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Points and Authorities in regard to Traffic Stops

Constitution of the State of California, A. D. 1849


Article I: Declaration of Rights
Sec. 1.
All men are by nature free and independent, and have certain unalienable rights,
among which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty: acquiring, possessing
and protecting property: and pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.
Sec. 21.
This enumeration of rights shall not be construed to impair or deny others, retained by
the people.
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE, Section 54950.
DECLARATION OF LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE. In enacting this chapter, the Legislature
finds and declares that the public commissions, boards and councils and the other
public agencies in this State exist to aid in the conduct of the peoples business. It is the
intent of the law that their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be
conducted openly.
The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them.
The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide
what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people
insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they
have created.
It is settled that the streets of a city belong to the people of a state and the use thereof is
an inalienable right of every citizen of the state.
Whyte v. City of Sacramento, 65 Cal. App. 534, 547, (1924)
Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal.2d 870 (1950)
A statute does not trump the Constitution.
People v. Ortiz, (1995) 32 Cal. App. 4th at p. 292, fn. 2
Conway v. Pasadena Humane Society, (1996) 45 Cal.App.4th 163
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, v. JERRY ARBERT POOL, C.A. No. 09-10303,
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
(Opinion filed September 14, 2010), On Appeal from the United States District Court
For The Eastern District of California

CALIFORNIA VEHICLE CODE


GENERAL PROVISIONS
SHORT TITLE
Pending Proceeding and Accrued Rights
Section 4. No action or proceeding commenced before this code takes effect, and no
right accrued, is affected by the provisions of this code,
There can be no sanction or penalty imposed upon one because of the exercise of a
constitutional right.
Sherar v. Cullen, 481 F. 945 (9th Cir. 1973)
Spevack v. Klein, 385 U.S. 511 (1967)
Garrity v. New Jersey, 385 U.S. 493 (1967)
Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964)
Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886)
Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, ... Pittsford v. City of Los Angeles, 50
Cal. App. 2d 25 [Civ. No. 13391. Second Dist., Div. One. Feb. 17, 1942.]
Obviously, administrative agencies, like police officers must obey the Constitution and
may not deprive persons of constitutional rights.
Southern Pac. Transportation Co. v. Public Utilities Com., 18 Cal. 3d 308
[S.F. No. 23217. Supreme Court of California. November 23, 1976.]
[The California Official Reports page is provided by Lexis-Nexis to access California case
law dating to 1850 free of charge! ]
...whenever a police officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to walk
away, he has seized that person. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968)
The Fourth Amendment applies to all seizures of the person including those consuming
no more than a minute. (United States v. Brignoni-Ponce, supra, 422 U.S. at pp. 879880 [45 L. Ed. 2d at pp. 615-616].)
People v. Spicer, (1984) 157 Cal.App.3d 213
The United States Supreme Court has identified three categories of police contact
with persons. The first is referred to as a consensual encounter in which there is no
restraint on the person's liberty. There need be no objective justification for such an
encounter.
The second type, called detention, involves a seizure of the individual for a limited
duration and for limited purposes. A constitutionally acceptable detention can occur if

there is an articulable suspicion that a person has committed or is about to commit a


crime.
The third type involves seizures in the nature of an arrest, which may occur only if the
police have probable cause to arrest the person for a crime. (Florida v. Royer, supra,
460 U.S. 491; Wilson v. Superior Court, supra, 34 Cal.3d 777.) People v. Bailey, 176 Cal.
App. 3d 402
[No. H000583. Court of Appeals of California, Sixth Appellate District. December
17,1985.]
Show of Authority
[1] The federal Constitutions Fourth Amendment, made applicable to the states through
the Fourteenth Amendment, prohibits unreasonable seizures. Our state Constitution
includes a similar prohibition. (Cal. Const., Art. I, 13.) A seizure occurs whenever a
police officer 'by means of physical force or show of authority' restrains the liberty of a
person to walk away. (People v. Souza, (1994) 9 Cal.4th 224, 229, quoting Terry v.
Ohio (1968) 392 U.S. 1, 19, fn. 16.) Whether a seizure has taken place is to be
determined by an objective test, which asks not whether the citizen perceived that he
was being ordered to restrict his movement, but whether the officer's words and actions
would have conveyed that to a reasonable person. (California v. Hodari D., (1999) 499
U.S. 621, 628.) Thus, when police engage in conduct that would communicate[] to a
reasonable person that he was not at liberty to ignore the police presence and go about
his business, there has been a seizure (Kaupp v. Texas, (2003) 538 U.S. 626, 629;
Florida v. Bostick, (1991) 501 U.S. 429, 437).
When the seizure of a person amounts to an arrest, it must be supported by an arrest
warrant or by probable cause. (Kaupp v. Texas, supra, 538 U.S. at p. 630.)
Probable cause exists when the facts known to the arresting officer would persuade
someone of reasonable caution that the person to be arrested has committed a crime.
(Dunaway v. New York, (1979) 442 U.S. 200, 208, fn. 9.)
In Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. 1, the United States Supreme Court created a limited
exception that allows police officers to stop and . . . frisk for weapons when they have
an articulable suspicion [the] person has committed or is about to commit a crime.
(Florida v. Royer, supra, at p. 498.)
[2] Thus, an officer who lacks probable cause to arrest can conduct a brief investigative
detention when there is some objective manifestation that criminal activity is afoot
and that the person to be stopped is engaged in that activity. (People v. Souza, supra, 9
Cal. 4th at p. 230; see also United States v. Cortez (1981) 449 U.S. 411, 417). Because an
investigative detention allows the police to ascertain whether suspicious conduct is
criminal activity, such a detention must be temporary and last no longer than is

necessary to effectuate the purpose of the stop. (Florida v. Royer, supra, at p. 500; see
also Wilson v. Superior Court (1983) 34 Cal.3d 777, 784 [describing a detention as
limited in duration, scope and purpose].)
The distinction between a detention and an arrest may in some instances create
difficult line-drawing problems. (United States v. Sharpe, (1985) 470 U.S. 675, 685; see
also United States v. Torres-Sanchez, (9th Cir. 1996) 83 F.3d 1123, 1127 [there is no
bright-line for determining when an investigatory stop crosses the line and becomes an
arrest]).
[3] This much is clear: A brief stop and pat-down of someone suspected of criminal
activity is merely an investigative detention requiring no more than a reasonable
suspicion. (Terry v. Ohio, supra, 392 U.S. at pp. 6-7.) People v. Celis (2004) 33 Cal. 4th
667
[6] The basic premise behind consensual encounters is that a citizen may consent
voluntarily to official intrusions upon interests protected by the Constitution. If the
citizen acts in reasonable submission to a show of authority, then his actions are not
voluntary or consensual.
Where consensual, consent may be withdrawn at any time (People v. Gurtenstein,
(1977) 69 Cal.App.3d 441, 451 [138 Cal. Rptr. 161]).
The citizen participant in a consensual encounter may leave, refuse to answer questions
or decline to act in the manner requested by the authorities.
...if the manner in which the request was made constituted a show of authority such that
appellant reasonably might believe he had to comply, then the encounter was
transformed into a detention. People v. Franklin, 192 Cal. App. 3d 935
Show of Authority
...evidence also supports the conclusion Ms. Spicer's freedom of movement was
restrained by a show of authority (Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S. at p. 553 [64 L.Ed.2d at
p. 508]; Royer, supra, 460 U.S. at p. 501 [75 L.Ed.2d at p. 239, 103 S. Ct. at p. 1326]; In
re Tony C. (1978) 21 Cal.3d 888, 895 [148 Cal. Rptr. 366, 582 P. 2d 957]). She was
confronted by a uniformed officer almost immediately after the car in which she was
riding was stopped. Without any explanation or prefatory remarks, the officer
requested her driver's license.
The nature of the questions asked by the officer during a contact are also relevant to the
seizure issue (see: Wilson, supra, 34 Cal.3d at pp. 790-791; Mendenhall, supra, 446 U.S.
at p. 554). An unequivocal verbal command is far more likely to produce the perception
of restricted liberty than a mere approach (People v. Jones, (1979) 96 Cal.App.3d 820 ,
825-826 [158 Cal. Rptr. 415]), casual banter (People v. Warren, supra, 152 Cal.App.3d

at p. 996), or an ambiguous statement which could be either a command or a request.


(People v. King, (1977) 72 Cal.App.3d 346, 349-350 [139 Cal. Rptr. 926].) Furthermore,
'a reasonable person might read an officer's May I as the courteous expression of a
demand backed by force of law.' (Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, (1973) 412 U.S. 218, 289
[36 L.Ed.2d 854, 898, 93 S. Ct. 2041], Marshall, J., dis.) The attitude expressed by Ms.
Spicer toward the police is credible and almost certainly typical. She testified, I just felt
like if a policeman should ever stop me if he wants my purse he will ask me. If he asks
me to get out of car I am coming out with [my] hands free. I have read too many people
getting shot these days by policemen who thought .... fn. 3
It is especially pertinent to this case that the officer did not explain to Ms. Spicer his
reason for requesting her driver's license. In People v. James (1977) 19 Cal.3d 99, 118
[137 Cal. Rptr. 447, 561 P.2d 1135], our Supreme Court stated, While we reject an
absolute requirement of a warning of the right to refuse permission as a precondition to
a consent search, we do not intend to discourage the giving of such advice in appropriate
cases. In view of the settled rule that the lack of such a warning is a factor to be taken
into account in applying the totality of the circumstances test [citations omitted], the
police would be well advised in close cases to make a record by expressly giving the
admonition .... In Mendenhall the majority found that knowledge of the right to refuse
a search request was highly relevant to the determination that there had been consent
(446 U.S. at pp. 558-559 [64 [157 Cal.App.3d 220] L.Ed.2d at pp. 512-513]). Where, as
here, the circumstances are pregnant with coercion, an admonition along the lines
mentioned in James was called for. People v. Spicer, 157 Cal. App. 3d 213 [Crim. No.
45072. Court of Appeals of California, Second Appellate District, Division Seven. June
15, 1984.]
Obviously, not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves
seizures of persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of
authority, has in some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a
seizure has occurred. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 19, n. 16 (1968). See also id., at 34
(WHITE, J., concurring); id., at 31, 32-33 (Harlan, J., concurring).
Reid v. Georgia, 448 U.S. 438 (1980)
JUSTICE BRENNAN, concurring in the result.
Although I agree that not all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens
involves `seizures' of persons, id., at 19, n. 16, and that policemen may approach
citizens on the street and ask them questions without seizing them for purposes of the
Fourth Amendment, once an officer has identified himself and asked a traveler for
identification and his airline ticket, the traveler has been seized within the meaning of
the Fourth Amendment. By identifying themselves and asking for Royer's airline ticket
and driver's license the officers, as a practical matter, engaged in a show of authority

and restrained [460 U.S. 491, 512] [Royer's] liberty. Ibid. It is simply wrong to
suggest that a traveler feels free to walk away when he has been approached by
individuals who have identified themselves as police officers and asked for, and
received, his airline ticket and driver's license.
Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420 (1984)
[N]ot all personal intercourse between policemen and citizens involves seizures of
persons. Only when the officer, by means of physical force or show of authority, has in
some way restrained the liberty of a citizen may we conclude that a seizure has
occurred.
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S., at 19, n. 16.
See also United States v. Mendenhall, 446 U.S. 544, 551 -557 (1980) (opinion of
Stewart, J.); id., at 560, n. 1 (POWELL, J., concurring in part); United States v. Herbst,
641 F.2d 1161, 1166 (CA5), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 851 (1981); United States v. Berd, 634
F.2d 979, 984-985 (CA5 1981); United States v. Turner, 628 F.2d 461, 462-465 (CA5
1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 988 (1981); United States v. Hill, 626 F.2d 429, 432-433,
and n. 6 (CA5 1980); United States v. Fry, 622 F.2d 1218, 1220-1221 (CA5 1980);
United States v. Elmore, 595 F.2d 1036, 1038-1042 (CA5 1979), cert. denied, 447 U.S.
910 (1980)
[9] It is axiomatic, of course, that warrantless searches are per se unreasonable under
the California and federal Constitutions with only a few carefully circumscribed
exceptions, and that the People have the burden of proving that any search without a
warrant comes within one of those exceptions (People v. Dalton, (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 850,
855 [157 Cal. Rptr. 497, 598 P.2d 467], and cases cited.) see generally 2 LaFave, Search
and Seizure (1978) 5.3 (a)).
People v. Laiwa, (1983) 34 Cal.3d 711
A 17-year-old boy enjoyed, and was entitled to assert, rights under the Cal. Const., Art. I,
13, protecting persons against unreasonable searches and seizures.
In re Scott K., (1979) 24 Cal. 3d 395
...a detention occurs if the suspect is not free to leave at will -- if he is kept in the officer's
presence by physical restraint, threat of force, or assertion of authority (see e.g., Restani
v. Superior Court, (1970) 13 Cal.App.3d 189, 197 [91 Cal. Rptr. 429]). But the definition
is under-inclusive: actual or threatened physical restraints are the characteristics of a
full-blown arrest (Pen. Code, 835), and an officer will frequently use more subtle
methods to detain a suspect whom he wishes simply to question about possible criminal
activity. The definition is also over-inclusive: either through fear or respect, many

persons who are not in fact under detention nevertheless do not feel free to leave at will
when a uniformed police officer indicates a desire to talk with them.
In re Tony C., 21 Cal. 3d 888
[Crim. No. 20142. Supreme Court of California. August 24, 1978]
Show of Authority in relation to so-called Traffic Stops
The Legislature has identified the POLICE CONTACT where you're issued a NOTICE TO
APPEAR as an ARREST, not a traffic stop. The POLICE CONTACT is a
COMPULSORY RESTRAINT on your freedom. When done without a WARRANT it is
PRESUMED ILLEGAL.
Defendant makes a prima facie case of unlawful arrest when he establishes that arrest
was made without a warrant, and burden rests on prosecution to show proper
justification. People v. Holguin, (1956) 145 Cal.App.2d. 520 [302 P.2d. 635]
It is the fact of the lawful arrest which establishes the authority to search,...
United States v. Robinson, (1973) 414 U.S. 218

CALIFORNIA VEHICLE CODE


DIVISION 17. OFFENSES AND PROSECUTION
CHAPTER 2. PROCEDURE ON ARRESTS
Article 1. Arrests .......................................... Sections 40300 - 40313
Section 40300. The provisions of this chapter shall govern all peace officers in making
arrests for violations of this code without a warrant for offenses committed in their
presence,
Section 40500. (a) Whenever a person is arrested for any violation of this code not
declared to be a felony, or for a violation of an ordinance of a city or county relating to
traffic offenses and he is not immediately taken before a magistrate, as provided in this
chapter, the arresting officer shall prepare in triplicate a written notice to appear in
court or before a person authorized to receive a deposit of bail, containing the name and
address of the person, the license number of his or her vehicle, if any, the name and
address, when available, of the registered owner or lessee of the vehicle, the offense
charged and the time and place when and where he shall appear. If the arrestee does
not have a driver's license or other satisfactory evidence of identity in his or her
possession, the officer may require the arrestee
Section 40504. (a) The officer shall deliver one copy of the notice to appear to the
arrested person and the arrested person in order to secure release must give his or her

written promise to appear in court... Thereupon, the arresting officer shall forthwith
release the person arrested from custody.
Vehicle Code, section 40504, subdivision (a), commands that when a traffic offender
such as defendant herein gives his written promise to appear by signing two copies of
the citation, Thereupon the arresting officer shall forthwith release the person
arrested from custody. (Italics added.)
People v. McGaughran, 25 Cal. 3d 577
[Crim. No. 20293. Supreme Court of California. October 25, 1979.]
...the violator is, during the period immediately preceding his execution of the promise
to appear, under arrest. (People v. Weitzer, (1969) 269 Cal.App.2d 274, 294 [75 Cal.
Rptr. 318]; People v. Valdez, (1966) 239 Cal. App. 2d 459, 462 [48 Cal. Rptr. 840].) fn. 2
The Vehicle Code however, refers to the person awaiting citation as the arrested
person. fn. 3
People v. Hubbard, (1970) 9 Cal. App. 3d 827
A detention is a seizure of the person which is subject to Fourth Amendment protection.
[Citation.] (Id. at pp. 993-994.) An arrest is also a seizure subject to Fourth
Amendment protections (see: Wilson v. Superior Court, (1983) 34 Cal. 3d 777, 784 [195
Cal. Rptr. 671, 670 P.2d 325] [the three levels of police contacts subject to Fourth
Amendment protections are consensual encounter, investigative detention, and
arrest]).
People v. Velasquez, (1993) 21 Cal.App.4th 555
When the plaintiff has shown that he was arrested, imprisoned or restrained of his
liberty by the defendant, the law presumes it to be unlawful.
People v. McGrew, 20 Pac. 92 (1888); Knight v. Baker, 133 P. 544 (1926)
One more thing before we begin: In addition to investigative detentions, there are two
other types of temporary seizures. The first (and most common) is the traffic stop.
Although traffic stops are technically arrests when (as is usually the case) the officer
witnessed the violation and, therefore, had probable cause, traffic stops are subject to
the same rules as investigative detentions.6
Fn 6. See People v. Hubbard, (1970) 9 Cal. App. 3d 827, 833 [[T]he violator is, during
the period immediately preceding his execution of the promise to appear, under
arrest.]; People v. Hernandez, (2008) 45 Cal. 4th 295, 299 [traffic stops are treated as
detentions].

Investigative Detentions, Spring 2010 POINT OF VIEW, ALAMEDA COUNTY


DISTRICT ATTORNEYS OFFICE. P. 1
A traffic arrest occurs when an officer stops a vehicle after seeing the driver commit an
infraction. ...the purpose of the stop is to enforce the law, not conduct an investigation.
Arrests, Spring 2009, POINT OF VIEW, ALAMEDA COUNTY DISTRICT
ATTORNEYS OFFICE
CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE
13951(b)(1) Crime means a crime or public offense,...
CALIFORNIA PENAL CODE
Section 19.6. An infraction is not punishable by imprisonment. A person charged with
an infraction shall not be entitled to a trial by jury.
A person charged with an infraction shall not be entitled to have the public defender or
other counsel appointed at public expense to represent him or her unless he or she is
arrested and not released on his or her written promise to appear, his or her own
recognizance, or a deposit of bail.
Section 689. No person can be convicted of a public offense unless by verdict of a jury,
accepted and recorded by the court, by a finding of the court in a case where a jury has
been waived, or by a plea of guilty.
In View of Code Civ. Proc. 24, declaring actions to be two kinds, civil and criminal, and
22, defining actions, there is no such thing as a quasi-criminal act.
Ex Parte Clark, 141 P. 831, 24 C.A. 389
Traffic experts and the public agree that traffic law enforcement is criminal only in a
limited procedural sense. People v. Lucas, (1978) 82 Cal. App. 3d 47, 147 Cal. Rptr. 235
[Crim. No. 31889. Second Dist., Div. Four. June 22, 1978.]
The classification of minor traffic violations as noncriminal infractions is receiving
increasing attention in recent years, not only in California but in other jurisdictions, as a
basis for more realistic treatment of the problem in the courts. Leading authorities in
the field of criminal law are proposing that the historic distinction between petty and
serious offenses be defined more systematically to facilitate enforcement of lesser
violations of police regulations.1 The system under study involves the creation of a
category of non-criminal offenses for which the sentence authorized upon conviction
would be a fine or other civil penalty, such as the suspension of a license or attendance
at a school for traffic violators.2 Jail would not be authorized as a sanction. Existing

provisions of law on arrest, evidence, presumptions and defenses in misdemeanor cases


would apply to traffic infractions and judges would conduct trials within the present
framework or criminal procedure but without all the paraphernalia of jury trial. Other
modifications to eliminate inappropriate criminal procedures on arraignment, bail and
plea might be considered in order to reduce the number of appearances required of
defendants who wish to appear on their traffic citations. No constitutional amendment
would be required and the proposal could be adopted in California by appropriate
amendments to the codes.
1967 JUDICIAL COUNCIL REPORT TO THE GOVERNOR AND THE LEGISLATURE,
CHAPTER 1 - A SYSTEM FOR CLASSIFYING MINOR TRAFFIC VIOLATIONS AS
NONCRIMINAL TRAFFIC INFRACTIONS, p. 31
...infractions are not crimes...
...upon the rationale the Legislature did not intend to classify infractions as crimes (see
People v. Oppenheimer, (1974) 42 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 4 [116 Cal. Rptr. 795] and People
v. Battle, supra, 50 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1.).
People v. Sava, (1987) 190 Cal. App. 3d 935
Courts' duty when interpreting statute is to discern intent of legislature.
State v. Arnold, 879 P. 2d. 1272 (Or. 1994)
Judge's first duty in construing statute is to determine meaning of the language used by
the legislature. Coslett v. Third Street Grocery, 876 P.2d. 656 (N.M. App. 1994)
The Judicial Council of the State of California SPONSORED Legislation Making Minor
Traffic Violations NON criminal INFRACTIONS.
- Summary INFRACTION TRAFFIC STOP = YOU'RE UNDER ARREST* AND IN CUSTODY*
FOR NON-CRIMINAL* BEHAVIOR
* California Vehicle Code 40300, 40500
* California Vehicle Code 40504
* People v. Sava, (1987) 190 Cal. App. 3d 935
The so-called Traffic Stop is an arrest; when done without a warrant it is PRESUMED
ILLEGAL. The PEACE OFFICER is REQUIRED to know the law and what IS and ISN'T
a crime. An UNAUTHORIZED warrantless arrest is ILLEGAL. The application of the
State's POLICE POWER to NON-criminal behavior is illegal. There is NO PROBABLE
CAUSE or REASONABLE SUSPICION of any CRIME in regards to INFRACTIONS of
the Vehicle Code. It is PRESUMED the officer is PROHIBITED from DISPARAGING

and DENYING fundamental rights, after all, he/she swore an oath not to.
officers are REQUIRED TO KNOW THE LAW!

Police

Even if the officer is not expected to know the law of all 50 states, surely he is expected
to know the California Vehicle Code The People v. Jesus Santos Sanchez Reyes, (2011)
196 Cal. App. 4th 856
Every officer knows, or should know, that he needs a warrant which correctly identifies
the arrestee, or probable cause, to arrest a particular individual.
Julian C. LEE, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. Jake GREGORY, United States of America,
Defendants-Appellants, The Federal Bureau of Investigation, Defendant (2004), No. 0257132, United States Court of Appeals, Ninth Circuit
We thus require citizens to apprise themselves not only of statutory language but also of
legislative history, subsequent judicial construction, and underlying legislative purposes
(People v. Grubb, (1965) 63 Cal.2d 614, 620 [47 Cal. Rptr. 772, 408 P.2d 100]; see
generally Amsterdam, The Void-for-Vagueness Doctrine in the Supreme Court (1960)
109 U. Pa. L. Rev. 67.) Walker v. Superior Court, (1988) 47 Cal. 3d 112
...an officer may be held liable in damages to any person injured in consequence of a
breach of any of the duties connected with his office... The liability for nonfeasance,
misfeasance, and for malfeasance in office is in his individual, not his official
capacity... 70 Am. Jur. 2nd Sec. 50, VII Civil Liability
Personal liberty, which is guaranteed to every citizen under our constitution and laws,
consists of the right to locomotion,- to go where one pleases, and when, and to do that
which may lead to one's business or pleasure, only restrained as the rights to others may
make it necessary for the welfare of all other citizens. One may travel along the public
highways or in public places; and while conducting themselves in a decent and orderly
manner, disturbing no other, and interfering with the rights of no other citizens, there,
they will be protected under law, not only their persons, but in their safe conduct. The
constitution and the laws are framed for the public good, and the protection of all
citizens from the highest to the lowest; and no one may be restrained of his liberty,
unless he transgressed some law. Any law which would place the keeping and safe
conduct of another in the hands of even a conservator of the peace, unless for some
breach of the peace committed in his presence, or upon suspicion of felony, would be
most oppressive and unjust, and destroy all rights which our constitution guarantees.
Pinkerton v. Verberg, 78 Mich. 573; 44 NW 579 (1889)
The privilege against self-incrimination is neither accorded to the passive resistant, nor
the person who is ignorant of his rights, nor to one indifferent thereto. It is a fighting

clause. Its benefits can be retained only by sustained combat. It cannot be claimed by
an attorney or solicitor. It is valid only when insisted upon by a belligerent claimant in
person. United States v. Johnson, 76 F. Supp. 538
Our holding today is based exclusively on Article I, section 13, of the California
Constitution, which requires a more exacting standard for cases arising within this state.
In Cooper v. California (1967) 386 U.S. 58, 62 [17 L. Ed. 2d 730, 734, 87 S. Ct. 788], the
Supreme Court recognized this well-known principle: Our holding, of course, does
not affect the State's power to impose higher standards on searches and seizures than
required by the Federal Constitution if it chooses to do so.
In short, the Supreme Court has clearly recognized that state courts are the ultimate
arbiters of state law,...
This court has always assumed the independent vitality of our state Constitution.
Thus in [13 Cal. 3d 551] determining that California citizens are entitled to greater
protection under the California Constitution against unreasonable searches and seizures
than that required by the United States Constitution, we are embarking on no
revolutionary course. Rather we are simply reaffirming a basic principle of federalism -that the nation as a whole is composed of distinct geographical and political entities
bound together by a fundamental federal law but nonetheless independently responsible
for safeguarding the rights of their citizens.
Rights guaranteed by this Constitution are not dependent on those guaranteed by the
United States Constitution. People v. Brisendine, 13 Cal. 3d 528
[Crim. No. 16520. Supreme Court of California, February 20, 1975.]
...under the California Constitution (Cal. Const., Art. I, 13) the evidence seized was the
product of an unlawful search. We agree, and conclude the judgment must be reversed.
...the established rule that it is the People, rather than the defendant, who bear the
burden of justifying a warrantless seizure (Badillo v. Superior Court, (1956) 46 Cal. 2d
269, 272 [294 P. 2d 23]).
Of course, our past decisions do clearly affirm that, while not controlling, the United
States Supreme Court's interpretation of similar provisions of the federal Constitution,
like our sister state courts' interpretations of similar state constitutional provisions, will
provide valuable guidance in the interpretation of our state constitutional guarantees
(see: e.g., Gay Law Students Assn. v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., (1979) 24 Cal.3d 458, 469
[156 Cal. Rptr. 14, 595 P.2d 592]; Gabrielli v. Knickerbocker, supra, 12 Cal.2d 85, 89).
People v. Longwill, 14 Cal. 3d 943
[Crim. No. 17773. Supreme Court of California, August 7, 1975]

Article I, section 15 of the California Constitution guarantees a criminal defendant's


right to have the assistance of counsel for the defendant's defense. (See also U.S.
Const., 6th Amend.)
This conclusion, of course, simply reflects one of the principal tenets of our federal
system of government: just as the United States Supreme Court bears the ultimate
judicial responsibility for determining matters of federal law, this court bears the
ultimate judicial responsibility for resolving questions of state law, including the proper
interpretation of provisions of the state Constitution. (See generally Falk, The State
Constitution: A More Than Adequate Nonfederal Ground (1973) 61 Cal. L. Rev. 273;
Note, State Bills of Rights (1973) 8 Harv. Civ. Rights - Civ. Lib. L. Rev. 271, 285-286.)
In fulfilling this difficult and grave responsibility, we cannot properly relegate our task
to the judicial guardians of the federal Constitution, but instead must recognize our
personal obligation to exercise independent legal judgment in ascertaining the meaning
and application of state constitutional provisions.
People v. Chavez, 26 Cal. 3d 334
[Crim. No. 20673. Supreme Court of California, January 29, 1980]
It is settled that the streets of a city belong to the people of a state and the use thereof is
an unalienable right of every citizen of the state.
Whyte v. City of Sacramento, 65 Cal. App. 534, 547, (1924)
Escobedo v. State Dept. of Motor Vehicles, 35 Cal.2d 870 (1950)

THIS BUILDING IS WHERE A CORPORATION CONDUCTS ITS BUSINESS


THIS IS WHERE SERVANTS EMPLOYED BY THE CORPORATION WORK
THE CORPORATE CHARTER FOR THIS CORPORATION IS

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE STATE OF CALIFORNIA (A. D. 1879)


WHICH IN TURN APPLIES TO THE EMPLOYEES AND RESTRICTS THEIR CONDUCT

Municipal authorities, as trustees for the public, ...


Pittsford v. City of Los Angeles, 50 Cal. App. 2d 25
[Civ. No. 13391. Second Dist., Div. One. Feb. 17, 1942.]

CALIFORNIA GOVERNMENT CODE, Section 54950. DECLARATION OF


LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE. In enacting this chapter, the Legislature finds and declares
that the public commissions, boards and councils and the other public agencies in this
State exist to aid in the conduct of the peoples business. It is the intent of the law that
their actions be taken openly and that their deliberations be conducted openly.
The people of this State do not yield their sovereignty to the agencies which serve them.
The people, in delegating authority, do not give their public servants the right to decide
what is good for the people to know and what is not good for them to know. The people
insist on remaining informed so that they may retain control over the instruments they
have created.
The law helps the vigilant before those who sleep on their rights.
CALIFORNIA CIVIL CODE, Section 3527

In Favorem Libertatas