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Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1720 Filed 06/23/16 Page 1 of 17

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Cecillia D. Wang (Pro Hac Vice)
cwang@aclu.org
Nida Vidutis*
nvidutis@aclu.org
ACLU Foundation
Immigrants’ Rights Project
39 Drumm Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 343-0775
Facsimile: (415) 395-0950

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Daniel J. Pochoda
dpochoda@acluaz.org
Brenda Muñoz Furnish
bmfurnish@acluaz.org
ACLU Foundation of Arizona
3707 N. 7th Street, Suite 235
Phoenix, AZ 85014
Telephone: (602) 650-1854
Facsimile: (602) 650-1376

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*Application for admission pro hac vice forthcoming

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Attorneys for Plaintiffs (Additional attorneys
for Plaintiffs listed on next page)

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF ARIZONA

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Manuel de Jesus Ortega Melendres,
et al.,

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Plaintiffs,

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v.
Joseph M. Arpaio, et al.,
Defendants.

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CV-07-2513-PHX-GMS

PLAINTIFFS’ RESPONSE TO
DEFENDANT ARPAIO’S BRIEFING
RE INTERNAL AFFAIRS
INVESTIGATIONS AND
DISCIPLINE

Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1720 Filed 06/23/16 Page 2 of 17

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Additional Attorneys for Plaintiffs:
Andre I. Segura (Pro Hac Vice)
asegura@aclu.org
ACLU Foundation
Immigrants’ Rights Project
125 Broad Street, 17th Floor
New York, NY 10004
Telephone: (212) 549-2676
Facsimile: (212) 549-2654

Jorge M. Castillo (Pro Hac Vice)
jcastillo@maldef.org
Julia Gomez*
jgomez@maldef.org
Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund
634 South Spring Street, 11th Floor
Los Angeles, CA 90014
Telephone: (213) 629-2512
Facsimile: (213) 629-0266

Anne Lai (Pro Hac Vice)
alai@law.uci.edu
401 E. Peltason, Suite 3500
Irvine, CA 92697
Telephone: (949) 824-9894
Facsimile: (949) 824-0066

James B. Chanin (Pro Hac Vice)
jbcofc@aol.com
Law Offices of James B. Chanin
3050 Shattuck Avenue
Berkeley, CA 94705
Telephone: (510) 848-4752
Facsimile: (510) 848-5819

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Stanley Young (Pro Hac Vice)
syoung@cov.com
Covington & Burling LLP
333 Twin Dolphin Drive, Suite 700
Redwood Shores, CA 94065
Telephone: (650) 632-4700
Facsimile: (650) 632-4800
Tammy Albarran (Pro Hac Vice)
talbarran@cov.com
Lauren E. Pedley (Pro Hac Vice)
lpedley@cov.com
Covington & Burling LLP
One Front Street
San Francisco, CA 94111
Telephone: (415) 591-7066
Facsimile: (415) 955-6566
*Application for admission pro hac vice
forthcoming

Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1720 Filed 06/23/16 Page 3 of 17

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TABLE OF CONTENTS
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .....................................................................................................ii 
INTRODUCTION ..................................................................................................................... 1 
I. 

Defendant Arpaio Is Wrong on the Law on Injunctive Relief ....................................... 1 

II. 

Defendant Arpaio’s Arguments About State Sovereignty Are Wrong .......................... 2 

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A. 

Nothing in Arizona law permits the “sovereign choice” of the Sheriff to
violate federal court orders .................................................................................. 2 

B. 

Defendant Arpaio’s Tenth Amendment arguments are contrary to
controlling precedents ......................................................................................... 3 

C. 

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply here ............................................ 5 

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III. 

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Plaintiffs’ Proposed Remedies Regarding Internal Investigations Adequately
Address Individual Employees’ Due Process Rights ..................................................... 5 
A. 

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1101, et seq., does not dictate due process
requirements ........................................................................................................ 6 

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B. 

There is no reason the Court’s findings should not be considered ..................... 7 

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C. 

There is no reason the Monitor should not be granted the IA
investigation and discipline authority ................................................................. 8 

D. 

No expert testimony is needed to identify matters for investigation .................. 9 

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IV. 

Chief Deputy Sheridan Should Be Barred From Involvement In Certain
Internal Investigations And Subject To The Disciplinary Matrix For Policy
Violations ....................................................................................................................... 9 

CONCLUSION ....................................................................................................................... 10 

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

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Cases

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Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532 (1985) .....................................................6

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Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426 (4th Cir. 1995)................................................................................6

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Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991) ................................................................................3
Hook v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrections, 107 F.3d 1397 (9th Cir. 1997) ....................................4

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In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir. 2000) .............................................................................5
Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) ...............................................................................6

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Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33 (1990) ...................................................................................3

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Plata v. Schwarzenegger, No. C01-1351 TEH, 2005 WL 2932253
(N.D. Cal. Oct. 3, 2005).........................................................................................................4

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Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976) ........................................................................................2

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Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850 (9th Cir. 1992).....................4, 7, 10

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United States v. Jefferson County, No. CV-75-S-666-S, Order Appointing Receiver
(N.D. Ala. Oct. 25, 2013) ...................................................................................................... 4

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United States v. Metro. Dist. Comm’n, 930 F.2d 132 (1st Cir. 1991) .......................................4
United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ., 29 F.3d 40 (2d Cir. 1994) ............................................4

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Voight v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552 (9th Cir. 1995) ..........................................................................6

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Whalen v. Mass. Trial Court, 397 F.3d 19 (1st Cir. 2005)........................................................6

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Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787 (1987) .............................1, 8

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State Cases
Marston’s Inc. v. Roman Catholic Church of Phoenix, 132 Ariz. 90 (1982). ..........................9

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Rotter v. Coconino County, 167 Ariz. 210 (Ct. App. 1990) ......................................................9
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State Statutes

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Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1101. ........................................................................................................6

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Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1110. ....................................................................................................6, 7

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Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-193(A)(7). ................................................................................................9

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INTRODUCTION

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Pursuant to the Court’s order of June 15, 2016 (Doc. 1716), Plaintiffs submit this

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response to the legal arguments raised by Defendant Arpaio in the Parties’ Joint

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Memorandum re: Internal Investigations (Doc. 1715). Defendants suggest that this Court is

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powerless to issue orders that, according to Arpaio, are contrary to his exercise of “sovereign

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choices.” These arguments are contrary to controlling Ninth Circuit caselaw, as set forth

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herein, and should be rejected.
Notably, despite being found to have willfully violated numerous orders of this Court,

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Defendant Arpaio continues to assert his “sovereign choices” (Doc. 1715 at 10) and to

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challenge the Court’s authority, deigning to “agree[] to” an independent authority over

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internal affairs as a “middle ground” “to reconcile” his “required latitude” with “the Court’s

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view” of the necessary injunctive relief (id. at 11, 16). Arpaio also questions the impartiality

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of the Court-appointed Monitor even while acknowledging that the Monitor is an agent of

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the Court. Id. at 15-16. Such arguments demonstrate Defendant Arpaio’s continued attitude

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of resistance to this Court’s orders and should not be countenanced.

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I.

Defendant Arpaio Is Wrong on the Law on Injunctive Relief
Plaintiffs have repeatedly briefed the scope and sources of this Court’s authority to

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impose the requested relief relating to Paragraphs 903 through 908. See Doc. 1715 at 2;

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Doc. 1684 at 1-2, 4-10; Doc. 1719. Defendant Arpaio does not take issue with any of those

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citations but asserts, based upon Young v. United States ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S.

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787, 801 (1987), that “a court’s exercise of its contempt authority must be constrained by the

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principle that only the ‘least possible power adequate to achieve the end proposed should be

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used in contempt cases.’” Doc. 1715 at 9. But Defendant omits the beginning of the quoted

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sentence from Young which, read in full, merely sets out what this Court has already noted in

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the instant proceedings—that a court should initiate criminal contempt proceedings only

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after it considers civil contempt remedies and finds them inadequate to address the harm.1

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Moreover, under the Young standard, initiation of criminal contempt proceedings is also
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Young, 481 U.S. at 801. Young sheds no new light on the propriety of the new injunctive

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relief requested by Plaintiffs, which is within this Court’s broad authority to craft injunctive

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relief to enforce its prior orders, as Plaintiffs have previously briefed (Doc. 1684 at 1-2, 5, 9-

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11).2

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Defendant’s citation to Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), is also unavailing.

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Indeed, Rizzo supports Plaintiffs’ requested IA remedies, as it emphasized that in cases

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involving a pattern or policy of misconduct—rather than in a case about “a heated dispute

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between individual citizens and certain policemen,” id. at 371—a district court has broad

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authority to order injunctive relief. See id. at 371-75 (citing O’Shea v. Littleton, 414 U.S.

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488 (1974); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939); Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974)). In

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the instant case, this Court found, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, that Defendant Arpaio had

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deliberate policies violating the constitutional rights of the Plaintiff class. Moreover, this

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Court has now found, on an ample and detailed record, that Defendant Arpaio further

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violated the rights of the Plaintiff class through numerous willful acts of civil contempt.

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II.

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Defendant Arpaio’s Arguments About State Sovereignty Are Wrong
A.

Nothing in Arizona law permits the “sovereign choice” of the Sheriff to
violate federal court orders

First of all, Defendant Arpaio has cited no provision of Arizona law that gives him the
power to willfully violate a federal court’s orders, and the rights of the Plaintiff class, with
impunity. Arpaio cites the Arizona state constitution vesting county sheriffs with
“powers . . . as prescribed by law.” Doc. 1715 at 11. Defendant also contends that Arizona
state courts “have refused to permit independent agencies to supervise and impose discipline

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on County officers.” Id. at 11 n.6. But how state law allocates discipline authority over
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warranted on the record of repeated and willful contempts by Defendant Arpaio in this case.
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Contrary to Arpaio’s contention, the IA-related injunctive relief would not “instruct[] state
officials on how to conform their conduct to state law,” Doc. 1715 at 10 n.6, but rather
would order injunctive relief to force Defendants to comply with federal court orders and
protect the constitutional rights of the Plaintiff class.
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sheriff’s deputies as a general matter is entirely beside the point, when this Court has found

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that the Defendants violated the constitutional rights of the Plaintiff class and the Court’s

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orders.

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B.

Defendant Arpaio’s Tenth Amendment arguments are contrary to
controlling precedents

Defendant Arpaio alludes to the Tenth Amendment, but cites no specific authority to
rebut the numerous cases in which federal courts have ordered similar injunctive relief over
the federalism objections of defendants. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 463 (1991), is
inapposite, upholding a state mandatory retirement law against federal statutory and
constitutional challenges. Nothing in Gregory remotely suggests that injunctive relief is not
appropriate when a municipal official has violated the U.S. Constitution and flouted a federal
court’s orders.
To the contrary, the Supreme Court has squarely held that “[t]he Tenth Amendment’s
reservation of nondelegated powers to the States is not implicated by a federal-court
judgment enforcing the express prohibitions of unlawful state conduct enacted by the
Fourteenth Amendment.” Missouri v. Jenkins, 495 U.S. 33, 55 (1990) (citation omitted). In
the interest of comity, Missouri does require the federal court to permit state agencies,
especially those that are “ready, willing, and—but for the operation of state law curtailing
their powers—able to remedy the deprivation of constitutional rights themselves,” to attempt
to devise and implement a remedy before more drastic measures are taken by the court. Id.
at 51. But in this case, Defendants have already had that opportunity and abused it. This
Court has found that Defendants willfully violated court orders, and then subverted the
internal affairs and discipline process to evade responsibility, to the detriment of the Plaintiff
class. Doc. 1677 ¶ 889. Under these circumstances, permitting Defendant Arpaio to
exercise his “sovereign choices” would be putting the fox in charge of the hen house.
Indeed, controlling authorities hold that the need for injunctive relief outweighs
comity concerns where, as here, a remedy is needed to enforce prior court orders or to

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protect the rights of plaintiffs. District courts are given great deference in fashioning

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remedies for contempt in cases where they have overseen institutional reform over a long

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period of time. Stone v. City and County of San Francisco, 968 F.2d 850, 856 (9th Cir.

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1992). The Ninth Circuit has held that “otherwise valid state laws or court orders cannot

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stand in the way of a federal court’s remedial scheme if the action is essential to enforce the

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scheme.” Id. at 862 (citing North Carolina State Bd. of Educ. v. Swann, 402 U.S. 43, 45

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(1971); see also Hook v. Arizona Dep’t of Corrections, 107 F.3d 1397, 1402-03 (9th Cir.

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1997) (appointing monitor despite state statute prohibiting payment to federally appointed

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special masters absent state legislative appropriation); United States v. Yonkers Bd. of Educ.,

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29 F.3d 40, 44 (2d Cir. 1994) (acknowledging appointment of special master might intrude

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in local affairs, but holding that it was permissible if tailored to cure a constitutional

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violation); United States v. Metro. Dist. Comm’n, 930 F.2d 132, 136 (1st Cir. 1991)

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(“Considerations of comity and federalism, however, do not give a state the legal power to

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violate federal law . . . .”).

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And as previously briefed by Plaintiffs, district courts have ordered similar IA-related

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remedies, over the asserted federalism objections of defendants. See Plata v.

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Schwarzenegger, Doc. 1684, Tab 3, at 5 (providing that if receiver finds state law is

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preventing him from carrying out duties under federal court order, he shall request that the

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court waive the state law requirement); United States v. Jefferson County, Doc. 1684, Tab 4,

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at 3-5 (granting receiver powers vested in county commission under state law and overriding

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state laws governing employment).

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In this case, the Court found that Defendants “are manipulating the operation of their

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disciplinary processes to minimize or altogether avoid imposing fair and equitable internal

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discipline for misconduct committed against members of the Plaintiff class,” in order “to

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avoid accountability for themselves, their protégés, and those who have implemented their

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flawed policies at the cost of fairness to members of the Plaintiff class,” and “continue to

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attempt to conceal additional past mistreatment of the Plaintiff class as it comes to light in

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order to avoid responsibility for it.” Doc. No. 1677 ¶ 889. On this record, the Court has

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inherent authority to invalidate past investigations and order new ones in order to protect the

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constitutional rights of the Plaintiff class.

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C.

The Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not apply here

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Defendant Arpaio puts misplaced reliance on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine, which

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generally holds that appeals from state courts may not be heard by the lower federal courts

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and may only be heard by the Supreme Court on a writ of certiorari. The Ninth Circuit has

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held that notwithstanding Rooker-Feldman, “final judgments in state courts are not

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necessarily preclusive in [federal] courts. Indeed, the rule has long stood that ‘[a] state court

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judgment entered in a case that falls within the federal courts’ exclusive jurisdiction is

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subject to collateral attack in the federal courts.’” In re Gruntz, 202 F.3d 1074 (9th Cir.

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2000) (quoting Gonzales v. Parks (In re Gonzales), 830 F.2d 1033, 1036 (9th Cir. 1987)).

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Any disciplinary rulings by the Merit Commission or a state court would not address the

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federal constitutional issues that relate to this litigation; those matters are within the

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jurisdiction of this federal court, and this Court may override such state or county rulings if it

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finds that they impede the protection of the Plaintiffs’ constitutional rights or the

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enforcement of this Court’s orders.

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III.

Plaintiffs’ Proposed Remedies Regarding Internal Investigations Adequately
Address Individual Employees’ Due Process Rights
The IA-related remedies requested by Plaintiffs and the United States adequately

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protect the due process rights of individuals subject to those procedures and are well within

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the Court’s inherent power to issue injunctive relief. See Doc. No. 1684 at 5-10. As an

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initial matter, Defendants’ lengthy argument that MCSO employees have a property interest

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in their jobs is beside the point; no one disputes that the interest exists. The only question is

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what process is due to those employees in new investigations pursuant to the Court’s order.

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A.

Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1101, et seq., does not dictate due process
requirements

Defendants again raise the argument that the statutory scheme set forth in Ariz. Rev.

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Stat. § 38-1101, et seq. limits the authority of the Court to issue IA-related remedies. This

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Court has properly rejected this argument on multiple occasions and for multiple reasons.

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Doc. No. 1684 at 6 n.2. To the extent that Defendants are now arguing that any deviation

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from this state statutory scheme is per se a violation of a deputy’s procedural due process

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rights, they are mistaken. In disciplinary cases, the “root requirement of the Due Process

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Clause [is] that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of

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any significant property interest.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 542

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(1985) (internal quotations omitted). Here, MCSO deputies subject to new investigations by

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the Monitor (or another authority, if appointed) will have a full opportunity to participate and

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to respond to the charges against them, just as they would if MCSO were conducting the

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investigation. This is more than adequate under Loudermill. Id. at 546.

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Numerous courts have held that a failure to follow state disciplinary processes does

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not constitute a violation the Due Process Clause. While state law can inform whether there

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exists a property interest subject to constitutional protections, what process is due to protect

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such an interest is a matter of federal law. See Loudermill, 470 U.S. 538-41; Mathews v.

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Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334-35 (1976); Voight v. Savell, 70 F.3d 1552, 1563 (9th Cir. 1995)

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(failure to follow state law disciplinary procedures did not violate Due Process Clause);

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Whalen v. Mass. Trial Court, 397 F.3d 19, 22 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005) (“[A] plaintiff is not

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necessarily entitled, as a matter of federal due process, to all of the procedures provided by

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state law.”); Gray v. Laws, 51 F.3d 426, 438 (4th Cir. 1995) (“The Constitution’s due

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process requirements are defined by the Constitution and do not vary from state to state on

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the happenstance of a particular state’s procedural rules.”).

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Under these authorities, the fact that an investigation may not conclude within a 180day period under Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 38-1110 does not give rise to a per se constitutional

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violation.3 To the extent that an employee wishes to raise specific arguments that a delay has

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violated his due process rights, he may address those arguments to this Court. Further, as

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explained above and in Plaintiffs’ memorandum on remedies, this remedial scheme is well

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within the Court’s inherent power to remedy constitutional violations and protect the rights

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of the Plaintiff class, and state law “cannot stand in the way” of the Court’s power to do so.

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Stone, 968 F.2d at 861-62; Doc. 1684 at 5-10.

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B.

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Defendants also argue that the Court’s findings of facts should not even be considered

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There is no reason the Court’s findings should not be considered

in any internal investigation commenced pursuant to Paragraphs 903-05 because they were

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never on notice that the adequacy of internal investigations was at issue. As an initial matter,

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Defendants’ assertion that they had no notice that IA-related issues would be at issue in the

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contempt proceeding is simply false. First, this Court has already found that Defendants

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were on notice that “the adequacy and good faith of their investigations would be subject to

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evaluation by the Parties and the Court.” Doc. 1677 at 156. Prior to the contempt hearing,

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the Court specifically put Defendants on notice that the hearing would cover “issues related

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to the competency of the defendants to conduct adequate self-investigations” and “the ability

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of the sheriff’s office to self-investigate and self-report.” Tr. of Apr. 7, 2015 Status

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Conference at 28-33. Indeed, the Court announced that it was scheduling additional dates

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during which the subject of internal investigations could be presented. Id. Defendants made

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no objection, but instead requested that the Court issue an order specifying the subject for the

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additional hearing days. Id. at 30. And the Court did so, again referring to IA-related

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matters. Doc. No. 995 (Apr. 7, 2015 Minute Entry). Further, Defendants themselves gave

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notice that they would put on evidence regarding the adequacy of MCSO’s internal

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investigations. Doc. 1462 at 5-6, 12-14. Defendants’ claim that they had no notice is

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Moreover, on its face, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 38-1110 does not provide for a strict 180-day statute
of limitations but rather provides that the employer shall make a good faith effort to
complete the investigation within that time period, and if the 180-day period is exceeded, the
discipline “may” be dismissed on appeal if it is found that the employer did not make a good
faith effort.
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preposterous. Moreover, Defendants’ notice argument is a red herring, since the issue is

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whether individuals who are later subjected to new investigations have adequate notice, and

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they will.
Plaintiffs do not propose that the Court’s findings of fact should be binding in all new

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investigations.4 Under Plaintiffs’ proposal, employees who are subject to those

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investigations will have every opportunity to be heard and to raise new facts in the new

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investigations. That is all that Loudermill and the Due Process Clause require. Mere

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consideration of this Court’s findings of fact in any future IA investigations does not present

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any due process issues.

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C.

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There is no reason the Monitor should not be granted the IA investigation
and discipline authority

Defendants are also incorrect in suggesting that having the Monitor conduct an

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internal investigation creates an inherent conflict with the Court and make no attempt to

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explain their position. First, the Monitor has long had authority over internal investigations

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that were also the subject of the Court’s findings of fact. See Doc. 795 at 18-21. Defendants

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have not objected. Second, to the extent the Monitor reaches a different conclusion from the

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Court’s findings in a reinvestigation of a previous case or in a new investigation, the Parties

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may appeal to the Court for review. See Doc. 606 ¶ 128. The Court remains the ultimate

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arbiter of disputes regardless of whether the independent authority is placed with the Monitor

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or some other third party.

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Plaintiffs do submit that as to Sheridan and Sousa, the Court’s findings as to IA cases 14542 and 14-543 should be binding because those individuals were parties to the contempt
proceeding and had every opportunity to contest the facts during the hearing. For the same
reason, the Court’s findings of willful false statements made to the Court and to the Monitor
by Chief Deputy Sheridan should also be binding against him. Indeed, as to any other
findings about willful false statements in court, those findings should be binding against
those individuals (Arpaio, Sheridan, Trombi, and Bailey). Cf. Young, 481 U.S. at 798
(holding that in-court contempts may be summarily punished).
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D.

No expert testimony is needed to identify matters for investigation

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Without explanation, Defendants suggest that expert opinion would be helpful in

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determining which investigations should be conducted by an independent authority. Doc.

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No. 1715 at 18 n.14. But this Court has already found almost all of the IA cases listed by

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Plaintiffs were either invalidated or found to be deficient by the Court. Further, given the

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voluminous evidence presented, the Court and/or the Monitor are capable of determining

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which matters require independent investigation.

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IV.

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Chief Deputy Sheridan Should Be Barred From Involvement In Certain Internal
Investigations And Subject To The Disciplinary Matrix For Policy Violations
Defendants’ brief indicates that contemnor Sheridan “will not agree to be subject to

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discipline pursuant to MCSO’s disciplinary matrix” in any new investigation. Id. at 19.

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Sheridan also states that “[a]lthough not required, the Chief Deputy will accept” the

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disciplinary findings by Detective Vogel that were overturned by Chief Olson. Id. Once

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again, Defendant Arpaio and contemnor Sheridan demonstrate their continued defiance of

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the Court, ignoring the Court’s findings that Sheridan repeatedly lied on the stand, lied to the

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Court-appointed Monitor, and committed multiple willful contempts of court. Sheridan is no

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position to choose whether to “agree” to sanctions for his willful contempt.
Sheridan now argues for the first time that the MCSO’s disciplinary matrix does not

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apply to his position, providing a County Attorney opinion issued on June 14, 2016 in

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support. Given the timing of the opinion, it is clear that Defendants sought the County

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Attorney’s advice in order to continue their systematic efforts to evade accountability for

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their misconduct. Even under Arizona law, the County Attorney’s opinion is not binding

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and should be given no weight.5 But more important, under the authorities cited above, the

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5

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See Rotter v. Coconino County, 167 Ariz. 210, 212 (Ct. App. 1990) (determining an issue
that had already been the basis of a county attorney opinion without any suggestion that such
opinion is binding or should be given deference). Even opinions issued by Arizona Attorney
General “are advisory only and are not binding on the court.” Marston’s Inc. v. Roman
Catholic Church of Phoenix, 132 Ariz. 90, 94 (1982). As the Arizona Attorney General has
supervisory authority over county attorneys, it would be illogical for a county attorney
opinion to be binding. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. § 41-193(A)(7).
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Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1720 Filed 06/23/16 Page 15 of 17

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Court has broad authority to issue injunctive relief necessary to enforce and effectuate its

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orders and protect the rights of the Plaintiff class, subject to due process requirements under

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Loudermill. A nonbinding county attorney opinion cannot stand in the way of a federal

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court’s authority to enforce its orders. See Stone, 968 F.2d at 861-62.

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The Court should ensure that internal policy violations relating to this case, including

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those committed by Chief Deputy Sheridan, are adequately addressed. As an at-will

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employee who has been found to have lied on the witness stand on multiple occasions in this

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litigation, who has committed willful contempt of court repeatedly, and who subverted

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MCSO’s internal affairs system to cover up gross violations of the Plaintiffs’ rights and

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federal court orders, this Court can and should order any and all appropriate discipline

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against Sheridan. Plaintiffs submit that termination is the proper discipline on this record.

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See Ex. 2001 at MELC416252-53, 416258. At the very least, given the numerous findings

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of serious misconduct regarding internal investigations specifically, the Court should

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prohibit Chief Deputy Sheridan from having any involvement in criminal and administrative

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internal investigations and disciplinary decisions in cases conducted pursuant to Paragraphs

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903-05.

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CONCLUSION
Defendant Arpaio’s legal arguments regarding contempt remedies should be rejected

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as they are wrong on the law. Plaintiffs respectfully request that the Court issue an order

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imposing the remedies they requested in the Joint Memorandum (Doc. 1715), as a remedy

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for the civil contempt and in the exercise of the Court’s inherent authority to enforce

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compliance with its orders to protect the Plaintiff class.

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By: /s/ Cecillia D. Wang

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Cecillia D. Wang (Pro Hac Vice)
Andre I. Segura (Pro Hac Vice)
Nida Vidutis*
ACLU Foundation
Immigrants’ Rights Project

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Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1720 Filed 06/23/16 Page 16 of 17

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Daniel Pochoda
Brenda Muñoz Furnish
ACLU Foundation of Arizona

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Anne Lai (Pro Hac Vice)

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Stanley Young (Pro Hac Vice)
Tammy Albarran (Pro Hac Vice)
Lauren E. Pedley (Pro Hac Vice)
Covington & Burling, LLP

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Jorge M. Castillo (Pro Hac Vice)
Julia Gomez*
Mexican American Legal Defense and
Educational Fund

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James B. Chanin (Pro Hac Vice)

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Attorneys for Plaintiffs
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*Applications for admission pro hac vice
forthcoming

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Case 2:07-cv-02513-GMS Document 1720 Filed 06/23/16 Page 17 of 17

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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

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I hereby certify that on June 23, 2016, I electronically transmitted the attached

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document to the Clerk’s office using the CM/ECF System for filing. Notice of this filing

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will be sent by e-mail to all parties by operation of the Court’s electronic filing system or by

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mail as indicated on the Notice of Electronic Filing.

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Dated this 23rd day of June, 2016.
/s/ Cecillia Wang