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NPS-56-86-O0l

U)IN

CID NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

AIR WEAPON SYSTEMS IN THE THIRD WORLD:
A COMBAT POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT TECHNIQUE

I

Christopher L. Christon
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF
June 1986
C>

Naval Postgraduate School
Monterev. California

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Approved for public release;

Preoared for:

distribution unlimiited

HO U'SAF/Assistant Chief of Stalf Ilnte!:
Director of Estimates
Room 4A882
Pentagon
i3 3C
Washington, DC

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NAVAL POSTGRADUATE SCHOOL
Monterey, California

Rear Admiral R. H. Shumaker
Superintendent

David A. Schrady
Provost

The work reported herein was supported by HQ USAF/ Assistant Chief of
Staff Intelligence, Director of Estimates, Room 4A882, Pentagon, Washington,
D.C. The reproduction of all or part of this report is authorized.

Christopher L. Christon
Lieutenant Colonel, USAF

Reviewed by:

Released by:
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Kneale T. Marshall
Chairman
Department of National
Security Affairs

Dean of Information and Poli,;y
Sciences

AIR WEAPON SYSTEMS IN THE THIRD WORLD
A COMBAT POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT TECHN!QUE

Christopher L. Christon, Lieutenant Colonel, UJSAF
Department of National Security AVfairs
Naval Postearaduate Schiobi
Mlonterey, Caliornia

June 1986

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

i,,

Security assistance to the Third World will remain a vibrant topic in the American political dialogue for
the foreseeable future.

While specific issues are fraught with political, economic, ethical, anu emotional

overtones, analysis of the military dimension is inseparable from the decision making process.

[lie mill-

tary analyst's charter is to provide decision makers with comprehensive assessments of arms transfer alternatives, probing their contributions to recipient force structure modernization and forecasting their
impacts on regional military stability.
In this pursuit. some form of quantitative analysis is inescapable, be it as simple as the tabulation of
military inventories or as complex as a sophisticated war gaming model.

No matter the complcxit\ of the

technique employed, its processes must be transparent to the decision maker and its content malleable to
his priorites and perceptions. At the same time, the teclmique must be slaved to the objectives and coinponents of the analytical question, not vice versa. To assist arms transfer policy making, the assessment
of potential capabilities to conduct definable operations ina specific environment is vital

To do less is to

leave critical stones unturned.
Simple tabular tcchniques have a place in the panoply of nilitary analysis, but their results can rarely
be translated into militarily relevant conclusions. The systematized aggregation of performance and force
propagation characteristics is an elemental attribute of any model which purports to assess combat capabthties. The objective of this research effort has been to develop a methodology Mich captures these
facets and aggregates them according to their relative utilities in generating potential combat outputs.
Lsing air weapon systems (125 aircraft) and the Middle Last North African regon (22 coUilrics) as a
developmental test bed, the study began by evaluating the assets and liabilities of cai hcr accrc:tioual~
methodologes.

Factor analysis stood out because of its ability to consolidate multiple variables into

conimon attribute perlormancc mea urcs. I lowcvcr, its conibiriational logic is hapha/ard M hlen

atplied
,t

the weapon s.stcm level, and its output measures are not lecgitiiate candidates for igregatioi at the force
leel.
trativekl

%lulti-attnbute utility technique produces a judoncnit bascd combinaional matrix but is adtinilsun wcildl, and naturally applicable only to ratio leel data.

Ifl]tnic dcclo)pCd b
ti

li

.\il Iic N iCiCcS ( orporatioi li

Ilie \cieahtcd linear acratior

Itch-

Lporatcs expert judglment ind prokess data

meiasuremenrit level but cannot accoinimodate multi-variable attributes aid is iicni,lti\c to pcr-

lornnce variations within broadl

dcined

ubs,,\steln caicittrucs.

\\liit ccr il sirenudilis or \weakncCsses,

eadih rnctlodologN demlontratcd the crutl.alit\ of OIld alld Cemrrirchcinisi c data inptu It)
the productiol of
m:anmgfal results.
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rc- J . HlIC rsults. Variables described b threshold from which otlier in t Jl. this minimalist version of the factor analysis mcthodology purged the indices ol cvtrtlwous %ariable influences. Data collection was accomplished using open source data. air weapon system performance and force propagation potential. Each subcomponent thus identified was further divided into the performance attributes which contribute to its operation. In some instances. [actor anal sis was employed to c: -ate relative index values for attributes described by multiple variables. Certain artifical constraints were cstabfished to expedite the process.t l - . the air weapon system performance group included a family of factors hich relate the subsystems in terms of configuration and combat utility. and sortie generation subcomponents were identified." estimated using the most accurate technique which could be supported..re. they wer. a matrix was developed the key elements of which constitute the components implicated in assessing force air combat capability. to elude their distorting. . The importance of intangible factors such as operator proficiency and C31 support was acknowledged. but their consideration deferred to other research efforts. national air combat inventories were anchored with known data from the past two years and projected out to 199(1. Since the methodology aimed to support the development of future arms transfer policies. While the possible inaccuracies are lamentable.tact norinal valuc. inventory. Two essential elements. They were divided into the subcomponents which define their basic dimensions. reversing the process followed in some other research eff-:is... Only after an analytical structure had been articulated and supporting data collected was a data reduction scheme devised. influcnces but were reserxed for introduction . Along with the various categories of subsystem.. Ratio properties were restored to the Indices through the utili/ation of a /Vro-\il Iid control case the tactor score for hich constituted a could be scaled. were synthesized statistically and recast as relational variable vlues to be employed during the weapon system combinational phase.. they are not fatal to the evaluation technique itself and can easily be revised in subsequent applications.corcN iii - proccs... were positioned at the apex of the framework. Only fixed wing aircraft with direct combat application in recent or future Middle Eastern combat scenarios were considered. A unique data set was collected to determine the relative utilities of attributes and subsystems in definable combat roles.. specific data values are consequently open to challenge... A panel of 25 fighter experts familiar with Middle Eastern air operations was polled to ascertain their views on lhe relationships which obtain among attributes and subsystems in four different mission areas. When data were unavailable. mission allocation.n the ae.- - - ~ - ~ -- %'. These -were in turn subdivided into the variables L which describe those attributes. On the force propagation side of the ledger. were not included in lie Lactotr probhem'.. larezcted at th attribute level. To guide the data collection process.

-rim- . To illustrate the impact of personnel force quality on sortie generation. it.rhlloph%. To further exercise the model. gauging their contribution to force capabilities under vtn iI'. a phased anal 'is Af a specific arms transfer proposal (advanced air defense lighters for Jordan) was conducted.itii specific weapon system alternatives. and anal.1il 11apo prolemi I ' ItI tre kll mluc. for omc ctitic. National aircraft inventories. with the computations not only considering relative utility values but also conforming to specific air weapon system configurations. its general application is not recommended. Solely rel\me on nkirilaiticd d.1'. hcnchts. Since the variables on which the support index was predicated are considered 'soft' surrogates for personnel quality. Ihe product is a set of relative combat potential scores (Air Combat Potential Units) for each of the 125 air weapon systems in whatever mission roles were appropriate.1. o prLesent model has its drawback- . I he mrlodel showed itself to be responsive to the type of modifications a decision maker might stipulate iII evah1Iti.e the composition.d l traimmaomk. Force propagation values were computed in a somewhat different fashion..l .The computational phase itself was adapted with a few major variations from the linear equations developed by The Analytic Sciences Corporation.. conditions. and maintenance resources were considered in a series of equations which computed the sortie generation potential for each possessed air weapon system in those roles to which it would likely be committed. air weapon system mission potential and national force propagation potential were mated to produce an estimate of a country's air combat potential in four mission roles on a single day of 11\ i. An analogous procedure was followed at the subcomponent and component levels. .regated the cumulative ellccts of s%stomI and force subcomponents on specific mission outputs.ta -orr. [he results of the ag. In the ultimnate computational step.. an additional force level factor. aid liabilities of air ... the relative support index. mission allocations.. ctc orc. Attribute scores were combined in accordance with their relative air combat utilities in each mission area. was also injected into select force propagation equations. Its undml\ ru tionid sthimc are cextendable to other regions. operational availability rates.ereation phase were reviewed to determine their efficacy both at the air wcapon" sxstem and national force levels The results conformed to intuitive assessments and poipanatly deiionstrated the desirability of employing a analytical scheme which agg.%capomn \ stcin ualv and . Ilowever. zing their impact on regional military balances under ditfring conflict scenarios [lie air combat potential aggregation methodology proposCed in this studY is1.r- t11 . profound influence testifies to the requirement for such intangiblcs to bc considered objectively or subjectively in force propagation and air combat analysis.rialnek. Expert assigned values for nominally described variables were used to modify the raw attribute scores extracted from the data reduction phase.t the force and rceronal levels. I- iiix ld- . ard coihin. combining subsystem attributes.a powiC ful and 1tL'Iblc mechanism with Mich to anal'. The process was intiated at the bottom of the anatical ladder.. maintenance requirements.

Creation of a responsive micro-based system iseminently feasible but requires additional developmental effort. Reliable mathmatical representations might not prove possible.ables had to be estimated. but it does provide the decision maker with finely textured and responsive static indicators of individual weapon system and force potential. a classified data base could be easily created and expanded to include additional aircraft. the methodology developed in this " research effort represents a productive vehicle for intelligence community participation in the security assis:ance policy development process. Integration of combat relevant intanibles is a similarly complex challenge. and the ground air defense environment were not considered in the prototype. Each of these liabilities is surmountable and represents fertile ground for additional effort within the intelligence community. The air weapon system potential model is not a predictor of combat outcomes. particularly in force level calculations. With the enhancements described above. subsytems. Consequent inaccuracies were inevitable. but the influences of operator proficiency and the like can be reasonably assessed by weapon system and regional experts and applied subjectively in interpreting model output. Finally. Utilizing the methodoligical framework and procedures. These elements need to be introduced in a fully proficient model or considered in modifying its results. the prototype as currently configured is not amenable to 'user-friendly' mi cro-computer processing. Analytical subsets addressing elements of the ground air defense environment could also be introduced into the model relatively painlessly. and regions. The linear combinational form used N% to aggregate values at each step in the process fails to capture the synergy among subcomponcnts. Of greater complexity is the development of algorithms which capture the synergy among system and force components. Unquestionably vital factors such as opcrator proficiency. One possibility is to attempt adaptation of exiting air combat simulations to define an alternative non-linear aggregational scheme. C 3 1 support. These indicators are essential points of departure in evaluating the military dimension of security assistance options. - V - U .

The resultant methodological scheme.rq -II PREFACE This technical note was prepared under the auspices of the Director of Central Intelligence s Exceptional Intefhgence Analyst Progam. In that liit.01..e . does not meet all of the goals oriinally set out for it. Most significantly.dinie the pprtu111\ t. detailed in this techical report. .c lirh . From the outset. if not its content. ' - . I IQ 1\SAl. K colleaaes assessing a variety of air threats and dcvelopments. . my long-standing conviction is that policy development and intellience anal. dA\ es much more deeply into the intricacies of air combat potcntial assessment than had been originally contemplated and than is available in current assessment systems. . nor are the economic and security advantaes and liabilities inherent in the process considered. Owing to a variety of factors.1- l\-t myself.Ili intelli ence tool.on\.il.-- lI. That assumption proved fallacious and caused a reorientation in study objectives. and most of the dicUi. These omissions notwvithstanding. I also believe the methodoloical structuie. not the least of which was my own limited expertise.\s ai an ai otM iti . the proposed mcthodolou. it was recogized that the essential cog in the alalytical wheel was the methodology which portrayed the effects of military equipment transfers on recipient combat capabilities and regional stability. 1.i' are inextricably meshed. . to the Assistant Chief of' Stall Intcllicncc. the political dimension of United States' arms transtoer policy toward the Middle East is not addresscd. It had been assumed that existing analytical methodologies would he sulicient to the task. the field of study was furtlher narrowed to air weapon systems. I trust this benefit will compensate [or the aforementioned analytical lapses.' . I lie develop- ment of a responsive mechanism to support future decision making emerged as a more compcling challenge than charting the historical evolution of Middle Iastern air combat capabilities. I would like to express my warmest thanks to the InItelligence (Coniniuiit%Saftor project. . It was originally conceived as a wide-gauged historical treatment of arms transfers to tile Persian Gulf Southwest Asian region. " ". the findings of which could serve as a basc for future forecasting. -- . revolve around its viability in that role. the proposed methodology constitutes one aniong nai\ tools intelligence analysts can emplox in assisting arms transfer decLision makers. . The temporal emphasis also changed as the study evolved. vi - -. l)evelopnert of a model to index and aggregate combat potential became the focal point of the research etfort. While some might consequently question its pertinence . Readers Aill note the methodology is cast as a policy assitance model. fOr allowine roe the' - i -'.. cll bc prolitabl% iplh.

J. Gibson and his staff at the Northrop Corporation. Edward Laurance of the Depa tment of National Security Affairs who initially inspired the project and channelled its course: to Colonel Jack L. William Vogt of I he . )irectorate of Estimates. Joyce Mullen of Third Point Systems Corporation. Despite the profound impact these individuals and many like them have had on the conceptualitation and preparation of this report.\nalktic Sciences Corporation.I . Several non-government entities also helped me over rough spots in the research and were particularly gracious in sharing perceptions and methodological concepts. or the United States Government. the United States Air Force.p__ it. and to the Naval Postgraduate School for providing a most hospitable research venue. E. the Ilntellicence Community Stall'. and Dr. Mr. who served as a most understanding and efficient project manager: to Lieutenant Colonel Richard Fornev of the Department of National Security Affairs who provided consistent technical and moral support: to Colonel John Garrison whose counsel on ams transter issues and practices was invaluable: and to Colonel Michael (Nort) Nelson who served as my mentor in sorting through and consolidating air weapon system performance attributes. Iloulgate. 'Ihcse include Mr. Ronald Sherwin and Ms. I IQ USAF. These are my responsibility alone. I &. Special personal thanks are due Dr. I have undoubtedly included some misperceptions or technical errors in the final version. the Department of Defense. The views expressed in this report are those of the author and do not represent the official position of the Naval Postgraduate School.

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.... . .. ... . .. . . . ...... Torin< FLtor Scors. . - ... .. ......... . .... ......."tlits 1 heor . ...... . . ... .. .... ........... .......... .... . . ...... .... .... ... . . . .... . .. ..... ....... .. . .... .. .. ...... . Iapler 3: \ ariable Selection .. ... .. .... ...... ....r ~ r .... ......... .. . ..... ..... .. ..... .Militari' Anal'sis .. . ... . .. . . . ... . ...... .. ... .... ... ... . .... . .. .. .. .. .. .. F ........ .. .. ......1:11 ) I. ...... . ... . ..... .. .. . . . . ..... . ..... .. . .libcornponcnts IId l tribtes . I'o -rade or Not To I rade ........ .... .... ... . . . ...... .. ......... .. . ..... . .......... . .. .... . . ... . ...... 2 .. ... . . .. .... T. . ... ........ iN ...... . Chapter 2: M ethodologies Reiiew . ... . ...... ..... . . ... .. .... ... . . .... .. . ......... .. ...... ............ .. . .. ... I)c sc n p tio n .. .. .... . . .. .... . . . ..... ........ .. .... .. ..... . ........ 'i " V.. ... . ... Ifle Role of Military Analysis ... . . .. ....... ..... .. . .... ....... .. ... . ....... . .. . .. .. ... . ... . . ........ ........ ..... ....... . . .. ..... ..... ...... .. . .. . ... . Principles of .... . .. ..... . . . ... ..... . .. ... . . . . ... . . 22 " . .. ... . .. ...... . ...... . . ... . ........ .. ..... . - r ... .... . ...' C O l \ r \\ mp........ .......... .. I im ita tio n s . . 1I : I r\%Im lb"LI Ito...... .. tio ASUI ( )R \1 Summ ietIhi dolo 'ics Sum mary ... ......cs.. ... .......'- - - - - - - - ..... . . I ... .. .. . ...r.. Air Weapons Systems .. ... ............ .... \ppl . ..... ...... .... . .I In tro du c tio n .. ...... .. ...... ...... .......7W7WVWVU'V.......... .. ....... ........ . ..... .... . .. . ... .... ... . .. ........... . .......... ... . ....... ... .. ...... ... . . . . .. . (cneral . Ii.. ... .. .......... ... . ....S( tI() RN Force \1odcFilization Model .... ....I . ... ... i2 I ... . . \pplic Itllol.. .. .. ..... . .. .... .. .. ... . ... .. ...\re:t \c~mi~tp mms.. 31 ... . ... Dltcsripton ... .. .. ..... .. . .. .. .. ...nalysis and Arms Transfer Policv... . . . ... .. ... CONTENTS Execu tive Sum mar .... . ............ . .. I I 2 . ........ ... ... ... .... ... -........22 \i lti.... . ...... .. .. .... Chapter I: Arms to the Third World . F acto r Sco res . . .. ..... ..... -. ..\ttribute I'tility lcchnique Summ 'a ... . ..... . ..... .... . .... .. ...... . . ..... ........ ... 'ti. . . .. .. .. .. . .. ........ ..... . ... .. ... 'tractm . .. .......... .. .. ... ................. ... ... .. .. .. I actor \nalv/m....... . ... .... . ..... . ...... .... .. .. . . . . . ir'l. .. . ... ... f.. . . ... ....... . . .... . . ... ... ... M ulti tri o u c I.. ....... .. ... ... . ..... .. ....... .. .. . C o u ntin I' D o llairs ....... .. .... . .......... ... ..... ... ........ ......ii .. .( [ilt. Comu tin eans. .. . . . .... ..... .. . ...... .... .. ... r . Research Methodology ' ... . ... ..... . . .. . F -icto rs .. ........ ... .... . ... .n S' 'tcmn '. .... . . .. . . ... ... . ... ... .. ....... ...... . r.... ... .......... ... . . . ... ro .. ... .. ..- ...Al\l pr m N.. . ... ...... . .... ..... .. . ........ . ... . . F acto r a h sis ... . I i i ..... . . ()rianization.... ... I ct In in". ..... .... . . . ........... ... .. ... .. . ... ... .. . .. .. ...... ..... ..... Ccription .. .......... .. ........ ..... . ... ........ .... . ........ ........ . Pre face ... .. ... . ... ...... . ..... ......................... ... ....... . .. .. . ... . ... Military .. . r 9 .............to n r \ui . . ....... .. . .. . ..... ..... S tructurmnw th e P ro blem . . ......... .. .... ompon...... . ... .. .... ... . ... . ... ....... I orc! Prop icition m tmb A I !. .. .... . ..... . .... \ 4 5 6 6 ... .. .. .. . lhe Dvnamics ofInte ational Arm s Trade ... .. .. . . . ............ .... .... .. .. Objectives .iets and Attributcs ... ...... ..... lIl . . .. . The A in mic ofan 1 ilem m a .. . .... ... . ...

............................................... esut.....si... ....11 sil ho. .............. ........................... ........ ......................... N1........ AFm PRomace Data...............................61 Realat u tili.. ............. ...llection.. ar-t-AiMisileostems. .................. .................... ....50) 5 onais..................ue Protestvandtries ......... ...............6....................... ..... F unctional ................ .... Comments........................un............................................. Systms....................... Reducution ...................-A 7 7 6 4" 7 1 ...6 ....................... es..... .............. .................. ........ ... ........ ..... \nl'si..... ................... ........................... oyment.. .. AtIlhue.... .. ReatonaleV........ 5:Shat nDataRercVariabl.................................................................... ...... 4 Chptrmm ata C.............. Missiles.. lation................................ ix .... ............................. ............. .......... Tae Acqusiomnc Sources........................................................... ... . .ib........ Comments................................... ....... e I Tl A peduto [neiloAti................... - 7 .......................................... ................................................... Artestndix Ptodes.............Employmen Summry 47 ............................................................ Variable Indice ilmn....................s.... I Leveling the Field............ie........................................................................... .....1 Indi................. .. ..... ...............................a...... A ocuhto A iast ......................... .... ................... islest...................t~n............ Su heA irfrm .................. ....................................... Air-to-Air Ranee Attribute............................Data..........................on........................... .......... .......... ..................................................................... .................... ............... ... ......................... .................................................... ............... Sources and i Genera omns.. .......................... ............... e .......................t. .............................4 A..................... ...................................... ................................26 ACraftmentcurat......... U'v armabe FatrAnalysis -rARpisn. Reere Gasio Anal............... Chater5: I C( ti i 60 N1 2 t' tSoucion..............a......... .... 51 Conflicti-nii Evidence.... .. ................................................. .... Sources GnrCommeints.........................n uls............................. ......neiiverakjlity Attriitt..................... Inl h ATosih ...............................and......... ....... ........... ....... s...........6f1 Sources............................. .................... ......................... d ......N Air-to-(iround Raiwc Attribute................ Esiratx Alogu Riw.......................................................... .... Atriv duo A inumlis'Maker roa........................................................ ......... ............Rpris......................... Catr4aaCollection o lemporal......................... Comarso "alhd v........... Aerioal Guns............................. ............. ................ ...... Resolving Contradictions ....... .... . .............................. Criteria t\nlvss ................7 w............... ............... ............................. .... ................... ................... 'Ia RietioI Srl ame 'ubsste.................. .............51 Some Collection Principles........t............................... ........................ ..................................... RIdces in......................................................... Ventris...................... [heucRacqitio n S% o ................. .................................... ........... ..................... ......I. .......... ...\Resolut~in..................................................... Raina Airces.................... Intorr-iti'onal............ 71 Commr................A............ .... Comenats. . ....................lIdic Ielie a lest......................................

....... I ata~ (ollcctlonl. .................................................................................. ..................................... ......................... I................................ . ......... Lnhancinue Iordanian Air Combat Potential....................................... PlineipleS ........................... Air Initclli-cnce Analysis ......... ....... Chapter 6: Air Combat Potential Score Computation ............ Air-to-Air Missiles............ ............................ ........ Force Propagation............................................................................................................. ...........................................................Air-to-Ground Ordnance Attribute................................. laraet Acm~isition Systems.......... ...................................................................................... .................................. ............. 117 Chapter 7: Policy Assistance Applications .............. 11 Sortie Production.......... ...... Other A\pplications ... ...... .......... I Sortie R~ates........ 1 12-1 ...... ...... n Vulnerabilits'................... I GeneralCComments................ 97 ........................... Airdto-Air ....................... ... 122 I13 123 2 I 1 I I ........................ Force Structure Impacts.... ............................ ....................... ......................... ..................................................................... ........................ Available Inventory in Role .......... l~sxls.. (ondusr............ ........................................................ 18 (:riteria................... Aircxaft Alternatives.............. ....................... . .................................................................. Jordan and Allies Versus Isracl ....................... Altem'nate Assumptions...... .......I I .................. . Assessinu Reuional Sitability............................. ................ 7 Air Weapon Systems........................... It.................................... Conclusions .. Jordian ziiul Allies Versus SN ria..................................... ................................ ........... P'4 Combining 'Subsystems........................... Inferdiction Mission.................................................... Airframes ................ ......... ..................... Nlamxteniance Yor'ce Quality............................ Ii Air-to-Ground Ordnance............... ..... for F urthecr I )evlopmnent.................... ... IIi)IF~ighter Mission. Air Weapon Sysfemn Results....... Wecapons I avload..................................... 94 9 ................................................I I( 5 11)5 Air Defiexse Mission....................lissilc Siibsv stems.....I Aerial Guns................... ......... Summar........................................ ......................................... ....................... ................. .............. .............................................................. ............... ......................... Aerial Gun Subsystems....nalvsi ............ ..........................................................on ..... Sije!................... I Suxnirv.......................... I(I IJ Full Pay load.. NIicrocom puter Processing. Up)erations Research A........-cstijoi ................................. ...................................................................... 133.............. ..... I I I I" 131 Chiapter 8: Summining Up ............... ................. ......... . .................... ... Alternate Package Composition........................ ............. I ............... 9N ............................................................. I )Ita \e~ aionI............................. Combat Force Potential .................................................... .............................. .............................. %lodifyinge A\ssumnptions and Packages............................ ) 91 Detectability Attibute........................... Analytical St roctore ........... ................ Close Air Support Mission.. Target Acqui sIti6n S\ stems................................................ -7....... .................

......................... 188 Appendix F: ' Combat Potential Scores Mideast Air Weapon Systems .......... I Air-to-Airl Missides ......................... .......................... .. ....... .................. -Xl- ..............2 Utility Function Curves .......... 145 Air Order of Hattie 1984-1990 ........ .............................................. .......................... .................... 197 Bibliography ... ... 17 1 Survey Derived Relative Utility Values ...... ........ ...... ............... 195 Appendix G: Middle Eastern Air Combat Potential 1984-1990 . 3............... 142 Aerial Gun :ile ..... . .. 165 Aircrew Survey and Relative Utility Variables .......................... .. ......................................... 26 3...................... ......... P t ~ --- - ...................... 174 Appendix D: Middle East Air Orders of Battle 1984-1990 .........................2 An Analytical Typology: Force Propagation Component ......... ........................ 183 Target Acquisition Systems ........... ........ 25 2.. ........ 1 7 Aerial Guns .......Range at Maximum Speed .1 A irspeed U tility Curve 2............. ................................. 148 Target A cquisition System s .............. 189 A ir D efense M ission ............. ....... .................. 144 Air ............. 164 Air W eapon System Configuration Appendix C: ......... ..... ........ 2 3......... .... 1 1 Inferdiction Mission .....3 Composite Utility Curve ..... ..... I8 li ............. ................... ...... 176 Appendix E: Air Weapon Subsystem Factor Scores . 183 Airfram es .................................... ................................................................................ ................. 15 ) A ir-to -A ir M issiles .......................- FIGURES 2............. 141 A ir-io-A ir'M issle File .................. .......................................................................................... 147 Middle East Air Weapon Systems Data .. .................................... ...........................................eaponSystem Confiuration File .....Mfiddle Middle M iddle East East East East East East Appendix B: Com bat A ircraft File .. 171 A ircrew Survey ....... - - "......................................\irfram es ..................... ............................... .Range at Maximum Speed ............. ... ..1 An Analytical Typology: Air Weapon System Component ............. ............................................................... 139 A ppendix A: M iddle M iddle M iddle .........-I . 148 ................ ................ 13Q Target Acquisition System File ......... ............................... ...................... I Close Air Support M ission (CAS) ....... .........hter Missio n .......... ... .. .........p File D escriptions .................................................. ................................ 16 1 A erial G un s ......... ................. ..............

... 17 2........ 43 3.... 5.... ... ..... .......... 5.... .... 73 .............. 4......................... 8I 5.....................4 Dimcnsions Of Air-To-Air riihter Capabilities 19 2.................. ..- 5.... 5.........2 Factor Analysis Of Conibat Aircratf -~( 2.................... 9 .................... 125 Combat Aircraft ...13 6................ 1S .. .... ..............6 7 Y ......6 Fighter Lltility Scores 3......... .....3 Air to Air Mistdie Variables............ ............................ ..............................1 5.... . .. ..6 Relative Utility Value Variables .........................4 Adjusted Ratio Level Scores...... .......... . .. .............................. 5..... ......... 23 2.................. 54 ....4 Aerial Gun Variables............. 1 Predicting Air Intercept Radius......... ..TABLES 2............1 Airframe Variables Factor Analysis.......................................................... SI 5............ 94 .................12 - - ... ................9 Air-to-Air Range Factor Scores .................................. 41 3.........19 \ainitenance Manpower Quality [actor Scores A ircraft With I lliihcst Air Dfense IPotenitial 91) ... 5....3 An Observable Data Set ... Art-rudOdance [actor Scores ............. ..............7 Inventory Variables. Aerial (Gun R~ate of [ire IFactor Scores................ Air Superiority ........... 5.... 5..............\ir-to-.......... 46 3............1 Airframe Variables ......... .. tcr...............14 Target Acquisition System Factor Scores ... 5. Q -xii- .... ............. . 24 ...... ...3 Dimensions Of A\ir-TFo-Air F~ighter Capabilities .......... ..... ...... ............................................. ............2 Factor Analysis 5........ ........ M........................5 Air Superiority Fighter Performance Components....... .15 ................ Airframe Dctectabilitv [actor Scores ........7 Maneuverability Factor Scores ......................11 ........ 38 3........ ........... .5 Impact of the Control Case on Rankings ..... 3....17 \~ir-to-Air Mlissile \'ulnicrahititv Factor Scores .6 A\irspeed/ Energy [actor Scores .... () 5......... ..........ir Missile Performance Factor Scores...15 .............. ..... 49 .....\cfial (Gun Fffectiveness Factor Scores.....1 Factor Analysis Of Combat Aircraft -Snider 2........................ 5................... . ........ ............. 1 14 .................. ............2 Target Acquisition System Variables.........5 Aicraft Configuration Variables ...................... ................94 ................................47 7 12 I............... S9 Air-to-Ground Range [actor Scores..............8 Sortie Generation Variables........ 42 3.. . 44 3...................................... .....................................

...................................5 Daily Sorties By Mission 113 6............. - Options ..10 Arab....Revised....... - Jordanian Air-to-Air Combat Potential Revised .... 117 123 7.8 Jordanian/ Syrian Air Combat Balance - Allied Support ....................3 - 1988 ...........................................2 6.................. 12-S 7.....I's Re-roled .........................................2 Combat Potential in Air-to-Air Roles 121 *7........6 Comparative Force Potential - 1988 .........3 Aircraft With Hliahest Fighter Potential ......................... Support ... 116 6...................................8 Combat Mission Potential 7..................S 6................................................ -xiii - ........... 126 *7.7 Jordanian Air Combat Potential - F........... 124 7........... 121 7... ........ 125 7........7 Comparative Force Potential - 1988 ....124 7........................6 Jordanian Air Combat Potential - U................................ 109 6...9 Arab/ Israeli Air Combat Balance ............................... 114 6...4 Jordanian Air-to-Air Combat Potential ......................................4 Aircraft With Hlighest CAS Potential .....5 Jordanian Air Combat Potential ....S.................. 127 7...............................6.........................................1 Combat Potential in Air-to-Air Roles ............................. Aircraft With Highest Interdiction Potential ....... 107 10. Israeli Air Combat Balance 129 - Depreciated . - 1988 ..........

pp.". Most industrial nations. 275-20.'Andrew J. in the absence of' comparable economic allures. with inter and intra state wars producing over 15 million casualties. 2 See Pierre. The Global Politics ol'Arms Sah'r. lhe az regate number of national frontiers to be contcted For instance Caln and Kruzel observe that military exports are vital to sustaining. further stimulating demand. .1 Introduction Arms sales are far more than an economic occurrence. 79 .-').tern oil producers' tent. to Moscow's overtures to current or potential Third World allies. for a thorough discussion of the current simiicance of arms transfers in international . I With the post-colonial diffusion of international power and the subsequent tattering of Cold War alliances. Important to United States' international security policy. pp. lhev are the cement which holds the Camp David Accords together: they are the nose under the N. a military relationship. By one estiuiatc. the 'I'hird World's demand for increasing quantities of high quality weapons has more than kept pace with the supply. - three-quarters of the conflicts occurring since World War 'wo have taken place in the Third World. See Caln et a. arrm. . ihreats to the security in the non- industrial world have mushroomed in the past forty years.it least half their production to remain atloat. Arms sales or grants have become the linchpin of American security relationships with much of the Third World.1.arms sales are foreign policy writ large. Recognizing superpower reluctance to chance a direct confrontation over Third World conflicts. 1. Pierre in The Global Politics of Arns Sales.tl'irs. Chapter I ARMS TO THE THIRD WORLD 1. the potential causes of war have multiplied. r6t4ish and i rench" military roduction lines. Arms sales have been pivotal in enticing Third World governments to switch superpower allegiances and in securing overseas facilities to support force projection requirements.iddle lVa. and they are on the leading edge of efforts to blunt direct or indirect Soviet advances in the Third World. confronted with ever rising weapons system and imported energy costs. rely on large scale arms exports to maintain affordable economics of scale for their own indigenous wcapons production. transfers are critical. Controlling l'uture Aitms lrad'.. emerging regional powers have come to rely on weapons inventories rather than diplomatic assurances as the best guarantees of their own security. .1 The Dynamics of International Arms Trade Few who read a newspaper or watch the evening news would contradict this observation. or an arms control challenge . With the post-war profusion of new states.o.. with aerospace industnes'requircd to export .

68-S 0 " ~~'1. 1. the acquisition of modem weapons is a preoccupying security concern of 'I hird World leaders. %\hcfn 3 See Starr and Most. For major arms suppliers. It is open to debate if the availability of modern weapons stimulates or suppresses the tendcnc. In'l . the British L.1. This fact notwithstanding.llerchants or l)cati. a perceived arms buildulp h potential adversary can provoke a preemptive attack (e. Following World War II. and ethnic hostilities an 1 not in the availability of modern arms.i military morale. Spurred by the results of the Nye investigation and popular exposes such as Fngelbrecht and Ilanigzhcn's Tw . and Iraq. France. Rarely do weapon sstems t it lone dictii the outcome of Third World conflict. the United States Senate's Nve Committee investigated international arms trade and drafted Iceislation (Neutrality Act of 1935). pp. political instability. . Patterns of Conflict'. which set up a governmental agency to control the sale of arms and required the President to apply an arms embargo against any countries involved in conflict. Modern weapons Vsci.g. which was charged with inmplcmncnting multi-lateral standards of' restraint adopted inI the Tripartite Agement of the same year. economic. responding to I ird Wold demands poses a devilish political. and combat strategy. and their unietctrrcd supply is the litmus test of patron constancy. virtually all con!hcts in the Third World have been fought with weapons supplied by the industrial nations. possess range.-\ fast-paced account of early Twentietl h Century attempts to curtail international arms trIlic can be found in Sampson. In the mildly pacifistic and isolationist climate of the 1930's. national cohesion and will. and firepower attributes which magnify the lethality of combat once joincd. Indeed.39 -4S for additional conflict related data. Conversely. 3 Ihe genesis of ihc conflicts themselves is imbedded in a crosshatched web of intraregional rivalries. and (Ireat Britain undertook to forestall a weapons explosion in the Mildle Fast throuh the foirmation of' the Near I atcrn Arms ('oordinatiniii Committee (1950). to violent conflict resolution in the Third World. as have the other sources of inter and intra-state conflict. mobility. lhe Committee was moderately successful in maintaining a-q quantitative balanLcII the flow of arms to Fgypt. and ethical dilemma. pp. The timely transfer of arms to a thrcatencd statc can mnake war an unacceptably costly option for an aggressive neighbor. military. The tenor of arms transfer policies in the Twentieth Century has run the gamut from virtuallk unbridled promotion to high-minded prohibition. Israel. the United States.2 The American Dilemma The American body politic has long sought to harmonize the elements in the arms transfer quandary.aar. . compelling historical and theoretical argunent' can be made on either side of the question. Long term results are more often the product of intanwbles sUch . Nonetheless.l<rmi lBa. Israel in 1967). but became unworkable in 1955. those same characteristics might also foreshorten its duration.has increased geometrically.aoor Party spearheaded an eventually unsuccessful attempt to prohibit the private production 4 and sale of arms by companies in the Unitcd Kingdom..

The furor over the A\W. With the exception ol transfers to Israel and Egypt in compensation for the maintenance of the Camp David Agreement. Arms & Security'. op. -3 - .\CS sale to Saudi Arabia was without equal in post-war history. the Nixon Administration viewed large scale arms transfers as a costeffective vehicle for strenghening international political allies. no major arms sale has been approved without a lengthy. 6 Reacting ncg- atively to the 'Nixon Doctrine'. substituting. public.5 the Soviet Union entered the regional arms market. Itie Out of'. and Sherwood. Congress attached the Nelson Ammendment to the 1974 Militar. Most recently. IcPebate. p. a prohibition of the insertion of new or significantly higher combat capabilities into a region. to paraphrase James Buckley. The tenor of the Reagan Administration's arms transfer policy has been more aggressive. 'Arms controllers' on Capitol lill had an enthusiastic ally in l'rcsidcnt Carter whose political and ethical sensibilities had prompted him to include the control of arms transfers as a plank in his campaign platform. Quoted in Picrre. In a different political clime. The policy which he promulgated set quantitative and qualitative boundaries to the export of arms. 1N-20.2. Congressional opposition forced the Adiinistration to defer plans to upgrade Jordan's air defense capabilities and to abandon a program to further enhance Saudi Arabian air defense and ground attack capabilities. lie proposed a descending dollar limit on auggregate transfers. It not only reaffirmed Congressional review but prohibited strictly commercial sales in excess of $25 million and proposed that annual aggregate sales should not exceed the dollar level reached in 1976. 5 See Kcrnp. creating surrogates whose military ca-pabiities would preclude the requirement for direct American presence in unstable regions. Assistance Bill mandating Congressional notification and review of proposed arms packages in excess of $25 million. 7 Intent and rhetoric aside. and a number of other measures which would have severely curtailed the role of the American government and arms producers in stimulating or responding to Third World demand for arms. 'a healthy sense of self preservation' for 'theologv'..lf alter t lie -sithdrawal of British forces in 197) stands as a case in point. and at times vitriolic debate. a proposal to supply air-to-air missiles for fighters the Saudi's had purchased from the United States was the subject o! ficrce political controversy. pp. arms sales since 1981 have still been scrutinized and reigned in by a Congress suspicious of the dlicacy of arms transfers and sensitive to domestic political pressures. w 6 Ihie proramn to establish Iran and Saudi Arabia as the twin pillars' of secunty in the IPer'ian (.cit. A more restrictive approach was adopted in the International Security and Arms Export Control Act passed in June 1976.

1 The Role of Military Analysis Militarv analysis forms the nucleus around which other. force posture. arms transfer polcy has vacililated in 'llamlct-ike' fashion over the past 50 years. it must assess the rclevance of the transfer to the reional security situation.ntroduccJ:. Military analysis must consider the impact of a proposed transfer on U. eves role skyward: the spectre of impenetrable models of suspect rclcalice descends. is invariably accompanied by a spate of figures charting the impact of the proposed transfer on the military capabilities of the recipient and the regional militar\ balance.3 While U.To Trade or Not To Trade 1.2 Military Analysis and Arms Transfer Policy 1. neither is it insignificant.ubjcct of tabular data is . supporting or opposing an arms package. Once the . testimony before any congressional comnmittee.S. but the analysis of . and employment plans. Answering these questions is es"cntiall political process to which no omnibus analytical regimen can be reasonably applied. Indeed. 8 lie Shakespearian metaphor is borrowed frotn IIarkavv and Neumnn.' Judiunent is an essential component in arriving at these determinations. 64-6K -4- "04 Ite les oin of 1t'c'tI t it - . 1. The assessment of the strictly military dimension of an arms transfer is not deterministic. Richelson ct al .1.9 Does a partic- ular arms package promote regional stability or fracture it? Are prospective recipients suitable targets 'or patronage? Are immediate economic benefits to the supplier offset by the potential domestic econoinc impoverishment of less well-heeled clients? Can tile widespread sale of arms be reconciled wNith the ethi:cal principles and political orientation of the American public. .lrim I rani/bfr Control Criteria. less analytically tractable. Ilow does a given transfer affect the recipient's force posture and war making potentid? Ilow do the resultant changes in military force structure affect the regional military balance? In answering these two questions. pp.2. More poliantly. attention ced be paid not only to the quantities of assets involved but also to their capabilities in definable mission roles. the role of transfer related military capabilities analysis is to provide a 'policy assistance mechanism to national decision makers.ggregated * tablular data simpl. in the iirf It or/ld p. answering two questions.6 1-62. The fact that the military aspects of an arms transfer constitute only a portion of the problem set does not derogate from the requirement that they be portrayed comprehensively and effectively. its application in specific instances is a product of how key decision makers answer four questions. 21. cannot be avoided in the production of a uscable assessment. In this context.\nal.s a o the mil- itary dimension of a proposed weapons transfer is an integral component of that process. considerations can be arrayed and is a mandatory element in each arms transfer proposal. costs.S.

." ' lic principle is just as lemittsatclv e\tctidcd to other I':..aIie appra.it .e inproved or As a composite index.al forces ha'.2.-...i/ I l at. i .il'tltiih Ini the iilii.e enemy. the trade-offs need to be minimized and explicitly defined.. Similarly.h-. deense policy inaking.ubsvysI'lS are the key teitures ht l h . p I-4 '01hil a. Not i orouslv scientific despite supericial appearances of pre- cision. the analytical procedures chosen must be scrutinized to dctermine their inherent proclivities to generate systemic and random error within the context of analytical objectives.. - . expert Judgent must play a key role not only in interpreting and leavening a model's output.1 1 asociated weapons .'..rolid . it must also be embodied in the formulation of the model itself.. \() . When the nature of modern weapons systems is regarded.SGA\ . : i. Finally. the relative combat contribution of key subsystems (e. Richiel-on et a!. radars) is essential in the determination of' overall capability. .. and its mathmatical form.11. its output cannot be applied independently but must be integrated with substantive non-quantitative anasis before conclusions can be drawn. the model's input data must be valid and accesible. does provide a Eiven %len applied at tIhe . Fo be usefully applied.- " -- ../. for a discussion of the applicititn ot IcerCeatcd 1i. and 14.. . From a substantive perspective.N'S.-..KpiaS. a militarily-oriented policy assistance model must comprehensively capture the essential combat related properties of the systems being analyzed. deteriorated relative to those of a putati.ar- dIvmasks some relevant distinctions and sacrifices the elkcets of s\ iergv among Its comlponcnt parts. and its workings transparent.. modem filiter-bomnber..' el hjich . its assumptions explicit. Its [hus.-..12 1 I 12 See I . . I. . l.tn . w0hich should caver them In the ueelnse iilsxis pmoee'. as is the requirement to aggregate combined weapon system capabilities at the force level.rc~a: useful anatomical description of the extcnt to . ' . op .. the output of a quantitative model is hiily dependent on the variables entered into it. t11e. 1. . . ". -fr.'.pouscd 1.Itl'... . 1)ata. . linear mathmratical form and the inclusion of sirmply fing assumptions make these losses inevitable.!'d ('..23 54-g5..e IM'.odel. t.-. .ome ot the guidelines Comptroller General are followed. a quanrtit.. '. While aurecation inevitably compromises precision. its lcssons are equall. The Fi ability to compare combat potential within a weapon system category and across alternative mission areas is a necessary attribute.ii. air-to-air missiles. Vlile h: (i. 'Ihis last set of principles is adapted from a list presented 1.n Trams m/i'ta to J.. .mIm.2 Principles of Military Analysis Analviical obscurity and irrelevance can be aertcd it .. the aeureatcd model nce. and It 'ar: . ' 2 hstem... a1phicilIle to lie arms traiimlcr pr hi!n SIee comment in I ciss ct a]. I I p I .ih' l .pp 5 -.-. -.a'I) ..the assumptions made concerning them. .A (' ilba ..1.<x.li.g.

the need for a systematizcd military analysis tool to support arms transfer and international security decision making is well established. and assumptions. four can be singled out as receiving particular emphasis in the evolution of this methodology. a research objective is to develop a methodology with wlhch a potentiad uscr can interact.\frican rc-ion. ban . Consequently. Fourth. commercial entities. Methodoloical transparency is essential but not sufficient. and academic groups to meet the demand. essence of the analytical process is theoretically unconstrained to a specific rcuion or weapon cgory. Two additional considerations.l 13 Ihe lwentv-two countries were included on the regional set A ar s sli ipint s it lBeria ahrain. 13.relevance. Third. also warrant mention. - "4 'tlhiopia. of the idealized principles described above. h I:i\ pt. First. performing iterative (sensitivity) analysis under varying conditions. Regardless. the focus throughout is on mission-specific combat output potential. of the dollar valuc of. The goal of this research is to propose a militarily focused aguregational methodology which capitalizes on the ground already covered and which adheres as closely as possible to the spirit. [his reion . substantive concerns take precedence xliherever possible.2 Limitations Within the framework of these overarching objestive.3. characteristics. None has achieved universal acceptance. While inputs such as weapons inventories or system characteristics constitute necessary starting points. the limitations inherent in the methodology and the data which it considers are clearly identified to facilitate realistic integration of systeinc outputs in subsequent case oriented analyses. 1. priorities. in those instances in which methodoloical simplicity conflicts with substantive accuracy o. rather than just being presented with static results. The user of a policy assistance tool must also be able to manipulate it to satisfy specific lines of inquiry. While all of the principles merit rigorous application.3. and validity of each data element are described. A myriad of quantitative assessment techniques have been developed over the past 25 years by governmental agencies. as are the processes to which they are subjected.Research Methodology 1. the derivation of input data and the internal workings of the mcthodologv arc transparent. application of the m catc\ wtodolog was restitcd to the Middle Iast North A. the judgment of weapon system and intelgnce Experts was souglit at each phase of the development process and integrated into methodology design and operation.was the recipient of 55". ome practical limits need to Ie drawn.1 Objectives Acceding to this list of demands is a tall order. The sources. it permits informed judgment on the methodology's utility. Second.. if not the letter. For developmcntal purposes. inferred from previously identified principles. infrequently met.. not on the analysis of' weapon system inputs.. the combat capabilities which they engender are the determinants of military potential.3 1. inally. While this feature prolongs the descriptive process.

aircraft are the category of weapon systcm in which the author has the most practical expertise.. Jordan. Mhorocco.it.- .. highlighting their advantages and disadvantages. Ic Y-'uenr \Itb RCepublic. the rernaindcr of the study will step through the elements involved in constructing a mnctliodoloyv for evaluating the rnilitar.S. IC'. political -svrcmn. Iraq.i'. pp..idi . ce . dll 1111'oples I'llocratic Re~public of Yemen. tIlc-.. .p:oithicil dcl~itilloti of 1he region. Q(atlr. . 'I)istant Battlcs'..1970's.Middle Eastern combat. Their visibility and cost propel them into the forefront of security policy concerns from both the supplier and recipient per- spectives. noting that the effective use of airpower will be the determining element In the first rounds of any future . iis basket o' :ountries is believed to capture its 111(1t interesting conflict and . enhancing methodological relevance. -.\.trat. It should be noted that. . impact of air weapons tranfers on tIe combat potential of Middle tastcrn states and on the rc ional inilitar.m" l corrcspodaliiiu to a . Finally.iltromr patterns Cordcsman. : . S. regonal geography. IFor an alternative IIliot .: . Kuwait. .lll S%ra. noting snificant impcdimcnts and the rmetliods used to surmount them.3. the principies underpinning it are extendable to other regions and weapons classes. virtually all ma jor systems in their inventories. Somalia. 1. althoueh the field of inquiry for development of this prototype has been narrowed considerably from the outset... p4. because of the observes that airpower '. The procedurc emnphlyed to reduce relevant data to anal\icalls 14 15 iian- Israel.3 Organization The basic philisophical groundwork laid.ubjcct of' securitv assistance to the region dominates arms transfer policy debates within the U. Chapter 4 outlines the data collection lroccss. Finally.' the Third World in 1983..Pm and S'c uritv'. . aircraft transfers and inventories are hi~ly visible. Chapter 3 will propose a structure within which to conduct the analysis and ideiti\ its key elements. . limited lines of communication.balance. Additionally. Another experienced military observer comes to the same conclusion but extends its application to the rest of the region. ()mnan. Chapter 2 will review some of the more salient techniques applied to the problem in the past. I iba. and the . 4S4-4S .\rib:i..rms . I ebanon. The Gul and the Scarch I)r . 15 At a more practical level.1 _ -. The countnes of the repon are among the relative handful in the Third World with sufficient Financial resources or supcr-po%%cr patronage to acquire signiflicant inventories of modern weapon systems. with the exception of Israel's. The investigation will also be limited to consideration of air weapons systems. . continuing the trend established in the mid. \\liile not uccc. Coheni . Kemp. tic 1nitCd Arab I Imirates. Anthony Cordcsinan is the critical form of military power in tile (Persian) Gulf'. and the limited sustainability of 14 round forces. are acquired internationally. the series of recent and ongoing conflicts in the area provide some limited data on the combat application of these weapons systems as well as suggesting a military development pattern for other regions potentially embroiled in protracted conflict. such as it is. - .:- -. so relatively reliable data concerning them are readily available.'iic Sia/ili.- -. SudIn..w directed to the lIhird World as a 'hole. .

mimic the real world exactly. lit I)tna-AiI: IRIC /C(Jifll. it can aCLu- raely represent only a few of the more important attributes of the phenomena heing investigated and does not assume to . and the final chapter identiuies some conclusions regarding the methodology and its potential application in assisting policy development.itive to the limitations of the system. the reader is cautioned to be sen.. Chapter 7 exercises the methodology in generating partial answers to potential arms transter pollcy related questions. JIhroughout. .ageable proportions is detailed in Chapter 5. p 31. . N - . w' - n'mni AlIdl. like wy analktical methodology. as well as its capabilities. Chapter 6 proposes a techliiquc Ior combining input data into individual air weapon system and force aggregated combat mission outputs and displays selected results. ' 16 I See l'ylcs.

review%sc. at least at the populL: lcvel.vlxpindi p. In different wa~s. but its utility in the ilitam'. the collection of reliable data. the Arms Control And Disarmament Aaency's WVorld Alilitarv Expenditures and A-rms Tran. <rm racc: model s. I lowever. arouind cost rat I cr o'(rdc'otian convinciniutlv conitcnids thait dollar to Tnatipo~mcr ratios.sb'rs anid the Stockholmn International Peace Research Institute's W~orld Armament and D~isarmament Yearbook. cral of' the more notable dollar bascd il ns k1col-cn.'~ui't. the mnethodologyv through which tranlsfers IR iLhcl '(i et al. The trigger whvlich activates the Conlgrecssional review process is. The two primary publications whlich catalog the international flow of arms.'r ('ontol (riterio.\nmcrican policy dcbatcs rcvo c.1 General Quantitative techniques have been employed extensively over thc past 25 years to estimate the impact of arms transfers on recipents' miili tary capabilities and regional iitary stability. analytical role envisaued here is limited. often in the context of' regzional and national defense expenditures. V2. a I list ffe valued is inconsistent and ottcn Jrani. rpP O t coIur'c. lrgte proportion of' all .Chapter 2 METHODOLOGIES REVIEW 2. Aincticaui debates concerning arms transfers are often predicated onl package values. Too often. f 'ui it' \u ~c~tr iia'ii:t:p 4> not icr stulds I Ii1dcbrTidt(1 tl/:. and the reduction of data to a common plane of comparison. and Il!-s siunificantlv. a dollar amount. crlio\ 5 an cconomeitric Truetilodolocy to tralislkitc Inilitar economic data into :omplarative poss cr outputs.lo t. I%one- tary alue is certainly not irrelevant.'ar: o 'r. they- have al been confronted by the same problems: the identification of significant variables.\tLent (it lorce: rniidcrriiiation anld sullport inf~rastrutct tre devL:%opmcnt 'in 1W' t. the sincular use of economnic values as the basis for mrilitary anialysis has two drakbacks.2 Counting 'Dollars' The most common mnedium of arms transfer analysis has been the comparison of the economic data associated with the transfer. after all. mnerit and historicil prece- There is no doubt that dlollar measures capture some sense of the magnitude of a transfer or of the priorities of' Ihird Voi Id states. has been solved at the expense of the first anid second. are valid lindicators oI :hc . devote much of their effort to establishing the valuation of individual and aggregated arms transfers. the last problem This section will review some of the techniques employed historically and evaluate their adherence to the criteria outlined inl the previous chapter.'! ' Ii.2 Reducing arms transfers to a common dollar mcasui has considerable dence. ._1 than 11iinctiondl cI ccClCs ccs. tor instance.

the tabulation of the numbers of weapons systems being transferred uid the inventories into which they are introduced is an essential element in any military' analysis. See I C t .cit . pp 29-11 . ard I c1rs.. 13-21 5 I his technique is used by SII'RI in developing its arms flow figures. for the tpc Smilitary analysis required to assist arms transfer policy makers. I u/k / ai.an arld Conmessional conference rooms.11 . rp v.I ranmcr I. Iauir arid Sourrcs. JordanianArms and the .t 4 Laurance and Mullen. cient? The wkeigit of opinion suggests not.u-ianslf'rr and t//. lhere is simply insuflicient covrcla. regional.a Itar. (hoicc.\lso. while . p\. operational capability. a more basic problem remains. and national levels. Cordcsman._ arms transerIs oln tiu1s point .'. Certainly.rllut clCd . iorths N's 1 1 Uts in flhird World . the I lowever..ufli- Weekly news magazines are replete with charts sho%%mg stacked symbols of various categories of weapon system.in.m.ent of monetary amounts based on an estimate Of the arnalo- gous value of unit cost establishes a more level measurement plane. 2. anis transfers to Saudi Arabia has been dedicated to infrastructure development.i- tion of discrete weapons systems into categorical totals makes for presentational simplicity and pcirrrrapplication of some statistical techniques against homongenzed data sub-sets.. offsets.. pp. even this approach . A] I he allo- cation of dolars among package elements varies greatly.ulfrs from a fhtal flaw when apphed to the assessment of military utility. Better than half of the dollar value of' I S. I t'. or potential combat output of the system which the dollais buN The comparison of the economic value of arms transfers and military expenditures can lcrztimatcl.cl. 4 a Ihe assign. calling into question its reliablrtlil% common frame of reference. 6 all of tie dollar Even if tis hurdle is cleared.' catzor\' lc'.3 Counting 'Beans' One often applied solution to the inadequacies of dollar based measures has been the tallying of the weapons they buy.alin.2: Iauuh and lsqnures. lp..N)-N2: anlont. op cir. But is it . Scc lor 1T'lJIk Richlson et al.'rn Ialance. At one level of abstraction.3 -3 1 I licre Is virtual unanimity among scholars invcsti. (ncw ..t t .opaque. . Imc.% detect trends and relative priorities at the systemic. pp35.%stanctc Iticv . If the contract price is used to value a transfer.\rni.lidd/e I:axt.>tc. ..it. intervening variables such as concessionarx teirrns.\ . arid Sierwin and I urmilcc.akini.? lowever. so are the briefing screens of many Penta. but it fails to capture the niritary impact of weapons system transfers on national force structures and regonal military balances. lrm lra toI rT to Aeu i' lop'd (. lie est ili trn . pp. hlie coinltcl. Security " .31-3 +- - . op.untr'u. tion between the economic value of arms packages (or expenditures) and their military utility. r %arorr1 "a11 l 'C -'tcrr.oifal \ 's\ cI. The most carefully sculpted dollar estimate provides no indication as to the nirv sion adaptability.1l. 'Assessing and Analyzing International Arms Trade Data'. categorical quantitative measures such r' these do depict general trends and gross pattcrns of arms transfer and force development... op.-12. arid co-production arrangements influence the product. they arc iadequate.'rluall amount of transfers to Israel has purchased weapons themselves. p. pp. others.

radars). A general impression of force posture can be estimated by considering the systems' respective roles and generations. neither conveys the spccificity of militarily relevant information required to project potential combat output. Under most categorization schemes. any resultant quantitative analysis will fall woefully short of providing the policy maker with militarily relevant assessments on which transfer decisions can be predicated.. Detailed inventorv anaklsis provides more granular information. Numbers )o Count p. time inventories. It does not indicate the thrust of a force's modernization or mission expansion.que. '. p.cit.p.cit. Phrased differently. op.g. Similar comments can be found in Shcrwin and Iiirance. The inventory approach aio suffers from the drawback of not having a common base on which relative combat potential can be measured among national torces.3: I landel. As one researcher notes. 10 Fpstein. reviewing inventories can determine if a force is being built up or if acquisitions just reflect a replacement of existing weapons.6: and others. The failure to account for the immense differences in capabilities between the two would cripple any serious attempt at guaging their impact on national force posture and regional stability.military utility (output) requires more finely grauied data than is conveyed by the tabulation of the numbers of a category of weapons (input) which a nation possesses or will receive. -lra)e. military and policy analysts concentrate on the analysis of weapons-specific inventories or transfer packages. p. pp. Richelson et al cite the considcration of these four acquisition patterns as beine. the estimation of the military impact of weapon systems transfcrs requires a more sensitive and flexible technique. but inventories alone provide a precarious perch from which to spring to any refined analysis of potential military output. Certainly more useful information is conveyed. While the reduction of arms transfers to a common economic measure or their consideration by category provide common ground for aggregate analysis.Iiliiarv Pow.25 9 : ILciss ct al. op.. but also the contributions to potential combat cffectivencss made by key subcomponents (e.eit..leasurinz . one that considers the combat relevant qualities of the systcms. In a vacuum..64. More frequently. The upgrade of system components can often have nearly as profound an impact on the performance of a weapon as would its replacement.. Clearly. pp. . Not only do the capabilities of the major systems themselves have to be considered. their effectiveness in an operating environment. a mere enumeration of peace- does not constitute an analysis of military capabilities. essential to the dLcrmination of the a nation's force posture and its relevance to a rcgional military balancc: op. 131..1 I--124: Snider. an I-5E and an F-15E would both be counted as supersonic aircraft.. and the level of support a user can provide.r. 10 The assessment of emplo~a- ble military force structure and realistic regional balances demands a more sophfisticated measurement technique.!C-. but similarly lacks the performance related detail to permit all but the most gencral and speculative of assessments. -11I- . 9 If the qualitative differentiation among weapons and their mission adabtability to the particular employment environment is not considered. missiles. a listing of weapons tells us little about prospective combat output and its implications for a reional military balance.

mai:'1. factor anal. defensive) the execution of which s'as closely -.'. several researchers have developed alternative approaches which encompass performance related attributes.tcent literature i. various studies grasped upon factor analysis as a technique well suited to the task of synthesizing performance characteristics into aggregate measures of weapon system capability./. The dimensions were assumed to represent categories of mission (e.. I -12- I I . sis uncovers underlying independent sources of statistical correlation among a body. As an exploratory tool. Applied to data sets in \hich the relationships are unknown or only suspected.cicnc prohlcms.cvcral R. it has been refined and adapted over the years to explore patterns of relationships among data.onzc the /ictional esence of this underlying order or to suCest uniforin causality. I aLer studies took a more refined approach and developed factor models in which multiple dimensions were extracted and related not to mission but to system performance attributes (e. IFactors.ttir p /. extraction of factors and rotation to a terminal solution. Factor Analysis 2. to reduce and eliminate redundancy in data. Sail Cash Kaclhieai. in.dimensions.' . 2.ad Iaitor . It falls to the researcher to cate.'icncc' .ocial Ud 1OlitiLa . I .4 In the mid-1970's. Dennis .. nal/l'tir Amd 1 a tor I laa' m. No matter the orientation of the effort.g. I he tollowing.g. tac- tar score prolhctn II -R ill be treatcd later. Originally devised by Charles Spearman in 1904 as a method of simplifying the complex phenomena determining intellectual ability.ItnAI1 andI ndcrstandinu [actor Analysis. ''(Thc~wtio anid Jac-on Kim and (:Urlcs V.4. A third. associated with the characteristics which contributed most silmificantly to their definition.1 Description Factor analysis is recognized as a general scientific method for analyzing data. Iwo aspects of the process will be touched upon here. factor analysis deserves further attention. Mucller [nitoducton to Factor . lhe earliest of the applications aimed at isolating dichotomous dimensions of aircraft performance characteristics and then extracting relative values or scores for Lach weapon on those dimensions. replete with exhaustive discussions of the application of factor analysis to .of input variables. offensive.n I'1 4'ii and 1 lu oral . maneuverability) the relative values of which could then be combined to represent outputs in given mission areas."?r. PaluiIbo S t/t '. or undcrl. . . W1thout delving too deeply into the statistical operation of the factor analysis process. and to define a functional unity for the transformation of multiple variable values to a common scale.[. a brief discussion ot its characteristics s ill facilitate evaluation of factor analysis based studies. may be extracted Iv . RuIIImIcl .7 -. it defines a patterned statistical relationship attributed to an abstract underlying dimension. the factor analysis based studies demonstrated the capability to condense values for multiple performance characteristics into commonly based indices which could be integrated into force level analyses..Attacking these inadequacies.1lztiiA' ttl '(laiticai . have been drawn on heavily in this capsile reltclent: .1. In this regard.. to determine the structure of data.

represents the most inclusive sumunary of the linear relationships among the input data. Thus. 12 \lihaka.lrAt. and Allan LeGrow. Oblique rotation does not require that the factors be uncorrelated with each other and more precisely defines cluster boundaries.. the second coinponent or factor is orthogonal (i.ewis Snider.' ." "Or . lca f teurmi: 1 .u . l. [his first component. 1. which conidcrcd 1f. Orthogonal rotation maintains the richt angle sepairation between the vectors which best fit distinct variable clusters.2.. at right angles) to the first.methods. with principal components extraction the method used in all of the studies under evaluation.bIezw: and I ctirow. "nider as 'interception air superiority and tactical support ground attack'. Iruc to ftOrm. The process continues until sulficient factors have been extracted to account for the total variance in the data set.'a 1Izuition: Snidcr. A second component is then extracted which defines the second best variable combination and which accounts for the proportion of the variance not captured by the first. or factor. I ?d'rtoandin! . I he results of Snidcr s inquiry. Milialka detined these as 'attack and dctcnsc .4. 1 Defining Factors The earliest efforts to apply factor anadysis to the evaluation of air weapons systems capabilities "ee launched by Michael Mihalka.wi ' i _1 1_ . The initial factor solution is not unique. 13v comparing loadings for all factors and variables. are depicted in Fable 2.and I'. Fach selected variablcs (5 and 12 respectively) which lie suspected would dcline one dimension or the other. since other statistically equivalent combinations could \Ncll define a different array of underlying dimensions. .Mihalka and Snider h. Rotation to a terminal solution overcomes this unccrtainlv by mattmatically rotating the factor matrix to delineate distinct clusters of interrelated variablcs. a variable loading represents the correlation coefficient between the variable and a given factor.rlm I cc ap /dal.12 While each study had its unique aspects.4. Two rotational methods are commonly employed. the ini defined the expected dimensions. potlhiII/d that fie-hter aircraft would fall alone two dimensions. The factor procedure first isolates the combination of variables Mhichaccount for more of the total variance in the entire data set than any other combination of variables.. with some editorial chances.e. the similarities among them allow their discussion as a group. In other words.lhhtr.2 Factor Analyzing Air Weapons Systems 2. A 'loading is generated for each variable on each factor which measures the deL-ee to which the variable is involved in the factor. 2. the researcher can identify those variables most closely associated statistically with a particular factor or multiple factors.2 aircrall. Principal components analysis ingests a data file comprised of any number of variables and the values for relevant cases on those variables..

llowever.13 .. - . missile algonthim). .Snider VARIABLE FACTOR 1 Production Year Primary MIssion Speed .Table 2. he extracted lrce t:atclor. an argument can be made that the selection of variables for anal- sis turned the process into a self-fulfilling prophecy. . . .88 . .11 .78 . the asymetrical representation of a functional attribute in this fashion can severly distort the solution.76 . Not onlv does this mode of variable selection tell us little more than we knew about the weapons svstem mission adaptability coming in. 13 Rumnimel. Analv/in. 13 More importantly.ht ratio and ". scored most liihly on the air-to-air dimension..eGrow ascertained this deficiency and added variables to the data set which attempted to capture the effect of weapons on mission capabilit.88 Maximum Speed FACTOR 2 . when Factor I isconsidered the air-to-air mission and [ actor 2 the air-to-ground mission. .2. but because they did not correspond to a predetermined typology.. which are sinle purpose round attack aircraft with relatively short legs and high top speed capabilities. . regard Factor 2.21 .. I. .10 . . . . .02 Take-off Weight Payload Ferry Range Combat Range Radius-Internal Fuel . .86 -. but the point remains that key mission-related perfOrnance variables were eliminated from consideration not on the basis of functional merit. the gerrymandering of input variables produced some suspicious relative factor scores on each dimension. .91 . A similar situation exists between ordnance payload and maximum takeoff weipht. Ile alo elimiated the most redundant variables from the previous set and added ones xkith more aconautical reeance (thrust-to-wei.20 Rate of Climb . . .98 Thrust .13 . . 29 aircraft.Ipplied auctor . p.07 Reviewing the factor loadings. These results were artIully rationalized.14 on the same attribute. the variables group around those factors which correlate to the most desirable capabilities for the respective missions.1: Factor Analysis Of Combat Aircraft . .00 . (number of gun barrels. Soviet SU-7's and SU-20's.ho\%n III fable 2. while the F-41' outpaced the F.93 Service Ceiling .211 14 . . .74 ..4nahkmi. Three of the variables (combat range. . as .91 . In particular.'ine loading).01 .86 Radius-External Fuel .22 .18 . and the two combat radius variables) tap essentially the same characteristic with onlh" minor variation.90 .

'l. with Factor 2 capturing air-to-ground qualities.91291 . lie F-16.52844 Reviewing the results.88188 .I data ba.68222 .leGrow VARIABLE Maximum Speed Ceiling Thrust Rate of Climb Take-off Weight Payload Combat Range Combat Radius Thrust-to-Weight Ratio Wing Loading Gun Barrels Missile Algorithm Production Year FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 . on .85771 -.e %sith 6 aircra'ft tended to COntirrn this :stiiatc. some of \lich are not easily abstracted to hiacr order concepts such as mission output.04521 .g.33873 -. For instance.90017 . As he also pointed out. l. wing loading. 17088 .. Again. Regarding LeGrow's results. While the combination of scores on Factors I and 3 produced performance rankings which were intuitively reliable. thrust-to-weidht ratio loaded moderately on Factors I and 3. I C't 1u1. an interceptor.el b\ the \scap M' related variablcs the second by thrust-to-wei.90778 . and %. production year.\' l1 Kdiniue.i related to it in'crscly froin an aeronautical perspective II 1. the conliination of multiple factors to produce a mission score is an arbitrary process if only factor anal\ tic results are considered.09686 .30709 . three factors emerged. 32122 .91183 . while several others (e.07818 .15425 -. which has a significant ground attack capability.34959 . 22243 -. was exceeded only by the A-61' and the A-71).31275 ._1fncuat.07798 .ing loadini.eGrow considered only aircraft with an air-to-air mission and reduced the number of variables in a sccond factor problem.83717 .54453 .62739 -.52984 .90804 -.1600r -. 14516 .ehlt ratio and \kinu load n.10637 ..24849 .07857 .81375 .01947 .27959 ..27103 -. O ne factor would have been delined lar.2: Factor Analysis Of Combat Aircraft . while the F-14A. The alteration of variables or cases can produce drastically different dimensions. lliruis-to-keiuht ratio is Jir. related to maneuverability. the scores generated for the second factor contained some serious anomalies. To further test the procedure..54158 -.06186 -. LeGrow noted that the presence of a third factor complicated interpretation and that the elimination of redundant variables and the insertion of other combat relevant attributes produced an overall matrix in which the distinctions were no longer as clearcut. the volatility of the factor andvsis process becomes clear.13349 .W . but with different and functionally contradictorN variable loadings.40090 .00532 . I. thrust) loaded heavily on one variable and moderately on others. ranked below the F-51: on that factor.Table 2.e(irow s third factor would have deco nyoscd into two factors liatl he considered a laruer number of" cases. 14 [Hie author believes that l. 14 LeGrow postulated that the combination of' Factors I and 3 appeared to best represent air combat capability.

tcrn h'sel. single model.. they' increased the number and aeronautical relevance of the variables under analysis and defined factors wich purported to represent system attributes rather than combat mission outputs. case compostion.z the Se 15 it rr r'. these lactols thened Iie names as and the variable loadings derived are depicted. for . [ifteen variables oberved for t)9intercplor and air superiority fighters were analyzed. Conider. 16 One data set and model will be discussed here. with separate analyses con- % ducted for interceptors and air superiority fighters and for ground attack and close air support aircraft respectively..thbin lPur months of each othcr inI instance. three 1. because it is the most sophisticated of variable combinations evaluated which also vividly illustrates the-pitfalls of attempting to stretch a technique past its limits.L I. with minor stlistic editing.c are presentcd inl boto ill iclielson Ct tion techiniqu& were %ancd to control lr .sicinic bias I il. or rotation technique. pp 1 144.is to Mi\ the I -1-4 (corcd lomcr ihln hc 1-5 asan interceptor air supcrloits.in. its undcrl. The result was a smorgasbord of analytical options.ix I he. The study aimed to use factor analysis to determine dimensions of tighter capabilities which would be 'invariant' regardless of minor alterations in Initially.7 rhe Analytical Assessments Corporation's (AAC) study team. op..S.(elroied spiihitonl austere ground support fighter.192 lie samtrle variablc sas als) wtsdl bs ' " -. all of which were flown for the first time % I')2. with ive factors extracted. Before discussing the results. the results from which wer. Most importantly. It also pcmiitted the independent analysis of multi-role fighters in each mission area..+ . in Iable 2. capon systems with capability scores for air to air missile systems included. It analyzes interceptors and air supcnorit\ flihters as [his anahsis was selected . Delineating mission groupings prior to analysis averted many of the interpretation problems and spurious results which confronted Snider and LeGrow. all aircraft were factor analyzed in a variable selection.\-I is a tccuioloicall ditferent dcsj. :" " " • '-**' y. pp 123-I24" for niFlew [actor rotaIn allI1 analses '. )imdcr and I c( ii'. ()iily loadings of . l'urihcrmore. some observations on the variables thcmscls are warrantcd. and tile.'-n and cost goals. lh I -15 is a leadine-edge high technology tigihter: the 1 -51:is a considcrabhl aircraft. Aircraft were treated both as launch platforms (internal weapons only) and as full wcapons systems (external ordnance included). \ear of production is intended as a surroaate representing relative technoloical sophistication or nioderrut\ I While tLis contention is superficially pleasing. applied a more sophisticated factor analytical methodology to the problem. assumptioni nmalld. \sOh '. inteurated into the overall air weapon system model. 15 The analytical problem was consequently segmented. re conductcd i:tthe air \ Capon .3. kno i. cit. distinct aialyses serc' accomplished for air-to-air and air-to-ground missiles. 5 or higher are shown to highlilght the factors. hl'ehitcr as all exaiiiple. Explaimnig the at times unrealistic results produced some inventive but aeronautically specious formulations. aircraft.. I irst. : . less sophisticatcd \Vlicn aircraft have car of production concs little as to their relatise tcchno- . which included Lewis Snider.

: .79378 . .3. . the results are largcly non- -I.. Third.96576 .logical sophistication. 'infra-red guided' and 'semi-active radar homing guided'.3: Dimensions Of Air-To-Air Fighter Capabilities VARIABLE ENERGY/ TECHNOLOGY Production Year Rate of Climb . Otherwise.94426 Mission Potential .90748 WEAPONS SUITE ARMAMENT .-. . . .86691 Glancing at Table 2. the 'missile guidance' variable was derived from a separate factor problem in which the attribute was described by two dichotomous variables.87492 .. . . ....70984 .. along with ordnance load and flight profile. these varied inversely for any given case. Table 2.9) positive and negative loadings.50267 .'. -.98072 Msl Lethality Msl Envelope Msl Guidance . the variable 'Mission Potential' was constructed by multiplying the combat radius of an aircraft by its mission speed.. which were assigned nominal alua- tions (0 or 1)..MANEUVERANCE ABILITY ._. 17.. . The materiality of the variable diminishes even more when generational comparisions are made between aircraft produced by different nations... In the factor scoring process. Intended to illustrate the point that hii speeds can reduce combat endurance. . Logically. .89930 . . the ctfects of these variable selection anomalies can be seen. Secondly...75280 Combat Ceiling Combat Speed All Weather Payload .. . whose own techmological capacities are far from even at the same point in time. which is involved inthe determination of combat radius in the first place.54015 . ..54982 Combat Radius Thrust to Weight Wing Loading Muzzle Velocity ENDUR.".89728 . ...71315 97935 Rate of Fire . . the combinational form has no aeronautical precedent and niores the fact that mission speed is one of the factors. ... -_ .- . a predictable situation since the variable was created by multiplying combat radius times combat speed. .91804 . defining a factor with high (. which will be described below.. Mission potential loaded significantly on the energy and endurance factors.-: ...-. . the dichotomous loadings cancelled each other out producing 'missile guidance scores' which were predicated on the values for all variables except the guidance value.

...--. wing loading also has an even higher positive loading on the energy techmology factor. Vhile the resultant variable groupings could have been pc stulated intuitively.. The scoring process entails two salient features. its promise fades when it is employed in this role at the air weapon system level. lhe missile and gun variables define factors representing the air-to-air missile suite and gun armament respectively. The absolute values of all varables in the set weighted proportionately to their involvement (positively or negatively) in the factor are considered in the solution and are summed to veild the factor score for a case.20 i. Weaker loadings produce coefficients which tend toward zero.v .l\0 F Score coefficients are consistent with the weight and direction of the factor loadings.. I llowever. The operative assumption is that each factor is a linear combination of the case values for every variable in the problem set. tests indicate variables with the weakest positivc loadings will also be awarded negatively signcd score coeflicicnts. wine loadinu loaded positively on the factor asserted to represent maneuverability.... - .2. ... Conscquently.. " . the addition of the statistical dimension offers the opportunity to create multi-variable indices which reflect the relative capabilit. . . • . a variable which is largely unrelated statistically (and perhaps not at all functionally) to a factor has a dclinable impact on the score. and all scores are measured on an interval scale.4.-. the factor score coefficient matrix (F) is derived from the rotated pattern matrix (A) according to the formula: (.Statiicai l '.i1 ... Unfortunately. . the factor score for a case (fl) in a three variable factor problem w% ould calculated by the equation. Variables with high factor loadings receive higher score coefficients relative to their loadings within the confines of the entire problem vet. In equation form.. . Jor die Social Srcncvt. as it should. Wing loading shows a negative relationship to the maneuverability factor. . of each aircraft on each combat related attribute.-... . 4X7-489.contentious.- ' . . . ". the absolute values for the variables are converted to standardized scores with a mean of zero and a standard deviation of one before the scores are rendered. I rom a technical perspective.. some scores are negative values even when all variables load positively on the factor. '.. . hetformulae cited apply to faclors extracd h\ I SX -171 -. 19 20 In earlier tables which did not include the missile variables. 19 A factor score (f) is then developed for each case by summing the products of tIe factor score coefficients (F) of all variables in the factor problem and the standardized values of each case (z) on those variables. . .. This description and equations are adapted from the examples ofk'trod in Nic et . ' . The key utility of factor analysis in this context is its ability to generate scores for each case on the underlying dimension or factor. Secondly. . showing predictable statistical affinities among variables.\-A). '.... . an observation requiring clarification. 2. . If the alternative rearession method of extractinte score cocflicients is used.2 Extracting Factor Scores.. Second [dition. '. pp. Ilhus. a questionable rclationship acronauticall. .. and negative loadings gencrate negative coeflicnts..

Looking at the factor which allegedly captures air-to-air missile capability. 02070 .16755 .07555 . -19- .21867 -.07271 -. Tlis scoring quirk is paricularly nettlesome when one considers that all radar guided missiles are dependent on an air-intercept radar (an attribute of an all-weather system) for their guidance.24689 . Scores for the maneuverability attribute would be diminished as a result of a later production year (modern technology surrogate) while bcing enhanced b% the presence of an all-weather radar and lessened if assigned missiles had more capable guidance systetns.03031 -. 14115 . the score for which would be diminished by the value of an aircraft's all-weather capability.08626 .25055 .03775 -. as does thrust-toweight ratio.89930 .00497 .36669 .18269 .48219 .36325 . 13076 .50267 . I lowever.07155 .21866 .10591 .87492 . 19166 .07273 .16637 .46583 -.94426 79378 . Thus.09772 -.28050 . 96576 .09275 -.37841 .54982 .00287 -.47030 .14295 . 12790 -.- A similar relationslp prevails for gun effec- tiveness. 10303 Combat Radius Muzzle Velocity ARMAMENT -. arc conidcrcd. missile launch envelope and others.MANEUVERANCE ABILITY -.00899 -. If the weak ngcuative loadingfs for two other encrv tcchnolov variables.24850 .24171 . 13473 Rate of Fire ENDUR.4.70984 -.32802 . 11167 . all-weather capability has a moderate negative loading.15801 -.89728 -.86691 .98072 -. 33946 -.11413 .54015 Thrust to Weight Wing Loading . 03979 .. 30998 -.3.01481 -.32456 .06441 -.29951 -.04379 Mission Potential . combat ceiling. which is an unblanked version of Table 2.90748 -. 11725 . 21 principal components analysis.09139 .fl =Fvarlzl + Fvar2Z2 + Fvar3Z3 The problems stemming from the first characteristic can be deduced from a review of the data in Table 2. the score for a missile mounted on an technologcally superior aircraft would be less than the score derived for the same missile mounted on an inferior platform.25789 -.01955 . the situation deteriorates ftu'ther. 31621 -. the missile performance vanables load positively.97935 -.4: Dimensions Of Air-To-Air Fivhter Capabilities VARIABLE Production Year Rate of Climb Combat Ceiling Combat Speed All Weather Payload ENERGY/ TECHNOLOGY WEAPONS SUITE . production Near and rate of- climb.91804 . 18566 -.11426 .04384 19642 .75280 . Table 2.71315 Msl Lethality Msl Envelope Msl Guidance .

55. leGrow demonstrated that the use of a constant in this fashion prcser-cd the interval. \ilitarn I cssons of the 19X2 Israel Syria (7Xnflict p.. -. seven pcrcent ofthe Israeli air kills over I anon in 1082 r achiexd by eun slqots. Most U. Because factor scores are computed on a standardized scale. Earlier researchers attacked the problem by adding a constant to the set of scores which raised the lowest negatine score to a ICsircd threshold (e. the value which describes the capability of the aerial gun has the same relative weight in the computation for air-to-air effectiveness as does energy or maneuverability. Since lie input variale \ivllics fr any cixen subs.11.067 in an air superiority role and . 'he AAC study and others compute total system capability as an unweighted linear combination of factor scores denominated bv the number of factors involved. a. detracting fronri the patterned essential to the derivation of neanindzlul factor groupings. 2.. Se. improvements in multiple attributes.n.e.ebanon Iir I 'ar.. a1d L anis.c wn...S.s /roi the / 9S2 L.\ statistical consideration concernine subsystems is also relevant. . 0. intra-factor) scoring process has a horizontal analog. 'I he flaw in the 'vertical' (i... it is roundly contested by the results of an aircrew survey that established that an aerial gun has a relative utility of .x .. Not only is this supposition counterintuitive..1 o'ow' L. .268. I ambeth. op. problem. maneuverability or speed being reduced to permit greater payload in a similar generation of aircraft). . relationship. More poignantly. they are not conducive to further combination.i .4. . While the implication that a 22 See Snider. for one such assertion. . aircraft can carry a version of the AIM-9 and are fitted with an M61AI cannon.g.stCm would be entered miultiple times rctlcctim their titliin. The essential point is that factor scoring conducted at the weapon system level forces the inclusion of functionally irrelevant data in the computation of values for discrete attributes. While these vJues accurately portray the distance between cases and can be used in direct comparisons of cases on a given factor. The two subsystems are techologically unrelated. --- . . - .043 in an interception role. . 2 2 While this contention might seem logical in a very narrow sense (e. .3 Using Factor Scores.2.cit.to several aircrall. and any scoring system which diminishes the value of one because of 23 the presence of the other is flawed.K- Observations of this type could be made indefinitely.ong the scores but distorted their ratio relationship. . . I10. Consequently. A defense of this characteristic has been advanced which contends that it captures the tradeoffs which must be made between some attributes in aircraft design. many of which are aircraft non-specific and which are developed independently of each other. 2 4 An unweihted linear computation of factor scores overreprescnts the role of the gun by more than 200%. 23 . . p. -20- .. Supportine s-' rvev results.g. although far less intimidating. t wou'd constuic what Rummel terms in 'a pnori' fictor. - - - -. . it is largely invalid when applied across subsvstems. some have necative values. it ignores the advances which permit simultaneous rr. The combined influence of these two scoring traits produces relative values at the air weapon system level wh-ich obscure more than they illuminate. 1 or 1). The mathmatical process by which factor scores are measured presents another. . pp...

I was the . Additionally. the ratio of capabilities between two systems could only be inferred. op. Functionally irrelevant information is included in generating factor scores. and factor results can prove erroneous if the variables considered do not represent the bulk of a system's aeronautically and operationally relevant attributes. Applied to the evaluation of combat aircraft. After experimenting with each.. ()zantitative . op.5-1 54..1. he concluded that M\I. The extrapolation of the raw factor analysis output to operationally pertinent composite indices is crippled by three characteristics when applied at the system level.1(d l)'(.valid ratio relationship existed in the first place was incorrect.d . pp. to include those of its subsystems. so their ability to define 'invariant' dimensions for fighter performance over differing spatial and temporal domains is suspect. lowell Jacobv applied NlA. pp. and multi-attribute utility theory (N.S-22) for a discussion of methods of dcaling with Iihc Icxcl of measurement problem. Ihe fact 25 26 See Richclson ct al. As demonstrated above. 21. \hile this author has io quarrel with thcir mcthodoloe\. LeGrow explored three alternate techniques for creating composite indices of fighter capabilities: paired comparisons.cit. his lead.137 and Jacobv.4 25 Factor Analysis Summary. it produces results which do not always embody a commensurate degree of operational validity. Some examples were offered which asserted that meaningful compaisons between alternate weapon systems packages could still be made as long as the limitations of the data were recognized.4. the composite indices created from factor outputs are interval level measures which lack the mathmatical properties to permit their aggregation at the force level. See I C(irmv. Finally.4. hc takes c'\cepIit~l to their contention that interval nature of factor scores is the most serious diav back to their use at the s% tcmns level. Iollow- in.cit..' (apabiities. factor results are sensitive to relatively minor variations in variable and case composition. successive intervals method. Consequently. The combination of scores for multiple factors into a coinposite is arbitrary and often produces illogical results. The AAC study took a more elaborate approach to raising negative values above zero by applying the expression for calculating a T-score (10*Z + 50) to the raw factor score but acknowledged that the transformed scores still lacked true ratio properties.1 wssme'nl ol I htrd I o."I').only technique comprehensive cnoue0h to deal with capability as more than just a combination of performance characteristics. 2. pp.hip sea denial capabilities.T to an assessment of '. [he discussion of MA C here is taken from these t %o publications and -21- .2. I1).3 Niulti-Attribute Utility Theory To overcome several of these deficiencies and to account for intanOblcs such as operator proficiency and support capability.it.. Factor analysis constitutes a powerful tool for reducing large bodies of data to statisticallv valid composite indices. 2. the observation that the addition of a functionallv irrelevant constant created a pseudo-ratio relationship of arbitrary signilicance stands. comprehensive variable selection is crucial.

I ~' --- . at t t er : 10 ot fpct-. Through .oie utihtv curve is constructed by connecting these discrete points.'. . and systems which they are caluatMn.4. . . I. and involves expert judgnent in defining combinational rules marks it as having significant promise in the analysis of air weapon system capabilities. the selection of variables wkhich . Judges are then requested to match successive increments of change in a variable's absolute value above the lower anchor point to core- sponding increases in utility up to the maximum useful value which is assiuncd a utilit% .1r'. op. attributes.cit..2 Application lIo test the theory. to -ut I.-. A panel of experts is requested to develop a scale for each variable which reflects the relative utihty of the variable's absolute values in a ojven scenario.4. the variables can %b ..5. MALT is a general approach for combining the utility values of multiple attributes into a sinele measurement of utility under a specified set of circumstances.cccs. product of expert judgments as to the relative importance (vciuhtj ot the tntl .tion concerning the variables.. -:..1 Description.r nents.cit. pp pp 5 ll. op.ie atu for l heLA. the expertise of the judges.is process.a . I 11cac arc hon in [able 2.MILI: '111. the phenomena under insestiation. '. . . identifying combinational weights. at ti.. lffective application of the technique is dependent on .ar inqury' s purpose and operative scenario.. I liese absolute values anchor the opposite ends of the utility function curve. I5 IifI. and the utility scores are assumed to have ratio propcrtis I he each variable is converted to a util value by imposing it on the respcctic utsht . 22 ~1 .'ro L heir ne. in LceLopir_.. and their .'~. .. produces ratio measurement scales.. Each util scale runs from 0 to 1 As the first step in the development of the utility function curve.1'.)rII.:•. ot 1 A I hroumi this procedure. that MAi'T permits the consideration of multiple variables.-..3. . relative value of multi-variable attributes and multi-attribute ss stems. the absolute values of multiple variables are transformed to a cornuion measure- ment scale (utils). .Ited ItIIInI each step in the process.3.[ . values now transformed to commonly based ratio measures.cGrow de ised a scenario to score fighter aircraft in a \fiddle I astcrn air slpertoritor engaCerent ie identified three relevant components and the variables MuhIch defined theIII. The combinational rules which covern au. a natural point is established.:. ... seeking to maximize expected nainand captire lte - . [he teclmique assumes that the experts will make rational choicc.1 . 2. judges are requested to identifv the absolute value at which the vanable under cotiidcration has no utility and the absolute value at which its utility in the postulated scenario peaks.reaation at the attributc m. from cnti ues contained in Richelson cl al. aid Yhcrwin and I atmranco. 2.

Ta'!e 2.' n are of' diminisheid utility in air u pcriorit. 1 Airspeed Ltility Curve 1.5 Rc-arding this curve.75 U(X5 .rd "loI(Nmi1end of' the curve? From the scoring tables inI tile *\ppendix.0 . It' 'o. WVhile there is no doubt that s'ped Mlachi I . L~et In e~ce-. the - .jThrust Missile Range Missile Speed Firing Envelope Number Guns EMPLOYMENT FACTORS National Technical Capacity National Pilot Proficiency A two Judge panel devised utility function curves for each -variable and specified weidhtings for eaci within its component I~gure 2. an application question arisecs. that tis was thle easec. it appealrs.5: Air Superiority Fiditer Performance Components PLATFORM1 PAYLOAD Maximum Speed to Weight Ratio Wing Loading Combgat Radius . of would anI aircraft with thle technical Potential to CXLcd M ach LS t lien be asieneild a lower uitilitv scol-e derived from the downwa\.: A sample utility curve tor maximum speed is shiown in Figure 2.

the utility function curve was defined by intervals between the countries arrayed at the bottom..S.. With no absolute measures of technical proficiency to govern the assignment of utility values..... These observations aside. In a broader perspective..-.. utility scores show some of the same vagaries that plagued fittor scores... a ranking not merited by its weapons suite or combat avionics. The same problem also appears to affect the extraction of utility scores for the range value.-..-... Three factors seem to have forced these unsuitable rtsults.... . ... While Jacoby's study considered sea denial ships rather than aircraft.... The approach appears to be a misapplication of the utility concept. MAUT does not appear adaptable to the analysis of problem sets which include nominally or ordinally measured variables...6: Fighter Utility Scores .47 .-. The utility value for the MiG-19 identifies it as more capable than all fighters except the latest U.. 'Table 2.. . i.. a partial re-. the above noted scoring idiosyncracy. The aircraft and their utility values are depicted in Table 2..--..-..'.-. insufficiently comprehensive variable selection.8.... The utility function for national technical capacity was developed with a list of countries along the y-axis which were then assigned utility values. The F-4E sits lowest in the goup... since the cost-benefit rationale which is supposed to govern curve development is abrogated.'.15 F-14 F-4E F-5E Miraie 111C MiG-19 MiG-21 MiG-23 96 86 79 . .iew of his findings illuminates some other features of the mult-attribute utility technique..6.. ... One other problem area emerged in reviewing LeGrow's individual utility curves.- -'. Proceeding from I c( owS 24- • :-~~~~~~~~~~~~. and using a multiplicative combinational technique at the system level.score extraction ignores the fact that an aircraft which has a maximum speed capability of Mach 2..48 69 68 62 58 Unfortunately..'.Air Superiority AIRCRAFT WEAPON SYSTEM UTILITY F-16 F... .. LeGrow combined the extracted utility values in accordance with the intervariable weightings assigned by the judges and then multiplied the platform and payload sub-totals to generate a final weapon system score independent of country.. fighters and the Mirage IIIC and almost 50 percent more capable than the F-41..'.. .5 can also usually operate at Mach 1.

The profound differences of opinion among 11Ijudges concerning. hie employed inul- tiple independent judges to enscribe the initial utility function curves rather than tasking two judges to develop consensus curves.71 .itp.2: Utility Function Curves Similarly fragmented results were 7 Range at Maximum Speed - 7.5 cationchalenve Jaov ete ilu trt and w hep o ~ ~ ~srbdb ~ the llsrtsoeoth mtod ctin-.iidiwi lirge.2.exploratory effort.fi siain seingc multiple utilltyl asescts.Jutonillt ls h hures dkeuII cve deIve froim Idt ohe11rxC NIA\L. cha Jacob orcnenig le .t intrpaion ands_ C31p.0sdieJd 27 hisob soifcnsidand 1011 r)%akofemlyn e util lenaicist c leu ATitisypofnctgt at S IIcfu tiiy iaic dti ly elliil sesmns. Jacoby launched a full-fledged M1ALT inquiry. one variable. number of systemns anid emiplo% ziment scenarios. Mlost significantly. this solution Is ext remelv t one and mianpower i nteii~ive w hen ree_.g[or illrtve puoe Igl oIctatg nate tedrw methods tor scon enc %l ~lliIc til% tIh cpi~sente m an fnito the ornpod utilit\kfuric ion itssdt ci' iiitclc Ioi w):. Figure 21. . I -related proCL-dures. - -).O . 5. range at maximum sustained speed. are exhibited in Figure 2.Jstoe variastine in rieesp n ete ad ilutate s onW Uthe o drawbacks C~rempoigMLsnti o adetroineonerror. obtained for virtually every variable (15) in the problem set.

.0 Z5 - 0 it..-- . a respondant to tvo NII. . )iffering scenario interpretations probably contributed to much of the variance.Figure 2. . 29 Individual judgments arc also predicated on the respondant's access to sufficient data concerning the variable and his interpretation of the scenario under wlhich it is scored.5 0. . even though Jacoby took great pains to detail the operating environment. 2() \. even uciteer cot)istcni( I hc ctlfort is . 26. .R ange at Maximum Speed 7. Each judge is required to make what amount to hundreds of discrete judgments which are colisistent within the variable being scored and across the family of variables.() rcn\v . the wide range of responses reveals the daunting intellectual challenge confronting a panel of experts in determining precise value/utility matchups in a multi-faceted inquiry of this type.uud i11C conlstnlnill tial for Obtaittning u hroa-sdatplc of' liig"roi deriverd piutheulneis is slimft. 2000 25. [he entire MAUI -based sea denal study constitutes a significant contribution to the field of military analysis and should be reviewed in toto by those considcring application of the technique. the measurment validity of the composite curve is suspect. thae t the 11111cil- ...3: Composite Utility Curve .. it discussion will terminate here with the identification of those attributes relevant to the inquiry at hand. for tile puro cs of this inquiry. ..surve\s.. . the author has first-hatnd expcrint'C with the the k11'If0-1t\ of maintatl iv. Perhaps more significantly. I lowevcr. RANGE AT MAXIMUM SUSTAINED SPEED (rm|I Given the range of disparate opinion.

4.'. ". -\I\R1 thLiootI loe0\ is coritmILcd II \.7 wvsmn t p. maintenance arid logistic suppolt. . "% • " ' . an essential attribute of any reliable methodology. it offers an attractive solution to the combinational dilemma identified by LeGrow in aggregating individual factor scores. it produces ratio level values measured from a common base which can be inserted in subsequent force level capability calculations.i Ila/i II. Additionally. 30 pccilfic The I"ASCFORNI mcthodology is not a statistical technique as such..S.iz/. for instance. (. The air weapons a. . Its implementation is cumbersome and prone to random judgmental influences which are well nigh impossible to isolate._nent and can be expanded to account for the effect of difficult to quantify factors such as operator proficiency. 31-510: Budgct rlnd . and have subsequently been applied to research questions in support of it and other government agencies.. While not a liability per se.1./w.4.d'.r..3. . I. MAUT's results are largely determined by the selcction of input variables and the validity of the data which describes them. .to /oi r . . TASCFORM Force Modernization Model 2. it incorporates many of the same attributes addre. is a subset of a family of analytical models which address the subject of general purpose force modernization.orporatlon. It combinational philosophy is predicated on mission specific expert jud..2. Conversely. communications and intelligence (-)11support.\ dctailed decription of the 'A (IC)R /fa'..nal'. Multi-attribute utility technique resolves several of the more pronounced dcficiencies identified in other quantitative methodologies but introduces some of its own. lacti.eL i'Ied). tIc Scicmwe. Consequently.\I:() IRM is a trademark of Ilhe . and cormnand. Office of the Secretary of Defense. The original models were developed in support of the Otuicc of Net Assessment. a trait it shares wvith virtually every other approach. its array of variables more comprehensively defines the combat relevant attributes of an air weapon systcm than earlier efforts.' lti .scssment model. Available methods for synthesizing disparate judgments are unsatisfying. Forre.cd I) the methodologies discussed above while maintaining the flexibility to consider nicaningful attributes which are not amenable to interval or ratio level measurement. - * .(1lOR1 .'p 2. 1... I lowever. / m t .l ('omlt l'.lciOn hi. . .+a'on+ ( ot / I .3 Multi-Attribute Utility Technique Summary The most rewarding asset of applying MAUT to the analysis weapon systems' combat capability is that it incorporates informed expert judgment in all phases of the assessment process.re o the (tmtd t. .I . . Conuressional ()tlicc. i. pp. .. 1W 1 S. In particular. - ~ . control. - .lt/tlodo/lov: I I'ccliniq 2-i.on'. It does not legitinately scale nominally measured variables.:. • .. 30 See. MAUT suffers from a number of conceptual and structural liabilities.4 The Analytic Sciences Corporation (TASC) developed a third quantitative methodology which incorporates the performance characteristics of air weapons systems into combat relevant capabilities indices which can be evaluated on their own or aggregated into force level assessments. TASCFORMTNM-AIR.

tCatu .ic airframe scores are then modified through a series of calculations which account for the contnbution of L subsystems (target acquistion." . -. 13a.4. . range. aspects of force modernization. 1s accounts onlv for energy maneuverability (acceleration).2 Application Ilie full IAS(CORM computational skein is too extensive to unravel in this overview.-'+ " i .". Ihe selection of a single variable tiuzlut ell Jiscard relevant intormation concernintg an attribute which encompasses two or more dtniensions.1 Description -Ilie TASCFORM process follows a hierarchical path. In all. clear night. and uetis l air Npced indexed to the corresponding value for the F-413. but .2. good all. A single variable is desiuznatcd to repre-cnt W each aunbute. the inital calculation is anchored at the airframe level and considers payload.lices htch ohlain amione targct acquisition systems within these calcgories.4. a comprehensive. " -" .weathCr) which are assignCd subjectlc I I(.urvivability) to mission performance. A basic airframe svstem figUre of merit is computed considering the values for four attnbutes (payload. three mission areas (air combat. I he concept is solid. ILor instance. Target acquisition capability is dixidod i~t( biur cateu.(rmics (clear day. range. force level projections can be accomplished by allocating candidate inventories across mission aieas and multiplying them h'. A final weapon system step adjusts performance indices to account for the systems' relative obsolence and sortie rate production potential. Finally.-AIR represent.4. : . lic F-41' - ". TASCFORM.0)). and operationally sensitive technique for quantitatively assessing the qualitati e. limited all-weather. the resultant force level measures of merit can be further modified to account for the effect of intangibles such as C 3 1. I-or instance. Just a few of its. Indexed values are modified by avionics and weapon \ trl attributes to reflect their 'tactical impact' on basic airframe performance. If desired. surface attack. I o use the tnanuicvcrability example. As noted earlier.". maneuverability is pegged to the indexed value for specific execss prover I lcrcin lies the first deficiency in the approach. 2.2. speed) indexed to the value for a baseline system (the F-4B).ilucs I his approach prolibits measurement of the very stgnifi cant capability k itfct .. it is equally applicable to assessments of the force structure and military balance aspects of arms traintcr policy support. and summed f'r each mission category. maneuverabilitv.. . anti-submarine wartirc) encompassing 13 distinct employment roles are evaluated for 112 fixed and rotary' wing aircraft. powerful.L will be highliighted to set the stage for further methodologcal development.\cclitin is lcss precise than riced he in two areas.4. 2. weighted according to expert assigmed values. maneuverability. ' " "' '" : "- +" ". the corresponding performance indices... . relative aircrew proficiency and the like in producing a final Equivalent Force Performance measure of merit. navigation) and associated attnbutcs (countermeasures susccptibilht." "-"-" . so the factor of lateral maneuverability (rate or radius of turn) is lost. While designed initially to address the U'S Soviet force balance. In all.) I .

Similar observations could be made concerning the survivability and sortie rate attributes.. . it addresses the critical role target acquisition systems play in modern air warfare as well as permitting adjustments for employment related factors. and the values thleniselves lack the ratio properties required for force lcvel aggregation. TASCFORM fails to make sufficiently granular assessments of the differences between specific subsystems in sonic cases. Additionally. . As opposed to the other analytical models.3 TASCFORM Summary TASCFORM-AIR establishes an indisputably superior framework for the aggregation of combat relevant It incorporates expert judgment into a clcarcut. In the same vein. . A similar situation prevails in the air-to-air missile category where differentiation is only made between guidance type and engagement mode (visual range or beyond visual range). . the combat relevant differences between missiles such as the all-aspect infra-red guided AIM-9l. The forced inclusion of irrelevant data in producing specific attribute indices is factor analysis' greatest weakness. and attributes into mission specific outputs. perhaps unneccessarily. .7 1 AN APQ-120 radar and the ANAPG-70 being developed for the F-15. . .. it is obvious that the dollar valuation and inventory approaches are inadequate on their own to generate sufficiently inlormative assessments of the impact of an arms transfer on a nation s force posture in a vacuum or in a regional context. its reliance on single variables to describe primary system attributes sacrifices a measure of descriptive and operationally relevant information. . pro'iding a particularly elfectivc scheme tor combining values for multiple vauiables - 29)- . . 2. flexible..4. Multi-attributc utility theory's ematest strength is its inclusion of expert judgment inall phases of the evaluation. but there is no doubt that the actual performance capabilities of the two systems vary considerably.' . 2. and the rear hemisphere only AA-8 are not captured.would receive equivalent scores.'. . transparent combinational process and permits the consideration of important but intangible variables.5 Methodologies Summary Regarding the sampling of military analysis methodologies wlich might be used to assist arms transfer decision making. On the debit side of the ledger. .. . followed by its inability to process nominal data without output distortion.4. They simply do not measure or aggregate information rcliably linked to combat capabilities. Again. .. dr ttii- . The negative aspect of this last feature might be partially offset by the implementational flexibility it offers. a pure factor solution provides no operationally lCeitirmate rationale for combining values for multiple attributes into a sineje system index. . Factor analysis is capable of aggregating many of the essential elements but is volatile and unreliable when applied at the weapon system level.

7 2. and operationally transparent and makes effective use of expert judgment.-IM . and system output is well suited to modification and higher order aggegation Its most pro- nounced drawback is a proclivity to over-simplify input data. Subsequently. Variable input is unconstrained by measurement scales. no one methodology provides a holistic solution to the problem of incorporating qualitative information into quantitative militar' assessments. Since the application of any aggregation technique will succeed or fail on the basis of these fundamental operations. ilowever. data reduction and aggregation techniques which capitalize on the strengths of the aforementioned models and minimize their weaknesses will be discussed. masking significant perfornance dillerenccs within generic categories. situationally flexible. it does not legitimately accommodate nominally described variables. and its administration is prohibitively cumbersome when applied to a subject with more than a handful of attributes and scenarios. variable selection and data collection will be addressed in the next tw o chapters. The common thread which connect5 thern iv a requirement for comprehensive mission relevant variable selection and thorough data ctlction ad preparation. In essence.A butes into a single measure of effectivess under a given scenario. The TASCFORM methodology is functionally comprehensive.

1 Defining Components Before individual measurement variables are considered.1. - Manhcim and Rich. p. - The numbers of possessed air weapon systems a national air force could be reasonably expected to employ in identifiable classes of combat operations at given points in time (force propagation potential). As one research guide admonishes.235. basic knowledge' of the subject area is a mandatory prerequisite. identifying key components and their subcomponents. it is prudent to structure the research question more elaborately. "a lhighly sophlisticated statistical analysis can rarely if ever compensate for a poorly conceived project or a poorly constructed data collection instrument. In defining these second level focal points.1 Structuring the Problem 3. The omission of elemental attributes can undermine a model's relevance as was noted in the previous chapter. p. 7. at least two major components must be meshed: * The performance potential of pertinent air weapon systems (aircraft plus specific subsystems) in definable employment categories (air weapon system combat potential). A crucial challenge is the identification of attributes and supporting variables which most compre- hensively but efficiently capture essential combat related capabilities. The two main analytical branches described above must be supported by a network of functional subcomponents.Empirical PoliticalAnalysis. 'good.11 Chapter 3 VARIABLE SELECTION 3.' I See Blalock. variables must be selected with a keen eye toward the technical complexities of the phenomena they seek to describe.. -31- 6 . To structure or operationalize the problem. The importance of this step cannot be understated since even. an insensitivity to the texture of the subject and the operative relationships between its parts can be debilitating.1"The problem at hand is to develop a measurement technique which assesses the impact of air weapons system acquisition on the air combat potential of Middle Eastern air forces. Consequently. Social Statistics.

Gunston and Spick's Modern Air Combat suggested a third: combat persistence or endurance. .'t/u b 'd . At the next rung down the analytical ladder. the air weapon system subcomponents displayed at the second level in Fig- '" ure 3.- .2 With this injunction in mind.. - 32 - . With airframes and their subsystems treated separately. target acquisition.- - . while the third is comprised of aerial weapons.- .. and Ilhc Analytic SLiences Corporation.2-14 to 2-15. two generic attributes appear common: the performance capacity of the system measured op whatever scale is germane and the system's vulnerability to degradation or incapacitiation. pp. . : -. [his structure draws heavily on ideas outlined in lhie Analytic Sciences Corporatio l TASCFO RI-AIR model and 'on notes pertaining to the calculation ot "measures of air combat merit prepared by operations analysts at Northrop Corporation s Aircraft Dix ision. was derived from discrete concepts found within these two documents and the TASC study. Airframe.. a mechanism is required to meld the potential represented by the subcomponents into a specific weapon system employed in a particular combat role. a basic step is the identifcation of those attributes \\hich define the relative performance potential of a weapon system subcomponent. The most operationally relevant of these were flagged as key subcomponent performance attributes. A USAF Tactical Air Command Fighter Weapons' School manual pinpointed two attributes essential to airframe performance: speed and maneuverability. fire control computers. 4 Defining the last two subcomponents distinct from the airframe provides an added bonus. I lowever. Since few target acquistion systems and even fewer weapons are airframe unique. 5 Target Acquisition and Avionics Systems. . . The function of the fourth subcomponent is not self-evident. . Ilic . less avionics. ITh(ic A erody'namics.- - -. The listed subcomponents are believed to define the predominant non-human elements which comprise an air weapon system.:.I( )A .- . pp. Isolating attributes for this subcomponent is made somine- what nebulous by the variety and diflerent purposes of the systems involved.. : . the first subcomponent is concerned with the combat potential inherent in the airframe itself.> . The term airframe will refer in this study to a basic aircraft. 1. 1 86. air-to-air missiles and air-to-. their segregation at this juncture allows the construction of individuallly tailored air weapon systems configurations during the computation process..193.eround ordnance. The next subcomponent addresses * target acquisition and combat-significant avionics systems.. 3 r Looking to the left side of the second row in Figure 3.. and weapons systems. This relational task is the province of the last of the air weapon system's subcomponents. -.Air Weapon Systems Subcomponents and Attributes 3..-- . Several air combat oriented publications and studies suggest a variety of candidates. pp..'(C.. The ae'rial weapons categor" includes guis..- --- -.- ..-' and head-up displays.3-2) to 3-22: ( iinston and Spick. 5 See USAF Fiihter Weapons School.. vulnerability to engagement.1. l1 odern1Air Combat. .. For the purposes of this studv1 avionics will be limited to navigation systems.... The fourth.1 are offered as an intermediate framework to guide the evolution of this inquiry.

the disparate natures of the systems results in the desi. Relational Factors. First. they must be related in terms of their proportional contribution to mission output. Air Weapon System Payload Target Acquisition Airframe Performance Speed Maneuverability Relational Lethality IEffectiveness Configuration Utility Endurance Figure 3. Second.gation of generic attributes which are a bit vague but which capture the essential combat qualities of a weapon: its lethality and its effectiveness in overcoming countermeasures.3 Force Propagation Subcomponents and Attributes The assembly of a family of attributes "fhich credibly define the boundaries to realization of combat potential for each nation over time is a daunting task. These two attributes are rcfcrred to as configuration and relative utility rcspectivelv 3. Authoritative military and academic literature leaves no doubt that a nations ability to support and operate combat weapons s\stems is a critical dLter- 33 - ..1 Propagation L-----------.1: An Analytical Typology: Air Weapon System Component Aerial WVeapons. This subcomponent encompasses two attributes.1. Again. subsystems need to be related in time and space.

rninant of' rnilitary effectiveness.

former Israell Air [orce Chief' of' Stall Fzcr Weizinan emnphatically

these largclv hiumani falctors,

-saedthat

other plane.

.

'~While

-ill decide the f'ate of war, of all wars. Not thle MirEle' Or any

this point might be somcwhvlat overstated, there is no argungw wvithisesn

Itif'Ortunatelv, the Individual and national variables which define such attributes as, leadership. technical
acuity, planning insighit, anid operator proficiency are virtua-1ly impervious to operationalization ill the
I leroic attempts have been mnade to isolate the variables associaited with national Support

er e IaIte

potential and operator proficiecy.CN 9

-ueer,
a thorough review of' the sugesdmthdhwsub

stantiated that they involved collection of information concerning variables which would grcatlvr exceed
the resources of this research effort (e.g., aircrew training and continuation flying, hours) or surrocat

\rI-

ables whosc relationships to the attributes they, were stipulated to represent were tenuous.
ASan additional consideration, the measurement techniques suggested by most researchers whIo lia~ c
attacked this problem focus olthose variables which inight conceivably catrsoeptino
nation'Is Imicrocompetance Ito operate anid employ weapons systems.

'No systematic measure of the

equally important attribute of' the 'mTacrocompetance' required to organize anid emnploy the wecapons 1is
available.

A\ review of' three decades of' Israeli air victories Ii the Mliddle Fast sui:-Csts that the latter is

just as important as the former.

[or these reasons, the effort to derive national measures of mecrit for

operator proficienicy or employment effeCctiveness was deferred to other researchers. Indeed, it IS pro01Mhle
that reeio nal experts can Subjectively flactor in these considerations with greater validity and efliciencs than
canl be tcenerated by a fixed computationalsce

.I

AS a result of this determination, the evaluation of errnplo mnent factors in this study Is limited to
those factors which inscribe an outer boundary on a nation's capability to uencrate its combha t hrces,.
With this caveat, the analytical typology dealing with f'orce propagation is displa\ ed Ii

Igretl -. 2

IbsI

t

Ouly, the invenitory of' air weapon systems possessed by a force is a necessary point of' depariture.

I IIus

oros s total must be further elaborated byv a term which reflcts their likely allocation to _n,,en cormubol
roles,.

lI COMurtplt

the picture, some measure of' a nation s cumulative potential to clluplo.\

Exscellent d Iscussions of' realistic constraints imposed h\ operational anid support1 Ctap;1lhilit
ai'la: dc I eonl, /Ilh, Pl'e'o'tlnc I.Lzl'i/
founid inl Pascal et al, M.en a(l( ;friu in the .t~l
u
Pilot Aill Iwdiar in AIit - t-;fur ( amtbat: IKenip, I rins anI .S'e(iitr and I )t Ptiv, \Iea.u1,
I fleetis eiess :aing
others.
Oijoick l i I amnbetl. .llovcovw.u lcmsan 1barn the 19S'2 1 eaihonn Air liar, p.31]. froiiicaulk
cons11istetly prc','ed for the srihsidi/Cd ac(]iirsition of the Most atL1\;ircLd .\nIericalt

jra

tile

canT

L'S

111

~

( o1lil~l
hac

,

.11t1is
d i-

LvetmcamlIv. contestled the .\rab acquiisition ott the saine or lesser capabilities.
we. tor iristamice. Benjamin I aibeth s contineints Ii litfalls in [iuhiter I orce Plaitnirw p.Ib
see In p;Irticular Pascal et alf. ope.it. - I ItITlAke arid I eveen,
Ah 1111(00'j'
'that,
110'c . Iir(t(w PH tic iecr, and1(1 eCI tcii
id

If.lmthaI0i!'V 6)t I l~~.it
1t r)f kv
mll',C.
1d
*
/'

Of.
.

ir ani(hLiplation of, the iiili111iltmu Credited to0 \l
Finf11MIoven
I lie p)oit is ho IL'rId'
comnputers, the t hine-s that ;ire comlputers andL t10 f idItent the hiiimWS that mre JUIoLemniL'Il s. ti a

C)I his i'

7-3-

11111
id In

tionally available inventory in the combat roles to which they have been allocated must i e derived.

lhe

ability to generate assets is the product of three attributes: the proportion of the force available for combat
operations, the maintenance support they require, and the maintenance resources on-hand to service
them. I I

FORCE

[Air Weapon Sy"stM

IForce

POTENTIAL

Propagation

I

ra Io
I

Figure 3.2:

An AMnalytical Tvpology: Force Propagation Component

Regarding Figure 3.1 and Figure 3.2 together, the attributes identified at the third level of the hierarchical structure represent the basic blocks with which a force level combat assessment can be built. As
such, they constitute a map to guide the search for potential capability measurement variables.

lIhe

numbers of variables describing a particular attribute might be as few as one or as many as ten or more.
1hcir selection is a function of the nature of the attribute, the relevant observations which pertain to it.
auid the avalability of descriptive data.

lie
h1 abbreviation \Ix is used as a shorthand term to describe maintenance.
35 -

3.2

Variable Selection Guidelines

Even within these structured confines, the plethora of candidate variables ftar outstrip, proc,,-m

oi intel-

lectual resources. Consequently, the explanatory power of possibly pertinent vanbles has to be ,cruencd
finely to extract the minimum number which explain the maximum siunificant %anancc in air weapon
svstem and national performance potential. 12

'he number of variables linked to an attribute ,hotild not

be so harshly pruned that comprehensive evaluation becomes illusory. On the other hand. redundant
variables which capture the same essential facet of an attribute need to be eliminated to avoid analst1ical
distortion. The more definitive the scale on which a variable is measured, the more precise are the results
which can be obtained from its analysis. Consequently, ratio or interval scaled variables arc prcfcrrable to
those valued on nominal or ordinal scales.

llowever, ratio or interval level measures are not always

applicable to or available for key .anables. WIle nominally described variables are not fully amenable to
some statistical processes, they should be included in the analysis if no legitimate alternative exists. Capturing the effect of relevant attributes is more critical than adulterating the substance of the problem to
accommodate sopluisticated statistical techniques.
A final temptation to be eschewed is the substitution of accessible 'surrogates' for qualities %%hich aie
not directly observable or or easily quantifiable. The use of surrogates is not in itself an unsound practice:
but each surrogate must be subjected to rigorous scrutiny before inclusion. The incorporation of surrogate variables which are only minimally or coincidentally related to the qualities they arc designated to
represent cannot help but distort the resulting analysis from a substantive standpoint, often lethall,.
In the same vein, the creation of composite or index variables stipulated to stand in tor a more coiplex and mathmatically indescribable characteristic must be treated cautiously. Indices frequently cnevI
meaningful performance related information unobtainable through any singl component measure. In the
realm of aircraft, thrust-to-weight ratio, wing loading, and wing aspect ratio are all widely rccoLii,cd as

"

leaitirnate indicators of energy maneuverability, turning capability, and relative lift rcspectivcl.I l1m ever.
indices are leaitimate only when their components have a functional impact on the charactcristic beine
represented and their combinational mode reflects an engineering or operational reality

A poorly chosen

surrogate or an invalidly constructed composite variable not only can miss the mark, it can lead the analvsis astray.
Inconsonance with the preceding, some basic ground rules are offerred to govern the idcntlication

of

studs variables.

12

Ihis principle is otten referred to as parsimony and is cornnionl acclaimed as one of the kc\ attri-'
butes of an. higher-order research effort. See, for instance, Manhcihm and Rich, op cit p i53"
3..

.

l,,::
...
;., <

-.
. -,, . -... . •.-.-.

..

-,

,••

..

.

.

-

" . -

. -".

- -- -

-, ,-

i

IA

list of candidate variable supporting the analytical structure described above should provide
broadest practicable explanation of the sources of variance implicit to each attribute.
Variable lists should be culled to the minimum required to explain combat relevant variance, eliminating redundant measures.
*

Comprehensive attribute representation should overrule concerns for parsimony.

*

Variables should be selected which represent the highest level measurement of the attribute being
portrayed but should not be eliminated if only measurable at a lower level.

e.

Surrogate variables should be used only as a last resort, and composite variables only when functional or operational precedents had been established.

3.2.1
3.2.1.1

Variable Selection Process
Air Weapon Systems

A list of candidate system variables was compiled in 'shopping list' fashion, relying on attributes fea-

tured in publications such as Jane's All the World's Aircraft, t'SAF Fighter Weapons School's Basic Aerodynatrics, and Modern Air Combat. Other variables were glea-ed from periodicals such as Aviation
Week and Space Technology and Air Force Magazine. Finally, variables considered in other military
analyses were appended to the list if not previously included. 13 As a final test of inclusiveness, the variable list was submitted to a panel of three fighter pilots and one inteltigence expert for review, and their
revisions incorporated.
'The initial 300 variable list was exhaustive but unweildly and inappropriate for further action without
agressive winnowing. It is immediately evident that collecting data on this number of variables is overwhelming, even in the unlikely circumstance that the requisite data were available in unclassified sources.
Some categories of of variables had to be simplified to permit concentration on the most salient combat
related attributes.

Avionics systems with important combat performance implications are treated genei-

cally as nomnaly scored simle variables.

For instance, the variable 'NAVCAT' cites navigation system

t. pc, and the presence of head-up displays and integrated fire control systems is captured in nomin;d

ari-

ables. The profusion of air to gound weapons systems and the multiplicity of associated characteristics
make them a particularly unweildly variable group-.14 Nonetheless. categorical variables are retained to
indicate an aircraft's precision guided munitions capability and type, partially accounting [Or advanced
weapons
13

14

tv.

inally, the question of assessing air weapon gound support requirements through.

1 or instance, I c(,irow olfers a ihorouih discussion of some performance variables and the dimen-'",ins they capture. Mhile I'.\SC ()RN[ s charts and equations give a good ovcrvicw of the attributcsand their" inter-relationships. See also Cordesman. Jordanian .tis aid lhe Gul' and the Scach /fr.Necurit v
It is reassuriniz to note that Ihe Analvi ic Science Corporation arrived at the same conclusion concerni, air to uround weapons in their 'qite cxh.ustise studN.

17

1

.7-

-7-

Man-. . 5 . . 16 The Statistical lPackae for the Social Sciences. The name and variant of the aircraft.1. . the single variable. . not considering tip mounted stores.et of files and procedures is currently under development.stical and computational processing. p. Table 3. Definitions of the variables follow the table.. . A complete file description is in Appendix A.19. 16 The initial complement of variables intended to portray the attributes of an airframe itself is displayed in Table 3.g. .. recommended by Epstein as the best single indicator of support complexity. fighter-interceptor.4¢ 3.1 The variables annotated with asterisks (*) are measured on a nominal scale. In addition. . +++ +++++++++I++ .2.S -.analysis of a family of maintenance variables was deferred. Instead. Distance from wing-tip to wing-tip. was introduced. Not to be confused with nationally determined employment codes which are associated with the inventory subcomponent. bomber-ground attack). S38 - . . Wing Span. .2 Airframes Application of the above considerations reduces the number of variables to be considered to manageable proportions. release Ten (Sl'SSX) was used for the creation of' data flcs and all stati. . Defines the aircraft system type (e.Maintenance Hours Per Flying Hour (MMIIIFH1). Role. A micio-comtputer based .1: Airframe Variables Aircraft Wing Span Wing Aspect Ratio Empty Weight Combat Wing Loading Fuel Fraction Maximum Thrus Variable Wingi Maximum Airspeed FL360 Maximum Airspeed SL Rate of Climb SL Rate of Turn Service Ceiling Attack Radius Maximum Ordnance Internal Guns Role Wing Surface Combat Weight Maximum Weight Internal Fuel Combat G Limit Thrust-to-Weigh Ratio Variable Camberw Specific Energy At Altitude Specific Energy SL Stall Speed Specific Excess Power Intercept Radius Combat Range Weapons Stations Gun Rounds Aircraft. the structure was modified slightly to facilitate automated manipulation and statistical processing.. 15 Epstein. Measuring Military Power. .

an aircraft is designed to withstand in maneuvering combat. The weight of an aircraft fully equipped less fuel and stores. .. Sea level was selected as representative of the low end of the combat envelope. thereby improving turning performance. The maximum 'wet' (with afterburner) thrust which an aircraft's powerplant can generate at sea level. Variable Wing. Empty Weight.. Variable Camber. . a factor which affects the wing's lift coefficient. The ratio of combat gross weight to wing surface area. Internal Fuel. Maximum Airspeed SL. The internal fuel capacity of an aircraft measured by weight. The maximum takeoff weight of an aircraft fully fielcd and loaded with stores.. Notes the presence of devices such as leading edge slats or maneuvering flaps which change the camber of wings in flight. .(00 feet) was selected as it represents the hiigh end of a likely combat envelope under most scenarios. Compares the internal fuel weight of an aircraft to its combat gross weight as an indicator of combat persistence. The maximum centrifugal force. expressed in terms of acceleration of gravity. Maximum Thrust. at which aircraft might well have significaitfly different speed capability than at higher altitudes. Notes the presence of a variable geometry or 'swing' wing. . This altitude (36. thus giving a better perspective of Useful speed. Thrust-to-Weight Ratio Compares the combat gross weight of an aircraft to its installed thrust as an indicator of its ability to accelerate and sustain turn rates... Total wing surface area. . Measures maximum airspeed at sea level.. Wing Aspect Ratio. VWing Loading. with an inverse relationship between the two. Measures maximum airspeed in a lhigh altitude profile. Indicates the relative turning performance of an aircraft. Combat Weight. A weight calculation which defines the likely gross weight of an aircraft when engaged in combat (as opposed to maximum takeoff weight). - 7 39 - . Combat G Limit. not considering tip mounted stores.- Maximum Weight.Wing Surface. Fuel Fraction. Maximum Airspeed FL360. Describes the planform shape of a wing.

-. . Weapons Stations. Most frequently. annotated Name. Maximum radius at which a normally air-to-ground mission configured aircraft flying a hi-lo-lo-hi profile can attack a target. Specific Energy SL.'1Os for which the designator is not published in open sources. Gun Rounds.i-. Internal Guns. While it consists of variables measured on both ratio and nominal scales. systems. Target Acquisition Systems 3. Altitude above which aircraft is incapable of further acceleration.' .*-' '-11 i - • .. A measurement of the total mechanical energy (kinetic plus potential) of an aircraft at its maximum air speed and service ceiling. It is displayed in Fable 3. 'FLANRAI)') is used.:.1. Number of weapons stations available for air-to-ground ordnance.. the leading 'AN' portion of the designator has been dropped. • " _ ".2. Maximum weight of air-to-gound ordnance which the aircraft can carry. with nominally measured variables ().. only the ratio level variables are candidates for statistical manipulation. level flight in this instance). Number of rounds of ammunition normally carried for the internal gun(s). Service Ceiling. except measured at sea level.-""-"" "" """-""". Combat Range. Stall Speed. the alpha-numeric designator assigned to the system. The maximum instantaneous level turn performance an aircraft can achieve at sea level in clean configuration.Specific Energy Alt. ? " " "''" :. 40 - . As above...-.!. -. Maximum radius at which a normally air-to-air mission configured aircraft can conduct a sub-sonic area intercept mission.e. a descriptive entry (i. _ l2 A '. Rate of Turn.-.: . . Maximum Ordnance.. Speed at which the aircraft's drag exceeds its aerodynamic lift in level flight. Attack Radius. Measures an aircraft's ability to change its energy state by accelerating.! . "' . Maximum range at which an aircraft can conduct its primary combat mission. : '.----' -"-"" . ? -i':-:. -..3 The next data set is comprised of performance variables associated with target acquisition attributes. Mach . Specific Excess Power.9. such as the St"-27 Flinker. "'2i ''? : " . Number of guns mounted internally to the aircraft.". Calculated at a particular condition of flight (10.2. In the case of' IS.1 '.-'-. For those \.000 ft.i--i . Intercept Radius..-.

. i.. . (... Code Coverage Range-Low Target. .... Range-High Target.. 'Al' for air-intercept. Track While Scan* Ground Mapping.. The first two letters describe the system's generic category (e.g. - ... ECC. Angular lateral coverage provided by the system. Maximum range at which a fighter sized target operating at lower altitude could be detected.. OL. The number of relevant information points (such as range. Data Points. ECCM Capability" A four letter descriptor of system type........round Mapping.M Capability.7-7 r%7'W L-wrw7 -- WK R'. airspeed) the system generates concerning the target.. -41 ... . fndicator of system's relative resistance to electronic counter measures through fcaturcs such as side-lobe suppression or frequency agility. Range-Low Target.1. . . . CNN Illumination. Ability to continue to scan for potential threats while tracking the highest threat target(s).::. akin to the field of view.. . bearing. ..2: Target Acquisition System Variables Name Output Power Range-High Target Data Points CW Illumination* Doppler Beam Sharpening* Code. Maximum range at which a fighter-sized target operating at the same or ligher altitude could be detected.. 'RA' for radar..... Actual or equivalent power emitted by system..g..- - T Table 3. - ... 'LA' for laser) and the second two address its primary employment role (e.. altitude... Output Power. Ability to provide radar display of ground environment with sufficient resolution to identify geographic or cultural features. Ability to provide the continuous wave target illumination required to guide semi-active radar homing air to air missiles.. Track \\While Scan.. Aplty to increase resolution of ground map display so that targets or wa~ppoints can be easily idcntificd. 'GA' for ground-attack).. Coverage. Doppler Beamr Sharpening..... .. i-..

Maximurn range against a receding target. although they will eventually be involved in combat potential computations. is comprised of variables associated with air-to-air missiles. Diameter of missile's body. Length of missile.3. Maximum range against a target which is converging with the launch platform from the forward hemisphere.4 Air-to-Air Missiles The next variable set.(semi active radar homing. Minimum Range-I ail. outlined m Table 3.Missile Weight. this table lists variables measured on both ratio and nominal scales. Range envelope within which the missile is effective against a target approaching from the forward hemisphere. Maximum Range-llead On. Effective Range-le:ad On.) Method by which missile is guided during its terminal phase.Mode. Missile Lengthi. Range from the launch platform within which the missile is ineffective against a tarct approaching from the forvard hemisphere. As with target acquisition systems. etc. Table 3. Trerminal Guidance .3. . infrared. Minimum Range-Hlead On. command guided. -42- - .3: ir to Air lissile Variables Missile Diameter Missile Weight Maximum Range-Head On Effective Range-Head On Minimum Range-Tail Warhead Weight Maximum Speed ECM Susceptibility* Acquisition Mode Missile Length Terminal Guidance Mode* Minimum Range-Head On Maximum Range-Tail Effective Range-Tail Fuzing Options G Limit Guidance Score* Missile Diameter. Gross weight of the missile.1. RZage from the launch platform within which the nissile is ineffctive against a receding target. active radar homing.2. Maximum Range-Tail. Nominally scaled variables are not being considered for statistical processing. .

. - -. Projectile velocity as it exits the gun. expressed in terms gravitational acceleration.-.4: Aerial Gun Variables Maximum Effective Range Muzzle Velocity Calibre Dispersion Rate of Fire Calibre. . Weight of missile warhead.." . . .. lists key variables associated with aerial gun systems.. Range envelope within which the missile is effective against a receding target.. ECM Susceptibility. . or jamming.4. I . Maximum Speed.2. Indicates if guidance system is capable of locking-on to a target beyond visual range. the missile G Limit. Maximum number of rounds which the gun can fire in a minute.. Table 3. Calibre of gun Maximum Effective Range.5 Aerial Guns The final weapon system table. of impact. The number of fuzing methods available. .flt. .. . Table 3. .~. -t. .- . A relative measure of the missile guidance system's susceptibility to defeat by electronic combat measures such as flares. . A measure of relative accuracy which reflects dispersion of rounds around a meian point Dispersion. All of the variables are measured at the ratio level.. . Acquisition Mode. - ----- . an indicator of maneuverability. An indicator of relative guidance system accurancy. Guidance Score. .. - . -43 - " --.. can accept. -. -.1. - '. Maximum missile speed to burnout. Warhead Weight. . Muzzle Velocity. •. .Effective Range-'ail.- - ... . Rate of Fire. Maximum range at which projectile maintains sufficient velocity to remain effective. The maximum centrifugal force. Fuzing Options. chaff. 3. .

-. laser.. and a formal file description is located in Appendix . Indicates capability to dispense non-intrusive electronic combat expendables such as flares or chaff.. For ea... Radar Guided AAM Infrared Guided AAM Number Infrared AAM* Gun System PGM Capable* Release Point Computer* Maintenance Hours Per Flying Hour* Production Country Crew Nlembers. Air Refueling Capable.'ed in mission potential computations are annotated (*).6 Relational Variables Aircraft Conftiuration.. Navigation Category.M. : - Number of aircrew members normally assigned..3.2...-. Radar System. Other Target Acquisition.... variables are defined following the table."".....-.. ation l" Number Radar AAM-..-.. air-to-ground..-. Indicates if aircraft is capable of aerial refueling.. In addition. ...' . Identifies additional target acquisition systems (infra-red search track. Radar Warning Receiver.. adahtifies most sophisticated category of navigation system fitted to the aircraft.- "-. these are assembled in the configuration tile . Variables nvol."..-.. fonvardlooking infrared) installed in or on the aircraft.....-.-.OtherTarget Acquisitig~n Head Up Display ' Stability Augmen. - - -. Indicates presence of an electronic warfare threat receiver (detector)..'-.. Ihis set of variables mates the airframc with its subsystems (target acquisition and weapons).hown in I able 3 5.c of manipulation... Passive ECM.. Table 3. "- • " -.. As was the case previously.. Identifies the target acquisition radar (air intercept.. or multi-mode) installed in the aircraft.".. it contains those combat-related performance variables wich are not suited to statistical manipulation but wluch still need to be considered in calculating air combat potential. Active EC. Indicates equippage with internal or external radar jamming or deception systems.1. .5: Aicraft Configuration "vanables Crew Members'* Air Refueling Capable Navigation qategory* Radar Warnsng Receiver* Passive ECM--Active ECMRadar System .."1 r-I ... "-I .

. if an airframe possesses attributes categorized as speed. . The number of radar guided AAMs normally carried. the list of variables shown in 'Fable 3. Gun System. Relative Utility. Indicates aircraft potential to deliver precision guided air-to-ground munitions..- ... . Stability Augmentation.. The problem of identifying variables which relate system and subsystem attributes to mission output potential presents a thorny challenge. and endurance. Maintenance Hours Per Flying flour. The singular exception are a few indicators which credit a host country such as Israel with making such drastic modifications to the aircraft that it is drastically different from its antecedant. The values for each variable represent the - 45 - ' . At a higher level. Identifies the infrared guided AAM normally carried by the aircraft. Release Point Com puter. . . .II Head Up Display. Production Country. Infrared Guided AAM.6 designates the juncture points. Radar Guided AAM. . Identifies the radar guided air-to-air missile normally carried on the aircraft. maneuverability. Number Infrared AAM. . these would interact in varying proportions to contribute to combat success in particular missions. Applying TASC's concepts in conjunction with advice from air operations experts.. . . PGM Capable. Identifies the aerial gun normally mounted internally. No definitive methodology entirely congruous with the objectives of this project could be identified. . . Number Radar AAM. . . Measures to increase platform stability during air-to-ground weapon delivery. building from the subcomponent to the full air weapon system level. For example. Employing this 'building block' approach. An estimate of the man-maintenance hours required to support one flying hour by a particular system. although the TASCFORM model embodies many applicable concepts. A code which describes the initial country of production for the air weapon system.dentifies the presence of a system which displays operational and combat related data on a combining glass at eye level. . the summed attributes of the airframe would interact with the summed attributes of the the target acquisition system and payload in proportions lhe values of which would be differentiated by mission. The number of infrared AAMs normally carried by the aircraft. Indicates presence of a computer which provides a CCIP/CCRP type solution for release of bombs. those junctures were isolated at which key combat related attributes were joined.

Much of the arms transfer literature concentrates on describing and evaluating the flow of weapons and associated capabilities. To eliminate redundancy. While this approach has its merits. lie 'Vulnerability Component' constitutes a factor ss hich depreciates the combait potential of the entire air weapon" s\stem.2. 46 - . one for each of the projected combat roles: air defense. air superiority. and close air support. but it has by 3cfinition a relative utility of unit). The potential for gleaning accurate data on major systems once they have been introduced into an inventory is more promising tham attempting to capture them 'in the pipeline'.2 Air Weapon System Acquisition System Utility Force Propagation Variables Two alternative variable definition strategies were considered for assembling inventory data. 1 7 The breaks in the table represent the progression of 'blocks' budding to full air 1 18 weapon system potential. Table 3. As such. interdiction. the relative values for its subcomponents need to be idcntificd.relative utility of a given attribute at a given juncture. Additionally. evaluating the combat potential which results from the transfers involves the broader task of fixing those capabilities in the context of a national and regonal force structure.6: Relative Utility Value Variables Airframe Component Airspeed Utility Maneuverability Utility Combat Endurance Utility abli Payload Component Infrared AAM Utility Radar AAM Utility Gun Utility Unguided Ordnance Utility Guided Ordnance Utility Target Acquisition Component Visual System Utility Radar System Utility Secondary System Utility En a ement Vulnerability Component Airs ieed U ilityManeuverability Utility ECM Utility Signature Utility Airframe Utility Payload Utility 3. the task of assembling a untied body of reliable data on the flow of arms is fraught with unccrtainty. 17 IS ~- [he formal description for this file is not presented in Appendix A.6 should con*ev sut ticent iformation to grasp its content adequately. since the file is actualhv coin 0oscd of 76 discrete variables crypticallv identified. each entry actually represents four variables. The presentation in I able 3.

Consequently.r 3.2. 3. Employment Code. 17---- Inventory Consequently.7 lists the inventory related variables on which data would be collected. described in Appendix A.2.- r. To preserve the capability to track combat potential back to the arms transfer source.7: Inventory Variables Country Code Weapon System Name Employment Code Weapon System Inventory Operational Availability Rate Country Code. this study will limit its employment purview to those quantifiable attributes which impinge directly on a national air force's capability to generate a multiple (sortie rate) of the combat potential embodied in its individual weapon systems. . a separate listing of subsystems available to a given country was prepared off-line for entry as variable values in the system configuration fde.7- M. An alpha-numeric code which identifies the likely combat role of the unit to which an air weapon system is assigned (e. a variable stipulating employment code is necessary. An additional consideration is the identification of the likely employment of a weapons system by a given country. The estimated fraction of possessed aircraft which would be available fOr operational employment.P:- r . A two letter code. While the formal inventory file.1 . Table 3. The nuiber of a particular aircraft possessed by a country in a given year. which identifies the country possessing the weapon system.. Identical to aircraft namne. The name of the air weapon system. Weapon System Inventory.g. includes information at the weapon system level only. Joshua Lpstein convincingly dcmonstrated the %iabilitv of' -47 - . Operationally Available Rate. an inventory approach was selected. Table 3.2 Employment As noted earlier. 'IMR' for fidbter-multirole). Weapon System Name. corresponding to DoD standard usage. 'FGA' for fighter-ground attack.2. - - I F . the country of production variable in the system data sets could be employed.2.

additional qualitative variables will be considered on an experimental basis. the length of the tlvin. the maintenance resources avail20 able to the national air force.cit. and military expenditures per GNP. 1 While Epstein acknowledges the important roles personnel quality. Epstein contends that by weighing the amount of maintenance required by an inventory of aircraft against the amount of maintenance available.8. I his limitation will apply even more strinentlv in most Third NWorld countries. the av. Deterrence in the 19. llowvcvcr. number of armed forces per . These measurements are modified by a term which estimates the range of the population to which the average technical value would apply and accounts for the influence of foreign advisors. military expenditures per capita. The Role (I Conventional Air Power. These include the usand. the analyst can set a sortie generation boundary. See cvecn and Vogt. and the employment scenarios in which the force will be employed. - 19 20 21 2Sc *l +++. Discussions with Northrop Corporation analysts revealed that they include estimates t orie duration by mission type. p.. 4 Methodoloi'y 1br . Consequently. variables suggesting motivation were drawn from two other studies which addressed an analogous subject..this concept in evaluating the Soviet air threat to Europe.. and the lengith of the mainrtenance day in :hcir 'ortie L'creration computation.1Aircrw l'.pp. +++. The latter two variables also provide some indication of the relative investment in support resources being made by the country concerned. Motivation is purportedly captured by scaling nations on a psychologically oriented matrix which assesses relative adherence to the 'active mastery' theme inherent im the 'Protestant Ethic'. The remainding qualitative variables will be employed for experimental purposes only and are by no means definitive. its consideration \N'as deferred because of thie predictable lack of aircrew infornation at the unclas. 2 1 While this approach might well be valid. The resulting employment variable set is depicted in Fable 3.ilakilitv of pilots iniaht be an even more potent predictor of sortie uencration boundaries. it is a factor which mizht be reintroduced if sulficient information became available. p. p3. in the Furopean environment at least.O's: Part 11.3B. Llav. doctrine.+ + .32. AWhilc the icthodoloy they emplov is considerably imiore so1h1.ified level.ticatcd than the one contemplated here and is anchorcd at" the weapon system rather than lorce level. the underlying psychological principles and assignment criteria are too speculative to be applied here. One study by The Analytic Sciences Corporation concluded that the _ quality of ground support is the product of the motivation and technical acuity of the servicing groundcrews.. and Pascal ct al. To inject a greater differentiation and realism into the problem. their approach is generally consistent with Fpstcin s. 2 -1 to 2-34. A . and organization play in determining actual rates within an outer sortie generation boundary.lethodology jor l'KSumatniz Conpati e .olicelu'i'. Only the top two quantitative variables will be included in the baseline methodology. See Albcrts.11. op. he asserts that calculating the boundary at least defines the 'worst case' eveji when allthe other variables are assumed to be equal. Unfortunately. - 48 - '4 1W .4ssessiti Groundcrew JPrQocienrcv. C l impcrlake and leveen. Operationalizing the problem requires that the researcher collect data which describes the maintenance requirement imposed by each aircraft. Another study focused on Europe contends that.. The technical acuity dimension is measured by assessing relative educational levels and the effects of exposure to technical systems like automobiles and telephones.

8: Sortie Generation Variables Maintenance Hours Required Maintenance Hours Available Literacy Rate Percentage Eligible in Secondary School Armed Forces Per Thousand Military Expenditures Per Capita Military Expenditures Per GNP Military Expenditures Per Government Expenditures 3. The overall problem was decomposed into two components: one which addresses the combat potential inherent in the systems themselves and a second which considers the force propagation potential of the operating nation.:" Table 3.. the implementation of which will be discussed in Chapter 4. . : 7. .-. ..: .. Each component is further segmented into a hierarchy of subcomponents.-.:. .i.-: --: i . The structure created in this chapter in essence constitutes a data collection plan.. :.3 Summary This section has outlined a methodological structure which will be employed to channel the collection of data relevant to the assessment of the combat potential of Middle Eastern air forces as a function of their acquisition of air weapon systems. _.--": -" . attributes...::-.: :.::.-:.-:"' :-: ..4 . . .: . and the variables which describe them. _ 49. - A. ":' ..

it was necessary from the outset to draw some boundaries for data collcctiou and analytical focus. but soic additional limitations need to be imposed. This temporal limit might appear to cotlict \. Similarly.stems such as the E3A!AWACS. The regional boundary (Middle East) has already been drawn. Though the definition of these boundaries restricts the pla~ing field somewhat.nIuqicTntl\ s. and aii borne tau.cr arc icI included. I loexcr. 4. the inclusion of over 120 combat aircraft makes it a repIescItatIC and viable data set.1.ses and are displayed in the oidcrs of battle.cors unduly effusive in a scheme geared primarily to forward looking evaluation. reconnaissance platforms. traiinuz versions of cnmbatait aircaft Were iIchideL in the iiti aldata b:se compilation and anal\ ~is ph:."% Chapter 4 DATA COLLECTION 4. Ilawkeye. but those advanced or conversion trainers which could be ea~il hit.2 Functional. Since the goal of this study is to evolve a workable methodology rather than to provide umversally applicable substantive solutions.. the essentials of the game are preserved. althoioh thc promise to play an increasingly significant role in Mideast combat. "ihese restrictions on s\stcnv colnidoration limit the field somewhat severely and rearettably exclude some iniportant support a. ith data bases looking back to World War II vintage aircraft.v. although they support combat operations.ith the injunction laid down by other researchers to construct evaluation schemes valid over time. Finally.1 Collection Boundaries. such a broad appioach . rotary-wing combatants are not addressed in this initial stud. Historical merit aside. Nonetheless.Ipei ts 0f corn bat potential estimation. (. no coimbat PtcitLtial scorcs were computcd for them. 4. n d I a combat role are.1 Temporal. A further limitation is to concentrate on those aircraft involved in primary combat roles. aircraft whose sole function is JiicrC\\ PII mary training are not included. - f . Only those combat aircraft employed in the region during the last decade or which milit reasonably be introduced into it during the next will be considered. E2C. - -4 Some reco inaiuce z.1..

3 Informational.1 Conflicting Evidence Along with simple error. and the penalty paid in accuracy by using them will be outweighed by the value of critical comments from the academic community.-+++ + + ++++ + ++ " Analoous considerations apply to other types of data observations as well. The research and intelligence communities are often captivated by the illusion that there is somewhere a number which reflects 'truth' with a capital 'T'.S. combat weight. the conditions 4+ ++. Even seemingly straightforward characteristics (e. As a result. A final note on limitations is intended primarily for U. individual data values might be at odds with those reflected in classified documents. mission profiles.2. although less precise. satisfactorily describe key variances. There is a profusion of data on many variables. unclassified materials. what rule of thumb can be applied to discriminating among competing 'truths'? 4. thrust-towcight ratio. The data included in the various study data bases are taken strictly from open source. Performance characteristics are observed under a variety of conditions.2. Even when they are. the author was. one is struck by a multiplicity of contending 'truths'.: . at times.51 - I. The producer claims the ground attack radius of an F-20A is 550NM. estimates of combat duration and loiter time all contribute to the measurement of a variable like round attack radius. Factors such as weapons load. it is rare that these conditions are cited. In reviewing the many publications and articles offering information on weapon system characteristics and inventories.1. One very well informed author alternativcly notes the ANiAPG-66A (now termed AN/APG-68) radar has a maximum target acquisition range against a low altitude target of 47NM in one book and 38NM in another. Also. 4.1. The unclassified data. wing loading) can be calculated from different but often unspecified bases. Government users. but a substantial portion is contradictory and of undefined derivation. Except in classitied technical publications.. Defense related literature is replete with such examples. a classified product would not be widely available for the critical review and comment of academic researchers. while other sources list it as 455NM and 595NM respectively.2 4.g.1 Some Collection Principles. Large-scale automated statistical processing could not be conducted in a classified environment at the research institution. This limitation was imposed for two reasons. deviations in data values appear to proceed primarily from two sources. required to rely on an estimative process to arrive at data values he recognizes are specified more precisely in authoritative classified data bases. In the absence of a definitive classified source. - '- . counted upon initiation (SlIR I) or upon consurmnation (ACI)A)? P- Is an arms transfer . Additionally.U- 4. Leveling the Field.

... the researcher has two 4 options when confronted with missing data.' 4 Epstein. applied liberally in the research at hand.145-146 . - . .1 All the Numbers Missing data are the bane of the quantitative researcher. .2. . no one source was viewed as 'gospel'. one can stop. the lack of an established performance history appears to leave the field open to 'best case' analysis and some measure of speculation.- . along with information on measurement criteria when presented.. values were adjusted accordingly. . Measuring Military Power. . These principles were... were at least consistent. . Consequently. observation conditions were reviewed or estimated to assess their correspondance to the regional employment environment. . - . 4. The second source of deviation stems from the difference between design goals and realized operational performance. . thrust-to-weight ratio. missing data represented over 20"0 of the obscrations. Values for a system or inventory variable were collected from several sources.. missing data dominated some variable columns and alfccted all. As Joshua Epstein notes. .2. When values conflicted.2 Resolving Contradictions There is no neat method for unravelling the resultant web of uncertainty. and regress to bean counting. - . . Some of the variables for which 3 There is a horizontal dimension to this dilemma as well.2.52 t~i . with higher concentrations in certain key variables and sets of cases. . and wing loading were recomputed using the formulae described below.- .. Once the basic data had been sifted. First. Missing data adulterate statistical results and cast suspicion on final values computed for each case. fuel fraction.-.are invariably unique to a particular case or to a small family of cases.2. .... of necessity. Or. -... . After initial data collection and review.. if any. . one can proceed like a rational animal: by fighting off the conditioned response that perfect measurements are necessary to make a rgasoned judgment on bounds: by drawing the most intelligcnt inferences one can from the data that are available: and by:varying ones assumptions so that the consequences of irreducible uncertainty may be gauged.2 Filling Gaps 4. throw in the towel. pp. Inthis study..: . . but its grasp can be loosened if the collector recognizes the sources of variation and attempts to level the playing field. With newer systems especially.. If deviations appeared substantial. Have the values for unique but related variable for the same system been measured under the same circumstances'. it is virtually 3 impossible to identify values for a variable down an entire list of cases which were similarly observed. •. mathmatically derived values for variables such as combat weight. Even when data did not conflict.1.:. 4. .. measurement conditions were examined if available or estimated if not. The value was selected which most closely approximated the weapons and fuel loads and operational settings deemed likely in regional combat. wing aspect ratio. This procedure generated a set of data bases in which the sources of deviation had been minimized and in which the biases. Across the spectrum of variables and cases.

and tour predictor variables in multiple rcercssion equations. Whether missing data represented a major portion of the observations on a variable or were limited to just a few. aircraft fielded by Dassault-Breguet during the 1970's on which Combat 'G' Limit data were available all showed the same value (7.to fill in the blanks through 'intelligent inference'. the task was the same . the value for the MiG-2313 was assumed to apply to both models.-V I. but some troublesome although scattered gaps in key variable observations remained. A statistical inferential tool. but none were listed for the MIG-23E. Ilowever. 4.3 Regression Analysis. 'W uX. Those pairs which did not also intersect functionally (statistical artifacts) were discarded. combat range. a variety of target acquisition systems.-. and countries with Soviet dominated inventories. stall speed). The relatively innocuous analogical process was successful in reducing the body of missing data considerably. Ihis technique is arguably more powerful than the variable pair approach and bcars fuither 53- C . I) model permitted an increase in the placard limit to 9. For instance. cases with missing data were reviewed to suggest analogous cases for which data on a given variable might be available. In a slightly broader extension. In the penultimate step.' I imit of 7. and the 5 here is always a dantcr of overlooking a differcntiating factor. ..g.2.33. This procedure was particularly fruitful in filling in gaps in observations on individual models of a 'family' of aircraft. three. was employed to fill these gaps. there were no suitable sustitutes for the explanatory power represented by others such as specific excess power.0. notably those pertaining to combat radii and maximum speeds. 6 Some tests were also conducted using two. ~~~M "'JflJ \' . if the service ceiling for the MiG-2313 were cited in an authoritative source. F-15.2.2 Analogous Comparison The inferential process moved through three phases in ascending order of complexity and descending order of certitude. data were most often missing for Soviet and some European produced aircraft. with the results modified by expert judgment. the reawession equations were employed to predict dependent values for all cases. but sensor changes in the C.2.N- W- -V7 more than 50% of the data were missing were dropped in the belief that their explanatory power was negligible or was captured just as well or better by other variables (e. From a case perspective. and combat radii. The remainder were plotted to determine the statistical significance of their relationship and to ascertain if the relationship were distorted by extreme values (outliers). VW V-' V- V- TV bVX' -. regression analysis.. That value was extended to aircraft from the same producer on which definitive information was not available. For example. a 'signature' characteristic of a generation of equipment from the same producer was assigned to cases missing that value. the variable pairs were subjected to regression analysis to define the predictive potential of one to the value of the other and to derive suitable prediction equations. 5 4.2.33). however.A B's had a '(. Pearson correlation coelicicnts were inspected to identify variables pairs which displayed strong statistical affiity. First. 6 Finally. instantaneous rate of turn.

1 Table 4.49856 BETA T SIG T . a.. predicted and actual values correlated closely in the middle of the data set.. In those cases in which values for both variables were known. When the equation was applied to all cases. they showed a positive correlation (r) of 0.. resulting in two predictions (of thirty-eight) that were '-] exploration. . ...88037 and an R' of 0. A scattergram reinforced the picture of a strong positive correlation not unduly influenced by extreme or outlying cases and indicated the variables would display a siginifcant positive relationship in all but one of 10..0000 P. .0000). _. .88037 8. 80131 F . .. 76483 54. I lowevcr.77505.09073 39. .61341 .000 cases (F = . and predicted compared to known values. A 54 - ---. . . should fall within plus or minus 55NM (the standard error) of the actual value..88037 . A solution for the unknown value can be derived by substituting the known value and data from the regression equation into the equation for a straight line: a by + k. A regression problem with air intercept radius as the criterion (dependent) variable and ground attack radius as the predictor (independent) variable was formulated.. The results are depicted in Table 4.869 .results were compared to those cases with known values on the dependent variable to judge the equation's efficacy.67714 Variables in the Equation SE B B Variable round Atk Rad Constant) . on the average. the observed error increased exponentially toward the upper and lower extremes. the value for sub-sonic area intercept was missing for 21 fighters. where (in this case): a = Air intercept radius b Slope of the regression line = y = Value for ground attack radius k = Value of the constant (intercept point) The result of the computation is a predicted value for air intercept radius which. One possible variable from which the unknowns could be predicted was ground attack radius.706 5. a. .78994 232. suggesting good explanatory potential.0000 Signif F = . with error as little two nautical miles.. To illustrate the process. h ...0000 .1: Predicting Air Intercept Radius Ground Attack Radius as a Predictor Multiple R R Square Adjusted R Square Standard Error =75.77505 .. .

the predicted values for the 21 unobserved cases were scrutinized individually and modified or estimated by another method if distortion were suspected. . Analogy and regression work well as gap fillers when values are missing for a limited number of cases and are not disproportionately concentrated on a particular variable or class of cases. and guns). . So. . . the ftnal data bases were submitted for review to two senior fighter pilots (airframes. all variables were analyzed using univariate statistical techniques to flag values which appeared out of character for the data set. In light of these observations. The fact that the element of uncertainty may be transmuted into substantive results does not invalidate the overall assessment technique. air-to-air missiles.in excess of 120NM off. In fact. To the contrary. Those variables or classes of cases for which the bulk of the values were estimated are clearly identified in the following section along with notes on the estimative techniques employed. the regression technique. . and one class of inventory variable were almost universally unavailable through open data sources. Careful estimation of values appeared to be the only practicable solution. . closing all but the most persistent voids in the data sets. S.. . . configuration. when tempered with expert judgment. This process brought the data bases to the level of completeness required by an investigation of this type while also purging them of random and s stenatic error.2. The average error was 16%. nor are its results exact. data on several weapons performance variables. .. over 30 rearession equations were developed and employed.55 - -9 .4 Estimative Analysis. 4. Its methods are not rigorously scientific. the estimation process incorporates a margin of error.. two employment related variables. care was taken to involve ouside experts and other researchers' techniques in bringing the values as close into line with assumed reality as possible. In . the ultimate combat potential computations are designed in such a manner as to permit the painless replacement of estimated data with actual (or better estimated) values if and when they become available. Estimation in this context does not suggest an arbitrary assignment of values simply to provide grist for subsequent evaluations. 4.- all. Suspect values were double checked and replaced if warranted. they did identify a number of values which they knew to be in error or suspected to be out of tolerances. In the tinal analysis.2. and a regional intelligence officer (inventories). Additionally. While their reviews were necessarily cursory. an experienced weapons system operator (target acquisition systems). .2. .. proved a most productive and reliable tool for filling data gaps. . Unfortunately.5 Expert Review. . This cautionary note notwithstanding.2. By definition. and the direction of error was almost equally distributed between high (52%) and low (48%) predictions. 1W . . there is no substitute for informed judgment. . .

.. Other specialized publications such as Cordesman's JordanianArms and the Mideast Militay Balance and The Gulf and the Search for Strategic Stability... With this precept in mind. and French aircraft producers' literature and informally from.. the following paragraphs highlight the primary sources used in compiling the research data bases. British. Primary data sources and mitigating factors are discussed in a lead-in paragraph.3 4. The following subsections are ordered in consonance with the variable grouping scheme outlined in Chapter 3. nor are the results necessarily definitive. and provide explanatory notes on the techniques used to estimate values for variables which were largely unobserved. It is incumbent on the researcher to make the collection process as transparent as practicable so that the user can arrive at his or her own conclusions concerning the information's validity.1 General Comments.. and Air Force Magazine.Sources and Methods 4. followed by specific comments on the derivation of values for those variables which might provoke some question.. Last but not least.--.. not nearly as cleanly systematic as the resulting weli ordered data bases might suggest. attention will be focused on those variables and classes of cases considered noteworthy or potentially contentious. and value descriptions are provided in the formal file description documents in Appendix A.1 Airframe Performance Data.. Ihese will not be addressed individually. . InIcravia... regretably..3. numerous of the author's acquaintances who had direct experience with particular systems.-. The data collection process is.3. some information was obtained directly from American. Full variable names. Compiling values for many of the variables was relatively forthright and non-controversial. Various editions of Jane's All The World's Aircraft constituted the primary source.. identify equations used to calculate derivative values. measurement units. Rather. The most prominent of these were Aviation Week and Space Technology. Armed Forces Journal International. All were compiled using SPSSX coding conventions. Nor will each case in which analogous examples or regression predictions were employed to fill discrete data gaps be discussed. particularly on later model systems. - 56 - N71 -Iv:. so some of the descriptive information is relatively cryptic. A number of periodicals proved fertile sources.3.2. and the associated explanations seWf-evident to the vast majority of readers. closely followed by Gunston and Spick's Modern Air Combat. 4. Sources Airframe performance data were culled from numerous publications.. The full data sets are reproduced in Appendices B through D. and the Department of l)efcnse's Soviet Millitary Power were also invaluable..2 4.

Weapons weight for all air-to-gound lighters .5 .. Because of coding protocols.%lIRIIIEI for the Israeli modified Mirage IIIE). .S. Some explanatory information on variables of interest is provided below.g.4. In those instances in which an aircraft has undergone major modification for a particular recipient. The aeronautical formulae cited were lifted from one of three documents: the U. an additional letter has been attached to the variant code corresponding to the first letter in the name of the operating nation (e. the values were selected which reflected most likely wing sweep during combat employment. For Soviet aircraft..2 Comments The general principles which were applied in sorting through the data and selecting specific values for entry into the data base were described previously. and Legrow's Measuring Military Capabilitiesfor Military and PoliticalAnalysis. In the case of variable geometry wing fighters. Aircraft Designator. This technique was used because most fidhters will rarely fly with a full complement of air-to-ground ordnance. Values were computed from file data using the formula: \"I = WS where: WL W % S Combat Wing L. Values for all aircraft were recalculated to reflect a likely comba.. the name corresponds to the Soviet designator (eg. Wing Aspect Ratio.oading Combat Gross Weight = = Wing Surface Area. AR = Wing Aspect Ratio b = Wing Span S = Wing Surface Area. This measurement was recalculated for each aircraft from data entries for wing span and surface area using the formula: AR = b2 iS. Wing Span and Wing Surface Area. weight. particularly when range is a compelling consideration.as calculted at half of maximum ordnance load and that of bombers at full ordnance load. Values were for the most part taken directly from source documents. as it would be in most Middle Eastern scenarios.. Weapons weight for air-to-air and multi-role aircraft was derived directly from the weight of the z:ir-to-air missiles identified in the aircraft configuration file. MiG-23). where. Basic Aerodynamics.2. Combat Wing Loading.g. The computation added half the internal fuel weight and the weight of a nonal combat weapons load to the aircraft's empty weight. Combat Weight. aircraft names had to be condensed in most instances. B) which is more cornmonly recognizable than the multi-letter Soviet model designators. The aircraft name is followed by the variant designator. The variant designator is derived from the NATO classification (e. All multi-role fighter weights were computed in the air-to-air role.3. -57- - - - - - . Gunston and Spick's Modern Air Combat.. Air Force Fighter Weapons School Instructional Text.

Ps = Specific excess power V(T-D)iW. these were stipulated as 10. Wing surface area and combat weiOt appeared to offer the most explanatory promise. Values for Soviet and earlier generation aircraft were larger than deemed reasonable. Specific Energy at Altitude and at Sea Level. where: V = Velocity (. The ratio of installed (with afterburner at sea level) thrust to combat gross weight. several calculations were tested until the equations which most accurately predicted to the known values were isolated. Thrust and weight data were readily available. although not precise.e altcrnative approaches to estimative hurdles. The weight of internal fuel as a percentage of the clean (without weapons) take-off :% weight of an aircraft.S. 7 drag was 'back-calculated' for those aircraft for which 1 s was known and was compared to variables observed for all aircraft. P5 was then calculated for all cases. velocity.Fuel Fraction. Depicts total aircraft energy (kinetic plus potential) under specified conditions of flight according to the formula: h + V2/2g. With too few observations to conduct a proper regression analysis.9Mach. and attitude. and IG respectively. but information on drag is rarely published in unclassified sources. Thrust-to-Weight Ratio. with one exception. With expert assistance.9 Mach) T = Maximum thrust available D = Drag W = Combat gross weight. Vithout his help. where: Specific energy under the given condition Es * - = h = Altitude (service ceiling or sea level) V = Maximum Airspeed at altitude or sea level g = Force of gravity. Thus. The small number offered scant promise for application of the analogical or regression techniques. Specific excess power can be calculated by the following equation: P. Specific excess power measures an aircraft's relative ability to change its energy state.000ft. These equations were applied to establish values for drag. aircraft which are generally aerodynamically cleaner than their Soviet counterparts and earlier genera7 Colonel Michael Nelson was invaluable in untangling the technical web associated with this and other aeronautical questions and in suegcstin. Authoritative values for specific excess power were available in open sources for less than 20% of the aircraft in the data set. A less rigorous and less reliable estimative approach was called for. In deference to available data. . Specific Excess Power. it is unlikely they would have beenclcarcd. The results were largely satisfactory. This overestimation is believed to result from the fact that the estimates were primarily derived from observations on late-model V. - 5 - . it must be measured from a common energy state described in reference to altitude.

so the results should not distort further applications unduly. To compensate.W 59 - for . available G is constant. wing loading and thrust-to-weight ratio. Corner velocity (Vx) is the speed at which an aircraft can turn most efficiently. Two known variables. Radial G is the vector which defines the plane of a turn and is equal to the square root of cockpit G (Gc) minus one. Data were available on only a handful of cases through unclassified sources. Maximum Instantaneous Rate of Turn. the bias appears consistent. Available Gr increases as the square of velocity up to the structural G limit of the aircraft (Gc) Once that limit is reached. the author had to rely on an expert-assisted estimative procedure. were identified which generally correlated to the V values derived by decomposing published rite of turn data according to the above equation. tion aircraft. An aircraft's best instantaneous turn rate is calculated through the equation: to = K (GriVx). That quality was not captured in the estimate. in turn. with a maximum adjustment of 10 percent.* --. and estimated instantaneous turn rates generated for all cases. where: (0 = Instantaneous turn rate K = A constant which converts radians per second to degrees per second and accounts for the value of gravity Gr Vx = Maximum radial G Comer Velocity. were inserted into the rate of turn equation. Two terms need further explanation.S. Given these tenuous circumstances. the velocity at which available Gr is exhausted. G. While this technique was the best which could be improvised. it was obvious that instantaneous rate of turn would have to be calculated independently not only to fill in the blanks but also to create a common plane of comparison. X These. Since the goal is to calculate the aircraft's best turning performance. the resulting estimates range to the high side. An admittedly unscientific procedure was evolved which predicted to known values fairly accurately. However. and European aircraft were adjusted downward on a case-by-case basis. was set at the aircraft's combat G limit (placard limit) which represents the maximum gravitational force the aircraft's structure is built to withstand. and increasing velocity results in a decreasing rate of turn. estimated P values for Soviet aircraft and early generation U. To grasp an aircraft's best turning performance. This method was used to predict V values for all aircraft. and the conditions under which they had been observed were infrequently cited. Consequently. The immediate problem was that data on Vx is rarely published. it is first necessary to determine its corner velocity. - 7.

This was accounted for by creating a case called 'Visual'. output power for visual acquisition or infrared systems). . [he two measurements were included to account for superior target detection potential accruing to a systecn -60 - IU . sufficient data were not available to differentiate among various laser ranging and target designation systems comfortably. authoritative data were not found on the radars installed on the latest Soviet fighters (Flanker. the measurement variable is not entirely germane to a particular system (e. Fulcrum. but the initial contribution was vital.3 Target Acquisition Systems. The TASCFORMTM Methodology: A Technique for Assessing Comparative Force Modernization served as the template for assigning nominal values to those variables for which interval measures were not appropriate. . Foxhound) or on the infrared search track systems on two Flogger variants. The aircrew has an inherent target acquisition capability irrespective of the systems installed. Second. in a few instances. IRSTSB). Adjustments were made to the data when measurement under conditions other than these was indicated.3. Range-tligh Target and Range-Low Target. Many of the values were subsequently altered to accommodate a different computational methodology.. Third.g. a dummy value was derived from a regression equation which calculated the relationship between range and output power for the radar systems. However. In these. two other volumes from the Jane's series provided invaluable data: Avionics and I3eapons Systems.4.2 Comments Several general notes concern the cases themselves. with the performance data adapted from the putatively analogous Western system. 4.g. the values for which reflect an aircrew's unassisted ability to detect a target. The infrared search track systems are differentiated by the letter of the Flogger model in which they are installed (e. Information was also gleaned from many of the periodicals cited above and from a few producers.g. The radars are identified in terms of the aircraft (e. Consequently.3.. Finally. Finally.3. several articles speculate that their performance characteristics are essentially similar to those of some Western systems.3. In addition to the All the World's Aircraft. The Analytic Sciences Corporation's excellent study. 4. Data were collected which to the greatest extent possiblc reflected the system's capability to detect a fighter-sized target (5m ) while in the scarch mode.1 Sources Data for this set was considerably less profuse than was available for airframes.3. These cautionary comments aside. they were treated as generic cases. 'FLANRAD'). the target acquisition system data base captures the bulk of the key attributes relevant to air combat... with values drawn from the limited data currently available. Values on this case were developed through aircrew interviews and should be viewed as representative rather than absolute.

. 8 Radars possessing a 'depressed angle' rather than pure 'look-down' capability were treated as having a capability against lower altitude targets.4. Associated values were assigned to a separate variable.. .. "+.N . 'SARI' for semi-active radar homing) were entered in the data base..++ +++ . This variable captures the distance required by the system to actuate its guidance system after separation from the launch platform. Gunston's Modern Airborne Missiles proved a most valuable source document.. . Criteria for entering values is as with the previously discussed variable pair. . . . For instance. Data Points. '. 4... while a more modem version is rated at 1.. The scoring scheme was adapted from the one developed by The Analytic Sciences Corporation.7 for a command guided missile to 1. .. .='r .f. Data were entered as available from system description and imputed from other system characteristics when not.0.. " .. one with a single aspect capability on only one. + + :=: . .. A missile with an all aspect capability is measured on both variables. guidance score. .2+ +t. .4 4. Sources Performance data on air-to-air missiles was drawn largely from Jane's Weapons Systems along with many of the aforementioned periodicals...: . These values range from 0.4.". .. .3.2 for one with active radar homing. . ..1 Air-to-Air Missiles. . Systems having this capability had data entered for both variables. .' . The categories of significant data which the acquisition system could relate to the aircrew or weapons computer relative to the target were enumerated for each case.\1inimum Range-tlead On and Minimum Range-Tail. 4. while air-to-ground radars had data entered solely on the 'Low Target' variable. . They are further differentiated to reflect relative accuracy within class..2 Comments Terminal Guidance Mode. r... 8 Air intercept radars capable only of acquiring targets at the same or higher altitudes were measured only on the 'High Target' variable. . altitude..3.which can distinguish a target while 'looking down' into ground clutter. bearing. .-1". . Maximum Range-/lead On and Maximum Range-Tail. and airspeed.7 for a system with a high susceptibility to electronic countermeasures to 1.g. "+. Two maximum range values were entered to differentiate those missiles with all aspect capability from those which can only be launched from the rear hemisphere (primarily infrared guided systems). )L?. The Analytic Sciences Corporation study provided a thoughtful matrix for extracting differentiating values for classes of nominally "- described variables.+ " .. . • "J. As was the case with target acquisition systems.'.:.3. . 1 for a system with very low susceptibility. . ECCM Capability.. an older infrared guided system is scored as a 0. . ". 1- - -.". Values ranged from 0.7t .- " . /:+}. .z A . . but at attenuated ranges. ..9. . Additionally... Descriptive values (e.. . These include range...

3. In the latter regard. It is computed with a for- mula borrowed from the TASC study: Re = Rmax (1 . Rmin i ECM Susceptibility. a value of 0. or electronic jamming. chaff.3. operations analysts at Northrop Corporation s All' craft Division provided insights into framing the estimation problem and practical documentation of estimation tcchniques. The International Institute for Strategic Studies' The Alilitary Balance was used to identif\' the specific weapons available to a country for installation on its aircraft in a given year. while one of 1. Acquisition Mode. Joshua Epstcin s book Measuring Military Power was irreplaceable as a source of data on aircraft man maintenance hours per flying hour and. Aircraft Configuration Data. with some notable additions. Two descriptive values are entered in the data base to indicate if a missile is capable of engaging targets at beyond visual range (BVR) or is limited to visual range engagements (VR).Rmax/Rmin). Adjusts the maximum range of the missile to account for the minimum range which must be covered before it is effective. In this instance. 4. but are used to differentiate employment conditions under the scoring logic which modifies the guidance score according to its pertinence to a particular mission type. as a guide on how to go about estimating values for systems on which data were not p: lished. A few externally mounted guns were included in this data set which is primarily concerned with internal weapons. where: Re = Effective range R max = Maximum range R = Minimum Range.Effective Range-flead On and Effective Range-Tail.1 Relational Variables.7 reflects the system with the lowest susceptibility.3.6.5 Aerial Guns Data for this category were extracted almost exclusively from jane's Weapons Systems. Pod mounted guns were entered to permit their evaluation as a configuration option during weapon system score compilation if desired.1 marks a system which is highly susceptible to countermeasures such as flares. more importantly. but with the spectrum reversed. Some additional data were also taken from brochures distributed by producers. 4. - 62- . The sources for the configuration data set were generally the same as cited above.6 4. Assignment of values for this variable adheres to the same concepts described above. The descriptions are not associated with a numeric value.

For the most part. -63- -. .. Finally. 0 lricn..1 - - --- .5-. one with full up systems to included a radar missile and sophisticated ordnance release point computer capability (F-20A) and one without (F-20).. There arc a handful of exceptions. The values of all of the variables in this file are changeable during the combat potential scoring process. Not shown in this file are the differentiating values associated with these categories. No attempt has been made to identify aircraft for which the recipient country might have some 1" co-production responsibilities. Collecting suficient data on this variable was an elusive task. Weapons system description documents such as Modern Air Combat catalogued possible or likely config- t. The system configurations in this file represent a best estimate which is by no means definitive. For instance. The problem is compounded bv the fact that the maintenance hours required vary from year to year.6 to 1. Navigation Category.. indicating the prcsence or absence of a class of capability or the installation of a particular target acquisition system... The descriptive values entered for this variable categorize the most sophisticat- N. manuficture. sions of an aircraft in deference to political considerations associated with its transfer. .~. . air-to-air missile.--. . ed navigation system installed on the aircraft. When an aircraft has been drastically modified by the recipient..4 rclecting the navigation system's contribution to overall weapons system effectiveness. authoritative data could be obtained on only 21 aircraft. Tlis feature permits the user not only to correct entries that might be in error but also to switch subsystems and weapons to determine their impact on resultant combat potential. ... Country of Production. In fact. some subsystems were deleted from ver- r. Because of these factors. .16C (F-16CSC) was similarly configured for the same reasons. all but two of I. 8 .' little data is published on it. A version of the F. .. the entry on this variable reflects the original country of production. Man Maintenance Hours per Flying Hour (MMIt/FII). an F-II Weapon Systems Operator with 15 years cxpericnce with aircraft navigation systems. mostly pertaining to aircraft in the Israeli inventory. presenting a moving tarect. A . the country of production annotation has been revised to reflect its largely indigenous nature. urations. These values are scaled from 0. which come into play in the combat potential scoring process. sources of secondary transfers are not singled out. owing to political sensitivities. In most cases.. or gun.S. two versions of the Tigershark were configured. .-++ +++ ++ 9 iecateizorics and associated vales were primarily developed by Major William R. a -A . While it suits the purposes of this study pcrfcctly and is described by Fpstcin as the standard index of aircraft maintainability in peacetime. Similarly. The Military Balance and various articles in periodicals and newspapers offered more definitive information on subsystems available to a given country. -. it was necessary to adopt an estimative approach to fixing values for this vari++a++ +++-'. the entries in this data set are self-explanatory. They range from dead reckoning to a global positioning system. The latter version is figured to be the one most likely to be approved for transfer to a Middle Eastern country like Jordan.

64- . White louse. It can be I0 See Fpstein.4 - . 11 See Benjamin Schemmer. and the values derived via this process do that adequately. the resulting values contain many inaccuracies. unless their subsystems were substantially different.Iilitar. 153-165 for the estimative technique which he cmploNed in his study and its justification. such as organizational maintenance concepts. There are other intervening variables which some into play. pp. perhaps some serious. the configuration data base and aircraft descriptions were studied to identify those aircraft which were similarly appointed and were fitted with subsystems of the same vintage.able. These are most frequently measured as Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF) and Mean Time to Repair (MHVR) respectively. Epstein makes a solid case for taking this tack. An aircraft's NITBF is dictated in part by the number and roliability of its subsystems. complexity. Jordanian 4rm. but these will be set aside here. associated workload.ft. Unfortunately. and Congress Concerned over Tactical Aircraft Complexity and Readiness'. l-sini this data as a baseline.. Aircraft were subjectively grouped. plug-in concept of primary maintenance associated with them.MTBFand MTTR were known for an aircraft. It stands to reason that if . Deficiencies in any of these areas can be offset by efficiencies in another. I lowever. while M'TTR is a product of their number. Jordan and Iraq are reportedly displeased with the maintainability and supportability of the Mirage Fl. . noting that. The goal is to assess relative combat potential.1W 2. l0 The MM I. predicting to MMII/ F II would be a fairly accurate process. 12 See Cordesman. and analogous MMtIl/FH values assigned to those aircraft for which the variable was undocumented. it is a viable delimiter of mission generation. newer fighters like the F-20A and the F-16C have multiple subsystems. 'Pentagon. albeit imperfectly. while the estimated figure might not be entirely accurate. causing values for that aircraft to be elevated slightly. and the maintenance procedure involved. p. those data are only marginally more available. For instance. [or instance. Power. 12 lhe process worked satisfactorily for the majority of the aircraft in the file zo generate data which portrayed at least some measure of the relative differentiation among the systems. but the maintenance load is ameliorated through the reliability of advanced microelectronics and the pull-out. A 1980 article presented a body of data taken from Department of Defense reports which categorized 12 fighter aircraft according to their complexity and indicated their respective failure rates. these need not be debilitating within the context and objectives of the study. No doubt.'aurini' . EIt value associated with an aircraft is largely a product of two factors: the frequency with which maintenace is required ant the difficultly of effecting the maintenance.87 --. so the estimation process has to tall back one level and focus on analogous reasoning at the subcomponent level. Some allowances were made Ior discrete reports concerning the reliability of individual systems. and man maintenance hours per sortie. 1 1 Various articles since then provided similar data on nine additional fighters. Multiple variants of a basic airframe were assigned the same value.

The basic questionnaire is included in Appendix C. -" -"-": ". First. subsuming the myriad of micro-considerations which defy individual quantification in an aggregated model. . . .-. . Attempts to decompose or rearrange TASC's values to suit this study's scheme proved unfruitful.. the respondant was asked in another chart to relate them under the same conditions.:. The error resultin. .. the junctures on which relative utility values were needed were organized into a tabular structure which graphically outlined the relationships to be evaluated.-"'"'. Despite the flaws in tile previous applications of MAUT to military analysis outlined in Chapter 2. 13 The figures can be challenged individually. A chart was prepared for each air weapons system component which arrayed the component's key attributes against the four combat missions being evaluated without reference to a particular system. the specific sources of the values and the considerations which went into them were opaque.6.. _.2 Relative Utilities As noted in the previous chapter. . The respondant was asked to make zero-sum determinations on the relative contribution of each attribute to combat success in each catcgory of mission. The collective judgment of experts with first-hand knowledge of the phenomena being investigated is a valid measure of relative merit. . Second. from taking a 'snap-shot' of the data could proc ]ust as tallacious as employing the estimative technique dcscri[)cd here. .-..Jacoby in their explorations of Multi Attribute Utility Technique (MAUT) offered an attractive solution.. .presumed at least that the errors will be no greater than those which might have resulted from picking 'authoritative' data from a single year.'". The concept underlying the survey procedures employed by LeGrow and .I increascd from 0. the survey technique on which it was predicated holds promise if questions are focused on a reduced basket of relationships with which the respondants are all intimately familiar and which could be considered at an intellectually more malleable level of abstraction.... bringing its MlII I'll value down to 41. Third."--. - 65 - •".: o":. The data had to reflect the relative contributions of these attributes to definable mission outputs. a family of data had to be collected to glue weapon system attributes together at their joints..- . -'. the TASC computational process differed from the one under consideration for this study in several important areas. hist two \cars lalcr that value had dropped further to 33.. greater control over the factors considered in formulating the values for the relational vaniables is imperative.30. .3. The subcomponents having been scored. Expert Survey Concept.. . . but as a whole they suit the purposes of this effort. " _. . Survey Formulation. A final chart requested a similar rating of the air weapon system. Since depicting the influence of the Middle Eastern operational environment on relative combat potential is a study goal. the mean time between failure rate for lhe F.. 4. But the specific values (termed 'Weighting Factors') were not suitable for direct adaptation for three reasons.-" '---'.76 to 1.. The Analytic Sciences Corporation embodied this concept in its computational matrices.. . the values were predicated on a Central European operating environment.6. . opcr13 Between the bcnninR of 1976 and the end of 1977. Having been identified previously (Chapter 3)....

. r'r. . along with weapons and tactics officers from two fighter wings with USCENTCOM contingency commitments. While these divergencies tamish the aura of the 'collective wisdom' irnputcd to the imcain or 06 - . and to that of target acquistion modes. percent between the median and mean values. F-16. were requested to participate in the survey.• . . Weapons and tactics officers from the IIQ 9th Air Force Directorate of Operations.. The categories of variables which showed the most pronounced divergencies of opinion were those related to relative utility of radar guided air-to-air missiles. Survey Results. I' ator proficiency. -. Of the 19 variables wlich displayed a range of values in e. These data were used in discriminating among responses if substantial disagreement on individual values cropped up.- . They were processed to determine the distribution of data for each variable and to extract relevant statistical information such as their mean. . control. communications and intelligence support (C 3 I) contributions to success in each mission category.111) were included in the survey. Thirteen had accumulated an average of just over 500 combat hours. They reported an average of almost 2000 hours total fighter time (high:4600.S Air Force at least. F-15. . the range for 15 could be reduced to 30 points by the removal of 3 or fewer of the extreme responscs. with meilian and mean values within 10 percent and with response rarges of 40 points or less. Responses for 57 of 76 vari- ables showed strong central tendencies. and F. * P 1 . Finally. and command. All had flown in exercises which simulated a Southwest Asia combat environment. low:325). r - ° . a lesser breadth of opinion was regitcred conccrniii the relative utilities of target acquisition systems and weapons payloads in the air defcnse and air superiority roles. and eleven had some flying experience in the Middle East. Additionally. Experienced fighter pilots familiar with flying conditions and combat scenarios in the Middle East represented the best source of well informed survey judgments. these are concentrated in Tactical Air Command's 9th Air Force.. An accompanying letter defined the Middle East the the employment region and gave a thumbnail description of a moderate intensity (compared to Central Europe) air operating environment.. I . . whose primary job is developing combat plans and tactics for the Middle East/Southwest Asia contingency operations. So that scenarios and objectives would be well understood. Survey Administration. A-10. Responses for only 10 variables showed a deviation of more than h. points of contact in each organization surveyed were briefed and asked to select those officers who would generate the most thoughtful responses. which serves as the air component of the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM).cess of 40. Twenty-four are pilots. and median values and to establish a range of responses. Within the I. to that of precision guided air-to-ground munitiolls. Officers currently flying six different types of aircraft (A-7. with one an F-111 weapons system operator. maximum. * . five questions were included to establish the respondants system familiarity and fighter and combat experience.V % . F-4. minimum. Data entered into the questionnaire tables were reformatted into an automated file as values for the previously described relative utility variables.

projected acqusition information was extracted from two automated files. and outfitting priorities in the tactical community. . the 1987 inventory figures represent estimates of the aircraft which would be possessed in l)ccomnber. Thus. . . Several periodicals were essential in the latter effort. the Arms Trans/eir Event Data Base produced by Third Point Systems Corporation and the Aerospace/Defense Markets and Technology data base compiled by Predicasts Terminal Systems. the Central Intclligence Agency's The l' orld Factbook.7. Primary source documents for the established inventories were the International Institute for Strategic Studies' 7Te Military Balance . . Additionally. . .1 Air Inventories. Fragmentary data provided in these publications were also used in devcloping force projections through 1990.. 1987. and all of those were reduced to less than 0. . they realistically mirror alternative positions often taken in arguments concerning weapon system development. and the Jaffee Center for Strategic Studies' The Middle East Military Balance. 14 See Ilaloc'. the survey results are sufficiently cohesive to produce relative utility values which might not hit the mark but which will be very close to it. One of two values (mean or median) can be selected as a measure of central tendency to extract a typical score from data sets such as these. Interavia's Air Forces of the World. and JCSS's The Middle East Military Balance.7 4. . employment. and The Air Force Times. Jane's Aerospace Weeklv. These incidental disagreements aside. the scoring procedure is designed so that they can be easily altered by another user to reflect a different viewpoint or the different demands of another employment environment. These included Aviation Week and Space Technology. . -.69-70. The mean is generally regarded as the best descriptor and is preferrable to the median if the data set is not highly skewed. Wlile these values will be used for the remainder of this study. 4. Complete air order of battle (inventor) listings are included in Appendix 1).5 or greater. This procedure was implemented.median values somewhat. The resulting relative utility values are displayed in decimal form in the tables in Appendix C. E-penditures and Arms Transfer Data Base provided by the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and from the World Bank's World Development Report 1985.3. . . Social Statistics. Information on variables concerned with the quality of the maintenance forces was drawn from an automated version of the World Militar. . pp. -67 - N .. Sources The combat aircraft inventories of the 22 nation study set were compiled from published air orders of battle (AOB's) for 1984 and 1985 and supplemented with annual projections through 1990.3. All inventories reflect the end-of-ycar totals for the respective calendar \car. 14 Only 19 of the 76 variables in this data set had skewness values of 0.5 through the removal of 4 or fewer outlying cases. .

Epstein calculated that approximately ten percent of total assigned air force strength accomplished the direct aircraft maintenance function.3 for Libya. Ilowever.2 Comments Data 'Smoothing'. Though virtually no information was available concerning their longer range air modernization plans.7. Libya.3.lrMS. 15 T1o preclude the erroneous impression of ever-expanding inventories. and 'Lessons of the Iam-Iraq War'. listorical data were evaluated in the context of a nation's military investments and assumed logistical capabilities to develop estimates of force level operational availability.9 for Israel to a low of 0. it is highly unlikely that some modernization will not occur. an estimative approach was dictated. op. Without classified data. 16. but it is logical in light of the limited absorptive and support capabilities of the nations in the set. but it is 15 1 his treatment is optimistic. The procedure broke blocks of ordered aircraft down into unit sized increments and spread these over the delivery period. Acquisition Estimates.4. Iordanian . Iraq. Aircraft were treated as operational when sufficient numbers to constitute a unit were on hand.cit. and Staudcnmaicr. Decrements were not enumerated on a strict one-for-one basis. Reviewing data on United States' and Soviet forces in L-urope. Search fr . Estimative techniques were also employed to project possible acquisitions for those countries on which scant planning data were available in open sources. Operationally Available Rate Estimates. it is consistent with tie concept of portraing an outside lunit to combat potcntial. identify the relative spacing between new equipment acquisitions. Maintenance Personnel Estimates. and the PDRY. Cordesmnan. Without access to classified intelligence sources.ic among others Stability. the resultant inventories in the post-1986 period cannot be viewed as definitive. No authoritative data were documented to establish the actual number of personnel available to perform primary maintenance on aircraft possessed by the nations under study. aircraft which would be made obsolete by newer acquisitions were decremented as functional replacements became operational. Looking to future acquisitions. Ilere the procedure was to review a country's acquisition track-record. 16 Sources included lpstein.SUU'. it was impossible to determine precise operationally available rates (OAR) for countries and systems. and forecast the receipt of later model Soviet equipment. data were 'smoothed' to reflect logical entry into a country's inventory when no specific delivery schedule had been reported. particularly for those countries which are Soviet clients. Since values for this variable are integral to the formulation of sortie generation boundaries. Ihe Gu/'and it. since the actual assimilation period would ptrobablV stretch over a \ car or more once the aircraft were in place. but they certainly represent one potential course of force evolution for countries like Syria. The values ranged from 0. but were forecast as functional conversions at the unit level. 'lran. Even at the force level.. This tecuique might provoke controversy. data had to be estimated based on an extrapolation from historical anecdotes.Iraq (1981) - 7 .17 Flis ratio might not be religiously applied in the Middle Last. particularly hin light of the recent introduction into Soviet forces of four new fighters.

Iran). In lieu of more explicit data..69 - 4! .. model. Since the Lebanese Air Force is. indicating the relative literacy and educational background of personnel who would be available for military service in the subsequent study period.. showing an exceptionally 1-gh ratio.. Future year projections were made by applying this ratio to forecast inventories. op. 18 This assertion was validated in small part by a conversation with an aircraft maintenance oflicer from one Middle Eastern country who stated that personnel to aircraft ratio goals were derived f'rom the U. the maintenance man to combat aircraft ratio observed in 1979 was used.. this drastic deviation from the norm would have little actual impact on combat potential estimates. Iran presented a special problem because estimates on air force manpower and operational aircraft in the base year were admittedly speculative.. The Iranian ratio was atypically high (22) because of the minimal numbers of operational aircraft available.likely that most of the nations in the region have borrowed similar personnel allocation concepts from their respective patrons. lie also noted that few of the countries with which he was familiar in the rcgion had attained them. data were assembled as a ten year average. reflecting a more reasonable organizational allocation of manpower. Data on Lebanon were likewise tenuous. 17 For a review of his supporting data. Consequently. the above mentioned source documents were reviewed to extract irdrmation on known national air force manning in the base years (1984 and 1985).cit. Ratios ranged from lows of below 1. Sudan. non-functional. Syria. Data on the motivational variables identified in Chapter 3 were readily available.-" mented the active contingent. Rather than taking a 'snapshot' of a base year. . for all intents and purposes... . Since sortie generation calculations are also limited by the numbers of airframes available. pp. The force quality modifiers developed from it will be applied off-line to illustrate their potential impact and should in no way be regarded as definitive. The technological adaptability variables were drawn from 1982 (percentage of age group in secondary school) and 1984 (literacy rate). South Yemen) to highs in excess of 7 (Israel. Oman. ... see Epstein. this anomaly is not significant. In the case of Israel. Quality of the Maintenance Force.S.. . predicated on the belief that motivational attributes and their impacts on personnel attitudes evolve over time. It must again be emphasized that these variables are 'soft' surrogates for the phenomena being studied and that this data set was compiled for illustrative purposes only. Ten percent of total manning was assumed dedicated to direct maintenance... . .5 (Libya. The number of estimated direct maintenance personnel was divided by the number of operational combat aircraft to identify the maintenance man to combat aircraft ratio which obtained in the base years. .203-207. mobilized personnel au.

14 6.4.. +t+++ . Those readers reviewing the data bases provided in Appendix B and Appendix C will undoubtedly identify variable values they believe fallacious.a ihercntly illusory certitude be demonstrated... their impact will be discrete and predictably marginal and the methodology undergirding them unaffected. Just as surely.4 Protest and Progress.. 19 .19" 19 Fpstein cautions aeainst analytical timidity when forced to employ data which nieht he opcn to question 'Nor shotild anon6 be cowed out of analysis by pseudoscientific demand thit . '.... But those judgments had to be made if the analytic process were to progress. while differing individual values might influence the outcome of specific combat potential computations. The exhaustive data lists are reproduced precisely so that technical experts can draw informed conclusions as to the relative reliability of the study's substantive findings. - 70 - *1 . The data are essential. these occassional factual errors will provoke what Epstein terms the. and every care has been taken to ensure their accuracy.' Epstein. 'storm of affronted protest.' which prevails when explicit judgments on numbers are made. It is important to note that. q .. op'cit.

Measuring Aircraft Capability. Otherwise. The data reduction process must adhere to many of the same considerations enumerated in the discussion of variable selection criteria in Chapter 3.. a credible data reduction scheme must be judged against four criteria. LeGrow.. These are discussed below. . 2 Consequently.2 Alternative Methods Basically.. In addition. propose a procedure which capitalizes on their stong points. -71- '. it cannot be achieved at the expense of incomplete representation of the combat relevant facets. 22 2 -2 2 3 for discussions ofe'cvel of mcasurcnclit concerns. if values for speed (1300kts). either directly or indirectly. [-or example.5 deiyrees/second).. . 1 To complicate the problem further. the value for speed accounts for over 75% of the resulting score.1 Criteria Despite the economies applied in the variable selection and data collection processes. pp. Among the several methods available.. the level at which the values are measured must be appropriate to their application.. rate of turn (19... 2 See Blalock. the task is to create an indexed value for each relevant attribute which can be measured along a homogeneous ratio scale. and describe its application to the data bases at hand. the creation of a relational scoring model presupposes a common mathmatical scale on which all variables are measured. Is it efficient? Is it comprehensive? Does it eliminate the distorting effects of disparate measurement scales? Can its products legitimately be entered into subsequent computations? The following sections will critically review alternative data reduction procedures. The derivation of aggregated values or scores which efficiently measure each of the critical attributes is pivotal in transitioning from raw data to a workable force level model. the higher level computations are distorted by the varying native scales.. therefore..10-20. pp. 15-22.. three appear to have most curreincv in projects of this type. pp. While parsimony is a prime concern.... with an estimate of the degree to which they meet the above criteria. and combat range (390NM) are simply added. each with its drawbacks. 5... Conversely. the sheer volume and differentiation of relevant data exceed manageable proporticns. have ratio properties if they are to be subjected to subsequent multiplicative computations..Chapter 5 DATA REDUCTION 5. no one facet should be asymetrically represented... Social Statistics.. Applied Factor Analysis. and Rummcl. Composite or index variables identified in the data reduction process must.

For instance. A second technique is to use statistical procedures to isolate a variable the values for which vary closely with others linked to the attribute under examination. rate of turn (TURATE) could be selected to stand-in for the attribute in subsequent applications. In a variation on the same theme which accommodates several variables. Could one variable then be reliably selected to represent the attribute defined by both? From one perspective. producing a homogeneously scaled data set . factor analysis can be used to define groupings of variables. Sinle representative variables are identified in two manners. 18-1 9 . with the variable having the highest loading selected as representing the attribute. the loss is negligible.1 Single 'Marker' Variable One approach is to select a single variable which the researcher believes captures the bulk of the significant variation in an attribute.3 For example.cit.000ft and at sea level in this data set are highly correlated (r = 0. While this technique is more powerful than the ones described previously. Table 5. op. this tack is an extension to the most basic level of the concept employed in identifying families of variables described in Chapter 3. it still provides a less than comprehensive portrayal of an attribute's relative value.2. In the TASC studv.. to standardized scores. The process becomes more complicated. when more than two variables are associated with an attribute. a previously discussed study stipulated specific excess power (1Ps) as the sole indicator of combat aircraft maneuverability. The most direct solution is to index all observations of the marker variable to a baseline value. but standardized values by dclini. the procedure has merit.8278). Of course. The researcher can simply assert that the variable captures the essential quality of the attribute. pp. Tis method provides an excellent mode for data comparison. One can safely assume ratio properties since all these kariahles are measured on interval scales with an inplied although never observed natural zero point.5. the choice a single variable discards a measure of the information which describes the attribute. monolithic. If the attnbute . it fails to account for the equally important aspect of lateral maneuverability. . For instance. While Ps plays a vital role in defining energy maneuverability. Since Factor 2 includes all of the maneuverability related variables.4 Variables measured on differing scales could also be converted with ratio properties. % .-.++++t+++++++ ++++ 3 Note that this application of factor analysis differs markedly from the efforts discussed in Chapter 2 in which all variables loading on a factor were incorporated in'creating an attribute score. the values for maximum speed at 36. however. With a multi-faceted attribute.1 depicts the edited results of factor analysis of 18 of the variables in the airframe data set. all values were divided by the corresponding value for the F-413. See lladock. it can be injurious. selection of a single variable does not solve the measurement problem. As with any summarizing technique.72. In effect. as long as the functional relationship between the variables is valid and their correlation is not simply a statistical artifact. Similar relationshfips obtain for many variable pairs.

68453 . Thrust-to-weight ratio.84577 . particularly when solid statistical techniques leavened with expert judgment are employed in the selection.. .1: Airframe Variables Factor Analysis FACTOR SURF CWGT SPAN 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 ..66447 ..84657 . .Table 5. thus.... the marker's explanatory power varies in inverse proportion to the complexity of the attribute being represented.78263 .58949 . W.59075 SCEIL LSPD SPECENA ASPD SPECENS .77102 TURATE TWPWR LIMG PSFL100 CSPD .74275 .55247 tion have no natural zero point and.. some researchers 'build' composite variables which compress the multiple aspects of a complex attribute into a single value. lack the essential ratio property required for multiplicative manipulation.-. eliminating distorting effects and maintaining ratio properties. . turning capability..-. Composites frequently convey meaningful performance related information unobtainable through any singe component measure.....'..80217 .60376 ..76903 .. . and relative lift respectively.. However. composites are legitimate only when their components have a functional - 73 - ". a more inclusive technique is called for... 5..-..2.. . To recapitulate...65941 . wing loading... and wing aspect ratio arc all widely recognized as valid (although not sufficient) indicators of energy maneuverability.81333 . If complex attributes such as manueverability are on the table.82407 . . lowever.2 Composite Indices To overcome the loss of comprehensiveness inherent in the marker variable approach.83257 . . The technique engenders parsimony and negates redundancy.50170 STNS MAXORD GARAD FRANGE AIRAD . . . The use of an indexing scheme to reduce disparate values to a common measurement scale has no major drawbacks. the isolation of a single or marker variable to represent an attribute is theoretically sound.

factor analysis possesses many of the qualities which satisfy the data reduction criteria outlined above. 5 An operationally more legitimate composite variable.2-9 to 2-14. This failing is not insubstantial in a model which aggregation of the cumulative potential of a national inventory. and the computational scheme must reflect accepted operational relationships. Conceptually at least. was created in the TASC study multiplying target acquisition values by the weapons' values. 6 [hc procedure is actually more complex and is described in detail in Vogt. noting the disproportionate impact of minor variations in variable values and its inability to deal with zero values. demands ++++++t+-++t++tt+++ See Sherwin and l.3 7 2-37 4.2. The variables related to most of the attributes under evaluation here do not lend themselves to the composite approach. however. 6 This procedure has considerable merit. The input variables must be critically scrutinzed to ascertain their adaptability to the process.aurance. Other questionable composites include one commonly used in the military community which multiplies payload times radius to indicate relative ground aitack lethality. It is debatable. The factor scoring utility calculates relative scores for each case which add the absolute values for the variables in the data set in consonance with their loadings on the factor. It is efficient. payload. This characteristic permits the researcher to peg the number of factors extracted for subsequent use to the number pertinent to the phenomenon under investigation. It is certainly comprehensive in that there are structural limits on the number of variables which can be analyzed. since groups of statistically related variables are arrayed into factors. since the two variables have a synergistic relationship. this type of functionally defensible composite does meet the basic criteria and offers a data reduction option under rigorously controlled circumstances.3 Factor Analysis . Nonetheless.A Reprise At first blush. Sherwin and Lau- rance demonstrated the inadequacies of this procedure. the major drawback is that factor scores are interval level measures wlich are not natural candidates for subsequent computations involving multiplication or division. IN II . 5. if the multiplicative process is a true representation of it. pp. Thc TISC)FOR. 'Payload Utility'.impact on the attribute being represented and their combinational mode reflects an engineering or operational reality. There is no inherent fallacy in composite variable construction but its application can be crippled through unrealistic variable combination. - 74-. A single value measured on a common scale is thus generated for each case on as many factors as are required to reach the desired level of explanation. each of which accounts for a specified proportion of the overall variance within the data set. Rattinger proposed a multiplicative combination of speed. 'Arms Transfers and Military Capability'. To borrow an anology from another section of the same report.1I1 Methodology. it is questionable if a target acquisition system twice as capable as its predecessor were mated with a missile system twice as capable as its predecessor that the product would be four times as potent. and combat radius as a composite measure of aircraft performance. pp.

Summary 5. its output is not fully amenable to inclusion in subsequent computations. Factor analysis offers the most comprehensive solution but is ineffective when applied exclusively at the weapon system level. - - . Factor models incorporate no inherent logic for the aggregation of scores for multiple attributes (factors). factor analysis defines variable groupings which are statistically valid but which often lack functional legitimacy. ' - . If all variables in the problem were functionally associated with the attribute being analyzed.' . With attributes already defined and linked. further elaboration of the minimalist factor analysis approach is warranted. .. .4 Each of the data reduction techniques investigated has significant assets and liabilities.. ' -. • • . Additionally. The calculation of scores for performance attributes includes values for variables which are operationally extraneous. The creation of composites is a valid but spotty solution of too limited applicability to satisfy the majority of analytical requirements in this investigation.2... Setting aside the level of ineasurement problem for the moment. there is no requirement for the simultaneous factorial analysis of all variables which pertain to an air weapon system. " . .q Chapter 2 sampled factor analysis based aircraft capabilities studies and highlighted the deficiencies encountered in using factor analysis to spring from raw variable values directly to an employment level combat potential assessment.. Implemented at the systems level. These substantial defects in application aside. Therefore.. it '" was observed that the attempts to relate a minimum number of factors to such overarching concepts as offensive and defensive capabilities or air-to-air and air-to-ground potential exceeded the reasonable bounds imposed by the nature of the technique itself and by the explanatory breadth of the variables considered. . data reduction need only be accomplished within the realm of each attribute itself. . . some additional deficiencies were highlighted.. • . . The use of marker variables isolated by whatever technique is parsimonious but sacrifices too much explanatory power.. the factor analysis technique did demonstrate a facility for educing a common scale for the composite measurement of the contribution of multipie variables to the value of a specific attribute. " . but the kernel of a solution resides in a factor analysis process construed less ambitiously." .3 A Minimalist Approach A data reduction scheme which meets the stipulated criteria might seem unobtainable. Exploring the more sophisticated application conducted by the Analytic Assessments Corporation.. In reviewing the factor analyses accomplished by Snider and LeGrow. . '" .p. ' . the derived thctor scores would be purged of the debilitating influence of irrelevant values. 5..".- 75 " -. - -A'. The programmatic structure extruded in Chapter 3 provided a framework in which essential weapon system attributes and thcir functional relationships were qualitatively delineated.. .

. The association is unremarkable. Variables could simply be assigned to an attribute group based on their functional relationships. Its expected association with range related variables (Factor 4) did not materialize. Reflecting on the observations made concerning earlier studies. The field thus narrowed.2 The Airframe Example Principal components factor analysis was accomplished for all weapon systems subcomponents.5% of the total variance was limited to wing aspect ratio (ARWNG) and wing span (SPAN). Just the procedure to identify and allocate those variables associated with airframes will be described in detail. 5.9% of the overall variation in the data set. Factor 5. The latter technique offers the advantage of previewing statistical anomalies and flagging possible redundanicies. reliance on factor analysis alone to accomplish this function could cause more problems than it solves.76 - . etc..g. missile.) level. The next step is to evaluate these statistical results within the context of previously identified airframe attributes and examine them for functional relevance and statistical redundancy. they were excluded from this phase of the data reduction effort and relegated to insertion during the combat potential computation phase. Vulnerability Attribute. A key factor in an aircraft's susceptibility to engagement is its size. The two exceptions were maximum thrust (MAXPWR) and specific energy at altitude (SPECENA).1. there are two alternatives for associating variables with attributes for factor analysis. Five factors were extracted. along with the variable for wing loading (WILOAI)). Those variables measuring energy and lateral maneuverability loaded distinctly on Factor 3.1 Analyze or Assign The first task is to isolate and screen those variables contributing to the attributes identified in Chapter 3.1 5. The happy medium is to begin with subcomponent level factor analysis and then modify its results judgmentally. while Factor 4 encompassed range and air-to-ground ordnance related variables. airframe. Bigger aircraft can be detected moore .3.Variable Reduction 5.1. with values on 125 combat aircraft which are currently operated or might be acquired by Middle Eastern states. Speed and energy related variables loaded heavily on the second factor. although weakly. but the same procedure was applied to each subcomponent. Table 5. accounting for 85.2 displays the results of the factor analysis of 26 variables.3. Variables loading en the first factor were primarily those associated with aircraft size and weight. Fuel fraction (FUFRAC) loaded unexplainably on this factor. To preclude the previously discussed distortions which arise when dichotomous variables are factor analyzed. . since the square of wing span is the nominator in the wing aspect ratio calculation. or they could be statistically grouped using factor analysis at the subcomponent (e. which accounted for just 4.3. . .

two.93662 surely at greater range visually or with radar.82569 . I VW 77 .125 Combat Aircraft FACTOR 1 CWGT EWGT FWGT MAXPWR * MWGT SURF SPAN SPECENA CSPD FUFRAC FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4 FACTOR 5 .65390 . which contribute their own dynamics.76382 FRANGE GARAD MAXORD AIRAD STNS .79935 .68444 LSPD SCEIL ASPD SPECENS WLOAD FACTOR 2 .- -r. Of the remaining six variables.86434 . - 77 - .55114 TWPWR PSFLIO0 TURATE LIMG .89053 .67524 . FWGT.65932 .and it has already been stipulated that aircraft rarely operate in combat at their maximum weight (MWGT).and wing surface area (SURF). Therefore.70448 .87697 .85250 . and MAXPWR were eliminated from further processing. Table 5.73902 . specific energy at altitude PFCFNA) and specific energy at sea level (SPILCENS) are products of calculations in which maximum Other attributes contributing to susceptibility to engagement are its speed and maneuverability.67392 ARWNG ..67755 .60071 65136 . Maximum power (MAXPWR) is irrelevant to the attribute and is assumed to load with these variables because larger aircraft require greater power.69763 . leaving the size attribute of the susceptibility to engagement calculation described bY the variables combat weight (CWGT). The variables which loaded on the second factor were for the most part measurements of various aspects of airspeed and energy. 7 An aircraft's empty weight (EWGT) and fuel weight (FWGT) are subsumed inthe calculation of its combat weight (CWGT).2: Factor Analysis . Airspeed/Energy Attribute. Wing loading (WLOAD) and fuel fraction (FUFRAC) are the major exceptions.69927 .60204 .89504 89093 .64482 .85243 . and their inclusion in the factor is a statistical quirk rather than a meaningfhl functional association. wing span (SPAN). -. EWGT.

airspeed at altitude (ASPD), service ceiling (SCEIL), and maximum airspeed at sea level (LSPD) are

cle-

ments. Since the specific energy variables constitute a more sophisticated measure of the speed/energy
attribute, they were selected for insertion into the scoring process, along with rate of climb (CS PD). This
screening eliminated the adverse influence of redundant measures of comparable phenomena and limited
the remaining field to variables the values of which showed a more normal distribution than their antecedents. 8
Maneuverability Attribute. Factor 3 variables are all statistically and functionally related to maneuverability (acceleration and turning). The design G value (LIMG) was subsumed in the calculation for
maximum instantaneous turn rate (TURATE), and the thrust-to-weight ratio value (TWPWR) was used
in estimating the denominator in the rate of turn equation and is closely correlated (0.98) to specific excess
power (PSFLI00).

For the sake of efficiency, TWPWR and LIMG were eliminated from further pro-

cessing.
Range/Endurance and Payload Attributes. The fourth factor encompasses variables associated with
two airframe attributes: range or endurance capability and payload capacity. It is not illogical that these
variable should load on the same factor statistically, since aircraft designed to carry large volumes of ordnance are also usually designed to carry it greater distances. More subtly, an aircraft with multiple external stations and and a heavier external load capacity can also carry more external fuel, thereby extending
its range in certain configurations. However, the simultaneous consideration of payload and range related
variables m the same same factor scoring module does not satisfy the goal of extracting separate values for
the range and air- to-ground payload attributes. A composite score for a notional range.payload attribute
would fail to capture the varying utility of these qualities in different mission roles. 9
Consequently, this factor was split into two 'sub-factors' which correspond to the attributes for
which measurements are desired: air-to-ground payload and range. A further subdivision of the range or
endurance attribute was also required to accommodate processing considerations. Aircraft with singular
mission roles (e.g.interceptors or ground attack fighters) had values entered only for the variable, area
intercept radius (AIRAD) or ground attack radius (GARAD), which corresponded to their mission category. As a result, these two variables are replete with missing values, a fact which causes serious abhormalities in the factor analysis solution and permits factor scoring only if mean values are inserted in place
of the missing data.'() The solution was to process air-to-air and air-to-ground aircraft in separate runs.
8 A\SPI,
and SCEil
-,SPI),were skewed -0.256, -1.229, and -0.890 respectively. SlITCFNA has a
skewness value of )0.69 and SPECENS one of .447.
9 Additionally, it should be remembered that the payload attribute for aircraft accompliing air- to-air
missions is alreadv described in terms of specific missiles in the contiguration tile, inaking the gross
measure of carrying capacity irrelevant.
10 An alternate was to create separate air to ground and air to air data bases with a variable akin to
,V\C's 'mission radius'. [his solution was r-ejected as being unnecessarily duplicative.
-

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Multi-role fighters were inserted in each. The final lineup was a factor group representing the air-toground payload attribute comprised of maximum ordance capability (MAXORD) and air-to-ground ordnance weapons stations (STNS); one focusing on the air-to-air endurance attribute, area intercept radius
(AIRAD) and ferry range (FRANGE); and one capturing the air-to-ground endurance attribute made up
of ground attack radius (GARAD) and ferry range.

1

The Orphan Attribute. The fifth and final factor presents an interpretation dilemma. Wing aspect
ratio is an indicator of relative lift, but it loaded on neither of the attributes which might have been anticipated, speed/energy or maneuverability. Since the explanatory power of this final factor was negligible
and did not correspond to an essential airframe attribute, it was dropped.

5.3.1.3

Target Acquisition Systems, Missiles, and Guns.

An analogous process was accomplished for each of the other air weapon system subcomponents. To
avoid repetitiun, just the high points and anomalies associated with them will be noted. As with airframes, variables described by nominal or dichotomous values were not entered into the factor problems.
All of the variables in the target acquisition set loaded on a single factor. This was categorized as comprising the 'performance' attribute. The gun variable 'dispersion' is inversely related to accuracy. To
channel the scoring thrust in a positive direction, this variable was transformed into a reciprocal. Two
factors were extracted, with muzzle velocity and rate of fire loading heavily on one; and calibre, maximum
effective range, and the reciprocal of dispersion loading on the other. The .,vo factors were separated and
scored as for airframes. In the air- to-air missile set, variables loaded on two factors. The first showed
heavy loading for those variables related to a missile's performance or lethality (the six range related variables, speed, warhead weight), while the second was composed of those defining a missile's vulnerability
to detection and target maneuvering (diameter, weight. and a negative loading for the maneuverability
variable, G limit). Since the maximum and minimum range variables against high and low altitude targets
had been the values in the maximum effective range computations, they were set aside. The G limit variable was transformed into a reciprocal, so that highly maneuverable missiles would score lowest on the
vulnerability attribute. Two separate factor scoring problems were formulated to derive scores for each
attribute.

-:- +

11

+ +4----4444
++++++++.- 4.4.

Althouzh th fuel fraction variable did not load on this factor, it was testc- alon xvitn the range
v'ariabl( s in deriving factor scores. Its inclusion generated results which in some in i'c s were it
drastic variance with known relative endurance qualitics. The probable rcaton is that the vaiiable
It ) ikel\ a valid rclaaccounts only for relative fucl capacity and not fuel consumption efficiencv.
tivc indicator if a single class of sinilarlv engined aircraft is under studvy7 When "pP'licd ac, )SS a
sample as broad as thi.s, its cects are counterproductive.
- 79 -

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14040

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cem. values for all remaining var. creating sets of attribute values which intuitively had ratio properties. its airspecd. 5. The same procedure was employed for each attribute.. .2 A Possible Resolution The threads of a possible solution reside in the nature of the data processed in this particular string of analyses.1 The Dilemma As noted previously.5. 1he AAC study. The influence exerted by negative factor score coefficients was preempted by the insertion into each attribute problem of only those variables which load heavily (statistically and functionally) on the factor and the conversion to reciprocal values of those variables which load negatively. for instance. this time with factor scores produced. A\s ludicrous as the example mivht .ables could be assumed to have ratio properties. Since the values for these cases constituted valid natural zero points when entered into the problem. Its inverse was then added to each score on the attribute. Several mathmatical solutions were attempted. Ilhus.3.2. would hc .2 Attribute Indices Utilization . mission endurance.. . The inverses of the values for the control cases were added to factor scores for the operative cases. 5.cro would not fly. a 'control' case was created for each subsystem with a value of zcro assigned to all its variables. it is no more unrealistic to postulate than the notion of .3. all basically anchored by tried techniques for reversing the standardized scoring process. would not the scores generated for them also constitute the zero point of the factor score scale? To explore the potential..3.trdncss of the conception. Factor analysis was accomplished at the subcomponent level to determine if the insertion of the control case forced a redefinition of the factors (attributes). etc. including a natural zero point.'Cro l)cpite the a~kkw. Still. an arbitrary system was employed in the analysis prototype. A more substantial token of validity is required. the fact that all raw data are transformed into standardized values prior to score calculation stands as a barrier. a notional aircraft with an absolute capability of . Since nominal and dichotomous variables were excluded from factor scoring..2. The solution is workable but unsatisfying. manfeum erabilit\. spcculated that a value live standard deviations from the mean niiht constitute a reasonable surrogate for zero. A nominal zero surrogate factor score was created at a point one standard deviation below the lowest authentic factor score in each attribute set. smacking of smoke and mirrors. I lowever. the aggregation methodology contemplated for this study demands attribute values be measured on ratio scales. logical assertion does not lceitimate the approach. 13 It was observed that the few older aircraft which had no capacity to carry external ordnance (weapons stations and maximum ordnance = 0) still received a factor score value. crature or ditance. 12 13 . The data bases all contained systems the performance characteristics of which verged on the minimum essential to a weapon which would have even a negligible combat impact. The basic groupings remained the same. 12 In fact.'ero temp".

52237 -. . 23149 .2.59509 -. VAR2. The data were subjected to principal components factor analysis.3.19392 . VAR3) was created with values for ten cases. follow precisely the same progession as the input data. As can be readil.02424 .55135 - . 38784 .4. their values. Subsequent cases were given a value which doubled that for the previous case.00000 01212 .33333.3: An Observable Data Set CASE VARI Case0 Casel Case2 Case3 Case4 Case5 Case6 Case7 Case8 Case9 VAR2 0 1 2 4 8 16 32 64 128 256 VAR3 0 3 6 12 4 4880 96 192 384 768 0 5 10 20 40 160 320 640 1280 The scores are listed under the heading 'FACTOR SCORES (RAW)' in Table 5.77568 1. 60721 -. and 'Casel' was assigned the value of a prime number. A notional three variable data set (VARI.61933) was added to the factor score for each case. 'Case0' was assigned values of zero for each variable.3 The Ratio Test The key element in establishing credibility is to demonstrate that the adjusted scores possess the same ratio relationships as the input values.4: Adjusted Ratio level Scores CASE CaseO Casel Case2 Case3 Case4 Case5 Case6 Case7 Case8 FACTOR SCORE (RAW) -. and the results tabulated under the column annotated 'FACTOR SCORES (ADJUSTED)'.5.15635 .93202 - I - FACTOR SCORE (ADJUSTED) .61933 -. seen.3. Table 5. All showed a loading of one on a single factor. Table 5.42541 -.04848 .09696 - . It is shown in Table 5.57085 -. with rounding. Reaching that goal with the study data files is patently infeasible. The inverse of the raw factor score for 'CaseO' (. with factor score coefficients of 0.

The inclusion of a control case unarguably alters the spread of the study data sets. i(i-25R and \li(i-251 qnirac-VA and . lowever. Clearly. Ordinal rankings were determined for each attribute pair. The first is the most troublesome. but a cursory review of scores for airframes with and without the control case showed the changes in the values of the derived factor scores for the active cases. the same test was conducted. maneuverability. the inclusion of zero values forced a more normal distribution for several variables which were ske'wed to the right.9991 To put the effects of the insertion of the control case inperspective. the addItion or deletion of anv case. will chace the relative scores and may chanue the relative rankins.9997 9999 0. most of the chancs could be traced to order reversals among variants of the same basic airframe (i..5: Impact of the Control Case on Rankings ATTRIBUTE SPEARMAN' s RHO Speed/Energ Maneuverablit Air-to-Ground Range Air-to-Air Range External Ordnance 0.2. The magnitude and direction of the changes had to be determined along with their effect on relative rankings. 15 Factor scores were generated for five of the attribute groupings of the airframe data set under two conditions. and the application of the zero based scoring technique appears to exact two. its clhlct i'inconM-' qucnfiad. and air-to-air range scores was comparable.e. the factor patterns and score coefficients did not change. I lence. The effect on the speed.9988 0. 14 As noted above. Ilhe vast majoritv of rankin. and the results compared using a non-parametric correlation procedure.. The results are depicted in Table 5.While the reason for this phenomena is unclear.Z- ' . Onks a handful chanced by more than two positions and just one'by more than two positions• tour) \Wimth the exception of the inexplicable tour position change on one case. l factor scores represent relative values within the confines of the factor space. iragc-l IB).. I'hese'chanvcs arc a result of the stan&irdization transformation x% Iich is -applied to all absolute values prior to score generation. the correla- tion of scores for the ar-to-ground range and external ordnance attributes dropped to .5. Case bv case results were also reviewed.9906 0. this time removing two active cases from the file (a fighter-interceptor and a ground attack fighter). the effects of the insertion of the control case on relative case rankings was negligible.97)9 and .3.zs remained the sanc. active or control.5. S2 .. 16 Table 5.4 The Distortion Test No solution is without its price.9566 rcspectivclv.. Thus. one with the control case and one without. it can be safely assumed that the insertion of the control case has at least no greater 14 15 Ironicallv.

--. .alidatinu factor. .. . the number of cases in which the zero based score increased was larger than the number in which the reverse was true. Within the more compact value ranges. Thus.5 The Scale Test The second price exacted by the adjusted scoring technique concerns the comparability of inter-attribute measurement scales. The reverse was true for values which fell above the median.verse. The threshold values themselves would in effect determine a portion of the relative weight accorded each attribute during the additive phase of the scoring process. the mean of each score set is equal to the inverse of the raw factor score of the sets control case. Chanes in case composition are made rezularlv. Predictably. 5. The same paired lists of scores were compared through the Wicoxon Signed-Pairs Test to determine the direction and locus of differences. 17 Although the effect of the control case on the scores' rank orders was inconsequential. . Sin e any list of cases represents a sample of a Ihrucr un. but fails to provide the desired common frame of reference across subsystems. ranging from a low of -1. It merely expands or contracts the space within which relative values are determined. . for inst.effect on relative case rankings than would the addition or deletion of active cases. standard deviations. providing greater differentiation. Output statistics reflect the same tendencies for each pair of lists. and and value ranges decreased slightly for the lists computed with the zero base. .85510 for maneuverability. to 125 cases over the course of the stud%. The raw scores for the zero point varied considerably among the attribute sets. . an argument could be made that the zero values provided a more well-defined representation of the actual ratio differences among the active case input values. their inverses constitute an uneven threshold. these statistics suggest that the insertion of the control case does not adversely distort the sets of attribute factor scores. their mean is I.erse of the raw factor score for absolute ) to the mean case creates a mean equal to the value( of the mncrse. " i. .. The means. Coupled with the results of the rank order correlation test.90708 for the ordnance attribute to a high of -4. The means of the values falling in the first two quartiles were higher (less low) for the factor scores computed using the data sets including the control case. -' " " . crew from 5. the effect of the inclusion or cxclusion of cscs does not constitute a in. The concept of indexing each attribute to the values for a given system satisfies the objective within the subsystem groupings.2. For each pair.. although this would be difficult to substantiate. A more viable alternative is to index each attribute score set to its own means.X3- ' . scores toward the higher end of the scale increased slightly while those toward the bottom decreased. ". . Since the raw factor scores are standardied.0000).3. ' ' " ' " . a variation on the indexing technique was adopted. V8 To cast the adjustment process 18 ".ance. it is prudent to observe its impact on the score values themselves. Conversely. Considering the nature of the adjustment process. The initial airframe tile. After several false starts involving the computation of a grand mean across the attribute data sets. the two-tailed signifi- cance tests rejected the hypothesis that respective distributions were not similar (P = . dding e in'. mirroring the problem caused by adding disparately scaled values discussed at the beinnig of the chapter..

-._arding intcrprctation of the data in the tables. in turn.. can be mated with with force propagation attributes to determine aggregate potential at the national level.4..rc. .. . a less accurate portrayal of reality than its contributing parts.. . like that of any data reduction scheme. the ratio properties of case scores can be restored in relation to a control case. and offer some subjective assessments of them. .. The outputs from this chain of analyses form the inputs along with the values for the nominally scored variables and relational variables to formulae computing a weapon system s relative technical potential in combat roles...corcd charactcnstics such as vanablc camber . . Most important l. .A ... it generates raw factor scores which portray the relative value of each case on a given attribute."-. . but a modestly geared factor analysis technique has sufficient merit on balance to warrant its employment. .. Finally.. 5. airframes with slighkl - ianee' Ilic per- dilicrcli rai\ factor k. in "omne instances.. These. the scores hive..". it remains to generate adjusted factor scores for the various subsystem attributes and judge the results subjectively. . . capsulize results. This section will touch on the salient points associated with each data reduction iteration. Complete listings ot the adjusted factor scores for each subsystem are presented in Appendix F.:.--".. it best satisfies the four criteria for effective data reduction postulated in the introduction. .-. . ." .. fI4 %-A -.. bcci .. .. in equation form. Of the alternatives." .. it defines the groupings of variables which most efficiently captured an attribute s value. . "-. . 5..-. Applied at the subsystem level in conjunction with subjective appraisal.V 7-. .... .1 The Airframe Subsystem Scores for the five attributes comprising the airframe subsvstem were derived using the miniinalst lactor analysis technique described in the preceding section.3 Raw Factor Score for CaseO. but no modilication has %et bccn made to account bor the influence ()I noninilx .- . where: fla =Adjusted Factor Score for Casel fl= Raw Factor Score for Case I f= 5. . .. ... "".3. the adjusted factor score for Case I would be calculated: fla = ((fl + (fo * -l))/(fo * -1). .4 Data Reduction Results [he spadework done. .. and the adjusted scores indexed to their means to create a common frame of reference across attributes and subsystems."'1 " : " . -- ..-. At the attribute level. . .". lie raw and adjusted factor scores for the top 15 scoring airframes are displayed in the tables for each attribute Some cautionary notes ire in ordr 7 rc..-.. A Reduction Method The path might have been tortuous and its end.. . ". .inus (maneuverability) or navigaiional cipibmlit CCptiVc reTxIwcr will alko note that.idjpitcd initihrnaiticallv.. .-.

design. 14-17. V . for an informative discussion of tlie relative merits of various airframe attributes n combat. and its combat weight calculated on the basis of that configuration. The location of the Mirage-FIE at the top of the list might seem surprising. 186-193. while retaining a Mach 1.-WI -07 _V P- V I -.5 capability at altitude.S. 1) 20 i8 Where multiple variants of a basic airframe have the same score on an attribute.M: ICW7- . . It should be remembered that each variant is specifically configured. This anomaly is caused by the truncation for display purposes of the latter value to three decimal places. I IS A 13C I)).19 5.e. it is instructive to note that II of the 15 aircraft which rank highest on the speed energy attribute are not of U. However. in particular maneuverability and detectability.K.unston. V_ are shown as having the same adjusted factor score in the display tables. See Modern Air Combat pp. Like all of the later model Dassault fighters. T" V. or U. But the MiG-25's have a relatively poor speed capability at lower altitudes due to their airframe design and structural composition. while the other variant (F-20) carries only the lighter AIM-9's. Finally. which are used in aggregate score computations.6. In fact.1. the Tigershark variant whose radar has the continuous wave target illumination option installed (F-20A) is configured with AIM-7 and AIM-9 air-to-air missiles. and pp.. the scores can be dissimilar and legitimately so. Thus. it also has a high rate of climb. I-. the most capable configuration of this aircraft has modifications to cockpit transparency and wing leading edges which give it a Mach 2.1 Speed/Energy Attribute The raw and adjusted factor scores for fifteen airframes which scored highest in the 125 airframe set are depicted in Table 5. The automated files retain five decimal place values. Since combat weight or a composite variable of which it is a component is involved in the factor analysis of these two attributes. the positioning of the MiG-25s is an endorsement of the principal that a single dimensioned 'marker' variable is insufficient to portray a meaningful picture of combat speed. the score is credited to a single designator describing all the variants to which the score applies (i. It has been observed that designers from these two countries have recognized the limited applicability of speeds in excess of Mach 1.4. which set high altitude speed records. The placement of the MiG-25R. The question may also arise as to why similar variants of an airframe have different scores on the same attribute. in sixth position might also take some rev iewcrs aback.2 top speed at sea level.20.8 in most combat scenarios and have subordinated technologically attainable maximum speeds to other considerations such as mancuverability.

Table 5.6: Airspeed,, Energy Factor Scores
AIRFRAME

FACTOR
SCORE
(RAW)

MIRFIE

1. 71643

1.734

MIG31
MIR2000C/T
MIG25R

1. 32272
1. 31800
1.29513

1.566
1. 563
1.081

MIR20O0R
F15A/B/C/D
SU27
MIG23G
FI5E

1.21650

1.520

1. 19940
1.18451
1.12331
1.09501
1. 09396

1. 513
1.506
1.480
1.468
1.468

FA18L
F16ALB/C/D
MIG23B

1. 08935
1. 07952
1. 07450

1. 466
1.462
1.459

MIG29

1.36185

MIG25/U

MIR4000

5.4.1.2

FACTOR
SCORE
(ADJUSTED)

1.09134

1.582

1.467

Maneuverability Attribute

The factor scores scaling relative maneuverability, Table 5.7, will perhaps provoke the most controversy,
since the results seem to challenge the assumed ascendancy of the lightweight fighter in this attribute.
However, it must be remembered that the attribute adresses maneuverability in two dimensions, energy
maneuverability or acceleration and instantaneous turning performance. The former dimension contributes to the positioning of the F-15E and SU-27 at the top of the list. It also bears mentioning that the
performance data on these fighters and on the MiG-29, Mirage-4000, and other new models are predicated
on design goals or prototype test results and not on operational performance.

It can be safCIU

assumed

that many of the values on vet-to-be-fielded systems will be altered when they reach operational status
and track records are scrutinized. The high maneuverability rating of the planned export version ot the
larrier (IIARMKS0) is consonant with its high thrust-to-weight ratio. In a continuation ot a previous
comment, note that 12 of the top 15 scores are awarded to figlhtcrs of :\icncan or British des ign.
mancuverability values shown will be further modified during the sconig procedure

I lie

hCn the etfeci of

devicEs which vary their wing camber is considered.

5 -

':t"""
2-',"
" " ,"-'i.
':""

"LI.'
|

."

''

"
I

..-'-- '- ..

-

"-

.

-

.
.-

.

Is

I

Table 5.7: Maneuverability Factor Scores
FACTOR
FACTOR
AIRFRAME
CORE
SCORE
RAW)
(ADJUSTED)
F15E

2. 32053

1.468

SU27

1.87997

1.389

F6A
F16B
F15C
F15D
MIG29
F20
F20A
MIR4000

1. 86495
1. 85503
1.83723
1. 78677
1. 74691
1. 72460
1. 61733
1.61681

1. 386
1. 384
1. 380
1.370
1.361
1. 357
1.335
1. 335

F16CSC

1.57651

1.326

1. 55900
1.51086
1.50160
1.43996

F15CFP
F16C
HARMK80
F16D

5.4.1.3

1. 323
1. 313
1.311
1.298

Air-to-Air Range Attribute

The highest relative air-to-air range or endurance scores for interceptors and multi-role fighters are listed in
Table 5.8. The F-15CFP is an F-15C configured with conformal fuel tanks (FAST packs). which increase
its sub-sonic area intercept and ferry ranges considerably. While ferry range has no intrinsic combat qual.itv, it suggests an airframe's endurance enhancement potential if external fuel tanks and fuel efficiencies are
employed. 2 1 Only two of the newest Soviet fighters appear near the top of this group which is dominated
by Western produced airframes.

21

Tiis association is aruuable. But a hiah fuel. light weapons load option would be called fbr in Some
Mideastem combat scenarios where endurauce is a primary concern. Iranian F-14s were rcporcdlv
empho\cd in this coilit uration ir tie early staues of the -war
\with Iraq. Ilhus. some uipoiic it"
cndurance expandibilitv potential was bclimved rnportant cnouwai to include. I hc same loic \was
used in denving the air-to-ground factor scores.
-

~~~~~~......
........

..

...

S7-

' .- ,_..-.;.....".

%

Table 5.9: Air-to-Air Range Factor Scores
AIRFRAME

F15CFP
F15E
F14AC
MIR4000
F15C
F15D
TORADV
MIR3NG
FI5A
MIRFlE

F15B
FA18L
SU27
MIRIIIE
MIG31

5.4.1.4

FACTOR
CORE
RAW)
2. 35225
1. 78011
1. 84757
1. 70393
1. 52780
1. 34757
1.27140
1. 17925
1. 17463
1.03482
.99440
.99292
.95923
.95836
.86412

FACTOR
SCORE
(ADJUSTED)
1.717
1.542
1. 563
1. 519
1.466
1.411
1. 387
1. 359
1. 358
1. 315
1.303
1.303
1.292
1.292
1.263

Air-to-Ground Range Attribute

The top two positions in the air-to-ground range attribute list, Table 5.10, went to the two Soviet built
bombers deployed in Middle Eastern countries. The inclusion of the earlier model F-15 variants in this
attribute group could be challenged. However, they do have a secondary attack capability if appropriately
configured.

In fact, some reports claimed Israeli Air Force F-15s participated in the bombing of the ()si-

raq nuclear reactor.

The extraction of scores in a secondary role on this attribute acknoxledges the

potential while offering no suggestion of its attainment.

The air-to-ground potential sconng logic will

consider the mission of the unit of assignment and the configuration of the air weapon system before rendering a score at the force level. 2 2 The Tornado Interdiction Variant (TORIDS) recently ordered by
Saudi Arabia scored well on this attribute, as did several of the older single purpose ground attack fighters
(A-7E, A-7P, Mlirage-51)2, and A-41 I). The air-to-ground range scores will be given the added dimcnion
of effective' range, when modified by navigation capability values in the sconne process

22

Saudi Arabian F-I5s are not equipped for air-to-ground missions, nor are thcir aircrews trained in
them.

N

I

.8

Table 5.1/: Air-to-Ground Range Factor Scores
AIRFRAME

FACTOR
SCORE
(ADJUSTED)

TU22BD
TU16AG
F15CFP

4. 74706
4. 29450
2.04871

FISE
F15C
TORIDS
A7E/P

2.924
2. 740
1.830

1.49469
1.39035
1.36715
1.32630

1.606
1.563
1.554
1.537

MIRSD2
F15D
MIR3NG
A4H
IL28

1.28591
1.25992
1.19300
1. 19024
1.10718

1.521
1.511
1.483
1.482
1.449

FI5A
FA18L

MIR4000

5.4.1.5

FACTOR
SCORE
(RAW)

1.03215
.93925
.62108

1.418
1.381
1.252

Air-to-Ground Ordnance Attribute

The air-to-ground ordnance attribute scoring problem considered two aspects: the maximum ordnance
weight which could be carried and the number of positions on which it could be carried. The results for
the top 15 scoring airframes are included in Table 5.12. The number of stations was included in the factor
problem to capture the flexibility in ordnance mix engendered by multiple stations. The large number of
weapons positions available propelled the A-1 OA over seven other systems which have a greater total carrying capacity.

While this result might raise eyebrows, the facet of multiple weapons type capability-

which it portrays is important. 23 The F-4MOI) in the third position is a 'paper airplane' at present, a
design proposal developed by the Boeing Corporation and the Israeli Air Force to modift

a portion of the

IAF's F-4s drastically to increase range and carrying capacity. Note the presence of just two Soviet fighters in the top grouping, the SU-25 and SU-22 ground attack aircraft. Soviet fighters generally scored low
on this attribute and on the air-to-surface range attribute, indicative of the relatively weak air-to-ground
potential of aircraft supplied Middle Eastern clients by Moscow.

During score computation, the adjusted

scores will be further differentiated to account for the precision and non-precision ordance deliver. capabilities of the host aircraft.

23

;\n alternative ,connit process was also tried for this attribute, simply indexin, maximum extcral
ordnance to the meo 0t the of the %anablc ,Ct. I he rssults shitted s{me indi~idual "colcs. but the
rink older corrolation remained rclativchl hi-h (r = )-. I he indcxcd scores were rctaned for
turiher ,cnitv.i', analks , in thc coimbat psotential 'oflipulation phasc.

A9

The factor scores will be one of four elements of the vulnerability to eng'agement compuation. 96083 2.13 depicts the 15 airframes with the lowest scores. Table 5.4.692 1.6 FACTOR SCORE (RAW) 2.571 1.15844 1.82164 1. and electronic combat capability.1 3. 077 1. 1 6 .Table 5.12: Air-to-Ground Ordnance Factor Scores AIRFRAME TU22BD FI5E F4MOD TORIDS MIR4000 TU16AG A10A FA18L SU25 F4EF F15CFP F16A/B/C/D LAVI MIR2000C/T SU22 5.83921 1.30224 1. the ones least likely to be detected based on their size and combat configuration.1.01349 FACTOR SCORE (ADJUSTED) 2. 27546 1.814 1.09097 1.530 1.935 1.23371 1. hsts the results of the vulnerability to detection segment of the factor scoring process. 546 1. -Table 5. 57579 1.495 1.43530 2. 095 2.448 1. Unlike the preceding tables. "" -. 'The others are speed.437 1. 39578 2. 342 2.813 1.03694 1.88353 1.03520 1. maneuverability.838 1.431 Detectability Attribute The final table.

680 . The AN APG67 is the multi-mode radar General llctries produced for the F-20A.\N AIPGTJ is a multi-mode system which will be installed in the F-IS. and doppler beam sliarpeniag) in the combat potential computations.14. and the AN APG6 is the up-graded s%stem installed in the latest F. 64136 -. 63966 FACTOR SCORE (ADJUSTED) .666 . all multi-mode or air intercept radars. are depicted in 'able 5.680 . 64136 -.654 .681 1 Target Acquisition Systems As noted previously. 66937 -. all of the ratio level variables which described a target tacquisition system's detection potential loaded positively on the same factor. 69432 -. 64302 -. 680 .13: Airframe Detectability Factor Scores 5.4. 65667 -.673 .Marconi lerranti FOXtlUNTER air intercept radar carried by the Air Defense Variant of the Tornado.644 . which is fitted to the F. 65291 -. 00279 -81966 -.675 .500 .664 . The results of the factor scoring process for the ten highest scoring systems. ]heir performance characteristics have been esti- mated. while the AN APG63 and AN . - 0I - . Ihe large and powerful AN AWG9. 67349 -. track wvhilc scan. 81507 -.\P(64 are associated with operational variants of the F-15. 71492 -.2 AIRFRAME FACTOR SCORE RAW SF260TP SF260MW F5A F5B FSE F5F RF5E F104GCF F20 F20A HARMK80 MIG21F MIG21C PRCF7 MIG21JKL -1.594 . 2 for installation in export versions 1 he detection values for the target acquisition effectiveness attribute will change somewhat wkhen thcy are combined with nominally described characteristics (electronic countercounter measures. The R DM is a multi-mode radar produced by I hompson-CS of the Mirate 200l) series. followed by the very capable . The .00573 -1.14A C topped the list. the SU-27 Flanker and Mi6-31 Foxhound respectively.499 .654 I . The TLLANRAD' and I IULNI)RAI)' are the radars installed in the two newest Soviet interceptors.16s.591 . 69438 -.Table 5.

thus the dilh-ring vulnerability scores le )2 - .039 2. All the missiles placing in the top ten depend on radar guidance.Vlhdern .90713 . the Soviet AA-6 (ACRID).Table 5.3i turn at 450) knots. p.ed in Table 5..'. 189 2. and sufficient propellant to generate longer ranges increases the potential that the missile will be detected and outmaneuvered. Ihis factor.16.. . The size required to house a more sophisticated radar bascd guidance system. 75172 APG63 1. -.4.379 .. will be considered in the combat potential computation. 15 .Air .71547 RDM 5. . The vulnerability scores will be further adjusted to account for the guidance system's resistance to electronic counter-measures and will denominate the overall comhat potential score. A\11-54 (PItOENIX) and AIM-120A (AANMRAM). the remaining entries correspond to six of the missiles which ranked highest in performance. which increases the launch aircraft's own vulnerability.24577 1.. 24 25 Gunston points out. have semi-active radar homing (SARII) terminal guidance systems. hwh ha%.928 1.84123 1.445 2. ' .480 1. forcing the launching aircraft's radar to continue target illumination until impact. .96316 1.".-.iened to those variants of the basic missi" '. '""" .96710 1. 2 5 The western edge in micro-electronics can be assumed to have contributed to absence of AANMRAM and the newest Irench radar guided missile NSupcr 530 D) from the top of the vulnerability list. a larger warhead. . Ie weiehts varshglly between the guidance %stcms. Several of the missiles which gained the highest lethality scores are also the ones most susceptible to detection and defeat.021 1. .. : " ' -" 7 ' '' .e infra-red ternniiial enidancc.. as demonstrated in Fable 5. See .880 APG67 APG68 . . . that a pilot who has detected a Mach 3 air-to-air missile with a 31( turning limit can outmaneuver it by mnaking a .92754 1.-"... -lhe '13' model desinator on Sovict missiles is a'. . While the top of the list is occupied h\ an older missile not among the top performers. for instance. All but two..85371 1.3 FACTOR Air-to-Air Missile Subsystems In no aircraft subsystem are the tradeoffs between performance and vulnerability to detection and defeat as evident as in the air-to-air missile category.15.)O1.14: Target Acquisition System Factor Scores SYSTEM FACTOR CORE RAW) SCORE (ADJUSTED) AWG9 FOXHUNT APG70 APG64 FLANRAD HOUNDRAD 2.." - " . . 2 4 Relative lethality scores are displa.042 2.66166 1.982 1.

720 1 85 1A 3 1. .15: Air-to-Air . 757 1. The identifications of the two groupings (rate of fire and effectiveness) are subjective approximations of the attributes they represent. When mated to an airframe.18 respectively. .84823 .296 . which loaded negatively. . 75773 1. and accuracy. .466 1.4. 65487 1.17 and Table 5. 362 1. .56567 .78797 .53167 1.347 1.488 AA7B AA9A ASPIDE SKYFLASH AIM7D AIM7C SUP530F 5.. 93 . The two factor scores will be combined according to their relative contribution to overall performance variance in developing a single measure of gun effectiveness.63438 .206 AIM7FLM SUP53D AA9A ASPIDE AIM7E SUP530F AIM120A AA7A SKYFLASH 1.210 AIM54 AA7A 1. Rate of fire and muzzle velocity loaded heavily on the first factor.06897 .461 1. 80864 2.52188 Table 5.73226 .84823 1.4 FACTOR COR5 1.273 1. . their effective- - .352 1.61216 .08042 1. The top ten scores for each attribute are listed in Table 5.334 1.340 1.Table 5.244 1. - . 316 1.939 1.20678 . with the exception of calibre. while the other variables loaded moderately. The patterns depicted reflect reasonable relationships among the relative overall effectiveness of the weapons.58902 . The second factor showed heavy loadings for calibre.Missile Performance Factor Scores MISSILE FACTOR SCORE RAW) FACTOR SCORE (ADJUSTED) AIM54 3.210 Aerial Gun Subsystems The assignment of meaningful descriptive titles to the two factors associated with aerial guns was not clearcut. 26857 1.62061 . 13195 1..88712 3.16: Air-to-Air Missile Vulnerability Factor Scores MISSILE FACTOR SCORE AW (ADJUSTED) AA6AB 2. maximum effective range.

.73419 .. the process through which the relative values were derived deserves brief mention..214 1.405 XM8 1.Table 5.63167 ...586 1.. 556 1..369 M28 .90187 .43403 1. 369 GAU13A GAU12U GAU8A MKIIMOD5 M61A1 NR30GAT XM27E1 1.586 1.249 1. 44211 1.573 1..403 1.. 410 M39 GAU2BA .97522 .489 1.. These are not mated to aircraft in the present configuration file. Several of the guns in the analysis are mounted in external pods.. but scores were generated for them so that they could be considered as armament options in later analyses if desired.63055 1.34511 1.19218 1. 214 DEFA553 M621 M5 GAU8A 5.441 1..30054 1.18: Aerial Gun Effectiveness Factor Scores GUN FACTOR SCORE (ADJUSTED) GAUI13A GPU5A DEFA554 MAU27 KCA30 1..90187 1. the use of national scores to quantify relative measures of the quality of maintenance forces is an illustrative sidebar to this study. military expenditures as a percentage of GNP and as a per- - i. Nevertheless. RAW) FACTOR SCORE (ADJUSTED) 1.4..489 1.619 1. Table 5.58126 1.331 1. 68924 1.374 .J 4- . military expenditures per capita.. 44211 1.646 1.5 FACTOR CORE RAW) Maintenance Force Quality As remarked earlier.308 ness will be further differentiated by the host's ordnance carrying capacity (rounds) in developing a net gun potential value. 10246 1.51434 1. 00225 1. 43403 1.75365 1.17: Aerial Gun Rate of Fire Factor Scores GUN FACTOR CORE .98490 . The four variables standing in for motivation (armed tbrces per thousand.

556 . the quality of Israeli maintenance manpower was assigned a value of one.567 562 .19.790 .380 .600 . the relative associations among the countries are generallv conrouent with other studies and uhjective appraisals. 15596 -. 'hey should be approached gngerly.6) and positively on the first one. Adjustments to this data set were made in a slightly different fashion than for weapon systems.75180 61468 :61238 .82650 -.83542 -.000 .631 .271 .683 . all variables loaded significantly (at least 0. .05612 -1.403 . Relying on historical observations.44771 .37109 1.490 .5- - 14 1 .271 . Table 5.219 168 - \Vhile these data are patently superficial. rccoLtzmg the fact that the input data captured only a fragment of the societal and oreanizational complex which determines fbrce quality [-he quality of maintenance force indices will be used to modif .46904 .314 . and scores extracted. 28085 . A notional country with zero values was added to the 22 active cases. 34915 -.599 .42115 . the man main- tenance hours available data in the final step in the national air combat potential equations.00045 1.248 .ccntage of central government expeditures) and the two suggesting technical capacity (literacy rate and percentage of eligibles in secondary school) were introduced into a factor problem.13173 -.45151 1.82826 -.688 Iraq Oman Syria atar Libya Saudi Arabia Kuwait Eg pt Le anon Iran PDRY Bahrain Somalia YAR Tunisia Algeria Morocco Ethiopia Sudan .97870 . Although two factors emerged under rotation.19: Maintenance Manpower Quality Factor Scores COUNTRY FACTOR SCORE (RAW) FACTOR SCORE (ADJUSTED) Israel Jordan UAE 2. 92810 -1. It was assumed that the the qualitatively most proficient maintenance personnel would generate one perfect maintenance manhour. It was selected as being sufficiently representative.269 . The raw and adjusted factor scores for all 22 countries are listed in Table 5.24876 -. 08363 -. 64010 -.441 424 . and all other observations were scaled to it in proportion to their raw factor scores.

.. ... . . 96 ...5 Summary Data were reduced to a manageable matrix through a system which capitalizes on the most attractive aspects of several different data reduction techniques.. Most importantly. . .-.. •......-. . The resultant body of data represents the relative quantities of each attribute which a subsystem possesses with the loss of significant information minimized to the extent permitted by any reduction scheme. . .• . Variables not lending themselves to higher orders of measurement were not forced into statistical problems ill-suited to their evaluation. . .._... .- .-. - . .. . • .. . the temptation to substitute neat statistical formulations for weighting relationships better determined by expert operational judgment has been eschewed. -.. ... .-. ... . the bulk of the information required to calculate estimates of national air combat potential is now in place...-.. .•. -. ..5. --.-.. . . ...-.. .. -.. - . ..-. Within the context of the study framework.

air weapon subsystems and systems are treated as linear combinations of attributes and subsystems respectively. 6. the final step. indicating the presence or absence of a combat related quality.M N7 -' Chapter 6 AIR COMBAT POTENTIAL SCORE COMPUTATION Having plowed through the variable selection.1 6. Variables such as el'. at the air weapons system level in consonance with specified system configurations and relational utility values. before subsystem scores are computed. Since all of the modifying variables were nominal. The evolution of national force level scores follows the hierarchical path outlined in Chapter 3. which are used to depreciate the potential of the system as a whole. First. 2tronic combat suite and navigation capability are examples of modifying variables. addressing the air weapon system process first. Second. and data reduction processes. -q7- "I ----------------------- . The nuts and bolts of the scoring sequence are outlined in the following sections.FIR FF IM ZM I . The force propagation branch computations are less elaborate. The computational philosophy adopted in this phase is derived substantially from the TASCFORM FNM methodolo~y. While the assumption of lineanty sacrifices the dynamic of synergy among system parts. a few general comments are in order. Raw inventories must be transformed into operational mission specific force levels and potential sortie rates esti~nated. is almost anti-climactic. in turn. the scoring stratcy" .umed at assigning. data collection. the latter proved impossible to capture in a broadly based aggregated model. the two branches are joined to calculate the maximum relative zombat potential a national force could expect to achieve under optimum circumstances on a given day. In the ultimate step. the path cut by TASC offered the most thoughtful and comprehensive approach encountered. air combat potential score computation. These scores are aggregated. Some relevant assumptions undergird the specific procedures. the raw attribute values evolved in the data reduction phase are modified by nominal values for those characteristics which enhance or diminish their potential but which were not suitable candidates for factor scoring. While the following aggregation formulae and input variables deviate in some significant aspects. The single exceptions are measures of vulnerability.1 Air Weapon Systems Principles Before dissecting the individual system scoring iterations.1. Air weapons scores are first computed at the subsystem level.

Values were adjusted in accordance with the panel's recommendations. Interdiction includes deep interdiction and offensive counterair operations. the air defense mission includes point and barrier defensive counterair operations. these utility values are user-adjustable during score computation. tighter or air 4 superiority. In the absence of specific data. and the close air support mission area subsumes direct air support of gound forces. Mission differentiation among the combat potential scores for a given system is a function of its configuration and the mission specific reative utilities extracted from the aircrew survey discussed in Chapter 4. and range. them values which reflected their functional impact on the attribute being modified. 6.g..1. recast to accommodate procedural differences. Scores for airframe potential are calculated: AFr =(NFSS * U Sr)+(NFSM*MA *U r )+ (NFSR r*RA*NA r*UR rr r - . The range. USr for the relative utility of the airspeed. one of which is Linked to aerial refucling capability (RA) and the other to navigation capability (NAr). The precise effect of such devices varies from airframe to airframe. For the most part.endurance value is modified by two factors... such as leading edge slats or maneuvering flaps. and counterinsurgency applications. analogous values were extracted from the TASC study.2 was selected as representing the best estimate across the field. maneuverability (NFSM). Finally. The navigation modifier aims to transform theoretical range into effective range by tapping the capability of an airframe to exploit its full range potential. An experienced navigator assigned relative values to navigation categories ranving from dead reackoning (. The fighter mission represents over-thebattlefield air superiority and escort employments. As with the modifying vara.4). thus enhancing turning performance. battlefield area interdiction.energy attribute).( to global positioning system (1. Specific values can be substituted when known. interdiction..es. Four mission areas are addressed: air defense. For the purposes of this investigation.2 Airframes The relative potential of an airframe in a combat role (AFr) is a product of the attribute values for airspeed/energy (NFSS). Since aerial refueling is dependent on the availabilty of tankers.endurance (NFSRr) and their respective relative utility values (e.T[. As with any modifying factor or utility value in the computation process. combat potential scores are computed as a function of the mission(s) in which the air weapon system might conceivably be employed. a general value of 1. their values can be adjusted by users to accommodate differing perceptions or priorities. These values were further differentiated according to the relative importance of navigation in each mission area. and close air support. The maneuverability attribute is modified by a factor (MA) which accounts for the influence of devices which vary wing camber. and submitted to a panel of fighter experts for review. Its effects will be demonstrated in a country-specific example later. it will not be included in the baseline calculations.

several of the initial subsystem attribute values are modified by nominally measured characteristics in the initial phase of the computation. The F.462) + (. It is a single-seat fiJliter equipped in this configuration with an AN/APG68 multi-mode radar and a laser range finder. and other features which diminish the effects of countermeasures. Ntission and aircraft non-specific scores (NFSTA) were derived for individual subsytems in the data reduction phase. The target acquisition score (TAr) calculation for an aircraft with visual (TAV). - . identify. Differing expert opinions were offered on the percentage improvement in visual acquisition afforded by a second set of eyes. As was the case with the airframe calculation. In the absence of a consensus.2"1. Radar scores did not consider nominally described variables such as the presence of track while scan. Values were awarded to systems based on descriptions of their frequency agility. Since the laser range -99 .. radar (TAR) and secondary subsystems (JAS)would take the following form: TAV = (NFSTAvis*VA*ECCMI) TAR = (NFSTAra d TAS TAr = *T AA * ECCNI) (NESTAsec *TAA *ECCM) (UTVr*TAV) + (UTRr TAR) + (LTSr*TAS) Again.7 to 1.. noting that experience. .1.. The target illumination modifying value was set at 1. These values were combined for each system into a modifying variable (TAAr).43"(1. . and target illumination capabilities or address a system's relative resistance to electronic counter measures. Resistence to electonic countermeasures values (ECCM) ranged from 0. The target acquisition computation assesses an aircraft's target acquisition systems' potential to detect. and doppler beam sharpening by 20 percent in the air-to-ground roles.3 Target Acquisition Systems . and personal qualities were key determinants.. .1. . a tactor (VA) of 1. the F-16C in a fighter role is presented as an example. . the following example is the computation of the combat potential score for the F. . . side lobe suppression.16C in the fighter mission role. .2"1.113)) AFf= 1. The air weapon system configuration file mated subsystems to aircraft variants.. Visual acquisition capability is enhanced by multiple aircrew members. workload.To demonstrate the implementation of this equation.16 has leading edge flaps and trailing edge flaperons for increased maneuverability and is equipped with an inertial navigation system.27*(1. AFf = (. Presence of a track while scan capability was estimated to enhance target acquisition by 30 percent in the air-to-air roles. .3 was identified as an aver- age position. doppler beam sharpening. .312)) + (.2 for laser systems which provided a self-designating capability.467 6.30"1. Utility values weight the subsystems' relative contributions to successful target acquisition in four combat roles.. and provide engagement related information concerning a target in various combat roles.

.' . The ANiAPG68 has track-while-scan and doppler beam sharpening capabilities and has a relatively high degree of resistance to electronic countermeasures. 6.1.: . . The values associated with guidance type (GUDIDSC r) were assigned subjectively..7 for a command guided missile to 1. .2 for one with its own active radar homing system.889 6.. must be entered into the equation. The equation for the mission non-specific combat potential score for an aenal gun (PLG) is: PLG = (URAT*NFSRAT*NRND) + (ULEF*NFSEFF) When applied to the M61AI carried by the F-16C. ' ' . considenng such features as relative accuracy and the ability to track a target without continuing input from the launching aircraft. the volume of ordnance available.'..: -. -.. The values ranged from . unlike those for the previous subsystems. . . ". . -. Two descriptive variables. . The modifying factors were further differentiated by their launch parameters - .4. .256 6. ' .51"2. . performance (NFSPFRF) and vulnerability to detection and defeat (NFSVUL).' ..4 Weapons Payload The calculation of weapons payload potential values (PLr) involves a number of steps and. : 100- .hute scores.. : -. .-.1. The expression for aerial guns will be presented first. Since values for the relative utility of rate and volume of fire (URAT) and ordnance effectiveness (ULEF) had not been established via the aircrew survey.-.' . the associated values are: PLG = (. :: : .073) PLG = 1. TAf= (.573) + (.546*1.finder has no application in a fighter role.4*1.32-.. A third factor associated with the host aircraft.6'1. . followed by discussions of air-to-air missiles and air-toground ordnance. . . the rapidity and velocity with which they could deliver ordnance (NFSRAT) and its effectiveness (NFSEFF). they were assigned subjectively. ..1 Aerial Guns Aerial guns were scored on two attributes..275) + (. The resulting variable (NRND) is used in the scoring process to modify the NFSRAT value. .. guidance system type (GUIDTYP) and susceptibility to electronic countermeasures (ECS) modify the respective atti.. .1. . the value for a secondary acquisition system is set to zero. . . .290) + (. The total number of rounds carried by each aircraft was computed and indexed to the mean of the data set.. is applied in two different forms depending on mission catcgory. .17*0) TAr= 1. Just the values in the final equation are depicted below. -.."- .4.2 Air-to-Air Missiles The data reduction process scored air-to-air missiles on two attributes.. . .

these are not suited to application in a study such as this. but the iosc was included in the scorng sequence to permit cxpandabitv. However. Combat potential scores (PLMr) were computed for missiles in each of the air-to-air roles according to the following equation: PLMr = (NFSPERF*GUIDSCr)/(NFSVUL*ECS) Note the use of the modified vulnerability value as a denominator.1. A weight of one was awarded an infra-red guided system in a fighter role at the low end of the spectrum. This combinational technique acknowledges that a system's vulnerability to defeat depreciates the value of its performance in full proportion.4. delivery parameters.643*. and target arrays can be cornputed using weaponeering algorithms. Individual comparisons of specific weapons. modifying values were assigned in accordance with the following assumptons. while a weight of 1. A sample computation is shown for the AIM-9L missile carried by many US and Western fighters and just recently exported to some Middle Eastern countries. haze and darkness and by their somewhat rnod delivery parameters.8) PLMf 1. relying largely on descriptive information. 10) - . Those with high susceptibility were assigned a value of 1.8. Consequently. their practical combat accuracies are more modest.680 6. and head-up displays is the subject of considerable debate.6 for an infra-red system with beyond visual range capability in the air defense role topped the list.1. \\ hilc their theoretical accuracies rmight eclipse those of freefall ordnance by a factor of !our or i icr. While precision guided munitions display geater accuracies. However. producing more effective 'bang' for the same ordnance load 'buck'.within or beyond visual range and the weight of that capability in air defense and fighter type engagements respectively.3 Air-to-Ground Ordnance A single air-to-ground ordnance attribute score (NFSO) was extracted during data reduction. Precision guided munitions are unarguably more accurate than their unguided cousins. PLMf (. r. \ stability augmented (SA) aircraft with a modem release point computer (CRP' and a head-up display (IIUD) can deliver frcefall munitions at accuracies approaching those of all but the most advanced preci- sion guided systems. their etTcctie employment can be degraded by dust.864*1)/(. but greater differentiation is needed to account for precision guided munitions capability (PGNIC) and avionics systems which enhance the accuracy of unguided ordnance delivery. modem release point computers. The accuracy value of freefall ordnance delivered by a -tabilized platform equipped with a release point computer and a IIUD was assianed a baseline accurac'. the extent to which accuracy is enhanced over that provided by a combination of freefall ordnance. 1 The susceptibility to electronic warfare modifier was also constructed subjectively. Missiles least vulnerable to electronic warfare (to include chaff and flares) were assigned a value of . No such system is currently operational.

495 PLOpg = (1. two AIM-9L's. infra-red and radar guided respectively) is divided by two to establish an indexed basic load.14-1. The generic precision guided munition (OAPG) was assumed to be 40 percent more effective on the average.39*(2/2)*2. is again used to demonstrate the computation. The two following equations apply: PLOng = (NFSO*OANG) PLOpg = (NFSO*OAPG) Substituting the values for the F-16C.495) PLOpg2. PLf = (. The F-I -C The latest version of the F-16C equipped with the AN APG68 radar is reportedly capable of carrying radar guided (SARH) missiles.093) + (. The followinu calculation is based on a weapons suite of two AIM-7F's.889) . The relative utility weights for guided and unguided munitions are LPGr and L\G respectively.495) + (.2 for an aircraft with just an iron sight.093 pg 6.value of one. the computations run: PLOng= (1*1. the equation %ould read PLi = (.ir-to-air and air-to-ground missions.48"2.39*(2. Earlier tests showed that. A descending scale was used to score non-guided muitions delivery accuracy (OANG) ranging from I for a full suite of delivery assistance equiptment to 0. the equation below applies: PLr= (UIMr*(NAAMI/2)*PLMr)+ (URM r*(NAAMR/2)*PLMr) + (UGUr*PLG) The number of missiles carried (NAAMI or NAAMR.38"1. First in the air-to-air roles.22"1. and an N161A1 aerial un and addresses the fiater mission.2)*1.067) + (.4 Full Payload Computing an aircraft's payload potential score (PLr) is a matter of combining invidual weapons type scores in accordance with information specified in the configuration file and weighting them according to relative utility values by mission (UIMr' URMrI UGUr) PLr is computed separately for the . - - r -r PLr = (LPGr*PLO pg )+(UNGrPLOng)+ (UGlr 4 PLG) Substituting values and relative weiLhts for the F-16C in an interdiction role. which can deliver precision guided munitions and which is equipped with a CCIPCCRP type weapons delivery computer and a HUD.889) PI Tf = 1.1.102- I . without this convention.4.4' 1.877 A sinrular set of equations determine payload potential scores in the air-to-gound mis-ions.495) PLO ng 1. the cumulative weight of multiple missile scores dominated subsequent air weapon system calculations.680) + (.

Electronic warfare capability is influenced by the ability to know that one has been detected (RWR) and to degrade the effectiveness of opposing target acquisition systems through passive (PECM) or active (AECM) means. . To preserve the additive combinational form." potential for detection and engagement is calculated: Vr =(UV'r NSFV)+(USVr (INESSf+(UIVr 1 NFSI')+liEVr ECr) Substituting values Cor the F.837 Vulnerability As noted earlier. and electronic warfare capability (EC. The lower an aircraft's potential speed.- . values for those attributes which diminish vulnerability first had to be transformed into reciprocals. In mathrnatical form.'. maneuverability. the higher the probability it will be engaged when detected. one with no ECM capability would score 1.. maneuverability (NFSM).. and electronic combat capability diminish that vulnerability somewhat. lhe reciprocals were entered into the vulnerability equation in proportion to the relative utility values (UvS r . / ' J l . UVEr) established by the survey and added to the value for detectability multiplied by its utilitv" tactor (. or electronic combat capability. vulnerability to engagement has two contrary dimensions. - - . . . an aircraft with a full complement of ECM assets would have an ECr score of zero. . Speed. . Weights for the relative utility of each system in varying roles were determined subjectively after discussion with fighter experts. but their most significant contribution is in avoiding engagement once. detectability and the ability to avoid engagement once detected.. Since the vulnerability equation is additive. . % "7 ? . . detected. all the information required to formulate the vulnerability equation was at hand.16C in the fighter role. The second is a product of an aircraft's speed (NFSS).). The basic assumption governing the assignment of values was that possession of the full suite of electronic warfare capabilities applicable to a given mission would diminish an aircraft's vulnerability to the full value consistent with the relative utility of ECM in a combat role. These variables are nominally described. Initial vulnerability to detection is largely a product of an aircraft's size. - . . the computation reads: -103 . " . .- . Various strategies were tested before an approach which best portrayed the influence of the relevant attributes and was conducive to further applications was identified. The first dimension is captured by the size attribute scored in the data reduction process (NFSV). ECr values were computed by the equation in which the presence of the characteristic is indicated by a I: -((URWRr*RWR) + (UPCMr*PECM) + (UACM*AECM)) ECr = An aircraft with a full ECM suite would score 0. . maneuverability.. * . .. so the first task is to develop values which represent their influence in avoiding detection and engagement. " A - . . The first two avoidance attributes were determined previously.PL i 6. maneuverable aircraft with a full r electronic counter-measures suite would be largely limited to its detectability. m .5 1. UVMr . " . The offsetting nature of the two families of attributes posed a combinational challenge. With the establishment of the ECr values. the vulnerability to engagement potential of a last. ..1. ". * :. t * '' * - 1 : " " " " ' 1 ' - .VV ) Thus.

"-4 . - . It should be remembered that they represent the full theoretical combat potential ot a specifically configured aircraft in a particular mission role relative to the potential of other aircralt in the data set in the same role. not unrealistic considering the the low survival expectancy of an aircraft like an SF-260 in a moderately dense defensive environment.837)) . . the product of these equations will be referred to as Air Combat Potential Units' (ACPU's). 633 ACPf = 2.633 : .589 ACP i = 2.3 respectively. air combat potential in the fighter role would be calculated: ACPf = ((.5 and 5.37"1.18*0) f4 Applying formula across the spectrum of aircraft and missions produced reasonable differentiation.l. Fhe methodology was desipmcd this w.- -I .27"1.28S( l11.32( 0. The range of values for the interdiction and close air support rmssions was considerably greater due to the inclusion of bombers and low performance aircraft in those mission areas. Thus. %t) perrmt evaluation of alternative configurations. and payload values are multiplied by their relative utility values (UAFr.374 Lacking a better term. 6. --.6 Combining Subsystems The final step in solving the air weapon system combat potential puzzle is to assemble the pieces according to their relative utlities in individual combat roles.\gain. Airframe. the . The least vulnerable aircraft in the air defense and fighter roles scored as being approximately half as likely to be engaged as the most vulnerable aircraft accomplishing those missions.462)+(.877)).476)+ (. target acquisition. No modifying factors are involved. Similarly. so the procedure is considerably cleaner than those discussed above. adding the ACPU's of a given aircraft does not produce a measure ot total combat potential across a spectrum of missions.900)+(.. input relative utility values :ipniieaie o :he entire mission set can be modied to accentuate a raven attribute or subsystem corresponding to a pcciltic employment environment or combat requirement.33V1.the composition of the data set will yeild different ACPU values. UPLr) and added. (.\CPU's gencratcd will chanee 1hei are i dynamic relative indicators not absolute measures of ur weapon s stem worth 1.023)+ (.256)+(.392 Alternatively in the interdiction role. UTAr . the formula is: ACPr = ((UAFr*AFr) + (UTAr*TAr) + (LPLr*PLr))/Vr Substituting the values for the previously described F-16C equipped with two AII-'F and two _IM-9L air-to-air missiles. The sum is depreciated by the value describing the aircraft's relative vulnerability to engagement.22*.30 1.36"1.*rr !7 !V!V Vf = Vf = Ir .329)+ (. Mathmatically.312)+ (. Altering aircraft configurations or chan. the F-16C's combat potential would be computed: ACP i = ((. . The ratios between most and least vulnerable aircraft in the air-to-ground categories were 3.371. 1.1.

the Mirage-2000 and the Tornado Air Defense Variant.. . ..1. Among the operational aircraft.. . The margin by which the F-15E leads the pack is a product of the fact that it is configured with six AIM-120A (AAMRAM) air-toair missiles.. multiple similarly configured variants have been compressed into a single entry for editorial purposes. " "... . an... " . potential.S.. All of the mission groups are dominated by newly operational or programmed aircraft. Each table lists the 15 aircraft which scored highest in the category. as is that of the Mirage-4000...6.*"~'..... t . -" . .7 Air Weapon System Results Illustrations of the output from the air weapons system assessment process are displayed in the next four tables.. . current versions of the F-15 score well across the board. lightweight fighters (F-16. Just two AIM-54's were loaded on the aircraft. Final positions in the top grouping are occupied by the latest French and British entrants into the export market. Neither they nor the F-15E are currently in service. As previously. The next highest scoring Soviet fighter (MiG-23G) is in thirty-second position.1. " -" ' ... The relatively low (within this group) position of the F-14AC despite its undisputed excellence in the interceptor role is a product of the fact that its configuration in this data set reflected the paucity of AIM-541PHOENIX missiles available to its only operator in the are. Individual values for all aircraft arranged by mission area are included in Appendix F.7.. even through their exact scores differed slightly.... As noted previously.... U. along with their Air Combat Potential Unit (ACPU) values and the values for their subcomponents..1 Air Defense Mission Table 6.. 6...." ... i :'-* .. ..... MiG-29.. the values on which their scores are predicated include measures of speculation and wishful thinking. " i" a " .. their less formidable payload capability offset by lower vulnerability scores.. suggesting a wide generational gap.. Likewise. -. the margins of new and future systems' superiority can be expected to contract as operational observations become available.1 contains the results from the air defense mission area computations. i. FAI8L.. a - -. The three newest Soviet fighters (SU-27. not suprisingly. MiG-31) place in the top grouping. ".. F-20A) also fare well..i = " - " ". with particluarly high marks for payload.. . Si- *. • ~~~. . and even that loading is overly gen- erous.. .-. .. The F-15s carry six of the the newest models of the AIM-7 SPARROW. .... Though their position atop the lists will no doubt be sustained. one for each mission area. " ..:. the ranking of the modified F-4 being considered by the Israeli Air Force is based on design information only.-.. .. . • '.

485 1. .505 1.672 . 1.703 . it is interesting to note the positional changes.822 . Despite the consequent lower payload scores.459 2.674 1. . . .213 .729 .739 Fighter Mission Looking at Table 6.776 .732 . . Neither the F-20 nor the F-16A carries radar guided air-to-air missiles.146 .535 2. . 287 2. 342 1.439 1.421 1.1.706 1. . The measuring instrument is leaner but incapable of detecting the legitimate and force posture relevant capabilities variations depicted in these two tables.522 2. 715 MIG29 1.458 2. high maneverability and low vulnerability qualify these lightweight fighters for inclusion in the top group.262 1.902 2.440 2.746 3.820 . .796 1.867 2.042 2.360 2.554 FA18L MIR2000C/T F14AC MIG31 TORADV F4MOD MIR4000 6.416 2.474 1.633 2. 843 2.985 3.953 5. . . . . with the smaller lightweight fighters creeping closer to the top of the list and the gaps between them and the F-15s shrmiakng.624 1.2 Aircraft With Highest Air Defense Potential AFa TAa PL V 2.007 1.609 .582 1..523 2. . .058 2.692 2.7. operationally or environmentally pertinent considerations are overlooked to preserve statistical simplicity.596 .046 . However. .773 . Companng just these two tables demonstrates conclusively the benefit of employing mission sensitive relational values in a quantitative assessment of this type.Table 6.820 .187 2.279 1. .058 3.104 7. .854 1. The MiG-31 and the Mirage-4000 drop out of the top group and are replaced by the F-16A and the austerely appointed version of the F-20.387 1.543 1.711 .464 1.622 2.510 1. . generally the same aircraft are represented.264 5. ACPa AIRCRAFT F15E F15C/D F15CFP F15A/B SU27 F20A F16C/D 5. .762 5. Without them.808 1. .418 1.358 1.452 1.242 4. 148 2.007 2.264 3.2.566 1.386 1. . .991 2.636 .370 2.

194 2. -107 - f.1.284 2.125 1.501 1.- -"-. - . the first of that series designed specifically as a true multirole aircraft.594 F16C/D SU27 FA18L 2.2: Aircraft With Highest Fighter Potential AIRCRAFT ACPf AFf TAf PLf FISE F15C/D F15CFP F15A/B 3..156 .3 lists the aircraft with the best potential in the interdiction role.849 . . .'3 2 . 762 1. Note the presence of only one Soviet fighter.097 1.653 .065 3. 186 3..256 1. and substantial although not superior ordnance carrying capacities.- v.720 1.. .. The exceptions are the modified F-4 and the Interdiction Variant of the Tornado.726 .284 2. F-15 variants which have only a secondary air-to-ground role move toward the bottom of the group. and the latter was designed specifically for the air-to-ground mission. .631 1.764 F20A 2. .460 1.130 2.436 1.158 1.520 1. ". .124 1.. .614 TORA/V MIR200OC/T F20 2.260 2.13 .026 633 .005 2."- -. % .692 Interdiction Mission Moving to the first air-to-gound category. .754 4. their positions taken by multi-role fighters characterized by relatively small size.795 .576 1. in this group. Again. 508 1. The former is planned to have significantly greater range and ordnance capabilities than existing F-4's.426 2. the programmed F.Table 6. 934 3.202 1.576 1. 185 1.. suggesting an apparent lack of emphasis in Soviet design on those qualities most important in conducting interdiction operations. .800 1. 392 2.1 IM .968 2..130 2.834 1. the SU-27.427 1.382 1.877 2.. .739 .414 1.3 Vf ..657 ..802 6.393 MIG29 F14AC F4MOD 1.543 1. - .754 .454 1. .7.720 1.403 1. is at the top.350 .503 1.469 5.806 .045 1.- ". ..880 1.756 1.649 .478 2.364 1.001 . " ".726 . Table 6.15E. 612 3. high performance qualities. .476 1. .057 2.423 1.757 F16ALB 2.

With the exception of these structural anomalies.261 2.238 1.842 1.414 1.897 1. 379 1.831 1.705 .438 1. but its vulnerability to enagement was almost twice as high due to its relatively lower speed and maneuverability. The A-10A.928 .227 1.262 1.190 2.634 . the list does not imply employment in that role in force level aggreggations.480 1.693 .205 1. it merely reflects theoretical potential. the CAS listing again shows the high mission potential of small.388 1. 374 2.4 i TA i PL 1.360 1. 195 1. It is highly unlikely. A-10.480 1. 068 2.898 1.882 . 637 1. 760 2.694 1.571 .3: Aircraft With Highest Interdiction Potential AIRCRAFT ACP i AF FISE F16C/D FA18L 2. for example. lightweight fighters with good payload capacities.106 . that F-15's would be employed in a close air support role.300 1.716 .498 1.327 .023 . although they possess attributes awarded high utility values by the aircrew survey. was second only to the F-15E in total payload potential.703 676 .619 . and speed. 327 2.272 2. 11)8 - . and SU-25 is also noteworthy.291 1.066 1. Their positions below the top grouping are strictly a product of their higher vulnerability to detection and engagement.055 1.928 i V i .790 1.660 2.837 2.694 .737 .593 2.599 .Table 6. Their inclusion ir.487 1.024 1.7.951 1.374 1.730 559 .837 1.669 .4 reveals some suprising results when viewed out of context.874 1.227 . 160 1. 069 1. 026 2.352 1. for instance. maneuverability.1. 329 1.764 .941 . 150 2.331 1. The absence of traditional CAS aircraft such as the A-7.981 2.245 F16ALB MIR2000C/T F4MOD F20A MIR4000 F15C/D F15CFP KFIRC7 TORIDS FI5A/B SU27 F20 6.646 Close Air Support Mission A review of the close air support mission group in Table 6.848 1.589 .

- .367 1. the fraction that will be available for employment." .146 1..462 1." '-" ." .1 1.594 ... The final product of these four elements describes the daily sortie potential (Sl' r) for each system in its probable combat role(s).'.560 .-. 2.587 573 ..525 .764 1. 2 While these conditions are unrealistic.292 .570 . .515 .'.612 .'. and maintenance deferrals.651 2. hses.632 1. 414 1. no attempt will be made to assess the relative operational.316 1.502 1. 247 2.410 2.691 2.401 2.482 F20A FA18L 3. and the number of times per day which they can be flown.329 MIR2000C/T 2.' '.518 1.509 .310 573 .'?.401 2.' .461 1.440 .596 .-.4: Aircraft With Highest CAS Potential AIRCRAFT ACP C AFC FI5E F16A/B 1. and values derived from such research could modify the suboptimal results produced here.423 1.610 .. As noted earlier.529 1.539 . representing the first day of combat. 362 2. Accepting this assumption.'. 702 2. .998 2. Surge operations are postulated over a 15 hour flying day.. four elements need to be considered in assessing an air force s propagation potential: the numbers of specific air weapon systems on hand.035 F16C/D F15A/B F16CSC MIR4000 KFIRC7 F4EF 6.509 2.749 . command and control... the role(s) in which they will likely be employed.j. " " ". .251 2." . they serve the purpose of defining the outer boundar.588 .691 .•.743 2.'.300 1.'-.462 . or support proficiency of individual nations in this study.462 .944 TA C PL C -* .120 .497 1.. sortie potential will be calculated for a single day.. .842 1. 103 2.482 1.616 Force Propagation General Comments The technical combat potential of air weapons systems is only realized in their employment.available technical potential which a national air force might generate under optimum conditions in specific missions areas..936 .'.-'. 388 1.480 .068 2.-.379 .509 ..." ii . In this effort.709 1.-.430 1.2.. . .340 .Table 6.' .998 1.. operational.046 1. The force propagation side of the air combat potential equation addresses those factors which govern the quantty of. and support capabilities will be assumed to be equal.842 1.432 .'. command and control. the construction o'a detailed combat model 109 - .593 F15C/D F4MOD F15CFP F20 2.-.. l lo vevcr. with no combat or maintenance losses considered and all non-essential maintenance deferred.410 1.115 2. .-.566 1.. .2 6. To keep the problem manageable. Those factors constitute tertile ground for research. of 2 A detailed combat assessment model would have to include the effect of multi-day operations. 445 . . Operations analysts regularly emplov methodolomes %%whi cl considcr thc-e and other variables n analyzing speciic easds.235 1.

. operationally available inventory in role (OIrt) is calculated.2. 4 To acknowledge their deep interdiction potential.g. 3 In actuality. Allocation of aircraft to employment roles (ALr) is a bit more cumbersome. Also in the file was an operational availability rate estimated at the force level.9*.2. Without a specific combat scenario.9. 3 Determining the number of aircraft available for employment is simply a matter of multiplying the system inventory in a given year (INVt) by the operational availability rate (OAR).3 Sortie Rates The number of mission area sorties an aircraft can fly in a given day (SRr) is determined by the lcneth of the flying day (LOD). multi-role fighter (FMR). 6. the duration of the mission (MDr). One unit type.5. If credible operational availabilitv data could be gathered across the spectrum of systems and 'countries heina considered._ thefrolevant factors and presenting a potential computation formifa. Unit employment codes are geared to a generic mission category (e.-ator of the primary mission to which they are assigned. fighter ground attack) which. For instance. 20 percent of the available Israeli F-15's are allocated to that role.2 Available Inventory in Role The number and type of aircraft on hand were tabulated in the the air inventory file along with an indi.4) Oil88= 11.uf lice.estions_ wcre essential in identifvin. their effectiveness in close air support being suspect.ppendix B to Epstein .1 basiirr . with two notable exceptions. for the most part. aircraft are allocated equally across mission areas. . OI-8 = (32*. 6. In their absence. the time the aircraft spends on the ground taxiing and arming (GT). Other factors is beyond the purview of this research project and would outstrip its resources. and the time required to accomplish necessary maintenance (MT).. Bomber aircraft are cast only in an interdiction role. Israeli F-15's assigned to multi-role units are assumed to perform primarily in the air-to-air roles for which they are best suited and not at all in the close air support role. would provide a more refined product. 29 would be available for combat at an operational availability rate of 0. a gross force le%el estunate-will have to . 5 Operations malsts at Northrop s Aircraft Division generously provided the outline of a inplificd technique for estmatina sortie rates. encompasses all four. The remainder are equally distributed between the air defense and fighter missions.11i/itar. thc. of the 32 F-16C's Israel will possess in 1988. In equation form. Ihcir sue.a nation's force propagation potential. each system would have differing operational availibilitv rates.' /oter - 1It) - . OIrt = INVt*OAR*ALr The number of IAF F-15C's allocated to the fighter role on a combat day in 1988 would be computed. subsumes two mission areas (interdiction and close air support in the case of ground attack fighters). The F-15 is too expensive and uniquely capable an air-to-air system to be thrust into the heavy ground defense environment which conlronts CAS missions.

306 hours if the force quality indicator were included. It is recognized that these values would be significantly different in a confrontation between Israel and Syria as opposed to one between Egypt and Libya. the force quality values are low- confidence estimates and will be employed just to demonstrate their effect.103 provided an an alternative methodology. The environment was assumed to be equal for all forces and missions. Nominal mission durations were assigned subjectively by category. where greater distances would come into play. values for a MiG-21JKL operated in a fighter role by the Syrian Air Force are inserted in the equation.600. Three factors needed to be considered in estimating maintenance time ior an aircraft flying a particular mission (MT): the hours flown on the mission (MD). In the case of Syria. The length of the flying day has been stipulated to be 15 hours. Since these had all been compiled previously. it was left to insert them in the equation. Consequentlv. They ranged from a low of . the maintenance ground time for the same %liG-2IJKL in a fighter role would increase to 4. The determination of a potential sortie rate for an aircraft and mission combination in the context of a 15 hour flying day is a matter of inserting the above identified values in the equation. just over two and one half hours of maintenance time would be required between each mission. and the maintenance personnel available for each aircraft - (MXP).5) 3. SRf= 15 (5SRf = 2.5*18)10. This indexed value (Israel= 1) would be applied to the denominator in the formula. 111l- . .ed here borrows from both.45 MTf = 2. the support quality index value is .5 S4 + . but will be assumed to be be equal across forces in this study.associated with availability of parts and supplies are also important. . SRr = LOD(GTr *MT . which require more elaborate arming. r +MDr) To agam use the example of the Syrian %liG-21JKL in the tiahter role. the man-maintenance hours required to support one flying hour for the aircraft (MMHFH). Unfortunately. The mission durations used in these calculations represent regional averages and can be easily modified for country specific analyses.584 Thus.Mission duration varies considerably as a function of environment and mission role. Ground time was estimated to be 45 minutes for airto-air missions and 75 minutes for air-to-ground missions. MTf = (1. If the effectiveness of maintenance personnel were to be considered. the MXP term would have to be modified by the support quality factor extracted earlier. The tectnique emplo.75 hours for a close air support mission to a high of 2 hours for a deep interdiction mission. MTr = (MDr*MMHFH)iMXP To demonstrate its use.

With the exception of Jordan.- -1 12 1) .4 Sortie Production The number of sorties which an air force could potentially generate in each mission area on a given day can be determined by multiplying the number of aircraft available for a mission area by the system s sore rate in that role. are the ordy other countries in the region with a substantial sortie production capability.5 also illustrates a point often made concerning the relativcl\ low threat posed by Libya's disproportionately large and ditficult to maintain inventory. largely as a factor of small maintenance pools which have not kept pace with the influx of aircraft. and the flying day is shorter. SPrt = Olrt*SRr Substituting values for an Israeli F-15C in the fighter role in 1988.If the force quality modifier were considered. ince none ol its aircraft are currently operational and there are no indications as to when that slttLaton flL1'lt .5 lists total one-day sortie production by mission for 21 Middle Eastern and North Afncan countries in 1988. With a low operational availability rate and a small native maintenance pool. . . Additionally. [he average sortie durations used in the region wide computation are longer than were flown in 1'73. It could be observed that the overall Israeli sortie rate across rmssions 12. a substantial portion of the Israeli force is allocated to the more time consuming interdiction and close air support missions. Iraq. so some of the sortie production totals are considerably higher than would probably be the case in actual circumstances. Egypt. L ebanon was omitted from this and other tables.2. .5 per day.. SPf 8 = (11.5 1. In mathmatic notation.6 The numbers in the far right column sum the total sorties across mission roles. 6. Several of the Gulf States also show discouraian y low sortie production. Algeria. the computation is. . Tripoli cannot propagate a credible number of sorties without enormous quantities of outside assistance.7) SPf88 = 19. with Synan sortie production concentrated in the air-toair missions. . Fable 6. quality of Israel could gen- erate nearly twice as many air-to-ground sorties. . Saudi Arabia.55 Again. Table 6. the fractional values represent an average and could be truncated if desired. Ihe. figures are uncontrolled for maintenance force quality. This possible anomaly can be explained by three tactors. the estimates for the other countries in this group would be depreciated significantly if maintenance quality were included in the calculation.phttoanC. and Jordan. the mix is quite difterent. .2) is lower than advertised performance in the Yom Kippur War. in descending order. While the Syrians could potcntiallv manpower being equal) produce nearly as many total sorties. the potential sortie rate would decrease to to less than 2.

CFPf CFPf 8 8 = 2.6 lists the 1988 combat force poten- tial assessments for the Israeli and Syrian Air Forces in 19$.39 Calculations are accomplished for each air weapon system in the inventory.lathmetically. 113 - . uated individually or ag egated for the entire national force. Ihe results can be eval- Fable 6. In this table.3 TOTAL " 31 1 106 3 419 150 47 556 544 271 8 174 0 13 279 337 121 0 9 196 237 60 22 32 78 204 20 8 15 0 136 52 60 177 422 48 5 9 30 139 24 34 136 491 74 114 730 1200 4 9 50 69 60 41 65 144 310 214 29 11 23 0 6 0 0 2 6 236 48 81 166 8 64 7 5 7 49 528 10 445 22 7 317 41 11 114 38 241 66 1117 0 67 0 10 6 29 7 7 35 4 15 30 4 6 54 9 15 22 58 22 UAE CAS 55 2 22 Saudi Arabia INT 79 2 50 Qatar FTR 266 12 130 89 530 93 Oman ADX 73 104 5 22 Combat Force Potential The ultimate step in the assessment process is to meld the two branches into a value which which categorizes a nation's relative potential to conduct combat air operations under the employment considerations stipulated. the process is straightforward.057*21.1988 COUNTRY INVENTORY Algeria Bahrain Egpt . This step transforms input data into a mission relevant potential combat output.58 = 44. . the quality of the respective maintentance forces is assumed equal.5: Daily Sorties By Mission .1. CFPr t = ACPr = SP Air Combat Potential for an Aircraft in Role r Sortie Production for Country n in Role r in Year t. Table 6.8. = t Combat Force Potential for Country n in Role r in Year t Substituting the values for a Syrian Air Force MiG-29 employed in the fighter role in 198R. CFPn = ACPr*SPn where.. Force totals are summed at the bottom of each column. Etiopla Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Libya Morocco Somalia Sudan Syria Tunisia North Yemen South Yemen 6.

the impact of air weapon system quality is vividly demonstrated.23 33.72 114.24 0 29.28 23.47 439.19 0 0 0 116. .59 0 0 0 0 0 19.67 0 0 0 65.93 58. the quality of its aggregate output in that mission category is one-third lcss.53 188.13 0 44.45 14. Roughly 60 percent of Syrias air defense force is comprised of older MiG-21 aircraft.13 15.23 28.39 0 0 7. .22 8.54 42.14 326..66 80.87 112.1988 AIRCRAFT INVEN -TORY TYPE ADX FTR INT 0 0 51.60 9.5 which showed the two countries with nearly equal undepreciated sortie production.60 6.91 0 76.28 CAS ISRAEL A4H A4N F15A F15B F15C F16A F16B F16C F16D F4EF KFIRC2 KFIRC7 18 50 18 2 32 62 8 54 8 100 120 72 TOTAL: FGA FGA FMR OCU FMR FMR OCU FMR OCU FMR FMR FMR 544 SYRIA MIG17F MIG21F MIG21JKL MIG21UM MIG23B MIG23E MIG23F MIG23G MIG23UM MIG25 MIG29 SU22 SU25 TOTAL: Note: 36 72 84 20 24 48 70 36 10 38 24 42 24 FGA FIN FIN OCA FIN FIN FGA FIN OCG FIN FIN FGA FGA 528 Undepreciated for Maintenance Quality Reflecting back to Table 6.19 0 0 26.29 16.26 6. .41 9.56 190. .93 7. .61 70. while the least capable Israeli aircraft flying the mission is the F-4EF.10 111.24 0 23.44 77.Table 6.95 0 9.09 0 0 0 0 32..13 0 36.49 .55 44. Even with the SU-25 added to its 114 .09 331.71 77.20 68.01 428.20 44.27 73.12 658.94 797.23 61.61 39. .12 111.72 14.06 49.72 2.03 17.6: Comparative Force Potential .66 19.71 77.41 25.21 94.47 99. . an aircraft which has significantly greater target acquisition and payload capabilities. Even the projected addition of two squadrons of MiG-29's to the Syrian inventor" is not enougl to offsct the advantage accruing to Israel through superior air weapons system teclnology.79 5.00 98.49 9.18 0 0 0 0 0 53. While Syria could potentially generate 30 percent more air defense sorties than Israel in a single day of surge flying. .33 26.45 0 0 75.61 22. Fable 6.49 25. . .72 5.80 43.90 84.51 115.97 55.6 also illustrates Syria's relative impotence itproviding air support to its ground forces.96 59.33 132.

. S A full listing of nationally ageaegated combat potential scores differentiated by mission for the l)P 4 1990 time frame can be t6unif-in-Appendix G. Jordan. the aircraft.7 depicts 1988 combat potential depreciated tor The IAF would have almost a 2:1 superiority measured in Air Combat P. the IAF has budt an air-to-ground capability unmatched by Syria or any other country in the repon. Iraq. In the critical Persian Gulf. and do not exist in a vacuum. the combined air forces of Syria. has demonstrated a political reluctance to export signficant quantities of capable air-toground aircraft to states which rmght pose a potential threat to Israel. North African countries. . . the combined Arab lead in air defense potential should be operationally considered in the context of Israeli interdiction potential. . combat potential scores lor 21 Middle Eastern. Development of commensurate air-to-ground capabilities has lagged. the United States.". acquired by Soviet clients in the region simply trail their western produced counterparts in air-to-ground potential. by 1988. This analysis reflects the attainment of that goal. Thus. The Israeli MATMON B air development plan. current and projected. . In North Africa. 9 It should be noted that mission capabilities are not operationally matched in combat. If the estimated quality of maintenance support is considered. and Iraq still fail to attain the levels of interdiction and close air support potential credited to Israel in 1988. Similarly. Egyptian potential ovcrvhelims Since the measure of maintenance quality is indexed to the Israeli raw value. Overall. projected air combat potential development for all countries except Israel appears to have focused primarily on the creation of credible air defense and air superiority capabilities. Second. . established creation of an air force capable of striking with overwhelming power anywhere in the remon as a prime goal. western supplier.klthoudh such an asssertion is Occassionalv made m tirin the politicaf kettle. with the possible exception of air superiority. the Israeli tigures are unchanged from the previous table. . and ntra-Arab poitical unpossiblitv 7 -115- . Syrian capabilities in the interdiction and close air support rules are dwarfed by the Israeli potential. and Egypt all will have amassed significant air-to-air combat potential by 1NS8 under projected acquisition plans. Two factors First. Iraq. the preponderance of Israeli close air support capability is partially offset by the numerically superior ground forces Arab states could theoretically commit.8 depicts the aggregated 198.' Table 6. to a position of panty with the other dominant air power in the region. As a result. the margn ot Israeli superionty in all mission areas becomes even more pronounced. .inventory. Saudi Arabia. . This example does not imply that the comhined combat potential of those Arab states could be cumulativev brought to bear against Israel. in asscociation with other members of the Gulf Cooperation Council..3 Any number of observations could be dra\'n :rom tis chart. the Saudi acquisition of the Tornado package will boost its capabilities. -.ria. Table 6. contribute. command-and control. . S. maintenance quality. tentiai Units in the combined air-to-air missions and nearly a 6:1 margin over Syna in the air-to-ground roles. Saudi Arabia. . As %dl later be seen. the primar. drafted in the wake of the N-3 War.it consitutes a logistic. Looking to the region as a whole.

76 84.49 9.51 115.93 58.93 8.90 22.41 9.Table 6.19 61. Sudan's potential inallmissions ismodest and does not match the air-to-ground potentiad available to Ethiopia.69 0 0 0 0 0 13.61 16.90 84.61 39.91 18.06 49.\cross the Bab-el-Mandeb.91 0 57. Finally.69 0 19.22 44.82 143. there is no doubt that Algeria will maintain a dominant air position in the Nlauhreb.07 69.72 0 6.55 [ 15.54 42.41 111.00 0 0 0 0 23. 70 22.26 6.03 11.97 55.72 5.50 0 0 0 0 0 38.60 6.87 0 0 56.56 319.48 0 0 5.45 14.01 428.33 26.02 233. -116- .03 31.42 0 25.61 70.12 111.71 77.58 56. 13 ISRAEL A4H A4N FI5A F15B F15C F16A F16B F16C F16D F4EF KFIRC2 KFIRC7 TOTAL: 18 50 18 2 32 62 FGA FGA FMR OCU FMR FMR 8 OCU 54 8 100 120 72 FMR OCU FMR FMR FMR 544 0 0 51.49 .72 14.47 7 23 5.71 77.66 80.79 25. To the south.86 0 16.78 29.77 14.07 0 0 0 48.94 797.72 2. while Somalia lacks a significant capabilty in all but the close air support roles.96 59.1988 AIRCRAFT INVEN -TORY TYPE ADX FTR INT CAS 0 0 26.00 98.7: Comparative Force Potential.53 188.90 0 30.19 0 0 0 116.90 17.22 6.10 99.09 331. The Tunisian and Moroccan air forces are simply too small and too undcrequipped to pose a credible match. North Yemen would clearly require assistance from Saudi Arabia to contest South Yemen's superiority in ali mission areas.27 73.33 132.55 SYRIA MIG17F MIG21F MIG21JKL MIG21UM MIG23B MIG23E MIG23F MIG23G MIG23UM MIG25 MIG29 SU22 SU25 TOTAL: Note: 36 72 84 20 24 48 70 36 10 38 24 42 24 FGA FIN FIN OCA FIN FIN FGA FIN OCG FIN FIN FGA FGA 528 Depreciated for Maintenance Quality that which could be generated by Libya without tremendous assistance from the Soviet Bloc.72 114.12 658.29 16.63 48.

20 5.62 66.Table 6.17 1.26 0 226.11 439.39 19.25 8.31 2.4 . What this chapter has demonstrated is that an analytical regimen which countenances the combined contributions of technical capability and force propagation to potential output in specified air combat roles is a viable assessment tool.27 38.67 797. political relevance.21 0 15.53 2. propagation potential) leads to conclusions which lack military and. 37 25.55 247.22 0 8.29 68.39 658.90 0 120.71 13.1988 COUNTRY Algeria Bahrain Egypt Ethiopia Iran Iraq Israel Jordan Kuwait Libya Morocc.35 20.21 0 15.79 428. .88 1.4 INVENTORY 266 12 419 150 47 556 544 130 89 530 93 50 22 214 64 49 528 22 67 73 104 ADX FTR 69.10 32.91 326.99 71.14 0 26.56 3.29 23.95 43. 76 30.51 0 25. 14 2.73 2.53 145.53 11. Further examples will be offered in Chapter 7 which exercise these application attributes.35 177.34 16. 117.55 6.66 5.27 1 p Undepreciated for Maintenance Quality Sununary These thumbnail analyses are representative only and by no means exhaust either the relevant questions pertaining to air development in the region or the analytical potential of the assessment methodolog'.59 25.86 0 14.67 CAS 59. 72 107. One may quarrel legitimately with individual input values in this data set and with the assurnptions under which they were combincd: but there can be no argument as to the essentiallity of their consideration in an analysis which attempts to measure the effect of weapons transfers on national air combat capabilities or regional balances.05 16.45 7.21 2.05 8.85 331.81 190.01 46.91 152.56 16. Oman atar audi Arabia Somalia Sudan Syria Tunisia UAE North Yemen South Yemen Note: 6.01 INT 15.30 3.49 114. mission relevance. 98 8. 93 202.38 50.14 199.29 17.47 37.68 3.85 1.79 5.55 17.58 12. The elimination of any one of these considerations (technical potential.80 64.99 34. to some extent.8: Combat Mission Potential .63 190. 03 8.07 3.48 1.16 36.89 6.

lost similicitly. analytical process is iterative. the effectiveness of which is largely a product of IUs appreciation of the methodology's assumptions. Without delving into the paradign s elements too deeply. it "%as noted that a model which could not be molded to meet user defined criteria would inevitably fail to generate policy relevant results. of input data. S. iedescribes a ten step process which begns with the determination of analytical objectives and criteria. and combinational scheme. flows through data collection and model design. be adjustable at each phase of its operation. The mechanism has been described and implemented and some individual results highlighted. the decision maker must have access to them and be able to mike alterations to suit his requirements. therefor. applies the model to assessing alternatives for evaluation and interpretation. Quade. I hc model which it employs must. Ilnalvis f"Or Public I)ecisions. In Chapter 1. -ha - . To avoid this pitfall.Chapter 7 POLICY ASSISTANCE APPLICATIONS The goal of this research was to develop a military analysis tool which could assist policy makers in developing. This chapter will demonstrate the sensitivity of these features in evaluating a security assistance question and suggest some additional categories of questions to which it could be directed. pp. 50-f6 for a thorough discussion of the steps in polic\ analysis and their interelationships. prionties. The methodology proposed for assessing the impact o" air weapon s\%tems' transfers (-? recipient force structure and reional military balances possesses those attributcs See Quade. in his discussion of the role of analysis in supporting policy decisions. in many instances. and ends with the reassessment of assumptions and "alternatives for reintroduction into a subsequent analytical phase. The model as it stands produces results dictated by the input data and underlying assumptions. evaluating. Fo question and change any of these essential elements. . The interpretation of analytical output demands decision maker participation. As such. features have been included in this methodology which permit user directed modifications of assumptions and. 7.1 Criteria E. and supporting security assistance packages. input data. and perceptions of a user evaluating a specific security assistance question. but its efficacy in producing decision relevant data still needs to be established. two key concepts bear mention in the context of this effort. its output is static and conceivably unresponsive to the problems. posits a cycle which an analytical regimen must transit. the It must accommodate the introduction of evolving alternatives and chanz- mrg assumptions if it is to present the decision maker with options pertinent to his problem.

\ddIlt East lalance. I ie intluence al political perceptions and obje'ctives would be applied outside ol' the mctho iolou - Il) . whose policy of aggressive deterrence includes regular overflights of Jordanian territory. for a dicus ion of threatv to Jordan and incidents of Israeli overtli chts. 7. Americas closest ally in the reion. Amman requested Unitcd States i. backdrop. Both the Syrian and Israeli air forces currently have the capability to overwhelm Jordan's air defense system. Consequently. ()ne cniponet atI See Cordesman. . The analytical example offerred in the next section is geared to illustrate the methodology s flexibility in responding to hypothetical decision maker directed changes at various junctures in the analytical process. Ihe intent o ils ecot1'n :. . Syria.-\eainst this admittedly sketch.\namics ot the: problcrm oir become crnbroiled in the debate af '. t . Jordan is also putatively threatened by Israel. The air component of.kho thrcaterns a hom. Jordan is a long. *'' " *- -I . and its economy is highlv dependent on free access to the port of Aqaba. Jordan itself is viewed as a threat by Israel. the capability to modify input data and underlying assumptions is emphasized.aluate MI iddle I astern political qlie't. It is threatened sporadically by a much more powerful neighbor.it:ince in enhancine its air. and those capabtlities will increase over the next five years as new systems are introduced.time American arms client whose strength and stability are critical to regonal security.which permit the decision maker not only to test alternatives but also to alter the conditions under which they are tested. defense capabilities to counter the projected threat into the lIql s.tns. Much of its industry is concentrated in along the Dead Sea: 60 percent of its azmculture is confined to the eastern Jordan Valley.ict patronage and radical tendencies are antithetical to Washington's regonal objectives. along with the potential to derive new alternatives and evaluate their effectiveness. not to e'. The security assistance dilemma presented by Jordan s requirement for an advanced air defense fighter embodies many of the elements which confound arms transter policy makers. Its power and water supplies are likewise inviting air targets.39 -42. recognizing full well that the actual interpretation process would by necessity involve a host of considerations exogenous to the model. this example will consider a simile security assistance question and its permutations. any security assistance to Jordan must be evaluated not only in the context of its own 2 defense but also in terms of the potential threat it poses to Israeli security. demontrate methodoiovical flexibilitv.2 Enhancing Jordanian Air Combat Potential Rather than trekking through a series of discrete problems. In 10(5. M\ethodoloical results will be interpreted strictly on their own merits. I his example wil not treat the political .. Conversely. whose So. Jordan s air defense system is currently limited to 38 Nlirage F-I B C F's. the elements of a question to which the air capabilities methodology could be applied can be drawn. From a military perspective.-1rms and the . Jordan is highly vulnerable to incapacitating air attacks from either of its more powerful neighbors. pp. with which Amman is not entirely satislied.Iordanian . In particular.

What pertinent questions are tractable to quantitative military analysis? First. S. Additionally. the Jordanian air defense enhancement request provides a demanding vehicle with which to flex the proposed analytical methodology. Third. Air-to-air combat potential scores were computed for each aircraft using the techniqucs. 4 It might be remembered from a previous chapter that modified versions of the F-16C and the F-20A have already been configured in the stuay data set. or practices. the first problem is to identify and evaluate the aircraft and configurations feasible for transfer under the constrictions imposed by the terms of the request and American transfer policy. it is hypothesized that the aircraft would have to be configured in such a way as to preclude their effective employment in an air-to-ground role. assumptions. a French aircraft. The ANIAPG67 radar associated with the F-20 has been similarly limited. 7. for a description of the requested arms package and its supporting rationale. with options to support BVR radar guided missiles and enhance ground tracking capabilities eliminated. and it is not the intent of this iLlustration to reenergize it or advocate particular alternatives. it can test the impact each alternative makes on national air capabilities. identified as the F-16CSC and F-20 respectively.the package was a request for 40 air defense fighters. The results of the initial inquiry are displayed in Table 7. it can evaluate the relative combat potential of alternative air weapon systems in the projected employment environment. In the Jordanian case. which lacks a foreward hemisphere engagenient capability.%anman s request. Ihe F-16CSC is equipped with the AN/APG66 radar which does not have the capability to illuminate targets for radar air-to-air missile guidance. it can assess the effect of the proposed arms transfer on the regional military balance under varying scenarios. the French alternative would not be subject to U. 4 It needs to be clearly understood that these particular assurptions and other like them cited in this example are included for the purposes of illustration only an do not correspond to k.2. 1. the CCRPCCIP feature of the fire control system has been omitted to complicate effective air-to-ground ordnance delivery. Both systems will be configured for the air-to-air role with four of the latest export version of the Sidewinder (AIM-9P). Of course. the Mirage-2000C. 120 - . and data discussed in earlier chapters.1 Aircraft Alternatives Two aircraft are likely candidates to meet Jordanian requirements: the F-16C and the F-20A. . 3 See Gordon. In deference to probable political restrictions. 3 The American response is currently adrift in a political maelstrom. the transfer of a capability to launch radar guided air-to-air missiles is stipulated as being destabilizing vis-a-vis Israel. To extend the frame of reference.overnmcntlt policies. 'Administration Urges Congess to Accept AXrms Sale to Jordan. perceptions. Further. Nonetheless. is also evaluated on the surmise that it rmiaht be an alternative from the Jordanian perspective if Washington denied .*figuration was not altered from that already exported to other Middle Eastern states. Second.S imposed constraints: so its con-.

The results of the second iteration are displayed in Table 7. it is probable that the range attribute is overemphasized.Revised AIRCRAFT AIR DEFENSE POTENTIAL FIGHTER POTENTIAL. which are afforded a high relative utility in the air defense mission. Table 7. 130 1. F-16CSC F-20 1.432 2.703 2.2: Combat Potential in Air-to-Air Roles .737 2.522 Note: Scores computed with system defaults As a reminder.734 2.541 1. the numbers shown represent units of air combat potential (ACPU's) credited to the air weapon system alone.1: Combat Potential in Air-to-Air Roles AIRCRAFT AIR DEFENSE POTENTIAL F-16CSC F-20 Mirage-2000C FIGHTER POTENTIAL 1. Given the compact defensive environment. The fact that the F-20 has a greater gun ordnance capacity also plays a marginal role in producing higher ACPU ratings.2.125 2.933 2. ACPU's are relative measurements within the confines of the study data set.121- 11'1 II . The Mirage-2000C garnered the highest ratings largely because of its equippage with radar guided air-to-air missiles. These factors offset the relative superiority of the F-16CSC airframe in both roles. To correct this deficiency. utility values were adjusted to lessen the impact of range and radar missile capabilities on the overall computation.Table 7. The higher scores awarded the F-20 in relation to the F-16CSC are primarily the products of a more effective radar and a lower vulnerability to engagement. its margin of superiority lessens as a function of the lower relative utility awarded the radar guided missiles. 133 1. as is the relative utility of radar guided air-to-air missiles. In reviewing the initial fi'dings. N.147 -- Note: Scores computed with revised utility values While the Mirage-2000C still receives superior scores due to itsmultiple missile type carnage. note that the assumptions under which the default relative utility values had been established were predicated on a nominal regional employment environment which did not correspond entirely to the situation facing Jordan. 134 Mirage-2000C 2. . They do not connote absolute values of independent merit.

the delivery of which would have begun in 1989. - 122- III . Additionally. additional information needs to be extracted from the data set and modified in accordance with inquiry objectives. it will be assumed that the notional analysis is being conducted in response to the initial request. . . additional dimensions of the assessment process come into focus. so it was assumed first deliveries could take place within three years of an order. with all 40 delivered by 1990. provides a more immediate payoff. with a decision anticipated before the end of 1985.. First.. It is also evident that either American alternative is inferior to the Mirage-2000C when combat potential is considered under asymetrical political constraints in an employment vacuum. if accurate. Based on the above. F-20's were introduced into the Jordanian inventory begining in 1988. but one which is suitable to the demonstration.--- '. .16CSC. the force level computations include a sortie generation algorithm which considers an aircraft's maintenance requirement (man maintenance hoursfiying hour) and mission specific sortie lengths. air-t level analysis. the first F-20s could be delivered within 2. Information concerning Mirage-2000C production schedules was not available. the earlier availability of the F-20.3 Again. For the sake of the illustration. only the first step in the inquiry has been completed. a couple of reminders might be useful. 7. First.The impact of the changed utility values on the comparison between the F-16CSC and F-20 is negligble.%al Jordanian Air Force. To accomplish this task. Consideration of these factors creates even Lreater differentiation among the options than was exhibited when the sterile air weapon system ratingzs were examined. Of course. alternative air inventories must be formulated. In deference to data base limitations. i.5 years of a decision.. although both score higher as a result of the modifications.. -- --------------------------------------.2 Force Structure Impactsr The next challenge is to measure the effect of the proposed transfers on the Jordanian air defense force structure. with the full package in place within 5. so the Air Combat Potential Unit ratings constitute aggregated totals.. even when the French option is considered.. Regarding this table. a risky assumption in the case of the F.L----'--- .5 years. it appears that the F-2() represents the most effective a On the basis of this torce ir-to-air combat choice br thc R. If the inquiry were terminated here. The capabilities embodied in the transfers under study are integrated into a pre-existing force structure.. as were all the Mirage-2000C's. According to a least one report.-. The results of the force level computations are displayed in Table 7.. Initial F-16CSC deliveries would be delayed an additional year. it was postulated that all deliveries would be completed by 1990... Second. the low maintenance overhead associated with the F-20 permits a higher sortie generation rate which more than comnpensates for the forrprset higher weaponthesystem scores received reoeived by the theteMirage-20)O0C.... it would appear that the F-20 represents a more favorable American alternative when only air-to-air applications are considered. All 40 F-16CSC's were also forecast to be in place by the end of that year.2.

. .24 81. •• " .24 49 45. • .67 100. : . lhesc -123€" - . although the F-20 still enjoys a definite advantage. This statement in no way is meant to impugm the estimates made by any aircraft producer.'"=. .Options 1988 1989 1990 46 45. 93 152.67 32.35 78. --n " .67 32. the user might again decide that some of the input data need further revision.02 45. • .3.38 191. the maintenance figure for the F-20 could be raised to match user perceptions and the F-16CSC estimate lowered. For instance. Table 7. 14 109. . 5 Consequently.- "- . The recomputation places the F-16CSC in a more competitve position in the 1990 time frame with the Mirage-2000C.3 7.35 78. . variations are included solely to demonstrate fiethodologca lcxibility.92 137.96 114. it could be observed that the maintenance requirement for the F-20 (15 MIII.- .2.92 135.- " .38 85.71 193.76 223.2. -I .3: Jordanian Air-to-Air Combat Potential . .1 Modifying Assumptions and Packages Alternate Assumptions Upon reviewing these results.05 Air Defense 78.: .89 267." ' " -u" .34 82.Table 7.02 64.02 100.35 78.46 165. __.06 F-16CSC Package Air Defense Fighter ToTal Air-to-Air F-20 Package To al Air-to-Air Mirage-2000C Package Air Defense Fighter Total Air-to-Air I Note: Computation used unmodified data and system defaults 7.4 displays the results of a computation when the maintenance requirement for the F-20 is raised by four hours and that for the F-16CSC is lowered by two. . .j ." .' . '" " . . 32 Fighter 57. F1) is not derived from an evaluation of fielded systems and might be overly optimistic and that the F-16CSC estimate (23 MMHiFH) is a bit pessimistic.30 32.

93 146.99 F-20 Package Air Defense Fighter Total Air-to-Air 75.02 120.73 152. CASA C-101's (14) join the inventory beginnig in 19. 11 1990 For the sake of this demonstration. it could be hypothesized that the F-20 package merits additional evaluation.2 Alternate Package Composition On the basis of these preliminary findings. 91 53. 50 383. 12 Total 325.01 206.78 44.54 45.54 162.02 45. Rcco~rizing 124- i 1 . 15 74. this time including the air-to-ground assets. which is subsumed into close air support in these calculations.3.Revised 1988 1989 1990 F-16CSC Package Air Defense Fighter To al Air-to-Air 46 45.84 133. 15 74.39 85.47 103. 91 53.45 158.Table 7.35 78. - . .67 32.98 86. Table 7.47 106. Jordanian interdiction and close air support capabilities are provided primarily by 56 F-5E's.S to accomplish the counterinsurgency mission.4: Jordanian Air-to-Air Combat Potential .45 158.5 portrays the impact of the 40 aircraft F-20 package on overall Jordanian force potential. Table 7.78 180.07 249.67 32.5: Jordanian Air Combat Potential 1988 1989 Air Defense Fighter Interdiction Close Air Support 75. 47 103.56 129.67 32. • .99 219.35 78. - ' " ' ' " " .30 64.2. 29 106. . 12 146.50 452.07 44. The calculations used in compiling this and subsequent tables incorporate the assumption and data revisions postulated earlier. -.02 98.56 43. Note: Computation used modified airframe and force level data. 7.35 78.38 Mirage-2000C Package Air Defense Fighter Total Air-to-Air ". an assumption could be made that proposal of a 4i0 aircrafi package would be politically inopportune but that a smaller complement might be palatable.

125- N .W "Ald .6..29 44. The results of this notional formulation on Jordanian air combat potential are depicted in Table 7.91 The impact of aerial refueling and supplementary maintenance (20%) support can be seen most clearly in the air defense scores for 1988 and 1989. since tankers would not be committed to support air superiority missions.91 405. Support 1990 1988 1989 Air Defense Fighter In erdiction Close Air Support 87.32 43. the figures in the 1990 column indicate that these support enhancements will not fully compensate for an inventory reduced by 40 percent.05 80.02 56. with an additional 12 the following year.6: Jordanian Air Combat Potential . Table 7. In realistic terms. it would reduce Israeli sensitivities to the proposal while bolstering Jordanian confidence. a final question is to evaluate the impact of the contemplated F-20 transfer insofar as it would permit the Jordanian Air Force to shift other assets to ground attack missions.36 405. it might be advisable to couple the reduced package with assurances of American support in case of Syrian aggression. While this hypothesis is a bit far-fetched politically. this particular security assistance arrangement might be a pipe-dream. even though they do make a dent in the potential deficit. 12 Total 339. However. Fighter mission capabilities are less noticeably affected. 12 F-20's would be delivered in 1988.45 158. Specifically.U. 7- . 6 Under this proposal.45 158. but the potential to evaluate such complex hardware and support combinations is inherent in the analytical methodology.Jordan's precarious security situation.. No further deliveries would be accomplished.05 80. One more flexibility exercise will be conducted before moving to the regional stability issue.29 123. A tentative security package was envisioned which would limit the number of aircraft to 24 but which would pledge American air refueling support for air defense missions and supplementary maintenance support for all F-20's in the case of war with Syria.S. the F-20's might conceivably replace the current contingent of Mirage F-I's in the air-to-air SAccording to the manufacturer. the F-20 can be equipped with an optional refucling probe. Potential air defense combat output in each of these years is significantly enhanced by the combined effects of increased endurance and greater maintenance resources.73 152. Acknowledging that Jordan is confronted with a relative deficit not only in air defense assets but also in round attack resources.29 44. 12 123. mirroring the original delivery proposal.

They are unmodified by considerations of operational proficiency or C31 support and should in no way be construed as predictors of combat outcome.-r'abia. such a conversion would be unlikely. with the latter re-roled as ground attack assets.01 In this instance. No allied close air support assets will be considered.29 325. force potential computations are only of passing interest when viewed outside their employment context...40 207. 7.. Note the substantial drop in air defense and fighter capabilities in 1989 which is only partially rectified with the arrival of 16 additional F-20's in 1990. it is important to recollect that the ratings represent the balances of relative potential for a sinvle day of combat. the 37 F-IC.48 42.7 depicts the results of that investigation. Table 7.72 64. with close air support capabilities climbing a more modest 25 percent. To further explore system capabilities. Aiman s notional allies will retain all air-to-air assets for their own protection and will contribute a portion IIraq. 37 207.8.4. The next series of assessments places a proposed 40 aircraft F-20 sale to Jordan in two threat environments.7: Jordanian Air Combat Potential -F-I's Re-roled Air Defense Fighter Interdiction Close Air Support Total 1988 1989 1990 75. since the command and control difficulties involved are be prolubtive.- r - missions. - -'. 12 374.80 70. The first assesses the relative combat balance between Jordan and its allies against its most threatening neighbor. 50%~o. it will be assumed that Saudi Arabia and Iraq will provide Jordan limited air support in a confrontation with Syria.- U- - - - .50 100. They are static rather than dynaniic indicators of potential combat effectiveness. Jordan's interdiction potential would increase by approximately 50 percent. Saudi . .1 Jordan and Allies Versus Syria At the outset.91 53.2. Syria.43 64. At the same time. 126 - I he - .4 Assessing Regional Stability Of course. 73 60. 30" of their interdiction resources for attacks against Syria. balance of air combat potential under this scenario is shown in Fable 7. Table 7.2.U - -.56 43. 7. but its effects can be forecast. 12 443. Given the Jordan's vulnerability to air attack and the relative superiority of its neighbors.E's were reassigned to air-to-ground missions in 1989 after the first 24 F-20's had become available for air-to-air operations. w r 'r ' r r•- r . 37 152.

74 347. With Egypt militarily and politically neutralized by the Camp David Accord. the addition of advanced aircraft to Jordan' s air defense arsenal might well deter a Syrian air attack but would still not be sufficient to carry the air war to Syria or to offset Syrian ground force superiority. and the composition is by no means clear.66 152. and Jordan will be included only insofar as the assessment concerns the impact ot' arms sales to it.Table 7. All other factors being held constant.07 60.55 190. The inability to credibly contest Syrian air superiority would severely curtail the potential effectiveness of Jordan's close air support assets. Similarly. albeit reluctantly. Syrian air defense forces have such a significant combat potential that the relatively weak interdiction effort which Jordan and its allies could launch would not likely be any more than marginally effective from a rnilitarv standpoint. On the plus side. virtually on a par with that of Jordan and its allies.59 69.21 FIherito Close Air Support - Allied Support 75.78 60.93 544. The first problem is to define which states fit in the Confrontation category.2.4. Additionally. 12 1990 146. Syria is the Arab hub.2 Jordan and Allies Versus Israel A second threat environment which must be adressed. Iraq and Saudi Arabia will be assumed to contribute the same level of support as %vas postulated in the previous scenario against Syria. given the overwhelming Syrian superiority in the fighter mission category. Its air-toground potential is considerably more modest. the Arab posture will be construed less effusively than is sometimes the practice. 12 68. the comparisons which really count in this evaluation are those between the mission roles.14 Fgtr326.29 434. 91 53. Since the study is concerned with militan potential and not rhetoric. the combination of Jordan's bolstered air defense potential and Syria's low interdiction potential distinctly diminishes the air threat against key targets within Jordan. the probability of Jordan maintaining air superiority over the battlefield would be remote.66 158.32 65. 47 103. involves war between the '\-rab Confrontation States and Israel.8: Jordanian/ Syrian Air Combat Balance 1988 Jordan and Allies Air Defense Fig~hter Interdiction Close Air Support irDfne439.34 Syria's preponderant superiority in air-to-air combat potential is clearly demonstrated. even though they are on a relative par with Syria's. 15 74.66 158.56 60. 1lowever. 29 1989 106.60 181. 7.40 192. this Line-up seems to constitute the least unreasonable of the potential threats to -12' .23 310.

With F-16's.71 353. assets can be employed in combinations tailored to a particular threat scenario rather than according to the static allocations used inthis par7 From a political vantage point.14 646. 92 419. In this an other force level examples. the reader will note that total combat potential actually dccrcascs insome years. Israel will continue to hold a clear edge in air-to-ground rrussion potential. Israeli capabilities to provide air support to ground forces measurably outstrip Arab potential to do the same. air superionty potential would suggest a virtual standoff if other factors such as pilot skill. Over the battlefield.92 Interdiction 331. 95 328. the organization and traurung ot the Israeli Air Force gve it considerably greater flexibility in asset allocation. 12- - . 10 Looking at Table 7.84 Fighter 428. Jordanian Mirage F-Is are conumitted to air-togrourfd roles in this assessment ot the threat to Israel.9.13 645. In a final comment. Evaluating the situation across mission areas. F. \'hcn tabluated annually. The Arab potential to conduct successful interdiction operations against Israel proper in the face of the IAF's substantial air defense capability is nealigible.58 494.53 165.46 Jordan and Allies Air Defense Fighter Interdiction Close Air Support Israel Air Defense " 658.02 187.51 746.8 Relative parity inthe air-to-air roles would be predicated on Syria's acquisition of four squadrons of MiG-29's and two squadrons of SU-27's by 1990 and Jordan s receipt of the F-20 arms package. l7' en when this matchup is deemed a wash.48 388. 16 382.86 342.91 780. 10 434.56 418. and. 7 Table 7 9: Arab Israeli Air Combat Balance 1988 1989 1990 526.15's assigned to units with multi-role responsibilities. maintenance proficiency. evolving Arab air defense potential might attenuate the hitherto unchallenged Israeli potential to conduct deep interdiction operations at will. The seenminilv countenntuitive observation is a function of the replacement foic %hich decrements obsolete aircraft in unit sized increments aliter new acquisitions become avalable.01 1 363. This example is illustrative only.Israel. not predictivc or even plausible. 9 In the same recard. compensating for numerical inferiority on the ground. From a iilitarv perspective. and C3 1 are held constant. 70 Close Air Support 797. Jordan's participation would be suicidlal with 1ivpt 6n 1he side-lines.04 183. to a lesser degree. combined Syrian and Jordanian air-to-air combat potential will approach that possessed by Israel at the end of the decade. the inclusion of Iraq and Saudi Arabia in a collegial cfrlot with S\ na is improbable.28 400. this procedure creates some inventory overlaps which would disappear 1finventones were tabulated on a monthly or qua-terly basis 9 Recopizing the Arab deficit in interdiction assets. [-4's. the picture is less clear.01 669.

". .. As can be seen from Table 7.14 434. altering computational inputs to accommodate differing perceptions or priorities.10 depicts the same force balance when sortie generation potential is depreciated for relative support personnel proficiency.'i. Using the findings from this hypothetical example..k . .92 127.Depreciated 1988 1989 1990> Jordan and Allies 199 Air Defense 344.70 Air Defense Fighter 658. " .. Table 7. To insert the impact of another dimension. ". - [ -.2.. quality of maintenance support. The F-20's would create the potential by NlMlY to defend against Syrian air attacks on the vulnerable Jordanian heartland while not providing sufficient 10 Those allocations can be changed within the model to retlect differing threat perceptions althou.62 256.84 419.. . .95 328. A further diminution of Arab potential would surely result from any appraisal which considered operator and C31 proficiency as well. :. and evaluating their effect on stability in a regional context.77 365.39 138. the relative balance between the IAF and the combined Syrian and Jordanian Air Forces disintegrates when support personnel quality is considered. multi-role fighter could be withdrawn from the air defense mission to gain air superiorty or to launch massive interdiction campaigns if the combat situation warranted. one might observe that the transfer of a package of 40 F-20's configured for air-to-air operations is the most effective practicable response to Jordan's requirement for a modem air defense fighter. . In this light. either quantitatively or subjectively.92 Israel 7. While the specific support index values might be challenged.84 324.-. .. 10 Close Air Support 797.10. 70 331.) . .. there is no serious argument that Arab maintenance capabilities are on a par with Israel's.. . Most importantly..70 Fighter Interdiction Close Air Support 251.2" '-?--. the potential for user interaction at each phase of the process was exercised. ..92 646..08 473.. . The model proved useful in assessing the relative merits of system alternatives. .75 303..ticular computation.. 129 - . . ". for instance.53 315..56 140. i-.01 363.. analytical output constitutes a flexible and comprehensive input to the interpretation and deliberation process.. ..10: Arab/Israeli Air Combat Balance .91 780. 10 For instance. 10 Interdiction 669. .51 746. " " .47 317.. .'". . Table 7. defining their impact on force structure. .5 - Conclusions This string of analyses demonstrates the responsiveness of the proposed methodology in analyzing the military aspects of a security assistance case under a variety of assumptions.. . .01 428. .h this was not done in the currenf example.. .

.inch determine threat. . the spotlight has been on the development and application of an assessment tool to assist arms transfer policy makers. When depreciating factors such as the quality of maintenance support are considered. This fact demands that it be firmly grounded technically and methodologically. . . be adaptable to alternate configuration and computational assumptions. . .3 Other Applications. the type of quantitative military analysis capability demonstrated here is an essential element in the process. However. not to mention some additional applications to which it could be adapted. ground force combat potential. Throughout most of this investigation. There is no doubt that its focus on combat potential permits a more relevant portrayal of air capabilities evolution than does an analysis tethered exclusively to inventories. The ability to consolidate the combined influences of aircraft attributes and subsystems is even more valuable. - 130 - . . . be visible to and accessible by the user. ". . . . Nevertheless. . and capture the impact of security assistance programs on recipient combat potential output and regional balances. however. In the same vein.1 Air Intelligence Analysis The same features which make the methodology viable from a policy assistance standpoint are vermane to some aspects of air intelligence analysis. the methodology is not sufficient in and of itself to capture the full ralec of' factors %. It goes without saying that these quantitatively based observations are insufficient evidence on which to predicate a transfer decision. and a basket of international and domestic political considerations before a comprehensive policy can be elicitcd. . . Rather. It would be remiss.. even this impact on Israeli secri. . as can alterations to force specific attributes such as mission allocation or maintenance support. . . .3..ty is negligible. . 7.i capabilities to support offensive Jordanian air operations against either Syria or Israel. it provides exponentially more comprehensive input data to the threat assessment process than does a mere listing of orders of battle and isolated performance characenstcs. . 7. this methodology meets the demand. . the impact on combat potential of upgrades to aircraft subsystems can be evaluated discretely or at the force level. they must be melded with assessments of other military factors such as ground based air defense capabilities. As illustrated. . The cumulative effects of the strengths and weaknesses of an air weapon system s parts are assessed all too infrequently in intelligence analyses which are boresighted on a handful of system characteristics. . The iterative capability is likewise pertinent to the process of estimating future threats under a variety of scenarios and force structures. . . . The sole threat such a transfer appears to pose to Israel is to diminish the potential effectiveness of Israeli interdiction operations. As in the case of arms transfer pollc\ assistance..

many rely on categorical or nominal input data. relative utility variables. Conceptually. system and force specific combat potential values generated by a methodolou"" such as the one proposed in this study could supplant nominal measures at the front end. it appears to be a productive avenue for additional inquiry. 7. modifying variables) were established as 'look-up' tables in the spreadsheet (LOTUS 1-2-3) and could be inspected and altered by the user pnor to score calculation. One additional deficiency is the fact that the model as currently constituted is cumbersome to operate.-L7 7. a series of menu screens were constructed.3.2 ""W- Operations Research/Analysis Standing alone. While the latter are capable of stepping through multiple series of force on force combat simulations. a hierarchy of menu-like screens could channel processing in the direction(s) desired by the user and make the information which he required for a specific inquiry immediately available. Using dBase-li as a test vehicle. input data could be altered and sub-sets reserved for eventual introduction into the computational (spreadsheet) phase. Files were arranged to correspond to the prowession of analytical nodes described in Chapter 3 (e. the options listed in which linked the user to specific data files. inventory).. using the Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SlPSS) processing system. \Vhile this combination provides a powerful and flexible processing environment. input data and combinational algorithms are not readily accessible to or modifiable by the casual user. - - --. and the requirement to delve into -pecific programs was clninated. system transparency is beclouded. and programs. However. each of the analytical iterations described in the previous section required reprogramming of the logic and utility values in several different computational modules. several substantive and procedural defects in the air combat potential methodology have been flagged as requiring further development. target acquisition system.-4 . - . The procedure is effective but demands intimate familiarity with the data sets.3. Computational variables (e. access procedures.g. Employing the file edit capability. Since force quality is an integal element in most operations analyses. Values for computational variables could be changed with relative ease. It was constructed on an IBM 3033 mainframe computer. the methodology lacks the element of dynamic interaction inherent n most operations analysis models. airframe. these procedures proved conceptually sound but tedious and at times frustratinu. t er visidility and interaction were enhanced.3 Microcomputer Processing Throughout the discussion. For instance. To that extent. While no feasibility tests of this application have been conducted.g. In execution. Initial tests on data sub-sets suggest that the system could be installed profitably on a microcomputer outfitted with data base management and spreadsheet software. but cvaluatinu dif- 131 - . processing was limited to segmented data sets and required the [nli ng of several spreadsheets..

the creation of a truly user-interactive analytcial system is eminently achievable.. In effect. .. it would be imprudent to abandon the effort to adapt a version of this methodology for microcomputer operation.fering configurations or force alternatives required reinitiation of the entire problem definition process.. One additional deficiency stemmed from the fact that factor scoring could not be accomplished using the system configuration available. Several of the problems experienced in attempting to adapt the analytical methodology proceeded th ehia i-1ik. Given these from factors.Ohr " ii the technical limitations inherent in the micro itself (Z-100 with 192K. the breadboard micro-based model proved only martgnally more 'user-friendly' than the original system and was more time consuming. no hard disk). To add a new system or subsystern to a microcomputer file required regeneration of the expanded file on the mainframe system with results downloaded to the micro.. With a more powerful processor and more flexible data base management sottlv are.. . - 132 - . Others from undoubtedly reflect the researcher's relative unfamiliarity with applicable micro software.

On the force propagation Side. They were divided into the subcomponents which define their basic dimensions. the air weapon system performance group included a family of factors which related the subsystems in terms of configuration and combat utility. it was established that a viable methodology would have to meet six criteria: * The methodology must be oriented toward combat relevant output not systemn input. Along with the various categories of subsystem. * Input data must be valid. were positioned at the apex of the framework. multiple sources were cross checked to develop the most accurate values possible.2 Data Collection The articulated analytical structure constituted the data collection matrix. Each subcomponent thus identified was further divided into the performance attributes which contribute to its operation. mission allocation. * Analytical assumptions must be clearly delineated and amenable to user designated variation. Two essential elements. WVhen data -133 - .Chapter 8 SUMMING UP The objective of this research effort has been to develop a methodology which permits the assessment of the aggregated impact of air weapon systems transfers on recipient air combat potential and regional military balances. These were in turn subdivided into the variables which describe those attributes. and sortie generation subcomponents were identified. accessible. of the ledger. 8. At the outset. a matrix was developed the key elements of which constitute the components implicated in assessing force air combat capability. 8. While absolute validity was compromised by the requirements to consider only unclassified data and to estimate values for Some unknowns. inventory. * Analytical procedures must be transparent and purged of sources of systemic error.1 Analytical Structure To insure compliance with the first three criteria. and free from bias. Thle importance of intangible factors such as operator proficiency and C3 support was acknowledged but their consideration deferred to other research efforts. air weapon system performance and force propagation potential. * Comparison between aircraft in definable mission roles and among aggregated national forces is essential. * The contribution of weapon subsystems to combat potential must be addressed.

41 air-to-air missiles.regation technique developed by The Analytic Sciences Corporation incorporates expert judgrient and processes data of any measurement level but cannot accommodate multi-variable attributes and is insensitive to performance variations within broadly defined subsystem catcroncs. its combinational iogic is haphazard when applied at the weapon system level. Only fixed wing aircraft with direct combat application in recent or future \iddle Eastern combat scenarios were considered.3 Data Aggregation To identify a data reduction and aggregational methodology which produced the most comprehensive results uninfluenced by systemic bias. Multi-attribute utility technique produces a judgment based combinational matrix but is administratively unweddly and naturally applicable oirly to ratio level data. \Viatccr its strengths or weaknesses.. A panel of 25 fighter experts familiar with Middle Eastern air operations was polled to ascertain their views on the relationships which obtain among attributes and subsystems in four different nussion areas. Since the methodology aimed to support the development of future arms transfer policies. The weihtcd linear a. 52 target acquisition systems.g. specific data values are consequently open to challenge. The configuration data set mated subsystems to aircraft and addressed those performance relevant characteristics (e. A unique data set was collected to determine the relative utilities of attributes and subsystems in definable combat roles. The results were synthesized statistically and recast as relational variable values to be employed during the weapon system combinational phase. off-the-sheLf aggregational methodolopes wcrc evaluated to identify their assets and liabilities.. In Wile the inaccuracies are lamentable. - li4 - . they were estimated using the most accurate technique which could be supported. each methodology demonstrated the criticality of solid and comprehensive data input to the production of meaning'ul results. Factor analysis stood out because of its ability to consolidate multiple variables into common attribute pertormance measures. and its output measures are not legitinate candidates for aggregation at the force level. However. Measurement biases were minimized by closely scrutinizing observation conditions and adjusting reported values to a common measurement plane. Certain artifical constraints were established to expedite the process. they are not fatal to the evaluation technique itself and can easily be revised in subsequent applications. some instances. navigation system) for which quantitative values were not available. national air combat inventories were anchored with known data from the past two years and projected out to 1990. and 36 aerial guns. 8. The final air weapon system data set consisted of performance and configuration data on 125 aircraft and aircraft variants.were unavailable.

and maintenance resources were considered in a series of equations which computed the sortie generation potential for each possessed air weapon system in those roles to which it would likely be committed. this minimalist version of the factor analysis methodology purged the indices of extraneous variable influences. This feature was installed to permit user visibility and control over methodolo-cical functions. Variables described by nominal values were not included in the factor problems to preclude their distorting influences but were reserved for introducti-ln in the aggregation process. The product is a set of relative combat potential scores (Air Combat Potential Units) for each of the 125 air weapons systems in whatever mission roles were appropriate. National aircraft inventoties. This model is not a 'black-box'. The process was initiated at the bottom of the analytical ladder. its profound influence testifies to the requirement for such intanibles to be considered objectively or subjectively in force propagation and air combat analysis. with the computations not onlly considering relative utility values but also conforming to specific air weapon system configurations. Since the variables on which the support index was predicated are considered 'soft' surrogates for personnel quality. its general application is not recommended. the relative support index. operational availability rates. All of the modifying and relative utility values involved in weapon system and force level calculations are explicit and can be modified by the model's user to rctlect differin. The computational phase itself was adapted with a few major variations from the linear equations developed by The Analytic Sciences Corporation. air weapon system mission potential and national force propagation potential were mated to produce an estimate of a country s air combat potential in four mission roles on a single day of flying. combining subsystem attributes. combat scenarios or priorities. Ratio properties were restored to the indices through the utilization of a zero-valued control case the factor score for which constituted a threshold from which other scores in the data set could be scaled.Capitalizing on the strengths of existing approaches. Factor analysis was employed to create relative index values for attributes described by multiple variables. However. Expert assigned values for nominally described variables were used to modify the raw attribute scores extracted from the data reduction phase. maintenance requirements. a hybrid methodology for data reduction and aggregation was implemented.2 . In the ultimate computational step. -135 - 2. an additional force level factor. To illustrate the impact of personnel force quality on sortie generation. mission allocations. Attribute scores were combined in accordance with their relative air combat utilities in each mission area. Force propagation values were computed in a somewhat different fashion. Targeted at the attribute level. An analogous procedure was followed at the subcomponent and component levels. was also injected into selected force propagation equations.

* Methodological output is composed of ratio level measurements which can be aggregated Into a virtually infinite varietv of combinations to permit comparisons across any spectrum. In doing so. The most prominent strengths and weakness of the of the proposed model.4 Results The results of the aggregation phase were reviewed to determine their efficacy both at the air weapon svstern and national force levels. * The model effectively captures the performance attributes of the most prominent aircraft subsystems and their relative combat utility under varying scenarios. The model showed itself to be responsive to the type of modifications a decision maker might stipulate in evaluattne specific weapon system alternatives. However. 136 - 1W . are outlined below. To further exercise the model. Ilowever. benefits. model output cannot legitimately stand alone but must be incorporated with other analysis which addresses the the remaining 65 percent of the question. and liabilities of air weapon systems transfers individually and at the force and regional levels. 8. technical potential determines approximately 35 percent of combat effectiveness. arranged according to study criteria. a phased analysis of a specific arms transfer proposal (advanced air defense fighters for Jordan) was conducted. the focus on mission relevant combat output was maintained. According to the aircrew survey. and analyzing their impact on regional military balances under differing conflict scenarios.5 Evaluation The air combat potential aggregation methodology proposed in this study is a powerful and flexible mechanism with which to analyze the composition. The results conformed to intuitive assessments and poignantly demonstrated the desirability of employing a analytical scheme which aggregates the cumulative effects of system and force subcomponents on specific mission outputs. weighing their contribution to force capabilities under varying conditions. the measurements are not absolute and are relevant only in relation to other values derived from the same data set and analytical model. * Throughout. It permits the evalua- tion of specific configurations and subsystem alternatives. and fire control computers could be integrated. the linear combinational form and the absence of key combat related intangibles produce results which are static indicators of undepreciated potential. Consequently. The picture could be further sharpened if equipment -specific quantitative values for electronic warfare equipment. air-to-ground ordnance. However. the methodology is far from perfect possessing some drawbacks which are easily surmountable and others which might prove impervious to systematic solution.8.

". 8.? " " . Given the prototype's processing environment. -.. Reliable matlunatical representations might not prove possible. The more 0 important assumptions are represented mathmatically in the computational equations and can be modified to accommodate revised assumptions or priorities. .. and regions.-- . But first some enhancements are required to shore up its validity and applicability. Of greater complexity is the development of algorithms which capture the synergy among system and force components. .- 137 - .7 Conclusion The air weapon system potential model is not a predictor of combat outcomes. subsytems.- . -. . categories of weapons.. The feasibility of a menu driven micro-based system has been demonstrated. A classified data base should be created and expanded to include additional aircraft. - . making these adjustments is at present a decidely complicated and 'user-unfriendly' task. 8. * Analytical subsets addressing elements of the ground air defense environment could also be introduced into the model relatively painlessly to permit analysis of a complete air combat picture. Integration of combat relevant intangibles is a similarly complex challenge..? -".--- . * A microcomputer based version of the analytical methodology should be developed permitting direct user interaction..6 Suggestion for Further Development The methodology's underlying philosphy. . and combinational scheme are valid and extendable to other regions. so this objective can be readily realized given the appropriate equipment and software expertise.- . analytical framework. and analytical problems.-i . but it does provide the decision maker with finely textured and responsive static indicators of individual weapon systcm and force - 4. This process would obviate inaccuracies and permit application to other Tluid World * am regions."" -. -- ---. but the influences of operator proficiency and the like can be reasonably assessed by weapon system and regional experts and applied subjectively in interpreting model output. Methological assumptions and limitations were underscored throughout the discussion. One possibility is to attempt adaptation of existing air combat simulations to define an alternative non-linear aggregational scheme. Two drawbacks are the requirement to reprocess data sets statistically to determine new relative attribute values as systems are added to the data set and the linear computational form noted in an earlier comment.. -.The data reduction and aggregation methodology is transparent and free of crippling systemic bias.

potential. These indicators are essential points of departure in evaluating the military dimension of security assistance options. With the enhancements described above. -138 - . the methodology developed in this research effort represents a productive vehicle for intelligence community participation in the security assistance policy development process.

. ...- '- . . ... Appendix A FILE DESCRIPTIONS A.-...... ' ...........--... 9 CSPD CLIMB SPEED SEA LEVEL (FPM) LSPD MAXIMUM AIRSPEED SEA LEVEL (KTS) SPECIFIC ENERGY AT SEA LEVEL (FPS) SPECENS LABEL BOMBER-GROUND ATTACK FIGHTER-GROUND ATTACK FIGHTER/TRAINER-GROUND ATTACK FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR FIGHTER/TRAINER-INTERCEPTOR FIGHTER-MULTI ROLE FIGHTER/TRAINER-MULTI ROLE FIGHTER-RECONNAISSANCE FIGHTER-TRAINER MISCELLANEOUS-GROUND ATTACK MISCELLANEOUS/TRAINER-GROUND ATTACK -139 . .... -- .•: ... N - -"-"'------'-- '---'--------.-----...... .'. .. Y~~-- ' - %........ ...I Middle East Combat Aircraft File NAME VARIABLES ON THE ACTIVE FILE DESCRIPTION ACFT AIRCRAFT NAME ROLE CATEGORY VALUE BMAT FTAT FTTA FTIN FTTI FTMR FTTM FTRE FTTR MIAT MITA SPAN WING SPAN (FT) SURF WING SURFACE (SQ FT) ARWNG EWGT WING ASPECT RATIO EMPTY WEIGHT (LBS) MWGT MAXIMUM TAKEOFF WEIGHT (LBS) CWGT WLOAD COMBAT WEIGHT (LBS) COMBAT WING LOADING (LBS PER SQ FT) FWGT FUFRAC INTERNAL FUEL (LBS) FUEL FRACTION MAXPWR MAXIMUM THRUST (LBS) TWPWR ASPD THRUST TO WEIGHT RATIO MAXIMUM AIRSPEED FL360 (KTS) SPECENA SPECIFIC ENERGY AT ALTITUDE (FPS) PSFL100 EST SPECIFIC EXCESS POWER FLI00 M.... .

SSPD STALL SPEED (KTS) LIMG COMBAT G LIMIT TURATE EST TURN RATE AT SL (DEG PER SEC) SCEIL SERVICE CEILING (FT) FRANGE FERRY RANGE (NM) CRANGE COMBAT RANGE (NM) AIRAD AIR INTERCEPT RADIUS (NM) GARAD GROUND ATTACK RADIUS (NM) NGUN NUMBER OF INTERNAL GUNS CAL CALIBRE OF GUN(S) ROUNDS ROUNDS GUN ORDNANCE STNS NUMBER OF WEAPON STATIONS MAXORD MAXIMUM ORDNANCE (LBS) VGW VARIABLE GEOMETRY WING VALUE LABEL I YES 0 NO VCW VARIABLE CAMBER WING VALUE LABEL 1 YES 0 NO -140- - 140- .

. . . . -. . - *. . . .-.7 VERY HIGH HIGH .2 Middle East Target Acquisition System File VARIABLES ON THE ACTIVE FILE DESCRIPTION EQUIPMENT NAME NAME !AME CODE EQUIPMENT TYPE VALUE LABEL IR SEARCH-TRACK IRAI GROUND ATTACK LASER LAGA RAAI AIR INTERCEPT RADAR RAGA GROUND ATTACK RADAR RAMU MULTI-PURPOSE RADAR PWR OUTPUT POWER (KW) CONE SEARCH AZIMUTH (DEG) UPRNG RANGE-CO OR HI ALT TGT (NM) DWNRNG RANGE-LO ALT TGT (NM) DATAPTS DATA POINTS REPORTED TWS TRACK WHILE SCAN VALUE LABEL 0 NO I YES ILLUM CW ILLUMINATION VALUE LABEL 0 NO YES 1 MAP GROUND MAPPING VALUE LABEL 0 NO I YES DBS DOPPLER BEAM SHARPENING VALUE LABEL 0 NO 1 YES ECCM ECM SUSCEPTIBILITY RATING VALUE LABEL .- . .. .. . .. . . .-..*.1 VERY LOW r 141 .". .A..0 1..8 AVERAGE 9 LOW 1. .t .

....7 VERY LOW .-.3 Middle East Air-to-Air Missile File VARIABLES ON THE ACTIVE FILE NAME DESCRIPTION MSL MISSILE NAME CODE MISSILE TYPE LABEL VALUE AAMI AAMR AIR TO AIR-INFRARED GUIDED AIR TO AIR-RADAR GUIDED PRODCC PRODUCER COUNTRY CODE DIAM LENGTH MISSILE DIAMETER (IN) MSLWGHT MISSILE WEIGHT (LBS) GUIDTYP TERMINAL GUIDANCE MODE LABEL VALUE MISSILE LENGTH (IN) ARH CG EO IR ACTIVE RADAR COMMAND GUIDED ELECTRO OPTICAL INFRARED LASR LASER GUIDED SARH SEMIACTIVE RADAR GUIDSC GUIDANCE SCORE WHWGHT WARHEAD WEIGHT (LBS) FUZE NUMBER FUZE OPTIONS MAXHRNG MAXIMUM HEAD-ON RANGE (NM) MINHRNG MINIMUM HEAD-ON RANGE (NM) MAXTRNG MAXIMUM TAIL-CHASE RANGE (NM) MINTRNG MSPD MINIMUM TAIL-CHASE RANGE (NM) MAXIMUM SPEED (MACH) LIMG G LIMITATION ECCM EFFHRNG ECM SUSCEPTIBILITY VALUE LABEL .... . .. - ..A..9 AVERAGE 1.-= ..8 LOW ..0 HIGH VERY HIGH 1..... .1 EFFECTIVE HEAD-ON RANGE EFFTRNG EFFECTIVE TAIL-CHASE RANGE MODE MISSILE LOCK-ON MODE VALUE LABEL VR VISUAL RANGE ONLY BVR BEYOND VISUAL RANGE -142 • --- ~.......--...... .........-.. ......

__1.GIUDADX GUIDANCE SCORE AIR DEFENSE GUIDAS GUIDANCE SCORE AIR SUPERIORITY p. -'4-- -. -- .

. . .----. .4 Middle East Aerial Gun File VARIABLES ON THE ACTIVE FILE "9 NAME GUN DESCRIPTION GUN DESIGNATOR CODE GUN TYPE VALUE AAAG ACCE ACCI LABEL ANTI-AIRCRAFT GUN ACFT CANNON EXTERNAL ACFT CANNON INTERNAL PRODCC PRODUCER COUNTRY CODE CAL CALIBRE (MM) MRNG MAXIMUM EFFECTIVE RANGE (NM) DISP DISPERSION (MILS) MVEL RATE MUZZLE VELOCITY (FPS) MAXIMUM RATE OF FIRE (SPM) "I". ." " ••..-"o" % ". "-* p""."-'. . . .""t -%-. ... .A.-.* v-. . -144- -p ." . ..- . ". "% -.'-." .!"- •- -- - -."-. .. .-.

5 Middle East Air Weapon System Configuration File VARIABLES ON THE ACTIVE FILE NAME DESCRIPTION ACFT AIRCRAFT NAME CODE AIRCRAFT TYPE PRODCC PRODUCER COUNTRY CODE CREW CREWMEMBERS ARC AIR REFUELING CAPABLE VALUE LABEL 0 NO 1 YES NAVCAT NAVIGATION CATEGORY VALUE LABEL DOP DOPPLER NAV SYSTEM DR DEAD RECKONING GPS GLOBAL POSITIONING SYSTEM INS INERTIAL NAV SYSTEM TAC TACAN TYPE SYSTEM RWR RADAR WARNING RECEIVER LABEL VALUE O NO 1 YES PECM PASSIVE ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES VALUE LABEL o NO YES I AECM ACTIVE ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES VALUE LABEL 0 NO 1 YES AAMR PRIMARY RADAR AAM NAAMR NUMBER RADAR AAM AAMI NAAMI PRIMARY IR AAM NUMBER IR AAM GUN INTERNAL GUN PGMC PRECISION GUIDED MUNITIONS CARRIER VALUE LABEL o NO 1 YES SA STABILITY AUGMENTATION VALUE LABEL 0 NO 1 YES HUD HEAD UP DISPLAY VALUE LABEL 0 NO 1 YES CRP RELEASE POINT COMPUTER - 145 - .A.

VALUE 0 1 LABEL NO YES TARAD RADAR TGT ACQ SYSTEM TAOTH SECONDARY TOT ACQ SYSTEM MMHfrFH MAN MAINTENANCE HOURS PER FLYING HOUR 146- .

A.6 Middle East Air Order of Battle 1984-1990 VARIABLES ON THE ACTIVE FILE NAME DESCRIPTION CC COUNTRY CODE VALUE LABEL ALGERIA AG BA BAHRAIN EGYPT EG ET ETHIOPIA IRAN IR IS ISRAEL IZ IRA JORDAN JO KU KUWAIT LE LEBANON LY LIBYA MO MOROCCO MU OMAN QATAR 3A SAUDI ARABIA SO SOMALIA SU SUDAN SY SYRIA TC UNITED ARAB EMIRATES TS TUNISIA NORTH YEMEN YE SOUTH YEMEN YS AIRCRAFT NAME LIKELY EMPLOYMENT ROLE VALUE LABEL BMR BOMBER CIN COUNTER-INSURGENCY FGA FIGHTER-GROUND ATTACK FIN FIGHTER-INTERCEPTOR FMR FIGHTER-MULTI ROLE OCA OPNL CONVERSION-AIR-TO-AIR OCG OPNL CONVERSION-GROUND ATTACK 0CM OPNL CONVERSION-MULTIROLE REC RECONNAISSANCE TNG TRAINING ACFT EMCODE INV84 INV85 1984 INVENTORY 1985 INVENTORY INV86 1986 INVENTORY INV87 1987 INVENTORY INV88 INV89 1988 INVENTORY 1989 INVENTORY INV90 1990 INVENTORY MXRAT OAR MAINTENANCE MAN/ACFT RATIO OPERATIONALLY AVAILABLE RATE -147 - .

51 5.28 5. .01 3.12 7374 7749 13228 21541 6211 10100 10100 10800 19127 19781 6195 5093 5093 7606 7606 7606 20860 14082 39921 28000 28800 28000 28000 28800 28000 15586 16258 18259 18259 19059 17780 11220 11220 28000 30328 30328 8085 8361 9723 10576 10950 8598 13000 8750 8015 8015 8015 13270 14070 28417 15432 3351 3648 4409 10700 3448 5440 5440 5440 10200 10200 2203 1754 1754 4260 4260 4260 10380 5819 16200 11635 11635 13455 23205 13455 13455 6972 5787 6972 6972 6972 6972 5050 5050 15614 15630 20094 3166 3116 4063 4603 3910 3736 5060 3000 3060 3060 3060 3199 3199 14450 7540 11805 12328 19621 34062 10775 17120 17120 18255 31727 32006 8797 6135 6135 12216 12216 12216 27432 20742 50335 37212 38012 38122 43001 38922 37064 19824 19904 23127 22433 23927 21954 14433 15127 37101 39525 41761 10012 10263 12099 13222 12905 12466 16282 10626 10315 12945 10315 14870 15670 42256 24452 16535 17637 25353 50000 14000 23740 23740 25390 42000 42000 11500 7495 7495 12345 12345 12345 52000 28000 74340 56500 56500 68000 68000 68000 75000 35400 35400 37500 37500 37500 35400 27500 27500 58000 60630 69275 20576 20116 24722 25152 16180 19180 26200 19000 16200 18890 13890 24000 24000 46734 34612 14X -"' .f .91 4.83 4.75 3.75 4.78 4. .78 2.80 2.28 5.01 2.01 4.01 3. Appendix B MIDDLE EAST AIR WEAPON SYSTEMS DATA B.91 2.18 5.01 3.83 3.20 3.1 Airframes ACFT ROLE SPAN SURF ARWNG EWGT FWGT CWGT MWGT ALPHAMSI ALPHAMS2 AMX A10A A37B A4H A4KU A4N A7E A7P BAC167 CM170 CM170I C101BB ClOICC C1O1DD FA18L F104GCF F14AC FI5A F15B F15C F15CFP FI5D FI5E F16A F16B F16C F16CSC F16D F16J79 F20 F20A F4CD F4EF F4MOD F5A F5B F5E F5F F86F G91Y HARMK80 HAWK200 HAWK50T HAWK<60A HAWK60T HUNTER HUNTERT IL28 JAGI04 FTTC FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTTC FTTC FTAT FTAT FTTA FTMR FTAT FTIN FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTAT FTMR FTMR FTTA FTAT FTTA FTMR FTTM BM4AT FTAT 30 30 29 58 36 28 28 28 39 39 35 40 40 35 35 35 38 22 38 43 43 43 43 43 43 31 31 31 31 31 31 27 27 38 39 39 25 25 27 27 37 30 25 31 31 31 31 34 34 70 29 188 188 266 506 184 260 260 260 375 375 214 186 186 215 215 215 400 196 565 608 608 608 608 608 608 300 300 300 300 300 300 186 186 530 530 530 170 170 186 186 288 195 201 180 180 180 180 349 349 655 260 4.20 3.25 3.01 3.47 2. 77 3.62 3.01 3.80 3. 20 3. 28 3.86 2.53 7.62 5.91 2.20 3.20 3.46 3.20 3.25 7.51 8.28 5.18 6.01 3.57 3.77 3.52 2. .58 3.-V .01 5.83 8.86 3.62 5.

41 2.39 2.97 1.12 5.78 3.11 3.19 5.25 2.46 3.27 4.94 1.25 5.94 1.94 1.46 5.94 1.66 1.81 1.94 1.24 5.24 6.47 3.25 2.43 3. 25 2.95 1.94 1.36 3.89 149 - 15432 6217 16060 16060 16860 15500 28000 5027 8060 5907 5907 6889 7066 7066 8115 7716 9220 12700 12440 12300 12300 12440 13100 21250 21200 24250 21450 22000 44100 43200 44090 23787 25000 48115 16314 16314 16314 17857 13570 14570 14570 16535 16535 17235 17000 24220 15350 14550 14550 14550 14550 6893 14317 12700 12700 12440 12440 29000 10723 1830 1654 14220 22050 22500 17250 39000 19040 19000 7540 2600 5670 5670 5670 6000 12000 1905 2122 1568 1568 2425 3523 3523 2586 2586 2962 3721 4202 4300 4668 4300 4300 12168 12168 12168 12168 10300 27000 27000 27000 12168 8800 27000 7379 7379 7379 7379 5039 5039 5039 6513 5860 6513 5959 19539 5842 5842 5842 5842 5842 1714 6356 3432 3725 4202 4202 15164 4603 373 403 5428 8157 8580 10000 15500 5181 5181 24452 8727 19715 19695 20105 19300 34660 6200 10334 8691 8691 10102 10963 10963 9408 9009 10701 14941 15301 15210 15394 15590 16010 30064 28044 32534 29186 29350 63860 60700 63850 33179 32242 64457 21710 21710 21502 23045 17789 18332 18346 21188 20090 21888 21478 35386 22271 21880 18714 18867 22101 9550 19700 14416 14943 15301 15265 36782 13225 2347 2186 19249 30539 32302 26660 48948 24381 24341 34612 11243 35715 35715 35715 37500 50000 7804 12346 11475 11475 13000 13558 13558 11085 10766 13393 20062 19026 20723 20723 20863 21853 41670 44312 44312 41670 41000 79800 73635 79800 39685 37500 90725 32850 32850 32850 33510 17637 17637 17637 36375 36375 36375 32400 unk 30200 30200 30200 30200 30200 14444 26455 22045 22045 19026 19026 58000 24722 2866 2866 19259 39020 42330 36050 63500 29750 29750 .JAGIll JASTREB KFIRC2 KFIRC7 KFIRTC2 LAVI LIGHTNG L29 L39ZA MB326K MB326L MB339A MB339C MB339K MIGI5BIS MIGI5UTI MIG17F MIG19C MIG21C MIG21F MIG21JKL MIG21R MIG21UM MIG23B MIG23E MIG23F MIG23G MIG23UM MIG25 MIG25R MIG25U MIG27DJ MIG29 MIG31 MIRFIA MIRFIB MIRFIC MIRFIE MIRIIIC MIRIIIE MIRIIIEI MIR2000C MIR2000R MIR2000T MIR3NG MIR4000 MIR5DD •MIR5DR MIR5D1 MIR5DIE MIR5D2 OV1OD PRCA5 PRCFT6 PRCF6 PRCF7 PRCF7E RF4C RF5E SF260MW SF260TP SUPETEN SU20 SU22 SU25 SU27 SU7BMKL SU7U FTAT FTAT FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTIN FTTA FTTC FTAT FTTA FTTC FTAT FTAT FTMR FTTC FTMR FTMR FTIN FTMR FTMR FTRE FTTM FTMR FTMR FTAT FTMR FTTC FTIN FTRE FTTI FTAT FTMR FTIN FTMR FTTI FTMPR FTMR FTIN FTMR FTMR FTMR FTRE FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTA FTRE FTIN FTIN FTAT MIAT FTAT FTTM FTMR FTIN FTIN FTRE FTRE MITA MITA FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTMR FTAT FTTA 29 34 27 27 27 29 35 40 31 33 33 36 36 36 33 33 36 30 24 24 24 24 24 47 47 47 47 47 46 44 46 47 34 44 28 28 28 28 27 27 27 30 30 30 27 39 27 27 27 27 27 40 32 30 30 24 24 38 27 27 27 32 46 46 51 48 29 29 260 209 375 375 375 350 380 283 202 208 208 208 208 208 255 222 265 269 248 248 248 248 248 400 400 401 400 400 612 603 612 401 380 580 269 269 269 269 375 375 375 441 441 441 375 786 375 375 375 375 375 291 301 269 269 248 248 530 186 109 109 306 432 432 450 500 297 297 3.97 1.73 4.91 3.50 3.90 5.58 4.43 5.81 2.90 4.81 2.94 1.95 1.94 1.21 3.91 4.' .39 3.31 4.47 5.48 5.97 1.25 2.98 1.95 2.89 3.83 6.75 5.91 6. ' .94 5.51 2.40 2.31 6.25 2.10 6.34 3.27 4.47 5.25 2.89 2.81 2.

20 5. 69 10084 10900 31500 31065 82000 80400 5440 16904 2372 4 5440 17720 24540 15632 41392 60000 14000 47985 60000 56870 130235 158730 81600 147650 185000 .TA4EH TA4KU TORADV TORIDS TU16AG TU22BD FTTA FTTA FTIN FTAT BMAT BMAT 28 28 46 46 108 91 260 260 400 400 1772 1451 2.20 6.58 5.91 5.91 2.

.29 266.52 . "-.80 285.18 2284.. 18 2601.97 231..34 .46 .10 303.78 415. 18 2601.38 .82 123.:'b :.19 3740 3740 3780 5300 5300 60000 50000 30000 50000 50000 300( 300C 400C 420C 420C 550C 580C 560C 650C 650C 50000 29000 50000 50000 50000 50000 50000 50000 50000 50000 52800 52800 28000 28000 28000 28700 28700 34500 32890 17700 17000 20000 650C 650C 650C 650C 500 500C 500C 500C 500C 500C 550C 550C 600C 587£ 5875 510 510C 518C 510C 530C 410( 5120 5000 5000 5000 5500 5500 4035 6000 6000 3937 580C 5800 5800 5800 6000 3000 3610 3903 3903 4800 4550 4550 5085 CM170 CM17OI C101BB C1OICC C1O1DD FA18L F104GCF F14AC FI5A F15B 2116 2116 3700 4700 4700 32000 15800 41800 47860 47860 .78 415.54 .54 . .29 362.30 ..90 351.80 .67 457.32 1433 1433 1433 1433 1175 1175 1175 1175 1175 1146 1146 1146 1275 1301 1301 802 768 934 894 670 544 739 2601.30 1195.39 .41 1887.54 215.00 356.39 .63 11800 11800 11800 17500 17500 2952 26100 28000 4135 45930 45930 45930 30900 50000 2755 4130 6494 6494 6595 6550 6550 10400 HAWK50T HAWK60A HAWK60T HUNTER HUNTERT IL28 JAGI04 JAGIll JASTREB KFIRC2 KFIRC7 KFIRTC2 LAVI LIGHTNG L29 L39ZA MB326K MB326L MB339A MB339C MB339K MIGISBIS SCEI MAXPWR 392 392 430 450 450 1146 1232 1342 1433 1433 .12 .44 .04 415.34 .61 .45 156.73 120.91 .81 813.14 902.73 2248.97 221.05 285.26 1325._ ..18 1853.55 1621.19 81.97 1508.94 .69 . .50 813.01 592.00 700 650 700 670 793 793 793 793 793 687 694 694 773 787 787 635 635 661 661 650 600 641 362.83 1853.71 HAWK200 5700 .. .87 177.26 1.21 560 231.92 535 560 560 621 621 432 729 729 408 750 750 750 597 700 332 340 460 460 485 490 490 567 211.47 85.35 849.96 791.80 266. 11 1.76 .05 221.82 .40 .78 263..99 .34 849.84 393.90 974.50 .76 .08 1.55 787.11 1071.96 .-.05 137.'.81 457.04 .82 348.32 .26 1.81 298.86 356.47 177.09 902.43 1285.19 362.30 975.48 1. .28 . .83 .63 1202..26 F15C F1SCFP F1SD FI5E F16A F16B F16C F16CSC F16D F16J79 F20 F20A F4CD F4EF F4MOD F5A F5B F5E F5F F86F G91Y HARMK80 47860 47860 47860 54820 25000 25000 25000 25000 25000 18000 17000 17000 34000 35800 41200 8160 8160 10000 10000 5970 8160 21500 1.67 .81 464.56 .17 .82 464.47 .41 2088. .65 1.89 1.53 .54 291.::.00 441.57 231.26 2230.92 .80 1200 5340 5700 5700 10000 10000 11904 16800 18540 3000 17900 18900 17900 20620 32600 1960 3792 3360 3360 4000 4450 4450 5952 .84 102.81 943.10 113.48 .19 312.55 .08 1257..91 364.08 1887.47 237.61 102.53 .11 704.72 1621.82 464.59 2230.83 1853.44 362.63 1067.05 298.82 464.83 1853.72 1077.76 .41 2201.54 688 1183. ?.95 322.26 1. 18 2601. . .ACFT ALPHAMSI ALPHAMS2 AMX A10A A37B A4H A4KU A4N A7E A7P BAC167 TWPWR ASPD SPECENA LSPD SPECENS CSPD 5952 5952 11030 18130 5700 9300 9300 11200 15000 12200 3410 .82 1.i % " . .83 1.00 11220 11218 15000 6000 6990 8000 8000 10300 20000 12000 5250 480( 480( 500(C 340( 417( 490C 480C 490C 355C 355C 4001 613.72 1202.51 106. ..72 1077. .68 1887.83 1804.34 .'. 83 1853.41 .09 1097.18 378 378 373 373 373 730 690 702 700 700 105.26 362.37 . - .36 1032. . -.39 487 487 700 450 455 587 561 583 720 563 410 975.58 803.41 .53 2601.82 392.41 173.- .58 613.85 825.38 .73 1797.10 266.88 2248.18 1.19 540 540 628 380 403 548 548 560 600 600 391 215.58 2264.61 105. - .63 9 5000 -151- %.68 849.76 1215.94 392.91 .75 902.82 464.84 102.73 2248. 18 2601. 11 1.- .95 312.52 716.63 811.14 1440.41 156.23 1.19 331.64 .07 575 575 575 622 622 434 917 917 422 1317 1317 1317 1060 1318 353 373 470 470 441 441 441 582 1077.'-.05 322.29 1.80 231.38 1.

33 2084.29 292. 68 2268.10 312.96 . .30 1742.51 266.29 341. 800( 525( 650(( 650t 656 656( 656( 697' 557 5575 557590 590( 590( 540( 656( 557557' 557' 557.68 2268.77 .88 .34 2104.34 2324.93 2324.06 473.07 1473.78 .95 549 545 628 600 650 680 650 675 727 727 629 727 661 650 650 650 629 793 750 693 693 693 793 734 754 754 793 777 793 734 600 800 800 800 800 800 250 721 641 641 535 535 773 661 165 216 648 680 680 380 725 450 450 550 548 793 782 530 600 222. .73 .61 .78 390.99 .82 1427.93 2104.50 .81 .74 1.06 473.74 . .59 221.35 2104.11 1421.93 546.69 .29 336.94 .75 .56 1980..25 464.72 . .68 223.78 .37 341.36 1949.62 . .64 2246.96 . 10 10400 8000 15000 21000 25900 30000 25900 30000 50000 50000 50000 50000 50000 40950 40950 40950 40000 50000 45000 47835 47835 47835 59000 16400 16400 16400 49000 47429 49000 20000 65600 16400 16400 16400 16400 16400 3020 15000 30000 30000 21000 21000 28000 34500 1250 2170 24600 45275 45275 6500 50000 29500 29900 8440 8000 30000 30000 13100 22100 510( 544.77 2104.78 219.74 .79 341.90 .36 1742.98 354.93 2104.93 2104.67 390.23 1032.29 312.95 312.11 2347.72 .82 507. .82 565 570 779 1031 1159 1177 1159 1177 1290 1290 974 1318 1280 1616 1616 1616 974 1318 1500 1261 1261 1261 1433 1261 1261 1261 1347 1318 1347 1261 1318 1261 1261 1270 1270 1261 250 774 720 720 1031 1031 1275 894 235 235 573 1220 1220 475 1350 896 896 1085.22 420.42 596 561 1301 1261 535 800 1079.55 291. 600 600 600( 610f 800( 885. .96 1147.81 .23 81 ..MIGISUTI MIG17F MIG19C MIG21C MIG21F MIG21JKL MIG21R MIG21UM MIG23B MIG23E MIG23F MIG23G MIG23UM MIG25 MIG25R MIG25U MIG27DJ MIG29 MIG31 MIRFIA MIRFIB MIRFIC MIRFIE MIRIIIC MIRIIIE MIRIIIEI MIR2000C MIR200OR MIR2000T MIR3NG MIR4000 MIR5DD MIR5DR MIR5DI MIRSDIE MIR5D2 OVIOD PRCA5 PRCFT6 PRCF6 PRCF7 PRCF7E RF4C RF5E SF260MW SF260TP SUPETEN SU20 SU22 SU25 SU27 SUBMKL SU7U TA4EH TA4KU TORADV TORIDS TU16AG TU22BD 5450 7400 14200 12677 13688 14550 13688 14550 27350 27350 23350 27500 22485 50020 50020 50020 25350 38000 61730 15873 15873 15873 15873 13225 13670 13670 19840 19840 19840 15873 42770 13670 13670 13670 13670 13670 2500 14330 14330 14330 12677 12677 34000 10000 475 505 11265 24700 25350 18000 60000 19841 8500 9300 33600 32000 41900 61800 .71 211.68 884.97 464.69 . .47 2075. 300f 5001 587' 5241 574( 574( 587' 518C 147( 280C 450t 590r 5907 350U 60CC 497K 497K 490C 480C 500C 500(4035 600 ' ' -152- .73 .22 266.68 1. 24 303.91 .56 1980.44 464.06 46.01 2227. .98 . 44 390.82 415.73 .06 473.23 .82 .74 1421.12 34. 79 312.94 . .93 2121.98 464. 557.82 398.33 750.77 2121.92 .26 .68 2680.29 312.06 .76 .63 266.95 .82 446. 79 106.71 303.64 1949. 73 388.49 310.09 285..98 354.57 211.18 .67 322.69 2084.63 2084.76 1454.75 .22 420. 587 574k 574 574' 574 574( 6101.82 452. .73 .99 . .34 2746.62 .67 .76 1.93 1258.06 473.49 992.91 .78 354.57 441.44 2268.61 1576.06 1742.67 322. .20 1276.82 398.21 .83 .03 1701.67 292.20 384.83 .95 20.22 464.43 2008.74 .36 2180.52 .91 .01 207.14 1361.10 473. 52 14968 149.83 .20 .32 .78 .22 2284.35 2377.60 .59 .70 326361 3406.47 2267.70 2230.22 2367.61 3263.

08 66.00 7.82 652.52 168.74 148 148 unk unk 124 136 unk 125 na unk unk unk unk unk 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 A37B A4H A4KU A4N A7E A7P BAC167 CM170 CM17OI C101BB F15B FI5C HUNTERT 7.76 20.64 116 116 0 0 "MX A1OA 7.85 65.97 162. 74 68.00 9.25 18.85 70.94 19.15 90 unk 1 0 0 0 7. 19 63.76 21.30 14.33 7.33 7.06 75 unk unk unk unk unk 99 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 CI1CC C101DD FA18L 7.34 22.00 58. - • ACFT LIMG WLOAD TURATE PSFLI00 SSPD VCW VGW ALPHAMS1 ALPHAMS2 9.33 7.09 22.00 8.00 9.00 7.79 21.09 61.16 17.72 unk unk unk unk unk 71 90 unk unk 80 82 82 113 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 JAGIll JASTREB 8.70 unk unk 88 0 0 0 0 0 0 7.74 17.86 243. 33 70.07 18.33 7.97 32.33 89.00 6.00 8.78 22.63 22.76 -66.78 36.33 7.61 22.82 63.00 6.18 77.91 -19.49 183.00 62 66 6544 21.96 59.41 unk unk 1 0 0 0 F4EF F4MOD F5A F5B F5E F5F F86F G91Y HARMK80 HAWK200 HAWK50T HAWK60A HAWK60T HUNTER 7.14 228.26 22.67 485.72 64.00 70. 25 13.33 7.00 74.32 15.56 93.09 18.13 -4.85 211.19 456.63 52.07 21.82 15.20 18.96 22.97 20.56 unk 0 0 F14AC FISA 7.67 799.60 22.66 unk unk unk 1 1 1 0 0 0 F20A F4CD 9.60 425.54 69.13 119 115 0 1 0 0 KFIRC2 KFIRC7 KFIRTC2 LAVI LIGHTNG L29 L39ZA MB326K MB326L MB339A MB339C MB339K MIGI5BIS 7.30 626.72 22.58 21.20 139.40 17. 32 17.33 7.33 74.33 73.74 unk 0 0 115 85 1 0 - d 0 0 r53 - } "!-.63 unk 1 0 F16CSC 9.00 66.90 17.56 13.20 6.91 0 0 IL28 JAGI04 4.76 67.31 980.65 18.31 14.64 52.00 9.61 17.08 821.61 85.00 14. 13 520.00 56.00 93.44 18.97 56.67 531.35 41.97 69.95 810.67 678.52 16. 67 -188.04 18.33 412.08 57.59 65.00 77. 25 48.50 8.04 882.76 73.78 41.42 80.45 16.31 695.58 78.08 44.74 17.00 5.02 60.97 21.33 6.50 6.86 163.50 52.45 10.00 81.59 108.00 22.66 780.16 22.43 72.87 19.52 62.35 17.00 8.00 442.50 32.69 unk unk 1 1 0 0 F16C 9.24 63.77 18.90 23.00 6.93 51.00 7. .17 91.17 19.78 48.37 806.00 9.90 204.33 9.08 193. 19 736.32 14.33 7.26 19.58 53.70 18.18 18.65 193.33 7.53 208.33 6. 18 447.00 9.79 58. 71 27.00 7.00 7.80 110 110 110 0 0 0 0 0 0 F16A F16B 9.33 9.05 71.50 6.76 20.89 175.33 6. .89 60.43 88 88 100 0 0 1 0 0 0 F104GCF 7.72 703.60 8.78 485.62 15.00 8.04 115 110 1 0 1 0 Fi5CFP F15D FISE 9.00 79.38 19.22 -66. 90 528.08 252.33 110 110 0 0 0 0 44.00 62.08 18.00 6.30 14.36 719.33 105.42 759.89 529.59 303. 74 56.99 400. - .33 7.62 474.72 17.74 17.94 41.00 9.11 370.94 9.37 17.76 175. 86 80.50 7.09 unk 1 0 F16D F16J79 F20 9.39 14.22 19.95 801.78 52.60 64.33 7.43 42.16 57.05 41.72 602.00 7. 37 65.* .22 -4.32 7.33 7.74 20.67 55.21 84.30 21.80 8.19 21.89 429.96 22.00 6.33 194.89 18.33 7.36 19.

10 21.40 100.59 20.33 7.35 398.13 233.92 480.00 6.97 70.23 18.96 64.00 8.96 17.97 15.65 69.63 14.19 18.63 239.48 119.22 293.72 451.31 58.54 61.33 40.61 297.96 17. 09 81.96 73.98 236.84 59.90 50.50 7.29 243.33 7.35 21.72 444.MIGI5UTI MIG17F MIG19C MIG21C MIG21F MIG21JKL MIG21R MIG21UM MIG23B MIG23E MIG23F MIG23G MIG23UM MIG25 MIG25R MIG25U MIG27DJ MIG29 MIG31 MIRFIA MIRFIB MIRFIC MIRFIE 6.00 6.17 393.31 9. 17 398.00 6.00 7.02 59.50 7.80 279.90 15.91 17.71 14.82 65.33 6.79 413.04 81.00 7.53 61.69 14.98 15.04 45.33 9.33 4.33 7.63 476.95 21.98 22.64 MIRIIIC MIRIIIE MIRIIIEI MIR2000C MIR2000R MIR2000T MIR3NG MIR4000 MIR5DD MIR5DR MIR5D1 MIR5DIE MIR5D2 OVIOD PRCA5 PRCFT6 PRCF6 PRCF7 PRCF7E RF4C RF5E SF260MW SF260TP SUPETEN SU20 SU22 SU25 SU27 SU7BMKL SU7U TA4EH TA4KU TORADV TORIDS TU16AG TU22BD 7.64 unk 114 unk unk unk 146 unk 146 unk unk unk unk unk 146 146 146 unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk 90 90 90 unk 90 unk unk unk unk unk unk 114 126 126 unk unk unk 124 72 68 104 124 124 unk unk 195 195 unk unk 100 104 unk unk 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 .87 19.00 37.43 220.84 19.33 536.35 49.99 400.57 55.97 22.00 28.32 9.45 203.93 19.00 7.46 449.27 45.09 311.90 82.85 19.34 501.11 62.40 6.84 17.38 55.52 437. 769.14 821.02 68.15 103.33 9.47 482.51 305.44 48.50 6.39 58.50 6.93 19.23 305.40 709.80 393.96 73.92 48.38 82 74 84.62 40.68 79.43 62.00 7.80 370.33 7.26 608.67 22.98 17.72 18.00 9.80 61. 33 4.08 70.82 14.97 17.50 6.66 104.38 - 154- 160.90 14.40 71.29 413.00 8.22 -326.94 32.33 7.50 7.17 62.50 8.00 8.50 4.07 363.97 17.63 57.01 14.76 74.37 18.98 17.66 15.40 17.16 131.33 7.44 18.00 4.20 494.73 14.77 17.82 17.00 47.03 536.00 8.33 7.87 17.91 299.32 373.28 22.69 14.33 7.33 486.54 380.50 101.13 72.69.95 65.33 7.00 8.87 463.90 85.33 7.56 49.68 80.00 6.80 61.75 15.71 527.83 18.66 75.62 18.49 18.00 7.76 15.70 399.40 4.38 522.00 8.30 358.88 398.30 104.73 15.35 22.40 6.21 -122.50 6.00 6.13 80.95 394.98 17.87 17.50 9.97 17.00 8.77 19.33 6.33 7.27 14.00 7.88 18.25 344.00 7.31 -322.89 48.85 475.00 7.87 19.76 179.85 111.69 17.33 9.00 6.49 53.33 7.77 19.23 393.00 6.24 97.07 386.46 441.

- .26 unk 630 unk 755 2000 2000 .31 .29 unk 720 550 400 3005 32 unk F15CFP F15D FISE F16A F16B F16C F16CSC F16D F16J79 F20 F20A F4CD F4EF F4MOD F5A F5B F5E F5F F86F 550 670 550 500 500 500 460 375 410 410 350 375 685 290 290 360 300 310 G91Y na HARMK80 HAWK200 HAWK50T HAWK60A HAWK60T HUNTER HUNTERT IL28 JAGI04 JAGIll JASTREB KFIRC2 KFIRC7 KFIRTC2 LAVI LIGHTNG L29 L39ZA MB326K MB326L MB339A MB339C MB339K MIGISBIS 400 540 na 440 440 490 525 na na na na 470 540 400 470 432 na 250 na na 320 na na 300 3450 45 .32 na unk AMX na 480 1600 .30 2340 2200 1675 2200 2200 1840 1840 2431 1902 1902 820 2100 2100 1900 1050 1600 480 944 1151 1151 1140 1140 1140 1006 unk unk unk .40 .19 .35 CM17OI CI1OBB CI1CC na na na 251 205 280 C101DD FA18L na 575 F104GCF F14AC FI5A na 590 600 AYP BAC167 CM170 291 399 unk .26 .29 .19 .34 .33 A7E 800 na 622 na na na 2431 622 255 251 2431 1404 755 .ACFT AIRAD GARAD FRANGE FUFRAC CRANGE ALPHAMSI ALPHAMS2 na na 315 315 2160 2160 .32 490 440 3005 3005 2100 400 2100 440 440 410 255 385 385 270 .30 .25 unk AIOA na 300 2131 .28 .21 .33 .36 .28 .26 .29 .27 .31 .28 .28 .29 .26 . .21 .28 .24 unk unk unk unk unk unk unk 1950 unk unk unk unk unk 1176 unk unk 669 unk unk unk unk unk 344 540 unk unk 950 950 950 719 -155 - °° .26 2100 2100 2100 1575 1620 1620 2000 275 500 187 187 275 225 220 305 250 325 275 275 275 290 300 538 451 451 170 415 420 365 325 260 175 200 145 145 201 330 330 200 .34 .35 1740 1741 .30 .26 36 unk unk unk 280 450 2000 2500 unk unk 150 na 450 .35 unk A4N na 355 1788 .27 .27 .28 .28 .31 .33 .26 unk unk .33 unk AJ7B A H A4KU na na na 216 878 .33 .26 .21 .36 375 3000 .29 unk 1735 unk .28 .31 1610 1610 1205 1205 1345 1890 unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk .29 1105 1250 unk .36 .25 .36 F15B 550 F15C 380 2604 600 450 .32 .28 .26 .33 .34 .33 1566 3409 2604 .

.27 .25 .25 .26 .38 .34 .24 . .29 .33 1500 unk unk 2605 3200 .26 .31 .28 800 2100 2100 2200 2100 1950 2158 2158 2158 2158 .26 .28 unk unk 900 436 436 na 750 na na 378 300 350 261 187 250 255 na 751 1565 na 1670 SU22 SU25 SU27 SU7BMKL SU7U na na 810 na na TA4EH na TA4KU TORADV TORIDS TU16AG TU22BD 1480 1500 1500 783 780 .28 .21 .36 .21 .34 RF4C na unk RF5E na 285 1545 .26 .50 2500 .21 .31 .36 .30 unk SF260MW na 260 926 .33 .31 .. .* MIGI5UTI MIG17F MIG19C MIG21C MIG21F MIG21JKL MIG21R MIG21UM MIG23B MIG23E MIG23F MIG23G MIG23UM MIG25 MIG25R MIG25U MIG27DJ MIG29 MIG31 MIRFIA MIRFIB MIRFIC MIRFIE MIRIIIC MIRIIIE MIRIIIEI MIR2000C MIR2000R MIR2000T MIR3NG MIR4000 MIR5DD MIR5DR MIR5DI MIR5DIE MIR5D2 250 310 371 400 372 400 na 360 470 470 na 470 420 610 na 590 na 360 810 670 640 670 700 416 648 648 150 220 210 na 217 200 280 210 385 385 350 385 330 na 487 450 460 325 na 406 376 446 450 na 348 348 725 1070 1188 971 1147 971 1147 1147 1514 1514 1514 1514 1314 1392 1392 1392 1350 1500 1392 1748 1748 1748 2036 2162 2162 2162 .32 .38 .23 .27 .27 unk .26 513 444 600 unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk unk 870 870 870 378 280 2100 na 358 700 870 na na 600 600 na 465 260 650 465 640 700 na na 700 .25 .23 .28 .25 .20 .28 .38 .31 .45 .29 800 740 unk unk unk unk unk unk unk OVIOD na 198 1243 .36 . .• .37 .33 .41 unk 156- .31 .26 . .29 .20 270 PRCA5 PRCFT6 PRCF6 PRCF7 PRCF7E na 370 370 400 400 348 200 249 200 200 1080 1187 1187 971 971 .36 .28 512 unk SU20 na 340 1220 .26 .35 unk 1500 2100 2100 3000 .25 unk 750 750 unk unk 306 2000 .17 unk SF260TP SUPETEN na na 260 351 925 1782 .29 .29 . .

5 30 30 30 30 30 8 23 30 30 0 30 30 23 405 280 280 280 280 240 200 150 200 200 0 280 280 160 F5A F5B F5E F5F F86F G91Y HARMK80 HAWK200 HAWK50T HAWK60A HAWK60T HUNTER HUNTERT IL28 JAGI04 JAGIll JASTREB KFIRC2 KFIRC7 KFIRTC2 LAVI LIGHTNG L29 L39ZA MB326K MB326L MB339A MB339C MB339K MIGI5BIS 6200 7000 7000 2000 4000 8000 6800 1540 6800 1540 7100 7100 6614 10500 10500 2420 8500 12250 8500 6000 6000 440 2425 4000 4000 4000 4270 4270 2000 5 5 5 2 6 6 7 7 7 10 6 2 4 6 6 6 6 6 2 2 2 2 2 1 6 20 20 20 13 2 30 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 0 0 2 2 2 157 - 280 280 280 200 300 .ACFT MAXORD STNS NGUN 5510 5510 8377 14341 5680 8600 8600 9470 15000 14250 5 5 5 10 6 5 5 7 6 6 0 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 1 0 30 20 30 8 20 20 30 20 20 0 125 350 1174 200 400 400 300 1032 1032 BAC167 CM170 CM170I 3000 330 330 4 2 2 2 2 2 8 8 8 200 360 360 C101BB 4960 6 ALPHAMS1 ALPHAMS2 AMX A10A A37B A4H A4KU A4N A7E A7P 6 6 8 2 2 1 1 30 200 7500 14500 15500 15500 15500 8 5 5 5 1 1 1 1 1 20 20 20 20 20 725 675 940 940 940 16000 7 1 20 940 5 9 7 7 7 7 7 7 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 20 940 940 515 515 515 515 515 515 20 20 900 900 ClOICC C101DD FA18L 4960 4960 17000 F104GCF F14AC FI5A F15B F1SC F15CFP F15D F15E F16A F16B F16C F16CSC F16D F16J79 CAL ROUNDS 15500 23500 15200 15200 15200 15200 15200 11950 13 13 20 200 200 570 F20 F20A 8300 8300 7 7 F4CD 16000 6 0 0 F4EF F4MOD 0 19080 23080 6 9 1 1 20 20 639 639 6200 5 2 20 280 4 5 5 3 5 5 4 4 6 6 2 2 2 1 1 1 2 2 4 2 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 23 30 200 250 300 120 120 120 200 200 650 300 .

- -.MIG15UTI MIG17F MIG19C MIG21C MIG21F MIG21JKL MIG21R MIG21UM MIG23B MIG23E MIG23F MIG23G MIG23UM MIG25 MIG25R MIG25U MIG27DJ MIG29 MIG31 MIRFIA MIRFIB MIRFIC MIRFIE MIRIIIC MIRIIIE MIRIIIEI MIR2000C MIR2000R MIR2000T MIR3NG MIR400C MIR5DD MIR5DR MIR5DI MIR5DIE MIR5D2 OVIOD PRCA5 PRCFT6 PRCF6 PRCF7 PRCF7E RF4C RF5E SF260MW SF260TP SUPETEN SU20 SU22 SU25 SU27 SU7BMKL SU7U TA4EH TA4KU TORADV TORIDS TU16AG TU22BD 0 1650 2900 2000 4400 4400 2000 4400 4400 4400 4400 4400 4400 8000 8000 8000 6615 8800 12000 8820 8820 8820 8820 3000 8818 8818 13890 1250 13890 9260 17635 8000 8818 400 400 9260 3600 4410 0 0 2000 2000 400 400 661 661 4630 8820 11023 8820 13225 5500 5500 8200 8200 18000 19840 19800 26450 0 2 2 2 3 3 2 3 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 5 6 6 5 5 5 5 3 5 7 7 4 7 7 9 5 2 2 2 5 5 5 0 0 2 2 2 2 4 4 6 8 8 10 6 4 4 5 5 6 9 8 10 2 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 2 1 1 0 1 2 0 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 2 7 1 23 23 30 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 23 0 0 0 23 23 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 30 8 23 30 23 23 23 0 20 8 0 30 30 30 30 23 30 30 20 20 27 27 23 23 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 0 0 0 500 200 360 270 270 270 270 250 250 250 250 200 250 250 200 250 250 250 250 250 1000 500 200 200 200 200 0 280 0 0 250 140 140 200 200 140 140 400 400 200 200 200 200 158- *-* * * * * .. *... .. .

2 Target Acquisition Systems NAME CODE AGAVE RAMU AIDAII RAGA AIRPASSI RAAI ANTILOPE RAMU RAMU APG63 APG64 RAMU APG65 RAMU APG66 RAMU APG67 RAMU APG68 RAMU APG69 RAMU APG70 RAMU APN153V RAGA APQ109 RAMU AP 120 RAMU APQ159 RAAI AWG9 RAAI BLUEFOX RAMU CYRI RAAI CYRII RAMU CYRIV RAAI CYRIVM3 RAMU CYRIV2 RAMU ELM2001B RAMU ELM2021B RAMU ELTAFIAR RAGA FLANRAD RAMU FOXFIRE RAAI FOXHUNT RAMU FULRAD RAMU HIFIX RAMU HILARKI RAMU HILARKII RAMU HILARKX RAAI HOUNDRAD RAAI IRSTSB IRAI IRSTSG IRAI JAYBIRD RAAI LASDES LAGA LASRNG LAGA RDA12 RAGA RDI RAAI RDM RAMU SCANFIX RAAI SCANODD RAAI SHRTHRN RAGA SKYRNGR RAAI SPNSCNA RAAI SPNSCNB RAAI TI-ATA RAMU TI-ATG RAMU VISUAL VIMU PWR CONE UPRNG DWNRNG DATAPTS 100 80 900 140 18 90 500 120 1300 1300 500 400 330 400 80 1300 80 150 200 80 1300 200 100 200 200 200 200 200 200 200 1200 600 1200 400 80 200 300 400 1200 80 100 150 80 80 200 600 600 80 80 200 80 100 100 300 300 40 10 0 80 0 10 0 2 2 2 50 40 4 37 47 34 29 38 47 14 50 10 0 0 0 80 15 0 0 0 15 15 0 25 30 40 0 70 30 0 0 15 20 50 10 15 0 2 2 20 20 20 0 0 30 0 0 0 20 20 3 100 120 45 38 47 51 20 120 0 20 25 10 110 30 14 30 30 30 30 30 35 0 130 50 97 40 4 25 35 40 100 15 20 18 0 0 0 54 60 4 6 0 9 11 11 30 80 10 120 120 120 120 160 120 90 120 90 90 90 90 120 120 120 120 120 120 120 90 90 90 120 120 120 90 40 90 90 120 120 40 60 90 30 20 90 120 120 60 60 90 90 60 60 120 120 30 4 4 4 3 4 4 4 4 2 3 3 3 4 4 3 3 4 4 4 2 4 2 4 4 4 3 2 4 4 4 4 2 2 3 2 2 0 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 1 -159 - "._ ' '.. . " .. " -'". .B.'. "i . . - ' "- -"-..''-" "."" ".-" " -...."..-'-... . -...". "" '.'. -' .' -S'. ...'.

0 1 1 1 JAYBIRD LASDES RDM SCANFIX SCANODD SHRTHRN SKYRNGR SPNSCNA SPNSCNB TI-ATA .7 1 1 1 1 0 . -16o - .9 1.1 1.0 .8 1.9 1.8 1. 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1.0 1.0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 .0 1 1. .1 1.0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 .1 0 1. APG64 APG65 APG66 APG67 APG68 APG69 TWS ILLUM MAP DBS ECCM 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 APG70 1 APN153V 0 APQ109 APQ120 APQ159 AWG9 BLUEFOX CYRI CYRIl CYRIV 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 CYRIVM3 CYRIV2 ELM2001B ELM2021B 1 0 0 1 ELTAFIAR FLANRAD FOXFIRE FOXHUNT FULRAD HIFIX 0 1 0 1 0 0 HILARKI HILARKII HILARKX HOUNDRAD IRSTSB IRSTSG 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1.1 1 1 0 1 1 1 I 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1.8 .8 .8 .8 .9 .7 .8 1.NAME AGAVE AIDAII AIRPASSI ANTILOPE APG63 .8 .0 .0 .1 .8 1.8 1.0 1.1 0 0 TI-ATG 1.7 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 LASRNG RDA12 RDI 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 .8 .0 .7 .0 1.7 .7 .1 1 0 0 1 0 0 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1.1 1.0 1.9 1.0 . 1 1.9 0 0 1 0 1 0 0 0 VISUAL .0 1.8 1.7 I 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 .8 .8 i.

0 4.0 8.0 248.0 66.2 10.0 I 161 - .0 129.0 503.0 60.0 97.0 60.0 60.0 195.0 22.4 10.0 191.4 10.0 66.0 8.0 326.0 4.0 25.0 8.0 33.6 551.5 109.0 423.7 4.0 8.0 88.8 50.7 15.0 88.8 6.4 22.8 6.6 66.6 132.4 110.0 425.9 112.4 4.0 452.0 113.0 115.0 144.0 9.3 27.0 121.8 4.0 114.0 8.0 660.0 200.B.0 139.0 198.0 66.0 26.0 145.0 181.5 485.0 22.0 130.0 110.2 120.0 300.0 88.0 10.0 120.3 985.0 118.0 177.5 125.0 144.0 8.7 8.0 188.0 161.0 326.0 66.0 50.8 7.0 50.0 100.4 190.0 172.0 500.0 650.2 8.4 10.9 145.2 2.0 88.0 2.0 72.0 144.6 170.9 145.0 4.0 205.5 24.4 52.0 22.0 157.8 15.4 10.2 112.0 190.2 88.7 15.3 426.0 232.0 440.6 97.7 8.7 113.0 88.3 125.0 4.0 66.0 145.0 144.0 190.0 330.0 1565 1565 705.6 6.0 5.0 190.0 27.0 8.9 139.0 84.8 105.0 164.0 6. 0 380.0 503.7 4.3 10.0 13.3 Air-to-Air Missiles MSL CODE DIAM LENGTH MSLWGHT WHWGHT AA2B AA2C AA2D AA6A AA6B AA7A AA7B AA8B AA9A AIM120A AA1OA AIM9D AIM9E AIM9G AIM9H AIM9J AIM9L AIM9M AIM9PN SKYFLASH AIM7C AIM7D AIM7E AIM7F AIM7M KUKRI ASPIDE FIRESTRK R550 STINGER AIM54 PIRANHA PYTHON3 R530R R5301 SUP530F RBS70 REDTOP SHAFRIR R550MK2 SUP530D AAMI AAMR AAMI AAMR AAMI AAMR AAMI AAMI AAMR AAMR AAMR AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMR AAMR AAMR AAMR AAMR AAMR AAMI AAMR AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMR AAMI AAMI AAMR AAMI AAMR AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMR 4.0 4.0 4.7 145.1 113.2 13.2 13.0 190.3 6.0 7.2 68.0 4.0 186.0 10.0 198.8 8.0 25.0 6.3 24.0 17.0 4.0 109.0 172.

0 1.5 2.7 .9 1.5 2.7 .0 1.7 20 35 15 20 25 20 20 25 30 25 25 .9 .9 .0 1.0 1.0 1.0 1.0 15 .0 40 15 30 15 30 30 .8 .0 BVR 4.2 2.8 1.0 BVR VR BVR VR VR VR BVR VR VR VR VR 4.9 .5 3.7 20 .0 1.9 .0 1.8 1.9 1.2 2.0 VR VR VR VR BVR 1.9 .0 1.0 AA7A SARH AA7B AA8B AA9A AIM120A AA1OA IR IR SARH ARH SARH AIM9D AIM9E AIM9G AIM9H AIM9J AIM9L AIM9M AIM9PN SKYFLASH AIM7C AIM7D IR IR IR IR IR IR IR IR SARH SARH SARH AIM7E SARH VR VR VR BVR VR 2.0 4.7 2.0 3.5 25 25 25 25 30 30 30 30 16 16 16 1.9 1.9 .8 .7 VR VR VR VR VR VR VR VR BVR VR VR 2.0 20 .0 1.0 3.9 1.0 .8 .5 2.1 .5 3.0 .MSL GUIDTYP GUIDSC MODE MSPD LIMG ECCM AA2B AA2C AA2D AA6A AA6B IR SARH IR SARH IR .7 1.9 .9 .0 .0 1.0 1.0 BVR 1.5 2.5 2.6 25 .5 2.7 .0 2.9 .5 4.0 SUP530F SARH .0 3.2 2.0 3.- - .5 2.2 .0 1.8 .0 .8 3.7 .8 RBS70 REDTOP SHAFRIR R550MK2 SUP530D LASR IR IR IR SARH .5 3.0 4.9 1.0 1.8 .8 1.0 1.5 2.8 1.7 AIM7F .9 .2 1.0 1.9 1.0 1.0 1.8 AIM7M KUKRI ASPIDE FIRESTRK R550 STINGER AIM54 PIRANHA PYTHON3 R530R R5301 SARH IR SARH IR IR IR ARH IR IR SARH IR 1.8 .9 .8 4.2 1.0 .5 2.5 2.9 3.6 25 20 25 30 25 .0 .8 .9 .0 1.8 VR 4.0 1.0 1.8 .0 SARH VR 3.9 .8 25 30 30 16 16 -162 S.5 5.5 2.0 4.0 1.8 VR VR BVR BVR BVR .7 .

0 .4 14.0 2.0 2.00 4.0 25.3 .6 .5 .0 .2 .4 .0 1.1 .6 . 20 9.0 11.60 12.0 12.20 5.70 2.5 .5 .3 7.0 .0 3.0 .0 .00 .4 9.00 7. 1 9.0 .90 9.0 .6 2.80 3.0 8.0 .0 2.60 AA1OA AIM9D AIM9E AIM9G AIM9H AIM9J AIM9L AIM9M AIM9PN SKYFLASH AIM7C AIM7D AIM7E 0 AIM7F 53.0 12.00 15.90 18.5 .76 .0 1.2 AIM7M KUKRI FIRESTRK 53.65 5.30 9.50 2.0 11.1 3.0 2.00 7.0 . 6 9.85 1.0 .0 .0 .MSL AA2B AA2C AA2D AA6A MAXHRNG MINHRNG EFFHRNG MAXTRNG MINTRNG EFFTRNG .2 .2 4.3 21.0 1.5 9.80 18.6 9.23 14.50 2.8 51.9 ASPIDE 26.8 2.0 .0 26.6 1.00 4.00 3.8 .04 3.00 18.4 3. 60 10.0 10.00 35.00 .0 .40 9.2 3.00 2.8 7.00 .40 9.0 .70 .2 .50 AA7B 20.3 .0 .5 .5 105. 1 1.00 27.5 11.00 2.0 51.0 3.8 .8 25.0 .30 18.2 . 1 2.5 AA8B AA9A .0 8.0 3.0 .5 36.95 2.96 6.0 AIM54 108 5.40 17.0 2.4 2.00 10.6 8.0 .90 8.4 .4 13.00 .0 2.8 .0 3.3 .40 .6 2. 7 .1 18.0 .40 5.96 1.8 - 163 - .0 4.3 REDTOP SHAFRIR R550MK2 SUP530D 6.4 1.90 36.90 AA6B . 9 .40 AA7A 25.20 .00 3.2 .5 8.6 .5 2.80 21.20 "13.0 2.00 6.8 1.0 PIRANHA PYTHON3 .00 .1 1.0 35.90 9.8 24.6 7.4 9. 1 14.00 10.00 8.50 8.00 1.0 .6 . 93 11.0 . 90 10. 60 2.6 R550 STINGER .0 .1 R530R R530I SUP530F RBS70 7.0 .1 .4 .5 .20 . 1 1.50 7.0 .50 AIM120A 27.23 2.5 .0 .4 .2 .8 21.53 .0 7.0 23.0 .90 .93 1.2 1.00 9.0 .0 30.6 37.8 9.0 .5 .0 2. 1 4.90 2.00 7.00 23.50 .5 17.0 .00 9.5 1.0 .0 24.0 7.0 1.7 5.0 2.90 1.6 .5 .00 1.0 3.5 1.7 1.0 12.0 3.0 18.00 33.9 2.0 23.30 7.00 15.0 .

863 1.0 1.100 .750 1.197 .0 4.5 2.0 7.0 20.100 1.0 2600 3100 2750 2400 2400 2700 2750 3600 3400 2700 3500 3000 2350 2800 2800 3380 3380 3380 2700 3400 2600 2700 2800 790 3380 3380 1200 1250 2550 2700 1200 2250 1400 1700 550 1300 1300 1800 550 4200 2400 4000 4200 2400 3000 570 640 1350 2400 4200 2600 3000 625 4000 3000 230 4000 740 850 900 850 5150 400 400 .0 37.0 30.0 27.0 2.243 .6 20.0 5.539 .0 30.5 5.0 2.000 .B.806 1.0 23.2 5.197 .329 .2 2.0 23.539 .0 2.593 1.0 7.000 .809 4.0 7.0 37.0 23.6 20.806 .0 2.62 GAU12U GAU13A GAU2BA GAU8A GPU5A GSH23 HGS55 HIS404 KCA30 MAU27 MKIIMOD5 M16 M197 M230 M28 M39 M5 M61A1 M621 NR23 NR23HS NR30 NR30GAT N37 N37D ACCI ACCI ACCI ACCI ACCI ACCI ACCI ACCI ACCE ACCE ACCI ACCE ACCI ACCE ACCI ACCE ACCI ACCE ACCE ACCE ACCE ACCE ACCI ACCE ACCI ACCE ACCI ACCI ACCI ACCI ACCI ACCI 30.592 ACCE 40.200 .0 20.806 .0 6.7 .4 Aerial Guns GUN CODE CAL ADENMK4 ADENMK5 CB.5 2.248 .0 4.0 UBK ACCE 12.5 2.50 DEFA552A DEFA553 DEFA554 FN7.187 1.197 .2 2.0 2.513 .0 5.0 6.5 5.0 7.0 30.5 4.0 4.6 25.0 5.0 7. 150 ACCE 7.0 2.0 6.6 .0 1.560 .0 5.6 30.000 .0 30.593 .7 US12.0 4.0 40.5 2900 700 ACCI 12.0 5.500 1.0 30.0 2.5 2.0 2900 2600 2850 790 700 2000 4000 400 -164- .0 30.0 20.0 4.187 5.7 20.500 .500 .0 30.5 5.2 5.809 .197 5.800 ACCE 30.079 1.6 30.0 30.0 4.7 XM188E30 XM27EI XM8 MRNG DISP MVEL RATE 1.000 1.0 7.100 .0 3.0 30.

... ..-... .- . .I. . - . _ . - n .. . . . . . . . - .5 PRODCC CREW ARC NAVCAT MMHFH ACFT 2 ALPHAMS1 FR ALPHAMS2 AMX A10A A37B A4H A4KU IA4N A7E A7P BAC167 CM170 CM170I C101BB CICC C1O1DD FA18L F104GCF F14AC F15A F15B F15C F15CFP F15D F15E F16A F16B F16C F16CSC F16D F16J79 F20 F20A F4CD F4EF F4MOD F5A F5B F5E F5F F86F G91Y JARMK80 HAWK200 HAWK50T HAWK60A HAWK60T HUNTER HUNTERT IL28 JAG1O4 JAGIll JASTREB KFIRC2 KFIRC7 KFIRTC2 LAVI LIGHTNG L29 L39ZA MB326K MB326L MB339A MB339C 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 2 3 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 2 1 2 2 1 FR IT us uS US us US Us US UK FR IS S S 5P US US uS US US US US US US US US US US us US us us Us us us Us Us Us us Us IT UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UR UK UK YU Is is IS is UK GZ GZ IT IT IT IT 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 TAC 20 20 18 16 30 29 30 53 45 20 18 20 20 20 18 24 45 60 41 41 34 34 34 34 30 30 25 23 25 25 15 17 38 38 38 16 16 20 20 40 20 44 24 20 24 20 44 40 60 38 38 18 18 18 15 26 40 19 19 20 18 18 22 DOP INS INS TAC INS DOP INS INS DO TAC TAC TAC TAC TAC TAC INS INS INS INS INS INS INS INS INS INS INS INS INS INS INS INS INS INS INS INS TAC TAC INS INS DR TAC DO INS TAC TAG TAC DR DR TAC INS INS TAC INS INS INS INS DR DR TAG DR DR TAC INS -165 -.. . . . . .. .. . Air Weapon System Configuration B. . .. . . ... . .~q . . . .

... | - . ..MB339K MIG15BIS MIG15UTI MIG17F MIGI9C MIG21C MIG21F MIG21JKL MIG21R MIG21UM MIG23B MIG23E MIG23F MIG23G MIG23UM MIG25 MIG25R MIG25U MIG27DJ MIG29 MIG31 MIRFIA MIRFIB MIRFIC MIRFIE MIRIIIC MIRIIIE MIRIIIEI MIR2000C MIR2000R MIR2000T MIR3NG MIR4000 MIR5DD MIR5DR MIR5DI MIR5D1E MIR5D2 OV1OD PRCA5 PRCFT6 PRCF6 PRCF7 PRCF7E RF4C RF5E SF260MW SF260TP SUPETEN SU20 SU22 SU25 SU27 SU7BMKL SU7U TA4EH TA4KU TORADV TORIDS TU16AG TU22BD IT UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR US CH CH CH CH EG US US IT IT FR UR UR UR UR UR UR US US UK UK UR UR 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 2 1 2 1 1 1 2 1 3 3 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 6 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 TAC DR DR DR DR DR DR DOP DOP DR DOP DOP DOP DOP DOP DOP DOP DOP DOP INS INS INS INS INS INS DOP DOP INS INS INS INS DOP INS DOP DOP DOP DOP DOP TAC TAC DR DR TAC 0 TAC 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 20 18 16 17 17 18 18 18 22 18 38 36 40 38 36 32 32 32 42 25 50 38 38 34 34 38 38 38 28 30 28 33 30 36 40 38 38 40 16 22 16 16 18 18 INS INS DR DR INS DOP DOP TAC INS DR DR DOP DOP INS INS DR DR 42 22 16 16 33 26 26 18 41 18 16 29 29 30 34 70 70 166- .

ACFT RWR PECM AECM TAOTH TARAD 0 0 ALPHAMSI 0 LASRNG ALPHAMS2 0 ELTAFIAR LASRNG AMX LASRNG 0 A10A 0 0 AJ7B APN153V 0 A H 0 0 LASRNG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 A4KU A4N A7E A7P BAC167 CM170 CM1701 CI01BB APNI53V APN153V APQ126 APQ126 0 0 0 0 cIOIcc 0 0 0 0 0 C101DD 0 0 0 0 0 FA18L F104GCF APG65 0 LASRNG 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 F14AC F15A FISB F15C F15CFP AWG9 APG63 APG63 APG64 APG64 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 F15D APG64 0 FISE F16A F16B F16C F16CSC F16D F16J79 F20 APG70 APG66 APG66 APG68 APG66 APG68 APG66 APG67 LASDES LASRNG LASRNG LASRNG 0 LASRNG 0 0 F20A F4CD APG67 APfO09 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 F4EF F4MOD APQ120 AP G65 LASDES LASDES 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 F5B F5E F5F 0 APQ159 APQ159 0 0 LASDES 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 F86F G91Y HARMK80 HAWK200 0 RDA12 0 BLUEFOX 0 0 LASDES LASRNG 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 HAWK5OT HAWK60A HAWK60T HUNTER HUNTERT IL28 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 LASRNG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 JAGI04 0 1 1 0 JAGI1I JASTREB KFIRC2 KFIRC7 KFIRTC2 LAVI LIGHTNG L29 L39ZA MB326K MB326L MB339A MB339C MB339K MIG15BIS 0 0 ELM2001B ELM2021B 0 ELM2021B AIRPASSI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 LASRNG 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 LASRNG 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 F5A 0 0 LASRNG 167 - " . . ..

. .. .*.. . - . .. .. 0 0 PRCF7 PRCF7E RF4C -168 . - .. 0 0 - "I - .. ' ''". - . . 0 0 0 - * . .. ..MIG15UTI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 IRSTSB 0 LASRNG IRSTSG 0 0 0 0 LASRNG LASRNG 0 LASRNG 0 LASRNG LASRNG 0 0 0 LASDES 0 LASDES 0 LASDES 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 MIG17F SCANODD 0 MIG19C MIG21C MIG21F MIG21JKL MIG21R MIG21UM MIG23B MIG23E MIG23F MIG23C MIG23UM MIG25 MIG25R MIG25U MIG27DJ MIG29 MIG31 MIRFIA MIRFIB MIRFIC MIRFIE MIRIIIC MIRIIIE MIRIIIEI MIR2000C MIR2000R MIR2000T MIR3NG MIR4000 MIR5DD SCANFIX SPNSCNA SPNSCNB JAYBIRD SPNSCNB SPNSCNB HILARKI JAYBIRD 0 HILARKII JAYBIRD FOXFIRE FOXFIRE FOXFIRE 0 FULRAD HOUNDRAD AIDAII AIDAII CYRIV2 CYRIVM3 CYRII CYRIV CYRIV RDM RDM RDM CYRIVM3 RDI AIDAII MIR5DR MIR5DI MIR5DIE AIDAII AGAVE CYRIVM3 MIR5D2 OVIOD 0 LASDES 0 0 PRCA5 AGAVE 0 PRCFT6 PRCF6 SCANFIX SCANFIX 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 SPNSCNB SPNSCNB APQ1O09 RF5E SF260MW SF260TP APQ159 0 0 01 0 0 0 i SUPETEN SU20 1 0 0 1 0 0 AGAVE HIFIX 0 0 SU22 1 1 HIFIX 0 1 1 1 SU25 SU27 SU7BMKL LASDES 0 FLANRAD HIFIX 1 LASRNG 0 0 1 1 SU7U 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 TA4EH TA4KU TORADV TORIDS TU16AG TU22BD APN153V APN153V FOXHUNT TI-ATG SHRTHRN SHRTHRN 0 0 0 LASDES 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 2 0 0 1 ...' ' ' ... . . . . .... . . - -.

0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 2 2 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 ADENMK4 .50 DEFA553 DEFA554 DEFA553 DEFA554 0 AA2B R550 0 GSH23 DEFA552A 0 0 DEFA553 DEFA553 N37 0 1 I 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 I 1 1 1 1 . ..7 0 DEFA552A ADENMK5 ADENMK4 1 I 1 ADENMK4 ADENMK4 ADENMK4 0 0 0 ADENMK4 ADENMK4 NR23 ADENMK5 ADENMK5 CB. 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 REDTOP R550 AIM9PN AIM9PN AIM9PN 0 1 1 DEFA552A DEFA553 DEFA554 M61A1 M61A1 FN7..62 HGS55 DEFA553 0 1 GAU2BA HGS55 1 1 1 M61A1 GAU8A 2 2 2 2 2 0 1 . . 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 169 - . 0 0 I 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 I 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 .ACFT NAAMR AAMR ALPHAMS1 0 ALPHAMS2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 A37B A4H A4H A4N A7E A7P BAC167 CM170 CM1701 CI1OBB C01CC CI1ODD 0 0 AMX AIOA 0 NAAMI AAMI 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 R550 2 R550 2 0 AIM9PN 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 0 SHAFRIR AIM9PN AIM9L AIM9L AIM9PN 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 FA18L F104GCF F14AC 2 0 2 AIM7M 0 AIM54 F15A F15B F15C F15CFP F15D F15E 2 2 2 6 6 6 6 6 6 AIM9L AIM9E AIM9J AIM7F AIM7F AIM7F AIM7M AIM7F AIM120A 0 0 2 0 0 AIM7F 2 2 2 2 2 2 AIM9L AIM9L AIM9L AIM9M AIM9L AIM9M 4 4 2 AIM9L AIM9L AIM9L F16A F16B F16C FI6CSC F16D F16J79 F20 F20A F4CD F4EF F4MOD F5A F5B F5E F5F F86F G91Y HARMK80 HAWK200 HAWK50T HAWK60A HAWK60T HUNTER HUNTERT IL28 JAGI04 JAGIII JASTREB KFIRC2 KFIRC7 KFIRTC2 LAVI LIGHTNG L29 L39ZA MB326K MB326L MB339A MB339C MB339K MIG15BIS 0 2 0 0 2 2 0 AIM7F 0 0 AIM7F AIM7E 2 2 AIM7F AIM7M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 AIM9L AIM9M 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AIM9PN AIM9L AIM9PN AIM9PN AIM9L AIM9D 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 4 2 4 4 2 2 0 4 2 2 4 2 0 0 0 2 2 0 4 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AIM9L AIM9L AIM9PN AIM9PN AIM9PN 0 0 0 AIM9PN AIM9PN SHAFRIR 4 0 0 0 SHAFRIR PYTHON3 2 0 AIM9J AIM9J AIM9PN AIM9PN PYTHON3 GUN PGMC SA HUD CRP 0 DEFA553 1 1 0 00 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 o 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 6A1 M61AI M6IAI 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 00 1 00 M61A1 M61A1 M61A1 M61A1 M61AI M61AI 1 1 1 1 I 1 1 1 1 M61A1 M61AI M61AI 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 DEFA553 DEFA553 1 M61A1 M61A1 M61A1 M39 M39 0 M61A1 M61A1 M39 M39 M39 M39 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 US12. 0 0 1 0 0 . .

S MIG15UTI MIG17F MIG19C 0 0 0 MIG21C MIG21F MIG21JKL MIG21R MIG21UM MIG23B MIG23E MIG23F MIG23G MIG23UM MIG25 MIG25R MIG25U MIG27DJ MIG29 MIG31 MIRFIA MIRFIB MIRFIC MIRFIE MIRIIIC MIRIIIE MIRIIIEI MIR2000C MIR200OR MIR2000T MIR3NG MIR4000 MIR5DD MIR5DR MIR5DI MIR5DIE MIR5D2 OVIOD PRCA5 PRCFT6 PRCF6 PRCF7 PRCF7E RF4C RF5E SF260MW SF260TP SUPETEN SU20 SU22 SU25 SU27 SU7BMKL SU7U TA4EH TA4KU TORADV TORIDS TUI6AG TU22BD 0 0 0 0 0 2 0 0 AA2B 2 AA2C N37 N37D NR30 2 AA2B 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 0 2 0 4 4 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 2 2 2 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 2 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 6 0 0 0 0 4 0 0 0 AA2C AA2C 0 AA2C AA7A AA2C 0 AA7A AA2C AA6A 0 AA6A 0 AA9A AA9A 0 0 SUP530F SUP530F R530R R530R R530R SUP530D 0 SUP530D SUP530F SUP530D 0 0 R530R SUP530D 0 0 0 0 0 AA2C AA2C 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 AA1OA 0 0 0 0 SKYFLASH 0 0 0 NR23 0 0 0 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 4 4 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 0 0 2 2 2 0 0 2 0 2 2 4 2 0 0 0 AA2B AA2D AA2D AA2B AA7B AA2D AA2D AA8B AA2D AA6B AA6B AA6B AA8B AA8B AA8B R530I R530I R550 R550 R5301 R550 SHAFRIR R550MK2 R550MK2 R550MK2 R550MK2 R550MK2 R550 R550 R550 R550MK2 R550 0 0 0 AA2B AA2B AIM9PN 0 0 0 0 R550 AA2D AA2D 0 0 AA2B 0 SHAFRIR AIM9E AIM9L AIM9L 0 0 0 0 NR23HS GSH23 GSH23 NR23HS GSH23 GSH23 GSH23 GSH23 GSH23 0 0 0 NR30 NR30GAT NR30GAT DEFA553 DEFA553 DEFA553 DEFA553 DEFA552A DEFA552A DEFA552A DEFA554 DEFA554 DEFA554 DEFA552A DEFA554 DEFA552A DEFA552A DEFA552A DEFA552A DEFA552A M197 NR30 GSH23 GSH23 GSH23 GSH23 0 M39 0 0 DEFA553 NR30 NR30 NR30GAT NR30GAT NR30 NR30 DEFA552A DEFA552A MAU27 ADENMK5 NR23 NR23 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 I 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 2. 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 0 0 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 0 17o - C .

ability Air Detense Fighter ' Combat = 100% Endurance! Interdiction Close Air Spt! PAYLOAD COMPONENT 2.A Aircrew Survey AIRFRAME COMPONENT 1. achieving success in interdiction and CAS missions respectively? Mission ' Freefall + Munitions I Interdiction Guided + GUN Munitions 100% A A . What is the relative utility of each of the listed weapons types in-. Mission !Top Useful + Maneuver. What is the relative utility of each of the listed weapons types in achieving success in air defense and fighter missions respectively? Mission ! Infrared Radar Guided !AAM !AAM I Air Defense!I Fighter * GUN = I . Close Air Spt.171 -. What is the relative utility of the following airframe performance factors in achieving combat success in the roles indicated7." 171- .+ MAirspeed ..Appendix C AIRCREW SURVEY AND RELATIVE UTILITY VARIABLES C.. . ! 100%' - 3.

+ Airspeed ' ability I ECM + Size/ 100% Signature I Air Defense Fighter ! interdiction I Close Air Spt _ _ . Mission ' Visual + Radar + Other = 100% !(IRSTS.e. What is the utility of each of the following factors in reducing an aircraft's suscep ibil}ty to engagement during each of the mission ypes? Consider size as a reciprocal measure (i. I _ !_ _ 172. d- . the smaller the Mission Top Useful + Maneuver. and that weather will not play a limiting role. What is the relative utility of each of the listed target acquisition methods in achieving success in the mission areas listed? Assume that no more than 10% of the operations will be conducted at night. Judge the situation as if all three types of target acquisition were availabl.. LASER)! Air Detense Fighter Interdiction ! Close Air Spt ! VULNERABILITY TO ENGAGEMENT 5. _ .TARGET ACQUISITION COMPONENT 4.

Airframe + Target + Payload ! ! * Acquisition Air Detense 100% = Fighter Interdiction i Close Air Spt EMPLOYMENT FACTORS 7. Hours in Current Aircraft: d. Current Aircraft: b. Total Combat Hours: _____ -173- -'_ . What is the relative utility of each of the listed components in achieving mission success in each mission area? Mission . Aircrew Rating: c. Please provide information concerning the following: a.AIR WEAPON SYSTEM 6. Total Fighter Hours: e. What is the relative utility of each of the following factors in assuring the success of the missions listed? Mission Air Weapon + Operator System Air Detense + C31 Proficiency ' Support ' = 100% iI Fighter Interdiction =T-e Air Spt? ' V RESPONDANT INFORMATION 8.

26 .27 Interdiction ! .30 F -174- |I " t'- . ' " ..61 1 ! 32 .35 Close Air Spt 1 57 . . .20 ..31 1 . ".36 Close Air Spt .39 .2 Survey Derived Relative Utility Values AIRFRAME COMPONENT Mission ! Top Useful ! Maneuver.56 Fighter .42 ! .39 ! GUN 1 13 .38 .14 Close Air Spt.29 ! .39 .13 . *" '." ..22 Mission Air-to-Ground Missions ! Freefall ! Guided ! Munitions ! Munitions ! GUN Interdiction I .38 .17 I .48 ..17 .C.38 ! .41 PAYLOAD COMPONENT Air-to Air Missions ! Infrared ! Radar Guided AAM ! AAM Mission Air Defense . Y * . .21 . •"-'.51 1 . " •.28 . LASER)! .26 ! .43 ! .."' . . " : Y!". .41 TARGET ACQUISITION COMPONENT Mission ' Visual Air Defense I Fighter Interdiction I Radar ! Other .31 . .30 ! .! Combat ! Endurance! ! ability Airspeed Air Defense ! .29 Fighter ! . . . .(IRSTS.

33 .30 ! .37 ! .34 1.23.32 .23 !.41 ! .27 .35 .19 .34 1 .41 1.39 .18 ! .37 ! .39 Fighter Interdiction 1 EMPLOYMENT FACTORS Mission ! C31 IAir Weapon ! Operator ! Proficiency ! Support System Air Defense 1 .36 .22 AIR WEAPON SYSTEM Mission !Airframe Air Defense ' ! Payload ! Target Acquisition ! .20 Close Air Spt I .VULNERABILITY TO ENGAGEMENT Mission ! Top Useful ! Maneuver.1 .36 1 .18 ! .34 .37 ! .39 I .22 .27 .23 1 .21 Fighter Interdiction -175 - 1 .36 Close Air Spt 1 .43 1 .31 .!ECM !! ! ability 'Airspeed Air Defense ! *Fighter Interdiction ' Close Air Spt 1 !Size/ Signature .28 ! .19 .20 .32 !.41 I .26 !.28 .

RD-R169 455 UNCLRSSIFIED AIR WEPON SYSTEMS IN THE THIRD WORLD: A COMBAT POTENTIAL ASSESSMENT TECHNI UE(U) NAVAL POSTGRRDURTE SCHOOL MONTEREY CA C L CHRISTON JUN 6 NPS-56-S6-fI F/G 15/7 3 NI mmhhhhhhhihhhl Ifllllllflllll .

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5 1 . '.i . . EMCODE CIN OCG TNG FGA TNG FIN OCA FGA OCG FIN REC OCA FIN FIN FGA FGA FGA 1984 24 4 20 60 10 95 10 40 2 1985 20 0 20 60 10 95 10 60 2 18 4 15 6 3 3 0 0 18 0 15 6 3 0 0 18 0 20 1986 20 0 20 50 10 95 10 60 2 0 0 18 0 12 12 1987 20 0 20 40 10 95 10 60 2 15 6 3 0 0 18 12 0 1988 20 0 20 30 5 84 10 60 2 15 6 3 12 0 18 12 0 1989 20 0 20 20 5 72 10 60 2 0 6 3 1990 20 0 20 0 0 60 10 60 2 0 6 3 24 18 18 12 36 18 18 12 1989 8 4 1990 8 4 0 0 MXRAT= 3. . . ..Appendix D MIDDLE EAST AIR ORDERS OF BATTLE 1984-1990 ALGERIA ACFT CM170 MIG15BIS MIGISUTI MIG17F MIG17F MIG21F MIG21UM MIG23F MIG23UM MIG25 MIG25R MIG25U MIG29 MIG31 SU20 SU25 SU7BMKL OAR= . .75 BAHRAIN ACFT F5E F5F OAR= EMCODE FMR FMR .... . . 1984 4 2 1985 6 2 5 1986 8 4 1987 8 4 1988 8 4 MXRAT= 2. .

3 0 10 0 15 16 .8 . .6 MXRAT: 4.. . EF REC IL28 TNG L29 MIG15UTI TNG FGA MIG17F FIN MIG19C FIN MIG21F MIG21JKL FIN REC MIG21R MIG21UM OCA FIN MIG23E MIR2000C FGA MIR2000T OCA OCA MIR5DD REC MIR5DR MIR5DIE FIN FGA MIR5D2 OCA PRCFT6 FGA PRCF6 FIN PRCF6 FIN PRCF7 FGA SU20 SU7BMKL FGA BMR TU16AG OAR = .3 12 3 0 6 0 10 16 3 12 3 0 6 0 10 16 3 12) 3 0 6 0 10 16 3 12 3 0 -177- . FGA PRCF6 REC RF4C REC RF5A 6 OAR= M. . . 127 3 5 15 0 20 24 5 12.68 ETHIOPIA ACFT ENCODE OCG F5B FGA F5E TNG L39ZA FGA MIG17F FGA MIG21F MIG21JKL FGA MIG21UM OCG FGA MIG23F SF26OTP TNG FGA SU25 OAR= . 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 0 15 34Z 6 0 0 33 10 59 0 50 23 60 62 15 21 0 0 0 6 6 0 4t 8 19 32 6 0 0 33 5 50 0 24 6 48 62 15 21 0 0 0 6 6 0 5 20 26 32 6 17 6 16 0 20 0 12 8 16 36 15 21 0 0 6 6 6 12 32 12 10 0 20 7 70 12 20 0 20 7 20 26 32 6 0 6 33 0 30 0 12 16 32 54 15 21 0 0 0 6 6 6 54 4 78 12 36 0 0 7 12 78 1Z 5 0 0 7 20 26 32 6 34 6 0 0 10 0 0 0 0 18 15 21 0 17 6 3 6 16 47 18 78 12 72 0 0 7 20 26 32 6 34 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 15 6 0 34 6 0 6 16 24 22 78 12 72 0 0 7 20 26 32 6 34 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 18 15 6 0 34 6 0 6 16 24 22 78 12 72 0 0 7 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 2 6 10 10 36 54 10 20 4 0 2 6 10 10 36 54 10 35 4 0 0 0 10 10 36 54 10 38 8 0 0 0 10 10 36 54 10 38 10 0 0 0 10 0 36 54 10 38 10 12 0 0 10 0 24 54 10 38 10 24 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 25 5 30 40 10 0 3 10 20 3 20 32 .XRAT= 22.4 IRAN ACFT EMCODE FIN F14AC FMR F4CD FMR F4EF FGA F5E F5F -.4 MXRAT= 2.EGYPT ACFT *F16A EMCODE ALPHAMS1 TNG ALPHAMS2 FGA FIN OCA F16B FIN F16C OCA F4D FMR . .2 54 10 38 10 36 . 0 0 10 0 1. FGA .

9 MXRAT= 7. . *.-.I T TAC HUNTER HUNTERT IL28 L29 L39ZA MIGISUTI MIG17F MIG19C MIG21F MIG21JKL MIG21UM MIG23E MIG23F MIG23UM MIG25 MIG25R MIG27DJ MIG29 MIRFIB MIRFIC MIRFIE PRCF7 SUPETEN SU20 SU25 SU7BMKL TU16AG TU22BD OAR= EMCODE 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 TNG TNG REC TNG TNG TNG FIN FIN FIN FIN OCA FIN FGA OCA FIN REC FGA FIN OCA FGA FIN FIN FGA FGA FGA FGA BMR BMR 12 5 0 12 24 30 30 40 60 120 6 48 16 6 10 8 6 0 4 0 6 0 5 45 0 40 8 7 12 5 0 12 24 30 0 40 60 140 6 48 18 6 17 8 18 0 6 8 8 25 5 50 0 40 6 7 12 5 0 6 24 30 0 20 36 120 6 60 36 6 17 8 36 0 8 20 12 50 5 60 0 36 6 7 12 0 0 0 24 20 0 0 24 108 6 72 36 6 17 8 54 0 8 20 24 75 0 70 12 18 6 7 6 0 0 0 24 10 0 0 0 72 6 84 36 6 17 8 54 12 8 20 24 100 0 80 24 0 6 7 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 60 6 84 36 6 17 8 54 24 8 20 24 100 0 80 24 0 6 7 0 0 0 0 24 0 0 0 0 48 6 84 36 6 17 8 54 36 8 20 24 100 0 80 24 0 6 7 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 80 50 85 18 2 20 62 8 0 0 131 120 0 20 0 13 73 80 50 85 18 2 20 62 8 0 0 131 120 18 30 0 13 73 60 50 85 18 2 32 62 8 0 8 131 120 36 50 0 13 73 36 50 85 18 2 32 62 8 36 8 115 120 54 60 0 13 73 18 50 85 18 2 32 62 8 54 8 100 120 72 60 0 13 73 0 50 85 18 2 32 62 8 67 8 84 120 72 60 0 13 73 0 50 85 18 2 32 62 0 67 8 69 120 72 60 0 13 73 .68 ISRAEL ACFT EMCODE A4H FGA A4N FGA CM170I TNG FISA FMR F15B OCM F15C FMR F16A FMR F16B OCM F16C FMR F16D OCM F4EF FMR KFIRC2 FMR KFIRC7 FMR KFIRTC2 TNG MIRIIIEI FIN RF4C REC TA4EH TNG OAR= .75 1--s. * '.6 MXRAT= 6.

8 MXRAT= 5.25 LEBANON ACFT HUNTER HUNTERT MIRIIIB MIRIIIE OAR=NA MXRAT=NA LIBYA ACFT EMCODE FGA OCG OCM FMR EMCODE JASTREB CIN L39ZA TNG MIG21F FIN MIG23E FIN MIG23F FGA MIG23UM OCA MIG25 FIN MIG25R REC MIG25U OCA MIG29 FIN MIG31 FIN MIRFIA FGA MIRFIB OCA MIRFIE FIN MIR5DD OCG MIR5DR REC MIR5D2 FGA SF260MW TNG SU22 FGA SU25 FGA TU22BD BMR OAR= .3 MXRAT= 1.71 KUWAIT ACFT EMCODE A4KU FGA BAC167 TNG HAWK60A CIN HUNTER FGA HUNTERT OCA LIGHTNG FIN MIRFIB OCA MIRFIC FIN TA4KU OCG OAR= .27 °9 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 0 17 5 57 12 3 2 15 17 0 15 5 56 12 0 2 19 17 0 15 5 56 12 0 2 19 17 6 15 5 56 12 0 2 19 17 12 7 5 56 12 0 2 19 17 14 7 7 56 12 0 2 19 17 14 7 7 56 12 0 2 19 17 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 30 9 0 6 3 0 2 17 6 28 9 12 0 0 0 2 32 6 28 9 12 0 0 0 2 41 6 28 9 12 0 0 0 2 41 6 28 9 12 0 0 0 2 41 6 28 9 12 0 0 0 2 41 6 28 9 12 0 0 0 2 41 6 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 3 2 0 0 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 30 30 30 100 18 14 50 7 5 0 0 14 6 26 13 7 45 100 100 0 9 30 30 30 124 36 14 55 7 5 0 0 14 6 26 13 7 43 120 100 0 9 30 30 15 143 36 14 60 7 5 0 0 14 6 40 13 7 43 140 100 0 9 30 30 0 143 36 14 60 7 5 0 0 14 6 54 13 7 43 160 100 0 9 30 30 0 124 36 14 60 7 5 12 0 0 6 66 13 7 43 170 100 12 9 30 30 0 112 36 14 48 7 5 24 12 0 6 66 13 7 43 170 100 12 9 30 30 0 100 36 14 36 7 5 24 24 0 6 66 13 7 43 170 100 12 9 - ------------------------------------------- .77 JORDAN ACFT EMCODE C101DD CIN F5A OCG F5B OCG F5E FGA F5F FGA HUNTERT TNG MIRFIB OCA MIRFIC FIN MIRFIE FIN OAR= . 6 MXRAT= 2.

6 MXRAT= 8.28 OMAN ACFT ENCODE BAC167 CIN HUNTER FGA HUNTERT OCG4 JAGIll FGA TORADV FIN OAR= .7 MXRAT: TNG FIN OCA OCG FGA FGA TNG FIN REC FIN FGA 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 24 22 5 3 14 4 18 22 6 12 28 24 22 5 3 14 4 18 21 6 12 28 24 22 5 3 14 4 18 21 6 12 28 24 22 5 3 14 4 18 21 6 12 28 24 2 5 3 14 4 18 21 6 12 28 24 22 5 3 14 4 18 21 6 12 28 24 22 5 3 14 4 18 21 6 12 28 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 12 12 24 0 12 12 4 24 0 12 12 2 24 0 12 6 0 24 4 12 6 0 24 8 12 6 0 24 8 12 6 0 24 8 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 8 2 1 0 10 8 2 0 2 12 8 0 0 2 12 8 0 0 2 12 8 0 0 2 12 8 0 0 2 12 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 40 46 15 16 65 2 40 54 16 16 65 24 0 17 0 0 0 40 54 17 16 70 25 0 16 10 0 0 20 54 17 16 70 25 15 0 10 0 20 0 54 17 16 54 25 30 0 10 12 36 0 54 17 16 36 15 0 54 17 16 36 25 30 0 10 24 48 6 3 1 0 5 17 0 0 0 6.6 MXRAT= 1.7 MXRAT= 5.03 ISO - 0 10 24 48 .MOROCCO ACFT * ENCODE ALPHAMS1 TNG CM170 CIN F5A FGA F5B OCG F5E FGA F5F FGA M4IRFlC FGA MIRFE FGA OV10D CIN RF5A REC SF26OMW TNC OAR= .43 SAUDI ARABIA ACFT EMCODE BAC167 F15C F15D F5B F5E F5F HAWK60T LIGHTNG RESE TORADV TORIDS OAR= .73 QATAR ACFT EMCODE ALPHAMS2 FGA HUNTER FGA HUNTERT OCG MIRFIB OCG MIRFIC FGA OAR= .

.- . .. ... . 7 MXRAT= 10. . .. .SOMALIA ACFT 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 10 2 2 9 7 30 4 6 10 2 2 9 7 30 4 6 10 2 2 9 7 30 4 6 10 2 2 9 7 30 4 6 10 2 2 9 7 30 4 6 10 2 2 9 7 30 4 6 10 2 2 9 7 30 4 6 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 3 2 2 10 8 2 2 6 3 2 2 10 8 2 2 6 7 6 2 10 8 2 2 9 10 10 2 6 8 2 2 12 10 10 2 3 8 2 2 12 10 10 2 0 8 2 2 12 10 10 2 0 8 2 2 12 EMCODE 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 BMR TNG TNG TNG FGA FIN FIN OCA FIN FIN FGA FIN OCG FIN REC FIN FGA FGA FIN FGA OCG 0 60 40 10 85 92 100 20 24 24 50 0 10 25 3 0 40 0 0 36 2 0 60 40 10 85 92 108 20 24 24 50 36 10 25 6 0 42 0 0 36 2 0 60 40 10 67 92 108 20 24 24 60 36 10 30 10 0 42 0 0 24 2 0 60 40 10 49 84 96 20 24 36 70 36 10 38 12 12 42 12 0 12 0 0 60 40 10 36 72 84 20 24 48 70 36 10 38 12 24 42 24 0 0 0 0 60 40 10 18 36 72 20 24 60 70 36 10 38 12 36 42 36 0 0 0 0 60 40 10 0 0 36 20 24 72 70 36 10 38 12 72 42 36 24 0 0 EMCODE FGA HUNTER HUNTERT OCG MIG15UTI TNG FGA MIG17F FMR MIG21F FMR PRCF6 SF260MW TNG SF260MW CIN OAR= . - .. . . . . . . . . . ... .. . . .86 SUDAN ACFT EMCODE CIN BAC167 FMR F5E FMR F5F FGA MIG17F FMR MIG21F MIG21UM OCM OCA PRCFT6 FGA PRCF6 OAR= . . . . . ..-. . . .. .. . . . .45 J J - xi ..... .4 MXRAT= 8.4 MXRAT= 2. .-.. . .. .57 SYRIA ACFT IL28 L29 L39ZA MIG15UTI MIG17F MIG21F MIG21JKL MIG21UM MIG23B MIG23E MIG23F MIG23G MIG23UM MIG25 MIG25R MIG29 SU22 SU25 SU27 SU7BMKL SU7U OAR= . *. . . . . . . . • . .

68 MXRAT= .23 SOUTH YEMEN EMCODE ACFT MIG23E - ! . 34 0 25 0 0 25 0 0 25 0 0 25 0 12 25 12 24 25 12 36 25 12 SU22 FGA OAR= . 6 UNITED ARAB EMIRATES 1984 ACFT EMCODE ALPHAMS2 HAWK5OT HAWK60A HAWK60T HUNTER HUNTERT FGA TNG FGA OCG FGA OCA 3 3 0 0 0 0 3 3 0 0 0 0 6 3 0 8 0 0 6 3 8 8 0 0 MB326K CIN 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 5 4 0 0 4 0 4 0 5 5 MB326L CIN 5 5 5 5 MB339A MIRIIIE TNG FIN 2 0 2 0 4 0 MIR2000C FIN 0 0 0 12 24 32 32 MIR2000R REC 0 0 0 3 3 3 3 MIR2000T OCA 0 0 3 3 3 3 3 OCA REC 2 3 2 j 2 3 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 MIR5DD MIR5DR MIR5DI SF260TP FIN TNG 25 6 24 6 24 6 12 6 1984 1985 1986 1987 0 6 0 6 0 6 OAR= .5 MXRAT=2.83 NORTH YEMEN EMCODE ACFT 1988 1989 1990 F5B TNG 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 F5E IL28 FMR BMR 10 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 8 0 MIG15UTI TNG FMR MIG17F FMR MIG21F 4 10 40 4 10 40 4 10 40 4 10 40 4 10 40 4 10 40 4 10 40 15 15 15 15 15 15 15 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 MIG15UTI TNG FIN MIG17F FIN MIG21F 3 30 36 3 30 36 3 30 36 3 30 24 3 18 12 3 0 0 3 0 0 MIG21JKL FGA MIG21UM OCA 12 1 12 1 12 1 12 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 FIN 0 0 0 12 24 36 36 FIN MIG29 FGA SU22 FGA SU25 OAR= ... " I .TUNISIA ACFT EMCODE 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 F5E F5F MB326K MB326K MB326L FGA OCG CIN TNG CIN 0 0 5 7 3 8 4 5 7 3 8 6 5 7 3 8 6 5 7 3 8 6 5 7 3 8 6 5 7 3 8 6 5 7 3 SF260MW TNG 17 17 17 17 17 17 17 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 6 3 16 8 0 0 6 3 16 8 0 0 6 3 16 8 0 0 OAR= 5.6 MXRAT= 2.4 MXRAT= 1.

573 1.872 2.830 1.113 1.537 1.573 .000 .252 .784 1.353 .185 .784 .158 .784 .773 1. 153 1.594 .844 1.462 1.054 1.834 .350 .928 1.813 .357 1.636 .000 1.546 2.411 1.667 .870 F20 F20A FTMR FTMR 1.611 1.840 .573 1.087 1.381 .358 1.495 1.366 .480 1.986 1.000 1. 750 2.100 1.225 1.000 .323 1.323 1.969 1.900 .495 1.375 .506 1.921 .601 .000 .353 .742 1.380 1.114 .896 .077 . 111 .031 1.215 2.O4GCF F14AC FI5A FI5B F15C F15CFP F15D FISE F16A FI6B F16C FI6CSC FI6D F16J79 3.236 1.759 .872 1.611 1.637 .763 .546 .000 .694 .000 .020 1.225 1.927 1.953 .872 2.183 1.467 1.604 .482 .907 .763 .928 .100 .095 1.506 1.771 .495 1.344 1. 952 .642 .115 1.511 1.931 1.642 -184- 1.587 .018 .000 .034 .890 .459 1.252 1.692 1.959 1.022 1.462 1.411 1.192 .193 2.835 .563 1.778 .592 .025 1.873 1.041 1.418 1.069 3.370 1.257 1.346 1.821 000 .413 .872 2.000 1.894 .1 Airframes Glossary NFSS = Speed/Energy Factor Score NFSM = Maneuverabi ity Factor Score NFSRA = Air-to-Air Range/Endurance Factor Score NFSRG = Air-to-Ground Range/Endurance Factor Score NFSO = Air-to-Ground Ordnance Factor Score NRND = Indexed Gun Ordnance Capacity NFSV = Size/Signature Factor Score ACFT ROLE NFSS NFSM NFSRA NFSRG NFSO NRND NFSV ALPHAMS1 ALPHAMS2 AMX AIOA A37B A4H A4KU A4N A7E FTTC FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT .384 1.537 .506 1.462 1.539 .000 .020 1.934 .311 .563 1.573 1.969 .506 1.386 1.462 1.725 .367 .611 .542 1.335 BAC167 CM170 CM170I C101BB C101CC C101DD FA18L F1.113 1. 750 .377 .813 1.782 .611 1.634 .855 .928 .611 .664 1.000 .322 1.298 1.495 1.069 .960 .271 2.834 .871 .902 .356 .889 1.864 .940 .049 1.303 .917 3.539 .023 .460 1.153 FTAT FTTC FTTC FTAT FTAT FTTA FTMR FTAT FTIN FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR .194 .937 1.271 1.872 2.303 1.000 1.000 1.009 .Appendix E AIR WEAPON SUBSYSTEM FACTOR SCORES E.776 .000 .261 1.606 1.050 1.902 .382 1.595 .993 .896 .302 .151 A7P FTAT .222 1.252 .986 .087 1.311 .469 1.450 .222 .350 1.601 .885 . 952 1.113 1.373 1.717 1.495 1.334 .355 1.573 1.776 .377 1.864 .466 1.312 1.573 1.689 .530 1.634 1.993 1.605 .783 .225 1.000 .504 1.000 1.451 1.885 .355 1.168 1.546 1.225 1.000 .000 .941 1.271 1.244 1.468 1.000 .761 .872 2.088 .062 2.466 1.326 1.462 1.153 .115 1.855 .741 2.193 1.271 1.000 1.673 F4CD F4EF F4MOD FSA F5B " FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR 1.

554 1.764 866 .448 . 521 .563 1.361 . 140 .000 .000 1.856 .184 .667 .172 1.570 .985 1.449 .293 1..244 1.000 .756 .611 .734 1.886 .000 .815 . . . .761 .891 -I5- i-'.881 .786 .611 .400 1.1.955 .932 .812 .699 .651 .810 .875 .764 .124 .660 .700 .899 FTMR FTAT FTMR FTMR FTTA FTAT FTTA FTMR F rM BMAT .979 .721 .100 825 825 .958 .965 1.611 .235 .620 .000 .979 .- - .862 . .000 .172 .700 .737 1.687 1.975 .026 1.000 .000 .667 .000 1..000 .716 . 165 MIG25 FTIN 1.761 .000 . .611 .359 .641 .468 1.-" .649 .000 .899 FTMR 1.036 .520 .000 .000 .081 1.553 .904 .990 1.651 . .000 .000 .528 .109 1.920 .171 1.881 1.764 .455 1.750 .087 1.915 .325 .798 .764 .955 .855 .637 . 382 1.927 843 917 1 237 .000 .122 1.457 1. .778 .619 .923 .366 1.611 .548 .858 .965 .855 .726 .817 KFIRC2 KFIRC7 KFIRTC2 LAVI LIGHTNG L29 L39ZA MB326K MB326L MB339A MB339C MB339K MIGI5BIS MIGISUTI MIG17F MIG19C MIG21C MIG21F MIG21JKL MIG21R MIG21UM MIG23B MIG23E MIG23F MIG23G MIG23UM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTIN FTTA FTTC FTAT FTTA FTTC FTAT FTAT FTMR FTTC FTMR FTMR FTIN FTMR FTMR FTRE FTTM FTMR FTMR FTAT FTMR FTTC 1.645 .675 .968 .733 .067 1.882 1.711 .887 .080 1.000 1.611 1.074 1.764 .955 . ..071 .000 .459 1.973 .873 1.000 .079 .204 1. .171 .979 .582 1.943 .264 1.062 .169 1.469 .952 . 165 1.676 .923 .625 .657 .566 1.962 1.144 .897 .367 .097 1.787 .000 .292 MIR2000C FTMR MIR2000R FTRE MIR2000T FTTM 1.611 .659 .703 .943 .89 .244 1.611 1.000 ..74 .216 .000 1.878 .789 1.764 3.000 .000 .629 .521 .576 .359 1.000 1.000 .000 .782 .367 .437 .- • .495 .817 .495 .652 .798 .125 . .292 1.925 .217 1.611 .458 .108 1.081 1.584 .000 1. 108 1.681 .240 1.315 1.681 .000 .979 .213 .076 .963 .856 .692 .912 .897 1.742 .814 1044 .896 .055 1.721 .997 1.011 .000 .774 .213 ."-'--.912 1.535 . . .923 .000 .111 1.000 .837 .467 1.056 1..625 .764 .654 .065 1.925 .161 1.205 1.457 1.960 1.378 1.006 1.764 .067 . .074 1.202 1.611 .202 1.611 .611 1.489 .960 . .798 1.935 .000 1.676 1.824 .846 .009 .140 .852 1.611 .787 .205 1..898 .897 .770 .103 1.890 .548 .238 .F5E F5F F86F G91Y HARMK80 HAWK200 HAWK50T HAWK60A HAWK60T HUNTER HUNTERT IL28 FTMR 1.703 .928 MIRSDI MIR5DIE MIR5D2 OVIOD PRCA5 PRCFT6 PRCF6 FTIN FTIN FTAT MIAT FTAT FTTM FTMR 1.262 1.104 1.056 1.369 .252 1.519 .563 . -.695 .685 1.692 .367 .447 .052 1.863 1.918 .000 .096 .-'. '.400 1.022 .611 611 .263 1.206 1.000 .787 .611 .270 1.¢ .862 1.325 .432 .090 1.681 .825 825 764 1.611 .563 1.267 .949 .886 .000 .867 .943 .580 .299 1.990 .812 .709 .074 1.829 .705 .886 .095 1.611 .501 .172 1.611 .759 .570 .311 .287 1.364 .423 .' . .998 .019 .035 1.400 1.392 .986 917 .764 .855 ." .000 .000 1.528 .931 1.074 .651 .528 ..967 .058 1.334 MIR5DD MIR5DR FTTA FTRE .855 .310 .- -.681 .644 .032 1.798 . 199 1.457 1.785 1.626 .000 .-.884 .904 .890 .256 .477 1.240 .548 .513 1.680 .000 .611 .007 1.837 .697 .611 .693 1.720 .252 1.035 1.520 1.611 .738 .764 .000 .082 1.628 ..000 .855 .081 1.i.000 .006 1.897 MIG25R MIG25U MIG27DJ MIG29 MIG31 MIRFIA MIRFIB MIRFIC MIRFIE MIRIIIC FTRE FTTI FTAT FTMR FTIN FTMR FTTI FTMR FTMR FTIN 1.855 .503 .. .155 1.997 1.240 .926 .874 .957 MIR3NG FTMR 1.847 1.843 .447 .735 .'.206 .764 .104 1.600 .309 .000 .000 .724 .855 .437 .667 .087 .727 .483 1.979 .000 .667 667 .785 .838 .000 1.790 .725 MIR4000 FTMR 1.983 1.683 .157 .978 1.720 .824 1. 150 .767 .037 MIRIIIE FTMR MIRIIIEI FTMR 1.917 .898 .000 .001 JAGI04 JAGIll JASTREB FTAT FTAT FTAT 1.252 1.725 .898 .684 .969 .611 ..611 . '.000 1.962 1.855 . 150 1.638 .238 1.421 .611 1.

878 1.052 .861 .834 I .068 1.047 RF5E SF260MW SF260TP SUPETEN SU2O SU22 SU25 FTRE MITA MITA FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT 1.884 TA4EH FTTA .586 .612 .355 1.768 1.169 .431 1.000 1.000 .814 2.554 2.611 .523 .740 2.813 .000 .000 .000 .000 1.000 .595 1.318 1.369 1.937 .290 .000 1.000 1.187 3.611 .611 .305 1.000 .292 ..611 .855 .935 .338 .011 1.611 .096 1.502 .320 .428 .318 .222 .559 1.935 .571 .480 .041 .104 .611 .289 1.924 .318 1.000 .016 .000 PRCF7 PRCF7E RF4C FTIN FTIN FTRE .571 SUU FTTA SU27 SU7BMKL FTMR FTAT 1.681 .700 .611 .415 4.387 .761 TA4KU TORADV TORIDS TU16AG TU22BD FTTA FTIN FTAT BMAT BMAT .610 .503 .861 .503 .894 .860 .000 .534 .000 .222 .861 1.951 .914 1.342 1.000 .842 1.854 .654 .000 .000 1.680 1.308 .074 1.000 .009 .074 .784 .428 .182 .480 .781 1.951 1.000 .389 .930 1.801 .000 .000 .764 .611 .000 .935 1.877 .428 1.000 .700 .715 .428 .334 1.053 .885 .907 1.000 .715 .000 .796 .000 913 .500 .934 1.610 1.342 1.

488 1.568 SPNSCNA SPNSCNB RAAI RAAI ..928 .374 1.445 .762 FLANRAD FOXFIRE RAMU RAAI 1.691 1.000 1.- I: .894 1.880 2.021 1. 733 .176 1.491 IRAI .484 .079 .275 .092 .094 .s.882 1.050 1.740 .458 RAGA RAAI .450 .042 FULRAD HIFIX HILARKI HILARKII HILARKX HOUNDRAD IRSTSB IRSTSG JAYBIRD LASDES LASRNG RDA12 RDI RDM SCANFIX SCANODD RAMU RAMU RAMU RAMU RAAI RAAI IRAI 1.432 1.094 .678 2.360 1.189 1.379 .596 .355 1.484 TI-ATA TI-ATG VISUAL RAI1U RA 1U VIMU 1.614 RAAI LAGA LAGA .094 1.777 ..233 1.798 .982 1.385 . 355 .762 .910 2.349 .214 FOXHUNT RAMU 2.742 AIDAII AIRPASSI ANTILOPE APG63 APG64 APG65 APG66 APG67 APG68 APG69 APG70 APN153V APQ109 AP 120 AP 159 AWG 9 BLUEFOX CYRI CYRIl CYRIV CYRIVM3 CYRIV2 ELM200IB ELM2021B RAGA RAAI RAMU RAMU RAMU RAMU RAMU RAMU RAMU RAMU RAIMU RAGA RAMU RAMU RAAI RAAI RAMU RAAI RAMU RAAI RAMU RAMU RAMU RAMU ELTAFIAR RAGA .124 1.480 1.E.039 .2 Target Acquisition Systems Glossary NFSTA = Target Acquisition Effectiveness Factor Score NAME CODE NFSTA AGAVE RAMU .316 RAGA RAAI RAMU RAAI RAAI SHRTHRN SKYRNGR .160 1.

86 .94 .63 1. 11 .28 .27 1.65 1.80 .75 .76 1.76 65 1.84 1.49 1.70 . 54 .21 "a .72 .64 .65 .21 2. 12 1.49 .48 .86 1.35 .47 . 17 1.71 .63 .28 1.34 1.36 1.35 3.46 .68 2. 15 1.80 .25 .86 .21 1.E. 14 1.83 .33 1.39 .15 .80 . 32 .63 1.63 .21 1. 15 1.33 1.74 1.76 .23 1.81 .24 1.64 .74 . 17 .55 .28 57 1.74 .74 .68 1.94 1.81 .30 .69 1.72 1.68 .86 . 18 1.68 1.71 .65 92 .65 .28 1.3 Air-to-Air Missiles Glossary NFSPERF Missile Performance Factor Score NFSVUL = Vulnerability to Detection/Avoidance Factor Score MSL CODE NFSPERF NFSVUL AA1OA AA2B AA2C AA2D AA6A AA6B AA7A AA7B AA8B AA9A AIM120A AIM54 AIM7C AIM7D AIM7E AIM7F AIM7M AIM9D AIM9E AIM9G AIM9H AIM9J AIM9L AIM9M AIM9PN ASPIDE FIRESTRK KUKRI PIRANHA PYTHON3 RBS70 REDTOP R5301 R530R R550 R550MK2 SHAFRIR SKYFLASH STINGER SUP530D SUP530F AAMR AAMI AAMR AAMI AAMR AAMI AAMRR AAMI AAMI AAMR AAMR AAMR AAMR AAMR AAMR AA-R AAMR AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMR AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMR AAMI AAMI AAMI AAMR AAMI AAMR AAMR 1.64 .

063 ACCE 1.577 1.973 .546 1.278 .017 1.110 1.899 .158 ACCI .361 .208 ACCI .389 .109 .580 ACCE 1.232 1.361 .50 DEFA552A DEFA553 DEFA554 FN7.402 ACCI 1.395 1.057 ACCE .460 .021 1.603 1.326 ACCI 1.851 .183 ACCE 1.914 .640 ACCI 1.637 1.383 1xq - ' .62 GAU12U GAU13A GAU2BA GAU8A GPU5A GSH23 HGS55 HIS404 KCA30 MAU27 MKIIMOD5 M16 M197 M230 M28 M39 M5 M61AI M621 NR23 NR23HS NR30 NR3OGAT N37 N37D UBK US12.675 .4 Aerial Guns Glossary NFSRAT = Rate/Volume of Fire Factor Score NFSEFF Effectiveness Factor Score " GUN ADENMK4 ADENMK5 CB.483 ACCI 1.222 ACCI 1.114 ACCE 1.610 1.483 ACCI .131 1.744 .073 ACCE 1.481 .301 1.603 ACCI .834 .862 1 148 ACCE 1.402 .296 1.732 ACCE .857 1.057 ACCE .921 .899 1.434 ACCE 1.036 1.589 ACCI .567 ACCE 1.142 .827 1.141 ACCI 1.834 .219 ACCE 1.192 1.7 XM188E30 XM27E1 XM8 CODE NFSRAT NFSEFF ACCI .805 1.857 1.744 .642 ACCI 1.251 1.603 ACCI 1.204 .E.239 ACCI ACCI ACCI ACCI ACCI ACCI ACCE ACCI ACCE ACCE ACCE .927 1.541 .973 .803 773 1.

735 5.016 19)0 - .464 1.071 .473 .606 1.252 1.242 .715 1.469 .256 .894 .523 2.226 1.097 .820 5.732 5.835 1.247 1.007 2.287 .441 1.294 1.762 .291 .771 1.505 1.439 1.058 3.459 3.055 .895 .693 .706 .213 .083 1.579 2.916 1.972 1.731 4.701 1.502 1.342 1.722 .615 .800 .148 1.Air Defense TAADX = Target Acquisition Potential .440 .264 .714 7.672 .779 2.703 1.452 .r .262 1.269 .525 . - .097 .287 .103 1.291 .412 VADX 2.841 .259 .978 1.510 .783 .483 1.855 .674 1.007 2.071 IS FTMR 1.208 1.458 1.746 3.800 .748 1.721 .Air Defense PLADX = Payload Potential .065 1.773 .932 1.349 1.Air Defense VADX = Vulnerability to Detection and Engagement .055 .878 .Air Defense kCFT PRODCC ROLE FA18L irI4AC F15A F15B F15C F15CFP FI5D FI5E F16A FI6B F16C F16CSC F16D F16J79 F20 F20A F4CD F4EF F4MOD FSA F5B F5E F5F F86F US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US FTMR FTIN FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR HARMK80 2.868 .923 1.1 Air Defense Mission Glossary AWSADX Air Weapon System Potential .672 2.778 2.055 .358 .007 2.451 1.916 1.798 .843 .582 1.898 .525 .468 .535 .916 .985 4.656 .402 1.646 1.991 .181 1.083 1.187 .079 .424 .761 1.541 2.Air Defense AFADX = Air Frame Potential .402 .661 .042 .933 2.723 2.250 .264 .071 .615 .815 .824 . 156 .666 .510 1.357 1.071 1.213 .390 .485 1.242 1.626 .904 .097 LAVI LIGHTNG MIGISBIS MIG17F MIG19C MIG21C MIG21F MIG21JKL UK UR UR UR UR UR UR AWSADX AFADX TAADX PLADX FTIN FTMR FTMR FTMR FTIN FTMR FTMR 1.991 .242 .279 .972 2.739 .963 .434 1.034 5.681 2.607 2.463 1.264 . 125 HAWK200 HUNTER HUNTERT KFIRC2 KFIRC7 KFIRTC2 UK UK UK IS IS IS FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM .004 .991 ..437 1.485 .521 1.709 2.759 .065 .680 UK FTMR .729 .543 1.212 .668 .721 .596 .901 .103 1.622 .170 . r or Appendix F COMBAT POTENTIAL SCORES MIDEAST AIR WEAPON SYSTE IS J= F.116 1.635 .776 5..654 .251 .366 .287 .800 .247 .264 .887 1.071 .055 .646 1.842 .953 .787 1.706 1.711 5.177 .101 .386 .055 .390 .470 .992 .388 .

751 .187 1.273 .737 1.147 1.722 .884 .421 1.604 .160 1.879 .677 .370 .856 1.902 1.889 1.796 3.387 2.103 .808 1.634 .155 1.359 1.112 2.786 .869 .674 .820 .744 .868 .636 . 046 .531 1.554 2.877 2.258 .884 .112 1.086 2.491 .029 1.854 2.990 .780 .168 .776 .908 .801 .480 2.721 .889 1.892 .822 'H * * * * * .843 1.386 1.291 .159 .737 .722 .474 1.435 .836 .729 .868 .413 .247 .936 .929 MIG23B MIG23E MIG23G MIG25 MIG25U MIG29 MIG31 MIRFIA MIRFIB MIRFIC MIRFIE MIRIIIC MIRIIIE MIRIIIEI MIR2000C MIR2000T MIR3NG MIR4000 MIR5DI MIR5DIE PRCFT6 PRCF6 PRCF7 PRCF7E SU27 TOR.091 .358 1.416 1.931 .993 .908 .739 .205 1.626 .820 .404 2.457 1.032 .634 .803 .029 .192 1.225 .ADV UR UR UR UR UR UR UR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR CH CH CH EG UR UK FTMR FTMR FTMR FTIN FTTI FTMR FTIN FTMR FTTI FTMR FTMR FTIN FTMR FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTIN FTIN FTTM FTMR FTIN FTIN FTMR FTIN 1.842 1.222 1.722 .486 1.604 .148 2.146 2.104 .112 1.723 1.624 .556 .692 1.695 1.194 1.624 2.695 3.MIG21UM UR FTTM .522 2.365 .409 1.058 1.943 1.058 1.360 1.083 .609 1.418 .201 1.868 .794 .308 .648 .902 .291 .209 .412 .793 .346 1.515 1.060 1.648 .566 2. - - .230 1.867 .639 .633 .556 .749 .264 .

720 .097 2.294 .330 .878 .Fighter PLFTR Pay oad Potential .198 1.968 1.731 .423 1.756 1.649 .258 1.308 1.282 .880 .701 .156 .652 .038 1.726 1.734 2.666 .768 .078 1. 124 .692 FTIN FTMR FTTM FTMR 2.841 .276 1.742 5.069 1.858 .150 .825 .070 .993 .762 1.483 1.495 1.512 1.875 .959 .895 1.393 1.114 .920 .453 .638 1.427 1.807 1.249 .768 .376 .528 .632 .834 MIG21JKL UR MIG21UM UR FTMR FTTM 1.020 1.946 .354 .088 .284 .170 .726 .809 2.238 .469 1. 115 .141 1.Fighter VFTR Vulnerability to Detection and Engagement ACFT PRODCC ROLE AWSFTR AFFTR TAFTR PLFTR VFTR FA!8L US F14AC F15A F15B F15C us US US US FTMR 2.319 .498 1.193 .954 .754 3.803 1.Fighter TAFTR Target Acquisition Potential .764 .583 .757 .808 .185 1.175 1.284 1.979 1.687 1. 331 .186 795 US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US UK UK UK UK IS IS IS IS UK UR UR UR UR UR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTIN FTMR FTMR FTMR FTIN FTMR 3.754 .720 .877 .920 . 035 .494 1.2 Fighter Mission Glossary AWSFTR Air Weapon System Potential .713 .720 .105 1.774 .794 2.436 .781 .924 .789 3.576 1.914 .426 3.391 .800 2.088 .088 .604 .114 .041 3.868 .657 .584 .623 1.217 .037 .820 Fighter .959 .412 2.045 2.118 .750 .873 .125 2.532 1.326 .714 .220 1.856 1.252 .546 .736 .871 1.230 1.854 .508 1.802 .808 1.147 1.256 .720 1.140 1. 350 .834 1.081 .590 .431 1.221 1.364 .401 1.579 .067 1.494 1.141 .065 2.055 .946 1.754 .476 1.020 .114 .796 .697 .454 1.503 1.457 .520 1.594 2.387 .697 .758 .962 .753 1.054 .968 1.243 .Fighter AFFTR = Air Frame Potential .720 1.753 1.762 .695 .748 .690 1.525 2.242 1.005 1.614 1.644 .001 .175 1.758 1.513 1.844 .804 .808 .039 1.149 1.824 192 .681 .726 .923 .153 2.420 1.614 1.124 .382 1.653 .720 4.379 1.387 .070 .937 MIG23B MIG23E MIG23G MIG25 MIG25U MIG29 MIG31 MIRFIA MIRFIB MIRFIC MIRFIE MIRIIIC MIRIIIE FTMR FTMR FTMR FTIN FTTI FTMR FTIN FTMR FTTI FTMR FTMR FTIN FTMR 1.286 .370 1.088 .405 .877 .972 1.754 3.242 .197 1.739 1.633 1.576 .673 1.849 .806 1.912 1.076 .750 .192 .934 2.583 .026 .478 .448 .689 1.923 .516 .739 F15CFP F15D F15E F16A F16B FI6C F16CSC F16D F16J79 F20 F20A F4CD F4EF F4MOD F5A F5B F5E F5F F86F HARMK8O HAWK200 HUNTER HUNTERT KFIRC2 KFIRC7 KFIRTC2 LAVI LIGHTNG MIG15BIS MIGI7F MIG19C MIG21C MIG21F US FTMR 3.286 .392 1.547 .004 UR UR UR UR UR UR UR FR FR FR FR FR FR 1.105 1.808 1.057 1.454 1.859 .861 .099 1.876 .158 2.088 .F.742 1.760 .379 .564 .354 . 148 .612 .111 1.509 .926 .312 3.334 1.

.130 2.857 2. .631 1..249 .531 1. 18 1.621 1.814 .401 1.983 .799 1.806 .. . 823 1. .768 . .364 .832 .586 .382 .871 . .809 .130 1.761 .972 1.955 1.984 .826 .972 .228 ..460 1.611 . 547 1.422 .414 1.275 .808 .484 .543 1.120 .881 1.260 2.403 193- .154 .406 . .202 1. 127 1.806 . .657 .759 . 661 .286 .501 760 . 105 2. .757 ..841 1.194 2. .000 .MIRIIIEI MIR2000C MrIR2000T MIR3NG MIR4000 MIR5D1 MIR5D1E PRCFT6 PRCF6 PRCF7 PRCF7E SU27 TORADV FR FR FR FR FR FR FR CHI CHI CHI EG UR UK FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTIN FTIN FTTM FTMR FTIN FTIN FTMR FTIN 1.120 1. .286 1.228 1.040 2.810 .631 1.322 1.489 .

001 1.190 .899 .526 .216 1.675 C101CC F16D US .272 1.990 .922 .388 1.662 1.312 .586 .Interdiction ACFT PRODCC ROLE AWSINT AFINT TAINT PLINT VINT ALPHAMS2 FR FTAT .737 .705 1.609 .142 .510 1.190 1.773 .274 1.762 .941 2.Interdiction VINT Vulnerability to Detection and Engagement .389 .837 1.245 .139 1.061 1.874 .360 1.139 .722 1.139 .637 1.056 .961 1.025 .380 .693 .126 1.882 2.855 .501 .446 .387 1.374 1.624 .628 .655 1.047 1.569 1.190 1.395 1.971 .139 .118 .503 .020 .195 .274 1.327 . 118 .014 F15A F1SB F15C F15CFP F15D FISE F16A F16B F16C F16CSC US US US US US US US US US US FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR 1.238 .538 .066 .107 .881 .676 .705 1.414 1.837 1.089 .172 1.Interdiction AFINT = Air Frame Potential .321 1.854 .670 .110 .161 .565 .469 .637 1.366 1.014 .222 IT FTAT .208 FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTTA .646 .628 .948 1.567 .737 .713 .230 1.634 1. 126 1.190 2.922 .390 1.274 .670 .072 1.331 1.093 .480 1.697 .789 1.F.541 1.834 FTTM 2.262 1.534 1.679 .068 1.248 2.619 .734 US FTMR 2.227 1.501 .374 .994 .589 US US FTMR FTMR FTMR .347 .518 1.694 .822 F4MOD .263 .074 .227 1.785 1.199 1.132 .204 .593 .470 .103 .790 1.150 1.634 1.Interdiction TAINT Target Acquisition Potential .673 .800 1.400 .571 571 .536 1.438 .603 1.765 .749 .015 - .480 1.466 1.139 .634 .480 2.282 .352 1.148 .683 .559 F4CD F4EF US US FTMR FTMR 1.480 1.723 US 1415 1.463 1.107 .730 F16J79 F20 F20A F5A F5B F5E F5F F86F G91Y HARMK80 HAWK200 HAWK50T HAWK60A HAWK60T HUNTER HUNTERT IL28 JAGI04 JAGIll JASTREB KFIRC2 KFIRC7 KFIRTC2 LAVI US US US US US IT UK UK UK UK UK UK UK UR UK UK YU IS IS IS IS FTZIR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTAT FTMR FTMR FTTA FTAT FTTA FTMR FTTM BMAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR 2.575 .107 .131 .679 .087 1.837 1.135 .519 1.893 .667 1.3 Interdiction Mission Glossary AWSINT Air Weapon System Potential .012 .908 .694 1.070 1.541 .694 .928 1.306 1.613 .601 1.139 .381 .297 .400 .776 .190 1.613 AMX AIOA A37B A4H A4KU A4N A7E A7P BAC167 C101BB .379 .498 .776 .107 .055 1.155 .261 2.024 1.438 1.227 1.753 .928 1.518 1.895 .496 .258 1.951 2.906 .107 1.139 .020 .087 1.605 .847 2.236 .601 .327 .898 1.329 1.716 .609 1.325 1.991 .430 1.690 .820 .379 .735 .544 1.626 .139 .' .760 2.990 .784 .434 .669 .702 .686 194- ~2 .754 .139 .107 .396 .534 .126 .942 C1ODD US US US US US US US UK SP SP SP FA18L F104GCF US US FTMR FTAT 2.078 1.139 .837 .374 1.095 1.244 .288 .Interdiction PLINT = Payload Potential .968 .107 .848 1.270 .578 1.730 .644 1.343 1.808 .008 2.158 1.023 1.

190 .981 1.098 .647 .478 .510 1.728 1.425 .532 .937 1.306 .745 .760 1.750 .749 .482 1.740 .250 .971 1.781 .126 1.492 .202 1.188 .311 1.107 .829 .300 .955 .671 .599 .839 .482 1.885 1.261 .654 .459 .599 .239 .987 .942 .926 1.268 1.714 1.290 1.716 1.229 .898 1.278 .709 .107 .626 .840 .831 1.882 .190 .756 1.796 .878 .403 .866 1.566 .160 .312 .139 .894 .218 .134 .399 .075 .825 .878 .842 2.275 .174 .325 .106 1.941 .357 2.112 .077 1.839 .079 .903 1.874 2.422 .190 .441 .897 1.107 .195 1.579 .602 .596 .190 1.933 -195- nh .635 .107 .866 1.422 1.425 1.202 .284 1.350 .268 1.539 .701 .637 .139 .597 .745 .133 .218 .205 1.346 2.353 .323 .800 .243 .216 1.703 .333 1.098 .127 .438 .992 .228 .360 .649 .561 .577 1.958 .715 .354 .443 .225 .L29 MB326K MB326L MB339C MB339K MIG15BIS MIG17F MIG19C MIG21F MIG21JKL MIG21UM MIG23B MIG23E MIG23F MIG23G MIG27DJ MIG29 MIRFIA MIRFIC MIRFIE MIRIIIE MIRIIIEI MIR2000C MIR2000T MIR3NG MIR4000 MIRSDD MIRSD2 PRCA5 PRCFT6 PRCF6 SUPETEN CZ IT IT IT IT UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR CH CH CH FR FTTA FTAT FTTA FTAT FTAT FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTAT FTMR FTAT FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTA FTAT FTAT FTTM FTMR FTAT SU20 UR FTAT SU22 SU25 SU27 SU7BMKL SU7U TA4EH TA4KU TORIDS TU16AG TU22BD UR UR UR UR UR US US UK UR UR FTAT FTAT FTMR FTAT FTTA FTTA FTTA FTAT BMAT BMAT .438 .856 .992 .051 .325 .797 .475 .774 .521 .678 .551 .487 .643 .026 .602 .726 .999 1.325 .549 .354 1.903 .139 .761 .342 .226 .069 1.764 .878 .231 1.350 1.312 .098 .679 .306 .244 .615 .067 .013 1. 759 1.300 .915 .747 .103 .493 .908 .360 .568 .291 .190 1.081 .918 .998 1.219 .399 1.249 .779 .597 1.452 .287 1.353 1.952 .830 .637 .610 .866 .452 .766 .647 1.031 .693 .947 .283 .408 .999 .648 1.312 .990 .706 .660 1.

340 .691 .216 1.509 .016 .859 .408 1.329 2.157 .235 .234 .033 1.802 2.652 1.691 1.341 1.593 1.574 .351 2.786 1.605 .204 .204 .873 .157 .908 1.998 1.560 .435 .299 .556 .804 1.114 .529 1.204 .342 1.410 .842 1.410 2.149 1.596 .423 1.380 1.238 1.292 196 .743 2.501 .035 1.582 .535 1.632 1.432 .875 .712 .462 .612 FTMR .314 .810 1.271 .052 .215 1.910 .859 .998 2.441 1.405 .279 2.773 .539 .671 .139 .610 .911 .578 1.247 2.367 1.595 .677 .204 .661 1.387 3.161 1.574 .462 .065 1.827 .302 .031 1.CAS AFCAS TACAS PLCAS VCAS AMX AIOA A37B IT US US FTAT FTAT FTAT A4H US US US US US UK FR IS SP SP SP US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US US F86F HARMK80 G91Y HAWK200 HAWK50T HAWK60A HAWK60T HUNTER HUNTERT JAGI04 JAGIll JASTREB KFIRC2 KFIRC7 CAS GAS C Vulnerability to Detection and Engagement ACFT PRODCC ROLE ALPHAMS1 FR FTTC ALPHAMS2 FR FTAT A4KU A4N A7E A7P BAC167 CM170 CM170I CI01BB CoI1CC C101DD FA18L F104GCF F15A F15B F15C F15CFP F1SD FISE F16A F16B F16C F16CSC F16D F16J79 F20 F20A F4CD F4EF F4MOD F5A F5B F5E F5F - US US US US US IT UK VCAS .199 2.120 .CAS Target Acquisition Potential Payload Potential .252 .080 CAS .651 1.568 .204 .288 .215 1.733 1.673 .445 .718 .482 .433 1.432 .120 1.553 .340 .509 - I .688 .863 .608 2.462 .944 2.584 .743 1.997 FTAT 1.509 .252 2.776 FTAT FTAT FTAT FTMR .711 .473 .333 1.405 1.157 .936 2.773 .247 2.388 1.094 1.699 2.362 2.129 "1087 1.849 .103 2.513 .009 2.717 .614 .204 .160 1.553 .664 .842 1.573 .204 .037 1.661 .523 .325 .204 .769 .526 .361 2.046 1.250 1.461 .397 .204 .755 .157 .614 .693 .900 .587 1.300 1.227 .740 1.592 .157 .844 .256 .414 1.4 Glossary Air Weapon System Potential AWSCAS Air Frame Potential .691 .525 .204 .533 1.141 .573 .252 1.591 570 .282 1.091 1.977 1.549 .419 .738 .655 .157 .758 .721 2.349 314 .573 .077 .446 .381 .514 .419 .476 .868 .588 .268 .597 .440 .712 1.898 .121 1.614 .480 .442 1.998 2.157 .780 FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTAT FTTC FTTC FTAT FTAT FTTA FTMR FTAT FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR .029 .940 .484 .219 1.551 1.851 .760 .518 1.310 1.733 .567 .842 1.760 FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTAT UK UK UK UK UK UK FTMR FTTA FTAT FTTA FTMR FTTM IS FTMR UK UK YU IS AWSCAS AFCAS TACAS PLCAS .616 .087 .788 .219 .401 .764 1.219 .731 1.252 1.749 .015 1.115 2.400 .875 .859 .461 .502 .805 .379 1.401 .702 1.146 1.832 .998 1.120 .208 .842 1.482 1.204 .877 1.531 .Close Air Support Mission (CAS) F.157 1.456 1.252 .756 1.573 .032 .

850 .744 1.204 .526 2.184 .474 .238 .717 .524 .034 1.696 .517 1.254 .500 .709 .164 .690 .564 .162 .968 1.006 1.157 .427 .379 1.157 .461 1.722 1.362 .084 1.198 .245 .068 1.585 .815 .690 .497 .287 .542 .204 .618 .219 1.724 .778 .714 .898 .897 1.706 .287 .935 -197 - .204 .669 .851 1.296 .646 .198 .094 .192 .747 1.252 .844 .252 .198 .715 .192 .310 .204 .385 .851 .321 .349 .948 .632 .734 .040 .251 2.374 .717 .919 .690 .146 1.594 .778 .319 .249 .218 .746 .419 .729 .705 .935 SU20 UR FTAT 1.894 1.302 .430 .630 .642 .549 .918 .951 .912 1.536 1.596 . 372 .204 .382 1.243 1.497 .474 .252 .157 .503 .313 1.530 1.457 .651 .303 .204 .317 .061 1.916 .316 1.009 .919 .499 1.204 .795 1.274 .528 .564 .050 1.266 .422 .799 1.634 .516 .395 .293 .511 .579 .204 .316 1.546 .207 1.204 1.035 1.802 .682 .252 .094 1.562 1.129 .613 .280 .683 1.204 .566 .184 .919 .862 .266 .405 1.721 1.565 .868 .627 .477 .395 .825 1.420 1.KFIRTC2 LAVI L29 L39ZA MB326K MB326L MB339A MB339C MB339K MIGI5BIS MIG15UTI MIG17F MIG19C MIG21F MIG21JKL MIG21UM MIG23B MIG23E MIG23F MIG23G MIG23UM MIG27DJ MIG29 MIRFIA MIRFIC MIRFIE MIRIIIE MIRIIIEI MIR2000C MIR2000T IS IS CZ CZ IT IT IT IT IT UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR UR FR FR FR FR FR FR FR MIR3NG FR MIR4000 MIR5DD MIR5D2 OVIOD PRCA5 PRCFT6 PRCF6 FR FR FR US CH CH CH FTMR FTTA FTAT MIAT FTAT FTTM FTMR SF260MW IT IT MITA MITA SF260TP SUPETEN FTTM FTMR FTTA FTTC FTAT FTTA FTTC FTAT FTAT FTMR FTTC FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR FTMR FTAT FTMR FTTC FTAT FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTMR FTTM FTMR 1.207 .655 .597 .468 .722 .585 .903 .409 .751 .164 .349 1.188 1.042 .704 .898 .806 .928 .034 1.084 1.728 .924 .791 .500 .986 .259 .775 .728 .099 .132 .395 .630 2.953 .978 1.994 .213 .482 .669 .105 .898 .491 .237 .094 .790 2.284 1.584 .122 .634 .635 FR FTAT .238 .422 .369 1.314 1.324 .959 1.590 .466 .103 SU22 SU25 SU27 SU7BMKL SU7U TA4EH TA4KU TORIDS UR UR UR UR UR US US UK FTAT FTAT FTMR FTAT FTTA FTTA FTTA FTAT 1.669 .233 .742 .515 1.901 1.179 .274 .596 .924 .632 .325 .329 1.233 .395 .643 .639 1.586 .936 .157 .020 .528 .256 .673 .284 .916 1.

16 1.80 156. . Appendix G MIDDLE EASTERN AIR COMBAT POTENTIAL 1984-1990 NOTE: Depicted in Air Combat Potential Units undepreciated for maintenance force quality. 98 39. 63 15.77 1. 72 3. 66 34.00 .75 12. 27 120.49 12.29 1. - ~.18 50.62 38.56 189.- 62.87 18.6- ~.05 97. 15 36. 17 86.72 3. 80 25.75 120.99 68.03 1.00 .95 39.59 12. 16 49.93 .3 15.29 CAS Algeria 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Bahrain 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 Egypt 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 .85 14.86 2. 90 12.81 194.5 25.93 1.94 36. 83 62.-. 72 107. 85 127.00 . 51 194.8066. 16 102.86 31.81 130. 34 140. 16 31.06 12.12 69.00 1984 1985 1986 1987 1989 110 94 76 56 47 47 97. 12 58.28 58.08 66.58 .35 .81 202.00 . YEAR INVENTORY AIR DEFENSE FIGHTER INTERDICTION 294 295 285 275 266 259 239 59.43 17.80 15.16 1.00 . 55 25. 18 46. 68 40.00 .01 12.52 35. 35 73.23 58.40 37. 61 129.06 12.97 59.89 46.94 15. 18 46.55 73.00 158.25 46.72 39.86 107.80 6 8 12 12 12 12 12 .16 1.57 166.00 . 58 43. 12 58.93 1.00 98.93 111.68 56.31 13. 21 138.00 .53 1.72 3.93 1.53 1.00 . 72 3. 38 49.* w .43 2. 97 28.16 1.69 97. Ethiopia 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 138 153 148 148 150 150 150 .44 145.63 Iran 71990 -'-I.35 25. 72 24.00 43.53 1.53 .73 38.66 35. 17 62.53 1.90 125. 16 1. 35 66.47 16.86 138.70 68. 59 44.72 441 450 441 437 419 399 399 165.55 59.00 .73 36.85 1988475.77 1.88 58.93 1.49 3.00 .00 .00 . 12 64.97 1.47 17.

37 11.36 Israel 1984 452.00 . 15 9.87 662.77 32.98 12.01 201.00 00 .8.05 196.84 434.00 .37 16. 97 152 00 1988 1989 1990 130 134 134 46.00 1989 1990 0 0 00 .73 87. 98 17.67 177.58 146.55 2.70 328.89 316. 92 1984 1985 1986 1987 125 126 126 132 41.47 289.34 46.49 182. 76 17.58 46.82 55.00 .87 46.00 .00 . 76 1988 1989 89 89 16. 76 17.79 61.96 195.55 2.00 .00 .55 Jordan Kuwait 2.37 11. 71 64.98 1984 1985 1986 5 3 0 .89 1987 1988 563 156 249. 15 141.00 .70 209.39 198.23 64.00 . 18 247.92 419.00 17.34 46.00 109q .34 29. 74 56 556 261.28 32.33 40.00 .97 397. 98 2.37 16.53 32.39 716. 14 646. 29 158.34 46.00 00 .39 2. 14 17.55 11.00 . 97 141. 9 1985 1986 1987 1988 509 527 541 544 1989 1990 523 499 669.85 177.37 11.31 612. 98 1990 89 16.00 .01 316.00 .22 12.37 770.67 491 427.81 46.45 152.10 780.00 .95 297.72 276.07 152.25 534.53 428.00 00 .00 .45 44. 76 17.53 43. 98 2.87 5.01 272.00 .00 .5 110.86 346.09 3. 34 46.31 257.85 64.34 32.YEAR INVENTORY AIR DEFENSE FIGHTER INTERDICTION CAS Iraq 1984 1985 457 508 222.85 169.55 11.73 44.77 331.70 280.34 658.98 190.76 1986 1987 89 89 16.76 Lebanon 1987 1988 0 0 .53 32.00 . 53 32.53 47.64 256.10 695. 51 746. 82 797.67 1986 1989 1990 541 240.53 32. 12 158 12 1984 1985 64 80 7. 58 46. 59 177.

89 Qatar 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 22 22 22 .00 .60 9.47 Oman 1984 1985 1986 1987 52 52 50 46 1989 1990 50 50 14.47 34.00 .13 52. 48 . . .25 114.25 34.85 115. 36 190.29 70. .56 248.00 . .00 .29 - 156.79 212.70 19.17 204.08 199.00 .72 111.48 8.14 6.00 .66 248.20 52.04 1.05 190.99 Saudi Arabia 1984 183 183.48 37.89 8.. 91 15.00 . 11 8.25 34.49 30.00 .31 134. 36 8.99 8.09 165 45 198.00 3 75 5.00 1.45 8.86 28.82 6.89 8.00 . 90 8. .00 .YEAR INVENTORY AIR FIGHTER INTERDICTION CAS DEFENSE Libya 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 460 505 528 527 530 530 518 17.90 34. .51 13.00 .82 9.14 6.25 34. 60 30.11 55.00 . 29 17.47 114.00 4.45 226.00 .00 34.47 114.13 . 11 9.00 .87 106.14 6. .66 21.49 120.00 .22 25.83 Morocco 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 93 93 93 93 93 93 .00 .98 71.84 2.00 .47 114.00 .26 9.00 .00 .48 41. 75 22.99 37.00 .60 30.99 1.27 68.47 114.99 1.06 37.85 97.22 18.26 14.35 6.00 . .00 .66 110. 09 156. . 18 15.14 1.00 .14 1.00 .49 30.90 8. .65 30.00 .13 134.95 28.89 37.00 .00 .60 9.26 15 21 24 22 .36 20)- S. 60 30. 99 29.00 7.91 41.83 12.64 18.00 1988 50 14. 99 8. 11 9.11 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 192 198 202 214 220 220 209.25 34.91 41. 31 8.53 70.25 114.49 94 .

35 8. 55 69.00 . 11 5.16 302. 79 46 7. 31 13.14 19.63 .11 5.96 19.74 12.20 2.56 23.45 3.79 64 64 3.45 1984 1985 2.40 65. 75 198. 03 1990 Syria 1986 539 305.20 2.00 .45 3.14 434.23 544.'I YEAR .89 5.32 70.35 35 35 4.29 192.29 4.16 1987 1988 1989 1990 541 528 498 480 418.93 181.80 4.62 2.07 6.60 3.00 .42 .35 8.61 6.45 1988 64 1989 1990 2.82 210.59 347. 66 68. 61 26.79 3.60 4.00 .42 439.74 3.00 .00 .42 3.91 5.00 .10 - 201 - 3.84 3.11 5.09 326.34 Tunisia 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 United Arab Emirates 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 40 39 53 59 67 75 75 19.63 34.56 23.57 214. 11 4.86 7.91 4.20 6.79 2.84 3.56 23.51 Sudan 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 46 52 49 46 4.00 .8/ 195.56 23. 03 .00 5.30 34. 11 21.79 2.42 75.00 .21 5.07 6.29 10.00 .35 8.6') 21.21 3.10 4.07 5.81 19.35 3.27 76.79 2.35 8.83 190.00 . 96 18.90 5.42 1. 51 12.35 8.91 7. 71 15.20 220 8.00 .07 6.11 380.61 5. INVENTORY FIGHTER AIR DEFENSE INTERDICTION CAS Somalia 64 64 1986 1987 64 64 3.97 264.60 8 20 22 22 22 22 22 .76 71.45 2.21 310.47 385.89 10.91 7.92 17. 17 16. 03 16.20 2.79 2.21 16.00 .06 23.00 8.88 5.45 3.79 2.07 6.25 6.56 6.00 . 79 1984 1985 508 554 326.20 220 8.74 320.45 2. 8-3 20.

YEAR North Yemen 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1939 1990 INVENTORY AIR DEFENSE FIGHTER INTERDICTION GAS 75 73 73 73 73 73 73 3. 39 3. 05 S..05 104 104 104 104 104 98 110 13.67 5. 03 6.27 16. 03 5. 71 2. 39 3.27 South Yem~en 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 . 64 16.41 13. 05 8. 91 10.71 2. 05 8. 39 3. 66 2.41 13. 39 3.03 10.65 6.53 3. 66 2.01 15.38 25.67 16. 38 19.66 8. 91 10.58 20. 05 8. 93 13.78 35. 71 2.74 2. 66 2. 03 6. 64 16.41 12.27 16.67 5. 03 6. 71 2. 91 9. 71 2.33 8.82 2. 71 2.39 2. 39 3. 64 16.05 8. 64 16. 66 2. 66 2.

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