Case number 83

PEOPLES JOURNAL et. al. vs. FRANCIS THOENEN

G.R. No. 143372 December 13, 2005

Facts: On 30 September 1990, a news item appeared in the Peoples Journal

claiming that a certain Francis Thoenen, a Swiss national who allegedly shoots
wayward neighbors pets that he finds in his domain. It also claimed that BF Homes
residents, in a letter through lawyer Atty. Efren Angara, requested for the
deportation of Thoenen to prevent the recurrence of such incident in the future.
Thoenen claimed that the article destroyed the respect and admiration he enjoyed
in the community. He is seeking for damages.
The petitioners admitted publication of the news item, ostensibly out of a social
and moral duty to inform the public on matters of general interest, promote the
public good and protect the moral public (sic) of the people, and that the story was
published in good faith and without malice.

Issue: Whether or not the news report fall under privileged communication and
therefore protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of speech.

Held: The right of free speech is not absolute. Libel is not protected speech. In the
instant case, even if we assume that the letter written by Atty. Angara is privileged
communication, it lost its character when the matter was published in the
newspaper and circulated among the general population, especially since the
individual alleged to be defamed is neither a public official nor a public figure.
Moreover, the news item contained falsehoods on two levels. First, the BF Homes
residents did not ask for the deportation of Thoenen, more so because the letter of
the Atty. Anagara was a mere request for verification of Thoenens status as a
foreign resident. The article is also untrue because the events she reported never
happened. Worse, the main source of information, Atty. Efren Angara, apparently
either does not exist, or is not a lawyer.
There is no constitutional value in false statements of fact. Neither the intentional
lie nor the careless error materially advances societys interest in uninhibited,
robust, and wide-open debate. Calculated falsehood falls into that class of
utterances which are no essential part of any exposition of ideas, and are of such
slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit that may be derived from them
is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and morality The knowingly
false statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth,
do not enjoy constitutional protection

CASE 85
Chavez vs. Gonzales (2008) (Political Law)
Francisco Chavez vs. Raul M. Gonzales and NTC | G.R. No. 168338 | February 15,
2008

Facts: As a consequence of the public release of copies of the Hello Garci compact
disc audiotapes involving a wiretapped mobile phone conversation between thenPresident Gloria Arroyo and Comelec Commissioner Virgilio Garcillano, respondent
DOJ Secretary Gonzales warned reporters that those who had copies of the CD and
those broadcasting or publishing its contents could be held liable under the AntiWiretapping Act. He also stated that persons possessing or airing said tapes were
committing a continuing offense, subject to arrest by anybody. Finally, he stated
that he had ordered the NBI to go after media organizations found to have caused
the spread, the playing and the printing of the contents of a tape. Meanwhile,
respondent NTC warned TV and radio stations that their broadcast/airing of such
false information and/or willful misrepresentation shall be a just cause for the
suspension, revocation and/or cancellation of the licenses or authorizations issued
to the said media establishments. Petitioner Chavez filed a petition under Rule 65
against respondents Secretary Gonzales and the NTC directly with the Supreme
Court.

Issues: (1) Will a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law justify
straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press? (2) Did the mere
press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC constitute a form of
content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the Constitution?

Held: (1) No, a purported violation of law such as the Anti-Wiretapping Law will not
justify straitjacketing the exercise of freedom of speech and of the press. A
governmental action that restricts freedom of speech or of the press based on
content is given the strictest scrutiny, with the government having the burden of
overcoming the presumed unconstitutionality by the clear and present danger rule.
This rule applies equally to all kinds of media, including broadcast media.
Respondents, who have the burden to show that these acts do not abridge freedom
of speech and of the press, failed to hurdle the clear and present danger test. For
this failure of the respondents alone to offer proof to satisfy the clear and present
danger test, the Court has no option but to uphold the exercise of free speech and
free press. There is no showing that the feared violation of the anti-wiretapping law
clearly endangers the national security of the State.

(2) Yes, the mere press statements of respondents DOJ Secretary and the NTC
constituted a form of content-based prior restraint that has transgressed the

Constitution. It is not decisive that the press statements made by respondents were
not reduced in or followed up with formal orders or circulars. It is sufficient that the
press statements were made by respondents while in the exercise of their official
functions. Any act done, such as a speech uttered, for and on behalf of the
government in an official capacity is covered by the rule on prior restraint. The
concept of an act does not limit itself to acts already converted to a formal order
or official circular. Otherwise, the non formalization of an act into an official order or
circular will result in the easy circumvention of the prohibition on prior restraint.

CASE 86
NEWSOUNDS BROADCASTING NETWORK INC. and CONSOLIDATED BROADCASTING
SYSTEM, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. CEASAR G. DY, FELICISIMO G. MEER, BAGNOS MAXIMO, RACMA FERNANDEZGARCIA and THE CITY OF CAUAYAN, Respondents.

Facts:

Petitioners operate and run Bombo Radyo DZNC Cauayan (DZNC), an AM radio
broadcast station, and Star FM DWIT Cauayan, an FM radio broadcast station, in
Cauayan Citry, Isabela. Back in 1996, Newsounds commenced relocation of its
broadcasting station, management office, and transmitters on propery located in
Minante 2, Cauayan City, Isabela.
On July 1996, the Housing & Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) and Office of the
Municipal Planning and Development Coordinator (OMPDC) affirmed and certified
that the commercial structure to be constructed conformed to local zoning
regulations, noting as well that the location is classified as a commercial area. The
radio station was able to fully operate smoothly thereafter.
In 2002 however, when petitioners applied for a renewal of mayors permit, City
Zoning Administratior-Designate Bagnos Maximo refused to issue zoning clearance
on the grounds that petitioners were not able to submit conversion papers showing
that the agricultural land was converted to commercial land. Petitioners asked the
court to compel the issuance of mayors permit but the court denied the action. In
the meantime, the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) Region II office issued to
petitioners a formal recognition of conversion of the property from agricultural to
commercial.
In 2003, petitioners again filed their application for renewal of mayors permit,
attaching the DAR Order. Respondent Felicisimo Meer, acting City Administrator of
Cauayan City denied the same, claiming that it was void on the grounds that they
did not have record of the DAR Order.

The deadline lapsed on Febuary 15, 2004, and respondents Meer and Racma
Fernandez-Garcia, City Legal Officer of Cauayan City, closed the radio station. Due
to the prvosion of Omnibus Election Code which prohibits the closure of radio
station during the pendency of election period, COMELEC issued an order allowing
the petitioners to operate before Febuary 17, 2004, but was barred again by
respondent Mayor Ceasar Dy on the grounds that the radio station had no permit.
Nonetheless, COMELEC allowed them to run again until June 10, 2004 after
elections.
Petitioners filed the case to the RTC and CA for the issuance of mayors permit but
both courts denied the petition.
A municipal or city mayor is likewise authorized under the LGC to issue licenses and
permits, and suspend or revoke the same for any violation of the conditions upon
which said licenses or permits had been issued, pursuant to law or ordinance. In
case of Cauayan City, the authority to require a mayors permit was enacted
through Ordinance No. 92-004, enacted in 1993. However, nothing in the ordinance
requires an application for a mayors permit to submit either an approved land
conversion papers from DAR, showing that its property was converted from prime
agricultural land or an approved resolution from the Sangguniang Bayan or
Sangguniang Panglungsod authorizing the reclassification of property from
agricultural to commercial land.
In 1996, the HLURB issued a zoning decision that classified the property as
commercial. Petitioners are also armed with several certifications stating that the
property is indeed a commercial area. Also, petitioners paid real property taxes
based on the classification of property as commercial without objections raised by
the respondents.
Petitioners argued that this consistent recognition by the local government of
Cauayan of the commercial character of the property constitutes estoppels against
respondents from denying the fact before the courts. The lower courts had ruled
that the government of Cauayan City is not bound by estoppels, but petitioners
classified that this concept is understood to only refer to acts and mistakes of its
official especially to those which are irregular.
Issue:
Whether the lower court is correct in contending that the government of Cauayan
City is not bound by estoppels on the grounds that the state is immune against
suits.
Held:
No. While it is true that the state cannot be put in estoppels by mistake or error of
its officials or agents, there is an exception.
Estoppels against the public are little favored. They should not be invoked except in
rare and unusual circumstances, and may not be invoked where they would operate
to defeat the effective operation of a policy adopted to protect the public. They

must be applied with circumspection and should be applied only in those special
cases where the interests of justice clearly require it. Nevertheless, the government
must not be allowed to deal dishonorably or capriciously with its citizens, and must
not play an ignoble part or do a shabby thing; and subject to limitations . . ., the
doctrine of equitable estoppel may be invoked against public authorities as well as
against private individuals
Thus, when there is no convincing evidence to prove irregularity or negligence on
the part of the government official whose acts are being disowned other than the
bare assertion on the part of the State, the Supreme Court have declined to apply
State immunity from estoppel. Herein, there is absolutely no evidence other than
the bare assertions of the respondents that the Cauayan City government had
previously erred when it certified that the property had been zoned for commercial
use. The absence of any evidence other than bare assertions that the 1996 to 2001
certifications were incorrect lead to the ineluctable conclusion that respondents are
estopped from asserting that the previous recognition of the property as
commercial was wrong.
Respondents were further estopped from disclaiming the previous consistent
recognition by the Cauayan City government that the property was commercially
zoned unless they had evidence, which they had none, that the local officials who
issued such certifications acted irregularly in doing so. It is thus evident that
respondents had no valid cause at all to even require petitioners to secure
approved land conversion papers from the DAR showing that the property was
converted from prime agricultural land to commercial land.
Respondents closure of petitioners radio stations is clearly tainted with ill motvies.
Petitioners have been aggressive in exposing the widespread election irregularities
in Isabela that appear to have favored respondent Dy and his political dynasty. Such
statement manifests and confirms that respondents denial of the renewal
applications on the ground that property is commercial and merely a pretext, and
their real agenda is to remove petitioners from Cauayan City and suppress the
latters voice. This is a blatant violation of constitutional right to press freedom.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed decisions of the Court of
Appeals and the Regional Trial Court of Cauayan City, Branch 24, are hereby
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The instant petition for mandamus is hereby GRANTED
and respondents are directed to immediately issue petitioners zoning clearances
and mayors permits for 2004 to petitioners.

CASE 88
Espuelas vs People
G.R. No. L-2990
December 17, 1951
Facts:

On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol,
Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were
hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree,
when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies
of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to Free Press, the Evening News,
the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other local periodicals in the
Province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their
publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was
written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's
supposed wife translation of which letter or note, stating his dismay and
administration of President Roxas, pointing out the situation in Central Luzon and
Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write to President Truman and Churchill
of US and tell them that in the Philippines the government is infested with many
Hitlers and Mussolinis.
Issue:
Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the
Government of the Philippines?
Held:
Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no
question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be
affirmed with costs.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written bybthe
accused, cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of
sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what
with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is
failure to particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on persuading
the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of free speech cannot apply
and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional
guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure
but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only
all libels against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted
authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer of least
to the President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives
dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone the
conviction could be upheld.

Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and

tends to stir up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence

from opposition who may seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and substance
of the offense under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up
general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to
resort to illegal methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to
repress the evils which press upon their minds.

Case 89
In Re Emil P. Jurado | 243 SCRA 299 (1995) FACTS:
Emiliano P. Jurado, a lawyer and a journalist who writes in a newspaper of general
circulation (Manila Standard) wrote about alleged improprieties and irregularities in
the judiciary over several months (from about October 1992 to March 1993). Other
journalists had also been making reports or comments on the same subject. At the
same time, anonymous communications were being extensively circulated, by hand
and through the mail, about alleged venality and corruption in the courts. What was
particularly given attention by the Supreme Court was his column entitled
Who will judge the Justices? referring to a report that six justices, their spouses
and
children and grandchildren (a total of 36 persons) spent a vacation in Hong Kong,
and that luxurious hotel accommodations and all their other expenses were paid by
a public utility firm and that the trip was arranged by the travel agency patronized
by this public utility firm. This column was made amidst rumors that a Supreme
Court decision favorable to the public utility firm appears to have been authored by
a lawyer of the public utility firm. The seed of the proceeding at bar was sown by
the decision promulgated by this Court on August 27, 1992, in the so-ca
lled controversial case of Philippine Long Distance Telephone Company v. Eastern
Telephone Philippines, Inc. (ETPI), G.R. No, 94374.
In that decision the Court was sharply divided; the vote was 9 to 4, in favor of the
petitioner PLDT. Mr. Justice Hugo E. Gutierrez, Jr., wrote the opinion for the majority.
The Chief Justice issued an administrative order creating an ad hoc committee to
investigate the said reports of corruption in the judiciary. A letter affidavit was also
received from the public utility, denying the allegations in Jurado's column. The
Supreme Court then issued a resolution ordering that the matter dealt with in the
letter and affidavit of the public utility company be docketed and acted upon as an
official Court proceeding for the determination of whether or not the allegations
made by Jurado are true.
ISSUE #1:
WON Jurado can invoke the principles of press freedom to justify the published
writings.

HELD:
NO. Although honest utterances, even if inaccurate, may further the fruitful exercise
of the right of free speech, it does not follow that the lie, knowingly and deliberately
published about a public official, should enjoy a like immunity. The knowingly false
statement and the false statement made with reckless disregard of the truth, do not
enjoy constitutional protection.

The Civil Code, in its Article 19 lays down the norm for the proper exercise of any
right, constitutional or otherwise, viz.: ARTICLE 19.
Every person must, in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties,
act with justice, give everyone his due,
and observe honesty and good faith. The provision is reflective of the universally
accepted precept of abuse of rights, one
of the most dominant principles which must
be deemed always implied in any system of law.
Requirement to exercise bona fide care in ascertaining the truth of the statements
when publishing statements which are clearly defamatory to identifiable judges or
other public officials.

Judges, by becoming such, are rightly regarded as voluntarily subjecting themselves

to norms of conduct which embody more stringent standards of honesty, integrity,
and competence than are commonly required from private persons.
Nevertheless, persons who seek or accept appointment to the Judiciary cannot
reasonably be regarded as having forfeited any right to private honor and
(CONTINUED......)

CASE 90
IN RE: ATTY. LEONARD DE VERA, A.M. No. 01-12-03-SC. July 29, 2002Facts:
Quoted hereunder is a newspaper article with contemptuous statements attributed
to Atty.Leonard De Vera concerning the Plunder Law case while the same was still
pending before the Court.
De Vera asked the Supreme Court to dispel rumors that it would vote in favor of a
petition filed by Estradaslawyers to declare the plunder law unconstitutional for its
supposed vagueness.

PHILIPPINE DAILY INQUIRER

Monday, November 19, 2001

Atty. Leonard De Vera also argued that he was merely exercising his constitutionally
guaranteed right tofreedom of speech when he said that a decision by the Court
declaring the Plunder Law unconstitutional
would trigger mass actions, probably more massive than those that led to People
Power II. While Atty.
Leonard De Vera admitted to having uttered the aforecited statements, respondent
denied having made thesame to degrade the Court, to destroy public confidence in
it and to bring it into disrepute.
Issue:
WON Atty. Leonard De Vera is liable for indirect contempt of court for uttering
statements aimed atinfluencing and threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law.
Held:
Yes, after a careful consideration of
respondents arguments, the Court finds his explanation
unsatisfactory and hereby finds him guilty of indirect contempt of court for uttering
statements aimed atinfluencing and threatening the Court in deciding in favor of the
constitutionality of the Plunder Law.Rule 71, Section 3 (d) of the Revised Rules of
Court authorizes the courts to hold liable for criminalcontempt a person guilty of
conduct that is directed against the dignity or authority of the court, or of an
actobstructing the administration of justice which tends to bring the court into
disrepute or disrespect.

Indeed, freedom of speech includes the right to know and discuss judicial
proceedings, but such right
does not cover statements aimed at undermining the Courts integrity and authorit
y, and interfering with theadministration of justice. Freedom of speech is not
absolute, and must occasionally be balanced with therequirements of equally
important public interests, such as the maintenance of the integrity of the courts
andorderly functioning of the administration of justice.

Thus, the making of contemptuous statements directed against the Court is not an
exercise of freespeech; rather, it is an abuse of such right. Unwarranted attacks on
the dignity of the courts cannot bedisguised as free speech, for the exercise of said
right cannot be used to impair the independence andefficiency of courts or public
respect therefore and confidence therein.In
People vs. Godoy
, this Court explained that while a citizen may comment upon the proceedings
anddecisions of the court and discuss their correctness, and even express his
opinions on the fitness or unfitnessof the judges for their stations, and the fidelity
with which they perform the important public trusts reposed inthem, he has no right
to attempt to degrade the court, destroy public confidence in it, and encourage
thepeople to disregard and set naught its orders, judgments and decrees. Such
publications are said to be anabuse of the liberty of speech and of the press, for
they tend to destroy the very foundation of good order andwell-being in society by
obstructing the course of justice.

Clearly, respondents utterances pressuring the Court to rule in favor of the

constitutionality of the Plunder Law or
risk another series of mass actions by the public cannot be construed as falling
within the ambit of constitutionally-protected speech, because such statements are
not fair criticisms of any decision of the Court, but obviously are threatsmade
against it to force the Court to decide the issue in a particular manner, or risk
earning the ire of the public.

Suchstatements show disrespect not only for the Court but also for the judicial
system as a whole, tend to promote distrust andundermine public confidence in the
judiciary, by creating the impression that the Court cannot be trusted to resolve
casesimpartially and violate the right of the parties to have their case tried fairly by
an independent tribunal, uninfluenced bypublic clamor and other extraneous
influences.

CASE 94
MTRCB v. ABS-CBN G.R. No. 155282. January 17, 2005
J. Sandoval Gutierrez

Facts:

Respondent abs-cbn aired Prosti-tuition, an episode of the TV program The

Inside Story produced and hosted by respondent Legarda. It depicted female
students moonlighting as prostitutes to enable them to pay for their tuition fees.
PWU was named as the school of some of the students involved and the faade of
the PWU building served as the background of the episode. This caused upsoar in
the PWU community and they filed a letter-complaint to the MTRCB.
MTRCB alleged that respondents
1) Did not submit the inside story to petitioner for review
2) Exhibited the same without its permission, thus violating sec 7 of PD 1986 and
some sections of MTRCB rules and regulations
ABS-CBN averred:
1) The Inside Story is a public affairs program, news documentary and socio-political
editorial, its airing is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of
expression and of the press
2) Petitioners has no power, authority and jurisdiction to impose any form of prior
restraint upon respondents.
After hearing and submission of the parties memoranda, MTRCB investigating
committee ordered the respondents to pay P20,000 for non-submission of the
program
MTRCB affirmed the ruling
Respondents filed a special civil action for certiorari with RTC QC. RTC rendered a
decision in favor of respondents, annulling and setting aside the decision and
resolution of the MTRCB and declaring and decreeing that certain sections of PD
1986 & MTRCB do not cover the TV program Inside Story, they being a public
affairs programs which can be equated to a newspaper
Hence, this petition
Issue:
Whether the MTRCB has the power or authority to review the Inside Story prior its
exhibition or broadcast by TV.
Held:
Sec 3 of PD 1986 enumerates the powers, functions and duties of the board:
Xxx
b) to screen, review and examine all motion pictures herein defined, TV programs,
including publicity materials
The court in INC v. CA rules that PD 1986 gives MTRCB the power to screen, review
and examine ALL TV PROGRAMS

*LESSON* where the law does not make any exceptions, courts may not exempt
something therefrom, unless there is compelling reason apparent in the law to
justify it.
Thus, when the law says all TV programs, the word all covers all tv programs
whether religious, public affairs, news docu, etc
It then follows that since the Inside Story is a TV Program, MTRCB has the power to
review it
The only exemptions from the MTRCBs power to review are those mentioned in Sec
7 of PD 1986
1) TV programs imprinted or exhibited by Phil govt and/or departments and
agencies
2) Newsreels
In a desperate attempt to be exempted, respondents content that Inside Story falls
under the category of newsreels.
MTRCB rules and reg defines newsreels as straight news reporting, as distinguished
from analyses, commentaries, and opinions. Talk shows on a given issue are not
considered newsreels.
Clearly, Inside Story is not a newsreel but more of a public affairs program and
within petitioners power of review.
Issue related to Consti law:
Petitioners power to review television programs under Section 3(b) of P. D. No. 1986
does not amount to prior restraint.
Ratio:
It is significant to note that in Iglesia ni Cristo, this Court declared that freedom of
religion has been accorded a preferred status by the framers of our fundamental
laws, past and present, designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of
conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs x x x. Yet
despite the fact that freedom of religion has been accorded a preferred status, still
this Court, did not exempt the Iglesia ni Cristos religious program from petitioners
review power.
Respondents claim that the showing of The Inside Story is protected by the
constitutional provision on freedom of speech and of the press. However, there has
been no declaration at all by the framers of the Constitution that freedom of
expression and of the press has a preferred status.
If this Court, in Iglesia ni Cristo, did not exempt religious programs from the
jurisdiction and review power of petitioner MTRCB, with more reason, there is no
justification to exempt therefrom The Inside Story which, according to

respondents, is protected by the constitutional provision on freedom of expression

and of the press, a freedom bearing no preferred status.
The only exceptions from the MTRCBs power of review are those expressly
mentioned in Section 7 of P. D. No. 1986, such as (1) television programs imprinted
or exhibited by the Philippine Government and/or its departments and agencies,
and (2) newsreels.

CASE 95
Miriam College Foundation, Inc. v CA 348 SCRA 265 December 15, 2000
Facts: The members of the editorial board of the Miriam College Foundations school
paper were subjected to disciplinary sanction by the College Discipline Committee
after letters of complaint were filed before the Board following the publication of the
school paper that contains obscene, vulgar, and sexually explicit contents. Prior to
the disciplinary sanction to the defendants they were required to submit a written
statement to answer the complaints against them to the Discipline Committee but
the defendants, instead of doing so wrote to the Committee to transfer the case to
the DECS which they alleged to have the jurisdiction over the issue. Pushing through
with the investigation ex parte the Committee found the defendants guilty and
imposed upon them disciplinary sanctions. Defendants filed before the court for
prohibition with preliminary injunction on said decision of the Committee
questioning the jurisdiction of said Discipline Board over the defendants.

Issue: WON the Discipline Board of Miriam College has jurisdiction over the
defendants.

Held: The court resolved the issue before it by looking through the power of DECS
and the Disciplinary Committee in imposing sanctions upon the defendants. Section
5 (2), Article XIV of the Constitution guarantees all institutions of higher learning
academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom includes the right of the
school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to attain
them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding
public welfare calls for some restraint. Such duty gives the institution the right to
discipline its students and inculcate upon them good values, ideals and attitude.
The right of students to free speech in school is not always absolute. The court
upheld the right of students for the freedom of expression but it does not rule out
disciplinary actions of the school on the conduct of their students. Further, Sec. 7 of
the of the Campus Journalism Act provides that the school cannot suspend or expel
a student solely on the basis of the articles they write EXCEPT when such article
materially disrupts class work of involve substantial disorder or invasion of the
rights of others. Therefore the court ruled that the power of the school to
investigate is an adjunct of its power to suspend or expel. It is a necessary corollary

to the enforcement of rules and regulations and the maintenance of a safe and
orderly educational environment conducive to learning. That power, like the power
to suspend or expel, is an inherent part of the academic freedom of institutions of
higher learning guaranteed by the Constitution. The court held that Miriam College
has the authority to hear and decide the cases filed against respondent students.

CASE 98
CASE DIGEST: BAYAN VS. ERMITA (Batas Pambansa 880 or The Public Assembly Act
of 1985)
I. FACTS
It is provided in the Constitution that it is a the basic right of every Filipino individual
to voice out or express himself, whether for personal reasons or common good
itself.
However,
a right,

certain

acts

must

be

discontinued

although

it

gives

body

to

especially if it harms the good for the greater mass. Batas Pambansa 880 is an
example of a delimiting
expression of

law

that

provides

boundaries

on

the

free

persons.
Such in the case of three petitioner groups, first of Bayan, secondly of 26 individual
petitioners, Jess del Prado, et al and third of Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU), all of whom
are recognized
to be

as taxpayers and

official residents

who

allege

themselves

staging a peaceful mass assembly when police forces under the rule of BP 880
forcibly and violently dispersed
incurred their

them

much

to

their

dismay,

which

members injuries and arrest. These groups of concerned citizens are attesting that
such manner
and that

of

dispersal

of

abiding

by

no

permit,

no

rally

policy,

delegation of powers in the local government (specifically by the Mayor Lito Atienza)
in the said dispersal were unconstitutional, as well as the implementation of BP 880
itself. They seek to stop such policies of ruthless dispersals, as it violates their basic

right to freedom of expression, redress of grievances and most of all their right to
peaceably assemble.
II. ISSUE
Whether Batas Pambansa 880 is constitutional or not.
III. HELD
As it is to be observed in the BP itself, BP 880 has provisions which defines the
requisites of a peaceful assembly, maximum tolerance of the police forces and
permit to rally (see definition of terms and Declaration of policy). On the matter
regarding the claim of illegality of power delegation without clear standards, the
mayor being the local government head concerned, has the right to issue or not
the permits. As stated in Section 6 of BP 880: (a) It shall be the duty of the mayor
or any official acting in his behalf to issue or grant a permit unless there is clear
and convincing evidence that the public assembly will create a clear and present
danger to public order, public safety, public convenience, public morals or public
health. The preceding and succeeding sections provide for the requisites of the
peaceful assembly stated in the Article 4 of the Bill of rights. As to the matter
regarding ruthless dispersals, police assistance as observed in Section 10 to 11
of the same law is observed for the interest of those exercising their right to
assemble peacefully. BP 880 gives that no assembly shall be dispersed, unless
there is impending violence which could lead to property destruction, harm to
others and the likes. As to the claim of the groups of the unconstitutionality of BP
880, the law itself provides acts which, if violated by the assembly regardless of
permission, are deemed to be a disruption of the common good, which is the
greatest and the object of supreme importance over the right of the assembly. As
stated in the U.S vs. Apurado case which has similar concerns: "It is rather to be
expected that more or less disorder will mark the public assembly of the people
to protest
such

against

grievances

whether

real

or

imaginary,

because

on

occasions feeling is always wrought to a high pitch of excitement, and

the

greater, the grievance and the more intense the feeling, the less perfect, as a
rule
will
be
irresponsible

the

disciplinary

control

of

the

leaders

over

their

followers. Also, as Primicias case contains: The right to freedom of speech, and
to peacefully assemble and petition the government for redress of grievances,
are fundamental personal rights of the people recognized and guaranteed by the
constitutions of democratic countries. But it is a settled principle growing out of
the nature of well-ordered civil societies that the exercise of those rights is not
absolute for it may be so regulated that it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment
the

of

others

having

equal

rights,

nor

injurious

to

the

rights

of

community or society.
If one is to read fully the contents or provisions of the BP 880, it is not a law
indicating
total ban of assemblies; but rather it exists to regulate the time, place, and manner
of
conducting the assembly. B.P. No. 880 cannot be condemned as unconstitutional;
it
does not hold back or unduly confine freedoms; it merely controls the use of public
places as to the time, place and manner of assemblies. Much of the population have
the
notion that maximum tolerance is a sinister move, but "maximum tolerance" is for
the
benefit of rallyists, not the government. The delegation to the mayors of the power
to
issue rally "permits" is valid because it is subject to the constitutionally-sound "clear
and
present danger" standard as stated in Section 10.
Therefore:
As the court finally decides that the Secretary of the Interior and Local
Governments,
are DIRECTED to take all necessary steps for the immediate compliance with
Section

15 of Batas Pambansa No. 880 through the establishment or designation of at least

one
suitable freedom park or plaza in every city and municipality of the country to avoid
misunderstandings of permit-related issues.
All in all, the petitions are DISMISSED in all other respects, and the constitutionality
of
Batas Pambansa No. 880 is SUSTAINED.

CASE 99
G.R. No. 171396, May 3 2006 [Legislative Department - Power to Declare War and
Delegate Emergency Power]

FACTS:
On February 24, 2006, President Arroyo issued PP No. 1017 declaring a state of
emergency, thus:

NOW, THEREFORE, I, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, President of the Republic of the

Philippines and Commander-in-Chief of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, [callingout power] by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Section 18, Article 7 of the
Philippine Constitution which states that: The President. . . whenever it
becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. .
.rebellion. . ., and in my capacity as their Commander-in-Chief, do hereby
command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order throughout
the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act
of insurrection or rebellion ["take care" power] and to enforce obedience to all the
laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or
upon my direction; and [power to take over] as provided in Section 17, Article 12 of
the Constitution do hereby declare a State of National Emergency.

On the same day, PGMA issued G.O. No. 5 implementing PP1017, directing the
members of the AFP and PNP "to immediately carry out the necessary and
appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and
lawless violence."

David, et al. assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the
emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a subterfuge to avoid the constitutional
requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the constitutional

guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly. They alleged direct
injury resulting from illegal arrest and unlawful search committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017.

During the hearing, the Solicitor General argued that the issuance of PP 1017 and
GO 5 have factual basis, and contended that the intent of the Constitution is to give
full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of calling out
the armed forces. The petitioners did not contend the facts stated b the Solicitor
General.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 is constitutional.

RULING:

The operative portion of PP 1017 may be divided into three important provisions,
thus:

First provision: by virtue of the power vested upon me by Section 18, Artilce VII
do hereby command the Armed Forces of the Philippines, to maintain law and order
throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well
any act of insurrection or rebellion
Second provision: and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction;
Third provision: as provided in Section 17, Article XII of the Constitution do hereby
declare a State of National Emergency.

PP 1017 is partially constitutional insofar as provided by the first provision of the

decree.
First Provision: Calling Out Power.
The only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it
becomes necessary, the President may call the armed forces to prevent or
suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion. (Integrated Bar of the Philippines
v. Zamora)
President Arroyos declaration of a state of rebellion was merely an act declaring a
status or condition of public moment or interest, a declaration allowed under

Section 4, Chap 2, Bk II of the Revised Administration Code. Such declaration, in the

words of Sanlakas, is harmless, without legal significance, and deemed not written.
In these cases, PP 1017 is more than that. In declaring a state of national
emergency, President Arroyo did not only rely on Section 18, Article VII of the
Constitution, a provision calling on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. She also relied on Section 17, Article XII, a provision on the
States extraordinary power to take over privately-owned public utility and business
affected with public interest. Indeed, PP 1017 calls for the exercise of an awesome
power. Obviously, such Proclamation cannot be deemed harmless.
To clarify, PP 1017 is not a declaration of Martial Law. It is merely an exercise of
President Arroyos calling-out power for the armed forces to assist her in preventing
or suppressing lawless violence.

Second Provision: The "Take Care" Power.

The second provision pertains to the power of the President to ensure that the laws
be faithfully executed. This is based on Section 17, Article VII which reads:
SEC. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus,
and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed.
This Court rules that the assailed PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants
President Arroyo the authority to promulgate decrees. Legislative power is
peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Section 1, Article VI categorically
states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the Philippines
which shall consist of a Senate and a House of Representatives. To be sure, neither
Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state of emergency can justify President
Arroyos exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.

Third Provision: The Power to Take Over

Distinction must be drawn between the Presidents authority to declare a state of
national emergency and to exercise emergency powers. To the first, Section 18,
Article VII grants the President such power, hence, no legitimate constitutional
objection can be raised. But to the second, manifold constitutional issues arise.
Generally, Congress is the repository of emergency powers. This is evident in the
tenor of Section 23 (2), Article VI authorizing it to delegate such powers to the
President. Certainly, a body cannot delegate a power not reposed upon it.
However, knowing that during grave emergencies, it may not be possible or
practicable for Congress to meet and exercise its powers, the Framers of our
Constitution deemed it wise to allow Congress to grant emergency powers to the
President, subject to certain conditions, thus:
(1) There must be a war or other emergency.
(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.
(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.
Section 17, Article XII must be understood as an aspect of the emergency
powers clause. The taking over of private business affected with public interest is
just another facet of the emergency powers generally reposed upon Congress.
Thus, when Section 17 states that the the State may, during the emergency and
under reasonable terms prescribed by it, temporarily take over or direct the
operation of any privately owned public utility or business affected with public
interest, it refers to Congress, not the President. Now, whether or not the
President may exercise such power is dependent on whether Congress may
delegate it to him pursuant to a law prescribing the reasonable terms thereof.
Following our interpretation of Section 17, Article XII, invoked by President Arroyo in
issuing PP 1017, this Court rules that such Proclamation does not authorize her
during the emergency to temporarily take over or direct the operation of any
privately owned public utility or business affected with public interest without
authority from Congress.
Let it be emphasized that while the President alone can declare a state of national
emergency, however, without legislation, he has no power to take over privatelyowned public utility or business affected with public interest. Nor can he determine
when such exceptional circumstances have ceased. Likewise, without legislation,
the President has no power to point out the types of businesses affected with public
interest that should be taken over. In short, the President has no absolute authority
to exercise all the powers of the State under Section 17, Article VII in the absence of
an emergency powers act passed by Congress.

As of G.O. No. 5, it is constitutional since it provides a standard by which the AFP

and the PNP should implement PP 1017, i.e. whatever is necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.
Considering that acts of terrorism have not yet been defined and made
punishable by the Legislature, such portion of G.O. No. 5 is declared
unconstitutional.

CASE 99
489 SCRA 160 Political Law The Executive Branch Presidential Proclamation
1017 Take Care Clause Take Over Power Calling Out Power

Bill of Rights Freedom of Speech Overbreadth

In February 2006, due to the escape of some Magdalo members and the discovery
of a plan (Oplan Hackle I) to assassinate the president, then president Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA) issued Presidential Proclamation 1017 (PP1017) and is to
be implemented by General Order No. 5 (GO 5). The said law was aimed to suppress
lawlessness and the connivance of extremists to bring down the government.

Pursuant to such PP, GMA cancelled all plans to celebrate EDSA I and at the same
time revoked all permits issued for rallies and other public organization/meeting.
Notwithstanding the cancellation of their rally permit, Kilusang Mayo Uno (KMU)
head Randolf David proceeded to rally which led to his arrest.

Later that day, the Daily Tribune, which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, was raided by
the CIDG and they seized and confiscated anti-GMA articles and write ups. Later
still, another known anti-GMA news agency (Malaya) was raided and seized. On the
same day, Beltran of Anakpawis, was also arrested. His arrest was however
grounded on a warrant of arrest issued way back in 1985 for his actions against
Marcos. His supporters cannot visit him in jail because of the current imposition of
PP 1017 and GO 5.

In March, GMA issued PP 1021 which declared that the state of national emergency
ceased to exist. David and some opposition Congressmen averred that PP1017 is
unconstitutional for it has no factual basis and it cannot be validly declared by the
president for such power is reposed in Congress. Also such declaration is actually a
declaration of martial law. Olivares-Cacho also averred that the emergency
contemplated in the Constitution are those of natural calamities and that such is an
overbreadth. Petitioners claim that PP 1017 is an overbreadth because it encroaches
upon protected and unprotected rights. The Sol-Gen argued that the issue has
become moot and academic by reason of the lifting of PP 1017 by virtue of the
declaration of PP 1021. The Sol-Gen averred that PP 1017 is within the presidents
calling out power, take care power and take over power.

ISSUE: Whether or not PP 1017 and GO 5 is constitutional.

HELD: PP 1017 and its implementing GO are partly constitutional and partly
unconstitutional.

The issue cannot be considered as moot and academic by reason of the lifting of the
questioned PP. It is still in fact operative because there are parties still affected due

to the alleged violation of the said PP. Hence, the SC can take cognition of the case
at bar. The SC ruled that PP 1017 is constitutional in part and at the same time
some provisions of which are unconstitutional. The SC ruled in the following way;

Resolution by the SC on the Factual Basis of its declaration

The petitioners were not able to prove that GMA has no factual basis in issuing PP
1017 and GO 5. A reading of the Solicitor Generals Consolidated Comment and
Memorandum shows a detailed narration of the events leading to the issuance of PP
1017, with supporting reports forming part of the records. Mentioned are the
escape of the Magdalo Group, their audacious threat of the Magdalo D-Day, the
defections in the military, particularly in the Philippine Marines, and the reproving
statements from the communist leaders. There was also the Minutes of the
Intelligence Report and Security Group of the Philippine Army showing the growing
alliance between the NPA and the military. Petitioners presented nothing to refute
such events. Thus, absent any contrary allegations, the Court is convinced that the
President was justified in issuing PP 1017 calling for military aid. Indeed, judging the
seriousness of the incidents, GMA was not expected to simply fold her arms and do
nothing to prevent or suppress what she believed was lawless violence, invasion or
rebellion. However, the exercise of such power or duty must not stifle liberty.

Resolution by the SC on the Overbreadth Theory

First and foremost, the overbreadth doctrine is an analytical tool developed for
testing on their faces statutes in free speech cases. The 7 consolidated cases at
bar are not primarily freedom of speech cases. Also, a plain reading of PP 1017
shows that it is not primarily directed to speech or even speech-related conduct. It
is actually a call upon the AFP to prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence.
Moreover, the overbreadth doctrine is not intended for testing the validity of a law
that reflects legitimate state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over
harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct. Undoubtedly, lawless violence,
insurrection and rebellion are considered harmful and constitutionally unprotected
conduct. Thus, claims of facial overbreadth are entertained in cases involving
statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate only spoken words and again, that
overbreadth claims, if entertained at all, have been curtailed when invoked against
ordinary criminal laws that are sought to be applied to protected conduct. Here, the
incontrovertible fact remains that PP 1017 pertains to a spectrum of conduct, not
free speech, which is manifestly subject to state regulation.

Resolution by the SC on the Calling Out Power Doctrine

On the basis of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution, GMA declared PP 1017. The SC
considered the Presidents calling-out power as a discretionary power solely vested
in his wisdom, it stressed that this does not prevent an examination of whether
such power was exercised within permissible constitutional limits or whether it was
exercised in a manner constituting grave abuse of discretion. The SC ruled that GMA
has validly declared PP 1017 for the Constitution grants the President, as
Commander-in-Chief, a sequence of graduated powers. From the most to the least
benign, these are: the calling-out power, the power to suspend the privilege of the
writ of habeas corpus, and the power to declare Martial Law. The only criterion for
the exercise of the calling-out power is that whenever it becomes necessary, the
President may call the armed forces to prevent or suppress lawless violence,
invasion or rebellion. And such criterion has been met.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Care Doctrine

Pursuant to the 2nd sentence of Sec 17, Art 7 of the Constitution (He shall ensure
that the laws be faithfully executed.) the president declared PP 1017. David et al
averred that PP 1017 however violated Sec 1, Art 6 of the Constitution for it
arrogated legislative power to the President. Such power is vested in Congress.
They assail the clause to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees,
orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction. The SC
noted that such provision is similar to the power that granted former President
Marcos legislative powers (as provided in PP 1081). The SC ruled that the assailed
PP 1017 is unconstitutional insofar as it grants GMA the authority to promulgate
decrees. Legislative power is peculiarly within the province of the Legislature. Sec
1, Article 6 categorically states that [t]he legislative power shall be vested in the
Congress of the Philippines which shall consist of a Senate and a House of
Representatives. To be sure, neither Martial Law nor a state of rebellion nor a state
of emergency can justify GMA[s exercise of legislative power by issuing decrees.
The president can only take care of the carrying out of laws but cannot create or
enact laws.

Resolution by the SC on the Take Over Power Doctrine

The president cannot validly order the taking over of private corporations or
institutions such as the Daily Tribune without any authority from Congress. On the
other hand, the word emergency contemplated in the constitution is not limited to
natural calamities but rather it also includes rebellion. The SC made a distinction;
the president can declare the state of national emergency but her exercise of
emergency powers does not come automatically after it for such exercise needs

authority from Congress. The authority from Congress must be based on the
following:

(1) There must be a war or other emergency.

(2) The delegation must be for a limited period only.

(3) The delegation must be subject to such restrictions as the Congress may
prescribe.

(4) The emergency powers must be exercised to carry out a national policy
declared by Congress.

Resolution by the SC on the Issue that PP 1017 is a Martial Law Declaration

The SC ruled that PP 1017 is not a Martial Law declaration and is not tantamount to
it. It is a valid exercise of the calling out power of the president by the president.