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“CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF ITC”
SUBMITTED IN THE PARTIAL FULFILLMENT TOWARDS THE AWARD OF MASTER OF BUSINESS ADMINSTRATION 2008-2010
UNDER THE SUPERVISION OF:
G.L.A Institute of Business Management Mathura (U.P.)
(Affiliated to U.P. Technical University, (LUCKNOW)
It is well evident that work experience is an indispensable part of every professional course. In the same manner practical training in any organization is must for each and every individual, who is undergoing management course. Without the practical exposure one cannot consider himself as a qualified capable manager. Hence to fulfill this requirement of research report was completed at under guidance Mr. Utkal khandelwal. At first everything seems strange and unheard but as the time passes one understands the concept and working of the organization and thereby develop professional relationship. Initially it is felt as if classroom study was irrelevant and it is unless in any concern working. But gradually it is realized that all basic fundamental concepts studied are linked in one or other ways to the organization. But how and what can be done with fundamentals depends upon the intellectual and applicability of the individual
I hereby declare that the Research project: “Analysis of Corporate Governance Practice in Banking Sector “submitted for the degree of master in business administration Research project done by me under guidenance of Mr. Utkal khandelwal under, towards fulfillment of requirement for the MBA course of G.L.A Institute of Business Management Mathura (U.P) 2008-10;
I further declare that this study or any part thereof has not been submitted for any other degree.
I would like to take this opportunity to express my deep sense of gratitude to all those who, directly or indirectly made this project possible. I have got considerable help and support in making this project report a reality from many people. I would like to thank Mr. Utkal khandelwal (Faculty of MBA) whose endeavor for perfection, under fatigable zeal, innovation and dynamism contributed in a big way in completing this project. This work is the reflection of his thought, ideas, concept and above all his modest effort.
TO FIND OUT THE CORPORATE GOVERNANCE IN BANKING SECTOR Introduction to the topic Review of Literature Need / Rational of study (Expected Contribution of the research work) Objectives of Research Research Methodology * Research design * Sample design Proposed Plan of Study (Chapter Outline) Limitations of Study References/ Bibliography .
With the introduction of corporate governance in banking sector the banking is made much easier and transparent. With increasing competition the banks have to pay entire attention on their working. . The banking industry is also not spread from this competition. we try to reach the bank employees/managers and ask them about corporate governance. Through the survey study. Hence to make the working easy and transparent the banks accepted corporate governance. we try to find out the problems of the corporate governance and with the help of questionnaire. The non-employed officials (such as students) are totally unbiased for their preference. Now the bank employees need not to wait to get the introduction from the top position to take decision. The reason of assigning such a project to a management student is to get frank feedbacks from the bank employees about the exact picture of the corporate governance.Introduction to the topic INTRODUCTION CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK In today‟s world there is a end throat competition in each industry.
laws and institutions affecting the way a corporation is directed. Corporate governance also includes the relationships among the many stakeholders involved and the goals for which the corporation is governed. There has been renewed interest in the corporate governance practices of modern corporations since 2001. customs. Corporate governance is a multi-faceted subject. suppliers. with a strong emphasis on shareholders welfare.MEANING OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE Corporate governance is the set of processes. An important theme of corporate governance is to ensure the accountability of certain individuals in an organization through mechanisms that try to reduce or eliminate the principal-agent problem. There are yet other aspects to the corporate governance subject. banks and other lenders. particularly due to the high-profile collapses of a number of . customers. The principal stakeholders are the shareholders. regulators. policies. A related but separate thread of discussions focus on the impact of a corporate governance system in economic efficiency. such as the stakeholder view and the corporate governance models around the world (see section 9 below). the environment and the community at large. administered or controlled. management and the board of directors. Other stakeholders include employees.
shareholders and other stakeholders. The Journal of Finance. for example. managers. The corporate governance structure specifies the distribution of rights and responsibilities among different participants in the corporation. 2. and spells out the rules and procedures for making decisions on corporate affairs. intending to restore public confidence in corporate governance.S. "Corporate governance is the system by which business corporations are directed and controlled. Definitions 1. firms such as Enron Corporation and WorldCom. the US federal government passed the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. By doing this. how the corporate owners can secure/motivate that the corporate managers will deliver a competitive rate of return". 3. This is often limited to the question of improving financial performance. organizational designs and legislation. . such as contracts. “Corporate governance deals with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves of getting a return on their investment”. such as.large U. the board. In 2002. "Corporate governance is a field in economics that investigates how to secure/motivate efficient management of corporations by the use of incentive mechanisms. it .
and the means of attaining those objectives and monitoring performance".".which can be defined narrowly as the relationship of a company to its shareholders or.also provides the structure through which the company objectives are set. as its relationship to society -…. 4. more broadly. from an article financial Times An Organisational Framework for Corporate Governance Shareholders ← boards of directors (Principals) ← ← ← ← Use and role of share stake ↓ Delegates authority market for corporate control CEO and Executive debt structure of the firm Management (Agents) product market competition ↓ Agent actions implicit incentives and constraints . OECD April 1999. page 15]. "Corporate governance . OECD's definition is consistent with the one presented by Cadbury [1992.
the Houston. shocked the business world with both the scale and age of their unethical and illegal operations. Enron. Worse. While corporate Practices in the US companies came under attack. Researchers in finance have actively investigated the topic for at least a quarter century1 and the father of modern economics. revealed significant and deep-rooted Problems in their corporate governance. There have been debates . and WorldCom. it appeared that the problem was far More widespread. Corporate governance has. Large and trusted companies from Parma at in Italy to the Multinational newspaper group Hollinger Inc. they seemed to indicate only the tip of a dangerous iceberg. It was clear that something was amiss in the area of corporate governance all over the world. himself had recognized the problem over two centuries ago.. Even the prestigious New York Stock Exchange had to remove its director. the telecom behemoth. of course. Dick Grasso. been an important field of query within the Finance discipline for decades.HISTORY The subject of corporate governance leapt to global business limelight from Relative obscurity after a string of collapses of high profile companies. amidst public outcry over excessive Compensation. Texas based energy giant. Adam Smith.
model of corporate governance is better than the bank based Models of Germany and Japan. have an unmistakably positive effect on economic growth and poverty reduction. as well as higher growth and employment. Between corporate governance standards and practices in these countries as a group and those in the developing world. . The proportion of private credit to GDP in countries in the highest quartile of creditor right enactment and enforcement is more than double that in the countries in the lowest quartile. However. Effective corporate Governance enhances access to external financing by firms.about whether the Anglo-Saxon market. Corporate governance has been a central issue in developing countries long before the recent spate of corporate scandals in advanced economies made headlines. leading to greater investment. in turn. 3. Indeed corporate governance and economic development are intrinsically linked. 2. Effective corporate governance systems promote the development of strong financial systems – irrespective of whether they are largely bank-based or market-based – which. the differences in the quality of corporate Governance in these developed countries fade in comparison to the chasm that exists Starting from the seminal “agency problem” paper of Jensen and Macklin (1976). There are several channels through which the causality works.
Good corporate governance also lowers of the cost of capital by reducing risk and creates higher firm valuation once again boosting real investments. Poor corporate governance also hinders the creation and development of new firms. . the ratio of stock market capitalization to GDP in the countries in the highest quartile of shareholder right enactment and enforcement is about four times as large as that for countries in the lowest quartile. There is a strong inverse relationship between the quality of corporate governance and currency depreciation. The return on assets (ROA) is about twice as High in the countries with the highest level of equity rights protection as in countries with The lowest protection. 8 Indeed poor transparency and corporate governance norms are believed to be the key reasons behind the Asian Crisis of 1997. There is a variation of a factor of 8 in the “control premium” (transaction price of shares in block transfers Signifying control transfer less the ordinary share price) between countries with the highest level of equity rights protection and those with the lowest. As for equity financing. 5.4. 7 Good corporate governance can significantly reduce the risk of nation-wide financial crises. Effective corporate governance mechanisms ensure better resource allocation and Management raising the return to capital. 6.
the Indian financial sector is marked with a relatively unsophisticated equity market vulnerable to manipulation and with rudimentary analyst activity.Such financial crises have massive economic and social costs and can set a country several years back in its path to development. and a generally high level of corruption. . Limited liability and dispersed ownership – essential features that the jointstock company form of organization thrives on – inevitably lead to a distance and inefficient monitoring of management by the actual owners of the business. These potential problems of corporate governance are universal. a dominance of family firms. Finally. a history of managing agency system. All these features make corporate governance a particularly important issue in India. Managers enjoy actual control of business and may not serve in the best interests of the shareholders. good corporate governance can remove mistrust between different stakeholders. In addition. Making sure that the managers actually act on behalf of the owners of the company – the stockholders – and pass on the profits to them are the key issues in corporate governance. reduce legal costs and improve social and labor relationships and external economies like environmental protection.
is as follows. It is not possible for the Board to fully instruct management on the desired course of action under every possible business situation. The central issue is the nature of the contract between shareholder representatives and managers telling the latter what to do with the funds contributed by the former. so that the management can be held for violation of . in principle. in turn. 9 The list of possible situations is infinitely long. Even if this power pattern held in reality.2. Central issues in Corporate Governance The basic power structure of the joint-stock company form of business. no contract can be written between representatives of shareholders and the management that specifies the right course of action in every situation. appoints a team of managers who actually handle the day-to-day functioning of the company and report periodically to the Board. it would still be a challenge for the Board to effectively monitor management. Consequently. Thus mangers are the agents of shareholders and function with the objective of maximizing shareholders‟ wealth. The main challenge comes from the fact that such contracts are necessarily “incomplete”. They elect a Board of Directors to monitor the running of the company on their behalf. The Board. The numerous shareholders who contribute to the capital of the company are the actual owners of business.
In real life. so these residual powers must go to management. Consequently the supervisory role of the Board is often severely compromised and the management.such a contract in the event it does something else under the circumstances. some “residual powers” over the funds of the company must be vested with either the financiers or the management. the manager (the CEO in the American setting. On his part the CEO frequently packs the board with his friends and allies who rarely differ with him. The efficient limits to these powers constitute much of the subject of corporate governance. the Managing Director in British-style organizations ) functions with negligible accountability. can potentially use . Most shareholders do not care to attend the General Meetings to elect or change the Board of Directors and often grant their “proxies” to the management. managers wield an enormous amount of power in joint-stock companies and the common shareholder has very little say in the way his or her money is used in the company. Even those that attend the meeting find it difficult to have a say in the selection of directors as only the management gets to propose a slate of directors for voting. Often the CEO himself is the Chairman of the Board of Directors as well. In companies with highly dispersed ownership. who really has the keys to the business. Because of this “incomplete contracts” situation. Clearly the former does not have the expertise or the inclination to run the business in the situations unspecified in the contract. The reality is even more complicated and biased in favor of management.
these features do not exist in developing countries like India. More often than not. As this would drive down the share price. This mechanism. The inefficacy of the Board of Directors in monitoring the activities of management is particularly marked in the Anglo-Saxon corporate structure where real monitoring is expected to come from financial markets.interests rather than the interests of the shareholders. The underlying premise is that shareholders dissatisfied with a particular management would simply dispose of their shares in the company. the company would become takeover target. presupposes the existence of a deep and liquid stock market with considerable informational efficiency as well as a legal and financial system conducive to M&A activity.corporate resources to further their own self. however. If and when the acquisition actually happens. It is thus the fear of a takeover rather than shareholder action that is supposed to keep the management honest and on its toes. An alternative corporate governance model is that provided by the bank-based economies like Germany where the main bank(“House bank” in Germany) lending to the company exerts considerable influence and carries out continuous project-level supervision of the management and the supervisory board . the acquiring company would get rid of the existing management.
3. ownership patterns and Corporate Governance The legal system of a country plays a crucial role in creating an effective corporate governed mechanism in a country and protecting the rights of investors and creditors. The legal environment encompasses two important aspects – the protection offered in the laws (de jure protection) and to what extent the laws are enforced in real . Box 1 gives a brief comparison of the two systems. Legal environment.has representatives of multiple stakeholders of the firm.
The English common law countries lead the four systems in the shareholder rights index with an average of 4 (out of a maximum possible 6) followed by Scandinavian origin countries with an average score of 3 with the French-origin and German-origin countries coming last with average scores of 2.11 Legal systems in most countries have their roots in one of the four distinct legal systems – the English common law. India. Researchers have used two indices for all these countries – a shareholder rights index ranging from 0 (lowest) to 6 (highest) and a rule of law index ranging 0 (lowest) to 10 (highest) – to measure the effective protection of shareholder rights provided in the different countries studied. The Indian legal system is obviously built on the English common law system. French civil law.life (de facto protection). Both these aspects play important roles in determining the nature of corporate governance in the country in question. for instance has a . German civil law and Scandinavian civil law. Recent research has forcefully connected the origins of the legal system of a country to the very structure of its financial and economic architecture arguing that the connection works through the protection given to external financiers of companies – creditors and shareholders. Thus. English-origin legal systems provide the best protection to shareholder lder rights.33 each. The first index captures the extent to which the written law protected shareholders while the latter reflects to what extent the law is enforced in reality.
Pakistan. UK. Most advanced countries have very high scores on this index while developing countries typically have low scores.26 for Scandinavian-origin countries and 16. Sri Lanka. for instance has a score of 4. Germany. Peru and Philippines. Here the Scandinavian-origin countries have an average score of 10 – the maximum possible – followed by the German-origin countries (8. Canada.68). The ratio of the stock .45 companies per million citizens as compared to 27. This difference in protection of shareholders‟ rights has led to completely different trajectories of financial and economic developments in the different countries. The English-origin systems spawn the highest number of firms per capita (on average 35.law countries) and better than all the other 42 countries in the study including countries like France. Pakistan and South Africa (all English-origin. Zimbabwe. Japan and Switzerland. highest in the sample examined – equal to that of the USA. Hong Kong. India.05).shareholder rights index of 5. The Rule of law index is another story. Colombia.46) and French-origin countries (6.79 and 10.00 for German and French-origin countries respectively). Thus it appears that Indian laws provide great protection of shareholders‟ rights on paper while the application and enforcement of those laws are lamentable. English-origin countries (6.17 on this index – ranking 41st out of 49 countries studied – ahead only of Nigeria. Indonesia. They are also the best performers in mobilizing external finance.
As for the ratio of external capital to GNP. The primary difference between the legal systems in advanced countries and those in developing countries lies in enforce me rather than in the nature of laws.e. 0. Enforcement of laws play a much more important role than the quality of the laws on books in determining events like CEO turnover and developing security markets by eliminating insider trading.79 companies per million citizens. India has a score of 0.in books. entrepreneurs and managers find it difficult to signal their commitment to the potential investors.30 and 0.60 for the English-origin countries.46. 12.31 which puts it in the upper half of the sample.market capitalization held by minority shareholders (i. India has 7. one of the lowest for English-origin countries but higher than many French-origin countries and Germany. In an environment marked by weak enforcement of property rights and contracts. substantially higher than the average ratio for German. This particularly hurts the development of new firms and the .21 respectively. Scandinavian and French-origin countries of 0. shareholders other than the three largest shareholders in each company) to the GNP of a country averages a remarkable 0. leading to limited external financing and 12 See Bergdorf and Classes (2004) ownership concentration.
Even in 2002. the average shareholding of promoters in all Indian companies was as high as 48. board activity. though this feature is prevalent in India as well. Apart from the universal features of corporate governance. proxy fights and executive compensation – lose their effectiveness. employee monitoring and social control. shareholder activism. In such a situation many of the standard methods of corporate governance – market for corporate controls. Large block-holding emerges as the most important corporate governance mechanism with some potential roles for bank monitoring. most Asian countries are marked with concentrated stock ownership and a preponderance of family-controlled businesses while state-controlled enterprises form an important segment of the corporate sector in many of these countries.1%. Corporate governance issues have been of critical importance in Asian countries particularly since the Asian crisis which is believed to have been partly caused by lack of transparency and poor corporate governance in East Asian countries 13 Research has established the evidence of pyramiding and family control of businesses in Asian countries. In spite of their substantial variation in economic conditions and politicolegal backgrounds. Asian economies as a group share certain common features that affect the nature of corporate governance in the region.small and medium enterprises (SMEs). particularly East Asia. .
family run companies with lower control by the family perform better than those with higher control. organizational forms that reduce transaction costs and asymmetric information problems. Concentrated ownership and family control are important in countries where legal protection of property rights is relatively weak. 15 In Taiwan. Recent research has also investigated the nature and extent of “tunneling” of funds within business groups in India. The effect of this concentrated ownership by management in Asian countries is not straightforward. firm value rises with largest owner‟s stake but declines as the excess of the largest owner‟s management control over his equity stake increases. Similar to the effects for US companies. The state is an important party in .14. Empirical analyses of the effects of ownership by other (non. Weak property rights are also behind the prevalence of family-owned businesses – 13 See Claessens and Fan (2003) for a survey the literature on corporate governance in Asia. in several East Asian countries.family) groups in Asia are relatively scarce.17 During the 90‟s Indian business groups evidently tunneled considerable amount of funds up the ownership pyramid thereby depriving the minority shareholders of companies at lower levels of the pyramid of their rightful gains. It is believed that this is a result of the ineffectiveness of the legal system in protecting property rights. Poor development of external financial markets also contributes to these ownership patterns.
In post-liberalization India. . but there is little evidence of their effectiveness in corporate governance in Asia.N External and minority representation in boards as well as participation by professionals are rare though increasing in Asian companies. In many Asian countries. Equity ownership by institutional investors like mutual funds has limited impact of performance in India. foreigners and lending institutions. Nevertheless.19 Ownership by other groups like directors.linear effects of entrenchment are also present with state ownership.22 See Box 2 for a discussion of a few typical features of Asian companies and their implications for corporate governance. The non.20 Hostile takeovers are all but absent in Asian countries. Several studies show that accounting performance is lower for state-owned enterprises in China.18 Institutional investors fulfill an important certification role in emerging markets. CEOs are more likely to lose their jobs when corporate performance is poorer. on the other hand. including India.some countries in Asia. appear to improve performance. foreign ownership helps performance only if the foreigners constitute the majority shareholders. corporate governance is not entirely ineffective in Asia. The corporate governance mechanism and efficiency in state controlled companies are generally deemed to inferior. The premium for control is significant in most Asian countries and as high as 10% of the share price in Korea21. . notably India and China.
India emerged far better endowed than most other colonies. The turn towards socialism in the decades after independence marked by the 1951 Industries (Development and Regulation) Act as well as the 1956 Induction . and a banking system replete with well-developed lending norms and recovery procedures.4. therefore. At independence. India inherited one of the world‟s poorest economies but one which had a factory sector accounting for a tenth of the national product. Corporate Governance in India – a background The history of the development of Indian corporate laws has been marked by interesting contrasts. a well-developed equity culture if only among the urban rich. trading and settlements. four functioning stock markets (predating the Tokyo Stock Exchange) with clearly defined rules governing listing. This section draws heavily from the history of Indian corporate governance in the beginning of corporate developments in India were marked by the managing agency system that contributed to the birth of dispersed equity ownership but also gave rise to the practice of management enjoying control rights disproportionately greater than their stock ownership.24 In terms of corporate laws and financial system. Companies Act as well as other laws governing the functioning of joint-stock companies and protecting the investors‟ rights built on this foundation.
protection and widespread red-tape that bred corruption and stilted the growth of the corporate sector. The situation grew from bad to worse in the following decades and corruption. Exorbitant tax rates encouraged creative accounting practices and complicated emolument structures to beat In the absence of a developed stock market. Their nominee directors routinely served as rubber-stamps of the management of the day. the Industrial Development Bank of India and the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India – together with the state financial corporations became the main providers of longterm credit to companies. Borrowers therefore . With their support. promoters of businesses in India could actually enjoy managerial control with very little equity investment of their own. In this respect. Unfortunately. Along with the government owned mutual fund. nepotism And inefficiency became the hallmarks of the Indian corporate sector. the corporate governance system resembled the bank-based German model where these institutions could have played a big role in keeping their clients on the right track. the three all-India development Finance institutions (DFIs)– the Industrial Finance Corporation of India. the Unit Trust of India.Policy Resolution put in place a regime and culture of licensing. they were themselves evaluated on the quantity rather than quality of their lending and thus had little incentive for either proper credit appraisal or effective follow-up and monitoring. they also held large blocks of sha res in the companies they lent to and invariably had representations in their boards.
Frequently they bled the company with impunity. but this would be the stage where India‟s bankruptcy reorganization system driven by the 1985 Sick Industrial Companies Act (SICA) would consider it “sick” and refer it to the Board for Industrial and Financial Reconstruction (BIFR). Very few companies have emerged successfully from the BIFR and even for those that needed to be liquidated. As soon as a company is registered with the BIFR it wins immediate protection from the creditors‟ claims for at least four years. Protection of creditors‟ rights has therefore existed only on paper in India. after which period the delay has roughly doubled. Given this situation. siphoning off funds with the DFI nominee directors mute spectators in their boards. it is hardly surprising that banks. This sordid but increasingly familiar process usually continued till the company‟s net worth was completely eroded. the legal process takes over 10 years on average. by which time the assets of the company are practically worthless. flush with depositors‟ funds routinely decide to lend only to blue chip companies and park their funds in government securities. Financial disclosure norms in India have traditionally been superior to most Asian . Between 1987 and 1992 BIFR took well over two years on an average to reach a decision. This stage would come after the company has defaulted on its loan obligations for a while.routinely recouped their investment in a short period and then had little incentive to either repay the loans or run the business.
The nominee directors from the DFIs. who could and should have played a particularly important role. Minority shareholders have sometimes been defrauded by the management undertaking clandestine side deals with the acquirers in the relatively scarce event of corporate takeovers and mergers. . While the Companies Act provides clear instructions for maintaining and updating share registers. Noncompliance with disclosure norms and even the failure of auditor‟s reports to conform to the law attract nominal fines with hardly any punitive action.countries though fell short of those in the USA and other advanced countries. The Institute of Chartered Accountants in India has not been known to take action against erring auditors. They are routinely packed with friends and allies of the promoters and managers. in reality minority shareholders have often suffered from irregularities in share transfers and registrations – deliberate or unintentional. the boards of directors have largely functioned as rubber stamps of the management. Consequently. Boards of directors have been largely ineffective in India in monitoring the actions of management. in flagrant violation of the spirit of corporate law. Sometimes non-voting preferential shares have been used by promoters to channel funds and deprive minority shareholders of their dues. have usually been incompetent or unwilling to step up to the act.
Concerns about corporate governance in India were. All in all therefore. it has played a crucial role in establishing the basic minimum ground rules of corporate conduct in the country.For most of the post-Independence era the Indian equity markets were not liquid or sophisticated enough to exert effective control over the companies. but non-compliance was neither rare nor acted upon. Perhaps the single most important development in the field of corporate governance and investor protection in India has been the establishment of the Securities and Exchange Board of India (SEBI) in 1992 and its gradual empowerment since then. Established primarily to regulate and monitor stock trading. however. minority shareholders and creditors in India remained effectively unprotected in spite of a plethora of laws in the books. Listing requirements of exchanges enforced some transparency. largely triggered by a spate of crises in the early 90‟s – the Hashed Mehta stock market scam of 1992 followed by incidents of companies allotting preferential shares to their promoters at deeply discounted prices as well as those of companies simply disappearing with . 5 Changes since liberalization The years since liberalization have witnessed wide-ranging changes in both laws and regulations driving corporate governance as well as general consciousness about it.
The SEBI committee recommendations have had the maximum impact on changing the corporate governance situation in India. The committee was formed in 1996 and submitted its code in April 1998.investors‟ money. Table 1 provides a comparative view of the recommendations of these important efforts at improving corporate governance in India. These concerns about corporate governance stemming from the corporate scandals as well as opening up to the forces of competition and globalization gave rise to several investigations into the ways to fix the corporate governance situation in India. Later SEBI constituted two committees to look into the issue of corporate governance – the first chaired by Kumar Mangle Birla that submitted its report in early 2000 and the second by Narayana Murthy three years later. One of the first among such endeavors was the CII Code for Desirable Corporate Governance developed by a committee chaired by Rahul Bajaj. . An outline Provided by the CII was given concrete shape in the Birla Committee report of SEBI. The Advisory Group on Corporate Governance of RBI‟s Standing 25 Go swami (2002) Committee on International Financial Standards and Codes also submitted its own Recommendations in 2001. A comparison of the three sets of recommendations in Table 1 reveals the progress in the thinking on the subject of corporate governance in India over the years.
Corporate governance norms should not become just another . They were applied to companies in the BSE 200 and S&P C&X Nifty indices. on March 31.SEBI implemented the recommendations of the Birla Committee through the enactment of Clause 49 of the Listing Agreements. to companies with a paid up capital of Rs. however. as of March 31. Clearly much more needs to be accomplished in the area of compliance. 2002. developing a positive culture and atmosphere of corporate governance is essential is obtaining the desired goals. Consequently. and all newly listed companies. Besides in the area of corporate governance. 2001. The Birla Committee. 10 crore or with a net worth of Rs. The recommendations also show that much of the thrust in Indian corporate governance reform has been on the role and composition of the board of directors and the disclosure laws. 25 crore at any time in the past five years. to other listed companies with a paid up capital of over Rs. 3 crore on March 31. paid much-needed attention to the subject of share transfers which is the Achilles‟ heel of shareholders‟ right in India. The Narayana Murthy committee worked on further refining the rules. 2003. the spirit of the laws and principles is much more important than the letter. Figure 1 shows the frequency of compliance of companies to the different aspects of the corporate governance regulation.
Corporate Governance of Banks the topic Nowhere is proper corporate governance more crucial than for banks and financial institutions.6. the possibility of corruption and diversion of credit of . bank failure owing to unethical or incompetent management action poses a threat not just to the shareholders but to the depositing public and the economy at large. much more difficult for the owners to effectively monitor the funk toiling of bank management. on the Levine (2003) Other hand. Existence of explicit or implicit deposit insurance also reduces the interest of depositors in monitoring bank management activities. therefore. brings in its wake. It is partly for these reasons that prudential norms of banking and close monitoring by the central bank of commercial bank activities are essential for smooth functioning of the banking sector. The very nature of the business makes it extremely easy and tempting for management to alter the risk profile of banks as well as siphon off funds. It is. Given the pivotal role that banks play in the financial and economic system of a developing country. Government control or monitoring of banks. The opaqueness in banking creates considerable information asymmetries between the “insiders” – management – and “outsiders” – owners and creditors. Two main features set banks apart from other business – the level of opaqueness in their functioning and the relatively greater role of government and regulatory agencies in their activities.
jeopardize the financial health of the bank as well as the economy itself. market institutions have been strengthened by government with attempts to infuse greater transparency and liquidity in markets for government securities and other asset markets.Political purposes which may. The reforms have marked a shift from hands-on government control interference to market forces as the dominant paradigm of corporate governance in Indian banks. Earnings. The RBI has moved to a model of governance by prudential norms rather from that of direct interference. Asset quality. in the long run. From 1994. the Board for Financial Supervision (BFS) inspects and monitors banks using the “CAMELS” (Capital adequacy. Liquidity and Systems and controls) approach. Management. even allowing debate about appropriateness of specific regulations among banks. Along with these changes. This market orientation of governance disciplining in banking has been accompanied by a stronger disclosure norms and stress on periodic RBI surveillance. Competition has been encouraged with the issue of licenses to new private banks and more power and flexibility have been granted to the bank management both in directing credit as well as in setting prices. Audit committees in banks have been stipulated .
Rules like no lending to companies who have one or more of a bank‟s directors on their boards are being softened or removed altogether. Nominee directors – from government as well as RBIs – are being gradually phased off with a stress on Boards being more often elected than “appointed from above”. Rural co-operative banks are frequently run by politically powerful families as their personal fiefdoms with little . limiting the possibilities of professional l excellence and opening the possibility of misdirecting credit. Corporate governance in co-operative banks and NBFCs perhaps need the greatest attention from regulators. thus allowing for “related party” transactions for banks. As for old private banks. Greater independence of public sector banks has also been a key feature of the reforms. The need for professional advice in the election of executive directors is increasingly realized. There is increasing emphasis on greater professional representation on bank boards with the expectation that the boards will have the authority and competence to Reddy (2002) summarizes the reforms -era policies for corporate governance in Indian banks. properly manage the banks within the broad prudential norms set by RBI. concentrated ownership remains a widespread characteristic.since 1995.
It is generally believed that the “new” private banks have better and more professional corporate governance systems in place. Corporate Governance and the World Bank The World Bank Report on Corporate Governance recognizes the complexity of the very concept of corporate governance and. The governance framework is there to encourage the efficient use of resources and equally to require accountability for the stewardship of those resources. These principles such as transparency. therefore. Openness is the basis of public confidence in the corporate system and funds will flow to those centers of economic activity. corporations and society. The aim is to align as nearly as possible the interests of individuals. which inspire trust. Corporate governance is concerned with holding the balance between economic and social goals and between individual and community goals. the recent collapse of the Global Trust Bank has seriously challenged that view and spurred serious thinking on.professional involvement and considerable channeling of credit to family businesses. . fairness and responsibility are universal in their application. accountability. The foundation of any structure of corporate governance is disclosure. focuses on the principles on which it is based. However.
Regulators the world over have recognized the vulnerability of depositors to the whims of managerial misadventures in banks and. All other considerations would fall in place once these two are achieved. therefore. Risk taking and management in a less regulated competitive market will have to be done in such a way that investor‟s confidence is not eroded. (ii) Even in a regulated set-up as it was in India prior to 1991. protecting the interests of depositors becomes a matter of paramount importance to banks. Why Corporate Governance in Banks ? “Banks exist because they are willing to take on and manage risks”.4 Besides.Banks deal in people’s funds and should. To sum up. “With the rapid pace of financial innovation and globalization. therefore. have been regulating banks more tightly than other corporate. act as trustees of the depositors. Moreover. the face of banking business is undergoing a sea-change. In other corporate. Banking business is becoming more complex and diversified. the objective of governance in banks should first be protection of depositors‟ interests and then be to “optimize” the shareholders‟ interests. this is not and need not be so for two reasons: (i) The depositors collectively . some big banks in the public sector and a few in the private sector had incurred substantial losses.
Banks deal in people‟s funds and should. therefore. the Bank for International Settlement (BIS)-based Basel Committee on Banking Supervision or came out with regulations were regarding the capital for requirements banks.entrust a very large sum of their hard-earned money to the care of banks.5 times the shareholders‟ stake in banks as early as in March. Regulators the world over have recognized the vulnerability of depositors to the whims of managerial misadventures in banks and. 2001. almost all countries adopted these regulations for their banks. To sum up. the objective of governance in banks should first be protection of depositors‟ interests and then be to “optimize” the shareholders‟ interests. BASEL COMMITTEE ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE In 1988. in due course. the depositor‟s contribution was well over 15. (ii) The depositors are very large in number and are scattered and have little say in the administration of bank. Although these essentially intended internationally operating banks. It is found that in India. act as trustees of the depositors. therefore. All other considerations would fall in place once these two are achieved. have been regulating banks more tightly than other corporate. .
particularly following the East Asian crisis and the collapse of certain hedge funds in New York which threatened to bring down banking systems of the US and the developed world. The Committee's recommendations were not mandatory. The crux of the Basel I requirements is the assignment of risk weights for different assets in a bank‟s book and aggregating the risk-weighted assets of which 8 percent was recommended as the capital of the bank. Run the day-to-day operations of business. Consider the interests of recognized stakeholders. but the world's central banks speeded up the process of compliance. . corporate governance involves the manner in which the business and affairs of individual institutions are governed by their boards of directors and senior management affecting how banks Set corporate objectives (including generating economic returns to owners). From a banking industry perspective. India adopted Basel I norms in 1992 closely following the inception of economic reforms.
it would be difficult for stakeholders to make management accountable. Basel Committee insisted banks to establish accountability for executing these strategies. 19998. and in compliance with applicable laws and regulations. The Committee felt that it was the responsibility of the banking supervisors to ensure that there was effective corporate governance in the banking industry. Sound corporate governance could also contribute to a collaborative working relationship between bank managements and bank supervisors. Supervisory experience underscores the need for having appropriate accountability and checks and balances within each bank to ensure sound corporate governance. Align corporate activities and behavior with the expectation that banks will operate in a safe and sound manner. Unless there is transparency of information related to decisions and actions. which in turn would lead to effective and more meaningful supervision. and Protect the interests of depositors. Basel Committee published a paper on Corporate Governance for Banking Organizations in September. .
The clear assignment of responsibilities and decision-making authorities. corporate governance also includes in its ambit the manner in which their boards of directors govern the business and affairs of individual institutions and their functional relationship with senior management. .From the perspective of banking industry. senior management and the auditors. where the importance of corporate governance has been emphasized. The Basel Committee has also issued several papers on specific topics. Establishment of a mechanism for the interaction and cooperation among the board of directors. A well-articulated corporate strategy against which the success of the overall enterprise and the contribution of individuals can be measured. codes of conduct and other standards of appropriate behavior and the system used to ensure compliance with them. incorporating a hierarchy of required approvals from individuals to the board of directors. These papers have highlighted the fact that strategies and techniques that are basic to sound corporate governance include: The corporate values.
promotion and other recognition. and Appropriate information flows internally and to the public.Strong internal control systems. and other checks and balances Special monitoring of risk exposures where conflicts of interest are likely to be particularly great. or key decision-makers within the firm (e. day- to-day running of the Direct line supervision of different business areas. large shareholders. independent of business lines. traders). senior management. including business relationships with borrowers affiliated with the bank. including internal and external audit functions. The financial and managerial incentives to act in an appropriate manner offered to senior management. business line management and employees in the form of compensation. risk management functions. There are four important forms of oversight that should be included in the organizational structure of any bank in order to ensure appropriate checks and balances: Oversight by the board of directors or supervisory board. Oversight by individuals not involved in the various business areas. and .g.
Fourth. banks have an overwhelmingly dominant position in developing the economy‟s financial system. and are extremely important engines of growth. For several reasons. banks in India are the most significant source of finance for a majority of firms in Indian industry. India has recently liberalized its banking system through privatization. as the country‟s financial markets are underdeveloped. Third. Corporate governance in banks has assumed importance in India post-1991 reforms because competition compelled banks to improve their performance . Corporate Governance in Indian Banks Although the subject of corporate governance has received a lot of attention in recent times in India. Second. banks are also the channels through which the country‟s savings are collected and used for investments. Independent risk management and audit and functions. disinvestment and has reduced the role of economic regulation and consequently obtained greater autonomy and freedom with regard to managers of banks have running of banks. corporate governance issues and practices by Indian banks has received only a scanty notice. First.
companies could call upon the . Composition of Boards Boards should be more contemporarily professional by inducting technical and specially qualified personnel. will be of interest.. companies could call upon the candidates for Directorship to furnish necessary information by way of self-declaration.Directors should fulfill certain “fit and proper” norms. There should be a blend of “historical skill” set and “new skill” set. experience and track record.. To ensure this. etc. . known as the Ganguly Group.. verification reports from market. i. credit recovery etc. experience and track record. viz. risk management.. formal qualification. To ensure this. viz. technology and systems.. formal qualification.Directors should fulfill certain “fit and proper” norms. strategic planning. skills such as marketing. treasury operations. Ganguly Committee’s Recommendations To introduce corporate governance practices in the banking sector the recommendations of the Working Group of Directors of Banks Financial Institutions.e.
candidates for Directorship to furnish necessary information by way of selfdeclaration. verification reports from market. . that he / she should not be a member of Parliament / State Legislatures etc. etc. may be adopted for private sector banks also. The banks may enter into a “Deed of Covenant” with every non-Executive Director. The Reserve Bank of India (RBI) also might compile a list of eligible candidates. Need-based training should be imparted to the Directors to equip them govern the banks properly.. Selection of Directors could be done by a nomination committee of the Board. delineating his/her responsibilities and making him/her abide by them. Certain criteria adopted for public sector banks such as the age of Director being between 35 and 65.
their qualifications. That generally the CEO is not the chairman. and that most directors hold other director positions. All listed Banks were audited by Big Four audit firms. The three year comparison demonstrates that the high level of corporate governance exhibited by the 12 listed banks in Hong Kong from 2004 to 2006 provides a possible explanation to the success of the region in terms of being a significant international financial centre. This paper explores the boards of Directors behind the 12 listed Banks on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange. in particular of its popularity within the Banking industry for the range of services it provides. type of directors in terms of independence. that there is a mixture of independent and executive directors. and the service providers themselves.Review of Literature Hong Kong is known for its financial sector significance. that some directors are highly educated in terms of holding masters or doctorate degrees. Through the use of archival data over a three year period. . It researches the number of directors on the boards. outside directorships held and the auditors of the financial statements. this paper finds that overall listed Banks in Hong Kong exhibit good corporate governance.
g. a doctor is giving prescription to the patient or a professor is giving lecture in the classroom. . If anybody is engaged in providing physical or mental service e. they all have the need of monetary and non – monetary perks. In the same way . By this research we tried to provide the basis to the retailers so that they can design their functionality and services in that way so that the customer of the retail organization will be loyal and become the permanent customer to the organization. The review on Corporate governance shown that marketing researchers must first come to terms with the meaning of Corporate governance before they can begin to understand its role in more comprehensive.Need / Rationale of the Study There is always a need behind to perform the things. a researcher conduct a research in order to dig out some kind of specific knowledge which can help in the advancement of normal life. – an accountant is preparing accounts for company. explanatory models of corporate culture and employee behavior. The study is an attempt to analyze the corporate governance in banking sector.
To know the dependence of the corporate governance. 2. To find out the mechanism & control of corporate governance.OBJECTIVES 1. Studying the norms & regulatory framework regarding corporate governance. Presenting overall picture of corporate governance in banking sector. 4. 6. 3. To find out whether banks really follows the corporate governance. To find out the systematic problems of corporate governance. 5. .
The research process designs the way of conducting research in conclusive and statistical manner. Hence this framework for research is known as the research design. “A research design is simply the frame work or plan for a study that is used as a guide in collecting and analyzing the data. which would enable the company to take rational decisions regarding further process.Research Methodology RESEARCH DESIGN: A Research project always is framed in a specific framework or blueprint of research for the problem. Sampling Technique: Convenient sampling technique Sampling Size: 150 Respondents was the sample size. Sampling Element: Individual respondent was the sampling element. The Study The study was exploratory in nature with survey had been used as method for collecting data to complete the study 2. .ICICI. Sampling Frame: All the Employees S. It is blue print that is followed in completing a research study”.I. Sampling Design Population: All the Bank employees of Gwalior region.B. 2. The data observation is tabled and the results are in the form of percentage. This is because the sample size is taken large and techniques adopted were for mass data. PNB.HDFC.
. Item to total correlation: To check the internal consistency of the questionnaires. Reliability test: To check the reliability of the questionnaires Factor Analysis: To find out the underlying factors in the questionnaires.2. 2.4 Tools Used for Data analysis. Tools Used for Data Collection Self-designed questionnaire was used to collect the data with the Likert type scale Which consist nominal ranking of 1-5 where 1 represented minimum agreement and 5 represented the maximum agreement with the statement.
Results & Discussions 3. The factors having item to total correlation lower than the critical value were declared as inconsistent and dropped from the questionnaire.1 Showing Item to Total Correlations for the Measure Evaluating S. Under this co-relation of every item with total was measured and the computed value was compared with standard value (0..471462 Consistent Accepted . Table 3.490203 Consistency Accepted/dr opped Accepted 1 Bank follow the corporate governance Consistent 2 Are you satisfy with the corporate governance culture in your bank 0. Items Computed correlation value 0.15915 for 150 respondents). No. Consistency Measure Consistency Measure (Public banks) Consistency of all the factors in the questionnaires was checked through item to total co-relation.
263229 Consistent Accepted 5 Find yourself comfortable with the corporate governance concept? 0.392758 Consistent Accepted 7 it helpful in customer 0.3 Is the performance of bank is depend upon the corporate? 0.59803 Consistent Accepted governance 4 The bank follows the corporate governance provisions & Recommendations according to Reserve Bank of India? 0.488848 Consistent Accepted .392254 satisfaction? Consistent Accepted 8 it helpful in business expansion? 0.505281 Consistent Accepted 9 Routine decisions influenced by the top management? 0.612752 Consistent Accepted 6 it quite helpful in profit maximization 0.
460875 Consistent Accepted 16 0.430434 Consistent Accepted 12 0.520626 healthy is this only a show-case thing? Consistent Accepted 14 Favor of the separate customer relationship management wing in your bank? 0.464085 Consistent Accepted .532415 Consistent Accepted 15 Effect of corporate governance on customer loyalty satisfied with the pay scale given by the bank 0.10 employees aware or follow the guidelines given by top management satisfied with the work of your recovery agent organization follow the RBI norms regarding recover 0.501642 Consistent Accepted 11 0.476715 Consistent Accepted 13 Competition should be 0.434474 Consistent Accepted 17 satisfied with the organization culture in your bank 0.
working hour 0. 0. Does the organization have any kind of mechanism for rotating board members? Does the organization undertake a review to ensure that actions decided at meetings have been taken? Does the company disclose the remuneration policy in the annual report? 0. Reward system 0.472226 Consistent Accepted 25. promotion policy 0. 0.489912 Consistent Accepted 24.458466 Consistent Accepted 20. Organization Climate of the bank 0.494835 Consistent Accepted 23.50712 Consistent Accepted 21.472471 Consistent Accepted 22.516428 Consistent Accepted . transfer policy 0.18.443414 Consistent Accepted 19.
15915 for 150 respondents.No. If the computed value is found less.395201 Accepted 3 Is the performance of bank is depend upon the corporate? Consistent 0.2 Showing Item to Total Correlations for the Measure Evaluating S.Consistency Measure (Private Banks) Firstly consistency of all the factors in the questionnaires was checked through item to total co-relation. then whole factor/statement is dropped and will be termed as inconsistent.521474 Accepted . Table 3.46276 Consistency Accepted/droppe d 1 Bank follow the corporate governance Consistent Accepted 2 Are you satisfy with the corporate governance culture in your bank Consistent 0. Under this co-relation of every item with total is measured and the computed value is compared with standard value 0. Items Computed correlation value 0.447773 Accepted governance 4 The bank follows the corporate governance provisions & Recommendations according to Reserve Bank of India Consistent 0.
594799 Accepted 10 employees aware or follow the guidelines given by top management satisfied with the work of your recovery agent 0.5 Find yourself comfortable with the corporate governance concept 0.365733 Consistent Accepted 8 it helpful expansion in business 0. 0.548319 Consistent Accepted 9 Routine decisions influenced by the top management Consistent 0.487409 Consistent Accepted 12 organization follow the RBI norms regarding recover 0.585401 Consistent Accepted . Competition should be healthy is this only a showcase thing Favor of the separate customer relationship management wing in your bank 0.567516 Consistent Accepted 7 0.478819 Consistent Accepted 6 it quite helpful in profit maximization It helpful in customer satisfaction? 0.515125 Consistent Accepted 13.58327 Consistent Accepted 14.701421 Consistent Accepted 11 0.
548319 Consistent Accepted 16. Does the company disclose the remuneration policy in the annual report? 0. satisfied with the organization culture in your bank 0.515125 Consistent Accepted 21.701421 Consistent Accepted 19. Effect of governance on loyalty corporate customer 0. satisfied with the pay scale given by the bank 0. Does the organization have any kind of mechanism for rotating board members? Does the organization undertake a review to ensure that actions decided at meetings have been taken? 0.585401 Consistent Accepted .567516 Consistent Accepted 25.15. promotion policy 0.447773 Consistent Accepted 23.58327 Consistent Accepted 22.594799 Consistent Accepted 18. 0. transfer policy 0. working hour 0.52781 Consistent Accepted 20.521474 Consistent Accepted 24. Reward system 0.
3 Showing Alpha Reliability Statistics for Public banks Reliability Statistics Reliability Statis tics Cronbac h's A lpha .4 Showing Alpha Reliability Statistics for private banks Reliability Statistics Reliability Statis tics Cronbac h's A lpha . so all the items in the questionnaire are highly reliable. reliability value is quite higher than the standard value. .900 N of Items 25 It is considered that the reliability value more than 0.858 N of Items 25 Table 3. Reliability test using SPSS software and the reliability test measures are given below: Table 3.7 is good and it can be seen that in both statistics.Reliability Measure Cranach alpha methods have been applied to calculate reliability of all items in the questionnaire.
21.2.owing Factor Analysis for public bank Variables converged Factor name 1.680 . Table 3.775 20 how are promotion policy? .Factor Analysis (public banks) Factor Analysis for public hospital The raw scores of 25 items were subjected to factor analysis to find out the factors that contribute towards „public Bank‟.20.5 Sh. After factor analysis 8 factors were identified.3 1 Bank follow the corporate governance 2 Are you satisfy with the corporate governance culture in your bank? 3 Is the performance of bank is depending upon the corporate governance? Loading .591.724 21 how are transfer policy? .643 .780 .
8 7 Is it helpful in customer satisfaction? .627 customer loyalty? 184.108.40.2068 8 Is it helpful in business expansion? .14 12 Does your organization follow the RBI norms regarding recovery? 13 Competition should be healthy is this only a show-case thing? .12.598 14 Are you in favor of the separate .13.746 the top management? .699 9 Are your routine decisions influenced by .627 .593 customer relationship management wing in your bank? 15 Effect of corporate governance on .
23.427 .25 5 Do you find yourself comfortable with the .709 24 Does the organization undertake a review to ensure that actions decided at meetings have been taken? 220.127.116.11 4 How much the bank follows the corporate .741 working hours? .816 .22. Does the organization have any kind of mechanism for rotating board members? . 22.430 governance provisions & Recommendations according to Reserve Bank of India? 10 Are your employees aware or follow the guidelines given by top management? 11 Are you satisfied with the work of your recovery agents? .543 23.718 5.505 corporate governance concept? 25 Does the company disclose the remuneration policy in the annual report? 4.502 .779 How much you satisfied organization culture in your bank? 17 19 with the .19 . How is Reward system? .
736 .18 16 How much you satisfied with the pay .745 scale given by the bank? 18 Organization Climate of the bank? .16.
After factor analysis 9 factors were identified.918 15 Effect of corporate governance on customer loyalty? .18.6 Showing Factor Analysis for Private bank Variables converged Factor name 10.8.15 Loading 8 Is it helpful in business expansion? . Table 3.17.918 18 Organization Climate of the bank? .Factor Analysis for private banks The raw scores of 25 items were subjected to factor analysis to find out the factors that contribute towards „private bank‟.918 .594 10 Are your employees aware or follow the guidelines given by top management? .594 17 How much you satisfied with the organization culture in your bank? .
588 4 How much the bank follows the corporate governance provisions & Recommendations according to Reserve Bank of India? .9.875 management? 16 How much you satisfied with the pay scale .2 2 Are you satisfied with the corporate governance culture in your bank? .7 7 Is it helpful in customer satisfaction? .16.875 given by the bank? 3.22 3 Is the performance of bank is depending upon the corporate governance? .932 23 Does the organization have any kind of mechanism for rotating board members? .932 .482 9 Are your routine decisions influenced by the top .4.951 22 how are Reward system? 951 23.
884 11.948 18.104.22.1681 14 Are you in favor of the separate customer relationship management wing in your bank? .922 24 Does the organization undertake a review to ensure that actions decided at meetings have been taken? 14.919 .19 11 Are you satisfied with the work of your recovery agents? 19 working hours? .451 corporate governance concept? 12 Does your organization follow the RBI .914 .6 6 Is it quite helpful in profit maximization? .5 5 Do you find yourself comfortable with the .884 25 Does the company disclose the remuneration policy in the annual report? .12.948 norms regarding recovery? 20 how are promotion policy .922 .1 1 Are your governance? bank follows the corporate .
21.860 only a show-case thing? 21 how are transfer policy? . 1.Test Z Test was applied for evaluate the differences between individual cell of research. If the value of Z less then than the standard value. Table 3.8 Showing summary of Z-Test Z Test Value of Z Public / Private Banks 0.321512 Insignificant .13 13 Competition should be healthy is this .860 Z.96 at 5 % level of significance the null hypothesis is accepted.
Ho1: There is a significant difference between the services of public & private Banks. .
The null hypothesis has been rejected because the Z test value (1.573498) is below the cut off value (1.96 at 5% level of significance). Therefore we can say that there is difference between the services of public & private banks
The project encountered many limitations. Inspire of the above care has been taken the results are available and are true to facts.
1. Banks were busy with their closing statements; hence time was a crucial factor.
2. Policy matters are such that banker do not give the thrust data.
3. All information collected is the first hand collection and hence may have some limiting factors.
4. Time was a major constraint in completing the project. As the project was very vast and there was paucity of time.
5. This is a concept based project, so it is very difficult to do the comparative study.
Proposed Plan of Study
Chapter No. 1 – Introduction to the topic. Chapter No. 2 – Introduction to the Organization and Implementing bodies. Chapter No. 3- Review of Literature. Chapter No. 4- Use and importance of the study. i. Conceptual Framework for analysis.
ii. Scope of the study iii. Aims and objectives Chapter No. 5- Research Methodology. Chapter No. 6- Data analysis and Results/ Findings. Chapter No.7 – Conclusion, Recommendation, Suggestions and Scope for further research.
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5 Do you find yourself comfortable with the corporate governance concept?      Q.QUESTIONNAIRE Q. its helpful in profit maximization?      .3 Is the performance of bank is depend upon the corporate governance?      Q.4 How much the bank follows the corporate governance provisions & Recommendations according to Reserve Bank of India?      Q.1 Are your bank follow the corporate governance?      Q.2 Are you satisfied with the corporate governance culture in your bank?      Q.
7 Is it helpful in customer satisfaction?      Q.8 Is it helpful in business expansion?      Q.10 Are your employees aware or follow the guidelines given by top management?      Q.13 Competition should be healthy is this only a show-case thing?      .Q.11 Are you satisfied with the work of your recovery agents?      Q.9 Are your routine decisions influenced by the top management?      Q.12 Does your organization follow the RBI norms regarding recovery?      Q.
14 Are you in favor of the separate customer relationship management wing in your bank?      Q.16 How much you satisfied with the pay scale given by the bank?      Q.Q.17 How much you satisfied with the organization culture in your bank?      Q.18 Organization Climate of the bank?      Q.15 Effect of corporate governance on customer loyalty?      Q.19 working hours?      .
20 how are Promotion policy?      Q.23 does the organization have any kind of mechanism for rotating board members?      Q.25 Does the company disclose the remuneration policy in the annual report?      .21 how are transfer policy?      Q.22 how are Reward system?      Q.]Q.24 does the organization undertake a review to ensure that actions decided at meetings have been taken?      Q.