "that it will not take any proceedings with the principal that
will increase the risks of the sureties or affect their remedies against him. Under this
rule, the surety on a bail bond or recognizance may be discharged by a stipulation
inconsistent with the conditions thereof, which is made without his assent. This result
has been reached as to a stipulation or agreement to postpone the trial until after the
final disposition of other cases, or to permit the principal to leave the state or
country." 16 Thus, although the order of March 26, 1982 issued by Judge Pronove has
been rendered moot and academic by the dismissal as to petitioner of the criminal
cases pending before said judge, We see the rationale behind said order.

As petitioner has failed to satisfy the trial courts and the appellate court of the urgency
of his travel, the duration thereof, as well as the consent of his surety to the proposed
travel, We find no abuse of judicial discretion in their having denied petitioner's motion
for permission to leave the country, in much the same way, albeit with contrary results,
that We found no reversible error to have been committed by the appellate court in
allowing Shepherd to leave the country after it had satisfied itself that she would comply
with the conditions of her bail bond.
The constitutional right to travel being invoked by petitioner is not an absolute right.
Section 5, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution states:
The liberty of abode and of travel shall not be impaired except upon lawful
order of the court, or when necessary in the interest of national security,
public safety or public health.
To our mind, the order of the trial court releasing petitioner on bail constitutes such
lawful order as contemplated by the above-quoted constitutional provision.
Finding the decision of the appellate court to be in accordance with law and
jurisprudence, the Court finds that no gainful purpose will be served in discussing the
other issues raised by petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is hereby dismissed, with costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Abad Santos, Yap, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Alampay, Gutierrez,
Jr., Cruz and Paras, JJ., concur.
Feria, J., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

G.R. No. L-30104 July 25, 1973

HON. GREGORIO. N. GARCIA, Judge of the City Court of Manila, and FRANCISCO
LORENZANA,petitioners,
vs.
HON. FELIX DOMINGO, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila, EDGARDO
CALO and SIMEON CARBONNEL, respondents.
Andres R. Narvasa, Manuel V. Chico and Felipe B. Pagkanlungan for petitioners.
Rafael S. Consengco for respondent Calo, et al.
Respondent Judge in his own behalf.

FERNANDO, J.:
The pivotal question in this petition for certiorari and prohibition, one which thus far has
remained unresolved, is the meaning to be accorded the constitutional right to public
trial. 1 More specifically, did respondent Judge commit a grave abuse of discretion in
stigmatizing as violative of such a guarantee the holding of the trial of the other
respondents 2inside the chambers of city court Judge Gregorio Garcia named as the
petitioner. 3 That was done in the order now impugned in this suit, although such a
procedure had been agreed to beforehand by the other respondents as defendants, the
hearings have been thus conducted on fourteen separate occasions without objection
on their part, and without an iota of evidence to substantiate any claim as to any other
person so minded being excluded from the premises. It is thus evident that what took
place in the chambers of the city court judge was devoid of haste or intentional secrecy.
For reasons to be more fully explained in the light of the facts ascertained the unique
aspect of this case having arisen from what turned out to be an unseemly altercation,
force likewise being employed, due to the mode in which the arrest of private petitioner
for a traffic violation was sought to be effected by the two respondent policemen thus
resulting in charges and counter-charges with eight criminal cases being tried jointly by
city court Judge in the above manner we rule that there was no transgression of the
right to a public trial, and grant the petition.
It was alleged and admitted in the petition: "In Branch I the City Court of Manila presided
over by petitioner Judge, there were commenced, by appropriate informations all dated
January 16, 1968, eight (8) criminal actions against respondent Edgardo Calo, and
Simeon Carbonnel and Petitioner Francisco Lorenzana, as follows: a. Against Edgardo
Calo (on complaint of Francisco Lorenzana) (1) Criminal Case No. F-109192, also for
slight physical injuries; (2) Criminal Case No. F-109192, alsofor slight physical injuries;

and (3) Criminal Case No. F-109193, for maltreatment; b. Against Simeon
Carbonnel (id.) (1)Criminal Case No. F-109197, for maltreatment; (2) Criminal Case No.
F-109196, for slight physical injuries; and (3) Criminal Case No. F-109198, for light
threats; (c) Against Francisco Lorenzana (on complaint of Calo and Carbonnel) (1)
Criminal Case No. F-109201, for violation of Sec. 887 of the Revised Ordinances of
Manila (resisting an officer); and (2) Criminal Case No. F-109200, for slander." 4 The
above was followed by this recital: "The trial of the aforementioned cases was jointly
held on March 4, 1968, March 18, 1968, March 23, 1968, March 30, 1968, April 17,
1968, April 20, 1968, May 4,1968, May 11, 1968, June 1, 1968, June 15, 1968, June 22,
1968, June 29, 1968, August 3, 1968 and August 10, 1968. All the fourteen (14) trial
dates except March 4 and 18, and April 17, 1968 fell on a Saturday. This was
arranged by the parties and the Court upon the insistence of respondents Calo and
Carbonnel who, as police officers under suspension because of the cases, desired the
same to be terminated as soon as possible and as there were many cases scheduled
for trial on the usual criminal trial days (Monday, Wednesday and Friday), Saturday was
agreed upon as the invariable trial day for said eight (8) criminal cases." 5Also this: "The
trial of the cases in question was held, with the conformity of the accused and their
counsel, in the chambers of Judge Garcia." 6 Then came these allegations in the
petition: "During all the fourteen (14) days of trial, spanning a period of several months
(from March to August, 1968), the accused were at all times represented by their
respective counsel, who acted not only in defense of their clients, but as prosecutors of
the accusations filed at their clients' instance. There was only one (1) day when Atty.
Consengco, representing respondent Calo and Carbonnel, was absent. This was on
April 20, 1968. But at the insistence of Pat. Carbonnel, the trial proceeded, and said
respondent cross-examined one of the witnesses presented by the adverse party. In
any case, no pretense has been made by the respondents that this constituted an
irregularity correctible on certiorari. At the conclusion of the hearings the accused, thru
counsel, asked for and were granted time to submit memoranda. Respondents Calo
and Carbonnel, thru counsel, Atty. Rafael Consengco, submitted a 14-page
memorandum with not less than 35 citations of relevant portions of the transcript of
stenographic notes in support of their prayer for exoneration, and conviction of petitioner
Lorenzana in respect of their countercharges against the latter. It is worthy of note
that up to this late date, said respondents Calo and Carbonnel had not objected to or
pointed out any supposed irregularity in the proceedings thus far; the memorandum
submitted in their behalf is confined to a discussion of the evidence adduced in, and the
merits of the cases." 7 It was stated in the next petition:
"The promulgation of judgment was first scheduled on September 23, 1968. This was
postponed to September 28, 1968 at the instance of Atty. Rafael Consengco, as
counsel respondents Calo and Carbonnel, and again to October 1, 1968 at 11 o'clock in
the morning, this time at the instance of Atty. Consengco and Atty. Francisco Koh who

had, in the meantime, also entered his appearance as counsel for respondents Calo
and Carbonnel. The applications for postponement were not grounded upon any
supposed defect or irregularity of the proceedings." 8
Mention was then made of when a petition for certiorari was filed with respondent
Judge: "Early in the morning of October 1, 1968, Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel,
thru their counsel, Atty. Rafael S. Consengco, filed with the Court of First Instance a
petition for certiorari and prohibition, with application for preliminary prohibitory and
mandatory injunction ... [alleging jurisdictional defects]." 9 Respondent Judge acting on
such petition forthwith issued a restraining order thus causing the deferment of the
promulgation of the judgment. After proceedings duly had, there was an order from him
"declaring that 'the constitutional and statutory rights of the accused' had been violated,
adversely affecting their 'right to a free and impartial trial' [noting] 'that the trial of these
cases lasting several weeks held exclusively in chambers and not in the court room
open the public';" and ordering the city court Judge, now petitioner, "to desist from
reading or causing to be read or promulgated the decisions he may have rendered
already in the criminal cases (in question) ... pending in his Court, until further orders of
this Court.'" 10
A motion for reconsideration proving unavailing, petition on January 28, 1969, elevated
the matter to this Tribunal by means of the present suit for certiorari and prohibition. In
its resolution of February 3, 1969, respondents were required to answer, with a
preliminary injunction likewise being issued. As was to be expected the answer filed by
respondent Judge on March 11, 1969 and that by the other respondents on March 19,
1969 did attempt to justify the validity of the finding that there was a failure to respect
the right to a public trial of accused persons. Neither in such pleadings nor in the
memorandum filed, although the diligence displayed by counsel was quite evident, was
there any persuasive showing of a violation of constitutional guarantee of a public trial,
the basic issue to be resolved. Rather it was the mode of approach followed by counsel
Andres R. Narvasa for petitioners that did manifest a deeper understanding of its
implications and ramifications. Accordingly, as previously stated, it is for us to grant the
merits prayed for.
1. The 1935 Constitution which was in force at the time of the antecedents of this
petition, as set forth at the outset, explicitly enumerated the right to a public trial to
which an accused was entitled. So it is, as likewise made clear, under present
dispensation. As a matter of fact, that was one constitutional provision that needed only
a single, terse summation from the Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights,
Delegate, later Justice, Jose P. Laurel, to gain acceptance. As was stressed by him:
"Trial should also be public in order to offset any danger of conducting it in an illegal and
unjust manner." 11 It would have been surprising if its proposed inclusion in the Bill of

Rights had provoked any discussion, much less a debate. It was merely a reiteration
what appeared in the Philippine Autonomy Act of 1916, popularly known as the Jones
Law. 12 Earlier, such a right found expression in the Philippine Bill of 1902, likewise an
organic act of the then government of this country as an unincorporated territory of the
United States. 13Historically as was pointed out by Justice Black, speaking for the United
States Supreme Court in the leading case of In re Oliver: 14 "This nation's accepted
practice of guaranteeing a public trial to an accused has its roots in [the] English
common law heritage. 15 He then observed that the exact date of its origin is obscure,
"but it likely evolved long before the settlement of the [United States] as an
accompaniment of the ancient institution of jury trial." 16 It was then noted by him that
there, "the guarantee to an accused of the right to a public trial appeared in a state
constitution in 1776." 17 Later it was embodied in the Sixth Amendment of the Federal
Constitution ratified in 1791. 18 He could conclude his historical survey "Today almost
without exception every state by constitution, statute, or judicial decision, requires that
all criminal trials be open to the public." 19 Such is the venerable, historical lineage of the
right to a public trial.
2. The crucial question of the meaning to be attached this provision remains. The
Constitution guarantees an accused the right to a public trial. What does it signify?
Offhand it does seem fairly obvious that here is an instance where language is to be
given a literal application. There is no ambiguity in the words employed. The trial must
be public. It possesses that character when anyone interested in observing the manner
a judge conducts the proceedings in his courtroom may do so. There is to be no ban on
such attendance. His being a stranger to the litigants is of no moment. No relationship
to the parties need be shown. The thought that lies behind this safeguard is the belief
that thereby the accused is afforded further protection, that his trial is likely to be
conducted with regularity and not tainted with any impropriety. It is not amiss to recall
that Delegate Laurel in his terse summation the importance of this right singled out its
being a deterrence to arbitrariness. It is thus understandable why such a right is
deemed embraced in procedural due process. 20 Where a trial takes place, as is quite
usual, in the courtroom and a calendar of what cases are to be heard is posted, no
problem arises. It the usual course of events that individuals desirous of being present
are free to do so. There is the well recognized exception though that warrants the
exclusion of the public where the evidence may be characterized as "offensive to
decency or public morals."21
What did occasion difficulty in this suit was that for the convenience of the parties, and
of the city court Judge, it was in the latter's air-conditioned chambers that the trial was
held. Did that suffice to investigate the proceedings as violative of this right? The
answer must be in the negative. There is no showing that the public was thereby
excluded. It is to be admitted that the size of the room allotted the Judge would reduce

the number of those who could be our present. Such a fact though is not indicative of
any transgression of this right. Courtrooms are not of uniform dimensions. Some are
smaller than others. Moreover, as admitted by Justice Black in his masterly In re Oliver
opinion, it suffices to satisfy the requirement of a trial being public if the accused could
"have his friends, relatives and counsel present, no matter with what offense he may be
charged." 22
Then, too, reference may also be made to the undisputed fact at least fourteen hearings
had been held in chambers of the city court Judge, without objection on the part of
respondent policemen. What was said by former Chief Justice Moran should erase any
doubt as to the weight to be accorded, more appropriately the lack of weight, to any
such objection raised. Thus: "In one case, the trial of the accused was held in Bilibid
prison. The accused, invoking his right to a public trial, assigned the procedure thus
taken as error. The Supreme Court held that as it affirmatively appears on the record
that the accused offered no objection to the trial of his case in the place where it was
held, his right is deemed waived." 23 The decision referred to, United States v.
Mercado, 24 was handed down sixty-eight years ago in 1905.
It does seem that the challenged order of respondent is far from being invulnerable.
3. That is all that need be said as to the obvious merit of this petition. One other
objection to the conduct of the proceedings by the city court Judge may be briefly
disposed of. Respondent Judge would seek to lend support to an order at war with
obvious meaning of a constitutional provision by harping on the alleged abdication by an
assistant fiscal of his control over the prosecution. Again here there was a failure to
abide by settled law. If any party could complain at all, it is the People of the Philippines
for whom the fiscal speaks and acts. The accused cannot in law be termed an offended
party for such an alleged failure to comply with official duty. Moreover, even assuming
that respondent policemen could be heard to raise such a grievance, respondent Judge
ought to have been aware that thereby no jurisdictional defect was incurred by the city
court Judge. As was so emphatically declared by Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cariaga v.
Justo-Guerrero: 25 "The case below was commenced and prosecuted without the
intervention, mediation or participation of the fiscal or any of his deputies. This,
notwithstanding, the jurisdiction of the court was not affected ... but the court should
have cited the public prosecutor to intervene ... ." 26
4. There is much to be said of course for the concern displayed by respondent Judge to
assure the reality as against the mere possibility of a trial being truly public. If it were
otherwise, such a right could be reduced to a barren form of words. To the extent then
that the conclusion reached by him was motivated by an apprehension that there was
an evasion of a constitutional command, he certainly lived up to what is expected of a

man of the robe. Further reflection ought to have convinced him though that such a fear
was unjustified. An objective appraisal of conditions in municipal or city courts would
have gone far in dispelling such misgivings. The crowded daily calendar, the nature of
the cases handled, civil as well as criminal, the relaxed attitude on procedural rules not
being strictly adhered to all make for a less tense atmosphere. As a result the
attendance of the general public is much more in evidence; nor is its presence
unwelcome. When it is remembered further that the occupants of such courts are not
chosen primarily for their legal acumen, but taken from that portion of the bar more
considerably attuned to the pulse of public life, it is not to be rationally expected that an
accused would be denied whatever solace and comfort may come from the knowledge
that a judge, with the eyes of the alert court alert to his demeanor and his rulings, would
run the risk of being unjust, unfair, or arbitrary. Nor does it change matters, just
because, as did happen here, it was in the air-conditioned chambers of a city court
judge rather than in the usual place that the trial took place.
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari prayed for is granted nullifying, setting aside, and
declaring bereft of any legal force or effect the order of respondent Judge Felix
Domingo November 29, 1968 for being issued with grave abuse of discretion. The writ
of prohibition sought by petitioner is likewise granted, commanding respondent Judge or
any one acting in his place to desist from any further action in Criminal Case No. 74830
of the Court of First Instance of Manila other than that of dismissing the same. The
preliminary writ of injunction issued by this Court in its resolution of February 3, 1969
against the actuation of respondent Judge is made permanent. With costs against
respondent policemen Edgardo Calo and Simeon Carbonnel.
Makalintal, Actg. C.J., Teehankee, Makasiar, Antonio, Esguerra, JJ., concur.
Castro, J., did not take part.
Zaldivar and Barredo, JJ., are on leave.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-29676

December 24, 1968

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. LOURDES P. SAN DIEGO, as Presiding Judge of Branch II of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal (Quezon City Branch); MARIO HENSON y DE GUZMAN;
RAFAEL GONZALES y SINCHONGCO; ANGEL MENDOZA y MARQUEZ; ROGELIO
LAZARO y MAURICIO, and BIENVENIDO WIJANGCO, respondents.
Office of the Solicitor Amores for petitioner.
D. Castro for respondent Angel Mendoza.
Cruz and Grecia for other respondents.
Judge Lourdes P. San Diego in her own behalf as respondent.
CAPISTRANO, J.:
In criminal case No. Q-8711, Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, the
information charged the defendants, Mario Henson, Rafael Gonzales, Angel Mendoza,
Rogelio Lazaro and Bienvenido Wijangco, as principals of the murder of Jesus Lapid
with the qualifying circumstances of treachery, evident premeditation, and abuse of
superior strength and with the aggravating circumstances of nocturnity, aid of armed
men and craft or fraud. The prosecution and the defense agreed that the motions for
bail of the defendants would be considered in the course of the regular trial instead of in
a summary proceeding. In the course of the regular trial, after the prosecution had
presented eight witnesses, the trial court resolved the motions for bail granting the same
despite the objection of the prosecution on the ground that it still had material witnesses
to present. The orders granting bail in the amount of P50,000 for each defendant on the
ground that the evidence of guilt was not strong must have made Fiscal Oscar
Inocentes very angry because in his motion for reconsideration of the orders granting
bail he used contumacious language for which he was forthwith cited for contempt.
Fortunately, after the fiscal had submitted his answer and explanation, the trial judge, in
a forgiving mood, did not punish him for contempt on condition that the contumacious
words be deleted from his motion for reconsideration.
The question presented before us is, whether the prosecution was deprived of
procedural due process. The answer is in the affirmative. We are of the considered
opinion that whether the motion for bail of a defendant who is in custody for a capital
offense be resolved in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial, the
prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a reasonable time, all the
evidence that it may desire to introduce before the court should resolve the motion for
bail. If, as in the criminal case involved in the instant special civil action, the prosecution
should be denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due
process, and the order of the court granting bail should be considered void on that

ground. The orders complained of dated October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, having been issued
in violation of procedural due process, must be considered null and void.
The court's discretion to grant bail in capital offenses must be exercised in the light of a
summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution; otherwise, it would be
uncontrolled and might be capricious or whimsical. Hence, the court's order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution followed by its
conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The orders of October 7, 9 and
12, 1968, granting bail to the five defendants are defective in form and substance
because they do not contain a summary of the evidence presented by the prosecution.
They only contain the court's conclusion that the evidence of guilt is not strong. Being
thus defective in form and substance, the orders complained of cannot, also on this
ground, be allowed to stand.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the orders of October 7, 9 and 12, 1968, are set aside. No
costs. Certiorari granted.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro,
Fernando and Teehankee, JJ.,concur.
Barredo, J., took no part.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 122770. January 16, 1998]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee vs. EDUARDO AGBAYANI y
MENDOZA, accused-appellant.
DECISION
PER CURIAM:
Nine years and four months ago this Court declared:
Rape is a nauseating crime that deserves the condemnation of all decent person who
recognize that a womans cherished chastity is hers alone to surrender of her own free
will. Whoever violates that will descends to the level of the odious beast. The act
becomes doubly repulsive where the outrage is perpetrated on ones own flesh and
blood for the culprit is reduced to lower than the lowly animal. The latter yields only to
biological impulses and is unfettered by social inhibitions when it mates with its own kin,
but the man who rapes his own daughter violates not only her purity and her trust but

also the mores of his society which he has scornfully defied. By inflicting his animal
greed on her in a disgusting coercion of incestuous lust, he forfeits all respect as a
human being and is justly spurned by all, not least of all by the fruit of his own loins
whose progeny he has forever stained with his shameful and shameless lechery.[1]
At the end of the day, after resolving this case of 14-year-old Eden Agbayani who
charged her own father with rape committed in the sanctity of their rented room on 19
July 1994, this Court finds itself repeating this declaration. [2]
Before this Court on automatic review is the decision [3] of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 106, in view of the death penalty imposed by it for the crime of
rape, defined and penalized under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended
by R.A. 7659.[4]
On 12 September 1994, the Station Investigation and Intelligence Division of the
National Capital Region Command, Philippine National Police (PNP), endorsed to the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City the complaint of Eden Agbayani (hereafter
EDEN) for rape against her father, herein accused-appellant Eduardo Agbayani y.
Mendoza.[5]
After appropriate preliminary investigation, a complaint [6] for rape signed by EDEN,
assisted by her sister Fedelina Agbayani, and subscribed and sworn to before Asst. City
Prosecutor Charito B. Gonzales, was filed against appellant with the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City on 27 October, 1994. The case was docketed as Criminal Case
No. Q-94-59149, then set for arraignment, pre-trial and trial on 22 December 1994. [7]
At his arraignment on 22 December 1994, appellant, assisted by Attys. Samuel
Baldado and Edwin dela Cruz as counsel de oficio, entered a plea of not guilty.[8] Upon
agreement of the parties, trial on the merits immediately followed, with the prosecution
presenting the first witness, Dr. Florante Baltazar, a Medico-Legal Officer of the PNP
Crime Laboratory,[9] who cross-examined by Atty. Baldado. [10] On the succeeding dates
of trial, the prosecution presented EDEN [11] and SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje.[12] During
these hearings, however, appellant was represented by Atty. Arturo Temanil of the
Public Attorneys Office.[13]
On this part, the defense presented appellant, Adoracion M. Cruz, Fedelina
Agbayani, as well as EN who identified her and Fedelinas affidavit of desistance,
[14]
which was subscribed and sworn to before notary public Eranio Cedillo on 6
February 1995. Said affidavit reads as follows:

We, Eden Agbayani, 14 years old, complainant and Fedelina Agbayani, 19 years old,
sister of Eden Agbayani, and presently residing at No., Phase 1, United Glorieta,
Kaniogan, Pasig, Metro Manila, after having been duly sworn to in accordance with law
do hereby depose and states [sic]:
That we are the complainant [sic] against our father, Eduardo Agbayani pending before
this Honorable Court docketed as Criminal Case No. 59149;
That after evaluating the circumstance that lead [sic] to the filing of the instant case I
formally realize that the incident between us and my father is purely family problem that
arise from the disciplinarian attitude of our father;
That this resulted to family misunderstanding, hence we decided to formally forego this
case and withdraw the same;
That I am executing this affidavit for purposes of finally withdrawing the instant case and
therefrom requesting this Honorable Court to dismiss the case against our father.
This affidavit was executed freely and voluntarily.
As EDEN declared in open court what she said in her previous testimony and sworn
statement were not true, the trial court held her in direct contempt of court, reasoning
that her intentional falsehood was offensive to its dignity and a blatant disrespect to the
Court, and actually degrading [to] the administration of justice. Accordingly, the trial
court ordered her committed to incarceration and imprisonment within the period
provided by law,[15] which penalty however was modified to a fine of P200.00 upon
EDENs motion for reconsideration.[16]
On rebuttal, the prosecution had EDEN back on the witness stand. She retracted
her affidavit of desistance and claimed that she had signed it under coercion by her
mother and elder sister.
The trial courts summary of the evidence for the prosecution, with the references to
the pages of the stenographic notes and exhibits deleted, is as follows:
The evidence adduced on the record shows that sometime in September of 1993 in
Malolos, Bulacan, the accused was charged by his two daughters, FEDELINA and
DODIMA AGBAYANI, [with] the crime of rape which case was raffled to the sala of
Judge Danilo Manalastas fo Branch 7, Regional Trial Court, Bulacan. The case was,
however, provisionally dismissed by said Judge after the complainants desisted from
pursuing the same in May 1994. Eduardo Agbayani was thus consequently released
from jail on July 13, 1994. Three (3) days thereafter, he began living with four (4) of his

six (6) daughters, Fedelina, Eden, Diana, and Edina, in a rented room at 30-A
Makabayan St., Bgy. Obrero, Quezon City.
The evidence of the prosecution, in part consisting of the testimonies of Complainant
Eden Agbayani, Medico-Legal Officer, Dr. Florante Baltazar and SPO1 Salvador
Buenviaje, shows that the above mentioned address, the complainant, Eden Agbayani,
on the evening of July 19, 1994, was sleeping on the floor of the room with her father,
the accused Eduardo Agbayani was awakened from her sleep by hands caressing her
breast and vagina. She turned to discover that it was her father who was then molesting
her. Frightened, she asked, Tay bakit niyo po ginagawa sa akin ito, gayong kalalabas
mo lang sa kulungan? and threatened to kill her [sic]. The accused then proceeded to
undress her. Thereafter he undressed himself and succeeded in having carnal
knowledge with the complainant who could only cry helplessly. The complainant
thereafter felt blood dripping from her vagina and felt pain.
The next day, or on July 20, 1994, the complainant informed her elder sister, Fedelina,
of what had been done to her by her father. She was told not to worry as they would go
to Bulacan to report the incident to Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan, who had, the year before,
handled the rape case filed by Fedelina and Dodima. Several attempts were made by
her sisters, Fedelina and Eden to reach the said fiscal but it was only on September 9,
1994, that they were able to meet with him. Fiscal Caraeg of Bulacan reported the
complaint to Judge Danilo Manalastas who reopened the previous provisionally
dismissed case and issued a warrant of arrest against the herein accused.
With the assistance of police officers from Station 10 of the SIID in Quezon City, the
accused was arrested on the same day at his residence at 30-A Makabayan St., Bgy.
Obrero, Quezon City and was later brought to Malolos, Bulacan where he is currently
detained. After the accuseds arrest, Eden and Fedelina returned to Station 10 where
they made individual statements before SPO1 Salvador Buenviaje narrating the events
leading to and occurring after the incident of July 19, 1994.
The next morning, Eden was examined by Medico-Legal Officer and Chief of the PNP
Crime Laboratory, Dr. Florante Baltazar, a colonel, who, accordingly, prepared the
corresponding Medico-Legal Report.[17]
Appellant put up the defense of denial and alibi. According to him, he could not
have raped his daughter EDEN, because on 19 July 1994, he was in Barangay Victoria
in Sual, Pangasinan, visiting his eldest daughter.[18] He declared that EDEN charged him
with rape because he had hit her with a belt after he caught her lying about her
whereabouts on night. Then on 24 July 1994, she left their rented apartment and did not
return anymore.[19]

Adoracion Cruz corroborated appellants alibi. She declared that on 17 July 1994,
appellant requested her to take care of his children because he was going to
Pangasinan to visit his sick father, returning home only on 21 July 1994. [20]
The trial court gave full credence to the testimony of EDEN, who appeared, during
her entire testimonies on January 20 and May 4, 1995, coherent, candid and
responsive; futher, it commended her for her courage and her unwavering strength in
the midst of the emotional and psychological strain and humiliation, not to mention the
pressure and lack of moral support of her family, brought on by the filing of this case. It
also ruled that EDEN did not voluntarily execute the affidavit of desistance, as it was
procured at the behest of her mother and sister for whom the sanctity of the family and
the familys good name were more important than demanding punishment for whatever
injury the complainant might have suffered in the hands of the accused. Besides, even
assuming arguendo that no such pressure was exerted by her mother and sister, the
trial court declared that it understood EDENs moral predicament, viz for a child like
EDEN, it was difficult to charge her own father with rape; insist on his punishment; and
hereby inflict emotional stress and financial strain upon the members of her family,
particularly her mother.
The trial court likewise gave full faith to the sworn statement (Exhibit E) of Fedelina
Agbayani.
Turning to the defense of appellant, the trial court found his alibi wholly self-serving,
and characterized the testimony of Adoracion Cruz unworthy of belief. As to appellants
claim that EDEN filed the complaint because of a grudge against him, the trial court
found this incredible,if not totally absurd, for:
The complainant is an innocent girl of tender years who is likely to possess such
vindictiveness and death of conscience as to concoct such a malicious and damaging
story. The complainant appeared, during her entire testimonies on January 20 and May
4, 1995, coherent, candid and responsive. Her retraction on March 16 was sufficiently
explained to this Court the seriousness of the injury upon he person and dignity inflicted
upon by the accused. Even assuming argumenti gratia that the complainant would
indeed lodge a complaint against her father solely on account of an altercation with him,
it is highly unlikely that the complainant would concoct a charge which would damage
her and wreck havoc on her familys reputation, destroy the household peace and
subject her father, the accused, to a grave punishment which by dent of express of law,
can obliterate him from the face of this earth. Indeed, to uphold the defenses proposition
would be stretching the imagination too far, if not to the extreme.

The trial court finally found that appellant employed on EDEN force or intimidation
by virtue of his moral ascendancy over her and his threat that he would kill her if she
reported the incident to anyone.
Accordingly, the trial court, applying Section 11 of R.A. No. 7659 which imposes the
penalty of death when the victim is under eighteen years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity within the
third civil degree, or common law spouse of the parent of the victim, rendered
judgement against appellant, to wit:
WHEREFORE, considering all the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered finding the
accused, EDUARDO AGBAYANI, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
RAPE committed against complainant, Eden Agbayani, his minor daughter. This Court
as a consequence thereof, hereby imposes upon him the supreme penalty law R.A.
7659. Further, Accused is hereby ordered to pay the complainant, Eden Agbayani, the
sum of P75,000.00 as damages, with all the necessary penalties provided for by law
without subsidiary imprisonment, however, in the event of insolvency and to pay the
costs.
Let the entire records of this case be forwarded to the Supreme Court on automatic
review.
SO ORDERED.
On 26 May 1995, appellant, through his new counsel de parte Attorneys Froilan V.
Siobal and Domingo Floresta, filed a Motion for New Trial [21] on the ground that serious
irregularities prejudicial to his substantial rights were committed during the trial, viz., the
failure of the counsel de oficio to: (a) present at trial the Barangay Captain of Barangay
Obrero, Quezon City, who would have testified, on basis of his certification attached to
the motion, that there was a house bearing No. 30, Makabayan St., in his barangay, but
that there was no such place as 30-A Makabayan St. of said barangay, which was the
address given by EDEN; (b) consider the futility of Adoracion Cruzs testimony; (c)
present private complainants mother and sister Fedelina on sur-rebuttal to testify as to
the circumstances which brought about the execution of the affidavit of desistance; and
(d) cross examine complainant and the police investigator exhaustively. He further
alleged that his counsel de oficio was never prepared during all the scheduled hearings,
worse, even waived the presence of appellant after the third witness for the prosecution
was presented. He also averred that the trial court used its inherent power of contempt
to intimidate private complainant.

In their Comments/Opposition to the Motion for New Trial, [22] the public and private
prosecutors alleged that there were no such irregularities; neither was there new and
material evidence to be presented that appellant could not, with reasonable diligence,
have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted at trial
would probably change the judgment of the court.
In its Order[23] of 31 July 1995, the trial court denied the motion for new trial being
devoid of merit and for not being within the purview of Sections 1 and 2, Rule 121 of the
Rules of Court.
In his Appellants Brief filed before this Court, appellant contends that the trial court
erred in: (a) denying his motion for new trial; and (b) holding that the prosecution proved
beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the crime charged.
In support of the first assigned error, appellant reiterates the grounds in his motion
for new trial, and adds two others namely, (1) the lower court failed to apprise him of his
right to have counsel of his own choice; and (2) the lower court did not give him the
opportunity to prepare for trial, despite the mandated period of two days prescribed in
Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court.
In his second assigned error, appellant contends that EDENs testimony is not
sufficient to convict, since its is unclear and not free from serious
contradictions. Considering their proximity to EDEN, it was impossible for her sisters or
any one of them not to have been awakened when EDEN was allegedly being abused
by him. Strangely, EDEN simply kept quiet and allowed him to abuse her; neither
did she shout for help or put up a fight that would have awakened her sisters. Notably,
EDEN and her sisters allowed him to live and sleep with them again in their rented room
even after the alleged rape.
Finally, appellant asserts that EDENs testimony is unreliable because her affidavit
of desistance must have necessarily been contradictory thereto. Her subsequent turnaround that she was pressured and influenced to execute and sign the affidavit of
desistance further confirmed her being untruthful and, in effect, demolished whatsoever
faith left on her charge against the accused.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) considers the first assigned error as
devoid of merit. When appellant appeared without counsel at the arraignment, the trial
court informed him that it would appoint de oficio counsel for him if he so desired, to
which appellant agreed. Moreover, the 2-day period to prepare for trial provided in
Section 9 of Rule 116 is merely directory and does not prohibit the court from
proceeding with trial after arraignment, especially if the defense, as here, consented

thereto. It would have been entirely different if the defense did not agree, in which case
the court would have no other alternative but to grant him the period.
As to appellants other grievances, the OSG points out that throughout all the
hearings, appellant never questioned the way his defense was being handled by his
counsel de oficio. The latters request for a continuance because he had not yet
conferred with appellant was not evidence of counsels lack of sincerity. On the contrary,
it showed counsels awareness of his duty to confer with appellant to ferret out the
relevant facts as regards the second witness for the prosecution. Likewise, the waiver of
appellants presence during the hearing of 18 March 1995 did not prejudice him,
because on that date, the defense presented EDEN to testify as to her affidavit of
desistance, and Fedelina to corroborate the statements of EDEN which testimonies
were in appellants favor. As to the manner appellants counsel de oficio cross-examined
the prosecution witnesses, the OSG stresses that the record shows that said counsel
tried his best.
The OSG then characterizes the second assigned error as barren of merit. EDENs
positive identification of appellant as the author of the crime rendered appellants
defense of alibi unavailing; moreover, she demonstrated clearly and vividly what
transpired that fateful evening of 19 July 1994. Thus in view of EDENs candid and
categorical manner of testifying the OSG concluded that she was a credible witness. [24]
As to the commission of rape in a small room and in presence of other persons, the
OSG maintains that such was not at all improbable. [25] There was, as well, nothing
unusual in EDENs silence; as she could only attempt to shout because appellant had
succeeded in covering her mouth with his hands and exercised a high level of moral
ascendancy over EDEN, his daughter.[26] Hence the OSG invokes the principle that in a
rape committed by a father against his own daughter, the formers moral ascendancy
and influence over the latter substitutes for violence or intimidation. [27]
As regards EDENs affidavit of desistance, the OSG maintains that court look with
disfavor on retraction of testimonies previously given in court, for such can easily be
secured from poor and ignorant witnesses usually for monetary consideration, [28] as well
as the probability that it may later be repudiated.
In his Reply Brief, appellant countered that his consent to the appointment of
counsel de oficio his arraignment did not relieve the court of its duty under Section 6 of
Rule 116 of the Rules of Court to inform him of his right to counsel and that it would be
grievous error to deny an accused such right. Appellant then elaborated on this point as
follows:

This is not without judicial precedent. In People vs. Cachero, 73 Phil. 426 and People
vs. Domenden, 73 Phil. 349, cited in RJ Franciscos Criminal Procedure, Third Ed.,
1966, p. 323 it was held, that:
The courts should comply with Rule 116, Sec. 3. It would be a grievous error to proceed
by sentencing the accused without due process of law and this is not complete, when
the accused is denied the right recognized by said rule. The records must show
compliance therewith or that the accused renounced his right to be assisted by
counsel. This is demanded by the interest of justice and remove all doubt that if the
accused had waived said right, he was fully informed before giving his plea of its
consequences. Omission by courts whether voluntary should not truly be censured but
also condemned.
Discussing further the right to the 2-day period to prepare for trial, the appellant
contends that said right:
[H]as been held to be mandatory and denial of this right is reversible error and a ground
for new trial. (R.J. Franciscos Criminal Procedure, Third Ed., 1986, p. 404, citing people
vs. Mijares,et al., 47 OG 4606; Dumasig v. Morave, 23 SCRA 259). This must be so xxx
to prevent that any accused be caught unaware and deprived of the means of properly
facing the charges presented against him.
The first assigned error does not persuade this Court. It is true that the transcript of
the stenographic notes of the proceedings of 22 December 1994 and the order issued
by the trial court after the conclusion of said proceedings only state that the court
appointed de oficio counsel with the consent of the said accused. They do not
categorically disclose that the trial informed appellant of his right to counsel of his own
choice. However, this does not mean that the trial court failed to inform appellant of
such right. The precise time the two counsel de oficio were appointed is not disclosed in
the record either. At the recorded portion of the arraignment aspect of the proceedings
on 22 December 1994, the two formally entered their appearance, thus:
COURT: Call the case.
(Interpreter calls the case).
FISCAL ROSARIO BARIAS:
For the prosecution, Your Honor.
ATTY. MARIETA AGUJA:

Respectfully appearing for the prosecution, Your Honor under the control and direct
supervision of the Trial Prosecutor, Your Honor, we are ready to present our first
witness.
ATTY. BALDADO:
For the accused Your Honor, appointed as counsel de oficio.
ATTY. DE LA CRUZ:
For the accused, Your Honor appointed by the court as counsel de oficio.[29]
This obviously means that the appointment had taken place earlier. The trial courts
order[30] of 22 December 1994 states that said de oficio counsel were duly appointed by
the Court with the consent of the accused. Since appellant has miserably failed to show
that he was not informed of his right to counsel, the presumptions that the law has been
obeyed and official duty has been regularly performed by the trial court stand. [31] In other
words, the trial court is presumed to have complied with its four-fold duties under
Section 6[32] of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court, namely, (1) to inform the accused that he
has the right to have his own counsel before being arraigned; (2) after giving such
information, to ask accused whether he desires the aid of counsel; (3) if he so desires to
procure the services of counsel, the court must grant him reasonable time to do so; and
(4) if he so desires to have counsel but is unable to employ one, the court must assign
counsel de oficio to defend him.[33]
It is settled that the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge
advised the accused of his right to counsel is not sufficient ground to reverse
conviction. The reason being that the trial court must be presumed to have complied
with the procedure prescribed by law for the hearing and trial of cases, and that such a
presumption can only be overcome by an affirmative showing to the contrary. Thus it
has been held that unless the contrary appears in the record, or that it is positively
proved that the trial court failed to inform the accused of his right to counsel, it will be
presumed that the accused was informed by the court of such right. [34]
In U.S. v. Labial,[35] this Court held:
Adhering to the doctrine laid down in that case, the only question to be determined in
this case is whether the failure of the record to disclose affirmatively that the trial judge
advised the accused of their right to have counsel is sufficient ground to reverse the
judgment of conviction and to send the case back for a new trial. Upon this point we are
all agreed that in the absence of an affirmative showing that the court below did in fact

fail to advise the accused of their rights under the provisions of Section 17 of General
Orders No. 58, as amended by section 1 of Act No. 440, the mere omission from the
record brought here upon appeal of an entry affirmatively disclosing that he did so, is
not reversible error.
In the absence of an affirmative showing to the contrary, the court below must be
presumed in matters of this kind to have complied with the provisions of law prescribing
the procedure to be followed in the trial had before him.
While in People v. Miranda[36] this Court explicitly stated:
However, said counsel calls attention to the fact that the record is silent as to whether or
not, at the time appellant was arraigned, the trial court informed him of his right to be
assisted by an attorney, under section 3 of Rule 112 of the Rules of Court.
This precise issue was determined in United States v. Labial (27 Phil., 87,88), in the
sense that unless the contrary appears in the records, it will be presumed that the
defendant was informed by the court of his right to counsel. *** If we should insist on
finding every fact fully recorded before a citizen can be punished for an offense against
the laws, we should destroy public justice, and give unbridled license to crime. Much
must be left to intendment and presumption, for it is often less difficult to do things
correctly than to describe them correctly. (United States vs. Labial, supra.) The same
doctrine was reiterated in People vs. Abuyen (52 Phil. 722) and in United
States vs. Custan (28 Phil. 19). We see no reason to modify it now.
In the instant case, the trial court appointed two de oficio counsel who assisted the
appellant at his arraignment, one of whom extensively cross-examined the first witness
for the prosecution, Dr. Florante Baltazar.[37] Besides, it is only in this appeal that
appellant raised the issue of the failure of the trial court to inform him of the right to
counsel. At no time did he previously raise it in the trial court despite ample opportunity
to do so. His consent to be assisted by counsel de oficio, coupled with said counsels
extensive cross-examination of Dr. Baltazar, may even be considered a waiver of his
right to question the alleged failure of the trial court to inform of his right to counsel. [38]
The cases of People v. Domenden[39] and People v. Cachero[40] cited by appellant
are inapplicable. In both casis the trial courts there clearly failed to inform the accused
of
their
right
to
counsel
nor
appoint de
oficio counsel
during
the
arraignment. Nevertheless, we take this opportunity to admonish trial courts to ensure
that their compliance with their pre-arraignment duties to inform the accused of his right
to counsel, to ask him if he desires to have one, and to inform him that, unless he is

allowed to defend himself in person or he has counsel of his choice, a de oficio counsel
will be appointed for him, must appear on record.
Turning to the alleged violation of appellants right to the 2-day period to prepare for
trial, Section 9 of Rule 116 of the Rules of Court reads:
Sec. 9. Time to prepare for trial. -- After a plea of not guilty, the accused is entitled to
two (2) days to prepare for trial unless the court for good cause grants him further time.
It must be pointed out that the right must be expressly demanded. [41] Only when so
demanded does denial thereof constitute reversible error and a ground for new trial.
[42]
Further, such right may be waived, expressly or impliedly. [43] In the instant case,
appellant did not ask for time to prepare for trial, hence, he effectively waived such right.
During the succeeding hearings, appellant was represented by Atty. Temanil of the
Public Attorneys Office in Quezon City, who entered his appearance as de parte, and
not as de oficio, counsel. It is to be presumed that Atty. Temanils services were obtained
pursuant to the law creating the Public Attorneys Office (PAO), formerly the Citizens
Legal Assistance Office (CLAO).[44] There is at all no showing that Atty. Temanil lacked
the competence and skill to defend appellant. The latters contention that his counsel
was not ready at all times because at the hearing on 20 January 1995 he asked for a
continuation as he has not yet interviewed [his] client, [45] is misleading. Atty. Temanil
made that statement after he cross-examined EDEN and after the judge realized that it
was almost 1:00 oclock in the afternoon and both of them were already hungry, thus:
ATTY. TEMANIL:
I just want to make it on record, Your Honor that from the start of the trial the
witness appears to be fluent and suffers no difficulty in answering the
questions, even the questions propounded by the Private Prosecutor, Your
Honor.
COURT:
Put that on record.
That is true, Atty. Temanil, it is almost 1:00 oclock in the afternoon and we
are both hungry now.
ATTY. TEMANIL:

I will just asked [sic] for continuance considering that I have not yet
interviewed my client, Your Honor.[46]
Neither is there merit in appellants claim that his counsel committed
irregularities: (1) in not considering the futility of the testimony of Adoracion Cruz; (2) in
not presenting the barangay captain in the evidence in chief for the defense, and
EDENs mother and sister Fedelina in sur-rebuttal; and (3) in not cross-examining
exhaustively EDEN.
Adoracion Cruz was presented to corroborate appellants alibi that he was in the
province and not in their rented room from 17 to 21 July 1994. On the other hand, the
testimony of the barangay captain could not alter the fact that rape was committed in a
rented room in a house along Makabayan Street in his barangay. Appellant neither
testified that he did not occupy a house numbered 30-A nor denied that he was living
with EDEN and her sisters in that room. Besides, he and his children were not renting
the entire house, but merely a room, which could probably be the unit numbered 30-A
referred to by EDEN.
As to the presentation of EDENs mother and sister Fedelina as sur-rebuttal
witnesses to disprove the claim of EDEN that they coerced her into signing the affidavit
of desistance, suffice it to state that there was nothing to show that they were in fact
willing to refute EDENs claim.
Finally, contrary to appellants allegation, a meticulous examination of the transcripts
of the stenographic notes convinces this Court that Atty. Temanil sufficiently crossexamined EDEN.If he decided to terminate his cross-examination, it could have been
due to the futility of any further cross-examination which might only prove favorable to
the prosecution, as it might have opened another window of opportunity for EDEN to
strengthen her testimony.
The second assigned error is equally unpersuasive. It raises the issue of the
credibility of EDEN as a witness. One of the highly revered dicta Philippine
jurisprudence has established is that this Court will not interfere with the judgment of the
trial court in passing upon the credibility of opposing witnesses, unless there appears in
the records some facts or circumstances of weight and influence which have been
overlooked and, if considered, would affect the result. This is founded on practical and
empirical considerations, i.e., the trial judge is in a better position to decide the question
of credibility, since he personally heard the witnesses and observed their deportment
and manner of testifying.[47] He had before him the essential aids to determine whether a
witness was telling the truth or lying. Truth does not always stalk boldly forth naked; she
often hides in nooks and crannies visible only to the minds eye of the judge who tried

the case. To him appears the furtive glance, the blush of conscious shame, the
hesitation, the sincere or flippant or sneering tone, the heat, the calmness, the yawn,
the sigh, the candor or lack of it, the scant or full realization of the solemnity of an oath,
the carriage and mien.[48] On the other hand, an appellate court has only the cold record,
which generally does not reveal the thin line between fact and prevarication that is
crucial in determining innocence or guilt. [49]
At any rate, in view of the gravity of the offense charged and the extreme penalty of
death imposed, this Court took painstaking effort and meticulous care in reviewing the
transcripts of the stenographic notes of the testimonies of the witnesses.
This Court is fully satisfied that EDEN told the truth that she was raped by her
father, herein appellant, on 19 July 1994, in their rented room in Barangay Obrero,
Quezon City. Her story was made even more credible by the simplicity and candidness
of her answers, as well as by the fact that it came from an innocent girl writhing in
emotional and moral shock and anguish.She must have been torn between the desire to
seek justice and the fear that a revelation of her ordeal might mean the imposition of
capital punishment on her father. By testifying in court, she made public a painful and
humiliating secret, which others may have simply kept to themselves for the rest of their
lives. She thereby jeopardized her chances of marriage, as even a compassionate man
may be reluctant to marry her because her traumatic experience may be psychological
and emotional impediment to a blissful union. Moreover, such a revelation divided her
family and brought it shame and humiliation.
If EDEN did testify regardless of these consequences and even allowed the
examination of her private parts, she did so inspired by no other motive than to obtain
justice and release from the psychological and emotional burdens the painful
experience had foisted upon her. It was then improbable that EDEN fabricated a story of
defloration and falsely charged her own father with a heinous crime.
What appellant claims to be improbabilities in the testimony of EDEN are more
apparent than real. The presence of her sisters in the small room did not at all make
impossible the commission of rape. The evil in man has no conscience. The beast in
him bears no respect for time and place; it drives him to commit rape anywhere even in
places where people congregate such as in parks, along the roadside within school
premises, and inside a house where there are other occupants. [50] In People v. Opena,
[51]
rape was committed in a room occupied also by other persons. In the instant case,
EDENs other companions in the room when she was molested by appellant were young
girls who were all asleep.

That EDEN was unable to resist or shout for help can easily be explained by the
fact that appellant threatened to kill her. Whether he was armed was of no
moment. That threat alone coming from her father, a person who wielded such moral
ascendancy, was enough to render her incapable of resisting or asking for help.
Intimidation in rape cases is not calibrated nor governed by hard and fast
rules. Since it is addressed to the victims and is therefore subjective, it must be viewed
in light of the victims perception and judgment at the time of the commission of the
crime. It is enough that the intimidation produced fear fear that if the victim did not yield
to the bestial demands of the accused, something far worse would happen to her at that
moment. Where such intimidation existed and the victim was cowed into submission as
a result thereof, thereby rendering resistance futile, it would be the height of
unreasonableness to expect the victim to resist with all her might and strength. If
resistance would nevertheless be futile because of intimidation, then offering none at all
does not mean consent to the assault so as to make the victims submission to the
sexual act voluntary.[52]
In any event, in a rape committed by a father against his own daughter, as in this
case, the formers moral ascendancy or influence over the latter substitutes for violence
or intimidation.[53] Likewise, it must not be forgotten that at her tender age of 14 years,
EDEN could not be expected to act with the equanimity of disposition and with nerves of
steel, or to act like a mature and experienced woman who would know what to do under
the circumstances, or to have courage and intelligence to disregard the threat. [54] Even
in cases of rape of mature women, this Court recognized their different and
unpredictable reactions. Some may shout; some may faint; and some may be shocked
into insensibility; while others may openly welcome the intrusion. [55]
Neither does the fact that EDEN continued to live with appellant in the same rented
room disprove the rape. While she was hurt physically, psychologically and emotionally,
yet the thought must have been irresistible and compelling that her assailant was her
own father, who was both a father and mother to her since her mother was in Saudi
Arabia and who provided her with the daily wherewithal to keep her alive. Besides, a
less harsh life outside was uncertain. Instances are not few when daughters raped by
their fathers stayed with the latter and kept in the deepest recesses of their hearts the
evil deed even if the memory thereof haunted them forever.
Nor is there merit in the insistent claim that EDENs affidavit of desistance must
have necessarily contradicted her previous testimony. We have earlier quoted if full this
affidavit of desistance. Plainly, nowhere therein did she retract her previous testimony or
claim that she was raped by her father. In any case, EDEN withdrew her affidavit of
desistance and solemnly declared that she was pressured by her mother and sister to

sign it. Moreover, affidavits, being taken ex parte, are generally considered inferior to
the testimony given in open court; [56] and affidavits or recantation have been invariably
regarded as exceedingly unreliable, since they can easily be secured from poor and
ignorant witnesses. It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony taken before a
court of justice simply because the witness who gave it later on changed his mind for
one reason or another. Such a rule would make a solemn trial a mockery, and place the
proceedings at the mercy of unscrupulous witnesses. [57]
This Court has no doubt that appellant is guilty as charged. The penalty therefor
is death under the first circumstance mentioned in Article 335(7) of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, which provides, in part, as follows:
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of rape is committed with any of
the following attendant circumstances:
1.When the victim is under eighteen (18) years of age and the offender is a
parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the
victim.
This law may be difficult to accept for those who believe that the verdict of death for
a sin or crime is Gods exclusive prerogative. But the fundamental law of the land allows
Congress, for compelling reasons, to impose capital punishment in cases of heinous
crimes,[58] hence the passage of R.A. No. 7659. Hoc quidem per quam durum est sed
ita lex scripta est. The law may be exceedingly hard but so the law is written and the
Court is duty-bound to apply it in this case.
To the appellant who inflicted his animal greed on his daughter in a disgusting
coercion of incestuous lust, thereby forsaking that which is highest and noblest in his
human nature and reducing himself to lower than the lowliest animal, the full force of the
law must be weighed against him, for he deserves no place in society. All that we
concede to him is a modification of the award of P75,000.00 as damages, which is
hereby reduced to P50,000.00 in accordance with current case law.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered AFFIRMING the decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 106, in Criminal Case No. Q-94-59149
finding accused-appellant EDUARDO AGBAYANI y MENDOZA guilty beyond
reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of rape defined and penalized under under
Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 7659, and imposing
upon him the penalty of DEATH, subject to the above modification as to the amount of
indemnity.

Two justices voted to impose upon the accused-appellant the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.
Upon the finality of this Decision, let certified true copies thereof, as well as the
records of this case, be forwarded without delay to the Office of the President for
possible exercise of executive clemency pursuant to Article 83 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by Section 25 of R.A. No. 7659.
With costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Vitug,
Kapunan, Mendoza, Francisco, Panganiban, and Martinez, JJ., concur.

FIRST DIVISION
[A.M. No. RTJ-99-1488. June 20, 2000]
JUANA MARZAN-GELACIO, complainant, vs. Judge ALIPIO V. FLORES in
his capacity as Presiding Judge, Branch 20, RTC, Vigan, Ilocos
Sur,respondent.
DECISION
YNARES_SANTIAGO, J.:
Before Us is an administrative complaint for Gross Ignorance of the Law and
Evident Partiality brought by Complainant Juana Marzan-Gelacio against
respondent Judge Alipio V. Flores, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Vigan, Ilocos Sur, Branch 20.
Culled from the records, the facts of the case, as summed by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) are as follows:
Ms. Juana Marzan Gelacio filed two (2) counts of rape against Emmanuel
Artajos. The said cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 4187 and
4188. It was thereafter raffled to the sala of respondent Judge Alipio
Flores, RTC, Branch 20, Vigan, Ilocos Sur.

On February 26, 1988, presumably after going over the records of the
case and the recommendation of 1st Assistant Provincial Prosecutor
Redentor Cardenas, Judge Flores concluded that the evidence of guilt
was weak but made a finding of a probable cause. Consequently, he
issued warrants of arrest with a recommendation of P200,000.00 bailbond
in both cases.
On March 16, 1998, complainant through her private prosecutor, Atty.
Jessie Emmanuel A. Vizcarra, filed an Urgent Motion to Deny Bail. Two (2)
months thereafter, more particularly on May 27, 1998 counsel for the
accused, Atty. Salacnib Baterina filed a Petition to Reduce Bailbond with a
notation: "No objection for P100,000.00 in each case by Provincial
Prosecutor Jessica G. Viloria."
On June 18, 1998, Judge Flores issued an order denying the "Motion to
Deny Bail" filed by the Private Prosecutor stating that the proper and
appropriate recourse of an aggrieved party, as in these cases, should
have been to ask for a reconsideration of the granting of bail to the
Provincial Prosecutor and/or appeal direct to the Secretary of Justice,
being a capital offense, within the reglementary period set forth by the
Rules of said Office.
In the same order, the Petition to Reduce Amount of Bail was held in
abeyance pending arrest and/or voluntary surrender of the accused.
Apparently, on June 22, 1998 Judge Flores issued an order granting
Motion for Reduction of Bail of the accused. (No copy of Order dated June
22, 1998 was attached).
On July 8, 1998 the Private Prosecution filed a Motion to Cancel Bail
Bonds of the Accused with the imprimatur of Assistant Public Prosecutor
Arnulfo Manzano.
On July 13, 1998, Judge Alipio Flores, acting on the said motion, treated
the same as a Motion for Reconsideration on the granting of bail, and
granted the same. The motion to cancel bail was held in abeyance
pending arrest of the accused. He likewise recalled the Orders dated June
18 and 22, 1998, which he issued and ordered the immediate arrest of the
accused.

On July 22, 1998, Judge Flores denied the Motion to Cancel Bailbond and
reinstated his Orders dated June 18 and 22, 1998. The Order of Arrest for
the accused was likewise quashed. Judge Flores in issuing this Order
relied on the stand of the Public Prosecutor that in accordance with the
guidelines of the Department of Justice the cases are bailable.
It was in the granting of a bail in the crime of rape where complainant
questions the actuation of respondent Judge.
Complainant contends that respondent Judge is ignorant of the law when
he granted bail without giving the prosecution a chance to prove the guilt
of the accused. She claims that it is very elementary for him not to know
that petition for bail must be set for hearing.
On August 27, 1998, Court Administrator Alfredo L. Benipayo by way of
1st Indorsement required Judge Alipio V. Flores to answer the complaint of
Ms. Juana Marzan Gelacio.
Respondent Judge in his comment alleged in sum that:
1.....On or before February 26, 1998, before making a finding of probable
cause and issuance of the corresponding Warrants of Arrest in the said
cases and finding that 1stAssistant Provincial Prosecutor Redentor
Cardenas recommended bailbonds of P200,000.00 for each of the cases,
called the branch prosecutor, 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Arnulfo
Manzano in his chambers after the morning session to find out whether or
not the recommendation for bail was not inadvertent. The latter informed
that the complainant was not able to prove all the elements of rape and
under their (Fiscals) guidelines on Bailbonds, the same is bailable.
Thereafter, the Fiscals Office even sent their 1997 Guidelines on
Bailbonds;
2.....After a careful perusal of the records of the two (2) cases, more
particularly the only evidence on record which is the affidavit of the
complainant Gelacio and the resolution thereof, he (respondent)
concluded that the evidence of guilt was weak but made a finding of
probable cause, issued the corresponding warrant of arrest with a
recommendation of P200,000.00 bailbond in both cases, both on February
26, 1998;

3.....On March 16, 1998, private complainant through private prosecutor,

Atty. Jessie Emmanuel A. Vizcarra, filed an Urgent Motion to Deny Bail,
and on May 27, 1998 accused through, Atty. Salacnib Baterina, filed a
Petition to Reduce Bailbond with a notation for: No Objection for
P100,000.00 in each case by the Provincial Prosecutor Jessica G. Viloria;
4.....Because of the inconsistent stand of the Private Prosecutor and
Public Prosecutor, the Court in its order dated June 2, 1998, treated first
the Motion' to Deny Bailbond by ordering the Public Prosecutor and
defense to comment/oppose the same within 10 days from receipt thereof,
with the Petition to Reduce Bailbonds meantime held in abeyance.
On June 18, 1998, the Court issued the order now under question.
5.....It is also noteworthy to mention that the private prosecutor on 8 July
1998 filed a Motion to Cancel Bail Bonds of the Accused, which the
Court motu proprio set for hearing on July 22, 1998.
In said hearing the Public Prosecution through 3rd Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Arnulfo Manzano opposed the cancellation of Bailbonds
maintaining the stand of the prosecution that both offenses are bailable.
6.....He does not personally know the accused nor the private
complainant, and the questioned cases had resulted in a battle royale
between the private prosecution and the public prosecution with respect to
the bailbond issue, in which case law and precedents dictate that the
public prosecution has control and supervision over the private prosecutor,
in spite of this, the Court had always given the latter the right to be heard;
7.....There can be no partiality on his part as this is the only Rape case
filed in Court where the Prosecution recommended bail;
8.....The remedy of the Private Prosecution should have been to question
his final order by proper proceedings to a higher court to test whether or
not he gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction
before an administrative complaint is filed.
On October 26, 1998, complainant through counsel filed her position paper
refuting the allegations of respondent Judge in his comment and reiterated her
former claim that respondent Judge was ignorant of the law in granting bail
without any hearing.

In his comment to Position Paper of Private Complainant and Rejoinder

respondent Judge stressed in sum that in the finding of probable cause
and issuance of the corresponding warrant of arrest, the Judge may adopt
the finding of the Provincial Prosecutor.
On the basis of the foregoing factual narration, the OCA in the evaluation report
recommended that the respondent Judge be fined Ten Thousand (P10,000.00)
Pesos for granting bail without a hearing with a warning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely, reasoning that:
In G.R. No. 80906 entitled "Amaya, et al. v. Ordonez", September 5, 1988,
the Honorable Court ruled that:
"Whatever the fiscal recommends as the amount of bail for
the provisional release of an accused is only
recommendatory. The Judge still retains the discretion to
apply the precedents laid down by the Supreme Court
regarding the reasonable nature of the bail to be required. It
is not bound by the Fiscals recommendation. More binding
are the decisions of the Supreme Court."
In the case at bar, respondent Judge does not deny that he granted bail to
a person accused of two (2) counts of rape. He however attempted to
excuse himself by saying that when he inquired inside his chambers from
the Prosecutor as to whether there was really a recommendation of bail
for P200,000.00 for each case and he (Fiscal) answered in the affirmative,
he had no choice, according to him, but to adopt the same. Moreover, he
added the Prosecutor relied on the Bail Bond Guide issued by the
Department of Justice. Such an excuse is unacceptable. It only
manifested his weakness and displayed his ignorance of the law and
several court decisions on matters such as this. It is very elementary that
felonies are defined and their corresponding penalties are found in the
Revised Penal Code. Hence, respondent Judge should not have been
misled by the insinuation of the Fiscal that the 1996 Bail Bond Guide
clearly expresses the bail to be recommended in the crime of rape.
Instead, mindful perhaps of the basic legal principles, the Revised Penal
Code should have prevailed. Besides, he should have known that the Bail
[Bond] Guide is addressed to the Prosecutors and their Assistants and not
to the Judges.

What is even more perplexing is the attitude of the Judge in asking the
Prosecutor to explain his recommendation of bail. This is contrary to Rule
2.01 of Canon 2 of the Code of Judicial Conduct. In no case is a Judge
allowed to engage in a legal discussion inside his chambers, of the
pending incidents of a case, without the presence of the representatives of
the parties.
Moreover, it was patent error for him to base his order granting bail merely
on the supporting affidavits attached to the information since those were
merely intended to establish probable cause as a basis for the issuance of
an arrest warrant, and not to control his discretion to deny or grant
in (sic) bail in all situation i.e., with or without a motion from the accused
and even without conducting a hearing on the matter.
It is admitted that there was a recommendation of bail. But the prosecutors
recommendation, although persuasive, does not necessarily bind the
Court.
A hearing is indispensable before a Judge can aptly (sic) said to be in a
position to determine whether the evidence for the prosecution is weak or
strong. And the discretion to determine whether it is weak or strong may
be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the Court at the
hearing. Whether in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular
trial, the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present, within a
reasonable time, as the evidence it may desire to introduce before the
court may resolve the motion for bail.
Besides, the Judge should have known that even when bail is a matter of
right, in fixing the amount of bail, he is required to take into account a
number of factors, such as the character and reputation of the accused,
forfeiture of other bonds, or whether or not he is a fugitive from justice.
The fact that the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence, it is still
mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing or ask searching and
clarificatory questions from which it may infer the strength of the evidence
of guilt, or the lack of it, against the accused. Where the prosecution does
not oppose the application for bail and refuses to satisfy his burden of
proof, but the court has reasons to believe that the prosecutors attitude is
not justified, as when he is evidently committing a gross error or a
dereliction of duty, the court, in the interest of justice, must inquire from the
prosecution as to the nature of his evidence to determine whether or not it

is strong, it being possible that the prosecutor [may] have erred in

considering it weak and therefore, in recommending bail.
The foregoing findings and disquisitions of the OCA are well taken. It is
imperative that judges be conversant with basic legal principles. [1] Indeed, the
Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to "be faithful to the law and maintain
professional competence."[2] Respondent judge owes it to the public and to the
legal profession to know the law he is supposed to apply to a given controversy.
[3]
Indeed
A judge is called upon to exhibit more than just a cursory acquaintance
with statutes and procedural rules; it is imperative that he be conversant
with basic legal principles and [be] aware of well-settled authoritative
doctrines. He should strive for excellence exceeded only by his passion
for truth, to the end that he be the personification of justice and the Rule of
Law.[4]
Considering that the granting of bail is common in the litigation of criminal cases
before trial courts, we are not the least impressed with the explanation proffered
by respondent Judge in granting bail in this case. On the contrary, we are
dismayed that he granted bail to an applicant charged with two (2) counts of rape
merely on the basis of supporting affidavits attached to the information. The
Court has not been remiss in keeping trial judges informed of the latest
developments on the subject.
The following duties of judges in case an application for bail is filed have been
clearly and repeatedly spelled out during seminars conducted by the Philippine
Judicial Academy, to wit:
1.....In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to
submit his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court,
as amended);
2.....Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the
application for bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution
refuses to present evidence to show that the guilt of the accused is
strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion; (Sections 7 and 8, supra)

3.....Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the

summary of evidence of the prosecution;
4.....If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon
the approval of the bail bond (Section 19, supra). Otherwise, the petition
should be denied.[5]
The procedural necessity of a hearing relative to the grant of bail can not be
dispensed with especially in this case where the accused is charged with a
capital offense. Utmost diligence is required of trial judges in granting bail
especially in cases where bail is not a matter of right. Certain procedures must
be followed in order that the accused would be present during trial. As a
responsible judge, respondent must not be swayed by the mere representations
of the parties; instead, he should look into the real and hard facts of the case.
To do away with the requisite bail hearing especially in those cases where the
applicant is charged with a capital offense "is to dispense with this time-tested
safeguard against arbitrariness."[6] It must always be remembered that imperative
justice requires the proper observance of indispensable technicalities precisely
designed to ensure it proper dispensation. [7] In this regard, it needs be stressed
that the grant or the denial of bail in capital offenses hinges on the issue of
whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is strong and the
determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion which remains with the judge.[8] On this point, Cruz v. Yaneza[9] states
in no uncertain terms that
in order for the judge to properly exercise his discretion, he must first
conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is
strong. As decreed in Almeron v. Sardido[10]
In exercising such judicial discretion, however, a judge is
required to conduct a hearing wherein both the prosecution
and the defense present evidence that would point to the
strength or weakness of the evidence of guilt. The discretion
of the judge lies solely in the appreciation and evaluation of
the weight of theevidence presented during the hearing
and not in the determination of whether or not the
hearing itself should be held for such a hearing is
considered mandatory and absolutely
indispensable before a judge can aptly be said to be in a

position to determine whether the evidence for the

prosecution is weak or strong.
Thus, when a judge grants bail to a person charged with a
capital offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life
imprisonment without conducting the required hearing, he is
considered guilty of ignorance or incompetence the gravity of
which cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or
excusable negligence.
Further, in Basco v. Rapatalo, we said:
Since the determination of whether or not the evidence of
guilt of the accused is strong is a matter of judicial
discretion, the judge is mandated to conduct a hearing even
in cases where the prosecution chooses to just file a
comment or leave the application of bail to the discretion of
the court.
Even more explicitly in Santos v. Ofilada[11] We have held that admission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes
the exercise thereof in accordance with law and guided by the applicable
legal principles. The prosecution must first be accorded an opportunity to
present evidence because by the very nature of deciding applications for
bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed in
determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words,
discretion must be exercised regularly, legally and within the
confines of procedural due process, that is, after the evaluation of the
evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the
absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of
whim, caprice and outright arbitrariness.[12]
xxx........................xxx........................xxx........................xxx
Even the alleged failure of the prosecution to interpose an objection
to the granting of bail to the accused will not justify such grant
without hearing. This Court has uniformly ruled that even if the
prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose any objection
to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing
or ask searching and clarificatory questions from which it may infer the

strength of the evidence of guilt or lack of it, against the accused. Where
the prosecutor refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to the application
to grant and fix bail, the court may ask the prosecution such questions as
would ascertain the strength of the States evidence or judge the adequacy
of the amount of the bail.[13] Irrespective of respondent judges opinion
that the evidence of guilt against the accused is not strong, the law
and settled jurisprudence demand that a hearing be conducted
before bail may be fixed for the temporary release of the accused, if
bail is at all justified.[14]
Thus, although the provincial prosecutor had interposed no objection to
the grant of bail to the accused, the respondent judge therein should
nevertheless have set the petition for bail for hearing and diligently
ascertain from the prosecution whether the latter was not in fact contesting
the bail application. In addition, a hearing was also necessary for the court
to take into consideration the guidelines set forth in the then Section 6,
Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure for the fixing of the
amount of the bail. Only after respondent judge had satisfied himself that
these requirements have been met could he then proceed to rule on
whether or not to grant bail.[15]
Most emphatic, however, is the recent case of Go, et al. v. Judge Benjamin A.
Bongolan[16] where owing to the increasing frequency of incidents regarding so
basic a subject in criminal procedure despite repeated reminders thereon, an
exasperated Court speaking through Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno castigated the
respondent judge for granting bail in a capital offense without conducting a
hearing thus:
Complaints involving irregular approval of bailbond and issuance of order
of release appear to be a common offense of judges. In the 1996, case
of Adapon v. Domagtay,[17]this Court observed:
"This is not the first time that a complaint is brought before
this Court involving irregular approval of bailbond and
issuance of order of release. The Court again reminds
judges of lower courts of their role as the embodiment of
competence, integrity and independence. This Court
believes that in order to achieve justice, judges should, in all
cases, diligently ascertain and conscientiously apply the law
in relation to the facts of each case they hear and decide,
unswayed by partisan interests, public opinion or fear of

criticism. This is the least that judges can do to sustain the

trust reposed on them by the public."
Earlier in Paderanga v. Court of Appeals,[18] this Court painstakingly
reminded judges of the procedure to be followed when a motion for
admission to bail is filed by the accused. It seems, however, that our
reminder has fallen on barren ground. Consequently, we find it opportune
to reiterate the rules:
"Section 13, Article III of the Constitution lays down the rule
that before conviction, all indictees shall be allowed bail,
except only those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when the evidence of guilt is strong. In
pursuance thereof, Section 4 of Rule 114, as amended, now
provides that all persons in custody shall, before conviction
by a regional trial court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, be admitted
to bail as a matter of right. The right to bail, which may be
waived considering its personal nature and which, to repeat,
arises from the time one is placed in the custody of the law,
springs from the presumption of innocence accorded every
accused upon whom should not be inflicted incarceration at
the outset since after the trial would be entitled to acquittal,
unless his guilt be established beyond reasonable doubt.
"Thus, the general rule is that prior to conviction by the
regional trial court of a criminal offense, an accused is
entitled to be released on bail as a matter of right, the
present exceptions thereto being the instances where the
accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense
punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment and
the evidence of guilt is strong. Under said general rule, upon
proper application for admission to bail, the court having
custody of the accused should, as a matter of course, grant
the same after a hearing conducted to specifically determine
the conditions of the bail in accordance with Section 6 (now,
Section 2) of Rule 114. On the other hand, as the grant of
bail becomes a matter of judicial discretion on the part of
the court under the exceptions to the rule, a
hearing, mandatory in nature and which should be
summary or otherwise in the discretion of the court, is

required with the participation of both the defense and a

duly notified representative of the prosecution, this time to
ascertain whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong for
the provisional liberty of the applicant. Of course, the burden
of proof is on the prosecution to show that the evidence
meets the required quantum.
"Where such a hearing is set upon proper motion or petition,
the prosecution must be given an opportunity to present,
within a reasonable time, all the evidence that it may want to
introduce before the court may resolve the application, since
it is equally entitled as the accused to due process. If the
prosecution is denied this opportunity, there would be a
denial of procedural due process, as a consequence of
which the courts order in respect of (sic) the motion or
petition is void. At the hearing, the petitioner can rightfully
cross-examine the witnesses presented by the prosecution
and introduce his own evidence in rebuttal. When,
eventually, the court issues an order either granting or
refusing bail, the same should contain a summary of the
evidence for the prosecution, followed by its conclusion as to
whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. The court,
though, cannot rely on mere affidavits or recitals of their
contents, if timely objected to, for these represent only
hearsay evidence, and thus are insufficient to establish
the quantum of evidence that the law requires.[19]
xxx........................xxx........................xxx
A bail hearing is mandatory to give the prosecution reasonable opportunity to
oppose the application by showing that evidence of guilt is strong.[20] We note that
the prosecution was caught off guard in the regular hearing of May 20, 1998,
when Atty. Astudillo sprang on it a Motion to Amend the Information and Fix Bail.
It is true that when asked by Judge Bongolan whether the prosecution would
present additional evidence, Prosecutor Gayao responded in the negative.
Subsequently, however, the prosecution changed its mind when it stated in its
Opposition that a resolution of the Motion for admission to bail would be
premature since it has additional witnesses to present. In his Comment, Judge
Bongolan contends that it is not necessary for the prosecution to present all its
witnesses before he could resolve the motion for bail. The stance cannot be
sustained. In Borinaga v. Tamin,[21]we ruled that the prosecution must be given

an opportunity to present its evidence within a reasonable time whether the

motion for bail of an accused who is in custody for a capital offense be resolved
in a summary proceeding or in the course of a regular trial. If the prosecution is
denied such an opportunity, there would be a violation of procedural due process.
The records show that the prosecution was supposed to present its 6th and 7th
witnesses on June 4, 1998 when Judge Bongolan prematurely resolved the
motion. A bail application does not only involve the right of the accused to
temporary liberty, but likewise the right of the State to protect the people and the
peace of the community from dangerous elements. These two rights must be
balanced by a magistrate in the scale of justice, hence, the necessity for hearing
to guide his exercise of discretion.
We note too that Judge Bongolan fixed the bail at P50,000.00 without
showing its reasonableness. In Tucay v. Domagas,[22] we held that while
the Provincial Prosecutor did not interpose an objection to the grant of
bail, still, respondent judge should have set the petition for bail hearing for
the additional reason of taking into account the guidelines for fixing the
amount of bail.[23] Thus, we fined the erring judge for gross ignorance of
the law.
It must be pointed out in this regard that "[J]udicial discretion, by its very nature,
involves the exercise of the judges individual opinion and the law has wisely
provided that its exercise be guided by well-known rules which, while allowing the
judge rational latitude for the operation of his own individual views, prevent them
from getting out of control.[24] In other words, judicial discretion is not unbridled
but must be supported by a finding of the facts relied upon to form an opinion on
the issue before the court.[25]
In numerous cases[26] we repeatedly ruled that the courts order granting or
refusing bail must contain a summary of the evidence for the prosecution
followed by its conclusion whether or not the evidence of guilt is strong. Indeed,
the summary of evidence for the prosecution which contains the judges
evaluation of the evidence may be considered as an aspect of judicial due
process for both the prosecution and the defense. [27] Nowhere is such summary
to be found in the assailed orders of respondent judge.
With clear-cut procedural guidelines on bail now incorporated in the Rules of
Court, judges have been enjoined to study them well and be guided accordingly.
Concededly, judges can not be faulted for honest lapses in judgment but this
defense has become shopworn from overuse. To reiterate, although the
Provincial Prosecutor had interposed no objection to the grant of bail to the

accused, respondent judge should have set the application or petition for bail for
hearing.[28] If the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence or fails to interpose an
objection to the motion for bail, it is still mandatory for the court to conduct a
hearing or ask searching and clarificatory questions. [29] For even the failure of the
prosecution to interpose an objection to the grant of bail to the accused will not
justify such grant without a hearing.[30]
As pointedly stated in Bantuas v. Pangadapun[31] "[T]o grant an application for bail
and fix the amount thereof without a hearing duly called for the purpose of
determining whether the evidence of guilt is strong constitutes ignorance or
incompetence whose grossness cannot be excused by a claim of good faith or
excusable negligence.[32] Furthermore, the Court has held that the failure of the
judge to conduct the hearing required prior to the grant of bail in capital offenses
is inexcusable and reflects gross ignorance of the law and a cavalier disregard of
its requirement."[33]
Given the peculiar factual circumstances prevailing in this case, we find the
recommended penalty of the OCA in the evaluation report appropriate.
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondent Judge is hereby FINED
Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) and STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of
the same or similar infractions complained of will be dealt with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J.,(Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.