3

status of Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. from

the National Statistics Office (NSO)
sometime in November 2003.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

4. Accused Atilano O. Nollora, Jr.

admitted having contracted two (2)
marriages, however, claimed that he
was a Muslim convert way back on
January 10, 1992, even before he
contracted the first marriage with the
private complainant. As a [M]uslim
convert, he is allegedly entitled to
marry four (4) wives as allowed
under the Muslim or Islam belief.

SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 191425
2011

September 7,

ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Respondent.

5. Atilano O. Nollora, Jr. presented a

Certificate of Conversion that he
converted as a Muslim since January
19, 1992 .

The Facts
1. "That on or about the 8th day of
December 2001 in Quezon City,
Philippines, the above-named
accused ATILANO O. NOLLORA,
JR., being then legally married to
one JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA.

6. He (Muslim Priest, Imam) declared

that a Muslim convert could marry
more than one according to the Holy
Koran. However, before marrying
his second, third and fourth wives, it
is required that the consent of the
first Muslim wife be secured. Thus,
if the first wife is not a Muslim, there
is no necessity to secure her consent

2. ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR
contracted a subsequent or second
marriage with her [sic] co-accused
ROWENA P. GERALDINO, who
knowingly consented and agreed to
be married to her co-accused
ATILANO O. NOLLORA, JR.
knowing him to be a married man, to
the damage and prejudice of the said
offended party JESUSA PINAT
NOLLORA."

During his cross-examinations, he declared

that if a Muslim convert gets married not in
accordance with the Muslim faith, the same
is contrary to the teachings of the Muslim
faith. A Muslim also can marry up to four
times but he should be able to treat them
equally.

3. When JESUSA PINAT NOLLORA

heard rumors that her husband has
another wife, she returned to the
Philippines (TSN, October 4, 2005,
page 10). Upon arrival in the
Philippines, the private complainant
learned that indeed, when she
secured a certification as to the civil
1

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

judgment is hereby rendered, as follows:
The Trial Courts Ruling
a) Finding accused
ATILANO O. NOLLORA,
JR. guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Bigamy

In its Decision6 dated 19 November 2007.

The principle in Islam is that monogamy is
the general rule and polygamy is allowed
only to meet urgent needs. Only with the
permission of the court can a Muslim be
permitted to have a second wife subject to
certain requirements.

b) Acquitting accused
ROWENA P. GERALDINO
of the crime of Bigamy for
failure of the prosecution to
prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.

Any Muslim husband desiring to contract

subsequent marriages, before so doing, shall
notify the Sharia Circuit Court of the place
where his family resides.

The Appellate Courts Ruling

On 30 September 2009, the appellate court
dismissed Nolloras appeal and affirmed the
trial courts decision.11

In fact, he did not even declare that he was a

Muslim convert in both marriages,
indicating his criminal intent.

The appellate court rejected Nolloras

defense that his second marriage to
Geraldino was in lawful exercise of his
Islamic religion and was allowed by the
Quran. The appellate court denied Nolloras
invocation of his religious beliefs and
practices to the prejudice of the non-Muslim
women who married him pursuant to
Philippine civil laws.1avvphi1 Nolloras two
marriages were not conducted in accordance
with the Code of Muslim Personal Laws,
hence the Family Code of the Philippines
should apply. Nolloras claim of religious
freedom will not immobilize the State and
render it impotent in protecting the general
welfare.

There are requirements that the Sharia law

imposes, that is, he should have notified the
Sharia Court where his family resides so
that copy of said notice should be furnished
to the first wife.
In an apparent attempt to escape criminal
liability, the accused recelebrated their
marriage in accordance with the Muslim
rites. However, this can no longer cure the
criminal liability that has already been
violated.
"(E)very circumstance favoring accuseds
innocence must be taken into account, proof
against him must survive the test of reason
and the strongest suspicion must not be
permitted to sway judgment" (People vs.
Austria, 195 SCRA 700). This Court,
therefore, has to acquit Rowena P. Geraldino
for failure of the prosecution to prove her
guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The Issue
The issue in this case is whether Nollora is
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of bigamy.
The Courts Ruling

Nolloras petition has no merit. We affirm

the rulings of the appellate court and of the
trial court.

(4) Nollora and Geraldinos marriage has all

the essential requisites for validity except for
the lack of capacity of Nollora due to his
prior marriage.16

Elements of Bigamy
Before the trial and appellate courts, Nollora
put up his Muslim religion as his sole
defense. He alleged that his religion allows
him to marry more than once. Granting
arguendo that Nollora is indeed of Muslim
faith at the time of celebration of both
marriages,20 Nollora cannot deny that both
marriage ceremonies were not conducted in
accordance with the Code of Muslim
Personal Laws, or Presidential Decree No.
1083.

Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code

provides:
Art. 349. Bigamy. The penalty of prision
mayor shall be imposed upon any person
who shall contract a second or subsequent
marriage before the former marriage has
been legally dissolved, or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively
dead by means of a judgment rendered in the
proper proceedings.

Indeed, Article 13(2) of the Code of Muslim

Personal Laws states that "[i]n case of a
marriage between a Muslim and a nonMuslim, solemnized not in accordance
with Muslim law or this Code, the
[Family Code of the Philippines, or
Executive Order No. 209, in lieu of the
Civil Code of the Philippines] shall apply."
Nolloras religious affiliation is not an issue
here. Neither is the claim that Nolloras
marriages were solemnized according to
Muslim law. Thus, regardless of his
professed religion, Nollora cannot claim
exemption from liability for the crime of
bigamy.21

The elements of the crime of bigamy are:

1. That the offender has been
legally married.
2. That the marriage has not
been legally dissolved or, in
case his or her spouse is
absent, the absent spouse
could not yet be presumed
dead according to the Civil
Code.
3. That he contracts a second
or subsequent marriage.

There is therefore a recognition written into

the law itself that such a marriage, although
void ab initio, may still produce legal
consequences. Among these legal
consequences is incurring criminal liability
for bigamy. To hold otherwise would render
the States penal laws on bigamy completely
nugatory ((Adjective) Ineffective, invalid or
futile.), and allow individuals to deliberately
ensure that each marital contract be flawed
in some manner, and to thus escape the
consequences of contracting multiple
marriages, while beguiling throngs of

4. That the second or

subsequent marriage has all
the essential requisites for
validity.13
The circumstances in the present case satisfy
all the elements of bigamy. (1) Nollora is
legally married to Pinat;14 (2) Nollora and
Pinats marriage has not been legally
dissolved prior to the date of the second
marriage; (3) Nollora admitted the existence
of his second marriage to Geraldino;15 and
3

hapless women with the promise of futurity

and commitment.

declaration of nullity of marriage in

the Regional Trial Court of Bohol,
on the ground that no marriage
ceremony actually took place on
accuseds marriage with Lucia,.

WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition.

4

On October 19, 1993, appellant was

charged with Bigamy in an
Information5 filed by the City
Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with
the Regional Trial Court of Bohol.6

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 145226
2004

The petitioner moved for suspension of the

arraignment on the ground that the civil case
for judicial nullification of his marriage with
Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the
bigamy case. His motion was granted, but
subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution.

February 06,

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
respondent.

The RTCs Ruling

On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol held
that the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y
Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Bigamy

Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia

Barrete were married on August 30,
1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina
Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court

discounted petitioners claim that his first
marriage to Lucia was null and void ab
initio. Following Domingo v. Court of
Appeals,8 the trial court ruled that want of a
valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in
a charge of bigamy. The parties to a
marriage should not be allowed to assume
that their marriage is void even if such be
the fact but must first secure a judicial
declaration of the nullity of their marriage
before they can be allowed to marry again.

On September 8, 1990, Lucia

reported back to her work in Canada
leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with
the Ontario Court (General Division)
a petition for divorce against
appellant which was granted by the
court on January 17, 1992 and to
take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio
Morigo married Maria Jececha
Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa Barangay
Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

Anent ((Preposition) Concerning, with regard

to, about, in respect to, as to, insofar as,
inasmuch as) the Canadian divorce obtained

by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v.

Gmur,9 which held that the court of a
country in which neither of the spouses is
domiciled and in which one or both spouses

On September 21, 1993, accused

filed a complaint for judicial
4

may resort merely for the purpose of

obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to
determine the matrimonial status of the
parties. As such, a divorce granted by said
court is not entitled to recognition anywhere.
Debunking Lucios defense of good faith in
contracting the second marriage, the trial
court stressed that following People v.
Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know the
law, and the fact that one does not know that
his act constitutes a violation of the law does
not exempt him from the consequences
thereof.

that what is sought to be punished by Article

34912 of the Revised Penal Code is the act
of contracting a second marriage before
the first marriage had been dissolved.
Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first
marriage was void from the beginning is not
a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that
the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from
the Canadian court could not be accorded
validity in the Philippines, pursuant to
Article 1513 of the Civil Code and given the
fact that it is contrary to public policy in this
jurisdiction. Under Article 1714 of the Civil
Code, a declaration of public policy cannot
be rendered ineffectual by a judgment
promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with

the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R.
CR No. 20700.
The RTCs Ruling on the Civil Case
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before
the appellate court, the trial court rendered a
decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring
the marriage between Lucio and Lucia void
ab initio since no marriage ceremony
actually took place. No appeal was taken
from this decision, which then became final
and executory.

Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the

appellate courts decision, contending that
the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows
mistake upon a difficult question of law
(such as the effect of a foreign divorce
decree) to be a basis for good faith.
The Issue:
To our mind, the primordial issue should
be whether or not petitioner committed
bigamy and if so, whether his defense of
good faith is valid.

The CAs Ruling

On October 21, 1999, the appellate court
decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:

The SCs Ruling

WHEREFORE, finding no error in
the appealed decision, the same is
hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

The petitioner submits that he should not be

faulted for relying in good faith upon the
divorce decree of the Ontario court. He
highlights the fact that he contracted the
second marriage openly and publicly, which
a person intent upon bigamy would not be
doing. The petitioner further argues that his
lack of criminal intent is material to a
conviction or acquittal in the instant case.
The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies

SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of
conviction, the appellate court stressed that
the subsequent declaration of nullity of
Lucios marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No.
6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is
5

punished under the Revised Penal Code, is

mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of
criminal intent are allowed as a complete
defense. He stresses that there is a difference
between the intent to commit the crime and
the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it
does not necessarily follow that his intention
to contract a second marriage is tantamount
to an intent to commit bigamy.

(3) he contracts a subsequent

marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would
have been valid had it not been for
the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant
case, we note that during the pendency of
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol
Branch 1, handed down the following
decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:

For the respondent, the Office of the

Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good
faith in the instant case is a convenient but
flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies
upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobis v.
Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be
successfully prosecuted provided all the
elements concur, stressing that under Article
4019 of the Family Code, a judicial
declaration of nullity is a must before a party
may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner
was aware of said Article 40 is of no account
as everyone is presumed to know the law.
The OSG counters that petitioners
contention that he was in good faith because
he relied on the divorce decree of the
Ontario court is negated by his act of filing
Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial
declaration of nullity of his marriage to
Lucia.

WHEREFORE, premises considered,

judgment is hereby rendered
decreeing the annulment of the
marriage entered into by petitioner
Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete on
August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and
further directing the Local Civil
Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the
cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there was no actual
marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer.
Instead, what transpired was a mere signing
of the marriage contract by the two, without
the presence of a solemnizing officer. The
trial court thus held that the marriage is void
ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and
423 of the Family Code. As the dissenting
opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700,
correctly puts it, "This simply means that
there was no marriage to begin with; and
that such declaration of nullity retroacts to
the date of the first marriage. In other words,
for all intents and purposes, reckoned from
the date of the declaration of the first
marriage as void ab initio to the date of the
celebration of the first marriage, the accused
was, under the eyes of the law, never
married."24 The records show that no appeal
was taken from the decision of the trial court

Before we delve into petitioners defense of

good faith and lack of criminal intent, we
must first determine whether all the
elements of bigamy are present in this case.
In Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down
the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally
married;
(2) the first marriage has not been
legally dissolved, or in case his or
her spouse is absent, the absent
spouse has not been judicially
declared presumptively dead;
6

in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision

had long become final and executory.

of criminal intent, which is now moot and

academic.

The first element of bigamy as a crime

requires that the accused must have been
legally married. But in this case, legally
speaking, the petitioner was never married
to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first
marriage to speak of. Under the principle of
retroactivity of a marriage being declared
void ab initio, the two were never married
"from the beginning." The contract of
marriage is null; it bears no legal effect.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is

GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated
October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the
resolution of the appellate court dated
September 25, 2000, denying herein
petitioners motion for reconsideration, is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY
on the ground that his guilt has not been
proven with moral certainty.

Taking this argument to its logical

conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner
was not married to Lucia at the time he
contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha.
The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the
crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a
conviction for said offense cannot be
sustained where there is no first marriage to
speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be
acquitted of the instant charge.

SO ORDERED.

In the instant case, however, no marriage

ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner
and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act
of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus,
needs no judicial declaration of nullity.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is
mandated to liberally construe a penal
statute in favor of an accused and weigh
every circumstance in favor of the
presumption of innocence to ensure that
justice is done. Under the circumstances of
the present case, we held that petitioner has
not committed bigamy. Further, we also find
that we need not tarry on the issue of the
validity of his defense of good faith or lack

area. In July of 2003, he went to the Office

of the Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite, to
check on their marriage license, and was
asked to show a copy of their marriage
contract wherein the marriage license
number could be found.5 The Municipal
Civil Registrar, Leodivinia C. Encarnacion,
issued a certification on July 11, 2003 to the
effect that the marriage license number
appearing in the marriage contract he
submitted, Marriage License No. 9969967,
was the number of another marriage license
issued to a certain Arlindo Getalado and
Myra Mabilangan.6 Said certification reads
as follows:

5
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 183896
2013

January 30,

SYED AZHAR ABBAS, Petitioner,

vs.
GLORIA GOO ABBAS, Respondent.

11 July 2003
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:

Facts:

This is to certify as per Registry Records of

Marriage License filed in this office,
Marriage License No. 9969967 was issued
in favor of MR. ARLINDO GETALADO
and MISS MYRA MABILANGAN on
January 19, 1993.

At the trial court, Syed, a Pakistani citizen,

testified that he met Gloria, a Filipino
citizen, in Taiwan in 1991, and they were
married on August 9, 1992 at the Taipei
Mosque in Taiwan.4
He arrived in the Philippines in December of
1992. On January 9, 1993, at around 5
oclock in the afternoon, he was at his
mother-in-laws residence, located at 2676 F.
Muoz St., Malate, Manila, when his
mother-in-law arrived with two men. He
testified that he was told that he was going
to undergo some ceremony, one of the
requirements for his stay in the Philippines,
but was not told of the nature of said
ceremony. During the ceremony he and
Gloria signed a document. He claimed that
he did not know that the ceremony was a
marriage until Gloria told him later. He
further testified that he did not go to
Carmona, Cavite to apply for a marriage
license, and that he had never resided in that

No Marriage License appear [sic] to have

been issued to MR. SYED AZHAR ABBAS
and MISS GLORIA F. GOO on January 8,
1993.
This certification is being issued to Mr. Syed
Azhar Abbas for whatever legal purpose or
intents it may serve.7
On cross-examination, Syed testified that
Gloria had filed bigamy cases against him in
2001 and 2002, and that he had gone to the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite to get certification on whether or not
there was a marriage license on advice of his
counsel.8
8

Petitioner also presented Norberto Bagsic

(Bagsic), an employee of the Municipal
Civil Registrar of Carmona, Cavite. Bagsic
appeared under a letter of authority from the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite, and brought documents pertaining to
Marriage License No. 9969967, which was
issued to Arlindo Getalado and Myra
Mabilangan on January 20, 1993.9

wedding, and that the marriage contract was

prepared by his secretary.16 After the
solemnization of the marriage, it was
registered with the Local Civil Registrar of
Manila, and Rev. Dauz submitted the
marriage contract and copy of the marriage
license with that office.17
Atty. Sanchez testified that he was asked to
be the sponsor of the wedding of Syed
Abbas and Gloria Goo by the mother of the
bride, Felicitas Goo.18 He testified that he
requested a certain Qualin to secure the
marriage license for the couple, and that this
Qualin secured the license and gave the
same to him on January 8, 1993.19 He further
testified that he did not know where the
marriage license was obtained.20 He attended
the wedding ceremony on January 9, 1993,
signed the marriage contract as sponsor, and
witnessed the signing of the marriage
contract by the couple, the solemnizing
officer and the other witness, Mary Ann
Ceriola.21

Bagsic testified that their office issues serial

numbers for marriage licenses and that the
numbers are issued chronologically.10 He
testified that the certification dated July 11,
2003, was issued and signed by Leodivina
Encarnacion, Registrar of the Municipality
of Carmona, Cavite, certifying that Marriage
License No. 9969967 was issued for Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan on January
19, 1993, and that their office had not issued
any other license of the same serial number,
namely 9969967, to any other person.11
For her part, Gloria testified on her own
behalf, and presented Reverend Mario Dauz,
Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez, Felicitas Goo and
May Ann Ceriola.

Felicitas Goo testified that Gloria Goo is her

daughter and Syed Azhar Abbas is her sonin-law, and that she was present at the
wedding ceremony held on January 9, 1993
at her house.22 She testified that she sought
the help of Atty. Sanchez at the Manila City
Hall in securing the marriage license, and
that a week before the marriage was to take
place, a male person went to their house
with the application for marriage license.23
Three days later, the same person went back
to their house, showed her the marriage
license before returning it to Atty. Sanchez
who then gave it to Rev. Dauz, the
solemnizing officer.24 She further testified
that she did not read all of the contents of
the marriage license, and that she was told
that the marriage license was obtained from

Reverend Mario Dauz (Rev. Dauz) testified

that he was a minister of the Gospel and a
barangay captain, and that he is authorized
to solemnize marriages within the
Philippines.12 He testified that he solemnized
the marriage of Syed Azhar Abbas and
Gloria Goo at the residence of the bride on
January 9, 1993.13 He stated that the
witnesses were Atty. Lorenzo Sanchez (Atty.
Sanchez) and Mary Ann Ceriola.14 He
testified that he had been solemnizing
marriages since 1982, and that he is familiar
with the requirements.15 Rev. Dauz further
testified that Atty. Sanchez gave him the
marriage license the day before the actual
9

Carmona.25 She also testified that a bigamy

case had been filed by Gloria against Syed at
the Regional Trial Court of Manila,
evidenced by an information for Bigamy
dated January 10, 2003, pending before
Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila.26

existence of the previous marriage, and that

the case was docketed as Criminal Case No.
02A-03408, with the RTC of Manila.30
Gloria stated that she and Syed had already
been married on August 9, 1992 in Taiwan,
but that she did not know if said marriage
had been celebrated under Muslim rites,
because the one who celebrated their
marriage was Chinese, and those around
them at the time were Chinese.31

As to Mary Ann Ceriolas testimony, the

counsels for both parties stipulated that: (a)
she is one of the sponsors at the wedding of
Gloria Goo and Syed Abbas on January 9,
1993; (b) she was seen in the wedding
photos and she could identify all the persons
depicted in said photos; and (c) her
testimony corroborates that of Felicitas Goo
and Atty. Sanchez.

The Ruling of the RTC

In its October 5, 2005 Decision, the Pasay
City RTC held that no valid marriage
license was issued by the Municipal Civil
Registrar of Carmona, Cavite in favor of
Gloria and Syed, as Marriage License No.
9969967 had been issued to Arlindo
Getalado and Myra Mabilangan, and the
Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,
Cavite had certified that no marriage license
had been issued for Gloria and Syed.32 It
also took into account the fact that neither
party was a resident of Carmona, Cavite, the
place where Marriage License No. 9969967
was issued, in violation of Article 9 of the
Family Code.33 As the marriage was not one
of those exempt from the license
requirement, and that the lack of a valid
marriage license is an absence of a formal
requisite, the marriage of Gloria and Syed
on January 9, 1993 was void ab initio.

The respondent, Gloria, testified that Syed is

her husband, and presented the marriage
contract bearing their signatures as proof.27
She and her mother sought the help of Atty.
Sanchez in securing a marriage license, and
asked him to be one of the sponsors. A
certain Qualin went to their house and said
that he will get the marriage license for
them, and after several days returned with an
application for marriage license for them to
sign, which she and Syed did. After Qualin
returned with the marriage license, they
gave the license to Atty. Sanchez who gave
it to Rev. Dauz, the solemnizing officer.
Gloria testified that she and Syed were
married on January 9, 1993 at their
residence.28

The Ruling of the CA

Gloria further testified that she has a

daughter with Syed, born on June 15,
1993.29

The CA gave credence to Glorias

arguments, and granted her appeal. It held
that the certification of the Municipal Civil
Registrar failed to categorically state that a
diligent search for the marriage license of
Gloria and Syed was conducted, and thus

Gloria also testified that she filed a bigamy

case against Syed, who had married a certain
Maria Corazon Buenaventura during the
10

held that said certification could not be

accorded probative value.36 The CA ruled
that there was sufficient testimonial and
documentary evidence that Gloria and
Syed had been validly married and that
there was compliance with all the
requisites laid down by law.37

the existence of said license. To prove that

no such license was issued, Syed turned to
the office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of
Carmona, Cavite which had allegedly issued
said license. It was there that he requested
certification that no such license was issued.
In the case of Republic v. Court of Appeals43
such certification was allowed, as permitted
by Sec. 29, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court,
which reads:

The Issue
whether or not a valid marriage license had
been issued for the couple. The RTC held
that no valid marriage license had been
issued. The CA held that there was a valid
marriage license.

SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. A written

statement signed by an officer having the
custody of an official record or by his
deputy that after diligent search, no record
or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist
in the records of his office, accompanied by
a certificate as above provided, is admissible
as evidence that the records of his office
contain no such record or entry.

The Ruling of this Court

In the case of Republic, in allowing the

certification of the Civil Registrar of Pasig
to prove the non-issuance of a marriage
license, the Court held:

There is no issue with the essential

requisites under Art. 2 of the Family Code,
nor with the formal requisites of the
authority of the solemnizing officer and the
conduct of the marriage ceremony. Nor is
the marriage one that is exempt from the
requirement of a valid marriage license
under Chapter 2, Title I of the Family Code.
The resolution of this case, thus, hinges on
whether or not a valid marriage license had
been issued for the couple. The RTC held
that no valid marriage license had been
issued. The CA held that there was a valid
marriage license.

The above Rule authorized the custodian of

the documents to certify that despite diligent
search, a particular document does not exist
in his office or that a particular entry of a
specified tenor was not to be found in a
register. As custodians of public documents,
civil registrars are public officers charged
with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a
register book where they are required to
enter all applications for marriage licenses,
including the names of the applicants, the
date the marriage license was issued and
such other relevant data.44

We find the RTC to be correct in this

instance.
Respondent Gloria failed to present the
actual marriage license, or a copy thereof,
and relied on the marriage contract as well
as the testimonies of her witnesses to prove

The Court held in that case that the

certification issued by the civil registrar
enjoyed probative value, as his duty was to
11

maintain records of data relative to the

issuance of a marriage license.

necessary for Sec. 28, Rule 132 of the Rules

of Court to apply.

The Municipal Civil Registrar of Carmona,

Cavite, where the marriage license of Gloria
and Syed was allegedly issued, issued a
certification to the effect that no such
marriage license for Gloria and Syed was
issued, and that the serial number of the
marriage license pertained to another couple,
Arlindo Getalado and Myra Mabilangan. A
certified machine copy of Marriage License
No. 9969967 was presented, which was
issued in Carmona, Cavite, and indeed, the
names of Gloria and Syed do not appear in
the document.

Under Sec. 3(m), Rule 131 of the Rules of

Court, it is a disputable presumption that an
official duty has been regularly performed,
absent contradiction or other evidence to the
contrary. We held, "The presumption of
regularity of official acts may be rebutted by
affirmative evidence of irregularity or
failure to perform a duty."46 No such
affirmative evidence was shown that the
Municipal Civil Registrar was lax in
performing her duty of checking the records
of their office, thus the presumption must
stand. In fact, proof does exist of a diligent
search having been conducted, as Marriage
License No. 996967 was indeed located and
submitted to the court. The fact that the
names in said license do not correspond to
those of Gloria and Syed does not overturn
the presumption that the registrar conducted
a diligent search of the records of her office.

In reversing the RTC, the CA focused on the

wording of the certification, stating that it
did not comply with Section 28, Rule 132 of
the Rules of Court.
The CA deduced that from the absence of
the words "despite diligent search" in the
certification, and since the certification used
stated that no marriage license appears to
have been issued, no diligent search had
been conducted and thus the certification
could not be given probative value.

It is telling that Gloria failed to present their

marriage license or a copy thereof to the
court. She failed to explain why the
marriage license was secured in Carmona,
Cavite, a location where, admittedly, neither
party resided. She took no pains to apply for
the license, so she is not the best witness to
testify to the validity and existence of said
license. Neither could the other witnesses
she presented prove the existence of the
marriage license, as none of them applied
for the license in Carmona, Cavite. Her
mother, Felicitas Goo, could not even testify
as to the contents of the license, having
admitted to not reading all of its contents.
Atty. Sanchez, one of the sponsors, whom
Gloria and Felicitas Goo approached for
assistance in securing the license, admitted
not knowing where the license came from.

To justify that deduction, the CA cited the

case of Republic v. Court of Appeals.45 It is
worth noting that in that particular case, the
Court, in sustaining the finding of the lower
court that a marriage license was lacking,
relied on the Certification issued by the
Civil Registrar of Pasig, which merely stated
that the alleged marriage license could not
be located as the same did not appear in
their records. Nowhere in the Certification
was it categorically stated that the officer
involved conducted a diligent search, nor is
a categorical declaration absolutely
12

The task of applying for the license was

delegated to a certain Qualin, who could
have testified as to how the license was
secured and thus impeached the certification
of the Municipal Civil Registrar as well as
the testimony of her representative. As
Gloria failed to present this Qualin, the
certification of the Municipal Civil Registrar
still enjoys probative value.

marriage ceremony. Most telling of all is

Exhibit "5-C" which shows appellee signing
the Marriage Contract.
xxxx
The parties have comported themselves as
husband and wife and has [sic] one
offspring, Aliea Fatima Goo Abbas, who
was born on 15 June 1993. It took appellee
more than ten (10) years before he filed on
01 August 2003 his Petition for Declaration
of Nullity of Marriage under Article 4 of the
Family Code. We take serious note that said
Petition appears to have been instituted by
him only after an Information for Bigamy
(Exhibit "1") dated 10 January 2003 was
filed against him for contracting a second or
subsequent marriage with one Ma. Corazon
(Maryam) T. Buenaventura. We are not
ready to reward (appellee) by declaring the
nullity of his marriage and give him his
freedom and in the process allow him to
profit from his own deceit and perfidy.50

It is also noted that the solemnizing officer

testified that the marriage contract and a
copy of the marriage license were submitted
to the Local Civil Registrar of Manila. Thus,
a copy of the marriage license could have
simply been secured from that office and
submitted to the court. However, Gloria
inexplicably failed to do so, further
weakening her claim that there was a valid
marriage license issued for her and Syed.
To bolster its ruling, the CA cited other
evidence to support its conclusion that
Gloria and Syed were validly married. To
quote the CA:

All the evidence cited by the CA to show

that a wedding ceremony was conducted and
a marriage contract was signed does not
operate to cure the absence of a valid
marriage license. Article 4 of the Family
Code is clear when it says, "The absence of
any of the essential or formal requisites shall
render the marriage void ab initio, except as
stated in Article 35(2)." Article 35(3) of the
Family Code also provides that a marriage
solemnized without a license is void from
the beginning, except those exempt from the
license requirement under Articles 27 to 34,
Chapter 2, Title I of the same Code.51 Again,
this marriage cannot be characterized as
among the exemptions, and thus, having
been solemnized without a marriage license,
is void ab initio.1wphi1

Moreover, the record is replete with

evidence, testimonial and documentary, that
appellant and appellee have been validly
married and there was compliance with all
the requisites laid down by law. Both parties
are legally capacitated to marry. A certificate
of legal capacity was even issued by the
Embassy of Pakistan in favor of appellee.
The parties herein gave their consent freely.
Appellee admitted that the signature above
his name in the marriage contract was his.
Several pictures were presented showing
appellant and appellee, before the
solemnizing officer, the witnesses and other
members of appellants family, taken during
the marriage ceremony, as well as in the
restaurant where the lunch was held after the
13

As to the motive of Syed in seeking to annul

his marriage to Gloria, it may well be that
his motives are less than pure, that he seeks
to evade a bigamy suit. Be that as it may, the
same does not make up for the failure of the
respondent to prove that they had a valid
marriage license, given the weight of
evidence presented by petitioner. The lack of
a valid marriage license cannot be attributed
to him, as it was Gloria who took steps to
procure the same. The law must be applied.
As the marriage license, a formal requisite,
is clearly absent, the marriage of Gloria and
Syed is void ab initio.

G.R. No. 201061

July 3, 2013

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner,

vs.
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR.,
Respondent.

The Antecedent Facts

Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. (Benjamin) alleged
that on 10 September 1973, he married
Azucena Alegre (Azucena) in Caloocan
City. They had three children, namely,
Rizalyn, Emmamylin, and Benjamin III.

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the

petition is hereby GRANTED. The assailed
Decision dated March 11, 2008 and
Resolution dated July 24, 2008 of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 86760 are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 109, Pasay City dated October 5,
2005 in Civil Case No. 03-0382-CFM
annulling the marriage of petitioner with
respondent on January 9, 1993 is hereby
REINSTATED.

On 7 March 1982, in order to appease her

father, Sally GoBangayan (Sally) brought
Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig
City where they signed a purported
marriage contract. Sally, knowing
Benjamins marital status, assured him that
the marriage contract would not be
registered.
Benjamin and Sallys cohabitation produced
two children, Bernice and Bentley. During
the period of their cohabitation, they
acquired the following real properties.

No costs.
SO ORDERED.

The relationship of Benjamin and Sally

ended in 1994 when Sally left for Canada,
bringing Bernice and Bentley with her.
She then filed criminal actions for bigamy
and falsification of public documents against
Benjamin, using their simulated marriage
contract as evidence.

6
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila

Benjamin, in turn, filed a petition for

declaration of a non-existent marriage
and/or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the trial court on the ground that his

SECOND DIVISION

14

marriage to Sally was bigamous and that

it lacked the formal requisites to a valid
marriage.

not be registered due to Benjamins

subsisting marriage with Azucena.
The trial court ruled that the marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was not
bigamous. The trial court ruled that the
second marriage was void not because of the
existence of the first marriage but because of
other causes, particularly, the lack of a
marriage license. Hence, bigamy was not
committed in this case.

After Benjamin presented his evidence,

Sally filed a demurrer ((noun) (law) a formal
objection to an opponent's pleadings ) to
evidence which the trial court denied. Sally
filed a motion for reconsideration which the
trial court also denied. Sally filed a petition
for certiorari before the Court of Appeals
and asked for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and/or injunction which the
Court of Appeals never issued. Sally then
refused to present any evidence before the
trial court citing the pendency of her petition
before the Court of Appeals. The trial court
gave Sally several opportunities to present
her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July
2008, 4 September 2008, 11 September
2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and
28 November 2008. Despite repeated
warnings from the trial court, Sally still
refused to present her evidence, prompting
the trial court to consider the case submitted
for decision.

The trial court further ruled that Sally acted

in bad faith because she knew that Benjamin
was married to Azucena.
The dispositive portion of the trial courts
decision reads:
ACCORDINGLY, the marriage of
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR. and SALLY
S. GO on March 7, 1982 at Santolan, Pasig,
Metro Manila is hereby declared NULL and
VOID AB INITIO. It is further declared
NONEXISTENT.
The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The Decision of the Trial Court

In its 17 August 2011 Decision, the Court of

Appeals partly granted the appeal. The
Court of Appeals ruled that the trial court
did not err in submitting the case for
decision. The Court of Appeals noted that
there were six resettings of the case, all
made at the instance of Sally, for the initial
reception of evidence, and Sally was duly
warned to present her evidence on the next
hearing or the case would be deemed
submitted for decision. However, despite the
warning, Sally still failed to present her
evidence. She insisted on presenting
Benjamin who was not around and was not

In a Decision4 dated 26 March 2009, the trial

court ruled in favor of Benjamin. The trial
court gave weight to the certification dated
21 July 2004 from the Pasig Local Civil
Registrar, which was confirmed during trial,
that only Marriage License Series Nos.
6648100 to 6648150 were issued for the
month of February 1982 and the purported
Marriage License No. N-07568 was not
issued to Benjamin and Sally.5 The trial
court ruled that the marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office because it could

15

subpoenaed despite the presence of her other

witnesses.

courts decision regarding the

property relations of Benjamin and
Sally.

The Court of Appeals rejected Sallys

allegation that Benjamin failed to prove his
action for declaration of nullity of marriage.
The Court of Appeals ruled that Benjamins
action was based on his prior marriage to
Azucena and there was no evidence that the
marriage was annulled or dissolved before
Benjamin contracted the second marriage
with Sally. The Court of Appeals ruled that
the trial court committed no error in
declaring Benjamins marriage to Sally null
and void.

The Ruling of this Court

The petition has no merit.
Validity of the Marriage between
Benjamin and Sally
Sally alleges that both the trial court and the
Court of Appeals recognized her marriage to
Benjamin because a marriage could not be
nonexistent and, at the same time, null and
void ab initio. Sally further alleges that if
she were allowed to present her evidence,
she would have proven her marriage to
Benjamin. To prove her marriage to
Benjamin, Sally asked this Court to consider
that in acquiring real properties, Benjamin
listed her as his wife by declaring he was
"married to" her; that Benjamin was the
informant in their childrens birth
certificates where he stated that he was their
father; and that Benjamin introduced her to
his family and friends as his wife. In
contrast, Sally claims that there was no real
property registered in the names of
Benjamin and Azucena. Sally further alleges
that Benjamin was not the informant in the
birth certificates of his children with
Azucena.

Finally, the Court of Appeals ruled that Sally

failed to present clear and convincing
evidence that would show bias and prejudice
on the part of the trial judge that would
justify his inhibition from the case.
The Issues
Sally raised the following issues before this
Court:
(1) Whether the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in
affirming the trial courts ruling that
Sally had waived her right to present
evidence;
(2) Whether the Court of Appeals
committed a reversible error in
affirming the trial courts decision
declaring the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally null and void ab
initio and non-existent; and

First, Benjamins marriage to Azucena on 10

September 1973 was duly established before
the trial court, evidenced by a certified true
copy of their marriage contract. At the time
Benjamin and Sally entered into a purported
marriage on 7 March 1982, the marriage
between Benjamin and Azucena was valid
and subsisting.

(3) Whether the Court of Appeals

committed a reversible error in
affirming with modification the trial
16

On the purported marriage of Benjamin and

Sally, Teresita Oliveros (Oliveros),
Registration Officer II of the Local Civil
Registrar of Pasig City, testified that there
was no valid marriage license issued to
Benjamin and Sally.

especially from her parents seen as Chinese

conservatives."17 In short, it was a fictitious
marriage.
The fact that Benjamin was the informant in
the birth certificates of Bernice and Bentley
was not a proof of the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally. This Court notes that
Benjamin was the informant in Bernices
birth certificate which stated that Benjamin
and Sally were married on 8 March 198218
while Sally was the informant in Bentleys
birth certificate which also stated that
Benjamin and Sally were married on 8
March 1982.19 Benjamin and Sally were
supposedly married on 7 March 1982 which
did not match the dates reflected on the birth
certificates.

The certification from the local civil

registrar is adequate to prove the nonissuance of a marriage license and absent
any suspicious circumstance, the
certification enjoys probative value, being
issued by the officer charged under the law
to keep a record of all data relative to the
issuance of a marriage license.11 Clearly, if
indeed Benjamin and Sally entered into a
marriage contract, the marriage was void
from the beginning for lack of a marriage
license.12

We see no inconsistency in finding the

marriage between Benjamin and Sally null
and void ab initio and, at the same time,
non-existent. Under Article 35 of the Family
Code, a marriage solemnized without a
license, except those covered by Article 34
where no license is necessary, "shall be void
from the beginning." In this case, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
solemnized without a license. It was duly
established that no marriage license was
issued to them and that Marriage License
No. N-07568 did not match the marriage
license numbers issued by the local civil
registrar of Pasig City for the month of
February 1982. The case clearly falls under
Section 3 of Article 3520 which made their
marriage void ab initio. The marriage
between Benjamin and Sally was also nonexistent. Applying the general rules on void
or inexistent contracts under Article 1409 of
the Civil Code, contracts which are
absolutely simulated or fictitious are
"inexistent and void from the beginning."21

It was also established before the trial court

that the purported marriage between
Benjamin and Sally was not recorded with
the local civil registrar and the National
Statistics Office. The lack of record was
certified by Julieta B. Javier, Registration
Officer IV of the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of the Municipality of Pasig;13
Teresita R. Ignacio, Chief of the Archives
Division of the Records Management and
Archives Office, National Commission for
Culture and the Arts;14 and Lourdes J.
Hufana, Director III, Civil Registration
Department of the National Statistics
Office.15 The documentary and testimonial
evidence proved that there was no marriage
between Benjamin and Sally. As pointed out
by the trial court, the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally "was made only in
jest"16 and "a simulated marriage, at the
instance of Sally, intended to cover her up
from expected social humiliation coming
from relatives, friends and the society
17

Thus, the Court of Appeals did not err in

sustaining the trial courts ruling that the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally was
null and void ab initio and non-existent.

be sustained. Assuming that her marriage to

petitioner has the marriage license, yet the
same would be bigamous, civilly or
criminally as it would be invalidated by a
prior existing valid marriage of petitioner
and Azucena.23

Except for the modification in the

distribution of properties, the Court of
Appeals affirmed in all aspects the trial
courts decision and ruled that "the rest of
the decision stands."22 While the Court of
Appeals did not discuss bigamous
marriages, it can be gleaned from the
dispositive portion of the decision declaring
that "the rest of the decision stands" that the
Court of Appeals adopted the trial courts
discussion that the marriage between
Benjamin and Sally is not
bigamous.1wphi1 The trial court stated:

For bigamy to exist, the second or

subsequent marriage must have all the
essential requisites for validity except for the
existence of a prior marriage.24 In this case,
there was really no subsequent marriage.
Benjamin and Sally just signed a purported
marriage contract without a marriage
license. The supposed marriage was not
recorded with the local civil registrar and the
National Statistics Office. In short, the
marriage between Benjamin and Sally did
not exist. They lived together and
represented themselves as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage.

On whether or not the parties marriage is

bigamous under the concept of Article 349
of the Revised Penal Code, the marriage is
not bigamous. It is required that the first or
former marriage shall not be null and void.
The marriage of the petitioner to Azucena
shall be assumed as the one that is valid,
there being no evidence to the contrary and
there is no trace of invalidity or irregularity
on the face of their marriage contract.
However, if the second marriage was void
not because of the existence of the first
marriage but for other causes such as lack of
license, the crime of bigamy was not
committed. In People v. De Lara [CA, 51
O.G., 4079], it was held that what was
committed was contracting marriage against
the provisions of laws not under Article 349
but Article 350 of the Revised Penal Code.
Concluding, the marriage of the parties is
therefore not bigamous because there was no
marriage license. The daring and repeated
stand of respondent that she is legally
married to petitioner cannot, in any instance,

Property Relations Between Benjamin and

Sally
The Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the
property relations of Benjamin and Sally is
governed by Article 148 of the Family Code
which states:
Art. 148. In cases of cohabitation not falling
under the preceding Article, only the
properties acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of
money, property, or industry shall be owned
by them in common in proportion to their
respective contributions. In the absence of
proof to the contrary, their contributions and
corresponding shares are presumed to be
equal. The same rule and presumption shall
apply to joint deposits of money and
evidences of credit.

18

If one of the parties is validly married to

another, his or her share in the co-ownership
shall accrue to the absolute community of
conjugal partnership existing in such valid
marriage. If the party who acted in bad faith
is not validly married to another, his or her
share shall be forfeited in the manner
provided in the last paragraph of the
preceding Article.

As regards the seven remaining properties,

we rule that the decision of the Court of
Appeals is more in accord with the evidence
on record. Only the property covered by
TCT No. 61722 was registered in the names
of Benjamin and Sally as spouses.26 The
properties under TCT Nos. 61720 and
190860 were in the name of Benjamin27 with
the descriptive title "married to Sally." The
property covered by CCT Nos. 8782 and
8783 were registered in the name of Sally28
with the descriptive title "married to
Benjamin" while the properties under TCT
Nos. N-193656 and 253681 were registered
in the name of Sally as a single individual.
We have ruled that the words "married to"
preceding the name of a spouse are merely
descriptive of the civil status of the
registered owner.29 Such words do not prove
co-ownership. Without proof of actual
contribution from either or both spouses,
there can be no co-ownership under Article
148 of the Family Code.30

The foregoing rules on forfeiture shall

likewise apply even if both parties are in bad
faith.
Benjamin and Sally cohabitated without the
benefit of marriage. Thus, only the
properties acquired by them through their
actual joint contribution of money, property,
or industry shall be owned by them in
common in proportion to their respective
contributions. Thus, both the trial court and
the Court of Appeals correctly excluded the
37 properties being claimed by Sally which
were given by Benjamins father to his
children as advance inheritance. Sallys
Answer to the petition before the trial court
even admitted that "Benjamins late father
himself conveyed a number of properties to
his children and their respective spouses
which included Sally x x x."25

WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the 17 August

2011 Decision and the 14 March 2012
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CV No. 94226.
SO ORDERED.

19