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Art. 68 Rights and Obligations between husband and wife.

Ilusorio vs. Bildner


332 SCRA 169
-May a wife secure a writ of habeas corpus to compel her husband to live with her in
conjugal bliss?
- Facts: Erlinda and Potenciano were married for 30 years. In 1972, the spouse separated
from bed and board. When Potenciano arrived from the States in 1991 he stayed with
Erlinda. The children alleged that Erlinda gave Potenciano an overdose of antidepressant
drug. On May 31, 1998, after attending a corporate meeting in Baguio City, Potenciano
did not return to Antipolo City with Erlinda, but instead stayed with a daughter at
Cleveland Condominium, Makati. The wife then filed a petition for habeas corpus.
Proper?
-No court is empowered as a judicial authority to compel a husband to live with his wife.
Coverture cannot be enforced by compulsion of a writ of habeas corpus carried out by
sheriff or by any other mesne process. That is a matter beyond judicial authority and is
best left to the man and womans free choice.
Article 73 exercise by either spouse even without the consent of the other of any legitimate
profession, occupation, business or activity. Objection shall be based only on valid, serious, and
moral grounds otherwise the act of the husband in preventing the wife from engaging in such
activity shall constitute a violation of RA 9262 (VAWC Law).
-In case of disagreement the court shall decide whether objection is proper or not and if
proper, when did the benefit accrue if prior to the objection, the resulting obligation shall be
enforced against the community or conjugal partnership property. If benefit accrued after, the
obligation shall be charged to the separate property of the spouse who did not obtain consent.
Art. 74, 75, 76, & 77-property regime of future spouses, requisites (92,95,05)
-Property relations between husband and wife is governed in the following order:
1. Marriage settlements which might either be the a. absolute community property
or b. conjugal partnership of gains or c. complete separation of property;
2. By the provisions of this Code; and
3. By local customs.
-Absence of marriage settlement or if regime agreed upon is void system of absolute
community of property.
-The marriage settlement as well as any modification thereof must be in writing, signed
by the parties, and executed before the celebration of the marriage.
Art. 82- Donations by reason of marriage
Requisites:
1. made before the celebration of the marriage;
2. in consideration of the same; and
3. in favor of one or both of the future spouses.

Art. 83 Formalities to be observed involving donations propter nuptias are the formalities
on the ordinary rules of donation unlike that of the Civil Code where donations propter nuptias
are governed by the Statue of Frauds (Article 1403 (2), -an agreement made in consideration
of marriage other than a mutual promise to marry as enunciated by the SC in Locquiao vs.
Valencia).
Art. 84- Limitation in cases of donation of present property (91)
-if the spouses agree upon a regime other than the absolute community property, they
cannot donate to each other in their marriage settlement more than 1/5 of their present property.
The excess is void. The law on testamentary succession and the formalities of wills will govern
donations involving future property.
Art. 86- grounds for revocation of donations propter nuptias (96)
Art. 87 Donation between husband and wife
ARCABA vs. TABANCURA, et al.
November 22, 2001
Facts: Francisco and his late wife were owners of a parcel of land. As he was alone, he
invited his niece, a cousin of the niece, and Arcaba to stay with him at his house. Later on, the
niece and the cousin of the niece left Franciscos home leaving only Francisco and Arcaba.
Before his death Francisco donated a 150-sq. meter lot to Arcaba. The heirs of Francisco are
now questioning the legality of the donation. Arcaba contended that the property donated is
payment for her past services rendered to the deceased. She further contends that sexual
intercourse is no longer possible considering that Francisco is already old.
SC: -Cohabitation means more than sexual intercourse, especially when one of the parties is
already old and may no longer be interested in sex. At the very least, cohabitation is the public
assumption by a man and a woman of the marital relation, and dwelling together as man and
wife, thereby holding themselves out to the public as such.
-Their public conduct indicated that theirs was not just a relationship of caregiver and
patient but that of exclusive partners akin to husband and wife. Thus, the donation made
by Francisco in favor of Cirila is void under Article 87 of the Family Code.
Art. 92 What are excluded from the community property (89)
Art. 116 Conjugal partnership property
Article 121 (2) Charges upon and obligation of the conjugal partnership (00,06)
1) Ayala Investments vs. CA (Directly Resulting from the Loan)
286 SCRA 272
Is a surety agreement or an accommodation contract entered into by the husband in favor
of his employer within the contemplation of the provision under Art. 161 of CC or 121
(2) of FC redounded to the benefit of the family?
No. The benefits must be one directly resulting from the loan. It cannot merely be a byproduct or a spin-off of the loan itself.
Husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract
Benefit to the family must be apparent at the time of signing of the contract

It is immaterial if in the end, his business or profession fails or does not succeed,
the law presumes and rightly so that such obligation will redound to the benefit of
the family
If the money or services are given to another person/entity and the husband only
acted as a guarantor, it cannot be categorized as RBF
-Benefits such as prospects of longer employment and probably increase in the value of
stocks might have been already apparent or could be anticipated at the time the
accommodation agreement was entered into are not only incidental but also speculative
and too small to qualify the transaction as one for the benefit of the suretys family.
-While the husband derives salaries, dividend benefits from PBM (the debtor
corporation), only because said husband is an employee of said PBM. These salaries and
benefits are not the benefits contemplated by Articles 121 and 122 of the Family Code.
The benefits contemplated by the exception in Art. 122 (Family Code) are those benefits
derived directly from the use of the loan. In the case at bar, the loan is a corporate loan
extended to PBM and used by PBM itself, not by petitioner-appellee-husband or his
family.
2) . CHING vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Accommodation Agreement)
423 SCRA 357
- Facts: On September 28, 1978, Philippine Blooming Mills Company, Inc. (PBMCI)
obtained a 9-million peso loan from Allied Banking Corporation (ABC). As added
security for the loan, Alfredo Ching together with 2 other persons executed a continuing
guaranty with ABC binding themselves to jointly and severally guarantee the payment of
all the PBMCI obligations owing the ABC to the extent of 38 million pesos. PBMCI
defaulted in the payment of its loans which, exclusive of interests, penalties and other
bank charges amounted to P12,612,972.88. After the issuance of a writ of preliminary
attachment the sheriff then levied the 100,000 common shares of CityCorp. stocks
registered solely in the name of Alfredo Ching. The wife of Mr. Ching then moved to set
aside the levy on attachment claiming that the 100,000 shares of stocks were acquired by
her and her husband during the marriage out of conjugal funds after the CityCorp
Investment Philippines was established in 1974. Furthermore, the indebtedness did not
redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership.
Is the argument of Mrs. Ching tenable?
Ruling:
- The barefaced fact that the shares of stocks were registered in the corporate books of
CityCorp Investment solely in the name of Alfredo does not constitute proof that the
husband, not the conjugal partnership, owned the same (Art. 116 FC). It was, thus, the
burden of ABC to prove that the source of the money utilized in the acquisition of the
shares of stocks was that of the husband alone. ABC failed to adduce evidence to prove
this assertion.
1) In AIDC vs. CA, this Court ruled that the signing as a surety is certainly not an
exercise of an industry or profession. It is not embarking in a business. No matter
how often an executive acted on or was persuaded to act as surety for his own

employer, this should not be taken to mean that he thereby embarked in the
business of guaranty or suretyship.
- For the conjugal partnership to be liable for a liability that should appertain to the
husband alone, there must be a showing that some advantages accrued to the spouses. No
presumption can be inferred that when a husband entered into an accommodation
agreement or a contract of surety, the conjugal partnership would thereby be benefited.
It could be argued that Alfredo was a member of the Board of Directors of PBMCI and
- was one of the top 20 stockholders, and that his shares of stocks and his family would
appreciate if the PBMCI could be rehabilitated through the loans obtained; that Alfredos
career would be enhanced should PBMCI survive because of the infusion of fresh capital.
However, these are not the benefits contemplated by Article 161 of the Civil Code
(Article 121 FC). The benefits must be those directly resulting from the loan. They
cannot merely a by-product or a spin-off of the loan itself (citing AIDC vs. CA).
3) FRANCISCO V. GONZALES (Unlawful Detainer)
- Michele was already living separately from Cleodualdo and rented the house in Lanka
Drive where she and new paramour purported themselves as H&W. Unlawful detainer.
- A wife may bind the CPG only
1) when she purchases things necessary for the support of the family, or
2) when she borrows money for that purpose upon her husbands failure to deliver the
needed sum,
3) when administration of the CP is transferred to the wife by the courts or by the
husband, or
4) when the wife gives moderate donations for charity.
4) BUADO V. NICOL (Quasi-Delict; Slander)
- Erlinda Nicol was found guilty of slander and was also adjudged to pay the sum of
P35,000.00 representing moral and exemplary damages, attorneys fees and cost.
Erlindas property however, was insufficient to answer for the liability so the sheriff
levied the conjugal property of the Nicol spouses. The husband questioned the levy and
the subsequent sale claiming that he is a stranger to the suit and hence, levy upon the
conjugal property was improper.
- SC: In Spouses Ching vs. CA, this Court that the husband of the judgment debtor cannot
be deemed a stranger to the case prosecuted and adjudged against his wife for an
obligation that has redounded to the benefit of the conjugal partnership. It must further be
settled whether the obligation of the judgment debtor redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership or not.
- Unlike in the system of absolute community property where liabilities incurred by either
spouse by reason of a crime or quasi-delict is chargeable to the absolute community of
property, in the absence or insufficiency of the exclusive property of the debtor-spouse,
the same advantage is not accorded in the system of conjugal partnership of gains. The

conjugal partnership of gains has no duty to make advance payments for the liability of
the debtor-spouse.
- Parenthetically, by no stretch of imagination can it be concluded that the civil obligation
arising from the crime of slander committed by Erlinda redounded to the benefit of the
conjugal partnership.
-

5) PANA V. HEIRS OF JUANITE (FC does not convert CPGs in CC)


To determine whether the obligation of the wife arising from her criminal liability is
chargeable against the properties of the marriage, the Court has first to identify the
spouses property relations.
Article 256 of the Family Code does not intend to reach back and automatically convert
into ACP relation all CPG that existed before 1988 excepting only those with prenuptial
agreements.
Article 76 of FC itself provides that marriage settlements cannot be modified except
prior to marriage.
Post-marriage modification CCAGRI
to automatically change the marriage settlements of couples who got married under the
Civil Code into absolute community of property in 1988 when the Family Code took
effect would be to impair their acquired or vested rights to such separate properties
The civil indemnity that the decision in the murder case imposed on her may be enforced
against their conjugal assets after the responsibilities enumerated in Article 121 of the
Family Code have been covered
Contrary to Efrens contention, Article 121 above allows payment of the criminal
indemnities imposed on his wife, Melecia, out of the partnership assets even before these
are liquidated. Indeed, it states that such indemnities may be enforced against the
partnership assets after the responsibilities enumerated in the preceding article have been
covered.26
No prior liquidation of those assets is required. This is not altogether unfair since Article
122 states that at the time of liquidation of the partnership, such [offending] spouse shall
be charged for what has been paid for the purposes above-mentioned

UNDER THE CIVIL CODE


1) BA FINANCE V. CA (Abandoned)
- Petitioner cannot enforce the obligation contracted by Augusto Yulo against the CPG with
respondent Lily Yulo because it was not established that the obligation contacted by the
husband redounded to the benefit of the CPG under 161 CC.
- Augusto Yulo undoubtedly contracted the obligation for his own benefit because at the
time he incurred the obligation he had already abandoned his family and had left their
conjugal home.
- Worse, he made it appear that he was duly authorized by his wife in behalf of A&L
Industries, to procure such loan from the petitioner.

2) HEIRS of AYUSTE vs. CA and MALABONGA


313 SCRA 493
-As the alienation was made prior to the effectivity of the Family Code, the Court applied Art.
173 of the Civil Code.
- Contract is voidable but spouse must bring the action for annulment
- within 10 years from execution of the contract and
- during the subsistence of the marriage.
- Record shows that plaintiff-appellant wife (sic) instituted on March 2, 1990 her action for
annulment of the sale executed by her husband on February 27, 1987 long after said vendorhusband died in 1989. It is thus clear that the action for annulment of the sale was not
instituted during the marriage as required by Article 173, the very provision of law which
grants the wife the privilege/right to have the sale executed by her husband annulled, in
derogation of the suppose (sic) vested right of the buyer. The two periods provided for in
said Article 173 during the marriage and within 10 years should concur.
- It is settled in this jurisdiction that registration with the Register of Deeds is notice to the
whole world.
3) HEIRS OF REYES vs. MIJARES
410 SCRA 97
If the sale of the conjugal real property is annullable, should it be annulled in its entirety
or only with respect to the share of the spouse who did not give consent?
-The SC citing Paulino vs. Bucoy (131 Phil 790) held that the plain meaning attached to
the plain language of the law is that the contract, in its entirety, executed by the husband
without the wifes consent, may be annulled by the wife. Had Congress intended to limit
such annulment in so far as the contract shall prejudice the wife, such limitation should
have been spelled out in the statute. To be underscored here is that upon the provisions of
Articles 161, 162 and 163 of the Civil Code, the conjugal partnership is liable for many
obligations while the conjugal partnership exists. Not only that. The conjugal partnership
is even subject to the payment of debts contracted by either spouse before the marriage,
as those for the payment of fines and indemnities imposed upon them after the
responsibilities in Article 161 have been covered, if it turns out that the spouse who is
bound thereby, should have no exclusive property or if it be insufficient. These are the
considerations that go beyond the mere equitable share of the wife in the property. These
are reasons enough for the husband to be stopped from disposing of the conjugal property
without the consent of the wife. Even more fundamental is the fact that the nullity is
decreed by the Code not on the basis of prejudice but lack of consent of an indispensable
party to the contract under Article 166.

A sale or encumbrance of conjugal or (community) property concluded after the


effectivity of the Family Code on August 3, 1988, is governed by Article 124 of the same
Code that now treats such a disposition as void if done without the conjoint consent of
the spouses or, in case of a spouses inability, the authority of the court (footnote).
4) PELAYO vs. PEREZ
459 SCRA 475
In January 1988, Pelayo, by a deed of absolute sale, conveyed to Perez 2 parcels of land
situated in Panabo. Lorenza, Pelayos wife, signed only on the 3 rd page in the space
provided for witnesses on account of which Perez application for registration of the deed
with the office of the Register of Deeds in Tagum was denied. Perez thereupon asked
Lorenza to sign the 1st and 2nd pages of the deed but she refused, hence, he instituted an
action for specific performance.
SC: We agree with the CA ruling that Lorenza by affixing her signature to the Deed of
Sale on the space provided for witnesses, is deemed to have given her implied consent to
the contract of sale.
Sale is a consensual contract that is perfected by mere consent, which may either be
express or implied. A wifes consent to the husbands disposition of conjugal property
does not always have to be explicit or set forth in any particular document, so long as it is
given. In the present case, although it appears on the face of the deed of sale that Lorenza
signed only as an instrumental witness, circumstances leading to the execution of said
document point to the fact that Lorenza was fully aware of the sale of their conjugal
property and consented to the sale.
Moreover, under Article 173, in relation to Article 166, both of the New Civil Code,
which was still in effect on January 11, 1988 when the deed in question was executed, the
lack of marital consent to the disposition of conjugal property does not make the contract
void ab initio but merely voidable. Hence, it has been held that the contract is valid until
the court annuls the same and only upon an action brought by the wife whose consent
was not obtained.
5) AGUETE V. PNB
- Claiming that she (plaintiff-appellee Estrella Aguete) has no knowledge of the loan
obtained by her husband nor she consented to the mortgage instituted on the conjugal
property a complaint was filed to annul the proceedings pertaining to the mortgage, sale
and consolidation of the property interposing the defense that her signatures affixed on
the documents were forged and that the loan did not redound to the benefit of the family.
- There is no doubt that the subject property was acquired during Ros and Aguetes
marriage. Ros and Aguete were married on 16 January 1954, while the subject property
was acquired in 1968.15 There is also no doubt that Ros encumbered the subject property
when he mortgaged it for P115,000.00 on 23 October 1974.16 PNB Laoag does not doubt

that Aguete, as evidenced by her signature, consented to Ros mortgage to PNB of the
subject property. On the other hand, Aguete denies ever having consented to the loan and
also denies affixing her signature to the mortgage and loan documents.
The husband cannot alienate or encumber any conjugal real property without the consent,
express or implied, of the wife. Should the husband do so, then the contract is voidable.
Article 173 of the Civil Code allows Aguete to question Ros encumbrance of the
subject property. However, the same article does not guarantee that the courts will declare
the annulment of the contract. Annulment will be declared only upon a finding that the
wife did not give her consent. In the present case, we follow the conclusion of the
appellate court and rule that Aguete gave her consent to Ros encumbrance of the subject
property.
The execution of a document that has been ratified before a notary public cannot be
disproved by the mere denial of the alleged signer.
The application for loan shows that the loan would be used exclusively "for additional
working [capital] of buy & sell of garlic & virginia tobacco
If the husband himself is the principal obligor in the contract, i.e., he directly received the
money and services to be used in or for his own business or his own profession, that
contract falls within the term "x x x x obligations for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership." Here, no actual benefit may be proved. It is enough that the benefit to the
family is apparent at the signing of the contract. From the very nature of the contract of
loan or services, the family stands to benefit from the loan facility or services to be
rendered to the business or profession of the husband. It is immaterial, if in the end, his
business or profession fails or does not succeed. Simply stated, where the husband
contracts obligations on behalf of the family business, the law presumes, and rightly so,
that such obligation will redound to the benefit of the conjugal partnership AIDC V. CA.

6) DE LEON V. DE LEON
- Petitioners assert that, since Bonifacio purchased the lot from PHHC on installment
before he married Anita, the land was Bonifacios exclusive property and not conjugal,
even though some installments were paid and the title was issued to Bonifacio during the
marriage.
- Whether the [CA] gravely erred in concluding that the land purchased on installment by
Bonifacio O. De Leon before marriage although some installments were paid during the
marriage is conjugal and not his exclusive property.
- Article 160 of the 1950 Civil Code, the governing provision in effect at the time
Bonifacio and Anita contracted marriage, provides that all property of the marriage is
presumed to belong to the conjugal partnership unless it is proved that it pertains
exclusively to the husband or the wife. For the presumption to arise, it is not, as Tan v.
Court of Appeals[9] teaches, even necessary to prove that the property was acquired with
funds of the partnership. Only proof of acquisition during the marriage is needed to raise
the presumption that the property is conjugal. In fact, even when the manner in which the
properties were acquired does not appear, the presumption will still apply, and the
properties will still be considered conjugal.[10]

- In the case at bar, ownership over what was once a PHHC lot and covered by the PHHCBonifacio Conditional Contract to Sell was only transferred during the marriage of
Bonifacio and Anita. It is well settled that a conditional sale is akin, if not equivalent, to a
contract to sell. In both types of contract, the efficacy or obligatory force of the vendors
obligation to transfer title is subordinated to the happening of a future and uncertain
event, usually the full payment of the purchase price, so that if the suspensive condition
does not take place, the parties would stand as if the conditional obligation had never
existed.[11] In other words, in a contract to sell ownership is retained by the seller and is
not passed to the buyer until full payment of the price, unlike in a contract of sale where
title passes upon delivery of the thing sold.[12
- The conditional contract to sell executed by and between Bonifacio and PHHC on July
20, 1965 provided that ownership over and title to the property will vest on Bonifacio
only upon execution of the final deed of sale which, in turn, will be effected upon
payment of the full purchase price
- This full payment, to stress, was made more than two (2) years after his marriage to Anita
on April 24, 1968. In net effect, the property was acquired during the existence of the
marriage; as such, ownership to the property is, by law, presumed to belong to the
conjugal partnership. SUCH PRESUMPTION IS REBUTTABLE ONLY WITH
STRONG, CLEAR, CATEGORICAL, AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE. What is
material is the time when the property was acquired.
- There can be no quibbling that Anitas conformity to the sale of the disputed lot to
petitioners was never obtained or at least not formally expressed in the conveying deed.
The parties admitted as much in their Joint Stipulation of Facts with Motion earlier
reproduced. Not lost on the Court of course is the fact that petitioners went to the process
of registering the deed after Bonifacios death in 1996, some 22 years after its execution.
In the interim, petitioners could have had workbut did nottowards securing Anitas marital
consent to the sale.
- it is that in several cases we ruled that the sale by the husband of property belonging to
the conjugal partnership without the consent of the wife is VOID AB INITIO, absent
any showing that the latter is incapacitated, under civil interdiction, or like causes.
o The nullity, as we have explained, proceeds from the fact that sale is in
contravention of the mandatory requirements of Art. 166 of the Code.
- even on the supposition that Bonifacio only sold his portion of the conjugal partnership,
the sale is still theoretically void, for, as previously stated, the right of the husband or the
wife to one-half of the conjugal assets does not vest until the liquidation of the conjugal
partnership
7) HEIRS OF HERNANDEZ,SR. vs. MINGOA, SR

- Hernandez married to Sergia, was awarded a piece of real property by PHHC by way of
salary deduction. After full payment, TCT No. 107534 was issued to the spouses. It bears
a restriction of any unauthorized sale to 3rd persons within a certain period. The heirs
learned, after Hernandez death in 1983 that TCT No. 107534 was cancelled in 1982 and
in lieu thereof TCT No. 290121 was issued in favor of respondents. Apparently,
Hernandez was unable to fully pay the purchase price so to prevent forfeiture of his right
to purchase, Hernandez sold to Dolores Camisura his rights in 1963. To circumvent the
prohibition, the spouses Hernandez executed an irrevocable special power of attorney to
enable Dolores to sell the lot to Plaridel Mingoa without the need of requiring Hernandez
to sign a deed of conveyance. Plaridel then sold the property to his daughter Melanie,
then 20 years old. It was alleged that Sergias signature on the SPA was falsified. The
forgery is so blatant as to be remarkably noticeable to the naked eye of an ordinary
person. Petitioners now contend that the SPA and the deed of sale are fictitious, hence
null and void under Article 1409 of the NCC. The declaration of the non-existence of a
contract under Article 1410 does not prescribe.
- SC: Articles 1409 and 1410 are not applicable. The subject matter involves conjugal
property. The events occurred before the effectivity of the Family Code.
- Article 173 of the NCC governs these transactions and it states:
o The wife, may during the marriage, and within ten years from the transaction
questioned, ask the courts for the annulment of any contract of the husband entered
into without her consent when such consent is required, or any act or contract of
the husband which tends to defraud her or impair her interest in the conjugal
partnership property. Should the wife fail to exercise this right, she or her heirs,
after the dissolution of the marriage, may demand the value of the property
fraudulently alienated by the husband.
- The failure of Sergia to file an action for annulment of the contract during the marriage
and within ten years from the transaction necessarily barred her from questioning the sale
of the subject property to 3rd persons.
8) HEIRS OF PROTACIO GO, SR. V. SERVACIO
- Under Article 130 in relation to Article 105 of the Family Code, any disposition of the
conjugal property after the dissolution of the conjugal partnership must be made only
after the liquidation; otherwise, the disposition is VOID.
- Protacio, Sr., although becoming a co-owner with his children in respect of Martas share
in the conjugal partnership, could not yet assert or claim title to any specific portion of
Martas share without an actual partition of the property being first done either by

agreement or by judicial decree. Until then, all that he had was an ideal or abstract quota
in Martas share. Nonetheless, a co-owner could sell his undivided share; hence,
Protacio, Sr. had the right to freely sell and dispose of his undivided interest, but not the
interest of his co-owners.
- Consequently, the sale by Protacio, Sr. and Rito as co-owners without the consent of the
other co-owners was not necessarily void, for the rights of the selling co-owners were
thereby effectively transferred, making the buyer (Servacio) a co-owner of Martas share.
Article 105 of the Family Code, supra, expressly provides that the applicability of the
rules on dissolution of the conjugal partnership is "without prejudice to vested rights
already acquired in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
- The proper action in cases like this is not for the nullification of the sale or for the
recovery of possession of the thing owned in common from the third person who
substituted the co-owner or co-owners who alienated their shares, but the DIVISION of
the common property as if it continued to remain in the possession of the co-owners
who possessed and administered it [Mainit v. Bandoy, supra] In the meanwhile, Servacio
would be a trustee for the benefit of the co-heirs of her vendors in respect of any portion
that might not be validly sold to her.
UNDER THE FAMILY CODE
Article 124 Administration of the conjugal partnership property (00)
GUIANG vs. CA (after FC took effect, VOID)
291 SCRA 372
-Court applied Art. 124 of the Family Code.
-Any alienation or encumbrance made after August 3, 1988 when the Family Code took
effect by the husband of the conjugal partnership property without the consent of the wife
is null and void. Such contract is void as one of the essential elements of a contract is
absent.
- Neither can the amicable settlement be considered a continuing offer that was
accepted and perfected by the parties, following the last sentence of Article 124. The
order of events is clear: after the sale, Guiang filed a complaint for trespassing against
Corpuz, after which the barangay authorities secured an amicable settlement. The
settlement however, does not mention a continuing offer to sell the property or an
acceptance of such a continuing offer. Its tenor was to the effect that Corpuz would
vacate the property. By no stretch of the imagination, can the Court interpret this
document as the acceptance mentioned in Article 124.
MANALO vs. CAMAISA (mere awareness is not consent)
374 SCRA 361
-Whether or not the husband may validly dispose a conjugal property without the wifes written
consent?
Facts: Manalo was interested to buy the Taytay and Makati properties of spouses Camaisa.
During the negotiations for the sale of the parcels of land both spouses were present and that

Manalo and Mr. Camaisa came to an agreement as to the price and the terms of the payment,
and a down payment was made but the wife of the vendor refused to sign the contracts to sell.
Having been aware of the transactions Manalo argues that Norma Camaisa had consented to the
transaction. And if she unjustly refused to affix her signature to the contracts to sell, court
authorization under Article 124 of the Family Code is warranted.
Held: The law requires that the disposition of a conjugal property by the husband as
administrator in appropriate cases require the written consent of the wife; otherwise, the
disposition is void. The properties, subject of the contracts were conjugal; hence, for the
contracts to sell to be effective, the consent of both husband and wife must concur. Norma may
have been aware of the negotiations for the sale of their conjugal properties but being merely
aware of a transaction is not consent. While Manalo is correct insofar as she alleges that if the
written consent of the other spouse cannot be obtained or is being withheld, the matter may be
brought to court which will give the same if warranted by the circumstances. However, it should
be stressed that court authorization under Art. 124 is only resorted to in cases where the spouse
who does not give consent is incapacitated. In this case Manalo failed to allege and prove that
Norma was incapacitated to give her consent to the contracts. In the absence of such showing of
the wifes incapacity, court authorization cannot be sought.

HOMEOWNERS SAVINGS & LOAN BANK vs. MIGUELA C. DAILO

453 SCRA 283


Spouses Dailo purchased a house and lot situated at San Pablo City and had it titled in the name
of the husband alone. In 1993, the husband obtained a P300,000-peso loan from Homeowners
secured by the house and lot. With the loan unpaid, the bank foreclosed the security. For failure
to redeem, Homeowners consolidated ownership over the property. In 1995, the husband died
and the wife found out about the mortgage, foreclosure and consolidation. Claiming absence of
knowledge of the loan obligation, the wife filed an action to annul the mortgage, certificate of
sale, etc. Homeowners moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that the property is
the exclusive property of the husband having been titled in the husbands name alone. That
assuming that the property is conjugal, Article 124 of the FC should be construed in relation to
Article 493 of the Civil Code on co-ownership where the co-owner may alienate, assign or
mortgage and even substitute another person in its enjoyment but the effect of the alienation or

the mortgage shall be limited to the portion which may be allotted to him in the division upon
termination of the co-ownership. Moreover, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family as
the proceeds thereof were used to fund the husbands subdivision projects.
Held: In Guiang vs. CA, it was held that the sale of a conjugal property requires the consent of
both the husband and wife. In applying Article 124 of the Family Code, this Court declared
that the absence of the consent of one renders the entire sale null and void, including the
portion of the conjugal property pertaining to the husband who contracted the sale. The same
principle squarely applies to the instant case. In the absence of a marriage settlement, the
system of conjugal partnership of gains governed the property relations between the spouses.
- The rules on co-ownership do not even apply to the property relations of Marcelino and
Miguela even in a suppletory manner. The conjugal partnership of gains is a special type
of partnership, where the husband and wife place in a common fund the proceeds,
products, fruits and income from their separate properties and those acquired by either or
both spouses their efforts or by chance. Unlike the absolute community of property
wherein the rules on co-ownership apply in a suppletory manner, the conjugal partnership
shall be governed by the rules on partnership in all that is not in conflict with what is
expressly determined in the chapter or by the spouses in their marriage settlements.
- The basic and established fact is that during his lifetime, without the knowledge and
consent of his wife, Marcelino constituted a real estate mortgage on the subject property,
which formed part of their conjugal partnership. By express provision of Article 124 of
the Family Code, in the absence of court authority or written consent of the other spouse,
any disposition or encumbrance of the conjugal property is void. The aforequoted
provision does not qualify with respect to the share of the spouse who makes the
disposition or encumbrance. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish.
- The burden of proof that the debt was contracted for the benefit of the conjugal
partnership lies with the creditor claiming as such. Petitioners sweeping conclusion that
the loan obtained by Marcelino to finance the construction of housing units without a
doubt redounded to the benefit of his family is without adequate proof. Other than
petitioners bare allegation, there is nothing from the records to compel a finding that,
indeed, the loan redounded to the benefit of the family.

RAVINA vs. VILLA ABRILLE (w/o Consent, VOID; w/knowledge, VOIDABLE)


In 1982, spouses Pedro and Mary Ann acquired a 555-square meter lot adjacent to the
land that was acquired by Pedro while still single. They then introduced improvements on

the property. In 1991, Pedro offered to sell the house and the 2 lots to Ravina. Mary Ann
objected and notified Ravina of her objections but Pedro, nonetheless, sold the house and
the 2 lots without Mary Anns consent.
SC: The lot acquired during the marriage was conjugal in the absence of clear, satisfactory and
convincing evidence to overcome said presumption or to prove that the subject property is
exclusively owned by Pedro.
A sale or encumbrance of conjugal property concluded after the effectivity of the Family
Code is void if done
a.) without the consent (written) of both the husband and the wife, or
b.) in case of one spouses inability the authority of the court.
If the sale was with the knowledge but without the approval of the wife, thereby resulting in
disagreement,
- such sale is annullable at the instance of the wife who is given
- 5 years from the date the contract implementing the decision to institute the case.
FUENTES vs. ROCA (30 yrs De Facto; Void ab initio)
Tarciano married but separated-in-fact sold a parcel of land to the Fuentes spouses by
way of an agreement to sell. The vendees were to give a down payment with the balance
to be paid as soon as Tarciano clears the lot of structures and occupants and secure the
consent of the estranged spouse Rosario to the sale. Allegedly, Atty. Plagata worked on
the requirements including Rosarios consent to the sale. He alleged that Rosario signed
the affidavit of consent in Manila but he notarized it in Zamboanga City. Tarciano then
executed a deed of absolute sale in favor of the Fuentes spouses.
When Tarciano and Rosario died in 1990, their children, in 1997, filed an action for
annulment of sale and reconveyance of the land claiming that the sale was void since
Rosario
did not give consent to the sale. Her signature on the affidavit was forged.
SC:
- Rosario had been living separately from Tarciano for 30 years since 1958, it would have
been quite tempting for Tarciano to just forge her signature and avoid the risk that she
would not give her consent to the sale or demand a stiff price for it. The affidavit of
consent has a defective notarization that strip the document of its public character and
reduce it to a private instrument, that falsified jurat, taken together with the marks of
forgery in the signature, dooms such document as proof of Rosarios consent to the sale
of the land.

- While Tarciano and Rosario got married in 1950, the property was sold on January 11,
1989, a few months after the FC took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 124 of the FC
provides that without the other spouses consent or a court order allowing the sale, the
same would be void.
- Under the provisions of the Civil Code governing contracts, a void or inexistent
contract has no force and effect from the very beginning. And this rule applies to
contracts that are declared void by positive provision of the law, as in the case of a sale of
conjugal property without the other spouses written consent. A void contract is
equivalent to nothing and is absolutely wanting in civil effects. It cannot be validated
either by ratification or prescription.
Ultimately, the Rocas ground for annulment is not forgery but the lack of written consent
of their mother to the sale. The forgery is merely evidence of lack of consent.
The Fuentes spouses point out that it was to Rosario, whose consent was not obtained,
that the law gave the right to bring an action to declare void her husbands sale of
conjugal land.
- But Rosario died in 1990, the year after the sale. Does this mean that the right to have the
sale declared void is lost forever?
- No. The sale was void from the beginning. Consequently, the land remained the
property of Tarciano and Rosario despite the sale. When the two died, they passed on the
ownership of the property to their heirs, namely, the Rocas. As Lawful owners, the Rocas
had the right, under Article 429 of the NCC, to exclude any person from its enjoyment
and disposal.
REIMBURSEMENT RE: CONJUGAL FUNDS:
JOSEFA FERRER vs. SPS. MANUEL & VIRGINIA FERRER and SPS. ISMAEL &
FLORA FERRER
508 SCRA 570 (November 29, 2006)
Before his marriage to Josefa, Alfredo acquired a parcel of land. Improvements
introduced by Alfredo on the property consisting of a residential house and a 2-door apartment
building were made during the marriage using their conjugal funds to pay off the loan obtained
by Alfredo for the construction of said improvements. Subsequently, a warehouse was also
constructed on the lot using the spouses conjugal funds. Sometime in 1989, when Alfredo was
already bedridden, spouses Ismael and Flora Ferrer made the former sign a document purported
to be his last will and testament. It turned out however, that it was a sale covering Alfredos lot
and the improvements thereon to the herein respondents. Alfredo then instituted an action for
the annulment of the sale but the trial court held that the sale is valid and should be complied

with by the parties in good faith. The appellate court upheld the decision of the lower court.
Alfredo died in 1999 and relying on the decision rendered in the previous case where the court
held that inasmuch as the lot is of greater value than the improvements and since Article 120 of
the Family Code provides the rule that the ownership of accessory follows the ownership of the
principal, then the subject lot with all its improvements became an exclusive and capital
property of Alfredo with an obligation to reimburse the conjugal partnership of the cost of
improvements at the time of the liquidation of the conjugal partnership, Josefa is now
demanding reimbursement for the cost of the improvements from respondents.
SC: What is incontrovertible is that the respondents, despite allegations contained in the
complaint that they are the buyers of the subject premises, are not petitioners spouse nor can
they ever be deemed as the owner-spouse upon whom the obligation to reimburse petitioner for
her costs rested. It is the owner-spouse who has the obligation to reimburse the conjugal
partnership or the spouse who expended the acts or efforts, as the case may be. Otherwise
stated, respondents do not have the obligation to respect petitioners right to be reimbursed.
JUDICIAL SEPARATION OF PROPERTY
Article 134- In the absence of express declaration in the marriage settlements, no
separation of property shall take place during the marriage except upon judicial order. The
separation of property may either be for sufficient cause (Article 135) or voluntary (Article
136).
Article 135 For causes falling under numbers (1), (2), and (3) i.e.1. sentenced to a
penalty that carries with it civil interdiction, 2. judicially declared an absentee, and 3. loss
parental authority decreed by the court, the presentation of final judgment is enough basis for
the grant of the decree of judicial separation of property.
Article 136 Voluntary dissolution must be verified and jointly filed by the spouses.
Articles 137, 138, and 139 liquidation of either the absolute community or conjugal
partnership upon grant of petition, effect the property relations of the spouses is now governed
by the regime of complete separation of property and the requirement of registering the petition
for separation of property and the final judgment granting the same with the appropriate
registries.
Article 141- revival of the former property regime that existed prior to its separation
upon proper motion. Thereafter no voluntary separation of property shall again be granted by
the court.
ELENA MULLER vs. HELMUT MULLER
August 29, 2006
Elena and Helmut, a German national, were married in 1989 in Hamburg, Germany. They
initially lived in Hamburg but in 1992, the spouses decided to move and permanently reside in
the Philippines. Helmut sold the house he inherited from his parents in Germany. With the

money, he bought a P528,000.00 lot in Antipolo and constructed a P2.3 million peso house
thereon. The Antipolo property was registered in Elenas name. The marriage however, did not
last due to Helmuts alleged womanizing, drinking and maltreatment and eventually the spouses
separated. In 1994, Helmut filed a petition for separation of properties. He claims that he is not
praying for the transfer of ownership of the Antipolo property as he is aware of the
constitutional prohibition of aliens acquiring lands of the public domain but merely
reimbursement. That the property is titled in the name of Elena because of said prohibition. That
the funds paid by him for the said property were in consideration of his marriage to Elena; that
funds were given to her in trust and equity demands that he should be reimbursed of his
personal funds.
Issue: Is respondent entitled to reimbursement of the funds used for the acquisition of the
Antipolo property?
SC: Aliens are disqualified from acquiring private lands. The primary purpose of the
constitutional provision is the conservation of the national patrimony.
Respondent cannot seek reimbursement on the ground of equity where it is clear that he
willingly and knowingly bought the property despite the constitutional prohibition. It has been
held that equity as a rule will follow the law and will not permit that to be done indirectly
which, because of public policy, cannot be done directly. He who seeks equity must do equity,
and he who comes into equity must come with clean hands.
Further, the distinctions between transfer of ownership as opposed to recovery of funds is
a futile exercise on respondents part. To allow reimbursement would in effect permit
respondent to enjoy the fruits of a property that he is not allowed to own. Thus, it is, likewise
proscribed by law.
The CA erred in holding that an implied trust was created and resulted by operation of
law in view of Helmuts marriage to Elena. Save for the exception provided in cases of
hereditary succession, Helmuts disqualification from owning lands in the Philippines is
absolute. Not even an ownership in trust is allowed. Besides, where the purchase is made in
violation of an existing statute and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in
favor of the party who is guilty of fraud. To hold otherwise would be to allow circumvention of
the constitutional prohibition.
The Court decreed the separation of property between the spouses and ordering partition
of the personal properties located in the Philippines only.
VIRGILIO MAQUILAN vs. DITA MAQUILAN
524 SCRA 166 (June 8, 2007)
Virgilio and Ditas marriage that was blessed with one son turned sour when the former
discovered that the latter was having illicit sexual affair with her paramour, which resulted to
the conviction of Dita and her paramour of the crime of adultery. Thereafter, Virgilio filed a

petition for declaration of nullity of marriage, dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal
partnership of gains. During the pre-trial of said case, they entered into a Compromise
Agreement as partial settlement of their conjugal partnership property. This was given judicial
imprimatur by the judge hearing the case. In an omnibus motion however, Virgilio prays for the
repudiation of the compromise agreement on the ground that it is against law and public policy;
that the proceedings where it was approved is null and void, there being no appearance and
participation of the Solicitor General or the Provincial Prosecutor; that it was timely repudiated;
and that respondent, having been convicted of adultery, is therefore disqualified from sharing in
the conjugal property.
SC: Article 143 of the Family Code, separation of property may be effected voluntarily or for
sufficient cause, subject to judicial approval. The questioned compromise agreement that was
judicially approved is exactly such a separation of property allowed under the law. This
conclusion holds true even if the proceedings for the declaration of nullity of marriage was still
pending.
While the appearances of the Solicitor General and/or Public Prosecutor are mandatory, the
failure of the RTC to require their appearance does not per se nullify the compromise
agreement. There is no exigency for the presence of the Solicitor General and/or the State
Prosecutor because nothing in the subject compromise touched into the very merit of the case of
declaration of nullity of marriage for the court to be wary of any possible collusion between the
parties. The agreement pertains merely to an agreement between petitioner and respondent Dita
to separate their conjugal properties partially without prejudice to the outcome of the pending
case.
The conviction of adultery does not carry with it the penalty of civil interdiction that
deprives the person of the rights to manage to manage her property and to dispose of such
property inter vivos.